# The Civic Attitudes of Ethnic Minority Youth and the Impact of Citizenship Education


## Abstract

This paper compares the civic attitudes of migrant and native youth in five West European countries, and explores the effect of citizenship education on the civic orientations of migrant children. Use is made of data from the IEA Civic Education survey. This survey involved a large study among 14-year olds in 28 countries. The paper finds that minority youth are more supportive of some civic values and less supportive of others in comparison to the ethnic majority. Minority support lags behind the majority on national pride, institutional and interpersonal trust, gender equality and critical stance. Differences between the two groups on gender equality and critical stance and to some degree also on the two trust indicators disappear however when social background variables are controlled for. It is concluded that differences between the allochtonous and autochthonous group in the espousal of civic values are mostly a reflection of social differences and that migrant cultures are not obstructing the adoption of these values. This contradicts the conservative notion that civic values are specific to western cultures and therefore incompatible with migrant cultures of other origins. It is further concluded that minority youth is likely to benefit more from citizenship education than the native group.



## Key words

Civic culture, political socialization, integration, ethnic minorities, migrants, citizenship education


## Introduction

The performance of ethnic minority children in the schools of West European states with large migrant communities has been a much discussed topic among scholars and policy makers since the 1980s. Attention has focused on their low achievement levels in language and maths in comparison to children from the dominant group, and on policies to overcome these shortcomings. Once ethnic minority children catch up with the autochthonous group on these matters, their integration in society and adoption of civic democratic attitudes will automatically follow, it was believed. Recently, however, and most certainly after 9-11, this instrumental view on the education and integration of immigrant children has been criticized. Commentators and policy makers have argued that a stress on knowledge and skills does not suffice to cultivate the norms and values seen to be underpinning the liberal democratic societies of Western Europe. Increasingly, the cultures of origin of migrant groups are seen as an obstacle to the adoption of these values. As a solution to this problem, some have proposed that schools should resume the traditional task of socializing children in the national culture. The inculcation of an overarching national identity , it is believed, would allow minority children to look beyond the narrow confines of their culture of origin and be conducive to the internalization of inclusive civic attitudes, solidarity and a sense of the common good. Miller (1995, p. 142) for instance holds that:

> The principle of nationality implies that schools should be seen, *inter alia*, as places where a common national identity is reproduced and children prepared for democratic citizenship. In the case of recently arrived immigrants whose sense of their national identity may be insecure, schools can act as a counterweight to the cultural environment of the family. It follows that schools should be public in character, places where members of different ethnic groups are thrown together and taught in common. It follows too that there should be something like a national curriculum, a core body of material that all children should be expected to assimilate.

In a similar spirit, the Council of Education, an independent advisory body to the Dutch government, has called for the re-institution of a national canon in the school curriculum, defining the canon as 'those precious parts of our culture and history we want the new generations to be educated in' (Onderwijsraad, 2005, pp. 119, 120). As another example of the changed discourse on the education of ethnic minorities, David Bell, the head of the school inspectorate for England and Wales, has suggested that Muslim faith schools were taking insufficient action to socialize children in the norms and values of British society (The Guardian, 17 January 2005).

In many cases it is simply assumed that ethnic minority children have an underdeveloped civic consciousness and that schools have the capacity to nurture the desired norms and values. Little is known however about the civic orientations of ethnic minority children in comparison to those of the autochthonous group, nor has much research been done into the effect of citizenship education on values formation specifically among immigrant youth. This article aims to shed light on these issues by analysing the survey data of the comprehensive IEA Civic Education project. This research project was carried out in 28 countries and tapped the civic knowledge, attitudes and engagement of fourteen year olds. The paper begins with a review of existing research on the development of civic identities among migrant groups and among youngsters. This is followed by a section on methodology which discusses the identification of the minority and majority group and looks at ways in which the elusive concept of civic culture can be made measurable.. Subsequently, two sections examine differences in support for civic values between minority and majority students and attempt to explain some of these variations. The last section briefly reviews some of the literature on the efficacy of citizenship education and examines students' views of their learning in schools.

## Civic culture and immigrant youth

This article is located at the intersection of two strands of research: the socialization of ethnic minorities in the culture and politics of the host society and the formation of civic attitudes among adolescents. To begin with the first of these strands, it must be noted that the political and cultural integration of immigrants was not much of an issue for well into the 1980s. Modernists assumed that immigrants would eventually adopt the political and cultural mores of the native group provided they were treated equally and were not facing obstacles to participate in the host society (Deutsch 1966; Gellner 1983). National culture and minority culture were not seen as conflicting: the former widened the horizon of immigrants by offering them job opportunities, social mobility and active citizenship in the national political community, the latter fulfilled the important psychological needs of

group belonging, security and shelter. There was thus a clear division of tasks. National culture was the vehicle of interaction in public life, minority culture was confined to the private circle of kin and friends. With the passing of generations people of foreign descent would gradually lose their ethnic roots and assimilate to the dominant culture, it was believed.

This view came to be challenged by multiculturalists in the 1970s and 1980s. They criticized modernists for privileging the culture of the dominant group over those ethnic minority cultures and argued that all cultures ought to be treated equally. In their view, ethnic minorities will only give their consent to the political institutions of the host society on the basis of strong and confident minority cultures, appreciated and promoted by the state. For multiculturalists, the political integration of immigrants is thus achieved via a 'detour': they first need to be socialized in their own cultures before they can feel part of the receiving society (Berger, Galonska and Koopmans 2004: 492).

Multiculturalism, however, was loosing popularity towards the close of the Millennium. Increasingly politicians and opinion leaders believed that policies supporting immigrant cultures isolated and marginalized ethnic minorities rather than encouraged their integration in society. Consequently, some have called for *interculturalism* as an approach that refocuses on the incorporation and participation of migrant groups in the wider society while trying to avoid the nation-centred and Eurocentred bias of modernism (e.g. Gundara 2000). Others have gone much further in their critique of multiculturalism and by proposing that the civic values of western democracies are not culturally neutral but part of a Christian-humanist tradition that dates back to the Middle Ages. Migrant cultures of a non-European origin, allegedly, do not share these values and governments actually erode democracy by promoting such cultures. Huntingdon for instance claims that the typical American political values of liberty, equality before the law, individual responsibility, and laissez-faire [called 'the Creed' by Huntingdon] originate from Anglo-Protestant culture. He warns that 'a multicultural America will, in time, become a multicreedal America, with groups with different cultures espousing distinctive political values and principles rooted in their particular cultures' (Huntingdon 2004: 340). Huntingdon's conclusions are supported by research showing that ethnic descent is a significant factor shaping the civic attitudes of contemporary Americans. Thus, using data from the World Values Survey and the cumulative General Social Surveys, Rice and Feldman (1997) found that the civic attitudes of Americans are remarkably similar to those of European nations with whom they share common ancestors. Ethnicity remained a significant predictor in their study even after controlling for individual background variables. Rice and Feldman nonetheless stress that socio-demographic variables and conditions not covered by their analysis are also important factors influencing civic attitudes.

Developments in social capital theory have also contributed to the scepticism about multiculturalism. Whereas initially social capital theorists thought that *any* kind of civic organizations would be conducive to social trust and participation in national institutions (e.g. Putnam 1993), later they made a distinction between *bonding* and *bridging* forms of social capital (Newton 1999; Green, Preston and Sabates 2003). Only civic organizations that included people of various ethnic and social backgrounds were seen as contributing to mutual trust and social cohesion. Organizations that merely bonded people of the same ethnicity or denomination could in fact lead to less social trust

and more divisiveness (Putnam 2000). The presumed detrimental effect of ethnic organizations has not been supported however by studies in various European countries. In their study of immigrant communities in Amsterdam, Fennema and Tillie for instance found that the denser the ethnic organizational network of an immigrant group the more they participated in local – non-ethnic – political institutions. This led them to the provocative tentative conclusion that 'to have undemocratic ethnic organisations is better for the democratic process than to have no organisations at all' (Fennema and Tillie:. 723). Similarly, examining various migrant groups in Berlin, Berger, Galonska and Koopmans (2004) observed that there was not a trade off between participation in ethnic organizations and interest in German politics. Intriguingly, they found a strong positive correlation between interest in the politics of the country of origin and interest in German politics, which suggests that general political interest is the key factor shaping political integration and participation.

The second strand of research informing the present study relates to the formation of civic values among youngsters. There are two dimensions to this strand that are of particular interest to this study. The first deals with the question whether there has been a steady decline in political interest and sense of civic duty among adolescents over the last 40 years. Conservative pedagogues seem to readily assume that there has, attributing the decline to increasing individualism, consumerism and pluralism in western societies. Though not speaking specifically about younsters, Putnam (2000), for instance, identifies television watching as the main culprit for the steady fall in civic engagement and activity levels in the United States over the last 40 years. Yet research findings do not support the idea of a continuous retreat of civic consciousness since the mid-1960s. Even if research today found low levels of political interest and participation, that would by no means imply that levels have declined as Torney, Oppenheim and Farren (1975) have already observed disappointing levels of civic awareness among youngsters in the early 1970s. Back then, this led them to the sobering conclusion that 'the widely-held objective of producing loyal, informed, critical, and actively participating citizens was not successfully attained in any of the [nine] countries [of the study]' (quoted in Hahn 1998: 22; brackets mine). Moreover, a two points in time study by Hahn (1998) among 14-20 year olds revealed that there were contrasting trends in a number of western countries. Whereas political interest was higher in 1993 than in 1986 in Denmark, the United States and England, it decreased in the Netherlands and Germany over the same period. Others have argued that it is not so much political engagement as such that has changed as the way it is expressed, with youngsters since the end of the 1960s increasingly prone to exchange traditional modes of participation (voting, membership of a political party) for involvement in lifestyle and single-issue based movements (Inglehart 1990). Indeed, the aforementioned IEA Civic Education study found that youngsters in most countries are much more willing to collect signatures for a petition and to join peaceful demonstrations than to engage in conventional political activities beyond voting (Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald and Schulz 2001). In sum research evidence does not sustain the claim that there has been a steady overall decline in civic values among youngsters in western societies.

This leads me to the second question relevant for the current study: to what extent are civic attitudes of adolescents indicative of later opinions in adulthood? Here the evidence of research is inconclusive. Some maintain that teenagers' political outlooks and

identities are still highly flexible and will only stabilize after age 30 (Flannagan and Sherrod 1998; Costa and McCrae 1994). But several longitudinal studies have shown that the political dispositions of youth do predict the civic attitudes and participation levels of grown-ups (Miller and Kimmel 1997; Damico, Conway and Damico 2000).

## Methodology

### *Identifying the native and the immigrant population*

As noted before, the IEA civic education survey among 14-year-olds provided the data for this paper. This survey was conducted in April 1999 among a sample of 90,000 adolescents in 28 European and non-European countries. From this collection of countries I selected only those countries which had sizable immigrant populations, i.e. England, Sweden, Germany, (French) Belgium, and Switzerland. [1]

Until now I have used the terms immigrants and ethnic minorities interchangeably, but it needs to be underlined that the non-natives in a western society constitute a highly heterogeneous group in demographic, cultural and socio-economic terms. This raises the question of which criterion can best be used to define ethnic minorities and distinguish them from the autochthonous group. The IEA Cived questionnaire contains three items which could be used for this purpose: country of birth, use of the country's language, and ethnic identification. The latter was chosen to tell the migrant population and the dominant ethnic group apart. Using country of birth as criterion has the disadvantage that only the most recent group of newcomers would constitute the allochthonous group. Children born in the receiving country with immigrant parents would simply be subsumed under the dominant group. Use of the county's language, which was worded as 'how often do you speak [language of test] at home' with the answer possibilities <never>, <sometimes> and <always or almost always>, is unsuitable because it conflates social and cultural elements. In addition to an identity statement, reported language use is more than likely reflecting the social status of the respondent's family. It therefore runs the risk of identifying social rather than cultural groups. As it is precisely one of the aims of this study to assess to what extent social conditions can explain differences between the autochthonous and allochthonous groups, the criterion used to distinguish the two groups should ideally not have many social implications.

I thus used ethnic identification as the distinguishing criterion. Respondents were asked to state which group *best described them*. Regrettably, this item has been asked differently in the countries participating in the survey (see Table 1 below). Not only did the question vary, also the answer categories differed from country to country (compare for instance Germany and Switzerland, which ask the respondent to state his/her state citizenship, to the other three countries where the question taps subjective identification).[2] However, as the ensuing analyses will show, the pattern of civic attitudes among natives and migrants is remarkably similar across the five countries examined in this study. This reassured me that the varying ways in which ethnic identification was measured did not have a major distorting impact. I labelled those who reported belonging to the titular nation as the autochthonous or 'majority' group and those who affiliated

with other, mostly non-European nations as the migrant or 'minority' group. Table 1 provides the sample characteristics of both groups in the five countries. As far as possible respondents from other West-European nations have been excluded from the minority group (some inclusion of West-Europeans could not be avoided because of the use of the "other" category in a number of countries). The minority group, though differing substantially from country to country in its composition, therefore mostly contains adolescents from non-western cultures.

**Table 1 about here**

*Specifying and measuring a civic democratic culture*

If politicians say that ethnic minorities have to be socialised in the civic democratic culture of western societies, what do they mean by this? What are the characteristics of this culture and how can adherence to it be measured? I draw from the works of two theorists to come to grips with the concept. Putnam (1993), the first of these theorists, identified four components to the concept of civic culture: civic engagement, political equality; solidarity, trust, and tolerance; and social structures of cooperation.

Civic engagement refers primarily to active participation in public affairs. Engaged citizens are interested in issues beyond their private concerns, feel involved and committed to these wider issues and are prepared to invest time and energy for the benefit of the public good without regard for their personal interest. The *expected political participation* variable of the IEA Cived data set was selected to tap civic engagement. This variable is a ready made scale composed of the following three items in the survey:[3]

*Expected political participation* ('expected participation in political activities')
'When you are an adult, what do you expect that you will do?'
(1) 'Join a political party'
(2) 'Write letters to a newspaper about social or political concerns'
(3) 'Be a candidate for a local or city office'
Answer categories: I will certainly not do this – I will probably not do this – I will probably do this – I will certainly do this

Political equality refers to the notion of equal rights and duties for all members of society. Proper citizens do not discriminate on grounds of religion, gender, ethnicity and sexual preference. They 'interact as equals, not as patrons and clients nor as governors and petitioners' (Putnam, 1993: 88). I used the scale variable *women's rights* to measure support for the idea of political equality. It includes the following questions (Torney Purta et al. 2001):

*Women's rights* ('attitudes towards women's political and economic rights')
(1) 'Women should run for public office and take part in the government just as men do'
(2) 'Women should have the same rights as men in every way'
(3) 'Women should stay out of politics' (negative)

(4) 'When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women' (negative)
(5) 'Men and women should get equal pay when they are in the same jobs'
(6) 'Men are better qualified to be political leaders than women' (negative)
(strongly disagree – disagree – agree – strongly agree)

Solidarity, trust and tolerance. People in a civic society have a basic level of trust in one another and are able from this position to express feelings of solidarity with fellow citizens and respect their opinions and backgrounds even if these differ substantially from their own points of view. I tapped solidarity by a self-constructed scale combining the following two items:[4]

*Solidarity:* "How likely would you be to .."
"Volunteer time to help [benefit] [poor or elderly] people in the community"
"Collect money for a social cause"
(I will certainly not do this – I will probably not do this – I will probably do this – I will certainly do this)

Trust was measured by an item on confidence in compatriots:

*Trust:* "How much of the time can you trust each of the following institutions?"
"The people who live in this country"
(never – only some of the time – most of the time – always)

A scale reflecting attitudes on immigrants was used as a proxy for tolerance:

*Ethnic tolerance* ('positive attitudes toward immigrants')
(1) 'Immigrants should have the opportunity to keep their own language'
(2) 'Immigrants' children should have the same opportunities for education that other children in the country have'
(3) 'Immigrants who live in a country for several years should have the opportunity to vote in elections'
(4) 'Immigrants should have the opportunity to keep their own customs and lifestyle'
(5) 'Immigrants should have all the same rights that everyone else in a country has'
(strongly disagree – disagree – agree – strongly agree)

Social structures of cooperation. By participating in associations of whatever kind individuals learn to cooperate and trust others, broaden their horizons and develop an understanding and commitment to overarching causes. This component was proxied by an item on participation in a student organization:

*Cooperation:* 'Have you participated in the following organizations?'
'A student council / student government [class or school parliament]'
(no – yes)

Putnam has a distinct micro-level conception of civic culture. In my view, however, a civic democratic culture not only involves individual dispositions but also elements of a collective, societal nature. Immigrants are confronted with these societal-level characteristics as they invariably have to get accustomed to the mores and institutions of the particular political community they have become part of. Western governments seek

to enhance the identification of ethnic minorities with the nation and to convince them of the value of the nation's democratic political institutions. Norris (1999) has paid particular attention to these more macro elements of civic democratic culture. She distinguished five dimensions to the political attitudes of people: support for the political community, for regime principles, for regime performance, for regime institutions and for political actors. For the purpose of this study I only focus on support for the political community and support for regime institutions.

Support for the political community refers to 'a basic attachment to the nation beyond the present institutions of government and a general willingness to co-operate politically' (*ibid*., p. 10). In this conception, the nation is seen purely as a political entity, separated from other nations by state borders and citizenship status. Norris concedes however that in addition to these formal boundaries the nation may be conceived of in ethnic, religious or language terms. If the nation is indeed informally understood as comprising only the autochthonous group, will ethnic minorities then ever feel part of the nation or will they feel excluded permanently? I tapped attachment to the nation by selecting the following scale variable from the IEA dataset:

*National pride* ('positive attitudes toward one's nation')
(1) 'The flag of this country is important to me'
(2) 'I have great love for this country'
(3) 'This country should be proud of what it has achieved'
(4) 'I would prefer to live permanently in another country'
(strongly disagree – disagree – agree – strongly agree)

Support for regime institutions concerns generalized backing, i.e. confidence in and approval of institutions irrespective of the politicians or leaders currently in charge of these institutions. The scale variable *institutional trust* was used as an indicator of support for regime institutions:

*Institutional trust* ('trust in government-related institutions')
'How much of the time can you trust each of the following institutions?'
(1) national government, (2) local government, (3) courts, (4) the police, (5) political parties, (6) national parliament.
(never – only some of the time – most of the time – always)

Critical stance

Lastly, an aspect that is usually also associated with civic culture and one that is curiously ignored by Putnam is a critical stance. Kymlicka (2002), for instance, sees the questioning of political authority as a key virtue distinguishing a citizen in a modern democracy from a subject in an authoritarian society. The research of Anderson et al. (1997) is also indicative of the importance of this aspect of civic culture. Asking teachers in the United States to state their opinion on good citizenship, they found that almost half wanted students to be educated as citizens with a critical attitude towards people in power. I tapped critical stance with the following item:

*Critical stance:* "When people who are critical of the government are forbidden from speaking at public meetings, that is … "

(very bad for democracy – somewhat bad for democracy – somewhat good for democracy – very good for democracy)

**The civic attitudes of ethnic minority children**

In this section I examine to what extent the minority differs from the majority in support for civic values across the five countries of this study. Analyses of variance show a general minority-majority effect for all the nine components of civic culture identified in the previous section. For all but one of these components there are also significant inter-country differences, and on five components we find interaction effects (i.e. the gap between the two groups varies significantly from country to country).[5] There are thus meaningful differences between the minority and the majority both at a general level and in specific countries.

We need to look more closely at the data, however, to determine the exact nature of these differences. Table 2 presents the mean levels of support for civic values among the minority and majority in each of the five countries.. The values of the scale variables from the Cived dataset have been standardized to the mean for all countries that participated in the IEA study (28), an international mean which is set at value 10. This explains why the mean values for these scales range between 8 and 12 in the table. The picture emerging from Table 2 is that minority youth in all five countries are less trusting of state institutions, less trustful of their fellow citizens, less patriotic, less supportive of gender equality, and less critical than members of the dominant group.[6]. These results may be said to be in conformity with the opinion that immigrants have difficulty in adapting to the political mores of the host country and in developing a bond with it. Their lower score on institutional trust could indicate that immigrants do not consider the institutions of the state as theirs or that they feel excluded from them. There could be some plausibility in this interpretation given that ethnic minority youth also displays significantly less attachment to the state (i.e. national pride) than majority youth in all of the five countries. The generally lower levels of support for gender equality among minority youth likewise seem to confirm the belief that civic notions of equality and participation for all are not part of most immigrant cultures. Equally in line with common opinion are the lagging levels of interpersonal trust in the minority group, which is easily interpreted as an indicator of the alleged mentality in many cultures of origin of exploiting the other before (s)he exploits you. Finally, the less critical attitudes towards power holders supports the popular idea that migrants are not used to question authority because of the authoritarian political cultures in their home countries.

**Table 2 about here**

It must be noted however that there is considerable variation between the minority groups across the five countries. On support for women's rights for instance minority youth in Sweden and in French Belgium have scores below the international mean, whereas their peers in Germany, Switzerland and England show higher than average scores. In England minority youth is even more supportive than majority youth although this difference is not significant. Differences are also substantial on institutional trust with mean scores of minority youth ranging from 9.3 in French Belgium to 10.5 in Switzerland. The cross-

national differences between the minority groups could be related to the cultural composition of the migrant population in each country, to characteristics of the host society or to a combination of these factors. Judging from the pattern of scores on the patriotism scale, the host society does leave its mark on the political attitudes of the immigrant population as the rank order of mean scores of the minority groups corresponds to that of the majority groups on this variable. In other words, in countries where the majority group shows relatively high levels of patriotism so does the minority group, and correspondingly where the majority has relatively low levels so has the minority. The national context thus seems to matter, indicating that the political identities and opinions of migrant groups are not solidly anchored in their cultures of origin but amenable to change by processes in the host society.

Interestingly, on the remaining components of civic culture the difference between the minority and majority is in favour of the former: minority youngsters express higher levels of solidarity, are more tolerant towards immigrants and state higher levels of school and political involvement than majority adolescents across all five countries. To begin with ethnic tolerance, the higher levels of endorsement for this aspect of civic culture are likely to be connected to an awareness among minority respondents that they are themselves (descendents of) migrants and are seen as such by the dominant group. Having negative opinions about migrants would thus entail thinking negatively about oneself. The conclusion that minority youth have most likely identified with migrants is reinforced by the magnitude of the difference between the minority and majority mean scores. In all five countries this difference is very large, ranging from 1.2 in England to as much as 2.4 in Germany. On none of the other four topics are differences between minority and majority groups so pronounced. The stark differences of opinion suggest that migrant issues are a contentious topic and possibly a source of conflict between minority and majority youngsters. The high levels of ethnic tolerance among minority youth certainly do not support the idea that immigrants and their offspring are even more intolerant towards newcomers than the autochthonous group.

Equally noteworthy are the data on cooperation (being involved in a student organization) and expected political participation. Regarding the former, it can be seen that minority and majority youth show practically equal cooperation levels in French Belgium, Germany and Sweden, while in England and Switzerland minority youth claims significantly higher involvement in student councils. Furthermore, minority youth have slightly higher levels of expected political participation than majority youth in all five countries, although the difference is only significant in England. How can it be explained that ethnic minority children appear to be slightly more active in student organizations and expect to be politically active in slightly higher numbers than the majority group while on average they are less trusting of state institutions than the latter? One reason could be that they equate state institutions with the current government. They thus may not express a lack of confidence in the functioning of democratic state institutions as such but more in the people currently in charge of these institutions (i.e. the government). They might feel badly represented by the government, motivating them to become politically active once they are adults. The surprising mismatch between involvement in student councils and expected political participation on the one hand and lack of trust in state institutions on the other could thus well be related to a desire to change an unresponsive political elite at the national level. An alternative explanation could be that

minority youth imagine their political involvement to be at the local or regional level rather than the national one, for instance in order to further the interests of their local ethnic community. It has to be remembered that one of the items composing the expected political participation scale is standing as a candidate for a local or city office. For minority youth it may thus be feasible to combine *local* political activism in support of their ethnic group with lack of trust in *national* institutions. If this explanation is valid, it would provide purchase to the aforementioned argument that civic cooperation of the bonding type is not necessarily conducive to social cohesion.

A difference in scope might also shed light on the seemingly contradictory finding that the minority groups combine *higher* levels of solidarity with *lower* levels of interpersonal trust across all five countries. Why would minority youth help the poor and the elderly and raise money for a social cause (the two indicators for solidarity) if they do not trust their fellow citizens much? Possibly minority respondents had a much narrower group in mind (e.g. members of their own ethnic group) as the target group for solidarity actions than the national community referred to by the item on interpersonal trust. Indeed, the first solidarity item is worded in a way that it restricts the scope of people to the elderly and the poor *in the community* (see previous section). Thus, as with expected political participation, the scores on the solidarity scale may reflect the bonding type of social capital.

**Explaining differential support**

The previous section showed that minority students are more engaged, more helpful and more tolerant towards immigrants than majority students and suggested reasons for these differences. In this section we have a closer look at the components of civic culture that were endorsed to a greater degree by the majority, i.e. at institutional trust, women's rights, national pride, interpersonal trust and critical stance. As noted before the pattern of support for these components is in line with the popular belief that the cultural background of non-western immigrants seriously complicates the adoption of civic values. Yet, it is worth exploring whether these differences are a reflection of social inequalities. Does ethnic identification (i.e. identification with either the majority or a minority group) remain a significant factor after social background variables have been controlled for? To assess the impact of social factors I performed stepwise regression analyses on each of the civic values that received stronger majority support, using the respondent's score on a civic knowledge and skills test, the use of the state language at home, the number of books at home, expected years of further education, and the level of education of parents in addition to ethnic identification as predictor variables.

**Table 3 about here**

Table 3 presents the results of these analyses for the five countries individually. It only includes the coefficients of the predictor variables which are statistically significant at a 95% or 99% level. The results show that the strength of ethnic identification varies

substantially across the five components of civic culture. In the regression on national pride it is a more important variable than any of the social variables in four of the five countries. By contrast, it ceases to be a significant factor in accounting for institutional trust in three of the five countries, with expected years of further education, civic test score and use of the state language at home being equally or more important predictors. Likewise it only remains a significant driver of interpersonal trust in England. In the other countries variations in interpersonal trust are mostly explained by civic test score and use of the state language. In the regressions on gender equality and critical stance ethnic identification disappears altogether as a significant condition. The variations on these indicators are solely accounted for by social variables in all five countries. The fact that there is only an independent effect of ethnic identification on national pride supports our conjecture stated before that patriotic sentiment may express more than loyalty to a political community alone. It probably also reflects allegiances to the dominant ethnic group. Ethnic minorities may have associated symbols of patriotism such as the flag, the anthem and special achievements in history and in sports with the particular culture of the dominant group, a culture they feel they may only be able to become part of by completely discarding their own cultural background. By contrast, gender equality and a critical attitude towards authority may have been interpreted by ethnic minorities as more universal values, i.e. as values independent of ethnic majority culture. This may be the key to understanding why ethnic minorities express as much support for the latter two components of civic culture as majority groups when controlling for a number of social variables. When assessing the civic attitudes of immigrant groups, one may thus have to make a distinction between universal values and symbols associated with a particular culture.

The results of the regression analyses may be said to be encouraging. They show that the espousal of civic and democratic values is essentially a social matter and not a cultural one. This refutes the views of cultural pessimists and conservatives who hold that democratic and civic values are particular to western nations and therefore incompatible with immigrant cultures of non-western origin. Neither do the results square with those of Rice and Feldman (1997), who concluded from a comparison of Americans with European nations of the same ethnic stock that the ethnocultural roots of Americans are a decisive factor in accounting for their civic attitudes (see before). The contrasting results could be related to the age of the respondents: the IEA Cived study used for this article sampled 14 year olds while Rice and Feldman made use of studies surveying adults. Possibly, migrant youth only develop an awareness of their ethnic and cultural origins in early adulthood and adjust their political outlooks accordingly. This would mean that ethnic identification matters above all for the adult population. Alternatively, there may be a cohort effect with different cleavage lines developing in the current generation of adolescents as compared to the previous ones. However, whatever the explanation for the difference, our analyses suggest that migrant youth are not predestined to have deficient civic orientations when they are reared in families with a non-western cultural background. If differences are evident between ethnic minorities and the dominant group in the adult population, they may well have developed only in late adolescence.

At this point a word of caution needs to be said about the amount of variance explained by the predictor variables. As Table 3 shows, these variables explain just a fraction of the variation in national pride, institutional trust and interpersonal trust. Their

performance on women's rights and critical stance is slightly better with the explained variance ranging from 4.1 to 19.1 per cent for these two indicators across the five countries. This means that conditions not covered in the analyses (and possibly not present in the study altogether) have a much stronger impact on the five response variables than the ones presented here. In fact ethnic identification is only significant in regressions with negligible percentages of explained variance. This all the more illustrates how unimportant ethnic identification is as a predictor variable. Possibly, religion and religiosity are important variables. It is a pity that the IEA Cived survey did not include questions on these topics.

Another point worth highlighting is the semantic cohesion of the concept of civic culture. How have the various aspects of civic culture examined in this study been interpreted by the respondents? Are these aspects so strongly interrelated that they all form one overarching syndrome that could be identified as civic culture, or do they constitute relatively independent entities that could even be at odds with one another? We carried out simple bivariate correlations between the civic culture components to address this question (see Table 4 the data of which only pertain to ethnic minorities). The results show remarkably similar patterns of correlations across the five countries. More importantly, they do not bode well for the internal coherence of the concept of civic culture. Not only are some components quite unrelated to others (e.g. the correlation between women's rights and institutional trust or between women's rights and national pride), there are also instances of a trade off between two components (the negative correlation between tolerance on the one hand and national pride and expected political participation on the other). A principle component analysis of the civic culture components confirms this observation. In a varimax rotated solution it identifies at least three dimensions with eigenvalues of more than one in each of the five countries.[7] In all countries but French Belgium a dimension can be found that combines national pride with institutional and interpersonal trust. Another dimension clusters women's rights and ethnic tolerance in the same group of countries. In Table 4 these dimensions are reflected by the high positive correlations between the items the dimensions include.. It is clear from these results that civic culture embraces a collection of highly diverse values and ideas that are not necessarily supporting one another. This observation has important consequences for citizenship education. If western governments believe that they can socialize ethnic minorities into the civic culture of their societies by educating them in national history and culture, they may well only promote *some* aspects of civic culture while actually discouraging the learning of others. The next section briefly discusses the efficacy of citizenship education in schools.

**Table 4 about here**

## Civic attitudes and citizenship education

Can citizenship education positively influence the civic attitudes of ethnic minority youth? Assessing the precise impact of specific school programmes on attitudes and opinions is a daunting task as this influence is so difficult to isolate from other conditions

that affect youngsters' outlooks – family, friends, community organizations, and the media. A study with this ambition would have to involve a sophisticated methodological design with time series measurement and experimental and control groups. The current article cannot live up to that ambition as the IEA Cived survey) was a snap shot taken at a single point in time. I can however make use of subjective accounts of school effectiveness as the IEA study asked students to give their views on how much they had learned from school. These data may not reflect the actual effect of school practices accurately but they are likely to be indicative of it.

The evidence of existing research is not very encouraging for the advocates of citizenship education. Examining the relation between education and racism, Hagendoorn (1999) for instance notes that the number of years of formal schooling has a much greater effect on ethnic and racial tolerance than the content of the curriculum. Likewise, Langton and Jennings (1968), who studied the political orientations of American high school seniors, found that government and civics courses only had a weak impact on levels of political knowledge, political interest, political efficacy, political participation and civic tolerance. They suggested that information redundancy might explain the disappointing result of civics courses: if students have already absorbed a great deal of information from other sources, such as family, peers and the mass media, it is unlikely that they will receive much new input from schools. To investigate whether redundancy played a role, they analysed a sub-sample of African Americans among whom information redundancy was expected to occur less frequently in view of their disadvantaged social backgrounds and exclusion from public life.[8] In other words, they expected African Americans students to have much less access to alternative sources of information than their White counterparts, leaving schools the opportunity to compensate for the information deprivation. Schools should thus be more effective in teaching civic knowledge and values to African Americans than to Whites. The results for the sub-sample indeed confirmed their expectation: The number of civics courses attended had a much stronger impact on the political knowledge, political efficacy and civic tolerance levels of African American students than on those of their White peers.

Langton and Kent Jennings results are highly relevant for this paper. As ethnic minorities in Western Europe are roughly in the same vulnerable social position as African Americans in the United States, would they also experience an information deficit, and would, as a corollary, civics education play a vital role in reducing the gap with the dominant group? Before turning to this question, it must be noted that Langton and Jennings' study has been criticised by Niemi and Junn (1998) for being too negative on the effect of civics curriculum. Unlike Langton and Jennings, they found that school factors did have a substantial bearing on the political *knowledge* of American high school students, although their effect on political *attitudes* was marginal. Furthermore, and in total contrast to Langton and Jennings, they found that African Americans benefited *less* from civics education than Whites. To account for these dramatically different results Niemi and Junn point to the changed position of African Americans in American society. Although African Americans were still overrepresented among the poor sections of the population in the 1990s, they did not face the total exclusion and marginalization of the mid-1960s when Langton and Jennings carried out their study. Possibly therefore Langton and Jennings' information redundancy argument no longer applies for more recent times.

So let us now see if the IEA data on ethnic minority youth match Langton and Jennings' or Niemi and Junn's findings. The IEA Cived study asked students to express their degree of agreement with the following statements regarding the effect of school on their civic knowledge and attitudes:

1. In school I have learned to be a patriotic and loyal citizen of my country (patriotism)
2. In school I have learned to understand people who have different ideas (pluralism)
3. In school I have learned to be concerned about what happens in other countries (interest in foreign countries)
4. In school I have learned about the importance of voting in national and local elections (elections)

Set answers: <strongly disagree> <disagree> <agree> <strongly agree>

We refer to these items by the terms in parentheses. As it turns out, a principal component analysis obtained a neat one-factor solution for the four items in all five countries, with alpha reliabilities for the corresponding scale ranging from .55 for Germany to .61 for French Belgium.[9] Table 5 presents the means on these items and on the scale (which was labelled 'civic education') for the minority and majority groups in each country. Mean values of more than 2.5 on the individual items indicate endorsement, while values of less than 2.5 indicate disagreement. The table also includes the difference of means between the two groups with negative values meaning that the minority group is more positive about the effect of schooling on their learning than the dominant group.

Before analysing the data of the table, it must be noted that there are significant majority-minority, country and interaction effects, as an analysis of variance revealed.[10] More particularly I found significant majority-minority differences on the civic education scale and on all individual items except patriotism. Significant between and within country differences were also found on all four items. This demonstrates that native students and students of migrant origin do appreciate the effect of schooling quite differently and that this difference varies between countries. Turning now to Table 5 to explore the nature and direction of these differences, we see, first of all, that it depends very much on the particular item whether students consider schools to have contributed to their leaning. Students in both groups and in all countries are much more positive about pluralism and interest in foreign countries, as topics and values they have learnt from school than about patriotism and elections. The pattern of responses is not as uniform across countries if differences between the minority and majority group are considered. While the majority group in French Belgium appreciates school education slightly more than the minority group on three items, the situation is radically different in Germany and Sweden. In these two countries the minority group is more positive about school learning than the majority group on all four items and on the civic education scale. Most importantly however, the mean differences between the two groups are only significant in cases where minority students value school education more than majority students (this happens in four of the five countries). These results clearly match those of Langton and Jennings on the difference in effectiveness of civics courses between African Americans and Whites. They thus support the idea that schools can fulfil a useful role in helping disadvantaged groups to catch up with the dominant group and thus in creating a more equal distribution of knowledge, skills and attitudes among the student population.

**Table 5 about here**

It is worth exploring the possible disproportionate benefit of school education for ethnic minorities in more detail however. If ethnic minorities indeed learn more from schools than the dominant group because their modest socio-economic backgrounds have complicated the collection of information from sources other than the school, then it can be expected that *within* the minority group children from more endowed families do not gain as much from school education as children from less privileged circles. I examinedd this relationship by focusing on the minority group and performing stepwise regression analyses of individual factors (civic test score and expected years of further education) and family background variables (education mother, education father, number of books at home and use of state language at home) on the civic education scale. The results were disappointing. Only three variables had a significant impact on student appreciations of their learning: use of state language in Germany, education father in Sweden and civic test score in Switzerland (with beta coefficients of .22, -.25 and -.23 respectively). In the last two cases the relationship *was* in the expected direction (negative), indicating that the more privileged the family background and the more talented the individual student the less school education was thought to have had an effect on the student's learning. Yet, as merely three out of thirty correlations proved significant (6 variables x 5 countries), these data provide only marginal support for the information redundancy / deficit argument In all likelihood factors such as personal interest and motivation, teacher popularity, peer pressure and the status of civics as a subject influence evaluations of school learning to a much greater degree than socio-economic background.

## Conclusion

It is often assumed that migrants of non-European origin do not and even cannot embrace the civic democratic values of western societies. The findings of the current study do not support this view. Ethnic minority youth were more supportive than majority youth of four aspects of civic culture in the five countries of this study. Minority consent lagged behind that of the dominant group on five indicators of civic culture: national pride, institutional trust, interpersonal trust, women's rights and critical stance. The difference between the two groups however disappeared entirely on women's rights and critical stance and to a large extent also on the two trust indicators when several social background variables were controlled for. The only indicator for which ethnic identification, the item in the dataset used to distinguish the minority from the majority group, continued to matter in all five countries was national pride.

This pattern of results suggests that ethnic minorities consider most aspects of civic culture as universal values rather than values specific to the culture and identity of the dominant group. The adoption of some of these values, most notably gender equality, primarily depends on social conditions, which indicates that migrant cultures are not

posing insurmountable obstacles to the internalization of civic values by members of a migrant community. The exception is national pride. In contrast to the other aspects of civic culture it is likely that this component *is* associated with the particular culture of the autochthonous population. Minority group members may feel that by expressing affinity with national symbols they are in fact assimilating to the culture of the dominant group at the expense of their cultures of origin. Alternatively, a sense of exclusion may have prompted them to reject cultural symbols they hold to be representative of the dominant group's identity.

As this research has not found indications of civic values being prevalent only among the autochthonous groups in the five countries of this study, the argument of cultural conservatives that civic culture is specific to western cultures is not supported. This is good news for all those concerned about the socialization of immigrant groups into the civic democratic culture of western societies. It means that civic values can be nurtured and internalized without migrant cultures obstructing the process.

Nonetheless, a number of qualifications have to be made. Firstly, I have investigated the civic attitudes of adolescents (14 year olds) only. To what extent do these predict views later on in adulthood? Evidence from existing research is contradictory about the changeability of the opinions and identities of teenagers. Some scholars maintain they are highly flexible while others do see them as important forecasts of adult views. However, regardless of whether the development of civic attitudes from adolescence to adulthood constitutes an age effect, a cohort effect or perhaps a process that affects the entire population, the findings of this study indicate that being reared in immigrant cultures does not prevent ethnic minority youth from adopting civic values. Hence they are not predestined to develop a faulty civic consciousness from the day they are born.

Secondly, the findings of this study suggest that the notion of civic culture unites such diverse ideas and values, some of which seem to stand in a competitive relation, that it is in all likelihood impossible to develop a teaching programme that benefits all these aspects equally. A programme, for instance, that focuses on national history and culture may well contribute to patriotism and trust in national institutions, but it is unlikely to affect gender attitudes much and it may well be detrimental to respect for and understanding of other cultures. Educational practitioners should therefore first determine which aspects of civic culture need special attention before selecting a certain programme or teaching method.

Finally, a brief review of research on the effectiveness of citizenship education showed that courses in civics and government only have a marginal positive effect on the civic knowledge and attitudes of youngsters. On the plus side however the results of the current study have corroborated the findings of earlier research which showed that socially disadvantaged ethnic groups benefit more from civics courses than the dominant group. This means that schools might well have the potential to reduce inter-ethnic inequalities in levels of civic knowledge, skills and attitudes.

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**Endnotes**

1. Unfortunately, other countries with large immigrants groups such as France and The Netherlands were not part of the study. Denmark, Italy and Norway did participate in the survey, but these countries were not selected because their questionnaires did not include the item ("which best describes you") that the current study uses to distinguish the minority from the majority group.

2. The way the question was asked in Germany and Switzerland (i.e. about state citizenship) does not exclude second or third generation immigrant children from the migrant group as the two countries have until recently had very restrictive naturalization policies which did not confer state citizenship on children from immigrant families born in the country. The migrant group in these countries therefore approximately covers the same people as those in England, Sweden and French Belgium – i.e. it includes first, second and possibly also some third generation immigrant children.

3. Apart from *expected political participation* the current study makes use of four other ready-made scales included in the IEA Cived dataset (*women's rights, ethnic tolerance, national pride* and *institutional trust*). The methodological experts who devised these scales made sure that they meet the standards of quantitative research. Thus, for expected political participation the alpha reliabilities range from .72 (Belgium French) to .77 (England) in the five countries of this study. For the other scales the corresponding figures are .74 to .84, .81 to .90, .68 to .77, and .71 to .79, respectively (Schulz 2004, pp. 105-119).
It has proved difficult to group other indicators of civic culture in the dataset into scales with equally high alpha reliabilities. The only other scale that could be constructed was a component combining two items on solidarity (see page ..). I used several individual items to cover components of civic culture for which a scale variable was not available and could not be constructed.

4. The alpha reliabilities of this scale range from .73 for French Belgium to .76 for Sweden.

5. The results of the ANOVAs can be obtained from the author.

6. Only in England is the minority slightly more in favour of gender equality and more critical than the majority but these differences are not significant.

7. The results of the analysis can be obtained from the author.

8. It must be remembered that Langton and Jennings wrote their article in the late 1960s when the civic rights movement had only just achieved its first successes in the struggle for equal rights for African Americans.

9. The results of the principle component analysis can be obtained from the author.

10. The results of the ANOVAs can be obtained from the author.

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Table 1. Sample characteristics of the majority and minority group in five European countries

| Country | Ethnic identification question and answer categories | |
|---|---|---|
| Belgium French | How do you see yourself primarily? As a … <European>, <African>, <Arabic>, <Asiatic>, <Other> | |
| England | Which best describes you? Tick one box only <White>, <Black Caribbean>, Black African>, <Black other>, <Indian>, <Pakistani>, <Chinese>, <Bangladeshi>, <Other> | |
| Germany | What is your state citizenship (*Staatsangehoerigkeit)*? <German>, <Turkish> <Italian>, <Other> | |
| Sweden | Do you most often feel you are … <Swedish>, <Finnish>, <Arab>, <Bosnian>, <Croatian>, <Serb>, <Iranian>, <Albanian>, <Turkish>, <Polish>, <Kurdish>, <Something else, which is …> | |
| Switzerland | What is your state citizenship (*Staatsbuergerschaft)*? <Swiss>, <Italian>, <French>, <German>, <Other> | |
| | | |
| | Majority*<br>(category and number of respondents) | Minority*<br>(ethnic groups included and number of respondents) |
| Belgium French | European**<br>1865 | African (49)<br>Arabic (84)<br>Asiatic (25)<br>Other (35)<br>Total 193 |
| England | White**<br>2593 | Black Caribbean, Black African and Black other (100)<br>Indian, Pakistani, Chinese and Bangladeshi (156)<br>Other (123)<br>Total 379 |
| Germany | German<br>3383 | Turkish (94)<br>Other (117)<br>Total 211 |
| Sweden | Swedish<br>2386 | Arab, Iranian, Turkish and Kurdish (178)<br>Bosnian, Croation, Serb, Albanian and Polish (62)<br>Something else, which is ..(43)<br>Total 283 |
| Switzerland | Swiss<br>2252 | Other (446)<br>Total 446 |

* the gender ratio was practically 1:1 in both the majority and minority group in Belgium, England and Sweden, ranging from 48.1% to 51.9%. Remarkably, the respondent's sex was not asked in Germany and Switzerland.

** Obviously, because of these categories it could not be avoided that the Belgium French majority and the English majority include some non-Belgians and non-British.

Table 4. Bivariate correlations between components of civic culture

| | Expected political participation | Women's rights | Ethnic tolerance | National pride | Institutional trust | Inter-personal trust | Solidarity | Critical stance | Coope-ration |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Belgium Fr* | | | | | | | | | |
| Exp pp | | -.13 | -.17* | .22** | .16* | .10 | .26** | -.04 | .22* |
| Wom rs | | | .40** | .11 | .11 | -.07 | .32** | .15* | -.06 |
| Ethn tol | | | | -.02 | -.07 | -.10 | .24** | .11 | .01 |
| Nat prd | | | | | .31** | .11 | .36** | .09 | -.04 |
| Inst tr | | | | | | .18* | .25** | .08 | -.06 |
| Interp tr | | | | | | | -.00 | .06 | -.01 |
| Solidarity | | | | | | | | .03 | -.10 |
| Critic st | | | | | | | | | .09 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| *England* | | | | | | | | | |
| Exp pp | | .01 | -.07 | .05 | .21** | .13* | .35** | -.05 | .07 |
| Wom rs | | | .18** | .08 | .07 | .08 | .26* | .13* | .05 |
| Ethn tol | | | | -.09 | -.03 | .00 | .06 | .03 | -.14** |
| Nat prd | | | | | .28** | .22** | -.03 | -.10 | .00 |
| Inst tr | | | | | | .25** | .19** | -.00 | .01 |
| Interp tr | | | | | | | .09 | -.02 | -.09 |
| Solidarity | | | | | | | | .02 | .14* |
| Critic st | | | | | | | | | .07 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| *Germany* | | | | | | | | | |
| Exp pp | | .03 | -.05 | .31** | .25** | .18* | .12 | .13 | .03 |
| Wom rs | | | .32** | -.07 | .09 | .01 | .22** | .03 | .05 |
| Ethn tol | | | | -.22** | .09 | .04 | .21** | .04 | .05 |
| Nat prd | | | | | .21** | .23** | .10 | .06 | -.08 |
| Inst tr | | | | | | .19** | .18* | .10 | -.12 |
| Interp tr | | | | | | | .12 | .04 | -.11 |
| Solidarity | | | | | | | | -.04 | .02 |
| Critic st | | | | | | | | | .02 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| *Sweden* | | | | | | | | | |
| Exp pp | | -.08 | -.16* | .10 | .16* | .07 | .46** | -.06 | .06 |
| Wom rs | | | .35** | .06 | -.01 | -.03 | .05 | .18** | .08 |
| Ethn tol | | | | -.12* | .05 | -.05 | .07 | .11 | .10 |
| Nat prd | | | | | .47** | .25** | .25** | -.17* | -.11 |
| Inst tr | | | | | | .35** | .14* | -.15* | -.09 |
| Interp tr | | | | | | | .05 | -.09 | -.08 |
| Solidarity | | | | | | | | -.02 | .02 |
| Critic st | | | | | | | | | -.04 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| *Switzerland* | | | | | | | | | |
| Exp pp | | -.11* | -.00 | .07 | .09* | .06 | .14** | -.04 | -.02 |
| Wom rs | | | .33** | .03 | .08 | .01 | .21** | .03 | .08 |
| Ethn tol | | | | -.12** | .02 | .02 | .25** | -.02 | .06 |
| Nat prd | | | | | .33** | .23** | .08 | .01 | -.11* |
| Inst tr | | | | | | .29** | .11* | -.05 | -.17** |
| Interp tr | | | | | | | .09 | .00 | -.10 |
| Solidarity | | | | | | | | -.08 | -.07 |
| Critic st | | | | | | | | | .12* |

* $P < .05$; ** $P < .01$

NB: The data in the table only pertain to ethnic minorities. The N ranges from 170 to 450 for all correlations.

Table 2. Support for civic values among minority and majority adolescents (means and mean differences)

| Components of civic culture | Belgium (French) | | England | | Germany | | Sweden | | Switzerland | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | majority | minority | majority | minority | majority | minority | majority | minority | majority | minority |
| *Scales with standardized values* | | | | | | | | | | |
| Expected political participation | 9.62 | 9.78 | 9.62 | 9.96 | 9.61 | 9.87 | 9.81 | 9.95 | 9.71 | 9.75 |
| Women's rights | 10.27 | 9.79 | 10.68 | 10.86 | 10.53 | 10.06 | 10.59 | 9.73 | 10.64 | 10.23 |
| Ethnic tolerance | 9.92 | 11.47 | 9.60 | 10.81 | 9.00 | 11.41 | 10.66 | 12.50 | 8.89 | 11.20 |
| National pride | 8.59 | 7.78 | 9.53 | 8.32 | 9.12 | 8.02 | 9.41 | 8.12 | 9.52 | 8.36 |
| Institutional trust | 10.06 | 9.30 | 10.08 | 9.43 | 10.03 | 9.71 | 10.27 | 10.02 | 10.80 | 10.57 |
| *Other variables* | | | | | | | | | | |
| Solidarity scale | -.02 | .01 | -.00 | .19 | .01 | .52 | -.23 | .07 | .03 | .47 |
| Interp. trust (1 never – 4 always) | 2.44 | 2.33 | 2.72 | 2.44 | 2.55 | 2.43 | 2.72 | 2.53 | 2.58 | 2.49 |
| Cooperation (1 no – 2 yes) | 1.21 | 1.26 | 1.18 | 1.27 | 1.12 | 1.14 | 1.51 | 1.50 | 1.07 | 1.10 |
| Critical stance (1 – 4)**** | 3.30 | 3.23 | 2.99 | 3.07 | 3.20 | 3.08 | 3.29 | 3.06 | 3.23 | 3.05 |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Mean difference between majority and minority*** | | | | | | | | | |
| | Belgium French | | England | | Germany | | Sweden | | Switzerland | |
| Expected political participation | -.17 | | -.34** | | -.26 | | -.14 | | -.04 | |
| Women's rights | .48** | | -.17 | | .46** | | .86** | | .40** | |
| Ethnic tolerance | -1.55** | | -1.21** | | -2.41** | | -1.84** | | -2.31** | |
| National pride | .80** | | 1.21** | | 1.10** | | 1.30** | | 1.16** | |
| Institutional trust | .76** | | .64** | | .32* | | .25 | | .23* | |
| Solidarity | -.03 | | -.19** | | -.51** | | .30** | | -.44** | |
| Interpersonal trust | .11 | | .28** | | .12 | | .18** | | .09 | |
| Cooperation | -.06 | | -.09** | | -.02 | | .01 | | -.03* | |
| Critical stance | .07 | | -.08 | | .12 | | .23** | | .18** | |

* *P < .05* (2-tailed; equal variances not assumed) ** *P < .01* (2-tailed; equal variances not assumed)

*** Positive values mean that the majority is more supportive of a particular component of civic culture than the minority group.

**** The scale of this item has been reversed to ensure that a higher value denotes a more critical stance.

NB: The table presents the results of a series of two sample t tests. The N in the minority group ranges from 190 to 440; in the majority group it ranges from 1638 to 3345.

Table 3. Regressions of social background variables and ethnic identification on five components of civic culture (standardized beta coefficients)

| | National pride | | | | | | Institutional trust | | | | | | Women's rights | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Bfr | Eng | Ger | Swe | Swi | | Bfr | Eng | Ger | Swe | Swi | | Bfr | Eng | Ger | Swe | Swi |
| Ethnic identification | -.10 | -.18 | -.13 | -.18 | -.28 | | -.09 | -.07 | | | | | | | | | |
| *Background variables* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Civics test score | | -.06 | -.12 | | | | .10 | | | | | | .31 | .25 | .21 | .34 | .19 |
| Expected further education | .08 | | -.09 | | -.05 | | .08 | | .08 | | .09 | | .13 | | .13 | .15 | .10 |
| Use of state language at home | .13 | .08 | .07 | .09 | | | | .06 | .07 | .11 | | | | | .04 | .08 | |
| Number of books at home | | | -.09 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Education mother | | | | | -.05 | | | | -.09 | | | | .07 | .07 | | | |
| Education father | | | | -.09 | | | | | | | | | | | -.08 | | |
| Explained variance (adj $R^2$) in % | 3.9 | 5.0 | 6.2 | 6.1 | 7.3 | | 2.9 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 1.2 | .7 | | 16.2 | 7.2 | 7.5 | 19.1 | 5.7 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Interpersonal trust | | | | | | Critical stance | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Bfr | Eng | Ger | Swe | Swi | | Bfr | Eng | Ger | Swe | Swi | | | | | | |
| Ethnic identification | | -.12 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Background variables* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Civics test score | | | -.05 | | .06 | | .21 | .37 | .26 | .35 | .24 | | | | | | |
| Expected further education | | | | | -.07 | | | | | .09 | | | | | | | |
| Use of state language at home | | | .05 | .10 | | | | -.07 | | .07 | | | | | | | |
| Number of books at home | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Education mother | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Education father | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Explained variance (adj $R^2$) in % | | 1.4 | .8 | 1.1 | 1.0 | | 4.1 | 13.3 | 6.9 | 16.7 | 5.9 | | | | | | |

NB1: The table only shows coefficients statistically significant at the .05 or .01 level.
NB2: Members of the majority group were coded as 1 and members of a minority group coded as 2 for the ethnic identification variable. This explains the negative correlations between ethnic identification and national pride: being a member of a minority group has a negative impact on national pride.
NB3: The table reports the results of a stepwise regression analysis. Only the results of the last step are presented.
NB4: The N is larger than 1000 for all analyses.

Table 5. Students' appreciations of their learning about civic education topics in school (means and differences of means)

| | Belgium (French) | | England | | Germany | | Sweden | | Switzerland | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Topics* | majority | minority | majority | minority | majority | minority | majority | minority | majority | minority |
| Pluralism | 3.05 | 2.96 | 3.11 | 3.22 | 2.87 | 2.89 | 2.98 | 3.14 | 2.99 | 3.08 |
| Interest in foreign countries | 2.86 | 2.77 | 2.86 | 3.01 | 2.81 | 3.01 | 2.90 | 3.05 | 2.90 | 2.97 |
| Patriotism | 2.45 | 2.41 | 2.59 | 2.49 | 2.47 | 2.51 | 2.35 | 2.52 | 2.41 | 2.61 |
| Elections | 2.38 | 2.50 | 2.31 | 2.45 | 2.28 | 2.38 | 2.66 | 2.72 | 2.39 | 2.37 |
| *Civic education scale* | .00 | -.02 | -.01 | .12 | -.00 | .15 | -.04 | .20 | -.03 | .20 |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Mean differences | | | | | | | | | |
| *Topics* | Belgium (French) | | England | | Germany | | Sweden | | Switzerland | |
| Pluralism | .09 | | -.11** | | -.03 | | -.15** | | -.09* | |
| Interest in foreign countries | .09 | | -.15** | | -.20** | | -.15** | | -.07 | |
| Patriotism | .03 | | .10 | | -.04 | | -.17* | | -.19** | |
| Elections | -.12 | | -.14* | | -.10 | | -.07 | | .02 | |
| *Civic education scale* | .02 | | -.13* | | -.15 | | -.24** | | -.23** | |

* $P < .05$ (2-tailed; equal variances not assumed)
** $P < .01$ (2-tailed; equal variances not assumed)
NB: The N ranges from 157 to 400 in the minority group and from 1570 to 3150 in the majority group across the five countries.