Promoting Ethnic Tolerance and Patriotism:
The Role of Education System Characteristics

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Introduction

Over the last decade, but certainly since the dramatic events of 9-11-01, many policy makers and academics have come to believe that the social cohesion of western societies is being steadily undermined by growing political alienation among sections of the population and by increasing ethnic and social polarization. Schools are called upon to do the repair work, especially in the compulsory education phase; they are expected to foster the civic values and overarching identities that are seen as crucial in maintaining overall order and harmony. Implicitly, schools and the education system more broadly are attributed a great deal of agency and effectiveness.

However, the question whether public education is indeed capable of fostering such values has been explored only for some facets of education. There is a vast literature on the effect of the curriculum, instructional approaches and educational attainment, but studies exploring the impact of system properties at the national level are, to our knowledge, next to non-existent. Our study intends to address this gap. It explores whether civic values and identities are related to the degree of system differentiation in the compulsory education phase. We will distinguish between the degree and kind of *territorial* differentiation (division of powers between the national, local and school levels regarding curriculum, textbooks and assessment) and the degree and kind of *pedagogical* differentiation (grouping of students by ability and tracking). In other words, are unitary states with national curricula in a better position to bring about civic values and identities than federal ones? Likewise, are states with

single-type comprehensive schools more effective in this regard than states with schools differing by profile and status? These system characteristics will be related to both levels and disparities of values and identities. Disparities, particularly those across social divides, are relevant to policy makers who are interested in combating pockets of alienation and disengagement among socially and ethnically disadvantaged groups as well as in achieving overall high mean levels of support for these values. Our outcomes of interest are ethnic tolerance and patriotism since it is these qualities that many policy makers seek to foster.

Social Cohesion Values

Interestingly, the growing ethnic diversity of western countries due to immigration has led policy makers to become concerned about two quite different values. On the one hand, they see the need for fostering acceptance and respect for people of different cultural backgrounds – i.e., *ethnic tolerance*. On the other hand, they are apprehensive about the possible negative effect of growing diversity on social cohesion and advocate the reinforcement of a *common overarching national identity* through the curriculum as a means to neutralize this perceived effect (see Appendix 1 [ON-LINE VERSION ONLY] for a brief review of policies pursuing these objectives). This identity is meant to be inclusive, in the sense that the native majority and immigrant minorities should be able to embrace it with equal ease, and is consequently based on political markers (e.g. the flag, the constitution, the anthem, the political history of a country). It is thus identification with the country and the nation politically conceived – in other words patriotism – that is promoted.

Remarkably, few policy makers question whether it is possible to cultivate ethnic tolerance and patriotism simultaneously. Many seem to assume that the latter

represents a neutral overarching expression of belonging to the country of residence which is fully compatible with a tolerant stance toward other ethnic groups. However, multiculturalists have argued that no identity can be culturally neutral (Feinberg 1998). Identity formation always involves processes of inclusion and exclusion and the favoring of in-groups over out-groups. National identities, even those based primarily on political markers, privilege the language and culture of the dominant group, and this will complicate their adoption by ethnic minorities. People expressing a strong attachment with the nation (i.e. a high level of national pride / patriotism) will tend to have exclusionary views on cultural others. Indeed, analyzing survey data from 21 countries, Mikael Hjerm (2004) found a negative relation between ethnic tolerance and national pride.

Nevertheless, national identities are likely to vary in the degree to which they include and exclude cultural others. Identities based on ethno-cultural markers (i.e. "ethnic" or "thick" identities) are mainly exclusionary, while those grounded on civic and political principles ("civic" or "thin" identities) are inclusive (Kohn 1944). According to Rogers Brubaker (1992), ethnic and civic identities can be seen as important discourses framing a country's immigration, naturalization and integration policies. Ethnic identities are said to prevail in the German-speaking and East European nations while civic identities are considered to be characteristic of France, the Low Countries, Switzerland and the English-speaking countries (Kohn 1944; Greenfeld and Chirot 1994). Consequently, in the former countries, fostering patriotism could well have the effect of undermining tolerance by reinforcing ethnic identities and thus contributing to exclusion and xenophobia. Although Kohn's ethnic-East / civic-West framework has been severely criticized on both theoretical and empirical grounds (for instance, see Kuzio 2001), we have to take seriously the

idea of stable cross-national differences in the nature of identity – and their possible impact on patriotism and ethnic tolerance – because lasting differences have been found between European states in immigration and integration policies (see Koopmans 2010) which correspond quite closely to Kohn's framework.

The notion of qualitatively different national identities is also relevant because there may be a link between the decision-making structure of an education system and the kind of national identity prevailing. For instance, federative states, particularly those with two or more official languages such as Canada, may be more successful in promoting a form of patriotism compatible with ethnic tolerance because their national identities are thin by necessity. Conversely, old homogenous nation-states with centralized systems could well promote intolerant forms of patriotism because their national identities are likely to be thicker and more exclusionary.

Education Systems and Social Cohesion Values

It is not difficult to see the theoretical connection between the two aforementioned modes of system differentiation and disparities of civic values. The degree of pedagogical differentiation (i.e., ability grouping and tracking) is likely to influence disparities across social, ethnic and gender divides in particular. This is because it is connected with segregation which, in turn, can be expected to affect such disparities. Ability grouping has the effect of assigning children of disadvantaged social and ethnic backgrounds disproportionately to low status (pre-) vocational tracks (Green et al. 2006; Gamoran 2001), resulting in more social and ethnic segregation across schools (or across classes within schools) in pedagogically differentiated systems compared to common schooling ones (Jenkins et al. 2008; Crul and Vermeulen 2003). Social and ethnic segregation is likely to result in greater values

disparities across groups for three reasons. First, the social and ethnic groups overrepresented in low status tracks may well experience their segregation as *involuntary*, in a sense that they feel excluded from more prestigious tracks. As a result, they are likely to express significantly higher levels of alienation and lower levels of civic mindedness than the more privileged groups in high status tracks. Second, by enhancing intra-group solidarity and inter-group difference, the segregation produced by a tracked education system engenders different life worlds with different norms and values for different social, ethnic and gender groups (van de Werfhorst 2007). Third, this effect of segregation could be reinforced by curriculum differences since pupils in academic tracks are likely to receive qualitatively different and more intensive education in civics and social affairs than those in vocational tracks (*ibid* 2007).

Few studies have investigated the link between pedagogical differentiation and disparities of civic outcomes empirically, and they explore a limited set of civic outcomes. Using data of the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) on adult skills, Herman van de Werfhorst (2007) found that the difference in civic participation rates between adults who had been in vocational versus academic tracks during school was larger in early tracking systems compared to comprehensive systems. His study thus showed that system characteristics indeed have an effect on inequalities of civic participation, though he could only explore system effects on civic participation and political interest. In addition, Frank Stevens (2002) found that in Flanders the vocationally trained pupils were more ethnocentric, anti-democratic, and "tougher on crime."

Territorial differentiation can likewise be expected to influence values disparities. Federal systems are likely to produce greater disparities, particularly

across regions, than unitary systems because sub-state authorities have much more autonomy regarding curriculum matters in the former. This sub-state autonomy is likely to yield a great variety of curriculum guidelines, subject matter, learning materials and teaching practices across schools within the country, which may produce large values disparities in general. To the extent that the residential patterns of social, ethnic and religious groups coincide with territorial administrative units, a federal structure may also well yield larger disparities across social, ethnic and religious groups.

Patrick Wolf and Stephen Macedo (2005) assume the administrative structure of a state to affect civic disparities when they argue that a national regulatory framework helps prevent school autonomy from showing its divisive effects. Shared values can be maintained, they contend, under conditions of school pluralism provided there is some minimal degree of national regulation applying to all schools. Remarkably, none of the contributions in their edited volume explores this claim empirically, possibly due to the lack of data on student civic attitudes at the time the contributions for the book were written. We know of only one study that investigated the link between territorial differentiation and disparities, in this case, academic achievement. Nathalie Mons (2007) found that a centralized structure, particularly with regard to the curriculum, certification of teachers and teacher recruitment, is associated with relatively small between-school and between-student disparities in academic achievement.

The theoretical link between both modes of system differentiation and *levels* of civic values in general is not straightforward. However, a distinct theoretical argument can be made with respect to ethnic tolerance and patriotism, our two outcomes of interest. The argument is that social and ethnic mixing fosters intergroup

respect and overarching identities provided a number of conditions are met (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006).[1] By implication social and ethnic segregation should lead to the opposite: narrow group-based identities, prejudice and inter-group hostility). This argumentation clearly provides the basis for Walter Feinberg's (1998) praise of the common school, because children of different social and ethnic backgrounds are grouped together, learn to cooperate with each other and share a common school experience. In turn, this will contribute to bridging identities, engagement with wider societal issues and intergroup tolerance, qualities which are often seen as underpinning liberal democracy.[2] Thus, to the extent that patriotic sentiments represents these bridging identities, we can expect systems with minimal pedagogical differentiation to show the highest levels of both ethnic tolerance and patriotism.

The relation between pedagogical differentiation and levels of civic attitudes has not been explored extensively either. In a cross-national study of 20 countries, Marie Duru-Bellat et al. (2008) found comprehensive schooling to be associated with a cooperative spirit, but they could not assess whether support for such values also reflects greater ethnic tolerance and more encompassing forms of belonging. Similarly, there have been numerous empirical studies from various national contexts showing that desegregated or integrated (i.e., mixed faith) schools have positive effects for inter-cultural friendships, comfort in dealing with interracial settings, forgiveness and reconciliation (for an overview, see Schofield 2001). However, since most of these studies focus on a single country, they have not addressed system characteristics such as the degree of pedagogical differentiation.

Finally, there are sources of support for theorizing a link between territorial differentiation and patriotism.[3] The high levels of autonomy enjoyed by sub-state

entities in federations are likely to complicate identification and engagement with the national level by directing the attention of citizens to the sub-state level. Indeed, the literature on nation-building and state formation has noted the propensity of young states and states desiring to catch up socio-economically with more advanced states to establish unitary education systems with national curricula for the purpose of congealing national identity and fostering cultural homogeneity (Green 1990; Kolstoe 2000). Generally, such states are reluctant to transfer powers to regions or national minorities as they fear that such policies might have centrifugal effects.

The preceding leads us to formulate the following hypotheses:

1. The larger the degree of pedagogical differentiation, the larger the value disparities across ethnic and social cleavages;

2. The larger the degree of territorial differentiation, the larger the value disparities in general and those across ethnic and social cleavages;[4]

3. The larger the degree of pedagogical differentiation, the lower the levels of ethnic tolerance and patriotism;

4. The larger the degree of territorial differentiation, the lower the levels of patriotism.

Data and Indicators

We merged two datasets to explore the relationships between system characteristics and civic values.

Measures of System Characteristics

The first dataset, compiled by Mons (2004, 2007), includes a set of 80 indicators. This dataset documents educational policies and system characteristics

relating to compulsory education in OECD countries and in some emerging countries in the beginning of the 1990s. The Mons dataset is a useful complement to the international (e.g., UNESCO and OECD) data already available on education systems for several reasons. First, existing data provide mainly quantitative indicators (e.g., he percentage of schools engaging in ability grouping), while the Mons data include relevant qualitative indicators (e.g., rigid tracking, flexible setting). Second, unlike other datasets which merely present a loose collection of individual indicators, the Mons dataset includes typological variables reflecting clusters of quantitative and qualitative indicators observable in distinct groups of countries. Such variables make it easier to identify distinct national education regimes.

The *pedagogical differentiation* variable in the Mons dataset is comprehensive in that it not only includes the traditional opposition between early selection and undifferentiated school organisation but also four other forms of differentiation: a) the kind of ability-grouping practised (setting, permanent ability-grouping in ISCED 1 and 2, permanent ability-grouping starting from ISCED 2, no ability-grouping), b) the kind of differentiated teaching provided (extra lessons following the common curriculum for all students, only enrichment classes or remedial classes for a selection of students, no form of differentiated teaching) and c) the pace of progression through the school years (automatic promotion, weak, average, strong rates of repetition) and d) non-completion rates (low, average, high levels of non-completion). A principle component analysis on these five forms of differentiation based on a sample of OECD countries, produced two dimensions which were labelled 'degree of selection' and 'degree of individualised/collective teaching.' (see Mons 2007, 187-189, for the results of this analysis).

Mapping the country scores on these dimensions in a scatter plot, Mons (*ibid*) identified four distinct groups of countries, representing a distinct model of compulsory schooling organisation (see Table 1). These models constitute the categories (or types) of the pedagogical differentiation variable.

[Table 1 about here]

The first model, which we labelled as "separation," is marked by early selection organized at the end of primary school, high rates of grade repetition, frequent setting in primary school, enrichment classes, little help for children with academic difficulties and average levels of non-completion. This type characterizes the systems of central European countries (Austria, Germany, Hungary, Switzerland).

In addition to the model of separation, the scatter plot produced three distinct models of comprehensive schooling, refuting the assumption that countries with comprehensive systems can be classified as a single group. The first model, that we shall call the "individualised integration" group is the archetype of the comprehensive school concept. The students must follow the same curriculum, at a similar pace, and if possible with the same peers and teachers throughout primary and lower secondary education. This model has the following characteristics: (a) a long common curriculum, (b) automatic promotion of students, (c) no or almost no setting, (d) individualised lessons, which are an integral part of the teaching process and concern all students, not just the weakest ones, and (e) low levels of non-completion. Countries characterized by this model include countries in the Nordic region (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden) and in Asia (Japan and South Korea).

Another model of a comprehensive school organisation we term "diverse integration". This model is characterized by: (a) a long common curriculum without official selection; (b) automatic promotion or very low repetition rates in primary

school and almost non-existent repetition in secondary school (due to a credit system); (c) flexible ability-grouping for basic subjects with within-class grouping in primary school and a differentiated offer of lessons according to the academic ability of students in each of the disciplines in secondary school; (d) individualised teaching, often with enrichment classes for talented students; (e) low levels of non-completion. Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States are emblematic of this model.

A third model of comprehensive school organization we call "uniform integration." This model combines the following properties: (a) a long common curriculum; (b) high repetition rates; (c) remedial classes only; (d) rigid ability-grouping starting from lower secondary; (e) high levels of non-completion. This model principally characterises the Latin-European family (France, Italy, Portugal and Spain).

The categorical variable capturing the degree and kind of *territorial differentiation* concentrates on issues of curriculum design (choice of subjects and number of teaching hours), textbook choice and modes of assessment and describes the division of powers and activities across the national, local and school levels on these issues. As shown in Table 1, its categories represent five models: (1) the *federal model*, in which sub-national entities are in charge of curriculum design, textbook choice and external student assessment (Australia, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, United States); (2) the *quasi-centralized model*, in which the three main functions described above are the exclusive responsibility of the central state (France, Italy, Portugal of the mid-1990s); (3) the *model of "collaboration,"* in which there is limited transfer of powers to schools and local authorities constrained by strong national frameworks and the existence of national external student assessment (as

seen in some Nordic countries such as Denmark); (4) the *"school autonomy" model*, in which frequent national external assessments is combined with strong school autonomy in matters of curriculum design, guided only by broad curriculum objectives at the national level (England, Hungary, Sweden); (5) the *"decentralization" model*, in which local authorities assume major responsibilities for curriculum design, textbook choice, and modes of assessment (e.g., Russia and Spain).

Although we have described both variables as categorical (identifying qualitatively different education system traditions), we can rank the different categories of pedagogical differentiation according to the degree of grouping by ability and those of territorial differentiation according to the division of powers across the national, local and school level. With regard to pedagogical differentiation, grouping by ability is practically non-existent in the individualised integration category, while it is the defining characteristic of the separation model. The other two categories of this variable fall in between these two extremes. In view of the hypotheses stated above, we consequently would expect disparities of civic values to be smallest in the individualised integration category and largest in the separation group. Likewise, levels of support for civic values should be highest in the former and lowest in the latter.

A similar logic applies to the categories of territorial differentiation. Clearly, the national level is least important in federal states and most important in centralized states. Consequently, we expect disparities of civic values to be smallest in the centralized model and largest in the federal group of countries and levels of support to be highest in the former and lowest in the latter. The remaining categories are anticipated to show average disparities and levels of support.

Measures of Civic Values

The second dataset is the IEA Civic Education Study (henceforth Cived study), which provides data on the dependent variable of this research – civic values. The Cived study consists of a large scale test and survey conducted in April 1999 among a sample of 90,000 14-year-old students and 4,500 school principals in 28 countries worldwide (Torney-Purta et al 2001).[5] A major advantage of the Cived study, in addition to the large national samples (3000 students and more) and the low non-response rates, is the inclusion of ready-made composite scales in the database, which have been tested for conceptual equivalence cross-nationally (Schulz 2004). This means that the items composing the scales have been understood in the same way across countries and that the data are thus comparable internationally. Given the nested character of the national samples, with one class per school being selected in each of the 150-200 sampled schools, the Cived study further allows researchers to explore both contextual effects and individual-level factors. We selected the 20 countries listed in Table 1 for further analyses. This selection represents a cross-section of the Mons and Cived datasets.

The Cived study, moreover, is particularly suitable to assess the effect of system properties on attitudes as it sampled grade eight, which in many countries is the last grade of lower secondary. Education systems show maximum pedagogical differentiation in the lower secondary phase, and it may therefore be expected that it is in this grade that an effect – if any – can be observed. After the lower secondary phase all systems become tracked and selective. A final advantage of the Cived study is that its data collection followed that of the Mons dataset by just a few years, making the temporal order of and time gap between the two datasets ideal.

We selected two composite variables from the database to tap ethnic tolerance and patriotism, our two outcomes of interest. These variables have been created by the Cived experts (see Torney-Purta et al 2001; Schultz 2004) and represent internally coherent composites consisting of the following items, based on Likert-type items (i.e., strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree):

A. *Ethnic tolerance* ('positive attitudes toward immigrants'):

   (1) Immigrants should have the opportunity to keep their own language.

   (2) Immigrants' children should have the same opportunities for education that other children in the country have.

   (3) Immigrants who live in a country for several years should have the opportunity to vote in elections.

   (4) Immigrants should have the opportunity to keep their own customs and lifestyle.

   (5) Immigrants should have all the same rights that everyone else in a country has.

B. *Patriotism* ('positive attitudes toward one's nation'):

   (1) The flag of this country is important to me.

   (2) I have great love for this country.

   (3) This country should be proud of what it has achieved.

   (4) I would prefer to live permanently in another country.

The higher the values on these variables, the more tolerant and the more patriotic we consider the respondent to be. We note that the first and the fourth item of the attitudes on immigrants variable clearly tap into the notion of respect for and positive acceptance of the cultures of out-groups, which is what ethnic tolerance is essentially about for many scholars (e.g., Heyd 1996, Walzer 1997). The other items can also be

said to represent ethnic tolerance to the extent that the latter is understood as including the principle of civic equality (i.e., accepting cultural others as fundamentally equal and entitled to the same rights and opportunities). We further note that the tolerance scale is likely to capture ethnic tolerance levels of the native majority only as the items all relate to immigrants (i.e., the out-group from the perspective of the native majority). Respondents of immigrant background may well have identified with immigrants. Consequently, positive answers on the ethnic tolerance items are likely to reflect self-assertion rather than ethnic tolerance for this group.

Control Variables

We further relied on the Cived dataset to select a number of control variables at the individual and classroom level. The individual-level controls concern gender, use of state language at home (as a proxy for ethnic identity), number of books at home (as a proxy for social background), civic knowledge and skills, and an open climate for classroom discussion. The last two variables are composite variables created by the Cived team (see Appendix 2 [ON-LINE VERSION ONLY] for their composition). Previous research has highlighted the importance of some of these factors for values and attitudes (for the role of knowledge and skills in enhancing civic values, see Galston 2001; for the role of open climate, see Torney-Purta 2004). The classroom-level variables concern the social and ethnic composition of the class, indicatedby the class average, respectively, of the number of books at home and the language spoken at home.

Finally, we used two control variables at the national level: democratic tradition, measured as the number of years of uninterrupted democracy from the introduction of universal suffrage, and ethnic diversity, assessed by the

fractionalization measure developed by Alberto Alesina et al. (2003).[6] The importance of a history of democracy as a contextual driver of ethnic tolerance has been underlined in numerous studies (e.g., Weil 1985; Linz and Stepan 1996). Democratic tradition, moreover, has the advantage of being closely related to other possibly confounding factors, such as the strength of civic and ethnic identities (as discussed before), levels of prosperity and Protestant culture,[7] and is thus able to broadly capture the influence of these factors as well.[8] In fact, adding the other factors in the analysis would only result in multicollinearity problems precisely because they are all so closely inter-related.

We will use ethnic diversity as a control variable in the analysis of patriotism as it has been argued that diversity undermines national solidarity (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). Consequently, we would expect national identity to be thinner and patriotism to be shallower in ethnically diverse states. The control variable is all the more important in view of the fact that many federative states are ethnically diverse. Including it in the analysis of patriotism therefore enables us to assess the effect of territorial differentiation net of that of ethnic diversity.

Data Analysis

Since our explanatory and control variables are at multiple levels (national, classroom and individual) and our dependent variables are at the individual level, we will perform multilevel analysis (MLA), using Mlwin software. MLA is necessary because of the nested structure of the data. Using more conventional multiple regression techniques to analyze nested data would result in an overestimation of the effects of higher level variables (Snijders and Bosker 1999), i.e., pedagogical and territorial differentiation.

MLA also allows us to explore cross-level interaction effects. Such effects can be used to determine whether disparities of civic attitudes across social cleavages differ across the categories of pedagogical and territorial differentiation. They therefore enable us to address Hypotheses One and Two. In sum, we will build a three-level model consisting of students (level 1), classrooms (level 2) and countries (level 3) and including cross-level interaction terms for individual and country-level variables.

Results and Discussion

Before reporting the results of the MLA, we present descriptive statistics (Table 2) and correlations between ethnic tolerance and patriotism (Table 3). Table 2 shows the mean values and standard deviations of the dependent variables across the categories of pedagogical and territorial differentiation. Levels of tolerance and patriotism appear to be lowest in the separation category, i.e., in the states with the most pronounced degree of pedagogical differentiation. This is in line with the third hypothesis. Respondents are also least patriotic in federal states, the most decentralised category of territorial differentiation, which is in agreement with the fourth hypothesis. Furthermore, consistent with the second hypothesis we see that the *dispersion* of tolerant and patriotic attitudes is largest in the federal states (as shown by the high standard deviations). The descriptive statistics thus all show the anticipated patterns. In the ensuing section we will explore whether these relationships hold in analyses with control variables at the individual, classroom and national level. Appendix 4 [ON-LINE VERSION ONLY] presents the descriptive statistics of all the control variables. We only selected control variables with relatively small numbers of missing values.

Let us now see how the two outcome measures are interlinked across the different categories of territorial and pedagogical differentiation (Table 3). To begin with the former, are patriotism and ethnic tolerance more compatible in federal states because the national identities of these states are likely to be thinner and less exclusive? Surprisingly, we see the reverse pattern appearing: in federal states and in states with high levels of school autonomy patriotism and ethnic tolerance are negatively correlated while in the other three categories they show a positive relationship (see Table 3). It thus seems unlikely that a federal structure itself produces or is indicative of thinner and more inclusive identities. Possibly, this result can be explained by the lesser ability of federal states (compared to cenralized ones) to overrule local authorities and centrally enforce inclusive identities through the curriculum.

The pattern of correlations across the categories of pedagogical differentiation is also surprising. The negative correlation in the separation group is in line with our prediction that the segregated school system of this group is not conducive for developing overarching identities. We further see positive correlations in two of the three groups of countries with comprehensive systems, suggesting that national identities are more inclusive in these countries. However, the correlation tolerance and patriotism is negative in the individualized integration group, although we predicted that this group of countries, where mixed ability classes are most pronounced and where conditions for inter-group contact (and the emergence of inclusive identities) are thus most favorable, would show a strong positive

association. This unforeseen finding raises doubts about the validity of the causal mechanism proposed earlier (i.e., that intergroup contact contributes to intercultural understanding and bridging identities).

[Table 3 about here]

We present the findings of the MLA in a stepwise fashion. First we present the zero model – i.e., the equation without explanatory conditions (see the columns marked as 0 in Tables 4-7). This provides information on the distribution of the total variance across the three levels taking into account all observed and unobserved factors. We then discuss the results of the model including our variables of interest (one by one) along with control variables at the individual, class and national level (Columns I). This allows us to assess the links between system characteristics and chosen civic outcomes net of confounding factors.[9] Finally, we report the models including the cross-level interaction terms for ethnic identity and social background across the categories of pedagogical and territorial differentiation (Columns II and III).

[Table 4 about here]

The zero models show that the proportion of the variance attributable to the national level (as indicated by the Intra Class Coefficients (ICC) in the Table) is 4.4% for ethnic tolerance and 12.3% for patriotism. According to Greg Duncan and Stephen Raudenbusch (1999), these proportions represent moderate to large effect sizes, respectively, which justifies the effort to look for explanatory factors at the national

level. Had the ICCs at the national level been of a magnitude of one or two per cent, we would have known beforehand that system characteristics were unlikely to be relevant in accounting for the variation in our two outcomes of interest.

Let us start by assessing how pedagogical differentiation is related to *disparities* of ethnic tolerance. Are the disparities across the ethnic and social divide largest in the system with the most pronounced degree of pedagogical differentiation? If so, the correlations between the individual-level conditions of ethnic identity and social background, on the one hand, and ethnic tolerance, on the other, should be stronger in the separation group. The strength of these correlations can be assessed by looking at the interaction effects in conjunction with individual-level main effects. These main effects pertain to the reference category (separation). The interaction terms of Columns III-V thus show how strong the effects of ethnicity, social background and gender in the other categories are in relation to those of the reference category. If these interaction terms *reinforce* their corresponding main effects (by showing a significant positive effect on top of a positive main effect or – conversely – by showing a significant negative effect on top of a negative main effect), then the disparities across the ethnic and social divide are larger in the other categories by comparison to the reference category. Conversely, if they *diminish* the main effect, the disparities in the other categories are smaller. Based on this logic, it can be observed that five of the six interaction terms dilute the main effect, while one is non-significant.

We illustrate the dilution of the main effect by focusing on the effect of ethnic identity. The main effect of this factor is -.834 (with an SE of .050) in the reference category, meaning that the ethnic majority has significantly lower tolerance levels than ethnic minorities in the Separation category.[10] The corresponding interaction

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effects are .229 (.088) for the Diverse Integration group, .775 (069) for the Uniform Integration group, and .247 (.072) for the Individualized Integration group. Thus, in all three categories the interaction effects diminish the negative main effect significantly, although these effects are not so large that they change the sign of the main effect (i.e., the effect of ethnic identity on ethnic tolerance is also negative in the other categories: -.834 + .229 = -.605; -.834 + .775 = -.059; -.834 + .247 = -.587). As five out of six interaction terms soften the main effect, we can conclude that disparities are indeed smaller in systems with smaller degrees of pedagogical differentiation, which supports Hypothesis One.

It can also be seen that tolerance *levels* are significantly higher in the individualized integration and uniform integration categories than in the separation group (i.e., the reference category), when controlling for all other factors including democratic tradition (see Column I). This, at first sight, supports the third hypothesis, since the categories with the smallest degrees of pedagogical differentiation have the highest levels of ethnic tolerance levels. However, the main effect of pedagogical differentiation by and large disappears once we add the cross-level interaction effects (see Columns II and III). As noted above, many of these interaction effects are significant, which leads to the conclusion that it is mainly through influencing the effects of ethnic identity and social background that pedagogical differentiation impacts on ethnic tolerance. The smaller the degree of differentiation, the weaker is the effect of these individual-level factors. Apparently, systems with the smallest degrees of differentiation enhance overall tolerance levels by increasing the tolerance levels of the most intolerant social and ethnic groups.

Why is pedagogical differentiation related in only such an indirect way to levels of ethnic tolerance? Possibly, it exerts its effect not so much through

segregation, as we proposed earlier, but through the curriculum. Curriculum differences across schools are bound to be larger in early tracking systems by comparison to comprehensive systems and these may well translate into larger tolerance *disparities* in the former without necessarily producing much lower *levels* of tolerance. Minimal emphasis on fostering civic values in one type of school could, for instance, be compensated by elaborate citizenship education programmes in other types of schools in early tracking systems resulting in mean levels of tolerance which are not much lower than those of systems with uniform curricula.

In fact, the pattern of links of territorial differentiation with ethnic tolerance provides further support for this conjecture. As noted before territorial differentiation represents the division of powers precisely on curriculum issues. Similar to pedagogical differentiation, it is related to *disparities* and not to *levels* of ethnic tolerance (see Table 5 – the table shows that only the interaction terms are significant, not the main effect of territorial differentiation in Column 1). Moreover, the relation with disparities is in full accordance with Hypothesis Two: in all groups the disparities across the ethnic and social divide are significantly larger in federal systems (the reference category) than in the other systems (see the interaction effects of Columns II-III which diminish the main effects).. In other words, in states where the curriculum is most uniform, and curriculum differences between schools are consequently minimal, we find smaller disparities across the board. In sum, both forms of differentiation seem to exert their impact on ethnic tolerance through the curriculum.

[Table 5 about here]

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Let us now see how pedagogical differentiation is related to patriotism (see Table 6). The connection between this mode of differentiation and *levels* of patriotism appears to be tenuous: among the three categories of interest it is only in the uniform integration category that levels of patriotism are significantly higher than in the reference category (separation), controlling for all other factors including ethnic diversity. These results support Hypothesis Three only marginally. As pedagogical differentiation was alsofound to be only indirectly related to levels of ethnic tolerance,the tenuous link with levels of patriotism provides additional support for the aforementioned conjecture that the causal mechanism which inspired Hypothesis Three does not apply (i.e., the capacity of social and ethnic mixing to generate intergroup respect and overarching identities).

[Table 6 about here]

Pedagogical differentiation does not exert a any influence on *disparities* of patriotism. Only in the uniform integration group are inequalities between ethnic groups in patriotic sentiments significantly smaller than in the reference category (see how the interaction effect dilutes the main effect). However, these inequalities are larger in the diverse integration group than in the reference category, which is not in line with the first hypothesis. Disparities across social groups are not significantly larger or smaller in any of the three groups with comprehensive systems.. We noted before that the curriculum is the likely causal mechanism linking pedagogical differentiation to disparities of ethnic tolerance. Possibly, the non-relation between pedagogical differentiation and disparities of patriotism simply reflects a lack of curriculum differentiation across different tracks with regard to issues of national

identity and patriotism. It could be that school ethos, content, teaching practice and assessment modes simply do not address these issues in either vocational or academic tracks, resulting in a fairly similar approach to issues of national identity across different types of schools.

Territorial differentiation shows much stronger links to patriotism, both to levels and disparities of this outcome of interest (see Table 7). Levels of patriotism are significantly higher in the decentralized and centralized groups compared to the reference category (federal states). These higher levels are retained when the interaction terms are included (see Columns II and III). The inclusion of interaction terms for ethnic identity even has the effect of making patriotism levels higher in all four groups relative to the reference category. Clearly, these patterns support Hypothesis Four: states with some form of regulation at the national level are more successful in fostering overarching identities – in this case patriotism – than federal states.[11]

[Table 7 about here]

Unlike pedagogical differentiation, territorial differentiation *is* associated with *disparities* of patriotism, but only with those across ethnic groups. These disparities are smaller in *all* categories by comparison to the reference category. In other words ethnic minorities are more similar to native majorities in expressions of patriotism in states with some form of national regulation concerning the curriculum. As overall levels of patriotism are also higher in the non-federal countries, we would expect ethnic minorities in the non-federal states to also show higher *levels* of patriotism than those in the federal states. A difference of means test reveals that this is indeed the

case: using state language spoken at home as the proxy for ethic identity, we find that respondents who never speak the state language at home express significantly higher levels of patriotism in each of the non-federal groups by comparison to the federal group.[12] Evidently, ethnic minority respondents find it easier to identify with their country of residence in non-federal states. This is another indication that the kind of patriotism promoted in non-federal countries is not ethnocentric and exclusionary.

Conclusion

This article has shown that system characteristics are related to both levels and disparities of ethnic tolerance and patriotism, our outcomes of interest. This is most evident for disparities. The more uniform a system is, both in terms of untracked mixed ability schools and in terms of a unitary decision-making structure regarding curriculum matters, the smaller is the dispersion of tolerant and patriotic attitudes across gender, ethnic and social groups. This finding is consistent with the proposition that an undifferentiated and nationally regulated school system is most effective in preventing segregation and maintaining a commonality of values across schools (Wolf and Macedo 2005; Green et al 2006; van der Werfhorst 2007). It further suggests that policy makers concerned about pockets of alienation and intolerance among certain sections of society ought to consider prolonging the period of common schooling with undifferentiated classes and instituting or expanding national regulation on curriculum matters.

The question whether value consensus across social divides is at all desirable or feasible in pluralistic liberal democracies has not been addressed here. Obviously, a case can be made for value pluralism as a necessary component of a dynamic society with a vibrant democracy. Future research will have to explore how value pluralism

across social groups relates to social cohesion and democracy in order to determine its desirability.

System characteristics are also related to *levels* of civic attitudes, although not as comprehensively as to disparities. The kind and degree of ability grouping of a system is not linked to ethnic tolerance and has only a marginal effect on patriotism. This finding is not in line with our hypothesis that tolerance and bridging identities would be stronger in comprehensive systems because the mixed-ability classes of such systems enable students of different social and cultural backgrounds to come in contact and learn about each other. The finding suggests that either the link between ability grouping and segregation is not as strong as postulated or that the mechanism proposed by contact theory (i.e., interaction between different groups resulting in more out-group tolerance and more encompassing identities) does not apply. If the latter is the case, this may be because the interaction failed to meet one or more of the criteria Gordon Allport (1954) considered essential for inter-ethnic contact to have positive effects.

Rather than through segregation ability grouping seems to have worked through the curriculum as this can explain why ability grouping is related to *disparities* of civic attitudes and not so much to *levels* of civic attitudes. After all, while it is easy to see how cross-track curriculum differences can enhance disparities in early selection systems, such differences need not affect mean levels of civic attitudes if rudimentary civic education programs in some tracks are offset by comprehensive programs in other tracks. Van der Werfhorst's (2007) findings provide additional support for this conjecture as he too finds a system's degree of stratification (i.e. extent of grouping by ability and tracking) to be related to cross-track *inequalities* of active citizenship dispositions and not to mean levels of such dispositions. A

system's decision making structure is not related to ethnic tolerance either, but it does show a strong link with patriotism: systems with some form of national regulation of the curriculum have significantly higher levels of patriotism than federal systems. This obviously supports the idea that a uniform curriculum is an effective instrument to promote unity and national identity, a belief that has inspired the nation-building politics of many newly independent nations (Kolstoe 2000). Interestingly, the patriotic attitudes expressed in states with national regulatory frameworks do not appear to be of an exclusionary nature as they are positively correlated with ethnic tolerance. What is more, in these systems ethnic minorities express higher levels of patriotism than those in federal systems, which further indicates that the national identities of the former are more inclusive. These findings have important policy implications. They suggest that public education does have the ability to foster a national sense of belonging that does not reduce tolerance provided this is done through some form of national regulation of the curriculum. They are also compatible with the pluralist notion that sub-national ethnic affiliations can perfectly well be accommodated within an overarching national identity (e.g. Feinberg 1998) and do not support the more skeptical view that national identity is difficult to reconcile with other identities since it is not culturally neutral (e.g. Kymlicka 1995).

We end with an important reservation. Although we controlled for various macro-level conditions and are thus fairly confident that education system characteristics exert an independent effect on civic attitudes, it cannot be ruled out that cross-national attitudinal patterns have predated modern education systems. That is, perhaps ethnic tolerance and patiotism levels were already high and inequalities across social groups low in countries before they introduced common schooling and nationwide curricula. Thus, in order to draw more definite conclusions, our cross-

sectional analyses,need to be supplemented with detailed over-time investigations into the effect of system characteristics.

Notes

[1] These conditions are equality of status, common goals, cooperation, authority support and opportunities for friendship.

[2] We note here that the (social-democratic) politicians who initiated the reform towards comprehensive education in many European countries in the 1960s were not primarily motivated by notions of intercultural understanding and bridging identities. Considerations of equality, social mobility and class emancipation lay at the heart of this reform movement (Wiborg 2009).

[3] We cannot think of any meaningful theoretical connection between territorial differentiation and ethnic tolerance.

[4] Our theoretical argumentation concerning the effect of pedagogical differentiation on value disparities only addresses value disparities *across social divides*. We therefore do not postulate an effect on value disparities in general. This is different for territorial differentiation. Clearly, there is every reason to assume an effect of this mode of differentiation on value disparities in general, as we explained above.

[5] The database is available at http://www.iea.nl/cived_datasets.html.

[6] This measure takes both the number of ethnic groups and the size of each group into account, with values approaching one denoting high diversity and values close to zero denoting homogeneity. See Alesina et al. (2003) for its calculation.

[7] Both levels of prosperity (Inglehart and Welzel 2005) and protestant heritage (Huntington 2005) have been related to liberal-democratic values including tolerance.

[8] For instance, using the Migration and Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) as a proxy for the strength of ethnic and civic identities (see www.integrationindex.eu), we found a strong positive correlation at the national level between history of democracy and the prevalence of civic identities ($r = .49$; $p = .011$; $N = 26$). Similarly, democratic

tradition is strongly correlated with economic prosperity (as measured with GDP per capita) (r = .81; p = .000; N = 31) and with Protestant culture (r = .58; p = .001; N = 32). [We created a 'Protestant Culture' variable with the values '0 – not protestant', '1 – mixed', and '2 – protestant'.] In other words, the longer the history of democracy, the stronger the civic identity, the more affluent the country and the more likely the country is protestant. We chose democratic tradition as the key control variable rather than the MIPEX measure of identity because the latter has data on just 14 of the states included in our analyses (see Appendix 3 [ON-LINE VERSION ONLY] for the values of all country-level control variables).

[9] Note that we did not perform analyses with all the system characteristics combined because of insufficient observations at the country level (N = 20).

[10] As the proxy for ethnic identity was the use of the state language at home with values <1 – never; 2 – sometimes; 3 – always or almost always>, a negative relation means that the more the state language is spoken at home the less tolerant the respondent is.

[11] Importantly, as noted earlier, the kind of patriotism promoted in the decentralized and centralized groups appears to be of a fairly inclusive nature given the positive correlations of patriotism with ethnic tolerance in these groups (see Table 3).

[12] In the federal group the mean level of patriotism of these respondents is 8.12. In the other groups the corresponding figures are 8.94, 9.29, 10.04; 9.37 and 9.02. These values are all significantly higher than 8.12. The international overall mean for patriotism is 10.

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Table 1. Classification of Countries by Pedagogical and Territorial Differentiation

Pedagogical Differentiation			
Separation	*Diverse Integration*	*Uniform Integration*	*Individualised Integration*
Belgium	Australia	Chile	Denmark
Bulgaria	England	Greece	Finland
Czech Republic	United States	Italy	Norway
Germany		Portugal	Poland
Hungary		Romania	Russia
Switzerland			Sweden

Territorial Differentiation				
Federalism	*School autonomy*	*Decentralization*	*Collaboration*	*Centralism*
Australia	Chile	Czech Republic	Bulgaria	Greece
Belgium	England	Poland	Denmark	Italy
Germany	Finland	Russia		Norway
Switzerland	Hungary			Portugal
United States	Sweden			Romania

Table 2. Mean Levels of Ethnic Tolerance and Patriotism

	Ethnic Tolerance			*Patriotism*		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Pedagogical Differentiation						
Separation	9.6	2.01	18,123	9.52	2.03	18,219
Diverse Integration	10.0	2.21	8,469	9.75	2.00	8,651
Uniform Integration	10.3	1.81	18,982	10.6	1.93	19,081
Individualized Integration	10.2	2.19	17,540	10.1	2.04	17,597
Territorial Differentiation						
Federal States	9.8	2.25	14,405	9.4	2.10	14,550
School Autonomy	10.2	2.08	17,273	10.2	2.03	17,393
Decentralized States	10.1	1.81	9,035	10.5	1.88	9,080
Collaboration	9.6	2.04	5,821	9.8	2.05	5,856
Centralized States	10.2	1.93	16,580	10.3	1.95	16,669
Total	10.0	2.06	93000	10.0	2.05	93000

NB1: The differences between the means are all significant at the .001 level
NB2: It has been argued that standard deviations are not a good measure of dispersion since they tend to be low at more extreme mean levels of the outcome of interest. However, this bias is not apparent in the data presented here, because there is no clear relation between the SDs and the means. That is, it is not the case that SDs of means close to the overall mean are higher than those of means more distant to the overall mean.

Table 3. Correlations between ethnic tolerance and patriotism

	Ethnic tolerance x patriotism (bivariate correlation)	N
Territorial differentiation		
Federalism	-.098***	14273
School autonomy	-.023**	17172
Decentralization	.172***	9024
Collaboration	.119***	5741
Centralism	.129***	16514
Pedagogical differentiation		
Separation	-.05***	18010
Diverse integration	.04***	8371
Uniform integration	.17***	18934
Individualized integration	-.04***	17409

$* P < .05; ** P < .01; *** P < .001$

NB1: Admittedly, the correlations, though significant, are rather weak. However, this seems to be the product of the sample size and thus does not necessarily reflect non-relationships. Typically large sample sizes, such as the ones in this study, tend to depress coefficient values and enhance significance levels. Indeed further exploration using multilevel analysis with cross-level interaction terms revealed that the differences in the direction and strength of the correlations between the various categories of the system variables are all highly significant (results can be obtained from the authors).

Table 4. Determinants of ethnic tolerance – the role of pedagogical differentiation

Level	Determinants	0	I	II	III
Individual	Gender (girl ref cat)		**-.547** (.017)	**-.548** (.017)	**-.547** (.017)
	Ethnic identity		**-.497** (.028)	**-.834** (.050)	**-.492** (.028)
	Social background		.008 (.007)	.011 (.007)	**-.041** (.013)
	Civic competence		**.015** (.000)	**.014** (.000)	**.015** (.000)
	Open climate for classroom discussion		**.148** (.004)	**.148** (.004)	**.148** (.004)
Class	Ethnic composition		**-.596** (.099)	**-.591** (.100)	**-.584** (.099)
	Social composition		-.043 (.023)	-.041 (.023)	-.042 (.023)
National	Democratic tradition		-.002 (.003)	-.002 (.003)	-.002 (.003)
	Pedagogical differentiation				
	Separation (reference category)				
	Diverse integration		.440 (.321)	-.227 (.403)	.251 (.336)
	Uniform integration		**.579** (.220)	**-1.69** (.292)	.268 (.232)
	Individualized integration		**.533** (.237)	-.185 (.313)	.211 (.251)
	Diverse integration x ethnic identity			**.229** (.088)	
	Uniform integration x ethnic identity			**.775** (.069)	
	Individualized integration x ethnic identity			**.247** (.072)	
	Diverse integration x social background				.042 (.022)
	Uniform integration x social background				**.073** (.018)
	Individualized integration x social background				**.072** (.018)
	ICC national level (L3) (%)	4.4			
	ICC class level (L2) (%)	7.7			
	ICC individual level (L1) (%)	87.9			
	Proportion of L3 variance explained (%)		32.5	35.5	31.2
	Proportion of L2 variance explained (%)		14.5	15.7	14.5
	Proportion of L1 variance explained (%)		7.6	7.7	7.6
	N (individuals)	63114	55101	55101	55101

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; coefficients significant at a 5 percent level are in bold.

Table 5. Determinants of ethnic tolerance – the role of territorial differentiation

level	*Determinants*	0	I	II	III
Individual	Gender (girl ref cat)		**-.547** (.017)	**-.546** (.017)	**-.546** (.017)
	Ethnic identity		**-.497** (.028)	**-.944** (.047)	**-.491** (.028)
	Social background		.008 (.007)	.010 (.007)	**-.050** (.014)
	Civic competence		**.015** (.000)	**.015** (.000)	**.015** (.000)
	Open climate for classroom discussion		**.148** (.004)	**.149** (.004)	**.148** (.004)
Class	Ethnic composition		**-.595** (.099)	**-.670** (.099)	**-.597** (.100)
	Social composition		-.045 (.023)	-.045 (.023)	**-.049** (.023)
National	Democratic tradition		.002 (.003)	.002 (.003)	.002 (.003)
	Territorial differentiation				
	Federal states (reference category)				
	School autonomy		.365 (.244)	**-.715** (.323)	.118 (.258)
	Decentralized states		.370 (.323)	-.241 (.475)	-.064 (.340)
	Collaboration		-.098 (.324)	**-2.05** (.420)	-.495 (.344)
	Centralized states		.465 (.253)	**-1.91** (.316)	.115 (.266)
	School autonomy x ethnic identity			**.378** (.075)	
	Decentralized states x ethnic identity			**.953** (.120)	
	Collaboration x ethnic identity			**.678** (.096)	
	Centralized states x ethnic identity			**.823** (.068)	
	School autonomy x social background				**.055** (.019)
	Decentralized states x social background				**.096** (.023)
	Collaboration x social background				**.089** (.025)
	Centralized states x social background				**.081** (.019)
	ICC national level (L3) (%)	4.4			
	ICC class level (L2) (%)	7.7			
	ICC individual level (L1) (%)	87.9			
	Proportion of L3 variance explained (%)		23.2	26.3	22.6
	Proportion of L2 variance explained (%)		14.5	17.2	15.1
	Proportion of L1 variance explained (%)		7.6	7.7	7.6
	N (individuals)	63114	55101	55101	55101

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; coefficients significant at a 5 percent level are in bold.

Table 6. Determinants of patriotism – the role of pedagogical differentiation

Level	*Determinants*	0	I	II	III
	Gender (girl ref cat)		**.227** (.016)	**.228** (.016)	**.227** (.016)
	Ethnic identity		**.473** (.028)	**.617** (.049)	**.472** (.028)
Individual	Social background		**.014** (.007)	.011 (.007)	.011 (.013)
	Civic competence		**-.002** (.000)	**-.002** (.000)	**-.002** (.000)
	Open climate for classroom discussion		**.137** (.004)	**.137** (.004)	**.137** (.004)
Class	Ethnic composition		**.633** (.092)	**.619** (.092)	**.633** (.092)
	Social composition		**-.214** (.021)	**-.214** (.021)	**-.211** (.021)
	Ethnic diversity		-.549 (.993)	-.514 (1.00)	-.538 (.993)
	Pedagogical differentiation				
National	Separation (reference category)				
	Diverse integration		.135 (.407)	-.390 (.480)	-.050 (.418)
	Uniform integration		**.779** (.385)	**2.23** (.435)	**.827** (.391)
	Individualized integration		.370 (.397)	.513 (.451)	.370 (.405)
	Diverse integration x ethnic identity			**.181** (.085)	
	Uniform integration x ethnic identity			**-.497** (.067)	
	Individualized integration x ethnic identity			-.048 (.071)	
	Diverse integration x social background				.041 (.021)
	Uniform integration x social background				-.012 (.017)
	Individualized integration x social background				.001 (.018)
	ICC national level (L3) (%)	12.3			
	ICC class level (L2) (%)	6.1			
	ICC individual level (L1) (%)	81.6			
	Proportion of L3 variance explained (%)		55.7	55.0	55.9
	Proportion of L2 variance explained (%)		16.9	18.1	17.3
	Proportion of L1 variance explained (%)		3.3	3.4	3.3
	N (individuals)	63548	55244	55244	55244

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; coefficients significant at a 5 percent level are in bold.

Table 7. Determinants of patriotism – the role of territorial differentiation

level	*Determinants*	0	I	II	III
Individual	Gender (girl ref cat)		**.227** (.016)	**.226** (.016)	**.227** (.016)
	Ethnic identity		**.473** (.028)	**.736** (.046)	**.471** (.028)
	Social background		**.014** (.007)	.012 (.007)	.013 (.014)
	Civic competence		**-.002** (.000)	**-.002** (.000)	**-.002** (.000)
	Open climate for classroom discussion		**.137** (.004)	**.137** (.004)	**.137** (.004)
Class	Ethnic composition		**.634** (.092)	**.661** (.093)	**.620** (.092)
	Social composition		**-.216** (.021)	**-.216** (.021)	**-.217** (.021)
National	Ethnic diversity		-.423 (.949)	-.401 (.954)	-.419 (.948)
	Territorial differentiation				
	Federal states (reference category)				
	School autonomy		.502 (.405)	**1.54** (.460)	.550 (.413)
	Decentralized states		**.984** (.408)	**2.18** (.536)	**1.01** (.420)
	Collaboration		.518 (.459)	**1.48** (.534)	.291 (.471)
	Centralized states		**.813** (.401)	**2.08** (.447)	**.828** (.408)
	School autonomy x ethnic identity			**-.358** (.073)	
	Decentralized states x ethnic identity			**-.411** (.117)	
	Collaboration x ethnic identity			**-.333** (.094)	
	Centralized states x ethnic identity			**-.437** (.066)	
	School autonomy x social background				-.011 (.018)
	Decentralized states x social background				-.005 (.022)
	Collaboration x social background				**.051** (.025)
	Centralized states x social background				-.004 (.018)
	ICC national level (L3) (%)	12.3			
	ICC class level (L2) (%)	6.1			
	ICC individual level (L1) (%)	81.6			
	Proportion of L3 variance explained (%)		47.4	46.8	47.4
	Proportion of L2 variance explained (%)		16.9	17.7	17.3
	Proportion of L1 variance explained (%)		3.3	3.3	3.3
	N (individuals)	63548	55244	55244	55244

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; coefficients significant at a 5 percent level are in bold.

Appendix 1 [ON-LINE VERSION ONLY]. Social Cohesion Values in the Curriculum

A brief review of education policies of several western countries reveals that ethnic tolerance and patriotism are indeed prominent objectives in the curriculum. Ethnic tolerance, phrased alternatively as respect for people with different views and/or cultural backgrounds and intercultural understanding/competence, is addressed in many policy documents. Thus, in the Netherlands one of the key national targets on citizenship for lower secondary education says that "pupils should learn to appreciate the societal value of respect for each other's views and lifestyles" (Government of the Netherlands 2008). Similarly, in the commentary to the cross-curricular theme of intercultural education, the government of Lower Saxony in federal Germany states that "In view of the internationalisation of all sections of society and the diversification of lifestyles, intercultural competence is a key skill for all children and adolescents" (Government of Lower Saxony 2008). Likewise, in Great Britain the National Curriculum for England and Wales states that Citizenship Education should foster respect for different national, religious and ethnic identities and encourage pupils to challenge injustice and discrimination (Government of the United Kingdom 2008). In sum, schools are expected to promote intercultural respect and equal treatment as key qualities pupils should acquire in order to function well as future citizens in pluralistic democracies.

Likewise it is not difficult to find evidence of patriotism being promoted. Interestingly, even many politicians on the left, who usually are very critical of attempts to enhance national unity, have dropped their reservations. For instance, in a famous speech to the Fabian Society in January 2006, Gordon Brown, who was then

chancellor of the Labour government, called on the political left to overcome their traditional fear of patriotism and "embrace the Union flag", stating that "We have to be clearer now about how diverse cultures which inevitably contain differences can find the essential common purpose without which no society can flourish" (BBC News 2008). Other countries have already put policies in place with the explicit purpose of enhancing national identity. The Netherlands for instance has created a national historical guideline ('Canon van Nederland') containing 50 'windows' of important persons and events in Dutch political history, which lower secondary education will be required to use from 1 January 2009. The advisory council that initiated the guideline motivated it by stating that the guideline was "an expression of our cultural identity" and that "particularly today our collective memory needs proper maintenance" (Canoncommissie 2008). Likewise, in Japan, the neo-conservative government headed by Koizumi initiated reforms aimed at restoring the feeling of national belonging and developing a "public spirit" (Nanta, 2009). The reforms included a new ceremony for playing the national anthem and flying the flag at school. Similarly, in France, teaching the national anthem La Marseillaise has become compulsory since the adoption of the 2005 Act on the Orientation and Program of the Future of Schools [Loi d'orientation et de programme pour l'avenir de l'ecole].

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Appendix 2. [ON-LINE VERSION ONLY] Composition of Index Variables

Civic knowledge and skills – This scale consists of a 38 items civic knowledge and skills test.

Open climate for classroom discussion (rated either as never, rarely, sometimes, or often):

1. 'Students feel free to disagree openly with their teachers about political and social issues during class'

2. 'Students are encouraged to make up their own minds about issues'

3. 'Teachers respect our opinion and encourage us to express them during class'

4. ' Students feel free to express opinions in class even when their opinions are different from most of the other students'

5. 'Teachers encourage us to discuss political or social issues about which people have different opinions'

Appendix 3. [ON-LINE VERSION ONLY] Values of Country-Level Control Variables

Country	Ethnic fractionalization	Democratic tradition 1999	GDP per capita 1999	Mipex 2007	Protestant culture
Au	.	51.00	25970.00	39.00	.00
Aus	.11	97.00	20050.00	.	1.00
BeFr	.56	51.00	24510.00	69.00	.00
Bul	.40	9.00	1380.00	.	.00
Can	.	79.00	19320.00	67.00	1.00
Chi	.19	9.00	4740.00	.	.00
Cyp	.	25.00	.	39.00	.00
Cze	.32	9.00	5060.00	48.00	.00
Den	.08	81.00	32030.00	44.00	1.00
Eng	.12	71.00	22640.00	63.00	1.00
Est	.	9.00	3480.00	46.00	1.00
Fin	.13	92.00	23780.00	67.00	1.00
Fra	.	54.00	23480.00	55.00	.00
Ger	.17	51.00	25350.00	53.00	.50
Gre	.16	24.00	11770.00	40.00	.00
Hun	.15	9.00	4650.00	48.00	.50
Ire	.	76.00	19160.00	53.00	.00
Ita	.11	43.00	19710.00	65.00	.00
Lat	.	9.00	2470.00	30.00	1.00
Lit	.	9.00	2620.00	45.00	.00
NL	.	77.00	24320.00	68.00	.50
Nor	.06	84.00	32880.00	64.00	1.00
Pol	.12	9.00	3960.00	44.00	.00
Por	.05	25.00	10600.00	79.00	.00
Rom	.31	9.00	1520.00	.	.00
Rus	.25	8.00	2270.00	.	.00
Slk	.	9.00	3590.00	40.00	.00
Slo	.	9.00	9890.00	55.00	.00
Sp	.	25.00	14000.00	61.00	.00
Swe	.06	78.00	25040.00	88.00	1.00
Swi	.53	28.00	38350.00	50.00	.50
USA	.49	79.00	30600.00	.	1.00

Appendix 4. [ON-LINE VERSION ONLY] Descriptive Statistics of the Control Variables

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	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Gender	64273	1 (girl)	2 (boy)	1.49	.500
Use of state language at home	58052	1 (never)	3 (always)	2.91	.328
Number of books at home	64147	1 (none)	6 (> 200)	4.29	1.351
Civic knowledge and skills (scale)	64573	9.47	165.19	101.3823	20.39930
Open climate (scale)	62283	2.58	15.54	10.0948	2.05145
Ethnolinguistic composition of class	64794	1.57	3.00	2.9117	.15236
Social composition of class	64799	1.63	6.00	4.2863	.74030
Democratic tradition	64820	17.00	106.00	50.9291	32.24855
Ethnic diversity	64820	.05	.56	.21	.15