

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN EDUCATION:

**A Study of Education Aid Policies and Management - with
Particular Reference to British and Swedish ~~Bilateral~~
Aid in Zambia, 1964-1989.**

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Thesis

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DEDICATION

To

My Father - Ba Kaluba Wali Langazye

and

My Mother - Ba Adesi Mwale

ABSTRACT

The study analyses the following aspects within the framework of international cooperation in education development: development trends in the Zambian education and training sector, aid process and coordination in Zambia, and foreign aid responses to Zambia's education development. The cases of British and Swedish aid to education and training are examined more closely for their policy changes and relevancy to Zambia's needs. The study has also sought to determine the position of donors on aspects of aid coordination in Zambia.

Because aid operates in overlapping frameworks and responds to many signals. The study has therefore adopted a holistic approach in its analysis of the issues. The following analytic and theoretical frameworks have been used in the study: the systems analysis, the supplementary aid theory, and the exchange and power-dependency theory in interorganisation relationship. The methodology used is qualitative descriptive critical analysis.

The findings indicate that the whole realm within which aid relationships are conducted is characterised by a complex mosaic of objectives and interests.

British aid to education and training for example has been structured in a way which is intended to make it responsive to a wide-ranging set of objectives in Britain and in the overseas aid constituency. Swedish aid too has a diversified and equally complex aid framework and goals. This is still undergoing changes in approach and method.

The findings of this study show that aid responses to education and training in Zambia has been given in the context described above. The aid relationships which has existed between Zambia and donors have accordingly been fairly complex. Consequently, some of the analytic frameworks used in this study have been found inadequate to explain some of the field experiences in Zambia's and donors' aid relationships.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAU	The Association of African Universities.
ADB	African Development Bank.
ANC	African National Congress (Zambia).
BAT	British-American Tobacco.
BESS	British Expatriates Supplementation Scheme.
BPP	Book Presentation Programme.
CDC	Curriculum Development Centre.
CCZ	Christian Council of Zambia.
CBI	Confederation of British Industries.
CBU	Copperbelt University.
CAFOD	Catholic Fund for Overseas Development.
CFTC	Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation.
CPR	Country Policy Review.
DTEVT	Department of Technical Education and Vocational Training.
DMDT	Directorate of Manpower Development and Training.
EBS	Education Broadcasting Services.
ELBS	English Language Book Society.
EEC	European Economic Community.
EAD	External Assistance Department.
EDP	Emergency Development Plan.
ETC	Economic and Technical Cooperation.
ESAURP	East and Southern African Universities Research Project.
ESDIIP	Education Sector's Development Investment and Implementation Plan.
ERIP	Education Reform Implementation Project.
ESP	English for Special Purposes.
FARI	Foreign Affairs Research Institute.
FNDP*	Fourth National Development Plan.
FINNIDA	Finish International Development Agency.
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
FNDP	First National Development Plan.
FAC	Foreign Affairs Committee.

GRZ Government of the Republic of Zambia.

GTZ Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit.

GDP Gross Domestic Product.

HEDCO Higher Education Development Corporation.

HRD Human Resource Development.

HMG Her Majesty's Government.

IIEP International Institute for Education Planning.

IMF International Monetary Fund.

INDP Interim National Development Plan.

IUC Inter-University Council.

JFS Joint Funding Scheme.

JSSLE Junior Secondary School Leaving Certificate.

KTH Royal Institute of Technology (Stockholm).

KKF Kenneth Kaunda Foundation.

KELT Key English Language Teacher.

LCTH Lusaka College for the Teachers of the Handicapped.

MDO Manpower Development Officer.

MGEC Ministry of General Education and Culture.

MGEYS Ministry of General Education, Youth and Sport.

MHE Ministry of Higher Education.

MHEST Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology

ME Ministry of Education.

MLNRS Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources.

NCDP Nationall Commission for Development Plan.

NERP New Economic Recovery Programme.

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation.

NCCM Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines.

NLS National Land Survey of Sweden.

NORAD Norwegian Development Agency.

ODM Ministry of Overseas Development.

OSAS Overseas Supplementation Aid Scheme.

OST Overseas Student Trust.

ODA Overseas Development Administration.

ODASS ODA Shared Scholarship Scheme.

PSP	Practical Subjects Project.
P/TC	Policy and Technical Cooperation.
PTA	Parent Teachers Association.
PIP	Public Investment Programme.
SIDA	Swedish International Development Authority.
SHAPE	Self-Help Action Plan in Education.
SNDP	Second National Development Plan.
SAREC	Swedish Agency for Research in Developing Countries.
SPP	School Population Project.
TCR	Triangular Colonial relationship.
TCTP	Technical Cooperation Training Programme.
TATD	Technical Assistance Training Department.
TNDP	Third National Development Plan.
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation.
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees.
UNIP	United National Independence Party.
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme.
UNU	United Nations University.
USSR	Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic.
UNZA	University of Zambia.
VSO	Voluntary Service Overseas.
ZIT	Zambia Institute of Technology.
ZASTI	Zambia Air Services Training Institute.
ZAMSTEP	Zambia Mathematics and Science Teachers Education Programme.
ZEMP	Zambia Education Materials Project.
ZCTU	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions.
ZNUT	Zambia National Union of Teachers.
ZLS	Zambia Library Service.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Aid to Education and Training Development:

A Historical and Current Perspective

External aid to education and training development in developing countries has been long standing. This support in what then were mainly dependencies and colonies, started appearing long before the outbreak of the first world war in 1914. Christian missionaries, philanthropic foundations and colonial governments typified the parties that provided assistance to missionary and colonial education development.¹ This triangular colonial relationship (TCR) around which the education crusade was centred marked the origins of international co-operation in overseas education development.² In this relationship some Christian missionaries not only received regular educational grants from colonial governments and their home constituencies, they also co-operated with other missionaries and philanthropic foundations in working out educational strategies for developing African education. A rider to this observation is that the recipients of colonial and missionary education were rarely consulted on western education programmes that were designed for and later imposed on them.

It is important to note that these agencies created external influence situations that were no less complex than what faces aid recipient countries today. Inter-agency competition, conflict, cooperation, and hidden agendas which characterises contemporary aid relationships, were an integral feature in early inter-agency relationships.³ No sooner had missionaries entered new lands than they searched for suitable stations and broader areas of influence. Such expeditions were sometimes challenged by rival counterparts. Thus evangelisation and education development became immersed in what superficially appeared to be ecclesiastical rivalry, but which frequently entailed foreign policy expeditions and major power struggles involving their national governments. The significance of this reflection is that it helps one to see today's aid transactions in a much broader historical and political perspective.

It was not until the post-independence era (1960s) that many newly independent nations saw a rapid growth, diversification and spread of official external aid in their national development sectors away from the unitary or even monopolistic influence of the former colonial powers. Seeking a historical repeat of the post-war aid-supported European economic recovery and development, many Northern governmental and non-governmental organisations became involved in giving external aid to developing countries.

The designation by the UN of the 1960s as a 'Development Decade' and the subsequent UNESCO sponsored regional educational conferences (Karachi 1960, Addis Ababa 1961, Santiago 1962) served to bring to the attention of national governments and the international community the problems of education development in newly independent states and the scope for international assistance. The conferences helped to set up broad educational objectives from which individual countries drew their own education blue-prints and to which aid donors presumably were expected to respond.⁴ Education and training then were accorded a priority rating by both developing countries and external aid agencies, and educational assistance increased steadily in this period and in most years up to the early 1970s. In carrying out the tasks of drawing up educational plans many developing countries' governments were assisted by international education commissions, or experts from international agencies, especially UNESCO. These undertook detailed surveys of educational provision and gave their recommendations, often in the form of highly specific manpower plans, education plans and project specifications.

In 1963, at the request of the first majority-rule government, a UNESCO commission comprising a group of Australian specialists visited Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) to investigate and report on the country's state of education in light of the Addis Ababa conference

recommendations. The Northern Rhodesia government also commissioned an Anglo-American group led by Sir John Lockwood, master of Birkbeck College, University of London, to advise on the development of a local University. Three months after Zambia's attainment of political independence in 1964, a UN inter-agency economic survey missions under the chairmanship of Dudley Seers, visited Zambia. Its terms of reference gave prominence to the state of education and manpower. The Transitional and First National Development Plans were based on the findings and recommendations of this survey, which found education and lack of skilled manpower to be the most serious handicaps Zambia faced at independence.⁵

Following this the government drew up a comprehensive education expansion programme for the country, covering the three main education sectors. Despite a massive increase in public resources, Zambia could not afford to fund the entire programme from its own resources. Hence recourse to external assistance became inevitable, and was strongly encouraged by the new nation's international economic advisers because education and training had been designated priority service sectors in the country's development process.⁶ Consequently, many donors directed their assistance to the two sectors. Because of the scale of the expansion programme donor assistance covered many aspects, including capital, technical and software assistance. As

Zambia's development prospects and problems continued to unfold, the government in keeping with its policy of non-alignment diversified its sources of external aid. Thus, both Western governmental and non-governmental organisations, and Eastern bloc governments became involved in Zambia's education and training. This of course availed the government of diverse resources with which it was able to cope more effectively with the dramatic expansion of the physical plant and the huge increase in enrolments.

For Britain the aid relationship with Zambia was not entirely new, but a continuation of the historical links through the medium of external aid and many other channels. It was also a demonstration by both parties that, while Britain's coloniser status in Northern Rhodesia had ceased on Zambia's independence day, her obligation to support her former colony's development remained. And, in any case, the legal, social and economic institutions with which Zambia embarked upon her development programme had been created and were still being manned in many cases by British colonial or ex-colonial civil servants. By contrast, the aid relationship of many western and eastern bloc countries with Zambia was based on a historical relationship with UNIP as an independence movement, and the then current political fashion of the industrialised world to associate themselves with the development problems of newly independent states. Therefore, for many industrialised countries Zambia's

attainment of independence offered opportunities to widen political, social and economic relationships. Assistance given to education and training training played strategic roles in strengthening and widening the scope of these relationships.

External aid to Zambia's education and training sectors can be put into two broad categories, technical aid in the form of training scholarships tenable in donor countries, and capital or technical assistance used in Zambia. The latter category of support (capital and technical) is often provided as a mix of both transferable and non-transferable external assistance. Over the years since Zambia's attainment of independence many donor countries and multilateral agencies have become involved in giving assistance to the two Ministries of Education. Each donor country has carved out a special enclave of concentration for its assistance. In so doing almost every aspect of education and training has been touched by the donorisation process. Against this background are a set of different aid policies and priorities which aid institutions are mandated to pursue.

1.2 Official Stand on Foreign Aid

Until the launching of the New Economic Recovery Programme (NERP), under the Interim National Development Plan in 1987, Zambia's official stand on foreign aid had been mainly that of maintaining neutrality on its sources of external assistance. This can be said to be the cornerstone of Zambia's official stand on foreign aid. For a long time no official attention had been paid to the conditions and working of aid in the Zambian development environment. The NERP therefore was the first public concern registered on development aid. The programme introduced tight criteria for the selection and prioritisation of aided projects, and introduced also a whole range of organisational measures to accompany the proposals.⁷ This represented an extraordinary step. It was the first time that external aid to Zambia was ostensibly subjected to such exacting measures of scrutiny (see priority weightings in the appendix).

Unfortunately these measures have never been implemented, which suggests that the exercise could have been merely an act of defiance and despair taken against the background of the social consequences of the IMF economic measures in Zambia. The step reflected also an attempt by the government to show the public that they were in control of the domestic affairs. This was particularly important during the internal crisis caused by the IMF economic measures. However, two recent events at different levels indicate that the organisation and administration of

external aid in Zambia has not changed. The Ministry of General Education, Youth and Sport (MGEYS) review committee on foreign aid to the sector found in 1989 the existence of some of anomalies which NERP had attempted to redress. The present (1990) attempt by the Public Investment Programme (PIP) to create an External Assistance Department (EAD)⁸ in Zambia for aid coordination provides further evidence that, the 1987 measures were never effected or had simply failed hence the new initiative.

1.3 The Study

1.3.1 Statement of the Problem

Zambia's external aid map for the education and training sectors indicates as in many other recipient countries a multiplicity of donors. This is apparent from the range of programmes and projects receiving external assistance in the two ministries of education. Besides the main donors, Britain, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Canada, the MGEYS and the MHEST have recently been offered diversified technical aid from an ideologically diverse number of countries, such as Saudi Arabia, USSR, China, and Japan. The Japanese are currently working in a Human Resource Development Project (HRDP) in the Department of Technical Education and Vocational Training (DTEVT) and have also just committed themselves to build two junior secondary schools. China has

favourably responded to the Zambian request to provide lecturers for the country's technical colleges,⁹ whereas the USSR has pledged to help build a technical college in Chipata, and Saudi Arabia is still considering its offer to build three junior secondary schools. The EEC is supporting a Zambian Mathematics and Science Teacher(s) Education Project (ZAMSTEP), and the UNDP is managing the Zambia Science Equipment Production Project.

Aid to education has become so extensive and complex that a recent study of Zambian education observed that it is difficult to get a comprehensive picture of the total aid programme in the education and training sector.¹⁰

Donors as a group are very diverse, each one of them has its own status in relation to economic and political power in the international community, historical linkages with Zambia's development process, the size of its overseas aid constituency, domestic education doctrines, aid policies to education and training, project administration and management styles and practices. This has given Zambia an undeniable opportunity to learn from varied international educational experiences and practices. It also means that in principle Zambia has enormous external resources at her disposal.

However, given the donor community's complex profile, a multiplicity of aid donors and resources could present serious problems to a recipient particularly where there are no clear policy guidelines for the recipient's education and training investment priorities. Donors may waste a lot of time and other resources in competing against each other for what they consider to be more attractive or strategic projects. Cassen et al. notes:

In several countries the donors actually compete. They look for projects of a reasonable size and manageability, and go sometimes to great lengths to secure them for their own aid programme rather than let them go to another.¹¹

In a situation where there are insufficient guidelines it is also likely that donors could easily influence a recipient's order of priorities.

Another serious concern to which this study addresses itself is the problem of aid coordination.¹² There is dissatisfaction among many observers and critics with the existing arrangements and practices in aid administration. More specifically, it has been pointed out that there is lack of necessary consultation, cooperation and aid coordination among donors in general. It is argued that this has negative consequences on the overall external support performance. Coordination, which is at the centre of the current aid debate, could mean different things in terms of interpretation and application. The current

literature on this subject has failed to address itself adequately to the issue of what is meant by coordination. This study proposes to analyse how the meaning of coordination is perceived and applied by Zambia and its donors, and also intends to attempt to provide answers to any attendant questions such as these below:

To what extent is there a problem of aid coordination in Zambia in general and in the education sector in particular? Would donors be willing to be organised into a strong coordinated framework or to cooperate among themselves beyond existing levels of operational linkages at project level?

Given the diversity of the donor community in the education and training sector in Zambia, it is not clear what aid policies to education and training donors are pursuing. It is equally not clear what Zambia's policy is on aid to education and training which guides donors' assistance.

There are big gaps in our knowledge of the aid environment in Zambia and other recipient countries, consequently there is demand for a better understanding of aid policies and aid administration and management in the context of both donors and recipients. Against this background it is important to examine how and whether Zambia's and donors' aid policies to education and training reconcile and fit into the country's

development context. It is equally important to examine how the administration and management of aid projects fit into Zambia's public administration framework.

1.3.2 The Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this research is to make a critical examination of the aid policies to education and training of both Zambia and its donors as well as the administration and management of aid projects in the field of education and training. Thus, the study will focus on the following aspects.

1. ZAMBIA'S AND DONORS' AID POLICIES

An evaluation of aid policies during the period from 1964 to the present.

2. AID PROCESS

The donor-recipient aid process structure in Zambia.

3. ZAMBIA'S AND DONORS' PRIORITIES

Zambia's and donors' priorities in the field of education and training. In particular, how far has the implementation of the 1977 educational reforms been incorporated by donors in their aid programmes?

4. AID ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

Administration and management styles and practices in aided educational projects, Zambian and donor institutions involved in educational aid management, and their administrative relationship and other important arrangements such as accountability within the broader framework of Zambia's public administration structure.

5. AID COORDINATION

The extent and level of cooperation, consultation and coordination among donors and also between donors and Zambia in the education and training sectors.

6. NEW MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES

Examine within the present public administration context the desirability of creating additional aid management structures or of reorganising existing management arrangements and institutions.

7. AID AND DEVELOPMENT

The extent to which aid to education and training has promoted or has hindered aspects of educational development and development as whole.

To give the study a more concrete context this study will present case studies of two of Zambia's major bilateral aid partners, Britain (ODA), and Sweden (SIDA). The study will also analyse specific cases of aid projects such as the following: The Self-Help Action Plan in Education (SHAPE), Zambia Educational Materials Production Project (ZEMP), and the Human Resource Development Project (HRDP). These will be analysed from the perspective of interorganisational cooperation and aid coordination. Non-governmental organisation's (NGOs) will be examined in relation to policy links and their institutional relationship with official aid agencies. Emphasis will be placed on identifying and analysing areas of strength and weakness in the present arrangements.

1.3.3 Definition of Key terms and concepts

1. DONOR An aid-giving multilateral organisation, government institutions such as ODA, SIDA, JICA, NORAD, FINNIDA, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and lending agencies offering concessional terms for development purposes eg. the World Bank, African Development Bank.

2. Recipient

A country, institution or sector receiving aid from a donor.

3. External Aid

External financial or technical assistance from a bilateral, multilateral or non-governmental organisation to a government or sector.

4. Educational Aid

External bilateral or multilateral financial or technical assistance from a donor agency to a recipient's education and training sector.

5. Aid Process

Channels and procedures through which aid is negotiated, agreed, and administered.

6. Coordination

The state of sharing by legal mandate, delegation or otherwise, responsibility for organising, planning and regulating the outflow of aid from donors, and the reception, administration and management of aid resources, among donors and between donors and recipients, at different levels.

7. NGO

Donor and recipient non-governmental organisations distinguished as 'donor NGO' or 'recipient NGO'.

8. Donorisation

The overwhelming functional dependency of a recipient country's development framework, sector or project on aid inputs.

1.3.4 Methodology

The methodology of this study is qualitative, descriptive critical analysis. Fieldwork was carried out through an extensive analysis of both primary and secondary data, and through a series of in-depth interviews of key officers in these institutions in Zambia, U.K. and Sweden.

ZAMBIA

Donors

- (a) Bilateral aid donors: British Council, USAID, HEDCO, FINNIDA, NORAD and SIDA
- (b) Multilateral aid donors: ADB, EEC, ILO, OECD, UNESCO, UNDP, UNICEF, World Bank

Recipient Agencies

Government Ministries, Departments and other Institutions

- (a) Ministry of Higher Education
- (b) Ministry of General Education and Culture
- (c) Ministry of Finance
- (d) National Commission for Development Planning
- (e) Bank of Zambia
- (f) University of Zambia

In Zambia officers such as Permanent Secretaries, Directors, academic specialists on Zambian development and aid process, and those who have been involved in negotiating,

administering and using educational aid resources were interviewed. Similarly, resident representatives and project field personnel of bilateral aid agencies were interviewed.

Data has been collected from the following:

- (a) Literature on aid and development in general.
- (b) Literature on aid and development in Zambia.
- (c) Literature on development and aid to education in general.
- (d) Literature on development and aid to education in Zambia.
 - (i) Zambia/Donor aid policy documents.
 - (ii) Relevant Zambian/Donor institutional annual reports.
 - (iii) Zambian budget documents.
 - (iv) Zambian annual economic reports.
 - (v) Zambian national development plans.
 - (vi) Zambia/Donor educational aid evaluation memoranda, agreed minutes and joint review reports.
 - (vii) Donors' project/programme evaluation reports.
 - (viii) Official speeches.

Fieldwork:

Interviews were undertaken as follows:

- (a) ODA - London.
- (b) SIDA - Stockholm.
- (c) Donors and recipient agencies- Lusaka, Zambia.

The study follows and emphasises a holistic research approach because it allows an open and broader approach to gathering data and studying contexts of situations. This method is not only appropriate to investigating the present educational aid context, it also facilitates the identification of possible alternative solutions.

1.3.5 Organisation of the Study

The study has been organised into twelve chapters as follows:

Chapter Two: Surveys the theoretical and conceptual literature on external aid, international relations, interorganisational relations. The chapter identifies appropriate frameworks within which the analysis of the issues of the present study has been done.

Chapter Three: Uses a macro-historical approach to traces the perspectives in Zambia's post-independence education and training development. The focus is on the policies of redressing past imbalances and deprivations during the 1964-1974 period.

Chapter Four: Examines the performance of the policies of expansion and development in the sector. Focus is also on the consequences of the economic crisis and its impact on the education sectors and the education reform movement, and the donor community.

Chapter Five: Focusing on institutional actors and procedures, this Chapter examines aid process in Zambia.

Chapter Six: Examines the policy and institutional links between foreign and aid policies in the donor's context.

Chapter Seven: Discusses British aid policies to education and training in a global perspective. The key developments in policy changes, aid organisational patterns are analysed.

Chapter Eight: Examines British aid to education and training in Zambia, 1964-1989. The focus is on the forms of assistance given and an analysis of policy changes.

Chapter Nine: Discusses Sweden's aid policies and priorities globally since 1965.

Chapter Ten: Analyses Swedish aid to education and training in Zambia. The focus is on forms of assistance given and its relevance to the local development problems, and the policy implications.

Chapter Eleven: Analyses aid coordination in the Zambian aid management framework. The current initiatives to enhance aid coordination are discussed against a background of a range of theoretical explanations on this subject.

Chapter Twelve: Summarises and discusses the findings and the conclusions of this study.

NOTES and REFERENCES

1. See the following: Coombe, T.A. (1968); Snelson, P.D. (1970); Berman, E.H. (1971); and Berman, E.H. (1984, 256).
2. The Triangular Colonial Relationship (TCR) refers to the politically important cooperative relationship which existed among these three institutions, the colonial government, Charitable Foundations or Trusts and Christian Missionaries. Successes in imposing colonial rule or annexing new areas under the jurisdiction of a particular missionary society depended to a large extent on mutual co-operation and assistance between and among these agencies. The significance of this illustration can only be understood if it is compared or contrasted to modern day aid crusades. A similar triangular relationship model still exists.
3. Berman, E.H. Op cit. (1984, 256).
4. Coombs, P.H. (1985).
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CHAPTER TWO

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter surveys the theoretical and conceptual literature on international relations, interorganisational relations, and foreign aid in an attempt to identify appropriate frameworks and models within which the analysis of the issues of the present study should be done. The main task of the survey is therefore to identify the relevant frameworks which can yield greater insights into the study.

Although foreign aid to education can be treated separately, it is very difficult for the purposes of analysis to disentangle it completely from the totality of aid, and international relations in general. Aid, regardless of its designation is decided upon and given against the political background of both donors and recipients. In all donor countries it is an important part of their foreign policy instruments. This is clearly reflected in the institutional arrangement and relationship between their foreign ministries and aid institutions.¹ In addition, most donor countries' aid institutions have special relationship with Trade and Commerce ministries and departments, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) involved in aid work. Thus, a joint aid network exists. Therefore, aid in its

various forms operates from a broad and complex background including multilateral institutions from which aid institutions draw their sanctions and direction. Aid donors pursue a multiplicity of objectives and goals, some of them altruistic, others not.²

Against this background it is being argued that a single and narrow analytic framework would not adequately perform the functions of describing and explaining many related issues surrounding aid to education and training. A single framework may not, for example, account well for changes in policy trends in aid to education, or the behaviour of aid institutions and their actors towards general or specific aid issues. A broad approach to the study is therefore called for. Before this is highlighted one important conceptual question requires to be addressed. What is aid?

2.2 Definition

Healey contends that aid is an ambiguous word and there is no common agreement on its definition and its measurement.³ The task of attempting to define aid is made even more difficult because of the diversity of aid. Morgenthau⁴ identified six functional categorisations of aid. In real life situations aid has a very polymorphic profile. That is, the dividing lines between the form and function of one type of aid and another is blurred. Aid to education for instance may perform both humanitarian and

economic functions. Assistance which goes out to enable a poverty stricken recipient government to provide essential basic education services which the government is unable to provide, may in the short term be classed both as humanitarian and budgetary support. It may well turn out also to be an economic contribution in the long run. The heterogeneity of aid therefore makes it difficult to cut a precise general definition of aid. Hence, the tendency among scholars has been to provide operational rather than general definitions.

Despite the definitional difficulties, scholars and writers have not been deterred from making attempts to define it or classify it.

Mosley defines aid as 'money transferred on concessional terms by the governments of rich countries to the governments of poor countries.'⁵ There are many other definitions which fall into this category.⁶ Although they are meant to be seen as operational, thus justifying their narrow perspectives, they nevertheless reveal important insights. First, economic considerations which dominate in the definitions of aid. Second, aid is perceived largely as a mechanical system of resource transfer rather than a complex and dynamic process of interstate exchange, in the world economic and political system. Third, the aid transaction is only seen as taking place between rich and

poor developing countries. These assumptions are not entirely correct. Therefore many of the 'economic' definitions of aid need to be corrected and augmented.

The term 'donor' is more often than not associated with developed northern countries. However, the concept should not be considered as synonymous with economic and financial might nor with a particular geographical or geo-political grouping. Indeed, the notion that aid transfer takes place only between rich and poor countries is disputable⁷. Some recipient countries play donor roles to other countries, especially when foreign aid is perceived in a much broader sense than merely financial transfers. Among the recipient-donor countries providing aid to Zambia's education and training development are: Bulgaria, Brazil, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, India, Turkey, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia.⁸ There is also evidence which shows that some rich OPEC countries have been recipients of generous aid from the western countries,⁹.

The preceding arguments have served to highlight the inconsistencies between what aid is thought to be and what one usually sees in practice.

Thus, in this study aid will be understood to mean 'conditional or unconditional resources offered to or transferred to a recipient country by any donor for the

purposes of enhancing the promotion of a recipient's development objectives and donors' short or long term objectives'. The key descriptors in this definition are:

Resources: Any form such as advice, material resources, technical assistance, capital or indeed other types of assistance.

Donor: Covers both official and private agencies, and multilateral agencies.

Donor's Objectives: Refers to foreign policy and aid policy objectives that are intended to benefit from the aid transactions. The objectives may be humanitarian, economic or otherwise.

Recipient: Any country that allows or asks another country to give it general or specific foreign aid.

All the key descriptors are used in their widest sense. Accordingly, the definition is open. Since aid is usually an open foreign policy strategy of donor countries this particular definition is more suitable to the holistic approach adopted for this study. Aid to education, as a sub-set of aid in general, partakes of the same essential characteristics.

In the subsequent paragraphs an attempt is made to identify and discuss theoretical perspectives that have a bearing on the aspects of this study. The discussion will assess the relevance and adequacy of the analytic frameworks.

2.3 Theoretical Perspectives

Foreign aid theories have a historical context which gives important economic explanations for the emergence of aid in general. The origin of aid theories dates to the periods before and after the second world war. That era witnessed five important developments: the cessation of war activities, the establishment of the UN and the World Bank, the emergence of economic growth models and development theories, the application of Marshall aid to the war ravaged economies of European countries, US aid to Japan, and the beginning of the emergence of independent states in Africa and Asia. All these factors influenced profoundly the shaping of the initial profile of aid.

Against the background of economic growth models which, among other things, emphasised the importance of foreign aid in the economic growth process, America committed enormous resources to the economic recovery programme of European countries. The success of the Marshall plan,¹⁰ left an indelible imprint on aid as an economic growth strategy. It is from this background that economists in western countries made conscious efforts to suggest that the strategy of economic aid could be applied to the development problems of newly independent countries in Africa and Asia. One observes therefore that economic aid theories grew out of both economic growth modelling and actual field experiences in Japan and Europe.¹¹

According to White,¹²; theories can be grouped into two main categories: economic aid theories which are referred to also as 'transfer' theories, and political theories of aid which are also known as 'transaction' theories.

2.3.1 Economic Theories

Economic aid theories are further subdivided into those that assert a positive relationship between aid, economic growth and development, and those that project a negative relationship between aid and development factors. Aid in the former category is perceived to be providing vital supplementary resources needed to support economic growth. The recently introduced aid for economic recovery in Third World countries would fall in this category. The resource transfer focuses on such economic factors as, national savings, availability of sufficient foreign exchange, and the state of human resource skills.

Counter arguments against the notion of aid as an external economic resource supplement are provided by the displacement theory. It argues that, whatever increased savings are made by a recipient as a result of the availability of aid savings are switched from development to non-development programmes, and some escape from the recipient's economy. But more importantly, it is pointed out that the availability of external resources causes recipients to reduce domestic initiatives to pursue

development attempts on their own. Nowhere is this argument more pertinent than in aid to education in developing countries. Despite increasing debates on aid in the last few decades, the arguments against aid have made little practical impact upon the problems of the main aid actors. Aid programmes have continued unabated, some of them emerging on the ruins of hitherto failed aid projects.

Alfred Marshall¹³ identified a number of essential factors which could influence both economic and non-economic growth. These are: natural resources, climate, human character, education, social mobility, willingness and ability to save, improved transport, external economies, and the existence of extensive markets. Although Marshall did not formulate a theory his economic growth prescription had an impact on economists in Europe and America and how they viewed the economic growth process. In particular, economic growth models that were later developed took important cues from such earlier works. The Harrod-Domar¹⁴ economic growth model, for instance, stressed the importance of external assistance in helping an economy to overcome some of its domestic economic shortcomings. The model examined the balance among income, savings, investment and output in a developed economy. Thus, external assistance was seen as critical in assisting a country's economy to grow faster than would be possible with domestic resources alone.

Subsequent models and theories drew heavily on earlier growth models. Rostow's historical stage theory of economic growth was one example.¹⁵ The theory related much to foreign aid and was developed largely within the Harrod-Domar paradigm. In his theory the 'take-off' stage in economic growth process become particularly important as well as controversial. The role of economic aid in facilitating the economic take off was perceived to be critical to a country's attempts to achieve self-sustaining economic growth.¹⁶ The notion of additionality in the Rostowian conception of aid belongs to the supplemental theory discussed earlier.

Chenery and Strout provided yet another comprehensive theoretical explanation and justification for aid.¹⁷ In their framework aid is placed within the context of economic development - a much wider paradigm than economic growth. In this framework, as in others, the sights of aid are set on helping to transform a stagnant economy into one of sustained growth. According to Chenery, aid is able to relieve certain specific bottlenecks which inhibit development. Lack of or scarcity of foreign exchange is cited as one example. Critical transformation factors are identified as: an increase in human skills, a rise in the level of savings and investment, the adoption of more productive technology and the development of new institutions.

2.3.2 Political Theories

Political theories of aid are also of two types, one focuses on the donor as an aid - giver and the other looks at the recipients. The former is concerned with the treatment of aid as an instrument of foreign policy and donors' wider external interests. The latter is concerned with the impact of aid on domestic politics in recipient countries. That is, to see what impact aid has on interests of the recipient government vis-a-vis other competing group interests. Unfortunately this particular area commands very little attention. Greater attention is paid to examining the virtues or shortcomings of aid from the donors' perspective.

Within the realm of political theories of aid there are specific frameworks which attempt to give conceptual explanations of aid. The interventionist framework is one such example.

According to Baldwin¹⁹ external aid may constitute intervention in terms of donor motivations, consequences, aid process or all three simultaneously. It is argued that intervention through aid is a type of influence: a non-military technique of intervention of modern statecraft. However, the concept of aid as intervention or an influence attempt should be placed within the larger context of aid and its place in international relations. The influence theory²⁰ offers such a framework.

Though conceived for the purposes of providing an explanatory framework for general bilateral relations between nations of more or less equal power, the model gives the necessary perspectives which can be extended to cover many important aspects of donor-recipient bilateral relations which basically exhibit unequal power relations in most cases.

The general properties of the influence model are that no nation is so completely isolated from all others that its activities have almost no effect on others. Nor is there a country so completely self-sufficient that it has no dependence upon others in order to meet its own real and perceived needs.²¹ To meet their various needs countries are engaged in an inter-nation influence interaction. However, and more importantly, the model points out that inter-nation influence is a two way transaction. That is, any country planning or attempting to influence another country, should consider that the target country is also exercising some influence upon it. In practical terms it would be argued that the very identification and classification of a country by a donor as a potential aid recipient leads to some degree of influence by the recipient upon that donor. It is further argued that nations select their influence targets because of perceived importance of their relationship to, and dependence upon them. And that the direction of an influence attempt is largely dependent on

how the initiating country perceives the probable outcome of its future relationship with the target country, that is, whether the relationship would yield any beneficial or disadvantageous outcomes. Inducement of preferred future behaviour of the target country is said to be at the centre of the inter-nation influence model.

The model recognises that a country has two techniques at its disposal in attempting to arrest influences, threats and promise of rewards. Each technique covers a very broad area and is usually carefully chosen to suit a particular influence situation. Threats may cover probable punishment which may take different forms such as withholding a reward, denying a preference or in extreme cases damaging that which the target country values. Promises may also include rewards and punishments for compliance or non-adherence to preferred behaviour.

Seen in the context of the present study, the concept of aid as an intervention strategy links up well with the influence model. Aid plays a significant role in inter-nation influence attempts and ordinary bilateral relations. There are also several examples where aid transaction has been characterised by a 'stick and carrot' relationship between donors and recipients.²² But again, aid and its linkage to the influence model cannot be examined and understood in isolation. Both emanate from particular national state

contexts and interstate transactions. Thus, a donor country's foreign policy is bound to show important reflections on various aspects of aid relationships.

A country's national foreign policy framework provides important leads that give critical assistance in analysing not only the behaviour that may be observed in a country's relations with other states but also in identifying specific policy objectives and values attached to them. Against this it is important to note that the role of aid in reinforcing foreign policy objectives is widely recognised.²³ Holsti in particular points out that nation states and other types of political units have needs and purposes, many of which they can achieve or meet only by influencing the behaviour of other states. Nation states are said also to be striving to achieve a range of private, collective, concrete and value objectives in their foreign policies. He sees foreign policies as largely a string of responses to initiatives and other actions of other actors, and that governments are more concerned with solving problems as they appear rather than defining long-range objectives.²⁴

An example illustrates the case of aid diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy. Britain's 1983 decision to increase the number of scholarships to certain overseas students, of which Malaysia was a major beneficiary, was a foreign policy move which succeeded in countering the 'buy

British last' campaign which Malaysia had mounted in retaliation for Britain's decision to impose full cost fees on overseas students.²⁵ This action was taken to change Malaysia's negative behaviour into behaviour which was not harmful to British interests. This case illustrates several points. First, it shows the strong feelings donors have regarding their vulnerabilities. Second, one also notices the important roles to which foreign policy and national resources have been committed to protect both national commercial interests and those of private citizens. Third, aid intervention helped to normalise the relationship. The preceding points endorse some of the arguments in the assumptions regarding aid's linkage to foreign policies.

The theoretical perspectives and models discussed in the preceding sections offer ample scope within which aid policies in general and aid policies to education and training in particular can be analysed.

Aid to education and training should be perceived within the broader context of a recipient's national economy and development framework. There is a clear suggestion that aid goes out to enhance effective linking of various economic and development process factors.' In the context of developing countries such as Zambia, education and training is one such factor in the country's national development grid. From the economic perspective, aid to education and

training is seen as a response to Zambia's particular economic needs in human resource development such as the acute shortage of domestic foreign exchange for the purchase of essential skills, equipment and materials.

Thus, in the framework of supplemental theories, aid to education and training is given for the purpose of redressing specific scarcities and deficiencies in Zambia's national economic process and development structure. This gives a partial explanation of why aid is given, but supplemental theories do not see any other significant relationship between aid and the choice of particular areas of support by donors. There is no acknowledgement that the significance of aid to education and training, to donors and recipients, transcends the regions of economic support. This narrows the view of a broad and complex phenomenon.

The displacement theory of aid submits strong counter arguments against all pro aid theories. More specifically the displacement theory points out that aid inhibits the dynamic process of change in developing countries.¹⁸ Alien values and patterns of organisation imposed by donors on recipients are perceived to be major stumbling blocks to development. The implications for aid to education and training are therefore obvious. Since the theory is dismissive of all approaches to aid, it cannot provide a comprehensive explanatory framework for analysing the

political economy of aid in general and aid to education in particular.

Yet, these perspectives are by themselves not sufficient to provide adequate interpretation of aspects of this study such as co-operation and coordination among donors, and also between donors and Zambia. Consequently, other analytical frameworks are considered in subsequent paragraphs.

2.4 Exchange Model

Organisational interaction has received wide attention from researchers in the sub-fields of sociology of organisations such as industrial sociology, political sociology and the management sciences. And more studies appear to have been done on interorganisational relationships that are set within a common political and economic environment²⁶ than has been the case with interorganisational relationships that involve organisations from different settings. Although the main concern in the former has been inter-organisational behaviour analysis in public service departments and industries, the insights and other explanatory knowledge gained from these studies have application to wider interorganisational behaviour analysis. In particular, the study of interorganisational relationships of aid organisations may require a judicious application of the principles of organisations.

Although they have organisational characteristics that are identical to industrial corporate companies, many, if not all do not function completely as such. Because aid organisations are politically sponsored, their organisational behaviour towards other similar organisations and recipients will always be subject to political checks at some point. Donors' initiatives on grounds of political expediency may also override other considerations in aid policies and decisions. In aid, donors pursue largely national interests, be it a projection of a positive national image through charitable or other humanitarian aid or using aid to widen the circle of the donor's friendly countries or countries under donor influence of one kind or another. The primacy of national interests in aid objectives and policies is paramount in aid relationships. These inevitably have an important bearing on the extent of donors' relations. To examine aspects of inter-organisational relationships researchers have employed various analytical frameworks. Among these is the exchange model.

From a sociological perspective²⁷ the exchange model rests on several assumptions. These are that: an actor will seek to interact with others who can satisfy his or her needs or facilitate attainment of desired goals, and the greater the probability that a potential exchange transaction will prove rewarding the more likely an actor is to initiate it. Thus,

management exchange is defined by Levine and White as 'any voluntary activity between two organisations which has consequences actual or anticipated for the realisation of their respective goals or objectives'.²⁸ In this framework, interaction and subscription to cooperation are important elements. Levine and White stress the point that in the exchange framework symmetrical relations form when members of two or more organisations perceive mutual benefits from interacting. Therefore motivation to form a cooperative relationship comes out when each organisation perceives that it will be better able to attain its goals by interacting and cooperating rather than remaining autonomous. They suggest further that symmetrical relationships of this type form in periods of scarce or declining resources.

2.5 Power-Dependency Framework

On the other hand the power-dependency model contends that the motivation to cooperate among organisations is asymmetrical. That is, only one party is usually motivated while others are not, and that cooperation is often induced or forced on weaker organisations by the most powerful. Interaction of exchange in this model is characterised by conflict because each party seeks to achieve its own goals.

It is evident in both frameworks that interaction and cooperation in interorganisational relationships is linked

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to motivation and goal achievement. The exchange framework carries a very explicit hypothesis which perceives collaboration among and between groups or organisations as inevitable at some point. However, what is erroneously implied in the two models is that relationships among actors are perceived to be either collaborative or conflictual. But any relationship is bound to show phases of cooperation and conflict at different points. Therefore both cooperation and conflict are probable in any inter-group relationship regardless of whether the groups or organisations involved in that relationship are unequal partners in terms of economic power or other attributes. This is indeed true of donor-recipient relationships and also among donors. Therefore there is more value in perceiving and analysing donors' interorganisational relationships as a whole. A more integrated approach in this case is consequently more suitable, both to broader donor-recipient relationships and aid coordination issues.

2.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter an attempt has been made to lay theoretical foundations on which aid policies to education and aid coordination issues may be based and analysed. Both normative and descriptive theoretical frameworks and models have been identified to provide explanatory guidance to the study. For the purposes of this study it is perceived that the analytical frameworks that will be employed are linked in many respects. It is for example clear that, Singer's influence model and Baldwin's conceptualisation of aid as intervention and influence can best be understood by being incorporated into a larger analytical framework. In this regard McClelland's²⁹ systems framework for analysing international relations provides scope for integrating various analytical frameworks and models. Aid in general and aid to education and training in particular can best be understood by adopting this broader approach.

Against this analytical background the following assumptions are going to be examined, that:

- (1) Zambia does not have any explicit policy on foreign aid to its education and training sector. Consequently aid responds mainly to specific education and training problems.
- (2) Zambia's education and training priorities are influenced by the donors' aid priorities and the resources made available.
- (3) Zambia's present administrative structure, internal institutional politics, and staffing problems in the Economic and Technical Cooperation Department (ETC) of the NCDP offers limited scope for creating an effective central unit for coordinating aid.

- (4) Donors' preoccupations with protecting their national interests in their aid programmes and their major differences in administrative and management styles would be obstacles to greater donor cooperation and aid coordination beyond the present levels of interorganisational cooperation.
- (5) Donors' aid to education and training in Zambia forms a constituent of donors' global political, economic and commercial interests. 'Global' is used here to denote each donor's aid constituency.
- (6) Zambia's attempts to select its own priorities in the education sector has been caught in the donors' endeavours to develop and promote their interests abroad.

The broader bilateral and interorganisational aid relations among donors and between donors and Zambia will be analysed within the contexts of the exchange, influence, and power-dependency, dependence/dependency analytic frameworks. Economic and political theories should also give important background insights on aid. These analytic frameworks are complementary.

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CHAPTER THREE

ZAMBIA: POLICIES, PRIORITIES, EXPANSIONISM, AND PERFORMANCE IN THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING SECTOR, 1964-1974.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter traces and analyses Zambia's policies and priorities in education and training development. It examines the policy environment in which broad and specific events and factors have occurred and given rise to Government initiatives. The analysis identifies the factors which have shaped public policy in education and training development, and assesses the sector's performance in achieving the policy objectives.

Zambia's post-independence education and training development has been driven by a continuous process of making attempts to respond to two sets of factors: the colonial legacy and the search for a new philosophy in education, and structural adjustments in the country's education and training system. Throughout the period, socio-economic and political events have exerted pressures, sometimes extreme, on policy and decision making in the sector. The development process appears to have passed through two distinct phases. The period from 1964 to the mid 1970s saw the introduction of new policies and

expansionism in the system, and the review and structural adjustment phase has stretched from the mid 1970s to date. Education and training policies and priorities have thus reflected and been influenced by events associated with these factors.

At independence in 1964, the education and training facilities for the African population were meagre, especially in comparison to the provision for non-African minority communities. Severe imbalances characterised the provision of these services among different racial groups. Restrictive access for Africans to trades and technical training, and prohibitive school fees were among the other policy issues the new government had to address itself to.

The lack of educated and skilled manpower among the African population was felt rapidly and acutely. The scale of the problem was such that the UN Economic Survey Mission to Zambia in 1964 described it as 'a marked heritage of imbalance and contrast in the field of human development.'

It is not too much to say that Zambia in terms of high level manpower, is one of the least educated countries in a most under educated continent. This demonstrable fact presents Zambia with its gravest danger on the eve of independence. Not only will the shortage of highly educated people be the greatest obstacle along the path to economic expansion, even political stability could be threatened.¹

In 1962 the three million Africans in Northern Rhodesia had 26 secondary schools, the majority of which were junior schools. The European population of 75,000 was served by 13 secondary schools, six of which prepared students up to form 6 level. At the time of independence a cumulative total of 1,200 African Zambians had passed the Cambridge School Certificate examination, and about 6,000 had attained two years of secondary education.² The educational status and attainment of the African population are illustrated in Table 1.

TABLE 1
African Population by Province and Educational
Status, 1963.

<u>Province</u>	<u>Total Pop</u>	<u>% Population & Educational Status</u>	
		<u>No Schooling</u>	<u>Some Schooling*</u>
Central	482485	66.4	33.6
Cop'belt	495855	55.2	44.8
Eastern	477682	76.3	23.7
Luapula	356461	65.0	35.0
Northern	563003	71.4	28.6
N/Western	210526	80.0	20.0
Southern	457301	63.2	36.8
Western	361905	73.6	26.4
Zambia	3,405218	68.0	32.0

* Includes different levels of schooling
Source: Compiled from CSO, 1969 Census.

This social situation created a sense of urgency in the new UNIP government. In carrying out the tasks of introducing new changes in the education system the government was assisted by the reports of two other international groups, the UNESCO Mission and the Lockwood Committee, whose studies had been commissioned by the interim coalition government on the eve of Zambia's independence.

The findings and recommendations of the three international missions to Northern Rhodesia in the run up period to independence provided vital data on the country's socio-economic situation. UNESCO was requested by the Northern Rhodesia government to investigate and report on Zambian education in light of the 1961 Addis Ababa education conference targets for Africa. It was the first full study of Zambian education ever to be undertaken.³ The Lockwood Committee of 1963 conducted a feasibility study on the need to establish a university in Zambia. The UN/ECA/FAO economic survey of Zambia in 1964 had a broader scope than the other studies. Besides education, other key productive sectors were covered by the study. Together, the studies provided the new government with an important planning base. The studies also served to draw the attention of the international community to Zambia's real socio-economic situation and areas where international assistance was needed.

A common theme which ran through the three studies was the identified need for Zambia to develop an education and training system which could meet the demands of a new political and economic order in the country. Thus, each mission put forward specific recommendations to help Zambia take on new social and economic responsibilities. The UNESCO group recommended that the highest priority in education be accorded to the expansion of secondary education. The government was urged to work towards ensuring that 75 per cent of the form 2 pupils proceeded to form 3 at the end of 1964, and that from the beginning of 1966 the intake into secondary schools be increased by 1050 each year up to 1970. These measures were intended to provide a quick response to the need to provide middle level manpower, and also to create a pool for a long term expansion programme. The Lockwood Committee recommended the establishment of a university in Zambia, a recommendation which was supported by the UNESCO team. Acting on the lead set by the two earlier missions the UN/ECA/FAO group made this recommendation:

The first priority in the years until 1970 must be to build the foundations which are lacking today. Zambians must be trained for the civil service, for the mines, for agriculture and industry, transport and commerce. All forms of education must be expanded, guided by the future needs which extend far into the future.⁴

Consequently, when UNIP came to power one of the immediate tasks it tackled was to translate some of its manifesto policies into action programmes. The changing of the old

policies and the expansion of the education and training system were accorded priority.

Much of the Government efforts and resources during the first decade of independence, 1964-1974 were thus directed at instituting remedial policies and changes in the system. During the process of this development a number of factors and events emerged which exerted pressures and influence on policy decisions in the sector. Even before UNIP came to power in 1964 its leadership was aware of the enormous financial obligations which awaited them in their intended attempts to expand the country's education system. Nonetheless, UNIP was determined to find ways of financing the programme. Seeking financial assistance from the IMF was considered a real possibility.⁵ This determination became evident in the development plans which followed. Table 2 sets out the chronology of the main events in the evolution of education and training policies in the sector.

The events outlined in Table 2 indicate only a partial context within which a blend of local initiatives, international advice, policy proposals, analytical investigations and legal provisions have occurred. Both domestic factors and international experiences have appeared to exert some influence on policies in the sector.

Table 2

**Chronology of Main Events in Education and Training Policies,
1962-1989**

<u>Year</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Goals/Objectives</u>
1962	UNIP Manifesto for first majority -rule election	To restructure and expand ET on the principles of racial equality in access to ET. Free education/ and development of human resources.
1963	First full Census of the African population	Count population and measure levels of attainment in socio-economic status.
1963	UNESCO Commission to Northern Rhodesia.	To investigate and report on the education situation in light of the 1961 Addis Ababa Conference targets.
1963	Sir John Lockwood Mission	To advise upon the development of a local University.
1964	UN/ECA/FAO Social and Economic' survey of Northern Rhodesia	To survey the socio-economic situation in Northern Rhodesia.
1964	UNIP Manifesto for post independence election	To reaffirm most of the 1962 pledges.
1964	Emergency Development Plan, 1964/65.	To allocate resources for priority investments immediately after independence while longer term policies were being formulated.

1965	The University of Zambia Act	To formally establish the national University.
1965	Transitional Development Plan. (TDP), 1965/66	To increase and expand educational facilities. Greater enrolments at primary and secondary school level. UPE targeted for 1970.
1966	Education Act	To regulate the new education system.
1966	First National Development Plan (FNDP), 1966/70	To develop local manpower, to increase enrolments at all levels of education. Universal primary entry by 1970. More secondary schools. Expansion of technical education and teacher training. More facilities for adult and informal education. And more bursaries for UNZA.
1967	Saunders Report	To establish a parastatal Commission for Technical and Vocational Training in order to expand and modernise technical education and trades training.
1968	The Teaching Service Commission Act	To provide unified terms and conditions of service to teachers.
1969	Loans and Guarantees Authorisation Act (Cap 601)	Law covering Government borrowing from local and external sources and the giving of guarantees to loans locally or from abroad.

1969	First National Education Conference	To review education development five years after independence.
1972	Technical Education and Vocational Training Act	To convert the parastatal into a Department for Technical Education and Vocational Training under the Ministry of Education.
1972	Second National Development Plan (SNDP), 1972/76	Continue expansion programme but at a slower rate. Stress emphasis on consolidation for quality education. Greater emphasis on practical subjects.
1973	Zambia Constitution Bill Published	Repealed Independence Act (1964). Established One-Party structure, and Party supremacy.
1974	UNIP National Policies for the 1974-1984 Decade	Greater emphasis on the role of science and technology.
1974	Education Reform, 1974-1977	To change the education structure, increase curriculum diversification and lay emphasis on developing education with production. Improving qualitative aspects of education and training.
1979	Third National Development Plan (TNDP), 1979/83	To mobilise resources for implementing the education reforms. Completing SNDP projects. Coordination of education resources to ensure equality of opportunity between rural and urban areas. Diversification of Grade 10-12 curricula. Emphasis on TEVT, primary and secondary teacher training. Establish new campus for UNZA at Ndola.

1980	Population Census	Count population and measure the social-economic status of Zambia.
1982	Creation of two Ministries of Education, MGEC and MHE	To give greater priority to science and technology in higher education.
1983	Examination Council Act	To establish the Zambia Examination Council
1984	Education Reform Implementation Project (ERIP), 1984-1986	To work out concrete proposals and a plan for implementing Universal Basic Education (UBE). To give advice to MGEC on financial and other implementation requirements.
1985	UNIP Policies for the 1985/1995 Decade	To train highly skilled manpower. Develop the education structure: Full time, continuous, and national service. To introduce compulsory schooling. Emphasise technical education at secondary school level. Development of science and technology.
1987	Interim National Development Plan (INDP), 1987/1988	A temporary plan while the Fourth National Development Plan was being formulated.
1988	Copperbelt University Act	To establish the former Ndola Campus of UNZA an autonomous university.

1989	New Financing Policy	Introduce new financing measures in higher education institutions. Students must contribute financially towards the full cost of their education or training.
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Sources: GRZ and UNIP documents. 1962-1989.

3.2 Policies, Plans and Performance, 1964-1974

3.2.1 Policies

UNIP began its reign in a multiparty system. Disagreements over national policies are characteristic of multiparty politics but there was general agreement with the opposition party on UNIP's agenda for social reform, especially on matters concerning education. The African National Congress (ANC), the main opposition party, shared common views with UNIP on the need to democratise access to and participation in education. This gave UNIP a free hand to implement its education policies without restraint.

The UNIP leadership came to power with a background of liberal political socialisation received from close contacts and association with liberal democratic political parties, other organisations, and left-wing individuals. While studying in Britain, Harry Nkumbula had taken a keen interest in the activities of the Fabian Society.⁶ In 1957 Kaunda was invited by the British Labour Party to attend a socialist conference in London.⁷ Later Kaunda spent some months in Britain studying how the Labour Party was organised. These contacts brought UNIP into closer contact with liberal democratic values, which later assisted them in forming their own outlook on political and socio-economic issues. The influence of these contacts are well

reflected in the 1962 UNIP Manifesto. In its attempt to solicit support for some of its proposed social reform programmes the document drew attention to what it considered justifiably large investments in education in Britain.⁸ But, embracing and projecting socialist or liberal democratic values was very popular then among nationalist parties, and represented an effective ticket with which to mobilise public support. UNIP's broad education policy drew inspiration from these values. This was quite explicit in the 1962 Manifesto whose preamble to the chapter on education quoted extensively articles, 1, 2, and 26 from the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁹ It is within this set of values that UNIP set out to restructure the inherited colonial education system and UNIP's attempts to create a mass education system should be seen in this light.

The domestic sources of influence on policies largely arose from the social and economic situation in the country. Population growth, social demand for education, and the state of the economy and the labour market all in different ways conditioned Zambia's education and training policy. And the nature of the problems in the sector determined that Zambia's education and training policy was largely reactive.

3.2.2 Emergency and Transitional Development Plans

To move towards a realisation of its objectives the Government took decisions that brought in several structural

changes in the system. The inherited colonial education structure had been racially organised into African, and non-African. African education was the responsibility of the Northern Rhodesia Government, whereas that of non-African was the responsibility of the Federal Government. Racial segregation in schools was abolished immediately after independence.

Up to 1965 the primary school system had consisted of eight years of schooling, sub A and B, and standards 1-6. In 1965 this programme was reduced to seven years, grades 1-7. To cope with the expansion programme, teacher training at primary school level was reduced from two years to a one year crash course programme in 1966. The measure was one of several that were designed to increase school/college output at various points in the education system. In 1966 this measure was partly responsible for the substantial increase in primary school leavers who proceeded to secondary schools. The introduction of this change enabled the grade 7 and standard 6 pupils to sit a common secondary school entry examination. Other than reducing the course programme and increasing enrolment, it is doubtful if the decision had any pedagogical considerations. Correspondingly, the secondary school course programme which had been of six years length was cut down to five. Acceleration of the supply of secondary school graduates into the economy and quick entry into the university at 'O' level standard were

the critical factors behind these changes. Although this measure was initially conceived as a temporary strategy, it has remained a permanent feature.

Before independence craft training provided under the apprentice system had not been open to Africans until 1960. One of the important features of the apprentice system had been a traditionally long internship period (five years) during which trainees mastered their trade skills. Because of its long training programme the supply of graduates to industry took longer. After the Saunders report of 1967 shorter term trades training programmes were introduced to replace the apprentice system. Zambia had also a few government and mission-owned Trade Schools for Africans which provided industrially skilled and semi-skilled manpower at and below middle levels for various engineering and construction fields. Many primary schools too had workshops attached to them with instructors. These provided training in woodwork, brickwork, basketry and other skills. Practical subjects in primary schools were however phased out soon after independence.

The Emergency Development Plan (EDP) allocated large capital funds for the expansion of the education system. The aim was to accelerate the expansion of secondary education and also to increase educational facilities in the rural areas. Thus, eighteen new secondary boarding schools were under

construction in 1965. The long term goal was to provide each district with a secondary school. During the Transitional Development Plan period, stage one of the University of Zambia and the building of two big Teacher Training Colleges were undertaken. Two technical secondary schools were opened in 1965 to accelerate the production of technical manpower. In the grant-aided Christian missionary education sector twelve new secondary schools were opened, nine by Catholic mission agencies.¹⁰

This rapid expansion increased vastly the country's school capacity in a very short period. In the secondary school sector the target was to create 8,435 new places, which represented a 100 per cent increase in enrolment. This served to demonstrate the new government's commitment to developing education as an important service sector in the country's development process. Because the economy was then strong, the government was able to finance 80 per cent of capital development in the public sector of the education system without significant external aid.

The government's strong financial position was demonstrated more conspicuously in the recurrent provisions, since the expansion programme was backed by a policy of free education. In practice this meant that pupils/students at all levels not only received free tuition, but also got their full complement of the required school/college

requisites appropriate to their level of studies. This included provision of exercise and textbooks, and minor equipment. In addition, pupils in boarding secondary schools received free meals, bedding and toilet requisites. Students at the university and colleges were accorded the same facilities and were also paid regular personal and travel allowances at the end of each term.¹¹ Indeed for a few years the expansion programme and the application of the free education policy seemed to have had no limits. It was largely due to this investment policy that Zambia was able to produce locally middle level educated manpower for the public service and the private sector of the economy in a relatively short time after independence.

Nonetheless, this development took place against a background of serious local manpower shortage in the education and training sector. In 1965, out of 294 teachers who were recruited for secondary schools, only 81 were appointed locally, and these would have been mostly non-Zambians. Table 3 shows the profile of the teaching force in 1964. Although the number of non-Zambian teachers was large, a considerable number of them left the country soon after Zambia attained independence:

Table 3

**Secondary School Teachers by Level of Qualification,
Gender, and Nationality Status, 1964.**

<u>Qualification</u>	<u>Zambian</u>		<u>Non-Zambian</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	
Graduate Trained	14	2	289	147	452
Graduate Untrained	2	-	89	45	136
Sec/ed Trained	44	5	115	94	258
Sec/ed Untrained	--	--	12	18	30
Not completed					
Sec/ed Trained	33	1	4	3	41
Not completed					
Sec/ed Untrained	2	--	--	2	4
TOTAL	95	8	509	309	921

Source: Ministry of Education, Annual Report, 1965, p.51.

In its efforts to introduce changes in the system the Ministry of Education had become overzealous. The teaching of practical subjects in primary schools which had been part of the school curriculum during the colonial period was phased out soon after independence. This was a rather odd decision and appeared to show manifestations of UNIP's overreaction to colonial education. Colonial education had been criticised for many shortcomings, of which one of them was its segmentation approach in preparing Africans for the labour market. Africans were slotted into manual and lower clerical jobs. Manual jobs, even including those that required trained skills, were looked down upon by many Africans. The phasing out of trade schools and the removal of practical subjects appears to have been connected to this sentiment. The paradox was that, no sooner had the decision been effected than the Ministry and the public began to question their own wisdom in having taken that decision.¹² The 1969 education conference devoted considerable time discussing the content of the primary school curriculum. Its conclusion was that upper grades in primary schools needed training in practical skills, and in 1974 FINNIDA was requested to help the Ministry reintroduce practical subjects in primary schools.

It has been shown that both the Emergency and Transitional Development Plans set the process of education and training development into motion. A number of short term objectives

were achieved during this period, but some of the projects that were undertaken had long-term effects which have affected subsequent plans.

3.2.3 First National Development Plan

The First National Development Plan (FNDP) covered the period from 1 July, 1966 to 30 June 1970. The FNDP budgeted K563.6 million for public sector capital investment, of which education and training got K78.4 million.¹³ In addition the government raised two World Bank loans worth 12.7 million US dollars to finance education projects.

The FNDP educational plan stressed increasing enrolments at all levels of education and training:

1. To provide sufficient places for primary education for every child aged seven in 1970.
2. To provide opportunities for all upper primary school children in urban primary schools and 75 per cent of children in rural primary schools to complete a seven year primary course.
3. To improve the quality of teacher training, and up-grade the standards of existing teachers.
4. To expand secondary schooling to provide manpower in the numbers and with the skills required for national development. This included preparing people for higher education, teacher training and technical training as well as for direct entry into employment.
5. To provide the resources for the university of Zambia to enrol over 1,600 students in 1970 and develop it to take a leading part in the educational, professional and cultural life of the nation. Professional training in medicine, engineering, agriculture, administration,

teaching and law will be started. A broad range of useful research and scholarship will be encouraged and a National Council for Scientific Research established.

6. To develop facilities for adult education (including classes for women, regional libraries educational broadcasting) in order that opportunities are available to Zambians of every age in every part of the country. Every agency contributing to education- missions, industry, or individuals is assisting the educational development of the nation and is therefore welcome.¹⁴

Except for one objective which focused on qualitative improvement of teacher education, all the other objectives were aimed at expanding educational and training facilities. The FNDP became a vehicle for attempting to complete the expansion programme started under the Emergency and Transitional Development Plans.

Following the recommendations of the Saunders Report (1967) the new Commission for Technical Education and Vocational Training was established through legislation. At UNZA three additional academic Schools, of engineering, medicine, and agricultural sciences were established. Higher degree programmes, certificate and diploma courses were also introduced. Hence enrolment increased from 312 students in 1966 to 1184 full-time students, an additional 285 were enrolled in part-time course programmes.¹⁵

External loans helped Zambia realise some of the FNDP objectives for UNZA's development and expansion of

facilities in secondary schools. The loans marked the start of external borrowing for capital development of education and training. The loans came at time when priority in the World Bank's lending programmes was for secondary and tertiary education to speed up 'human capital formation'. Between 1963 and 1970 the Bank approved 43 education loans, of which 33 were for secondary general, technical, and agricultural, plus some tertiary training projects.¹⁶

The FNDP made significant achievements in meeting some of the planned targets. For example, the school system expanded further to absorb the huge increases in enrolments which the previous plans had created. Intake at all levels continued to increase during the plan period. In primary education the Plan achieved 89.4 per cent of the planned target for urban enrolment. The number of primary classes increased by 50 percent, from 12,837 to 18,118 in the same period. Secondary school enrolments more than doubled from 23,000 in 1966 to 52,472 in 1970.

However, against this background of some successes the Ministry faced a set of financial and operational problems in implementing the plan and maintaining a viable education system. In 1968 education estimates were cut by 26 per cent on the capital account, by the end of the FNDP budget stringency had made its full effects felt. The expansion programme in particular slowed down considerably,

consequently the level of enrolment in form 1 remained more or less the same between 1968 and 1972. Capital development at UNZA fell more than a year behind. The planned building of three teachers colleges and the expansion of others were shelved. Outside the capital development programme there was great concern over the increasing numbers of grade 7 push-outs who could not get form 1 places, and seemed to be heading for school leaver unemployment.

The goal of universal primary education was not achieved by 1970. The disparity in access to schooling at upper primary level between urban and rural areas had persisted.

Progression rates from lower to upper primary in rural areas continued to be constrained by selection examinations because of the inadequate number of school places. At secondary school level the ministry faced the problem of recruiting trainee teachers into the Kabwe Teachers College. In 1968 places were offered to 120 applicants of whom 89 accepted and 72 enrolled. In 1969 places were offered to 115 applicants, but only 48 enrolled.¹⁷ Competition for students had become very keen among training institutions and employers. Moreover, it was difficult to retain Zambian teachers in the face of lucrative jobs outside government service. Consequently, heavy reliance on recruitment of teachers from abroad continued during the FNDP.

As the expansion programme took shape, so did the number of administrative, professional and qualitative problems in the education system. There was extreme pressure upon the administrative and supervisory resources, a significant decline in the professional quality of the teaching force could be seen, shortage of teaching supplies had gradually increased, heavy staff turnover, and student indiscipline all became worrying problems.¹⁸

The scale and severity of the problems eventually gave rise to the convening of the first national education conference in 1969. At that point the Ministry of education had been headed by two previous ministers, John Mwanakatwe and Arthur Wina. Mwanakatwe had laid down the structural foundation of the new system, launched the expansion plans, and made the controversial decisions. Wina's tenure was brief but he opened up some of the issues arising from the massive educational growth. When Wesley Nyirenda took over the Ministry in 1969 he chose to have a public debate on many issues that his predecessor had raised in parliament the previous year.

3.2.4 First National Educational Conference, 1969

In September 1969 the Ministry of Education organised a national education conference to take stock of the performance of the country's education and training system since independence.¹⁹ A cross section of practitioners in

the education and training sector from throughout the country were represented at the conference. The issues covered included education priorities, course content for primary schools, school leaver problems, financial matters, structure, organisation and control of educational institutions, teachers, and teacher training, examinations, technical education, curricula and syllabuses, relationship between the needs of industries and technical training programmes, education for girls, and discipline in schools.²⁰

This conference was significant in several ways. For many of the issues it addressed itself to, the conference came rather late. The wisdom and advice which came out of the conference should have prevailed at the time of drawing up the first post-independence education plan. Nevertheless, the conference gave Zambians two timely benefits, a quick inventory of the situation as it had unfolded and a focus on particular problems which had emerged, such as the school leaver problem. Despite the increasing financial problems which the government was facing, the country's resolve to continue the expansion programme had not diminished. The conclusions of the conference had pointed to this. The conclusions were that:

1. The majority favoured some form of UPE;
2. All groups wanted to see a radical reshaping of the primary school system with emphasis on practical subjects;
3. While the cost would be heavy, the country could and should provide UPE regardless of the rate or needs of economic growth;
4. Boarding schools should be provided to cater for rural children who had to cover long distances and children of civil servants who were subject to frequent transfers;
5. There was need for a comprehensive school medical service to ensure that pupils' progress was not being hampered by physical defects or malnutrition;
6. Science should be taught at all levels beginning in grade 1;
7. More technical teachers should be trained.²¹

Before the 1969 conference the government had taken policy decisions in respect of the following changes which were presented to parliament:

- (a) to change the structure of the secondary school course;
- (b) to diversify the secondary school curriculum;
- (c) to maximise utilisation of space in secondary schools (increase class enrolment from 35 to 40 and double-bunk instead of single beds);
- (d) to convert Hillcrest secondary school into a technical school;
- (e) to convert Chalimbana Teacher Training College into a special In-Service college for teachers as soon as funds become available
- (f) to diversify secondary school curricula by introducing a wide range of practical subjects.²²

Following these two events the Ministry went ahead to implement policy proposals. Practical subjects in the areas of technical drawing, woodwork, metalwork, agricultural science, and business studies were introduced in secondary schools and Teachers colleges.

An important political event which took place during the FNDP was the 1967 launching by UNIP of Humanism in Zambia as a national ideology.²³ This was an attempt to stamp the Zambian people with a political ideology with which they could identify. Humanism was also intended to act as regulatory framework for the country's social and economic endeavours. UNIP faced an impending general election in 1968 with severe internal strife. The struggle for fair tribal representation in the power hierarchy had become fierce.²⁴

Humanism therefore came at a most critical time. One could say that its political role was both visionary and diversionary. The ideology being man-centred, non-tribal, and non-exploitative was expected to act as a unifying factor in the nation. Hence, soon after its launching UNIP tried to introduce it as a teaching subject in schools. The 1969 education conference considered this proposal but concluded that the implementation of Humanism in schools would face many practical difficulties. Besides, the opposition party and the general public had reacted cynically and suspiciously to the introduction of Humanism. Though difficult as the effort turned out to be, UNIP had made its first political mark on education.

Thus, within the FNDP period the government carried out an unsuccessful attempt to introduce a party ideology in the school curriculum and renewed its efforts to mitigate past education and training deprivation through further expansion. Paradoxically, its attempts to introduce qualitative changes in the system came at a time when recurrent resources were under considerable pressure. In all, it is expansionism which appeared to direct the planning process. Although the Government was fully aware of the magnitude of the emerging problems in the country's economy and in the education and training sector in particular, the national conference in 1969 failed to produce any real public commitment to rationalising education and training expansion. Expert advice, such as the one below, which had been given to guide the thinking of the conference did not seem to make much impact:

The scope of secondary and higher educational expansion, on the other hand has been defined by a calculation of two independent economic factors: Manpower needs and estimated financial resources. The magnitude of both depends upon assumptions about the rates of increase in production, wages, and employment. Many of the assumptions have been falsified by events. The country faces the prospect of skilled manpower supply in excess of demand (as distinct from need),... and insufficient revenue to sustain the soaring capital and recurrent costs of education expansion at the approved plan rates.²⁵

Ostensibly because a large number of projects initiated during the FNDP had not been completed by the end of the Plan period in 1970 the Government extended the expiry date

of the FNDP to December 1971. Nonetheless, the political and economic problems which had arisen in the country following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia made it very difficult for the extension to have any positive effect. The re-routing of supply lines in particular severely affected the supply of building materials and equipment.²⁶ The school construction programme was delayed, and the objective to enrol all seven year olds into Grade 1 by 1970 became untenable. Intake into secondary schools faced similar difficulties. The FNDP average progression rate target of 33 per cent for Grade 7s had by 1970 slipped back to 25 per cent.

In all, the FNDP saw both great strides in accomplishing some of the objectives, as well as frustrations in the failures to achieve others. In 1969 Technical Drawing was introduced into the Junior Secondary School Leaving Examination (JSSLE) at Form 2 level.²⁷ In 1970 Statutory Instrument no 118 (Compulsory Attendance) was introduced, this made truancy in Government and aided schools a punishable offence in a court of law. Since school enrolment was not compulsory, but only attendance, the effect of this improbable legislation was minimal and it soon became a dead letter. Tuition and boarding fees at secondary schools were completely abolished. The Government's commitment to expanding the education services was evident in the Ministry of Education's share of

recurrent expenditure (excluding public debt appropriations and defence), which remained at a higher 22.7 per cent in 1968, 23.0 per cent in 1969, and 22.0 per cent in 1970.

Zambianisation, a programme of replacing expatriates with Zambians had achieved some successes in some sections of the public and private sectors.²⁸ This programme was not only closely connected to the development of secondary and tertiary education and training, it was partly responsible for its rapid development and expansion. Political symbolism and patronage had also promoted the drive for rapid Zambianisation. Unfortunately training for Zambianisation was caught up in the politics of education and training for development. Zambianisation has meant rapid access to training and accelerated promotions, quite often without regard to critical development and productivity requirements in industries and the public sector. Paper qualifications became important criteria by which peoples' potential to contribute to the development process are judged. The programme became reduced to a political objective rather than a developmental strategy. Because many investment decisions are still being made in education and training in respect of advancing the Zambianisation programme, it is important that a critical conceptualisation of the place and role of this programme is given thought by the Government.

The results of the 1969 population census had documented the worrying trend that massive numbers of people had moved from their villages into urban areas since independence. The economic implications of this for social services provision, such as education, were quite obvious. Moreover, the 1969 manpower survey projected a continuing deficit of many skilled and semi-skilled people in the economy.²⁹ For most of the jobs advanced education and extensive training were required.

Politically, education development during the FNDP had taken place against a very trying period for the ruling party UNIP. Between 1967 and 1972 when the one party constitution came into being UNIP had faced serious internal problems. Factionalism, sectionalism, and accusations of political dominance by some tribes were some of the serious issues in the inter-party and intra-party contests for power.³⁰ UNIP leadership had come under severe challenge from both ANC and the relatively newer small parties, United Party and the United Progressive Party, each of which drew support from a predominantly ethnic and provincial membership. The run up to the 1968 general elections and the 1971 referendum for the one party system was a particularly difficult time. Thus the development process was being led and managed by a leadership that was, on the one hand engaged in a fierce internal power struggle and inter-party political contest, while at the same time leading an equally demanding and complex development programme.

3.2.5 The Second National Development Plan (SNDP)

The start of the SNDP had been delayed by the Government's difficulties in recruiting expatriate planners to work on the plan: itself a confirmation of the thin resources of local expertise on which the government could draw.³¹ The SNDP came well marked with these features: a moderate will to pursue the quantitative growth process, a catalogue of continuing budget cuts, and (despite the postponement) delays in completing many of the projects started earlier. During the Second Plan period a strong realisation emerged within the government that the country's education system needed to be critically reviewed and overhauled.

The objectives of the education sector of the SNDP were:

1. to provide sufficient new lower primary streams to keep pace with population growth.
2. to provide sufficient new upper primary streams to achieve a national progression rate of 80 per cent from grade 4 to grade 5 by 1976.
3. To complete the construction of three secondary schools, to make extensions to twelve secondary schools, and to build thirteen new full secondary schools and two junior demonstration schools at teachers colleges.
4. To expand two Primary Teacher Training Colleges and to complete the construction of two Secondary Teachers Colleges. To build three new Primary Teachers Colleges.
5. To expand Nortec and Evelyn Hone Colleges. To complete expansion works at four Trades Training Institutes. To begin the construction of Zambia Aeronautical Services Training Institute.
6. To complete UNZA's World Bank financed education projects- School of education, School of Engineering, student residences and catering facilities.³²

The SNDP was launched at a time when the economy was in difficulties. Zambia's economic performance had suffered major setbacks at the close of the FNDP due to both internal and external factors.³³ Fluctuations in the price of copper, the main foreign exchange earner, had caused great concern to the Government. The financing of development capital inputs was very much dependent on foreign exchange reserves. Although the government had regarded the setbacks in the performance of the economy as temporary, their effects had nevertheless begun to take shape in the budgetary allocations. Table 4 shows the government's capital and recurrent expenditure on education during the SNDP.

Table 4

Government Recurrent and Capital Expenditure on Education, 1972-1976 (K'million)

	Recurrent					Capital				
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
<u>Primary School</u>										
Expenditure	27.00	28.78m	31.22m	34.16m	44.71m	3.68m	3.97m	3.77m	4.05m	2.78
% of Total	44.6	44.2	44.8	45.3	47.5	19.3	13.4	17.4	17.9	11.8
<u>Secondary School</u>										
Expenditure	13.93m	14.40	15.71	16.75m	20.96m	5.36m	10.52	11.61m	8.13m	6.90
% of Total	23.0	22.1	22.6	22.2	22.3	28.1	47.6	53.5	36.0	29.3
<u>Teacher Training</u>										
Expenditure	1.71m	1.57	1.90m	2.13	2.42m	0.81m	1.61m	1.33m	1.18	1.53
% of Total	2.8	2.4	2.7	2.8	2.6	4.2	7.3	6.1	5.2	6.5
<u>Technical Education</u>										
Expenditure	5.80m	5.84	5.64m	6.69m	7.69m	2.09m	1.33m	0.99m	3.17m	3.64m
% of Total	9.6	9.0	8.1	8.9	8.2	35.7	24.5	17.1	20.4	15.5
<u>University of Zambia</u>										
Expenditure	3.85m	6.39	6.40m	5.89m	8.64m	2.09m	1.33m	0.99m	3.17m	3.64m
% of Total	6.4	9.8	9.2	7.8	9.2	11.0	6.0	4.5	14.0	15.5
<u>Other and Admin.</u>										
Expenditure	8.21	8.09	8.80m	9.79	9.72m	0.30m	0.26m	0.30m	1.47m	2.68
% of Total	13.56	12.4	12.6	13.0	10.3	1.6	1.2	1.4	6.5	11.4
Total	60.50m	65.06m	69.67m	75.41m	94.14m	19.03	22.10m	21.70m	22.60m	23.52m

Source: Ministry of Education, (1976), Pp.41-42.

Given that capital expenditure by nature does not follow an even path, and depends on project finance and the government's willingness to commence new projects, it is not surprising Table 4 shows that some sectors experienced fluctuations in capital expenditure. Overall, capital expenditure during the SNDP showed very negligible growth against a background of rising inflation in the country. The responsibility for capital development in the primary sector was transferred to the provincial administration towards the end of the Plan period. In the new arrangement the position of the Ministry of Education has weakened as education expenditure has to compete with other provincial needs. The tendency has been to balance allocations rather than give according to sectors. In concrete terms the reduction of funding in primary school development meant that the SNDP set targets could not be achieved. Double and triple shift systems were employed to cope with rising enrolments in a system that was expanding very slowly.

A survey carried out in Lusaka by the Ministry of Education in 1973 revealed serious inequities in access to schooling within the urban areas. The results showed that, in squatter areas only 36.0 per cent of the school aged children attended primary schools, in the site and service areas it was 57.0 per cent, whereas in the high and medium cost areas it was 87.0 per cent. In one squatter area the proportion of school age children attending school was as low as 18.0 per cent.³⁴

It will also be observed that overall recurrent expenditure provisions in each subsector had not shown significant increases between 1972 and 1974. Thereafter the primary and secondary school subsector recorded dramatic increases which came as a result of a salary review in 1975. The emolument factor in recurrent expenditure is a mask which often hides negative realities behind aggregate figures. This can be discerned from examining allocations to individual functions as shown in Table 5 below which indicates expenditure allocation for student consumables that is, teaching and learning materials and replacement works.

Table 5

Recurrent Expenditure Provision for Student consumables and Capital Works Replacements in Selected Institutional Subsectors, 1972-1976

	Student Consumables					Capital Works Replacements				
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
<u>Primary Schools</u>										
Expenditure	1.98	2.12	2.03	3.37	4.11	0.03	0.26	0.21	0.36	0.21
% of Total	7.3	7.7	6.5	9.9	9.1	0.1	0.8	0.7	0.9	0.4
No. of Pupils	777873	810234	858191	872392	907867					
<u>Secondary Schools</u>										
Expenditure	0.98m	0.70m	1.26m	0.91	1.36	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.08	0.04
% of Total	6.8	4.7	7.7	5.5	6.6	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.2
No. of Pupils	60051	61354	65764	73049	78805					
<u>Teacher Training</u>										
Expenditure	0.07m	0.07m	0.10m	0.11m	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.01
% of Total	4.2	4.6	5.0	5.0	5.4	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.5	0.4
<u>Technical Education</u>										
Expenditure	0.75m	0.46	0.51	0.47	0.41	-	0.12	0.08	0.05	0.17
% of Total	11.8	7.9	9.0	7.0	5.3	-	2.0	1.5	0.7	2.2
No. of Students	4,123	4,609	5,666	5,421	5,569					

Source: GRZ Financial and Economic Review Reports, 1972, 77.

The recurrent expenditure provisions in Table 5 should be considered against the actual number of students being served, the number of institutions and the state of repair in the institutions. A comparison of per capita cost across institutions is also useful in measuring the disparity between the subsectors. In Table 5 it is evident that Teacher Training Colleges suffered the worst cuts. The reality behind this is was that qualitative aspects in teacher education received severe adjustments, erosion, or complete withdrawal due to lack of adequate funding. For capital intensive subsectors such as technical education, inadequate funding imposed very frustrating experiences because maintenance of plant could not be carried out effectively. The reflection of the Department of Technical Education and Vocational Training (DTEVT) on their 1975 performance summarised a common experience which faced many institutions in the country:

Institutions continued to experience difficulties in their pursuit of qualitative training of skilled personnel to meet manpower needs of the country because of inadequate funds. The increased allocation could not, unfortunately meet the training requirements because of the high cost of materials. The main areas were student requisites and boarding costs. Although some institutions kept within their allocations...they could not augment existing equipment by new purchases nor could they do the necessary maintenance. It is feared that most equipment, a lot of which is very expensive, may eventually become unserviceable, either through normal attrition or lack of maintenance. But a situation may be reached when any lessening of funds will make it necessary to discontinue some training programmes.

A similar crisis of accommodation was experienced at UNZA around 1974.³⁶ The under provision of capital funding which occurred between 1971 and 1974 held back the expansion programme of student accommodation and kitchen and dining hall facilities. This was at a time of rising student enrolment in the University. The net effect of the under funding of capital projects was that the replacement of decrepit school buildings, construction of teacher houses, provision of water, electricity, and sewage facilities in the sector fell behind scheduled targets.³⁷

Some indicators of efficiency in the education system had shown little improvement in the first decade of independence. The progression rate from Grade 4 to 5 had continued to show severe imbalances between regions and between urban and rural areas. The progression rate ranged from around 100 per cent in the Copperbelt Province to 58.3 percent in Eastern Province.³⁸ The ratio of Grade 7 pupils proceeding to Form 1 during the SNDP had not risen in relation to the rising numbers of Grade 7 candidates. Table 6 shows the trend in the progression rate from 1964 to 1976.

TABLE 6

Grade 7 - 8 Progression Rates, 1964-1976

<u>Year</u>	<u>Enrolment Grade 7</u>	<u>Progression (%)</u>	<u>Enrolment Form I/Grade 8</u>
1964	14,781		
1965	18,090	44.6	6,601
1966	36,076	60.6	10,976
1967	41,973	41.5	14,963
1968	59,242	35.4	14,869
1969	64,659	26.5	15,721
1970	67,222	23.5	15,175
1971	73,859	23.4	15,753
1972	80,506	21.3	15,747
1973	85,213	21.8	17,570
1974	93,891	22.6	19,254
1975	99,693	22.8	21,462
1976	103,699	22.2	22,113
1977	107,145	21.8	22,659

Source: MGEC. Education Statistics. Various years.

The trend had been clearly downward while the number of Grade 7 candidates kept rising. For many years many push-outs have dealt with their problem by repeating Grade 7 to get a second or third chance at entry into form 1. Unfortunately this 'solution' puts extra pressure on a system that is already over-stretched. Repetition has been responsible for overenrolment and crowding in most grade 7 classes and rapid wear and tear of school facilities.

Despite the financial and other difficulties capital development projects and extension works continued. The major part of the planned secondary school building projects carried over from the FNDP were completed and target enrolments for the secondary school level were achieved satisfactorily. Primary school enrolments rose from 810,234 in 1973 to 858,191 in 1974, an increase of 5.9 per cent. Some 'upgradings' of primary schools (that is, to overcome the bottleneck at grade 4) in the Eastern Region were made possible by phasing out boarding facilities and converting dormitories into classrooms. However, whatever achievements the FNDP and the SNDP made they were secured under difficult budgetary and operational conditions. Most of these adverse conditions persisted during the Third National Development Plan (TNDP) with even greater severity.

Both the FNDP and SNDP introduced no major shift in educational and training policy. Education and training programmes were still responding to the initial policy of

redressing past education deprivations in the provision of facilities, human resource development, and the Zambianisation programme. The expansion which took place in the 1960s and early 1970s produced such a spiral knock on effect in the system in the last two decades that its consequences have lived on. In the face of these financial and planning problems resulting from this expansionism the Government's reaction has been mixed. On the one hand it has never disguised its recognition of the country's declining economy and its attendant consequences for public expenditure on development programmes.³⁹ However, the Government's planning and expenditure behaviour have on many occasions contradicted official concern over the unfavourable state of the economy.

Throughout this period education and training development were caught up between the pressures of social forces, population growth in particular, and the internal politics of patronage. Because education provision and expansion cannot be held back against an increasing young population, it is imperative that objectives and priorities be rationally reviewed often if this takes place in a context of scarce resources. Politicians were more concerned with the delivery of education and training as a political good, as a vote winner. Consequently, professional advice on planning tended to be overwhelmed by the political will to deliver the education goods.

During the SNDP three important events took place which opened a new chapter in the country's education development process. In 1973 the President appointed an Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) to consider and to make recommendations regarding education development in Zambia during the 1974-1984 decade.⁴⁰ The committee was one of many that had been appointed to review social and economic sectors as part of the preparation process for the new Manifesto in the immediate period after the creation of the one party state. In 1974 UNIP produced a document on national policies for the decade (1974-1984).⁴¹ In 1974 the government launched a far reaching education reform exercise in the country.⁴² Other no less significant initiatives included the Presidential decree in July, 1975 to all education and training institutions that they should become production units. Although these events were separated briefly in time, their broad subject matter shared a common background. They were all in different ways making attempts to provide solutions to the problems that had mounted in the country's education and training system.

The 1973 Ad Hoc Committee reviewed a wide range of issues in the entire education and training system. Although the Committee spent only 25 days on this exercise, it was able to provide a comprehensive synoptic coverage of the issues on educational structure, administrative and professional aspects, technical education, and support services. Its

treatment of the issues showed a marked depth of critical analysis of the situation. Their recommendations on financing education were particularly critical and dissenting:

The Committee regarded the feeding of pupils as the responsibility of parents and also felt boarding facilities to boarders, while day pupils in the same school do not enjoy them, introduces an element of inequality. The Committee therefore recommends the following:

- (i) There should be free tuition but not free boarding facilities;
- (ii) The government should continue to provide these facilities where they exist but everyone must pay for the services; and
- (iii) Boarding facilities in urban areas must be abolished and dormitories converted into classrooms- refectories should be retained to cater for pupils who must pay for the services.⁴³

In yet another recommendation relating to financing education, the report said:

In order to realise the proposed education development in the coming decade, which we are convinced is essential, the financing of education deserves special attention. Everything possible should be done to raise additional funds from sources outside the budget. For example, serious consideration should be given to the possibility of an educational levy. Within the Budget, developmental priorities should be re-examined with a view to the re-allocation of funds to education from other projects in the country.⁴⁴

This is the furthest Zambians had come to suggesting a change in the financing of some aspects of the country's education provision. The Ad Hoc Committee's report on financing education was at variance with the 1969 education

conference report. The conclusions of the 1969 report rejected any suggestion of reintroducing boarding fees. A more significant conclusion was that which related to bilateral aid. The 1969 report was for more bilateral aid to support the country's education development. In contrast, the 1973 report made no appeal at all to the government to look to bilateral aid.

Several issues appear to emerge from the two reports. Firstly, the fees had just been abolished, consequently it made little sense to reintroduce them only a few years later. Secondly, UNIP's pride in Zambia's post independence era was its deliverance of the people from the colonial measures which had restricted their access to education. Therefore the fees issue was politically very sensitive for UNIP, and particularly for the President, personally, who made no secret of his views.

Although the 1973 report made some observations about expatriate teachers, the recommendation on teacher supply avoided any reference to the need for this kind of technical assistance. Instead, the Committee emphasised the need to produce teachers locally and urged the government to provide better conditions of service for teachers. The important points about the 1973 report are that, it came at a time when some of the problems that had been discussed in 1969 had taken definite shape, the grade 7 push-outs had

increased, and there were clear difficulties on the part of the government in maintaining levels of recurrent expenditure provision seen in the immediate years after the attainment of independence.

The recommendations of the Working Groups culminated in the production of the 1974 UNIP Manifesto for the 1974-1984 decade. The Party adopted most of the recommendations that were put forward by the Ad Hoc Committee.

Curiously, none of the 1974 UNIP manifesto's proposals on national education policies addressed themselves to the central issue of financing education and training. The Ad Hoc Committee had clearly put a financing caveat on future education development in the country.⁴⁵ How could this have happened? The final design of the policies was the responsibility of the party officials at Freedom House. This group was more inclined to pay particular attention to political sensitivities in the policies. Therefore, a non-committal stand on this matter appeared to be preferable because it left the government with more open options. Despite caution over financial resources, expansionism and UPE remained important items on the agenda of education development.

The Ad Hoc Committee and the result of the task it carried out should be seen in a broader perspective. The Committee

had no authority of sanction over the sector and the recommendations it was asked to work out. The authority to make policies and important decisions lies in the Social and Cultural subcommittee of the Central Committee of UNIP. The Ad Hoc Committee's task had therefore been largely administrative and facilitative for the decision making process of the Party.

The result of the Ad Hoc Committee's work (the UNIP Manifesto) raises also a question about the purpose which the manifestoes serve. Essentially, they are part of the Party's propaganda to sell its image to the electorate, hence the careful selection of what appears in it.

Seven months after the publication of the 1974 manifesto the Ministry of Education launched a major education reform exercise.

The initial impetus for a comprehensive reform exercise which nevertheless built on the general unease about the educational performance, and the work of the senior officials in the Ad Hoc Committee was given by the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation conference on formal education in Africa which took place in Tanzania. The Permanent Secretary for education, the late S.J. Kazunga and senior officials attended this conference, at the personal direction of President Kaunda. President Nyerere gave a

very challenging introspective opening speech on education and development.⁴⁶ The discussions at this meeting sharpened the inspiration among Zambian official to move towards reviewing the education system.

3.2.6 Educational Reforms, 1974

The pressure for reforms which began building up in 1969 had by 1974 reached such proportions within the government that the need to initiate a reform exercise could no longer be deferred, nor could problems and issues in education continue to be perceived separately. Concern was no longer with such matters as the problem of increasing numbers of push-outs or indeed the importance of providing adequate and reliable transport for the inspectorate. The entire education system had been indicted: '...my analysis of the education system, provides overwhelming evidence of the need for us to undertake a survey of the entire system and formulate cogent, progressive and feasible reforms.'⁴⁷

The organisation of the reform exercise which followed involved a very comprehensive plan of consultation and discussions which extended far and beyond.

Following extensive study tours of ten countries in Africa and abroad to examine the education models and reforms of other countries, and intensive evaluations of all sectors of the education system intensive discussions were held within

the Ministry of Education and among a cross-section of the ministries, trade unions, academic and the Party. Consequently a draft document entitled ' Education for Development: Draft Statement on Education Reform' was produced.⁴⁸ This document offered radical socialist oriented changes in the Zambia's education system.

The political climate within which the reforms took place gave strong impetus to the way the reforms were perceived and projected. The reform movement emerged in the long shadows of the socialist oriented Zambian Humanism which had been launched in 1967. Since then UNIP had been trying to find effective strategies for institutionalising the party ideology. Education had thus potential to act as a delivery channel as well as a target for ideological socialisation. A curious event around the time of the initiation of the reform exercise was the publication by Freedom House in 1975⁴⁹ of a document of political education syllabuses. It was a curious small document whose circulation was quite conspicuous and controversial, but little else was said about this document. The timing of its publication could not have been unrelated to the internal initiatives that had been going within UNIP since 1967. The document was part of the UNIP's attempts to introduce scientific socialism in education institutions. The schools did not approve of them. The Ministry of education was however not particularly opposed to it, but wanted a clear pedagogical guideline.

This unfortunately was missing. The document provided political education syllabuses for pre-school level through to university level. Its socialist leanings were very evident in the suggested readings for each level. Literature on Humanism, anti-colonialism and marxism-leninism dominated the list. The least one can say is that the document bordered on introducing some form of indoctrination. It is not quite clear whether the contents of this document had any influence at all on the reforms, but the thoughts of the 1976 Draft Statement on the reforms were not very distant from some of the contents of this document.

The key areas which the draft proposals covered were Education for development, education structure, education and production, mobilising and managing educational resources, teacher education, curriculum development, education materials and equipment, assessment, certification, selection and guidance, and organisation and management. The details of these subject areas were presented to the public for closer scrutiny and public debate.⁵⁰ The reactions of the Zambian public to the draft proposals were mixed. There was consensus in favour of some proposals and complete dissent on others. Some were dismayed at the level and size of transformation which the proposals envisaged introducing in Zambian society. The reactions to the reforms are well documented elsewhere.⁵¹

However, a few points of discussion from the draft document are worth further reflection and discussion. On mobilising and managing educational resources the Ministry took the view that direct financial contributions from the public and private sector were needed to support the new system of education. The Ministry proposed to target previously untapped financial resources to make a contribution in expanding the new education system.⁵² The Ministry called for greater sacrifices from the Zambian people in providing support to education; but the draft document refused to consider re-introducing school fees.⁵³ It was felt that the fees placed a heavy burden on parents.

Three things were clear from the Ministry's position on financing education. There was a willingness on the part of the Ministry to find and use new measures of involving the general public in sharing with the government the costs of education provision. In this task, the Ministry saw itself and the Zambian people as the primary source of financial resources. This left recourse to foreign aid at the discretion of the government. External aid appeared to be a difficult factor to bring into the equation of the country's education system which the government was attempting to work out. This underlined the government's new approach towards greater self-reliance and public sacrifice. The issue of the possibility of reintroducing school fees had clearly remained as sensitive as ever. But, more than anything

else, it had once again shown UNIP continuing to protect its own conscience and pride in the face of mounting practical difficulties.

In presenting the final 1977 reform document the Minister of Education called attention to the greater demand the reforms would make on the country's financial and non-monetary resources.⁵⁴

The 1977 document's recommendation focused on introducing reforms in the following areas:

- a. Education and training system, that is, linkages within and between formal, non-formal, and special education.
- b. Qualitative aspects - that is improving resource inputs into education and training, professional support services, efficient management and administration, examination and assessment, and curriculum reforms.
- c. Community support to government in education and training provision services.

The government recommended introduction of a restructured and adjusted education and training system which could provide inter-sectoral links or continuity between different levels of schooling and training. A full complement of curriculum reform and facilities provision were to accompany the structural changes at many levels of education and training provision. Other specific recommendations were the need to continue using the English language as a medium of instruction from grade 1, putting more emphasis on science

and technology, strengthening the programme of education with production in institutions of learning, establishing resource centres, to offer more skills training opportunities in continuing education programmes, to localise school certificate examinations by 1980, and to intensify the training of teachers.⁵⁵.

The approval of the 1977 reform document by the party and government sealed a comprehensive agenda for Zambia's education and training development. From then onwards new development plans have been required to respond to the reforms. Likewise, donors who would like to assist Zambia have been expected to choose projects which fall within the framework of the reforms. However, external aid as a separate subject of debate failed to find a place on the agenda of the reform exercise.

The education reform turned out to be an extensive and intensive exercise which produced different experiences among the different groups. Were Zambians any wiser after the reforms? Only qualified answers can be given. Yes, Zambians came closer to understanding a little about their own social structure, values, and their 'imprisonment' in a servant system they could not restructure. In practical terms the reforms failed to come up with clearly defined priorities. Though the exercise was aimed at formulating Government policy for future education and training

development,⁵⁶ the absence of discussion of the implementation strategies and detailed cost implications weakened the reforms considerably.

3.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In analysing Zambia's post-independence education and training development, the EDP, the TDP, the FNDP, and the SNDP clustered together as an important period in which many new developments took place. The period carried the duty of translating UNIP's education and training policies into actual operational programmes. The period was also characterised by concerted initiatives to make major adjustments in many aspects of the country's education and training system.

In the first section of this chapter it has been shown that during the first four Plan periods Zambia's education and training development responded mainly to the following: to UNIP's policies to redress past deprivations and imbalances in education provision, to the policy to abolish racial segregation in schools and to the policy to remove school fees barriers in access to schooling, to the need to develop indigenous educated and skilled manpower, and the need to diversify school curricula and training programmes in light of the changes that were taking place in the economic sector. Specific policy objectives included: attempts to provide universal primary education (UPE), and to provide free education and training at all levels in the public education sector.

In this period expansion of education and training facilities were accorded the highest priority. The pace of capital development was such that by 1970 there were clear indications that the government was gradually beginning to experience difficulties in providing adequate recurrent expenditure provisions to service capital development. The start of the Third National Development Plan (TNDP) faced a context in which set objectives came up against mounting problems and constraints. A rearrangement of priorities became not only necessary but also inevitable.

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CHAPTER FOUR

ZAMBIA: POLICIES, REFORMS, AND PERFORMANCE IN EDUCATION AND TRAINING DEVELOPMENT, 1975-1989

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In this Chapter the analysis and discussion focuses on the developments in the sector in a place that has been marked by economic decline and new education and economic reform initiatives. The discussion will focus on the education development objectives against the previous development plan performance and in the face of government financial difficulties. The education reforms and the subsequent attempts to find a strategy for their implementation are examined in the broader context of the new initiatives in a context facing increasing operational resource constraints. The perspectives of the recent national development plans objectives on education are also analysed to reflect the position of education in the current structural adjustment programme. In all, the discussion attempts to set the background to which increased donor assistance has been responding.

4.2 The Third National Development Plan (TNDP)

Since the conclusion of the education reform exercise in 1977, the reform document became a policy guide to new developments. Its influence on subsequent policy decisions

was very explicit in the TNDP. The TNDP was designated a staging vehicle for the implementation of the educational reforms. In preparing the TNDP, for example, the following aspects from the reforms were instrumental in structuring the Plan:

1. improvement of the quality of education.
2. improvement of teacher education and professional development of teachers.
3. elimination of regional and other imbalances in education provision at grades 1, 5, 8, and 10.
4. expansion and diversification of continuing education.
5. maximisation of use of education facilities.
6. use of local materials and technology in new school buildings. Building simple, durable functional, and low cost maintenance schools.
7. encouragement of self-help educational projects by communities.
8. completion of localisation of school certificate examinations.
9. planning well recurrent and capital expenditure.
10. consolidation of production activities in all education institutions to bring out educational values, develop correct attitudes and production skills.
11. development of resource centres.
12. development of the new curricula that will accommodate the educational reforms..¹

One can see that the aspects listed above aimed at introducing five important measures; internal efficiency, rational expansion, qualitative development, local initiative, and curriculum diversification.

Thus the TNDP objectives were to:

1. enrol into grade 1 all children who have attained the age of seven; and
2. enable all children who complete grade 4 to enter grade 5 and proceed to grade 7;
3. provide resources during the TNDP to commence work on several new schools that had not been completed during the SNDP;
4. introduce measures to improve junior secondary school curriculum and organisation;
5. open more than ninety grade 8 classes during the TNDP;
6. design and introduce curricula for grades 10 -12;
7. provide adequate training for teaching staff for senior secondary schools;
8. provide suitable materials and equipment for all secondary schools;
9. create a total of 980 additional places by using existing facilities;
10. accord high priority to teacher education during the TNDP.²

It is clear that the TNDP shared much of the previous Plan's emphases. It was intended to continue the expansion programme and also to attend to the need to improve the qualitative aspects of the education and training system. The specific objectives of the following subsectors; teacher education, technical education and vocational training, continuing education, and special education were particularly emphatic on the need to expand facilities and to enhance the quality of education and training.³ However, the TNDP like its predecessors carried no clearly defined priorities in its long list of objectives as the TNDP declared:

Programmes and projects to be undertaken during the TNDP assume that all priority areas indicated in the education reforms are of equal status and that any reductions or curtailments should be on the basis of certain items which might be deleted or slowed down from particular categories rather than on the basis of eliminating whole categories.⁴

4.2.1 Performance of the TNDP

The interim period before the TNDP came into operation was dominated by two major events, the education reforms and the processing of the fourth World Bank loan for the education and training sector.⁵ Although the loan agreement was signed on 17th January 1977, long before the education reforms were finalised and published in October, 1977 the loan request contained expansion aspects of the reforms as part of the justification for the loan request. This was rather strange as the final recommendation had not yet been given the official endorsement.

The performance of the TNDP was not different from its predecessor in major respects. The successes that were achieved had been counterbalanced by a catalogue of financial and operational problems. In accordance with the main objective in the sector of improving the quality of educational services a number of quality enhancing projects were undertaken. These included the following:

- a) The Zambia Education Materials Project (ZEMP). This project aimed at production of teaching and learning materials

- b) The Zambia Mathematics and Science Teacher Education Project (ZAMSTEP). The project is aimed at improving the quality of teaching in science and mathematics.
- c) The science equipment production project.
- d) The Self-Help Action Plan for Education (SHAPE). It is aimed at assisting colleges and schools in the development of self-reliance activities in areas of production work and professional improvement of teachers.
- e) The Practical Subjects Project (PSP). The Project was concerned with skills training for primary school pupils, and also to improve the teaching of practical subjects in Primary Teacher Training Colleges.⁶

These were all foreign aid funded projects involving two multilateral agencies and five bilateral donors. The practical subjects project has since been discontinued after more than fifteen years of uninterrupted support by FINIDA. Although these projects had been in the spirit of the TNDP and the education reforms they were not explicitly anticipated, and the PSP had in any case been operational already a little earlier.

During the TNDP minimum expansion took place at both primary and junior secondary school level. Capital investment in primary schools fell far short of what had been planned. The actual expenditure reached about 43 per cent in 1984. Consequently, restricted development resulted. Additional school buildings and replacement of those which were beyond repair could not be undertaken.⁷ The primary and

secondary sector suffered also from a severe shortage of qualitative inputs such as teaching and learning materials.⁸ Table 7 shows the results of a recent study to establish the availability of textbooks in a sample of Grade 8 classes in 1987.

Table 7

Textbook Availability in Grade 8 Classes, 1987

Number of Schools	72
Number of Grade 8 Classes	337
Grade 8 Enrolment	14,044
Average Class Size	41.7

Textbooks Available

	<u>Owned by the School</u>	<u>Owned by the Pupil</u>	<u>Total</u>
English	4,414	36	4,450
Mathematics	13,398	121	13,519
Science	3,825	221	4,046
Geography	6,688	239	6,927

	<u>No. of Textbooks per Class</u>	<u>No. of Pupils per Textbook</u>
English	13.2	3.2
Mathematics	40.1	1.0
Science	12.0	3.5
Geography	20.6	2.0

Other Books (not Textbooks) Available

	<u>Owned by the School</u>	<u>Owned by the Pupil</u>
English	1,675	433
Mathematics	1,742	276
Science	853	144
Geography	2,148	266

Source: Kelly, M.J. 1987, Unpublished.

Table 7 gives only a small insight into what is a big national problem in the education system. The pitiful situation regarding textbooks is very clear in the table. Except for Mathematics whose situation had improved only recently because of a British supported Mathematics project, other subjects faced the same difficulties. In most schools in the country textbook sharing is the only way teachers cope with the present problem. It is a solution which has brought with it obvious organisational problems, and also challenges the old teaching practices which have not adapted to a situation of scarcity. What the table cannot show is the condition of the available textbooks in schools. Most of the stocks of books are very old and in need of replacement and not repair. Table 8 shows the summarised expenditure on pupil and domestic science requisites in primary schools during the TNDP

Table 8

**Expenditure on Pupil and Domestic Science
Requisites in Primary Schools, 1981-83**

<u>Item</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1981-83</u>
Exp'ture	K1521504	K2955861	K1929705	K6413070
Enrolment	1073314	1121769	1194070	3389153
Per Pupil	K1.41	K2.63	K1.61	K1.89

Source: Kelly, M.J. et al. (1986)

The preceding table shows the state of budgetary allocation during the TNDP in one subsector alone. It marked a trend which in 1987 culminated in the complete withdrawal of Government subventions for this function. It should be noted that by 1983 parents' annual average expenditure on learning materials per child had already exceeded K15.

However, the TNDP increased enrolments at primary school level by using the practice of double and triple shift system in a large number of upper primary classes in both urban and rural areas. Because enrolments increased without proportionate increase in the number of classes, the average class size often exceeded the desirable limits.

In the secondary school sector the planned and actual classes and enrolments had been achieved by the end of the Plan in 1983. Towards the end of the Plan period there was an increase in the number of self-help projects. Many former primary boarding schools in rural areas and other idle buildings were converted into self-help junior secondary schools,⁹ which rose from twenty-four in 1984 to two hundred and eighty three by 1988. This particular step reflected an element of resourcefulness and also a sense of urgency in the Government and among the people. The pressure for access to secondary school had built up to such a point that the normal expansion programme of school facilities had failed to cope with the demand. Besides the

progression rate from Grade 7-8 had remained at around 20 per cent.

The Department of Technical Education and Vocational Training carried out a moderately significant capital development programme. The construction of three trades training institutes was started and the construction of eleven staff houses was completed. Though significant in some limited measure, the capital development programme had projects which should have been long completed had it not been for inadequate budgetary allocations. A 250 student hostel for Evelyn Hone College was completed, and the staff development programme for accelerating Zambianisation in the institutions of the Department was implemented according to the Plan. The level of Zambianisation in higher institutions rose from 35 per cent in 1979 to 60 per cent in 1983.

Two major policy decisions were made which affected the provision of higher and technical education in the country. The Zambia Institute of Technology (ZIT) and Mwekera Forestry College were incorporated into the Copperbelt University, and Zambia Air Services Training Institute (ZASTI) was transferred from the Ministry of Higher Education to the Ministry of Power, Transport and Communication. The grounds on which both decisions were justified were not made clear. In the case of expanding the

Copperbelt University it would appear there was one probable reason, to economically justify the position of the University as an autonomous institution. As a constituent campus of the previous federal structure Ndola Campus, as it was then known, had been running two faculties only, the School of industrial and Business Studies, and the School of Architecture and Environmental Studies. The incorporation of ZIT 'solves' the long -running problem of two different institutions sharing a single campus. The incorporation of Mwekera resolves the problem of a school of Forestry which the Government had previously assigned to a rural site in Solwezi but never implemented.

The major development affecting the University was the abolition of the anomalous federal administration structure which had been in existence since 1975.

However, the timing and the very wisdom behind the policy decision is rather suspect. ZIT has been experiencing its own share of financial and operational problems common to all institutions in the country. Incorporation of a unit such as this one into a system facing its own formative organisational problems appears extremely unreasonable. A 1989 ODA review of its support to University education made the following observations about the Copperbelt University.

The range of difficulties, both financial and academic, that have been discussed for UNZA apply even more to the new University, as it tries to merge different traditions, different levels of academic activity with all that this implies for facilities, resources and staff and different funding arrangements and patterns of governance. The full implications of the new situation are not clear, including the very sensitive questions of staff appointments and salary scales, and it will take sometime to sort this out.¹⁰

In the teachers' college sector the major achievement during the TNDP was the completion of the Lusaka college for the teachers of the Handicapped (LCTH). The college provides training services to other countries. Related to this development was the successful conclusion of a national campaign to reach the disabled children in 1983. This exercise assisted the Government to see the actual profile of the disability situation in Zambia. During the TNDP a policy decision was made to raise the entry qualifications into Primary Teacher Training Colleges, from Grade 10 to 12 with effect from 1985.¹¹ This step was looked upon as a qualitative enhancing measure, yes, but only to a certain extent. The number of 'O' level applicants had been growing in the colleges as opportunities for direct employment became scarcer. It was therefore only logical to subject applicants to a competitive entry into colleges. In fact, the time has come for the Ministry of Higher Education to consider introducing a proper recruitment screening examination in addition to the present 'O' level requirements.

Achievements in other subsectors were the establishment of the Audio-Visual Aids Service (AVAS) and the increasing of broadcast time, and coverage of education radio programmes. Repairs to more than 2,500 radios was carried out and in addition the Education Broadcasting Council, which had been dormant since 1973, was revived. This was not until an external consultant had carried out an evaluation of the state of EBS in Zambia.¹²

There is much to be said on the deficit side of the TNDP's balance sheet. The performance of the Plan had showed that the cumulative problems in physical and qualitative development had persisted, and in a few key areas the dimension of the problem had taken a very bad turn. Limited physical expansion, population growth and the age of admission policy into Grade 1 were all for example responsible for the failure to achieve the planned goal of enabling all seven year old children to enrol into Grade 1. Table 9 shows the problem of access to schooling at Grade 1 level.

Table 9

Grade 1 Enrolments by Age and Region (%) 1980

Region	A G E										Total Grade 1 Enrolment
	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12			
Copperbelt	0.6	2.7	10.2	24.8	28.1	21.1	8.2	3.9	39,525		
Eastern	1.2	4.9	14.6	24.2	19.9	18.8	8.5	7.6	16,087		
Kabwe	0.9	4.3	14.4	26.2	21.5	17.8	8.6	5.8	14,598		
Kusaka	2.0	7.0	19.1	26.9	19.7	14.8	6.1	4.0	25,142		
Luapula	0.8	3.0	9.9	22.8	23.1	21.8	10.5	7.8	12,728		
Northern	1.0	4.2	11.4	23.1	22.2	20.1	9.6	8.0	21,274		
N. Western	1.3	5.9	17.4	25.1	19.4	15.6	7.7	7.2	7,620		
Southern	1.1	4.7	22.7	27.6	19.7	14.4	5.5	3.9	21,810		
Western	1.1	3.9	15.0	27.1	21.9	17.1	7.3	6.4	13,542		
ZAMBIA	1.1	4.4	14.7	25.4	22.5	18.2	7.9	5.6	173,046		

Source: Kaluba H. 1985, Table 1(b). p. 162.

It is clear from the Table that a large number of Grade 1 places were taken up by the 8, 9 and 10 year old children. This group alone had 66.2 per cent of the places. The possible negative efficiency and qualitative effects of mixing age-groups has never been given serious thought in the Zambian teaching practice.

The target of enabling every pupil who completed Grade 4 to enter Grade 5 and proceed to Grade 7 was likewise not achieved.

In the DTEVT the construction of staff houses, workshops, libraries and administration offices at four trades training institutes could not be undertaken because of budgetary limitations. The Teacher Training sector faced a similar situation, the objective to increase enrolment in existing colleges and to build an additional college and a science teachers college could not be realised because of financial constraints. Maintenance of college facilities also suffered severely as only a few repairs could be undertaken. As most colleges were old institutions, lack of maintenance and repairs imposed additional difficulties in their operations. Like other Government institutions the colleges have all along been dependent on Government funding. In the post 1975 period, competition for limited Government resources among sectors and subsectors became acute. The teacher training sector does not seem to have fared well in

this contest. The survey carried out on DTEVT institutions between December 1983 and June 1984 also produced a comprehensive catalogue of practical problems facing this department as a result of the limited funding¹³.

The consequences of budgetary cuts over a number of years are reflected in Table 10 below.

Table 10
The State of Training Operational Equipment
in the DTEVT Institutions, 1984

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>No. in Stock</u>	<u>Working</u>	<u>Not Working</u>	<u>Unserviceable</u>
Carpentry	148	97	51	33
Bricklaying	52	27	25	20
Metal Fabrication	46	19	27	9
Metal Plumbing Sheet M	36	9	27	20
Electrical	576	424	152	104
Auto Mechanics	152	43	109	41
Autobody	42	17	25	2
Radio + T.V.	226	122	104	-
Kitchen Equipment	35	9	26	5
Agric Mechanics	8	1	7	6
Vehicles	89	71	18	4
Commerce (Typewriters)	186	165	21	-
Mechanical	8	5	3	-
Auto Chassis	10	2	8	-
Auto Engines	78	40	38	14
Library Equipment	21	8	13	1
<hr/>				
Total	1,713	1,059	654	259
Percent		61.8	38.1	39.6
<hr/>				

Source: Compiled from DTEVT International Reports, 1984

Although the overall profile of the status of equipment appears favourable because of the weight of the entry on electrical equipment, the individual institutional cases from which the figures were drawn showed different pictures. In two cases (out of 4) the percentage of broken down equipment was more than 50 percent. It is clear from the quantity of broken down equipment that the toll must have been gradually built up over some years. The negative effects on the quality of training in such situations are quite obvious. It is hard to imagine how set objectives can be met in a system experiencing severe shortages of training equipment and other learning materials.

By the end of the TNDP the average class sizes for primary and secondary schools had grown. Variations between regions showed that urban regions such as Copperbelt and Lusaka had the largest average class sizes in the primary school sector. Although the official figures have usually put the average class sizes for the two regions at 45 and 50 respectively these figures mask the reality reflected in the upper ranges. In many schools it is not uncommon to find classes whose enrolments exceed 60 pupils, while in Grade 7 classes, 70 pupils per class has not been a rarity in most regions. This is clearly a stark reflection of the pressures the system has come under.

At the end of the TNDP the education and training sector had made some progress but, was overall not significantly any better than it had been in 1979 in a number of areas. The developments which had taken place during the Plan period had not been comprehensive enough to reduce the deficits that had built up over many years. Disparities in participation rates in schools among the various regions were still very evident. Although the national progression rate for Grade 4-5 had been raised, imbalances still existed in the nine regions. The goal of universal basic education was as distant as ever. The objective to enrol all seven year olds in Grade 1 was not achieved. The provision of instructional and learning materials had worsened. Less and less recurrent expenditure provisions were made for student requisites and other operational functions.¹⁴ It was clear that the sector had become less able to cope with the qualitative demands that were being made on its system.

Despite all the difficulties the MGEC was facing the Government had remained relentless in its pursuit of universal basic education for all children. As the TNDP drew to a close the MGEC initiated a very comprehensive study to produce a detailed plan to help transform the old education system into the new structure proposed by the education reforms. The study was undertaken at the request of the International Development Association (IDA) in the context of Zambia's fifth World Bank education project. The study,

named the Education Reform Implementation Project (ERIP)¹⁵ was undertaken by a team drawn almost completely from UNZA.

4.3 The Education Reform Implementation Project (ERIP)

The ERIP Study was the most comprehensive research oriented review of education ever undertaken since 1964 and also since the publication of Mwanakatwe's book The Growth of Education in Zambia in 1968. Other important points about the Study were that it took place six years after the conclusion of the education reform exercise, a quite long gap between the endorsement of the reforms and the initiatives to implement them. The state of the economy had changed much between 1977 and 1984. The declining export prices of copper and the heavy deterioration of the terms of trade had pushed the economy into contraction.¹⁶ Correspondingly, Government public expenditure during the same period tended to reflect the consequences of this economic decline. The ERIP study was therefore clearly undertaken against a background of obvious economic and financial odds. Externally, Zambia was still faced with the freeze on lending from the World Bank. At the time of the study the lifting of the freeze was not yet in sight.¹⁷

The ERIP study achieved four things. It reaffirmed the long standing need for the Government to marshal resources and ideas for the provision of universal basic education. It presented the Government with various financing modalities

which could be employed in developing the new education system. It also drew further attention to the need to arrest the deterioration of the quality of education and training by providing adequate qualitative inputs into the system.

To these ends, the study produced large amounts of useful data and information on the physical and qualitative state of the education subsectors. The data covered a wide range of areas and aspects including the following: the present nature of Government financing of education, foreign aid, implications of universal basic education on resource inputs, maintenance of quality in the education system, curriculum issues, organisation and management of education, and assessment, certification and selection. The utility of such data and information for policy making and actual planning are quite obvious.

The report presented 133 recommendations, of which the main ones focused on the need to provide the first stage of universal basic education, that is, seven years of primary schooling. The report was very explicit in its assignment of high priority to basic education. It declared that all other education targets were to remain subordinate to those measures identified to support the development of basic education.

However , the ERIP study suffered one major weakness. The study lacked a particular financial framework within which to work out the mechanics of implementing UBE. Alternatives in the study needed to be seen against definite financial boundaries.

Perhaps the most enduring achievement made by the ERIP study is the impact its recommendations have had on recent Government policies on financing education. This alone made the study a turning point in Zambia's education policies. On the need for the Government to transfer some of the costs of education provision to users, the study took a very clear position of support. It advocated an arrangement whereby the Government could share some of the costs with parents and the communities.¹⁸ The fact that the study made the financing recommendations at a time when the World Bank was carrying a campaign to persuade developing countries to adopt a more market forces approach in financing social services happened to be coincidental. The Bank never put any direct pressures or indirect influences on the team over the direction of the study. The recommendations came out of the basic economics of Zambia's declining economy and public expenditure. The financial squeeze which faced the Government had left very few options. Therefore the coincidence of time and opportunity was more responsible than anything else. Consequently, between 1984 and 1988 the Government made increasing efforts to re-introduce user fees at primary and secondary school levels.¹⁹ In 1984 a policy shift, to

charge fees to non-Zambian children attending primary schools, was announced. In 1985 the Government reintroduced boarding fees in secondary schools, an even more radical departure. Later, the colleges and the University were also affected. In terms of creating savings for the Government it would appear that some of the policy measures were not well conceived. For example, the primary school sector was a very small target in terms of the cost recovery exercise, not to mention the difficulties of establishing who the non-Zambians were. The principle was good. It can be said that a combination of a bad economic and financial climate in the Government, and external pressure, forced UNIP to abandon its long standing policy on financing education.

No less important was a Government policy decision on training which the Cabinet Office announced on 6th December 1983. In the Cabinet Circular No.19 the Secretary to the Cabinet issued new policy measures on training which superseded the earlier provisions of 1970. Among other measures the 1983 circular called for the following: the establishment of the corps of Manpower Development Officers (MDOs) to serve the ministries; the redesignation of responsibilities for technical assistance, administration of training awards and manpower development and training from the National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP) to the Directorate of Manpower Development and Training (DMDT); the setting up of a national manpower planning committee;

assigning priority in training to in-country programmes and to staff in training institutions; and replacement of expatriates. The key sectors that were identified for these measures were: Health, Education, Finance, Engineering, Agriculture, Science, and technology.²⁰ Two factors had helped to shape the Cabinet policy on training. First, in March, 1983 a national seminar on manpower and training policy in Zambia was held in Lusaka. The seminar not only drew the profile of the country's manpower and training structure, but some papers took the opportunity to draw the government's attention to numerous shortcomings in the government's approach to manpower development and training. One paper had made the following observation:

The manpower policy environment in Zambia is characterised by a separation of responsibilities, a duplication of some activities and a neglect of others. The organisations responsible for shaping manpower policy are generally in the public sector, whilst policy implementation takes place in all sectors.²¹

Coombe and Lauvas drew attention of the Government to the same problem in their study in 1984. The need for better institutional arrangements in manpower development and training had received very strong emphasis in the TNDP also. The Cabinet move therefore came as a response to many signals within the government.

Following the conclusion of a joint GRZ/World Bank examination on Zambia's education sector's implementation

and investment plans (ESDIIP) in July, 1987, MGEC requested the Cabinet to consider various recommendations. The first set of recommendations proposed cost-transfer and cost-sharing measures in financing education and training provision. The recommendations included those that required that: parents/students pay for consumables, pupils attending evening schools to pay K40 annually towards teachers' salaries and K20 for books, Zambian students should pay subsidised boarding fees whereas non-Zambians should pay economic fees, transport allowances paid to students in higher institutions be withdrawn, all students (except those at UNZA) should contribute towards the replacement of textbooks. Other measures aimed at introducing efficiency and improving quality in the education and training system. The measures were long overdue but came at the most inappropriate time for the majority of the people to stand up to the challenges of the proposed financing arrangements.

The acceptance of the ESDIIP recommendation came as a last straw to the Government. The limits of principles had finally been reached. In March, 1989 the Minister of Higher Education announced to Parliament a new policy on financing education and training in tertiary colleges and the universities. This policy has shown the government's willingness to face problems with a more realistic approach.

4.4 The Interim National Development Plan, 1987-88

The INDP which the Government introduced as a stop gap plan when the IMF/World Bank economic recovery programme was abruptly suspended on Labour Day in 1987, came as one of the most ironical steps taken by the Government during the country's economic crisis and also in the wake of the externally assisted economic recovery programme. The Plan was a hasty, poorly thought out protest against the IMF austerity economic recovery measures. The economic measures involved making fundamental changes in the core economic policies.²² Reduction and removal of subsidies, import liberalisation, market determination of foreign exchange rate, and the decontrol of interest rates and prices were among the key reform measures the IMF had introduced.

The introduction of the IMF programme caused a sudden severe change in the economic and social lives of the people. The price of maize meal, the staple food, went up by 120 per cent overnight and so did other commodities. This caused such a traumatic shock among the people that it led to severe riots in Copperbelt province and the threat of a riot in the capital.²³ The scale and intensity of the riots were such that they frightened the Government into rescinding its earlier decision to hike food prices.²⁴ This particular political event and the need for UNIP to go into the general elections of 1988 with a relatively less volatile political climate were the most probable reasons for suspending the IMF programme and the subsequent introduction of the INDP.

The IMF measures were so extensive and pervasive they appeared to have stripped the Government of its control over the economic affairs of the country. Even in a one party state such a position was not at all politically favourable. Against this backdrop the INDP was intended to function as an image prop in the face of UNIP's declining popularity during the crisis. As an economic strategy the Government has yet to show what purpose the Plan served.

The INDP can best be judged by examining the objectives the Government apparently expected it to achieve in the eighteen month period. In the education and training sector the objectives had remained largely the same as in previous plans. The attempt to provide universal basic education and the improvement of the quality of education and training had firmly remained on the agenda. Cost-recovery measures formed another important objective.²⁵

On employment and human resources the INDP proposed to pursue three objectives which had direct implications for education and training provision. The plan decided that the government should use Zambian expertise in the implementation of foreign funded projects which previously have utilised foreign manpower. Intensifying high level professional and technical training for Zambians in the

fields where expatriates are still predominant was another objective. Thirdly, the Plan reemphasised the need to expand and strengthen practical skills training programmes at primary and secondary school levels. However, an attempt by the Plan to prioritise the investment and work activities in the sector was not very successful. The donors in particular found the ranking of priorities not very clear in terms of identifying areas that needed assistance most.²⁶ Table 11 shows the INDP's planned investment and priorities in the education sector

Table 11

Planned Investment in the Education Sector, 1987-88

Programme/Project	1987 Budget Allocation	Interim Plan Provision	Funding		Donor Agency
			GRZ	Foreign	
<i>Priority A</i>					
1. Construction of Primary Schools	—	7,656	7,656	—	
2. Repairs and Improvements ..	500	2,550	2,550	—	
3. Teacher Training Resource Centre ..	700	4,550	4,550	—	
4. Staff Development (DTEVT) ..	2,564	6,564	4,000	2,564	SIDA Grant
<i>Sub-Total</i>	3,764	21,320	18,756	2,564	
<i>Priority B</i>					
5. Repairs and Improvement to Secondary Schools	1,550	5,000	5,000	—	
6. Zambia Institute of Technology	80	262	182	80	CIDA Grant
7. Rehabilitation project (UNZA School of Agriculture) ..	3,500	5,500	2,000	3,500	CIDA Grant
8. UNZA	10,000	17,000	14,000	—	
9. Copperbelt University	662	5,000	5,000	—	
10. Tools and Equipment (DTEVT)	300	2,000	2,000	—	
11. Education for the Handicapped	400	700	400	300	SIDA Grant
12. National Council for Scientific Research	1,500	4,000	4,000	—	
13. UNZA Staff Development ..	3,400	9,400	6,000	3,400	SIDA Grant
<i>Sub-Total</i>	21,392	45,562	38,582	7,280	
<i>Priority C</i>					
14. Livingstone Trades Training Institute	20	122	122	—	
15. Choma Trades Training Institute	20	122	122	—	
16. GRZ Secondary Schools Extension	350	1,000	1,000	—	
17. Zambia Examination Council ..	550	900	900	—	
18. ADB Education I	6,000	12,000	6,000	6,000	ADB Loan
19. IBRD Maintenance Project ..	8,000	16,000	8,000	8,000	IBRD Loan
20. Planning Unit (HQ)	3,900	4,900	1,000	3,900	SIDA Grant
21. Administration of Zambia Education Projects Implementation Unit	846	930	930	—	IBRD Loan
22. IBRD Education Project V ..	13,000	13,300	3,300	10,000	IBRD Loan
23. Improvement to Institutional Buildings	800	2,880	2,880	—	
24. Lusaka Housing Project (Houses for new (ZWBEP)	40	100	100	—	
25. Chipata Trades Training Institute	100	200	200	—	
26. Monyu Trades Training Institute	100	200	200	—	
27. Luanabya Technical and Vocational and Teachers College ..	150	300	300	—	
28. Northern Technical College (NORTEC)	40	100	100	—	
29. Staff Development	2,564	2,564	—	2,564	SIDA Grant
30. Zambia Mathematics and Science Teacher Education Project (ZAMSTEP)	3,350	6,000	3,250	2,750	
31. Education Broadcasting Services	100	200	200	—	
32. Zambia Examination Council ..	550	700	700	—	
33. Evelyn Hone College of Applied Arts	100	300	300	—	
34. Office and School Furniture ..	500	550	550	—	
35. Solwezi Trades Training Institute	100	110	110	—	
<i>Sub-Total</i>	41,180	68,478	30,964	33,214	
<i>Grand-Total</i>	57,336	130,660	87,608	43,058	

Source: INDP (1987).

Table 11 requires clarification on several points. Given the distribution of the items across the three priority categories, it is not very clear how the priorities were drawn up and also how the items were ranked. The distribution and ranking of the items appear to have been done randomly. What appears to be high ranked items in Priority 'A' category are also found in other places down the ranking list. For example, repairs and improvement, which is ranked second in priority 'A' group, also appears as items (19 and 23) in priority 'C' group. Why does the Zambia Examination Council appears twice in group 'C' (17 and 32) with different budgetary provisions? The staff development programme in DTEVT is ranked fourth in priority 'A' group, whereas that of UNZA comes thirteenth in group 'B'. The Zambianisation level in DTEVT had by 1984 already reached 66.2 per cent of the 178 filled posts, whereas in UNZA the ratio of Zambianisation varied from 48.5 to 51.4 per cent in different schools in 1986.²⁷ Staff development is meant, among other things, for replacing expatriates. If that is the case the prioritisation in this table defies logic.

Since the Plan intended to show the current donor commitments in the sector it has not been explained why the assistance of some donors working in the sector was excluded. Consequently, the structure of funding in the Plan is rather deceptive. The Plan shows that Zambia's

contribution to the Plan investments stands at 67.0 per cent against 32.9 per cent of donor funding. If the commitments of the missing donors were included the balance would be far less in favour of the Government's contribution. All the preceding points raise a number of questions regarding the way the Plan was conceived and assembled.

4.5 The Fourth National Development Plan, 1989-1993

Thus it will be observed that the background to the Fourth National Development Plan had been characterised by sustained efforts and a search for solutions to the long list of growing problems in the education and training sector. The FNDP* objectives in the education sector were to:

1. ensure improved performance in all education institutions
2. provide pre-school education through community efforts
3. provide more widespread and equitable educational opportunities at basic level and giving priority to expansion of primary education.
4. widen access to primary and secondary education through distance education, night schools and part-time courses
5. ensure carefully controlled expansion at all levels
6. enhance the training and research capacities at tertiary level
7. consolidate and extend the teaching of population education to all institutions and training of teachers for this purpose
8. strengthen and enlarge the financial resource base for education provision, especially in the fields of mathematics, science and technology

9. monitor adherence to standardised chargeable fees by all private institutions.²⁸

During the FNDP* the government wished also to pursue its policy to establish a Trades Training Institute in each province. It was therefore hoped that during the Plan period the construction of Trades Training Institutes in Eastern, Northwestern, and Western Provinces would be completed. The achievement of FNDP objectives is expected to be guided by qualitative and cost-effective strategies. The planned investment outlay for the Plan period is given in Table 12. The full list of items in the investment plan is given in the appendix.

TABLE 12

**FNDP* Planned Investment Outlay by Subsector,
Activity, and Source of Funding, 1989-1993.**

(K'000)

<u>Sector/Function</u>	1989		1990		1991		1992		1993	
	<u>Lcl</u>	<u>Aid</u>	<u>Lcl</u>	<u>Aid</u>	<u>Lcl</u>	<u>Aid</u>	<u>Lcl</u>	<u>Aid</u>	<u>Lcl</u>	<u>Aid</u>
<u>Primary</u>										
Capital Wrks	22000	1800	66600	5400	66800	5400	44400	3600	22200	1800
Equip'/Books	11400	2600	11400	2600	11400	2600	11400	2600	11400	2600
Staff Dev'	1694	----	1694	----	1694	----	1694	----	1694	----
<u>Sub-Total</u>	<u>35294</u>	<u>4400</u>	<u>79694</u>	<u>8000</u>	<u>79694</u>	<u>8000</u>	<u>57494</u>	<u>6200</u>	<u>35294</u>	<u>4400</u>
<u>Special Educ</u>										
Capital Wrks	288	15	696	33	696	33	462	24	288	15
<u>Sub-Total</u>	<u>288</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>696</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>696</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>462</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>288</u>	<u>15</u>
<u>Secondary</u>										
Capital Wrks	20005	3765	43014	8301	43014	8296	95509	6031	20005	3765
Equip'/Books	793	185	793	185	793	185	793	185	793	185
Staff Dev'	660	----	660	----	660	----	660	----	660	----
<u>Sub-Total</u>	<u>21458</u>	<u>3950</u>	<u>44467</u>	<u>8486</u>	<u>44467</u>	<u>8481</u>	<u>96962</u>	<u>6216</u>	<u>21458</u>	<u>3950</u>

Teacher Educ

Capital Wrks	5616	924	7178	1092	7178	1092	6372	1008	5616	924
<u>Sub-Total¹</u>	<u>5616</u>	<u>924</u>	<u>7178</u>	<u>1092</u>	<u>7178</u>	<u>1092</u>	<u>6372</u>	<u>1008</u>	<u>5616</u>	<u>924</u>

Technical Educ

Capital Wrks	13650	7080	27940	14250	27940	14250	20795	10665	13650	7080
Staff Dev'	1000	-----	1000	-----	1000	-----	1000	-----	1000	-----
<u>Sub-Total</u>	<u>14650</u>	<u>7080</u>	<u>28940</u>	<u>14250</u>	<u>28940</u>	<u>14250</u>	<u>21795</u>	<u>10665</u>	<u>14650</u>	<u>7080</u>

Library Service

Equip'/Books	260	-----	700	80	700	80	300	20	200	60
Staff Dev'	120	-----	120	-----	120	-----	120	-----	120	-----
<u>Sub-Total</u>	<u>380</u>	<u>-----</u>	<u>820</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>820</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>420</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>320</u>	<u>60</u>

Cont' Education

Capital Wrks	340	60	1020	180	1020	160	680	120	340	60
Staff Dev'	200	-----	200	-----	200	-----	200	---	200	-----
<u>Sub-Total</u>	<u>540</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>1220</u>	<u>180</u>	<u>1220</u>	<u>160</u>	<u>880</u>	<u>120</u>	<u>540</u>	<u>60</u>

Educ/Broadcast'

Capital Wrks	225	75	675	225	675	510	150	225	75
Staff Dev'	240	----	240	-----	240	240	---	240	----
Sub-Total	465	75	915	225	915	750	150	465	75

UNZA

Capital Wrks	17050	4150	22350	6650	16500	6000	2000	1500	500
Research	500	----	500	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Sub-Total	17550	4150	22850	6650	16500	6000	2000	1500	500

CB/University

Capital Wrks	10475	3610	20525	7230	16950	6055	11550	4120	5775	6560
Sub-Total ₂	10475	3610	20525	7230	16950	6055	11550	4120	5775	6560

TOTAL **106716** **24264** **207305** **46226** **197380** **43376** **202685** **30523** **85906** **23624**

Note: This Table has been re-compiled to reduce numerous activity items under each sub-heading to three functional categories.

1. Provision for capital works mainly.
2. Provision for construction and equipping the new School of Forestry and Wood Science, expansion of the physical plant of the School of Environmental Studies, construction of the Library and a Multi-purpose Conference Centre.

Source: FNDP* (1989, 320-)

From Table 12 emerges a number of points. The indication of the levels of foreign aid resources the Government wishes to raise has never been outlined with such specificity. This is a useful guide in planning, but, how was the aid component worked out? One notices also an attempt by the Government to move away from staff development programmes that are dependent on foreign aid. However, the author's present observations have shown that donor funded staff development programmes have continued. Budget provisions for most of the items shows no growth at all during the Plan period. Planned expenditure on equipment, books and staff development shows this stagnant feature across all subsectors. Given the existing inflationary economic situation in the country the projections and provisions are very unrealistic. Even in its indicative form, the Plan does not fail to intrigue one regarding its lack of realism.

The year 1989 experienced several sustained initiatives targeted at finding solutions to the effects of the economic crisis on Zambia. A number of bilateral, multilateral, and private consulting teams hired by donor agencies visited Zambia to evaluate the crisis further, to assess the measures that were being worked out to mitigate the crisis, and to offer advice.²⁹ Against the background of the Fourth National Development Plan, the World Bank and the Government of Zambia prepared the 'Financial and Economic Policy Framework' of the New Economic Recovery Programme (NERP) as well as the Public Investment Programme (PIP), to introduce structural adjustment measures and the new investment programme to accompany them.

In the education sector the new investment programme has reaffirmed that priority in education expenditure should be given to primary education, especially among the poor communities in the urban and rural areas.³⁰ Other areas of special attention in the 1989-1993 PIP are : the rehabilitation and maintenance of existing facilities, and the provision of teaching and learning materials. To help reduce the financial burden of providing education services by the Government the following measures have been endorsed: involvement of the communities in the construction, operations, and maintenance of educational institutions, the encouragement of the private sector to play a bigger role in providing education, and the use of user fees to implement long term strategies of cost-sharing and cost-recovery financing arrangements.

These measures are not new, they are part of a long standing difficult attempt to enhance the quality of education and the institutional facilities, and to implement the adjustment and the revitalisation programme which the World Bank formally adopted in 1988.³¹ It is the escalation of the deterioration in the quality of education and the ever increasing disparities in access to education that continue to draw fresh domestic and international attention. Therefore, this suggests that both the PIP and the NERP measures are intended to give the adjustment programme a proper scope and a firm grounding.

4.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter and its predecessor have provided an outline and discussion of the development of the development process and trends in the education and training sector in the two eventful periods of 1964-1974 and 1975 to date.

It has been shown that Zambia's education policies and priorities during the first decade were strongly shaped by two important factors: the need to redress the past imbalances, deprivations and the racial segregation in the system, and the need to develop a large corps of educated and skilled local manpower. Consequently, the thrust of Zambia's education and training development involved a massive expansion programme of the system's infrastructure. Secondary school and University facilities were targeted for rapid expansion and extension. Increasing social demand for education and the expansion of activities in the economy kept the Government pushing this expansion programme further and further during the first decade. Because the economy was then strong and revenue from copper prices were very high, the Government was able to provide 80 per cent of the total funding for the capital development programme. The strength of the Government's financial position and its strong commitment to providing wider access to schooling were demonstrated in the Government's adoption of the policy to provide free education.

Throughout the first decade there prevailed a strong desire on the part of the Government to strive towards giving universal access to Grade 1 for all seven year old children. Unfortunately, that goal remains as distant as ever. Rapid population growth and resource constraints have remained major obstacles to achieving that goal.

Following the expansion programme the Ministry of Education diversified the secondary school curriculum. Practical subjects in the industrial arts and business studies areas were introduced. In a school system that had not yet sufficiently developed and diversified its supply of teachers, the introduction of practical subjects caused some organisational problems in schools.

The expansion programme which began at independence was however, soon overtaken by two social events. A rapidly growing population (at 3.2 per cent annually) fueled an ever increasing social demand for schooling and certification. Because these factors have never kept pace, inequalities in access to and participation in education between and among regions and various social groups have continued to persist.

By the end of 1974 it had become very clear that despite all the remarkable achievements made during the first decade, problems in the internal efficiency of the system had

emerged to challenge Government efforts. Of course early warning signals regarding the looming resource constraints had been sounded as early as 1968. Initially the Government took very little notice of them. These problems and a gradual awareness by the Zambian officials that the inherited education and training system had not been adapted to respond to the post-independence social and economic situations compelled the Government to undertake the education reform exercise in 1975.

Attempts to introduce the teaching of Humanism in schools did not succeed because of numerous practical problems.

Thus, the first decade ended most appropriately by taking an inventory of the country's performance and searching for new goals and organisational measures for a new education system. There couldn't have been a better way to begin a new decade.

The chapter has also shown that the beginning of Zambia's second decade of independence was heralded not only by the education reform initiatives, but ironically by the start of Zambia's economic decline. The financial difficulties which resulted from the economic decline manifested itself in the fluctuations and increasing reductions in public expenditure on social development programmes. In the education and training sector evidence of reduced public expenditure on

development and recurrent functions appeared in many different ways. Initially, the trends showed themselves up in operational problems which often delayed the start or completion of projects, or indeed in the failure to achieve the set objectives. Later, the Government found it increasingly difficult to provide resources commensurate with the adverse economic circumstances in the country. The Government could not provide real financial resources. As the situation took a stronger hold, the Government was forced to drastically reduce or withdraw subventions to a few vital functions in the running of the education and training system. Teaching and learning materials, and other administrative aspects suffered unacceptable budgetary cuts.

Consequently, the beginning of the 1980s saw the start of an unofficial cost-transfer from the Government budget to the parents. Because schools could no longer provide learning materials parents were obliged to buy most of the school requisites themselves. This marked the most serious crack in Zambia's long standing policy on free education provision. Although the Government was aware of these financial difficulties its policy on financing education had officially remained unchanged. However, the difficulties in the economy grew so intense that the overwhelming financial problems forced the Government to concede defeat. The official policy of free education, had long become redundant, what had remained was the spirit of it being

moved by an unrealistic pride and principles. Between 1985 and 1989 the Government responded to the financial difficulties by announcing new policies regarding the financing of education and training. First, a levy was imposed on all non-Zambian children attending primary and secondary schools, this was soon followed by the introduction of a nominal boarding fee of K100 per student per term in secondary schools. Finally, the Government in March 1989 announced a comprehensive new financing policy for the higher education and training sector. Later in the same year the Government and the World Bank endorsed all the earlier measures aimed at effectively implementing the use of user fees in the education sector.

Looking back one notices that as a consequence of the economic crisis which has built up over the years Zambia has come under increasing pressure to adopt new policies and strategies in the education sector. Worried about the long-term effect of economic crisis on the national development of Zambia, the international donor community too has been exerting pressure on the Zambian Government to adopt more rational and realistic policies in the face of the present crisis. There is increasing pressure on Zambia to take more coherent policies and public actions. The present domestic and international efforts suggest that Zambia is going to continue to be under pressure to consolidate the adjustment and the revitalisation measures

which have just been instituted in the education and training sector.

In conclusion it can therefore be said that while Zambia has made remarkable achievements in many aspects of education and training, some have been secured under great difficulties while the achievement of many others would not have been possible without external assistance. The severe resource constraint situation which the Government experienced after the mid 1970s was responsible for the coming of a diversified corps of donors to the sector and the rapid donorisation of many aspects of Zambia's education and training programmes. Since then the coverage and depth of aid intervention in the sector has been wide and big. Given this background and this method of dealing with resource problems, what kind of aid policy framework have donors been offered by Zambia?

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CHAPTER FIVE

AID PROCESS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyses aid process in Zambia. It examines the actors and the procedures involved in the aid process in general and in the education sector in particular.

Among the least discussed aspects of the aid subject, aid process perhaps ranks first. Sensitivity to some facets of this matter forces both donors and recipients into a general reluctance to discuss this aspect more openly. Hence, quite often investigators are only able to get superficial features and trends. Reinforcing this view is the observation that aid policies are formulated in a context of complex pressures, and that little is known of the nature of such pressures and the channels through which they operate.¹ Consequently some issues in the aid process have remained heavily masked or untold.

Some controversial issues in aid matters can partially be explained by examining how donors and recipients conduct their aid process. Issues like aid coordination and that aid is heavily politicised can be better understood against the background of a donor's or recipient's management of its aid process.

Despite there being official obstacles to the full understanding of the aid process in many countries, it is still possible to construct to a certain level an aid process structure for any given country. There are basics to which all aid transactions must submit. Aid transactions for example operate within the interacting institutional frameworks of donors and recipients. Therefore the process complies with certain formal procedures provided by relevant governing institutions. At the operational level formal inter-governmental aid agreements provide guidance on how the aid process should be conducted. The aid process is a target of many influence attempts by interest groups, and this is particularly true of the aid environment in the western industrialised donor countries.

Zambia's aid process arrangements are similar to those of many other recipient countries. Yet, a closer examination of its structure is able to reveal its own particular features and process flow. To gain a comprehensive understanding of the aid process in general and in the education sector in particular in Zambia, one should make a critical examination of, among other factors, institutional and individual actors.

5.2 Institutional Actors

The main institutions that are designated to run the affairs of Zambia's aid business with donors are, the Ministries of

Foreign Affairs (MFA), Finance (MoF) and the National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP). However, in practice other institutions get involved in various aspects of the aid process. The major institutions in this category are, the President's Office, the Prime Minister's Office and the United National Independence Party (UNIP). The work of the first three institutions entails executing specific functions relating to aid transactions. The MFA takes care of protocol and other donor-recipient courtesy formalities pertaining to the country's aid process. The NCDP attends to aspects of aid negotiations and their agreements. The Ministry of Finance looks after aid funds where aid agreements have made such provisions. These institutions together with recipient sectors form the operational base with which donors interact. The mutual service relationship among these actors is therefore more easily identifiable.

Among the latter, institutional actors constitute a special category of their own. They have high political standing and leverage. However, unlike the other group, these do not share a regular aid process relationship. Nor do they have individually a regular aid process relationship with the MFA, the MoF and the NCDP. Some of the tasks relating to the aid process performed by these actors have therefore tended to be discretionary and highly political as will be seen in subsequent discussions. The task therefore is to examine the provisions that are there to guide the aid process and to examine also the actors' role in this process.

5.3 Procedures

Procedures are an important part of any work of both simple and complex organisations. They help to regulate behaviour among actors. In this regard procedures perform functions that are intended to minimise or eliminate altogether inconsistencies and/or deviations from expected established practice. To serve their purpose more effectively and positively procedures ought to be explicit and well understood. Above all, there should be a commitment on the part of all actors to observe that the established procedures are adhered to. Frequent breaches of set procedures renders their very existence redundant.

As far as the initial aid process is concerned Zambia has not laid down any explicit procedures which donors must follow. Consequently inconsistent and uncoordinated participation in the aid process has often occurred. Although ultimately aid agreements have to be discussed and concluded under the superintendence of the NCDP and the Ministry of Finance, in practice donors can initiate aid transactions with target sectors or individual institutions. Correspondingly prospective recipient sectors have been known to solicit donors directly for external assistance. This is contrary to what is considered should be the standard practice. For the NCDP this has meant that it is sometimes required to follow up aid transactions whose origins may not be well known to the commission. Sometimes

directives to negotiate with donors are given when commitments to accept aid offers have already been made by target recipients or higher authorities acting on behalf of earmarked recipients. The NCDP has often found itself under pressure from both higher authorities and client sectors. As for the donors this rather loose and open system gives them opportunities to choose the best possible route to take in their attempts to 'sell' aid packages.

5.3.1 The President's Office

The President's Office's participation in the aid process is by and large not a regular feature. The office plays mainly a facilitative role. It is often used to enhance Zambia's search for external assistance. Country briefs which the President carries on visits abroad usually contain details of Zambia's possible areas of international cooperation which should be brought to the attention of potential donor countries. Many loans, grants and technical assistance have been secured using this method. At home the office can direct other relevant institutions such as the NCDP or Ministry of Foreign Affairs to follow up aid transactions initiated by the President's Office. Sometimes this is done discreetly at the request of donors. It is at this point that the facilitative role dissolves but emerges later as an interventionist role.

The President's Office has also been used by donors on some occasions to intervene in the aid process on their behalf.

Pressures are brought to bear on this office by donors who want to ensure that they get the projects they want or decisions which favour their line of thinking. The recent case of Russia's insistence on building a Trades Training Institute in Chipata against the recommendations of the Ministry of Higher Education (MHE) serves to illustrate the point on intervention. The Soviets played on Zambia's international and local political sentiments to persuade the MHE to agree to their decision on the location of the institute. This minute from the Director-General of NCDP to the Permanent Secretary of MHE conveys the message:

"The USSR informed His Excellency the President that they would want to start using these funds with a project first in Zambia in honour of his leadership as Chairman of OAU. They want to do this before they start other projects in neighbouring countries. I am therefore pleading that you should speed up the comments so that ...the agreement is reached as quickly as possible to enable the project to start immediately.²

Despite the MHE's strong recommendations that the new institute should be built in Solwezi, the Soviet Government managed by exerting pressure on the President's and the Prime Minister's offices to persuade the MHE to accept their demand.³ This was not by any measure an extraordinary case. It is quite common and donors are all too familiar with the value of employing a strategy such as this one.

However, Zambia's submission to the Soviet's demand in this particular case must be understood in its wider aid and political contexts. The USSR has been a donor of various

forms of external assistance to the country since Zambia's attainment of independence in 1964. Technical assistance in both personnel provision and scholarships for training of Zambians in the USSR has for many years formed a regular feature of Soviet aid to Zambia. Therefore Zambia feels indebted to the Soviets for the valuable assistance given to the country. Against this background the Soviet demand might have appeared to the Zambian political leadership too small an issue to cause any serious bother. Secondly, the Prime Minister's office and the NCDP were fully aware that the location chosen for the new college by the Soviets was a bargaining strategy. The top Zambian leadership has important direct connections with the town. This the Soviets must have known was their most attractive political bait which could not be ignored or easily resisted by the two offices of state. Nevertheless, all these considerations do not in any way make lighter the long term planning implications which such decisions impose on the recipient ministries.

Political intervention by higher authorities on behalf of donors has considerably weakened the Zambian bargaining position in aid matters. It has also tended to be disruptive as well as obstructive because officials in the sectors are not left entirely free to make judgements and decisions. Therefore, in the face of such interventions it is very difficult for planners in particular to make rational infusions of external resources into the sectors' development programme.

5.3.2 UNIP

Ever since the one-party state came into being in 1972, UNIP has made every effort to create a public image which projects the supremacy of the party over the Government and some of its other institutions. In practice UNIP has demonstrated this by exercising interventionary powers in domestic affairs.

The party's participation in the aid process is mainly at the level of mobilising external resources from various donor countries.⁴ Because party members are represented in many policy and decision-making committees, UNIP's participation and influence on the aid process is very much diffused. Through the cabinet and the authoritative sub-committees of the party's central committee UNIP has wider access to matters of the country's international relations and economic assistance. It must also be remembered that it is the President who appoints the director-general of NCDP. Through these mechanisms UNIP is able to control and influence, directly and indirectly, Zambia's external aid affairs.

5.3.3 NCDP

The NCDP is the central institution in the country concerned with matters of external aid. The Commission is headed by a Director-General and six directors who are responsible for running the departments. However, it is the Economic and

Technical Cooperation (ETC) department which has direct responsibility for aid affairs. The following are its functions: it acts as an aid broker between Zambia and donors, it processes Zambia's requests for external assistance, it also convenes and conducts national aid negotiation and agreement meetings. The other work involves assisting ministries and donors to review their existing aid agreements. Thus, NCDP's major tasks in aid process entail a great deal of administrative and consultative work.

In recent years there has been a move to expand the functions of the ETC in the NCDP. There are plans to create an aid monitoring centre within the NCDP. This would be part of an expanded ETC structure. Among the other tasks of the NCDP Monitoring Centre (NMC) would be to establish a computerised monitoring system of donor's aid and project files.⁵ This initiative will soon be overtaken by the most recent attempts to step up the External Assistance Department (EAD). This is discussed in chapter 11.

Although the NCDP is meant to process all external aid resources coming into the country the bulk of foreign aid from NGOs is not channelled through the NCDP and the national treasury. NGOs' assistance goes directly to the recipient sectors. Consequently the Commission has no control over such resources. This has made it very difficult for Zambia to measure NGOs' assistance to the

country. Plans are now under way to ensure that in future all NGOs' aid flows are properly monitored by the NCDP and the treasury.⁶ The government would like to see, in particular, NGOs enter into formal aid agreements with the Zambian government. That the government had never thought of doing this much earlier gives further insight into how the aid business has been run in Zambia.

Granted that the work of the ETC department is exclusively to look after Zambia's aid interests, it is imperative that one examines closely not only the institution but also the actors who man its system. As indicated earlier in this study aid business has become very complex for recipients, who have the added responsibility and burden of dealing with large numbers of diverse donors. Therefore, having skilled and experienced and well motivated personnel to man one's aid business is a very critical factor for a country like Zambia. Indeed, skills and experience which can effectively deal with broader and sometimes intriguing issues in aid relations are important attributes. There is no doubt at all that long years of working experience by NCDP staff has given them considerable abilities to deal with donors. However, such experience cannot effectively compensate for a lack of the specialised skills and competence which aid transactions often demand.

The ETC department, like most other government departments, recruits its staff through the Public Service Commission or its officers are appointed/promoted from the ranks of the civil service into it. Long and varied interactions between the ETC and various donor agencies and their countries have inevitably produced characteristic behavioural patterns which the ETC department is now very familiar with. Such invaluable experience helps the department to deal with each donor in an appropriate manner. The observation below could be applied to many donors. Saudi Arabia for example has been found to be a very strict and hard donor to negotiate with. It usually demands to see properly carried out feasibility studies before it can consider requests for assistance.⁷

While long term working interaction with donors has helped Zambians to form predictions of donors' behaviour, it is not enough for Zambian negotiators to be able to anticipate stands donors will take on certain issues and to prepare to meet those demands in advance. Their worth as skilful negotiators would be judged by how effectively they can manage negotiations and be able to shift a donor's position in favour of Zambia. That this aspect forms a serious deficit in the department and other recipient sectors is reflected in poorly negotiated aid agreements which now exist. Zambia is finding it extremely difficult to execute some of the provisions of such agreements, yet, it has an obligation to do so, or re-negotiate them.

For example, Zambia's request to the East German authorities to pay Zambian students in convertible currency was turned down by the East Germans because the East Germans pointed out that, under article 5 (2) of the GDR/GRZ agreement provisions are that Zambian students would be paid in local East German marks.⁸ Surprisingly, Zambia is required to provide Zambian students' maintenance allowances in convertible currency to the GDR authorities. This could have been an oversight on the part of the Zambian negotiators. However, whichever is the case this is an example of an agreement which was poorly negotiated by Zambians. The Zambian authorities have not only found it increasingly difficult to raise large amounts of foreign exchange to service the agreement, they have also realised that this shared scheme enables the East German government to obtain valuable foreign exchange from cooperating countries such as Zambia. Table 13 shows the number of Zambian students who studied in East Germany in the early 1980s.

Table 13

**NUMBER OF GDR/GRZ SPONSORED ZAMBIAN STUDENTS
IN EAST GERMANY BY FIELD OF STUDY AND YEAR.**

<u>FIELD OF STUDY</u>	<u>Y E A R</u>			<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1981-1983</u>
Agric. Machines & Equip.	10	16		26
Agric. Machinery Fitt.		14		14
Agric. Mech.	23			23
Agric. Tech.		10		10
Agronomy		22		22
Agro-Engineering		2		2
Animal Husbandry	1			1
Architecture	1			1
Auto-Engineering		1		1
Butchering	15			15
Cattle Breeding	16			16
Cattle Zoo Tech.		27		27
Clothing Fab	11	10	10	31
Electricity	12		17	29
Electrical Engineering	1			1
Electrical Fitt	15			15
Engineering	1			1
Economics	2			2
Grinding skills		10		10
Industrial smith		15		15
Leather Fab.	7	12		19
Min. Engineering	1			1
Machining	10	15		25
Metallurgy	6			6
Metal cutting		11		11
Medicine	4			4
Metal Processing		9		9
Mining		2		2
Nursing			8	8
Pharmacy	2			2
Political Education		5		5
Power Plant Engineering		1		1
Railway Transport	1			1
Rolling Mills		15		15
Sports Coaching			1	1
Transport Tech	1	1		2
Tropical Agric.		2		2
Telecom Engineering			15	15
Textile Tech.	8			8
Vehicle Fitting		10	10	20
Veterinary Medicine	1			1
TOTAL	149	210	61	420

SOURCE: DMDT (1983). Pp.21-45.

The range of training programmes is obviously wide, but one wonders whether some of them could not have been better offered in a Zambian training and working environment.

A separate case involving a 1967 technical assistance agreement to the University of Zambia has recently revealed similar characteristics. The University of Zambia Secretary in 1987 drew attention of the Permanent Secretary of the MHE to the difficulties UNZA had been experiencing in executing the 1967 GRZ/USSR technical assistance agreement to the University. The agreement provides, among other things, that Russian personnel at UNZA would be paid in convertible currency (sterling). Consequently since 1967 the Russian staff have remained a special category of expatriates in terms of remuneration.⁹ Seen in a broader context, this case and many similar others serves to demonstrate that aid transactions with donors should not be approached with absolute trust and pre-conceived innocence by recipients. The argument being submitted here is that such costly lapses on the part of Zambian negotiators could have been significantly reduced or eliminated altogether had the negotiators been more skilful and not concerned with short term benefits alone.


Because of the inadequate number of professional staff in the ETC department it has not been possible for them to

extend their services beyond administering aid agreements. It has not been possible for example to provide evaluation services to the recipient sectors. Evaluation studies have been done largely by foreign consultants hired by donors or by the donors themselves. This allows the Zambian authorities to see the performance of the aided projects though the perspective of donors or their consultants. Until the ETC department is able to conduct its own evaluations, it will always find it difficult to take definitive stands on certain aid issues against donors. On the other hand, recruitment and retention of more professional staff by the ETC department faces the same problem which the entire civil service has had to live with. It faces competition from the private and the parastatal sector.

Figure 1 indicates channels through which official donors' assistance gets to the National Commission for Development Planning.

Figure 1

Aid Process Between Donors and Zambian Institutions.



KEY

-----> Donor - recipient contacts.

—————> Channels through which all aid requests or offers must pass before programme or cooperation agreements are discussed with a donor by the NCDP.

—————> Specific aid offers which come through the NCDP are sent to relevant Zambian ministries for detailed scrutiny and comments before can hold further formal agreement discussions with relevant donors.

—————> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sometimes refers aid matters to relevant ministries or departments, or to NCDP for further discussions with recipient ministries.

Figure 1 attempts to show the multi-channel structure through which aid gets to various target sectors and the NCDP. It shows that the present arrangement gives the donors alternative routes through which offers of external assistance can be channelled. One conspicuous feature one can observe from figure 1 is the absence of an indication of where the starting point of the aid process is located. It is difficult to place, therefore it is not easy to try to put the stages of the aid process in a strict sequential order. The system has both direct and indirect approaches. In a more direct approach a prospective donor can inform the NCDP of its intentions to provide assistance. There are also instances when the NCDP is drawn into the process long after a donor and a Zambian sector have already had extensive discussions. It is not clear which Zambian institution has the responsibility to ensure that donors and recipient sectors follow consistent aid process procedures. The NCDP mandate on aid matters falls far short of covering this critical area. Consequently, the system has laid itself open to all sorts of pressures and manipulations. Even within the safeguards of agreement provisions one is still able to observe unrestrained behavioural aspects in the manner in which aid process is conducted.

The University of Zambia and some Teachers Colleges e.g David Livingstone, Malcom Moffat and Charles Lwanga are educational institutions under the MHE which have had direct involvement in negotiating for their external assistance

from donors. Teachers Colleges solicit for assistance from overseas church affiliated NGOs or through the Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ). Until recently all aid business for the university was handled by the Deputy Vice-Chancellor's office. Because of the increasing dependence on external aid the university has established an office in the Deputy Vice-Chancellor's Office to deal with technical and capital assistance matters. It can ask for assistance directly from the donors or channel the request through the NCDP.¹⁰ Schools have also solicited for external assistance directly from foreign embassies, bypassing the NCDP. In 1987 a small rural basic school in the Eastern Province asked the British High Commission in Lusaka to provide it with a duplicating machine.¹¹ Although such aid is usually small and generally regarded as merely a gesture of goodwill, all the same it reinforces the multi-channel situation portrayed in figure 1.

5.3.4 Parliament

Parliament as a separate institution does not play any direct role in national aid issues. Although it has on a few occasions raised issues on the country's conduct of its aid relations, these have been done on the personal initiative of MPs. Parliament has not been assigned specific functions to debate and take decisions on national aid issues. For example, its Public Accounts Committee has never focused attention on aspects relating to how the

country manages its aid resources. Similarly, the Auditor-General's annual reports have always kept a safe distance from examining Zambia's management of its external resources. This is very odd indeed. As a recipient Zambia has equally compelling reasons to monitor the performance and value of its external resource inputs. Parliament is one agency which can provide the necessary checks on qualitative and other aspects of external aid. By contrast, parliaments in donor countries play important roles in many aspects of their countries' aid business.

Of all the actors involved in the aid process two occupy special positions. These are the donor and the recipient. The next few paragraphs will examine how the education sector conducts its aid process.

5.4 The Education Sector

The structure of the aid process in the recipient ministries is not in any way different from the general aid process of which the ministries are a constituent part. However, it is at this level that one is able to notice further features and trends in Zambia's aid process system.

The key offices that are involved in the aid process in both the MGEC and MHE are, the Permanent Secretary's office, the Assistant Secretary's office (Policy and Technical Cooperation), the Chief Education Officer's office (Policy

and Technical Cooperation), and the Planning Unit. The director of the Department of Technical Education and Vocational Training (DTEVT) is also often involved directly in aid negotiations when his department is to receive aid or has made a request to receive external assistance. The Curriculum Development Centre (CDC) has also had direct negotiating links with donors. In fact, through the SHAPE project, the CDC is now able to reach more donors. But, rarely would principals of tertiary colleges be invited to take part in aid discussions.

The Permanent Secretary is the front-line officer in the aid process. All external aid requests from and offers to the sector are required to pass through his office for record purposes, for endorsement and subsequent submission to the NCDP or discussion with donors whichever the case may be.

The actual process work is carried out by mainly three officers and their staff, these are, the Assistant Secretary (P/TC), the Assistant Secretary (Planning), and the Chief Education Officer (P/TC). The responsibilities and duties of these officers include among other things, processing aid requests from the sector, negotiating with donors and interpreting government policy on aid to Zambia and the education sector in particular, keeping records of data and other information relating to external assistance, and many other normal administrative tasks. Indeed, except for the

task of undertaking negotiations with donors, all other duties fall within the usual categories of government work. Despite the special nature of the officers' duties, their appointment to these positions is done under normal public service procedures. That is, officers are promoted or transferred from senior and other middle education officer ranks. No special or additional training is given to them to equip them to handle the extra tasks of managing the aid process and administering aid. The non-professionalisation of the civil service in Zambia and other Eastern and Southern African countries has caused great concern in recent years. Critics have been concerned that there are no agreed upon conventions and modes of conducting business in the public service.¹²

The MGEC and the MHE face enormous internal problems relating to their own organisational structures, and the addition of new responsibilities.¹³ The authorities' reliance on general administrative aptitudes and long experience have proved increasingly inadequate to enable an old system to deal with additional administrative and many other challenges which aid presents. For a system whose development has been dependent on external assistance the difficulties being experienced by the MGEC and the MHE may be partly as a result of donors' neglect. Donors, both bilateral and multilateral, have spent vast amounts of resources in technical and capital assistance but none of

these has ever focused on equipping Zambian personnel with skills which could enable them to deal more effectively with aid management.

The MGEC and the MHE have not laid down any procedures regarding guidance to prospective donors and Zambian officers. Hence the aid process in the Ministries is conducted in a variety of ways. Any Zambian responses to donors' initiatives have tended to be ad hoc. A donor may arrange visits to the Ministry to acquaint itself with the current situation and to seek official opinion and positions on issues in which donors have a special interest. This is one approach and is exemplified in the minutes of a meeting between the MHE and the Area Manager for Sumitomo Corporation of Japan.

2.1 "The Chairman informed the meeting that Mr. Yamazaki, who is the area manager of Sumitomo Corporation for the Africa and Middle East Group, had been in the country to scout for possible areas where Japanese grant aid could be considered.

2.2 The meeting observed that Japanese grant aid could only be considered in three areas as thus:-

Agriculture
Education
Medicine¹⁴.

This particular case helps to throw light on other important points. The Japanese had not only decided which areas they intended to support but made it clear also that earmarked areas would be expected to receive certain types of aid only. The education sector could in this case be considered

for capital assistance (equipment). Consequently, the MHE's plea to the Japanese to raise assistance which could help complete the building of three Trades Training institutes at Chipata, Mongu and Solwezi could not go further than Mr. Yamazaki's ears. A further illuminating point is the open but quite substantial involvement of Japanese private corporations in development aid.

The University of Zambia School of Education is the proud owner of a very expensive and impressive language laboratory donated by the Sumitomo Corporation of Japan in 1987. According to the Zambian in charge of the laboratory, the negotiations which preceded this gift bore all the hallmarks of discussions that had not sufficiently taken account of how the gift would serve the recipient. The package contained two very expensive multisystem and multi-purpose T.V sets and two large and well equipped laboratories. The donation had been accepted against the advice of the technician by non technical senior officers. He pointed out that the entire laboratory facilities are redundant because of the small number of students who use them. The technician pointed out that his advice that half of the total cost of this gift should have been spent on other small equipment which could have assisted trainees in making various teaching aids had been ignored by both Zambians and donors. The costly multisystem T.V. monitor for instance is a ridiculous gift to an institution which doesn't have

basic manila paper for making teaching charts. And in any case, Zambia does not have a multisystem T.V. transmitter. What the Japanese representative was looking for in the meeting cited here was a commitment from the Zambian authorities that they would support specific forms of assistance to the sectors the Japanese had already earmarked. It is encounters such as this one in which the competence of Zambian negotiators is tested in many ways.

Another approach by donors is sending a team on a fact finding mission as an initial response to Zambia's request for assistance. This is done either independently by donors or the consultants they have hired. Donors have maintained these independent approaches because the MGEC and the MHE have not produced a common procedural requirement which donors should follow. Consequently, it is quite common for donors to demand meetings with education officials at short notice, and these are usually granted. This often presents serious problems of internal consultation among education authorities.

Nonetheless, whether donors' missions come on their own looking for markets for their wares or are invited to come and assist in specific areas, what really matters in the final analysis is whether Zambians can obtain favourable outcomes from such aid meetings. The extent to which Zambians are able to shift donors' positions in aid negotiations depends on many factors, among them being

Zambia's own ability to manage negotiations as well as the donors' level of stakes in the aid agenda. Ministry officials have reservations about their own capabilities in aid matters, as one senior officer observed.

"In cases where the participants are inexperienced or imprudent in dealing with foreign aid, there are problems of reaching national priorities on what forms of aid to request...participants who are not watchful may accept aid that may not only be difficult to maintain in the long run, both technically and financially, but may ultimately benefit more the donor countries."¹⁵

Although the odds are overwhelming against Zambian negotiators a few of them are on guard and able to point out anomalies in the aid process. The Zambia Mathematics and Science Teachers Education Project (ZAMSTEP) illustrates how intriguing aid transactions can be, and how they are sometimes unfairly conducted.


Members of the steering committee of this project had expressed surprise that: (a) they had not seen the signed ZAMSTEP contract before the meeting was convened, and (b) issues which should have been discussed before signing the contract were being raised after the contract had been affirmed. It would appear that in order to facilitate the smooth passage of the contract document some members of the team had been bypassed by the higher authorities in the MHE. And in the short period the project has been in operation Zambian lecturers involved in the project to provide counterpart assistance have pointed out many insensitivities

in the provisions of the project contract. The restrictions on the use of project vehicles in the colleges where there are no other means of transport has caused great concern and displeasure. So has the exclusion of Zambian lecturers from receiving additional payments for services provided to the project. Consequently, the feeling among some members of the committee was that this project had been tactically manipulated and imposed on Zambia.¹⁶

Figure 2 shows a complex interactive pattern in the aid relationship between donors and the education sector, the NCDP and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What emerges from Figure 2 is again a clear difficulty if one attempts to trace the logical stages of the aid process.

Figure 2

Aid Process Between Donors, NCDP, Foreign Affairs and the Zambian Education and Training Sector.



- > Contacts between donors and Zambia institutions.
- =====> Aid requests by institutions and comments on considered aid offers are sent to NCDP through the ministries.
- > The role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to re-direct aid offers to appropriate institutions.
- =====> Aid offers given to ministries are sent to relevant departments or institutions for consideration. This is mainly applicable to the Universities and DTEVT.
- > Aid destined for the MGEC and the MHE are channeled through the NCDP for more discussions with relevant donors.
- > NCDP contacts with education ministries and institutions.

5.5 Pressure Groups

An examination and discussion of the aid process would be incomplete without making some reflections on the kinds of pressures and other influence attempts it is subjected to. It is well known that donors' internal aid machineries and process are frequently targets of influence attempts through lobbying and other open campaigns by aid interest groups as well as political parties.¹⁷ Britain for example has over one hundred non-governmental organisations involved in many aspects of overseas development work.¹⁸ A few of these are keen activists in lobbying the British government on overseas aid issues.¹⁹ Although these interest groups do not always succeed in shifting government policies and decisions on aid issues, nevertheless their lobbies serve to draw the attention of policy-makers to various issues. This they are able to do because interest and other pressure groups are an important integral part of the political fabric in donor countries. These groups are not only allowed to operate but they are also encouraged to play an active part in various aspects of development aid. The corresponding situation obtaining in recipient countries is rather different and varies from one country to another.

Therefore the state of internal pressure and interest groups which can bring influence to bear on political and government machineries in Zambia has to be examined in the country's political context.

Prior to the establishment of the one-party state in 1972, Zambia had the full experience of operating in a multi-party system in a newly independent state. Opposition parties, the African National Congress (ANC), the United Party (UP), and the short-lived United Progressive Party (UPP) contested UNIP's government and challenged it on several local issues. UP was opposed strongly to the cancellation of the South African contract to recruit cheap labour from Zambia. It felt also that Western Province, the base of its political power, was economically lagging behind other provinces in the national development process. The UP also raised strong objections to the 1968 Mulungushi Economic Reforms, and further rejected Humanism as a vague ideology. By contrast the UPP's criticism of the UNIP government focused on agricultural policies, financial management, and leadership style. It was also opposed to UNIP's policy of economic disengagement from dependence on South African trade and trade routes.²⁰ These were the forces behind the opposition parties' attempts to gain political power which would have given them more access to the fortunes of independence.

The opposition parties' interest in UNIP's conduct of the country's international affairs was largely dominated by regional matters. Thus, the issues on which the parties contested power were predominantly local. Inter-party conflict and competition characterised much of Zambia's

domestic politics then.²¹ External aid could not have gained prominence on the agenda of Zambia's politics because aid was then generally regarded as no more than an important external input into the local resource base, therefore Zambian politicians did not see much to question about foreign aid. This unfortunately tended to blind critical perception. Severe criticism of aid by other parties would have been regarded as anti-developmental by UNIP. It would have also raised grave reservations among donors regarding Zambia's commitment and willingness to develop the country.

Similarly, trade unions and other social organisations were also mainly concerned with their own internal politics. The trade unions were primarily concerned with making attempts to fulfil pre-independence promises of better pay, promotions, and other good conditions of service. In domestic politics they were engaged in a fierce struggle to remain autonomous from government's attempts to control them.²² Although the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) had been a recipient of direct aid for some of its operations, the unions never took any strong public position on national aid matters until recently over the IMF case. Ironically, although aid has played an important role in sustaining the activities of many sectors in which their members are employed, the unions have never taken an interest in the politics of aid distribution in the country's national development process.

The position of interest groups in the MGEC and the MHE has to be understood in this broader context. The Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT) and the hundreds of Parent-Teachers Associations (PTAs), represent two important, but structurally different groups in the education sector. The PTAs are organisationally disaggregated and involved mainly in their school politics. By contrast ZNUT is a national organisation with limited access to international assistance. These groups have never been in the mainstream of actors in the sector's aid process. They do not have any representation even on externally funded projects which have direct consequences for their children and teachers. The SIDA-supported multigrade school project for instance began and has progressed without consultations with the teachers union. Yet the project aims at transforming the entire teaching pattern in the rural areas of Zambia. The self-help school project too to be mounted soon by SIDA and the ADB has passed through several preparatory and planning phases, none of which has involved the teachers' union. Yet the implications of this project for teachers have already begun to emerge. The communities want to know which agency will be responsible for hiring teachers and collecting house rent in this sector. The possible reasons why the union is kept out of such important discussions are the ministry's fears concerning the union's supposed militancy and radicalism. It is feared that these elements could threaten aid

negotiations and the flow of aid. Consequently, the ministry would like to see the union tied to labour movement affairs.

In this regard the union and the PTAs have been left without any mechanism through which they could exert their influence on the aid process other than direct access to the MoE. It would also appear that the Teachers Union, as indeed is the case with other Unions, feel erroneously that external aid issues are too far removed from the bread and butter issues concerning their members. Yet many of the professional activities in the sector are sustained by external assistance.

Church organisations and other NGOs involved in educational work form another set of interest groups in the educational sector. Organisations such as the Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ) and other individual denominations are no less distant from the politics of official aid in the educational sector. Their energies are concentrated on those issues affecting their educational institutions. Unlike PTAs and the ZNUT, church organisations have direct access to more diversified international assistance through NGOs in donor countries.²³ This has given them a certain amount of independence and consequently has weakened their interest in official assistance.

One can therefore conclude that as far as exerting pressure on the aid process is concerned, interest groups have had no direct impact on it. The groups are first and foremost concerned with the welfare matters of their members. Because the effects of aid on interest groups are generally indirect and often subtle, aid issues have attracted less attention. Thirdly, because aid is a sensitive subject recipient sectors such as the MGEC and the MHE have made no provision to create structures which could allow more actors to participate in the aid process.

5.6 SUMMARY and CONCLUSION

In this chapter an attempt has been made to construct and discuss the aid process in Zambia and to identify its main institutional actors. It has been shown that the structure of the aid process is dominated by two sets of institutional actors, the political and the bureaucratic. The key political actors reside in the President's office, the Prime Minister's Office, and Freedom House.

The NCDP forms one important single subject in the category of bureaucratic actors. It houses the ETC department which is directly responsible for administering aid negotiations and agreements between donors and Zambia. The other actors are recipient ministries and the University of Zambia. However, the present aid process structure and arrangements are such that interest and other pressure groups do not have a direct role to play in the country's international aid affairs. The groups for their part do not seem very keen on involving themselves in these affairs. Nor has the government given them encouragement to take an active part. The government would like to see interest groups concentrate on serving the immediate interests of their members. This serves to reduce public dissent on national policies and other issues. This fear has however, denied the country getting the benefit of dissenting opinions on fundamental national issues.

All the actors except for pressure groups operate in an aid process framework which is governed by inadequate procedural provisions. Hence, aid transactions between Zambia and donors do not always follow a logical, strict sequence. This loose arrangement has ensured that the NCDP does not have absolute power over major aspects of aid to Zambia including enforcing aid process procedures. Thus the NCDP and its aid functions can be subjected without restraint to numerous and wide influences from higher political institutions. Unfortunately, donors have also on many instances used the weaknesses of the present system to obtain their objectives. This puts undue pressure on recipient sectors and has left both the NCDP and the recipient sectors in weaker positions to take definitive decisions and to act independently on some issues. That the government has not raised the NCDP to a Ministry despite its critical importance and mounting aid work has also affected its functional relationship with recipient sectors.

Even with the best of aid process arrangements not much can be achieved if the individual actors do not measure up to the demands of the tasks in the aid process. Both the NCDP and the MGEC and the MHE have indicated that their work in the aid process would have been strengthened if they had adequate and more skilled manpower. In the NCDP the shortage of manpower has severely limited the services it can offer to the recipient sectors. Because the government

has not perceived the tasks of administering aid negotiations and agreements as a rather different set of undertakings requiring additional skilled expertise, it has continued to treat manpower cases in these institutions in the same manner it has treated manpower requirement problems in the entire civil service. That is, civil servants have often been required to take on additional responsibilities without parallel adjustments in their supporting staff and expertise. In the education sector, as indeed is the case in many other sectors, this has reduced the work of technical cooperation offices to one of carrying out clerical duties relating to aid transactions.

Therefore it is the conclusion of this chapter that despite the large increase in the number of donors and projects in the country, the Zambian government has not made serious efforts to develop a very strong aid institution and a coherent aid process structure. The aid process has been caught up in the country's own political structure and administrative weaknesses. Donors' interests and intrigues have also made the aid process in Zambia less amenable to strict control. The effects of this on Zambia's development planning efforts and process are both short and long term.

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CHAPTER SIX

THE LINKS BETWEEN DONORS' FOREIGN AND AID POLICIES

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the links between foreign and aid policies. The focus is on the relationship in the institutional framework and the functional relationship between foreign and aid policies. The discussion will draw its illustrations mainly from the experiences of Britain's ODA and some Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) concerned with development aid affairs. Thus the discussion's lines of debate will be around the structural, administrative, and policy links. Where appropriate examples will be drawn from the experiences of other donor countries.

A country's foreign policy is a key national feature in measuring and assessing a nation's self-perception and also how it perceives the world around it. These perceptions produce observable behaviour in a state which follows discernible lines of action. These are aimed at achieving particular objectives, the ultimate goal being to seek, to secure, and to protect by various means one's national interests at home and abroad. Behind foreign policies are motivations which are quite often very strong and complex. Today in a world that is often described as a context where there are no permanent friends, the conduct of foreign

policy has become highly demanding on the decision-making, diplomatic and executive machineries. The tasks of foreign policy making and execution call for greater foresight, subtlety and flexibility than ever before. Consequently foreign policy institutions and instruments assume a critical role in the management of a nation's foreign policy.

Foreign policy institutions vary considerably in size, complexity, operations and amount of resources committed to them. The size and location of a country's external interests, position in the international power league, self-perception and perceived world perceptions of itself are among the factors which help a government make important decisions on the resources and institutional arrangements it can deploy for managing foreign policy programmes. Countries such as Britain, the United States, Sweden, Canada, France, and Japan have interests that are located in far outlying areas of the world. This has necessarily called for extensive institutional arrangements to manage and protect those interests within the broader realm of conducting their countries' international relations. Hence to the traditional foreign policy infrastructure of ministries and their outpost stations around the world have been added new units to help shoulder the extra responsibilities. Official aid agencies and a variety of

government-supported or recognised non-governmental organisations (NGO's) fall into this category of essential auxiliary units in the machinery of the foreign policy plant.

6.2 Institutional Framework and Links

In all donor countries the Ministries of Foreign Affairs appear to have some structural and administrative links with the countries' official donor agencies. However, the relationship and the level of structural integration between the two institutions tends to vary from donor to donor, and so do the administrative arrangements.

The ODA for example was created in 1965 to work as part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Relations Office (FCO), with responsibilities for development aid administration. Unlike SIDA, ODA is administratively an internal department within the FCO though it is housed outside the FCO main building. It is headed by a Minister who has delegated responsibilities from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Though structurally not an internal department within the FCO, the British Council has a special and complex institutional link with the FCO via the ODA. The Council carries out its own programmes and also executes others on behalf of the ODA. Its special role is performed outside the UK across the world. Because of the nature of its field work the Council plays an important advisory role

to the ODA and the FCO on operational and policy matters concerning British development aid.¹ Consequently, the Council's senior officers are consulted regularly by the ODA and the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) on a range of subjects in their field. Similarly, the Council's field staff have for the same reasons close contacts with the HMG Missions. Through these mechanisms the British Council is able to provide important input into ODA's policy and decision-making process. Therefore the British Council's physical distance from the FCO, ODA and HMG Missions abroad appear to mean little in terms of the real internal administrative cooperation and consultation arrangements.

SIDA by contrast was created in 1961 with the organisational and management structure of a parastatal agency. It is an external unit of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its senior officers at the level of Director-General and his deputies are appointed by the government. West Germany's institutional framework however presents a rather complicated picture. Unlike Britain and Sweden, the Ministries of Economic Cooperation, Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Finance play a prominent role in development aid matters.² Each institution is responsible for specific tasks such as international commodity agreements, and monetary issues. Its aid policy and administration is said to involve a fairly diversified spectrum of institutions. West Germany makes a clear distinction between financial and

technical assistance: the former is channelled through a government owned development bank while the latter is administered by the Gesellschaft Fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), a wholly government owned limited liability company.

Donor governments have maintained management policy which allow cross-transfer of personnel between the foreign and aid service organisations. Senior aid officers have often been appointed to senior foreign service posts.³ This arrangement gives the officers insights into developing countries from two vantage points, through aid work, and diplomatic access. Thus in concluding this part one observes that at the official level the extension and linkages between foreign and aid institutions is self-evident. However, this is not the case in the relationship between donor governments on one hand and the NGOs on the other.

6.2.1 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)

The links and relationships between the ODA and voluntary aid organisations are generally kept deliberately less conspicuous by both parties. NGOs' would like to project an independent image of themselves and their activities. The ODA too keeps a physical distance from the organisational and management aspects of NGOs' activities. For some NGOs the relationship starts with being a recipient of a regular grant from the government.⁴ Although the funding enables

the ODA to maintain a light foothold in the NGOs' activities the relationship between them extends far and beyond giving and receiving annual grants. A closer examination of NGOs will show important informal features which provide NGOs with firms links with governments.

Organisational and management structures of NGOs provide a second important link in their relationship. In the case of British NGOs their governing councils or executive committees often include active as well as retired high ranking government officials as well as private individuals and community leaders. The British Government has grant support schemes for many British NGOs. Under the Joint Funding Scheme (JFS) Oxfam, Christian Aid, Save the Children Fund, Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (CAFOD), Catholic Institute for International Relations and other British NGOs receive regular operational grants from the government.⁵ On the Board of Trustees (1988) of Action Aid for instance, were the following political personalities among others the Rt Hon Christopher Chataway, and the Hon Sir Bernard Braine MP. The 1986 Council and Executive committee of the VSO included among many others the Director-General of the British Council and former ODA senior staff members.

The examples given above serve two important purposes. A corps of distinguished active and retired officers serving

on governing councils gives the NGOs prestige, but more important it is also a means through which the NGOs can maintain an active lobby in the private sector and government corridors. Through them the NGO is also able to generate public goodwill in Britain. It is also important to note that these officers take to the NGOs valuable local and international experience which benefits NGOs' policy and decision-making process. The government benefits also in two ways. This representation by proxy strengthens the spirit of collaborative work between the NGOs and the government. Secondly, this kind of representation provides an important checking mechanism on the policies and activities of NGOs, especially those that may have direct implications for Britain's standing internationally. Under this arrangement policy decisions and projects which threaten Britain's larger bilateral relations with other countries would not be allowed to go through unchallenged.

In these informal and proxy ways the FCO is able to extend and maintain a presence of support and influence in NGOs. The partnership is a firm one, and of critical importance in the maintenance and management of Britain's public and private foreign policy objectives, as one scholar observed:

Even in situations where private and state foreign policy appear to be in conflict the conflict may be more apparent than real. Thus while the British government was supporting the federal forces with arms in the Nigerian civil war, the Prime Minister called together a meeting of the voluntary services and urged them to do all they could to relieve the conditions on the Biafran side.⁶

NGOs are tied to the policies and national interests of their governments and the public in different ways through public support and government regulatory mechanisms. Consequently their policies and activities are subject to direct and indirect influences. Aid to education and training provided by NGOs to developing countries is given against this background. Closer insights into some of the issues raised in the preceding paragraphs can further be obtained by examining historical cases and specific donor policies.

6.3 Foreign and Aid Policies

Sweden's foreign policy objectives have been listed as:

- (1) To safeguard the security of the country.
- (2) Non-Alliance and neutrality.
- (3) To support struggles for national independence.
- (4) To mobilise international opinion against oppression and intolerance.
- (5) To support and promote economic and social equality and peace.⁷

Compare objectives (3-5) with Sweden's declared aid policy objectives which are intended to promote:

- (a) Economic growth.
- (b) Economic and social equality.
- (c) Economic and political independence.
- (d) Development of democracy in society.⁸

The overlapping between the two sets of policy objectives needs hardly any explaining, it is self-evident.

In broad terms Britain's foreign policy objectives have remained concerned with issues of defence/security, prosperity, and liberal democracy. These have maintained their firm positions in the country's foreign policy framework. In a 1978 Government white paper the objectives of British foreign policy were listed as:

- (i) To safeguard the security of our country.
- (ii) To promote its prosperity.
- (iii) To uphold and extend the basic values and freedoms of our democracy.
- (iv) To honour our commitments and obligations.
- (v) To work for a peaceful and just world.
- (vi) To contribute to the achievement of the above objectives by providing assistance to the developing countries.

Over the years donors have become less moralistic about their assistance. But also time and developments in the recipient environment have made it difficult for donors to continue masking aid projects with moral tags. Competition among donors has also helped to reveal the extension and intrusion of foreign policy objectives into foreign aid. Consequently there is a readiness among some donors now to admit that aid is a cover for many political and economic objectives. As Lord Pym acknowledged, British aid is:

An arm of foreign policy in both the political and economic senses. It serves the diplomatic purposes of promoting better relations and also promotes commercial interests. There is no conflict here, in many cases the different objectives are mutually reinforcing.⁹

In the field, however, donor staff often make conscious efforts to play down this relationship. Field staff will avoid indiscreet discussion which could expose the larger boundaries of the political economy of foreign assistance. Perhaps it is the need to protect one's national interests which forces them to avoid close discussions of their foreign and aid policies. It is also a fact that these policies contain many sensitive aspects, hence the need to exercise extreme caution. The next section examines two British cases to illustrate further the relationship under discussion.

6.4 Policies in Historical and Current Perspectives

Britain's granting of political independence to her colonies opened the newly independent states to diversified economic assistance from other industrialised countries. For Britain this meant that the 'burden' of helping to develop her former colonies could then be shared with the international community. This development however brought with it economic and political challenges. First, there were fears for the security of British economic interest in newly independent states that had embarked on sweeping nationalisation policies. There were also fears in British

circles of Sino-Soviet influence spreading quickly in some of the newly independent nations.¹⁰ Consequently, the Bow Group noted in 1962 that one of Britain's purposes in Africa was to encourage the steady spread of education for its own sake and in the knowledge this will limit the roaming influence of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

The conclusion of technical, economic and other cooperation agreements between the Soviet bloc, and China on one hand and some developing countries have in many instances heightened western countries' concerns for their own interests in developing countries. Thus Britain's post-colonial foreign policy objectives have been shaped by her own reaction to the perceived political and economic trends in the international environment. In particular the Sino-Soviet political and economic initiatives have tended to receive strong response and counterbalancing measures from western countries such as Britain as the case below indicates.

The English Low-Priced Books Scheme (ELBS) was started in 1960 by the commonwealth Relations Office and publishers in Britain to counter the spread of cheap books from the USSR and China.¹¹ This scheme which was operated by the Central Office of Information (COI) illustrates a number of important points in addition to the obvious educational and cultural objectives. First, one notices the evident

cooperation between private industry and the government to further British interests abroad in areas of hitherto dominant British influence. One also observes the protection of private British commercial interests by the British government. Consequently, by pursuing the ELBS the British government built mutual reinforcing links between the government and the private sector within Britain's foreign economic relations framework.¹² The scheme can also be isolated as a case where the British move was a response to a specific economic and political signal. Politically the ELBS should also be viewed as having been a British cultural/commercial element in the larger western containment strategy against soviet economic and political endeavours.

The British concerns with promoting their interest abroad have over time directed attention to other sources of competition with British interests. Western competitors against British interests have equally made Britain feel very vulnerable:

I have visited over 40 countries while working for Peat Marwick and have increasingly noticed a growth in acceptance of American education and cultural mores. Recently in China for instance I was part of a British Council mission visiting universities in the hope of fostering links and contacts. It was clear that we were treading in a path well worn by previous American university missions. From the obvious statistics of student exchanges between China and overseas countries Britain seemed to be slipping far down the league table. We noticed for instance extremely few English periodicals in the university libraries, while the American ones predominated. Sadly, there were even fewer reference books describing Britain or British Universities.¹³

Some corrective measures have already been taken. A special scholarship scheme for Chinese students and academic staff to study and do research in Britain was announced during the Queen's visit to China in 1986. This move would have been made in all probability even in the absence of potential or actual competitors for the Chinese Market. The sheer size of the Chinese population, the liberal economic reforms then being adopted and also the economic market potential which China offers are enough incentives to attract the kind of attention manifested in Britain's recent educational aid decision.

But against all this background lies Britain's third preoccupation after defence/security and the state of the country's economy. It is the concern for the country's international image, and the political or economic consequences which an unfavourable image abroad could pose for British interests.

6.5 British Cultural Diplomacy

The task of positive image building was recently tackled by a Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) in its study and review of British cultural diplomacy. The government believes that the problem of image building can best be tackled by mounting an effective cultural diplomacy campaign. The FCO's memorandum of 7th November, 1987 to the FAC listed five British cultural diplomacy objectives as follows.

1. To convey the image of Britain as a creative well integrated and forward looking society based on liberal values- a social and cultural model to be emulated;
2. To inspire respect and understanding for the people of Britain and their achievements;
3. To correct wrong and counter unfavourable impressions of Britain;
4. To explain policies and interests to decision-makers and opinion formers overseas and.
5. To promote British economic interests overseas including the export of British goods and services.¹⁴

The memorandum identified six strategies which Britain could use to secure these objectives. These are:

- (a) Promoting knowledge and use of English language.
- (b) Promoting the British educational system overseas.
- (c) Disseminating knowledge of British achievements in science and technology.
- (d) Promoting British democratic values.
- (e) Explaining British policies in all fields.¹⁵

The FAC report has listed six institutions which should share the responsibility for securing cultural diplomacy objectives. These are, the British Council, the Central Office for Information, the BBC, the FCO information department, private organisations and overseas students.

The importance of this cultural diplomacy drive is manifold. It has critical direct implications for British aid to many overseas social and economic sectors, especially aid to education and training.

Access to the British educational and training system gives overseas students opportunities to learn and appreciate many aspects of British endeavours in many spheres of life. The programmes are meant to expose the students to specific social, cultural, political, and economic values of British life. Assistance given to educational programmes abroad also contains elements of this objective. Aid to education and training therefore is critical to the achievement of the cultural objectives. That the presence of overseas students in Britain is seen in terms of their importance to the furtherance of cultural diplomacy objectives is shown in this statement:

Government policy is to provide carefully targeted support to bring to the United Kingdom students who will benefit, both personally and as far as their countries are concerned, from British education, thus creating goodwill and strengthening links with Britain. Since 1983 the FCO has run its own worldwide scholarship and awards scheme, bringing selected people in all walks of life to study in the United Kingdom mostly for postgraduate work. There are special fee support schemes for Hong Kong, Malaysia and Cyprus.¹⁶

Given this policy background the reasons given by the British government for introducing a scholarship scheme for blacks from South Africa cannot be accepted without much questioning and debate.¹⁷ The scheme initially provided about 80 awards annually in the (UK) at mainly undergraduate level. A second scheme provides 50 scholarships tenable within South Africa. It is intriguing that in both schemes the South African government is actually cooperating fully with the British government. The South African government has issued passports to candidates and also gives the British Council a free hand to choose candidates from different professions including the Trade Union movements. The scheme cannot be understood only in terms of Britain making attempts to redress the consequences of apartheid on education for non-whites, the schemes must be examined and understood in the contexts of the current cultural diplomacy drive, the political and economic situation in the Southern African region, and Britain's political stand on South Africa.

Britain's moderate approach to the international community's call for tougher economic sanctions against South Africa has led some members of the world community, especially the Frontline States and the black people of South Africa to accuse Britain of supporting apartheid. Over the years this and the radical politicisation of the youths have undoubtedly created strong antagonistic feelings against

Britain in South Africa. Britain knows very well that allowing anti-British attitudes to run deeper and unchecked would not be in her interests nor in the interests of other western countries. In the event of major political changes taking place tomorrow or in the distant future Britain would not like to face the new era from an alienated and disadvantageous position. In this instance also Britain has found herself facing a delicate political situation in which it has strong interests at stake. Evidently this is a situation Britain is very much accustomed to and has dealt with many times over before.

Britain's colonial as well as the post-colonial history is full of episodes in which the Crown has often faced delicate situations in which Britain is forced to balance immediate interests against long term national objectives and goals. This has often compelled Britain to take stands on international conflicts with a lot of caution, especially in cases where the result of a settlement could go either way. Hence Britain's policy of discreetly accommodating and supporting officially and privately both parties in the conflict. Thus the Eritreans and Ethiopians are found in British educational institutions with support being provided by the public and private funds. The Sudanese have had similar support extended to them. The policy seems to be never to close the door completely (cf the Biafran approach).

In the current situation British and other western countries' interests have become vulnerable. Consequently there is keen western interest in the groups that are seeking power to control a country in which their economic and other interests are substantial.

The example cited should therefore be perceived in this light. They have a strong immediate and long-term political agenda. The current task seems to be to use educational programmes to draw away the young men and women from active South African radical political activities, or sustained exposure to related political activities in which British and other western interests are entangled. Though the numbers of scholarship holders is presently small the significance of the programme lies in the cumulative composition of those who get the awards and their future potential to deliver desired political goods on which the security of Britain and other western interests depends. The long term objective is simply to create a large pool of British educated and trained non-whites who, it is hoped would be favourably disposed to western liberal democratic values.¹⁸ The schemes demonstrate the employment of aid to intervene in and influence the course of political events.

However, the recent concern with cultural diplomacy in Britain is not new but only a serious re-assertive move and reflections on how the British cultural diplomacy machinery has been working in the face of competition from other rival countries such as France, West Germany, and Japan. Thus the additional objective of the recent movement is to re-energise the cultural diplomacy machinery.

As far as developing countries are concerned Britain's explicit cultural diplomacy objectives poses several searching questions. Are the British objectives compatible with those of the recipients in their development efforts? What implications do these objectives have for the choice of aid recipients, and the balancing of British priorities against those of the recipients in education and training programmes. The tendency will be for Britain to select carefully those priorities which can enhance the achievement of cultural diplomacy objectives. This puts at risk recipients requests which fall outside the cultural diplomacy targets.

It is perhaps appropriate at this point to extend the discussion on cultural diplomacy to the aspects of dependence and dependency and their position in British and relationships with the recipient world.

6.6 Dependence and Dependency

Radical theorists see aid as merely another vehicle for continuing the underdevelopment of the Third World countries by the industrialised capitalist countries in the North.¹⁹ Hayter once described aid as the smooth face of imperialism and an enabling mechanism for sustained capitalist penetration.²⁰ It has been further contended that aid acts as an instrument that has a strong influence on the direction of political and economic events. It is believed that aid will cause events to go in the direction most suited to the interests of the donor countries. The critique is rounded off with a further argument that aid creates a subservient bourgeoisie class in developing countries, these become political allies of the donors because of their dependence on foreign aid.

Dependence, also defined as external reliance is said to point to particular inequalities in the exchanges between individual countries.²¹ In this relationship the less dependent has more bargaining power, and important factor in controlling the outcomes of specific events. Whereas dependency refers to a system of interstate exchanges which creates structural inequalities in the relations between the groups of countries. The structural concept of dependency focuses on the manner in which developing countries are incorporated into a global aid system dominated by the western industrial states. Dependency is said to be a

higher order of structural power which involves the ability to manipulate the choices, capabilities, alliance opportunities, and payoffs that actors may utilise. The asymmetry in the North-South relations are said to be caused by the overwhelming structural power which the industrialised western donor countries possess.

McKinlay and Little (1979) analysed British aid allocation using a foreign policy model. The model is based on the premise that aid constitutes a foreign policy instrument which a donor can use to promote and protect its interests.²² The proposition which the model pursues are that, through aid donor countries can establish commitment and dependency which help a donor to obtain some foreign policy advantages. Thus commitment in this model is defined as:

A process whereby a state attempts to register its support for another state. Commitments provide two main benefits which account for the willingness of high-income countries to demonstrate a commitment to low-income countries. Commitments can be used both to deter intervention by a hostile state, and to discourage a developing country from moving out of a developed state's sphere of influence. The dependent party therefore holds a subordinate position, the dominant party possessing a potential for leverage or control. This potential for control constitutes the main advantage of creating a dependency relationship.²³

The authors point out that this commitment and dependency are tied to western donors' interests in five areas:

- (1) the maintenance of spheres of influence,
- (2) discouraging associations with communist powers,
- (3) power politics,
- (4) economic and development performance and,
- (5) political stability and democracy.²⁴

This model focuses on the donor-recipient relationship viewed from the donors' perspective. While this model offers important lines of explanations in the aid relationship, there are aspects in it which require further scrutiny and a much more balanced projection. For example donors' aid relationship has not been confined to low-income countries as the model suggests. It is common knowledge that the search for commitment and dependency objectives have the rationality being projected in this model. Wealthy countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwaiti, Libya, Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain received official western aid from the West every year form 1977 to 1979.²⁵ Among the aid partner of Britain in recent years (1980-1989) were economically diverse countries such as, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Malawi, Ethiopia and Ghana.²⁶

The dependency explanation in the case of aid relationships has tended to conceal the dependency and vulnerability of

donors. Aid relationships have been projected in a way which emphasises the recipients' subordinate position in the relationship. No attention is given to the dependence of donors on aid to seek, secure and protect their intangible objectives abroad. It is also a fact that many western countries, economies and security are dependent on the supply of raw materials and facilities which can aid the protection of their global interests. West German's comparatively larger aid for Egypt in Africa is explained in terms of its overriding geo-strategic importance in the Middle East.²⁷

It is true that there is a close structural relationship between aid, dependence, and dependency. Excessive and prolonged reliance on aid can give rise to a dependent state. When the manifestations of the dependent state become entrenched, that state seeks to create a regular pattern in the relationships. No subject stands to offer a more illuminating discussion on the issues of dependence, and dependency than externally funded education and training programmes in developing countries.

The current depressed economic and financial situation facing Zambia should provide a context in which dependence can be discussed. It is true that the absence of adequate national savings and the shortage of foreign exchange has forced Zambia to rely more on external financial and

technical assistance resources to cope with its internal deficits in its operations (see table 31). However, it is not aid in which the donors do not have some short or long term interests. In education as indeed is the case with other sectors, the degree of reliance on external aid tends to vary, but the higher education sector usually gets more foreign aid inputs than others. As Zambia's reliance on foreign aid is expected to increase rather than diminish the idea that Zambia is very dependent on foreign aid will increasingly become difficult to dispute. The account of Zambia's dependence is a simplified version of a more complicated relationship between Zambia and the donors and their aid objectives. The dependence discussed here rests on measuring quantifiable donor inputs, which apparently makes it easier to draw judgements on dependence based on possession and non-possession of resources. This gives an incomplete picture.

Donor countries have created an institution on which they too have become dependent. Whether it is a short term and less pervasive dependence or not, the point is that donors suffer from its pressures also. These pressures have shown themselves often in the British aid business. The government has on many occasions pointed out the political and commercial benefits it expects to derive from investing in aid to education and training. Furthermore, there have been internal pressures within the British government, and

some pressure groups such as the Overseas Student Trust (OST) to persuade the government to invest more in aid. This is intended to ensure that Britain does not lag far behind its competitors, France and West Germany.²⁸ In these concerns there are strong indications that Britain, and other major donors are dependent on external aid to achieve their political and commercial objectives abroad. Therefore, the idea that Zambia gets aid only because it is dependent on such support is not entirely correct.

How does dependency relate to aid to education and training? The unequal structural relationship which exists between Zambia and the donor countries cannot be explained in terms of aid to education and training alone. This relationship is a function of a whole set of different structural exchanges, political, economic, cultural etc. Aid therefore, acts as a facilitator, it seeks to secure and maintain the relationships in patterns that will support the interests of donors, both in the short and long term perspective. Britain's cultural diplomacy objectives are about the achievement for Britain of favourable international relations in the world. It is doubtful whether in this initiative Britain seeks to create long term dependent partners. If the experiences in the Commonwealth countries relationship can serve to explain this point, it has been observed that, while Britain values the strong relations with the Commonwealth community, it is prepared to diversify

its overseas bilateral relations. Thus in recent years more students have come from Francophone countries to study in Britain. Ten years ago it was the turn of students from some Latin American countries. Cost-benefit considerations appear to be uppermost in contracting aid relations rather than the mere need by a donor to have a country as its dependency.

6.7 British Overseas Student Policy

After the introduction of the full cost fees had removed the indiscriminate subsidy for all overseas students, we introduced measures to bring students to Britain on a selective basis, notably the FCO scholarships and Awards Scheme (FCOSAS) aimed at increasing British influence by training in Britain future leaders and decision makers from overseas. We devote substantial resources to this scheme and other FCO support for Overseas Students. These programmes, together with other government scholarship schemes, currently support some 20,000 overseas students at a cost of about £100 million.²⁹

The declarations in these statements are explicit about the current British policy on overseas students. The duality of purpose which Britain is pursuing through its aid to education and training, and the extent of involvement by the FCO in development aid, are all evident here, thus underlining the relationship between the British foreign policy and aid policy objectives. In this context the overseas students are viewed as assets for British foreign policy, for cultural diplomacy, and for commercial objectives. This is also reflected in the wide interest which the overseas student policy question has attracted

from interest groups such as the Confederation of British (CBI), and the Overseas Student Trust (OST). Among the NGOs concerned with overseas student policy affairs in Britain the OST occupies a special position.

The role of the OST in lobbying for a better and more coherent overseas student policy exemplifies yet another case of a government-NGO relationship. For many years the OST has promoted active debate on the British Overseas Student policy issues. Its forum and regular studies on the subject enables the government to incorporate some of the viewpoints in the policy and decision-making process. For example, the OST was responsible for organising the debate by experts on the overseas student policy question in the early 1980s. Following this lobby the government adopted some of their recommendations in the subsequent scholarship and award schemes for overseas students introduced in the mid 1980s.³⁰

6.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter has drawn attention to the institutional relationship between a donor government's foreign policy organs and their aid agencies. The discussion has focused mainly on the institutional framework and the functional relationship between foreign and aid policies. Throughout the discussion illustrations of the points have been drawn mainly from the experiences of Britain. The relationship between the official aid agency, ODA and the non-governmental organisations has been examined in the context of policy and functional links. Similarly, cultural diplomacy and the overseas student policy have been examined to identify the position of NGOs and the government at policy level. The issues of dependence and dependency have been discussed as extensions of the cultural diplomacy debate. The objective of the discussion in this chapter was not to seek generalisable findings, but to draw attention to the specific nature of foreign and aid policy links.

It has been shown that the nature of today's international affairs has made its conduct complex and highly demanding. This has necessarily called for elaborate and extensive institutional arrangements to manage a donor country's international affairs. Aid agencies have formed essential support units in the conduct and management of bilateral affairs.

In the case of the ODA it is an internal department in the Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Office. This is hardly surprising, and many donor agencies have similar institutional structures.

The relationship between the FCO and the NGOs concerned with development aid has been found to be quite discreet. Although the FCO does not exercise direct control over them, the ODA makes regular contributions to the NGOs' budgets. Most governing councils of NGOs have on their membership retired and active senior government officers and other public figures. These perform the following functions: they maintain a lobby in the government and private circles on behalf of the NGOs, they give counsel to NGOs, through them they NGOs are able to generate public goodwill in Britain, they help to strengthen pluralism and collaborative work between ODA and the NGOs. More importantly the representation provides a discreet screening mechanism on the policies and activities of the NGOs, it is a quality control mechanism and protection device for both donors and recipients. In this way the NGOs have earned themselves a place in the management of some aspects of Britain's international affairs abroad.

The discussion on the historical and current perspectives has served to explain further the relationship between foreign policy objectives and aid initiatives. The ELBS in

particular has shown how Britain was able to attempt to achieve many objectives in one scheme. The relationship between the government and private industry was very evident. Thus the ELBS was a two pronged instrument, a foreign policy tool and a commercial venture.

Another context in which the links can be examined is within the cultural diplomacy movement. It is a movement whose objectives demand that the FCO, ODA and NGOs should work towards enhancing Britain's cultural diplomacy objectives. The objectives are a blend of a political, commercial economic, and cultural nature. Through increased aid investment in education and other areas the FCO and ODA expect to achieve better cultural diplomacy benefits. The movement is yet another example of the existence of the close links between foreign and aid policy objectives.

Britain's international social relations objectives as contained in the Kershaw Report (1988) place a very heavy responsibility on social vehicles of cultural diplomacy. In this task none is more suited and in a better position to help Britain secure many enduring results than the medium of education and training. This has direct implications for Britain's aid programmes to education and training for overseas countries. Effects of this movement on specific countries would depend on how each country is economically and politically assessed in relation to Britain's immediate interests/priorities and long term goals.

Dependence and dependency have been discussed in the section on cultural diplomacy because the functioning of this movement is expected to rely heavily on aid investments. Correspondingly, aid giving has been criticised for its tendency to induce both dependence and dependency among the recipient countries. It has been argued that dependence, contrary to most of the ideas held in the current debate, cuts both ways. That is, donors give aid because they too are dependent on the benefits which it yields. However, in the current debate the tendency has been to project dependence as a phenomenon occurring only in recipient countries.

While accepting that aid plays a facilitative role in seeking to maintain structural relationships that are more favourable to Britain, doubts have been raised regarding Britain's intentions to enter into enduring dependency relationships with recipient countries. The experience of Britain in Africa has shown that Britain would like to diversify its bilateral relations, especially in the Francophone countries. The approach appears to be one of weighing carefully the costs and benefits. This has been demonstrated in the choice of recipient countries by Britain.

The overseas student policy has been discussed to exemplify yet another special link between government organs and interest groups. The OST has been highlighted to show how an interest group is able to provide a platform at which policy issues are debated, and policy ideas generated. These form important inputs into the policy-making process of the ODA.

The links between foreign and aid policies are evident. They exist in different institutional forms and operate at different levels through a variety of mechanisms. For the recipients the policy links and the pluralism in aid delivery presents a complicated package. The findings raises questions about aid coordination in the field. Secondly, if the NGOs have such close policy and administrative links with the Official donor agencies does it make sense for them to operate independently? Doesn't this approach create an unnecessary difficult situation for recipients' attempt to coordinate aid? Wouldn't it be more administratively practical if the donors' aid came packaged together?

The next chapter examines British aid policies and priorities to education and training globally.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

BRITISH AID POLICIES AND PRIORITIES TO EDUCATION AND TRAINING, 1965-1989

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines trends and changes in the policies and priorities of British aid to education and training over the last twenty-four years. Special attention is given to the new sensitivity of British aid to the changing needs of the recipients' education and training development process. An attempt will also be made to determine the extent to which British aid has been responding to its own internal signals within the diverse British aid constituency. The chapter therefore starts with a close examination of Britain's policies and priorities to education and training in its global context.

Aid policies and priorities function as mirrors through which inner aspects and dimensions of donors' motivations, philosophies, and practices can be closely studied. There is strong agreement among donors that their aid policies to education and training are influenced by a battery of factors, including donor countries' own politics and ideologies, the advice of their education specialists and consultants, the experience gained from the field and recipients' policies and advice.¹ British aid like other

donors' aid, has been motivated and influenced by several factors.² Although the emergence of the policies which appeared between 1970 and 1980 coincided with a period of economic decline in most of the recipient countries, it cannot be argued that the policies were primarily intended to respond to the changes that had prevailed in the recipients' development circumstances. Besides international economic factors, it was the internal factors in Britain which acted as a driving force in policy change and renewal.

The following factors have in particular influenced British development aid policies: internal reflections on national aid performance, domestic pressures on aid arising from a diversified donor constituency, public interest in development aid, and also the need to rationalise aid-giving in order to achieve more selectivity and cost-effectiveness. The pressures which these factors have exerted have tended to vary from time to time. However, they have affected many aspects of aid policies, in particular budgetary allocations, choice of sector and subsector concentration, and the form of assistance which Britain is able to extend to recipients. Thus there are different levels at which British aid can be studied.

7.2 Aid Policies and Priorities

7.2.1 Manpower Aid to Education and Training

The 1965 White Paper on development assistance identified the shortage of professional and technical manpower as the most serious handicap which faced newly independent states.³ The paper took note of the enormous expansion programmes in education and training systems which many developing countries had embarked on. These circumstances compelled Britain to give the greatest attention to the need to develop manpower in developing countries. The paper pledged:

In our aid programme we shall give the highest priority to technical assistance, which is not only in itself a vital contribution to all forms of development, but is often a pre-condition of a successful programme of financial aid.⁴

The practical application of this statement saw a massive mobilisation of manpower aid for the education and training sector in the form of teachers, lecturers and other related staff. Thus in the 1960s British aid concentrated on the following:

1. The supply of large numbers of teachers to secondary schools and lecturers to tertiary institutions.
2. Assistance to the development of universities.
3. Large scale training programmes in the U.K. for students from the recipient countries.

Of all British technical assistance programmes, aid to education and training has perhaps gained more prominence worldwide than any other form of assistance. This aspect forms one of the pillars of British aid and one in which the British government places high intrinsic value⁵. The first category of technical assistance was organised under two schemes, the Overseas Supplementation Aid Scheme (OSAS) for secondary school teachers and the British Expatriate Supplementation Scheme (BESS) for lecturers in colleges and universities. The Ministry for Overseas Development (ODM) supplemented the salaries and allowances of staff in these schemes. ODM had however mounted this assistance with a clear understanding that the schemes were to be progressively reduced as recipient countries increased the stocks of trained local manpower. These schemes have provided invaluable assistance, but they have involved costs to the recipients, notably in the form of local salaries and subsidised housing.

The importance which the British Government attached to education and training development is reflected in the following indicators. Of the 11,712 HMG financed personnel recruited in 1965 to work overseas in dependent and independent territories, 22.8 per cent were destined for the education sector. This was the second largest group after the category which went into Public Administration (23.9%). Given that manpower aid to other sectors included also some training components in areas such as police work, agriculture,

fisheries, public works, health etc., the total number of HMG personnel committed to education and training development was much higher than the 22.8 per cent shown here. As argued elsewhere in this study, this level of involvement reflected the inadequate social development structure the British had left behind in their former colonies. Teachers represented 86.4 per cent of personnel recruitment under the OSAS programme, a further indication of high involvement in the sector. British volunteer personnel showed a similar pattern of distribution. Of the 1,335 volunteers working abroad in 1965, 69.3 per cent were classified as teachers.⁶

Although the number of personnel recruited for the education sector kept fluctuating in the period between 1965 and 1969, by 1970 the number of HMG personnel recruited for the sector had risen to 33.1 per cent of the 13,991 people recruited for all sectors, and by December 1970 the total number for education was 35.8 per cent, the largest single group out of 13,751 personnel in all sectors. This was the apex of the OSAS and BESS programmes and was fairly consistent with the growth and expansion programme that had been taking place in many recipient countries, especially in Africa. However, soon after 1970 ODM took a decision to scale down the recruitment of British teachers for overseas service. It has been said that ODM took this decision in order to allow recipient countries to accelerate their teacher training programmes.⁷ However, there was more to the decision than

British interest in enhancing the localisation programmes. The operation of the OSAS and BESS programmes had not been without problems. They had become progressively more expensive for Britain, and some recipient countries had run into difficulties regarding their own contribution to the programme. However, the scaling down of OSAS and BESS has left large gaps in educational support which cannot easily be filled particularly in scarcity subject areas.

Around 1975, closely following the first 'oil shock' and the rise in oil import prices, manpower assistance showed a marked change in favour of the renewable natural resources sector. In Africa, 38.8 per cent of the total of 361 HMG wholly financed personnel were in this sector, education accounted for 23.5 per cent. Other categories of personnel, the partly financed and the volunteers, in other geographical regions showed similar trends.

The position of education against other sectors has not improved in recent years. As late as 1984, the renewable resources sector received 15.4 per cent, the highest share of Britain's £373.9 million bilateral project aid expenditure, while education received 0.6 per cent. This trend continued through 1986 with renewable resources and industrially related sectors receiving more resources. By 1987 the education sector had only managed to improve its previous position to 2.3 per cent of the £219.8 million project aid budget.⁸

7.2.2 Overseas Student Catchment Area

Britain's catchment area for its overseas students/trainees has remained largely unchanged. Students/trainees from the Commonwealth constituency of Africa and Asia still dominate the student numbers in Britain. This reflects Britain's special relationship with the Commonwealth countries. However, each individual recipient country has experienced variations in its share of UK education and training places. As technical assistance in the form of education and training opportunities takes up a very large share of British aid money to the education and training sector, the number of trainees/students from each recipient country should be of particular interest in measuring, though crudely, Britain's relationship with recipients.

For all the Commonwealth African countries, except Tanzania, the number of students/trainees going to Britain showed a consistent upward increase between 1965-1984.

Table 14 shows the distribution and number of HMG financed African studies in the U.K.

Table 14

AFRICAN STUDENTS AND TRAINEES IN BRITAIN FINANCED FROM
ODM/ODA AID FUNDS IN SELECTED YEARS 1965-1987

<u>COMMONWEALTH</u>	<u>Year</u>							<u>NON-COMMONWEALTH</u>					
	<u>65</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>Country</u>		<u>65</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>84</u>
Botswana	11	28	67	132	204	196	Algeria	1	54	168	12	54	14
Gambia	40	59	71	110	89	58	Libya	3	8	1	-	1	-
Ghana	96	277	236	295	290	106	Morocco	2	9	12	24	24	24
Nigeria	362	499	299	515	824	275	Tunisia	-	51	28	34	32	19
Kenya	162	221	234	526	969	416	Egypt	23	99	197	295	249	50
S/Leone	73	180	117	140	154	92	Cameroon	67	125	49	66	67	125
Tanzania	168	64	242	757	349	216	Guinea	1	-	-	-	16	9
Uganda	159	269	24	198	330	187	Iv.Coast	6	10	18	35	29	6
Malawi	37	149	185	308	466	393	Liberia	10	3	16	16	60	16
Lesotho	50	22	75	88	134	90	Mali	15	-	11	12	16	11
Mauritius	25	143	107	73	111	53	Senegal	-	2	10	25	35	12
Zambia	45	92	130	353	596	323	Togo	2	-	8	16	18	12
Zimbabwe	29	125	1047	2635	452	140	Ethiopia	32	43	73	174	18	100
Swaziland	19	34	46	100	184	105	CAR	-	4	1	-	8	2
							Congo	2	8	12	5	8	6
							Burkina F.	-	5	14	11	20	7
							Zaire	-	-	8	27	33	23

Burundi	-	-	-	1	7	10	-
Rwanda	-	-	13	-	-	3	3
Mozambique	-	-	-	-	-	24	82
Madagascar	4	10	13	9	15	7	7
Angola	-	-	-	-	-	-	12
Benin	-	-	5	17	17	13	13
Niger	1	-	4	5	16	9	9
Somalia	7	34	33	56	65	48	48
Mauritania	-	-	1	3	13	9	9
Chad	1	-	6	9	21	6	6
Sudan	128	309	276	273	290	119	119
Gabon	-	3	-	-	2	-	-
Cape Verde	-	-	-	-	4	-	-
Djibouti	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Namibia	-	-	-	52	74	117	117
S. Africa	-	-	-	-	104	-	-
Guinea Bis	-	-	-	4	-	3	3
TOTAL	1276	2162	2880	6230	5152	2650	305 777 978 1187 1346 864

SOURCE: Compiled from ODM/ODA, British Aid Statistics, various years.

NOTE: For 1970 and 1975 only the highest figure between new arrivals and those on course at the end of December has been used.

The 61.9 per cent drop in Tanzanian students/trainees in Britain between 1965 and 1970 no doubt resulted from the bad Anglo-Tanzanian relationship over Tanzania's decision to discontinue paying pension benefits to former British civil servants who had served in Tanzania. Britain had suspended aid to Tanzania over this matter.⁹ However, the period between 1984 and 1987 has seen dramatic falls in student numbers from all African Commonwealth countries. The decrease across the board comes in the wake of a heavy emphasis on close selectivity in the recruitment of overseas students, and the projectisation approach.

The increases in recruitment and diversification of the composition of the overseas student body had been preceded by soul searching national studies on Britain's overseas student policy.¹⁰ The studies had raised a number of issues relating to Britain's recruitment, financing and management of overseas students.

British policy in the field of overseas students has, until now, been largely unfocussed The result was a large increase in numbers and a large increase in the cost to the British taxpayer with little relationship between the pattern of those large student numbers and Britain's own long-term priorities.¹¹

In his study of overseas student policy Williams (1982) drew attention to the categories of countries which Britain could consider to favour in technical assistance on broad

political grounds. Among these were the Lome Convention group of Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.

The figures in Table 14 reflect the fulfilment of ODA's objective to extend British assistance beyond the Commonwealth constituency. The increase in the number of non-Commonwealth students clearly represents a new policy on Britain's technical assistance constituency, particularly as it relates to education and training, and the long term objectives of British aid. The policy clearly has its roots in the recent overseas student policy politics, which drew the attention of the government to the need for Britain to diversify the political and economic constituency of its interests, and also to avoid relying heavily on the Commonwealth basket for the safety and security of its interests in the long term perspective.

The official worry that the 'profile' of Britain is under threat in some countries appears to have a relationship to the sudden increase in the number of students in those countries. It has already been considered as a way to redress the problem. For example, The British Council in 1986 raised the issue of Britain's position in Egypt in relation to its profile and the vulnerability of British interests posed by the declining size of the Egyptian Anglophile generation. Also the lead in cultural relations which was seen to be taken by France, Germany and Italy in Egypt had been particularly

worrying. To reverse this situation the Council urged the Government to provide more scholarships and prestigious arts events to raise Britain's profile.¹² The new policy seems also to be an appropriate response to the concerns of some British industrialists on matters concerning entry into new markets.

British contractors are seeking to challenge the French dominance in the Francophone countries in Africa as well as meeting the challenge of all international competition in other markets. To move into new markets is a risky and difficult process, which requires the laying of considerable amount of ground work in establishing connections.¹³

It is also evident from the figures in Table 14 that Britain has obtained modest shares of student markets in countries that had been undisputed market preserves for France and Belgium for a long time.

7.2.3 Education and Training Award Schemes

Behind the statistics of British financed overseas students in Britain are now a range of education and training award schemes. Until the 1980s Britain had been providing awards mainly under three bilateral schemes, ODM/ODA, British Council, and Industry Scholarship Schemes. In addition British technical assistance had been reaching recipients via multilateral channels, such as through the programmes of the World Bank, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP, WHO, UNESCO, CFTC, Colombo Plan and others. This has not only supplemented bilateral

assistance in Britain's programme countries, but also ensured that those countries which cannot benefit from Britain's bilateral aid provisions can do so indirectly through the assistance extended to them by multilateral agencies.

The awards given to developing countries were British responses mainly to external signals from recipient countries' demand for education and training awards. For many years the award schemes operated on a rolling scheme. Each year, all factors being favourable, developing countries could expect to receive their 'share' of education and training awards from the British government. The British wanted to help redress the skilled manpower deficits quickly in most of the former colonies. Because of the favourable economic conditions then, and also because of the residual British influence in many of these countries, Britain had taken a less critical approach in its technical assistance programmes. The design and programming of this aspect of technical assistance was, as Williams (1964) had described: 'a succession of ad hoc responses to events'.¹⁴ When the Conservative Party came to power in 1979 the government downgraded the Ministry for Overseas Development to an agency of the FCO, and subjected aid to a thorough scrutiny. Subsidisation of overseas students, education and training in particular came under severe attack. Consequently, a new policy to charge overseas students full economic fees came into effect in 1980.¹⁵ Surprisingly, Britain's decision to

introduce prohibitive fees came at a time when the crises in human resource development in many poor countries had been fully recognised by other major bilateral aid donors and multilateral agencies.¹⁶

The main reason given for the introduction of full cost fees was that the British Government wanted to remove the indiscriminate subsidy of fees for overseas students, and to introduce measures which could allow Britain to bring overseas students on a selective basis.¹⁷ This fees policy should also be viewed as part of a larger portfolio of changes which the Conservative Party have introduced in their aid programmes since they came to power in 1979. The changes have been characterised by both a reductionist and compensatory approach in the field of assistance to education and training. The overseas student policy was preceded by a £50m cut from the 1979/80 aid budget.¹⁸ The fees policy was intended to save the Treasury millions of pounds from the cuts in subsidies. Income to universities and colleges from privately sponsored students was likewise expected to increase as a result of the new policy. However, it was soon found that the difficulties which the fees policy would generate among recipient countries would in the short or long term have serious implications for British interests at home and abroad. Compensatory fees schemes were consequently worked out to help redress the difficulties which might arise from the fees policy.

The full-cost fee policy caused widespread protests from developing countries with close bilateral relations with Britain. Malaysia went as far as to boycott British trade as a protest. Local (U.K.) lobby groups on behalf of overseas students drew the attention of the government to the economic and political consequences the policy had imposed on Britain. Recognising the strong opinion of protest in many client countries and the need to get a more enlightened perspective on the matter, the Overseas Students Trust (OST) commissioned two important studies to examine wider issues relating to the new government stand on overseas students.

The Government's introduction of full-cost fees for overseas students from September 1980 has yielded substantial public expenditure savings of perhaps £150m per annum. But it has also damaged British interests in the diplomatic and commercial fields.¹⁹

The findings of the 1982 study (Williams) drew the government's attention to the whole range of political and economic issues concerning overseas students in Britain, and the short and long term implications for British interests. The study made proposals which focussed on the need for the government to mount a diversified award schemes. The study identified the following possible schemes:

1. Separate specialised functional schemes of awards directed to research, business and trade-related objectives, diplomatic and cultural objectives, and overseas development. Several departments to be responsible for policy in this field.

2. Research interests should continue to be catered for by the Overseas Research Students Award Scheme (ORSAS) on the DES vote. The scheme should operate more flexibly in terms of the value of awards offered, meeting full tuition fees for some candidates, and eligibility should be extended to research students in polytechnics.
3. Trade and Commercial interests should be promoted by a new scheme of Scholarships in areas of advanced engineering and technology on the Department of Trade and Industry vote, and the possibility of some collaboration by industry and commerce should be explored.
4. Diplomatic and cultural objectives should be pursued through an expanded programme of British Council awards, funded on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office information vote and not as part of overseas aid.
5. Overseas development needs should continue to be catered for by the Technical Cooperation Training Programme (TCTP) under the ODA. The programme should be expanded to provide additional help for the poorest countries and for those most dependent on British higher education facilities, and for programmes of post-secondary education development in the Commonwealth.
6. To make provision for individuals who would not be picked up under the government-to-government schemes, there should be a programme of general scholarship support through education institutions, operating their own guidelines as regards type of recipient and size of award. Universities and colleges would disburse these funds and 10 per cent of awards funds should be allocated to this programme.
7. Under the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan: Britain should support strengthening and expansion of the Plan and be ready to match any additional support from other Commonwealth countries. There should be special help through the Technical Cooperation Programme for the development of Commonwealth post-secondary education.²⁰

The study urged also that some of the awards should be put on a part funding basis so as to cover a large number of recipients.

The significance of the proposals of this study was in the design of the award schemes which emerged later. The proposals went far beyond suggesting relief measures to counteract the burden caused by the new fees policy. Critical features in the proposals were, the variety and sophistication of some of the proposed awards. The variety meant that in practice all able overseas students, in their own country or whilst they were in the UK, could have assistance extended to them on a government- to-government or on a one-to-government arrangement (FCO awards). The rationale was to enlarge the overseas student recruitment catchment areas by freeing some awards from bilateral formalities. The structure of the entire award schemes was therefore intended to allow the government to pursue some of its aid objectives and priorities in ways that were not constrained by external actors.

Indeed, although this particular study was commissioned by and done for a non-governmental organisation, it is very interesting to note that soon after its publication the government introduced a range of award schemes that were identical to the proposals of the 1982 study. The award schemes were:

(a) The ODA Shared Scholarship Scheme (ODASSS):

This scheme was introduced on 3 June 1985. The Scholarships are jointly funded by the ODA and some Universities and polytechnics. A total of 500 awards are to be given between 1986-1991. The target group are students of high academic potential from developing Commonwealth countries who must show that they cannot support their studies or be covered by the government bilateral schemes. The awards are for both post graduate and undergraduate studies. Channels of application are Universities in the UK or British High Commission offices abroad.

(b) FCO Scholarships and Awards Scheme (FCOSAS).

This was introduced in February 1983. The target group are present and future leaders, decision-makers and formers of opinion, including particularly able students from countries with whom the UK's economic relations are expected to develop. The scheme provides about 600 awards annually for a wide variety of countries. Awards are for unrestricted study at undergraduate, postgraduate and research levels. Candidates are selected by British Embassies in consultation with British Council officers, or the FCO in London.

(c) Country/Territory Support Scheme.

In addition to the FCO scholarships the Government in 1983 also introduced country support schemes. These are intended to reflect the special relationship in the education field Britain enjoys with certain countries e.g. Hong Kong, Malaysia, Cyprus and certain dependent territories. Hong Kong is a special economic dependent British territory. Malaysia has been an important trade partner of Britain for a long time, it is also one of the fast up-coming newly industrialised countries with considerable British investments. The scheme caters for full time studies. On completion of their studies graduates of this scheme must return to their home countries. The channels of application are the recipient's own education authorities and academic institutions.

(d) British Council's Fellowship Programme

The scheme started in April 1985 and replaced the long standing Scholarship Programme. The target group are people in key professions. The subsidiary schemes are the senior Fellowships and the exchange programme with Eastern Europe, China and the Soviet Union which operate under bilateral cultural agreements. The programme provides about 500 awards annually. There is no restriction on subjects of study. The scheme can cover different ranges of programmes from short two months attachments to three year postgraduate research programmes. The British Council is responsible for publicising the awards and selecting candidates.²¹

From the above schemes it will be observed that the objectives behind them cut across the following important areas: the political, economic/developmental and educational categories. The schemes have helped to crystallise the conception and projectisation of British overseas students support. This fragmentation of the overseas students into units related to British interests has been criticised for its shortcomings and apparent contradictions.²² At another level the schemes show Britain's efforts to address its international political and economic relations from all fronts. Investment into poor bright students from the Third World is particularly instructive. In it Britain recognises the political culture of most developing countries where leadership is not usually the monopoly of one class, clan, tribe or family. Britain is therefore engaged in the politics of anticipation and alternatives. The FCOSAS in particular appears to be intended to influence domestic politics in the recipient countries. In the absence of official opposition party frameworks and the intolerance of dissent in many recipient countries, this appears to be one way of attempting to influence events abroad.

These schemes together with the other old bilateral award schemes have brought Britain in line with the policies and practices of other donor countries, which for a long time have maintained dual arrangements in award schemes: official bilateral government-to-government and private one-to-

government arrangements. France has for a long time operated special scholarship awards for earmarked developing countries especially those that are important French markets.²³ With the emergence of sharp competition for effective spheres of influence and maintenance of reliable supply sources for certain raw materials from the Third World, these schemes are going to increase worldwide as the scramble for the minds of Third World students intensifies among donors.

To the recipients the range of British award schemes provides what seems to be a multi-access entry into the British education and training programmes. The new structure offers great hope to many qualified overseas students who are in countries where selection of candidates for scholarships is less objective than it should be and also where some social groups are simply denied access to this aspect of social development and mobility. On this count the intentions of the schemes appear to have considerable merit.

Although the number of awards under the new schemes is small, the schemes raise a number of issues and questions. The mark of British political and commercial motivations rather than recipients' development considerations are all too evident in the profiles of these additional schemes. It is contrary to the principles of honest partnership in development cooperation that Britain should pursue schemes which are deliberately designed to operate outside the

recipients' own national development institutions and development programmes such as manpower development frameworks. That the schemes, especially the FCO scheme, aim at recruiting policy-makers and opinion formers will only help exacerbate the existing donor competition for strategic influence in recipients' key policy institutions.

For Britain the schemes reflect the feeling of dangerously lagging behind in areas that are critical to British interests. Thus, the British Council recently drew attention to these shortcomings in British approaches in this area.

Indonesia is heavily dependent on overseas training. In 1984, according to the Ministry of Education, 350 Indonesians were studying in Britain but 4,000 each in France and Germany and considerably more in the U.S.A. The Ministry of Technology, with funds to train 1,500 staff overseas, did not initially include Britain among the countries to supply such training. The British Council managed to reverse this decision but has made no progress in other sectors such as agriculture and telecommunications because of lack of staff and resources. M. Mitterand, on a recent visit to Indonesia, underlined the importance which France attached to attracting university students and offered more scholarships.

The Council views the situation with concern as the British share of the expanding training market (and hence related trade) is largely dependent upon its efforts. Penetration of this market requires a long-term strategy. ²⁴

Indeed concern regarding the position of Britain in overseas countries in relation to that of other donors appears to have been expressed with respect to many countries. In Ethiopia

recent concern centred around the massive annual Soviet scholarships and other Eastern bloc technical assistance programmes to which Britain could not respond more competitively. Similarly, in Jordan the share of the training market for Britain has shrunk to about two percent, whereas the USSR and its satellite states took a larger share of the market.²⁵ It is clear here and elsewhere that award schemes and the overseas students have been caught in a very intricate web of donors' politics and economics. Interestingly, in the 1981 comprehensive review of aspects of British technical assistance in many developing countries the team paid little attention to the recipients' development problems.²⁶ Recipients, as key actors in the equation, are seen from one perspective only, that is, as supply markets rather than grounds on which donors work with recipient partners to attempt to solve recipients' development problems.

Income derived from self-financing and overseas agency financed students has for a long time formed an important part of the financial structure of many tertiary educational and training institutions in Britain.

More recently it was revealed that the Egyptian government has been sending 500 PhD students every year at a cost of £10,000 each per annum.²⁷ It is the contribution of these overseas students to the economies of British Universities and

Polytechnics that were seriously threatened by the full cost fee policy of 1980. The various award schemes are on the one hand intended to ensure that self-financing students or those financed by their own governments are not completely deterred from coming to Britain for studies. The subject of overseas students is connected in a rather complicated way to the British policy on where their funded training programmes should take place. Thus 'in-country' and 'third country' training occupies a position in British aid which is discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

7.2.4 In-Country Training

An important element in many aspects of development aid is the need to help develop local institutional infrastructures to sustain the pace of social and economic growth. In the education and training sector this has meant providing capital aid to establish schools and higher institutions of training. In spite of recipient countries getting such institution-building assistance it has not been possible for them to meet all their training needs within the framework of their own resources. Consequently, overseas training has always been sought or provided to close the gap. On the other hand, In-Country training goes a long way towards meeting the objectives of development aid, and fostering self-reliance by providing training in the recipients' countries. It is also considered important because of the relevance of the programmes to the environment in which they are taught and

applied. Policy decisions concerning assistance to In-Country training are shaped by internal and external factors.²⁸

The key factors which have influenced donors' policy decisions on where their funded training should take place, and the balance they should maintain between donor-country and In-Country training are the availability of adequate training facilities, the relevance of training programmes offered by recipients as alternatives to overseas training, and the language of instruction. The internationalisation of the English language for example has limited the contribution which non-English speaking donors can make in providing training opportunities in their own countries. However, In-Country training has been affected by donors' political and economic interests as will be shown later in the discussion. Recipients too have not always been well disposed towards In-Country training.

7.2.5 Third Country Training

As far as many donors with strict training placement policies are concerned, Third Country training is not very different from own country training in that both involve the donor supporting institutions and training programmes outside their countries. Like In-Country training, it has often received qualified support from donors. The significance of Third Country training lies in its potential to enable both donors

and recipients to tap resources that would not otherwise be available to recipients, at costs that are sometimes more economical than donor-country training.

The position of donors on this subject tends to vary according to each donor country's economic, financial, ideological and political circumstances. Many donors have however adopted carefully open-ended policies which allows them to respond to all three possible training locations according to their set guidelines.

France for example had for a long time supported Third Country training. France funded training programmes in African countries in areas such as French language teaching for Ghanaian teachers in Togo and the training of Mauritian doctors in Senegal. This supplemented the opportunities offered to overseas students in France. West Germany recognises a few institutions outside its borders where it can fund training for overseas students. Nairobi University and Ibadan in Nigeria are among those that have been recognised, otherwise the general policy is that most of the scholarships should be used in West German institutions.²⁹ On the other hand the USSR and other Eastern European donors do not directly fund In-Country or Third Country training. All their technical assistance awards have in the past been taken up at their own countries' training institutions. The practical realities of their

economies have been such that they could not finance training programmes outside their countries using hard currency reserves. Besides the ideological imperative in training overseas students in their institutions, foreign students have in fact functioned as a source of foreign exchange for their economies.

Very little has changed in the basic policies and attitudes of donors towards In-Country and Third Country training. Donor funded training is still heavily unbalanced.

Britain has pursued policies which have always given qualified support to both In-Country and Third Country training. Since the 1960s the policies have passed through important phases of adjustment. These attempts to restructure the policies have been very instructive in revealing the contradictions in British approaches to overseas students and also the difficulties the government has had in dealing with the issues of In-Country and Third Country training in the broader context of its aid policy. In as far as Britain is concerned the issues of In-Country and Third Country training have all along been closely related to the government policy on overseas students and also the more recent debate on Britain's cultural diplomacy.

Of all the factors that have influenced ODA's policy on In-Country and Third Country training, none has been more

significant than the framework set by the Treasury within which assistance to In-Country and Third Country training should be conducted. Prior to 1976, when the ODM's Technical Assistance Training Department (TATD) announced ODM's decision to adopt a new policy on Third Country training, ODM had been operating under a very rigid set of Treasury criteria as notified to BC Representatives by the Director TATD in 1976:

British technical assistance funds are not available for financing the training of Study Fellows overseas, and developing countries are normally expected to make their own arrangements for financing training in Third Countries. But limited delegated authority exists for ODM to consider proposals for Third Country training at institutions overseas where HMG already has some financial interest or is providing expatriate staff provided the following conditions are satisfied:

- (a) There must be evidence that the training proposals cannot be provided either in Britain or in the requesting country; or that it can be provided more effectively or cheaply in the country proposed.
- (b) Neither the country for which training is provided nor that where it takes place can reasonably be expected to bear the costs, or that part of them which ODM wishes to finance.
- (c) No Third Country training can be financed in any of the DAC donor countries, ie. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, USA. (Condition C. is as set out by the Treasury; the intention is of course that all developed countries should be excluded).

There is an overall annual ceiling of £50,000 for all Third Country training except for the special schemes (e.g, University of the South Pacific, the Asia Institute of Technology, Bangkok etc).³⁰

The criteria set out above can only be described as very restrictive, prohibitive and protectionist. The application of these criteria meant that technical assistance awards could not be taken up in the recipients' countries. Because Britain has a well developed and large higher education and training system, it is able to offer extensive study programmes at various levels in a very wide range of fields. This alone made it difficult for ODM to justify the financing of Third Country training. As for recipient countries, the criteria unfairly challenged them in some measure to offer competitive alternatives to institutions and programmes in the U.K. The exclusion of DAC donor countries from receiving any British technical assistance for Third Country training was aimed at leaving Britain as the only open alternative among the western countries. Eastern bloc countries were completely non-existent as far as consideration for Third Country training was concerned. The Treasury's objective had been to limit the number of places outside Britain where British money could be spent. Table 15 shows the balance between UK and outside based training.

These restrictions are reflected in the number of awards that had been made by ODM/ODA for Third Country training between 1979-1983. The pattern was maintained throughout the 1983-1988 period.³¹

In 1976 ODM under the Labour Government made significant changes to the policy on Third Country training. Among the objectives of this move was an attempt to develop training facilities overseas so that future demand for training in Britain could be reduced.³² The reasons for this move were not made clear, but the move certainly marked the beginning of the government's critical attention to the overseas student question. It is also possible that the issues of immigration which in the early 1970s drew much public attention might have precipitated the need to review the policy on overseas students' training locations. ODM's interest centred on the need to identify suitable institutions in developing countries which could house Third Country training. A comprehensive exercise of consultation and discussion then followed over the proposals for the new third country training policy between the British Council's TATD and the overseas offices of the British Council and HM Embassies/High Commissions. This work also benefited greatly from two critical reviews of Third Country training commissioned by ODM.³³ It became possible under the new arrangements for Britain to finance Third Country training if suitable and willing institutions which could accept third country students could be found. On developing training facilities abroad, ODM decided that such opportunities could be pursued whenever possible. It was also decided that ODM could only support awards for In-Country training for developmental oriented programmes in developing

countries where financial difficulties to support such programmes were overwhelmingly evident.

The period between 1977 and 1980 saw further efforts by ODM to revive the old policy. In 1978 ODM stated that priority in using technical cooperation training funds would be accorded to placing ODM sponsored students in Britain, This was a clear indication that the ODM initiative had failed to get support.

ODM's policy adjustment initiatives were significant for their failure to produce a major shift in Government policy on Third Country training. The exercise had put the Government to a big test which revealed the existence of opposing viewpoints on this subject matter. U K based training still dominates the location of training programmes. The recent establishment of more focused and selective scholarship and award schemes, and the competition facing Britain for overseas students means that Britain is unlikely to change its policy soon. In 1981 ODA's review of its technical cooperation made this judgement on the matter:

Third Country training is not unduly popular among recipients nor do we know sufficient about the institutions in which it takes place. It is not easy to fit into political, commercial and industrial criteria.³⁴

The last statement above perhaps sums up the main reason for the lack of major support for both In Country and Third Country training. It is both insensitive and cynical. Moreover, in the Commonwealth community at least, Britain has been associated with the development of their higher education and training institutions in various ways, through technical assistance, capital aid, curriculum development and examinations. It is therefore cynical of ODA to claim ignorance. The statement was intended to provide a very strong basis for justifying a highly restrictive Third Country training policy.

On the other hand the attitude of many recipient countries' leaders towards Third Country training has not been helpful in the arguments for more Third World based training. The IDS survey of Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius and the Sudan in 1977 on attitudes to Third Country training produced findings that were as true then as are likely to be today.³⁵ As far as the national leaders were concerned, Third Country training was acceptable as long as it met the training demands of the sending countries. However, beneath this public support were also strongly condescending attitudes towards Third Country training. All four countries expressed serious reservations about the quality of education and training programmes and facilities in African institutions. Consequently, Sudan could consider it only as a short term measure. Ironically, these same countries boasted of having extra capacity in their

institutions which non-nationals could utilise. However, this is not always the case. The lack of extra capacity in many of the institutions in Southern Africa has made it difficult to place Namibian students in that region.³⁶ The survey found also that the fees in most of the potential Third Country locations were extremely prohibitive. At that time, for example, it was more expensive to train a non-Kenyan in Kenya than in Canada. A very strong 'pilgrimage' attitude exists also among officials in the recipient countries. Historical ties and educational links in particular between Britain and the former colonies have made it natural for them to look upon Britain as the most appropriate venue for training.

A recent (1984) British Council review of Third Country training shows that there have been no significant changes in the British position of Third Country training. Furthermore, ODA and the British Council have also in recent years complained of budgetary cuts which would make it difficult for them to cover Third Country training as well as British-based training.

The ODA review team in 1981 recommended that ODA should continue to finance such training only where it was appropriate. This was also extended to In-Country training. The recent movement to reassert the value of cultural diplomacy in Britain (see Chapter 2) has added yet another obstacle to any attempts to move towards more training outside Britain. Recent studies sponsored by ODA to establish the number of political, religious, educational, legal, military, diplomatic, and business elites in recipient countries who have been educated in Britain serve to illustrate the wide interests that favour U.K based training against other locations.³⁷

It is therefore evident from the preceding discussion that, both aspects of overseas training have been caught in the intricacies of the British political economy of aid. Because Britain views the training of overseas students in the perspective pointed out by the 1981 ODA team earlier, where UK financed training takes place is of considerable political and commercial/economic importance to Britain. Secondly, the educational and training infrastructure which Britain has built over the years to cover developing countries' needs offers very competitive ranges and qualities of course programmes. It is therefore technically very difficult for ODA to justify financing Third Country training, especially at advanced and postgraduate level, in rival industrialised

countries. The negative attitudes of recipients to these alternative training arrangements are most unfortunate, but they also help to expose not only the lack of confidence among recipients in their own or their neighbours' institutions but also show how education obtained from abroad has effectively succeeded in eroding that confidence. It is indeed a big unintended score for cultural diplomacy objectives.

There are a few institutions in Africa, Asia and Latin America which offer high quality and relevant training. The findings from a survey conducted by the Eastern and Southern African Universities Research Programme (ESAURP) Secretariat in 1982, revealed that most universities have a high degree of sufficiency with regard to academic staff requirements especially in the science faculties and the course programme coverage.³⁸ In a recent report to the Commonwealth Standing Committee on Student Mobility and Higher Education in 1989, Coombe made reference to the existence of a few centres of specialisation in the Commonwealth countries such as Malaysia, Nigeria, Singapore, and in the West Indies.³⁹ In any case, the United Nations University (UNU) is an institution which is committed to helping developing countries' institutions to upgrade their research capacities and capabilities. It therefore stands to support Third Country training where the programmes would meet its objectives.

In arguing for a more supportive approach to Third Country training the author is aware of some of the social, cultural,

and political obstacles to the promotion of Third Country training among the recipient countries.

Despite these odds Britain has continued to finance both training programmes in line with the provisions of the Treasury policy guidelines. Table 15 shows the present balance in the location of British funded training.

Table 15

U.K Government Supported Student/Trainee Fellowship
 Holders by Location of Training, 1983-1988

Person-Months (% in Brackets)

Location	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
U.K.	63251 (96.7)	69181 (95.6)	-	69509 (95.2)	79316 (94.1)	85149 (94.7)
Third Country	650 (1.0)	2810 (3.9)	-	2902 (4.0)	4197 (5.0)	4138 (4.6)
In-Country	1502 (2.3)	367 (0.5)	-	621 (0.8)	791 (0.0)	653 (0.7)
TOTAL	65403 (100.0)	72358 (100.0)	-	73032 (100.0)	84304 (100.0)	89940 (100.0)

Source: Hulme, D. (1989, 26).

Table 15 speaks for itself. Training awards are still very much tied to the U.K.⁴⁰ However, ODA finances many short-term in-service training programmes in recipient countries. There has been an interesting increase in Third Country training since 1984. There are also ODA funds for education seminars. Under this scheme recipients are encouraged to use these funds for local or regional short training purposes. Britain also makes regular contributions to some regional training institutions and multilateral agencies which fund Third Country training. The Association of African Universities (AAU) has in the past received financial support from the British government through the Inter-University Council (IUC). Among the multilateral agencies which receive financial contributions are, the World Bank, the African Development Bank (ADB), ILO, UNDP, UNICEF, Commonwealth Secretariat and UNESCO(until 1985).

In its assistance to education and training programmes Britain has also paid particular attention to the study areas for which aid is provided.

7.2.6 Subject Areas

Britain's initial approach to this aspect was open. Any subject which fell within the areas of social and economic development could expect to be considered favourably for assistance. But , Britain considered herself also as being

particularly qualified to give assistance in certain categories of subject areas, as the following list, from the 1984 document indicates.

1. Public Administration.
2. Teacher Training.
3. Technical Education.
4. Economic Management and Financial Planning.
5. Agriculture and Natural Resources.
6. Education and Training in Industrial Development.
7. Scientific Research.
8. Medical and Nursing Training.
9. Management Training ⁴¹.

The coverage of the study areas indicates clearly that the demands of development and economic growth in the newly independent states had a profound influence on the scope of study areas chosen by Britain. Taken separately each study area focused on specific needs. Training in public administration was clearly linked to the need to develop indigenous skilled public administrators who could take over from expatriate and residual colonial civil servants. The need to redress the deficit of local skilled manpower that colonialism had created had been compelling. Support to these areas continued for almost a decade and half. This support has continued in adapted and diversified forms.

In 1975 the Labour Government produced a White Paper to announce its new policy on development aid.⁴² The paper focused on the policies in the main sectors receiving external assistance. In the education and training sector ODA took note of the changes that had taken place in recipient countries and the need for donors to provide more relevant assistance. Thus within the framework of the new policy of giving more aid to the poorest, ODA adopted a new policy on aid to education and training. Priority and emphasis were placed on giving aid to aspects which could yield greater developmental effects. ODA identified the following areas as new targets of their assistance:

1. Development and reform of the curricula.
2. Development of local examination institutions.
3. Employment of diverse media in education.
4. Provision of books.
5. Provision of some teachers in some countries.
6. Diffusion and improvement of the teaching of the English Language.
7. Teaching of vernacular languages.
8. Education management and inspection of school systems.⁴³

The preceding subject areas were carefully chosen to correspond with and to relate to the context of new

educational problems in developing countries. Around the mid 1970s a number of African countries for example had either initiated a major educational reform or were in the process of preparing for one. Zambia conducted her reform exercise in 1975/76, Botswana in 1977, Lesotho in 1978, Togo in 1972. Other countries that undertook similar exercises were Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Malagasy. These attempts aimed at creating new educational systems with new philosophies and educational practices. Technical and vocational training for example drew a lot of attention in many of these reforms. The implications of this for the development of new curricula were very obvious. The need to mobilise resources also became evident. For many countries several aspects of their reforms could not be implemented without external assistance. Among other matters the reforms focused on the need to localise external examinations. Some countries wanted to cut off links with the Cambridge University Examination Syndicate. Also, because of the problem of educational provision and access to schooling the use of alternative strategies such as the media, were considered attractive by many countries.

ODA's new target areas could not have been more sensitive and relevant. The new areas carried a high potential to yield some commercial benefits to Britain as the reforms in many countries required governments to mobilise local and international resources.

The 1976 ODA guide document which followed the 1976 White Paper, served to elaborate on the points dealing with assistance to education. Mathematics, science, English, and technical and vocational training were singled out as developmental subjects which were earmarked for assistance. Education personnel from these categories, plus educational planners, specialists in examination techniques, curriculum reformers and teacher trainers were also identified for support.⁴⁴ In 1982, 1984 and 1986 ODA produced similar policy guideline documents which all reaffirmed the 1976 priority areas. The documents however went further to identify new areas which ODA was keen to assist. The additional areas were, English language teaching with specific emphasis on English for Special Purposes (ESP). This was to be linked to training assistance in industry, management, and agriculture. Other areas were distance education, experiment and innovation in non-formal education, curriculum development and reform, and educational materials production.⁴⁵

Over the last two decades assistance to English language teaching has commanded special attention from the ODA and the British Council. In 1986/87 the British Council had provided assistance to 63 countries in various aspects of ELT.⁴⁶ Countries that had the largest British Council ELT assistance programmes were Hong Kong, Greece, Ecuador, Iraq, Kuwait, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain and the United Arab Emirates. More emphasis is now being placed on ESP and

English for Non-Commonwealth countries. Both areas have great long-term significance for the political, cultural and commercial objectives of British aid. To non-English speaking developing countries, acquisition of English language skills is important for many purposes economic, cultural and diplomatic, including the establishment of communications with other donors.

ODA has also taken a keen interest in subject areas that appear to fall far outside the main framework of support. Education and training in mother tongues became one of such areas which drew the British Council's attention in the mid 1970s. For a long time the development of mother tongues had been left to the recipients. The issues involved were in some cases very complex and too sensitive to attract external aid. However, following several international conferences, especially the 6th Commonwealth Education Conference (1974), the Conference of Senior Officials of Ministries of Education in 25 Least Developed Countries, the IIEP Seminar on Education Planning and Rural Development, and the UNESCO Conference of Ministers of Education of African Member States it became apparent that many developing countries were intending to turn or return to the use of mother tongues in education, especially at primary school level. Recognising this development, and also its customary areas of specialisation, the British Council chose to offer assistance with curriculum development, research into the interactions between the subject-matter and the language

through which mother tongues were taught and learned, the development of improved educational methods and materials, and the training of nationals working in these areas.⁴⁷ The University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies was identified as an institution with expertise to assist developing countries in mother tongue education. Subsequently, the Treasury agreed to have ODA extend its assistance to overseas students studying mother tongue languages.

7.2.7 Book Aid

Another form of British assistance to education that has been in existence for a very long time is book aid. There are two types of book aid. The first category are the low priced books which are produced under the auspices of the English Language Books Society (ELBS) which groups more than 50 publishers. The scheme started in 1960 initially with the intention to counter competition from cheap Russian and Chinese books in the Indian sub-continent. Subsidisation by ODA of the production of these books enables recipient countries to purchase them at reduced prices. In 1986 the scheme had been operating in 87 countries, and the total sales since its inception in 1960 had exceeded £25 million by 1981. The second scheme is the Books Presentation Programme (BPP). The programme was established in 1971. Its objective is to assist recipients' institutions with donations of essential books and reference materials. The scheme is also intended to

help give support to other British capital or technical aid projects. The scheme is run by the British Council or HM Embassies/High Commissions.⁴⁸

Because of the economic difficulties facing many developing countries and their serious effect on the countries' financial ability to purchase goods from abroad or to produce educational materials, the two schemes appear to offer perfect stop-gap measures. This has caused recipients to give uncritical appreciation of the assistance extended to them through these two schemes. The severity of the educational books and equipment situation has left little room for many recipients to question critically the book aid schemes and their implications for local educational materials production. It is true that ODA now gives some assistance to recipients engaged in local materials production, but this must be seen within the entire context and wider objectives of British capital and technical aid to a country and its global performance in this field. Particularly because of their undeniable attractions from the point of view of giving genuine development-oriented assistance, the book schemes are a challenge to ODA.

7.2.8 Link Schemes

In the catalogue of British assistance the assistance given to recipient higher education institutions (Universities and Colleges) to enable them to twin with counterpart institutions

in Britain is not well publicised. The scheme carries with it a training and staff development programme for the recipients where this is needed. Other features include the exchange of academic staff between institutions. The scheme may also offer material assistance including capital works, equipment and books. The link schemes operate in specific frameworks which define the objectives being pursued and also the mechanics of working towards those objectives. Among other objectives which link arrangements offer are, joint supervision of postgraduate students, development of more effective examinations through the work of external examiners and gaining access by the recipients to more resources such as textbooks and periodicals. The entire link scheme is intended to work within the realm of institutional building.

However, where the institutions involved have drastically unequal resource backgrounds the gains from the schemes tend to be disproportionate. That is the kind of relationship many recipient countries' institutions have had with their counterparts in the U.K. The impact of the present economic crisis in many recipient countries' institutions has reduced their capacity to gain much from link arrangements. The problem of high staff turnover has meant that joint projects cannot be sustained for longer periods where this is necessary. Also, the general deterioration of operational resources has meant that researchers and other staff from Britain working in the schemes abroad cannot contribute their maximum effort.

7.3 Projectisation

According to ODA the project framework is a paradigm within which aid packages or projects with specific time-bound objectives should be developed.⁴⁹ The project framework is meant to cover all major bilateral assistance. In this approach an aid request should be presented in a project form with a precise outline of the input requirements, and the assignment of responsibilities between or among parties involved. Besides being a mechanism of tight control over aid work, the framework can allow a string of assisted projects to be properly served by aid. It would appear also that the project framework is guided by a search for complementarity in aid work. For example, assistance to English language teaching or book presentation would as much as possible be given not for its own sake, but to support other wider ODA projects. This marks a big departure from the previous approach when some forms of aid, such as awards for training, were given in a much looser form. Training awards in particular had operated as an open-ended scheme in which some awardees came from sectors in which Britain had little or no other aid investment at all. The consequences of this approach had been that Britain incurred training costs which other major donors in those sectors could have met. It was believed that Britain denied herself also possible commercial/trade opportunities which a carefully and well targeted aid approach could bring.

The new policy is intended to overcome these shortcomings. The new policy introduces a closer scrutiny of recipients' aid requests. It also makes comprehensive negotiations over the projects inevitable, and therefore also longer. To benefit more from this approach recipients will need to negotiate more skillfully and will also need to demonstrate the ability to design better projects. Although it is too early to pass judgement on the performance of projectisation, recipients should expect to be asked more and more by ODA to come up with projects in which British capital and technical aid will be integrated and work to complement each other. The participation of British technical assistance personnel in the projects is likely to form an important feature. From this design a greater British impact on the aid scene is anticipated.

7.4 Theoretical Assumptions: A Discussion.

It is also important to review British aid and the principles and objectives behind it in the theoretical perspectives discussed in chapter two. The theoretical assumptions from the systems analysis, intervention, and influence models present an appropriate combination of explanatory frameworks within which the broader issues of British development aid can be discussed and analysed.

There are two levels at which Britain and its development aid can be analysed. First, at the level of how Britain perceives the international system politically as well as economically, and how Britain sees its position in this system. The two are closely integrated in that, the way Britain perceives the international system also shapes its responses to the signals from the system.

As an imperial power Britain's perception of the international system was one of a world context in which it had an important role to play and interests to protect. The empire then formed a sub-international system in which Britain was the main nation state actor. It was a subsystem with its own functional and complex relationships in political and economic affairs. As a nation state unit Britain's inputs into the empire were many and varied. It is these inputs, legal, economic, cultural and political which formed the basis of interaction and unequal interdependence. Nationalism and the independence movements in the colonies could, in the framework of systems analysis, be regarded as reactions to the colonial inputs in the empire system.

The decolonisation process was loosening the system to allow it to forge new political and economic links in the international system. However, Britain still believed that as a nation state with enough resources it has a contribution to make to the orderly development of societies in the world,⁵²

especially those in poorer countries. The motivation to help these poorer subsystem units is based upon this feeling 'the long term interests of the rich countries are inextricably bound up with the future of the Third World'⁵³ This is how some British politicians have viewed the international system and the interaction between Britain and other state units. Others have been more specific in pointing out, 'We, and the West in general have a clear political interest in the stability of Africa'⁵⁴ Here Britain feels it has substantial investment inputs and other connections to justify its interest in Africa's development. Britain's development aid should be viewed from these broader perspectives. The motivation to assist Third World Countries with aid has however not been without controversy. Some regard aid as intervention with interference or influence properties.⁵⁵

The view of some British politicians⁵⁶ on this subject are that aid which seeks to develop goodwill, acquiescence and dependence is not unreasonable, because other development factors are usually taken into account. Nevertheless, the question of balancing development objectives against others is always a tricky one. But, there is evidence which suggest that aid is sometimes intended to intervene and to influence the outcomes in favour of Britain or values to which Britain subscribes favourably. Aid investment into the cultural diplomacy programme is an influence attempt on target countries. The FCOSAS is another explicit example of training

aid intended to yield effective influence on other countries' future leaders. This kind of aid reveals how Britain's perceives its weakening position in the international system and the need to do something about it. What emerges here is an international system in which complex and simple relationships are taking place. Britain as a nation state actor in the main system recognises in its thinking and actions it exists in an international system in which other nation state units exist. Britain has made it clear that it perceives the maintenance of a stable international system as an important task. Thus Britain and other donors have attempted to justify their aid intervention in the Third World on this perception.

7.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion has attempted to build a profile of British aid to education and training as it has developed from the mid 1960s to the present time. The major finding is that Britain has made shifts in its aid policies to education and training over the last twenty-four years. The policy changes appear to have concentrated on two key areas: the target areas of assistance, and the administrative and operational procedures of conducting aid business. It is clear that in the policy changes which have taken place, Britain has been responding to a wide-ranging set of signals from three main sources: from Britain's own internal administrative, economic, and political constituency, from the aid policies and activities of other donors, and from the development environment of Britain's overseas aid constituency. These factors have tended to influence and to provide the framework for the scope and direction for British aid.

Although changes of government initially tended to affect mainly the organisation of British aid administration, since 1979 when the Conservatives came to power the impact on aid policies has been particularly marked. Nonetheless, British aid policies have had both enduring aspects and those that have yielded basically to changes over time and renewal initiatives.

British aid to education and training has been regulated by a series of policies and decisions which have appeared at intervals since the mid 1960s. Some have dealt with broad issues relating to the entire British aid programmes while others have focused on specific aid subjects such as the position of Britain on assistance to ELT, ESP, vernacular languages, Third Country training, book aid, technical education or universities, curriculum reform and development, localisation of examinations. In terms of major trends, British aid has moved from a somewhat open-ended process to a much more selective and tightly controlled approach in recent years.

In the 1960s ODM's aid focused on three main areas: on technical assistance for providing British teaching staff for secondary schools and universities, capital assistance for the development of universities in the former colonies, and the provision of large scale training programmes in the UK. Based on the principles of assisting in the fields where Britain has resources and expertise, recipients had to fit their aid requests according to these set categories. Most recipients' external aid needs fell precisely into these sets of categories. Over the last two decades technical assistance in manpower provision and staff training in the UK has formed the mainstay of British aid. On this account the policy had remained relatively closed. Aid requests that were outside these two areas could not easily be considered. However, it

was also possible for other aid requests to be considered if they were built around the main target areas. For example, the scope of subject/course training programmes in technical assistance was very large, and included many varieties of staff training programmes.

In 1975 the policy focus was widened to include new areas for assistance. The areas were: curriculum development, provision of books, diffusion and improvement of ELT, and education management and supervision. Assistance in all areas could be given through technical assistance. The policy therefore received alterations which amounted to little adjustments to take account of changes in recipients' needs. A little after 1975, ODA identified the following subjects for special assistance: mathematics, science and English language - especially English for Special Purposes (ESP) - and technical and vocational Training. These were designated as developmental subjects. Later, around 1977 a decision was taken to extend assistance to the improvement of the teaching of the local languages in the recipient countries. This provides very limited evidence that Britain has periodically made policy adjustments to respond to the wider needs of the recipients. This particular decision took a compassionate form and was more inward looking. Assistance was tied to training programmes tenable at designated British universities. However, these adjustments have not altered the main focus of British aid. Assistance to education and

training has all along been dominated by various aspects of technical assistance to the higher education sector.

Britain's policy on Third Country training has always been to give it qualified protectionist support. In principle Britain supports the idea of funding training programmes in recipient or Third Countries. However, HMG's Treasury has set criteria which few recipient or Third Countries can meet. The criteria are designed to prevent British funds being applied in other countries which are viewed as competitors against Britain in offering training programmes. Hence the protectionist criteria. This policy is however backed up by a very competitive education and training infrastructure which few industrialised countries can rival. In-Country and Third Country training are very sensitive issues to the inner objectives of British aid and any liberalisation of the present stand would severely weaken the cultural diplomacy and economic policy objectives of British technical assistance. The abortive 1976 initiative to liberalise the Third Country training policy confirms this point. In short, In-country and Third Country training are simply not compatible with the key principles and objectives of cultural diplomacy being pursued by Britain through assistance to education and training. Given also the very small number of overseas students who are HMG funded in the UK in any year (see Appendix III Table 7), it would not make sense for Britain to shift a substantial part of these training awards abroad.

Significant changes have taken place in ODA's policies since 1979. The coming to power of the Conservative Party in that year brought a succession of new policy initiatives.

In 1980 the government introduced full economic fees for all overseas students coming to study in Britain. Students from the EC countries were exempted. The consequences which followed were that the number of overseas students, especially those in the fee-paying category fell considerably in the year immediately following the introduction of the policy. Fearing the possible long term political and commercial damage which the policy would inflict on Britain, the government responded with yet another policy drive. The loss of foreign students was redressed by enlarging the catchment area for overseas students. Thus in addition to the traditional Commonwealth student markets Britain sought to get more foreign students from francophone and other non-Commonwealth countries. A set of diversified and projectised compensatory scholarship schemes tenable in the UK has run parallel to the student recruitment drive.

These policy actions show both moral contradictions, and also economic logic. Charging students from developing countries full economic fees while students from rich industrialised countries in the EC receive concessional treatment does not make any moral sense at all. However, the view that foreign

students have an economic value in Britain makes the policy on student fees a little easier to follow. The student fees policy, the decision to enlarge the student catchment area, and the new scholarship schemes underline the new policy position of the Conservative government on foreign students in development programmes. The government appear to perceive the overseas students in terms of short and long term economic and political value to Britain. In pursuing these objectives Britain wishes to compete against other donors more effectively. The approach to technical assistance is reflected in these pointers:

The Department of Trade and Industry have identified a list of countries which they see as especially strong candidates for aid to promote trade. They advance this list also for TC purposes, and particularly as examples of countries in which TC might be used to establish or re-establish opportunities and entries for British industry.⁵⁰

Current Ministerial policy is that concessional transfers (and TC is generally free) should be directed mainly to the poorest countries.... These countries have not the capacity to absorb aid eg. require help in education before their other needs can be approached. It is not to be assumed that because they are poor they do not answer to political, commercial and industrial criteria.⁵¹

The overall picture which emerges suggests that aid to education and training is given within a very broad and complex policy framework. The motivation behind external aid sees the transfer of resources to the recipients as performing functions that exceed the role of providing supplemental resources. Aid is perceived as apolitical and an economic inducement to be used to obtain favourable political and

commercial benefits from aid relationships. This aspect is especially evident in the case of British aid. This is the framework within which Britain and its client aid recipients have to attempt to solve development problems affecting developing countries.

In conclusion it must be said that the discussion in this chapter has shown that British aid to education and training exhibits both simple and complex characteristics. It has been shown that the scope and focus of British aid have been subjected to frequent adjustments to respond to the changing needs within its own constituency and that of the recipients. However, this adaptability must be seen in relation to the broader and specific aid objectives being pursued by Britain. It is clear that development is not the only objective being pursued in Britain's aid relationships, political advantage and commercial benefits for Britain are considered as legitimate objectives in British aid programmes. Given this background the notion that aid functions as a supplementary resource becomes an extremely inadequate explanation for what is a complex phenomenon.

Within the broad framework of its own objectives and criteria for giving assistance, aid to individual recipient countries varies and is kept under constant review by ODA. The diverse criteria for the selection of recipient countries are given in

the 1981 ODA report on technical cooperation. It gives explicit reasons why countries are aided. For some it is because they are poor but nevertheless may possess some distant commercial, political and industrial potential. Some rich countries are aided because they are considered to be 'take-off' countries with effective capacity to absorb aid resources. Trade potential in these countries is of particular importance, whereas others have received aid as a means of facilitating the entry or re-establishment of British businesses and industries in those countries. What this points to is a careful targeting of British aid. It also means that a broader analysis of aid to education and training as a constituent element in a coordinated aid policy would be illuminating.

The next chapter examines British aid to education and training to Zambia against the background given in this chapter.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

BRITISH AID TO EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN ZAMBIA, 1964-1989

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter sets out to analyse British aid to education and training in Zambia since 1964. The objective is to identify the forms of assistance given to Zambia, and also to examine the British aid policy framework within which aid to Zambia is given. In particular, the discussion will also assess the relevance of British aid to Zambia's education and training development needs and problems. From the analysis in this chapter it should be established whether Britain pursues global or country specific policies.

In the absence of access to ODA Country Policy Review (CPR) documents on Zambia it becomes very difficult to make an accurate and conclusive analysis of what Zambia's standing has been in British aid politics over the last two and half decades. Though valid in their own right, proxy measurements are likely to give only a general indicative assessment of a situation which has a great deal more to it. Thus, levels of aid given over time, the number of scholarships awarded to a country, the number of HMG financed personnel working in a country, do not reveal much about the inner political thinking and attitudes

which lie behind that assistance. Therefore, in order to attempt to assess the British aid relationship with Zambia it will be necessary to begin with an examination of Britain's broader economic and political relationship with Zambia.

In the period between 1965 and 1970 Britain had a strong economic/trade relationship with Zambia within the African Commonwealth group of countries. In 1968 the book value of British investment in Zambia was £25.6 million, the fifth in position in the African Commonwealth after Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, and Sierra Leone in that order.¹ Zambia had the highest rate of return on British assets in the same year. The rate was 14.5 per cent, that was 5.4 per cent higher than the rate of return for East Africa (9.1%), and 5.7 per cent higher than the rate for West African Commonwealth countries put together (8.8 %).² Up to 1970 Britain was Zambia's principal source of imports and had been also the main destination for Zambian exports (chiefly minerals) until Japan took the lead over Britain in 1970. Table 16 shows Britain's trade relationship with Zambia within the African Commonwealth group in 1971.

Table 16

British Trade with Commonwealth Africa, 1971 (£m)

<u>Country</u>	<u>British</u>	
	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>
Nigeria	139.476	164.980
Sierra Leone	26.910	12.672
Ghana	32.182	44.614
Gambia	4.564	2.707
Zambia	56.789	49.292
Kenya	30.062	65.540
Uganda	19.283	15.631
Tanzania	24.692	23.669
Malawi	12.910	8.575
Botswana	2.782	1.487
Lesotho	2	63
Mauritius	17.347	8.349
Swaziland	9.436	230
TOTAL	386.435	387.809

Source: Arnold, G. and Murray, R. (1973, 3).

It is evident from the table that Zambia was the second main source of British imports from Commonwealth Africa. It was also the third main destination for British exports to Commonwealth Africa.

It is also important to note that during this period a number of major British companies operating in Commonwealth Africa and elsewhere were represented in the Zambian economy through their subsidiaries. Among these were: Blackwood Hodge Limited (100 % share), British-American Tobacco Limited (B.A.T. 100 % share), Charter Consolidated Limited (through N.C.C.M. 49 % share)- the Zambian subsidiary produced 20 per cent of Charter's investment income then- Lonrho Limited (Lonrho Zambia, African Commercial, Heinrich's Syndicate, Industrial Credit, Mobile Motors, and National Breweries), Mitchell Cotts Group Limited (Fraser & Chalmers Zambia Limited), and Unilever Limited (Lever Brothers Zambia Limited).³ The diverse areas of operation which these companies represented are particularly instructive in understanding the role which the British companies played in the Zambian economy. Fraser and Chalmers for example was an important contractor in many heavy work operations of the Zambian mining industry.

Zambia's important economic/trade relationship with Britain was underlined by it being the main supplier of copper to

Britain in the 1960s. In reacting to the political row with Britain over the Rhodesian case after the UDI, Zambia had made indications that it could use its control over copper supplies to Britain to bring pressure to bear on Whitehall.⁴ The vulnerability of Britain over this matter was summed up in the words of the then British Prime Minister, Sir Harold Wilson:

Zambia was, in a real sense part of the third constituency. Britain was utterly dependent on her copper supplies. Had they been cut off, by the Rhodesians or by Zambia made sullen by our refusal to use force, we would have had two million unemployed within a matter of months.⁵

Thus Zambia had emerged as an economically strong trade partner with Britain in the African Commonwealth group. Zambia was then well able to support significant British economic and commercial interests. Bangura (1983) points out also that Zambia's large sterling holdings in Britain gave it additional leverage in its political relationship with Britain, especially over the Rhodesian case.⁶

The period between 1971 and 1979 can be regarded as a transition era during which time the Zambian economy faced progressive problems of adjustment and economic decline. It was not until the 1980s that the net effect of the economic decline took full effect. The Anglo-Zambian economic relationship however took a new turn at the beginning of the 1970s. Conscious of the need to diversify its export markets, and also influenced by

Britain's response to the UDI, Japan took the lead from Britain as the major destination for Zambian exports, mainly copper. As the effects of the economic decline grew stronger it became inevitable for some of the international companies to reduce or completely close down their operations in Zambia. Fraser and Chalmers of the Mitchell Cotts Group wound up, and Blackwood Hodge was sold to local businessmen. In short, the British presence in the Zambian economy has experienced a significant reduction since the 1970s. Consequently, while trade has continued between Britain and Zambia, Zambia's position has shifted further down in relation to Britain's trade with other African countries, especially in the Commonwealth Group. The copper leverage which Zambia previously exerted has long been undermined by scientific advances in copper substitutes and diversifying Britain's sources of supplies. There is abundant evidence to show that Zambia passed through the last two decades as an economically weak country. Aid partners of Zambia have had to contend with what this economic crisis has meant in terms of various aspects of the aid relationship.

Politically, the Anglo-Zambian relationship has been generally stable against a background of a number of international issues on which Britain and Zambia have taken different standpoints. The significance of these differences will be examined shortly. In broad terms it

is the colonial connection that has defined the Anglo-Zambian political relationship. The Commonwealth group is an extension of this same framework. However, each former colony has had a relationship with Britain which has been subjected to continuous reviews in the light of national and international events.

If Zambia has attracted any significant political attention from Britain in the last twenty five years it has been because of the following inter-related cases: the Rhodesian UDI problem, Zambia's support to the liberation wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia, and the problem of apartheid in South Africa. All cases have now been resolved except the South African problem. Zambia's large involvement in these problems as a base and sanctuary for freedom fighters and a peace and freedom broker, put it at the political centre stage of Southern African politics. Because of the logistical support Zambia has offered to the liberation movements, it has had a certain leverage over the activities of the guerrilla movements. This was a vital pressure point which western countries like Britain which favoured a more moderate approach to the resolution of the conflicts could use, not to stop the wars completely but to keep channels of negotiations open. The UDI case illustrated this point perhaps more strongly than others. The creation of the Frontline States in the Southern African region helped to emphasise an attempt to

approach regional conflicts from a common perspective, and in the process outlined the role each regional actor like Zambia was playing in the regional politics.⁷ In the face of the overwhelmingly radical marxist guerrilla network around Zambia's borders, it was critical that Zambia was not left feeling completely isolated by the Western powers. Zambia's role in the settlement of regional issues gave it a certain amount of political importance.

During the period 1945-85, the Western countries' view of Southern Africa as a strategic region for East-West power politics has had implications for how each member country in the region is perceived in the west, politically and strategically.⁸ Apart from the outright politics of East-West regional presence, Southern Africa has long been known to contain strategic non-fuel mineral deposits.⁹ Maull's (1987) framework for mineral risk assessment of Western countries' dependence on Southern African minerals indicates the level to which some western countries have been dependent on cobalt supplies from Zambia.¹⁰ Zambia and Zaire together share 71 per cent of the world's cobalt reserves (1985/86). Cobalt is listed among the serious risk minerals in the area. A very high dependence on this source is therefore clearly evident.

From the preceding discussion it is clear that though Zambia is in a serious state of economic crisis, it has

taken comfort in the knowledge that it possesses a mineral of critical importance to Western industrialised countries. Securing uninterrupted supplies is very important to those countries which need it. Both national and regional political stability become very important factors in this complex equation. Western aid to developing countries has often been given against all odds to ensure that political stability is maintained in countries or regions containing strategic interests. In conclusion, it is observed that the Anglo-Zambian political relationship has existed in a continuously shifting broad and complex, economic and political framework. The aid relationship has originated from this complex framework and functions as an important part of the framework. The aid relationship is constantly reviewed to ensure that redundant policies and measures are dropped in the face of new policy initiatives. British aid to education and training must be seen in this broad context.

8.2 Aid to Education and Training

Britain's aid response to Zambia's needs in the education and training sector have since 1965 concentrated in these areas.

1. Limited capital development aid
2. Manpower aid
3. Training
4. Books and libraries
5. Institutional link schemes
6. Vistorships to the UK

8.2.1 Capital Development Aid

The only major British capital aid to Zambian education took place during the First National Development Plan period. Britain provided aid to establish the University of Zambia's main library.¹¹ Similar, but smaller assistance was extended to the Zambia Library Service (ZLS) and the Education Broadcasting Services (EBS). Since the UNZA capital assistance there has been no comparable British capital assistance to the education and training sector.

That British capital development aid to Zambia's education and training sector was provided on a smaller scale at a time of Zambia's new development programme is not at all surprising. The British Treasury, while recognising that some newly independent former British colonies faced economic problems at independence, also pointed out that former colonies could not expect blanket financial assistance from Britain.¹² Aid was given according to the Treasury policy which applied to newly independent states. Under the policy terms the British Government made a financial settlement to an ex-colony at independence, the amount received reflecting the aid a territory would have received from Colonial Development and Welfare sources had it not become independent. The British Government was also aware that this form of assistance was not in all cases adequate to cover

development programmes. However, it noted that newly independent states had recourse to financial assistance from many multilateral and bilateral financial sources, including access to the private London financial market.¹³

At independence Zambia had inherited a strong economy. Between 1964 and 1969 the very high price of copper resulted in the economy averaging a 13 per cent annual growth rate in real terms.¹⁴ The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at market prices rose from K502 million in 1964 to K1,140 million in 1969.¹⁵ The value of the Kwacha against the UK pound was then around K2 = £1. In light of this Zambia must have appeared financially well off and therefore eligible only for limited assistance. True, Zambia had made its own plans for mobilising local as well as external resources to finance the capital development programme of the education and training sector. But, global observations have tended to show that Britain has generally chosen to commit limited capital development assistance in its aid to education and training. Britain's 'generosity' has appeared in other areas of assistance.

8.2.2 Manpower Aid

The expansion programme which took place in the tertiary and secondary school sector produced a demand for teachers

and lecturers which could not be met locally. In fact by 1970 only one in ten secondary school teachers was a Zambian. Consequently, reliance on recruitment of expatriate teachers became inevitable. During the FNDP the Zambian Government signed technical assistance agreements with several countries for recruiting contract teachers.

Britain's response to Zambia's manpower problem in the teaching profession took two forms. ODM provided inducement allowances to British teachers and lecturers to encourage them to go out to work in Zambia. It also provided training scholarships for Zambians to study in Britain. Manpower aid to this sector has always consisted of the following categories of personnel, the OSAS, BESS, and British Council fully-funded KELT Officers. To these groups must also be added volunteers from HMG funded voluntary organisations. The number of HMG funded British personnel going to work in the education and training sector in Zambia rose steadily from 546 in 1966 to 1,076 in 1970 when the OSAS programme reached its peak. In fact, after 1966 the number of British expatriate personnel in the education sector was much higher than in other sectors. Table 17 shows the number of ODM funded personnel in Zambia.

Table 17

**ODM funded British Personnel in Zambia by Sector
and Aid Schemes in Selected Years, 1966-1972.**

<u>Sector</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1972</u>
Education	546	942	1076	742
Dev' Planning	31	64	34	44
Public Admin	691	480	295	206
Social Services	63	43	25	10
Works/Communications	484	751	736	484
Mines/Industry/Comm	60	62	37	22
Agriculture	292	254	222	----
Health	221	363	395	93
Natural Resources	---	---	---	211
<u>Other</u>	<u>295</u>	<u>309</u>	<u>229</u>	<u>147</u>
All Schemes	2683	3268	3049	1941
OSAS %	85.5	99.6	99.7	99.5

Source: Compiled from, ODM, **British Aid Statistics**,
various years.

NOTES: 1. 1968 included 575 officers assisted under BACS.
2. All figures as at 31st December.

In 1969 Britain provided 60.1 per cent of the total number of secondary school teachers in Zambia. Table 18 shows Britain's share of the teaching force against other countries.

Table 18

**Number of Expatriate Secondary School Teachers
by Country of origin, 1969.**

<u>Country</u>	<u>Number</u>
Britain	900
Norway	27
Denmark	49
Russia	15
Other European Countries	13
Canada	63
USA	13
West Indies	12
Aden	7
Ceylon(Sri Lanka)	7
India	4
Pakistan	1
Australia	2
New Zealand	3
South Africa	143
Ethiopia	136
Tanzania	25
Kenya	21
Uganda	21
Nigeria	13
Rhodesia	13
Other African Countries	19
Total	1,497

Source: M/Educ, 1969 Conference Report.
Pp. 90-91.

British secondary school teachers formed the largest group in the OSAS programme. Very few British teachers were recruited to work in the primary school sector, as this area unlike others faced rapid Zambianisation due to the large pool of local teachers that already existed in the country and the crash programme that was mounted in 1966 to train teachers for this sector. A small number of BESS lecturers were recruited to teach at the University of Zambia and other tertiary institutions. Not all OSAS teachers offered competitive work experience. As one report noted:

Examination of a sample of 48 OSAS teachers serving in government schools in September, 1968 showed that 13 had a total of less than two years experience, and 25 less than four years. Of 12 wives of OSAS staff teaching in government schools, 8 had less than four years total teaching experience.¹⁶

This finding gives some insight into the recruitment of British teachers for Zambia. It is evident from this finding and also from ODA statistics that a large number of OSAS teachers went to work in Zambia at the beginning of their teaching careers. It follows from this also that ODM/GRZ failed to recruit long experienced settled teachers, due perhaps to perceived risk factors. Zambia faced also some competition from Britain's internal teacher's employment market, and from other newly independent countries within the Commonwealth.

There is no doubt at all that all categories of OSAS teachers have played a very important role in Zambia's education and training development. Expatriate teachers took with them to Zambia diversified rich experiences. And it is true that many of them worked in less attractive locations and conditions.

Britain's technical assistance to Zambia during the Second National Development Plan continued to be mainly in the area of manpower supply. However, around 1975 ODM made a decision to scale down manpower aid to education and training. This decision had come against a background of new policy guidelines from ODM on British aid to education in developing countries.¹⁷ The thinking in ODM on aid to education had taken a new turn in 1972. Not only had ODM taken note of the quick changing development scenario in most developing countries, it took steps to identify what it believed were appropriate aid responses. Among other things the new thinking in ODM's policy emphasised greater freedom and discrimination in making judgements about who and what to assist. On human resource assistance ODM felt that many countries no longer needed to recruit British teachers in large numbers.¹⁸

In the case of Zambia it has been pointed out that the decision to scale down manpower aid to secondary schools in particular was based in anticipation the belief that

the Zambianisation programme had made enough progress to take care of new manpower needs in the sector.¹⁹ Furthermore, there was also a strong feeling within ODM that the time had come for Zambia to embark on a serious long term staff development programme, especially at the University level.

Possibly, there were other reasons for reducing the OSAS personnel in Zambia. Zambia's economic difficulties had by the mid 1970s confirmed its down turn course. The Zambia Government had continuously found it difficult to remit expatriate gratuity payments to overseas banks on time. Many expatriates had to wait for more than a year to get their money. Other conditions of service, such as accommodation and transportation facilities etc could not be met by Zambia without much difficulty. This had caused ODM great concern. Therefore reducing the OSAS staff was a logical step to ensure that ODM's involvement in problems arising from the GRZ teacher's contracts were kept to a minimum. There is also no doubt that the OSAS and BESS programmes had become progressively very expensive for ODM.

The decision to start reducing supplemented teaching staff came at a time when local teacher training institutions for secondary school teachers had barely got firmly established. Nkrumah Teachers College opened in 1967, and

its first graduates came out in 1969. The University's first small batch of teachers came out in 1970. One could hardly have considered the output of local teachers strong enough to justify the early decision to reduce supplemented personnel. Zambia's recourse to the recruitment of large numbers of expatriate teachers from the Indian sub-continent and from the Republic of Ireland was confirmation of the fact that the Zambianisation programme was nowhere near meeting adequately the manpower needs in schools. There was also another side to the decision. The exercise to reduce supplemented staff in secondary schools gave way to Zambia recruiting many non-standard English speaking teachers for Zambian schools. This was quite contrary to ODM's broad objective of improving the English language standard in recipient countries. Even more intriguing was the decision later to include English language among the subjects which were earmarked for cutbacks.

In the last decade recruitment of HMG supplemented teaching staff for secondary schools, colleges and the two universities has continued, but under very careful and constant scrutiny in the run down exercise.

Table 19 shows the progressive running down of the OSAS group.

Table 19
OSAS Personnel in the Education
Sector by Subsector, 1980-1983

<u>SECTOR</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
Secondary	250	245	178	135
Teacher Training	15	16	16	12
DTEVT	49	55	50	45
<u>Support Services</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>10</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>324</u>	<u>329</u>	<u>256</u>	<u>202</u>

Source: MGEC (1985) Unpublished Inspectorate Reports.

It is clear from Table 19 that the real effect of running down the OSAS programme in the secondary school sector began to be felt. It would also appear that other than the secondary school sector other sectors retained more or less a constant level of strength of OSAS staff.

It is quite evident that supplementation support has been concentrated in a few subject areas. Notice also the variations in the scaling down exercise between subject areas. Subjects such as Geography, Mathematics and English experienced large cuts whereas others have remained with relatively the same strength of OSAS teachers.

Since 1980 the ODA/GRZ joint manpower reviews for the education and training sector have revealed the following on ODA's manpower aid. The decision made earlier in the 1970s to run down the OSAS and BESS programmes has been upheld. It is still being implemented with some adjustments being made to accommodate special cases. Some allowance has been given for compensation and shifting of resources between sectors to reduce any undue imbalances or deficits in staffing due to the cutbacks.²⁰ However, this is all kept within the ceilings given for supplementation. Also, MGEC, DTEVT and MHE and its institutions have been encouraged to identify priorities in their manpower needs to assist ODA's run down and redesignation exercise. In addition, ODA agreed to increase Zambia's UK training awards in 1981/82 to help accelerate the Zambianisation of the supplemented posts. In this regard ODA increased the awards by 30.0 per cent, from £1.05 million to £1.35 million.²¹

The reaction from the OSAS and BESS personnel to ODA's run down exercise has not at all been welcomed by the majority of teachers. Many of them had been working in Zambia for a long time and would have liked to continue serving in Zambia. However, under the present economic circumstances in Zambia they can only do so under the favourable protection of a supplementation scheme. There is evidence to show since the run down exercise began that each ODA/GRZ manpower review has turned into a forum in which pleas to retain many OSAS teachers have been made.²²

In the last few years, supplementation in both secondary schools and tertiary institutions has shifted to cover projects which ODA is supporting in the education and training sector. In 1987 the DTEVT had four ODA supported projects in the following areas: Technical Maintenance, Craft Training, Business Studies and Engineering Manpower.²³ UNZA and CBU have theirs.²⁴ This is how British manpower aid through supplementation has evolved from the mid 1965 to the present day.

There are a few points of discussion which should follow. ODM's assumptions that without the OSAS and BESS programmes newly independent ex-colonies would have found it very difficult to retain the residual corps of colonial civil servants or indeed to recruit new British personnel

did not strictly apply to Zambia at the time of independence and for a few years thereafter.

Between 1964 and 1970, the period the OSAS programme was at its peak in Zambia the country had a strong economy as indicated earlier. Remittances of expatriates' salaries and allowances to their countries faced little restriction or delay then. It is therefore argued that given those favourable conditions Zambia would have been able to recruit new teachers from Britain without many of the financial difficulties which the British Government had anticipated.

The launching of the two supplementation assistance programmes was also closely followed by an accelerated decolonisation process which saw the independence of the following former colonies: Tanzania 1961, Uganda 1962, Kenya 1963, Sierra Leone 1963, Malawi 1964, Zambia 1964, The Gambia 1965, Lesotho 1966, Botswana 1966, and Swaziland 1968. Individually and collectively these countries held considerable British investment and involved substantial two way trade. There was therefore a strong argument for maintaining a British presence in the countries.

In many of these countries independence brought with it severe apprehension among the British settler and civil

service communities. There were fears over their careers and future under new Black governments. Many had in fact voted with their feet in some of the countries.²⁵ The rapidity of the decolonisation process threatened to flood Britain with thousands of returning colonial civil servants. That prospect would have caused HMG some serious redeployment problems. There was therefore an economic need to retain many of the British civil servants in overseas service in the initial years following the granting of independence. The two schemes provided the respite and additional incentives for retaining the British staff. The schemes also gave the British expatriates an assurance of their government's continued commitment to their welfare. If anything, the new OSAS and BESS staff needed this kind of assurance more than the former colonial civil servants.

On the other hand Britain's political and economic interests in the former colonies did not come to an end when colonies became independent. There was also a political interest on the part of Britain to retain some continuity in its influence in the former colonies. Independence had opened up the former colonies to other European powers, such as the Soviet Union and its satellites. Consequently, the threat of communist influence in the newly independent states was never taken lightly then by the British government. Therefore, the

retention and recruitment of British staff through the schemes provided the much needed political continuity in British influence through the presence and institutional legacies in the former colonies. It is therefore not possible to argue that the OSAS and BESS schemes were merely a one-way aid response to the social and economic situation in the former colonies of the Commonwealth Group. The schemes had an agenda which cut across the interests of both Britain and the former colonies. Manpower aid was a response to political, economic and development signals.

The recruitment of teachers from abroad was an expensive exercise for the Zambian government. Although now it would be difficult to measure that cost in exact monetary terms because of poor record keeping and the inaccessibility of this kind of government information, there are indicators which provide a basis for this judgement.

The inputs into the OSAS programme give some illustration of what it cost Zambia to maintain the programme. The Zambian inputs into the programme included the creation of a recruitment office in London, and appointing officers to administer the recruitment. The officers were maintained in London at great expense, which included not only basic salaries and allowances, but also boarding education for their children and private medical facilities. The

Zambian government was also responsible for the costs of, advertising the teaching posts, medical examinations of applicants, return air passages for appointed officers and their families, and school holiday passages for the officers' children who could not accompany their parents to Zambia.

The OSAS and KELT agreements stipulate that the host institution should provide supplemented staff with all necessary transport, housing, equipment and other facilities.²⁶

While in Zambia the expatriate teachers received subsidised furnished accommodation, free medical facilities, occupational support services in the schools and colleges, and a gratuity at the end of each completed thirty month contract. There were also indirect benefits which Zambia gave to officers on OSAS contracts. The tours of work in Zambia have given many OSAS teachers opportunities to improve their economic/social situations in Britain. It is also true that a teaching post in Zambia offered expatriate teachers opportunities to develop their African experience in their careers which may have been put to effective use. These have all been undoubtedly attractive and generous incentives in considering overseas appointments.

Since independence the Zambian Government has accepted technical assistance of this kind without a single guiding statement to direct the donors.²⁷ It is only recently in 1988, that the Cabinet considered a policy position on technical assistance.²⁸ Zambia's attention in technical assistance has apparently been directed at short-term benefits, rather than assessing the entire technical assistance against its own short and long-term inputs and costs. Manpower aid from Britain and elsewhere induced costs from the Zambian Government which should have been carefully checked against all technical assistance inputs and expected benefits. Real aid is in the margin between donor and recipient cost inputs. The Zambian case demonstrates a familiar but always tricky situation where aid has been caught up in the politics of responsibility between a donor and a recipient. To assert its independent position the Zambian Government is obliged to take greater responsibility in matters concerning the financing of its development programmes.

As far as the present and the future is concerned, the ODA project framework offers some limited opportunities for Zambia to continue to obtain technical assistance from Britain. However, to get the maximum benefits from the new system it will require a skilled, competent and also shrewd cadre of Zambian aid personnel, that is, Zambians

who are very skilled negotiators. It is very doubtful if in fact foreign aid in its long years of existence in Zambia has produced Zambians with sharp negotiating skills. Nor has the local environment encouraged it. The GRZ recommendations following the NATCAP report on technical assistance do not go far in making changes to the ways in which Zambia has managed technical assistance.²⁹ It should therefore be expected that, for various reasons arising from both the donors' and Zambian political and economic constituencies, donors are going to continue to take the greater responsibility on matters concerning technical assistance.

Table 20 shows Zambia's position regarding manpower aid to education within the African Commonwealth group and in the rest of the British education aid constituency in 1982/83.

Table 20

British Education Manpower Aid to African Commonwealth
Countries, by Functional Categories, 1982-1983.

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>KELT</u>	<u>TCO</u>	<u>OSAS</u>	<u>BESS</u>	<u>CAT IV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Botswana	1	-	92	13	-	106
Gambia	-	1	5	-	-	6
Ghana	1	-	-	15	2	18
Kenya	5	-	81	26	-	112
Lesotho	-	2	11	13	-	26
Malawi	4	-	8	95	-	107
Nigeria	-	-	-	-	2	2
Sierra Leone	5	-	-	13	3	21
Swaziland	2	-	32	8	-	42
Tanzania	5	-	-	11	-	16
Uganda	-	-	12	-	-	12
Zambia	5	1	220	30	-	256
Zimbabwe	1	-	-	-	-	1
TOTAL	29	4	461	224	7	725
Zambia's % Share (Afr. Commonw'lth)	17.2	*	47.7	13.3	*	35.3
Zambia's (Global) % Share	22.3	*	36.3	11.6	*	24.1

* = Negligible.

Source: ODA, (1984) Education Sector Policy Paper. Table 5.

Zambia's share of the OSAS is extremely high. It would appear that Zambia is treated as a special case.

Britain's manpower aid programme in Zambia is today the largest in the world. In 1988 there were 178 posts in the civil service, parastatals, and other institutions.³⁰ Of these more than 50 per cent have been working in the education and training and related work.

8.2.3 Aid to Training and Staff Development

Parallel to manpower aid, Britain has been giving extensive assistance to Zambia's manpower training and staff development. The coverage of this aid has been so extensive and pervasive that no public sector can claim not to have benefited in one way or another at some point from British Council or other British training programmes.

In 1965 there were 45 Zambians on ODM funded education and training programmes in the U.K. Both education and training programmes covered a large area of public sector activities. The concentration however appeared to be stronger in the area of education in the initial years.³¹ By 1970 the number of scholarship awards for Zambia had progressively increased and diversified. Other sectors besides education had clearly built up their claims on the

scholarships. In the subject areas, the social sciences, and agriculture came close behind education. In the training area, public administration training programmes dominated all other fields. In both cases the priorities that were attached to the need to train manpower in those two fields are reflected in the number of awards allocated to them. In 1981 the number of ministries/departments receiving British Council training awards had reached 48 in all.³² These ranged from parastatal companies and District Councils to large Ministries. The subjects and training fields covered even more extensive ground, from laboratory technology training to film production plant taxonomy, chemical engineering etc. Table 21 shows the extent of the coverage of the British Council education and training programmes.

Table 21

British Council Sponsored Education/Training Programmes
for Zambians by Sector, 1981 and 1982.

MAWD

Co-operative
Irrigation Engineering
Agriculture Engineering
Animal Husbandry
Hydrology
Poultry Husbandry
Agriculture
Lab. Technology
Agric. Extension
Fisheries Management
Technical Education
Vet. Lab. Science
Agricultural Economics
Technical Education
Soil + Water Engineering
Tropical Medicine
Rural Social Development

EDUCATION

Teacher Education
Education
Health Education
Education (Maths)
Education Management
Craft Design/Technology
English Teaching
Science Education
Special Education
Education TV Production
Agricultural Science
Education Administration
Learning Resources

DTEVT

Engineering
Technical Education
Supply + Mat. Management
Further Education
Architecture
Education
Library Studies
Education Administration
HND Engineering

Mechanical Engineering
Printing
Civil Engineering
Physiotherapy
Exam Management
Management
Advanced Radiography

UNZA

Electrical Engineering
Industrial Studies
Physics (PhD)
Manpower Studies
English
Auto-Engineering
Computer Science

HEALTH

Paediatric Nursing
Lab. Technology
Advanced Nursing
Nuclear Medicine
Pharmacy
Nursing Administration
Medical Physics
Public Health
Radiography
MRCP (Medicine)
Health Education
Nursing (BSC)
Technical Education
Opthamology
Drug Quality Control
Food Technology
X-Ray Dept. Administration
Health Service
Occupational Hygiene

OTHERS

Parliamentary Procedures
Purchasing + Supply
ICS Administration
Law
Cartography
Geology
Accountancy
Project Management
Aircraft Engineering
Social Policy
Pest Management
Estate Management
Industrial Relations
Horticulture
Agricultural Economics
Land Survey Management
Cost Accounting
Training Management
Building Engineering
Accountancy AAT
Commercial Forestry
Analytical Chemistry
Development Finance
Telecoms Traffic
Photolithography
Tax Collection
Quantity Surveying
Ratings + Valuations
ACCA
Entomology
Applied Statistics
Book Production
Pre-School Education
Home Economics
Customs + Excise
Leather Technology
Building Conservation

SOURCE: DMDT (1983).

Until the introduction of the projectisation framework British scholarship awards to Zambia were rather open-ended. The procedure was that Ministries were given their share of awards, thereafter the Ministries and their departments nominated and later selected the candidates. These were then presented to the British Council for placement in U.K. institutions. This was a perfect example of a donor giving its recipient the autonomy to identify within the broad focus of its aid to education the manpower in need of further education and staff development. However, this liberty produced its own flaws. Procedures and criteria for selecting candidates were not tight nor was the manpower development planning and coordination very effective,³³ consequently, undue emphasis in offering training to one category of personnel or subject area in a ministry or department was not at all uncommon.

The focus of aid to education and training has been periodically shifted as has been indicated in the preceding chapter. New areas for support which ODM identified in the mid 1970s included Mathematics, Science and Home Economics subjects which then had just been designated developmental subjects. Nevertheless, when requests for training assistance which fell outside these areas arose, the British Council often treated them with discretion. Thus, despite the declared interest to support only a few selected subjects, the British Council at one time agreed to sponsor two Zambian teachers for training in Music and Special Education respectively.³⁴

Although there have been shifts in the subject areas which ODA is willing to support, the key principles and objectives in the policy on aid to education and training have remained unchanged. They embrace political, and commercial interests, and the need to strengthen human resource development and institutional capacity in recipient countries. While this is true, there has been a paradox in the way ODA has pursued the objective relating to the need to strengthen institutional capacities in recipient countries. The case is explained below.

ODA's sponsorship of Zambians to study in the U.K. benefits Zambia in many different ways. Students gain access to new technologies, management techniques, and other skills, not to mention the rich international experiences of studying in the U.K. However, the policy and practice of sending Zambians abroad for training has also in the process affected the capacity of local institutions to develop new training programmes and to strengthen existing ones. Britain and some other donors are not willing to allow a share of their scholarship awards to be tenable at the Zambian institutions. Nor has Britain been willing to disclose the actual amounts allocated for training awards, an important element in planning and negotiations. A little of the amount spent on training Zambians in the U.K. could go some way in lifting and sustaining capacities in local institutions. It is not just access to international currency that local institutions would benefit from, it is a whole range of possibilities which would come with such kind of arrangements.

Today (1989/90) the cost of tuition alone for one Masters student for one academic year at the Institute of Education in London is £4,300. This amount would cover full cost fees for five foreign students (more if they are Zambians) at the University of Zambia in the Humanities, and Education areas. This of course raises questions about Britain's interest in strengthening local institutions. It would appear that Britain conceives the achievement of that objective in a way which does not see the sponsorship of Zambians for training programmes at local institutions as an important aspect in developing and strengthening local institutions.

Admittedly, the issue under discussion is surrounded by a rather tricky situation. It is a fact that Britain makes contributions to the development and strengthening of Zambian institutions in other different ways including staff development. The argument is simply that Zambia does not have the liberty to decide whether to take up the scholarship awards for staff training or use that money earmarked for overseas training for improving the state of institutional facilities. Nor does Zambia have the privilege to decide where it wants its staff trained with the British scholarships that are offered. The demand to train some Zambians locally on ODA sponsorship raises a whole range of politics surrounding development aid.

There is competitive protectionism on the part of Britain. The ODA and HMG Treasury know that British higher education

institutions are as good if not better than many of their counterparts in the industrialised world. On this account they would find it hard to justify spending training money outside Britain. This is a case of tying British aid to British goods and services. The politics of responsibility also come into play in this issue. Donors are reluctant to extend their aid into other areas because they feel it is the responsibility of recipient governments to finance development and maintenance of facilities outside areas which donors are prepared to assist. This is a very tricky illustration in which donors are justified in refusing to render assistance, which in their opinion would only displace recipient governments' efforts. On the other hand donors have often used the responsibility argument as an easy defence mechanism when they do not want to provide requested assistance. There is also the consideration of British cultural diplomacy which has already been dealt with at some length in chapter 6. Local training programmes would undermine the principles and objectives of cultural diplomacy which Britain pursues through education and training programmes offered in the U.K.

Therefore, because British training awards like those of other donors answer to many calls other than development needs in Zambia, very little change in the British policy can be expected. In any case, the issue has now been overtaken by events. The introduction of the projectisation approach has meant fewer scholarship awards are offered, and many of these are tied to specific projects as essential inputs. This has already been implemented in Zambia.³⁵

For some time now the ODA and the Directorate of Manpower Development and Training have been operating a unique shared funding arrangement for parastatal companies to send their personnel abroad for further training. To overcome this problem ODA agreed to support parastatal personnel for training and to pay 25 per cent of the total full cost fees for each student. The only condition was that the other 75 per cent of the fees was to be paid in local currency (Kwacha) to the DMDT. This money was earmarked for utilisation by local training institutions. The arrangement has achieved two objectives. In theory the arrangement should enable profitable parastatal companies to send their personnel abroad for training, but contrary to all expectations many parastatals have not taken advantage of the arrangement.³⁶ The arrangement has created a small pool of financial resources which local institutions can use for training, development and improvement of local facilities.

ODA agreed to this scheme because it does not breach the Treasury creed on aid. The numbers that have been involved have been too small to cause any serious upset in ODA's overall assistance to Zambia's training programme. It would be interesting to see if ODA would be persuaded to agree to such a funding arrangement for training programmes that are tenable at Zambian institutions.

8.2.4 Book Aid and Library Development

Book aid to the sector's institutions and to public libraries has formed another important element in the whole configuration of British aid to Zambia's education and training development programme. Like training scholarships, it is difficult to imagine which public sector institution has not been at one point a beneficiary of British Council book assistance, either directly or indirectly. Assistance with books has usually taken two forms. Ad hoc and discretionary goodwill book presentations have been made by the British High Commission or the British Council to schools, higher education and training institutions or indeed to a specific subject area.³⁷ The second mechanism is the long standing British Book Presentation (BPP).

Like education and training scholarships, ODA book assistance has covered almost every conceivable subject in the sector's endeavours. This can be discerned from the wide range of subsectors which receive book support. In the MGEC and MHE the recipient institutions have in recent years ranged from subject associations to large institutions such as the University of Zambia. In 1984/85 fifty-one institutions received book support from ODA which amounted to £65,000.³⁸ In 1985/86 the number of recipient institutions had risen to 57. By 1988/89 the allocation for Zambia's BPP had risen to £130,000, covering 50 institutions. The allocation between institutions tends to vary according to the identified needs.

The role which the BPP has played in the education and training development process in Zambia in recent years is quite obvious. In the face of increasing balance of payments difficulties, the government's ability to import educational books and other support supplies has been reduced drastically or completely ceased in some subsectors. The BPP has been assisting to fill those gaps. And for some time to come Zambia is going to continue to fall back on this assistance. This aid covers not only the supply of textbooks but other general and reference materials for institutional libraries.

For a very long time the BPP has followed a simple administrative procedure. Local institutions participating in the scheme are asked to place orders for books worth the amount allocated to them. The orders are processed through the British Council who through their U.K. channels purchase the books. The books must be purchased from British publishers and book sellers. The BPP is now undergoing trial changes. A new look coupon system along the lines of the UNESCO scheme has been introduced.³⁹ A few recipient countries including Zambia have been selected to take part in the trials. In the new scheme the scope has been widened to include a few Zambian bookshops to take part in the scheme. Bookshops can purchase coupons from the British Council with local currency. In turn the coupons enable bookshops to purchase books and other supplies from U.K. sources. There is no doubt that this is an excellent scheme in Zambia's present dire financial circumstances.

However, the economics of ODA's book assistance to Zambia raises a few questions. The scheme has been characterised by a single important restriction. That is, Zambia cannot use ODA's book money to purchase from the cheapest or any other source of its choice. Secondly, British books have been pouring into Zambian institutions at a time when the country has been facing perennial local publishing and printing problems at Kenneth Kaunda Foundation (KKF).⁴⁰ Yet, under the conditions of the book assistance Zambia cannot use that money to accelerate the rehabilitation and the improvement of the publishing and printing industry. The paradox is further heightened by the fact that during the difficult years KKF has been going through, ODA has from time to time provided KKF personnel training scholarships knowing very well that at the end of their further training such personnel would be returning to a work environment in which conditions would not facilitate the maximum application of the new skills. The tying of bilateral aid to British goods and services accounts for this. And as long as ODA has minimum interest in developing Zambia's publishing and printing industry, Zambia can only expect the minimum of support from ODA. Dependence on British books and suppliers has been ensured by the application of the measures described here. In this way also Britain has ensured the maximum protection of Britain's book trade markets against other potential competitors. In the face of the current foreign exchange difficulties in Zambia the BPP ensures also that the British book industry is not cut off from the market.

ODM assistance was also instrumental in Zambia's establishment of the Zambia Library Service (ZLS) soon after independence. Britain provided technical assistance in the form of books and training of Zambians to run public libraries. ODA support to the ZLS has continued, in 1985 the BPP voted £3,037.50 for ZLS support. However, support to the ZLS from BPP has in general not been regular as has been the case with other sectors. In 1987 and 1988 British Council did not allocate any money to ZLS.⁴¹ The BPP assistance has been concentrated in educational and training institutions where the need and demand for books has been extremely acute in recent years. With ever declining public expenditure on social services such as library services, and also being an institution which attracts very little donor funds, the ZLS has little commercial value to Britain's book industry. The case for other institutions is quite different. Most, if not all the other institutions covered by BPP fall into sectors which receive substantial financial aid from abroad. The relationship between this point and BPP is that, besides answering to direct recipient needs, the BPP is an introduction to and a directory of the British book industry. Through the BPP 'advertisement' it is always hoped that independent orders outside the British aid support could follow as a recent case illustrates. A British firm has just completed its supply of books worth around £2 million arising from the African Development Bank (ADB) junior secondary school project in Zambia.⁴²

Table 22 shows the level of BPP support to Zambia in recent years.

Table 22

**BPP Expenditure on Approved Projects for Zambia by
Sector, 1984-1988 (£)**

<u>Sector</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>
MGEC	1,600	11,727		44,000	25,000
MHE	7,400	22,092		9,000	23,000
UNZA	6,500	13,432		16,500	26,000
DTEVT	18,000	15,997		9,900	19,000
Health	8,500	5,670		16,500	16,000
Agric	11,800	7,155		6,000	6,000
Public Admin.	9,950	9,089		15,500	13,000
TOTAL	63,750	85,162	140,000	117,400	128,000

Source: Compiled from British Council BPP expenditure lists for Zambia.

Note: (1) Public Administration covers a whole range of central, local government, and parastatal institutions and departments.

(2) For 1986 no breakdown is given for the expenditure in the source.

8.2.5 University Links

Although somewhat removed from the mainstream of aid most people are familiar with, links between the various UNZA and CBU departments and their counterparts in British institutions have formed another channel through which ODA aid to education and training reaches Zambia. The British Council has played a key role in establishing these links, and often they have made the first initiative to sound the British interest in establishing links.⁴³

In 1988 there were ten links between UK Universities and the various departments at UNZA and CBU. These were:

<u>U.K</u>	<u>Subject Area</u>	<u>Zambia</u>
Bristol	Education	UNZA
Glasgow	Vet. Medicine	UNZA
Leeds	Physics	UNZA
Stirling	Geography	UNZA
Birmingham	Mathematics	UNZA
Newcastle	Archit' & Environ' Stud.	CBU
Swansea	Electr' & Electronics	UNZA
Manchester	Manpower Research	UNZA
Aberdeen	Environmental Studies	CBU
London	Medicine	UNZA

The administration of the links is through the British Council and the Universities in the UK to whom funds for the links are given. The links cover the following: the exchange of staff

and students, and donation of equipment by British universities to counterparts. Student exchange has been directed mainly at the staff development programme for the Universities. The links have been designed to serve among other purposes the following: institutional development, training of technical staff, course and curriculum development, technology transfer, and research collaboration.

For Zambia the links are characterised by an unequal partnership. The Zambia institutions have entered into the link relationship as subordinate counterparts, especially from the point of resources. In short, they have little to offer to their counterparts from Britain. The limitations from the Zambian side are quite severe. If this is the case, why do ODA and British Council bother to create links with Zambian institutions that do not have half the required operational resources which could enhance the objectives of the links?

One can give different explanations for this, but all of them arise from the way Britain has perceived the position of recipients' institutions in their portfolio of overseas economic and political interests. The link arrangements serve to maintain some British presence and continuity in recipients' institutions, most of which will have had already infusions of other British aid (books, BESS staff, scientific equipment etc).

The motivation to compete against other donors from an advantageous position forms another reason. Closely related to this is the need to maintain academic enclaves which would look to Britain for support. It must be noted that the two universities in Zambia have balkanised departments. Donors have taken up their areas of concentration. The School of Agriculture has a dominant Canadian and Belgian support. This extends to training of staff to provision of support resources such as vehicles. It is not surprising that even within this school clear boundaries exist between the Belgian supported Soil Science department and the rest of the School. The Economics department at UNZA has a link with a German university. The courtesy of steering away from counterparts' areas of interest by ODA may account for these and other departments not being on the British Council link list. The links also help Britain to maintain overseas departments and institutions in the orbit of its international academic network. The links also serve an important purpose of 'selling' the British academic industry. The links are therefore inward looking. It is also important not to see the links between UK institutions and their Zambian counterparts in isolation. The Zambian links are part of Britain's worldwide academic network which is centrally supported and controlled. From its position of weakness in resources. Zambia faces a very difficult task in becoming more independent.

Britain has also been involved in giving assistance to time specific projects. These have not been many but are equally important in following the trend of British aid to education. The Mathematics Textbook Pilot Project focused on assisting eighteen secondary schools that were initially involved in the trials.⁴⁴ The KELT project (1980) in the DTEVT has concentrated on developing and improving communication skills through curriculum development, teacher training and staff development in ESP, and assistance with the development of effective national examinations in ESP.⁴⁵ ODA has also for a long time provided support to the Curriculum Development Centre (CDC) through the funding of English Language Teaching adviser. The British Council is also providing a management service to the Zambia Mathematics and Science Teachers Education Project (ZAMSTEP). This is an EEC funded project in Zambia. Together with other projects outside the education and training sector, ODA has a large aid portfolio in Zambia.

8.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter it has been that in the first five years of Zambia's independence, the aid relationship between Britain and Zambia took place against a backdrop of thriving trade relations between the two countries. Within the African Commonwealth countries group Zambia had commanded a respectable position in British trade. Zambia's position as the main supplier of copper to Britain had enhanced Zambia's importance in its relationship with Britain. Whitehall felt then that some of its industries had become vulnerable because of Britain's heavy reliance on copper supplies from Zambia. The threat of political turmoil from the Rhodesian UDI cutting off or severely interrupting flows of British imports from the region had in particular caused great concern. Further evidence of Britain's large economic presence in Zambia in the immediate years after independence was on the number of major international British firms with subsidiary companies in Zambia. The copper prices were good, the economy was buoyant. This however, was quickly followed by a nationalisation policy and other controls over the economy, much to the displeasure of international companies.

The period between 1971 and 1979 saw the Zambian economy going through progressive problems of adjustment and continuous decline. The net effect of the economic problems which started at the beginning of the 1970s appeared in their full maturity

in the 1980s. Zambia's trade position with Britain has correspondingly changed drastically. Apart from Zambia's own internal economic decline, several external factors have intervened to give the Anglo-Zambian trade relationship a new structure. Today Britain perceives Zambia mainly in terms of possessing economic potential rather than power, and also being part of the important Southern African geopolitical belt.

Politically, the Anglo-Zambian relationship has been fairly stable except for the running disagreements over the best strategies to adopt in making attempts to secure solutions of the independence struggles in the region. The case of the political situation in South Africa has continued to be a source of frequent friction in the Anglo-Zambian political relationship. Despite these frictions and Zambia's support to the marxist guerrilla movements on her borders, Britain and other Western countries which were opposed to a violent settlement of independence disputes maintained a warm relationship with Zambia. Isolating Zambia would have risked losing it to the Eastern camp. The strong thaw in East-West relations means that soon or later Britain must find new variables on which to base its perception of countries like Zambia. In all, Anglo-Zambian relations have existed in a broad and complex economic and political framework. In this the aid relationship has appeared as an extension of the core relationship, it is not independent. Aid has become increasingly linked to Britain's economic and political objectives overseas. These Britain is more prepared to defend than ever before.

Development objectives in British aid have never been stated in detail beyond that they seek to create self-reliance and secure sustainable growth. These are open-ended goals which often attract different interpretations both in conception and method of achievement. Self-reliance suggests a limited zoo-like induced development. This can satisfy limited needs and demands. Aid with its checks is designed to produce precisely this restrained type of development. The development environment in the developing world has changed. Whereas basic needs can be met by a carefully planned and executed self-reliant economic and development programme, sustained development looks beyond local initiatives. For this, competitive economic growth and development come into play. A few recipient countries like Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea have managed to embark on this course, much to the discomfort of industrialised countries. The challenge to donors is, in the face of these developments, can donors allow aid to induce or enhance competitive economic development? Britain's aid responses to education must be placed in this broad perspective.

The profile of British aid to education and training in Zambia shows that, Zambia has not attracted any special major aid policy from ODA. Aid has been given according to ODA's global aid policy settings. However, within this framework it is known that ODA maintains a certain amount of policy discretion

to allow it to respond to special cases. These have been kept to the barest minimum for two reasons. Over the years Zambian officials have come to know well what ODA will agree to assist or not. Thus they will avoid taking a path they know will lead nowhere. ODA exercises its discretion to give assistance outside the designated frameworks very carefully to avoid upsetting set boundaries of expenditure and overall long-term objectives.

ODA's application of its global policy goals to Zambia has revealed quite interesting features. On one hand the policy settings have always been reconciled with the broad needs of Zambia. This coincidence has been to the advantage of ODA-operations. Discussions that have been held on assistance to Zambia have been able to deal with clearly defined areas that already exist. ODA's manpower aid in the mid 1960s and book aid in the last decade fall into such categories. That ODA is dealing with an education and training system with multiple problems presents donors like Britain with unlimited opportunities to provide assistance. Almost every aspect in the system is in need of one form of assistance or another. On the other hand in avoiding country-specific aid policies ODA has failed to stand up to the challenges of the broader problems of recipient countries such as Zambia. The country's education and training development problems today go well

beyond the needs of English language teaching, mathematics and science. They also go well beyond the need to provide British supplemented or fully-funded staff. .

Yet it has been demonstrated that despite the rapidly declining conditions in Zambia's education and training system, ODA's support has not varied significantly in content or method, despite projectisation. The lack of explicit policy on aid to education and training on the part of the Zambian Government has unfortunately given unintended support to this situation. If Zambia had explicit policies on the aid it receives from the UK and other sources it is almost certain that ODA would have been compelled to respond to Zambia's needs in a more country specific manner. Aid process between UK and Zambia would then cease to be an exercise in Zambia fitting its needs into ODA's support framework, which is the case now.

In terms of forms of assistance given to Zambia, British aid has maintained its major features. Britain has kept away from building projects. The concentration on human resource development and manpower aid continued to receive greater attention in the 1960s and early 1970s until the decision to scale down support came into force. Book aid and links between institutions have continued. Somehow the donation of books has not come under the project framework because the BPP is regarded as a project in itself. However, one is tempted to say that the changes that have occurred to British aid in Zambia have emerged from ODA's global response to its international aid constituency. Secondly, some of the changes

that have occurred in British aid to education in Zambia have been targeted at introducing closer scrutiny and selectivity in ODA's assistance. This again is a hallmark of ODA's support found in most countries of its aid constituency. In short, there has been no dramatic shift in policy which one could call a special policy response by ODA to Zambia.

Using the case of some aspects of British aid to education and training in Zambia as a point of reference, the notion that external aid functions as supplementary resources is rather shallow and too naive. The notion arises from the narrow economic sense of the need to fill up the deficits in national development resources. Hence the adoption of what appears to be a value-free proposition. Relating the supplementary aid theory to the Anglo-Zambian aid relationship, a few practical difficulties emerge. It has been argued in this chapter that the real aid still lies hidden between what ODA has given to Zambia and the hidden costs Zambia has had to carry in receiving foreign aid. Notice that these are over and above the contractual counterpart funding which sometimes Zambia has been asked to meet. There are also opportunity costs. Because ODA and other donors have carried the responsibility of making important decisions on external inputs which should go into the Zambian education system, Zambians have lost. The supplementary aid theory therefore proves to be an inadequate explanatory framework for what aid is and what it seeks to achieve as observed in the case of British aid.

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CHAPTER NINE

SWEDISH EDUCATION AID POLICIES AND PRIORITIES

9.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyses Swedish education aid policies and priorities from the time SIDA was established in 1962. The key education policy documents of 1972 and 1986 are closely examined to trace and compare any major shifts in policies and priorities. The chapter attempts also to identify factors that have exerted some influence on Swedish policies.

The stated points of departure in SIDA's aid policy for education and training are that it recognises its policy and priorities are a function of many factors. SIDA acknowledges that recipient governments' own education policies and priorities have had some influence on its own. Other factors that have exerted influence on SIDA are said to be other bilateral donors' policies, SIDA's education specialists and consultants, SIDA's now long experience in the field of education in developing countries, and Sweden's own domestic politics and ideologies ~~of what is~~ good concerning education.¹ The degree to which each of these factors has influenced SIDA's policies has tended to vary.

Education and training were the first areas to receive Swedish development aid, and for a long time remained the mainstay of Swedish development assistance. Emphasis on education and training in earlier Swedish assistance stemmed from that country's decision to give assistance to sectors in which Sweden had sufficient experience. Vocational education and training in particular had a high reputation in Sweden as being very well organised and practical.² In the mid 1960s Swedish development assistance came up against three related factors: the accelerated decolonisation process, especially in Africa, the lack of resources needed to develop human resources for the development process, and the height of manpower planning activity in the context of the human capital theory. The development debate then was dominated by the assumptions which saw manpower planning and human resource development as the most critical factor needed in development process. The weight of these factors exerted some influence on early Swedish responses to the development needs of newly independent countries.³

Starting with a small overseas aid constituency of three countries in 1961, Sweden increased its programme countries to eight a decade later. Today the constituency covers seventeen politically and economically divergent countries. The range extends far, from the erstwhile embattled revolutionary state Nicaragua to large and small multiparty states such as India and Botswana. This could be

interpreted as Sweden's extension and expression of its policy of neutrality in the international development aid framework.

There are however some interesting features in the profile of SIDA's programme countries. Ten out of the nineteen programme countries are former British colonies. And, nine countries in the aid constituency are located in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, with a further concentrated presence in Southern Africa: Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In fact, this group of countries forms nearly 50 per cent of SIDA's aid constituency. Except for Tunisia, it is quite clear that Sweden has not made inroads into Francophone Africa. Could this be attributed to the economic grip France has maintained on its former colonies or could it be linked to Sweden's preference for English as its first foreign language? In terms of education assistance disbursement, the Commonwealth group in SIDA's constituency received 63.5 per cent of the MSEK3.120 disbursed between 1981 and 1986 to all programme countries.⁴ That SIDA's aid to education is concentrated in the Commonwealth programme countries, and in Sub-Saharan Africa has been evident from SIDA's aid statistics since 1980.

Because there are other developing countries with more unfavourable economic and social conditions than some of the countries being aided by SIDA, it is difficult to justify

SIDA's selection of programme countries on purely social and economic need. Six of SIDA's eleven programme countries in the 1980 decade were classified as middle income countries.⁵

Among the low-income countries that in recent years would have presented a deserving case to SIDA are, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Chad and others. The economic odds against these countries have ranged from negative GNP growth rates, to high inflation, rapidly increasing populations, disproportionate government receipts and expenditure, disabling external debt repayment and educational decline. For example in 1983 primary school participation rates in Burkina Faso, Niger and Somalia were 27 per cent, and 21 per cent respectively. A corresponding pattern existed for their secondary school sectors.⁶ These features compare very unfavourably with those of selected programme countries like Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Lesotho. It would therefore appear that Sweden, like other donors, applies selection criteria which do not restrict itself to a single consideration.

Countries with socialist oriented development programmes certainly seem to have attracted Sweden's attention. In this category are countries like Tanzania, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Cuba, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola and

Guinea Bissau. It cannot be ruled out that economic potential is another important factor in selection of programme countries such as Zimbabwe, Kenya and Botswana. Anti-apartheid attitudes and anti-colonialism have also been important political factors which have attracted sympathetic attention from Sweden. Thus, many independence liberation movements in Africa received considerable practical support from Sweden during their struggles. The PAIGC (Guinea-Bissau), FRELIMO (Mozambique), MPLA (Angola), SWAPO (Namibia), ANC (South Africa), ZAPU and ZANU (Zimbabwe) have been among the movements which have received considerable assistance from Sweden. This support and development aid have served to highlight the achievement of Sweden's internationalist political objectives. There is a possibility that Sweden, like other donors, could expect in the short or long term to derive economic benefits from these aid relationships. Therefore like many other donors Sweden seems to pursue a range of objectives in its assistance programme.

Although Sweden had been giving development aid as far back as 1945, it was not until 1962 that Sweden passed a Bill to create SIDA, an institution, which could undertake an enlarged scope of official development assistance.

9.2 The 1962 Bill

Among other adverse economic and social conditions which motivated Sweden to create a formal framework for assistance were the problems of inadequate education facilities and poor living conditions which faced newly independent states.⁷ The cornerstones of the 1962 Bill were international solidarity, humanitarian concern, the need for social equality and social justice. This policy set up an assistance framework in which the transfer of Swedish resources to developing countries could be promoted and regulated. The Bill in Sweden came against the background of similar initiatives in a few industrialised countries.⁸

Although SIDA had been involved in a number of education and training projects abroad, directly or indirectly through the multilateral agencies, it was not until 1972 that it produced its first policy on aid to education. Before that it had been easier for SIDA to operate without an elaborate policy framework. The aid constituency was small then and aid was concentrated into the single area of vocational training and technical education.

Internationally, this policy came against a background of important events in the aid field. The UN's first Decade of Development had just come to an end. Inventories of successes and failures were being compiled by countries and relevant multilateral agencies. The World Bank had

published its education sector policy paper in 1971. The paper drew attention to the quantitative aspects of education development and other trends in education systems. It paid particular attention to efficiency and productivity, education and labour markets, and the financial constraints facing developing countries.⁹ The Kericho conference in Kenya in 1966 had brought together some African countries to assess their post 1961 Addis Ababa conference achievements in relation to rural development and employment.¹⁰ The Commonwealth Secretariat produced a report in 1970 which dealt with issues concerning out-of-school education and training for agricultural development.¹¹ At the time the policy was made a number of Swedes who had worked abroad in international organisations such as the World Bank had already returned to work for SIDA.¹² Together these provided a wealth of experience from which SIDA could draw some guidance.

9.3 Policies

9.3.1 The 1972 Policy

The policy's point of departure was that it identified the following problems in education systems of developing countries:

1. The high cost of education in relation to available resources.
2. The dominance of western values in the education systems.
3. Inadequate provision of primary education to the majority of children.
4. The high priority assigned to the traditional 'theoretical' secondary and tertiary education as against agricultural and vocational training.¹³

This was a belated indictment of the inherited colonial education system in most of the developing countries. In making attempts to address these problems SIDA took note of the priorities which had been identified for developing countries by some multilateral agencies. The UN for example assigned a high priority to the following aspects of education and training in the second decade of development:

- a. Teacher training
- b. Technical education
- c. Vocational training
- d. Supplementary vocational training
- e. Development of the curricula and teaching materials.
- f. Use of media in education.¹⁴

Against this background SIDA drew up its own priorities in education and training sectors as follows:

1. a. Non-formal education including adult education.
- b. Education for employment promotion and raising of production.
- c. Elementary basic education.
- d. Vocational and agricultural training.

- e. Training and supplementary training of teachers and administrators within non-formal education, vocational training and primary schools.
- 2.
- a. Secondary education especially that which is directed to science, technology and agriculture.
 - b. Training and supplementary training of secondary school teachers.
 - c. Tertiary education.¹⁵

Many donors had become sensitised to the movement towards providing more practical, rural and agriculturally oriented education and training. Sweden's long experience in such fields as vocational training and the Folk High School was an additional source of influence in the choice of priorities.¹⁶

The policy pledged to provide three forms of assistance: financial, material support including buildings and textbooks, and the supply of personnel. In technical assistance SIDA put great emphasis on the need to provide personnel who could provide outreach effects in their work. Planners, administrators, and teacher trainers were all considered to be in this category.

The key aspects which characterised the 1972 policy were that it was highly prescriptive, stricter, and specific on the target areas to which Swedish assistance should go. The framework for assistance had been worked out from a

Swedish perspective.¹⁷ The assumptions were that what had worked well in Sweden's development process should be good and also work well for developing countries. This was clearly an attempt by Sweden to internationalise some aspects of Swedish experiences in the field of education and training. The policy was also based on strong elements of idealism. This and the sufficient international experience and knowledge of the depth of the problems in developing countries helped to shape Sweden's approach in development aid.

Following the publication of the policy in 1972, SIDA initiated many education projects in Bangladesh, Botswana, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, India, Kenya, Mozambique, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In accordance with the policy guidelines, assistance concentrated on vocational training and technical education projects. For example, between 1979 and 1986 SIDA's assistance to education and training in Sri Lanka went to the establishment of an institute for industrial foremen/supervisors, pre-vocational, vocational, technical, and science education, and educational planning and management. The MONAP Projects in Mozambique had a similar concentration on the establishment of training institutions. The areas covered were agricultural and veterinary training. Between 1974 and 1984 SIDA assisted Kenya with the expansion of technical education. In Tanzania assistance went to the establishment

of the Moshi Vocational Training Centre and also to the improvement of the National Vocational Training Division. Other assistance went to support qualitative aspects such as education materials production in Botswana, Ethiopia, India, and Mozambique.¹⁸

There is evidence of many achievements made with Swedish aid in the education and training sectors of the recipient countries. Certainly Swedish capital aid has helped many recipient countries to build education and training institutions. However, SIDA cannot claim that these achievements have moved the recipient countries much closer to peace, freedom, social justice, and social equality. What assistance did was to provide great amounts of relief and resources in areas where there was acute scarcity. This perhaps removed the first obstacle to initiating a self-generating development process.

SIDA's response to the much derided education systems in developing countries was rather paradoxical. Western models of education, weak or broken indigenous teaching traditions, and heavy conformity with western values, are among the aspects SIDA considered obstructive to educational development in recipient countries.¹⁹ In Africa, for example, education systems were criticised for being examination and certificate oriented.²⁰ Looking at the projects undertaken by SIDA before and after 1972 there is

little evidence to show that the Authority made any attempts to redress the weaknesses it had identified. Instead, most of its projects became merely additional western models in the system that was already congested with other alien models or experimental projects. On the one hand this highlights the limitations of Swedish idealistic optimism in its attempts to induce change in foreign social systems. But, above all SIDA found it difficult to avoid getting its projects embedded in the existing entrenched western oriented education systems. This is a frustrating reality which SIDA has had to come terms with in developing countries.

In 1982 SIDA produced a guideline paper on assistance to education.

9.3.2 The 1982 Paper

This paper had been preceded by a Parliamentary directive in 1978 which urged SIDA to direct its aid resources towards the following areas: economic growth, economic and social equality, political and economic independence, and also the development of democracy. A critical discussion of these objectives follows later.

SIDA's emphasis on primary education is reflected in its assistance to the sub-sectors as shown below:

Table 23

Education Assistance Disbursement to Sub-Sectors
1982-1987

<u>Sector</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>
Primary	40	29	49	58	55	58
Secondary	6	16	9	5	3	3
Tertiary	5	7	1	2	2	3
Vocational	34	27	23	22	26	21
Adult	11	13	8	10	8	8
Misc	4	8	10	3	6	7
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: SIDA (1989) Appendix 3.

However, as a percentage of the bilateral assistance, education aid has been on a slight decline since the beginning of the 1980s as shown in Table 24 below.

Table 24

Education Assistance as a Percentage Share of Total
Bilateral Assistance, 1982-1987



<u>Function</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>
Bilateral	3615.7	3806.3	3972.4	4283.4	4649.5	5045.3
Education	284.0	246.2	314.9	250.0	242.9	276.3
% Share	7.9	6.4	7.9	5.8	5.2	5.5

Source: SIDA (1989).

Correspondingly, the proportion of education assistance going to individual programme countries has reflected this trend. In the case of Tanzania the drop in assistance has been over 50 percent in the period between 1983 and 1987. Some countries such as Cuba, Tunisia, Vietnam, and Swaziland have now been dropped altogether from the list of the education programme countries. It is not yet clear why these countries have been dropped. Could SIDA claim to have accomplished its mission in these countries? Or are these eliminations part of its rationalisation of its assistance? Are they meant to give way to new programme countries? Table 25 shows the changes that have taken place in SIDA's aid to the education sector in the recent years.

Table 25

Education Assistance by Country 1983/84 and 1987/88



Source: SIDA (1989) Appendix 2.

SIDA's education projects have included the provision of equipment and furniture to 500 SIDA financed schools in Botswana, a national literacy programme mounted jointly with GTZ and UNICEF in Botswana, assistance to the Teaching Aids Production Unit (TAPU) in Tanzania. Other areas were education materials printing programmes, special education, teacher training, educational planning, vocational training and adult education.²¹ It is evident here that SIDA's assistance was quite widespread with some accent on the qualitative aspects. Towards the mid 1980s SIDA's response to the growing crisis in education in its Southern African constituency turned to the need to provide more qualitative inputs into the education systems.

The period between 1972 and 1986 when a new policy came into effect saw rapid changes in the socio-economic conditions of SIDA's African programme countries. Adverse social conditions were emerging as a result of declining economic performance in most countries. Education was one of the social services that quickly bore the brunt of the crisis. Ironically, it was around this very time that many programme countries initiated extensive educational reforms. Four liberation movements which Sweden had actively supported had become full fledged governments in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea Bissau, and Zimbabwe. Consequently the scope of Swedish assistance to these countries had to widen to deal

with the needs of national development after the liberation wars. For donors like SIDA this period was an anxious time. They watched to see which direction the reforms would take and also assessed the impact of the economic crisis and the implications which these factors had for external assistance.

9.3.3 The 1986 Policy

The main cornerstones of the Swedish development aid programme remained unchanged in the 1986 policy objectives. Social development and equality, democracy, and independence remained as the guiding posts. In education SIDA conceptualises equality in terms mainly of access to and participation in education programmes by different social groups in society. Reaching the slow learners and the handicapped learners forms an important part of this objective. Access to education is also perceived to be a strategy which can bring about greater social and economic equality.²²

These are all relevant objectives in SIDA's programme countries. Their operationalisation however is challenging, They are even more exacting when directed at developing countries' social and economic contexts. If SIDA had complete policy control over its programme countries' education systems its commitment to welfare education would yield quick results. But this is not the case.

There is no doubt at all that SIDA's assistance to education has enabled more children to enter school systems in its programme countries. However, greater equality of access to and participation in education programmes has yet to be achieved at significant levels in both primary and secondary schools. Except Cuba, since 1970 all of SIDA's programme countries have shown little improvement in the attempts to narrow the participation gap between females and males in the primary school sector.²³ Examination of access to schooling under other labels, social labels, might reveal even more startling trends. In this objective SIDA is up against odds which go well beyond the need to provide extra classroom space. The social attitudes of some people towards education, economic factors, domestic policies, and donor policies are all parts of the problem being addressed.

The pursuit of greater social and economic equality in developing countries presents a different set of debatable issues. Education provides opportunities to change one's socio-economic position, but it does not ensure the achievement of equality. The notion of equality brings into play many complex social and economic factors which education cannot overcome. Today the situation is even more difficult. The economic adjustment measures being implemented in, for example, the Sub-Saharan African countries are making the movement towards this objective more difficult for recipient governments. Cuts in public

spending on social services and the accent on privatisation of social services such as education stand in the way of this objective. Therefore SIDA is in a much weaker position in trying to implement it.

The goal of independence in SIDA's aid programmes has two functions, to educate and train indigenous manpower with a view to reducing the recipient countries' dependence on expatriate manpower, and to enable recipients to move more towards independent education development programmes. Both are well meaning objectives. However, although many successes have already been achieved in the field of donor supported training programmes, experience has shown that once physical dependence on expatriates has been removed or reduced it has been replaced by psychic and institutional dependence on external assistance. This is even more disabling in terms of developing local initiatives. It limits the independence which donors like SIDA are helping to achieve in to their recipient countries. Similarly, SIDA's conviction that its aid would move recipient countries towards independent development needs careful examination. Chapter six has shown how donors aid preferences have the potential to distort national priorities.

SIDA's 1986 policy objectives are balanced and welfare oriented. They are well meaning in their own right.

However, they must be seen against the background of the aid environments in recipient countries and SIDA's operations in the field.

SIDA's 1986 policy guidelines for aid to education and training present a profile full of significant new features. Unlike its 1972 predecessor, the draft of this policy was subjected to scrutiny across a wide spectrum of people within Sweden and also among the recipients. This was a well meaning gesture. The ground setting of the policy adopted a rather sober and reflective approach to many issues in development assistance to education. Major shifts on previously key areas in SIDA's assistance to education are very evident in the 1986 guidelines. There is also a recognition by SIDA of the entrenchment of the colonial heritage and its strong influence on the educational systems in many developing countries.

Drawing on its now long experience in the education field, SIDA has re-examined its position on some key areas of its assistance, such as practical training. SIDA believes this programme and a few others have become too expensive to be made available on a broader basis.²⁴ Plant requirements in practical subjects have been found to be advanced and expensive. Teachers too require an extensive training background. Vocational training and other aspects of technical education had featured very prominently in the

1972 policy document and also in previous Swedish assistance.

On formal education and training SIDA has conceded that there is a need for an institutionalised type of training connected to the work place.²⁵ This marks a departure from the 1972 objective which put priority on non-formal and adult education. There is also an attempt to take a balanced view on many issues. Thus, while emphasising that SIDA's support should go to education programmes which are directed at raising rural agricultural production, attention to the needs of urban populations has also been called for.

9.3.3.1 Priorities

The most outstanding comparative feature in the 1986 policy is the designation of priorities. The policy has directed SIDA to put more emphasis on assistance than before on basic education. The scope of this has however been enlarged to include programmes of various types rather than primary education alone. There is also a move to concentrate on areas where Swedish performance has been particularly good. The following are also in the priority category: institutional vocational training, apprentice training, maintenance aspects, education planning, natural science, and technical subjects, public service training, and production of textbooks and teaching aids. As for assistance to other programmes, SIDA is required to

determine its response on an individual basis after a careful analysis of the request and a consideration of the political goals of Swedish development cooperation.²⁶

The document is not explicit on what those political goals are, consequently there is some inevitable confusion. It is not clear whether SIDA is making reference to the goal of promoting democracy and political autonomy among recipients or to a set of new political goals within SIDA which have yet to be made public.

9.3.3.2 Technical Assistance

The policy envisages that foreign personnel in key positions and for special assignments are still going to be needed by developing countries. Against this background Swedish personnel going out on technical assistance assignments are expected to be engaged on a long term basis as a way of providing effective service. The view of some SIDA personnel is that previous short-term assignments were unsatisfactory, especially when considered against the odds of working in new environments, the scale of some of the programmes and the need to provide a sustained service.²⁷ The decision on long term technical assistance appears therefore to have come in response to SIDA's own lessons learnt in the field.

The most dramatic change in technical assistance concerns the guidelines for Swedish personnel in Swedish projects in

which foreign personnel participate. The policy urges SIDA to project a more distinctive profile of Swedish participation in such projects than had been the case before. This is a new emphasis in SIDA's position which for a long time had been liberal. Until the coming of this policy SIDA had paid little attention to the overt politics of image-projection which characterised the projects of many other donors. Under the previous provisions foreign nationals were employed by SIDA to work on short or long term projects. The emphasis moves SIDA into a role of conscious image-projection and also introduces overt protectionism in Swedish education projects.

SIDA's new position on technical assistance could be explained in different ways, all of which point to its attempts to change, to adapt, and above all to engage in the aid business following the common donor practices.²⁹ Given the long period SIDA has been in this business now, it is also possible that SIDA feels it has built up a cadre of Swedish nationals who can attend to SIDA's aid work abroad without as much recourse as before to foreign personnel. And yet, SIDA continues to engage non-Swedish consultants, to send recipient countries students for training to non-Swedish institutions, to have a non-exclusive procurement policy - although a strong preference for Swedish products is evident.

9.3.3.3 Forms of Assistance

Besides capital assistance, the new policy has pledged to extend support to some of the recipients' recurrent costs in the poorest recipient countries. This assistance does not however cover teachers' salaries. Recurrent cost assistance is not a favourite item on the agendas of donors. Many regard it as a bottomless pit. The opposition Swedish Conservative Party and the export promotion interest groups are not at all supportive of SIDA providing local cost financing on the commercial grounds that such assistance gives the recipients much needed foreign exchange which they can use for all types of imports, including those from Sweden's commercial competitors.³⁰

While SIDA's decision to provide this kind of assistance has been motivated by the sheer need to reduce the financial hardships facing recipient countries, the move also raises questions regarding how far the boundaries of development assistance should extend. Offers of external aid in this area may serve only to block the development of local resource development initiative.

9.3.3.4 Overseas Training

SIDA's expenditure on staff development and in-service training across all the sectors it provides aid to is quite enormous. It is also common knowledge that most SIDA funded training programmes have in the past directed

students to third countries, mainly the U.K., Canada and U.S.A. Yet, despite this large involvement in this area and SIDA officials revelation that Sweden intended to increase its stock of Third World students, the 1986 policy (English version) has kept quiet on this key aid item.

Sweden has started hosting training programmes for which previously students from recipient countries were sent to the U.K. or Canada. In 1987 thirty-four students attended various short courses and attachments in Sweden³¹. The courses ranged from telecommunication administration and management to financial management, physical planning, personnel management, economic statistics, tax administration and local government structure. Together the courses and attachments represented 114 man weeks. In 1988 the number of trainees rose to sixty-three, and carried behind them 567 man training months. This excludes the Masters training programme period for fifteen Zimbabwean students not indicated in the SIDA report. Correspondingly, the range of courses and Swedish institutions providing training has widened. Courses included office machine repairs, teacher training, applied technical maintenance, foundry work, industrial electricity and public administration.³² This development represent a new policy front with far wider implications for Sweden, the U.K., Canada, U.S.A., and the recipients.

Although the mechanics of these training and attachment programmes are not yet fully known, a few points appear to be quite certain. The number of trainees is progressively increasing. SIDA or the Swedish Institute has assumed additional responsibilities in the placement of students and student welfare. This role is identical to that of the British Council. In this policy SIDA is pursuing, both directly and indirectly, a programme of cultural diplomacy. Trainees are going to be exposed to Swedish industrial and public administration culture as much as they would have been exposed in Canada or Australia. This aspect is important for Sweden's long term trading relationship with recipient countries. As far as ~~we~~ recipients are concerned, this part represents a new dimension in their donor-recipient relationship. It has opened up another training front and could provide more overseas training opportunities. Donor countries that have previously housed SIDA funded staff development training programmes should expect progressive cuts in the number of SIDA sponsored students. The accent on competition against other donors is quite evident. Another way of looking at this development is simply that SIDA has chosen to fall into line with trends in foreign assistance.³³

9.4 SAREC

Since establishment in 1972 SAREC has played a key role in promoting research activities in developing countries. Its

activities are important in the task of attempting to measure the total sum of SIDA's development aid activities. A trace of SAREC's activities are also important in attempts to see Swedish aid in a broader perspective.

SAREC's assistance to development research has covered a very wide spectrum of subject areas in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The subject areas have ranged from religion to land nationalisation, health planning, and a survey of the working capacity of Liberian males suffering anaemia of chronic malaria.³⁴ The investment into these programmes has been enormous as some of the projects have had a life span of several years. At the centre of SAREC's assistance have been a number of Swedish academic or research institutions which cooperate with their counterparts in developing countries. Part of the link arrangement here has involved the acceptance of doctoral students from cooperating developing countries at Swedish institutions to do research.

In 1978 Swedish institutions had research contacts with more than 79 developing countries. This cooperation has been concentrated on mainly SIDA's programme countries, as Table 26 shows.

Table 26

The Number of Swedish institutions Cooperating
with Developing Countries

<u>Country</u>	<u>No. of Swedish Coop' Institutions</u>
India	40
Tanzania	30
Kenya	29
Ethiopia	26
Nigeria	21
Pakistan	12
Egypt	11
Mozambique	2
Vietnam	4
Guinea-Bissau	4
Cuba	6

Source: SAREC (1978, 147)

At that time the balance of institution contacts tilted more towards Africa (54%), mainly in Central and Southern Africa. It is important to note that besides SAREC funded research a small number of research activities are supported by the Swedish business community. Today SAREC has an office in Harare, a mark of a decentralisation process and possibly increased activities.

The significance of SAREC's research activities lies in their coverage of subject areas and their implications for Sweden as a donor country. In helping to solve some of the problems in developing countries through research, SAREC has in the process built up vast knowledge for Sweden. This is important for Sweden's broader relations with the outside world. Consultants often find it useful information. The cooperation schemes also serve a useful function of being entry points for Swedish interests in the programme countries.

9.5 Broader Cooperation Framework

Sweden's approach in Africa was a decade ago described as 'an approach which combines big business operations with one of the most idealistic aid programmes'.³⁵ Sweden's business interests in Africa date back to the 1950s when Sweden and Liberia jointly owned and ran Lamco. Since then the boundaries of Swedish business interests in Africa have crossed many borders. Swedish companies have been

interested in specific as well as general industrial projects and investments in Africa. Swedish companies were keen to take part in the planned extensions of the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric Scheme in Mozambique.³⁶ There are now two types of Swedish business presence in developing countries, the direct investment subsidiary companies of transnationals, and the joint ventures under the financing arrangements of Swedfund. The latter are generally small scale operations.

Among the Swedish transnational companies that have been operating in developing countries are the following: Saab-Scania, Volvo, Tetra Pak, Sweco, Svenska Rayon, Ericsson, SKF, Sandvik, Atlas Copco, Stal, Cellwood Machinery, Artin-Kores, Emahart Teckni, Skega, Stafsjo Bruk, and Smedmark.³⁷ This list represents a whole wide range of products and services. In economic and commercial terms the list represents Sweden's partial competition against rival products and services. Volvo trucks have to compete against Leyland-Daf, Mercedes Benz, Renault or Fiat trucks. Where does this all fit in SIDA's aid business?

Although only a small percentage of Swedish bilateral aid is tied, it is common knowledge that almost 50 per cent of aid returns to Sweden through purchases and service payments. Therefore the Swedish aid represents commercial and trade opportunities in overseas countries for Swedish companies.

SIDA is not only aware of this fact, but has also made arrangements within its structure to facilitate the companies' access to new trading markets where they do not exist yet. Through the same arrangements recipients are able to get access to Swedish suppliers through SIDA's purchasing department.³⁸ Some Swedish companies have won large contracts in SIDA's overseas aid projects.³⁹ What emerges here is a strong pointer that the Swedish companies may not be as distant from their country's overseas aid as people might think. But how close is aid to education and training to this reality?

It is important to note that aid to education is nothing but essentially money to be spent on project goods and services. It can be the purchase of hardware or the engagement of short-term feasibility study consultants. The larger the proposed aid investment in education and its projects, the more likely that Swedish companies would feel inclined to bid for contracts. Aid to education is perceived by Swedish companies in terms of its potential to provide contracts and openings for marketing Swedish products and services. The consulting services of such companies as the Inter-Science Group, and Winblad AB have been highlighted in the subsequent chapters. Other factors being equal, this makes aid to education as attractive to Swedish companies as aid to aspects of industrial development.

The overall trade relationship between Sweden and African countries for example has shown a mixed profile. Table 27 makes an attempt to highlight the level of Swedish trade relationship with some African countries.

Table 27

Sweden's Volume of Foreign Trade (Exports) to Selected African Countries
and Years, 1974 - 1988

(Million US Dollars)

<u>Country</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>
<u>AFRICA</u>	<u>504</u>	<u>429</u>	<u>627</u>	<u>707</u>	<u>736</u>	<u>789</u>	<u>683</u>
Angola	11	14	27	66	26	21	30
Egypt	35	54	88	141	-	173	178
Ethiopia	5	5	15	13	30	46	54
Ghana	7	9	8	12	3	5	6
Kenya	21	13	24	34	16	31	31
Nigeria	27	71	123	120	63	34	40
South Africa*	134	97	91	180	188	106	7
Sudan	7	6	10	13	27	19	19
Zaire	10	6	18	11	9	14	23
Zambia	25	16	20	28	9	15	16
Zimbabwe	-	-	-	2	13	13	19
Tunisia	17	29	21	65	43	30	20
Tanzania	14	11	35	28	31	37	40
Morocco	35	55	36	66	49	68	87
Liberia	169	139	252	112	10	191	5
Mozambique	-	7	12	17	13	20	26

* Includes Custom Union member countries.

Source: IMF, The Direction of Foreign Trade Statistics, various years.

It will be noted that some countries such as Angola, Egypt, and Tanzania have shown consistency in the increase of their volume of trade with Sweden. The majority of the countries in Table 27 have had an erratic trade relationship with Sweden. Interestingly, it is the countries that are outside Sweden's aid framework, such as South Africa which have had the biggest volume of trade with Sweden. Another important feature in the table is the spread of Sweden's trading relationship. Though small in most of the countries Sweden has penetrated the markets of many developing countries. This feature reduces the economic force of the point about Sweden not having been a former colonial master. The spread of trading relationships today between the industrialised countries and the developing countries seems to have diminishing relevancy to the previous colonial relationships. Japan has demonstrated this quite ably in some African countries like Zambia.

SIDA's aid policy objectives must be seen within the overall context of Sweden's aid policy framework. The objectives for development aid laid down by the Swedish Parliament seek to promote growth of resources, economic and social equality, economic and political independence, and a democratic development of society in SIDA's programme countries. The philosophical underpinnings of these objectives are said to be found in Sweden's social and

political ideology of social liberalism, integration, solidarity, equality, justice and social security⁴⁰. Thus, Sweden's welfare state, and the corporate structure of the Swedish polity are also among its domestic factors that have influenced SIDA's overall development aid policy. From these objectives it is easy to see the origins of Swedish aid policy objectives in the education sector.

What emerges here are a number of explanatory points about Sweden's development assistance and its perception of the developing countries. Development assistance is intended to be used as intervention in recipients' social political and economic systems to influence the development process. The need to internationalise ideologies and other concepts regarded as fundamental in Swedish society is very evident. This is one of the major weakness in Swedish aid. Recipient countries are not completely devoid of their own ideologies and other values on which they would like to develop their own societies. Though SIDA's principles imply a more contributive role, that is, engaging recipient governments on their policies in order to influence them, pre-conceived aid objectives and their principles tend to be the first obstacle recipients have to face in their efforts to create a development process based on recipient values. Yet, in the same breath it is said that SIDA's aid is intended to enhance self-reliance for the recipient countries. This does not reconcile with SIDA's aid intervention which is

intended to develop societies in the programme countries which are compatible with Swedish social and political ideologies. The premise of Swedish development aid here is rather flawed and contradictory, yet it is the best justification Sweden could use to win public support for aid.

The specific aid policy objectives call for closer scrutiny. Sweden's claim that it seeks to better the social and economic conditions of the economically poor countries must be examined against the choice of programme countries. In Africa none of the low-income semiarid countries, Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Niger or Somalia have ever been on SIDA's aid list. Yet their economic and social indicators make them more worthy candidates for aid than countries like Botswana⁴¹. In terms of the public criteria set for giving aid Botswana seems to occupy an odd position on SIDA's list. A few examples illustrate this point. Botswana's GDP annual average growth rate for the 1973-1984 period was 10.7 per cent. Only five countries in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa managed to get a 5.0 per cent growth rate or better in the same period⁴². Perhaps, Botswana qualifies for Swedish aid on account of being a Frontline state. Since 1982 Botswana has maintained the highest international reserves among the SIDA programme countries (1982-1986). Table 28 attempts to give some insight into the economic and social positions of selected African countries.

Table 28

Social and Economic indicators in selected African Countries 1985

Country	Population (Million)	Adult Literates (%)	GNP* per Capita	Foreign Reserves (US \$ m)	External Debt. (US \$ bn)	Debt/ Export Ratio	Total ODA per Capita (US \$)
Algeria	-	-	2590	2672	15.33	108.7	
Angola	9	41.0	-	-	2.70	-	10.1
Benin	4	25.9	270	4	0.82	310.3	23.9
Botswana	1	70.8	840	713	0.34	38.6	96.8
Burkina Faso	7	13.2	150	127	0.54	340.4	28.2
Cameroon	10	56.2	910	-	2.92	103.4	15.9
C.A.R.	3	40.2	290	-	0.34	190.4	34.9
Chad	5	25.3	-	-	0.18	184.2	36.3
Ethiopia	42	55.2	120	142	1.88	340.0	16.9
Gambia	1	25.1	230	2	0.25	279.5	50.1
Kenya	20	59.2	300	358	4.39	275.2	21.9
Lesotho	1	73.6	370	40	0.17	59.2	94.4
Malawi	7	41.2	160	41	1.02	362.5	16.1
Mali	7	16.8	180	21	1.48	581.2	54.2
Mozambique	13	38.0	210	-	-	-	23.0
Niger	6	13.9	260	125	1.20	479.3	50.7
Somalia	5	11.6	280	3	2.07	1622.0	70.7
Tanzania	21	-	250	15	3.88	983.4	23.1
Tunisia		-	1140	218	4.92	162.8	-
Uganda	15	57.3	230	-	1.16	310.6	12.2
Zambia	6	75.7	300	182	4.64	535.3	54.8
Zaire	30	61.2	160	188	5.89	293.3	10.8
Zimbabwe	8	74.0	620	112	2.20	168.7	29.6

NOTE

1. Bold = SIDA Programme Countries
2. * = 1986 data.

SOURCE: Compiled from World Bank, ECA and ADB documents, various years.

It is interesting to note from Table 28 that not only is Botswana in a favourable position in many areas, it has also the highest per capita aid. This suggests that there could be a less well known selection criterion being applied in the choice of programme countries. The table confirms also the earlier criticisms which have been levelled against SIDA on this issue⁴³. It would also seem from this finding that Swedish aid policy in respect of programme country choice is not very different after all from that of other donors.

Some of West Germany's aid recipient countries have similar characteristics. Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco are not low income nor are they debt distressed countries, yet the three countries account for a relatively high share of the total aid for the entire continent of Africa.⁴⁴ It has been observed that no correlation exists between the volume of West Germany's aid and the political and socio-economic orientation of the recipient countries.⁴⁵

Sweden would like it to be known that it is a different type of donor in many respects. However, indications are there that the differences in the core objectives between Sweden and other donors are gradually becoming thinner. Sweden is going to come under increasing pressure to respond to the events in the international development environment without the aid complex and restraint which has characterised SIDA's aid practices in the past.

9.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The major findings in this chapter are that SIDA has made important shifts in its aid policy to education and training in the twenty-eight years, since 1972 when the first education policy was published. The policy concentrated on two key areas: the target areas of assistance and the administrative and operational procedures for conducting aid business. The 1986 policy followed a similar pattern. It outlined the priority areas of support and also indicated the method and procedures to be employed.

SIDA is a case of an institution whose policies on aid to education have undergone rapid but careful and selective adjustments. Adherence to set priorities has been maintained with a measure of discretion reserved to deal with deserving cases.

The 1972 policy presented a set of thinking within the Swedish Parliament and SIDA which appear to have been overwhelmingly weighed down by ideology, domestic perception of education problems, and overreaction to the aid signals. Thus, the policy was characterised by a rather prescriptive and idealistic approach to education development issues. The internationalisation of Swedish development experiences were the guiding principles. This and the results from the

field quickly gave Sweden the vital lessons from the realities of the recipients' development environment. Consequently, development aid sights had necessarily to be adjusted.

The 1986 policy was therefore partly a product of the realism gained from the 1972 policy experiences. It was also as much a response to a wide ranging set of signals from the domestic and the external constituency. The policy has adopted an open approach and a more balanced position on some key education development issues. The specificity which marked the 1972 policy has been severely adjusted to make it a loose political and theoretical aid framework. Aid to education and training is perceived in a new light. Apart from the responses to the realities of the recipient's development environment, the 1986 policy has shown strong evidence of its response to the policies and practices of other donors in the aid community.

In this particular regard SIDA has adopted quite openly protectionist and image-projection methods in its assistance. Overseas training is one aspect which has been targeted for more Swedish participation than has been the case before. This has moved SIDA into a whole new area with far reaching implications and consequences for Sweden, other donors and the programme countries. One immediate implication is that a few Swedish education and training

institutions have been drawn to respond to SIDA's overseas aid commitments in providing training for staff development. Though presently small, this is SIDA's competition to which other donors like Britain must now stand. The decision to have a distinctive and perhaps more competitive Swedish profile in the technical assistance component of its projects is not particularly surprising, given the volume of aid funds involved, the growing internationalisation of Swedish higher education, and the considerable depth of experience of Swedish personnel and institutions in developing countries.

It can therefore be concluded that Swedish aid policy on education has undergone major shifts in some aspects while retaining a flexible stand on others. More importantly, SIDA appears to have moved its new policy into the orbit of international aid practices. There is a definite move to sharpen Swedish aid on all fronts and against other donors. It can also be said that since 1986 SIDA decided to face education and training development needs with an enlarged scope of assistance accompanied by some new rules of engagement. Seen in its broader perspective, SIDA's overall development aid of which the aid policy on education is part still retains a few contradictions. As SIDA moves out more to compete against other donors the more apparent the contradictions will become. SIDA's aid to education and training in Zambia is examined against the changes that have been discussed in this chapter.

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CHAPTRE TEN

SWEDISH AID TO EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN ZAMBIA

10.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyses Swedish aid to education and training in Zambia against SIDA's policy objectives and Zambia's development priorities. The discussion also examines the adequacy of the aspects of supplementary and displacement theories of aid.

Unlike Britain which had a long colonial relationship with Zambia, Sweden's aid relationship with Zambia started against a background of a weak trade relationship. Sweden has never been among the major trading partners of Zambia.¹ Sweden's presence in the Zambian industrial sector has for many years been mainly through the four subsidiary companies of large Swedish transnational companies, Ericsson, SKF, Sandvik, and Atlas Copco. These were direct investments outside the aid programme. The only company to emerge out of the aid initiatives has been the Zamseed joint venture. Other initiatives such as the attempt to set up a Volvo trucks assembly plant failed to materialise.²

Given this background it would be difficult to argue that Swedish aid has been shadowing Swedish commercial

investments. This trend is consistent with observed Swedish aid and investment behaviour in developing countries. The major recipients of Swedish investments are usually not on SIDA's list of aid recipients.³

10.2 Factors in SIDA's aid to Zambia

Six SIDA officials from the level of Deputy-Director General through to the Head of Education and programme officers were asked to identify factors which had exerted influence on Sweden's decision to give aid to Zambia. The responses to the structured interview and the verbal discussions revealed a blend of perspectives. The degree of agreement or rejection tended to vary on each question. However there was a common agreement that Swedish aid had been motivated by among other factors, the feeling that Sweden had the capability to provide development aid. The influence of cultural exchange factors, foreign policy objectives, as well as trade considerations yielded mixed responses, some said they had no influence at all while others said they had to some extent. This points to a suggestion that SIDA officials have not yet come to terms with the reality of aid business. There was also a reluctance among a few of them to officially commit themselves to a position which would compromise SIDA's declared public stand on these issues. The same kind of response was obtained when the same officials were asked if SIDA was engaged in attempts to counterbalance other donors' assistance in Zambia. The influence of

Zambia's education priorities on SIDA's decision were given a qualified agreement.⁴ The overall finding here seems to point to the suggestion that Swedish aid has been influenced by several factors other than the problems of development in the Zambian education system. In this way the aid policy can be said to be responding to multiple constituencies.

10.3 SIDA's Aid Structure

Support to education and training began in the early 1970s. The programme started with capital assistance to the University of Zambia and the Department of Technical Education and Vocational Training. The scope has now been enlarged and diversified, and consists of capital, technical and recurrent budget assistance.

10.3.1 Capital Aid

Capital assistance marked the first phase of SIDA's programme in Zambia. The University of Zambia received K1.2 million towards the total construction cost (K1.53m) of the School of Mines. In addition, the School received a further K0.57 million for research and teaching equipment.⁵ SIDA was also asked to provide a fully funded professor in hydrometallurgy to the School.⁶ The Swedish contribution to this project went well beyond supplementary support. At another level this project served to highlight the beginning of the Government's inability to finance capital projects without outside financial intervention.

Since then capital assistance to the University of Zambia has been extended to the School of Engineering in Telecommunications and Electronics, and in Land Surveying. The support to this project started in 1979 in Telecommunications and Electronics through an international link between the school and the Royal Institute of Technology of Stockholm (KTH) which oversees and services the link arrangements including equipment supply. The agreement provides for a SIDA employed lecturer, and a scholarship for staff development.⁷ Cooperation in this project is still running. The course programmes being supported by SIDA in this project represent an area in which the country has been facing an acute shortage of manpower.⁸

SIDA has also been providing aid to the Land Surveying degree programme at UNZA since 1982. The aid package has included the supply of laboratory equipment, staff development training, and providing technical assistance (teaching staff) on a limited basis.⁹ Again, it hardly needs mentioning that this is one area in which the relevance of the assistance given cannot be questioned.

However, the operationalisation of this support programme draws ones attention to a few issues. The cash contributions of SIDA in these projects is overwhelmingly predominant. In the 1988 SEK 1.764 million for the Electrical/Electronic engineering programme Zambia's

contribution amounted to only 1.4 percent. In the category of equipment purchase in which the Zambian share appeared, its contribution was 8.6 percent out of the SEK300,000 allocation.¹⁰ Is this another mark of the Government's declining capacity to finance capital projects or simply an aspect of an enthusiastic donor? Most likely both.

An examination of the equipment procurement for the projects reveals interesting comparative features. The orders for equipment, accessories and books worth SEK 96,270:81 in 1984 were placed with Swedish firms. The books were ordered from Almqvist & Wiksell, electronic instruments from the following: Luna AB, Sv Deltron AB, Gosta Backstrom AB, and from ELFA. The Land Survey programme is unlikely to have bought its equipment outside Sweden. In both cases, two Swedish institutions have been engaged as third parties to service the cooperation agreements. These are the KTH and the National Land Survey of Sweden (NLS). It is therefore not surprising that in purchasing equipment for Zambia they turn to their own industries.

This represents protectionism as well as commercial penetration at different levels. These purchases protected Swedish aid from slipping to other rival companies in other countries. It would seem it is for this reason that funds for the cooperation link arrangements are overseen by Swedish institutions rather than their counterparts in

Zambia. It is important to note also that the use of Swedish third parties in cooperation arrangements conveniently distances SIDA from the protectionist decisions such as the ones cited here. Through such purchases Swedish industrial plant penetration into new markets has been facilitated through aid channels. Although KTH and NLS have no express instructions to use SIDA money on Swedish products only, they are nevertheless expected to use their discretion 'wisely'. What comes out of these projects is therefore a whole host of educational and non-educational aspects. This behaviour is in no way peculiar to SIDA, many other donors exhibit it. Britain has a comparable universities link scheme which produces identical results.

Other major capital projects which SIDA has undertaken have included the construction and extension of the following institutions:

1. The Cooperative College
2. The Luanshya Technical and Vocational Teachers College
3. The Mpika College of Agriculture
4. The Lusaka College for Teachers the Handicapped
5. Chainama Hills Health Training Centre

It will be noticed that SIDA's capital assistance cuts across the three main sectors of agriculture, education and health. The assistance has also ranged from providing full

construction as in the case of LTVTC to extensions of existing facilities as was the case with the Chainama Health Training Centre. It has been the case that some of SIDA's capital projects have gone into institutions in which other donors are working on other aspects. The CHHTC which has just been cited is a good example. Belgian aid has been in that centre for many years.¹¹ In terms of manpower development each one of these institutions has been designed to play a special role. A discussion of capital assistance is incomplete without reference to technical assistance which often accompanies it.

10.3.2 Technical Assistance

This has been provided mainly in five forms, SIDA funded Swedish personnel, SIDA funded third country personnel, teaching assistants, Minor Field Study Swedish Students, and funding for staff development programme across all sectors being supported.

The fully funded staff have been employed in key posts where local manpower has been difficult to obtain. Lecturers have been provided at UNZA, LTVTC, Mpika College, and other experts have been seconded to the Ministry of Education under technical assistance arrangements. A second category of Swedish technical assistance has been the teaching assistants sent to work in the Department of Electrical and Electronic engineering and in the Land

Surveying programme. Although their numbers are very small in any academic year, the teaching assistants are said to be providing vital services, especially in recent years when the shortage of full time staff has been very acute.¹² A third category of assistance has been the provision of special teaching assistants under the auspices of the Minor Field Study (MFS) Programme. These have also been working in the University and other projects.

The MFS programme is a recent SIDA initiative in their own institutional capacity building programme. Its objectives are to stimulate the interest of younger people, especially those at colleges and universities in overseas development work. It provides financial grants for field studies in developing countries in which SIDA is working.¹³ Sectors in which SIDA is working are given priority in receiving the services of MFS assistants. Although SIDA has presented the MFS as a separate initiative, it is hard to believe that this is not part of the 1986 new policy initiatives, especially those aspects relating to new guidelines on technical assistance.

A more significant feature arising from this programme is that it appears to be a long term strategy by SIDA to build a pool of Swedish third world specialists and institutions.

The programme will be administered by colleges and universities with which SIDA will draw up special agreements. These organisations will constitute SIDA's institutional consultants.¹⁴

The parallel between this programme and the ODA programme is quite obvious. ODA has for a long time supported a programme of a similar kind, but involving experienced personnel who wish to go and work abroad. The programme marks changes in SIDA's aid in the late eighties and nineties.

SIDA has also been renowned for its role in generously funding staff development training programmes. A range of training programmes covering short-term courses to PhD programmes have been supported in diverse fields. The DTEVT has had the most large scale SIDA funded staff development programme. In the 1986/87 academic year 20 lecturers were studying in the UK and Ireland on SIDA scholarships. The programmes ranged from tourism to metal fabrication and electronics. Between 1982 and 1986 SIDA supported 98 man years of training for Zambians across twenty public organisations. Table 29 shows the extent of the coverage by subject areas:

Table 29**SIDA Funded Training Programmes in the U.K. by Field of Study and Sending Agency, 1982-1986**

<u>Field</u>	<u>Ministry/Organisation</u>
Psychiatric Nursing	Health
Agriculture	MAWD
Statistics	C.S.A.
Public Health	Health
Marketing and Export	Commerce and Industry
Lab. Technology	Geological Survey
Fiscal Studies	Finance
Accountancy	Lusaka District Council
Applied Entomology	MAWD
Food Science	Health
Pharmacy	National Drug Co.
Education	Education
Public Prosecution	Legal Affairs
Business Administration	Mwaiseni
Project Finance	Finance
Accountancy	Finance
Systems Analysis	Finance
Fiscal Studies	Finance
Further Education	NIPA
Food Science	Health
Development Administration	Commerce/Industry
Accountancy	NHDC
Development Administration	Finance
Technical Education Management	DTEVT
Further Education	NIPA
Further Education	NIPA
Education	MGEYS
Criminology	Home Affairs
Econometrics	NCDP
Curriculum Evaluation	MGEYS

Education Administration	MGEYS
Project Finance	Finance
English Language	Education
MBA	ZSBS
Purchasing & Supply	ZNWMC
Nursing Administration	Ndola District Council
Social Planning	NIPA
Higher Education	MHE
Agric. Economics	Indeco
Further Education	NIPA
Hotel Management	DTEVT
Development Administration	Mines
Timber Technology	Rucom Industries
Environmental Planning	NCDP
Education Planning	MGEYS
Architecture	Indeco
Land Resource Management	MAWD
Economics	NCDP
Occupational Health	Health
Management	Cabinet Office
Civil Engineering	LUDC
Public Health Nursing	Health
International Relations	UNIP
Mathematics	Education
Wildlife Management	MNLR
International Affairs	UNIP
Advanced Flying	Power and Transport
Management	MSB

Source: DMDT (1983).

There are two significant things about Table 29. One is the extent of the coverage of the sectors and the occupational categories, and the second is the fact that these courses were funded outside Sweden. The latter feature is contrary to most donor practices. It is even more interesting to note that during this period there was only a handful of Zambians studying in Sweden, only four in 1984.¹⁵ This is how far SIDA's generosity went on the overseas training front. However, as indicated earlier SIDA has taken steps to gradually alter this aspect, to place more overseas students in Swedish training institutions. This development appears to be closely related to the objective of the Minor Field Study (MFS) programme which was announced in 1985.

It is an undisputable fact that SIDA's assistance and that of other donors have shared the burden of propping up the Zambian education and training system. The short-term results in particular have been overwhelming. However, seen in terms of a long term strategy to build up the institutional capacity of Zambia, SIDA's policy on funding training is not supportive of that objective. It refuses to finance in-country training through the payment of direct fees, but will provide scholarships for training abroad.¹⁶ By refusing to fund local training programmes, especially at the University and associated colleges, the achievement of institutional capacity development is being delayed. The policy has for example delayed the development of many

postgraduate training programmes. The support for institutional capacity development must be on all fronts, which is not the case now. This can be attributed to donors' wish to protect their institutions against recipients' institutions, this argument is even stronger now that SIDA has adopted a new overseas student training policy.

Because of the declining public expenditure on education and training and its consequences for education provision and the quality of education, SIDA in recent years has paid more attention to providing quality enhancing inputs into the education and training system.

10.3.3. Recurrent Budget Assistance

This has been extended to cover many operational ministry requirements at both the headquarters and the sub-sectors. The grave situation which has given rise to this emphasis is depicted in Table 30 below.

Table 30

Public Recurrent Expenditure by Level of Education and Type
of Expenditure, 1970, 1980, 1985, 1986
(in constant 1970 Kwacha Million)

Expenditure	1970	1980	1985	1986
Administration:				
Personal emoluments	1.60	1.61	2.11	2.03
Duty travel	0.64	0.28	0.25	0.19
General & Other expenses	1.18	0.75	0.32	0.56
Sub-total	3.42	2.64	2.68	2.78

Primary Schools:				
Personal emoluments	15.33	18.59	17.92	15.28
Teaching materials	4.53	0.56	0.33	0.00
General expenses		1.00	0.50	0.54
Sub-total	19.66	20.15	18.75	15.62

Secondary Schools:				
Personal emoluments	6.73	6.46	4.15	4.41
Teaching materials	5.40	0.46	0.72	0.00
Boarding costs		2.24	2.85	2.93
General expenses		0.82	0.41	0.41
Sub-total	12.03	9.98	8.12	7.75

Teacher Training:				
Personal emoluments	0.56	0.74	0.37	0.60
Teaching materials		0.06	0.04	0.04
Transfers to students	0.76	0.41	0.42	0.48
General expenses		0.17	0.09	0.18
Sub-total	1.32	1.38	0.92	1.30

Technical Education:				
Personal emoluments	n.a.	1.52	1.43	1.25
Teaching materials	n.a.	0.19	0.07	0.09
Transfers to students	n.a.	0.60	0.49	0.44
General expenses	n.a.	0.93	0.44	0.50
Sub-total	2.25	3.24	2.43	2.28

University:				
Operating grant	3.54	4.77	5.46	5.67
Bursaries for students	0.62	0.87	2.33	2.44
Sub-total	4.16	5.64	7.79	8.11

TOTAL	42.84	43.03	40.69	37.84

n.a. not available

Source: Fägerlind, I. et al. (1989)

The sharp decline in expenditure on teaching materials is very evident in the primary, secondary teacher training and technical education sectors. Personal emoluments too have also shown a consistent decline in all sectors except the University. For the secondary school and the technical education sectors, the decline may also be attributed to the high turnover of expatriate staff.

The provision of qualitative aid inputs has taken many forms, including staff development across the sector. Since the beginning of the 1980s SIDA has provided the MGEC headquarters with operational equipment, other materials and funding for staff training. Equipment has included typewriters, calculators, copiers and vehicles. Staff, mainly inspectors and education officers, have benefited from SIDA funded overseas training. The courses have ranged from educational planning to project financing undertaken in London and Paris.¹⁷ The mobile education planning training programme which has been undertaken across the country would not have succeeded without the transport support from SIDA. Study visits to neighbouring countries by senior education officers have formed part of the assistance programme. In 1987 SIDA supported a feasibility study aimed at finding ways of improving data processing at the MGEC headquarters. In all, it is technical assistance, staff development programmes for Zambian personnel and the provision of equipment that have formed the core of SIDA's assistance to the Ministry headquarters.

Educational materials assistance in the primary school sector has been concentrated on the provision of the following: text-books, exercise books, teachers handbooks, maps and desks.

The desk programme began in 1980, in response to the acute shortage and wear of desks that had built up over many years through lack of financial resources to replace old furniture and the sheer lack of timely restorative maintenance. Between 1982 and 1985 over 100,000 two seater desks were provided to primary schools in all provinces.¹⁸ The programme represented almost 90.0 percent of the total assistance voted for education materials by SIDA, and has represented over 50.0 percent of the education sector support (ESSP) in some years.¹⁹ The desks have been distributed at enormous cost. Following the recommendations of a consultant in 1985 on the desk programme, the provinces are now responsible for the production of desks with SIDA support.

Like the desk programme the books assistance programme has been addressed to a particular need in the internal efficiency of the system. Under this programme SIDA in cooperation with FINNIDA have been assisting Zambia in producing textbooks, teachers handbooks and exercise books which have been in short supply.

The crisis which Zambia has been facing with regard to teaching and learning materials has already been discussed in Chapter 3 part II. SIDA's financial input into this programme has been very substantial. As Table 31 shows, between 1984 and 1989 this programme came second to the desk programme in financial allocation.

Table 31

Swedish Aid Allocation in Education, 1984-1989.

(in Million SEK)

<u>Programme</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>
Educ. Materials	6000	5800	4100	9200	17900	13300
Desk Programme	8200	17207	15150	2500	3000	4000
Planning Unit	1524	2645	3135	3000	3369	5450
SHAPE/Teacher Train.	655	92	2000	2500	4097	5375
DTEVT	720	1911	12600	2564	3600	6500
Special Educ.	3484	3294	4169	3112	3180	4500
UNZA	3480	3352	3062	2614	5700	6700
Unallocated	2137	-	226	-	-	-
<hr/>						
<u>Total Allocations</u>	<u>26200</u>	<u>34301</u>	<u>34342</u>	<u>26490</u>	<u>40746</u>	<u>45825</u>

Source: Fägerlind, I. et al. (1989).

Although the books programme was recently criticised for operating without a clear target of the total need in the system,²⁰ the assistance has been very vulnerable. Its scale underlines the magnitude of the problem being addressed.

The Self-Help Action Plan for Education (SHAPE) has its origins from the education reform movement of 1974. The reforms advocated among other new changes the notion of resource based learning, resource teachers and innovations in curriculum and method.²¹ The reform document endorsed also the need to establish resource centres around the country. Beginning with a church sponsored College resource centre the Ministry of Higher Education sought foreign aid to establish more resource centres throughout the country. The centres introduced techniques of do-it-yourself production of educational materials and apparatus. Local support and recommendations of 1984 study by Coombe, T. and Lauvas, P. gave the initiative an extra boost. A 1985 study by Coombe, T. and Hoppers, W. and a locally-based team enlarged the scope of self-help activities in education by pointing out the need to integrate the various school activities such as the FINNIDA supported practical subjects activities and school production activities. With the support of SIDA and NORAD a more comprehensive scope of self-help enterprise (SHAPE) aimed at promoting qualitative aspects in the system was launched.

The programme started in 1987 with an initial allocation of SEK 2.5 million.²² NORAD too provided financial support. SHAPE has since its establishment been involved in organising the teacher resource centres at colleges and in schools, the development of school production units, and training seminars and workshops for teachers in all regions. Donor support has enabled the programme to purchase field and workshop equipment which has included, bicycles, motorcycles, motor vehicles, duplicators, and typewriters. In a carefully worked arrangement the provision of equipment has been used as an incentive. In order to qualify for the provision of equipment school and college communities are required to raise local resources through self-help activities to support the operations, maintenance, and sustainability of the SHAPE activities. The response to these conditions from the local schools and colleges has been very positive and supportive. Thus significant achievements have been made in creating a strong spirit of self-reliance, self-sacrifice and enthusiasm in SHAPE activities. A recent evaluation of the SHAPE project has indicated that despite there being a few operational problems, SHAPE is firmly on the ground and that it should continue to operate.²³ Several recommendations have been made to help adjust and firm the SHAPE activities.

Given the effective integration of donor inputs and local efforts and the strong commitment of the organisers, the

short-term achievements have not come as a surprise. The SHAPE programme is being run by Zambians and so far education recurrent funding by the government for its activities has been minimal. This should encourage further the development of self-reliance. Overall, SHAPE has been recommended for continued support by all the recent evaluation studies and suggestions for improvement have also been made.²⁴ Because SHAPE has only been in existence for a short period of less than four years, the real test of its standing as a self-action plan of activities is yet to come. In the meantime SIDA's financial support to SHAPE has provided valuable start-up inputs which are being provided within the framework of the SHAPE guidelines. This should be regarded as the first achievement. The second achievement will require SIDA to gradually disengage its financial support to give SHAPE an opportunity to prove that it can stand on its own feet. This will be the most difficult test for Zambia. The tendency to seek outside intervention at the sight of a problem will be tested here. It would therefore be wise for Zambia at this stage to show a clear commitment to phasing out donor support from SHAPE. At the moment this commitment is not explicit. Zambia could consider a phased withdrawal of donor support from particular aspects of the programme. This would give SHAPE the test it will have to face sooner or later.

Following the recommendations of the 1983 Fägerlind report, SIDA started funding a multi-grade schools pilot project. The objective is to make the organisation and operation of the scattered small ungraded primary schools in rural areas more efficient and economical. Since then funds have been provided for re-training the teachers for the project schools and for the provision of back-up school requisites, books and desks.²⁵ The project which started with four schools in the Mkushi district has now been extended to cover more than 165 schools. A recent evaluation of the project found that the operation of the system still faced problems associated with the remote location of the schools.²⁶ The other specific problems were that, the college that had been designated to house and run the multigrade teaching had failed to successfully integrate this mode of teaching into the mainstream of its teacher training programme. The District Education Officers however saw the multigrade system mainly as a means of upgrading the ranking status of the schools. Despite these problems the project has been successful in initiating good community-school relations and teachers have shown a strong commitment to it.

The multigrade school project demonstrates the multifaceted nature of donor projects. The project is within the boundaries of the SIDA aid objectives, especially its interests in promoting development in rural areas. That

from four pilot schools the project has been extended to over 165 schools with many of them being upgraded in the process is a measure of success for all parties concerned. More children are able to attend school in a reorganised and resourceful system. SIDA has not introduced any new extraordinary pedagogy, but money and resources which has motivated people to act and see things. The other side of the project is that it demonstrates the level of inability by the Zambian Government to act independently without donors' aid intervention. Zambians did not display the necessary initiative but have nevertheless responded very well.

A more recent project funded by SIDA is the pilot self-help schools, project in Petauke district in the Eastern Province of Zambia. The background to the project is this. As a response to the mounting social demand for school places and also aware of the stark financial difficulties facing the Government, the communities with the encouragement of the Government began building self-help schools. The MGEC Buildings Section produced basic guideline plans to assist communities in their efforts. Minimum safety requirements were demanded of new buildings being put up or old ones being converted. By 1984 the number of self-help schools, especially junior basic Secondary Schools had reached its peak.²⁷ Northern Province recorded the highest number of self-help schools. A major start in real self-reliance had

once again begun, and communities understood very well that the development of auxiliary school facilities had become their responsibility. Gradually, communities had awakened, and were beginning to ask relevant questions which indicated they knew the business they were in. Nor did they pretend that self-help schemes were easy.²⁸

Soon SIDA and the African Development Bank became interested in Zambia's self-help efforts. After some discussions with the MGEC officials SIDA's interest manifested itself in sponsoring a study tour of SIDA supported self-help schools in Ethiopia by two MGEC personnel and an external consultant. This was quickly followed by a pre-feasibility study of the sample districts, Katete and Petauke.²⁹ Three models of self-help schemes, the 'total self-help', the 'community-oriented' and the 'government oriented' were all considered. SIDA has opted for the community oriented model, i.e. aided self-help.³⁰ In this model local communities and PTA receive some material and financial support. The project was formally started in 1989 and is to be evaluated in two years time.

At the economic level the self-help project could be argued as simply another exit point for surplus Swedish financial resources. It has provided overseas consultancy work for a Swedish firm, Winblad Konsult AB. In Zambia the project has provided ground for research for the University of Zambia

and will also contribute to sustaining some levels of employment in Zambia in the sectors that will be engaged to supply materials to the project.

On the one ~~hand~~ it is perhaps not hard to imagine why the MGEC should have agreed to external intervention in these self-help schools. Aid has the ability to deliver quicker results. This is important especially in Zambia's present depressed economic circumstances and the effects it has had on the education sector.³¹ There are also other benefits associated with the project from which the MGEYS could benefit, the availability of transport vehicles at the Ministry headquarters or in Katete and Petauke could assist the operations of the Ministry in several ways. But these are likely to be short term benefits. Both the ADB and SIDA support to the self-help schools should initially be seen in this light.

Like any other donor supported project the pilot self-help schools have two profiles, the Zambian and the aid profile. An analysis of the Zambian profile has been given. It has shown that the schools are just a manifestation of the current problems the sector is facing and the attempts it is making to solve them. The aid profile is an extension of this local manifestation, but requires its own analysis. The donors support to self-help schools should also be seen in the context of Zambians making their own efforts to solve

their problems, and the long term perspective of the need to give the Zambians an opportunity to face the challenges of their development single handedly. In this light the wisdom of the MEGEYS and the donors to give assistance to self-help schools is questionable. The fact that the MGEYS gave consent to the donors to give aid does not exonerate them from what appears to be a bad judgement and decision by all parties concerned. After all, isn't the difficult times the best time to test the endurance and resourcefulness of the people?

SIDA's increasing participation and spread in the field of education and training can be discerned from comparing the Government expenditure on capital and recurrent functions against that of SIDA's financial commitments in the various education and training related fields across all sectors.

Table 32

GRZ/SIDA SHARE IN FUNDING SECTOR TRAINING RELATED
ACTIVITIES, 1988 (Kwacha).

<u>PROJECT/ACTIVITY</u>	<u>GRZ</u>	<u>SIDA</u>
Teacher Res. Centres	-	700,000
Special Education	-	940,000
DTEVT Headquarters	100,000	2,500,000
ZIT	-	2,564,000
MGEC (Planning Unit)	-	3,900,000
Educ. Broadcasting	400,000	300,000
MLNR Training Programme	-	568,000
Cooperative College	-	1,376,000
MAWD Training Colleges	-	2,970,000
" " "	-	338,000
Research - Seeds	1,000,000	1,550,000
Research - Soils	200,000	1,500,000
Research - Crops	-	3,300,000
NRDC	-	1,160,000
Lima Extension Training	-	2,450,000

NOTE: GRZ = Government of the Republic of Zambia.

Source: GRZ (1988, 379) Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure.

It is obvious from Table³² that SIDA has had a far greater responsibility in funding training activities than the government. To the Zambian government the table is yet another illustration of the financial difficulties which have mounted over the last decade. The anatomy of the system is laid bare here to show how dependent it is on foreign aid support.

The demands on SIDA to increase and widen its support have continued. In 1987 the acting Chief Inspector of Schools (MGEC) presented SIDA with a long catalogue of areas in need of assistance.³² The items included four-wheel drive vehicles for school inspection work, chemicals for science teaching, kilns, looms, resources for locally organised seminars, funds for overseas seminars for inspectors, spinning and weaving equipment, and leatherwork machinery. In the same year the University of Zambia presented its needs proposals for consideration to SIDA.³³ Their list was for the general institutional support in the following areas: staff development and retention, library services, and the local production of lecture notes and reprinting of textbooks. Specific requests were for training scholarships in Engineering, Medicine Environmental Studies, and Natural Sciences. There was also a request for staff supplementation to help retain senior staff. SIDA has already responded by accepting to supplement salaries of third world country lecturers in the University.³⁴ The

Swedes and Zambians are not eligible for this facility. The request from the Library was for subscription to the journals. The request for 1988 from DTEVT included funds for the following purposes, book allowances, seminars, TVTC library books, and library books for all DTEVT colleges.³⁵

Even against the support of a single donor the Zambian education and training system has exhibited characteristics of a system that is just barely making it operationally. The operational difficulties are many and widespread, but have only been made less disabling by the intervention of external aid. The financial difficulties produced by the economic crisis are quite obvious in this case. But, how do the economic theories of aid attempt to explain the situation facing the Zambian education and training sector? A full description of the theories and their basis is given in chapter two.

10.4 The Supplementary Theory

The key precepts of this theory are that aid is perceived to be a vital supplementary resource in the economic growth and development of recipient countries.³⁶ The function of aid is seen as that of supplementing domestic savings and especially providing much needed foreign exchange in the recipient economy. The maintenance of a good level of investment is one of the goals to be derived from aid by recipients.

The assumptions in the theory are that the recipient country will have an economy and a performance which can derive benefits from the infusion of foreign aid. These conditions existed in Zambia in the immediate period following the country's attainment of independence until the mid 1970s. The Government then had sufficient financial resources to invest into many major capital projects. In the education and training sector the government undertook the expansion of facilities with very little external capital aid, as discussed already in chapter three. Hence, aid concentrated in those areas for which the government could not provide easily, such as skilled manpower. Aid filled up the deficits but it is doubtful if it helped Zambia make any significant domestic savings. Therefore, one could only say with caution that a supplementary aid relationship existed then in certain areas of Zambia's development process.

It is true also that since the mid 1970s the problem of foreign exchange shortages which the government has been experiencing has only been eased by the intervention of external aid as illustrated by SIDA's much higher financial contribution to the projects. From this it is quite clear that aid has in recent years assumed a much larger responsibility than providing supplementary aid in the sense in which the theorists intended.

Although Zambia's total share of government expenditure is still far greater than donors' especially by virtue of salary payments, the supplementary argument cannot still hold because of the following points. It is common knowledge that donors have on a number of occasions helped Zambia to raise counterpart funds, even salaries of teachers have received indirect donor inputs through a rather complicated process. Therefore the government share of general budget support may not in fact be 100.0 percent after all. It is therefore difficult to explain donors' contributions and the role their aid is playing in purely supplementary terms. Distortions have occurred right across the aid spectrum. And, on the one hand, donor decisions to give aid are not motivated by needy situations alone. Other considerations such as political influence and cultural diplomacy have been shown to be just as important in other donors' aid portfolio. Zambia's economic situation, on the other hand, has been devastated and reduced to a level where aid in certain operations is the only means of ensuring continuity in the operations.

Ideally, the act of supplementation should focus on joint funded projects in which the ratio of financial contributions could be worked more realistically. This may require Zambia to fix a percentage share for donors' participation in local projects. Clear and firm policies and a strong economy are important prerequisites. These are absent in the present circumstances.

10.5 The Displacement Theory

This theory believes the transfer of external resources to the recipient's development process inhibits the dynamic process of change in developing countries. It points out that from an economic point of view aid does not enhance the capacity to mobilise domestic resources. Quite the contrary, aid is said to have the effect of easing the pressure on recipients, so that they feel less inclined to make the efforts themselves.³⁷

SIDA's support to the self-help schools project must be seen against these theoretical assumptions. As pointed out earlier external aid to this particular community initiated project threatens to stall or completely remove the motivation in the community to find solutions to their problems. The project answers also the assumptions that aid introduces alien values and patterns of organisation. The notion of externally aided self-help is alien and somewhat contradicts the very principles and spirit of self-help initiatives. Implicit in SIDA's and the MGEYS's decision is a grave doubt regarding the potential of the Zambian communities and Parent and Teachers Associations (PTA) to undertake development projects alone. The element of displacement exists in every aspect of external aid given to Zambia, because technically aid represents Zambia's opportunity cost.

10.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The main areas of discussion in this chapter have been as follows. Unlike Britain whose colonial relationship with Zambia had created and left a political and economic framework within which the post-independence aid relationship has been conducted, Sweden's aid relationship with Zambia began against a weak trading relationship and a small Swedish economic presence in Zambia. This status exists even today. Therefore the assumptions that aid follows donors' economic investments cannot be generalised. However, this case should be seen in the light of Sweden's long term aid strategy in the programme countries.

Sweden's decision to assist Zambia has been influenced by a number of factors. Although the level of agreement among SIDA officials has tended to differ on the factors and the degree to which each one of them exerts influence, the available evidence suggests that Swedish aid like that of other donors is intended to respond to Swedish foreign policy, economic and other objectives. SIDA is an agency under the MFA after all.

Swedish aid to education and training in Zambia has included capital assistance, technical assistance in the form of manpower supply and the funding of training programmes for Zambians, and in recent years it has included the provision

of recurrent budgetary assistance. The balance among these components has tended to vary. In the 1970s SIDA had big capital projects, in the 1980s these gave way to more projects emphasising the provision of qualitative inputs into the system. However, an analysis of the balance in each subsector is likely to show slightly different patterns depending on the major needs of each one of them.

Although officially Swedish aid to education is not tied, this study has found that SIDA projects at UNZA have procured equipment and books mainly from Sweden. UNZA's cooperating and overseeng Swedish counterparts have not breached any SIDA policy or regulation by buying Swedish products for UNZA. The finding nonetheless draws attention to a discreet practice of protectionism by SIDA's appointed link scheme cooperants. Gradual market penetration is being achieved through the spread of Swedish equipment and technology in the Zambian market. Swedish technology is being offered as a competitive alternative to Zambia's future market-the graduates from engineering and technical colleges. It is therefore fair to say that alongside SIDA's generous aid policy a very careful strategy is being carried out to utilise aid channels for entries of Swedish commercial presence in Zambia. The attempt to establish a Volvo truck assembly plant in the '1970s is one case in point.

The coverage of subsectors which started with capital projects at UNZA and in the DTEVT in the 1970s has now been extended. The list now includes formal regular primary education, special education, teacher education, and special projects such as the SHAPE. Although SIDA's policy emphasises the need to support basic primary education, its assistance in Zambia has shown that some graduated balance has been maintained, with more going into primary education and its related services.

Technical assistance from SIDA has been concentrated in three components. The provision of Swedish and other specialists appointed to work in special tasks in SIDA supported Zambian institutions. The Swedish teaching assistants at UNZA form another group. They are the equivalent of the British cadets who came to teach in Zambia alongside the regular British volunteers and expatriates in the 1960s. The third group comprises the Minor Field Study students. The MFS programme is for Sweden's own internal organisational development as much as it is a response to other donors' practices. The element of sharpening SIDA's development aid competitiveness against other donors appears evident in this programme.

Assistance to staff training programmes stands out as one of the most outstanding aspects of Swedish aid to Zambia. It has been shown that a very wide variety of professions and

trades across many sectors have been supported. The key features in this programme has been SIDA's inclusion of training components in its projects, and the liberal approach to the selection of overseas training locations, contrary to the practice of most donors. And for a long time SIDA's assistance has been based on Zambia's articulated needs in the sectors and projects rather than SIDA's own pre-selected areas. Although SIDA supports the need to strengthen the institutional capacity of Zambia through training, Ironically SIDA has strong objections to paying fees for Zambian students enrolled at UNZA regardless of the nature of the training programme.

The consequences of the economic crisis on education in the last decade has made SIDA to come under increasing pressure from Zambia to give more aid in many areas where the Government cannot provide sufficient budgetary allocations. SIDA's response has been to give more qualitative inputs into the system in those areas that are covered by aid agreements.

SIDA's assistance to the self-help schools has drawn much attention in this study because of SIDA's lack of genuine sensitivity to local community development initiatives. It has been pointed out that the decision to aid self-help schools threatens to deny the communities a chance to try their initiative capacities to the limits of their abilities.

Both SIDA and the MGEC are guilty of opportunism in this pilot project.

Putting Zambia's present economic situation into the economic aid theoretical perspective, the findings of this study has observed that the supplementary aid theory is today inadequate to stand up to the critical economic circumstances enveloping many developing countries such as Zambia. The theory's assumptions about aid going to enhance the generation of domestic savings has been caught up in the flexible reinterpretation of the objectives of aid today. The need to provide supplementary resources is not the only criterion donors follow in their aid decisions. At another level SIDA's decision to aid the self-help schools would seem to confirm the assumptions of the displacement theory. But, on the other hand Zambia's economic performance has shown that there is very little to be displaced by aid.

Thus, in conclusion it can be said that the relevance of SIDA's aid to education and training must be measured in the context of economic performance and the consequences it has had on the development of the social sectors such as education. The multiple needs in the system have in particular made it difficult for Zambia to project an order of priorities. Consequently, every assistance has turned out to be 'essential' to the survival of the system. Over the last two and half decades SIDA's assistance to education

had grown and has been diversified. Attempts to respond to particular needs arising from the consequences of the impact of the present economic crisis in education have thus dominated SIDA's aid. However, on developmental grounds both SIDA and the MGEC have been found lacking in sensitivity and critical judgement in the decisions to aid some of the projects.

SIDA's conduct of its aid in Zambia has revealed important parallels between SIDA's practices and those of other donors. Would this aspect make it easier for SIDA and other donors to coordinate aid or indeed to be coordinated? These issues are discussed in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

COORDINATION ASPECTS IN EDUCATION AID MANAGEMENT

11.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines coordination in education aid management in the present overall aid management framework in Zambia. The analysis focuses on the following: the assumptions on coordination in the current debate, the institutional arrangements for educational aid management, the views of both Zambian officials and donors on coordination, and the present 'New Economic Recovery Programme' initiative to create an External Assistance Department (EAD). Cooperation and coordination is analysed in the context of the exchange and power-dependency theoretical assumptions.

11.2 The Debate and Assumptions

Donor cooperation and aid coordination have received attention throughout the recent history of development aid mainly from the donor countries themselves. In 1970 less formal meetings were held at Montebello (Canada) and Ditchley Park (UK) to precede a formal conference at Heidelberg (W. Germany).¹ The conference discussed ways of improving aid business. Information exchange, consultation between donors and recipients, and aid coordination were the main subjects of discussion.

Since the mid 1980s there has been renewed interest in the issues concerning donor cooperation and aid coordination. In 1986 the European donor agencies held a conference in London to share experiences and to show each other their preferred areas of aid concentration.² Subsequent conferences have been held in Ireland (1987) and the Netherlands (1988). At the multilateral level the World Bank has taken several initiatives to organise aid coordination meetings on behalf of member states. Ghana had such a meeting organised for it in 1986 in Vienna.³ In the follow up to the Education in Sub-Saharan Africa policy paper the Bank organised similar meetings at regional level. The economic adjustment programme being implemented in many Sub-Saharan countries has also put a new accent on the need for these countries to have effective aid coordination institutions.

The major criticism in the debate has been that there has been weak or ineffective aid coordination in recipient countries.⁴ Recipient countries receiving aid from diverse sources are said to face an exceptionally difficult task in coping with the problems of aid management, both at the central government and at the sector level. It has been observed, particularly, that recipients' administrative and management institutions are inadequately equipped to cope with additional demands put on them by donors. This has been blamed for reducing the impact of aid on solving problems.

An adequately equipped and staffed aid management institution, and a cooperative donor community are considered as being absolutely essential. It has also been implied in some quarters that a cooperative relationship between donors would be easy to obtain. The whole issue of aid coordination has been approached from a western donor perspective. In the recent meetings held no representatives from the Eastern bloc countries ever attended them.

There are facts, fictions and exaggerations in some of the criticisms. For example, it is not entirely true that donors do not cooperate. In the modern day aid business some form of cooperation between and among donors is inevitable. Cooperation in such areas as project identification, feasibility studies, evaluation of projects, joint financing and staff recruitment for projects already exists in different degrees.⁵ However, cooperation in these circumstances usually operates at what can be called 'non critical' levels. The relationships are ad hoc, purpose-specific and usually short-term. Cooperation of this kind does not involve decision making in the field which could compromise the interests of the individual donor agencies. Despite what has been described here, cooperation among donors has not completely eliminated competition.

11.3 Coordination: The Zambian Views

The tone of the Zambian officials on this subject was set in this statements: 'For quite sometime now the Party and its

Government have been worried that most of the benefits have been lost due to lack of close collaboration and cooperation by so many agents of development.' and that 'The multiplicity of donor projects requiring local administration inputs are likely to create serious administrative problems.'⁶ A recognition that some coordination arrangements in Zambia's education aid management would be advantageous was indicated by several officials.

In an unprecedented attempt to review independently the management of the donor projects in the sector, the MGEYS review committee conceded in 1989 that it had found a number of anomalies in the way some of the projects were being managed by both donors and the Ministry of General Education, Youth and Sport.⁷ The committee was not particularly happy with the administrative arrangements which some donors had adopted in their projects. The ODA and FINNIDA were criticised for setting up administrative structures which tended to operate outside the MGEYS' main management framework.⁸ The ODA was criticised for not involving the Inspectorate in the management of transport and the finances of the Mathematics Text Book Project.⁹ That the funds for this project could not be included in the GRZ estimate books of the Ministry was viewed with particular concern. SIDA's running of the self-help schools pilot project outside the Ministry's long-established Zambia Education Projects Implementation Unit (ZEPIU) caused

concern. FINNIDA was said to be operating a financial management system which kept the Zambian officers outside the control of the aid funds in the sector. The School Population Project (SPP) aided by UNESCO and housed at the Curriculum Development Centre (CDC) was cited as example of a project which caused some disruption in the local administration arrangements. It was found that the Zambian officer appointed to oversee this project spent most of his time on the project leaving his normal duties unattended. The reasons for such tendencies are usually not hard to find. Incentives in aid projects tend to create such disruptions.

The problems identified by the Zambians are significant in many ways. They serve to reveal the kinds of consequences uncoordinated aid can impose on local administration arrangements. Also the incentives which aid projects often carry can work both as a motivating factor as well as a potential source of management discord. The examples given help also to point out the areas of possible conflict which are already in place in Zambia in any future attempt to coordinate aid. FINNIDA's case merely emphasises a point about donors' different administrative arrangements. It also reveals a little about donors' distrust of MGEYS's capability to manage aid finances, hence the tendency to insulate some aspects of their management system. The degree to which this has been practiced tends to differ from project to project and from donor to donor.

Although calls for coherence in the way aid is managed have been very strong and quite persistent for a long time, the kind of coherence called for had never been made explicit until late 1989 when the Government published the Financial and Economic Policy Framework paper under the banner of the NERP. Previously officials spoke of the quantum advantage Zambia would have if it had a centralised aid management unit. The modalities of the actual aid coordination were never discussed in detail. Nor were the possible costs of implementing a coherent coordination framework considered. Not all Zambian officials are convinced of the need for aid coordination without reservations. The Director of ETC in the NCDP had some reservations about Zambia's ability to achieve effective aid coordination.¹⁰ He foresaw difficulties and conflicts arising from the donors' desire to pursue particular objectives, and also the demand by some donor parliaments that their agencies should work in particular earmarked sectors. A further examination of the existing education aid management in the sector should help put some of the issues discussed here into perspective. It should also set the background against which donors' views on coordination will be analysed.

11.4 Aid Management Framework

There is no single central unit responsible for managing aid for the education and training sector. It is managed by different parties in a system involving the Ministry of

Finance on the one hand and the MGEYS, MHEST, and donors on the other.

The task of the MoF is to manage and disburse those funds that have been committed by donors through its channels. SIDA has a Swedish internal auditor at the MoF to assist in the financial management of SIDA aid funds.¹¹ The decision to employ this person may well have been necessitated by the large volume of SIDA funds which are employed in the Education, Health, Agriculture, and Cooperatives sectors. There is a possibility also that the appointment could have been one of those measures donors take to protect aid programmes against internal management inefficiencies in recipient systems. NORAD is another agency which channels its aid funds through the MoF. FINNIDA on the other hand does not.¹² Under its arrangement it produces financial statements for both foreign and local accounts to the MGEYS and the MoF. Multilateral organisations use the imprest system. The funds are released after a financial statement is prepared on the expenditure of the previous funds. The funds are released to the recipient Ministries via the Ministry of Finance.

Within the sector and in the individual projects there are further variations in aid management styles. At the sector level SIDA channels its communications through the head of

the Planning Unit, MGEYS, which has been made responsible for SIDA supported projects. He takes charge of the funds for the project in the sector. However, unlike other SIDA projects, SHAPE has had a Swedish accountant attached to it. This is unusual, but could simply reflect the concern with which SIDA has viewed the capacity of the MGEYS and the MHEST to undertake extra financial management responsibilities for this inter-ministerial programme. SHAPE has had a large overseas procurement component, which may have necessitated close monitoring of its spending.

FINNIDA follows the practice of sub-contracting the management of its projects after public tender. The PSP project has been sub-contracted to a Finnish university, and the ZEMP project to a firm specialising in international book development and consultancy work. Until 1989, FINNIDA's ZEMP and PSP projects had FINNIDA-appointed coordinators. These were in charge of all financial matters concerning the running of the projects. The MGEYS's feelings over this arrangement have already been pointed out.¹³ The PSP is being phased out after 16 years of operation under successive FINNIDA co-ordinators. The post of coordinator for ZEMP is about to be Zambianised. However it is not clear whether he will continue with the same management style as his predecessor.

What has been presented here is an illustration of the diversity in approaches to aid and project management in the education and training sector. The two cases reveal a continuum to show the differences in aid management control, from the discreet double check mechanisms of SIDA to complete financial control in Finnish projects. Some aspects of these findings raise questions on how donors perceive their development missions. The exclusion of the Zambians from the financial management of some projects leaves big gaps in the realm of responsibility for development which donors claim they wish to establish. The present attempt to coordinate aid through the creation of the EAD must face and resolve some of these issues.

11.5 Coordination: Donors' Perspectives

The following aid agencies, HEDCO, FINNIDA, GTZ, NORAD, NUFFIC, ODA, and USAID were asked structured questions relating to donor cooperation and aid coordination (see questionnaire in appendix). The questions ranged from an attempt to find out about the level of operational linkages among donors to questions about the kinds of agreements which govern their cooperative relationships, and donors' perceptions of what they consider to be the major obstacles to aid coordination. Except ODA all other agencies responded.

From the responses obtained it is quite clear that the majority of the donors working in the Zambian education and training sector have had cooperative operational linkages at some point. The degree of cooperation has often depended on the scale of projects undertaken jointly. The co-financing of ZEMP between FINNIDA and SIDA can be described as an example of a large cooperative commitment. The British Council, ODA, and the Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) do also cooperate in an in-house arrangement, especially through financing and administration arrangements. The SHAPE project has been a cooperative venture to some extent between SIDA and NORAD.¹⁴ However most of the cooperation arrangements in co-financing have been done on an informal basis between donors alongside the standing agreements between Zambia and each donor.

Given this scenario one is tempted to say that the present concern over donor cooperation is redundant. But a closer examination of the cooperative relationships described here will reveal that they were all initiated by donors within the existing frameworks of their support programmes to the sector. Zambia has very little control over donor coordination decisions. In the present arrangement it is the prerogative of the donors to decide which projects they would want to co-finance. Consequently, the aid coordination and management perspective from the Zambian side is rather deceptive.

At the level of aid coordination between and among donors, there was common agreement that good prior consultation and good working procedures in a responsive recipient development environment could enhance successful coordination of aid. SIDA emphasised that effective aid coordination has been made difficult by structural problems. Each donor tends to have its own agenda and working procedures, e.g. a planning cycle which is different from other donors.

All the respondents were in agreement that donors' preoccupation with the need to project their own national aid identity, and divergent donor policies and priorities were among the major obstacles to aid coordination. They all agreed that different administrative styles and practices could stand in the way of effective coordination and cooperation among donors. To emphasise this point donors admitted to following their own organisations' style and practices in the following areas: project planning, administration and management, and project evaluation. Differences of opinion appeared on a few points. Not all donors believe their goals can best be met by cooperating with others, nor did all the respondents agree that failure to see mutual benefits from cooperative relationships is one of the obstacles to aid coordination.

Overall, the responses indicate that the cooperation that exists in a few projects in the education and training sector is an exception. Operational linkages are mainly confined to co-financing and occur mainly between the Nordic donors. There is a case for example for aid coordination between the ODA and JICA of Japan in the DTEVT's present projects on plant maintenance and human resource development, but no such coordination takes place. While recognising the need for some coherence in Zambia's aid management, and the need for donors to cooperate in aid business, donors are aware of the entrenched obstacles which stand in the way of any attempts to coordinate aid by Zambia. There is also a general feeling that coordination processes tend to be time consuming, and that only projects attracting large sums of aid money should be considered for aid coordination. The signals from the responses suggest that there is qualified support for aid coordination from the donors. Further indications are that some donors do not mind entering into less enduring cooperative relationships if such relations will not affect their organisational policies, practices, and above all aid policy objectives. This discussion has clear implications for what Zambia could expect in its present attempt to create the EAD.

11.6 Theoretical Perspectives on Aid Co-ordination

Coordination in interorganisational relationships has been defined as an attempt to ensure that organisations take

into account the activities of other organisations in joint undertakings.¹⁵ An extended definition suggests that the more widespread the general ideological conviction that the group can satisfy its needs through collaboration with other groups, the greater the tendency towards intergroup relations.¹⁵

In the initial definition Zambia would be perceived as a third party organisation which is attempting to bring about rationalization of aid management through coordinating the activities of diverse donor groups. To achieve this the facilitative party needs to have strong influence which can bring together the organisations. Zambia as a poor recipient country seems to have limited leverage. This puts Zambia in a weak position as the mobiliser of a coordination process. The extended definition points to a position to which the donors who were interviewed reacted with reservations.

In the context of inter-aid agency relationships, coordination should be perceived as a process embodying elements of active organisation and management through consultation and cooperation. Its application can take different forms. Matching available aid resources to specific development problems would be one aspect. Limiting the number of donors and resources according to perceived development aid needs at national, provincial and sector

level would be another aspect. The combination can be as complex or simple as the mobiliser wishes it to be. The extent of the organisational and management controls employed would determine the level of coordination.

However, it should be mentioned that studies in interorganisational relationships have so far been carried out only on non-development aid organisations. The focus has been mainly on local, central government and private organisations within national boundaries.¹⁷ These tend to receive a different kind of political pressure and have usually a 'smaller' and easily identifiable constituency. This is not the case with development aid organisations. Therefore the findings from these studies would tend to have limited explanatory application.

The theories of interorganisational relationships have presented their own assumptions about interorganisational interactions. The exchange and the power-dependency theories have come up with explanations which provide a basis for analysing further the feasibility of effecting greater donor coordination and cooperation in the education and training sector.

The Exchange Theory. From a sociological perspective the exchange model rests on several assumptions.¹⁸ These are that: an actor will seek to interact with others who can

satisfy his or her needs or facilitate the attainment of desired goals, and the greater the probability that a potential exchange interaction will prove rewarding the more an actor is likely to initiate it. In management, exchange is defined as 'any voluntary activity between two organisations which has consequences actual or anticipated for the realisation of their respective goals.'¹⁹ It has been pointed out also that an exchange framework could contain different forms of interorganisational relationships (voluntary, formal, legal etc).²⁰ Although all the donor agencies interviewed admitted to having some operational cooperation with some of their counterparts, none of them is based on any legal or other formal agreement. One could therefore say that these donors have been engaged in mainly voluntary interorganisational relations of a nature not governed by any legal provisions.

The initial exchange framework as developed by Levine and White in 1961 was later extended on the basis of the results from further research by Benson.²¹ The results from Benson's research came up with the following conclusions organisations seek an adequate supply of resources to fulfil their programme requirements, to maintain their domain, to extend and defend the organisation's paradigm or way of doing things, and that when relationships among organisations are in equilibrium there would be domain consensus, ideological consensus, positive evaluation of the

other organisations and work coordination among them. This is a very optimistic and positive set of conclusions. How close are they to reality?

Interaction and subscription to cooperation are very important elements in the exchange framework. Levine and White have stressed the point that in the exchange framework symmetrical relations form when members of two or more organisations perceive mutual benefits from interacting. Motivation to form a cooperative relationship comes about when each organisation perceives that it will be better able to attain its goals by cooperating and interacting rather than remaining autonomous. The model suggests also that relationships of this type form usually in periods of scarce or declining resources.

Against this theoretical background and given also the knowledge that cooperation among donors in the education and training sector already exists, donor agencies present possibilities of analysing their actual and possible interorganisational behaviours.

The cases of cooperation that have been cited illustrate one example of an ad hoc cooperative interaction between donor agencies. SIDA's formal agreement to support ZEMP in its ESSP is with the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport and not with FINNIDA. Similarly, NORAD's initial support to

SHAPE was a one-time purpose specific contribution. This emphasises the kind of cooperative structure which has existed in Zambia. It is unlikely that SIDA's and NORAD's participation in the two projects were motivated by any sense of declining resources or a realisation by FINNIDA and SIDA that they could not meet their contractual obligations in the projects without the intervention of the other donors. In fact each one of them is capable of financially supporting the project single-handedly if they wished to do so. SIDA's cooperation with FINNIDA in the ZEMP project can be described as of a coalition type.²² In this context each agency has its own set of goals, but collaborates informally and on an ad hoc basis where some of its goals are similar to those of the other donors. Also, the coalition itself has no authority, the authority but for its behaviour rests with each individual donor agency. There are indeed other similar coalition cooperative relationships among donors in the education sector in different forms of assistance.

It would therefore appear that SIDA's decision to finance the purchase of educational materials for the MGEYS from the ZEMP project had been motivated by the following: a practical desire to assist the MGEYS purchase the materials which the Ministry couldn't have done without assistance, and political calculation that it would be expedient for SIDA and its domestic constituency to be associated with the running of a key project in the sector.

The preceding discussion appears to make the following suggestions: ad hoc, purpose-specific coalition relationships between donors are possible, and appear to be more prevalent than the other types. Donors seem to prefer loose informal operational linkages to rigid agreements. It would also appear that donors find these relationships easier to manage because they often involve specific financial or technical assistance commitments, and each donor remains in charge of its own policy and goal setting functions.

The MGEYS role in facilitating the initiation of these operational relationships has been rather indirect, mainly through the presentation of resource and operational difficulties at the MGEYS/donor meetings.

Power-Dependency Theory. This contends that the motivation to cooperate among organisations is asymmetrical. That is, only one party is usually motivated while the other is not, and that cooperation is often induced or forced on weaker organisations by the most powerful. Interaction or exchange in this model is characterised by conflict as each organisation seeks to achieve its own goals.²³

The World Bank's relationship with the government of Zambia can be examined from this perspective. The motivation to pursue economic policies and structural adjustments in the

economic and social sectors has not been shared by Zambia in the way the World Bank and the IMF has perceived them. Consequently, the demand by the World Bank in 1987 that Zambia should reach an agreement with the IMF as a condition for getting further access to financial support caused severe conflicts which later resulted in Zambia suspending the implementation of the economic programme. This case can be described as an example of forcing a weak recipient country into a cooperative relationship it does not agree with fully.

Seen against the present initiatives to coordinate aid more effectively and the experiences Zambia has had so far with donor cooperation, the assumptions stand to be given a qualified falsification on one hand, and an endorsement on the other. In the cooperative relationship among the Nordic donors discussed earlier, their relationship can hardly be described as asymmetrical. Could this be attributed to the fact that they are all members of a regional grouping sharing similar aid objectives? It is not clear how cooperative the relationship would have been had it involved donors from different camps. It is also unlikely that SIDA as a leading donor in the Nordic group may have been engaged in attempts to force the others to support its programmes.

The discussion so far has highlighted interorganisational relationships in which the parties have remained autonomous

in their policy decision-making and other key organisational areas in the relationship. This has reduced the areas of possible conflict. Because donor agencies are not strictly like any other commercial or industrial company their competition and conflict tend to manifest themselves differently. Thus the failure of the power-dependency assumptions to apply to the existing inter-donor relationships should be seen in this light. If the circumstances were different the possibility of operating conflict and problems relating to dominance would occur. Given this background it would be erroneous to dismiss the assumptions as being totally inappropriate to the study of relationships among donors.

In a recent (April 1990) outline of Zambia's Public Investment Programme (PIP) for the 1990-1993 period, the Government of Zambia and the World Bank have reiterated the need for Zambia to create an External Assistance Department (EAD).²⁴ The Government has made a commitment to carry this out to facilitate the implementation of the structural adjustment programme. The EAD is intended to carry out the following:

1. Management of aid flows.
2. Develop annual external aid strategies and plans.
3. Establish a system to exercise control over external loans, credits, and grants by Government entities, including parastatals.

4. Establish systems to monitor, record and control external grants to ensure that these do not place excessive recurrent cost burdens on Zambia.
5. Establish systems to monitor the implementation of aid programmes and projects, including the use to which funds are being put, the rates of disbursement etc.
6. Ensure aid is being used most effectively.
7. Advise the Government on the negotiation of aid programmes and project assistance.
8. Design and implement programmes to enhance the coordination of donor assistance, particularly at the local level and including mechanisms for responding to questions to all concerned of the donor community.
9. Advise the government on its approach and presentations in aid affairs.

Even in the absence of an outline of details of the specific tasks to be carried out in the proposed EAD, the new management proposals appear to be wide and quite far reaching. What is not clear however is whether the creation of the EAD is a separate initiative within the NCDP or part of a comprehensive reorganisation of the present Economic and Technical Cooperation (ETC) Department in the NCDP. Whatever is the case the measures proposed represent the undertaking of a long overdue action.

Zambia's success in this undertaking is going to depend on the following: its political will and interpretation of its aid management and coordination mandate, that is, how far Zambia intends to impose its will on donors' preferences and priorities (cf Chapter 5), how donors perceive their short

and long term position in the new coordination structure and management arrangements, and, most importantly, it will depend on the willingness of donors to cooperate. This the Government is aware of.²⁵ It represents the first possible major obstacle the EAD should expect to encounter after its creation.

While many bilateral aid donors have been looking forward to Zambia adopting a more coherent aid management approach, it is not clear how far they expect Zambia to go in its measures and how they themselves intend to respond to them. Are bilateral donors willing to accept policy and management measures from the Zambian government which could put a stop to the kinds of political pressures some donors have been putting on Zambia, as discussed in Chapter 5? Donors are often sensitive to committing themselves to arrangements which could compromise their preferred position. Thus the Japanese insist on maintaining their own management structure within the mainly ministerial or organisational management framework. It is most unlikely, to take another example, that Britain would agree to have a larger part of its training funds allocated to Zambia spent elsewhere than in Britain in the name of 'coordination'. There are other donor idiosyncrasies which the EAD will need to take account of and to reconcile with the new set of guidelines. Therefore a coordination process which seeks to order the behaviour of the donors by imposing new standards of

organisational and management behaviour needs to proceed very carefully.

This suggests for example that attempts by Zambia to match foreign aid to perceived needs and problems will not be easy. Yet, the extent to which the proposed EAD measures will go and how they will be implemented will determine whether Zambia has opted for a radical and comprehensive coordination or a modest approach.

For the NCDP as an institution which seeks to mobilise aid coordination and thereby indirectly promote donor cooperation, the assumptions suggest that it needs to establish a stronger position if it expects to be able to influence the donors to come together or to accept its decisions. In the past it has been very difficult for the Ministry of Education and the NCDP to influence donors to accept some of Zambia's identified priority areas in the sector. Bringing together donors who do not share the same perspective on development problems and the kinds of solutions which should be applied is not going to be a lesser task. As a mobiliser, the Zambian government's position is weakened by its dependence on external resources for its operations. This imposes severe limitations, including limitations on its power to influence even ad hoc cooperation relationships between donors.

11.7 The World Bank

The majority of the bilateral donors that were interviewed were not in favour of a multilateral agency being entrusted with the responsibility of coordinating aid in Zambia. Alternative proposals offered have ranged from: creating a loose framework in which regular donor meetings could take place under the leadership of Zambia or a chosen leading bilateral donor, to sector level coordination, and asking the World Bank to promote aid coordination under the auspices of the Zambian government.

There are many reasons why the World Bank is an attractive alternative to other options. Because of its resources the Bank commands a status which could help it to execute the tasks more efficiently. And, bilateral donors and the international financial community are more likely to feel assured of getting maximum discipline over the management of the volume and the direction of aid flows. This is particularly true now in respect of the priorities laid out in the PIP. The acceptance of the PIP, and the commitment to the New Economic Recovery Programme (NERP) indicate that political resistance to the IMF and the World Bank measures have for the time being softened. Therefore there is a possibility that in a carefully worked out arrangement the World Bank could play a leading role in Zambia in promoting aid coordination.

11.8 SUMMARY and CONCLUSION

In this chapter the discussion has centred around issues of cooperation among donors and aid coordination in Zambia's education aid management. The discussion has drawn attention to the current debate and the assumptions on aid coordination by western donors. The major criticism has been that recipient countries like Zambia have administrative frameworks and arrangements which are inadequately equipped and staffed to cope with the large flow of resources and management demands made upon them by a diverse donor community. Therefore the assumption is that implementing an effective aid coordination strategy against a background of cooperative relationships among donors could enhance the management of aid resources. The current economic structural adjustment programme being implemented in Zambia has given its full endorsement of the need to coordinate aid more rationally and effectively.

The views of Zambian officials on aid coordination have been supportive. However, internal politics have in the past made it very difficult for Zambia to implement its own measures aimed at coordinating aid. Until 1989 and with the assistance of external help, the call from Zambians for coherence in their aid management was never explicit in terms of what actually they wished to be done. The 1989 brief MGEYS evaluation report of project management in the sector illustrates this point.

The discussion has also shown that despite these initiatives the management of aid resources and projects in the sector has continued the same practices which have been criticised. Donors have continued to fund and manage their projects in the way they had done before.

Donors' views on aid coordination have produced very significant signals in this discussion. They have pointed out the conditions they consider to be essential in efforts to promote effective aid coordination. On the other hand they have also made it known that there are entrenched obstacles on the donors' side which often stand in the way of attempts to coordinate aid.

Contrary to what is generally held, there has been cooperation between donors in a few projects in the education sector, mainly those funded by the Nordic donors. However, this cooperation has been usually of an ad hoc, purpose specific type. The relationships have also been characterised by loose coalition relations. Policy making, planning functions, and goal setting have all been kept out of the way of these short-term initiatives. This has of course given rise to questions about whether this is the most preferred form of inter-agency relationship, and indeed what implications this may have for the present initiatives in Zambia.

The discussion of the issues in the context of the chosen theoretical assumptions has produced the following findings. The assumptions of the exchange theory have been found to be partially valid in their application to the analysis of donor relationships. The key premise on which the theory is predicated has been found to apply more to non-aid organisations than to donor agencies. The need to collaborate between donors is for example not motivated by a state of declining resources as this becomes quite a sensitive aspect in donors' standing. Besides, the independent achievement of aid objectives is a particularly important matter for donors. The limited scope of the exchange explanations can perhaps be attributed to their research base. It has relied heavily on findings from non aid organisations in their own national settings.

Similarly, the assumptions from the power-dependency theory should be seen in the light of some of the findings on the preferred form of relationships among donors. The view that relations between organisations are characterised by conflict and competition does not strictly hold in the examples of cooperative relationships cited in this discussion. However, were the donors to attempt to integrate their policy making and planning functions at the highest levels, conflicts would not only be inevitable, the proportion of disagreements as far as donors are concerned is likely to be much larger. This attempts to illustrate

the point that donors exhibit characteristics which are somewhat peculiar to the aid relationship. Thus, the exchange and power-dependency theoretical assumptions cannot be taken as entirely useful guides to the study of inter-donor relationships.

In conclusion it should be said that Zambia's latest initiative under World Bank sponsorship to set up the EAD should be seen against the background of the whole range of issues and trends discussed in this chapter. The effort is welcome and it is opportune, but it faces formidable challenges both internally as well as externally from the donor community. The move has set Zambia and its donors on a difficult test course (cf chapter 5).

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CHAPTER TWELVE

C O N C L U S I O N :

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS

12.1 INTRODUCTION

This study has focused on foreign aid to education and training development in Zambia since the country's attainment of political independence in 1964. Aid has been discussed and analysed in terms of donor policy and priority objectives globally as well as how these objectives have applied to Zambia. The critical discussion of the following: education and training development aid process in Zambia, and the structural and policy links between Britain's FCO, the ODA, and non-governmental organisations has been carried out to set the background and broad context and characteristics of development aid. The discussion of the issues raised in this study has also been put against certain theoretical assumptions.

Thus the discussion in this chapter has been set out as follows: the first part analyses the findings from the policy and development trends in the Zambian education and training sector, the second part discusses the findings from the sections on aid process, coordination and foreign aid policy links, the third part examines the findings on British aid policies and priorities, the fourth part examines the findings from Swedish aid, fifth, the analysis looks at the theoretical assumptions in light of the findings in this study, and finally the discussion looks at possible areas for future research.

12.2 Education and Training Policy and Development

The findings in this study have shown that the structural problems colonialism left in the education sector, that is imbalances in the provision of facilities and opportunities, and segregative policies, acted as a powerful force behind UNIP's social action programme at independence. The need to address these problems became paramount and subsequently got translated into an ambitious expansionist policy. The buoyant economy which was inherited at independence gave strong impetus to the expansion programme. Thus education and training development were perceived in terms of responding to the inherited post-colonial crisis in the sector and the economic demands on education. The long term goals of education development reflected this same approach, a continued mechanical expansion of the system. Despite the timely internal warning given against unchecked expansion of the system little attention had been paid to the possible consequences of the expansion programme. It was hardly surprising therefore that by 1970 the system had begun to register internal efficiency difficulties.

The broader policy context of Zambia's education and training development was that UNIP was in effective control of the social policy and action programmes. The opposition party was in a weak position to present any strong alternative social policy and action programme. Outside parliament there were no interest groups to carry out a strong education lobby. The

policy regime consequently faced a situation in which the two events mentioned earlier dominated the political climate in policy and decision-making. The adoption of a one party state system in 1972 finally put UNIP in total control of all the affairs of the country. Since then political dissent and any lobby on internal or international affairs must be conducted within the framework of the party. The interpretation of this in practice has put severe limitations on the possibilities of getting diverse opinion inputs into the policy making process. From 1972 education policy and development had been operating in this political framework.

In spite of being aware of the practical difficulties the system was facing, the expansion policy and the diversification of the school curriculum continued amidst increasing practical difficulties of programme implementation and adjustment in the system.

The education reform movement of 1984 came against this background. Its significance was that it was a policy initiative by the professionals to change the education system. The fact that this movement had received official approval from the highest political office (State House) did not imply a change in the political framework and conditions. The success of the movement to take off the ground was perhaps more due to a combination of these factors: personal initiative of the professionals in the Ministry of education,

the timing of this initiative had coincided with international concern over education development in the region and more importantly, the internal problems in the education system which had been sounded as early as 1968 had subsequently reached proportions which could no longer be dealt with on an ad hoc basis. Despite the difficulties of implementing the reform programme fully, the reform document has since 1978 constituted a policy for enhancing the quality of education and further attempts to achieve basic education for all.

The findings have also indicated that external aid has played a significant role in facilitating education and training development. Politically, aid has been perceived to be nothing more than an international moral obligation to assist Zambia to develop. It had also been perceived to be a short term measure to help Zambia reorganise and implement its own development machinery. Up to the time of the reform movement this feeling was still strong in the government. This may have accounted for Zambia's failure to create a short or long term policy framework within which aid could operate. Besides, there are bilateral aid agreements which also could have made Zambia less inclined to take extra policy or organisational measures. The recent case involving UNZA's difficulties to service the 1967 GRZ/USSR technical cooperation agreement has served to show the inadequacy of the aid agreements as effective proxy internal policy frameworks. It has also been shown that aid is treated with a lot of

sensitivity by the Zambian bureaucrats, it is therefore not surprising that until now there have never been efforts to coordinate aid flows and its management. Lack of an explicit policy on external aid has been responsible for producing an ineffective and somewhat badly organised aid process in Zambia.

12.3 Aid Process

Although in this study aid process, foreign and aid policy links and aid coordination have been treated separately, the issues each one of them has raised has implication for all the three areas. For example, aid process and coordination in Zambia has provided a context in which foreign and aid policy outputs can be observed and discussed.

This study has found that in the case of Britain and other donors covered in this study the link between foreign and aid policy objectives is apparently strong. Besides the FCO, the ODA, the British Council, as well as some NGOs have emerged as important public and private managers of British foreign and aid policy agendas. The NGOs are a mixed group of secular and religious organisations. These have been described as important private managers of British foreign policy.¹ The wider implication of this finding is that the foreign and aid policy machinery is large and complex. This pluralism in foreign and aid policy management and delivery system presents a number of possible political and management

difficulties to the recipients. First, the background relationship of the NGOs with the foreign affairs organ imply that they are not as strictly non-governmental as they project themselves. This has implications for how far they can allow recipient governments to intervene or control their development aid programmes. Also this pluralism is a strategy intended to deal with recipients at different political levels, consequently local management of aid which could threaten the existence of this arrangement is unlikely to receive favourable cooperation from donors.

The study has also drawn attention to the premium which the British government in recent years has placed on its international social and political objectives through cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is a blend of diverse sub-objectives in the areas of politics, commerce and trade, internationalisation of and sustainability of British culture abroad etc. Because British education and training is well placed to achieve these objectives, the movement has put British aid to education and training and development needs in recipient countries in a new balancing act. For Zambia this carries the following signals: Zambia's requests for assistance which fall outside this and the project framework are less likely to be considered favourably in principle. Britain should be expected to adopt an aggressive and a competitive approach against other donors and towards the achievement of its aid objectives. It must be mentioned

however that the interpretation of the objectives of cultural diplomacy appear to be quite wide and covers a wide range of programmes and activities. This means that the chances of a recipient making a request which is not covered by some aspects of cultural diplomacy are small.

While the present pluralist approach to British foreign and aid policy management has definite administrative advantages, this strategy however poses possible difficulties in Zambia's attempts to coordinate aid flows and its management. To gain further insight into what has been discussed and the issues raised, the outputs of the policy and institutional links (eg. policy objectives) ought to be examined in the context of an actual aid process.

The major finding from this section concerning donors has been that, some donors such as the USSR and Japan have exerted a lot of pressure on the Ministries of Higher, and General Education to accept their own preferences in locating their aid projects. This has not only upset the priorities the Ministries had worked in capital development projects, it also reflects the extent of the politicisation of the aid process on the one hand, and the possibility that the preferences were intended to achieve other undeclared objectives. It would also appear that interest in these projects resided at a very high political level in both Japan and the USSR.

This, together with the fragmented institutional framework for aid process in Zambia has made it very difficult for Zambia to manage external aid more effectively. The analysis of aid process in Zambia has shown that there are several institutional actors involved in various aspects of aid. These have ranged from the President's Office to individual Ministries and Freedom House. This is not a case of decentralising aid process management, but a reflection of incoherence at political and management levels in the approach to external aid. The loose framework and the fact that the NCDP does not have a full complement of the required number of professional workers has severely weakened the position of the NCDP in Zambia's aid business. This has sometimes opened it to undue internal as well as external intervention and influence attempts. The absence of an organised lobby on external aid affairs, and the exclusion of external aid from the Auditor-General's accounting measures has meant that many anomalies go unnoticed and unattended to. This exacerbates the administrative and management situation.

One political explanation for this state of affairs is that, what appears to be a fragmented institutional aid framework in Zambia could be a strategy to avoid creating a powerful local institution (cf the proposed creation of EAD, 1990). A strong local aid management institution, as will (in theory) be the case soon, would present accountability and efficiency demands which would most probably not accord well with the kind of

internal political control the government would wish to exercise over it. Thus one finds that aid has been caught up in an internal power struggle. Whatever benefits the government is able to derive from the existing aid process and management system are ad hoc and have been overwhelmingly counterbalanced by the more serious long term consequences as evidenced in the East Germany and the Russian technical cooperation agreements.

12.4 British Aid

this study has shown that British aid to education and training has been subjected to periodic policy adjustments over the last twenty-four years. The two key areas to which the shift in policy emphasis has been responding have been the target areas for assistance and ODA's internal administrative and operational procedures for conducting aid business. It is important to mention also that each British government has been associated with a particular impact on development aid, administratively or politically.

The policy changes have reflected Britain's response to a wide-ranging set of signals from the following sources: from Britain's own internal administrative, economic and political constituency, from the aid policies and activities of other donors, and from the development environment of Britain's overseas aid constituency.

The major internal administrative changes have usually involved the position of ODA. That is, at one time ODA (then called ODM) was a full fledged Ministry, later it was transferred to the FCO as a department. These changes have had more to do with Britain's own internal power politics between the two main parties, Labour and the Conservatives than actual development aid. ODA as a ministry or a department would still be subject to parliamentary administration and scrutiny. However, the strength of Foreign Office desire for control over aid policy cannot be underestimated.

The scope of British assistance to education and training has largely consisted of a large technical assistance component, that is, either manpower supply or funding for training programmes in the UK or in a Third Country. In the 1960s the large number of British teachers and education advisors in the former colonies reflected these particular responses. A political commitment to assist former colonies in their development programmes, a political need to maintain a British presence in the former colonies. This was in fact a complicated blend of political and economic responses. Over the last twenty four years Britain has turned technical assistance (training) into a major education industry. Britain has been able to attract large numbers of non HMG funded students into British education and training institutions (see Appendix III table 7). The need to

provide competitive training programme has now heightened as Britain competes with other donors, mainly, France, West German, Japan, Canada, and USA for Third World Student markets. The study has also shown that in the spirit of competition Britain seems to have embarked on a course of making big inroads in selected Francophone countries in search of new sources of students. Internally also there has been a sustained debate and lobby by interest groups, mainly the OST, that Britain should stand up to its own position as the world's training ground and to the competition from rival donors.

An interesting trend revealed in this study concerns the changes that have taken place in the support to subject areas. It has been shown that the choice of subject areas for support have tended to reflect the special demands of each time period. Thus in the 1960s teacher training and public administration were among the range of subjects earmarked for support. In the mid 1970s the scope of assistance had been enlarged and diversified to include education management and supervision, curriculum development, the provision of books and improvement of English language teaching etc. Interestingly, the shift in focus coincided well with many of the recommendations of education reform movements across several African countries. Another way of looking at the shifts is simply that Britain regards its education and training service to overseas clients as a good and service

that has to keep pace with particular demands in the market. It is therefore imperative that Britain should make adjustments along the way. This approach may be simply characterised as commercially rational.

From 1979 to date the era of the Conservative government in Britain will be remembered for among other things, the initiatives it has taken and the impact it has had on matters concerning policies which affect its overseas aid clients. The areas covered are Third Country Training, Cultural Diplomacy, Overseas Student question, and the scholarship/award schemes, and selectivity. The five areas of policy are closely linked.

Britain's policy on Third Country Training is a revelation of protectionism in aid as well as a demonstration of the complex framework within which aid operates. The restrictive criteria which HMG's Treasury has set for expenditure on Third Country Training is a form of tying training aid. This in turn must be viewed in the broader perspective of the economics of British technical assistance (training aid), and the broader political framework in which it is expected to operate. The figures from Appendix III table 7 show that the number of HMG funded students has been comparatively smaller than other groups. Consequently, any liberalisation of the present policy would reduce the number of HMG funded students further. This would pose the following possible problems for

Britain and its institutions. An increase in In-Country and Third Country training placements would inversely reduce overseas students in British institutions. The institutions would increasingly be left to Private student market forces, which cannot guarantee a sufficient flow of students, a factor which is very critical in the economy of many institutions. The present policy therefore has the economic value of ensuring that many institutions get a regular supply of HMG funded overseas students over whom HMG has control of placement and welfare matters. On account of this the protectionist approach in the policy appears quite understandable, besides, it has already been pointed out that the policy is backed up by a very competitive education and training facilities.

At another level the policy should be seen as operating in the wider social and political framework of Britain's cultural diplomacy. An unrestricted policy on placement of overseas students would weaken the achievement of cultural diplomacy objectives. Given this background the restrictions imposed on the policy are not entirely of an economic and a financial nature, they also carry important political implications. For recipient countries this means that they should expect mainly discretionary support in this area. Given also the negative political attitudes towards Third Country Training among some Third World leaders, and also the operational difficulties facing many Third World institutions, it is very unlikely that Britain could be persuaded to shift its policy. The need to

develop Third World institutions through Third Country training has therefore been caught between British policy restrictions and the politics of standards and national identity in education and training in developing countries.

It is important to see the overseas student policy of 1980, the subsequent diversified scholarship and award schemes, and the new emphasis on selectivity in technical assistance as being closely linked. After all, it was the findings from the Overseas student debate which gave rise to the new scholarship schemes in the mid 1980s. The three aspects show Britain's economic and political responses to both internal as well as external signals. Internally, the decision to charge overseas students full economic fees was an economic measure intended to introduce a more economic approach to the recruitment of overseas students. It was a clear indication that the Conservative government viewed overseas students in more economic than political terms (cf the OST views). The introduction of new scholarship and other award schemes to redress the consequences of the full cost fees policy that had appeared was also as much a response to internal pressures, especially from the OST lobby, as it was a response to perceived external signals. The fear that the full cost fees would send students to the USA, Canada, Australia had been made abundantly clear, hence the need to take corrective measures.

The introduction of diverse scholarship schemes has brought a new dimension to the overseas student subject. In it a new diversified vision of overseas students by Britain has emerged. The schemes have framed or boxed students into specific target groups which are expected by Britain to yield particular political or commercial outputs. Thus the CBI scholarships are expected to yield trade and other commercial benefits, the FCOSAS aims at achieving political objectives for Britain. Correspondingly, Britain expects recipients to benefit from the schemes. Strangely, the recipient countries were never consulted on how the schemes would work and what they could expect from them. Yet the schemes have far wider implications for the recipient countries' development process.

The cultural diplomacy movement has come as a reaction to what internally was perceived to be a gradual decline in Britain's international standing against its own previous performance and also against the performance of other rival donor countries in the international aid system. Britain's concern with the latter shows that cultural diplomacy at one level has been a political response to the perceived trends in the international aid system. At another level cultural diplomacy is nothing more than an internal process of policy renewal and adjustment. It is also functioning as one of Britain's political window to the outside world. This makes it a rather complex political equation in Britain's development aid.

The implications of cultural diplomacy objectives for Britain's political social and cultural institutions are wide. It means that institutions and programmes/projects that have the capacity and capability to respond to the achievement of these objectives, such as education and training, have a special responsibility in this process. In terms of organisation it means that programmes of studies, and administrative arrangements which can enhance the achievement of the objectives have a critical role to play in the whole process of cultural diplomacy. It is in this light that the In-Country and Third Country Training policy, the packaging of overseas students into particular political or commercial categories, and the diversified scholarship Schemes should be seen. In the context of cultural diplomacy objectives these aspects serve special delivery and protectionist functions. Thus training in the UK as opposed to training in Third Countries performs a special function in the attempts to build Britain's international image among overseas students. Consequently, overseas students as targets of cultural diplomacy have a special place in this process (cf 1986 OST Ditchley Park Colloquium).

For the recipients the cultural diplomacy movement has spelt out a further tightening of British aid. Besides being a public relations exercise Britain expects to use it to account for some of its aid investment properly. However, cultural diplomacy objectives carry the risk of failing to strike an

adequate balance between the achievement of Britain's social, political and economic objectives and the provision of needed aid resources in the recipients' development process.

The opening of the East European corridor has added a new dimension to the movement. Britain has to make quick adjustments in its aid focus and emphasis to deal with the new European opportunities in the East. There is every likelihood that this unfolding development has opened up another competition front in British aid, inevitably some recipient countries or regions should expect some keen competition from the East European region.

Though not entirely new the project framework adopted by Britain in 1984 has presented wider implications for recipients of British aid. On the one hand the approach should be seen as an administrative strategy intended to introduce close control of aid programmes through effective project planning, design and rational organisation by both Britain and the recipients. One can therefore see that this approach is part of a larger package of administrative measures introduced in the 1980s to improve and enhance accountability and selectivity in the aid business. This decision marked also a departure from the open approach which had characterised some forms of British aid, such as technical assistance (training aid) in the 1960s and 1970s. For many recipients the demands of the project organisational and

planning resources, both in terms of competence and the institutional capacity to undertake comprehensive project planning and design tasks. Consequently, many have often sought external assistance in carrying out project design and presentation work. This unfortunately opens the recipients to possible donor or private consultant manipulations. It is also important that recipients should approach ODA's policy from a country framework perspective, that is, they should ensure that ODA's preferences in aid investment accord well with the development process components in the national grid.

British aid to education and training in Zambia should be seen in light of the discussion and analysis of British aid made here. The findings have shown that aid has been given to Zambia according to ODA's global policy settings, goals and priorities. ODA's lack of a country specific policy has been made easier by Zambia's lack of an explicit policy on external aid. The absence of any explicit ODA aid policy to Zambia appears to serve Britain the following functions:

It gives Britain a broad framework within which to work. It also gives Britain broader discretion especially on decision-making, in this way Britain avoids being tied ~~entitlements~~ down to specific commitments which Zambia would regard as entitlements, as Sir William Ryrle remarked on the reasons why recipients are never told by ODA the financial aid allocated to them "the recipient country does not know how much has been allocated to it. If they were told, this would

become an entitlement and we would be under pressure to spend ..."² Such has been the extent of avoiding specific commitments.

The study has also found that despite the present operational difficulties facing the Zambian school system due to the impact of the economic crisis, the emphasis in British aid has not been sufficiently adjusted to reflect the current demands in the system. This reflects among other possible reasons ODA's difficulty to respond quickly outside its normal aid framework to new demands in its aid constituency. In the present project framework approach the present state of affairs could also be attributed to Zambia's failure to present projects in the areas of greatest need. The relationship over this matter is fairly complex. But as pointed out earlier British aid to Zambia must be set within the global policy parameters and the economic, political and cultural frameworks of its development aid. These provide insights into the difficulties ODA faces in attempting to make rapid responses.

12.5 Swedish Aid

The findings of this study have indicated that Swedish aid to education and training has undergone changes at the following different levels: at the conceptual, policy and administrative/management arrangement levels. Some changes have been more of a new emphasis than a shift of policy on earlier policy stands. These changes can also be described as careful and selective adjustments.

Sweden's 1972 policy on education and training has been described in this study as having been prescriptive and weighed down by the Swedish ideological perception of the Third World development context. The policy was therefore an attempt to reinterpret its own-development experiences and to give it an international dimension. The policy could also be viewed as simply an early expression of how Sweden saw the education development problems and the need to provide its own framework of assistance. The need to put a Swedish mark on the international development scene was clearly evident in its anti-western and anti-traditional pedagogy.

The 1986 policy came as a response to the following: the 1972 policy had done its fair share, its shortcomings had become apparent, consequently it needed renewal. The development scene in Sweden's overseas aid constituency had undergone rapid development experiences in the fourteen years the policy had been in operation, the need to make some policy and operational adjustments had increasingly become inevitable in the face of those new changes and demands on the systems. SIDA had also gained immense field experience. This must have generated both inspiration as well as internal pressures on SIDA to consider making adjustments in its aid responses. Also, it cannot be denied that international trends in the aid environment have also had some impact on SIDA's aid adjustments reflected in the 1986 document. Therefore the period between 1972 and 1986 should be viewed as a time when

SIDA came under internal and external pressures. Internationally, the 1986 document showed SIDA's first public indication that it was now standing up to respond to international trends in the aid business.

Some of the specific changes in SIDA's aid focus, orientation and emphasis at global and country level must be seen in the context of the trends discussed here. The key factors in this framework have been Sweden, the recipients, and other donors at one level, at another level aid policy in this framework has been a function of responses to Swedish foreign policy, economic/political, and Third World development consideration.

Although SIDA's policy aims at emphasising basic education, the findings in this study have shown that within that policy framework SIDA maintains a certain level of discretion to support other sectors. This has been the case in Zambia where the University of Zambia and the technical colleges have been recipients of Swedish aid since the mid 1970s. Support to the University of Zambia has now been extended to include selective staff salary supplementation. Unlike ODA's BESS, the Swedish scheme is open to all eligible Third Country lecturers. These two examples serve to demonstrate SIDA's open and flexible approach. SIDA is able to spread out its aid resources because of, not only its flexible approach but also because of the worsening material and operational conditions in the system discussed earlier.

Because of the adverse conditions in the education and training sector SIDA and other donors have not been presented with the real test of their aid policies. As indicated earlier in this study the multiple problems in the system has reduced many aid programmes/projects to the level of relief or rescue measures. In this situation every piece of foreign assistance appears to be essential. The real test for development aid would come if Zambia was in a position to present to the donors enduring priorities. This is not the case at present because donors have the opportunity to choose from many alternative areas in need of assistance. These distortions and of course donors preferences for certain areas have made it difficult for Zambia to attempt an integrated approach to development aid planning and utilisation. The prospects of major changes taking place on this front in the near future now await the implementation of the proposed EAD.

12.6 Theoretical Assumptions

In analysing aid relationships it is difficult to avoid taking a systems analysis approach because of the following: donors view themselves as existing in a world in which cultural, political, economic and other relationships across national frontiers are not only inevitable but also a fact of life. The individual nation states are also perceived as having important roles to play in the international system. It is also true to say that since the end of the Second World War the world setting has developed many institutions whose

objectives and procedures have brought nation states together as part of an integrated international system.

For donors their view of their aid constituencies as part of the international system has been very explicit in their motivations and aid objectives. According to many donors aid is given to promote development. This, it is held, would enhance stability in the international system. Of course donors' perception of units in the system and their stability is also linked to their global interests, which partly accounts for who gets aid and from which donor. This leads one to understand donors' aid constituencies as their large subsystem units in the international system. The views of the recipient nation states on this subject have been dominated by the feeling that other countries (industrialised) have an international obligation to assist those that are striving to develop. Aid is therefore perceived by recipients also in its international dimension.

The argument in this short discussion is simply that aid, its relationships and outcomes can best be understood by analysing both its nation state environment as well as its international context.

On the standing of other theoretical assumptions the study suggests that, while many of them have remained valid, others need to be subjected to new test grounds and rules. The study had demonstrated the limitations and difficulty in attempting to generalise the application of some of the theoretical assumptions. The case of the exchange theory stood out as a glaring example. So have others in different ways.

12.7 CONCLUDING COMMENT

This study has traced and demonstrated the trends in policy changes concerning education and training development in Zambia on one hand, and British and Swedish external aid to education on the other. It has been shown that education development in Zambia has been a history of mixed achievements, challenges, frustrations, and a determination to persevere in the face of quite often overwhelming odds in a rapidly *changing* context.

Since the mid 1960s foreign aid to education and training in Zambia has had to face these aspects in different role positions. That is, aid has provided solutions to some of the problems, it has supported local measures to facilitate the development process, and has also helped Zambia to prepare the education and training system to tackle some of the current and future tasks. This has taken place in a complex set of donor-recipient relationships.

Despite the long and complex aid relationship Zambia has had with donors, Zambia has been conducting its aid business and management without any explicit aid policy framework. Consequently, aid process and management have lacked effective coordination. Domestic as well as external aid factors have contributed to the present incoherent approach in Zambia's aid organisation and management.

The study has shown that the donors' aid responses originate from very complex donor agendas and constituencies in which a diverse portfolio of economic, political, commercial, cultural and moral factors exert influence on the direction of aid policies. The pressures of these factors have sometimes made aid responses less responsive to particular development needs. Consequently, some field experiences with aid have tended to defy some of the theoretical explanations of external aid.

The contribution of this study lies in the following areas: It is an important addition to the continuing debate of the contribution of bilateral assistance to education development in developing countries. It has revealed and made explicit the depth and extent of many issues and arguments in the discussion of British and Swedish aid policies. Thus the study has provided the impetus for further study, testing and refinement of some of the findings. There is need for example for Zambia to study more closely both the short and long term opportunity costs of receiving foreign aid in a wide range of areas. There is a need also for Zambia to examine the possible effective strategies it can employ in what is a very complex external aid service.

NOTES and REFERENCES

1. Harrod, J.R. (1973, 300)
2. Ryrie, Sir William (1986, 11)

APPENDIX I

1. Questionnaire
2. The attached questionnaire was used to act as an agenda in most of the personal interviews with donors. It was also sent to donors who could not be visited. These were NORAD, FINNIDA, GTZ, HEDCO, and USAID.

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. How much operational linkage is there between your organisation and other donors in the education and training sector in Zambia? (Please tick)

- (a) Much
- (b) Some
- (c) None

2. Are there agreements between your organisation and other bilateral and multilateral donors concerning assistance to projects of common support in Zambia? (Please tick)

1. With Bilateral Donors

- (a) Formal agreement.
- (b) Informal agreement.
- (c) No agreement.

2. With Multilateral Donors

- (a) Formal agreement.
- (b) Informal agreement.
- (c) No agreement at all.

3. Please specify multilateral and bilateral aid organisations with whom you have had co-financing collaboration during the last 5 years.

1. Bilateral Donors

2. Multilateral Donors

- (a)
- (b)
- (c)
- (d)
- (e)

- (a)
- (b)
- (c)
- (d)
- (e)

(f) Other (specify)
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.....

7. What are the major obstacles to effective aid coordination and cooperation among donors? (Please tick more than one if you wish).

(a) Donor's preoccupation with projecting their own national aid identity.

Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree

(b) Divergent donor policies and priorities.

Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree

(c) Donors' belief that their goals can best be achieved by remaining autonomous.

Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree

(d) Failure to see mutual benefits from such interaction.

Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree

(e) Different donor administrative styles and practices.

Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree

(f) If you have any other views on major obstacles please specify.
.....
.....

8. Which of the factors listed below has exerted influence on your organisation's policies on aid to education and training?

(a) Recipient government's policies or advice.

Much Some None

(b) Other bilateral donor agencies' policies.

Much Some None

(c) Multilateral organisations' policies (World Bank, ILO, UNESCO, UNICEF etc).

Much Some None

(d) Your own organisation's education specialists and consultants.

Much Some None

(e) Your own organisation's experience in aid to education and training in developing countries.

Much Some None

(f) Your own country's politics and political ideologies as to what good education is.

Much Some None

(g) If you have any other views on the factors please specify:

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9. Which of the factors listed below has exerted influence on your organisation's policy and decision to give assistance to Zambia's education and training sector? (Please tick)

(a) Your country's capability to provide required assistance.

Much Some None

(b) To counterbalance other donors' assistance.

Much Some None

(c) To support other donors' assistance to Zambia.

Much Some None

(d) Cultural exchange considerations.

Much Some None

(e) Zambia's education and training needs.

Much Some None

(f) Zambia's education and training policies.

Much Some None

(g) Your country's foreign policy considerations.

Much Some None

(h) Trade and Commerce considerations.

Much Some None

(i) Other (specify).....
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10.A To what extent do you feel that your organisation's chances of attaining its objectives in the Zambian education and training sector could be enhanced if your aid resources and those of other donors were effectively coordinated? (Please tick)

1. To a great extent.

2. To some extent.

3. Not at all.

10.B How could such coordination be undertaken? (Please tick and specify where indicated)

1. By a Zambian government agency.

Specify which:.....

2. By the donors themselves.

Specify how:.....
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3. By the UNDP.

4. By the World Bank.

5. Other (specify).....
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11. How would you rate your organisation's performance in planning and executing aid programmes for the Zambian education and training sector, in the following respects.

(a) Coordination with other donors.

Very good Good Poor Very poor

(b) Coordination with recipient ministries and departments.

Very good Good Poor Very poor

(c) Efforts to fill gaps not supported by other donors.

Very good Good Poor Very poor

(d) Education and training outcomes in Zambia.

Very good Good Poor Very poor

(e) Strengthening recipient's capacity to manage programmes/projects after your organisation's assistance has ceased.

Very good Good Poor Very poor

12. To what extent do you see your organisation's style and practices in the aspects listed below as being significantly different from that of other donors?

1. Project Planning

(a) To a great extent.

(b) To some extent.

(c) Not at all.

2. Project administration and management.

(a) To a great extent.

(b) To some extent.

(c) Not at all.

3. Project evaluation.

(a) To a great extent.

(b) To some extent.

(a) Not at all.

4. Dissemination of results and recommendations from project evaluation studies.

(a) To a great extent.

(b) To some extent.

(c) Not at all.

13. If you have ticked (a) and (b) in answer to Question 12, how would you describe the significant differences between your organisation and other donor organisations of which you have knowledge?

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14 . What is the policy of your organisation with regard to management of your aided projects? (Please tick more than one if you wish)

- (a) Include a project management training component for local staff in all major projects.
- (b) Your own specialists/consultants must be seconded to ministries and departments concerned to manage projects, or assist in managing them.
- (c) Involve other donor staff in project management.
- (d) Recipients must meet all local management costs.
- (e) No overall policy- only general guidelines.

Specify the guidelines:.....
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.....

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION

APPENDIX II

List of People Interviewed and
Organisations visited

PEOPLE INTERVIEWED - LUSAKA ZAMBIA

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
Prof L H Goma	Minister, Higher Ed
F Chelu	C I S (MGEC)
J Z Banda	Director, ZEPIU
R Mazonga	CEO (P/TC) Higher
W Hoppers	Exec Sec, SHAPE
Prof M Kelly	UNZA
F Lundstrom	S/PL0, General Ed
A M Pensulo	Special Ed Inspector
L Makomani	As/Sec (PL) Gen Ed
M Luoto	Prog Officer, (Fin)
I Mwamba	Psp Insp, fin Proj
J Simonsen	Norwegian Anthropol'st
Kisenga	Indus Art Inspector
E N Phiri	As/Sec (P/TC) Gen Ed
K M Joseph	Head (TCAU) UNZA
M Sikuyuba	S/PL0, Gen Ed
E A Y Mwambazi	CMDO, (DTEVT)
I Muchelemba	As/Dir, Manpower (NCDP)
Mrs Ngoma	Economist, NCDP
S Siame	Dir (ETC) NCDP
Dr Calvaro	UNDP
I Hoel	Prog Officer, NORAD
I Colbro	Prog Officer, SIDA
B B Nkonga	Ed Sec, Chr Council
Dr C Fundanga	Perm Sec, (E&F) Cabinet
K Chali	Director, DMDT-Cabinet
P Daka	Spec Task Force, Cabinet
F Sheldon	Head, Irish DCO
B O'Connor	BPP Officer, Brit Coucil
N Billany	Coordinator, ZEMP
A Rasineu	Coordinator (PSP)
E M Mutale	Sectoral Planner, NCDP
I Wamulwange	Science Insp, Higher Ed
J M F Calder	UNZA
S Chidumayo	As/Dir (IPRD) NCDP
J Mulholland	Rep, Brit Council
P Skelton	D/Rep, Brit Council
M D Chanda	S/PL0 Higher Ed
G Chibesakunda	Science Inspector
L O'Keefe	KELT Advisor
A Malama	ESP Curr Specialist

NOTE : The positions as at the time of the interviews
in 1988.

FIELDWORK REPORT

The following fieldwork activities were undertaken.

(a) Interviews Lusaka - Zambia

SIDA - Stockholm and Lusaka.
British council - Lusaka and London.
FINNIDA - Lusaka.
NORAD - Lusaka.
HEDCO - Lusaka.
British High commission - Lusaka.
Ministry of General Education - Lusaka.
Ministry of Higher Education - Lusaka.
Zambia Education Projects Implementation Unit - Lusaka
UNDP - Lusaka.
University of Zambia - Lusaka.
Cabinet Office - Lusaka.
National Commission for Development Planning - Lusaka.
SHAPE - Lusaka.
Directorate of Manpower Development and Training - Lusaka.
Department of Technical Education and Vocational Training - Lusaka.
Christian Council of Zambia-Lusaka.
USAID-Lusaka.

(b) Access to archival and other official documents:

SIDA - Archives and Library - Stockholm
ODA - Library - London
MGEC - Policy and Technical Assistance Files.
MGE - Policy and Technical Assistance Files.
NCDP - Documentation Centre - Lusaka.

(c) Interviews

Stockholm - Sweden

L Wohlgemuth	Then Head, Education - Now Deputy Director-General - SIDA.
K Rosecrantz	Programme Officer - SIDA.
G Rosengart	Programme Officer - SIDA.
G Melbring	Programme Officer - SIDA.
L Lawin	Now Head, DCO - SIDA - Botswana.
A Johnston	Researcher, University of Stockholm.
I Fagerlind.	Director, Institute of International Education - University of Stockholm.
L O Edstrom	Deputy Director-General - SIDA - Now Ambassador, Mozambique.

(d) Interviews

London - UK

I Mackinson	British Council-London, former Director NIPA, Lusaka
D Titheridge	British Council - London
C Stephens	British Council - London
C Treffgarne	Lecturer/ODA Education advisor
W Dodd	Former Chief Education Adisor ODA. London.
C L Carmichael	Former Manpower Advisor, Government of Zambia. Now Peat Marwick London.

Other

Aklilu Habte	Former Director, Education World Bank.
K B Van den Bosch	Head, Education and Training NUFFIC.

APPENDIX III

Tables

Table 1

EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN
ZAMBIA BY SOURCE AND TYPE

<u>BILATERAL DONORS</u>	<u>ASSISTANCE/PROJECT</u>
1. BRITAIN	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Staff Development 2. British Staff Supplementation (OSAS, BESS) 3. Commodity Assistance 4. Book Presentation 5. English language Development (ESP, KELT) 6. Mathematics Textbook Project 7. DTEVT Equipment Maintenance Project 8. CBU School of Technology 9. Crafts Training Project.
2. SWEDEN	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Staff Development (MGEC, DTEVT, UNZA) 2. Technical and other support to LCTH. 3. Technical assistance to UNZA 4. Desk Provision. 5. Multigrade Teaching Project. 6. Provision of Primary School Teaching & Learning materials. 7. Support to SHAPE 8. Special Education Support 9. Self-help School Project
3. NORWAY	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Secondary School Maintenance 2. Continuing Education 3. Staff Development 4. Support to SHAPE
4. FINLAND	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provision of Education Materials (ZEMP) 2. Staff Development. 3. Construction of Practical Subjects Workshops.
5. FRANCE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Staff Development (Scholarships) 2. Commodity Assistance.
6. W. GERMANY	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Staff Development (UNZA) 2. School-leaver Programme 3. Adult Education Support.
7. CANADA	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Staff Development (UNZA) 2. Housing - (UNZA)

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 8. JAPAN
 9. BULGARIA 10. CZECHOSLOVAKIA 11. POLAND 12. INDIA 13. CUBA 14. ROMANIA 15. E. GERMANY 16. NORTH KOREA 17. U.S.A. 18. AUSTRALIA 19. CHINA*¹ 20. NEW ZEALAND | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Vet. School - (UNZA) 2. Maheba (Refugee) Sec.School. 3. Human Resource Development (DTEVT). 4. Staff Development (UNZA) 5. Technical Assistance (see School)
 Staff Development, mainly Scholarships for Overseas training. |
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MULTILATERAL DONORS

ASSISTANCE

- | | |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. WORLD BANK
 2. AFRICAN DEV.BANK
 3. E.E.C.
 4. UNDP | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Construction of new school Buildings 2. Providing educational equipment. 3. Carrying out renovations to school buildings
 1. Construction of new school buildings 2. Self-Help school Project
 1. Zambia Mathematics and Science Teachers Education Project (ZAMZTEP)
 1. Zambia Science Equipment Project. |
|--|---|

*¹: Has discussed with MHE and shown willingness to provide very limited technical assistance-technical lectures for colleges.

SOURCE: Compiled from various MGEC and MHE sources.

Table 2

UK's Bilateral Country Aid Programmes in Selected African Countries, 1980-1988 (£m)

Country	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Kenya	25.33	21.70	16.76	31.85	38.31	34.43	33.75	27.75	33.60
Sudan	31.31	23.40	34.59	25.26	27.55	42.29	25.99	20.19	21.84
Tanzania	28.68	23.89	19.87	28.82	17.02	17.96	12.71	24.04	34.02
Zimbabwe	11.87	14.44	16.59	12.09	14.28	23.63	12.50	12.49	12.73
Zambia	16.15	13.97	12.13	14.93	13.45	25.55	35.35	24.82	11.97
Egypt	10.54	5.00	6.45	6.35	10.36	19.10	15.74	7.86	8.05
Malawi	11.60	13.73	9.35	8.24	10.81	14.00	15.01	24.86	12.13
Botswana	7.72	6.95	5.54	5.52	4.77	8.77	12.32	11.07	4.85
Uganda	1.72	7.57	2.80	4.07	5.44	9.17	8.57	10.39	21.85
Lesotho	5.52	3.23	4.09	5.07	3.79	2.38	3.78	3.90	4.14
Nigeria	2.65	2.57	3.03	2.29	3.79	6.24	5.58	5.36	3.30
Ghana	12.65	7.44	6.40	4.84	3.77	11.68	19.45	20.04	28.50
Gambia	1.68	1.84	2.28	2.46	3.20	3.61	9.89	7.17	5.30
Mozambique	3.21	2.99	1.13	1.30	1.90	8.36	7.42	22.79	28.00
Sierra Leone	1.57	2.12	2.93	1.46	2.22	3.62	3.84	2.60	1.65
Swaziland	4.19	3.69	3.11	2.35	2.16	3.46	6.40	3.45	1.95
Mauritius	2.09	1.60	1.39	0.83	1.81	2.18	5.77	8.07	1.69
Somalia	1.52	1.41	1.61	1.91	1.70	1.73	3.94	7.27	6.19
Seychelles	3.90	4.07	2.80	2.30	1.47	1.13	2.51	1.67	1.47
Zaire	1.22	1.05	0.81	2.65	0.74	0.73	0.28	3.11	1.39
Liberia	0.24	0.30	0.38	0.53	0.56	1.05	0.90	0.91	0.66
South Africa	0.18	0.26	0.39	0.54	0.51	-	-	-	4.60
Nambia	0.15	0.22	0.23	0.35	0.47	0.60	0.73	0.96	1.46
Cameroon	0.31	0.36	0.31	0.28	0.40	7.46	3.74	6.80	2.50
Ivory Coast	0.16	0.19	0.13	0.25	0.26	2.61	7.44	4.54	1.74
Senegal	0.09	0.43	0.10	0.35	0.23	1.02	4.93	1.79	2.80
Mali	0.16	0.14	0.09	0.09	0.14	0.74	1.18	0.98	-
Morocco	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.12	0.11	0.09	0.15	0.18	-
Burkina Faso	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.12	0.10	0.27	0.13	0.15	-
Ethiopia	0.22	0.13	0.06	0.05	0.10	28.05	9.62	8.55	4.06

NOTE: For 1988 figures do not include ATP component.

SOURCE: FCO/ODA, Statistics of the British Aid Programme, various years.

Table 3

**African Students in Britain by sending Country and British Scholarship/Award Scheme,
1980-1984**

Country	1980			1982			1984					
	TCTP	CSEFP	B/C.SCH	TCTP	CSEFP	ORSAS	B/C.SCH	TCTP	FCOSAS	ORSAS	B/C.SCH	CSEFP
Algeria	10	-	-	-	-	6	-	24	8	15	7	-
Angola	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	-	-	-	3
Benin	14	-	-	6	-	-	-	193	3	-	3	5
Botswana	127	1	-	111	4	-	2	58	4	5	-	-
Cameroon	54	-	3	64	-	-	3	98	8	140	-	-
Egypt	226	-	10	179	-	26	6	-	6	5	7	-
Ethiopia	40	-	8	2	-	1	7	-	-	-	-	-
Gabon	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
Ghana	228	19	2	233	24	12	3	234	3	4	4	45
Ivory Coast	36	-	-	23	-	-	-	29	-	-	-	-
Kenya	472	17	5	585	14	6	-	916	14	9	3	27
Lesotho	85	1	1	97	1	-	-	125	1	1	3	4
Malawi	297	8	2	351	3	3	4	442	6	5	3	10
Mauritius	48	5	-	56	9	5	2	71	12	7	1	20
Morocco	15	-	2	16	-	-	4	14	6	1	3	-
Mozambique	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	24	-	-	-	-
Namibia	55	-	-	61	-	-	-	71	-	1	-	-
Nigeria	304	55	-	529	72	45	-	613	12	63	-	136
Senegal	17	-	-	16	-	-	1	30	3	-	2	-
Seychelles	80	-	1	84	1	-	-	64	2	-	-	1
S/Leone	130	8	1	138	8	4	2	140	3	2	2	7
South Africa	-	-	20	-	-	24	24	33	9	48	14	-
Sudan	232	-	8	239	-	8	5	272	3	11	4	-
Swaziland	108	-	1	163	1	1	-	178	3	1	1	1
Tanzania	689	10	3	475	12	4	3	314	6	6	5	18
Zambia	306	10	2	460	13	4	6	565	3	2	4	22
Zimbabwe	189	11	-	549	5	7	-	420	8	8	4	12

SOURCE: British Council, (1985).

Table 4

**Government Support for Overseas Students in U.K. by Category of Award Scheme,
1985-1989**

<u>SCHEME</u>	1985		1986		1987		1988	
	Students	£m	Students	£m	Students	£m	Students	£m
<u>ODA</u>								
TCTP	10,063	53.00	10,500	60.00	11,465	66.00	12,000	72.00
ODASSS	-	-	138	0.75	175	1.10	250	1.40
CSFP	675	6.80	700	7.20	750	7.40	722	7.90
BRUFS	-	-	-	-	80	0.40	170	1.86
Nassau Fell.	-	-	60	0.25	120	0.50	120	0.65
Sino-Brit. Fr.	-	-	-	-	336	0.70	620	0.70
<u>FCO</u>								
FCOSAS	931	4.06	1,211	4.59	1,485	5.50	1,737	8.99
Country/Terri.	2,967	4.60	3,017	4.67	3,029	4.25	3,100	3.84
CSFP	234	2.13	195	2.12	240	2.14	228	2.31
Marshall	66	0.70	69	75	70	0.77	70	0.83
<u>British Council</u>								
Brit.Coun.Fell.	1,165	3.70	1,577	4.07	1,623	4.46	1,713	4.54
<u>DES</u>								
ORSAS	1,723	4.22	1,770	4.61	1,808	5.04	1,900	5.90
Fulbright Sch.	30	0.29	26	0.28	24	0.27	44	0.29
<u>DTI</u>								
CBI Scholarships	64	0.15	54	0.14	73	0.17	83	0.20
TOTAL	17,918	79.65	19,317	89.43	21,278	98.70	22,757	111.41

SOURCE: FAC (1989) Funding for Overseas Students. Min./evidence, pp.3, 7.

Table 5

Country	ODA Exp. on Fellowships (£'000)	% of Total Fellowship Expenditure Assistance	Number of Person-Years Financed	£'000 per Person-Years	% of Official Development Aid to that Country for Fellowships
India	7679	11.7	471	16.3	9.8
Kenya	4732	7.2	452	10.5	18.0
Nigeria	4111	6.3	343	12.0	76.6
Bangladesh	3164	4.8	335	9.4	9.1
Malawi	2837	4.3	361	7.9	13.0
Zambia	2789	4.2	333	8.4	11.4
Tanzania	2038	3.1	213	9.6	8.5
Sri Lanka	1929	2.9	167	11.6	16.7
Indonesia	1870	2.9	148	12.6	21.1
Botswana	1588	2.4	175	9.0	20.7
Ghana	1574	2.4	144	10.9	8.0
Uganda	1554	2.4	158	9.8	20.7
China	1427	2.2	351	4.1	48.8
Sudan	1366	2.1	155	8.8	6.8
Pakistan	1196	1.8	145	8.2	5.3
Zimbabwe	1167	1.8	143	8.2	11.7
Nepal	1140	1.7	121	9.4	11.4
Swaziland	961	1.5	105	9.2	32.5
Malaysia	887	1.4	103	8.6	10.2
Cameroon	858	1.3	108	7.9	23.4
TOTAL	44,867	68.4	4,531	9.9	

SOURCE: Overseas Development Administration, British Overseas Aid 1987

Table 6

Recommended Tuition Fees for Overseas Students, in
the U.K., 1986 - 1988 by Level and Subject Group (£)

1.	<u>University</u>	<u>1986/87</u>	<u>1987/88</u>	<u>1988/89</u>
	Arts Courses	3,480	3,690	3,950
	Sciences	4,570	4,840	5,180
	Clinical Courses	8,450	8,960	9,590
2.	<u>Maintained + Assisted</u>			
	<u>Institutions</u>			
	Advanced Courses	3,540	3,720	4,017
	Non-Advanced	1,947	2,055	2,226

SOURCE: Tillman, G. (1988) P.21.

Table 7

NUMBER OF OVERSEAS STUDENTS IN THE UK 1979-85

Student Numbers	1979/80	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85
Total in UK	121,748	108,610	87,007	77,934	74,137	Not Known
HMG-Funded	9,303	9,022	9,163	10,434	14,332	17,400
% of Total	7.6%	8.3%	10.5%	13.9%	19.3%	-
Total from Commonwealth and Dependencies in UK	51,934	44,721	37,894	32,634	30,828	Not Known
HMG-Funded	5,492	5,633	6,173	7,320	10,365	11,818
% of Total	10.6%	12.6%	16.3%	22.4%	33.6%	-
Total from European Community in UK	13,082	13,934	10,841	11,000	9,792	Not Known
HMG-Funded	102	104	99	102	88	130
% of Total	0.78%	0.75%	0.91%	0.93%	0.9%	-

Source: British Council, (1985), Annex B

Table 8

ODA's Target Countries for Commercially Related
Technical Education and Training, 1980

<u>Region</u>	<u>Country</u>
Latin America	Argentina
	Bolivia
	Brazil
	Chile
	Colombia
	Ecuador
	Mexico
	Panama
	Paraguay
	Peru
Uruguay	
North Africa + Middle East	Algeria
	Egypt
	Jordan
	Morocco
	Yemen Arab Republic
Africa	Angola
	Botswana
	Cameroon
	Gambia
	Ghana
	Ivory Coast
	Kenya
	Malawi
	Mauritius
	Niger
	Nigeria
	Tanzania
	Zambia
	Zimbabwe
Asia and Far East	Burma
	India
	Indonesia
	Malaysia
	Pakistan
	Papua New Guinea
	Philippines
	Sri Lanka
	Thailand

SOURCE: Quoted by ODA Working Party in its Review of ODA
TC Appendix III. (The Working Party's source being
Appendix II to Annex C to OTM 6/80).

Table 9

BRITISH AID TO EDUCATION AND TRAINING-PROJECTS IN ZAMBIA,
1989

1. Customs and Excise Staff Training.
Two fully funded training officers (under recruitment), vehicles, equipment and teaching materials and short-term consultancies; to improve training of Customs and Excise Officers.
2. National Institute for Public Administration (NIPA).
Four supplemented officers, two in accountancy and two in legal training. Three further supplemented personnel in accountancy, health services, management and computers under recruitment; plus equipments; to strengthen teaching capability and advice on structural and Management issues.
3. Management Services Board (MSB).
Two supplemented personnel, one under recruitment in financing management and management services, plus equipment; to strengthen the structure and teaching capability.
4. Copperbelt University Faculty of Technology.
Four long-term TCOs plus equipment, books, and vehicles, to establish and operate a Higher Diploma Studies Programme in water and road engineering and a programme of short intensive in-service courses for District Council works personnel.
5. English Methodology and Materials Development.
Four fully-funded and ten supplemented officers, equipment, vehicles, books and links with U.K. institutions; to help raise the quality of English teaching in primary and secondary schools.
6. Mathematics Textbook Project.
Books and equipment worth £350,000; to support and improve mathematics and science education in secondary schools.
7. Craft Training Project.
Two fully-funded officers (one under recruitment), books, vehicles, reprographic centre and in-country and U.K. training; to upgrade the quality of skill training in Trades Training Institutes.
8. Technical Education Equipment Maintenance Project.
One fully funded adviser, plus vehicle, equipment, in-country training and short-term consultancies; to provide support and maintenance of equipment in technical education institutions throughout Zambia.

Possible Future Projects.

Projects under preparation or consideration.

1. UNZA.
 2. CBU Schools of Technology and Environmental Sciencies.
 3. UNZA and CBU management consultancies.
 4. UNZA and CBU Libraries.
 5. Engineering and manpower support for NORTEC.
 6. Business studies training.
 7. Male Registered Nurse training.
 8. Pharmaceutical sector manpower and training.
 9. Paramedical training at Evelyn Hone College.
-

SOURCE: ODA, (1989) British Bilateral aid to Zambia.

Table 10

Swedish Education Assistance to Programme Countries

<u>Country</u>	<u>82/83</u>	<u>83/84</u>	<u>84/85</u>	<u>85/86</u>	<u>86/87</u>	<u>87/88</u>	<u>Total (MSEK)</u>
Angola	50.5	22.8	30.3	20.9	21.5	21.7	167.7
Bangladesh	88.5	9.2	6.5	27.1	22.8	13.0	167.1
Botswana	219.0	20.0	7.0	27.9	22.9	32.8	329.6
Cuba	211.3	-	-	-	-	-	211.3
Ethiopia	271.7	27.4	20.7	33.4	27.4	30.2	410.8
Guinea-B	20.1	3.8	1.6	4.2	4.7	4.4	38.8
India	126.4	2.1	38.7	-	-	2.5	169.6
Kenya	192.4	7.2	5.7	-	-	-	205.3
Lesotho	4.0	-	-	-	-	-	4.0
Mozambique	29.4	7.2	10.8	12.3	19.1	15.0	93.8
Pakistan	30.8	-	-	-	-	-	30.8
Portugal	18.9	1.8	-	-	-	-	20.7
Sri Lanka	38.6	10.0	11.4	6.8	4.4	11.9	83.1
Swaziland	60.6	4.0	2.8	4.2	0.3	-	71.9
Tanzania	472.1	55.9	52.8	39.9	50.5	47.4	718.6
Tunisia	100.9	-	-	-	-	-	100.9
Vietnam	5.2	0.1	5.1	*)	*)	*)	10.4
Zambia	101.9	27.0	36.4	13.4	13.4	19.2	211.3
Zimbabwe	86.6	37.3	69.4	39.9	39.6	46.7	319.5
Total	2128.9	235.8	299.2	230.0	226.6	246.0	3366.5

*) Administered by Industry Division.

Source: SIDA (1989).

Table 11

SIDA Financed Education and Training Projects, 1974-1987.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Project</u>
Bangladesh	1976-1986	1. Vocational Training.
Botswana	1982-1985	1. Education Sector Support for Rural Development Promotion. 2. Third Country Training. 3. Teaching Aids Production. 4. Education Evaluation and Research. 5. Primary School Furniture and Equipment.
Ethiopia	1976	1. Supply of Paper for Textbook Production.
	1983-1985	2. Education Sector Support Programme.
India	1979-1985	1. Non-formal Education. 2. Cover Costs for Paper for Books.
Kenya	1974-1984	1. Technical Education Programme.
Mozambique	1977-1985	1. Production of Teaching Materials. 2. Establishing Publishing Unit for Production of School Books.
	1981-1984	3. MONAP 1-4. Ministry of Agriculture Training and Capital Development Programme.
Sri Lanka	1979-1985	1. Capital Development - Establishment of Training Institute for Manufacturing/Construction/allied work, at Foremen Level. 2. Technical, Vocational and Science Education Development Project.
	1983-1986	3. Technical Education, improve quality and manpower orientation. Establishment of Technical Teacher Training Institute.
Swaziland	1983-1985	1. Education Planning.

Tanzania	1982-1985	1. Sector Support to Education - Adult, Primary, In-Service Training. Paper for Printing books. Completing building Secondary School.
	1982-1984	2. Vocational Training. - Moshi Vocational Training Centre.
Zambia	1979-1985	1. University of Zambia, School of Engineering (Telecoms and Electronics).
	1984-1985	2. Teacher Training and Resource Centres and Production Units.
		3. Education Planning at H/Q Mobile Education Planning Training Programme.
	1983-1985	4. University of Zambia - Land Survey.
	1984-1985	5. Education Materials Production - books, furniture etc.
		6. Special Education, Staff Development, Curriculum Development.
Zimbabwe	1980-1985	1. School Reconstruction
		2. Scholarship Fund.
		3. Teacher Training.
	1981-1982	4. Capital Development-Teacher houses, rural Secondary Schools.
	1980-1985	5. Curriculum Development
	1982-1985	6. Special Education.
	1983-1985	7. Planning and Evaluation.
		8. Setting up a Standards Control Services Unit.
		9. Non-formal Education.

NOTE: Some programmes/projects have been extended beyond the dates indicated.

Source: SIDA, (1987).

Table 12

Swedish Education Assistance - Personnel and consultancies, 1984-1988

<u>Personnel</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>
No of contract employees on duty	71	81	86	91	99
No of contract jobs started	34	32	34	30	42
No of jobs under recruitment	36	22	27	41	13
No of short-term employees on duty	33	55	47	68	45
No of short-term jobs under recruitment	6	5	9	2	4
<u>Consultancies</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	
No of assignments	30	33	33	52	
No of participants	55	45	45	90	
No of man-months	78	54	64	194	
Total Cost (MSEK)	5.6	7.0	8.5	11.8	

Source: SIDA (1989)

Table 13

Swedish Education Assistance by Sub-sectors, 1978-1988
(%)

<u>Sector</u>	<u>78/79</u>	<u>79/80</u>	<u>80/81</u>	<u>81/82</u>	<u>82/83</u>	<u>84/85</u>	<u>85/86</u>	<u>86/87</u>	<u>87/88</u>
Primary Education	21	29	32	46	40	29	58	55	58
Secondary Education	18	13	17	13	6	16	5	3	3
Tertiary Education	5	3	4	2	5	7	1	2	2
Vocational Training	23	25	26	27	35	27	22	26	21
Adult Education	12	9	17	12	11	13	10	8	8
Other Projects	22	21	4	1	48	8	3	6	7
Total Million SEK	1214.9	161.6	198.5	285.0	270.0	235.8	230.0	226.6	246.0

Source: SIDA Statistics Various Years.

Table 14

Proportion of Capital Budget for Education Arising
from Development Assistance in Zambia, 1980-1986

Year	Total Capital Budget*	Local Funds	<u>Development Assistance</u>	
	K'million	K'million	Amount K'million	Percentage %
1980	9.30	6.96	2.34	25.2
1981	12.63	5.27	7.36	58.3
1982	15.26	7.08	8.18	53.6
1983	13.41	6.72	6.69	49.9
1984	19.57	13.02	6.55	33.5
1985	26.80	7.90	18.90	70.5
1986	99.86	25.08	74.78	74.9
<hr/>				
1980-86	196.83	72.03	124.80	63.4

* Does not include supplementary estimates.

NOTE: All amounts in current prices.

Source: Reproduced from Kelly, M J etal (1986)
Appendix xixb.

Table 15

**Criteria for Selection and Prioritisation of Aided
Projects, 1987**

<u>Criterion</u>	<u>Weighting</u> (%)
1. Projects with high multiplier effect	10.0
2. Manpower Development	8.0
3. Projects with a short gestation period	7.8
4. Import substitution projects using local materials	7.7
5. Projects promoting non-traditional exports	7.6
6. Projects with forward and backward linkages	7.5
7. Projects using local raw materials	7.3
8. Government Revenue generating projects	7.1
9. Employment generating projects	6.6
10. Labour intensive projects	6.3
11. Basic needs projects	6.2
12. High internal rate of return projects	5.1
13. Projects promoting balanced economic development	4.2
14. Cost-effectiveness	3.5
15. Projects nearing completion	3.0
16. Loans for maintenance of capital stock	1.5
17. Externally aided projects with cross conditionalities	0.6
18. Aided projects which impose policy reforms	0.0

NOTE:

Priority weighting were also given in each sector. In the education sector it was given as follows: Basic education 28.7 percent, maintenance of education facilities 26.3 percent, Vocational training 22.5 percent, and skills oriented secondary education 22.5 percent.

Source: INDP (1987, 16).

Table 16
Public Investment Programme in Zambia, 1990-1993
(Highest Priority)
(Millions)

<u>Sector</u>	Foreign Com \$	Local Cost K	Total Cost K	%
Agriculture	329.1	5489.7	13717.2	28.2
Mining	150.7	4111.5	7879.0	16.2
Transportation+ Communications	352.4	3553.3	12363.3	25.4
Energy	139.4	657.0	4142.0	8.5
Manufacturing	87.5	644.6	2832.1	5.8
Education	61.3	196.3	1449.0	3.0
Health	49.7	206.5	1449.0	3.0
Water, Sanitation, Public Works	50.6	360.0	1625.0	3.3
WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT	5.5	43.6	181.1	0.4
Non-Trad. Exports	57.0	1322.8	2747.8	5.7
TOTAL	1283.2 (65.9%)	16585.3 (34.1%)	48665.3	(100.0%)

Source: Coombe, T. et al. (1990).

Table 17
Non-Capital Aid Expenditure by Donor and Purpose, 1981-1983

<u>DONOR</u>	<u>TECH.ASSIST.</u>	<u>SCHOLARSHIPS</u>	<u>SCHOOL MATERIALS</u>
	%	%	%
Belgium	68.5	25.1	6.4
Canada	50.6	21.1	28.3
W. Germany	45.7	25.3	29.1
France	84.5	11.6	3.8
Italy	67.6	13.7	18.8
Nederlands	60.6	19.1	20.2
Sweden	33.3	1.4	65.3
Switzerland	58.4	19.0	22.6
U.K.	56.6	40.1	3.3
U.S.A.	61.1	20.9	18.0
USSR	17.6	82.3	0.1

SOURCE: Compiled from Orivel, F. and Rasesa, J.B. (1985).

Table 18

Technical Cooperation Flows and as Proportion of Official
Development Assistance (ODA) for DAC Countries
(Total in US \$ mn), 1988

Country	Bilateral ODA	Technical Cooperation Contributions	TC as % of ODA
Australia	535	180	33.6
Austria	155	64	41.3
Belgium	425	166	39.1
Canada	1259	-	-
Denmark	459	65	14.2
Finland	263	21	8.0
France	5326	2369	44.5
Germany	3090	1535	49.7
Ireland	27	13	48.1
Italy	1878	404	21.5
Japan	5248	853	16.3
Netherlands	1419	543	38.3
New Zealand	66	15	22.7
Norway	528	84	15.9
Sweden	897	185	20.6
Switzerland	389	75	19.3
United Kingdom	1002	462	46.1
United States	7007	1749	25.0
EEC	1696	138	8.1
Total DAC	29972	8784	29.3

NOTE: Data no available.

Source: OECD 1988, Table 23.

APPENDIX IV

Terms of Reference for Aid Review
in the MGEYS, 1988.

EXTRACT 1

**The Terms of Reference for the MGEYS Review
Committee on Foreign Aided Projects, 1988.**

1. The manner in which projects are identified, processed and approved.
 2. Management of the projects including project related facilities and equipment.
 3. Financial arrangements.
 4. Relationship of projects to the principal activities of the MGEYS.
 5. Communication involving project staff, the Ministry and donors.
 6. Any other matters relevant under review.
-

Source: MGEYS (1988).

EXTRACT II

Terms, Duties and Responsibilities of the Planned NCDP Monitoring Centre (NMC)*

1. To compile information on the status of the on-going projects, including total cost, amount spent, the amount of external financing committed and disbursed for these projects.
2. To create an appropriate mechanism that provides an early warning of difficulties encountered in project implementation for each Province and District.
3. To analyse difficulties encountered in project implementation and indicating possible solutions.
4. To prepare reports for NCDP on the implementation of particular projects and programmes, focusing on those for which there have been significant deviations.
5. To act and/or cause implementing agencies to act on the recommendations and/or decisions made by GRZ, particularly to undertake follow up action where progress on implementation is behind schedule.
6. To design and adopt appropriate procedural system in order to secure financial and physical "State of the Art" reports in a timely manner.
7. To keep consolidating information on permanent basis and to prepare reports in an agreed manner.
8. To design and maintain permanent training programmes, especially for those officers based in provinces and districts.
9. To enhance mobilisation and disbursement of aid flows to Zambia.
10. To provide a forum to keep GRZ and donor agencies informed of progress with aid utilization and projects implementation.

NOTE: This was the earlier initiative within the NCDP which was never implemented and has now been superseded by the proposal to create an EAD.

** This is a donor-proved expert working in the NCDP.

SOURCE: Mirovic, D.** (1984, 14).

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