LANGUAGE, EDUCATION AND MODERNISATION

IN THE MAGHREB : a Comparative Study

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ABSTRACT

The central argument of this thesis is that the
contradictions between modernisation and restoring a national
identity, drawn from the Arab-Islamic culture, have generated
tensions in the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia). The
thesis concentrates on the particular problems posed by language
and language policies in these contemporary circumstances.

Chapter One provides an overview of the major
concerns of the thesis, with a special stress on cultural
and language questions.

The main argument of Chapter Two is that Western
theories of development are based on the assumption of the
universality of the Western model, and undervalue the social
and cultural elements of developing nations, including the
Maghreb.

Chapter Three extends the analysis to the role of
language and nationalism in the process of nation building
and analyses, with special reference to Algeria, the
contradictions between development policies drawn from the
West, and language policies stressing an Arab-Islamic
identity. This chapter deals particularly with the problems
of having Arabic as the national language and French as the
operational language.

Chapter Four examines comparatively the interrelationship between language policies and the social and educational contexts of the Maghreb. The arguments of the chapter are: that language policies have been influenced more by ideological than practical considerations; that contradictions at the political level are reflected in the social and educational contexts; that these contradictions are affecting the educational system adversely.

Chapter Five draws the themes of the thesis together, and reassesses contemporary difficulties over language policies in the context of modernisation problems. The chapter makes proposals for new language policies in a complex linguistic, cultural and economic, situation, with some concluding comments on the specific case of Algeria.

TO MY FATHER GOD BLESS HIS SOUL

TO MY MOTHER MAY SHE LIVE LONG

TO MY PEOPLE, TO MY COUNTRY

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Chapter I

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

This general introduction sets out the main
purpose and argument of the thesis. It sketches some
relevant features of the Maghrebian socio-cultural and
economic context in terms of language policies. The
introduction also outlines the overall organisation of the
thesis.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse
comparatively language policies in Morocco, Tunisia and
Algeria; and to underline the contradictions generated by
these policies in a process of nation building which has
emphasized economic modernisation. These contradictions are
located against the existing social, educational and
economic background of the Maghreb(1). In the light of this
analysis, alternative approches to language policies in the
Maghreb, with special reference to Algeria, will be
proposed.

The general argument of this thesis is pursued
through the testing of two propositions.

The first proposition is that most theoretical
work — and many policy makers in the developing world — have
understood modernisation within a model which stresses

industrialisation and economic growth. This emphasis on

economic development has undervalued the socio-cultural

context and the specific problems of developing nations.

The second proposition is that the adoption of a

Western model of development(2) has had disruptive effects

on the societies of the emerging nations, affecting their

cultural identity and reinforcing their dependence on the

West. The dilemma faced by these countries is exemplified in

the three countries of the Maghreb, where a more delicate

balance between their search for national identies and

economic modernisation is still sought.

Specifically, in the case of the countries of the

Maghreb, it is argued that there is a strong contradiction

in practice between the emphasis on national identity drawn

from Arab-Islamic culture and the process of modernisation

which has been based on the experiences of the West. It is

argued that the Western model of development, in its

conception and practice, ought to be applied with care in

countries such as those of the Maghreb with their specific

political, social, economic, and educational contexts. It is

argued that the problems and constraints generated by the

adoption of the policies of development in the Maghreb

indicate the inadequacy of prevailing theories of

development. It is suggested that this inadequacy is mainly

due to the lack of altertness in such theories to the

specific contexts and needs of these countries.

However, the argument put forward in this thesis does not imply that the Western model of development should be rejected. The Western model remains at the present time a major source for reference in terms of modernisation. Western literature and experiences, knowledge and achievements, are of some relevance to developing nations such as those of the Maghreb, in their current stage of development.

However, the assumptions in the Western literature need careful examination in the light of contemporary problems of development. Secondly, the unsophisticated application of Western theories to problems of development (especially in the Maghreb) needs very careful review and critique. This thesis examines the first proposition in Chapter Two. The remainder of the thesis concentrates on the second proposition by a review of development in the Maghreb, with a special emphasis on the cultural dimension of Maghrebian development and the particular problem of language policy.

The language policy in the three countries is centered on the concept of "Arabisation". The term Arabisation means, linguistically, the adoption, translation, and/or conversion of foreign words into the Arabic language. This is part of the process of development and modernisation of the language(3). However in the Maghrebian context, Arabisation refers basically to the reestablishment of the national culture through the Arabic

language. That is, the replacement of the French language, especially in education, by the national language: Classical Arabic. In this context, the language policies are determined essentially by political considerations rather than a desire to modernise the Arabic language and adapt it to the requirements of modernisation. The political position (and the nature and characteristics) of the Arabic language on the one hand, and the economic policies, based on the Western model on the other hand, have led to the failure of the Arabisation issue in the Maghreb, especially in Algeria. In this sense cultural identity, in the three countries, and especially in Algeria, is primarily a _political_ national identity which is emphasised by the government(4). In this case Arabo-Islamic culture in general and the Arabic language in particular are used to ensure domestic and international political legitimacy. In this process language holds a salient position because of its importance in national cultural identification:

> Language which reflects cultural and
> ethnic affiliation and includes values
> and modes of perception which are
> encapsulated within it, is the most
> frequently found part of cultural
> identity and its maintenance is a
> political act of supreme importance.
>
> (5)

Behind this issue of language, which is at the
core of the thesis, is a subordinate question about the
nature of the necessary adaptations and transformations of
the Western model before its adoption, according to the
contexts, potentialities and aspiration of each country.

To approach this question the particular
experiences of China and Japan are reviewed before attention
turns to to the Maghreb. China and Japan, in their different
practices, suggest insights into the applicability of
Western theories in contexts of development. China's stress
on "delinking"(6) from the capitalist world economy may be
contrasted with Japan's apparently proven ability to succeed
in economic terms while retaining a strong socio-cultural
identity.

It is this latter achievement which defines much
of the immediate problem facing the nations of the Maghreb.
How may they combine economic development with the
development and reassertion of clear cultural identity?

However this question glosses over an important theme
which needs clarification to determine the parameters of the
comparative work: is there a Maghrebian problem - or are
there sharp differences between the three nations?

The contemporary socio-cultural and economic contexts
of the three selected countries of the Maghreb share some
similarities in the midst of differences. They share common
socio-cultural assumptions, social structures and historical
experiences. The nations of the Maghreb were subjected to

almost the same waves of colonisation and foreign domination
of which French colonisation and its strong impact has been
their latest common experience. They also share the
commitment to establish an Arab-Islamic identity as well as
undertaking modernisation inspired by Western thought and
practice. At the present time, they face many of the same
problems and constraints of nation-building, as well as
similar contradictions and hesitations between their past
and their future. The Arabic language is considered, in the
three nation-states, as a central feature in the creation of
national identity. But the French language, for historical
as well as practical reasons, holds a salient place and
plays an important role in these societies.

However, each of these emerging Maghrebian nations
also has its specific socio-historical and economic context,
and aims. The political system, the economic potentialities,
and the educational policies vary from one country to the
other. As a consequence, the language policies vary from a
radical option for a rapid and complete Arabisation (as is
the case in Algeria), to a moderate bilingualism (as is the
case in the two other countries, especially Tunisia). These
different approaches vary also according to the role of
language in the areas of cultural (re-)creation and
modernisation, and the primacy of each.

There are differences in the social-cultural
context of the three countries, as well as similarities. In
Morocco and Algeria an important proportion of the poulation

has preserved the use of the original vernacular —
Berber(7). Identification with the Berber language varies
from one country to the other and from one group to the
other. In Tunisia the proportion of the Berber population is
almost non-existent(8), which diminishes the complexity of
the linguistic problem in this country. In Morocco and
Algeria identification with the Berber language (though in
different spoken varieties) differs from one group to the
other and from one country to the other. The major argument
of these different groups in the two countries is that the
Berber language constitutes an integral part of the
authentic national cultural identity, and that Berber should
be accounted for in language policies.

In addition to the complex linguistic situation in
the Maghreb, generated by the coexistence of the Arabic
language (with its diaglossic problem)(9) and the Berber
language (with its varieties), there is the problem of the
French language which is deeply rooted in these societies as
a result of French colonisation.

The type and length of French colonisation and its
impact differs from one country to the other. In Morocco, it
was shorter (less than half a century) than in the others.
Morocco, a protectorate like Tunisia, was not subjected to
the same French cultural and especially linguistic influence
as Algeria. Rather it is the case that French influence,
because of the adopted policies of development, has been
increasing since independence in both Morocco and Tunisia.

However in these two countries there emerges, as in Algeria, contradictions between the stated emphasis on the Arabic language as the symbol and means of national identity and unity, and the frequent predominence in daily national activities of the French language.

In Algeria there is no official policy in favour of bilingualism. The Arabic language, as the national official language, is more strongly stressed. Hence the Algerian approach could be considered as more radical than that of the two other countries. Nevertheless, French is more deeply rooted. The economic and social structures inherited from the long colonial period, as well as the adopted policies of development, have maintained the use of French, if not increased it. In other words, there is a problem.

In Tunisia there is a relatively overt adoption of bilingualism as a language policy. This is partly due to the shorter length of colonisation (seventy five years) as compared with Algeria. Tunisia, like Morocco, was a protectorate. Because of this indirect French colonisation, the impact of French culture and language was less important than in Algeria. In fact, in Tunisia, as well as in Morocco, the link with the Arabo-Islamic culture has never been interrupted: the use of Arabic was relatively well maintained in Tunisian society and in education. However the increasing use of French after independence has led to a de facto situation of bilingualism which coexists with the official position claiming Arabic as the national language.

Algeria, however, was integrated as a French national territory for over a century and thus was subjected to a strong assimilationist policy, and its social and cultural structures have thereby been deeply affected. In this context, Morocco and Tunisia underwent a process of "acculturation". In Algeria it was a process of "deculturation"(10) which took place. Hence the more radical approach to language policy in the Algerian context is a reaction to a stronger colonial policy. The heavy emphasis on the Arabic language as the national language is used as a major means to assert its cultural identity. At the same time, it is hoped that the national language will constitute a cultural barrier against further foreign penetration.

Thus, the Algerian case suggests the idea that the stronger the Western impact, the more powerful is the need to strengthen socio-cultural charecteristics.

The different language policies in the three countries reflect their political systems and orientations. In Morocco, the Monarchy emerged at Independence as the most powerful political institution. Its legitimacy is drawn essentially from its identification with the Islamic religion(11). However its continuity is justified through its commitment to modernisation. In this country, a liberal form of political organisation has been adopted with a multi-party system and a constitutional assembly. However, decision making and authority are highly centralised. In Tunisia, the political leadership draws its legitimacy from

its role in the nationalist movement and its commitment to
modernisation. Tunisia claims a left-wing oriented policy
with a single party system. However, there is a trend, in
this country, towards a capitalist type of economic system.
In Algeria, as in Tunisia, the political leadership draws
its legitimacy from the role it played in the nationalist
movement, and the commitment to modernisation. Culture and
language are used, because of the particular colonial
experience, in the Algerian context, as a strong means for
power and legitimacy. In this country a relatively clear
left-wing oriented policy is adopted with a single party
structure.

Modernisation is emphasized in all three countries
as a major objective in nation-building and is therefore
constantly used as a means of legitimacy for the political
leadership in the three countries. In the same way the
reestablishment and reinforcement of national culture and
language is stressed in these countries, though with greater
assertion in Algeria.

In the search for political power, ideological
positions are important. Thus many issues of social and
educational policies are treated as significant symbols:
policies are ideologised. In this context, language is
treated, in very similar ways in the three countries, as a
primarily political issue, and as with so many political
issues, a gap emerges between rhetoric and practice.

The perspective of this thesis is that a more careful assessment of language policies would now be useful; and will become the more useful as ideologically informed decision-making diminishes. At the moment the contradictions and gaps between stated aims in terms of language policies and practice strongly reflect the political and economic situation in the three nation-states.

In economic terms, the three countries of the Maghreb possess different potentialities, especially in natural resources. This affects their language and educational policies. For example, Morocco and Tunisia, with relatively more limited resources than Algeria, need to rely more on external aid for their development. Algeria, relatively richer in terms of human and natural resources than the two other countries, appears to be more self-reliant and relatively less dependent. Hence the claim for a "delinking" policy with the West in general and France in particular. However, the strong emphasis on economic development and modernisation, through industrialisation as a major national aim, has required, in Algeria, relations and dependence on Western thought and practice. This situation, in the light of the present economic recession and especially with the drop in oil prices and limited oil reserves, is likely to continue. Consequently, the international framing and process of modernisation in the three countries of the Maghreb is likely to continue to structure their language policies.

This theme of language-related problems of the three countries of the Maghreb in the process of nation-building is analysed in this thesis around the following themes:

(a) a critical review of some of the theories of modernisation and an examination of the experiences of China and Japan in relation to these theories, which is the work of Chapter Two;

(b) an assessement of the tensions in the social and economic contexts of the Maghreb, which is the central concern of Chapter three;

(c) an assessment of the tensions in the linguistic and educational contexts of these three selected countries is the topic of Chapter Four; and

(d) an investigation of alternative approaches to the language problem in the Maghreb is the work of Chapter Five.

Chapter I

Notes and References.

1. The "Maghreb" is an Arabic name for the three countries of Northern Africa. Literally meaning "setting sun", this term was maintained by the French to designate Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. These countries formed historically one geographic, political, ethnic, and cultural entity called "Berberia". In contemporary history, Libya and Mauritania are included in "Le grand Maghreb". This thesis is concerned with the three countries of the Maghreb: Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria.

2. The term "Western model of development", as used in this thesis, refers to: the example of "successful" industrialization and modernisation achieved by countries such as Britain, Germany, the USA, and France in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The term "Western theories of development" has a general reference to the long line of theorising which streches back into the nineteenth century (eg. in the works of Marx) about development; but it has a particular reference to the theorising of Western thinkers about development in the period 1960 to 1980. For analytic purposes, it may be sometimes useful, in the thesis, to make a distinction between nineteenth

century and twentieth century theories; but it also
should be noted - and this is one of the points made
later in the thesis - that there are some similarities
of assumption in both nineteenth and mid-twentieth
century theorising.

3.   See Grandguillaume, G.   Arabisation et Politique
     Linguistique au Maghreb. Maisonneuve et Larose,
     Paris 1983, p. 37., see also Souriau, C.
     " l'Arabisation en Algerie.", in l'Afrique du Nord
     Contemporaine, C.N.R.S, Paris, 1975, pp.375-397.

4.   cf. Brock, C., & Tulasiewicz,W.,(eds)Cultural Identity and
     Educational Policy., Croom Helm Ltd, London, Sydney,
     1985, p.3.

5.   Ibid., p.8.

6.   For the concept of "delinking" see: Amin, A.
     Delinking: towards a Polycentric World., Zed Books Ltd,
     1985, pp.51-52.

7.   "Berber" is a name given to the inhabitants of
     the Maghreb by the Romans when they occupied the
     area. It is also the name of the vernacular spoken
     by the population before the Islamisation and
     Arabisation of the Maghreb. Today this language is
     still preserved by important proportions of the
     population, especially in Morocco and Algeria.

8.   The proportion of Berber speaking population is
     estimated at over 40% in Morocco, over 20% in Algeria,
     and about 1% or less in Tunisia. Estimates quoted by

Grandguillaume, G., in _Arabisation et..._, op.cit. p.14.
However in the absence of official and reliable census
returns in the three countries, about the
Berber-speaking population, any figures can only be
approximate.

9.   "Diaglossia" is a socio-linguistic term proposed first
      by C.A. Ferguson, to refer to languages, such as the
      Arabic language, where two varieties of the same
      language coexist: one classical and one colloquial.
      There is thus a situation of diaglossia when there is
      a sharp cleavage, in syntax and vocabulary, between
      the written and spoken forms of a language.
      See: Ferguson, C.A. "Diaglossia" In _Word_, Vol. 15,
      1959, pp. 325- 340.

10.   Because of the nature of colonisation in Morocco and
      Tunisia, French cultural influence was as a relatively
      'normal process' resulting from a contact with a
      different culture which led to the incorporation of
      some of its elements. It was therefore a process of
      "acculturation". Algeria it was a case of "cultural
      imperialism" in so far as the French culture and
      language were systematically imposed on Algerian
      society as an integral part of colonial policy.
      The existing national culture was repressed and the
      social structures shattered, and an attempt was made
      to replace them by French culture through an
      assimilationist policy. In this sense a process of

"deculturation" took place in Algeria.

See: Haouam, S: <u>Education and Cultural Imperialism:</u> <u>the Case of Algeria</u>. M.A. thesis in Education, Institute of Education University of London. 1979.

11. The Moroccan Monarchy claims its descent from the Prophet's genealogical tree, hence, as a theocratic monarchy it draws its legitimacy principally from Islam.

See R. Leveau: "Islam et controle politique au Maroc" in the <u>Maghreb Review</u>, January-April 1981, Vol.6, No 1 and 2, pp. 10-18.

CHAPTER II

Development and Modernisation.

This Chapter has two purposes.

The first purpose is to analyse selected major

theoretical approaches to development and modernisation(1).

This task is not carried out extensively, as the literature

is now extremely large. The attempt here is to look at the

similarities and differences among the theories of

modernisation and their implications in terms of choice of

development strategies. The second purpose is to investigate

the processes of development of China and Japan. These two

particular experiences of development, through their

different approaches and emphases, give a clearer insight

into the interrelations between the development problem and

cultural specifcities.

Thus Chapter Two is divided into two parts:

firstly it assesses the assumptions of Western theorising

about development, and secondly it examines the experiences

of China and Japan.

The main argument in the first section is a double

one: (a) that most Western theories of development and

modernisation are based on the assumption of the

universality of the Western model; (b) that these theories

emphasized industrialisation and economic growth and have

overlooked, or undevalued, the specific socio-cultural,

political and economic contexts of the developing nations. Thus the adoption of the Western model of development in these nations has generated obstacles rather than led to modernisation. The implementation of the Western model of developemnt, in its thought and practice, has in fact only reinforcd the socio-economic and even political dependence of these developing countries on the Western world and has contributed to local socio-political contradictions and problems.

As indicated, section two of this Chapter is devoted to two illustrative cases: China and Japan. The experience of development in China is used in this thesis to illustrate the 'delinking' approach suggested by the Marxist, neo-marxist and Dependency theories based on the notion of self-reliance. The problems and constraints generated by such an approach are assessed. The Japanese experience is used to illustrate the 'convergence' approach suggested by most Western social scientists in this context.

The argument in this section is that China managed to achieve a certain degree of development, relying mostly on its own potentialities, and has therefore constituted a challenge to the Western based and Western dependent model. However, the apparent viability of the Western model of development is reflected in the experience of Japan. Drawing from Western thought and practice, Japan has achieved a high level of development in a short span of time. Japan's experience, with its ability to adapt elements of the

Western approach and practice to its own needs and
circumstances, may constitute a model for developing
nations, such as those of the Maghreb, in terms of national
and international integration. Lessons might be learnt from
the policy adopted by Japan to develop its human resource
and its use of its social and cultural features to reinforce
its development.

The two examples stress the overall argument that
while the Western model cannot be completely adopted in
other contexts, neither is it useful to reject it
completely. Internal and external adaptations are necessary
in any process of development and modernisation. The Chinese
experience suggests that a complete delinking with the West
(as the principal source and prototype of today's
development) was not only unwise but perhaps impossible. To
catch up with the swiftly moving process of development, it
is necessary to refer to, and rely on, Western thought and
practice.

However, it is the general argument of the thesis
that the local socio-cultural characteristics in any society
must be considered in development strategies. Thus, the
value of the Western model resides in the efficiency with
which it can be adapted to local characteristics and needs.
This "internalisation" of the Western model can only be
achieved if adaptations and adjustments are undertaken at

local i.e national level (politically, economically, and
socially) to avoid, or at least minimise, the disruptive
effects of an imported model.

These adaptations are reflected in the Japanese
experience of development. In that country, the will to
adapt Western thought and practice to its own context,
coupled with an effort to bring about internal
transformations, has led to its present success in achieving
a striking level of modernisation.

Section 1: <u>The Assessment of Western</u>
<u>theories of development</u>.

It is suggested, in this chapter, that classical
and contemporary theories of development have been based on
the general assumption of the universal validity of the
Western model. This emerges from the continuous emphasis on
industrialisation and economic growth as the main means, and
indicators, of development and modernisation. This view had
led to a dichotomous categorization of the world's nations.
This dichotomy, shared by most Western theorists of
development, is based on the assumption that Western
industrialized nations represent the prototype of "modern"
societies; and that other nations generally represent the
"traditional" societies. Therefore, in order to modernise,
the so-called traditional societies have to follow the same
path undertaken earlier by Western societies in their
process of modernisation. Furthermore, the developing

societies need to adopt western social, cultural, and
political structures as pre-requisites for their
development.

Therefore these theories, with their different
approaches, were concerned with questioning the socio-
cultural fabric of traditional societies(2), claiming that
such social fabrics were major obstacles to their
development and modernization. In so doing, such theories
reject the possibility that there could be positive, and
adaptable elements in each nation's socio-cultural setting,
which would promote development rather than hinder its
progress(3).

Western industrialised nations have undoubtedly
achieved a remarkable level of development. The theories of
development and modernization stemming from these nations'
experiences can contribute to the development of emerging
nations such as those of the Maghreb. However, it is
suggested in this thesis, that this would be better achieved
if such theorising were adapted to the specific
socio-cultural and political contexts of each society. The
developing nations, in their desire to catch up as quickly
as possible with the industrialized nations, perhaps cannot
go through the same linear process and stages of development
as the industrialized nations. Hence, development theories
ought to make provision for the time factor, as the present
circumstances and potentialities of the developing nations
are different from those of the industrialized nations.

It is suggested that this criticism — of the lack of attention to local contexts — applies even to those theories of development which are themselves critical of other approaches to development. That is to say, it is suggested that even Marxist views of development, although a critique of the prevailing world order of capitalist nations, have not acknowledged local socio-cultural circumstances.

However, what the Marxist, and especially later on the Neo-Marxist approaches have acknowledged, and attempted to explain, is that underdevelopment is a consequence of the earlier development of the industrialized nations. "Underdevelopment" is seen as the consequence of the international order that the capitalist nations have established. Marxists do not see underdevelopment as the result of the 'inherent' characteristics of under-developed societies, but as the result of prevailing international relationships characterized by neo-colonialism and imperialism[4]. In this limited sense it may be argued that Marxist theories break with one version of linearity, i.e they suggest that the arena in which development is now taking place has altered from the relative 'tabula rasa' of the nineteenth century.

The important contemporary version of neo-Marxist theory is dependency theory which emerged during the 1960s, principally in Latin America as an alternative approach to the existing Western theories of development[5]. Dependency

theories underline the increasing dependence of emerging nations, and their subordination to Western-dominated nations' international relations. This dependence has resulted in widening the gap between the developed and the underdeveloped nations.

Nevertheless, it is also suggested here that dependency theories, although concerned with industrializing rather than industrialized nations, propose a universal approach to development for the different developing nations.

Both the Marxist approach(6) and Rostow's stages of development(7), although different, share an 'historical' view of development, based on an evolutionary, linear perspective of the patterns of change. Both emphasize the economic basis of the process of modernisation. That is, they view development as a linear process dependent principally on economic growth. Newer evolutionary approach emerged in the post war period, mainly between the 1960s and the 1970s, and principally in the United States. American sociology, in fact became <u>the</u> model in terms of social theorising about societies and their development(8). Thus most theories about development and modernisation , throughout the Western world, were therefore highly influenced by American theoretical assumptions at one pole and at the other pole by Marxism.

The theoretical assumption made by American-influenced Western social scientists were exported to developing nations. Thus, in the Maghreb, for instance, the influence of the French model of development, the influence of the French model, has affected policy choice along with American theories of development(9).

These neo-evolutionary theories — with such works as those of T. Parsons(10), F. Hoestelitz(11), E. Hagen(12), and S.N Eisenstadt(13) — classify societies into traditional and modern. Newer Marxist approaches present an alternative view of development and modernisation(14). However, even the neo-Marxist approaches, though created from a third world perspective, do not bring obvious practical solutions to the problems faced by countries such as those of the Maghreb.

A large amount of literature has been devoted, in the West, to explaining and analysing the processes of development and modernisation. During the particular period of the 1960s and early 1970s, Western social scientists, in their analysis of the development and modernisation processes, have formulated theories based on two major assumptions:

- Western countries present the prototype of modernisation.
- Industrialization and economic growth are the key factors to modernisation.

It is suggested here that these assumptions about the process of development stem from a long-established Western intellectual tradition concerned with the notion of progress. This notion was stimulated by the important development of science and technology in Western Europe from the late eighteenth century, and which nurtured a belief in the 'historical' superiority of Western societies, the validity of its model and its historical development. Hence, the theories of development which emerged during the nineteenth century and after, explained the process of development in terms of evolution from one pole to another, a historical process based on general laws and causal effects(15).

To trace this 'continuum' through which societies pass, from tradition (backwardness) to development (progress), theorists of development established categories of societies and their characteristics. Two categories were, in fact, established: at one end there are the simple (primitive) and at the other the developed (complex). Most of these theories concentrated on the 'differences' between 'simple' and 'complex' societies(16).

It is suggested that in spite of a notable improvement in terms of analytical detail, these theories have remained faithful to the evolutionist tradition. The theories continued to maintain the assumption of the universal value of the Western model to achieve modernisation. This 'evolutionary' conception of developent

based on 'linear' unidirectional pattern was, for example,

also expressed in Marx's approach to development(17) as well

as Rostow's stages of economic growth(18).

A. The Evolutionary approaches

The evolutionary perspectives of development are based

on the notion that history presents certain regularities and

a specific succession of features and events. The evolution

of society is therefore perceived according to specific

processes and patterns of economic and social changes. The

evolutionary interpretations of Marx and Rostow have in

common the notion of the process of development as a

succession of stages with specific characteristics(19).

(a) The Marxist approach

Marx and Engels in extending Hegel's dialectical

materialism to the study of society and its history,

attempted to propose a 'scientific' theory of the general

laws of social development(20). Marx's conception of social

change and development was centred on the 'evolving'

material relationships, (relations of production)(21), i.e.

ownership of the means of production and the social

relationship they entail. Hence, class and class conflicts

are related to the modes of production and ownership(22).

This constitutes the basis of Marxist analysis of society.

In 1848, Marx stated that :

The history of all societies has been,
until today, only the history of
struggle... The modern bourgeois society
has not abolished class conflicts, it has
only substituted new classes, new
conditions of oppression, new forms
of struggle to that of the past.

(23)

Marx's fundamental assertion is that social classes are
determined by their economic roles, more precisely by their
position in the modes of production(24). This relationship
can be seen in a capitalist system where a "bourgeois" class
(the owners of the means of production) is exploiting a
class of proletariat (the working class)(25). This process
of exploitation will eventually generate reaction from the
working class, through a "class consciousness" within the
proletariat, leading to a situation of class conflict. This
class conflict is related to the economic struggle of
classes in a capitalist system, the processes of production
are based essentially on profit maximisation. This profit is
mainly in the interest of the economically dominant group
and consequently conflicts with the interests of the working
class. This situation of conflict will necessarily lead to
an organised struggle by this group (a revolution). This
'revolution' will continue until the dominent relationship
between capital owners and salaried workers is abolished.

This will result in the collapse of the capitalist system,
and the establishment of a new social order(26). A new order
will emerge from the new social relations based on economic
and social equality in an egalitarian state(27). In relation
to Hegel's thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, Marx's defined
development as a dialectical process based on "capital
accumulation" leading to the wealth of one class and the
poverty of the other(28). He therfore believed that the
characterisitics of a social structure could be explained in
terms of the society's economic system, and the class
conflict thereby generated. The economic structure
constitutes the basis of different social relations, ideas
and institutions. The ideas, the institutions and the
different organizations are considered as the superstructure
of the society. This approach of 'structure and
superstructure' underlines the way in which the mode of
production determines all aspects of social life. Change of
the structure entails change in the superstructure, which in
turn influences the change of the structure, that is, it can
either delay or accelerate this change.

Change (or development) is therefore linear, and it
repeats itself(29). The relationship between the structure
(economic relations) and the superstructure (socio-political
values) is summarized by Marx as follows:

...The economic structure of society-

the real foundation - on which rises the

legal and political superstructutre and to
which correspond definite forms of social
consciousness,..determines the social,
political and intellectual processes in
general. It is not the consciousness of men
that determines their being, but on
the contrary, it is their social being
that determines their consciousness.

(30)

Economic determinism is thus the major feature of
the Marxist approach to development and it therefore limits
the role of socio-cultural characteristics in changing
societies. Marxism also conceives change and development as
linear processes; which implies that all societies are
firstly similar and that secondly, in the process of their
development, they necessarily go through the same
experiences, and eventually achieve the same results.

However, as much as it exerted influence, Marxism
has had many opponents and critics(31). Rostow's 'stages of
economic growth', for instance, were presented as an
alternative to Marx's stages of feudalism,
bourgeois-capitalism, and socialism-communism(32). Marx and
Rostow show some of similarities in their interpretations of
development. They both conceive the evolution of societies
from primarily an economic perspective. That is, economic

change conditions social, political and cultural changes. However Rostow rejects the view that class conflict and exploitation are inherent to the capitalist system.

(b) Rostow's stages of development

Rostow's approach to development was as an attempt to formulate a general theory of modernisation with a classification of all nations or societies along linear stages on a single path of "self-sustaining growth"(33). The stage-approach to development elaborated by Rostow is based on a "dynamic theory of production"(34) where he identifies the leading sector, the growth of which is thought to be instrumental in 'propelling the economy forward'. He proposes five stages of development through which any society has to pass to achieve modernisation(35).

Modernisation and development are considered as a process of going from a stage one (traditional society) to a stage five, when the society reaches the level of intensive consumption. In terms of historical sequence, in Rostow's analysis, the sequence is: tradition,transition, take-off, and then the society, becoming auto-dynamic, evolves towards maturity and then high consumption. According to Rostow, most Western industrial nations are now in stage five(36).

This analysis has generated interest and arguments among social scientists(37). Moreover, it seems to have had a lot of influence and appeal among policy-makers, especially in the period extending from the 1960s to the

1970s(38). However, Rostow's approach, as well as exerting

influence on development theory and practice, has been

subject to strong criticism, directed mainly to his

'universalist' view of development and his 'linear'

conception of history: he assumed that all economies tend to

pass, regularly, through the same stages, starting with the

same potentialities(39). He also assumed that the

availability of resources, and the choices presently

confronting the developing nations, would in the stages two

and three be the same as those experienced formerly by the

modern nations(40).

Thus, although Rostow's theory places less

emphasis on pure economic determinism than Classical

Marxism, Rostow's approach to development and modernisation

is based primarily on economic growth and therefore comes

under the same criticism of development theories which

neglected or undervalued the importance of the

socio-cultural aspects in the process of development.

B. The Neo-Evolutionist Approaches

The neo-evolutionist approaches of development

are relatively contemporary as they emerged in and after the

1960s. However, these theories remained faithful to the

evolutionary perspectives of development and hence have

analysed development and modernisation on similar

assumptions. Their work was also based on an evolutionary

conception of development and a classification of the

world's nations into two categories (eg the modern and the
traditional. This implies that unless the same path of
Western nations is followed by the developing nations,
modernisation cannot be achieved.

Among these theorists, Talcott Parsons is
considered as the leading figure in the 'neo-evolutionary'
theory of development which appeared during the 1960s and
1970s. Parsons explains the process of change (development)
as a result of industrialisation, thus following the same
line of thought as the evolutionary theories. For him the
movement, (called a stage of change), from one type of
society (seen as simple, traditional, usually non-Western),
to the other (seen as complex, modern, Western) is the
process of modernisation and development(41). Therefore, the
so-called 'traditional' societies, possessing distinctive
characteristics ('dichotomously' opposed to modern ones)
need to acquire the opposite distinctive traits of the
modern societies(42). This movement is made through stages
of social differentiation and integrative patterns (the
evolutionary universals)(43). Parsons therefore implies that
the acquisition of what he calls 'new normative complexes'
and new values are necessary to regulate the new
relationships imposed by differentiation, a feature of
modern societies(44). For instance, in modern societies,
kinship is replaced by 'citizenship' within "democratic
institutions and new forms of social organisation"(45).

The process of development and modernisation is conceived in terms of 'shifts' from a simple, particularistic, ascriptive, and diffuse type of society (the traditional) to a complex, universalistic society (the modern), where roles are assigned in terms of abilities, achievements, and talents, thus increasing efficiency and rational division of labour(46).

Folllowing the same line of analysis B.F.Hoeselitz(47) also uses a similar type of categorisation of modern and non-modern societies. For him three major criteria distinguish the traditional society from the modern.

The first is cultural, whereby the traditional society is characterized by 'conservatism and particularism'(48); whereas the modern society is characterized by 'universalism and differentiation'. The traditional society is described as specific and therefore presents a certain 'static' quality; modern society is dynamic allowing for expansion, change and improvement(49).

The second criterion is psycho-social: the individual in the traditional society is subjected to tradition and conformism, and therefore cannot manifest entrepreneurship(50). He is often unable to innovate, since his possibilities are confined with established limits. In modern society, the individual enjoys more freedom, non-conformism, and therefore shows more initiative and creativity(51).

The third criterion is socio-economic: the
traditional society's economy is underdeveloped with a
defined distribution of roles(52). Individuals are not
equipped to function effectively as the conditions are
'undifferentiated' and 'ascriptive'(53). The modern society
has a developed economy where individuals enjoy a great deal
of 'differentiation', 'separation and specialisation' of
roles(54). This yields functional specialization and
increases the capacity to create and adopt effective
institutions generating economic growth(55).

It is suggested here that Hoesetelitz's approach
fits into the general framework of the classical theories of
development underlying the universal validity of the Western
model. Furthermore, this categorisation with descriptive
trait lists, implies a 'schematic' (ideal type) of modern
society as a polar opposite of traditional society. This
approach, it is suggested, unifies, under each of the
proposed categories, societies which are actually
heterogeneous and diverse.

It is also suggested that Hoeteliz' theory gives a
'static' representation of the modern and the traditional
societies, and does not provide an analysis for the process
of transition from one type to the other. Thus, Hoeselitz
sees the characteristics of the Western societies are
'inherently' modern and that the traditional societies, are
therefore required to adopt the same characteristics of the
Western industrialized nations. However, Hoesteliz does not

explain how this would come about, neither does he account

for the specific characteristics of these so-called

traditional societies; or whether some of them might possess

positive elements which would contribute to the process of

their modernisation.

Another example of the Western analysis of the

processes of development is that proposed by E.Hagen (56) in

his theory of social change. Although he admits that

societies identified as 'traditional' are diverse and that

traditionalism characterises certain aspects of all

societies, nevertheless his approach is also based on the

'criteria' method(57).

In his approach, Hagen emphasises that the

traditional society shows a notable resistance to change

mainly due to a certain mystical vision of the world and to

an "authoritarian" type of social structure(58). For Hagen,

in this type of societies, change can only occur as a result

of important pressures such as social or political

upheavals(59).

It is suggested that this approach, again,

appears essentially Western-oriented, as it stresses the

value of the Western model of development; and undervalues

any capacity of the traditional societies to initiate and

sustain a process of development. Hagen even emphasizes that

the characteristics of the so-called traditional societies

are obstacles to development(60). Nor does Hagen explain,

for the countries in search of appropriate models of

development, how the process of development occurs.

However, the analysis of modernisation as a

process, a movement from one type of society (the

traditional) to another type of society (the modern), has

been made by other authors such as S.N.Eisenstadt(61).

Although identifying modernisation according to a set of

criteria(62), and hence applying the method of

categorization adopted by the previously mentioned authors,

Eisenstadt does identify the conditions and mechanisms of

the process of modernisation(63).

He stresses that a modern society is

characterized by a flexibility of social, political, and

economic structures, and the capacity to adapt quickly to

changing situations(64). Continuous change is in the nature

of modernisation. Hence flexibility of a society's

sub-systems is a necessary condition of access to

modernisation. He also believes that modernisation is not

unilinear or irreversible. The process of modernisation can,

for different reasons and in different contexts, suffer

interruptions, which he calls "breakdowns of

modernisation"(65). In this process, diversified structures

can be produced and would operate with different approaches

depending on the time when they occur(66).

For Eisenstadt, the process of change in the developed nations, was initiated by economic as well as cultural changes in the society(67). Therefore such features as urbanism, political organisation, social mobility are a consequence of those changes. In the developing nations it is the consequences of these changes, such as rapid urbanisation, political organisation, and a rise in people's needs and aspirations, which appear first and often before adequate economic and cultural changes are achieved(68). When these changes occur before the societies' 'superstructure is consolidated', and before its 'proper dynamism' becomes operational and autonomous, the process of modernisation would then be 'partial' and cannot be sufficiently 'diffuse'(69). It therefore remains fragmented and leads to "breakdowns of modernisation"(70).

The argument of the thesis, in this context is that the neo-evolutionist approach, in the different theories, is based on a general paradigm of societies which assumes 'identifiable' qualities and characterisitics which differentiate traditional from modern societies. The shared assumption among the different theorists is that, in order to become modern, the traditional societies need to acquire the qualities and traits of modern societies, that is Western societies. Hence any nation aspiring to modernisation needs to acquire the same traits as the Western nations: Westernisation in those approaches is a 'sine-qua-non' condition for modernisation.

Thus, there are 'evolutionary universals'(71), or 'the Western ethics'(72) which are necessary conditions for modernisation. This implies not only the adoption of the economic structure and organisation of the West but also its socio-cultural values. Even when provision is made for the socio-cultural variables in development, the subordination to the industrialized Western World is maintained.

Western theories of development and modernisation, have, directly or indirectly, influenced many development programmes and policies of Third World countries, especially during the 1960s and 1970s(73). It is the argument of the thesis here that most of these 'new' nations which embarked on intensive programmes for industrialization and economic development, have had to import technologies and to rely on Western knowledge and expertise. This not only reinforced their dependence on the Western nations but has generated important internal socio-cultural, political and economic problems.

Among the problems have been desillusionment with and criticism of the Western model and its theorizing about development(74). These theories were seen, especially by Third World intellectuals', as serving the interests of developed nations, with the major aim of maintaining them(75).

The strongest attack against neo-evolutionst modernisation theories has come from Marxist-oriented theories offering a different view and explanation of development from the perspective of underdevelopment and "dependency".

D.The Neo-Marxist approach:

The neo-marxist perspective of development analyses the 'under-development' of Third World nations(76). Neo- colonialism in the neo-Marxist analyses is seen as the new means by which the international capitalist order exploits and maintains the newly independent nations in a subordinate position: the centre (advanced capitalist nations) maintains the under-developed nations in their 'periphery'. The structures serve the interest of capitalist nations through this continuous situation of dependency(77).

The dependency 'theories' emerging from Latin America express this view of 'centre' and 'periphery'(or Metropole and Satellite) relations(78). Most neo-Marxists now consider neo-colonialism as the new means of exploitation used by the industrialised nations over developing and undeveloped ones(79). Hence, the structures of the economy, established during the colonial period, are perpetuated and even strengthened. The process of political decolonisation itself, expressed with an emphasis on industrialization and economic growth, provides a framework

of neo-colonialism for the great majority of developing
nations. The less-developed nations are therefore maintained
in a peripherical position, in relation to developed nation
(in the centre).

Hence the less-developed nations become an
extension of the centre (the developed nations). According
to Johan Galtung(80), there is a disharmony of interest
between 'centre' and 'periphery' nations leading to an
increasing inequality expressed in the dominance exercised
by the centre nation over the centre of the periphery; which
in turn exercises its dominance over its own periphery. This
produces conflicts of interests within the periphery, and
contributes to maintaining the dominant position of the
centre over the periphery(81).

Although Galtung's analysis deals principally
with the overall theme of imperialism, in its different
forms it covers in particular the themes of development and
underdevelopment and their interactions. Borrowing largely
from the Marxist approach, Galtung defined imperialism
through the interaction, and the relationship which exists,
between the centre and periphery nation so that :

(i)   there is a harmony of interest between the centre
        in the centre nation and in the centre of the
        periphery nations.

(ii)   there is more disharmony of interest within the
        periphery nation than within the centre nation.

(iii)   there is a disharmony of interest between the

periphery in the centre nation and the periphery
nation(82).

Thus, according to Galtung, imperialism is not merely an
international relationship: it is a combination of internal
and international relations. Galtung asserted that
development is linked with, and depends on, the interaction
between internal and external structures of the centre and
the periphery(83).

Dependency theories emerged mainly as a critique
of theories of modernisation and development, where the
previous views of "non-development" as a consequence of
different stages of the evolution of societies, are
rejected(84). "Under-development" is seen as a feature of
the same historical process, related to the existence of
capitalist system of development and its expansion founded
on international relations of dominance and subjugation.

The Dependency approach stemmed from the work
undertaken by the Economic Commission of Latin America
(E.L.C.A) led by Raohl Prebisch during the 1950s. The ELCA
is considered as the major source which gave impetus to
dependency theories(85). This commission attributed
underdevelopment to the international structural
relationships based on unequal trade with the industrialised
nations. These relations and exchanges - based on the
importation of capital, equipment, and technology against
raw materials and fuel exports - meant increasing reliance
on international firms and corporations. This dependence was

stimulated by a strong emphasis on industrialization and
consumer goods imports. Thus unequal exchange is founded on
a market situation favourable to the industrialised nations,
and whereby the development of non-industrialised nations is
limited and even hampered(86).

This idea was further developed by Paul.Baron in
the early 1960s(87). He pointed out in 1957, that
development and underdevelopment are integral parts of the
unbalanced and unequal character of the relationship
existing between rich and poor nations(88). This
relationship was achieved with the complicity of the elite
of the poor nations and it has both facilitated access to
their resources and has maintained the traditional
domination of the Western capitalist powers. Under these
conditions, economic growth and development of these nations
will remain limited and will, even, with time, reach a stage
of stagnation. The only solution would have to be political,
i.e. through a revolution.

A.G. Frank developed this view further in
describing capitalist nations as 'metropoles' and the poor
nations as 'satellites'(89). He also stressed the relation
between the metropole and the satellite nations as a
dominant dependent relationship: the stronger the ties
between metropoles and satellites, the higher is the
underdevelopment of the satellites. The economy of the

satellite countries is incorporated in the economy of the
metropole and its structure is adapted to the needs of the
metropole in order to maintain the dependency(90).

According to Frank, the only alternative to this
pressure exercised by the metropole over the satellite,
would be a complete decoupling or delinking between the two
poles; this can only be achieved through an immediate
socialist revolution(91).

Dependency theory, as an alternative approach to
development, has, from the late sixties and early seventies,
initiated a great deal of research in the sociology of
development of the emerging nations(92). In particular the
dependency approach, within the neo-Marxist approach, has
attempted to explain the mechanisms underlying development
and underdevelopment, from the developing nations'
perspective. Although deriving from Marxism, dependency
theory is not concerned with the effects of imperialism on
the metropole, but with its effects on the peripheral
countries. In this theory, the dependent-dominant
relationship of interaction constitutes the major obstacle
to a proper development of the third world countries.
Breaking the existing pattern of development - delinking -
is therefore a necessary condition to ensure the development
and modernisation of the peripheral nations.

However, it is the argument of this thesis that
dependency theories' analysis of underdevelopment have, in
crucial aspects, remained within the Western determined

theoretical framework. including an implied acceptance of Western socio-economic superiority and the viability of its model of development. What is questioned by Dependency analyses is the unequal and dependent economic relations and exchanges with capitalist-industrialised nations.

What these theories failed to emphasize is the diffrential effects of the applicability of the Western model, in contexts with different socio-cultural characteristics, such as the case of the Maghrebian nations. Apart from prescribing 'a socialist revolution', or a 'delinking' with the Western type of political and economic system for developing nations, dependency theories fail to specify how an integrated development , based on the rationale of local socio-cultural, political, and economic circumstances is to be achieved.

Thus, dependency theories have maintained the pattern of categorization of the nations of the world into two categories: in this case the capitalist-Western and the developing-dependent nations. Implied in these theories, therefore, is the assumption of universal characteristics of the developing nations. Hence, a universal solution to the problems of development, a socialist revolution and delinking, is proposed.

The cases of China and Japan are used in this chapter to underline, through their specific experiences of development, the inadequacy of the previously analysed theories about development in non Western contexts. China's

policy of delinking from the capitalist Western economy is
contrasted with Japan's ability to develop, economically, on
Western lines, while retaining its socio-cultural identity.

Section II: Illustrating Cases: The Chinese and

Japanese experiences of modernisation.

The purpose of this section is to investigate, in

the light of the critical analysis of the different theories

of development and the two major approaches drawn from them

(capitalist and socialist oriented), two specific

experiences: China and Japan.

The major argument is that these two experiences

of development practically assess the validity and

usefulness of delinking with the Western approach to

development (as the case of China suggests), and convergence

with the Western approach (as the case of Japan apparently

suggests). The overall argument pursued in these two

illustrative cases is that neither a complete delinking nor

a complete convergence with the West are adequate approaches

to development and modernisation. Both approaches

underestimate the difficulties posed by historical

traditional and cultural specificities — and the complex

effects of development with, and on, culture.

A. China: a Case for Delinking

The purpose of this case study is to analyse a specific strategy and experience of development which was based on the notion that a delinking with the Western world, with the influence and international relations it entails, was a better approach to development and modernisation.

The argument in this particular case is that the Chinese experience of development has suggested that a delinking with the West was not an ideal solution and can be problem-generating. The Western model of development has had disruptive effects on the nation's socio-cultural values and structures. This eventually led to radical oscillations in development policies.

a) The historical Setting.

The specific historical development of China, as is the case of each nation, has shaped the present course of its development. Therefore it is the purpose of the analysis of the Chinese historical setting to underline relevant aspects of its socio-cultural, political, and economic bases which affected its development.

It is the argument in this case that Western influence, coming through power and unequal exchanges, and hence without adaptation to the Chinese context, has

disrupted rather than promoted the processes of development and modernisation in this nation. It has distabilized the social structures.

In the specific case of China, one can even argue, considering the present socio- cultural and economic situation, that contacts with the West have caused a movement backwards rather than forwards. This country's old civilization, which was the cradle for Asian culture, has disintegrated as a result of Western intrusion(93).

Chinese civilization, until it was affected by Western disruptive influence, was characterised principally by the Confucian tradition, a specific system of ethics where the society's structure was highly hierarchial. Relationships were properly ordered within the society, and behaviour and attitudes were regulated by social position or status. It was believed that prosperity of the society was based on appropriate hierarchical relationships, according to specific and clearly defined positions and roles.

> Great men have their proper business
> and little men have their proper
> business... Some labour with their
> minds, and some labour with their
> strength. Those who labour with their
> minds govern others; those who labour
> with their strength are governed by
> others.

(94)

In terms of development, China until the
eighteenth century, had enjoyed a great deal of prosperity
and economic and political expansion with the annexation of
more than half of the Asian continent including Nepal,
Burma, Siam, Vietnam and Korea. The exports of agricultural
goods such as tea, silk, cotton, towards South-Asia and
Europe, were increasing. This economic growth was also due
to a rapid increase of the population. The important
economic, commercial and demographic evolution which occured
during the eighteenth century continued until the
mid-nineteenth century(95).

From the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
China became a major arena for capitalist and imperialist
rivalries in terms of economic and political
intervention(96). The Northern and South-Eastern coasts,
where commerce was floursihing and most transport networks
were established, became the centres of Western influence.
Treaties and conventions were signed with Western partners,
increasing their attempts to enforce their position in the
country(97). The 'most favoured nation clause', enforced
after 1842 in Chinese treaties signed with the West,
encouraged the industrial powers to strengthen their
position and each one of them attempted to obtain new
economic advantages.

It is the argument at this point that this
process of development in its form and practice was alien to
the Chinese context and did not serve their needs. The

initiated industrialisation was geared to the development of
the different powers attracted to the area and created an
increasing dependence of China on the Western powers.

In fact each capitalist power had its own 'zone
of influence'. Hence Russia strengthened its position in the
North-East (Manchouria), where she was to be supplanted
later by Japan in 1905; Germany was established in the
Shandong peninsula; Great Britain occupied the middle-basin
of Yangzi; and France's stronghold was in the three
provinces of China's South-West. Permanent military bases
were established to protect and maintain the different
powers' investments and authority in their sphere of
influence(98).

On the eve of the First World War, the political,
economic and even cultural influences of the West were at
their highest in China. Their control was so powerful that
it took the form of a 'financial protectorate'. Foreign
investments were considerable, especially in the sectors of
light industries, mines and railways. Foreign firms
dominated and controlled most financial institutions. The
economy was oriented towards the interest of the foreign
firms and most of the consumer goods were imported(99).

It is suggested, here, that this foreign
intervention if it promoted industrialisation in China, also
aggravated the gap between the modern industrial sector
(unequally spread), and the agricultural sector (which
remained traditional). The existing urban and rural

differences and inequalities were reinforced. It is
therefore suggested that the economic developments
introduced by the West have had disruptive effects on
Chinese political and social structures.

The new capitalist 'bourgeoisie', of merchants
and tradesmen started to exercise pressure for a share in
economic and political responsibilities. On the other hand,
in the cities a class of proletariat was emerging while the
economic conditions of the population in the rural areas
were not improved(100). This situation led to internal
discontent and eventually rebellion which created a
political fragility within the Chinese context, especially
with the influence of the Western political system. October
1911 witnessed the fall of the Mandchouri empire and the
establishment of the first Chinese republic with the
adoption of an 'American' inspired constitution and the
organisation of general elections in 1913(101).

The victory of the Japanese army in parts of China
in 1935 reinforced the rising popular discontent and
accelerated the emergence of the Chinese communist
party(102). Low wages, hard and dangerous working
conditions, unfair work contracts, the foreign export geared
economy, led in the urban centres to the organisation of
trade unions with a strong communist ideology, culminating
to the Chinese revolution and the birth of the People's
Republic of China(103).

It is suggested here that the international
political context, especially the Russian revolution,
influenced the Chinese revolution. The new approach to
development adopted by the Soviet revolution in 1917 was a
challenge to some Western value and all Western economic
systems. Communism and socialism emerged as possible
alternatives to existing Western political and economic
systems(104). The wars, conflicts and turmoils in Western
societies, helped to weaken the image of Western culture
and strengthened the belief that modernisation could be
achieved without it. A non-capitalist alternative was sought
by the new leaders of the Chinese revolution.

The argument put forward at this point is therefore
that the Western model and its impact on China has had
disruptive effects and eventually led to a radical
transformation of the Chinese society: from a feudal, highly
capitalist society to a socialist one.

(b) The Industrial Revolution and the Birth of a
    popular Republic.

The birth of the Chinese Republic was therefore
the beginning of a new era, a revolution against a long
established order and mainly against an existing pattern of
international relations. The major aim of the new leaders it
is suggested was to build a national economy, self-reliant

and hence indpendent from the West and its influence. A
policy of delinking was adopted in order to put an end to
what the dependent and 'exploitative' relationship with the
West.

The experience of the Soviet Union, and its
success in becoming a superpower, presented an attractive
alternative model of development. Moreover the Soviet Union
proved to be a valuable ally of China in the first years of
the revolution. However, it is an argument that, later on,
Chinese approach to communism was to become different from
that of the Russian, the Chinese were more concerned with
the need to create barriers against external interventions
and by national reconstruction than by class conflicts. In
this sense, Marxism was adapted to their specific problems
and needs.

In China the Socialist Revolution was undertaken
by a 'popular consensus', a 'new form of democracy' which
included groups from the different strata of the
society(105). In fact the four social groups defined by Mao
as the "four revolutionary classes": the proletariat,
peasantry, middle-class and national capitalists, were
involved in the new republic politics. However, this
"heterogenous homogeneity" inevitably led to important
conflicts and contradictions within the new polity and were
to continue. These conflicts were reflected, as will be
related subsequently, in the development and modernisation
policies adopted.

However, it is the argument here that the
alternative approach to development, Marxism-based, was
still in the early period of the Revolution heavily relying
on industrialisation and economic growth and on an imported
model of development, that is of the Soviet Union. This has
also created problems and contradictions.

Industrialisation was seen by the Chinese
leadership as the key factor in the process of modernisation
and economic development. The period, from 1949 to 1952, was
devoted to 'reconstruction' that is the use of the existing
economic institutions, while transforming the social and
political structures in accordance with the socialist
thought and practice(106). Industrialisation became a
central theme in the Chinese development programmes,
especially from the period 1952-1957 with the first five
yearplan. From the first years of the revolution, agrarian
reform was undertaken, but this sector remained in a
secondary position as compared with the industrial sector,
and consequently suffered from lower rates of
investment(107).

It is suggested here that this emphasis on
industrialisation and economic growth led to a need for
external assistance, namely from the Soviet union. This was
a major contradiction with the set objective of
self-reliance sought by the Revolution. In fact Soviet aid
was very important in the early years of the Chinese
revolution(108). This aid included the adoption of Soviet

management approach (the one-man management system), and the high number of Chinese students as well as advanced research personnel sent to be trained in the USSR(109). During this phase of Chinese economic and industrial planning impressive achievements were obtained in the industrial sector and important changes were undertaken in the agricultural sector(110).

However, it is argued here that the highly centralized political and economic system, the emphasis on the development of heavy industries, the conflicts at the political level and the contradictions generated by the collective leadership and the adoption of the Soviet 'one-man system'(111) produced important constraints on Chinese development. The famous "Great Leap Forward", launched by the end of 1957 and early 1958, was the strategy marking a new period in the Chinese political and economic policies(112)

The Great Leap Forward was aimed, principally, at mobilizing human resources and energies to accelerate development. It was also an attempt to reduce the imbalance between the agricultural and industrial sectors. The slogan was to "walk on two legs"(113), that is to increase production in both sectors. In this context, radical transformations were undertaken at the managerial level to fight the highly centralised urban-based bureaucracy. This was reflected in the decision of the Central Committee, in

1957, which stipulated that all managers and specialised
staff must participate in manual tasks and that the workers
were expected to participate in managerial functions(114).

By the 1960s, the negative effects of the Great
Leap Forward began to emerge: the Chinese economy was facing
a crisis(115). This situation coincided with unfavourable
climatic conditions leading to serious agricultural
problems, which indirectly affected industry. Thus the
economic imbalance between industry and agriculture was
aggravated(116).

The Chinese experience, in its attempt to import
and implement the Soviet model of development, proved
unsuccessful. This underlines the argument about the
inadequacy and inefficiency of importing a foreign model of
development without adapting it to local context and needs.
The failure of the Soviet model of development in China led
to the interruption of important industrial projects and the
deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations. Their conceptions
of socialism and communism as well as major political issues
appeared to diverge increasingly(117).

It is suggested that the apparent inadequacy of
these foreign models, first the Western then the Soviet,in
the Chinese context led to a radical reaction against these
models expressed in the delinking policy adopted by China
from the early sixties. It also led to the search for an
alternative approach to development, emanating from within,
hence the appearance of the Chinese Cultural Revolution.

c) The Cultural Revolution:

The Cultural Revolution in China, it is the interpretation in this thesis, was a new alternative to the Soviet model of development and modernisation. It was also a means of overcoming the obstacles encountered by the Chinese socialist revolution in its process of national construction and development. Although an innovation, the Cultural Revolution was presented by the Chinese political elites as a 'natural' process of an 'uninterrupted' revolution where "throughout the stages of socialism, the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie" could not be stopped(118).

It is suggested here that modernisation in China's Cultural Revolution was consequently equated with the notion of a 'continuing revolution' which would lead to new norms, behaviours and structures in the Chinese society; a society which would develop by relying on its own forces. Hence the claimed aim of the Cultural Revolution was basically self-reliance. This could only be achieved by the 'political dynamism of the masses', and through an extensive and continuous socialist education in urban as well as rural areas(119).

The Chinese Cultural Revolution was socio-cultural based rather than economic. In this sense, it can be suggested, that it constituted an alternative to development rejecting the long established tradition of Western

theorising about the primacy of economic growth and industrialisation over the social and the cultural. In this limited sense, the Chinese Cultural revolution fits with the general argument of the thesis: the importance of socio-cultural aspects in fostering and sustaining development.

However, it is also suggested that, unlike Japan, China's Cultural Revolution was not based on, and did not aim at, using the positive elements in the Chinese culture to promote the nation's development. On the contrary, it was aimed at radically transforming traditional socio-cultural assumptions and replacing them then with new values and a new ideology.

The start of the Cultural Revolution was the 'Sixteen Point Declaration' of August 8, 1966. This was a call for a 'struggle' against 'revisionism' and 'economism', promoted by the adoption of the Soviet model(120). This declaration stressed the need for a renewed sense of revolutionary impetus and the creation of economic and social structures in line with Mao's thought. The 'triple combination' of the Red Guards, the army and the 'faithful' members of the communist party constituted the active forces of the Cultural Revolution. They formed the central core, organising mass-mobilisation and mass-participation(121)

To shake old values and develop new ones was the assertive slogan of the Cultural Revolution: to 'touch the people in their souls' was seen as the basic means of

success for the Chinese leaders(122). The development of a socialist cultural revolution was not the prerogative of the elite only but the responsibility of the broad popular masses. Workers, peasants, soldiers, revolutionary intellectuals, cadres, and leaders were to participate in the new bases of national construction(123).

The formation of a 'New Socialist Man' was, in fact, seen as the most important objective of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Mao believed that "men are more important than weapons", and that the success of the Cultural Revolution depended largely on the "revolution in men's minds"(124). Hence the necessity to re-educate all members of the society in order to enable them to combine professional competence with political consciousness. Criticism and self-criticism were prescribed by Mao as the best methods to elucidate past errors and clarify the path for the future. He insisted that the education of the Chinese New Man should be based on the close relationship between socialist political education and productive labour. Practice was to be therefore both the source and the test of knowledge in general and the national ideology in particular(125).

It is suggested therefore that the Cultural Revolution was to stimulate the process of development by firstly a 'revolution of the minds'. This was a necessary

condition to break up with traditionalism, capitalism, and the Western impact as a whole. The revolution of the minds was to be achieved with the education of the masses.

Education in its widest sense was central to the aims of the Cultural Revolution. It was seen as the major means to communicate to the masses the principles and objectives of this revolution.The formal educational system therefore needed to be changed and adapted to the new national realities and aims.It had to embody the general principle of the Cultural Revolution that : "all knowledge should arise from practice"(126).

The major modification introduced in the Chinese educational system was the emphasis on political and ideological instruction, and linking theoretical learning with practical learning (emanating from the workers and peasants)(127). The curricula was divided into part-time work and part-time education; the slogan was: 'red and expert'(128). To organise practical training in the countryside, for the different cycles of the educational system, to stress political education and abolish forms of selection (such as marks and examinations), were the measures taken in order to make the educational system a potent means in transforming ideas and behaviour(129). In other words the educational system was to be one of the major agents of change and a source of self-strengthening, an instrument to achieve modernisation.

It is the argument at this point that education was both a means and an aim in the Chinese Cultural Revolution: it constituted a central theme of this new approach to development.The important changes in educational form and content were undertaken in order to adapt national education to the new national aims and objectives. Hence, education was perceived as the driving force, and the principal agent of social change(130). National goals were to be achieved through educational goals.

The radical policies on educational thought and practice adopted and implemented during the Cultural Revolution, are increasingly criticised today(131). This revolution in education is held responsible for a fall in educational quality and the high rate of illiteracy. It is principally criticized for its inability to produce the efficient and expertly qualified manpower needed for economic, industrial and technological development and national modernisation, according to international standards(132).

However, the most striking aspect of educational reform in China during this period, which may be relevant to developing nations such as those of the Maghreb, is the equal weight given to theory and practice, the close relationship between knowledge and its practical use for national development. In the Chinese experience, education was no longer confined to specific institutions, nor to a limited length of time or specific groups. Problem-solving

and practice were the methods and aims, Mao stated: "Reading is learning, but applying is also learning and the more important kind of learning at that"(133).

Mao insisted that any type of knowledge, whether national or foreign, old or new, should be used to solve Chinese problems(134). Hence, appraoches to learning should be selective and aimed at assimilating only what is useful to the development of the society.

However, it should also be noted that in the Chinese context, as is also often the case in developing nations, ideology and political considerations, overrode practical realities; education came to reflect more the abstract ideas, the ideology of those in power, rather than to solve problems faced in the process of development.

As Communist China enters a new phase of its history, beginning from the 1970s, a shift in educational emphasis is visible, especially in the nourishing of talent and efficiency, to hasten the process of modernisation in China. Important steps were taken by the post-Mao leadership to open up again to the outside world. The aims and principles were accordingly reconsidered: "education should be oriented towards the future", was the official statement(135).

It is suggested here that the new reforms of education will undoubtedly aim at relating education to national development rather than merely to ideology. This can currently be seen for example in the Central Committee's

proposals for the reform of the secondary education
structure and especially with the expansion of vocational
education(136).

> China is undergoing a major transformation
> of its educational system, with the aim of
> better orienting education toward modernisation,
> toward the outside world, toward the future,
> and better integrating the results of the social
> and scientific revolution in educational
> practice. We are much interested in the
> educational reforms going on in many other
> countries, for we fully realize that education
> has become a major global issue, that it will
> be quite impossible to completely solve
> education problems if a country tries to rely on
> its own material and intellectual resources in
> internationalizing age of increasing
> interdependence, in which the development of
> human resources to, a large degree means the
> improvement of education,information and
> knowledge.

(137)

This summarizes the new orientation of Chinese
educational policies as well as its new approach to
development and modernisation. Implicit is a rejection of

Mao's policies and prescriptions for a self-contained and
self-reliant society, within his version of a socialist
society.

Thus in the Chinese context, the search for
socio-cultural identity and unity were not so much based on
linguistic, religious or other common characteristics of
national identification as on a specific view of communist
ideology.

Within this framework - in terms of language policy
- no specific or radical changes occured during the Cultural
Revolution. The need for a unifying language, especially in
education was felt long before the advent of this
revolution. As early as the fifteenth century officials in
China used 'Mandarin', an educated variant of the Peking
dialect, as an official language(138). But it was only after
1911 that the option for a unifying national language became
a clear policy.

In 1916 a committee was set up, the National
Language Reasearch Committee,with the aim of developing a
standard national language. Between 1892 and 1920 efforts
were made to develop and modernise the Chinese language, to
make it more accessible to the vast majority of the
population(139). In 1952 another research committee was set
up with the aim of reforming the Chinese written language.
This resulted in the simplification of the more complex
characters (about 2300 were changed); at the same time
another alphabet was published and was immediately

introduced into schools, newspapers, and books. The new

alphabet was a teaching aid as well as a basis for the

development of alphabets of the other dialects, and

consequently would contribute the diffusion of the national

language(140). Another important change in language policy

was the arrangement of the chararcters from vertical to the

horizontal rows, read from left to right, like European

writings (141), which is quite a revolution. This language

policy, in spite of some limitations is considered as

successful(142).

The argument of the thesis, therefore is that in

China, as in many other nations, language is perceived as a

powerful instrument in national unity, and the development

of a national education. However, the Chinese approach to

language is not, as is the case in the Maghreb, ideological,

but rather practical. Efforts were made to develop,

modernise, and adapt language to national circumstances and

needs, to make it simpler and more accessible as a tool of

communication and learning. The useful aspect of the Chinese

approach to language for the Maghreb is that although

ideology and political considerations were paramount in the

Chinese society, language policies were not determined by,

nor based on, ideology but on a systematic and pragmatic

development and modernisation of the language to make of it

a viable and useful medium. Moreover, in spite of a strong

and general reaction against foreign influence and

penetration, there was no radical rejection of foreign

Western languages. These were maintained, their acquisition was encouraged, but with the stress, from the political leadership, on adapting and using them to the Chinese needs and way of thinking.

To summarise the general arguments related to the Chines experience of development, it is suggested that, during the Cultural revolution, it was the overall national development, the process of nation-building which was the major concern of the Chinese leadership from the onset of the Revolution in 1949. The Chinese experience was principally a reaction against the Western model of development and later on the Soviet model and the dependence they entailed.

The pre-1940 failure of the Western model in the Chinese context created important socio-cultural, economic, and political problems. This generated the need to break radically with this model and turn to the alternative model of the Soviet Union, that of a Communist Revolution. The attempt was then to adopt a specific approach to development, an alternative, based essentially on self-reliance and the full use of the existing human and material potentialities.

However, the Chinese Cultural Revolution suggests that the delinking approach, claimed by the Neo-Marxists as a viable policy for development, appears irrelevant to the problem it attempts to solve. Modernisation in China is still in the process The Cultural

Revolution has suggested that if the complete adoption of the Western model is problem-generating, a complete delinking with the West is also problem-generating. This is firstly because the Western world is today the leading example of development and modernisation, and secondly, because the requirements of modernisation necessitate exchanges and interdependence.

The Chinese experience has asserted that the process of development could (and should) start from "within". However this does not mean isolation and seclusion as this particular experience has shown. Rather, it means that socio-cultural characteristics, ought to be flexibly reinforced in the process of development so that adaptation to the requirements of modernisation are possible. The path to modernisation does not reside in a complete adoption or rejection of the Western mode of thought and practice - as suggested by the two major theoretical approaches. It resides in the ability to adapt the Western model of development to the specific context of the society concerned. In this sense, development means, as it should, transformation of the society more than transfer of external thought and practice. In this respect, the experience of Japan offers a useful example of a policy of development based on both internal social transformation and the acquisition, through adaptation, of foreign techniques and know-how.

B. Japan : a case of 'convergence'

The purpose of this section is firstly to analyse an experience of development largely based on Western thought and practice and to emphasize the argument of the thesis that to achieve development it is important to adapt the Western model to local needs, circumstances and characteristics

The general argument here is that the Japanese experience suggests a successful formula for a modernisation inspired by the Western model of development whithin a frame of the retention of social and cultural identity. The remarkable achievements of Japan, in terms of development are not so much a result of its own economic potentialities, or the adoption of Western thought and practice, as a result of an ability to adapt, and adjust, to the Western model.

It is also the argument that the Western model of development, in its thought and practice, when selectively adapted to the nation's specificities by internal adjustments offers a viable means for achieving modernisation. The combination of what the West has to offer, in terms of scientific and technological knowledge, of strategies and means for development, with selected and adapted national socio-cultural elements, constitutes a positive strategy of development as Japan illustrates.

a) The historical setting:

The characteristics of Japanese society, its
structure and organisation, were to be gradually altered
through contacts with the outside world in general and the
West in particular.

The argument is that Japan has shown, throughout
its history, an inclination (rather than resistance) to
absorb foreign cultures and know-how in its social
framework. First the Chinese influence and then the Western
influence played the role of catalysts in the Japanese
process of development and modernisation. However it must be
emphasised that these foreign influences and effects were
accepted and incorporated into the existing socio-cultural
setting; they were not imposed. They were adopted, and
mainly adapted, to the needs of a desired change. Hence,
these influences brought about changes; they were not the
change.

China had for centuries been a privileged
commercial partner and an attractive political and cultural
model for Japan. Japanese absorbtion of Chinese culture
reached its peak between the seventh and nineth century AD.
In fact the introduction of Buddhism, the influence of the
Confucian tradition and other socio-economic and political
elements imported from China largely accounted for the
shaping of the Japanese culture(143). Hence the Japanese
social structure was, as in China, highly hierarchial:
status, roles, behaviour, and attitudes were strictly
regulated. The Imperial institution, one of the longest

surviving monarchial dynasties, was the supreme institution.
The Monarch 'Tenno' was considered as the father of all
Japanese people. He was like the Chinese Monarch, seen as
the intermediary between the two worlds, that of heaven and
that of mortals. But in Japan the role of the 'Tenno' was
more 'holy' than administrative, from the twelfth century to
the early nineteenth century. Actual power, legislative as
well as executive, moved into the hands of the military
chiefs the 'shoguns' who held the reigns of government and
gradually managed to establish a rigorous 'feudal'
administration and exercise tight control over the
population(144).

The Japanese social culture during the Edo Era
(around 1615 to 1868) was organized on a rigidly structured
system. Its members were divided into basically four social
groups: the Samurai, the Peasants, the Artisans, and the
Merchants. Inter-relationships among these different social
groups were organised according to strict rules and social
barriers isolated these groups leading to the development of
specific characteristics, behaviour in each one of these
groups. The Samurai, at the top of the social hierarchy,
represented a distinct group, socially, functionally, and to
a certain degree geographically(145).

The peasants, second in the social hieararchy,
constituted the vast majority of the population. However,
they were often higly exploited and suffered hardships and
injustice. There was also an important regional disparity

between a rich South-West and a poor North-East. The
Artisans were mostly located in rural areas and were
classified among the peasants (later they were incorporated
into the Merchant group)(146). The Merchants, the last in
the Japanese social order, were often despised. The Japanese
slogan " "revere the grain - despise money"(147) expresses
Japanese disdain for the merchants, the money-makers, and
their subordination even to the peasants. Nevertheless, the
merchants, principally city merchants, played a key role in
the development of the modern economy during the seventeenth
century(148).

The Edo Era in general and the seventeenth
century in particular witnessed important changes in
economic, social, and political terms(149). It was a period
of initiative, innovation, and entreprise. Internal peace,
commercial and financial activities expanded, leading to the
growth of urban centres like Osaka. This, in turn, along
with important demographic growth, contributed to the
development of agriculture(150). From a subsistence economy,
agriculture developed into a cash crops economy. The
development of consumer goods generated the development of
manufacturing which in turn generated inter-regional trade
and further expansion of small-scale manufacture(151). The
growth of urban centres, the improvement of communication
networks, entrepreneurship, and the increasing demand for

consumer goods, resulted in a rapidly expanding market

economy and created an economic vitality which gave a new

shape to Japan's process of development(152).

The argument in the thesis here is that the

important socio-cultural changes, during this period and

after, underline Japanese skill and readiness to change a

rigidly organised social structure and adapt to the changing

circumstances of the country and the requirements of

development. This economic effervescence, which

characterized seventeenth century Japan, brought about

changes in the social structure and affected political

organisation. The strict social differences and distinct

roles began to fade as people from the different groups

started to engage in various kinds of entrepreneurship and

profit-making. Many Samurai, for instance, had to take up

administrative positions toward the end of the seventeenth

century and some of them were forced by the financial

pressures of the end of the Edo Era to undertake commercial

activities(153). The Merchants began to control the

country's finances. With the consolidation of their economic

position, many of them managed, in spite of persistent

hostitlity, to climb the social ladder, and a few of them

even reached Samurai rank. Their situation was strenghened

with the establishment of the guild system which regulated

commercial organisation and protected merchants'

interests(154).

The Edo Era, it is suggested, marked the
beginning of the process of the modernisation of Japan. The
important evolution achieved during this period, in economic
and social terms, constituted the basis on which subsequent
developments, in the nineteenth century, were built.
However, it is also suggested that if important social and
economic transformations took place in Japan during this
period and after, aspects of the Japanese social
organisation and values, such as respect for hierarchy, were
retained. In spite of new conditions in social mobility, the
blurring of the traditional social divisions, the
Confucian-based organisation of systematized relationships
and organisations has survived to the present day. This
respect for hierarchy, in professional as well as in private
life, has regulated the process of Japanese development and
could be even considered as the genesis of its access to
modernisation(155).

Overall, it is suggested that Japanese access to
modernity has been a result of a successful combination of
traditional and modern elements, a fusion of external
influences with internal adjustments. It was a process of
adaptation to the outside world which is the theme of the
next sub-section.

(b) Japan and the outside world

Japan's transformation to modernity occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century with its direct contact with Western powers, but its roots go far back in history. The Chinese political system and ideology based on secular authority served as a model in the establishment of imperial institutions in Japan. Buddhism and Confucianism constituted the most powerful moral, philosophical, and religious doctrines which determined Japan's social life(156). Even the Japanese language, one of the strongest features of the country's identity and unity, borrowed from the Chinese language the bases of its characters(157). The Chinese influence on Japan was powerful: China has been for centuries the "centre of the World" for the Japanese(158). And in spite of important controversies and consequent suspension of their relations, which characterized Chinese-Japanese history, trade between the two countries continued to flourish.

The Japanese distinctive ability to borrow and adapt foreign techniques and know-how was not limited to China and to a lesser extent Korea, but it also has profited from Western knowledge and konw-how and adapted them to their particular context. Western thought and practice has particularly influenced the development of modern Japan because of this readiness and ability to internalise foreign elements to a local setting(159).

However, the argument here is that foreign influence is accepted, even strongly desired, in Japan as long as it is not imposed and does not constitute a threat to the Japnese socio-cultural identity. When the Japanese felt that contacts with the West, at a certain period of their history, was detrimental to their interests, radical reactions followed: for example, the complete insulation that happened during the sixteenth-seventeenth century.

c) Japan's contact with the West

Japan's earliest contact with the West goes back to the sixteenth century with the arrival of the Portuguese in this area in 1542-43, during the European expansion in the East and the Far-East with the propagation of Christianity(160). The Jesuit Order (Society of Jesus) began by the late sixteenth century to exercise a monopoly over Nagasaki's raw silk and foreign trade. The missionaries led the way for merchants and traders. These were Portuguese initially but later an important number of Spanish, Dutch, and British businessmen came to concentrate their trade and commercial activities in Japanese ports(161).

Western influence on Japanese development started in fact from this period. The Portuguese brought to Japan, along with the Christian faith, goods and techniques. Their influence was substantial in the development of scientific knowledge, trade and politics. They introduced the printing press and naval construction. They contributed to the

development of cartography, warfare techniques and fire
arms(162). The Japanese were willing to absorb and use this
knowledge and techniques until the expansion of Christianity
and the foreign monopoly on trade and important commercial
centres became to be resented by the Japanese. This led to
the radical policy of "Sokoku", that is isolation and
insularity against foreign penetration and influence.

The policy of insularity was enforced by an
Imperial Edict, to ban Christianity from Japan and to expel
the Jesuit missionaries. This policy, primarily directed
against Christians, was also used to protect Japan from the
destabilising effects of the West. It lasted for more than
two centuries from 1639 to 1854(163). During this long
period of isolation the Japanese leaders managed to ensure
internal pacification and unification(164). As indicated it
was this period which was instrumental in consolidating the
economic foundations of the country, during the seventeenth
century(165).

It is suggested that this long period of Japanese
'gestation' reinforced its socio-cultural, political, and
economic characteristics. It was also a period of
internalising and testing the efficiency of foreign
techniques. Japan's period of isolationism could be
considered as a period of relative dynamism. The different
governments in the course of the seventeenth century
concentrated on consolidating the nation's economic basis by

establishing a monopoly on foreign trade and encouraging

domestic production which, as indicated, led to the

expansion of the national market(166).

However, in spite of the notable development

achieved by the mid-eighteenth centuty, the policy of

isolation was leading to a gradual stagnation in terms of

economic development. It was in fact the beginning of

economic recession which affected the social and political

contexts of Japan. The central authority began to weaken and

this prompted a need for a change. It was also realised that

to bridge the gap in terms of economic and technological

developments, it was necessary to reopen the country to the

West. Modernisation, therefore, was seen as the best

defensive policy(167).

From the second half of the eighteenth century,

Europe and America emerged as increasingly powerful

nations, and hence began their expansionist policies in the

East. These policies were principally directed to China,

American interest in Japan was intially related to the use

of Japanese ports for refuelling and supplies. However

commercial treaties were signed between 1853 and 1854(168).

The Americans were followed by Western powers, mainly the

French and British, who managed to obtain similar treaties

for free trade. Japanese ports were then opened to Western

commercial activities with the signing of the 'Ports

Treaties' in 1859(169). These commercial relations paved the

way to diplomatic relations and the Western system of

international political and economic relations was gradually imposed. This was reflected in the imposition of Western jurisprudence in parts of Japan to protect Western interests.

The increasing economic and social influence of the Western powers produced revolts against the government. This led to the policy of "Joi" (expel the barbarians) culminating in an attack on American, French, and British ships, who retaliated by bombarding Kagoshima and strengthened their fleet to protect their positions(170). Western technological superiority was confirmed, principally by the deployment of their war force.

The Japanese discovery of this striking technological, especially military, superiority spurred the Japanese to master this technology and the knowledge underlying it. It was the beginning of the emergence of modern Japanese nationalism, with the emergence of a new elite concerned with the modernisation of Japan in the light of international developments(171).

The "Shogun" government was forced to resign in 1867, and with the death of the Emperor Komei in the same year, his son Mutsuhito was restored as the legitimate monarch of the country. The new government moved to Edo, renamed Tokyo(172).

This was the beginning of a new era in the Japanese history and its entry into the international capitalist system. It was the period of the restoration of the young 'Tenno' (emperor) and the decisive movement for modernisation.

d) The Process of modernisation

The most crucial phase in fostering Japan's modernisation was the Meiji period (1868-1912). The most important aspects of this period were the building of a modern state and economic development, which generated rapid and profound changes politically, socially, and economically. These changes, it is suggested, were drawn from the Western model while retaining the country's socio-cultural specificity. The ideal sought by the Japanese political elite was to absorb Western knowledge and techniques with a Japanese spirit.

A major characteristic of the policy of modernisation undertaken during the Meiji period was speed. From their access to power, the new Japanese political leadership undertook to establish, on Western lines, their political authority with the creation of a central government, the promulgation of a constitution in 1889 (based on the Prussian model), a parliament, and different parties(173).

It is the argument here that the important
political and economic policies, during the early nineteenth
century, were coupled with social policies. The aim was to
bring about important social changes for a more adequate
adaptation to the new requirements of development and
modernisation. It was in this context that the abolition of
the rigid feudal social structure was undertaken, as argued
earlier, as a necessary step in the process of
modernisation. Social relations and social mobility in
modernising Japan would not be regulated by birth-rights
and social status but essentially through efficiency and
meritocracy. This has led to important transformations in
the Japanese traditional social stratification with the
gradual disappearance of class division which had
characterized Japan. These profound changes, in turn,
largely contributed in speeding up the process of
modernisation.

However, it should also be noted that the
Japanese approach to modernisation during the Meiji period,
was not free from problems and contradictions. As was
underlined in the general argument of the theseis, the
adoption of the Western model of development creates
disruptive effects in other contexts.

One of the strongest effects of the West in Japan
was the development of militarism. This was initially aimed
at protecting the country against foreign penetration, but
rapidly it became, as in the Western tradition, a major

means for imperialist expansionism. The militarisation of

Japan conditioned the process of its development which

bacame more strongly geared towards warfare than towards

socio-economic development(174).

However, during the period between 1878 and 1900,
important economic developments occured. The opening of the
ports for foreign trade had stimulated further developments.
Imports and exports increased quickly along with industrial
and technical development leading to the expansion of
communication networks(175). The involvement of the
government in laying the industrial infrastructure and
foundations had decisive effects on speeding Japanese
development. In its early stage of leadership the Meiji
state had a complete control over the economy, but gradually
the private sector emerged with the expansion of firms and
enterprises. It was in fact the strong relationship and
co-operation between the state and the private
enterprises(176), both drawing from, and relying on some of
the socio-cultural values of the Japanese society that
account for the country's remarkable development(177).

An important aspect of the Japanese experience of
development and modernisation, which is relevant to
developing nations such as those of the Maghreb, is that
Japan was essentially an agrarian society. Modernisation and
economic development were initiated in a predominently rural
poulation with limited industrial activities(178). During
Japan's development the role of agriculture was dominant

employing the largest proportion of its labour force and constituting its main source of revenue. It is also suggested that industrialization was not undertaken at the expense of agriculture as is often the case in industrializing countries. In Japan agriculture was used to subsidise industry, to contribute to industrial development, especially after the Land Reform Act of 1873 when land distribution and taxation were rationalized and new techniques, such as fertilizers and courses in agriculture and farming, were introduced(179).

An important development in agriculture and its link with industrial development was the diversification of agricultural products (such as new rice varieties); the development of sericulture wihch led to development of a silk fabrics industry. This was followed by growth in textile and cotton spinning industries. These products constituted, with tea, the major exports. In fact by 1918 Japan became a major competitor in the silk fabrics trade. Silk, tea, and textile revenues were reinvested in capital goods imports, such as machinery(180). Hence, gradually, the Japanese economy was moving from agriculture, to light industry, to heavy industry, especially armaments, ship building, iron and steel. Gradually the nature of imports and exports was changing, from exporting raw materials and importing finished goods. By the end of the Meiji period, Japan was able to reduce its imports of manufactured goods

to a minimum and Japan was able by 1870 to export finished

goods(181). Rapidly, Japan was becoming a major partner

with, and a competitor of the world powers.

It is the argument here that it is

'internalisation' and adaptation of the Western model to the

Japanese context, rather than transplanting it as a whole,

which distinguishes the Japanese experience. At the same

time a process of internal adaptations to the requirements

of modernisation and development were undertaken, as for

example in the modernisation and diversification of

agriculture. These internal and external adaptations have

reduced Japanese dependence on the West, and lessened the

disruptive effects of Western thought and practice in

Japan's socio-cultural context.

Consequently, in a short span of time (mainly

from the Meiji Restoration to the First World War), the

Japanese leadership succeeded in setting up a consolidated

and largely unified political system, was able to achieve

important institutional reforms and social changes, and

established strong industrial base.

The Japanese experience raises questions about

the validity of the linear-evolutionary Western theorising:

the speed of the Japanese changes makes it difficult to

locate the transitions between stages, or even the stages

themselves. However it is also important to note that the

importation of the Western model, with its technology and know-how, were crucial in Japan's transformation to modernity.

But the successes were not without a price. As stated earlier Japanese militarism and imperialism, its conflicts with Western powers in general and the United States in particular, was a result of the Western impact in this area and mainly of the Japanese attempt to achieve the Western level of power and military strength. The transplantation of this foreign model, and the international relations it entails have adversly affected the Japanese process of development and modernisation. The Japanese did not succeed in their attempt to be accepted among the world powers, but were rather driven into wars and destruction and subordination to the West, namely America.

After that experience and its consequences, a more systematic process of adaptation of the Western model (in its thought and practice) was undertaken.

This approach was reflected in Japanese post-war political and economic policies and international relations. Efforts were geared towards consolidating national political and institutional structures, reinforcing the existing economic bases, and expanding and diversifying international relations(162). Self-reliance became a major objective in Japanese developmental policy.

Overall, it is suggested that the acquisition of knowledge and modern technology have been the moving forces in the Japanese development: hence the emphasis on education in the process of nation-buiding. This stress on education reflects an awarness of the socio-cultural dimension in the Japanese approach to development. However it must be noted that the importance given to education is not new in the Japanese context. Emphasis on the accumulation of knowledge and the absorption of foreign know-how has been a characteristic of the Japanese, from their emulation of China to the present day. This thirst for knowledge, accumulation, and receptivity to foreign ideas, underlines the strong emphasis put on education in the Japanese context.

It is the argument here that the major aim of Japanese education was, and still is, to provide and secure an efficiently trained manpower, within national cultural characteristics (eg.loyalty) as the principal frame in national development. It is also the argument that with its very limited natural resources, its need to rely almost exclusively on external capital and knowledge, education in Japan has constituted the major source for its access to modernity. Hence the strikingly strong emphasis on educational achievement in the Japanese society.

Today education provision in Japan has achieved high levels: 100 per cent of the age cohort arein the primary cycle (6 to 12); 94 per cent in intermediary

education, and 88.6 per cent finish secondary education. There are in Japan 981 universities and institutions of higher education (Colleges) of which 216 are state controlled(183). Access to higher education is highly selective. There are two qualifying examinations for entry: the first is organised by the National Centre of Universities, the second examination set by individual universities is dependent on success in the first. It allows access to the different universities depending on the results achieved.

Fierce competition and severe selection are the proeminent features of the Japanese educational system. This is due to the tight relationship between educational institutions and the job market. This underlines the social transformations in Japan and the process of internal adaptations to the requirements of development and modernisation. Meritocracy rather than aristocracy, efficiency rather than ideology, are stressed through education(184).

Education in Japan is therefore basically geared to producing the human capital necessary for national development. The general aim is to train competent and skilled manpower, possessing a flexible mind and the ability to adapt to new situations, to be able to innovate and rapidly grasp the process and strategy of the enterprise within national economic and socio-cultural structures(185).

It is the argument here that the close relationship

between the state and industrial enterprises, and the attention given by both to national socio-cultural values are reflected in the Japanese educational system. The close relationship between formal education institutions and the enterprises, between educational achievement and professional life, creates intensive competition. Education is used purposefully to serve practical ends in the process of nation-building. Hence, education in Japan is an important economic resource, as the provider of qualified manpower. Also is the major means used to reinforce and perpetuate national cultural values (traditional and modern) which form the bases of the Japanese national cohesion. This has been strengthened by a single and developed unifying language, the Japanese national language. In Japan, although there are regional dialects, the national language is accessible to the majority, if not the totality of the population(186).

Today Japan is in the vanguard of the third revolution of industrial technology. Japanese large-scale, urban centered, industrialisation and level of modernisation is sustained by a modern political structure, with a strong central government which has provided an adequate political leadership and economic and social structures and institutions which constituted strong support and incentive to development and modernisation(187).

In the process of its modernisation, Japan has had to undergo fundamental changes politically (with the establishment of a strong central authority and the achievement of unity), socially (with the preponderence of efficiency over rank or social origin), and economically (with a rational organisation and use of the available resources). These structural, institutional, and social transformations were, in general terms, conceived and adopted along Western lines.

The Japanese experience thus presents at one level a case of convergence and immersion with the West, since it changed from a backward, agrarian and feudal society, to an industrially developed, urban, more or less liberal, and secular society. The process of its modernisation was based on a conscious imitation of the Western model. Its present achievements bear striking similarities with those of Western modernised societies: a high rate of industrialization, with an important degree of self-sustaining growth; a modern political structure with means for democratic representation; a system of universal education; and a social mobility determined by efficiency and merit. These phenomena fit the indicators proposed by most Western theorists of development and modernisation.

However, the major argument put forward in the case of Japan is that, in spite of similarities with the Western model of development, and in spite of the degree of impact of this model, Japanese modernisation presents a

specific and distinctive case. It is suggested that tne Japanese experience, refutes the universal validity of the Western model as emphasized by Western theories of development. The Japanese case underlines the importance of the local context: the socio-cultural characteristics which affect the process of modernisation.

The political, social, cultural and even economic transformations of Japan are rooted in its historical process of development, going back to to its earliest contacts with China and its culture. Development began prior to its contact with the West(188). Even during the period of isolation which lasted for over two centuries, there was important dynamism and preludes to change, mainly during the seventeenth century(189). Therefore, Western influence constituted an extra stimulus to internal potent forces. Japanese emulation of the Western model was in fact based on careful selection and adaptation of foreign elements considered as useful to its modernisation, but at the same time compatible with its social and cultural setting. The Japanese legal system , for instance, was established with a structure inspired by French, British, and German models. But it drew also from its social tradition and customs, specific assumptions and values concerning family relations, the reciprocal obligations of individuals, and the moral codes governing the while social fabric. These elements were incorporated, though often in a subtle way, in the system(190).

The Japanese experience of development is presented in this thesis as an example of a successful adaptation of the Western model of development rather than its 'blind' adoption. Its modernisation has been influenced by Western thought and practice. However these were incorporated, and improved upon, thanks to its own cultural traits, its people's sense of duty, entrepreneurship, thirst for knowlege, and creativity.

In this context nationalism has been important. However, Japanese nationalism is particular in its strong emphasis on efficiency. It is this pragmatic approach to national issues that propelled its modernisation and which is relevant to countries as those of the Maghreb where nationalism as an ideology is strongly emphasized.

It is thus the theme of nationalism as an ideology which is underlined in the following chapter. But befrore attention turns to the Maghreb, it is useful to pull together the themes of this chapter, against the general argument of the thesis.

Conclusion

The period following World War Two witnessed the scramble of colonialism and imperialism which led to the emergence of an important number of new political entities: the newly independent states, as was the case of the three Maghrebian states (Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria). Once political independence achieved, these states were to undertake the process of nation-building in order to establish and reinforce their sovreignty and achieve national development and modernisation. A need was then felt, in these emerging states to find means and ways to initiate and sustain a process of development to achieve a level of modernisation similar to that of the Western industrialized countries. Therefore, the Western World offered a viable source of reference in terms of development and modernisation.

This viability of the Western model was emphasised by Western theories of development, especially those formulated during the late fifties and early sixties. These theories, and in fact subsequent ones, were based on two major assumptions which proved inadequate and even misleading for the emerging nations:

- The universal validity, and necessary use, of the Western model of development for modernisation,
- the preponderence of industrialisation and economic growth in this process.

The adoption of the Western model of development, with the political, economic, social, and cultural influences it entails, has, instead of propelling development and modernisation in the emerging nations, created problems and obstacles to the process of nation-building. The gap between industrialized and industrializing nations has been widening. This led to the emergence of alternative theoretical approaches to development such as neo-Marxists, and mainly dependency theorising.

These theories have emphasized the unequal international relations between developed and developing nations, and stressed that underdevelopment in the emerging nations is but a consequence of the development of capitalist Western nations. Therefore, to break this dominant-dominated relationship a 'delinking' with the Western capitalist system approach to development was proposed as the way toward the development of the new nations.

However, these alternative theories to development, although voicing the intellectual perspective of the developing nations, were also based on the general assumptions proposed by the theories they criticise. The approach - of the alternative theories - is also based on a universal perception of the different developing nations and consequently proposes a universal solution: breaking with the Western system and repalcing it by a radical socialist

system. In so doing, the neo-Marxists have ignored, as did other theorists, the importance of socio-cultural specificities in any process of development. Furtheremore, their solution of a radical break with the West, in this increasingly internationally-based world order, is probably impossible.

The experiences of China and Japan have emphasized the argument that neither the 'convergence with the West' approach proposed by the 'evolutionary' (capitalist oriented) theories, nor the 'delinking' approach proposed by the radical (Marxist-inspired) theories are adequate formulas for development in emerging nations such as those of the Maghreb. The Western model and its influence, when not adapted, had disruptive effects in the societies it was introduced in. The Chinese as well as parts of the Japanese experience have attested to the problems arising from imposed rather than selected Western forms of influence. The delinking approach adopted by China has led to a set of economic, social, and political problems. In turn, this has led especially in the after-Mao period, to a reconsideration by the Chinese themselves, of such a radical approach to national policies for development. There seems to be a readiness in China, though hesitant, to turn back towards the West and the international world, for a model of modernisation which can only be possible through an interdependence.

It is suggested here that the Western world remains the major source of modern knowledge, science, and technology. As a model, it has much to offer to those nations still in the initial phases of their process of development and moderniosation. However, the point is that, because it constitutes a model, it cannot be applied without adaptation to other contexts with their specific aims, characteristics, and possibilities.

The example of Japan, in its relation to this point is that this 'convergence', has been based on Japanese terms: that is, the ability, not to adopt, but to select and adapt Western modes of thought and practice to its own context, needs, and aspirations. This strategy of combining Eastern values with Western techniques could be a useful model for the Maghreb which is still in search for a balance, between a strong desire for national cultural preservation and an equally strong desire to achieve a Western-based modernisation.

However, the Japanese experience and its achievements are the result of its own particular conditions and circumstances. Therefore, it too remains a model, and like any other model of development cannot be transplanted into another context without having the same disruptive effects the Western model has had.

Thus, one can note that, Japanese pragmatism has been apparant in Japan's realisation, and acceptance, of Western economic, social and technological superiority. One

can note its success in incorporating, through rigorous selection, useful elements of Western theories and technologies. One can note efficiency and meritocracy have become the major conditions for social mobility. One can note its investment in education. One can note that, through internal and external adaptations, Japan has been able to ensure national as well as international integration and achieve a high degree of modernisation. And one can even note that it is this national as well as international integration which constitute the major concern for the three countries of the Maghreb: Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. In the process of their nation-building they are faced with the dilemma of achieving modernisation while preserving their specific cultural identity. Modernisation is partly dependent on the West while national cultural identity is based on the Arabo-Islamic culture.

But in so noting, there is no suggestion that the Japanese or Chinese experiences are transferable or should be, to the Maghreb.

The Chinese and Japanese cases establish some caveats or limits on accepting the usefulness of Western theorising or recipies for development in the third world. The Chinese and Japanese cases provide illustrations of the difficulties of combining nation-building with economic development - especially the dangers of domestic or international political instability. But they are mainly useful as warnings both about the over-simplicities of some

of the major theories of development which have influenced

men's behaviour and about the importance of local

socio-cultural specificities in influencing development.

It is now time to address the question of the

local socio-cultural specificities of the Maghreb directly,

with special reference to the role of language policies in

those contexts. This is the whork of chapters three and

four.

Chapter II

Notes and References

1. Modernisation and development are often used in the literature to express the same meaning. However early approaches tend to use the term development, whereas modernisation is used in more recent works, especially by American social scientists. In this thesis the concept of development is interpreted as a social process which leads towards a condition called " modernisation".

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6. See Marx, K., & Engels, F., _Selected Works. In one volume._, Lawrence and Wishat, London, 1968; see also Marx, K., _Communist Manifesto._, Editions Sociales, Paris, 1973.

7. See Rostow, W.W., _The Stages of Economic Growth. A non Marxist Manifesto._, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,

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14. See Hoogvelt, A.M., op.cit., p 165.

15. Ibid., pp.106-107.

16. Ibid., p.109.

17.Ibid., pp.149-150.

18.See Rostow, W.W., op.cit.

19.See Hoogvelt, A.M., op.cit., pp.149-150.

20.Marx, K., & Engel, F., op.cit., p24 & pp.399-417.

21.Ibid., p182.

22.Ibid., pp.456-469.

23.See Marx, K., Communist Manifesto..., op.cit., p.53.

24.Marx, K., & Engel,F., op.cit., pp.186-229.

25.Ibid., pp.26-27 & 51-53.

26.Ibid., pp.11-14.

27.Ibid., p.182.

28.See Gurley ,J.G.,: "Economic Development: A Marxist View".
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31.See Barratt, B.M., " A Critique of Marxist Theories of
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   of Imperialism., Longman, London, 1972.

32.See Meier, G.M., : Leading Issues in Economic Development.
   Fourth edition, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford,
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33. See Rostow, W.W., op.cit., p.17.

34. Ibid., p.12.

35. Ibid., pp.59-92.

36. Ibid., p.45.

37. Kuznets, S., " Notes on Stage of Economic Growth as a System Determinent". In Alexander Eckstein (ed.), Comparison of Economic Systems, Berkley, 1971, p.243. Also quoted by Meier, G.M.,ibid., p.91.

38. Rostow, W.W., op.cit., pp.4-12.

39. See Meier, M., op.cit p90-91.

40. The five Stages of development proposed by Rostow are:

(i)   The Traditional Society

(ii) The preconditions for the take- off (where important changes in economic and social patterns of the society occur, including strategic factors, succession of strategic choices).

(iii) The take- off stage (central notion in his approach, which he describes as "decisive transition in a society's history", where high economic productivity generates changes in the structure of the society.

(iv) The drive to maturity, the society in its process to the auto-dynamic stage.

(v)   The stage of high mass-consumption.

See Rostow, W.W., op.cit., pp.11-14.

41. Parsons, T., & Shils, E.A., op.cit., pp.250-275.

42. Parsons, T., The Socila System., op.cit,. pp.167-177.

43. Parsons, T., " The evolutionary Universal...", op.cit., p.341.

44.Ibid., p.339.

45.Parsons, T., & Shils, E.A., op.cit., pp.49-77.

46.Parsons, T., "The Evolutionary...", op.cit., p.356.

47.Hoestelitz, B.F., op.cit.

48.Ibid., pp.32-33.

49.Ibid., p.41.

50.Ibid., pp.41-42.

51.Ibid., p.41.

52.Ibid., p.33.

53.Ibid., p.47.

54.Ibid., pp.41-42.

55.Ibid., pp.74-80.

56.Hagen, E., op.cit.

57.The general characteristics of traditional societies

proposed by Hagen are:

- Behaviour is transmitted from generation to generation

with little change,

- Behaviour is determined by custom and not by law,

- The social system is based on hierarchy,

- Classification (individual status) is determined by

birth and not by success or mobility,

- Economic growth is low. Ibid., pp.55-85.

58.Ibid., pp74-80.

59.Ibid., p.84 & p.255.

60.Ibid., p84,

61.Eisenstadt, S.N., op.cit.

62.The set of criteria proposed by Eisenstadt to identify

modernisation are principally four:

- Ecological (such as urbanisation).

- Economic (a high levl of technique and preponderance of
industrialisation.

- Political (diffusion of power and group integration).

- Cultural, whereby there is a continuously renewed
vision of culture, which allows for expansion and
development. Ibid., pp.11-22 & pp.44-45.

63.Ibid., p.p.42-44.

64.Ibid., pp.45-46 &102-106.

65.Eisenstadt, S.N., Modernisation: Protest..., op.cit.,
p.106.

66.Ibid., pp.106-107.

67.Ibid., p.106.

68.Ibid.

69.Ibid., pp.106-109.

70.Ibid., p.106.

71.Parsons,T., "Evolutionary.....", op.cit.

72.M. Weber explains the size of capitalism in Western
Europe and its economic activity as resulting from, and
inspired by, the 'Protestant Ethic', which according to
him stimulated hard work, the rational pursuit of economic
gain, and adaptation to changing economic conditions.
Hence, Protestanism, unlike other religions, has an
'elective affinity' with the 'spirit of capitalism',
which explains, in his view, the accelerated economic
growth and the social and economic changes

characterizing Western Europe. See: Green, R.W.,

Protestantism and Capitalism.The Weber Thesis

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73.See Hoogvelt, A.M., op.cit., p.118.

74.See Meier, G.M., op.cit., p.89-90.

75.See Hermassi, E.B., op.cit., pp.1-15.

76.See Goldthorpe, J.E., The Sociology of the Third World.

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77.Ibid., pp. 137-139. See Also Meier, G.M., op.cit.,pp.139-142.

and Blomstrom, M., & Hettne, B., op.cit., pp.194-199.

78.Galtung, J.N., " A Structural Theory of Imperialism", in

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80.See Galtung, J.N., op.cit.

81.Ibid., p.97.

82.Ibid., pp.97-108.

83.Ibid., pp.99-104.

84.See Hoogvelt, A.M., op.cit., p.165.

85.See Goldthrope, J.E., & Blomstrom, M., & Hettne, B., op.cit.,

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86.Munhoz,H., Ibid., pp.15-42.

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in political and economic terms rather than uniquely
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90.Ibid., p. 11.

91.Ibid., pp.10-11.

92. Goldthrope, J.E., op.cit., pp.137-139.

93.See Balazs, E., " Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy",
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94.Andors, S., ibid., p.27.

95.Ibid.,p.26.

96.Ibid.,p.38.

97.See Murphy, R., " The Treaty Ports and China's
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99.Andors, S., op.cit., p.31.

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   Cambridge University Press, London, New York, 1982,
   pp.606-620.

101.Vohra, R., op.cit., p.83 & pp.104-109.

102.Ibid., p.121.

103.Gerne, J., op.cit., p.639.

104.Ibid., p.651.

105.Ibid.,pp.651. See also Vohra, R., op.cit., p.159. See
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108.Ibid., pp.210-214.

109.Andors, S., op.cit., pp.44-50.

110.Ibid., pp.56-57. See Also Alan, J.,(ed.), _China and the_
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   country's human resources, and secondly at achieving a
   relatively balanced development between the industrial
   and agricultural sectors. For more details on this

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113.Anders, S., ibid., pp.68-70.

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148. Ibid., pp.69-79. On the Merchant's role in the Japanese process of development see also Sheldon C.D., _The rise of Merchant Class in Tokugawa Japan: 1600-1868._, Russell & Russel, New York, 1958.

149. Lehmann, J.P., ibid., pp71-72.

150. Ibid., p62.

151. Ibid.

152. Theodore de Bary, op.cit., pp.5-8.

153. On the economic growth of Japan during the Edo Era see: Yoshihar, K., _Japanese Economic Development: A Short Introduction._, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Tokyo, 1979. See also Allen, G.C., _A Short Economic History of Modern Japan._, George Allen & Unwin, third Edition, London, 1972.

154. See Allen, G.C., ibid., pp.15-20; and Lehmann, J.P., op.cit., pp.80- 86.

155. Ibid., pp.72-74.

156. See Morishi, M., _Why Has Japan Succeeded?: Western technology and the Japanese ethos._, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, London, New York, 1985, pp.86-87.

157.Ibid., pp.9-19 & pp.33-36.

158.Ibid., p.20 &p.66.

159.Even Confucianism, which constitutes the most important

basis of the Japanese culture, was imported from China,

but underwent considerable modifications so that

Japanese Confucianism became, in many respects, different

from Chinese Confucianism. See Morishi, M., ibid., p.2.

160.See Matsuda, K., The Relations Between Portugal and

Japan., C.C.H.U., Lisbon, 1965, pp.4-21.

161.Ibid., pp.1-21. See also Lehman, J.P., op.cit., pp.36-37

& p.44.

162.Lehman J.P, op.cit., pp.48-58.

163.Ibid., p34.

164.See Hane, M., Japan: a historical survey., Charles

Scribner and Sons., New York, 1972, pp.149-150.

See also Lehman,J.P.,op.cit., p.38 & pp.43-47.

165.Ibid., pp.135-138.

166.Ibid., pp.139-140

167.Ibid., pp.148-149.

168.Ibid., pp.136-140.

169.Ibid., p.137.

170.Ibid., pp.141-147.

171.Ibid., p.296.

172.However the Monarchy, represented by the young 'Tenno'

(Emperor) Meiji was restored to symbolize strongly

national unity rather than having a real impact on

decision-making. Here emerges the influence of the

British model of a modern constitutional Monarchy.

About the Meiji leadership and their policies see Hane, E.,

op.cit., p.268 & p.319 and also Morishi, M., op.cit.,

pp.70-72.

173.Lehman, J.P., op.cit., p.170.

174.Ibid., pp. 130-135.

175.Ibid., p.87. See also Lehman, J.P., op.cit., p.181.

176.Morishi, M., ibid., pp.96-97.

177.Ibid., pp.95-100.

178.Ibid., pp.86-97.

179.Lehman, J.P., op.cit., pp.221-222.

180.Ibid., p.194.

181.Ibid., p.195.

182.In terms of international relations, Japanese diplomacy,

since the Second World War, has been principally based on

peaceful relations and diversified economic and commercial

partnerships. So, the previously adopted policy of military

expansionism which led to almost the destruction of Japan

is replaced today by an economic and commercial expansion.

On the Japanese 'commercial diplomacy' see Guillain, R.,

Japan Troisième Grand., Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1969,

pp.211-227.

183.Vandermeersch, E.," Le Miracle du Modèle Japonais", in

Le Monde de l'Education., Numero 110, Novembre 1984, p.14.

184.See Lehman, J.P., op.cit., p.180.

185.Ibid., pp.213-220.

186.Ibid., pp.8-9.

187.See Lehman, J.P., op.cit., p. 253, p.265 & p.314.

188.Morishi, M., op.cit., p.20; also Lehman, J.P., op.cit.,
   pp.34-36.

189.Morishi, M., ibid., p.591; see also Lehman, J.P., ibid.,
   pp.61-63.

190.Lehman ,J.P., ibid., pp.253_259.

CHAPTER III.

Modernisation and National Identity.

Language Policies and Modernisation in the Maghreb.

The purpose of this chapter is firstly to locate
the role of nationalism and language in the process of
nation-building, and to look more specifically at the
importance given to language in the Maghrebian states within
the process of their particular process of development. The
second purpose is to investigate comparatively the
contradictions(1) and the fluctuations(2) in terms of
language policies in the three selected countries of the
Maghreb. These policies will be examined in relation to the
political and economic contexts which have influenced these
policies.

The arguments of the chapter are:
- that both social actors and social theorists have
identified the central importance of language in the
creation of national identity; and that political actors in
the three countries of the Maghreb have used the language
issue to promote nationalism and national identification as
important bases for nation-building,
- that the present language situation and the related
problems are the result of the specific historical processes
of each of these countries, namely the impact of
colonisation and especially French colonisation,

- that politics, focused through the power of the state, have framed language policies as a contentious and ideological issue,

- thus, as the politics of language are determined by ideological rather than practical considerations there are frequently contradictions between official stated aims and actual practices,

- that the economic policies adopted in each country, largely inspired by the Western model and dependent on Western thought and practice, have reinforced these contradictions. The strong commitment to both national identity and modernisation underlines these contradictions and has led to fluctuations in language policies, between these two aims, and has made problematic the role and status of the French language,

- that the experiences of development of these countries emphasize the general argument of the previous chapter: the disruptive effects of the adoption - without adaptation - of the Western model of development in a different socio-political context, especially when national cultural identity is strongly stressed.

While there are important similarities between the three countries(3), their political systems and structures and their political emphases differ. Hence, their policies in terms of national identity and national modernisation differ accordingly. The type of colonisation experienced by each of them, its length and strength, has shaped the

process of their decolonisation, especially their approach to national cultural identity symbolized in the Arabic language.

Morocco as a constitutional Monarchy claims a democratic system allowing the existence of different political parties. Its economy is capitalist-oriented and its relations with the West are based on a liberal approach(4). The type of colonisation, as a French protectorate with less direct control, and its time period resulted in a lesser colonial impact. Its transition to independence was smoother(5) than in Algéria, which led to the maintenance of closer relations with France. There has also been, since Independence, continuous emphasis on decolonisation while there has been incresing relations and reliance on the West in general and on France in particular. The Arabic language has been used as the symbol of national identity and as the means of cultural decolonisation, whereas French is seen, and used, as the means to modernisation and international relations.

Tunisia is a republic claiming a liberal political system, though with only one official party. Its economy oscillates between capitalism and socialism(6). However, like Morocco, Tunisia has maintained open relations with the West. Tunisia was also a French Protectorate and experienced a shorter period of colonisation than Algeria,

with less colonial impact. The transition to independence

was even smoother than in Morocco and thus French-Tunisian

relations were characterized by

continuity(7). The contradictions and fluctuations in

language policies in the Tunisian case emerge from the

official emphasis on the Arabo-Islamic identity, symbolized

and expressed in the Arabic language, and the desire to

modernise on the Western model, through the use of the

French language. The strong commitment of the Tunisian

leaders to both has led to the maintenance of the two

languages. Each fulfils specific roles and aspirations. The

Arabic language is used to achieve national integration

while the French is used for international integration

(especially with the West). In spite of their different

political systems, Tunisia and Morocco share a relatively

similar approach to language policy. This can be described

as a more moderate approach to language policy than in

Algeria, which because of its specific historical and

political contexts, has adopted a radical approach to

language.

Algeria is a republic based on a claimed socialist

system with one official party. Its economy is socialist, in

the sense that it is state-controlled, and its relations

with the West are selective. Foreign participation in the

national economy is rather limited and is made through the

appropriate official agencies. Among the three contries

Algeria experienced the longest and strongest type of

colonisation. It was under the direct control of France for over a century. The colonial imprint was therefore much stronger than in the other two countries. Algeria's transition to independence was achieved after a long-lasting war and important political conflicts with France. Hence, the process of decolonisation was more radical.

The contradictions regarding language policies are reflected, as in the two other cases, in the strong emphasis on a national identity based on the Arabo-Islamic culture and the adoption of the Western model of development. However, the process of development has yielded increasing relations with the West and the need to maintain the French language as an important medium for modernisation. Here again there is a strong and continuous claim for economic and cultural decolonisation whereas modernisation, based on heavy industrialisation, has led to greater reliance on Western technology, thought and practice.

The three countries of the Maghreb are therefore engaged in the achievement of two major objectives in their nation-building: the establishment of a national cultural identity and modernisation. The former is derived from the Arabo-Islamic culture where language holds a central role; the latter is largely dependent on the Western model and what it entails, such as the need to maintain the ex-colonial language.

However, the issue of language is perceived and tackled differently in each of the three countries. This is related to their relatively different colonial experiences, and their political and economic structures.

To pursue the general arguments outlined above, this chapter will be organised as follows:

Section I is a general introduction to the chapter. It will deal with nationalism and language and their role in nation-building. Emphasis in this section will be on the importance of language in nation-forming in general and in the Maghreb in particular.

Section II, as the core part of the chapter, deals with the processes of nation-building of the three countries. The following sub-sections are analysed for each country:

a) the historical context,

b) the political context,

c) language policies,

d) the economic context.

In this chapter, the process of nation-building with its historical setting, political context, language policies, and economic context of each country will be treated separately. This is to underline the general theme of the thesis stressing the importance of local specificities in the process of development. The order in which the three countries are treated in this and the

following chapters is based on the sequence, in time, of

their access to independence: Morocco in March 1956, Tunisia

in June 1956, and Algeria in July 1962.

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Section I: Nationalism and Language.

The purpose of this section is to analyse briefly the importance of language and nationalism in the creation of nations in general and in the Maghreb in particular. The argument is that language, as a central ingredient in nationalism can be a unifying force in claims for national identity. However, language can also be a major source of disunity after the initial excitment of the creation of a nation-state.

Nationalism has been a major force which has contributed to the shaping of the world today with its division into nation-states. The three countries of the Maghreb, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria gained access to independence, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, after a long chain of colonisation and foreign interventions(8). The latest foreign penetration was French colonisation which started in Algeria during the mid-eighteenth century, in Tunisia in the last part of the same century, and in Morocco in the early nineteenth century.

Thus, in the Maghreb, as in other parts of the world, nationalism which had characterized late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Europe spread to the colonies, especially after the second world war, and was the genesis of the emergence and construction of "new" nation-states

(commonly called the emerging nations). But what is nationalism, and what is the role of language in nationalism, especially in the case of the Maghreb?.

Nationalism as a modern phenomenon(9) is commonly recognized as a potent and powerful force for promoting a sense of groupness and solidarity. As such, nationalism has contributed to the emergence and consolidation of nations. Hence the close relationship which exists between the idea of a nation and nationalism(10).

The concept of nation(11) refers, generally, to a notion of groupness, a manifestation of a "national conscience" based on a sense of solidarity and affiliation(12). This is often perceived within a political and geographic unit with a number of ingredients such as a common history of race, traditions, culture and language, which constitute the bases of a 'national identity' and a 'national unity'. National cultural identity as an 'affective' conception of beloning to a specific nation has constituted the core of nationalism. It is this form of nationalism, seeking nation formation and development, which has influenced the widespread movement of 'national consciousness' which characterized the twentieth century, particularly following World War I and World War II, in different parts of the world(13).

Hence, because of its power to generate support and cohesion, nationalism has been used by political leaders in the Maghreb, as elsewhere, to promote a national

awarness, to create a sense of solidarity and community and to establish, (or re-establish) an independent state or nation(14).

Cultural identity has been central in stimulating and fostering nationalist sentiments. Ethnic and cultural identification has been used by most, if not all, nationalists as the catalyst of group solidarity. Cultural identity creates a sense of common bonds, of 'sharing', of common traits, affiliations, and aims(15).

Ethnocultural identification has helped create nations and liberate populations from dependance and subjugation, as was the case with the Maghrebian states.

Thus, in this context aspects of cultural identity, such as language, are used, as in the Maghreb, as important symbols in nationalism, and sustain national sentiment and national mobilization. Nationalism was not only used against the colonial power but it continued to be used after independence to achieve political legitimacy. Consequently the language question has become central to the politics and policies of the Maghreb.

Language as an important element in national cultural identity has been a powerful element in nationalism and its maintenance(16). But why is language in particular of such significance in national identification?

Language is seen as the means by which a nation asserts its existence, ensures its continuity and protects itself from outsider influence. For Fichte, for instance,

language was the national soul, and its defence was simultaneously, a defence of the nation(17). Hence the need for a nation to have and assert its own language as the main expression of its identity.

> A people without a language of its own
> is only half a nation. A nation should
> guard its language more than its
> territories — 'tis a surer barrier, a
> more important frontier than fortress
> or river.
>
> (18)

The importance given to language, the strong attachement to it as one of the most significant indicators and tools of national identity, is due to the 'intrinsic' value of language and its qualities as a communicative as well as symbolic device for the individual and the society(19). It is because of both its 'instrumental' function (as a tool of expression and communication) and its 'symbolic' function(as an element of national identification and assertion) that language often played a central role in nationalism. As a powerful tool of communication and interaction, it has been the medium of the 'message of nationalism': the means of spreading it and of transmitting national ideology. Because of its identitive connotations, its integrative power and its historical and cultural associations, language in fact surpasses its

instrumental role to become a symbol, if not the symbol, of

national identity. Hence from a mere tool of communication,

language, as an important element in nationalism becomes a

conduit carrying the ancestral cultural heritage and

'historic greatness'(20).

Hence in Maghrebian nationalism it is asserted

by the political elite, especially in Algeria, that

preserving the national language is the major means of

safeguarding national cultural values and national

identity. Consequently language has become a political

issue, and considered as basic to sociocultural and

political integration.

It is mainly because of its symbolic values that

language has been so significant in the nationalism of the

three countries of the Maghreb(21). This is because of the

'sacred' and 'holy' attributions given to the Arabic

language as the expression and the major defining

characteristic of Islam. Arabo-Islamic tradition, symbolized

by the Arabic language, was an efficient instrument of unity

and mobilization against colonialism.The Arabo-Islamic

identity which was among the principal justifications for

independence, continues to be used as a mobilizing force in

the process of nation building, as a means to guarantee

mass-participation and adhesion to the leadership of these

states.

The official adoption of a common unifying Arabic
language, submerging regional differences, was therefore
seen by the political elite of the three countries as an
important means for fostering national cohesion, and
participation in the process of national development and
modernisation. Hence language in these 'new polities'
became, for political leaders, an issue to be settled
urgently, if national consensus and national adhesion were
to be realized.

However, the three emerging nations of the Maghreb
were faced at Independence with other pressing problems and
priorities. In the process of nation building, they had on
the one hand to ensure their political stability, dependent
on accommodating their population into a unified political
and socio-cultural framework, and on the other hand to
ensure the development of their political, social and
economic structures, in accordance with the model of
development of the advanced (mainly Europeans) nations.
In these processes, the role given to language was important
- and a review of decisions and difficulties connected with
language policies is one work of the next sub-section.

Section II: The process of nation building.

The purpose of this section is to analyse
comparatively, language policies in the three countries of
the Maghreb within historical, political, and economic
contexts.

The major arguments pursued in this section are:
- that the Arabic language became, with the advent of Islam,
a central feature of the Maghrebian societies. This language
was absorbed and integrated into the local contexts,
subsequently giving birth however to local dialects. In
addition the Berber language has been preserved by important
proportions of the population in Morocco and Algeria.
- that the Western impact, mainly through French
colonisation, and later on through the importation of its
model of development, has generated problems and
contradictions especially in linguistic terms.
- that economic policies, with their emphasis on
industrialisation (of agrarian societies), have led to
increasing dependence on the West and have increased
tensions over language policies.
- that these language policies are politically sensitive and
inefficient in practical terms both in terms of the
socio-linguistic context and in the effects of the adopted
policies.

These arguments are pursued in the following
sub-sections

A.Morocco

a) The historical context:

The particular historical development of Morocco has shaped its present socio-economic and political structure and orientations. The two major historical events which have had far reaching effects in the Moroccan context (politically, economically, and culturally) were its contact with firstly the Arabs and secondly with the French. These contacts have left their imprints in the socio-cultural framework of this country. The Arabo-Islamic culture is accepted while the French, linked with colonisation, is questioned (principally by the political leadership).

The Arabo-Islamic culture implanted in this area especially between the tenth and fifteenth centuries was paralleled by economic prosperity, internal organisation (political, social, military) and a notable commercial expansion with the Islamic empire controlling a large net of commercial routes(22). However, internal divisions and wars and the Turkish threat contributed to the weakening of the reigning Dynasty and led to serious financial difficulties. It was during this period, from the fifteenth century, that the Islamic empire began to decline. At the same time. Europe was undergoing an unprecedented development. Its industrialisation, and socio-economic progress led to the

need for its expansion outside its borders in a search for markets, raw materials, and larger spheres of control and influence.

Morocco, because of its strategic position, and precarious political and economic situation, presented an attractive place for the increasing European imperialist and colonialist ambitions. So, Morocco, from the mid-fifteenth century, was increasingly attracting European interest as an important route for commercial and political penetration. This led to the signature of treaties in 1856, opening the gates for European products and influence. A Moroccan-French convention was signed in 1863 granting commercial privileges to French products and another treaty with Spain was made with an important indemnity for previous wars between the two countries.

Hence, Morocco, in a short span of time, became a centre for the rivalries of European powers, mainly France, Spain, Germany, and Britain. For Great Britain, concerned with the security of Gibraltar, it represented a strategic political spot. For Spain, in addition to its strategic position, it represented the recovery and acquisition of expanded borders. However, it was for France that the Maghreb was most important in terms of economic and political ambitions(23).

With its control of Algeria, the control of Morocco became necessary for France. This led, in spite of resistance from inside Morocco, and opposition from the

other Europen powers, to French success in annexing Morocco
to its empire. France gradually managed to reach agreements
first with Britain then with the other rivals allowing its
supremacy in the control of Morocco.

Morocco came under French control from 1912.
However it remained a zone of international interests,
especially in terms of commercial exchanges, with Spain
controlling the Northern part of the country. But French
domination was reinforced, and for fourteen years Morocco
was a French protectorate. Although its colonisation was
'indirect', French penetration, politically, economically
and culturally was important in affecting Moroccan society
as a whole. A process of modernisation, that is
industrialisation and a new socio-political organisation,
was undertaken. Capital investment, the creation of an
economic and industrial infrastructure, the development of a
modern agriculture, were among the most important changes
brought about by French colonisation in Morocco(24).

However, it is suggested here that these economic
and industrial transformations were aimed at fostering the
interests of the colonial powers and at consolidating the
development and modernisation of the metropole.
Consequently, they strongly disrupted the existing
socio-cultural and economic patterns of the Moroccan
society. This affected mainly the rural areas where the most
fertile land, was colonized and its owners uprooted(25).

These disruptive effects of French colonisation in Morocco eventually led to the emergence of nationalist liberation movements.

The Moroccan nationalist movement against French domination started with rural revolts during the twenties as a reaction to increasing rural colonisation. These revolts gradually developed by 1930 into an organized general movement for national independence, involving the rural as well as the urban population. The Second World War and its effects on the expansion of nationalism, the tightening and hardening of French occupation, its recourse to direct control through military intervention and the extension of land colonisation, and finally the deposition of Sultan Mohammed V in 1953 contributed to the strengthening of nationalism in Morocco and led to the weakening of French colonialism(26). Hence negotiations for the independence of Morocco were undertaken between France and national representatives and culminated in Independence in March 1956.

It is suggested that ideas about a national identity, drawn from the Arabo-Islamic tradition, played a key-role in stimulating and sustaining nationalism in this area, and because of its power in sustaining people's unity and adhesion, it has continued to be a central theme in the process of nation building.

The Arabic language as the 'sacred' language of
the Koran, has been a salient feature in Arabo-Islamic
identification. In Morocco, as in the other countries,
Arabic was therfore used as a means of reaction to, and
protection against French cultural, and especially
linguistic influence. From the onset of Moroccan
nationalism, the reestablishment and reinforcement of Arabic
as the official national language, and the principal
feacture of national identity, was emphasised(27).

Morocco's position between the Western and Eastern
Worlds has made of it a centre for different cultural
contacts throughout history(28). The adoption of Islam, and
The Arabic language became the overriding distinctive
features of the emerging Moroccan cultural identity. However
the French influence also left deeply rooted cultural and
linguistic marks. This was reinforced by the policies
adopted for national construction and modernisation after
independance. Furthermore, the Moroccan socio-cultural
setting contains another important feature: the Berber
language and culture, preserved by an important proportion
of the society and having an impact Moroccan culture in
general(29).

Therefore, it is suggested here that the adoption
of the classical form of Arabic, which is different from the
spoken variety, as the official national language in
Morocco, without an analysis of the existing socio-cultural
and linguistic situation, has led to problems in the

society. These have resulted principally from the extreme
centrality of politics and power of the state in the
Moroccan process of nation-building. The race for power and
political legitimacy has characterized the Moroccan
political elite since Independence. In this context
nationalism and the emphasis on the Araboo-Islamic cultural
identity in general and the Arabic language in particular
were used as symbols and means for political exercise and
influence. Consequently ideology, though useful in framing
language policies, has reduced efficiency in implementing
them.

b) The Political Context

The political situation of Morocco which emerged
at Independence, after a long period of foreign
intervention, had two major characteristics: the powerful
position of the Monarchy and the intense battle for power
among the different political parties. The Monarchy emerged
at Independence as a legitimate and powerful political
institution with the Sultan (who became officially the King
in 1957) as the living symbol of nationalism, victory, and
unity. Mohammed V restabilished his throne as the principal
locus of power, legitimacy, and unity(30). He represented
political as well as religious institutions in accordance
with the Arabo-Islamic tradition, holding the title of
'Amir-El-Moumininin' (The Commander of the Faithful)(31).
The Moroccan Monarch was however in favour of a modern form

of polity, a constitutional monarchy with a democratic type
of government, that is with an assembly, a constitution, and
multi-party system(32).

Shortly after Independence a Consultative
Assembly (parliament) was created in August 1956 as an
initial step towards the democratic institutionalisation of
the monarchy, but the Assembly members were nominated by the
king and not elected. The King considered that a democracy
should be established progressively and only "when people
have attained a certain level of political maturity"(33). In
a speech delivered in 1956 and he stated:

> It is necessary to proceed by stages to
> lay the grounds of the democracy, we want to
> establish, on the bases of political
> maturity, civic education and social
> promotion.
>
> (34)

In Morocco, independence from France was the
initial step in nation-building. Nationalism has continued
to be stressed to ensure popular support, mobilization, and
unification around the political elite represented
principally by the king. The Monarchy has been since
independence the major institution transcending any other
institution, giving to the king supreme authority in terms
of decision-making, or in accepting or rejecting any policy
proposed by the government. Claiming his descent from the

Prophet himself, the king is the temporal and spiritual leader of the Moroccan nation(35). His 'Divine' power (expressed in his title of the 'Commander of the Faithful') places him above the struggle for power between the different political parties.

Morocco clearly reflects the tensions and contradictions, at the political level, between adopting, in the process of nation-building, a traditional (Monarchial) or a modern type of state on the Western model with a constituent assembly and different parties. King HassanII, coming to the throne in 1961, continued to exercise control over key policy sectors. However he undertook to concretise the option for a 'democratic' political organisation through a constitutional assembly(36).

The Prime Minister is appointed by the king, and he appoints his own Ministers. The role of the King, in terms of decision-making, has been to formulate the general principles leaving to the government and parties the responsibility of establishing programmes and formulating specific policies. However the king and his Cabinet hold the power to veto any decision the Assembly and the government might pass (according to the Article 62 of the 1962 constitution). In fact the parties have little influence in changing any policy approved by the king or in enforcing one rejected by him(37). Royal cabinet members as well as government members are nominated by the King and are

responsible to him. He also held the ultimate legislative

powers and had exclusive control over the police and the

army(38).

Thus the ultimate power and authority are

concentrated in the hands of the monarchy whose legitimacy

is drawn from 'people as well as God'(39). The king is the

living symbol of Arabo-Islamic national identity bestowed

onto him through ancestral right. Hence his emphasis on the

Arabo-Islamic identity of Morocco, expressed through the

Arabic language, which constitutes an essential element in

the King's legitimacy. The building of a modern state and

socio-economic development following the modern Western

example, has also constituted a major source for the

monarchy's legitimacy. In this context the established

modern political institutions are an extension of the

Monarchial power.

The three officially recognized parties at

independence were the Istiqlal party, The Democratic Party

of Independence(PDI), and the Liberal Party of

Independents(PIL). The Istiqlal Party has been the most

representative of the parties and has claimed legitimacy

through its important contribution in bringing about

independence and its support to the King. The two other

parties (PDI and PID) were relatively much smaller than the

Istiqlal, in number and influence(40). It is assumed that

these small parties were maintained by the King for the sole purpose of balancing the power held by the Istiqlal Party(41).

None of the different parties in Morocco has offered open opposition to the Monarchy. Their opposition, since independence, has been directed against each other and their energy concentrated in the race for power reflected in securing a majority in the government(42).

This struggle for power and the important discord between the different parties resulted in the dislocation of the first government dominated Istiqlal members soon after independence(in 1956). The political situation was so unstable that the government was torn by party rivalries and their lack of consensus on the one hand, and on the other hand by loyalty to the king, as the ultimate power, and its duties towards the Parties(43). Other parties emerged after Independence, each claiming to represent and defend national interests and/or the interests of a specific national group.

The bases of the new nation-state were therefore laid in a confused atmosphere. A race for power and political legitimacy characterized the Moroccan political scene and directly affected policies, including language policies.

The air of political rivalry was so bitter that important matters could

not be brought up in meetings of the
Council of Ministers and the Highest
Council of Government became useless
as a decision maker... The political
Parties role in decision-making process
was purely dilatory. Unable to force a
measure[sic], they were frequently
successful in enforcing their will only
by blocking action.

(44)

For the Monarchy, as well as the different political
parties, Arabization has therefore constituted a central
theme in political discourse and a priority aim to be
achieved in the process of nation-building. But the process
of modernisation and economic development (on western
lines) was as strongly emphasized as was the need to
maintain the use of French language.

As indicated earlier, the contradictions which
emerge in the Moroccan political context are mainly due to
the dilemma faced by the political leadership between
maintaining tradition, represented by the Monarchy and its
power, and modernisation, i.e. establishing adequate and
efficient institutions and legislation. There is on the one
hand an emphasis on the 'privileged' role of Morocco as a

link between East and West and on the other hand there is
the claim for a unifying authentic culture, Arabo-Islamic in
essence.

These contradictions are reflected at the level of
foreign relations which are clearly Western-oriented.
Because of its political system and model of development and
Western capitalist based, Moroccan foreign relations have
been since independence increasingly closer to the West,
principally France, the United States, and the EEC
countries. Interrelations and exchanges with the Arab world
have been comparatively more restricted, generally to
similar regimes such as Saudi-Arabia and Gulf countries.

Language policy in Morocco clearly reflects many,
if not most, of the contradictions of the political system
and its oscillation between modernisation and tradition,
between its past and its future, between Arabo-Islamic
culture (through the Arabic language) and Western culture
(through the French language). It also, and above all,
reflects (in the process of nation-building) the
contradictions between the search for power and national
construction.

It is therefore the argument at this point that
the Arabic language, as the sacred language of Islam, is
used as a powerful instrument for reinforcing the 'divine'
origin of the Monarchy. However the need for the Monarchy to
establish modern institutions for its survival requires the
maintenance of the French language. The constantly opposed

political Parties, also primarily concerned with power and political legitimacy, have constantly used the issue of language as a major instrument in their ideological discourse(45). Hence, language has been a powerful device for nationalistic manifestations of the different political forces in Morocco, and has more often been rhetorically stressed rather than actually applied.

Consequently language policies in Morocco, and the extent of their implementation, has been dependent upon, and reflected, the political orientation of the group in power.

c) Language Policies

Language is considered in Morocco, as in the two other countries, as primarily a political issue because of its roots in the onset of the nationalist movement. It constituted a central part of the message of nationalism as an essential element of national identity(46). Therefore, once political independence achieved it was presented as an integral part of the overall national policies and one of the major priorities in the process of national construction(47). It was enlisted among the principal means of decolonisation and the establishment, or recovery, of the national cultural identity and the achievement of national unity. This ideological value given to language was expressed in the Preamble of the Constitution (1962) which defined the kingdom as: " a sovereign Muslim state, whose official language is Arabic"(48).

As stated above the Monarchy, draws its legitimacy essentially from Islam and identifies with the Arabo-Islamic world. Consequently the option for Arabic as the national language is claimed as a national priority:

> With Arabisation, Morocco must recover its first vocation. Mohamed V considered the preservation of the Arab character of Morocco as one of his dearest principles, and it is thanks to him that Morocco remained an Arab country by its language and its traditions
>
> (49).

However, King Hassen II who reigned from 1961 to the present day, is known for his Western oriented stand. His conception of the image of Morocco (present and future) is that of a 'crucible' for Eastern and Western civilisations, Africa and Europe(50). In this case the French language is not only necessary because of modernisation requirements but is also desirable as a link with the Western world and its civilisation. The King once stated that language, like culture, is international: it is not the 'province' of any people(51). Hence, as much as the Arabic language is important for the Monarchy as the expression and symbol of Islam, the French language is important as the means for modernisation and international integration.

As indicated earlier, language policies in
Morocco have been marked by ambivalence and hesitations,
especially at the practical level. This has resulted in
important contradictions between the stated aims (choice of
Arabic as the national official language) and practice
(maintenance of French as an operational language)(52). Even
policy formulation at the political level has been shaped
by, and reflects, the trend and influence of those in power
whether they are in favour of an Arabo-Islamic-Nationalist
cultural policy or a Western-based, international one(53).
Hence the first years of independance were marked by a
strong claim, and practical attempts for an immediate
implementation of the Arabic language at all levels of
national activities, particularly in education(54). This was
the approach of the Istiqlal Party which was then the most
important and influential Party.

The Istiqlal Party, emerging at the foreground of
the Moroccan political scene with its members occupying
important governemental positions, continued to emphasise
its extreme Arabo-Islamic nationalist doctrine. Arabic
language and culture, their restoration and reinforcement
were presented as the major themes in the party's political
discourse and a priority in its political programmes. The
claim of the party was mainly that language was central in
the process of decolonisation and a necessary condition for
the affirmation of national sovereignty and identity.

The enthusiasm for Arabisation was expressed in the rapid ad hoc policy of Arabisation, which was launched at the beginning of independence in 1956(55). Mohammed Al Fassi one of the founding members of the Istiqlal Party, known for his radical pro-Arabo-Islamic position, was appointed Minister of Public Instruction and Fine Arts in December 1955. He remained in his post until late 1957 and early 1958(56). During his short term in the first Moroccan government, he undertook to implement the Arabisation of the educational system. In this context he proposed a programme, in 1956-1957, for both rapid Arabisation and universal education(57). However the lack of preparation, the lack of human and material means, the change of government in 1958, and the fading prestige of the Istiqlal Party, all contributed to a reconsideration of, and a more cautious approach to the Arabisation policy which was highly criticized by the other Parties, teachers, and public opinion(58).

No real practical provisions were made for the ways in which this policy was to be implemented through, taking into account the existing socio-cultural and economic possibilities of the country. Furthermore, the role and place of the French language in the Moroccan society was still perceieved as important, even for those in favour of a rapid and complete Arabisation. Mohamed Al-Fassi stated:

... In the future, Arabic will be called
upon to play the leading role both in
the administration of industry and in
commerce. It is in the interest of
Moroccans to learn French just as it is
in the interest of the French [in Morocco]
to learn Arabic. In the Northern zone, we
will naturally keep an important role for
Spanish, as we do for French in the rest
of Morocco ...French will really be the
second national language...(59).

The failure in the first attempt at implementing
the Arabisation policy called for more moderate approach and
more time. A Royal Commission for educational reform was
therefore set up in 1958 to examine the ways in which a more
objective approach to the introduction of Arabic in the
educational system could be achieved. In April 1961 the
First Congress of Arabisation was organised in Morocco
(Rabat) and an 'Institut d'Arabisation' was set up(60). The
approach adopted was for a gradual and progressive
Arabization of the educational system.

However the trend to Arabic-French bilingualism was
increasingly felt in Moroccan political and intellectual
circles. King Hassen II himself stated in the speech before

the Commission mentioned above that: "We are for

Arabisation. But if this is a duty, bilingualism is a

necessity..."(61).

It is suggested here that the implementation of a

rapid and complete Arabisation was therefore not only

impossible but in fact not really desirable. The maintenance

of the French language was necessary, as recognised by

Moroccan officials themselves after the first hasty

experience(62). This view was strongly expressed by the

political elite stressing modernisation and economic

development as the national priority.

Mehdi Ben-Barka, a fervent modernist(63) has been

expressed the attitude of most Moroccan modernists

(including the King):

> We intend to conserve the use of French
>
> not so much through love of France but
>
> by the necessity of having an opening
>
> into the West ... we are firmly decided
>
> to go ahead with Arabisation ... and
>
> to affirm our Islamic culture but we
>
> also propose to open windows onto
>
> Western culture by using French as a
>
> complementary language ... so as not
>
> to remain in asphyxiating isolation
>
> (64)

It is the major argument of the thesis here that Morocco, as in Tunisia and Algeria, the main dilemma of the governing elite has been in finding a balance between the two ideals of achieving economic and industrial development and establishing a national authentic identity which is Arabo-Islamic based. It is also the argument that the Arabic language is not in its present condition competitive with the French language in the areas of scientific and technological knowledge, international exchanges and so on. M. Lakhdar, General Secretary of the Institute of Arabisation has himself affirmed: "...If theArabic language can easily express literary and abstract notions, it cannot at the present time express, with such ease technical and scientific notions"(65).

Therefore a rapid and complete adoption of Arabic as a working language at all levels of national activities, proved difficult if not impossible. This was because of the lack of human and material resources required to implement this language, at least in the educational system were not available. French was necessary for at least a transitory period until the Arabic language could become operational. M. Benhima, Minister of Education in 1966, expressed clearly and officially the governmental option for bilingualism which in fact means the maintenance of French language as a necessary medium for modernisation, mainly in scientific and technical studies. He pointed out that: "...It appears that

for a transitory period, the use of a foreign language [French] as a tool of work remains unavoidable in scientific fields"(66).

This desire to maintain the French language as a more operational language was again emphasized by the same Minister of Education when he stated that the "French language is indispensable for us. It is the language of technique. In Africa, what we are lacking is not verbal expression, but technique"(67).

This seems to have been the prevailing attitude of the majority of those involved in decision-making about the policy of Arabisation. The principle is retained that Arabic is an indivisible part of national identity and sovereignty, while in practice the French language remains an unavoidable necessity.

The issue of language has remained in Morocco a major subject of controversy among the different parties, each government, and the opposition. It has been the major means used by each political party to criticize and oppose the policies of the party in power. For instance, the Istiqlal Party after its time in the government constantly accused its successors of substituting the French language for the national language and hence hampering the process of decolonisation(68). In the Party's daily paper l'Opinion (French version), it was stated in headlines that "There is no difference between military occupation and linguistic colonisation"(69).

However in its programme of action, apart from
constantly stressing the urgent need for a complete and
rapid Arabisation, the Party has not proposed any efficient
methods to put this into practice. In fact once this Party
was back in the government in 1977, its approach to language
policy was less intransigent towards Arabisation than in its
first mandate. Faced with real needs and pressures,
especially in the educational system, this Party was forced
to call upon French 'technical assistance' (about 1700 new
French teachers were recruited for the academic year
1978(70).

An Istiqlal member, appointed as Minister of
'Education and training' (Ministere de l'education
nationale et de la formation des cadres) in 1977 stated
that :

> ... We arabise because we are condemmed
> to arabise: the level of knowledge of
> French has become so low in our schools
> that we cannot teach in this language
> fundamental disciplines such as physics,
> chemistry or mathematics. I intend to
> arabise only the primary and secondary
> cycles, where the scientific notions
> remain basic; at this level the Arabic
> language does not create any problem...
> The question is not even raised (in
> in higher education) as long as we have

not educated the teaching personnel. In
any case, the essential vocation of the
university is scientific research which
cannot be done efficiently without foreign
languages.

<div align="right">(71)</div>

This underlines the fluctuations of language
policies in Morocco. As in the two other countries, a major
contradiction appears between the stated aim for Arabic as
the official language while French is maintained as an
instrumental language. Such a statement also underlines the
awarness of the political elite regarding the present
inadequacy of the Arabic language to convey efficiently
scientific and technolgical knowledge. So far no real effort
have been undertaken to make Arabic more appropriate to
modern requirements.

This is because the Arabic language has remained the
major means of political opposition and conflicts. Each
party, depending on the political orientation it defends,
uses the issue of language to criticize governmental or
other parties policies. For instance, the socialist Union of
Popular Forces Party (USFP) used the issue of language to
criticise governmental policies of Arabisation. For this
party, these policies denote:

... a reactionary conception related to
the dominant class... and... the

> principal axis for class struggle in
> education... Arabisation remains
> therefore linked with the ideology of
> the dominent class and could not be
> used to fight the roots of cultural
> alienations.

(72)

This Party was not overtly opposed to the option
for Arabic as the national language. However they wanted it
to be conceived within a 'socialist order'. Members of this
Party also expressed their concern for local languages
(colloquial Arabic and Berber):

> ... The use of popular culture must find
> its due place in our educational system.
> Hence University Chairs must be devoted
> to the study of the local dialects and
> the cultures they convey.

(73)

The other left wing Party, the UNFP (The
National Union of Popular Forces) was in favour of the
principle of Arabic as the national language. However like
the USFP they have claimed a recognition for local
languages, mainly Berber, as an integral part of national
culture and identity as well as an Arabic-French
bilingualism for international integration:

> ... We are attached to the principle of

Arabisation and we defend Arabic as the language of Islam and national unity. But, an institute to the Berber language should also be created in order to preserve this language from disappearing... Moreover, we think that a bilingualism (French-Arabic) - positive and not uncontrolled - is indispensable in our time... because, to make our country lose its vertical cultural dimensions (with Europe and Africa), when opting for a horizontal monolinguism (exclusively Arabic), would be, for us, simply and purely killing our national cultural genius which must remain Arabic, African,and Mediterranean.

(74)

It is the argument here that the different parties and all those concerned with the language question have in common this contradictory approach between a strong emphasis on the Arabic language as the only official language and the equally strong desire to maintain in practicethe use of French. So the policy of Arabisation, in the absence of efficient measures for its implementation, has remained in Morocco mainly a subject for political debates used politically by those involved in decision making. The dilemma of the governing elite of choosing

between authenticity and modernity is reflected in the
contradictions expressed in their proposed policies as
regards to the two languages (Arabic-French) and even
regarding local languages (spoken Arabic and Berber). The
main contradictions emerge from their double desire to
return to the sources of culture (Arabo-Islamic) and to
embark on a Western model of development.

Whatever the desire, the process of modernisation
undertaken in this country has some exigencies. The French
language plays an important role in the process of
development, not only because it is a Western international
language but because the Arabic language, at the present
time cannot fulfill adequately the role played so far by the
French language in scientific and technological knowledge
and international relations. The process of modernisation in
general, and economic development and industrialisation in
particular in Morocco, as in the two other countries, have
reinforced rather than reduced the role of French language
and its impact in the nation-state.

d)The economic context

It is in relation to the economic context and
economic policies that the contradictions, problems, and
fluctuations in terms of language policies emerge clearly.
Modernisation, especially economic development and
industrialisation are as basic, in the process of

nation-building, as is national identity. Strong emphasis on both has created problems and contradictions in Moroccan society.

In this context each language is therefore, implicitly (sometimes explicitly) in political discourse, attributed a specific role. This clashes with the stated option for Arabic as the only official national language. Arabic is perceived as the symbol and means of access to an authentic national identity, while French is linked and used in the process of modernisation.

Morocco was therefore at its independance an essentially agricultural society, and by definition (in Western economic perpective) a traditional society. Hence modernisation was to be initiated; and because modernisation has been equated with Westernization, industrialization, and economic growth, these were to be imported from the West in their totality; bringing along Western thought and practice. It was difficult in such a context to undertake this development and at the same time establish a distinctive national cultural identity drawn from a completely different, if not opposed, source.

Modernisation in Morocco, because it was at independence in its early stage of development, had limited potentialities and therefore has been increasingly dependent on the West in general and France in particular. The Moroccan economy emerged from the colonial period weak in its potential and structure, with a large undeveloped

agricultural sector and a small modern one. The industrial

sector in its initial stage of development(75). The

traditional economy was essentially agricultural and

constituted the most important sector of the national

economy.

The small modernised agricultural sector

occuppied 20% of the most fertile land, half of which was

taken back by the Moroccan authorities, the rest remained in

free hold and was usually in the hands of Europeans(76). Its

production was entirely absorbed by the foreign markets, and

consequently received most attention from the state because

of its importance to the national economy, especially in

terms of foreign currency revenues(77).

Hence even the agricultural sector has been geared

towards trade, in other words towards economic growth

rather than social development. Agricultural products were

defined by Western market needs and economic exchanges.

Consequently the whole of the Moroccan economy in

its structure, organisation, and lines of production was

heavily conditioned by the West. This clearly had direct

bearing on the socio-cultural context of the country and has

led to greater dependence on the French language as a link,

and means of access to Western scientific and technological

knowledge and practice.

Industrialization in Morocco was initiated only

around the forties and early fifties with the important

immigration of Europeans following World War II and above

all the capital brought in and invested in industrial

projects. However the agricultural sector was little

affected, except for the emergence of the small modern

subsector. It was during this period that the principal

industries emerged. A few light industries such as sugar,

textile and consumption goods industries along with

important extractive industries were set up(78).

Thus, overall, the whole industrial sector was in

fact heavily dependent on foreign investments and

enterprises. So with the departure of most of the European

population at independence and the capital leakage

(evaluated at about 1.417 million Francs)(79) the early

attempts at industrial activities were greatly affected.

The economic situation therefore experienced a

drastic decline at independence and necessitated greater

reliance on foreign capital investments. Morocco was

financially closely linked to France, as a member of the

French Franc Zone during the early years of independence.

The international value of the French Franc as well as the

economic development in France directly influenced the

Moroccan Franc. This membership also implied free

circulation of capitals and trade between the two countries.

But in 1957, French aid to Morocco was discontinued for a

period of five years (because of political and economic

controversies(80). However technical and cultural assistance

as well as commercial relations were little affected.

Furthermore, in spite of this discontinuity of financial

aid, France continued to allocate a loan of 5 milliards of French Francs to the Moroccan budget as a balance of the remainder of the aid planned during the protectorate period(81). The principal source of financical aid during this period was the USA which financed 57% of the capital goods budget of 1957. Between 1957 and 1966 Morocco received, in loans and aid, around $510 million(82).

It is the argument at this point that the economic development of Morocco was almost entirely reliant upon the West, whether financially or technologically. This has maintained this country in the Western 'orbit'. Access to political independance, consequently, did not alter the existing structures imposed by the colonial situation whereby economic and commercial activities (and consequently socio-cultural patterns) were strongly influenced by Western rather than national needs.

It is also the argument that the commercial structure, which prevailed after the colonial period, reinforced this situation of dependence. It was reflected in the nature and volume of imports and exports and the balance of payment deficit. The exports were mainly of raw agricultural and mineral (mainly phosphate) products (at very cheap prices), whereas the imports were expensive manufactured products (consumer goods and industrial equipment). In 1956, it was assumed that one ton of imported goods, for instance, cost five times the price of an

exported one(83). The deficit in foreign trade was increasing as the imports of consumption goods and equipement increased.

This imbalance between imports and exports in the Moroccan economy underlines some of the contradictions generated by the imported Western economic model and the unfair terms of exchanges it establishes and which serve more Western interests than the Moroccan ones.

However, the government had to base its industrial policy on foreign investments and trade, and the role of foreign multinational firms became increasingly important in Moroccan economy. These were expected to finance and set up industrial units and serve as main agents for the transfer of technology. With a liberal economy, nearly all industrial sectors and projects are open to private capital in which the Multinationals play a vital role(84). These almost exclusive economic relations and exchanges with Western countries, especially France, have maintained the Moroccan economy in a subordinate situation and controlled by foreign interests.

In reaction, from 1973-1974 the Moroccan government initiated the 'Moroccanisation' (nationalisation) of most foreign enterprises. But this measure has remained only partial since the state, or national investors, would participate to about 50% of the invested capital along with the progressive introduction of Moroccan personnel in its management(85). So foreign capital and enterprises continue

to have a major share in the Moroccan economy. This 'nationalisation' was also limited mainly to financial changes, which were beneficial to only a minority and therefore resulted in reinforcing rather than diminishing the control of multinational corporations in the country's economy(86).

In fact, even when the government or national private investors contribute 50% or more of the needed capital (often acquired through loans or aid), they still depend, almost exclusively, on foreign technology, equipement and experts. In this context the European Community has been the major partner of Morocco, absorbing 56% of its commercial exports, and providing 51% of the total commercial imports(87).

Among the European countries, France, because of its historical link and geographical proximity, its industrial, equipment, and socio-cultural impact, has occupied a privileged place in the Moroccan economy. 'Co-operation' between the two countries covers a wide range of industrial and commercial activities in Morocco and related fields such as the administration, transport, health, communication, tourism, and education.

Morocco has remained one of the principal beneficiaries of French aid and France is Morocco's most important source of foreign assistance. In 1979 French financial assistance amounted to 1200 million French Francs(88). The Moroccan economy also depends highly on

tourism and the contribution of the Moroccan imigrant labour

force in Europe. Tourism is increasingly contributing to

foreign currency revenues. In 1979 the total number of

tourists in Morocco was around 1,549,000; and the revenues

from this source were of about 1,560 million DH(89).

Europeans (mainly French, Spanish, British) constitute the

greatest proportion of tourists coming to Morocco.

Tourism is also an important agent of cultural

contacts and exchanges with the West. It plays a major role

in the maintenance of French language and culture. The

national language and culture are relegated to a secondary

role because they are economically less rewarding.

In addition to tourism, emigration was a source of

revenues for the economy. The number of immigrants in Europe

has been steadily increasing since the 1960s. Most of them

are in France. During the period 1970-1978 their number

increasd from 170,835 to 385,991(90). Their financial

contribution to the Moroccan economy consists in

transferring parts of their earnings home; in 1973, for

instance, their financial transfers to Morocco contributed

24.7% of the total external revenes(91). This again

constitutes an aspect of economic dependence as it

reinforces relations and exchanges with the West. It is

hoped that these workers, when they return, would help in

the process of the transfer of technology, but considering

that a large proportion of these immigrants are neither

educated nor qualified and considering the nature of work they are allocated, mostly low grade jobs(92), the transfers they might make are only cultural.

Thus it is being argued here that the process of nation-building in Morocco, in spite of the claims for economic and cultural decolonisation, has been increasingly reliant on France in particular. Opting for an industrialisation-based model of development, within limited means and its inherited economic structure, Moroccan ties with France particularly have increased rather than reduced since independence. This has led to contradictions between the stated aim of decolonisation and the establishment of a distinctive national identity (symbolised by the Arabic language), and the increasing foreign economic and socio-cultural penetration requiring the increasing use of the French language.

The different and various interractions with the West and France are made through the use of the French language in work and communications. Spoken by the vast majority of the political and intellectual elite, French has retained a privileged position at all levels of national activity, especially in scientific and technical fields. There seems to be an interdependence between the supremacy of French partnership in the Moroccan economy and the maintenance, even the increasing use, of the French language.

In spite of political fluctuations in the two countries' relations, and in spite of increasing competition in this area from countries like Japan, Germany, and the USA, with their important technical and technological competence, France has remained to the present time Morocco's major partner. The status of the French language and its impact on the Moroccan society as a whole make direct contact easier, and therefore facilitate economic and industrial operations. The need to call upon French personnel, French equipment, and its maintenance and replacement have all contributed to reinforcing the role of the French language as the language of economic development and modernisation. Consequently the national language, Arabic, has become relegated to a secondary role in practice while it continues to be at the forefront of political discourse.

This ambiguity over the role of the national language in relation to the French language within the general process of nation building and the contradictions and problems generated, is also faced by Algeria and Tunisia though somewhat differently because of their specific socio-political and economic contexts.

B. Tunisia.

a) the historical context.

The particular historical experience of Tunisia
has, as argued earlier, shaped the course of its development
and has, to some extent, defined its language policies. As
was the case in Morocco and Algeria, the Arabic and French
penetrations have left the strongest impact on Tunisia,
politically, economically, and culturally.

The Arab penetration, with the advent of Islam,
has marked the historical setting of Tunisia with a
distinctively Arabo-Islamic imprint(93). In fact, the Arabic
influence has been deeper in Tunisia than in Morocco and
Algeria. This is reflected in the complete Arabisation and
Islamisation of the Tunisian population and the very small
proportion of Berber-speakers(94).

The consolidation of Arab penetration in Tunisia,
between the tenth century and the fifteenth century, in
addition to the Islamic Faith and Arabic language, brought
social transformations. Important economic, political and
cultural developments were noted in this country which
gradually became one of the most important Arabo-Islamic
centres for cultural and commercial contacts and
exchanges(95). However this socio-economic and cultural
prosperity began to decline from the fifteenth century with
the weakening of the central power, the Hafisides Dynasty,

and the increasing threat of the emerging Western powers.

This period also coincided with an expansion of the Ottoman

empire and the consequent arrival of the Turks in Tunisia in

1574(96).

However European expansionism became increasingly

attracted to Tunisia, because of its important geographical

position as an open door to Africa. From the late

seventeenth century, with the decline of the Ottoman empire,

European penetration began in Tunisia. This penetration was

first in the form of commercial activities, but gradually it

began to be transformed into political and eventually

military attacks. These attacks came principally from Spain

and Italy and later on from Britain and France(97).

It is suggested that it was with this European

penetration, especially the French, that the established

Arabo-Islamic socio-cultural features of the Tunisian

society were disrupted and the course of its development

affected. As a strategic route for commercial activities,

Tunisia drew European interest from the fifteenth century.

But it was France which managed to strengthen its commercial

privileges. The French invasion of Algeria in 1830, in

addition to Tunisia's then precarious political and economic

situation, precipitated the intervention of France in

Tunisia. A protectorate-form of colonisation was established

by a treaty signed between France and the Turkish

administration on 12th March 1881.

This 'protectorate' type of colonisation implied indirect rule, leaving administrative autonomy to the Turkish regent, the' Bey'. In fact, the maintenance in power of the Bey was ficticious as French domination covered all national activities, whether political, economic, or social. Important economic and political reforms were undertaken by French authorities. Controlling the national and international policies of Tunisia, France began to establish socio-economic infrastructures, such as the introduction of new judiciary and educational systems, and the construction of roads, hospitals, and ports. Important agricultural reforms and early industrialisation were undertaken, especially with the increasing number of European settlers (mainly Italians and French). Until 1911 France managed to maintain peace and a relative economic prosperity in Tunisia which was often cited as an example of French colonial success(98).

But this economic prosperity was beneficial almost exclusively to Europeans. The early industries were export-geared, and Tunisians were excluded from representation in the politics of their country and had no power in decision-making. This, with time, led to discontent, especially among the youth who started to question this exclusive foreign domination.

From 1911 onward there started to emerge the early manifestations of Tunisian nationalism. These manifestations were at the beginning merely claims for political

representation, but they were quickly stamped out by the
French authorities. However, after the First World War, and
mainly from the 1920s, France undertook socio-economic and
political reforms. A Constitutional Assembly was established
with a Tunisian Party, the 'Destour'. The members of the
Destour party represented the bourgeoisie principally, and
therefore served mainly their interests and not those of the
rest of the population. This also contributed to the growth
of Tunisian nationalism(99).

The effects of the Second World War in the
spreading of nationalism in different parts of the world,
the worsening political, economic, and social conditions of
the Tunisians, the increasing dissatisfaction with French
colonial policy, prompted the emergence of a nationalism
directed against France. From the early thirties an
organised nationalist group appeared under the leadership of
a young intellectual, Habib Bourguiba. This group formed a
Party with the name of ' Neo-Destour' as a reaction to the
previous Party, which was accused of serving colonial and
bourgeois interests. By the late 1930s the Party managed to
rally, organise, and gain support of many sections of
society. The popular revolts and riots organised by this
party were severely repressed the French, resulting in the
dissolution of the party and the imprisonment of its
leaders(100).

The period following World War II was marked by
French efforts for Tunisian reconstruction after it became a
war arena with British and American forces stationed there.
It was also an attempt to restore calm and prevent the
reemergence of nationalism. But with Bourguiba's return
from exile in 1949, the party was reorganised and the
leader's prestige restored among the Tunisian population.
His exile in fact contributed to his image as the hero of
Tunisian nationalism(101). Bourguiba quickly began to
negotiate with France for self-determination, and the
establishment of a sovereign state, but without success.
This led the party to organising an armed force.

The strengthening of Tunisian nationalism and
pressure for independence, along with the problems faced by
the French in Indochina and the arrival of Mendes France to
power in June 1954, all contributed to the speeding up of
negotiations for unrestricted national autonomy.
Consequently, agreements were signed in 1955 and confirmed
by the Protocol of the 20th March 1956 whic announced the
independence of Tunisia from France. One year later the
Turkish Bey was deposed and the Tunisian Republic was
proclaimed(102).

The end of French colonisation marked a new
phase in the history of Tunisia. Nationalism was nurtured by
the desire to reestablish national identity in a sovereign
state with a distinctively Arabo-Islamic culture. In this
context, the Arabic language constituted the symbol and

expression of this cultural identity and was therefore used
as a major means to sustain nationalist sentiment and
popular adhesion to the new state(103). Hence its adoption
as the official national language upon Tunisia's access to
independence. But modernisation, on the Western model, and
the almost total dependence of this country on external aid
has not only maintained but increased the use of French
language in Tunisia. Furthermore, the primacy of the state,
another colonial legacy, and the related struggle for power
and political participation has greatly affected the issue
of language in this country as in the two other countries.
The Arabic language has become a central theme of political
discourse and a major instrument for political legitimacy.

b) The Political Context

It is the argument in this sub-section that
language in Tunisia, as in the two other countries, has been
tackled as a primarily political issue. Hence, it has been
affected by the political trends in this country and the
tensions and conflicts of the political elite. Language
policies, in turn, reflect the contradictions and dilemmas
of the governing elite in the process of nation-building.
However in spite of the centrality of language in the
Tunisian politics, the approach has been more moderate as
compared to the two other countries, especially Algeria.

This is because in Tunisia access to independence and the transfer of power went through rather smoothly and without as much violence as was the case in Algeria.

The transitional period, specifically from the signing of the French-Tunisian conventions in June 1955, was a period marked by internal and external difficulties. The Bey was in theory the holder of power, but it was in practice the Neo-Destour Party which was in charge of the negotiations and the related decisions for independence. Consequently, this Party quickly managed to estabilsh its political supremacy. Its emergence as the symbol and representative of the nationalist movement and the leader of the victory displaced the role of the Bey and eventually led to the collapse of the Monarchy and its replacement by a constitutional republic(104).

The main problems that emerged at this time among the Tunisian leadership and the internal tensions within the Neo-Destour Party were related to the different conceptions of the future image of the new sovereign state. Some party members were in favour of a complete 'delinking' with France (in dependency theory terms) politically, economically, and above all culturally. The second view was, in the name of modernisation, more in favour of maintaining strong ties with France. Important conflicts around these two approaches emerged within the Tunisian political elite(105).

In this context two almost equally influential
political leaders, with different ideas, became opposed in
the early period of independence, namely Bourguiba and Salah
Ben Youssef. The controversy between them was related to the
French-Tunisian conventions which were signed by Bourguiba
and were questioned by his opponent who described them as
producing a 'step backward' and as a form of continuous
dependence on France. Ben Youssef was in favour of a more
radical attitude towards France for a complete and immediate
independence within an Arabo-Islamic framework(106). His
criticism was principally about Bourguiba's approach to the
process of decolonisation which he considered as being
undertaken too moderately and hence hampering the
establishment of national economic and cultural sovereignty.

In fact the agreements with France were based on
an 'interdependence' compromise, which granted Tunisian
leaders home-rule but not really complete independence.
France maintained control over Tunisian foreign affairs,
defence and the economy as well as many administrative
functions. The most controversial clause, denounced by Ben
Youssef, was the granting to France of control of internal
security services and the police(107). Using this argument
Ben Youssef managed to rally support, principally from
shopkeepers and small traders and from some urban youth, and
mostly from traditionalists: predominently religious groups

and old Destourian members. These were the people who saw in

the Neo-Destour a Western oriented Party diverging from

Arabic and Islamic values.

However, during the Congress of the Neo-Destour

held in Sfax in November 1955, Bourguiba was able to

overcome this opposition by winning the highest votes. He

was supported by the Trade Union (U.G.T.T) and other

national organisations backed by important popular support.

He also managed to win control of the Constituent Assembly

elected on the 25th March 1956 where Neo-Destour members

gained about 90% of the seats. Expelled from the Party and

faced by his opponent's victory, Ben Youssef and his

followers resorted to armed uprising, leading the country to

the verge of a civil war and causing alarm in political and

public spheres. The political 'crisis' was overcome by

Bourguiba's Party in January 1956 and Benyoussef was

compelled to leave the country(108). This put an end to any

overt opposition. Nevertheless opposed political factions

continued to exist, often as a response to the exlusive

power of the Government and the Party and resulting from the

feeling of insecurity created by Ben Youssef's

opposition(109).

The Arabic language as a political issue, and

closely related to the reestablishment of the national

cultural identity, held a central place in these political

conflicts. It was one of the major arguments used by Ben

Youssef in his opposition to Bourguiba. It was also used by

the political elite in general to underline their
nationalistic character and hence legitimate their power.
They justified their maintenance in power by their
dedication to the reinforcement of national sovereignty
through the establishment of a distinctive Arabo-Islamic
cultural identity with Arabic language, as the official
national language.

However, the Tunisian political elite under the
leadership of Bourguiba was also strongly dedicated to
modernisation as the principal element in nation-building
and consequently favoured a 'convergence-with-the West'
approach to development. This clear option for the supremacy
of modernisation in Tunisian political concerns has been
reflected in the language policies adopted since
Independence.

A French-Arabic bilingualism has increasingly
become a feature of Tunisian society, especially its elite.
The strengthening of Bourguiba, a bilingual himself and a
fervent modernist, in his position at the head of the
nation, favoured the trend towards a Western type of
development and modernisation. The Arabic language as the
national language is emphasised in political discourse only
moderately as compared with the two other countries. The
requirements of modernisation more strongly voiced(110).

Tunisia's general policies, including language policies, have been characterised by a relative consistency, principally due to the maintenance in power of the same political elite and the absence of effective opposition.

The supremacy and exclusiveness of the single Party in fact contradicts the stated doctrine of the Party prior to independence: to establish a 'liberal democracy'. The 'liberal' competition of rival parties was shortlived with the exception of the Communist Party which remained officially tolerated, but with little influence on national policies, until 1963 when it was banned(111). It was difficult for the opposition to achieve strong political organisation because of the single Party system. Opposition could only be perceived from debates within the Party and national organisations. However tensions over some issues, such as language, sometimes surface indicating differences behind the image of unanimity and cohesion in the Tunisian political elite.

The traditionalists, mostly fundamentalists, who stress a return to the Arabo-Islamic tradition, have remained the major force of opposition to the leadership. They have been against the clearly modernist Western oriented policies of Bourguiba and his Party(112). But their influence has been so far rather limited as the leadership has managed to secure its position.

Stability and continuity are the distinctive characteristics of Tunisian politics since the same elite bringing independence has continued to govern national policies for decades; in comparison with Morocco and Algeria, where instability and continuous change of politicians has been characteristic.

President Bourguiba played a central role in the consolidation of the Tunisian state and hence has become the predominent political figure. His role as a founding member of the movement for liberation and his strategy in bringing about independence gave him great prestige. He is considered by the Tunisians as the 'Father' of the nation and is called the 'Supreme Combatant'. Bourguiba is often described as a charismatic figure (Tunisia's Mao). He managed to surround himself by people who are convinced by his 'rational' policies(113). His popularity and legitimacy have been reinforced by his strategy in maintaining a coherent Party with committed members, and by concentrating the power of decision-making in his own hands (with the full support of the Party).

In the Tunisian polity, it is difficult to distinguish between government and Party, and hence locate those really involved in decision making. The relationship between the Party and the State, and the government, is so interlinked that apart from the presidential figure there is almost no distinction in the structure, membership, and actions of both the government and the Party. This close

relationship was even strengthened by the 1958 reform of the Party, which was renamed 'The Socialist Destourian Party'(114). By integrating the Party into the government (Ministers were recruited from the Central Committee of the Party) and integrating the members of the government into the Party a higher level of of political mobilisation and stability was achieved.

The Tunisian National Assembly has had, as in Morocco, little power in decision-making. It is the Destourian Party which plays the role of the mediator between the government and the national organisations and between the leadership and the masses(115).

In this context the language issue, like other national issues, is characterized in Tunisia by paragmatism, rationality, and consistency, especially in comparison with the two other countries (mainly Algeria). In spite of the option for a socialist form of politics with a single Party, in Tunisia (unlike Algeria for instance) ideology in its abstract form is not preponderent in Tunisian political discourse. Bourguiba himself emphasised stated that:

> The ideology of Destour Socialism
> is practical (as well as pragmatic)
> in two senses: it connects the
> aspiration to transform the society
> with concrete policies and realities,
> and it represents the convictions

and beliefs not of a few ideologues,

but of a relatively large number of

the Party activists and supporters.

(116)

The Tunisian leadership, because it has been
clearly and strongly committed primarily to modernisation,
has had to draw its legitimacy from practical and pragmatic
achievements rather than ouspoken ideology. Bourguiba has
criticized ideology as the basis for national politics. He
has argued that ideology is:

a lure and a scapegoat...Men must

assume responsability for their acts

(and not put) responsibility for our

failures on the back of such scapegoats

as Neo-colonialism, imperialism and

reaction.

(117)

Thus, overall, the approach to language in the
Tunisian context was not defined by ideological
considerations. It was determined by practical necessities.
The primacy of modernisation (based essentially on
industrialisation and economic growth) along with the option
from the early seventies for liberal economic policies
favouring private enterprise and increasing international
relations, have influenced language policy in Tunisia. They
have reinforced the use of the French language as the major

instrument for national development. Moreover, faced by
practical constraints in implementing the Arabisation
policy, a practical bilingualism was adopted and is
followed.

However, in spite its relative homogeneity,
continuity, and pragmatism, the Tunisian political system
illustrates many of the contradictions observed in the two
other countries. These contradictions, characteristic of
most emerging nations, are those related to the tensions
between nationalism versus internationalism, socialism
versus capitalism, complete decolonisation versus reliance
on the former colonial power, and finally national
authenticity versus international acculturation. These
contradictions are reflected in Tunisian language policies.
These contradictions are visible in the ambivalence and
hesitations between the two languages, Arabic and French,
and the confusing political discourse regarding each
language. This is also reflected in the important gap
between the stated aim of one official language and the
adoption of bilingualism in practical terms.

c) Language Policies

In Tunisia, as in Morocco and Algeria, Arabic is
claimed as the national official language and as a major
expression of Arabo-Islamic cultural identity. In the

Constitution promulgated in June 1959 it was stated that it

was "The will of this people...to remain faithful to the

teaching of Islam, to the unity of the Greater Maghreb,

to belong to the Arab family"(118). Article One of the

Constitution establishes Arabic as the language of the state

and Islam as its religion. In a speech delivered in June

1958 the President Habib Bourguiba stressed this link(119)

and asserted that the educational programme should be "able

to reinforce the national character of Tunisia which is

rooted in the Arab culture and Islamic religion and a past

of glory..."(120).

However, unlike the two other countries, the

language issue in Tunisia, especially among the political

elite, is far less passionate and radical. It is certainly

used for political legitimacy, and to nurture nationalist

sentiment, but it has not really constituted a strong

ideological doctrine. This is due to the priority given by

the Tunisian leaders to modernisation as the basis of

nation-building and to the fact that among the three

countries, Tunisia is relatively the most Arabised. Also,

during the colonial period Arabic and French coexisted,

especially in the educational system.

Language policies are conceived within the

framework that economic development and national

modernisation constitute the first priority in Tunisian

politics. Hence the emphasis on the Arabic language is

important; but mainly in so far as it does not hamper the process of development which necessitated the use of French language.

While the Tunisian leadership constantly stresses its attachment to the Arabic language and the Islamic Faith, neither extreme Pan-Arabism, nor religious fanatism are claimed or accepted. On the contrary cultural archaism and religious dogmatism are considered as obstacles to development(121). Even in the early period of nationalism, puritanical reformism never had a strong hold in the movement.

Bourguiba, although placing the state in an Islamic and Arabic framework, has been supporting "modifications" of some important values which he saw as irrational or contrary to 'the true spirit of Islam' as well as modernity. Examples of these modifications include the introduction of the 'Personal Code' adopted in August 1956, bringing fundamental changes in family relations. Polygamy, for instance was outlawed, and divorce, previously a prerogative of men, became a prerogative of the court, and Tunisian women were given the freedom to marry within another Faith(122).

These modernist changes and decisions led to the idea that Islam itself is to be adapted to national evolution. Bourguiba has stated that:

Islam... is finally a sense of measure

and recourse to reason. It teaches us
that religious commandments must be
adapted to the evolution of social
structures... In Tunisia we will not
let our religion disappear and our
society become perverted... we
believe in a necessary evolution of
the religion.

(123)

Therefore, language policies have been in practice in
favour of an Arabic-French bilingualism. The Maintenance of
French is not only due to the needs of modernisation but also to
a pro-Western political orientation. This is expressed in the
desire to remain open to the external world through the French
language. In Tunisia, as in the case of Morocco, the political
leadership constantlty emphasizes the privileged role of the
country as a link between the Eastern and Western civilizations:

Providence established Tunisia in
a privileged location at the centre
of the sea which is the mother of
civilizations... The Latin and
Germanic West and the Punic and
Muslim East first confronted each
other and later intermingled there.
and in a world in search for

comprehension, Tunisia offers itself

as a land of reconciliation among

men, religions, and nations.

(124)

There has been therefore in Tunisia a readiness to adopt

Western thought and practice and a determination from the

political elite to remain in the Western orbit via France and to

conserve and increase the use of the French language. The French

language is seen in this context as the means of access to

this Western civilization, and an instrument for modernisation.

The instrumentality of the French language in

Tunisia was emphasized by M.Messadi (former Minister of

Education (1958-1968), when he declared to a Press

conference in 1967 that:

> ... French has an important role to play
>
> in certain countries of the Third World;
>
> we belong to the developing countries,
>
> we have to catch up with industrialized
>
> countries. For this we possess the French
>
> language which is both a language of work
>
> and culture. For us it is less a learning
>
> of a foreign language than the utilization
>
> of an instrument which would help to make
>
> up for the centuries which separate us from
>
> the developed world. It [French] would
>
> grant our access to modernity.

This is the opinion of a Minister of Education who early in his period of office initiated the process of Arabisation in education and who assisted in excluding French from the first three years of primary education(126).

The faith in the important role of French for modernisation has led this country, where Arabic was more widely used at independence, to an increasing use of this language. The desire for a 'happy co-existence' of the two languages, Arabic and French, was expressed by M.Masmoudi. a member of the government who declared:

> In order to discover and penetrate rapidly
> and efficiently the secrets and mysteries of
> modern techniques, Tunisia like other
> countries, has chosen to have recourse to the
> French language which history has
> particularly equipped with a 'supranational'
> function. This does not mean that we are
> unaware of the problems which would arise
> from the confrontation of this language with
> ours. This certainly does not mean that we
> neglect the work of innovation necessitated
> by the attachement we have for the Arabic
> language. This means above all that the
> confrontation of the two languages
> requires from us a vigilant action and

constant effort of research and adaptation
so that this confrontation would not be in
the sense of elimination but that of a
happy continuation.

<div align="right">(127)</div>

Thus there is an awareness of the limitations of
the Arabic language and the need to develop it and adapt it
to the contemporary requirement of development through
innovation and constant research. However, this wish has
been confined to rhetoric as no practical policies have been
formulated for the development of the Arabic language.

In the meantime the official adoption of
bilingualism, which is contradictory with the option for a
single national language, has not been overtly questioned.
This is mainly due to the type of regime, with a single
Party, and the overwhelming power of the state and the
absence of effective oppsition.

Nevertheless, there has been growing pressure
related to the language issue(128). For example at the
Party's VIIIth Congress, in the Report of the High
Commission of the Party it was stated that:

> ... It is recommended that the government
> elaborate, in the earliest time possible...
> a national plan of a general dimension,
> which should be applied within reasonable
> stages, aiming at making Arabic the

language of education, of the administration
and of social and cultural activities in the
country.

<div align="right">(129)</div>

But the Report goes on, indicating that if this is the
principle, its application is much more complex. It requires
important human and material means, which are not available.
Furthermore, the commitment to modernisation necessitates
the use of French. Hence in spite of pressures for the
national language, and the previously stated 'concern' for
the reinforcement of this language, the stand for
bilingualism is again underlined by the political
leadership(130).

In Tunisia, therefore, as in the two other
countries of the Maghreb, there emerges a gap between the
stated aim of the establishment of the national language and
the practical use of French. The use of French in Tunisia
particularly increased from the 1970s onward. This coincided
with the increasingly liberal policies of openess to the
West which has reinforced the need to use the French
language. This has in fact generated dissatisfaction in both
political circles and in public opinion(131).

These difficulties in terms of language
policies and practices have been complicated by
thediaglossia characterizing the Arabic language and the
difference between the official language (Classical Arabic)
and the spoken variety. However in Tunisia, the moderate

approach to language is reflected in the offical attitude towards this variety, and President Bourguiba is known for his 'popular' speeches where he mostly uses the spoken variety of Arabic when addressing his people rather than the Classical form, as practiced by officials in Morocco and Algeria. In one of his speeches he even declared: "...No, really, Classical Arabic, is not the language of the people..."(132).

However the official national language is Classical Arabic and when formally stressing the importance of Arabisation, Tunisian officials, including the president, refer to this form of the language. But in Tunisia there seems to be a real desire to bridge the gap between the oral and written languages by simplifying classical Arabic and bringing it nearer to the spoken one. This is a different attitude from that of the two other countries, the rest of the Arab world, and the Arab academies, where classical Arabic is viewed as 'sacred' because it is the language of Koran. Therefore it has to remain 'pure', insulated from any influence of the spoken varieties, which are but a common and vulgarized form of the Classical language.

Thus in Tunisia, too, in this attitude to diaglossia, the approach to language is less emotional and relatively less ideology-based. More generally, this attitude is also seen in the increasing use of the French languge along with the national language which is in fact relegated to a secondary position. The primacy of

modernisation in Tunisian national planning, based on industrialization and economic growth, has led to greater reliance on the West and France. This has reinforced the need for the use of the French language.

d) The Economic Context

The economic context in Tunisia and the policies adopted from Independence for its development, have had a direct bearing on the issue of language. The strong emphasis in Tunisian politics on modernisation on the Western model has helped consolidate relations and dependence on the West and particularly France. This reliance on France has been even more important because of the relatively restricted economic potential of Tunisia at the time of Independence. This led to the necessity of increasingly using the French language as a priveleged means of access to scientific and technological knowledge and a link with the Western world.

The economic conditions of Tunisia did not suffer radical breakdown at the end of the colonisation as was the case in Algeria. There was a pragmatic approach by the political leadership in negotiating post-indpendence economic relations with France. This helped maintain the inherited economic structures established during the period of colonisation. However, the country's political and economic sovereignty were quickly confronted with pressing

problems, made crucial by the decision to embark
immediately on industrialization with scarce domestic
resources(133). As in Morocco and Algeria, the economy
inherited from the protecorate period was dual, with a large
traditional sector providing a living for the great majority
of the population and a small modern sector in an early
stage of development.

An underdeveloped agriculture was the major
characteristic of the Tunisian economy at Independence. For
a country engaged in industry-based modernisation this meant
severe dependence on external contributions not only to
intiate the processes of industrialization and economic
growth, but also to maintain a reasonable standard of living
for its population. The agricultural sector could not, at
Independence, even satisfy basic consumption needs.

The contribution of the agricultural sector to
the G.N.P was less than 25%, and animal production was not
sufficient for domestic consumption. In 1956, Tunisia
imported meat, milk, butter, and cheese(134). The modern
sector of agriculture was until Independence largely owned
by Europeans, who, using only a ninth of the total
productive agricultural land, managed to achieve the highest
rate of production(135).

In Tunisia, therefore, as in the two other
countries of the Maghreb, economic development was rather
limited at Indpendence. The colonial policy in this context
had concentrated on developing an infrastructure in relation

of its own needs. The small proportion of the agricultural
sector which was modernised was owned by European settlers
and being commerce-oriented, it served their own needs. At
Independence most of this sector was either privately
bought by Tunisians or by the government. However until 1960
an important proportion was still in the hands of Europeans.
In spite of its high yields this sector could not respond to
the consumption needs of the population and imports of soft
wheat from France were necessary, which exceeded one million
quintals(136).

This specific type of agricultural production,
inherited from the colonial period, therefore led to an
almost total reliance on imported goods for subsistence.
Furthermore, this production (such as wine) has created
after Independence a form of dependence in terms of markets,
which entailed specific relations with Western countries.
France remained, in fact, the principal, if not the only
market, of this type of production. Even the best quality
dates which Tunisia produced in the South of the country,
amounting to about 400,000 Quintals a year, were shipped to
France to be conditioned for exports(137).

Thus, the argument is that agriculture in
Tunisia, because of its structure, organisation, and type of
production, has reinforced the dependence of this country on
the former colonial power which has largely contributed to
the increasing need for the use of the French language and
the strengthening of its cultural impact. This economic,

cultural, and linguistic dependence on France has become
even stronger by the process of industrialisation
undertaken after Independence.

This reliance was even more necessary because
industrialization was very limited in Tunisia upon its
access to Independence. Industrialization was restricted to
mining, with small light industries, and parts of the
agricultural sector. Industrialization was initiated, as was
the case in the two other countries, only after the Second
World War and was initially limited to the extractive
industries with their required infrastrucuture, such as
transport, energy and ports(138). The main resources were
phosphate, iron, lead, and zinc, but the reserves were not
important and do not constitute a potential basis for the
nation's economy.

Among the three countries of the Maghreb, Tunisia
is economically the poorest. Its small reserves of raw
materials were over-exploited by Europeans especially during
the peak period of the late forties and early fifties(139).
The production of natural resources was therefore quite
limited, and the little produced was exported in its raw
form because of the scarcity of the means for its
transformation. Manufacturing industry was limited to small
industrial units, most of which specialized in the
processing of food produced by the modern agricultural
sector.

Consequently, the industrial sector, considered by the Tunisian leadership as the central aspect of modernisation and national development, was almost nonexistent. Its development needed important human and material resources which this country did not have and this generated a greater reliance on the West. The industry developed in the modern agricultural sector, for instance, was almost exlusively financed, controlled, and run by foreigners at Independence(140). This almost total reliance on Western thought and practice was dramatically felt in the economic sector during the first years of independence, with the departure of the European settlers.

The departure of more than 100,000 Europeans greatly disturbed economic activities: the rate of economic growth dropped during the period 1950-1953. In 1956, 110 industrial units were stopped and investments decreased from 9 milliards French Francs in 1953, to 7 millards in 1956 and 3.2 milliards in 1957(141). To maintain a minimum of economic activity, the Tunisian government opted for an open economy to attract private capital. It had to rely heavily on foreign aid, mainly from France and the U.S.A. This situation was complicated by an important deficit in the trading balance. In 1956, imports were about 20% higher than the total exports and cost up to six times the cost of exports(142).

It is suggested at this point that commercial
relations with the West and principally France were in
Tunisia, as in the two other countries, based on unequal
exchanges, regulated by the Western countries. In Tunisia
the deficit of the trade balance has maintained its need
constant for Western, principally French, aid. This 'aid'
has entailed political, economic, and cultural forms of
dependence, which if altered would have affected the 'aid'
flow. French aid to Tunisia diminished after Independence,
and was increasingly replaced by American aid: nearly 60
million dollars were provided in grants for general economic
support(143).

It is the argument here that the emphasis on
modernisation, through industrialization, in Tunisia has
conditioned its political and economic orientations towards
an imported capitalistic and open model of development. This
orientation was necessary to stimulate foreign private
investment which was vital to sustain the industrializing
economy. The relative political stability of this country,
its adoption of an open economy, and the increase in export
revenues, in fact attracted foreign capital to Tunisia. In
addition to private investments, financial support is also
acquired through aid and loans from the World Bank, Western
nations, and some Arabic nations(144).

Economic relations with the Arab countries have
been developed only recently, mainly since the transfer of
the Arab League in June 1979 from Egypt to Tunisia, but the

Tunisian government has never been in favour of exclusive
Pan-Arabic relations. Its moderate, sometimes ambiguous,
political solidarity with the Arab countries,and in
particular the desire to strengthen relations with the West,
has contributed to the relatively restricted economic and
financial cooperation between Tunisia and other Arab
countries. With its pragmatic and universalist aproach, the
leadership has always based its international relations on a
broad perspective with a wide range of nations from East,
West, and African countries.

Mainly because of the adopted model of development
and the economic structure, inherited from the colonial
period, Tunisia' relations with Europe have remained in a
previleged position within its foreign policy. In this
context the relations with the European Community were
reinforced when agreements were signed in 1969, for five
years initially, with the aim of intensifying commercial and
industrial exchanges between Tunisia and the E.E.C. These
agreements were renewed in 1976, for an unlimited period
with the aim of extending the Community's economic,
financial, and social assistance. The finacial aid allocated
to Tunisia within the frame of these agreements was of 95
million European Currency Units in the form of a donation or
loan with special clauses for repayment(145).
These increasing interrrlations with the E.E.C have
reinforced the use of the French language as the major
instrument of interractions and exchanges.

It is the argument here that these increasing ties
with Europe have led to a defined and restricted frame of
exchanges and relations which entail the use of the French
language and consequently a cultural dependence, in addition
to the economic one. This has created some contradictions in
a society claiming complete independence, specifically from
French influence, and claimimg an authentic cultural
identity as the ultimate aims.

France, in fact, has remained the principal
Tunisian partner not only in economic and financial terms
but also in social, cultural, and educational fields as
well. The French government and French private entreprises
contribute largely to national development plans. In the
period 1981-1982, the financial loans provided by France, at
a low rate of interest and a long term period for payment
amounted to 450 to 500 million Francs(146). The Tunisian
government is likely to ask for an increase of the financial
aid from France as a result of the present political
developments between the two countries. France remains also
one of the principal markets for Tunisian goods absorbing
the highest proportion of its exports, and is still its
major supplier in equipment and consumer goods(147).

The important number of Tunisian emigrants in
France also constitutes another crucial aspect in the two
countries' relations. The high rate of unemployment at home,
has generated a notable movement of the Tunisian population
to Europe seeking work. Their emigration to Europe has been

steadily rising from Independence(148). Their financial transfers to Tunisia have had an important share in the national economy(149). Tourism is also a major element in Tunisian economy and one of the most important sources of foreign exchange and relations with the West(150).

It is suugested that these multiple relations with Europe and France have therefore reinforced the status and the role of the French language as the predominent tool of work and the medium of interactions. The (semi-official) option for bilingualism, whereby the French language has become the privileged language in scientific, economic, and even political and cultural fields is not only due to the historical imprint of the past but also to present policies of modernisation. The economic policies, principally, have reinforced the ties with France and have contributed to the maintainance of its influence in many sectors of national activity.

Among the three countries, Tunisia fits most clearly into the "convergence-with-the West" approach to modernisation, as a process of nation-building. Consequently it reflects the problems and contradictions generated by the importation of the Western model into a different context. The economic policies adopted after Independence, based on industrialization have had disruptive effects in this society possessing greater agricultural than industrial potentialities. This has engendered continuous dependence on Western, especially French thought and practice. This, in

turn, has created important contradictions in the
socio-cultural context, between the imported French culture
and language, and the claimed identification with the
Arabo-Islamic culture and language.

So, in Tunisia, the contradictions and problems in
terms of language emerge most strongly in relation to the
heavy stress given to economic development with relatively
little attention to the socio-cultural aspects. The
practical adoption of bilingualism, in this context, is
strongly conflicting, in its form and objective, with the
stated objective of Arabic language as the only official
language and the symbol and means of establishing an
authentic cultural identity. In Tunisia - as in Algeria and
Morocco - the attempt to institutionalize a rapid
Arabisation has generated severe problems and
contradictions.

C.Algeria

a) The historical setting

The history of Algeria is predominently a history of colonisation and foreign penetration. The different waves of colonisation, from the arrival of Phoenicians and then the Romans in this area to the French intervention, have gradually and deeply transformed the existing Berber socio-cultural, political and economic features(151).

As was the case in Morocco and Tunisia, the Arabo-Islamic culture has become the salient feature of the Algerian character and identity. Though the process of Islamiation and Arabisation was met in this country, as well as in the rest of the Maghreb, by a strong resistance which lasted for centuries, they were finally accepted and integrated. They even become the salient features of national identity in the face of French colonisation.

It was therefore, with the advent of Islam that Algeria, in the same way as in Morocco and Tunisia, experienced gradual but profound transformations, mainly the adoption of Islam and its religion. The majority of Berbers were converted to the Islamic religion, but many of them have preserved their language to the present time. During the period extending from the eleventh to the fifteenth century, with the consolidation of the Arabo-Islamic culture and civilization in the area, an important economic, political, and cultural renaissance is noted. The mingling

of the two civilizations, the Berber and the Arab, the
development of commerce and trade, the creation of cultural
centres, the rise of urbanisation, all led to an
unprecedented prosperity in the whole area. This was
increasing with the expansion of commercial routes to Africa
in the South and Europe, through Spain in the North(152).

However this economic prosperity and cultural
dynamism began to decline, as in Morocco and Tunisia,
because of internal divisions and conflicts, the weakening
of the central authority, and the development and expansion
of European powers. The Spanish were among the first
Europeans to take a grip on the littoral of the Maghreb
during the early sixteenth century(153). This period marked
also the arrival of the Turkish Corsairs in Algeria; they
were called upon for protection against Spain. However, they
quickly took complete control of the coastal towns and
managed to found a central authority with the help and
protection of the Turkish Sultan. The expansion of the
Ottoman Empire helped the Turks to reinforce their control
in Algeria(154).

The Turkish intervention in Algeria was as
disruptive to the socio-cultural context of the country as
was later that of the French. Furthermore, their
administration in fact facilitated European penetration
rather than protected against it. The decentralized form of
political system established by the Turks with a weak
central authority and an increasingly stagnant economy,

opened the way to European, principally French intervention(155). The Turkish leaders were mainly concerned with collecting taxes from the population; hence commerce with European powers was encouraged to increase their profits(156).

This gradual penetration through commercial treaties and exchanges culminated in the French invasion of Algeria in 1830. It was a new form of domination, a real process of colonisation. The 'assimilationist' policy adopted by France through the imposition of its culture, language, and way of life to the detriment of the local culture and values present a case of cultural imperialism, the consequences of which continue to affect the present history of the country.

The military occupation of Algeria was the first step in the process of colonisation which with the arrival of the European settlers began to take a distinctive shape. A gradual but systematic dispossession and oppression of the Algerian society began, not only in political and economic terms but also in cultural terms. The French Army and the settlers institutionalized their control in the 1848 Constitution with the official annexation of Algeria to French territory(157).

A civilian regime, under the administration of a governor, was set up and the country was divided into three main 'departments' and subdivided into 'arrondissements' as in France. But within this administrative structure, three

zones were clearly distinguished: the Civilian, the Mixed, and the Arab. Civil zones were those occupied mainly by Europeans; the Mixed zones were where two communities co-existed; the Arab zones were those where the majority of the native population lived. These were under military rule(158).

The second phase of French colonial policy was in fact the concretisation and consolidation of the French conquest in Algeria. The most fertile lands were taken over by the settlers (Colons) and their owners uprooted, and since the native population was predominently agricultural, it was almost the whole Algerian society which suffered from such a policy(159).

The cities, as the administrative and economic centres, attracted the highest density of European populations. The Arab community in these urban centres was confined to guetto-type areas, the suburbs, or to the rural areas. The increasing power of the Colons, controlling more and more of the economy, often determined the policy of the Metropole in Algeria(160). They constantly resisted any policy favouring the integration of the native population and the development of its socio-political conditions. They strongly opposed the policy of assimilation of the native population, especially in terms of rights and political representation.

The policy of assimilation adopted by France in Algeria specifically was the ultimate phase of the process of colonisation. Its aim was the complete integration of Algeria, its land and people, into the French socio-political and economic framework. This led to the establishment of political, economic, social, and educational French structures.

However, this assimilation was paradoxical and inconsistent. The Algerians were considered as French 'subjects', but were not French citizens(161). This policy of assimilation was not in fact resisted only by the French settlers. It was also strongly resisted by the Algerians themselves. This was because in order to acceed to the French Citizenship the Algerians had to renounce to their Islamic Faith and their own culture.

Hence, in spite of this so-called policy of assimilation and integration, the Algerian population continued, throughout most of the colonisation period, to be deprived of its most basic rights in its own country. It was relegated to a secondary position economically, socially, and politically. In this process, strong efforts were made by the colonial power to stiffle Algerian cultural identity. The Algerian population was neither represented politically nor protected legally(162).

The Algerian population therefore was subjected to a planned disintegration of its culture and identity. Social mobility for this population was rather limited, and

only possible through knowledge of French culture and especially the French language. This language was the language of schooling, of communication, and of work.

In fact cultural assimilation was one of the major objectives and one of the strongest colonial strategies. The French Minister of Public Education under the Third Republic stated:

> The first conquest of Algeria has been
> accomplished by weapons and was ended
> in 1871 by the disarmament of Kabylia.
> The second conquest was achieved when
> the indegenous population accepted our
> administration and Justice. The third
> conquest will be achieved through
> schools: it should ensure the
> predominence of our language over the
> different local idioms, [it should]
> inculculate to Moslems the idea which
> we ourselves have of France and its
> role in the world...

(163)

Cultural subjugation was therfore a clearly stated aim in French colonial policy in Algeria. Hence the policy of dispossession and uprooting of the Algerian

population from its land was paralleled and completed by a
systematic destruction of the pre-colonial social structures
and values.

> The French cultural agression was
> based on a political and economic one.
> The land confiscation was accompanied
> by the destruction, more or less
> achieved, of the precolonial structures.
> In addition to the imposition of the
> French language, a whole European ethos
> used as a means to exercise power, was
> induced into Algerian society.
>
> (164)

Resistance to these processes took different
forms, mainly revolts and armed insurrections(165).
Throughout French colonial history in Algeria, and until
Independence, opposition to this foreign penetration was
expressed in terms of the national cultural identity.
Precisely because of the assimilationist French policy and
its form of cultural imperialism, Arabo-Islamic cultural
values and language were most strongly perceived in this
country as the symbols and means to resist French
colonialism(166).

The Islamic religion and the Arabic language
constituted therfore, for the Algerian population, a refuge
and a major means of nationalistic assertions against French

domination. But it was in the period after the First World War that an organised nationalist movement began to take shape under the leadership of the Emir Khaled, raising the question of rights of the Algerian population(167).

The late Twenties and early Thirties witnessed the emergence of an organised nationalist movement expressing specific objectives and claims: the independence of Algeria from France and the establishment of an Algerian nation. In fact two major movements appeared during the period between the two Wars: the first under the leadership of Messali El-Hadj formed a Party called 'l'Etoile Nord Africaine' (E.N.A), and the second was formed by the movement of the 'Association des Oulema' (scholars), a religious group under the leadership of Sheikh Abdelhamid Ben-Badis. The two movements had in common their emphasis on an Algerian cultural identity drawn from the Arabo-Islamic tradition(168).

The role of the 'Association des Oulema' in the Algerian nationalism was principally related to the claim for cultural rights. They stressed the recognition of the Islamic religion and the Arabic language as the essential features of the Algerian identity. The Oulema's slogan was " Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my Country...Independence is a natural right for every people of the Earth"(169).

However they did not propose any practical programme to achieve this purpose. Furthermore, they seem to have accepted the idea of French supremacy and their action was mainly confined to bourgeois-intellectual circles and urban centres. But their assertions did constitute later a moving force in the movement for liberation. Because of their threat to the French, the Oulema's movement was severely repressed and their schools were closed down and their members were persecuted(170).

On the other hand the E.N.A Party was a labour-based movement. Initially it recruited mainly from emigrant workers in France, then it expanded to Algeria. Its major aim was mobilize the population and fight for the indpendence of Algeria from French colonialism(171). This party was in fact the first organized and structured party. It raised the Algerian problem in political terms and worked to attract international attention(172). Consequently, this movement constituted a real threat to French colonisation and was therefore even more severely repressed. Its members were either arrested, exiled or went underground.

A third nationalist movement was to emerge during the inter-War period. It was made up of some 'Liberal politicians', under the leadership of Ferhat Abbas, and they were among the very few allowed to engage in political action within French political insitutions(173). They, unlike the two other movements, believed at the beginning in the virtues of assimilation. They insisted on equal rights

between Muslim and European citizens and asked for
socio-economic reforms and the preservation of the cultural
identity of the Algerian population within the French
socio-cultural framework. A few of these liberals managed to
obtain Seats in the French parliament but their
participation and influence were limited(174). The rigid
French political system and intensive opposition from the
colons gradually weakened their political actions. The break
of the Second World War, the spread of nationalism, and the
unchanged conditions of the Algerian population led to
disillusionment with France and its insitutions. They
increasingly realised that there would be no real
assimilation for the native population. They became
convinced that autonmy from France was the only path for the
Algerians to recover their legitimate rights.

The extreme nature of French colonisation — a type
of apartheid policy towards the Algerian people's most basic
rights — contributed to the strengthening and eventually to
the radicalisation of the nationalist movement. This
movement was, by the end of the Second War, still latent but
expanding and the claim for independence was more overtly
expressed.

Different parties emerged in the post-War period
such as the 'Parti du Peuple Algerien' (P.P.A), which later
changed into 'Mouvement pour le Triomphe de la Liberté et de
la Democracie'(M.T.L.D). This party was under the leadership
of Messali El-Hadj founder of the E.N.A. The 'Liberals' on

the other hand formed a party called 'Union Democratique des
Musulmans Algeriens' (U.D.M.A) under the leadership of
Ferhat Abbas. These parties though different in their
approaches were united in their objective of national
independence(175). The extreme repression adopted by the
French to eradicate all forms of nationalism in Algeria
helped consolidate a unity among the various nationalist
strands and led them to feel the need for an equally extreme
means to achieve the aim of national liberation. Hence, a
military branch 'l'Organisation Secrete'(O.S) was formed in
1947 with the principal objective of creating an armed
revolt.

The creation of the 'Comité Revolutionaire d'Union
et d'Action' (C.R.U.A) between 1953 and 1954 managed to
rally all these different movements for national liberation.
This was to become in 1954 the 'Front de Liberation
Nationale' (F.L.N) and the instigator of the outbreak of
the Algerian revolution on 1st November 1954(176). The role
of the F.L.N Party in the organisation and continuity of the
war against France has constituted its major claim to power
and to its leading role in national politics to the present
time.

The armed action against French colonisation
lasted for seven years and was a bitter and violent war. It
ended in March 1962 with the ceasfire and the beginning of
negotiations between Algerian representatives of the F.L.N
and the French(177). Independence was proclaimed on the 5th

of July 1962, and Algeria became after one and a quarter
centuries of French colonisation an independent sovereign
state.

It is the argument here that the impact of such a
long history of dependence and external influence has
generated in this country a strong need to assert its
distinctive national cultural identity. This need was such
that it became the central issue and the major objective in
the process of nation-building. French colonial policy, and
especially its advocated assimilation, and the systematic
repression of the Arabo-Islamic culture and language were
the major forces for this strong identification and the
weight given to the Arabic language and the Islamic religion
as the most important features of the Algerian identity.

The Arabic language, because of its tight
relationship with Islam and because of its role as a major
protection against French cultural influence, has
constituted a potent means of mobilization and reaction
against colonialism. Hence, because of its centrality in
Algerian nationalism, the Arabic language, continued after
Independence to be a major political issue and therefore an
important source for political legitimacy.

b) The political context

As a primarily political issue, the establishment
of the Arabic language was claimed by the political elite as
an integral part of a real independence from French

colonisation and its effects. Thus language policy has
influenced, as it has been influenced by, the political
context of the country.

The long period of colonisation and nearly eight
years of war created important problems for the emerging
political elite; the most important of which were the
establishment of a central authority and, hence, access to
power. The organisation of political units during the
nationalist movement for liberation period was dictated by
war conditions with the supremacy of military affairs over
the political. This already constituted a source of
antagonism and dispute among the groups involved(178).

The F.L.N Party regrouped, during the process of
liberation, militants from the different spheres of society
and with different political trends. This political elite
were united behind the objective of independence, but the
dissidence emerged once this objective was achieved.
Internal conflicts, in fact, appeared from the eve of
Independence during the congress of the Party held in
Tripoli (Lybia) in May 1962(179). It was during this
congress that the major decisions about the future
political, economic, and social policies were made. It was
therefore in an atmosphere of conflict over access to power
that the language policies were adopted. These emphasised
Arabic as the national official language and the need to
restore it in Algerian society.

However, it is suggested that because access to power was the priority for the political elite, major political issues, such as language, became means more than ends. The conflicts were not about the policies themselves or the ways in which to achieve them, or about major political options but were related to who would lead. There were for instance intensive debates regarding membership of the party's Political Bureau, which was to constitute the central-cell of Algerian political organisation. There were also bitter criticism of the provisional government (G.P.R.A)(180) which was in charge of the negotiations about the Evian agreements(181). These agreements were denounced by some members of the Tripoli Congress as a form of neo-colonialism which provided for an increasing dependence on the former colonial power.

Two major groups emerged at the eve of Independence: one was characterized by a radical attitude towards France, and was in favour of a sharp cut-off, through the rejection of the Evian agreements. The other was more moderate and favoured the continuity of the relations, in accordance with the Agreements. They also stressed the need to maintain the same political leadership which was formed during the revolution.

The first group was led by Ahmed Ben Bella(182), and backed by the army, whereas the second group was constituted principally by members of the provisional

government and were mostly politicians. The tension between
the two groups culminated in a crisis which almost ended in
violence during the summer 1962(183).

The emergence of Ben Bella's group as the leading
group, their radical position vis a vis France, and their
strong emphasis on decolonisation as their major programme
directly affected language policy. The option for Arabic as
the official national language became the major slogan and
the central theme of political dispute. Closely linked with
nationalism and national identification, it constituted an
important means for political legitimacy and hence was
extensively used as a claim to have access to power.

The President Ben Bella managed to strengthen his
position rapidly after independence and was able to oust his
oponents. He extented his control over the government, the
Party, and the National Assembly. He became officially the
Head of the Government, President of the Republic, and
General Secretary of the Party. Here again the Assembly had
no effective power. The only task it was allocated was to
elaborate a project for the Constitution, but even that was
later denied. It was the presidential group in the Political
Bureau which finally established the Constitution which was
'unanimously' approved in a general referendum organised in
September 1963(184).

The centrality of power in the first Algerian
government was reflected in the confusion and overlap
between party and government. The President took decision

making into his own hands which led to the resignation of
the President of the National Assembly, former G.P.R.A
president Ferhat Abbas, as a protest(185). The F.L.N Party
instead of being a major political insitution, as stipulated
in the constitution, came under the president's
control(186), which narrowed even more the scope for debates
concerning important national issues such as the national
language. Decisions were therefore imposed rather than
debated.

An authoritarian regime was in fact established
in Algeria, based on the president's personal rule, an
abstract type of socialism, and an affiliation with the
Eastern Bloc. This in itself was a major contradiction with
Islam as the religion of the state — a religion essentially
opposed to the Comunist-Socialist ideology — but, in the
Algerian context, both ideologies were used to legitimate
the state as the defender of the majority's rights, and the
national cultural identity, through the intended
establishment of the Arabo-Islamic culture and language. The
political leadership emphasized that socialism in Algeria
would be a 'specific', even a 'scientific' socialism(187).

Such a regime and the highly abstract form of
politics quickly led to increasing problems and
contradictions at political, economic, and social levels.
This justified the overthrow of Ben Bella and his
government, in June 1965, and the access for power of Houari
Boumediene who was then at the head of the National

Army(188). The military 'Coup d'Etat' was therefore
organised by those who in fact brought the former President
to power. Their arguments were based on criticism of the
authoritarian regime established by Ben Bella, his 'cult of
personality', and above all his inefficient national and
international policies.

Thus, it was mainly the practices rather than the
major choices of the previous regime which were questioned.
Hence socialism and the reestablishment of the national
cultural identity remained among the priority objectives of
the second government, and became used in the same framework
with the same power-related objectives.

However, Boumedienne, with his own personality and
specific views established a new type of leadership which
was in fact more radical. The 'Conseil de la Revolution' was
formed by the new president and his close allies as a
collegial system, an alternative to the centralized control
of Ben Bella. This Council was to become the central unit of
decision-making for more than ten years (1965-1979)(189). In
spite of this collegial organisation, the system was highly
centralized and decision-making was unilateral. Furthermore,
it was principally the President, Houari Boumedienne, who
held power and directly influenced policies, such as those
related to language(190).

Boumedienne was known for his clearly radical
positions, especially his strongly expressed
anti-colonialist and anti-capitalist stands, his

unconditional support for and identification with
Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism. Possessing himself an
Arabo-Islamic education, he was among the few who were
fluent in Classical Arabic. He always gave his speeches in
this language, which was for him the basic and the most
essential element of national character. To achieve complete
independence, in political, economic, as well as cultural
terms from the former colonial piower, was constantly
stressed as a principal objective. He was overtly critical,
even opposed, to Western capitalism, and consequently was a
protagonist of the idea of a 'delinking-with-the-West'
approach to development and 'self-reliance' rather than
'convergence-with-the-West'. He was among those who strongly
denounced the unequal international relations based on the
domination of industrialized nations and and on the
dependence of the industrializing ones(191).

At the national level, Boumedienne's strategy to
achieve complete independence from the West was based on
what he called the three revolutions: the first one was
political and aimed principally at the strengthening of the
state apparatus; the second was the economic and
concentrated on industrialization and economic growth and
state control (nationalisation) of economic resources; the
third one was the cultural revolution and aimed at
reestablishing and reinforcing national cultural identity.
The Arabic language was considered as the most important

element in this cultural revolution, the means to react to and eradicate the consequences of colonisation and protect against neo-colonialist infiltration.

It was during Boumedienne's leadership (1965-1978) that the Arabic language was most strongly stressed and the bases for its implementation were laid. The process of Arabisation was part and parcel of the policy of 'decolonisation' recognized by Boumedienne and was considered as one of the most important foundations of the Algerian nation(192).

However, it is suggested that modernisation, based essentially on economic development through industrialization, was equally, if not more strongly, stressed as a pressing major aim to attain self-reliance and hence real independence. But such a programme necessitated reliance on Western thought and practice and mainly the use of French language as the instrument of access to it. This constituted one of the major contradictions in terms of language policies in Algeria during Boumedienne's era, to a higher extent than in Morocco and Tunisia.

After the sudden death of Boumedienne in December 1978, the Party F.L.N designated Chadli Bejeddid as the Party's leader and the only candidate for presidency(193). He became Algeria's third president, since independence, in April 1979. His arrival to power within the same political framework as his predecessors underlines the continuity of a centralized form of government and decision-making and an

authoritarin regime with one Party system and hence the
continuous need for ideological discourse as a major means
for political legitimacy. In this context, the Arabic
language continues to be central in the restricted political
debates.

c) Language Policies

In Algeria, language policies have been mainly
concerned with the process of Arabisation since the 1962
Tripoli Programme. Arabisation was integrated into the
process of decolonisation as a political issue and used to
define radical reactions against the French assimilationist
policies. The Arabic language was considered as the symbol
of national identity and unity; hence its use as an
ideological instrument for political legitimacy.

Unlike Morocco and Tunisia, there has been, in
Algeria, no official claim favouring the French language or
bilingualism, especially from 1965 onward with a more
nationalistic and radical regime(194). It is therefore
difficult to find official statements questioning the
adopted policies of Arabisation. Official debates have
concentrated on the means and ways of speeding up the
process of Arabisation to reinstate as quickly as possible
the Arabo-Islamic character of the nation(195). These
debates remained however theoretical and divorced from
reality and its constraints.

The contradictions in terms of language policies
in Algeria can be identified mainly from the gap between
rhetoric and practice, that is between the official claim
for the urgency to use the Arabic language effectively and
the maintenance of French as the working language. These
contradictions are also reflected in the fluctuations in
implementing the Arabisation according to the political
trends of those involved successively in decision-making.
These fluctuations varied from radical options by
nationalists and tradionalists, to moderates or modernists.

In the 1962 Tripoli Programme the option for
Arabic as the national official language was stated among
the main political options:

> ...The Algerian culture will be national,
>
> its role as a national culture, will
>
> consist in the first place, to restore
>
> the Arabic language, which incarnates the
>
> cultural values of the nation, its dignity
>
> and effectiveness as a language of
>
> civilization... Our culture must be
>
> Algerian, based on the Arabic language
>
> which is deeply rooted in the nation. It
>
> will be used to fight cultural
>
> cosmopolitanism and the Western imprint
>
> which contributed to inculcating in many
>
> Algerians a contempt of their language

and their national values.

This statement underlines the radical position of the
Algerian political leaders towards language policy. It
stresses their clear view of the Arabic language as a
political and cultural means to react to and fight French
cultural influence. This option for Arabic was confirmed in
the first Algerian constitution (1963) where in Article 2,
the new state was defined as "... an integral part of the
Arab Maghreb, of the Arab world and of Africa"(197)
In its Article 5 it was stated that Arabic is the national
official language(198). During the first period of Algerian
Independence, Ben Bella constantly stressed the principle of
Arabisation and related it to the option for socialism. For
him there would be no socialism without Arabisation(199).

This political option and institutionalization
for the Arabic language was again emphasized in the second
government's constitution of 1976 under the leadership of
Houari Boumedienne. It was stated in Arcticle 2 and 3 of the
constitution that Islam was the religion of the state and
Arabic its national language. It was added that the
government will work to generalise the use of the national
language at the 'official level'(200). Hence, Arabisation
was even more strongly stressed in this government as one of
the most important national priotities. Boumedienne was a
fervent partisan of Arabisation, which he considered as a
'revolutionary objective'(201):

> Without recovering that essential element
>
> which is our national language, our
>
> efforts would be useless, our personality
>
> incomplete, and our entity a body without
>
> soul... Opinions may differ concerning
>
> means and methods, but there cannot be a
>
> a divergence concerning the option itself.
>
> This option is an established and definitive
>
> fact.
>
> (202)

This statement shows the radical option for the officially adopted language policy, the intransigent approach and Boumedienne's conviction that such a central issue as language cannot be subjected to questioning or revision.

In terms of language policy in Algeria two periods can in fact be distinguished during the leadership of Boumedienne. The first period from 1965 to 1964 was characterized by an intensive implementation of Arabisation. This was principally in the educational system and the administration along with the setting up of the Party's national Commision of Arabisation. In 1973 a Congress of the Party was held to evaluate the achievements of this policy. In 1975 Boumedienne stated that:

> ... The day when the Arabic language will be

a tool of work and communication in the

petro-chemical plants of Skikda and the

steel plant of El Hadjar (Annaba), it

will be the language of iron and steel...

(203)

This statement can be considered as an

indication of the beginning of the second period, where a

relatively more cautious approach can be noted. In fact, in

the process of modernisation with the economic policies

based on intensive industrialization, hasty Arabisation

proved difficult. In this context the French language was

used as the operational language.

The appointment in 1977 of M. Lacheraf at the

Ministry of Primary and Secondary education and A. Rahal at

the Ministry of Higher Education (both were fervent

modernists) marked a pause in the process of Arabisation and

even a return to French-Arabic bilingualism. Lachref's views

about the national language can be summarised in the

following statement:

... As long as Arabisation does not

fulfill all these conditions [its

adaptation to science and modernity],

in order to respond to the imperatives

of a fruitful rationality and a never

ending creativity, it will risk

remaining vulnerable, decried even, and

will not be able to 'dislodge' the

more appropriate foreign language...

which is qualitatively more functional.

It is up to those who master the Arabic

language to make this possible, by

creative acts,..[while] using French

and other foreign languages in the

indispensable professional information

of teachers, pupils and students.

(204)

Mostefa Lachref was among the very few politicians who

overtly questioned the rationality of a rapid Arabisation in

the Algerian context. He was concerned with efficiency

rather than ideology in terms of language policies. For him

the language question, because highly ideologised, has

become "un otage du nationalism"(a hostage of

nationalism)(205).

But this rational approach to language policy was

never applied since, with the government which came after

Boumedienne (1979), the trend was in favour of a return to a

speedy Arabisation. During this period Arabisation was again

inscribed among national priorities, and measures were taken

to arabise further education and administration. A new

National Commission of Arabisation was set up to spread the

use of the national language. It was also the period where

an Academy of the Arabic language was created in 1985.

In contemporary history, with this government
having established its authority, reforms have been
undertaken since 1988, in the national economy. Hence the
necessity to adapt the educational system to these reforms
stressing the necessity to hasten the process of
modernisation. The language issue, however, has remained
among the privileged themes of political discourse and
closely related to the notions of national sovereignty,
identity, and nationalism. But the increasing importance
given to the economic and specifically to the industrial
sector requires the maintenance of the French language as
the language of work and communication.

d) The Economic Context

The major contradictions in terms of language
policy are more strongly reflected in Algeria than in the
two other countries in relation to its economic context and
policies. This is not only because of the double emphasis
on both national identity, through Arabic, and
industrialization, through French, but also because of the
dramatic state of the Algerian economy at independence which
necessitated a higher reliance, for its development, on the
West and France. To develop the national economy required
greater dependence on Western aid, thought, and practice; it
especially required the maintenance of the French language,
already deeply rooted in the socio-economic context, as a
major instrument of interaction.

In 1962, the Algerian economy was characterised by a dual system, that is a largely traditional agricultural sector, and an industrial sector in its early stages of development. The difference between the traditional and modern sectors within the agricultural sector was even more important in this country than in Morocco and Tunisia. The traditional sector which provided a living for the greatest proportion of the population, was producing mainly cereals and olive oil in the Northern part of the country and dates in the South. This sector was characterized by scattered, poor, and unsufficiently irrigated lands. Hence yield was low and the production barely sufficient for subsistence. The devastating war for liberation further affected this sector, where fields and forests were burned. About 8,000 villages were destroyed and a large proportion of animal breeding stocks were liquidated(206). The 'ressettlement' policy adopted by France during colonisation resulted in the uprooting of about two million peasants who became landless and were deprived of their main source for subsistence(207).

The modern sector of agriculture which was developed was relatively small and was exlusively in the hands of Europeans before Independence. It was located on the most fertile lands of the rich coastal plains and represented less than 16% of the total agricultural lands.

Modern and sophisticated techniques were used in this sector including irrigation, fertilizers, qualified manpower coupled with underpaid local labour(208).

This modern sector was abandoned by the European settlers at Independence. It was taken over by the state and organized into cooperatives. This sector represented the must valuable part of the agricultural sector because of its modern means and good quality products, but it also was an important source of dependence on France with its products dependent on demand from the French market.

So, the long period of French colonisation lasting for over a century was never geared to the economic development of Algeria. The modern structures set up during this period were geared towards exports, and as was the case in Morocco and Tunisia, to the French economy.

Agricultural production on the whole saw an important decrease during the first years of Independence. This was due to the sudden departure of the settlers, the lack of qualified and skilled manpower able to use the available equipment left by the Colons. Added to this was the disorganisation in the processes of distribution and marketing systems(209).

It was with such a poor potential that the process of modernisation was launched in Algeria after Independence. Industrialization was considered, by the new Algerian political leadership, as the principal means of access to this modernisation. However, the industrial sector

was almost nonexistent then and its development required
tremendous human and material means which were not
available. Consequently heavy dependence on the Western
industrialized nations was unavoidable.

Industrial activities were more strongly affected
than agriculture with the departure of Europeans. About 80%
of this population had left within the first six months of
Independence, and among these were most of the technical and
administrative personnel(210). Industrial activity therefore
dropped by about 50%. This European exodus was accompanied
by important capital outflow which in fact had started
before Independence. Algeria was part of the French Franc
zone, consequently circulation of capital between Algeria
and France was simple. The total investment dropped
dramatically from 464 billion French Francs in 1961 to 84
billion in 1963(211). Overall production dropped by 35% in
1962 as compared to 1960. Only hydro-carbon production
continued to increase without interruption because it
remained in the hands of multinational firms(212).

The rise in national expenses, the need for
capital investment and qualified manpower to build the
economy, made it necessary to remain closely linked with
France for technical assistance and financial aid. This
technical and financial dependence generated specific
exchanges with France, regulated by French needs and
conditions.

The trade balance with France was always in deficit, as in the cases of Morocco and Tunisia. The Algerian exports were far from covering the imports from France. The imports from France were principally manufactured and consumption goods, capital goods, food and agricultural products. The exports towards France were mainly crude oil, wine, and citrus fruits(213).

In addition to this trade imbalance, financial dependence, whether aid or loans, was the other major characterisitic of the Algerian economy after Independence(214). The exploitation and development of the oil and gas resources had remained, until 1971, largely financed by the French government and the Multinationals. In 1963, France invested 30 million French Francs in this sector as stipulated by the Evian Agreements(215).

The nationalisation of natural resources and foreign banks and entreprises, in 1971, was a step to reduce this financial dependence and foreign control over the Algerian economy. In this context, Algeria was economically more privileged than the two other countries with its important natural resources, mainly oil and gas. These resources in fact have consituted the major sources of revenues which were invested in the industrial projects. In 1979, for instance, they constituted 60% of the total national revenues and covered 97% of the total exports(216). Their income has been used almost exclusively to finance industrial imports.

However, considering the ambitious economic
policies, especially the option for heavy industry as the
basis for development, the large revenues from oil and gas
do not cover the needed investment. Hence, the increasing
need for foreign aid and borrowing to finance industrial
projects and general imports.

The major argument put forward by the political
elite in developing heavy industry has been that it will
generate other basic industries which will contribute to
agricultural and industrial development. This policy has
been based on the notion of "industrializing
industries"(217). It was an economic strategy which aimed at
achieving, in the long run, 'effective' economic growth in
the different sectors of the national economy. The idea was
to create a 'snow-ball' effect, whereby heavy industry would
eventually provide the necessary tools and products needed
in agriculture and light industry; and consequently
gradually achieve the ultimate aim of self-reliance. But,
the implementation of this model has needed capital, high
technology, and skilled manpower which were to be imported.

The economic policies adopted since Independence
have, therefore, required close relations with the Western
world and France. In this context relations with the
European Community have been increasing since Independence
and have involved different aspects of economic and
industrial exchanges. Agreements between the E.E.C and
Algeria were signed in 1976, for an unlimited period,and

were based on the principle of 'interdependence and equality". These agreements were enforced in 1978 with the main objective of favouring the economic and social development of Algeria, as well as commercial exchange, and financial and technological 'cooperation'. The financial aid granted by the EEC was 114 million ECU(218). The prinicpal Algerian exports to the EEC have been essentially oil and gas; the imports include principally heavy machinery, transport equipment, manufactured goods, consumption goods, and chemicals. Along with these commercial exchanges the European Community agreed to participate in the realisation of programmes for industrial development, and to help accelerate the transfer of technology through cooperation in the scientific and technological fields. Algeria has also developed relations with individual countries of Europe mainly West Germany, Italy, and France(219). Relations have also been developed recently with the U.S.A and Japan as well as a wide range of socialist countries.

The Algerian government has been claiming the necessity to diversify its economic relations in order to reduce the country's dependence on France. This claim has been stronger especially from the 1970s when relations between the two countries started to detoriorate. But if France is today only the third commercial partner of Algeria, after West Germany and the United States, its geographical proximity, its linguistic and cultural

influence, and its maintained administrative and economic

structures, have secured its place as one of the most

important economic and cultural partners.

The other important area of French-Algerian

relations, and which has been often the source of the

detoriation of their diplomatic relations, has been the

great number of the Algerian immigrants in France. Their

migration has constituted, as in Morocco and Tunisia, an

important outlet for the pressure on the limited job market,

and their financial transfers contribute to national

revenues. In this country also, it was hoped that the

emigrants would eventually participate in the process of the

transfer of technology. But, since the majority of them are

unskilled they have been allocated the lowest jobs. It is

the conditions of their work and living, the lack of their

training, and the clauses for their eventual return home,

which have created tensions between the two countries.

However, in spite of areas of conflict and

disagreement between France and Algeria, their economic and

political exchanges have always been re-established after

short periods of tense relations. The strong impact of

France in the different domains of national activities,

especially in the economic policies adopted since

Indpendence, have helped in maintaining privileged relations

and exchanges with France which, in spite of strong

political rhetoric, have been strengthening rather than

diminishing.

One of the major aspects of these relations is the cultural and principally the linguistic. The French language has been, particularly in the Algerian context, deeply rooted not only because of the assimilationist colonial policy, but because of its identification with modernisation and its use as an instrument for the acquisition of scientific and technological knowledge. Furthermore, the model of development and the specific relations it entails has maintained the French language as the means of interaction with these countries.

The Algerian experience of development and modernisation has led to an increasing dependence and therefore contradicts the major aim of economic and social independence. This experience underlines the principal argument of the thesis stressing the inadequacy in use of the Western model. Furtheremore, the adoption of this model, in addition to reinforcing economic dependence, has affected cultural options and policies and generated contradictions. The economic contacts and exchanges formed a basis for cultural influence and necessitated the increasing use of the French language as the major, and efficient, means of interaction with the Western world. This constitutes a major contradiction with the aim of reestablishing an authentic Arabo-Islamic cultural identity, of which the Arabic language is the unique expression.

These contradictions seem to be more visible in this context because of the radical Algerian approach to the language issue in political discourse, where ideology, rather than reality and efficiency, holds a central place in the national politics.

In Algeria as in the two other countries language policies and the contradictions they generate in relation to the historical, political, and economic contexts of each country, are clearly perceptible. Furthermore, with their specific characteristics and constraints, the social and educational contexts of these countries, constitute themselves obstacles to this policy.

Conclusion.

Nationalism in the three countries of the Maghreb
has contributed to the mobilization and participation of the
population in the struggle for liberation. It continues to
be used as a powerful means to sustain this mobilization for
national construction and especially the consolidation of
the nation-states. In this context, cultural identity,
because of its unifying power, has been strongly stressed as
a major aim in the process of nation-building to ensure
people's adhesion.

A common language has generally been considered
as a distinctive and important feature of national identity
and consequently a potent means in the creation of
nationalism. The importance of language in national
identification is mainly due to the central place and role
it holds in culture:

> ...national language, accepted by
> all members as the natural medium of
> social intercourse and as an outward
> symbol of their nationality...as the
> repository of racial and national
> memory, should be considered as the
> most important influence in the
> formation of national character.
>
> (220)

A unifying language is an attractive ideal in national

formation and construction: it constitutes an important

source of unity. However, nationalism and the emphasis on a

unifying language in a heterogeneous social context, can be

divisive rather than unifying. It can create within a nation

conflicts and problems.

In the particular case of the Maghrebian

nation-states the issue of language has been closely linked

with nationalism. It has been therefore conditioned by

ideological considerations whereby language has become a

major means of political legitimacy and assertion of

national sovereignty. Consequently policies specifying one

unifying language, the Arabic language, in a rather complex

linguistic situation, have generated in the three societies

important problems and contradictions.

The issue of language in the three Maghrebian

states has been analysed in this chapter around the

following major arguments:

- There has been in the three countries, with

varying degrees, an undervaluation of the impact of the

historical process in cultural and linguistic formation.

The strong influence of French colonisation cannot be simply

eradicated by ideological claims.

- The centrality of politics in these states, with
the predominence of ideology and search for power has not
only conditioned but also obscured approaches to language
policy. Thus the language issue has become an instrument for
political legitimacy rather than efficiency.

- The process of economic development undertaken
in the three countries, based the Western model, has
particularly affected language policies and accentuated
their contradictions. It has particularly reinforced the
role of the French language in these societies which also
claim an authentic cultural identity based essentially on
the Arabic language.

The three countries of the Maghreb share many
similarities in the process of their nation building. They
face a similar set of problems and constraints, and their
contradictions appear to be of the same nature. However,
each one of these countries, for specific historical,
political, economic, and social processes and
characteristics, presents a distinctive case in terms of
language policies, emphases, and contradictions.
Hence, in comparative terms, there are as many similarities
as there are differences.

Morocco and Tunisia, having gained independence
before Algeria, initiated their development process at an
earlier period. But Algeria, with its intensive
industrialization policies and its important natural
resources, has managed to achieve a higher degree of

industrialization. In Morocco and Tunisia, this process has been relatively slower due to a more cautious approach to development and relatively limited natural resources, especially in the case of Tunisia.

One of the major problems shared by the three countries is the dilemma generated by their desire to achieve modernisation, in the earliest time possible, and at the same time to establish an authentic national cultural identity. The model for their modernisation stems from the West while their national identity is linked to the Arabo-Islamic culture. Modernisation in the three countries is based essentially on industrialization and economic growth requiring continuing reliance on Western countries. This economic process has reinforced the predominance of the French language. Arabo-Islamic identity is closely linked with, and expressed principally through, the Arabic language.

The historical process, especially the type and length of French colonisation, has affected approaches to language in these countries. Their respective economic and political systems have also influenced these policies. The Moroccan Monarchy with its identification with Islam and its emphasis on modernisation justifies the use of the two languages, hence there is, in this country a semi-official adoption of bilingualism. Tunisia, the most arabised of the three, more strongly stresses modernisation as a major aim, and has adopted more clearly policies of bilingualism.

Algeria, spite of a de-facto situation of bilingualism and its process of intensive industrialization, more strongly emphasizes Arabic as the only national official language.

The French colonial experience with its economic, political and socio-cultural legacies has contibuted to the shaping of the Maghrebian states' approaches to development as well as their language policies. Algeria, among the three countries, was particularly affected by its colonial experience. The long period of this colonisation, for one hundred and thirty years, has had a major impact. At the same time Algeria has generated a more radical response to this influence, especially in cultural and linguistic terms - hence the centrality of language in the Algerian politics. However, the inherited economic and socio-cultural structures and the adopted policies of development have maintained if not increased relations with France.

In Morocco and Tunisia the colonial experience was shorter than in Algeria and because of the indirect type of colonial rule, as protectorates, the French impact was less important. However, after Independence, relations and dependence on France have steadily increased. These relations with France, especially in economic terms, have affected language policies in Morocco and Tunisia. The use of the French language has increased since independence.

Hence, in the three countries of the Maghreb, the two-fold objective of establishing a national cultural identity and achieving modernisation has generated

contradictions. However, Tunisia with its moderate approach

is comparatively facing a smaller degree of contradiction

than in the two other countries. Tunisia, because of its

clearly Western oriented economic policies and its

acceptance of the Western model as the source of reference

for modernisation, fits in the 'convergence-with the-West'

approach to development. Hence its language policies favour

a French-Arabic bilingualism.

However the problems faced by Tunisia in its

process of nation-building reflect more strongly the

contradictions of this model in a different context. The

most important of these is the disruptive effects such a

model has in the social and cultural context of this

country. The policy of bilingualism has generated, as will

be related in the next chapter, important contradictions and

problems in the social and educational contexts

particularly.

Morocco, a constitutional monarchy, with a

'democratic' political system and a capitalist-based economy

also fits, in this respect, in the 'convergence' category of

development. However, the monarchy draws its legitimacy from

its affiliation and identification with the Islamic religion

and the Arabic culture and stresses its strong emphasis on

Arabic language as the only national language and the

expression of national identity. This has created tensions,

not only in terms of ultimate national aims and objectives, but in terms of the roles and status of each of the two languages, Arabic and French, in Moroccan society.

Algeria, with its clearly socialist-oriented political and socio-economic policies, its radical and overtly expressed anti-Western and anti-capitalist stand, fits well into the 'delinking' category of development. This is also reflected in its language policies emphasizing Arabisation as a means of self-assertion against the West and particularly France. However, the clearly Western oriented policies of development, requiring an increasing use of French, contradict the claim for Arabic as the only national official language.

In the three nations of the Maghreb, the process of nation-building has been affected by their social and economic policies. In these policies, often ideology transends efficiency which led to the use of language as a major means to gain access to power and legitimacy. In addition the adoption, without adaptation, of the Western model and the primacy of the economic over the social and cultural as well as the lack of attention to the specific and real socio-cultural characteristics, have generated tensions and problems in the three societies. Education, supposedly a means of human development, is a major source and recipient of such problems and contradictions.

Chapter III

Notes and References.

1. Contradiction is used here, and subsequently, in its
   general meaning. That is to express inconsistency in the
   aims and practices in the formulation and implementation
   of policies related to language in the three countries of
   the Maghreb.

2. "Fluctuations" is used in this thesis to mean
   oscilliations in the formulation and implementation of
   the adopted language policies, especially in terms of
   emphasis between the Arabic and French language.

3. The three selected countries of the Maghreb share a
   number of similarities. The most important of which
   are: geographic proximity, ethnic, religious, and
   linguistic unity, and a relatively common historical
   experience.

4. Liberal approach to the international relations is one
   based on free exchanges and circulation of capiltal and
   goods.

5. 'Smoother' refers to the (relatively) non violent
   process of access to Independence.

6. During the period following Independence, the Tunisian
   government relied on the private sector for the economic
   development of the country. In 1961 a centralized and
   planned economy was established in order to ensure an

'integral' development of the Tunisian economy. However,
by 1969 this economic "dirigism" failed and the
government had to return to a liberal economic system.

7. This continuity was, however, altered shortly
after independence with the conflict over the
previously agreed terms of negotiations. France's
continuing influence was implicitly stated in
maintaining French troops on Tunisian soil. But to
guard its long term interests, even after the Bizerte
crisis in 1959, France opted for a compromise: its troops
left the country. Thus a complete rupture of its
relations with Tunisia was avoided.
See: Aron, R., and Poncet, J
., La Tunisie, P.U.F, Paris,
1971.

8. This land of the Berbers, the original inhabitants of
Northern Africa, attracted a number of foreign
invasions. The most important were: the Phoenicians and
Greeks, followed by Romans and Vandals, then came the
Arabs with the advent of Islam, the Turks (in Tunisia and
Algeria), and finally the French. For the history of the
period previous to the Islamisation of the Maghreb see:
Julien, C.A., Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord, des origines
a la conquete Arabe. Tome I, Librairie Payot, Lousane,
1964.

9. The usage of the term "nationalism" as well as its
roots is situated in nineteenth century Europe. It

emerged in Western Europe, especially in France and England during the late 18th to early 19th century as a result of the reaction to the expanded monarchial powers of the state.

10. However, nationalism, as a concept, has remained an abstract, ambiguous and controvesial concept. This is because its meaning varies from period to period, from language to language, and from person to person. There are, in fact, as many different conceptions of nationalism, just as there are different doctrines and ideologies underlying the phenomenon. See:
   Fishman, J.A.   Language and Nationalism: Two integrative essays, Newbury House Publishers, Rowely, Massachussets, 1975, p.3.

11. The idea of 'nation' was based on the notion of the right to the plurality of societies according to their ethnic, linguistic and/or religious identities. To set up independent nations on these bases was seen as an alternative to the "inclusive" and centralizing monarchial systems.

12. For a thorough and more extensive treatment of the concept "nation" see Zernotto, G., "Nation: The History of a Word" in Review of Politics, No 6, 1944, pp.351-366. See also Rustow, D.A., "New Horizons for Comparative Politics" in World Politics, 1975, pp.530-542. See also Edwards, J., Language, Society, and Identity, Basil, Blackwell, Oxford, 1985, pp.37-46.

13.See Gellner, E. , <u>Nations and Nationalism</u>, Basil

    Blackwell, Oxford, 1983. See also Breuilly, J.,

    <u>Nationalism and the State</u>, Basil Blackwell, Manchester,

    University Press, Manchester, 1985, pp.352-365.

14.The idea of nation has been generally described as a

    'subjective', and 'emotional ' phenemenon, because it is

    based principally on 'presumed' ethno-cultural common

    characteristics, and with common values and aims. Hence,

    it appeals to affective solidarity, based on sentiments,

    symbols, and specific values. Whereas the idea of a

    state was a firmly established reality in Western Europe

    before the advent of modern nationalism. The term

    'state', unlike 'nation ', refers to a more tangible

    politico-geographical unit under the control of a

    specific government. See: Fishman, J., Op.cit., p.25.

    The term ' nation-state' is presently more commonly

    used to combine the 'subjective' and emotional apects

    of nationalism, with 'objective' statehood aspects.

    See: Edwards, J., op.cit., pp.37-46.

15.These notions of cohesion, consciousness, solidarity

    have been used, by nationalists, as the the major

    and most integrative arguments, from the early

    nationalist manifestations during the 19th century.

    A distinctive identity has been used as a central

    feature of nationalism. See Edwards, J., op.cit.,

    pp.16-17., see also Fishman, J.A., op.cit., pp.1-10 .

16.The role of language in determining a group's

community or a nation's identity, its centrality

in nationalism, prompted intellectual interest

and has generated an important amount of literature on

language and identity. Language has been subjected

to a multi-disciplinary approach, it has been treated

and analysed according to each specific disciplinary

perspective. See Barker, E., National Character and the

Factors in its Formation, Methuen, London, 1977. See

also Connor, W., "Ethno-nationalism in the First World:

the present historical perspective", in Ethnic Conflict

in the Western World, by Esman, M., (ed.), Cornwell

University Press, New York, 1977. See also Edwards, J.,

op.cit. See also Fishman, J.A., (ed.), Reading in the

Sociology of Language, Mouton, The Hague, 1968. Also

Fishman, J.A., "Studies of Language as an Aspect of

Ethnicity and Nationalism: A bibliographic introduction",

In Sociolinguistics Newsletter, 14 (2) 1984, pp.1-6. See

also Fishman, J.A., Language and Nationalism..., op.cit.

See also Fishman, J.A., Ferguson, C.A., and

Das Gupta, J., (ed.) Language problems of Developing

Nations, Wiley Editions, London, New York, 1968. See

also O'Barr, M.W and O'Barr, F.J, (eds.) Language and

Politics. Mouton, the Hague, Paris, 1976.

17.Edwards, J., op.cit., pp.23-27. See also Fishman, J.A.,

   Language and Nationalism..., op.cit., p.49.

18.Quoted by Fishman, J.A, ibid., p.49.

19.Edwards, J., op.cit., pp.16-19.

20.Fishman, J.A., _Language and Nationalism..._, op.cit., pp.44-45.

21.In the Maghreb, the Arabic language is valued more as a symbol of cultural identity and authenticity than as a tool of expression, work and social interaction.

22.See Laraoui, A., _L'histoire du Maghreb, un essai de synthese_, Maspero, Paris, 1967. See also Terrasse, H., _Histoire du Maroc, des Origines a l'etablissement du Protectorat Français_, Editions Atlantides, Casablanca, 1956.

23.About Western rivarlies in Morocco see Brockway, F., _The colonial Revolution_, Hart Davis and Mac Gibbon, London, 1973. See also: Laroui, A., _l'Histoire du Maghreb..._,op.cit.

24.See Amin, S.,_l'Economie du Maghreb_,Tome 1 Editions de Minuit,Paris,1966. pp.25-37.

25.See Nickerson, S.J, _A short History of North Africa Lybia, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco. From Pre-Roman times to the present_, Derin-Adair, New York, 1961. See also Berque, J., _Depossession du Monde_, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1964, chapter III.

26.For the history of the Moroccan Nationalist Movement see Duclos, L.J., and Al., _Les Nationalismes Maghrebins_, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. Paris, 1966.

27.Zouggari, A., _Islam et Nationalisme au Maroc, 1912-1956_, These de Docotorat 3eme Cycle, Paris V , 1977.

28.See Salmi, J.M., "L'Accés aux Langues Occidentales au

Maroc a la Veille du Protectorat Français".

In Proceedings of the First Congress on Miditerranean

Studies on Arabo-Berber Influence, S.N.E.D, Alger, 1973,

pp.266-268.

29.The influence of the original culture and language ,

the Berber, is still omnipresent in the customs,

habits, social structures and organisation in the

Maghreb. The spoken Arabic, for instance, contains

many Berber words and expressions. In fact, it is

this surviving influence of Berber culture and

language which principally distinguishes the Maghreb

from the other Arab countries. See: Marthelot, P.,

"Maghreb, Machrek: Quels problemes?", in Proceedings of

the Second International Congress of Studies on

Cultures on the Western Miditerranean II, S.N.E.D,

Alger, 1978, pp.454-459.

30.See Palazolli, L., Le Maroc Politique de l'Independence

a 1973, Bibliotèque Arabe, Sindbad, Beirout, Paris, 1973,

pp.6-24.

31.Because the Moroccan monarchy claims its descendence

from the prophet, the king asserts his 'ansectral'

legitimacy as the protector and defender of Islam

and thus the Arabic language. See Leveau, R.

" Islam et Controle Politique au Maroc", in Maghreb

Review., Vol 6, No 1-2, London, January-April 1981,

pp.10-18. See also Waterburry, J., The Commander of the

Faithful: the Morrocan political elite. A study in

Segmented Politics., Widrenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1970.

32. See Ebrard, P. " Assembleé Nationale Consultative Marocaine", in Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, C.N.R.S., Paris, 1962, 1962, pp.35-59. See also Moore, C.H., Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia., Lttle Brown and Co., Boston, 1970, pp.107-110.

33. See Camau,M., La Notion de démocracie dans la Penseé des Dirigeants Maghrébins., C.N.R.S., Paris, 1977, pp.3-20.

34. Ibid., P.27.

35. Leveau, R., op.cit., pp.12-17.

36. Ibid., pp.16-17.

37. Moore, C.H., op.cit., pp.107-109.
    pp. 3-20.

38. See Palazzoli, L., op.cit., pp.18-25, see also Ebrard, P., op.cit., p.45.

39. An expression borrowed from Brueilly, J., op.cit., p.360.

40. Most of these parties emerged after Independence. These were: The "National Union for Popular Forces" (l'Union Nationale des Forces Populaires: UNFP), formed in 1969-1960, a Socialist Party claiming to represent Morrocan Labour force. From this party was to emerge another party (1972) called the " Popular constitutional Demcratic Movement",

(Mouvement Populaire Consitutionel Democratique: MPCD).

The "Popular Movement" (Mouvement Populaire: MP) was

formed in 1957 and claimed to represent rural Berbers.

The " Democratic Front for Constitutional Institutions",

(Front Democratique pour les Institutions

Constitutionnelle: FIDC) was formed in 1962; in 1964,

this party became the " Demcratic Socialist Party" (le

Parti Socialist Democrate: PSD), which, in spite of its

name, supported the Monarchy's interests. See:

Zartman, W., Problems of New Power: Morroco., Atherston

Press, New York, 1964.

41. Ibid., pp.264-270.

42. Ibid., p.270.

43. Ibid., pp.2454-255.

44. Ibid., p.270.

45. See Grandguillaume, G., Arabisation et Politique...,
    op.cit., pp.135-161.

46. See Waterbury, J., op.cit., pp.266-267.

47. The Istiqlal Party emerged at the forefront of the
    political scene, its members occupied important
    governmental positions. Mohammed Al-Fassi, a leading
    figure in the party, was the Minister of education in
    1956. The political doctrine of this party was claimed
    as strongly nationalistic and identified with Islamic and
    Arab culture and language. Arabisation has been one of
    their major themes and strongest assertions. See
    Zartman, W., Problems of..., op.cit., pp.264-270 &

pp.191-198.

48. See Fougeres, L., In Annuaire de L'Afrique du Nord .,
    op.cit., pp.155-156.

49. See Grand guillaume, G., _Arabisation et..._, op.cit.,
    p.31 & p.88.

50. The role played by Morocco as a link between East and
    West and also as a centre of different and diverse
    civilizations and cultures, is often stressed by the
    Moroccan leadership, including the king, to justify the
    need to maintain French language and remain Western
    oriented in their general policies. See subsequent
    official statements in this chapter.

51. Quoted by Grandguillaume, G., _Arabisation et ..._,
    op.cit., p.159.

52. See Moatassime, A.,"Le Bilinguisme Sauvage: blocage
    linguistique , sous-development et cooperation
    hypothéquée,l'example Maghrebin, cas du Maroc",
    in _Revue du Tiers Monde_, XV, No 59-60, 1974, p.647.

53. See Grandguillaume, G., _Arabisation et..._, op.cit.,
    pp.85-94.

54. Zartman, W., _Problems of..._, op.cit., pp.162-168.

55. Ibid., pp.161-168.

56. Ibid., pp.162-168.

57. Ibid., pp.162-170.

58. See Grandguillame, G. _Arabisation et..._, op.cit.,
    pp.70-94.

59. Quoted by Zartman, W., _Problems of..._, op.cit., p.164.

60.Ibid., p.168.

61.Quoted by Grandguillaume, G., in " Politique de
   l'Enseignement au Maghreb, Quelles perspectives?", in
   Maghreb-Machrek Review, No 80, April-May 1978, p.56.

62.Benhima, M., for instance, when he became Minister of
   Education in 1966-1967 and who was responsible for
   what was called then the 'pause' of the Arabisation,
   declared in a press conference (6th April 1966), that
   the previous experience of Arabization has compromised
   the quality of education. See Grandguillaume, G.,
   Arabisation et..., op.cit., p.91.

63.Mehdi Ben-Barka, was considered as the spokesman of
   the modernist tendency in the early years of
   Independence. He was president of the National
   Assembly in 1956-1957, and was an active member of
   the U.N.F.P Party. When he became overtly opposed to
   the Monarchy, he was exiled to France in 1966 where
   he was kidnapped and assassinated.

64.Quoted by Zartman, W., Problems of..., op.cit., p.158.

65.Dero, A.C., " Notes sur l'Assistance Culturelle et
   l'Arabisation", in Correspondences d'Orient; Etudes,
   1971-1972, Centre pour Etudes du Monde Musulman,
   Bruxelles, 1972, p.68.

66. Merrouani, M., & Souali, M., "Question de l'Enseignement
   au Maroc", in Bulletin Economique et Social du Maroc,
   No 143-146, Rabat, 1980-1981, p.176.

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op.cit., p.657.

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launched by the Istiqlal Party and supported by other

groups (eg students) was pressing for a rapid

Arabisation, reached its peak in 1973. See

Grandguillaume, G., Arabisation et..., op.cit., pp.82-83,

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69.Quoted by Moatassime, A., in "La politique de

l'enseignement au Maroc de 1957 à 1977", in

Machrek-Maghreb , No 79, January-March, 1979, p.47.

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71.Quoted by Grandguillaume, G., Arabisation et...,

op.cit., p.86.

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73.Ibid., p.344.

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Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Penguin Books, Middlesex,

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P.U.F, Paris, 1962, p.75.

81. Oualalou, F., op.cit.,pp.40-86.

82. Ibid., pp.40-43.

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Technologique, Editions Cujas, Paris, 1976, p.163.

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December 1st, No 607-608, 1980, p.154.

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in Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord,1979, CNRS, Paris,

p.654.

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d'Administration Publique, Paris, 1973, pp.50-68.

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in his speech for the " Seminaire Francophone sur la

Tunisie et l'Artisanat" in <u>Annuaire de l'Afrique du

Nord 1970</u>, p.417.

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129.Ibid., pp.58-59.

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131.Ibid., pp.50-52.

132.Quoted by Grandguillaume, G., ibid., pp.62-63.

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see Guen,M., <u>La Tunisie Independente face a son</u>

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P.U.F, Paris, 1961.

134.Ibid., pp.75-76.

135.Ibid., p.56.

136.bid., pp.71-73.

137.Ibid., p.72-73.

138.See Tiano, A., Le Maghreb entre les Mythes, P.U.F,

Paris, 1967, pp.314-328.

139.Guen, M., op.cit., pp.92-93.

140.See "Tunisie" in Europe d'Outremer..., op.cit., p.217.

141.Gallissot, R., op.cit., p.74.

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143.Knapp, W., op.cit., p.188.

144.Ibid., pp.180-190.

145.Santucci, R., " La Politique Etrangère de la

Tunisie continuité et pragmatisme", in

Maghreb-Machrek, No 91, January- February-March 1981,

p.52.

146.Ibid., p.53.

147.Ibid., p.52.

148. Adams, A., op.cit., p.654.

149.Germidis, D., op.cit., p.41.

150.Ibid., p.45.

151.The history of the Maghreb, undertaken by

Europeans, principally French historians, is traced

to the Phoenician invasion. A great deal of uncertainty

and controversy still exists among historians about

earlier periods. The history of Algeria in particular, has been a privileged subject of investigation. Attempts have been made by colonial historians to establish the non-existence of a specific Algerian history, civilization, and culture until the arrival of the French. See Vatin, J.C., <u>L'Algerie Politique Histoire et Société</u>, Presse de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1983, pp.19-47.

152. See Gellner, E., and Micaud,C.A., <u>Arabs and Berbers From Tribe to Nation in North Africa</u>, Duckworth, London, 1972.

153. Vatin, J.C., <u>l'Algerie Politique</u>..., op.cit., p.86.

154. Ibid., p.89.

155. Ibid., p.90.

156. Ibid., p.95. See also Grammont, H.D., <u>Histoire d'Alger Sous la Domination Turque (1515-1830)</u>, Lerroux, Paris, 1887.

157. Vatin, J.C., <u>l'Algerie Politique</u>..., op.cit., pp.105-106.

158. Ibid., pp.20-25.

159. bid., p.114.

160. See Bourdieu, P., and Sayad, A., <u>Le Deracinement.La Crise de l'Agriculture Traditionnelle en Algerie</u>, Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1966, see also Bourdieu, P., <u>The Algerians</u>, Boston Press, 1962.

161. See Rouissi, M., op.cit., pp.27-28 & pp.65-103.

162. Horne, A., <u>A Savage War of Peace. Algeria 1954-1962</u>,

MacMillan LtD., London, 1977, p.35.

163.Quoted by Fanny, C., in: <u>Instituts Algeriens 1883-1939</u>
Office des Publications Universitaires, Alger, 1975,
p.16.

164.Etienne, B., <u>Algerie Culture et Revolution,</u> Sueil,
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165.See Ageron, C.A., <u>Les Algeriens Musulmans et la</u>
<u>France (1871-1919)</u>, Vol I & II, P.U.F, Paris, 1968.

166.Ibid., pp.293-300. See also Kaddache, M,
<u>Histoire du Nationalisme Algerien, Question Nationale</u>
<u>et Politique Algerienne 1919-1951</u>, SNEdD, Alger,
1981, p.78.

167.Kaddache, M., Ibid., p.97.

168.Ibid., pp.229-270.

169.Horne, A., op.cit., p.38.

170.Kaddache, M., op.cit., p.614.

171.Ibid., pp.197-204.

172.Ibid., p.199.

173.Ibid., p 39. See also Quandt, W.B., <u>Revolution and</u>
<u>Political Leadership: Algeria 1954-1968</u>,
The Massachussetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
Massachussetts, M I T Press, London, 1969, p.25.

174.Quandt, W.B., ibid., pp.34-35.

175.See Kaddache, M., op.cit., pp.778-780.

176.Horne, A., op.cit. pp.83-96, and Quandt, W.B.,
op.cit., pp.91-97.

177.See Hermassi, E., <u>Leadership and...</u>,op.cit., pp.129-142.

178.Quandt,W.B., op.cit., pp.90-98.

179.The texte of the Tripoli Programme is reproduced in the
Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, CNRS, Paris, 1962,
pp.683-704.

180.Quandt, W.B., op.cit., pp.143-147.

181.These Evian agreements are reproduced in Annuaire
de l'Afrique deu Nord, 1962, pp.656-678. See also:
Ben-Khedda, B. Les Accords d'Evian, U.P.U, Alger,
1987, pp.81-117.

182.Ben Bella was one of the main revolution leaders,
arrested by the French armyon 22nd October 1956 and
was jailed until independence. He became the first
President of independent Algeria until his removal in
1965.

183 For this race for power see Hermassi, E. Leadership
and..., op.cit., pp.125-142. See also Quandt, W.B.,
op.cit., pp.164-174.

184.Quandt, W.B., ibid., pp.204-217.

185.See Abbas, F., L'Autopsie d'une Guerre, l'Aurore,
Garnier, Paris, 1980. See also Abbas, F.,
l'Independence Confisquée 1962-1978, Flammarion, Paris,
1985.

186.Confusion between party and the state is in Algeria
different from the 'confusion' noted in Tunisia
where there is an overlapping between the party and
the state in terms of power and decision-making. In
Algeria, however, the party has in theory all the

power, as the central unit of political organisation,
but in practice, it is the president and his close
collaborators who are the deciosion-makers.

187.See Etienne, B., op.cit., pp.193-201. See also:
Camau, M., op.cit., pp.338-457.

188.Colonel Houari Boumedienne was head of the national
army during the last years of the liberation war. He
became Minister of defence at independence. He
organised the overthrown of Ben Bella in June 1965 and
became president until his death in December 1978.

189.For the composition of this 'Council' see:
Quandt, W.B., op.cit., p.108 and pp.241-243.

190.After ten years of military regime, Boumedienne launched
a new Charter and constitution (the second since
independence) and organised elections for a new National
Assembly in 1976. As the single candidate for
presidency he was elected President of Algeria in
December 1976. He remained in power until his death in
December 1978.

191.See Balta, P., and Rulleau,C.,
La Strategie de Boumedienne, Sindbad, Paris, 1978.

192.Ibid., pp.210-213.

193.Chadli Benjeddid was also a colonel in the national
army, he was also the only candidate of the party
for the presidence. He, therefore, succeeded
Boumedienne in February 1979 as the third President of
Algeria since Independence.

194.With the exception of M.Lacheref (ex-Minister of
    education (1977-1979)) who was one of the
    active participants of the Algerian Revolution.
    He contributed to the elaboration of the Tripoli
    Programme in 1962. Lacheraf clearly criticized, as will
    be related further in the chapter, the adopted
    policy of Arabisation.

195.Gra.Grandguillaume, G., Arabisation et..., op.cit.,
    pp.120-123.

196.See Texte de Tripoli Programme..., op.cit., p.696.

197.The 1963 Algerian Constitution was reproduced in
    Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord 1963, CNRS, Paris,
    p.853.

198.Ibid., p.853.

199.Ben Bella's speech quoted by Grandguillaume, G.,
    Arabisation et..., op.cit., pp.116-119.

200.Republique Algerienne: La Constitution 1976.
    Presses de l'Armee, Alger, 1976, p.11.

201.Quoted by Grandguillaume, G., Arabisation et...,
    op.cit., p.127.

202.Quoted by Souriau, C., " l'Arabisation..., op.cit.,
    p.392.

203.A much quoted statement about Arabisation from one
    of Boumedienne's speeches, published by Revolution
    Africaine, No 586, 12-22 May 1975, Alger.
    See also Balta, P., & Rulleau, C., op.cit., pp.216-217.

204.Quoted by Dufour, D. , op.cit., p.48.

205.Lacheraf, M., L'Algerie Nation et Société, Maspero,

Paris, 1969. See also Lachref, M., " Reflections

Sociologiques sur le Socialisme et la Culture en

Algerie", In Temps Modernes, March 1964, p.323.

206.See:Raffinot, M., & Jacquenot, P.,

Le Capitalisme d'Etat Algerien, François Maspero,

Paris, 1977, p.50. See also Bourdieu, S., and Sayad, A.,

op.cit., pp.47-60.

207.Ibid., pp.18-26. See also Marthens, J.C,

Le Modele Algerien de development. Bilan d'Une Decennie

(1962-1972), SNED, Alger, 1973, pp.144-145.

208.Isard, H.B., Le Maghreb..., op.cit., p.179.

209.Amin, S., Le Maghreb Moderne..., op.cit., p.120.

210.Ibid., p.120.

211.Ibid., p.132.

212.Ibid., p.55.

213.See Benyoussef, A., Population du..., op.cit., p.452.

214.Amin, S., L'Economie du..., op.cit., pp.271-273.

215.See Ben-Kedda, B., Les Accords d'Evian..., op.cit.,

p.98. See also Tiano, A., op.cit., p 580.

216.See " Algeria" in Europe d'Outremer..., op.cit.,

p.28.

217.This approach was adopted from De Bernis, G.D.,

"Deux Strategies pour l'Industrialisation du

Tiers Monde. Les Industries Industrialisantes

et les options Algeriennes", In Revue du Tiers

Monde, 1971, p.547.

218. See " Algerie. Chronique Economique" in

Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord 1979, op.cit.,

pp. 592-597.

219. Ibid., pp.593-597. See also "Algerie" in Europe

d'Uutremer...,op.cit.p.30;

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Quoted by Lehmann, J.P., op.cit., p.4.

Chapter IV

Language, Society, and Education in the Maghreb.

The purpose of this chapter is to locate comparatively, the relationship and effects of the political and economic policies on the social and educational contexts of the three contries. Firstly the contradictions, and inconsistencies between these policies and practices at the social and educational levels will be emphasized. Secondly, there will be an analysis of the socio-cultural context of the three states, that is the complex linguistic situation, and the type of education favouring bilingualism.

The argument in this chapter moves through four stages. First the contradictions at the political and economic levels are located in the social and educational contexts. Second, it is argued that these policies have generated conflicts and divisions in society, heightening the dichotomy between modern versus traditional sectors, and leading to a new type of stratification and mobility via identification with, and mastery of, each of two major languages (Arabic and French). French has come to be identified with modernity; Arabic with traditionalism and the cultural heritage. This dichotomy is also reflected in the educational system through the different roles allocated to each language in the curriculum. Thirdly, it is suggested

that economic and technological transfer, with its cultural

packages and specific needs, has reinforced not only

economic dependence but socio-cultural and educational ties.

In this context the role of French instead of deminishing,

in accordance with political principles and statement, has

increased. Fourthly, the complex linguistic situation or

these societies has reinforced the contradictions of the

language policies. This situation is characterized by the

coexistence of different vernaculars. There are two spoken

varieties, Arabic and Berber and also classical Arabic and

French, Each has its contexts and roles, though they often

overlap in social interactions.

However the linguistic situation, and role and

impact of each language in the social and educational

contexts, vary from one country to the other.

Morocco is characterized by a complex linguistic

situation with the coexistence of French-Arabic bilingualism

among the educated population, Colloquial Arabic is the

major means of communication, and Berber is spoken by an

important proportion of the population (40% to 60%)(1). The

language policies in Morocco have created different language

related attitudes or identifications. Although classical

Arabic is accepted in the society as a symbol of

Arabo-Islamic national identity, this language is generally

perceived as a 'traditional' one, confined to formal and

religious communication. Spoken Arabic and Berber are used

in informal interactions and family circles. The French

language, although not as deeply rooted in the society as in the case of Algeria, is increasingly used in Moroccan society not only as a tool of work and education, but as a means of social interaction and communication. In the economic and educational arenas, French with its modern 'cultural connotations', is used as a working language which has increased its prestige in Moroccan society. Although the Arabic language has been introduced in schools since Independence, with varying degrees of emphasis, French has been increasingly used as the major means of instruction, especially for scientific and technical subjects. Education is seen, here, as in the two other countries, as one of the major means for modernisation.

In Tunisia, the linguistic situation is less complex than in Morocco and Algeria, principally due to the very small proportion of Berber-speakers. However, as in Morocco and Algeria, there is both an Arabic-French bilingual situation and spoken Arabic is the medium of communication of the majority of the population. The political and economic policies of the country which emphasize modernisation have increased the role and use of French, which was weakly rooted here prior to independence. The dedication of the Tunisian leadership to the aim of modernisation, on the Western model, has emphasized overtly the need for adequate social and cultural changes.

However while Arabic is claimed as the national language, French is increasingly used at all levels of national activities. Arabic is stressed as the symbol of national identity, but it is considered by most people, especially the young, as a less efficient and less instrumental language than the French(2).

The educational system remained French in its general form, structure and organization. The official claim has been that the educational system will be the principal field of implmementing the Arabic language, and the main channel for spreading it. In fact it is the French language that the educational system is reinforcing and spreading. The bilingual language policies adopted in education (with the use of French in scientific, technological, and higher education, and Arabic in the arts) has increased the prestige of the French language and its role as the means of access to development and modernisation.

In Algeria, the linguistic situation is as complex as in Morocco, if not more so. The French language is deeply rooted in the society, due to one hundred and thirty years of French colonisation and the type of colonisation, which stressed the supremacy of the French language. The official language, classical Arabic, has been until recently, mastered by a small proportion of the population: the very few who had access to Arabo-Islamic schools during the colonial period. Colloquial Arabic is the major medium of communication of the vast majority of the population.

Berber, with at least three varieties, is still spoken by an important proportion of the population (about 25%)(3). In this context, the French language, not only because of its historical impact but mainly because of its identification with modernisation, and its use for scientific and technological knowledge and skills, has been reinforced.

The educational system was also the major field of implementing and spreading the national language. Although there is no official recognition of bilingualism, the two languages are used as mediums of instruction in the schools. Rapid and systematic introduction of Arabic into the educational system has been pursued in this country, more than in the two others, although as indicated Arabic remains largely confined to the Arts, while French is used in most other subject fields.

The major argument in this chapter is that language policies in the three countries of the Maghreb directly affect the social and educational contexts, which are themselves interrelated and interdependent. The social and educational contexts, as the principal fields of the implementation of the officially adopted language policy, strongly reflect the contradictions and problems noted at the political and economic levels.

Thus the organisation of this chapter will be as follows:

- (a) The social context. In this section the characteristics of each country will be

investigated. The emphasis will be on

the complex linguistic situation

characterizing these countries, especially

Morocco and Algeria. The contradictions,

in terms of language policies, and the

effects of these on the societies of the

three countries will be underlined.

- (b) The educational context. In this section,

the organisation, the structure of the

educational system and the actual language

policies, will be analysed.

The educational system, as the principal field of

implementing language policies, is used in this chapter to

underline the contradicitions and problems created by the

language policies in each of the three countries of the

Maghreb. However, as stated earlier in the thesis, each one

of the three polities has its distinctive socio-cultural

traits and specific approaches to national policies such as

those concerning language. The social and educational

contexts of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria will thus be

treated separately but with comparative comment when this is

useful.

A. Morroco

a) The social context:

As indicated, Moroccan society has particular
characteristics resulting from its history, its geographical
position, and its post-independence political and economic
options. These have their bearing on the language issue and
ought to be taken into consideration when formulating
language policies. The lack of attention to these specfic
characteristics has contributed to the emergence of problems
and contradictions in terms of language in this society.

The development of Morocco has been largely
influenced by its geographical situation. The Mediterranean
sea to the north, the Sahara to the south and the Atlantic
to the west have made it a centre for cultural contacts and
interactions. Separated from Europe by only a narrow strait
of fourteen kilometres, Morocco has constituted a strategic
place of cultural, economic, and commercial international
exchanges throught history(4). These foreign contacts, often
made through colonisation, have left their imprints in the
socio-cultural framework of this country.

Among the different waves of foreign penetration,
it was, as indicated in the previous chapter, the Arab and
the French which have marked this society (politically,
economically, and above all culturally). The Arab
penetration, particularly, has left a deeply rooted imprint
with the Islamisation and then the Arabisation of the

society. However, as indicated earlier, Berber culture and language have been preserved by an important proportion of the population. The Berber language constitutes today one of the major featurs of the Moroccan social context. French colonisation, more recently, has also influenced the Moroccan social-cultural fabric.

Therefore, Morocco can be described as a multi-cultural society, with the coexistence of three languages and cultures (the Arabic, the French, and the Berber).

It is the argument of the thesis that the adoption of one official language, namely Classical Arabic, in this context, along with the economic development options, has created contradictions. The economic contradictions inherited from the colonial period, with an important imbalance between a dynamic modern sector and a stagnant traditional one, has led to economic as well as social disparities. These economic conditions, along with the policies adopted after Independence have maintained, if not increased, the disruptive effects of an imported model of development.

Moroccan society was at independence largely rural: 70% to 80% of the total population was involved in agro-pastoral activities(5). The means of farming and agricultural exploitation remained archaic. Production was then barely sufficient for subsistence. This community did not suffer, during colonisation, from a systematic

dispossession, as was the case in Algeria and to a lesser

extent in Tunisia. Its entire patrimony, with its tribal

institutions and modes of organisation, was therefore

maintained(6). The process of development and modernisation

undertaken by the French with a limited participation from

the native population had little bearing on the way of life

of this community.

The majority of the population of the cities

continued to live in poor conditions where standards of

living and income were low. In fact the Moroccan population

as a whole had an unequal share in the national income as

compared to the European population. In 1955 the total

population was estimated at 9.7 millions of whom 6.3

millions were in agriculture. The per capita income of the

Europeans at this period was about 7 times higher than that

of the Morrocan population(7).

These low rates of income and living standards

were further affected by the drop in the Gross National

Product coupled with the high rate of population growth(8).

The deterioration of the conditions of living of the rural

population, due to decreasing agricultural output and the

increasing population, generated the process of rural exodus

towards the cities and emigration to European countries. In

the cities, the taking over of the jobs left by Europeans

could only absorb a small proportion of the unemployed

population. During the early years of independence,

urbanisation increased by 50% and, in the major urban

centres, the total population almost doubled(9). In addition

almost half of the total population(42%) were under twenty

years of age, which created increasing pressures on both the

educational system and the job market(10).

In the modern economic and administrative

sectors, which remained the same as under the Protectorate,

a limited number of jobs was offered to nationals. It was

mostly foreigners who were called upon for the key managing

positions in this sector. The inherited economic,

administrative and cultural structures made it necessary to

depend predominantly on French technical and cultural

assistance in the first years of independence. In 1956,

there were 34,000 French working in different areas of the

Moroccan administration(11). This technical and cultural

assistance with France was regulated by a Convention signed

by both parties in October 1957, which stressed the

necessity of a close 'cooperation' between the two

countries. This Convention also established the legal

framework and official status for the French nationals

working in Morocco(12).

In early 1957 there were 20,000 French Technical

Assistants in Morocco. They constituted 40% of the total

number of the government's personnel. Three quarters of this

personnel was part of the Protectorate administration(13).

This French presence in the administrative apparatus was

partly justified by the transitional period of the transfer

of power from France to Morocco, which was officially

extended from March, 1955 to October, 1957. This has

maintained ties with France. However, it was after this

transitional period that the impact of the French culture

and language has increased in Moroccan society.

The technical and cultural assistance was

institutionalized through the signing of three conventions.

The first one was related to "Administrative and Technical

Cooperation", concluded on 6 February, 1957; the second was

the" Cultural Convention" initiated 30th May, 1957; and the

third convention was related to the legal bases for this

cooperation and was signed on 5th October, 1957(14). The

judiciary system, in fact, remained (until 1966)

predominantly French in its structure and content and was

based on the Napoleonic Code with the use of French language

as the main medium(15).

It is suggested that the important number of

French personnel in national activities not only maintained

but reinforced French-based institutions and their

organisational methods. In this context, the role of the

French language seems to be increasing which has affected

the already complex linguistic situation of the Moroccan

society.

In the Moroccan context, in addition to the

expanding French-Arabic bilingualism, there is

Berber-Arabic bilingualism, and the important diaglossia

between the two varieties of Arabic (the spoken and written

forms). Furthermore in the Northern part of Morocco, besides

Arabic and French, Spanish was also used, as a result of Spanish influence in this area. At Independence four schools were still teaching in Spanish. About 10% of the total population spoke Spanish language, with varying degrees of fluency(16). Berber is still spoken by an important proportion of the population which was estimated at the time of Independence at around 40% of the total population. They constituted about two thirds of the rural population and were concentrated in montainous areas, especially in the Atlas and Rif zones in the North of the country. Their geographic isolation accounts to a large extent for the preservation of the Berber customs and language(17).

Moroccan spoken Arabic is the predominant means of communication of the greatest majority of the population, except the few Berber monolinguals. Hence the problems and contradictions generated by the adoption of Classical Arabic as the only national official language and the symbol of local cultural identity. This language (the Classical) was the privilege of only a limited few, those who had received a formal education at the 'Medersas' or 'Ecoles Libres' during the Protectorate period, or those who followed their studies at the 'Karaouiyine University'. These constituted a small proportion and were mainly concentrated in urban areas where a sound knowledge of French and Arabic is limited to a few. In the rural areas, where the rate of illiteracy is very high and estimated at over 90% of the

total population(18), Classical Arabic because of its
religious connotations was prestigious but not much used in
daily life.

By contrast, the French language has been
increasingly connected with modernity and economic welfare.
Its use in public administration and its role in social
mobility has reinforced its position as a symbol of power
and progress. The Arabic language remained relegated to a
secondary role, in the spiritual realm particularly, and for
many of the young generation it symbolises the old fashioned
and retrograde. Hence, in Moroccan society as well as in the
Tunisian and Algerian societies, the modern and traditional
sectors, represented mainly by the rural and urban social
groups, were in constant competition and conflict.
Linguistic interactions helped reinforce differences in
social relationships.

> The dominant language [French]
> occupies the domain of the secular,
> that is everything to do with every
> day life, administration, technology,
> politics, studies etc...while the
> dominated language [Arabic] is driven
> back to the domain of the sacred.
> Thus the dominated-dominating language
> opposition is converted into an
> opposition between old and new.
>
> (19)

This situation stemming from the colonial
period has intensified with the increasing Western
socio-cultural products. In the different socio-cultural
activities such as cinemas, radio and television programmes,
French is predominently used. In bookshops and news agents
it is mainly French books, newspapers, and magazines which
cover the shelves(20). This has contributed to the creation
of a new kind of stratification (Francophones vs
Arabophones). Therefore language has become, through the
already highly selective educational system of Morocco, a
major means of social mobility and prestige.

> More than literal [classical] Arabic,
> French constitutes a redoubtable
> instrument for social selection and
> elite "reproduction". It is through
> the different stages of the Moroccan
> educational system, a great supplier
> for the administrative apparatus, that
> such selection is performed.
>
> (21)

Therefore the issue of language in Morocco, as in
the two other Maghrebian countries, has become an indicator
of social differences, and a measure of and means to social
status. The use of the French language tends to denote
identification with modernism; whereas the use of the Arabic

language, even if it is identified with nationalistic
affiliation is nevertheless often regarded as belonging more
to the past than the future(22).

b) The educational context

In Morocco as in Tunisia and Algeria, the
educational system reflects the contradictions and problems
related to language policies resulting from the double
objective of achieving modernisation and establishing an
authentic cultural identity. Education in this context is
considered as the principal means for the implementation and
diffusion of the Arabic language and the related political
and social values. At the same time the educational system
has been expected to provide the necessary qualified
manpower for development and modernisation. However, because
of the two different sources of references of these two
objectives (Eastern and Western) the educational system has
become an arena of contradictions and ambivalances between
these two poles.

The Arabisation policy was introduced into the
educational system immediately after Independence in the
primary cycle, as education provision expanded. This was
expressed in El Fassi's plan for the schooling year
1956-1957. The main goal of this plan was to achieve
universal compulsory education for the first three grades
within five years, with Arabic as the basic language of
instruction(23).

The implementation of the ambitious policy was
hampered by practical problems such as the lack of staff and
teaching materials. This led to criticism of this policy
which was seen as affecting the quality of education. Before
the end of the school year 1956-1957, the Union of Secondary
School Teachers passed a resolution demanding:

> ... The suspension of the current
>
> experiment in Arabisation, until
>
> truly qualified 'cadres' can be
>
> formed. If the Minister persists
>
> in wanting to continue this harmful
>
> experiment in the present conditions,
>
> he alone must bear all the
>
> consequences of this action.
>
> (24)

This policy was also criticized by the differnt political
parties, especially the 'Modernists', who were concerned
with national development which, they argued, can only be
achieved through the use of French(25).

The official dedication to modernisation and the
increasing influence of the 'Modernists' in the government
along with the general dissatisfaction with this first
Arabisation policy led to the setting up of a "Royal
Commission of Educational Research" (R.C.E.R.) in 1956 to
work out a programme for a general educational policy

including the language issue. The Commission concluded that

Arabisation should be implemented gradually, in accordance

with the existing possibilities and needs of the country.

A more prudent approach was therefore adopted

taking into account the available human and material

possibilities, which in fact favoured the maintenance of the

French language in the schools. The Commission stressed that

the educational aims should be based on:

> ...Unification of the country by the
>
> greatest possible extension of the
>
> Arabic language to the teaching of
>
> subject matter, every time that it
>
> can be done without harming the
>
> quality of the acquired knowledge.

(26)

These recommendations are vague and ambiguous,

especially in the tension between the aims of the

educational system and the means for the implementation of

the Arabization policy. They also hint at the use of

language as a political issue for legitimacy, where language

policies are shaped by, and reflect the influence, of those

in power.

Thus with the reorganisation of the government in

1958-1959, Abdelekerim Benjelloun was appointed at the

Ministry of National Education. He came to his new post with

special instructions from the king to reorganise the

educational system in its form and content and to define the
general aims of education. Benjelloun's major role was to
overcome the problems generated by the previous educational
and linguistic policies.

The new educational programme is still the major
source for the Moroccan educational policies. The general
principles of national education were essentially:
- The unfication of the inherited diversified system.
- Its Arabisation.
- Its expansion (universal compulsory education was
  officially introduced later, in 1963).
- Its Moroccanisation, that is, promoting the education and
  training of national teachers, and adapting the curriculum
  to the national context(27).
These objectives were ambitious and impossible to achieve
simultaneously, considering the available means. This new
plan indicates once more the gap between stated aims and
possible practices.

Because of the lack of teachers of Arabic
language, a call was made on the Middle East Arab countries
to provide teachers. Most of them came from Egypt. At the
same time, an accelerated teacher training programme was set
up for national teachers. However, the principle of a
cautious Arabisation was still stressed during this period
(1958-1959).

The Arabisation of the primary cycle introduced
by Al-Fassi was maintained but arithmetic and natural
science were taught in French because of the lack of
specialised teachers and books in Arabic. The time allocated
to the teaching of French was increased. In the last four
grades of the primary cycle half the time of school hours
was attributed to each language - about fifteen hours for
each. The secondary cycle and higher education remained
almost exclusively in French.

Because of the claimed priority given to
Arabisation, a new commission was set up, by the King, in
1959, called 'le Counseil Superieur de l'Education
Nationale'(the Superior Council of National Education). Its
members, principally politicians, met in June 1960 to
prepare a programme of Arabisation for the next Five-Year
Plan. Their conclusions were again rather abstract regarding
Arabisation, which was in fact missing in their statement,
concentrated on the general objectives of education which
were:

> ...providing the country with the
> trained leadership necessary to
> permit it to attain the rank of
> modern nations...and to give to
> the citizen a moral and
> intellectual training which
> allow him to fulfil his role in

society.

A second meeting of this Council was held in 1962 and was presided over by the King. In its final report it was stressed that the medium of instruction should be the Arabic language for all subjects. The Institute of Arabisation (created in 1960) was required to study the means and ways of expanding Arabic to scientific subjects, and propose a programme for the Arabisation of the whole educationnal system over a period of fifteen to twenty years. However the head of this Institute, A. Lakhdar-Ghazal, a fervent supporter of Arabisation, has frequently insisted in his declarations that the policy of Arabisation should be based on realism and objectivity. According to him, attention should be directed to improving and modernising this language(29).

Until 1965 Arabisation of the educational system was progressing rapidly: in the primary cycle all subjects were taught in Arabic. But French was also maintained to prepare pupils for secondary and higher education where French was predominently the medium of instruction.

The quality of education was affected by this hasty Arabisation coupled with the lack of human and material means. Therefore, a new Minister of Education was appointed in 1965 to reconsider the Arabisation policy adopted since Independence(30). The Minister, M.Benhima, insisted on returning to the use of French in scientific

subjects in the primary cycle, and on giving priority to improving educational standards by introducing adequate programmes and modern teaching methods. He also suggested the adoption of a system of selection for access to secondary education.

However, he also identified the now familiar dilemma:

> ... Arabisation of education remains
> since independence, the principal
> objective to be achieved. But if it
> is easy to adopt the principle, its
> implementation, with the lack of
> means, is not easy ...

(31)

This statement, once again, underlines the gap between rhetoric and reality. The principle of Arabisation remains, for nationalistic reasons, central to any educational reform; while in practice, it is the French language which continues to be the major medium of instruction, especially in technical and scientific subjects, and in higher education.

From this period onwards language policy in Morocco has been more moderate in terms of Arabisation in education. With the increasing concern for modernisation, and principally economic development, education became linked with training and has been aimed at providing the

necessary qualified manpower. Although Arabisation has
remained at the forefront of political and social debates,
especially in its relation to education, the use of the
French language in education has been in fact intensified.

The implementation of Arabic language in the
educational system was made even more difficult because the
Moroccan educational system is still largely based on the
French model, in its structure and organisation. It has been
regulated by the same selective principles as French public
education.

The Universities are in general based on the same
administrative and academic organisation as the French
universities, with the exception of the Kairawiyine
University (Fes) which maintained its traditional role as an
Arabo-Islamic centre of higher education. However this
university was reorganised, by Decree, in 1963 with the aim
of modernising its teaching and introducing scientific
approaches to the study of Islamic Religion and thought and
it was expected to play an important role in forming Arabic
language teachers.

Normal schools, based on the French 'Ecoles
Normales' were gradually established all over the country
for teacher-training and education, especially for the
primary cycle. Secondary education teachers were recruited
from the university. The teaching material, including books
and manuals, is largely imported from France, especially for
secondary and, above all, higher education.

The reliance on the French educational model in
its content and form, and the ambivalent attitude regarding
the place and role of the French language have generated
problems: they also reflect the contradictions noted in
language policies assessed in the previous chapter.

Consequently, the process of Arabisation in
Morocco, as in the two other contries, has remained
difficult to accomplish in terms of the means and ways to be
used for its implementation. Arabisation has also remained
unclear in terms of its contribution in the process of
modernisation. The French language has maintained its
supremacy throughout the educational system. Its position
has even increased from the seventies onwards because of
demographic, economic and educational expansion. The
educational system with its increasing enrolments and
limited number of qualified teachers along with economic
development needed more reliance on foreign technical
assistants.

In purely statistical terms a decrease in the
number of foreign assistants is noted. In 1968 foreign
assistants in secondary education constituted 56% of the
teaching body, in 1971 they were 35%, in 1978-1979 they were
only 20%. Their proportion is decreasing in primary and
secondary eduction, with the expansion of higher education
and its role in providing teachers. However, in real terms,
the number of foreign teachers remains important, especially
in higher education. The proportion of foreign, principally

French, teachers in the academic year 1978-1979, for instance, was estimated at 30 to 40 per cent of the total teaching personnel in higher education(32).

The number of this foreign teachers is still very high in scientific and technical subjects (in secondary and higher education) where they constitute about 45% of the teaching staff. In 1977 for instance, out of 1,895 teachers of maths, physics, chemistry and natural sciences teaching in the secondary cycle, 1,622 were foreigners, of whom 1,128 were French(33). In the early eighties the proportion of French teachers in secondary and higher education was 14%, and it was 76% of the total number of foreign teachers in these cycles(34). Added to this is the important number of lecturers who come for short periods or as visiting scholars.

In contemporary history, and in comparison with the first decades of Independence, there has been an important decrease noted in the number of foreign teachers, in general terms. This is due mainly to the an increase in the "Moroccanisation" of the teaching staff in secondary and higher education. However, it must be emphasized that this does not affect the language of instruction, in scientific and technical fields and professional training, which remains French. The other feature in the training of Moroccans, who are to take over from foreign staff, is the important number of students abroad: 25,000 in 1979-1980, most of them were trained in French Universities. For

example, during the academic year 1978/1979 out of the

12,541 students on a scholarship abroad, 11,274 were in

France (90%)(35). The total number of Moroccan students in

France (with or without a grant) was 13,948 in 1979(36).

This does not include the number of students on short

courses or training programmes, within industrial and

economic agreements. The expansion of higher education (as

well as primary and secondary education), the need to form

highly educated and qualified university teachers, is likely

to increase the proportion of students abroad, especially in

France.

The educational system therefore, considered as

the major agent for dessiminating the national language, and

national culture and identity, has, in fact, become one of

the principal obstacles for implementation of the national

language. It is in the educational system that the French

language is maintained, and through it that French culture,

thought and practice are expanded.

From the primary cycle French is taught as the

first foreign language, starting in the third grade, and

there has been a controversy about whether to teach maths in

Arabic or French. Scientific subjects are taught in French

in secondary education almost exclusively, especially in

'bilingual' schools. These so-called bilingual schools,

where French is predominant mainly in the teaching of

scientific and technical subjects, constituted in 1979 95%

of the total number of secondary schools (446 schools out of

471). The largely Arabised secondary schools constituted

only 3.35% of this total (16 Arabised schools and 18

religious)(37). In addition to the French Mission for

Culture(M.U.C.F.) and private secondary schools, using

primarily French as a medium for instruction, there is, in

the public sector, 1% of the total secondary schools,

usually reserved for the notables, modelled on the French

Lycee and teaching exclusively in French(38).

In higher education, in spite of the increasing

creation of Arabised sections, especially in Arts subjects,

the number of students enrolled in branches taught in French

is still high. For instance, among the 40,000 enrolled

students in 1977, only about 11,000 were enrolled in

Arabized sections(39). Most of the scientific research

undertaken either in post-graduation or in other research

arenas is carried out in French, while governmental plans

are increasingly stressing the role of education in

industrial development and its adaptability to national

needs in qualified manpower.

The supremacy of the French language, over Arabic,

in technical and scientific training remains to the present

time. The low rate of schooling in the rural areas, the

important number of foreign teachers in secondary and higher

education, the exclusive use of French in scientific,

economic, political, and industrial activities, the job

market with its limited possibilities for monolingual Arabophones, are some of the main obstacles to an overall Arabisation.

In the educational system, the coexistence of the two languages and the uncertainty about their respective roles and aims has resulted in a reinforcment of the educational problems characterizing a developing country. In Moroccan schools wastage and drop outs have achieved alarming prportions. For example in 1978-1979 the rate of wastage in primary and secondary education was 35% in primary and 21% in secondary education. In higher education it has reached about 50%(40). The dual system of education, French/Arabic, has also engendered a drop in the quality of education. Educationalists and members of the public often argue that pupils in today's Moroccan schools master neither the Arabic language nor the French language.

The hesitant implemention of the Arabisation policy in the educational system is increasingly criticized. The dissatisfaction has had its effect on those directly involved, the students: unrest and demonstrations have become customary each academic year. Their pressure might lead to a postive rethinking of the educational system, the issue of language, their role in the society and the relation of aspirations to the possible means.

Overall, the language policies and the noted fluctuations in their implementation have generated social conflicts and contradictions in education in Morocco. This

has resulted mainly from the undervaluation given to the socio-cultural features of the society and the lack of human and material means to fulfil the ambitious objectives in terms of education: parts of the pressing need to achieve modernisation while restoring national identity. This situation, as stated earlier in the chapter, is not unique to Morocco. It is also faced by Tunisia and Algeria, though with variations according to their specific aproaches and circumstances.

B. Tunisia.

a) The Social Context

In Tunisia, as in the two other countries, the lack of attention to the specific characteristics and needs of the society, when formulating language policies, has created problems and tensions in the society. The social context, in turn, has affected the success of the official language policies, especially at the level of their implelementation.

The social problems and contradictions which have emerged in Tunisia since Independence mirror the contradictions and oscillations, noted earlier in the political, economic and mainly linguistic policies. Tunisian society, for historical reasons, but also because of the developmental policies adopted is exposed to two sources of reference: the Arabo-Islamic and the Western, mainly the French.

Tunisian society has much in common with the Moroccan and Algerian societies, with their Berber origin, their geographic proximity, their shared history, and their religion and language. However, it has its own particularities which distinguish it from its neighbours. Its geographic position, the impact of history, and the adopted policies after independence have marked Tunisian

society in a specific way. Situated between the East and the West, Europe and Africa, and bordered by the Mediterranean Sea, Tunisia, as was the case in Morocco, has been throughout history the cross-roads for many civilisations with easy access to foreign penetration.

In Tunisia also it was the Arab and French influencess which mostly marked this society. The Arab influence bringing the Islamic faith and Arabic culture and language has particularly shaped the present social context. In Tunisia, Arabic culture and language were more deeply rooted and dissiminated before French colonisation than in the two other countries(41). French colonisation and its cultural impact were more a result of the country's receptivity to other cultures than as a result of a systematic policy of assimilation as was the case in Algeria.

With a relatively organised traditional educational system, with its primary schools (Kouttabs) and secondary schools (Medersas) and its prestigious university 'Zeitouna', the Arabic language was maintained during the colonial period. Modern French and Arabic schools were gradually introduced. However, with a highly selective system, only a few Tunisians received a bilingual education in these schools, among whom were most of the political elite. This has assisted in maintaining bilingualism as a policy.

The adoption of Arabic as the official language at
Independence was linked to the aim of reestablishing
national cultural identity, while at the same time
undertaking modernisation on the Western model(42). This had
resulted in a complex linguistic situation with two
languages, each fulfilling a specific objective.

This de facto situation of billingualism raised
contradictions in this essentially Arabic-Islamic
social-context; and with the universalisation of education,
Tunisia, with its limited potentialities, could not cope
with maintaining two languages. The language policies
adopted since Independence have in fact accentuated the
socio-economic problems inherited from the colonial period.

As indicated earlier, Tunisian society emerged in
1956 as a predominently rural society, with a large
traditional agricultural sector, hardly sufficient for
subsistance, and a small modern industrial sector in its
early stage of development(43). The hard conditions and low
standards of living of this rural population led to a
massive migration towards the cities, especially after
Independence.

This rural exodus has had important social and
economic repercussions, such as the uprooting of large
numbers of the population, disruption of local
socio-cultural organisation, a dramatic drop in agricultural
production, the emergence of shanty towns, and the rise of
unemployment(44). Unemployment has been one of the major

concerns of the Tunisian leadership. In spite of government

attempts to reduce it, it has been rising steadily since

1956, as every year about 28,000 new jobs are needed(45).

As in the two other Maghrebian countries,

urbanisation is a relatively new phenomenon in Tunisia. The

movement to the cities started only after World War II with

the creation of the industrial economy, but it was from

Independence that it became more important. This was due to

four main reasons: increasing unemployment and low standards

of living in rural areas; mechanisation of the modern sector

of agriculture; industrialisation in the urban centres and

the fringe benefits it brought; and finally the rise of

aspirations brought about by Indepedence for more wealth,

education and better life.

In addition, at Independence 41.7% of the total

population were under 15 years of age and more than 50% were

under twenty(46). This important feature of the Tunisian

society produces pressures in a very tight job market and

limits educational and training possibilities. In spite of

the job vacancies (due to the departure of Europeans) which

have been occupied by Tunisians, the rate of unemployment

was still very high. Most of the jobs left by Europeans

required skills which the majority of Tunisians did not

possess, as the economic and administrative structures were

created and managed almost exclusively by Europeans. This

has led to dependence on economic and technical assistance

from Europe in general and France in particular.

In 1956, the French presence in the political, economic and social spheres of activity was still very important and was expected to increase through bilateral conventions. The 1955 French-Tunisian Conventions stipulated that an important number of posts at management levels were to be reserved to French personnel. This was in order to ensure the 'transition' period. The French courts would transmit gradually their powers to Tunisian courts over a period of 20 years. Defence and foreign affairs would continue to be under French jurisdiction(47).

Although many points of this convention were reviewed soon after independence, as was the case for defence, security and foreign affairs and later the judiciary system, many areas of national activity remained, for lack of competent Tunisian staff, in the hands of foreigners, mainly French where professional training and expertise were required such as civil engineering and telecommunication). In 1956, out of an estimated total number of 4,960 'highly skilled personnel' only 1,570 were Tunisians(48). During the same year, there were 12,500 French civil servants in the Tunisian administration, with important positions which could not be filled by Tunisians. This French presence in Tunisia has increased dependence on French assistance and has contributed to the maintenance of the French language.

Tunisian society, marked by a long colonial period, was still bearing its imprint after Independence. It was characterized by a striking imbalance between the urban and rural populations, and between the few literate (estimated at 25% of the total population) and a large majority of illiterates(49). In the urban centres, the Tunisian population, exposed to Western influences, in their contact with Europeans, mastered the French language to varying degrees. This was a necessity for economic reasons, since job opportunities were available only to those who had at least some knowledge of French language, and this situation continued after Independence. Classical Arabic was mostly used in relation to religious practices and was taught only in Koranic schools and at Zeitouna University. Spoken Arabic was the medium of communication for the majority of the Tunisian population.

However the linguistic situation in this country was not complicated (as in of Morocco and Algeria) by the Berber language, which is almost non-existent since only around 1% of the total population, located in the Djerba Island, have kept the use of this language(50).

It is therefore the co-existence between French and Arabic, and the different roles allocated to each, and the diaglossia between written and spoken Arabic, which constitute the contextual linguistic features of Tunisian society.

Consequently, as a result of the colonial policy, the economic pressures and the political options, the French language emerged at Independence reinforced in its role as a modernising factor. This has increased its prestige among the population and its importance as a necessary means for social and economic and even political mobility.

Classical Arabic, with its role mainly limited to traditional education with predominantly religious connotations, has remained in Tunisian society linked with the past; while French is perceived as being related to technological and scientific progress, and the future. This has resulted in different attitudes towards the use of each of these two languages among the younger generation(51). Often, a speaker shifts from one language to the other or uses the two or three of them in the same sentence. This characteristic is common to the three Maghrebian countries.

The governing elite, with its emphasis on modernisation as the basis for nation forming, attempted a transformation of the social context to adapt it to the requirements of modernisation. This, in view of the transfer of technology, and the acquisition of modern Western know-how would not be possible unless social attitudes and mentalities were adapted, in a fight against 'backardness' in all its forms. This view was often expressed in the president's speeches. In an interview with a French

television he stated: "in this race for progress, the new

economic structures are secondary to new mental

structures"(52).

For example, Islam as the religion of the state (or Arabic

as the national language) must not be an obstacle to the

process of modernisation. National culture as a whole is

conceived by the political leadership in relation to

modernity and development. In this context the French

culture and language play an important role in the Tunisian

society, as ameasure of modernism.

However, Colloquial Arabic remains the

predominant means of expression and communication of the

vast majority of the Tunisian population. In spite of the

relatively higher rate of literacy in Tunisia, as compared

to Morocco and Algeria, Classical Arabic is only used in

education, formal lectures and speeches. As indicated

earlier President Bourguiba himself is known for his

populist rhetoric and he often uses Tunisian dialect in his

speeches, rather than Classical Arabic(53). The main forms

of bilingualism are the French/Arabic ones, and the two

varieties of Classical and Colloquial Arabic. In

administration both Arabic and French are used but the bias

is toward French. Street names, road signs, and shop names

are in both languages. In bookshops and libraries there is

an abundance of French books, magazines,and newspapers. In

entertainment, such as in cinemas, theatres, television and
radio programmes, French language and culture have an
important share.

The argument here is that the contradictions in
the Tunisian society emerge from the roles and status
allocated to each of the two languages Arabic and French.
The official claim for Arabic as the only national language
and the maintenance of French as the de-facto working
language and as a means for political, economic and social
mobility, has emphasized these contradictions.

In fact, access to the job market, especially to
prestigious positions and political roles, is available to
those who know French or at least to those who are
bilinguals. The Arabophone monolinguals have very little
access to important positions and little prestige. They
remain marginal in national political and economic
activities(54).

Most of these Arabophones were educated at the
Tunisian traditional Zeitouna University, or in the trial
arabized schools and the few Arabized arts and literature
branches established in universities since the 1970s.
These Arabophones are a pressure group in favour of a more
rigorous implementation of Arabization. They have
expressed their criticism of the governmental language
policy and the role granted to the French language.

Those who strongly claim Arabisation, called the
'traditionalists', and those who favour French-Arabic
bilingualism, called 'modernists', constitute the two major
groups involved in the debates about the language issue in
Tunisia today. The traditionalists' argument is mainly
based on the claim for national identity and authenticity;
whereas the modernists stress French as a means of access to
desired economic and social change and a link with the
modern world and universal civilisations(55). The different
emphases on language and its role are mainly related to the
choice of the medium of instruction. Hence, it is the
educational system which has constituted the principal arena
of debates and the field of contradictions over the adopted
language policies.

b) The Educational Context:

In Tunisia, the educational system was considered
as the principal means through which national identity was
to be re-established. The Arabic language was to be used and
dissiminated through the educational system. The
educational system was equally expected to promote the
social and economic changes necessary for modernisation.

The Tunisian educational system remained unchanged
from Independence until 1958. During this period it was
characterised by diversity, with three types of education. ,
One was completely Arabised, represented mainly by the

Koranic schools. The second was bilingual, providing
secondary education, represented by the prestigous Sadigi
College. The third was completely French, with the three
cycles.

The first reform of the Tunisian educational
system was initiated two years after Independence in
1958(56). This reform was undertaken with the major
objectives of:

- unification of the inherited diversified system,

- its nationalisation, with the implementation of
  Arabisation,

- its adaptation to the national context with its social
  aspirations and economic needs,

- its expansion, with the aim of achieving universal primary
  education (57).

These were the main aims of Tunisian national education
which have constituted the general guidelines of
contemporary policies of education including the reform of
1968.

The first aim, unification of the educational
system, was considered as a crucial basis for Tunisian
education, and therefore the diverse types of schools
(Koranic French and bilingual schools) were replaced by
national public schools. The Tunisian Ministry of Education
was in charge of the organisation of the whole educational
system including its universalization, curriculum

elaboration, and teacher training. With the nationalisation
of the educational system the Tunisian government aimed at
achieving Arabisation within a period of ten years.

Therefore, the first two years of the primary cycle
were completely Arabised. Arabic was introduced gradually as
a subject in the later years of this cycle. In the secondary
cycle two sections were created (A and B). In section A,
Arabic was the medium of instruction for all subjects. in
section B, called the transitory section, French was used as
the medium of instruction.

Attempts were made, with the available human and
material means to expand education for the maximum number of
children of school age. Tunis University was created in 1959
to promote higher education (58).

The Arabisation of the educational system was
characterised in this country by a rather pragmatic
approach. The process of its implementation was, unlike
Morocco and Algeria, prudent in spite of the claim for a
complete Arabisation within ten years. In the 1958 reform it
was stated that:

> ... We cannot uniformly and at once
> impose the exclusive usage of the
> language that the ancient pedagogy
> has neglected: its brutal expansion
> would run, among other things, against
> the scarcity of qualified teachers and

the absence of adapted manuals. It is

necessary to Arabise progressively

taking into account the time factor

and the subjects in order to ensure a

harmonious continuity [between past and

future].

<div align="right">(59)</div>

The ambitious programme of this 1958 reform

could not be achieved. Rather it resulted in social

conflicts and educational problems. Thus a new reform was

undertaken in July 1968 with the appointment of Ahmed Ben

Salah at the head of the Ministry of education. The major

aim was to expand Arabisation within another period of ten

years. But, a year later Ben Salah reintroduced French in

the first two years of the primary cycle. In the secondary

cycle section B (using French as the medium of instruction)

became more and more important leading to the supression of

section A (which used Arabic). Hence, with this second

reform bilingualism in education was confirmed:

... Tunisia, future oriented, has

deliberately opted for bilingualism.

French, a 'vehicular' language, and

the language adjuvant of culture

should be reinforced so that the

pupil, open from an early age to

the external world is able to

acquire practice of the French

language; while penetrating the

history of his country, that is

Arabo-Islamic civilization and

culture.

<div align="right">(60)</div>

The general recommendations of this reform

mainly stressed the need to improve the quality and

efficiency of the educational system, to respond to the

requirements of socio-economic development and to integrate

the educational system into the national economy. The same

Minister, Bensalah, was also made head of the Ministries of

Planning, Economy and Finance. To explain this affiliation

of the Ministry of Education to the other ministries, the

Tunisian president declared:

> Experience showed that it would be
>
> suitable - if only for a certain period -
>
> to regroup in the same hand, the
>
> responsibility at the national level for
>
> the Ministry of education with that of
>
> social and economic development. In this
>
> way we shall ensure the organic integration
>
> of the two conceptions, educational and
>
> economic, not only because of their
>
> interaction, also because each is
>
> subordinated to the other.

<div align="right">(61)</div>

This structural change reaffirmed the role assigned to education as the promoter of economic development. This led to changes in the organisation of the educational system, its content and teaching methods. Emphasis was on professional training and the formation of the skilled manpower needed to ensure economic growth(62).

In higher education, the university structutre and its organisation are modelled on French universities, and so are the centres for research and high schools(63). French is the language of instruction of almost all subjects in most branches. The Arabisation of some branches in the humanities was initiated only after 1970.

The major role of the university has been to provide the necessary manpower for national development. The creation in 1979 of a new Ministry for Higher Education and Scientific Research (M.E.R.S.), separate from the primary and secondary education administration, was undertaken to devote special attention to this important cycle and adapt it to national needs. To achieve an adequate balance between higher education, training and employment is the main objective of this option. The integration of educational planning into overall national economic planning, and the priority given to scientific and technical training, has called for a greater use of French as the medium of instruction, especially in secondary and higher education(64).

The extension of education to all children of school age and the process of Arabisation have constituted the prinicpal objectives of Tunisian educational reforms. However the limited human and material means made it impossible to achieve these ambitious objectives. Consequently, to respond to the objective of educational expansion reliance on external assistance, mainly French, was necessary. This, in turn, affected the policy of Arabisation.

The extension of education, in fact, made noticeable progress in the first decades of Independence. The rate of schooling rose from about 29% in the period of independence to around 73% in 1971(65). With the second reform and the emphasis on quality rather than quantity the system became more selective and access was limited. In primary education for instance the rate of enrollments dropped from 81.1% in 1965-1966 to 77% in 1974-1975(66). This increased to achieve a 95% rate for boys of school age by 1985(67). But girls are still underschooled at the present time, and disparity between rural and urban areas is still very high. Acess to secondary and higher education remains limited(68).

The 'nationalisation' of the educational system was also among the major objectives of the Tunisian educational policies. This nationalisation referred to the

adaptation of education (in its content and form) to
national characteristics, needs, and values, with a Tunisian
teaching personnel, and the implementation of Arabisation.

However, apart from the introduction of a few
changes in content (such as relating historical, literary,
and geographic instruction to Tunisia and the Arab world),
the rest remained based on the existing French model(69).
The language of instruction has remained predominantly
French.

The Tunisification of the teaching staff has
expanded especially in the primary cycle, but in the
secondary cycle in 1981 the proportion of foreign teachers
was still 16.2%. During the period 1977-1980 there were 940
French teachers in secondary education(70). These teachers
were to be replaced by nationals from 1980, but because of
the increasing needs for scientific and tehcnical teachers
in this cycle, the government decided to maintain the same
number of French teachers. It is likely that the call on
foreign teachers in general and French teachers in
particular is to increase rather than decrease, considering
the increasing number of students in scientific and
technical branches and the still insufficient number of
trained Tunisian teachers in these disciplines(71).

The Fifth Plan for economic and social
development (1977-1981), in fact, emphasises a more
scientific and technical orientation of education. According
to this Plan 73% of the total students in secondary

education were to be concentrated in mathematical-science, technical science, and industrial science branches against a proportion of 47.7% in 1972 and 66.4% in 1976(72). In higher education, because of this trend, the need in foreign teachers is still important.

It must be noted that, as was the case in Morocco, the 'Tunisification' of the teaching staff does not necessarily mean Arabisation, as most of the Tunisian teachers who are replacing the French are French-educated either in Tunisia or in French universities. During the academic year 1978-1979, for instance, there were 9,625 Tunisian students in France, of whom 613 were on a grant award by the French government(73). In 1980, 556 new grants were awarded for post-graduate studies in France(74).

The option for Arabic language as the major medium of education and the most important element of a nationalised education, has remained only an aspiration. This is because not only are human and material possibilities limited, but also the political and economic options favour a situation of Arabic/French bilingualism.

Decades after Independence, the French language is as present as ever in Tunisian society. It is still the working language, not only among the educated elite but also among the less educated and even among segments of the working class. Its privileged position and prestigious status in national activities has been perpetuated not only

by the French-based model of education but also by its association with modernity and technological progress and universal civilisations.

The Tunisian leadership seems to have achieved some support and consensus for its policies, and the vast majority of the population seem to have accommodated to this situation of bilingualism. But this apparent consensus is undergoing changes and rising dissatisfaction with the present political and economic order can be perceived in Tunisian society. The failure of the educational system to fulfil the high aspirations for a democratized knowledge and better chances for social progress has led to a re-evaluation and even questioning of the prevailing order and the prescribed formulas, especially in terms of language and educational policies. The present linguistic dual system is more and more considered as responsible for the ongoing process of stratification and at the base of the problems in education.

The prevailing situation of bilingualism in education in Tnisia, with the de-facto supremacy of French over Arabic, has affected the quality of education. This is reflected in the high rate of wastage and drop outs of school children exposed to two mediums of instruction neither of which is in reality their mother tongue(75). This situation has also generated a confused bicultural situation where each language fulfils a specific role, leading to the emergence of a dual system in education with two types of

knowledge, one traditional and one modern(76). Hence

languagse have become a means of educational and social

selection and have affected social mobility by reinforcing

social inequalities(77).

Furthermore, the maintenance of bilingualism has

raised important financial constraints for this emerging

nation with its limited resources. However, the Tunisian

approach to the language issue has been relatively moderate

and pragmatic as compared with Morocco and Algeria. The

leadership's dedication to modernisation has been clearly

formulated, hence the overt option for bilingualism. This

was not the case in Algeria where, because of its particular

historical, political, and economic circumstances, the

approach to language is much more radical.

C. Algeria.

a) The social context

The Algerian social context has affected and is
affected by the language policies adopted since
Independence. It also reflects the problems and
contradictions generated by these policies. This is
principally because, when formulated, the language policies
failed to take into account the socio-linguistic
characteristics of this society which have resulted from its
historical process and specific experiences.

Algerian society was exposed to foreign
domination and influence for the longest period among the
three Maghrebian societies. Although Algeria experienced the
same chain of colonisation, and approximatively at the same
time, it was the French colonisation which has left the
strongest impact after the Arabs.

The particular length and type of the French
colonisation has marked the Algerian social context. For
more than a century, this country was integrated as a part
of French territory, including European settlement(78). The
process of 'deculturation' was applied systematically on the
Algerian society with the colonial policy of assimilation.
The Arab penetration, however, with the adoption of Islam
and the spread of Arabic culture and language is perceived

in this society as a process of 'acculturation', though to a
lesser degree than in Tunisia. As in Morocco a
Berber-speaking population has remained to the present time.

The post-independence period was marked by the
adoption of radical policies, especially in terms of
language, as a reaction to the French policy of
assimilation. However, the option for modernisation and
economic development has strengthened ties with the Western
countries, especially France, and consequently has
contributed to the continued use of French.

This underlines the contradictions between the
stated policies of Arabisation, and actual practices, with
the maintenance of the French language. As the largest
country of the Maghreb, and with important potentials in
natural resources, Algeria was able to accelerate the
process of industrialisation and economic growth which has
also affected the social context.

The development of the society, with one of the
highest birth rates in the world(79), has been neglected in
the race for industrialisation, in order to catch up with
the modernisation led by the West.

The Algerian society which emerged at the
independence was poor after a long colonial period and a
destructive war of liberation. The highest proprtion of the
population 70% to 80%, lived in rural areas and depended on
agricultural earnings(80). Colonisation and war affected the
rural population to a much greater extent than the urban

population. It started with the dispossession of the
peasants, initiated from the early days of colonisation.
They had to give up gradually the most fertile land for
either the French government or the European settlers(81).
At the eve of Independence, the communal land 'domaine' was
estimated at 11 million hectares and the total land in the
hands of the settlers was over two million hectares,
distributed over 8,000 large properties(82). The movement
of the Algerian population was towards the mountainous and
less fertile areas. The rural population was directly or
indirectly involved in the liberation war.

In addition to the losses in terms of lives, around
one third of the population was displaced. This
'resettlment' policy, adopted by the French authorities to
isolate the rural population, had affected about 2.16
million people by 1960(83), and has had far reaching
consequences on the population as a whole(84). It has
resulted in the disintegration of the social fabric of this
population. The great majority had to seek work either in
the European owned farms or in the nearest urban centres.
The population exodus towards the cities was increased by
the effects of the war. The rural population, moving to the
urban centres for better prospects, aggravated the
unemployment rate, which was already high. Urbanisation
reached its highest rate during the war period and by the
early years of Independence the population of most cities
and towns had more tha doubled. In Algiers and its suburbs,

during the 1954-1960 period, the population increased by
36%, reaching 4,307 million in 1966(85). The departure of
the French population increased the rural exodus. During the
period 1960-1963, around 800,000 people moved to the
cities(86), creating a mass of shanty towns ('bidonvilles')
and poor living conditions.

In spite of the vacant jobs left by Europeans and
taken over by Algerians, mainly in the administrative sector
where the number of Algerian civil servants increased from
30,000 in 1955 to 300,000 in 1963(87), the rate of
unemployment at Independence remained very high. Around two
thirds of the active population were unemployed(88). This
situation was aggraved by a rapid growth of the population,
estimated at a rate of 3% a year. From 1954 to 1964, the
population increased from 9.530 million to 12.102
million(89). Emigration constituted an outlet for the rising
pressures on the job market. Morocco and Tunisia have
received Algerian emigrants but the greatest majority left
for Europe, France principally. By the end of 1963 there
were about 610,000 Algerians living in France(90).

In 1963, the new organisation of the agricultural
sector was based on the 'Self-Managment' of the lands left
by the settlers. Management Committees were set up by
Agrarian governmental legislation with the major objective
of reducing the rural exodus. But this new legislation
concerned only a small proportion of the rural population,
often those employed on the modern agricultural sector prior

to Independence. This organisation of the agricultural

sector reinforced regional and economic disparities more

than it solved the acute problems of the rural population

which needed an immediate and systematic reorganisation of

the agrarian sector as a whole(91).

The Algerian population at Independence was 80% to 90%

illiterate(92). Only a few had some training as most of them were

kept outside the administrative apparatus, industry and schooling

throughout the colonial period(93). Only in the last years of

liberation were there attempts at their integration, with the

'Plan de Constantine' launched in October 1958. This plan aimed

at bringing about economic and social reforms for the native

population(94). Those reforms came too late as the war for

liberation was well engaged. The European population who left was

estimated at more than 1 million, representing 80% of the

Algeria's qualified manpower(95).

As the economic and social structures remained in the

French type of organisation, it was French technical personnel

which continued to operate them. The foreign technical assistance

was clearly spelled out in the Evian agreements(96) where

important provisions were planned in terms of cultural, financial

and technical aid. The French population who remained in Algeria

after independence was less than 200,000. Nearly 18,000 of the

French who left the country returned later the same year, within

the frame of technical and cultural co-operation between Algeria

and France(97).

Because of the length of the colonisation period and the specific terms of of the French-Algerian relationship during colonisation, the French presence in Algeria was much more important than in Morocco and Tunisia. Its impact was therefore more deeply rooted in the structures of the country. French culture in general and the language in particular have been for a long period constantly used as a symbol and means of power, of prestige and superiority. This situation of dependence strongly affected the Algerian population.

Islam and the Arabic language, often closely interlinked, were used as a 'protecting barrier' against a cultural and linguistic 'agression' which threatened the Algerian identity; and were used as major means in fostering nationalism in the population.

However, at Independence, in spite of a renewed interest in Islam and the Arabic language and their equation with national identity, French remained entrenched in the society. It was almost exclusively used in the general administration of the country where about 47% of those holding high positions and 71% of management posts were the same staff who served under the French government(98). Moreover, with the French-Algerian agreement signed in August 1962, more than 20,000 French assistants were sent to Algeria, half of them to serve in the administrative and technical fields and the rest in education(99).

The use of the French language in the different

fields of national life, especially in education, economy

and administration, has strengthened its association with

development, prosperity and above all modernity; hence it

has become in Algerian society a necessary condition of

access to jobs and social promotion(100). The young,

representing more than half of the population(101), tend to

perceive the French language not only as a means of social

and economic mobility, but also as an open window to the

modern West.

The Arabic language, in spite of its claimed value

and relation to national identity, remained limited in its

utilisation and expansion, because of the importance of

French language, and also because of its place and role in

the overall linguistic and cultural situation of the

country. In Algeria also, the diglossia between the spoken

and written forms of Arabic is quite important, a gap

widened by the borrowing of a large number of French words

introduced into the spoken variety of Arabic(102).

The highly academic form of Classical Arabic, in a

context of a low rate of literacy, was only accessible to a

very limited proportion of the population who attended

religious schools or had studied in the Middle East or at

Tunisia's University or Morocco's Quaraouinine. Their number

was much smaller than Morocco and Tunisia. The vast majority

of the population used and understood only the spoken

variety of Arabic or Berber. The Berber language is spoken

by an important proportion of the Algerian population, which
was estimated at 25% to 30%, and it remained their mother
tongue(103). This group of population is still characterized
by its strong stand for clan and linguistic identification.

Spoken Arabic and Berber are used in daily
communication and social life, especially in the rural
areas. In the cities French is predominantly used by the
majority of the intellectual elite. It was and even is the
language of literature, plays, films and an important part
of radio and television programmes. The French version of
daily papers had a wider distribution than the Arabic
versions. In 1966 the national paper 'El Moudjahid' in
French sold about 40,000 to 50,000 copies a day, whereas the
Arabic version 'Al-chaab' sold around 15,000 copies a
day(104). French newspapers and magazines remained popular.
In the same year 'Le Monde' sold 10,000 copies; 'France
Soir', 20,000; 'Figaro', 3,000 copies, and 'Paris Match';
12,000 copies(105).

The linguistic situation was therefore quite complex
in the Algerian social context at Independence, and has
become even more confusing with the political ambivalence
over the implementation of the Arabisation policy and the
role attributed to each language within the language policy.

The linguistic issues have not been subject to
national debates in spite of the political tensions among
members of the political elite and among the public in

general. The political debates on language have been centred
mainly around the means and methods of Arabisation and have
stressed the need to speed up the process. To question the
principle itself or to raise the question of the role of the
Colloquials in the society was 'taboo'(106).

During the decade 1970- 1980, the process of
Arabisation has been accentuated with the partial
Arabisation of the administration. Two ministries were
completely Arabized, namely the Ministries of Justice and
Interior (the Home Office). Their Arabisation mainly
concentrated on producing, for the public, forms and
documents in Arabic. But the structure of all ministries and
their affiliated administrations has remained based on the
French model and is run predominantly in French. The
majority of civil servants work in French and communicate in
this language or Colloquial Arabic. Administrative
communication is done in French, and most civil servants
require at least a summarised version in French of any
report addressed to them in Arabic(107).

At all levels of national activity, the French
language is necessary for work and communication, and still
is an important means of social and economic mobility. In
day to day life, in social interaction and communication it
is still extensively used by the Algerian population along
with Colloquial Arabic and Berber. In entertainment such as
cinemas, theatres, radio and television programmes the use
of French is still strikingly high. In the cinema most films

are presented in French. In the centre of Algiers, for instance, out of fourteen main cinemas only two show Arabic films regularly. On television and radio a noticeable effort has been made to increase the amount of broadcasting in Arabic, but as most programmes are delivered in Classical Arabic, they have been criticized as being inaccessible to the majority of the population. A similar criticism was made of the range of films imported from the Middle-East, mainly Egypt, which was seen by some members of the public as transmitting values and a way of life different from the Algerian reality(108).

There is still an important number of films on television delivered in French. On the radio there are three channels: one in Arabic broadcasting in Classical Arabic, one in Berber using Kabyle exclusively, and the third is 'international' with English and Spanish broadcasts for short intervals, but the rest of the programmes are exclusively in French. The bookshops and libraries host a wide range of French books, magazines and newspapers. Given the wide distribution of national papers and magazines in French, national Arabic newspapers and magazines have to compete with the French ones, even though the number of which has been reduced by governmental censure. But Le Monde', for example, still enjoys wide popularity, mainly among the intellectual elite(109). Therefore the French

language is still present in the Algerian society, in the formal and informal activities of the population alongside spoken Arabic and Berber.

The Arabisation of the educational system was followed by the Arabisation of the 'environment', including the administration, the mass-media, and shop names and road signs, which have been so far a mere translation of French ideas, values and appellations, to such an extent that their meaning in classical Arabic is completely missed. This is especially striking in shop names and road signs where only the spelling has changed from French to Arabic. The equivocal approach to Arabisation, often described as superficial and non-committal, has aroused public dissatisfaction and criticism.

Three major group attitudes can be identified in Algerian society regarding the language issue. They represent the major political tendencies in the society. These different groups are commonly dissatisfied with the governmental Arabisation policy, and the process of its implementation. However, because of the restricted channels of expression and representation, their manifestation has been sporadic and emerges only occasionally in the national press and literature with little effect on decision-making.

One of these attitudes favours the revival and modernisation of local languages namely colloquial Arabic and Berber, which they consider as a major component of the national character and the genuine means of its expression.

The Arabic language that the government is attempting to

install in its classical form is seen as not related to the

national reality and is seen as much as an imported language

as French(110). This group has not rejected the principle of

Arabisation but has focused its criticism on the methods for

its implementation, mainly in what they see as an imitation

of Middle Eastern thought. They also have pointed to the

lack of effort in integrate oral languages into the language

policy(111).

The Berber issue appears more complex as, unlike

Colloquial Arabic which is considered as a derivative of

classical Arabic, it is a distinct language, identified with

the original inhabitants of the area, and is still spoken by

a large proportion of the population. At the present time

there are four major varieties of this language spoken by

the 'Chaouia' and the 'Kabyles' in the North,and the

'Touareg' and 'M'zab' in the South. The pressure-group for

linguistic recognition of the Berber language has often

emerged from the Kabyles claiming a 'unified general Berber

language'. This claim is however seen from different

prespectives by different 'Berberists'.

Three different views have emerged in the recent

years over the issue of Berber language(112). One is in

favour of the official recognition of cultural pluralism in

Algeria, including the different varieties of Berber and

spoken Arabic. This postion does not oppose the policy of

Arabisation, but seeks a place for the Berber language as a

part of national culture. The second attitude is more
extreme in its rejection of 'Arabism' as the characteristic
of the Algerian society. The claim here is for the adoption
of Berber and/or spoken Arabic as the national language(s).
Therefore the Arabisation policy is seen as illegitimate on
nationalistic grounds.

The third attitude is that of those who criticise
the political system as a whole, and its " authoritarian
approach", especially on cultural and linguistic issues.
Their request is for a 'democratic' policy including
linguistic and cultural freedom for Algerians, in a liberal
and democratic state. Their claim is therefore more
political than cultural and linguistic. These different
attitudes towards the Berber language culminated in the
social unrest which took place in Kabilia during the spring
of 1980. Demonstrations and riots took place for a few
weeks, in an attempt to exert pressure on the authorities to
reconsider the language policy taking into account the
Berber language(113).

The scale and importance of this movement seems
to have alarmed the Algerian authorities, who were compelled
to raise this issue in the National Assembly (the
Parliament) and the Party's National Congress. The outcome
was an official statement which stressed the Berber, Arabic,
and Islamic character of the Algerian personality and the
necessity to hasten the process of Arabisation(114).

The second major attitude toward language in the
Algerian social context involves those who favour the
official recognition of bilingualism (French and Arabic), in
order to achieve the two-fold objective of authenticity and
modernity. They generally support the maintenance of the
French language, as an important tool for modernisation,
transfer of technology, and modern culture. They point out
to the present inadequacy of the Arabic language to respond
to the on-going technological progress (115).

The third major attitude is identified with those
who claim a more consistent and radical Arabisation policy.
This involves primarily the Arabophones who see themeselves
as marginal in a society where French remains predominant.
Their dissatisfaction with the present language policy was
expressed in the student unrest of the Arabophones in the
winter of 1979-1980. This movement lasted for nearly three
months of student strikes and demonstrations, which spread
to the secondary schools. The main claim was for an
immediate and complete Arabisation at all levels(116).

It is the argument here that the already complex
linguistic situation in the Algerian social context was
made more complex by the language policies adopted since
Independence. Instead of achieving the stated aims of
reinforcing national cultural identity and unity, these
policies have emphasized linguistic differences and

generated important linguistic problems and contradictions,
especially in the educational context where the language
issue is central.

b) The Educational Context

The educational context as the principal field of
implementing the Arabisation policy strongly reflects, and
perpetuates, the language-related problems and
contradictions in the Algerian society. The organisation,
structure, and the different policies adopted and
implemented in this context clearly show the ambivalences,
and dilemmas between two sources of reference: the Arabic
and the French.

As in Morocco's early years of Independence, a
radical and rapid Arabisation of the primary cycle was
undertaken in Algeria. However the first attempt was
hampered by obstacles, the most important of which were the
high rate of illiteracy among the population and the even
higher rate of unschooled children of school-age. This,
coupled with the lack of human and material means and the
general social and political situation of the new state,
made it impossible to devise any concrete policy of
Arabisation in the first years of independence. The most
urgent task was to assure schooling for as many children as
possible in relation to the Tripoli programme.

Therefore the first Minister of Education,
A.Benhamida, was faced by important constraints in
formulating any definite policy of Arabisation. His efforts
concentrated on schooling and recruiting teachers at home
and abroad. The school year 1962-1963 was operated with the
contribution of the French government within the
transitional clauses of the Evian Agrements. French
assistance remained important in the educational system,
especially during the first decade. Hence, French types of
schools and the French language were maintained(117).

It was mainly with the second government that the
process of implementing the Arabisation policy was
undertaken. The Arabisation of the first year of the primary
cycle was introduced in 1964 by the newly appointed second
Minister of Education, Cherif Belkacem. This government
clearly stated in 1965 that the policy of Arabisation of the
educational system was one of the major national aims. These
were:
- democratisation of education,
- its Algerianisation (in its content and form),
- its Arabisation,
- and promotion of scientific and technical education(118).

The aim of 'democratisation of education' refers
to the expansion of education to all children of school age.
Its 'Algerianisation' concerns the replacement of foreign
teachers by nationals and the adaptation of the content of
curricula to the Algerian context. Arabisation aimed at the

use of Arabic as the medium of instruction instead of French. The fourth aim is related to the economic and social options, stressing development by adapting education to its requirements.

However, these aims would obviously require tremendous human and material means which, in the specific Algerian context with its limited means could hardly be achieved. Furthermore this would require greater dependence on foreign, principally French, economic and cultural assistance, which contradicts the ultimate aim of the educational system: national authenticity.

There emerges also a contradiction among the objectives themselves especially between the first three aims and the fourth. The promotion of scientific and technical education would require the exclusive use of the French language since Arabic cannot, at the present time, fulfill these roles. But because of the radical approach to Arabisation as the central theme of any educational reform, the process of its implementation in the educational system was rapidly undertaken.

In 1967, the National Commission of Arabisation, created the same year, proposed four methods of implementing this policy; "horizontal Arabisation", starting with the first of primary school and moving upward year by year; a "vertical Arabisation", subject by subject; a" regional Arabisation", the selection of specific geographic zones to be Arabised; and a "punctual Arabisation", on certain

subjects and in a particular time. These four methods were applied simultaneously during the period 1967-1968. Fully Arabised pilot schools were also created(119).

In 1971 a structural change within the government resulted in the creation of two distinct Ministries of Education: a Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education led by A.Benmahmoud and a Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research led by Ben Yahia Mohamed. Both Ministers were given the task of pursuing the process of Arabisation. This year was also proclaimed the year of Arabisation, as it was decided by the Algerian President that Arabisation was to be implemented widely, methodically and without delay. It was in the primary and secondary education that this new approach to Arabisation was applied.

During the period 1969-1977, the Arabisation policy was influenced by A.Mehri who started a radical Arabisation of the educational system. In 1969 he presided over a National Commission for educational reforms, which included a sub-commission of Arabisation, to be implemented from 1974. When he was appointed General Secretary of the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education in 1977 he set a plan for a total and complete Arabisation of primary and secondary education by 1982, in order to 'force' the Arabisation of higher education(120). His action was halted by his replacement and the appointment of M.Lacheraf, as the new Minister of Primary and Secondary Education. He expressed his determination to bring about a new reform by

reconsidering the process of the complete Arabisation

undertaken previously. He started by dismissing Mehri's team

and stopped the projects in process.

With the third government, Lacheraf was replaced

by M.C. Kharoubi at the head of the Ministry of Primary and

Secondary Education. He favoured a return to the policy

initiated by Mehri(121). This indicates the discordant

approach to language policy and its fluctuations and

influence according to the political tendency of the persons

involved in decision-making.

Therefore an increasing dissatisfaction with the

Arabisation policy is felt (in Algeria) which stems

essentially from the inconsistencies in implementation in

the educational system. The educational system, as the major

agent of social change, was meant to achieve the double

objective of re-establishing national identity and promoting

modernisation. This had led to a dual system of education,

one Arabised in order to achieve the first objective, and

the other using principally French for the second objective.

The Arabisation policy so far has been implemented in the

literary subjects and social sciences, whereas French has

remained the predominant medium of instruction in the

scientific subjects and branches(122).

With the governmental emphasis on scientific and technical education on the one hand, and the job-market possibilities on the other hand, available mainly to French educated (or at least bilinguals), the scope and efficiency of the Arabisation policy seem rather limited.

This, again, underlines the contradictions between the stated aims and actual practices. Furthermore, the efforts undertaken to achieve the other educational aims, namely the expansion of education to all children of school age, its 'Algerianisation', and principally the stress on scientific and technological knowledge, not only created important pressures in the educational system but are in themselves contradictory. since access to scientific and technological knowledge, for instance, is essentially imported from the West and necessitates the use of the French language. The democratisation of education with the objective to provide education to all children of school age was itself an ambitious programme considering the increasing demand. The population explosion in this country(123), has led to a rising pressure for schooling.

In spite of remarkable results, universal education is not yet achieved. Inequality of access between urban and rural areas and between boys and girls is still strikingly high. The average rate of schooled children, in the primary cycle in the important urban areas, reached between 77% and 86% during the decade 1975-1985. In the rural areas the rate of schooled children is much lower and

so is the rate of schooled girls as compared to boys(124).

The aim of general compulsry education is not yet achieved and disparities between the two sexes and urban and rural areas, in terms of educational provision, is still quantitatively and qualitatively very high.

The demand for education and the attempt to take the maximum number of children into the schools made it difficult to achieve the other objectives especially the Algerianisation of the teaching staff and the Arabisation of the system as a whole.

The Algerianisation of the teaching body in the primary cycle is achieved, but the number of qualified teachers, although steadily increasing, is still minimal especially in rural areas. Their level of education and training, the large number of children (40 to 50 per classroom) and the limited pedagogical means have not only resulted in an important drop in quality but has contributed largely to the rate of wastage(125).

In secondary and higher education the Algerianisation of the teaching staff remained difficult to achieve. Until recently,there was an important proportion of foreign teachers, especially French teachers in this cycle. In 1976-1977 there were 3,035 foreign teachers out of a total of 15,744 in the first cycle of secondary education, 450 of them were French. In the second cycle, general education, there were 2,918 out of 4,117 teachers, more than 1,000 of them were French. In secondary technical education

out of a total of 853 teachers, 449 were foreigners, of whom 200 teachers were French. In higher education there was a proportion of 60% to 70% of foreign teachers(126).

In the Algerian context, where the impact of the French language was the strongest and where the means to achieve very ambitious educational objectives are limited, a radical approach to language was adopted. This radicalisation is reflected in the increasing and rapid process of the Arabisation of education. The Arabisation of the primary cycle of education is achieved as all subjects are taught in Arabic. French is taught as a subject from the fourth grade only. But in secondary education there were, until recently, two sectors, one completely Arabised with French as the first foreign language, and another called bilingual where both languages are used with the predominance of French in scientific subjects. In higher education most branches in the humanities and social sciences have been Arabised completely as is the case in the departments of law, literature, and sociology, or Arabised branches have been created alongside ones taught in French (as is the case in the departments of economics, psychology and educational science). The scientific and technical branches, and post-graduate studies and research are still using French almost exclusively(127).

In the last decade (1980-1990), Arabisation has been totally achieved in the primary and secondary cycles. In higher education it is expanding to cover most

branches(128). But this rapid process of Arabisation has affected the quality of education, which has resulted in a cultural and educational 'vacuum'. The rising generation is not only undereducated, that is possessing minimal and superficial knowledge and skills, but does not master properly either Arabic or French(129). This generation, as the popular saying goes, are 'bilingual illiterates'.

Furthermore, scientific and technical education is considered as one of the major foci of education, and as closely related to the supremacy of industrial development in the national planning. In this context scientific and technological studies are considered as the most important field throughout the educational system and are increasingly encouraged by the government. National grants for the students at the university are higher for those in science than those in the humanities or social sciences. Scholarships to study abroad are more easily obtained for scientific and technical studies. The job market is more accessible to those with a minimum scientific and technical education and training than to those with literary and arts degrees. Considering that scientific and technical education is, to a large part, provided in the French language, whereas the Arabic language is still reserved to the increasingly less prestigious humanities, the complete Arabisation of the educational system - which is the official intention - remains a major political issue in this country.

This situation has been reinforced by the existing general structure of the educational system, its administrative organisation and pedagogical norms, which are still largely based on the French model. The Ministries of Primary, Secondary and Higher education themselves and affiliated administrations operate mainly in French.

The privileged position of the French language at all levels of political, economic and social activities has contributed to its prestige whereas the Arabic language had been relegated to a secondary position. In this context, the Arabisation policy is not only far from being fully achieved, in real terms, but the partial implementation has created serious problems with political, economic and social repercussions.

Conclusion.

In the three countries of the Maghreb, the social and educational contexts were directly affected by the contradictions resulting from the language policies adopted. The policy of Arabisation in the three nation-states was conceived within their process of decolonisation. It was and is the means by which national identity is to be re-established and colonial influence is to be eradicated.

However the commitment of these countries' leaders to modernisation, imported from the West in its form and content, has not only increased their economic dependence (on France particularly), but has reinforced the cultural impact of the West. This has increased the role and prestige of the French language to the detriment of the national languages.

The claim for the Arabic language, as the official national language to restore national identity, has been constantly asserted by the political leadership in the three countries. However, in practice the French language remains an important feature of the Maghrebian societies, and is used as a tool of work, education and social interaction. French is identified with modernisation and progress whereas

Arabic is given a secondary role and seems to fulfil

nationalistic aims rather than practical objectives,

becoming principally an ideological issue.

In Morocco, Arabic is the official language but

the use of French is justified on the grounds of the need

for the modernisation which legitimates the continuity of

the Monarchy. In Tunisia, Arabic is also the official

language but the primacy of modernisation in nation building

justifies the semi-official adoption of French-Arabic

bilingualism. In Algeria there is a more radical emphasis on

Arabic as the national language which is used as a major

means of political legitimacy. However, in practice there is

a de-facto situation of bilingualism. Consequently, in

Algeria the emphasis is on a reduction of the use of French

language. In the two other countries there seems to be a

strengthening of the use of French language.

The Arabic language in its present form is not

accessible to the majority of the population where the

mother tongue is either colloquial Arabic or Berber,

especially in Morocco and Algeria. French is considered in

the three countries as a more viable means of social and

economic mobility and access to modernisation. Arabic, in

the Maghrebian social context, is still identified with

tradition, a notion reinforced by two major factors :

- the classical linguistic characteristics of the language

   render it unable to compete with Western modern

   languages in terms of transmitting scientific and

technological knowledge.

- the economic options related to industrialisation
  requiring an important transfer of technology and
  know-how led to stronger ties with the West and the
  increasing use of the French language.

In Morocco and Tunisia there is a clear trend in
favour of universalism, in the sense of remaining open to
different civilisations especially the Western. However, in
Morocco the important proportion of Berber speaking
population has complicated the social setting for
implementing Arabisation. In Algeria the reaction against
French colonisation resulted in a more insulating policy
with a stronger stress on Arabisation. However, the
historical impact of the French language in addition to the
existence of a relatively important Berber speaking
population has, as in the case of Morocco, complicated the
social and linguistic setting for the adopted language
policy.

The educational system is seen as one of the
principal means to achieve the two major aims of national
identity and modernisation. Education is the principal
channel for the implementation of Arabisation and its
expansion into the society. In terms of modernisation, the
educational system is expected to provide the required
qualified manpower and to raise the standard of living of
the population. These double functions attributed to the

educational systems have resulted in its being the field of convergence for the contradictions and fluctuations of the language policies.

In Morocco, the Arabisation of the educational system has oscillated between radical and moderate policies, whereas in Tunisia these policies were characterized by a certain moderation with a prevailing bilingualism. In the case of Algeria, Arabisation was undertaken more radically and rapidly in spite of difficulties in the way of its implementation.

The contradictions in the three countries, in terms of language policies, have adversely affected the social and educational contexts. The major contradiction underlying these policies is that between a strong emphasis, in the political rhetoric, on using Arabic language to offset the impact of the colonial heritage, and importing, without discrimination, the Western model of development. Furthermore, in the three countries of the Maghreb, since their access to independence, little provision has been made to make the Arabic language an instrumental tool in education, work, culture and development.

Thus, there is a pressing need to reconsider approaches to the language question in the three countries, especially in Algeria, and to undertake language planning which notes both the specific characteristics of the

societies and the desired type of modernisation and its

requirements.

Chapter IV

Notes and References.

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stand for the local languages as the true expression ot

national cultural identity. See his declaration in

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language, and given the authoritatian type of regime in Algeria, it is this particular attitude which has been constantly stressed by the national media. Hence language-related debates have been oriented towards the reinforcement of this attitude to underline the legitimacy of this option. So, what emerges is an impression of an overall consensus for the language policy and the impression that controversies are only related to the ways and means of its implementation. This has blurred the full scale of the language question in the Algerian society.

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122. Chevalier, A., & Kessler, V., op.cit., p.64. See also: Grandguillaume, G., Ibid., p.133-134.

123. The rate of population growth in Algeria has remained one of the highest in the world, estimated at 3,2 % a Year. See Ferguene, A., op.cit., p.33.

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126.See Dafour, D., " L'Enseignement en Algerie", in

   Maghreb-Machrek , April-May-June 1980, pp.33-56.

127.Grandguillaume, G., op.cit., pp.98-109.

128.Grandguillaume, G., "l'Algerie Identité à Rechercher",

   in Economie et Humanisme, op.cit., p.49.

129.Freund, W., " La Grande Torture des Esprits au Maghreb",

   in Le Monde Diplomatique, No 424, July 1989, p.13.

Chapter V

General Conclusion: Proposed Alternative Approaches

to Language Policies in the Maghreb

The purpose of this chapter is threefold: to draw

the main arguments of the thesis together; to reassess

contemporary difficulties over language policies in the

three countries of the Maghreb, in the process of their

nation-building; and to propose in the light of the general

argument of the thesis, alternative approaches to language

in the Maghreb, with special reference to Algeria.

The arguments of this chapter will evolve

around the following main themes:

- the importance of local socio-cultural values,in the

  process of modernisation;

- the need for the societies of the Maghreb to undertake

  internal and external adaptations in their process of

  development;

- the need for an efficient assessment of the existing

  complex linguistic situation in the three countries;

- the need for language policies to be based on rational

rather than ideological factors, with an analysis of the

possible consequences of proposed solutions.

Thus the organisation of this chapter will be as follows:

Section 1: An integrated Process of Modernisation.

In this section an alternative approach to

modernisation, emphasising the importance of the

socio-cultural specific characteristics of each society, is

underlined. In the Maghreb, an integrated development is

necessary, which takes into account the appropriate

adaptations required by both national identity and

modernisation.

Section 2: Contemporary language situation in the

Maghreb.

This section will deal with a reassessment

of contemporary difficulties over the policies of language

in relation to the three countries' process of development.

These difficulties are currently accentuated by the rising

social pressures for political participation and improved

standards of living, which imply the creation of a

democratic political systems and efficient economic models.

Altered language planning may become necessary in this

context.

Section 3: Language Planning.

In this section three alternative approaches to language policy will be proposed. The first proposal is that of standardizing and developing the local languages (Colloquial Arabic and Berber), in relation to the argument emphasising the importance of the specific socio-cultural traits of the Maghrebian society. The second alternative consists in modernising and developing the Arabic language to make it more operational and competitive. The third alternative would be an organised and rationally planned Arabic-French bilingualism. This range of choice is assessed.

Section I

An Integrated Process of Modernisation

Modernisation involves the interrelated and
interactive processes of economic and social development.
As argued earlier in the thesis the experiences of
development in China and Japan have underlined the important
role of socio-cultural factors in the process of
modernisation.It was also argued that the specific
characteristics of each nation must be taken into
consideration in the modernisation process. Among these
specific characteristics language and education issues are
significant, and - before attention reverts to the Maghreb -
it is worth reviewing the Chinese and Japanese experiences
and policy efforts in these two areas. However, it is
stressed that the main theme of this chapter remains the
Maghreb.

In China, the language issue has been
characterized by two major problems which strongly
influenced national policies in general and educational
policies in particular. These two problems are related to

the diversity of spoken languages and the complexity of the writing system(1). This has affected national unity as well as educational development and has led to important reforms launched in the late 19th century, with the main objectives of establishing a national language accessible to and used by the majority of the Chinese population(2). In 1916 a National Language Committee was set up with the aim of developing a standard national language - Mandarin - for written communication and wide use in China(3). However, the complexity of the writing system with its very large number characters has always constituted a major obstacle to the learning of the Chinese language. There were about 50,000 Chinese characters, and even though some of them are obsolete, at least 3,000 characters have to be learned for the minimum literacy in urban areas(4). In addition each character is composed of a number of strokes ranging from one to thirty six which can affect the clarity in writing and certainly constitutes a burden for the learner(5).

Therefore, efforts at the simplification of the traditional Chinese writing has involved the reduction of the number of strokes used to write a particular character, and the reduction of the total number of characters by

weeding out those that are unusual, redundent, and those

with complex alternate forms(6). In 1952, a new Research

Committee for Reforming Chinese Written language was set up

and its work has led to the identification (and

simplification) of about 3,000 characters which are

frequently used, and these are introduced in primary

schools(7).

Hence, China, given the complexity of the

language, has had to struggle to achieve an agreed standard

script and one official language, based on the Peking

dialect, Mandarin. This dialect has been in a strong

position since Pekin became the capital of China in the

early fifteenth century and it has continued in use as the

major common language under the Communist leadership(8).

Language policies in China have therefore been

geared towards the achievement of a common national

language. Among these efforts were the simplification and

improvement of the written system of Chinese language. But

despite this, illiteracy rates have remained a problem

within the education system. In 1949 the rate of illiteracy

in China was about 45% of the total population(9).

China's efforts in anti-illiteracy are
clearly the greatest experiment in mass
education in the history of the world.
A nation of some 970 million in some
odd years had become a nearly literate
society.

(10)

Nevertheless, in spite of all these efforts, China is still
far from being a universally literate society and about 25%
of the total population is still illiterate(11).

This particular difficulty however, should not
be permitted to hide the proposition that education has been
central in the Chinese Revolution. It was closely and
explicitly related to the process of nation-building(12).
Education was used as the major means of political
socialization and in the spreading of the new ideology which
underpinned the economic and socio-cultural transformations
of the Chinese society. The Cultural Revolution in
particular was aimed at instilling new norms, behaviours,
and perceptions. In this context, education played the key
role in achieving the major objective of the Cultural
Revolution: to be both Red and Expert(13).

Education in revolutionary China was also closely linked to national economic development with the objective of developing China's human resource. This required important and even radical changes in the Chinese educational system to adapt it to national requirements.

There have been at least four major educational reforms in China since 1949, combining political principles with institutional changes(14). The first reform (1950-1957) aimed at changing the inherited system of education and adapting it to the new socialist doctrine and aims. The second reform occured in 1958, with the restructuring of the schools and the introduction of the notion of "productive labour" into the curriculum in line with the economic policy known as 'the Great Leap Forward'. The third reform which occured with the Cultural Revolution during the decade 1966-1976, during the decade 1966-1976, brought about further major and radical transformations in the Chinese educational system, the most important of which was the emphasis on relating theory to practice(16). The fourth reform is located from the post-Mao period, after 1976, and has been characterized by crucial changes in the objectives of the educational system. These reforms stress academic

achievements rather than ideological values> There has been

a major move away from the approach to the theory and

practice of education adopted during the Cultural

Revolution(17).

This new trend in the contemporary Chinese

educational policies reflects the emphasis of the political

leadership on scientific and technological knowledge

stemming from the West. This was clearly spelled in the

Chinese Five-Year-Plan (1981-1985) where the need to send

scholars and students abroad is stressed(18). This specific

policy is formulated within the renewed emphasis in today's

China on development and modernisation, where a move from

ideology to efficiency in education is noted(19).

Therefore, the Chinese experience illuminates

the major themes of the thesis namely the close relationship

and interactions in the development process between thwe

economic and the socio-cultural variables and the issue of

language. The latter is raised principally for its relation

to edducation and the development of literacy. The concept

of a unifying language is often stressed in political

rhetoric in China as was disscussed earlier; however, even

during the crucial period of the Communist Revolution, it

was mainly communist ideology which was used as a unifying

force rather than language. In this context, it must be

noted that national unity in China is rooted in its

tradition and civilization. But cultural identity was

reinforced by the communist ideology and an hegemonic

imposition of a common language: Mandarin. The resorbtion

of the Tibet resistance, for example, reflects the strongly

integrative policies of the Communist Chinese leadership.

But this particular approach to development, as

argued earlier, though useful an experience for late comers

like the countries of the Maghreb, has not been successful

in achieving modernisation. This is reflected in the level

of development presently achieved by China which is not

competitive with modern industrialized nations, and which

continues to face severe social and economic problems.

It is increasingly realised in China, as in many

other parts of the Globe, that delinking with the West is

neither posssible nor desirable. It is commonly realised

today that national development cannot be exclusively

self-reliant. The world today is increasingly characterised

by interdependence among nations. However this view of

internationalisation and universalisation of development

does not imply, as most theories of development suggested,

total Westernisation. It implies flexibility and

possibilities to make internal and external adaptations as

previously argued in the thesis. In this context the

experience of Japan is enlighteneing.

Japan, as argued earlier in the thesis has

achieved a remarkable level of development and modernisation

because of its ability to use foreign thought and practices

in dealing with its own specific problems while retaining

strong cultural identity. In this process, the Japanese

socio-cultural factors have contributed to the promotion of

its modernisation.

The Japanese, like the Chinese language is

complex. But, unlike China, there is no major linguistic

diversity in Japan. In this country a common language,

Japanese, has constituted a major unifying force.

The Japanese language writing system has three

main types of writing characters: Kanji, Hiragana, and

Katakana, Roman letters are also used but to a much lesser

extend(20). The Kanji characters were imported from China

and are ideograms developped from pictograms and signs(21).

The three types of Japanese characters are designed to be

written in vertical lines, though they can also be writtewn

horizontally. There are more 1945 characters for use in

books and newspapers, but every Japanese needs to know

considerably more characters to read even the newspapers and

ordinary books(22). Thus the Japanese language is a mixture

of the four types of characters mentioned above(23).

However, the Japanese language has its own pecular sentence

structure and writing system which distinguishes it from any

other language.

The importance of education and learning have

always been a major characteristic of Japanese society. This

contributed to the spread of literacy which achieved a high

rate as early as 1870, and increased with the educational

policies of the Meiji period(24). The development of the

Japanese language as a unified and important element of

Japanese national cultural identity has largely contributed

to the development of its educational system and

modernisation. This is because language was not an issue it

did not consequently hamper the development of the

ducational system. In this sense, education in Japan has

promoted modernisation.

To a higher degree than in China, education in
Japan has been closely linked with such national
development. In Japan , with its limited natural resources,
the human factor constitutes the major resource.
Furthermore, as argued earlier in the thesis, socio-cultural
values are percieved in Japanese society as important in
initiating, sustaining, and promoting economic
development(25). The adaptation of the Western model of
development to the specific characterisitics of the Japanese
society has not engendered resistance to economic
development.

The process of development of the Japnese
educational system has been characterized by three major
phases. The first one can be traced as early as 1868 with
the educational policy of the Meiji Emperor which
emphasized, on the lines of the European models, the
expansion of educational opportunity through compulsary
education. The main objectives of this policy were to raise
edducational standards with the acquisition of academic and
technical knowledge, and to contribute to the consolidation
of a modern state(26). Education was therefore geard towards

the double objective of bringing about the necessary changes

for modernisation while preserving Japanese cultural

identity.

The second phase was during the period American

occupation in 1945, where important changes were introduced

in the Japanese educational system. The most important of

these changes were related to curriculum and the structure

and administration of the system. Above all, the educational

system was democratized and its national ideology was

suppressed(27).

The second phase of the reforms from 1952 to 1960

was taken up by the Japanese. The major aims were to

establish a democratic educational structures and achieve

universal education. These reforms were spurred by: a)

nationalistic reactions against American policy; b)

adaptation of the adopted American model of education to the

cultural and social conditions of the Japanese society; c)

adaptation to the changing social, economic, and educational

needs(28).

Therefore, education in Japan has been perceived

and used as a powerful means of development. Hence,

educational policies were tightly linked to economic

policies as well as social policies. In this sense, the experience of Japan underlines a major theme of the thesis emphasizing the necessity for an integrated development to achieve modernisation.

However, in the particular case of Japan cultural identity and national unity were reinforces by a common unifying language from the early stages of its development as a nation.

These themes in the Chinese and Japanese experiences should now be kept in mind as the range of responses developed in the Maghreb are analysed. The responses in the Maghreb, while facing the same general problems - including the issue of a complex language situation - have been interestingly different, and certainly less successful than the responses of Japan.

The emphasis on the economic aspect traced in this the in the Maghreb has led to an unbalanced and fragmented developmen made worse by the fact that economic potentialities are limited a the model of develpment is imported and only loosly related to lo specficities.

Modernisation has remained a central theme in the process of nation-buiding. The Maghrebian nations have set modernisation as the main objective to be achieved, in order to catch up with the Western world. However, the three countries of the Maghreb, in their attempts to follow the Western path, have failed to fulfil this goal. These nations are still struggling for development in a world characterized by some leading industrilized nations and many dependent underdeveloped ones. This situation has led to an increasing disillusionment with the Western model of development, especially its economic determinism and emphasis on industrialisation(29).

The Maghrebian nations have invested most of their resources to intiate and sustain economic growth through industrialisation. But, this process of industrialisation has generated social and economic problems which have hindered the development of these societies. The progress made in industrialisation has not generated (as was expected) the development of other sectors, namely agriculture; but it has resulted in an increasing dependence on Western nations in terms of technology and financial resources(30). Furthermore, this uneven development has

created important social problems such as unemployment, lack of social services (such as housing, health, education), and consequently social disparities have been reinforced.

It is the argument here that the priority given to economic development, through industrialisation, based on imported technology and Know-How, has undervalued the role of people in the process of modernisation. People, in fact, constitute the basis of any development. The socio-cultural environment conditions the objectives of modernisation(31). Therefore, an approach based on an integrated model of development, where the nation's human and material resources are efficiently, rather than ideologically, invested in the different sectors, is necessary to achieve modernisation. Such an approach largely involves the mobilisation, participation, and expansion of people's capabilities(32). Industrialisation cannot succeed without appropriately trained people. Technological transfers and development icannot be achieved if no provision is made to expand the knowledge and abilities of the personnel involved. The development of people's capacities is, in turn, dependent on the social and cultural development of the country concerned.

The importance and centrality of the socio-cultural aspects in the process of development and modernisation has been underestimated in the theories of development(33). These aspects have been considered as secondary and subordinated to economic and material factors. In this sense, the social dimension has been reduced to a materialistic variable. Underdevelopment has been analysed in Western theories of development in relation to economic 'backwardness'. Consequently, these theories have proposed the adoption of the Western model of development as the prototype, the universally valid, example of development(34).

However, such an approach to development implies a process of 'deculturation' for the developing nations which have to internalise Western socio-cultural values as part of this model. The cultures and traditions of the developing nations are considered as obstacles to modernisation in these theories. Therefore these nations are expected to absorb Western cultural influence. This process started in fact with the spread of Western colonialism and its

'civilizing mission', whereby the dominated societies
gradually become lost of their collective memory, and their
identity(35):

> ... dispossessed of the knowledge of their
> own reality, 'uprooted' from within,
> members of the third world societies
> have all one desire: be identified with
> Westerners. The 'Fetish' instrument which
> expresses this desire is called economic
> development.
>
> (36)

The socio-cultural and economic dependence on the
West has been reinforced since the access to independence of
the developing nations with their policies of development
based on an imported model of development from the West.
This situation has generated conflicts and contradictions,
when these nations undertook to define and (re)establish
their cultural identity and at the same time achieve
modernisation. However, the Western world remains the
leading example of successful practice and the major source

of theoretical approaches to modernisation. The emerging

nations cannot therefore modernise without referring to, and

interacting with the West.

The delinking approach proposed by Dependency

theorists, in order to break with the situation of

dependence, is difficult in an increasingly interrelated and

interdependent world. The experience of Mao's China, in

spite of important achievements in terms of economic

infrastructure, has suggested that it is difficult to break

up with the West if modernisation is to be achieved quickly.

In this context, the recent political and economic changes

in China are significant.

The remarkable level of development and

modernisation achieved by Japan also suggests some

limitations in both linear-evolutionary and dependency

theories of modernisation. Japan has developed in a short

span of time contradicting the notion of 'stages' in

theories of development. Furthermore, as the first non

Western nation to achieve such a competitive degree of

modernisation Japan undermines the contemporary notion that

a complete rejection of the Western model -a delinking

policy- is the only way to achieve development in the Third

World.

It is suggested that Japanese success is not so

much a result of the adoption of the Western model as it is

of its adaptation. Japan has adapted to its specific

political and socio-cultural setting what the West has to

offer in terms of development(37). In so doing, Japan, has

managed to reduce the disruptive effects of a foreign model

and achieve an integrated modernisation.

During its process of nation-building, Japan has

not only accomodated the Western model to its specific

context, but at the same time it underwent internal

adaptations and transformations. Social organisation

structures, and social norms, were used as means for

national development. Consequently, Japan has achieved what

countries like those of the Maghreb are striving for: to

modernise while preserving national cultural identity.

It is this aspect of the Japanese approach to

development which should be noted by developing countries

such as those of the Maghreb. The important aspect of this

particular example of nation-building is that in Japan a

nationalist ideology has been an essential element in the
modernisation of Japan, especially in the post Second World
War period. But, the difference between Japanese twentieth
century nationalism and the Maghrebian one is that the major
ideology of Japanese contemporary nationalism is that of
meritocracy and efficiency as motivating principles of
popular action and participation.

Popular participation has constituted the pillar of
Japanese development. Japan - an agricultural society which
lacked natural resources - has managed to transform itself
quickly into a highly industrialised nation principally
because of its people and its socio-cultral qualities. More
than any other aspect of Japanese development, it is this
aspect which is mostly relevent to the countries of the
Maghreb: emphasis on the human and socio-cultural aspects as
major resources for modernisation.

However, this strong emphasis given to the
socio-cultural development, in this thesis, neither means an
overvaluation of the socio-cultural over the economic, nor
an exclusive stress on national identity. Such an approach

would imply a 'cultural determinism' as compared with the 'economic determinism' proposed by some Western theories of development.

The argument in this thesis is that national development ought to be based on a combination of the socio-cultural and the economic as major elements to achieve an overall modernisation. In this context, the experience of Japan - where modernisation has been neither exclusively economic nor overstressing cultural authenticity - is a tempting one for the developing nations of the Maghreb. However, it must be noted that when embarking on intensive industrialisation and economic development, following World War Two, Japan posssessed a long established cultural tradition and a unifying (and developed) language. Whereas the Maghreb, due to its long colonial experience and disruptive foreign influence, is today characterized by a complex socio-linguistic situation. This situation has been complicated by overideologised cultural and linguistic policies as well as by an imported, and non adapted, model of development.

Section 2

The contemporary language situation in the

Maghreb

More than a quarter of a century after their

access to independence, the Maghrebian countries are still

trying to clarify the language issue. The policy of

Arabisation, adopted in these countries, was aimed at

restoring national cultural identity. The implementation of

the Arabisation policy concerned principally the educational

system where the French language was gradually replaced by

the Arabic language. However, the maintenance of the French

language, as the more efficient and operational language and

the existing local languages (Colloquial Arabic and Berber)

have hampered this process of Arabisation.

In Morocco, the primary and secondary cycles are

completely Arabised while French is taught as the first

foreign language. In higher education French has remained

the major medium of instruction, especially in scientific

and technological branches; while the humanities have been

Arabised. Access to higher education is therefore

conditioned by knowledge of the French language(38). In 1989

the first wave of completely Arabised students has entered

higher education, and because of the predominence of French

in this cycle the new students entering university will be

required to undertake an intensive summer course of French

language(39).

In Tunisia, the Arabic and French languages have

been simultaneously used as mediums of instruction in

primary and secondary education. In higher education French

remains the major language(40). The recent reforms of

education launched in 1987, were aimed at improving the

efficiency of the educational system. In terms of language

policy, the Arabic language was to be reinforced during the

first three years of schooling. At the same time the

teaching of the French language has been increased, starting

from the second year of primary education. The argument for

this language policy is that the Arabic language will

mainly strengthen, in the child, national sentiment and

identification with the Arabo-Islamic values. The French

language is justified on the grounds that it is the language

of scientific and technical knowledge and the means of

access to other civilizations(41).

In Algeria, the Arabisation of the primary and

secondary cycles is completed. French is only taught as the

first foreign language. In higher education Arabisation has

been completed in the humanities branches. In the scientific

branches attempts are made, this year, to introduce the use

of Arabic language as the medium of instruction(42).

However the Arabisation policy as a whole, whether

in secondary or higher education has been hampered by three

major obstacles: the lack of qualified personnel; the

scarcity of teaching material, especially in scientific

subjects; and the continuing use of the French language as

the major language of work and knowledge.

At the present time, the educational system as a

whole, in spite of its arabisation, is still producing

bilinguals who have insufficient knowledge and mastery of

both languages. The reasons are complex but include the

failure of the educational system itself in its general form

and content, and the fact that neither of the two languages

is the mother tongue or the means of social interactions. It

is Colloquial Arabic and Berber which are the major means of expression in daily life. But French, because of its operational qualities and hence its social status, is often used in social interactions, especially in Algeria(43).

It is the argument of this section that the major reason for this increasingly complex linguistic situation, particularly in Algeria, is the absence of stable and rational policies. A rational (as opposed to ideological) approach means, in general, a less politicized framing of national policies and especially language policies. More precisely, it implies that language, as an important tool of work and education, should be de-politicized and reformed in terms of its practical efficiency. A rational approach to language is also used to mean the use of, and reliance on, experts rather than politicians in language planning.

It is therefore suggested that, because of this lack of a rational approach, the language policies in the three countries of the Maghreb have failed to attain the simultaneous objectives of reinforcing national cultural identity and modernisation. French language, as the operational language for development, is less and less well

mastered by the rising generation. The same argument is valid for the Arabic language, the symbol and expression of the Arabic cultural identity.

However, from the perspective of the Maghrebian political elite, these policies are considered successful, since the Arabic language has expanded throughout the educational system. Hence their present justification for the use of a second language of wider communication, namely French, in education and other activities because it no longer is a threat to national identity(44). This could be a prelude for a more democratic debate on the language question.

The current changes in the political scene in the Maghreb, mainly in Tunisia and Algeria, may favour a more rational, that is de-policized, approach to the language issue. In Tunisia, there were changes after 1987 with the deposition of Bourguiba. The new president, Ben Ali, has undertaken a process of political, economic, and social reforms(45). However, the most important of these reforms is the recognition of the different political parties, with the exception of the religious party.

It is suggested here that these changes constitute
the premises of the establishment of a democratic system,
which will bear on the different national policies. The
approach to language is likely to be more rational, that is
de-policized, and reformulated on pragmatic bases. In this
case it will be more closely linked to development rather
than on an over ideologized cultural identity.

In Algeria, the social upheaval of October 1988
has forced the political elite to reconsider the whole
political system established since Independence. The
president, Chadli Benjedid, was forced to undertake
political, economic, and social reforms to respond to
rising popular dissatisfaction and major problems at various
levels of national life. Some of the major and pressing
problems in the Algerian society are the lack of political
participation, economic recession, and above all the
specific problems of the young generation especially in
relation to education, training and employment.

The major changes, so far, have been the reform of
the Constitution, with a more liberal political approach.
This led to the official emergence of different political
parties in the national Political scene. Hence, there seems

to be a move, here also, towards the adoption of a more

democratic political organisation. This important change,

from an authoritarian-monolitic regime to a more open

political system is likely to affect overall national

policies. Consequently, the approach to language, if a

democratic system is really applied, will have to be based,

as in Tunisa, more on rational than ideological formulas.

In Morocco, there has been no spectacular change;

especially in political terms. But it seems that the

possibilities for social reforms are appearing(46). The

unification of the five countries of North Africa (Morocco,

Tunisia, Algeria, Lybia, and Mauritania) into what they call

"L'Union du Maghreb Arabe",(U.M.A), is likely to promote

changes in this country. These will result from the

interrelationship and inter-influence, politically,

economically, and culturally, of the countries involved.

This new organisation of the Maghrebian countries

was officially created in February 1989, with the main

objectives of reinforcing political, economic, and cultural

ties among the member countries. The U.M.A is based on a

sense of common historical and social characteristics, and

similar aspirations and aims(47). This organisation, if

sustained, will mean a unified strategy concerning mainly economic and cultural cooperation(48). Therefore, the language polices will have to be reconsidered in accordance with the global development of the member countries. This means, in practice, more adapted, useful, and flexible policies than exclusively national ones. However, Morocco, Tunisia, and especially Algeria are facing two major and crucial problems in terms of language policy.

The first is that the ad-hoc policy of Arabisation which has been implemented so far has affected a whole generation of school children. Therefore, if an efficient language policy, that is socially relevant and economically useful, is to be adopted, it will be necessary to make provisions for this generation which has been affected by the previous radical language policies. This will mean the planning of intensified and adapted educational and linguistic programmes to facilitate their integration into the new socio-cultural framework.

The second is that the failure of the political, economic, and social policies, as reflected in the whole reconsideration of the monolitic political system, the economic crisis, and social unrest, have favoured the

emergence of religious fundamentalist movements. The two

immediate effects of this rising movement, in the Algerian

context, are opposition to the policy of modernisation, and

the claim for a religious Islamic state. Consequently, if

this movement, now a recognised political party in Algeria,

manages access to power, a more radical approach to

Arabisation will be stressed.

This new situation of the Mghrebian societies, in

general and Algeria in particular, calls for more clarity

and rationality, as opposed to ideology, in the options of

the political leadership regarding the choice of the desired

future image of the society and the type of model of

development to be used for its achievement. In this sense, a

choice is to be made regarding the selection of the most

relevant social and cultural features which embody national

cultural identity and at the same time promote national

development.

Once this choice is clarified, the problems and

contradictions, as reflected in language policies will be

overcome. This means that it should be made clear, at the

political level, which aspects of the national culture are

most appropriate in the process of development. It means

that the internal and external adaptations to be undertaken are clearly formulated in the overall national policies. In this context, the language issue, free from ideology, will no longer constitute a central theme of controversy. The dilemma between two different sources of references (the Arabo-Islamic and the Western) will be resolved by these adaptations and pragmatically conceived polices.

Therefore, if the political approach to national policies is altered and reformed in terms of practical efficiency rather than ideology, it will then be necessary to assess the alternatives and possibilities, in terms of language options. The Maghrebian countries and specifically Algeria, will have to look for adequate solutions to the ambiguous linguistic situation. There is a pressing need to reconsider the approach to language policies, adopted so far, and initiate a rigorous language planning.

Section 3

Language Planning: Alternative language Policies

It is the purpose of this section to investigate

the possible alternative solutions to the present language

policies in the Maghreb in general and Algeria in

particular.

The general argument for the alternative

approaches to language, in this section, is that if a more

democratically based type of political system is to emerge,

then a more pragmatic approach to national planning in

general and to language planning in particular will be

necessary. There will be a need to move away from the

predominence of ideology to pragmatism. This will involve,

in terms of language planning, the direct contribution of

experts in the field of language and related issues (eg.

education, economy, and sociology). These experts will have

firstly to assess the linguistic situation of the country

and determine the range of choices offered to them. Secondly

they will have to make proposals for language planning; they

can have insights from the of available literature on

language planning as well as from practical experiences of

other countries which had previously faced similar

linguistic problems. However these theoretical approaches

and practical experiences should be, as argued throught the

thesis, carefully analysed and adapted to local

circumstances and needs. Thirdly, it is a crucial part of

language planning to measure and foresee the constraints and

consequences of each alternative and inform public opinion

to ensure adhesion and support.

Language planning in this context implies an

organised investigation of adequate solutions to language

problems(49). However, the complex political and social

meanings and roles of language for political legitimacy and

cultural identity, as a symbol and means at the same time,

in addition to its role as an instrument for communication,

complicate the process of language planning.

Hence the different approaches to language

planning whether in theoretical or practical terms. For the

purpose of this research three major approaches to language

planning have been identified. These involve:

- The selection of a national language (Code Selection);

- The Standardisation of a language (Elaboration and

and Codification);

- Development and modernisation of the national

language(50).

These aproaches have been selected in relation to
the existing social and cultural reality of Algeria where
three possible language policies can be proposed. The three
alternative policies are part of the code selection, that is
the choice of a national language or languages constitutes
the first step in future language policies, if they are to
be undertaken. In this context the standardisation of the
local languages could be selected as a language policy as a
response to the noted importance of socio-cultural
characteristics of Algeria and mainly to the social pressure
for more attention, in national planning, to these
languages.

A- The Standardisation of the Spoken Varieties.

The spoken varieties, Colloquial Arabic and
Berber, are major features of the Algerian social context,
and are considered by many as the real expression of the
national cultural identity(51). As an integral part of the
national cultural and linguistic repertoire, it is therefore

important to take them into consideration when approaching

language planning in this country. It is necessary to

analyse, at least on a theoretical basis, the possibility of

planning of these languages. The emphasis on the

standardisation of the spoken varieties is justified by

three major arguments: the first is that there is a social

pressure, especially from the Berbers, for an official

recognition of these languages; the second is that these are

important features of the national cultural identity and

therefore require attention from the political as well as

the intellectual elite; the third is that these vernaculars

are the mother tongues of the Algerian population and

consequently have an important effect on educationl

achievement:

> There is evidence that learning the art
>
> of reading in an alphabetized version of
>
> the home vernacular is the quickest way
>
> to literacy, since the child can associate
>
> known sounds and known words and phrases
>
> with recongnizable letter sequences
>
> (52)

Although Colloquial Arabic, in general terms, is a derivative of Classical Arabic the gap between Colloquial Arabic and Classical Arabic is very important, especially in the case of Algeria. So the child is confronted with a nearly new medium when starting school. In addition, Berber is the mother tongue of an important proportion of the population who, given the national policies, are increasingly claiming the use of their language in education. However, Colloquial Arabic and Berber are undeveloped and are classified as dialects(53), hence the need to investigate the possibilities, and effects of their standardization as an aspect of language planning.

The standardization of a 'dialect' into a standard language involves a planned process, a direct and deliberate intervention into a medium of expression which has not a literary written form, as is the case of the Colloquial Arabic and Berber(54). It also involves a process of development of the language in order to adapt it to the requirements of the present time. Language planning is therefore necessary to bring a 'dialect' up to the status of language. Consequently, the study of the Colloquial Arabic and Berber, their characteristics, their homogeneity and

diversity, need to be investigated as an initial step in this planning. This involves theoretical as well as practical approaches, especially now that theoretical advances in sociolinguistics can help a systematic study of such problems. Because of the growing interest in dialects and their importance in national cultures, an increasing number of linguists, sociologists, educationalists, and principally sociolinguists, have proposed useful theories, analyses and methods of language planning, including dialect standardization(55).

In the case of Algeria the standardization of both Colloquial Arabic and Berber would be based on the general principles and processes proposed by language specialists. The general model involves the following main processes in language standardization:

- Norm selection,

- Codefication,

- Development or elaboration,

- Implementation(56)

Norm selection refers to the choice to be made regarding: the variety (or varieties) to be standardized; the specific purposes to be achieved; and the functions to

be allocated to the chosen variety. In the case of the Maghreb, this language is the spoken form of Arabic, which is characterized by both a certain homogeneity, common features and intelligibility, as well as regional differences. A second problem is the Berber language which differs morphologically and syntaxically from Arabic.

In Algeria, therefore, the promotion of a 'standard' variety, in each language, which can be grasped by the majority of the population will condition the success of this policy. If this can be achieved than the second step will be its codification.

"Codification" refers to the development of the linguistic structure of the selected variety including phonology, grammar, and lexicon. The production of dictionaries, literary texts and orthography are basic to the codification process. A crucial aspect of this process is "graphisation", that is the development of a writing system.

The development of most languages depends on the development of its writing system as an essential means for its diffusion, preservation, and growth. It is also thanks

to the existence of writing systems for languages that literacy, education and knowledge have been achieved throughout the world(57).

Graphisation, in the case of the spoken varieties of Algeria, would require the establishment of norms of pronounciation, grammar, vocabulary, and orthography. These would be different for either Colloquial Arabic or Bereber. Graphisation involves mainly the choice of a specific writing system, including the fundamental choice between syllabary and alphabetic systems.

This will present a delicate issue in the case of Algeria as a choice needs to be made between the Arabic script, the Roman script, or the invention of a new script. However, the Arabic script could easily be used for the Colloquial Arabic while the existing Berber script 'Tifinagh' could be used for Berber.

"Modernisation" (development, elaboration) of language refers to the expansion and enrichement of a language so that it will be able to "cover topics and appear in a range of forms of discourse for which it was not previously used"(58). The development of a language, or its elaboration, constitutes the major stage following the

structural change or establishment of the spoken varieties in a standard language. This process is related more to the functional aspect of the language within the society, that is the role and status of the language, rather than its structural aspect, eg. its grammar. Elaboration of language involves the expansion of its functions from a tool of interaction among individuals (as is the case of the two spoken varieties) to an appropriate vehicle for modern thought and practice. This involves the expansion of the lexicon, for each variety, by the introduction of new words, concepts, and expressions. In turn, this requires the production of glossaries, dictionaries, and new technical terms and expressions(59).

The process of implementation of such a language policy requires the contribution of the government and affiliated agencies. It will also require the contribution of linguists as well as sociolinguists, sociologists, educationalists, economists, and political scientists. In short it will require the coordinated attention of multidisciplinary authorities. This is because of the importance and centrality of language in overall national activities.

The success, or failure, of a language policy is tested at the level of its implementation. As indicated earlier, the assessment of the different choices in language planning are an important intial step. However an assessment of the positive and negative effects and the constraints (political, economic, social and cultural) is equally important before the final adoption, or rejection, of a particular policy is made.

It is the argument here that a policy of standardizing the two spoken varieties in Algeria namely Colloquial Arabic and Berber will have the following set of positive effects:

- the standardization of a comprehensive (standard) and generally accepted form of speech will stabilize and preserve the common means of expression of the Algerian population and their cultural identity.

- this policy will abolish the diaglossic situation, in the case of Colloquial Arabic, which constitutes an important obstacle in national communication and education. It will reduce and eventually eliminate the present social disparities generated by Classical Arabic and French.

- the development of these mother tongues (Colloquial Arabic

and Berber) will facilitate the child's socialisation in classroom activities and improve his educational achievement.

- As the real means of expression of the Algerian society, and therefore the true vehicles of national cultural identity, these two languages will be more politically and socially legitimated.

However, this particular policy will generate important problems and constraints which must be noted:

- the first constraint is that the standardisation of both Colloquial Arabic and Berber will take time and money, which a developing country like Algeria cannot afford at the present time.

- during the process of standardising these two vernaculars, there will be a need to maintain the use of a modern language, eg. French. This will not improve the already complex linguistic situation in Algerian society.

- Once standardised, these spoken languages will be enclosed in specific and established grammatical and lexical rules to which the spoken form does not presently comply. Thus, in their new form (standardised and developed) these languages will lack the natural and spontaneous

characteristics of the spoken form.

- the eventual option for either or both vernaculars as the
official national language(s) will generate important
political and social problems. It will be difficult to
achieve a general consensus regarding the variety to be
standardized. This will lead to further division among the
population.

Thus, the standardization of the spoken
vernaculars as a solution to the present language-related
problems, in the Maghrebian context in general and the
Algerian in particular, will be problem-generating.

However, as the major languages of the majority
of the population and the means of cultural expression and
preservation, Colloquial Arabic and Berber, constitute, in
the Algerian context, important elements of the national
cultural identity. These vernaculars, in fact, have
transmitted, for generations, national traditions, values,
and feelings of Algerian society in ways in which the two
other languages (classical Arabic and French) are not able
to do. This is because, in their present form are
ill-adapted to the socio-cultural context of Algeria.
Consequently, Colloquial Arabic and Berber should be

accounted for in any language planning. the language

policies adopted so far have failed to provide structures

for the preservation or consolidation of these languages. In

fact, the strong emphasis on the classical form of Arabic as

the only national language was aimed at the eventual

eradication of Colloquial Arabic, perceived as a 'corrupt'

form of the Classical language, and Berber, perceived as a

threat to national unity. In the Algerian context, mainly

because of the restrictive type of political system, any

claim for these vernaculars was 'taboo', and considered as

anti-nationalist. There is today a pressing need to assess,

to attempt to standardize, and to develop these mediums

which constitute essential elements of the Algerian

personality and cultural identity. This might be achieved in

the long run, but presently, it is necessary to look for

other alternative solutions to the language problems in the

Maghreb in general and Algeria in particular.

In this context, and because of the radical option

for Arabic adopted in Algeria particularly, the second

alternative in terms of language planning, would be the

modernisation of the Arabic language. This solution could be

considered as an intermediate solution between the

Classical and Colloquial Arabic, between the oral and

written forms of the Arabic language.

B- The Modernisation of the Arabic Language.

        The purpose of the modernisation of the Arabic

language is firstly to create a variety of the Arabic

language which responds to the needs of national unity and

cultural identity. A modernised form of the Arabic language

would constitute a link between the spoken form, the major

expression of the national cultural heritage, and the

Classical form, the language of the Islamic religion,

tradition and knowlege. Secondly, once modernised and

adapted to the present needs, this new form of the Arabic

language could replace the foreign languages, as a viable

and competitive instrument for scientific and technological

interactions. Thirdly, a modernised form of the Arabic

language, bridging the gap between the spoken and written

varieties, would eliminate the diaglossia characterizing

this language.

        The major argument for this solution is that

the Arabic language, in its present condition does not

respond to the specific cultural and linguistic

characteristics of Algerian society, nor is it adapted to

contemporary scientific and technological thought and

practice.

Hence, in relation to the general argument of the

thesis stressing the necessity of internal (as well as

external) adaptations, and in order to fulfill the major

national objectives of cultural identity and

nation-building, the Arabic language needs to be modernised.

The modernisation of the Arabic language will

involve both its general structure ,'corpus', as well as its

role in society ,'status', planning'(60). Corpus planning

involves the changes and innovations in the form and content

of the language. Status planning involves the expansion of

its functions in the society and its place in relation to

other languages. The modernisation of the corpus of the

Arabic, that is its morphology, will aim principally at

equipping the presently rigid form of the language with more

flexibility in word-formation and sentence building. This

will facilitate intervention in the language, that is

bringing into the Arabic language innovation, translation,

and invention. In other words, a more flexible morphology of

the language would make it easier to adapt to modern thought

and increase its modern vocabulary. This will affect the status planning of the language. The fusion of the spoken varieties with the Classical language, through word borrowing and structure adaptation, along with the simplification of the Classical form, will produce a 'standard' language more easily accessible to the population. The status of the language will improve as its role in the society and its functions in the educational and economic contexts become palpable. It is, however, the corpus planning which is the most difficult in the overall development of the language.

The corpus planning of the Arabic language will concentrate on the modernisation and adaptation of the structure of the language, especially its writing system and grammar which constitute the principal difficulties in its learning and diffusion(61). Arabic writing is commonly known to be difficult. It has two major areas of difficulty: the first one is the plurality of letter variations (intitial, medial, and terminal), for example the letter 't' will vary in its written form depending on whether it comes at the beginning, middle, or end of a word. The second is the absence of vowel signs(62), the absence of vowel letters

which are the equivalent of 'a','o', 'e', 'i' etc. Children,
or beginners, learn Arabic with stress marks over the
letters (- , o _) which indicate the way in which the
consonants are to be pronounced. These kinds of technical
problems constitute a burden on the learner to understand
and use the different letters and make correct spelling
difficult. This difficulty in language acquisition,
especially reading, is complicated by the absence of
punctuation (apart from the fullstop). The other area of
difficulty of the present writing system is printing, as a
great deal of time, effort, and expenses are needed to use
the vast number of variations for a printing system.

There have been, in recent history, especially
after the Second World War, proposals to improve the Arabic
writing system. Two major approaches could be mentioned: one
proposal favours the simplification of the Arabic writing
system, mainly by reducing letter variation to a
minimum(63). A modified and simplified Arabic writing system
was advocated on the argument that although the changes
would affect the tradition, they would facilitate reading,
writing and printing; and consequently promote literacy in
the Arab world. The other proposal favours a radical change

of the script and its replacement by the Roman Alphabet, as happened in Turkey in 1932(64). The position of Romanizing the Arabic script(65) was justified on the grounds that the Roman script was more widely used and more efficient. Its adoption would facilitate communication with most parts of the world. The major criticism directed against this proposal is that the Roman Alphabet lacks symbols for some Arabic consonnants. This approach was also rejected by the 'Classicists' of the Arabic Academies who favour the preservation of the Arabic script.

The other major difficulty in the modernisation of the structure of the Arabic language is its grammar. Arabic grammar is characterized by the complexity of its rules, exemplified mainly in the great number of 'exceptions' resulting in a multiplicity of grammatical terminology(66). This creates important problems in education in the Arab world. The method of its teaching is maintained in archaic form as a means of preserving the 'purity' and 'richness' of the Arabic language. There have been, since the late Forties and early Fifties, various proposals to simplify, or reform, Arabic grammar as an essential basis for the modernisation of the language(67).

However, these proposals were also rejected by the traditionalists-classicists who control the academies. They argued that the present grammatical structure is an essential foundation of the Arabic language and the major asset for the preservation of its purity. This attitude has hampered any progress in language modernisation.

The modification of the structure of the Arabic language, principally its script and grammar, will lead to the transformation of its content as it becomes more precise and flexible and more easily able to absorb modern terminology. The introduction of new terms, concepts, and ideas into the language is needed, because at the present time the 'poverty' of the Arabic language lies principally in its inability to produce adequate vocabulary for scientific and technological innovations. The Arabic language, once a language of science, has become today a mere borrower of foreign terminology, without any process of adaptation to the patterns of the language. This has led not only to the static, even impoverished, state of the Arabic language, but the 'invasion' by words and expressions which do not convey properly the knowledge to be transmitted. But

this innovation, in terms of vocabulary, and language cultivation cannot be achieved if the structure of language itself is not modified.

The status of the language in the society depends essentially on its expressive power, communicative strength, and functions in different socio-political and economic activities(68). Improvements in status will result firstly from the 'corpus' planning of the language with the transformation of its structure and content according to modern and scientific norms. Hence, becoming more operational, and more useful, it will become more viable and thus more acceptable. The simpler characteristics of a modernised form of the Arabic language, its adaptation to contemporary requirements, its use in education, work, and daily communications will have an effect on its status and expansion. Its diffusion in the society will depend on the means and ways used for its modernisation and implementation.

The process of the modernisation of the Arabic language and its effective use at all levels of national activities will be determined by the efficiency of its development. This process of developing the language will

require the joint efforts of multidisciplinary specialists, especially linguists, sociolinguists, and educationalists. They with the politicians will make the fundamental decisions and devise the best ways of bringing about the changes and implementing them.

As a national issue, with its political, economic, socio-cultural and educational implications, it is the responsibility of the state to organise and administer this policy. A National Commission of these experts could be set up to investigate and assess the possibilities and consequences of the policy. The role of the educationalists, for instance, would be to consider the ways in which it would be educationally efficient and how the educational system would contribute to its expansion. The educationalists will ensure that the appropriate educational facilities, human and material, are available.

The modernisation of the Arabic language will, therefore, require a major effort but this is not an impossible task. Any language can be developed and modernised if its people are motivated to do so and if the social and economic contexts are also developed. It is necessary, and urgent, if this language is to be preserved,

to undertake the process of its modernisation and adaptation
to the requirements of our times. This, in fact, could have
been initiated, in the Maghrebian countries since their
access to independence, as well as other Arab countries.
But, in these different countries, ideology in general and
its relation to the language issue in particular has shaped
language planning. The language question has been used as a
means of political or/and religious legitimacy rather than a
subject of scientific inquiry.

Thus, the modernisation of the Arabic language,
as a pressing issue, will have the following major positive
effects:

- once modernised the Arabic language will help recover a
  much desired national cultural identity, based on the
  Arabo-Islamic heritage.
- bridging the gap between the Classical and Spoken
  languages will strengthen national unity and identity and
  produce a richer culture through this symbiosis:

> Diaglossia itself can be a source
> of creativity within a given language
> once the two versions of the language

begin to be bridged. Then, and only

then, would the language as a whole

acquire different levels of meaning

and a range of nuances not otherwise

available in any one version.

(69)

- it will become a more efficient instrument in achieving

national progress, and hence becomes more viable and

competitive in relation to other languages.

- it will have an important bearing on education as an

efficient medium of instruction. The educational

task will be facilitated as the teaching and learning

processes will be carried out in a language easily

grasped by all, as it will embody elements and expressions

of the Spoken language.

- once it is able to convey scientifc and technological

knowledge, it will reduce dependence on the French

language and the related problems of importing a foreign

language.

The modernisation of the Arabic language could be

presented as the most viable solution to the language

problem in Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian countries.

However, there are a number of constraints and obstacles to this which have hampered the process of modernisation of this language. The major obstacle is related to attitudes towards this language. The Arabic language, as the expression of Islam and its Holy book has given it a certain prestige and sanctity among the Arab and Muslim community. Hence it was maintained untouched as attempts to change it have been regarded as prejudicial to the purity of the language. This mythic view of the language on the one hand, and on the other hand the important role this language played as a language of civilization, culture, and science in the past are used as major arguments by the classicists for its maintenance in its traditional form. To modernise it, efficiently, implies, as suggested above, dramatic changes in the orthography, grammar, and vocabulary. This, according to the classicists will affect the purity of the language and the ultimately whole of Arabo-Islamic thought and civilization.

It has been, in fact, the role of the Arab Academies to undertake the process of moderinsing the Arabic language. But their number hides the diversity and lack of consensus about principles and means and ways of bringing

about this modernisation. There are at least four Academies: the Syrian, established in 1918-1919, the Egyptian in 1932, the Iraqi in 1947(70). The most recently established is the Algerian in 1986. These Academies each produce an official journal and other publications related to contemporary Arabic linguistic, cultural, and educational problems. Their work mostly stresses the 'glorious past' of the Arabic language and literature. The Academies leaders resist any influences from the Colloquials and loan words from abroad(71). The Egyptian Academy stands out as an exception. Real efforts have been made to modernise the Arabic language and adapt it to modern thought and practice(72). However, in general these attempts and others are strongly resisted by the classicists who control these Academies.

There has been, since the Second World War, increasing pressure from the young generation of intellectuals either to standardize the Colloquials or bridge the gap between the two varieties. But this was constantly resisted. The Colloquials, in the different parts of the Arab world, are seen by these tradtionalist Academecians as corrupt, and corrupting, versions of Classical Arabic. The preference is for the expansion of the

Classical language through formal education. In this context the general aims of the Damas Academy, for instance, are significant:

> ... To protect and preserve the Arabic language against the dangers threatening it, particularly against the dialect phenomenon of which the immediate consequences are manifest in the violation of the integrity of the language and its foundations...
>
> (73)

Thus, there has been a deliberate policy of maintaining the Arabic language in its present undeveloped form, by 'specialists' and by politicians of the different Arab countries, including those of the Maghreb. The process of modernisation of the Arabic language would require a change of approach in political terms. It also requires the allocation of human and material resources.

Consequently this solution, though attractive is costly in time and resources. Hence the need to look for another alternative solution to the language problem, in the Algerian context particularly. This alternative is that of an Arabic French bilingualism.

C. Arabic-French Bilingualism.

The purpose of this alternative approach to
language planning is to propose an immediate solution,
principally in education, in order to achieve the desired
objectives of national identity and modernisation. As an
immediate solution, bilingualism, in the Algerian context,
will solve the language problems faced with the present
language policy, especially in education.

The main arguments are that there is, firstly, a
de-facto situation of Arabic-French bilingualism in
Algerian society at all levels of national activities.
However, this bilingualism is endured rather than
welcomed(74). Furthermore, because the policy is not
officially stated, its implementation is disorganised and
inefficiently planned. Secondly, the pressing need to hasten
the process of modernisation and the increasing
internationalisation of world relations, require the use of
a language of wide communication such as French. Thirdly,

the Arabic language, in its present condition, cannot fulfil the major aims given to it in the area of modern scientific and technological knowledge and activities.

A planned and well organised bilingualism will involve, above all, a specification of the objectives to be achieved and the roles to be attributed to each language. This will facilitate the processes of its adoption by the society at large as well as by those concerned with its implementation.

The role of the Arabic language will be to maintain and preserve the national cultural identity, largely drawn from the Arabo-Islamic tradition, and reinforce national unity. The role of the French language will be principally that of a means of access to modern scientific and technological knowledge. The Arabic language will facilitate and strengthen relations and interractions with the Arab and Islamic countries, while French will facilitate and strengthen relations and interractions with the rest of the world. Consequently, through these two languages, a broader international integration could be achieved.

The institutionalisation of a functional

bilingualism means the adoption of a clearly defined policy

and its insertion into educational planning with

legislative, economic, and educational provisions. The

necessary means for the implementation and diffusion of this

policy and its possible consequences for the social and

educational sectors should be rigorously assessed. This

language policy would necessarily involve an option for a

specific form of bilingualism in terms of practical steps,

especially at the level of implementation. It might be

useful to look at policies of bilingualism, mainly bilingual

education, in other contexts and draw relevant examples in

the planning of a bilingual education and try to adapt it to

the Algerian context.

Studies of bilingualism, in countries such as the

United States of America, Canada, the U.S.S.R, Belgium,

Suitzerland and others, often concentrate on the analysis of

the roles and relationships of the languages involved in

education. The choice of the role attributed to each

language bears on the type of bilingualism to be adopted

particularly whether it is a 'transtion-oriented' or

'maintenance oriented'(75). In the former the mother tongue

is used for a determined period in the educational system, along with the major language. The main objective of this type of bilingualism is to unable the child to adjust to the learning process through the use of the medium most familiar to him. In the United States, for instance, English is introduced gradually, but increasingly to become the major medium of instruction in the secondary cycle, while the mother tongue (Spanish, Portuguese, or Italian) is taught in the primary cycle of education. The ultimate aim of such a language policy is to move from a bilingual situation to a monolingual one on the basis of a unifying national language (English). Hence, as a set of practices, bilingualism in the United States is only transitional.

In 'maintenance oriented' bilingualism there is a stable and balanced distribution of the two languages in the curriculum and throughout the three cycles of the educational system. This type of bilingualism aims at maintaining the two (or more) languages in the society concerned, that is opting for a bilingual (or multilingual) type of society as is the case in Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, the U.S.S.R and so on.

In the specific case of Arabic-French bilingualism in Algeria, a combination of these two approaches can be applied. A transition-oriented bilingualism would involve the Arabic language, as the mother tongue, as the first and major medium of instruction in the first years of the primary cycle; the French language will be introduced in this cycle from the second or the third year. Both languages, Arabic and French, are given a balanced and even distribution from the secondary cycle principally.

The purpose of such an approach is to achieve a relatively equal mastery of the basic skills of the two languages. In this context, teaching material, syllabuses, teaching methods, must be provided for in both languages. Translation would be here of crucial importance. In terms of time-tables, the "concurrent approach" used in some American bilingual programmes can be adopted(76). This means a 'balanced' time allocation in the use of the two languages should be applied for all subjects of the curriculum. Consequently, the profeciency of the pupil in the two languages will be more easily achieved as he is socialised into recognising, and separating, the grammatical structures

and language characteristics. This will enable him to avoid language interferences occuring in the case of second language learning with a limited time and subject allocation(77). The mastery of these linguistic skills will better prepare the pupil for higher education where the distribution of the two languages becomes functional: each will be used for specific subjects and specialisation.

The major argument for this form of bilingualism consists in achieving a "balanced and coordinated" knowledge of both languages(78), that is a well organised and equal knowledge of the two languages. This will affect social attitudes towards the Arabic language as it becomes functionally equal to the French language at the national level.

However, the achievement of this objective of a balanced competence in the two languages depends on the assumption that they have both reached a similar level of development. If this was the case, would make the need for bilingualism absolete because, if the Arabic language achieves a level of development similar to that of French, it will fulfill the functions requiring the use of French.

The two languages will then become "functionally redundent"(79). Consequently the maintenance of an Arabic-French bilingualism will become unjustified.

But, in the Algerian context, because of the equal emphasis on national identity and modernisation, both Arabic and French languages are needed at the present time. Hence the adoption bilingualism of would be useful as an immediate solution, at least for a transitory period, until the Arabic language is modernised and adapted to the requirement of modern times.

Bilingualism has become a major concern in most parts of the world; but it has remained a complex and controversial issue. As an increasingly worldwide phenomenon, bilingualism has been a privileged theme of research, especially since World War Two, yielding an impressive array of literature(80).

Early studies on bilingualism, before the 1940s, were mostly undertaken by psychologists and educationalists(81). These studies concentrated on the psychological and intellectual development of the individual and his adaptation to his social environment. It was asserted that psychological and educational problems were

noted in bilingual children(82). However, interest in

bilingualism, especially in education, has risen since 1945

as a consequence of the development of international

relations and the expansion of communication means and

networks(83). The emergence of some strong and widespread

languages, mainly English, French, Russian, and Spanish, as

languages of 'wider communication', has largely contributed

to the expansion of bilingualism and fostered further

intellectual interest in the subject. The establishment of

new political entities, with heterogeneous cultural and

linguistic populations, has also contributed to the

development of this phenomenon.

Nevertheless, an emphasis on the negative

effects of bilingualism continued to predominate in the

literature. Bilingualism was perceived as the cause of the

low scores of intelligence tests produced by bilinguals as

compared to their monolingual contreparts. Psychological

disturbances and afflictions, such as mental alienation and

even schizophrenia, are attributed to bilingualism. Haugen

Einar introduced in 1962 a new 'ailment' resulting from the

individual's exposure to two, or more, languages, called

"schizoglossia". It refers to:

... the conflict which arises within the
individual speaker when he becomes
uncertain as to what he ought to say and
write because the linguistic item is
presented to him in more than one way.

(84)

These 'disruptive' effects of bilingualism were
reviewed by linguists who were concerned with the lingustic
proficiency of the bilingual and the interference and
confusion arising between the two languages used. The
linguists claimed that the individual's language learning
ability is divided between two languages and consequently
his linguistic performance will be limited. The structures
of the languages themselves are altered as components of one
of the languages is often introduced in the other(85).

Sociologists have underlined another aspect of the
'negative' effects of bilingualism. It was seen as an
obstacle to social integration, social equality, and
national cultural development(86). These 'traditional'
attitudes towards bilingualism and its drawbacks which still

prevail in an important number of recent researches, have
largely influenced language and education planners in their
position to bilingualism.

However, 1960s research, initiated mainly by
Elizabeth Pearl and Lambert Wallace questioned the validity
of these findings about the negative effects of
bilingualism(87). Their main argument was that the earlier
theories on bilingualism failed to take into account
essential factors, such as the social class background and
educational opportunities of the bilinguals who were
investigated. This new approach, based on the socio-cultural
context of the groups investigated, achieved radically
different results from the previous ones. It showed that the
linguistic, intellectual, and educational performances of
bilinguals was much higher than that of their monolingual
peers(88).

The work of Pearl and Lambert marked a new trend
in the research about bilingualism and its effects on the
individual and the society. Most of the subsequent studies,
characterized by a plurisciplinary approach and based on
contextual variables, produced findings favouring
bilingualism. The results showed that bilingual children

gained high scores on measures of cognitive flexibility

'diversified structure of intelligence', creativity, and

mental development(89). The stress of these studies

continued to be the socio-cultural context in analysing the

effects of bilingualism(90). These new approaches,

emphasizing the advantages of bilingualism, may justify its

adoption.

In the case of the Maghreb in general and Algeria

in particular, and in addition to the advocated general

advantages of bilingualism, Arabic-French bilingualism is

justified in this thesis by the following major arguments:

- the strategic geographic position of the country as

  a link between the Arab and Western worlds.

- the historical impact of the French language, along

  with the Arabic, has meant that they have become integral

  parts of the socio-cultural and linguistic characteristics

  of the society.

- the process of nation-building and development, based

  essentially on Western thought and practice, requires

  the use of the French language, whereas the Arabic

  language is the expression and symbol of the

  Arabo-Islamic national cultural identity.

- the linguistic and cultural contacts of the two

  languages will constitute a source of a cultural

  enrichment and progress for the society.
- in the process of modernisation, the use of the two

  languages will part of the necessary internal and

  external adaptations.

However, there are some important constraints and obstacles to be considered when planning this policy of Arabic-French bilingualism in Algeria.

The major obstacle is political, since the language issue has been raised in political terms. The adoption of Arabic as the official national language has been used as a means for political-power legitimacy and a reaction against the former colonial power. Hence there will be a need for other means of political legitimacy (such as a more democratic system and efficient policies); and a new approach to the French language, which will have to be viewed as an asset rather than an instrument of foreign domination.

The second obstacle is economic. The maintenance of two languages will necessitate important investments, especially in education. This will increase the financial

pressures on this developing nation. Financial provision could be obtained from the joint contribution of the state and private capital.

The third obstacle is <u>socio-cultural</u>. The French language is not, first of all, the mother tongue of any social group in this country. Consequently, it more difficult to legitimate, compared with Canada or Belgium, for example, where each of the two languages is the mother tongue of a proportion of the population.

Modernisation, and access to the international community are perhaps the main possible sources of legitimation

The option for bilingualism as an immediate solution for the language question in Algeria is not an end in itself but a transitional solution towards a new linguistic situation, until Arabic is modernised and developed. Arabic-French bilingualism appears to be the most practical answer to the current language issue, while the Arabic language is developed and modernised and the local dialects are promoted. Then the Arabic language, as an operational language, will be used as the unifying national

language. The Colloquials will also be able to find a place in the society which uses French language as the main second language for international integration.

However, excessive optimism should not be attached to these proposed solutions. It has finally to be stressed that a very great deal depends on political developments. At the time of writing, with the success of traditionalists in the Algerian local elections, the complex interrelationship between politics, economics, culture, schooling and language policy is likely to continue to change, in scale, and at multiple levels(91). The future of the language issue in the Maghreb is not simplistically predictable.

Chapter V

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> Politics - indeed educational policies -
> can be used to further, transform, or
> destroy a social, cultural or national
> identity and...affect groups or
> individuals in different levels of scale
> of change...

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