

**ACCESS TO FORMAL EDUCATION IN THE XINJIANG UIGHUR
AUTONOMOUS REGION OF CHINA 1949-1987 WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO HIGHER EDUCATION FOR ETHNIC GROUPS**

by

Hakima Arshidin

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Abstract

This thesis describes, analyses, and explains the problems of equality of access to, and provision of formal education, particularly higher education, in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of China between 1949 and 1987. It contrasts the central government's constitutional assurances of equality in education for all ethnic groups, both the non-Han indigenous majority and the rapidly increasing immigrant Han-Chinese minority, with the reality of their implementation. This contrast and the inequalities in education resulting from it constitute the central theme of the thesis.

The concepts of equality and inequality, ethnicity, assimilation and cultural diversity in education are first considered. The question as to where the root of the problem of access to higher education lies, whether in the outcome of higher education admission practices, or in the shortage of supply from lower down the system, is then examined closely. The question is addressed through the use of indicators of equal access to education; equal provision of educational facilities; equal prospects of survival; and success in progression from one level to another. These in turn are analyzed in terms of several dimensions including culture, religion, demography and geography.

The investigative method followed is essentially a historical analysis of statistical data, supplemented by an analysis of policy documents, political statements, and literature, and informal interviews.

The findings of the thesis are that, in spite of a nationally declared policy of equal access to education for all its ethnic groups, Xinjiang belies its official title of being Uighur and autonomous; and that attempts at assimilation to the Han through local language reforms, a nation-wide unified curriculum, political education, and the imposition of Standard Chinese have been to the detriment of the non-Han and have caused grave inequalities. The thesis concludes with suggestions on how these inequalities can be reduced and the interests and identities of the non-Han protected.

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
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
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Location of Xinjiang in The People's Republic of China



Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region



**An Explanatory Note on Language Variations and Educational
Terminology**

(A) Language Variations of Names

<u>English</u>	<u>Uighur</u>	<u>Chinese</u>
Aksu	Aksu	Akesu
Altai	Altay	Alatai
Artush	Atux	Atushi
Bayinghulin	Bayin'ǝulin	Bayin guo leng
Bortala	Bortala	Bo-er ta la
Chinese	Hanzu/Hansu	Hanzu
Ghulja	Ǟulja	Yining
Hotan	Hotan	Hetian
Hui	Tunggan, Huysu	Hui zu
Ili	Ili	Yili
Karamai	Karamay	Kelamayi
Kashgar	Kǝxkǝr	Kashi
Kazak	Kazak	Hazake zu
Kirghiz	Kirǝiz	ke-er-ke-zi zu
Kizilsu	Kizilsu	Kezilisu
Komul (Qomul)	Komul	Hami
Kuqa/Kuchar	Kuqa	Kuche
Manchu	Manjur	Man zu
Mandarin, Standard Chinese,	Hanzuqa Hanzu Tili	putung hua
Mongol	Mongǝul	Monguzu
Qbqaek (Chochaek)	Qoqǝk	Tacheng

Russian	Orus	E'lesi zu
Sanji	Sanji	Changji
Sibo	Xiwə	Xibo zu
Sinkiang, Chinese Turkestan, East Turkestan,		
Xinjiang	Xinjiang	Xinjiang
Tajik	Tajik	Tajike zu
Tartar	Tatar	Ta-ta-er zu
Tianshan Mountains	Tangri Taǝliri	Tianshan
Turfan	Turpan	Tulufan
Uighur	Uyǝur	Wei wu-er zu
Urumqi/Urumchi	Urumqi	Wulumochi
Uzbek	Uzbek	Wuzibieke zu

(B) Educational Terminology







<u>English</u>	<u>Uighur</u>	<u>Chinese</u>
(primary school)	(baxlanǝuǝ mǝktǝpni)	(xiao xue)
leavers/completers	putturgǝnlǝr	biye sheng
(middle school)	(ottura mǝktǝpni)	(zhong xue)
leavers/completers	putturgǝnlǝr	biye sheng
(technical school)	(tehnikumni) putturgǝnlǝr	(zhuanke)
completers/graduates		biye sheng
(secondary normal	(sifan mǝktǝpni)	(shifan xue
school)leavers/	putturgǝnlǝr	xiao) biye
completers		sheng

(tertiary/higher education) graduates	(ali m kt. pni) putturgānlār	(daxue) biye sheng
pupil (primary school)	(baxlanǝuq mǝktǝp) oǝuǝuqi(si)	(Xiao) Xuesheng
pupil (junior middle school)	(tolluksiz ottura mǝktǝp) oǝuǝuqi(si)	(chuzhong) sheng
pupil (senior middle school)	(tolluǝ ottura mǝktǝp) oǝuǝuqi(si)	(gaozhong) sheng
pupil/student (technical school)	(tehnikum) oǝuǝuqi(si), yaki (tehnika mǝktǝp) oǝuǝuqi(si)	(zhuanke) sheng
pupil (secondary normal school)	(ottura sifan mǝktǝp) oǝuǝuqi(si)	(shifan) xuesheng
student (tertiary or higher education)	(Ali mǝktǝp) oǝuǝuqi(si)	(daxue) (xue) sheng
post graduates	aspirantlar	yanjiu sheng
enrolment	mǝktǝptiki oǝuǝuqi	zai xiao xuesheng
new Entrants	yengi oǝuǝuqilar	xinsheng
graduates	oǝush putturgānlār	biye sheng

PS: From this glossary it can be seen that 'pupil' or 'student' in English is consistently translated into Uyghur as 'okughuqi' and as 'xuesheng' into Chinese. Both 'okughuqi' in Uyghur and 'xuesheng' in Standard Chinese mean a person who is learner. Therefore, in this thesis 'student' instead of 'pupil' is used for learners at all levels of the education system except primary education.

Similarly, 'graduate' instead of 'leaver/completer' is used for those who finish all stages of education with the exception of primary education.

(C) Transcription of Uighur Alphabet

A (a), B (b), D (d), E (e), F (f), G (g), H (kh), I (i), J (j), K (k), L (l), M (m), N (n), O (o), P (p), Q (ch), R (r), S (s), T (t), U (u), W (v), X (sh), Y (y), Z (z),  (gh),  (h),  (q),  (ae),  (ö),  (ue), NG (ng)

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1950 and 1985

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INTRODUCTION

SCOPE OF THE THESIS

One of the results of the 1949 Revolution was the replacement of the feudal and semi-feudal Chinese social system by a socialist one which was expected to be 'democratic and changing'.¹ As a result Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) began to be administered directly by the central government which gave education top priority. The Chinese government has insisted on the equality of all nationalities. Thus in September 1949, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference adopted a Common Program which emphasized:

1. Equality of each of the national minority groups with the Han majority group.
2. Freedom of each of the national minority groups to preserve its language, religion, and customs.
3. Indivisibility of the Chinese nation.
4. Right to regional autonomy of minority groups.

¹. Holmes, Brian (1981) Diversity and Unity in Education, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. (introduction)

5. Right of members of national minority groups to serve in the armed forces.²

In November 1950, the Sixth Session of Administrative Council of the Central People's Government approved "A Tentative Plan for the Training of Minority Cadres", the first major plan in new China to develop the education of minorities. The plan stipulates:

The central, provincial, and county authorities should train large numbers of cadres from the different minority nationalities.... to meet the needs of national construction, regional autonomy among minorities, and the requirements of nationality policy stipulated in the "Common Program."³

A year later at a meeting of the same Council, Ma Xulun, Minister of Education, delivered a report about minority education policies and tasks for the future. He indicated:

.... education programs should foster a spirit of equality, unity, fraternity, and cooperation among nationalities; preserve minority cultures; and enhance

². Hu, C.T.(1974?) The Education of National Minorities in Communist China, p.4, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Office of Education, U.S.A., in SOAS library, London.

³. Kwong, J., Editor, Education of Minorities, Chinese Education, Vol.22, No.1, Spring 1989, M.E. Sharpe, New York.

patriotism and support for the people's government.⁴

In 1984, Shi Jun, Director of the General Office of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, restated the following:

....the State must fully ensure and help the minority nationalities to realize their rights of equality and autonomy. The Constitution lays emphasis on strengthening the regional national autonomy and enlarging the concrete content of the autonomy. The constitution enables the national autonomous areas and organs of self-government to enact their autonomy in the following six aspects: the right to legislate for autonomy regulations and specific regulations; the right to manage their finance; the right to run their economy; the right to manage their cultural affairs; the right to organize their public security forces; and the right to use the common spoken and written language to carry out their work.⁵

These statements clearly show that over at least a period of 35 years all nationalities in the People's Republic of China have been constitutionally assured of equal rights

⁴. Ibid.

⁵. Shi Jun, National Minorities Flourishing, China Official Yearbook, 1983/84, p.457, Dragan Pearl Publications, Hong Kong.

including those relating to culture and education.

Despite the tremendous achievements that have been made in the quantitative expansion of education during the past 40 years in the XUAR, there have been problems of inadequate facilities, inefficiency, and above all inequality in access to, and provision of, education for different ethnic groups. Such inequalities are apparently more conspicuous in higher education. Nevertheless, Xinjiang has continually invested in education despite these problems.

The desire for equality and democracy can be related to the distribution of national resources among the different ethnic groups within a multiethnic country. The strong belief that education, especially higher education, contributes to the well-being of individuals and to the better distribution of educational services among these ethnic groups in different parts of the country plays an important role in the development of political, economic and cultural strategies for national development. In consequence Xinjiang has been preparing to undertake an ambitious modernization plan to become one of the most important bases for China's future economic growth.⁶ Such a plan is thought to require a base of science and technology developed through higher education.

⁶. A Survey of Xinjiang Economic Development, edited by Chen Dajun, (Xinjiang People's Press, 1985), p.14.

In response to the increasing demand for skilled manpower, policy-makers have been faced with questions as to whether to transfer skilled workers, highly educated technicians and managers, from other provinces, and even from abroad, or whether to give full consideration to Xinjiang itself in the first instance by developing its higher education in favour of the indigenous people. The current situation suggests that the former policy is being practised and not the latter. As a result, the already existing inequalities between ethnic groups in education, in the economy and in other aspects of society are being increased.

This study addresses itself to the inequalities between ethnic groups in Xinjiang, with an emphasis on access to, and provision of, formal education, especially higher education. The problem considered therefore hinges on the identification of these inequalities. According to various definitions in international literature, equality/inequality in education, more specifically in higher education, refers to a wide range of issues such as equal access to the system, which includes provision of facilities; participation in the system or the probability of survival; attainment throughout the system, in other words equality/inequality of output or in the performance of the participants; and opportunity which applies to the value of education in achieving equal access to jobs, income, political power and social status. All of these can vary in their effects on different kinds of citizens, men

and women; the different ethnic groups in the different regions, for example urban and rural; the different socio-economic groups and the physically healthy and the disabled. The main, but not exclusive, concern of this study is the equality/inequality of access to higher education for immigrant Han-Chinese and indigenous non-Han people viz. Uighurs, Kazaks, Kirghiz, Mongols, Hui, Sibo and Others in Xinjiang between 1949 and 1987.

Thus, the major aim of the study is through systematic description and analysis to attempt to throw more light upon the contemporary chiefly ethnically based inequalities in access to, and provision of, formal education, especially higher education, in Xinjiang. Specifically the main research question is: What is the degree of inequality in higher education in Xinjiang? To what extent the inequalities in higher education are the outcome of inequalities of higher education admission practices; and to what extent are they the outcome of supply originating lower down the system? Accordingly throughout the thesis two questions will be kept in mind: 1) What have been the changes in the patterns of enrolment and the student supply throughout the education system over time, and especially since 1949? 2) How do these relate to the changes in higher education admission practices which have been closely linked with various political and social campaigns in Xinjiang since 1949?

As indicators of equality/inequality in formal education for different ethnic groups, the following data will be collected: 1) the number of new entrants, enrolments, and graduates by Han and non-Han (and by ethnic groups among the non-Han where such data are available) at all educational levels in XUAR, 1949 - 1987; 2) the number of schools for different ethnic groups and the number of various ethnic pupils/students in each class at the primary and secondary levels; 3) the number of teaching staff by Han and non-Han, and by ethnic groups at all levels for that period; 4) the total population of the region, the percentages of each ethnic group, or of Han and non-Han, in the total population, plus the school-age population by Han and non-Han or by ethnic groups, where such data are available; and 5) rural and urban populations vis-a-vis the school population in rural and urban schools. All these should serve the purpose of measuring ethnic inequality in quantitative terms. Other information relating to the formal education for ethnic groups in Xinjiang is provided from source materials published within China as well as abroad. Additionally informal interviews are carried out during the fieldwork.

This introduction describes briefly Xinjiang's geography, its ethnic, as well as cultural diversities; the dramatic changes in the composition of the population through immigration, and gives a brief overview on the education of Xinjiang in the pre-Revolution period. Such background

information is essential to an understanding of the complexity of educational development in the XUAR between 1949 and 1987.

Chapter 1 deals with the conceptual issues of ethnic minority education, both in an international context, and in the context of China. Specifically, it describes and evaluates the following concepts, viz. dialectical materialism, equity and equality, multi-ethnic education, minority education, ethnicity, minority and majority, assimilation, racial discrimination, multi-cultural education, multiculturalism, cultural diversity and unity in education, and bilingualism. The conceptual discussion will also touch on the arguments on contemporary Chinese national minority education, which has been revealed in various publications. Finally, an attempt will be made towards the end of this Chapter to present the major points in the review of the literature on the education of minorities.

Chapter 2 is devoted to a discussion of the availability of higher education, particularly with regard to admission, centred around the first part of the core question the extent to which inequalities in higher education are the outcome of inequalities in admission practices. These inequalities will be examined in the following aspects: 1) changes in intake and admission practices which include: the continuous selective nature of admission; the changing

principles and practices of admission; the present process of selective admission; the progression from senior middle to tertiary institutions; the government's 'special treatment' for ethnic minorities in admission practice; the problems existing under the present selective system; and 2) the changes in the enrolments of tertiary institutions and the enrolment ratios for the various ethnic groups in Xinjiang.

Chapter 3 surveys some of the major aspects of inequality in the provision of higher education. These include: the medium of instruction, the curriculum and its duration. As indicators of inequality in the expansion of higher education, the following will also be examined and reviewed in the light of Chapter 2: 1) the distribution of Han and non-Han students by field of study and 2) the growth of higher education staff for Han and non-Han, relative to their respective populations.

Chapter 4 explores to what extent are inequalities in access to, and provision of, higher education rooted in inequalities of supply in primary education. These inequalities of supply will cover changes in intakes, the medium of instruction, the duration of primary schooling, the curriculum and the expansion of primary schools and staff. As an ultimate measure of equality/inequality in primary education, it will be essential to examine the enrolment ratios for various ethnic groups and their levels

of literacy/illiteracy.

The question of inequalities in higher education arising from inequalities of supply into and from secondary education will then be examined in Chapter 5. Specifically, changes in secondary school intakes, enrolment, enrolment ratios, and staff development according to Han and non-Han, (and of different ethnic groups where such data are available) will be examined. There will also be a discussion on such inequalities in supply as in the changes in secondary school duration, the curriculum, and the disparity between Han and non-Han during the secondary school expansion.

Thus, Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the inequalities in higher education enrolment, as reinforced by admission practices. Chapters 4 and 5 concentrate on the inequalities in the expansion of enrolments at primary and secondary levels of formal education in the XUAR since the Revolution.

Chapter 6 devotes itself to examining and analyzing the pattern of the supply of Han and non-Han students for higher education. With the available data the student flow from primary to higher education will be investigated from three angles: 1) samples of student flow from primary to tertiary institutions between 1970 and 1987; 2) the progression rate for Han and non-Han from one education level to another in the years for which data is available

between 1966 and 1987; and 3) the educational attainment/failure rates of Han and non-Han pupils/students at each level. The aim is to explore where the main root of inequality in formal education lies. It is essential in such an examination to find out which cause predominates over which in higher education, - the inequality caused by admission practices, or the inequality caused by the crucial short supply of non-Han students in Xinjiang?

Finally, in the Conclusion the thesis attempts to draw general conclusions and suggest remedies about the inequality in formal education for the various ethnic groups in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region between 1949 and 1987.

BACKGROUND

The People's Republic of China, consisting of a quarter of the world's population, is a multi-ethnic state. There are altogether 55 recognized minority nationalities that occupy 60 per cent of its total territory in five autonomous regions. These are the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, the Tibetan Autonomous Region, the Ningxia Hui (Tunggan) Autonomous Region, the Yunnan Zhuang Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The ethnic groups which inhabit these areas differ in language, religion, culture, philosophy and way of life from the Han-

Chinese. One of the largest ethnic groups are the Uighurs who are inhabitants of Xinjiang (meaning new frontier or border) in the northwest.

This section limits itself to a brief description of Xinjiang's geography, the composition and distribution of its ethnic groups and their cultural diversity. It also discusses the dramatic changes in the overall composition of the population of the Region since the Revolution of 1949.

1. Geography

a. Location

Xinjiang is China's largest and strategically most sensitive region. With its 5,700 kilometres long border, the Region shares its frontier with five countries, namely the USSR to the north and the west, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India to the south-west, and Mongolia to the north-east.

Located in the heart of the Euro-Asian continent, Xinjiang is surrounded by high mountains such as the Altay (in Mongolian meaning Golden), Pamir, Qaraqrum, and Altun mountains. With its 7,443.8 metre high Tomur Peak, Tangri Taghliri (Tien Shan Mountains) divide the Region into two

parts; namely the areas north of the Tangri Taghliri are called northern Xinjiang which includes the Jungar Basin; the areas to the south are called southern Xinjiang in which the Tarim Basin lies. The Turpan and Kumul areas are to the east of the Tangri Taghliri and therefore they deserve to be called eastern Xinjiang. The Tarim Basin, with an average height of 500 metres above sea level,⁷ covers more than half of the total area of Xinjiang and includes the extensive Taklimakan Desert. Oases fringe the basin, Kashgar, Hotan, and Aksu being among the largest. The Jungarian basin, averaging one thousand metres in elevation, has an annual rainfall of 400 - 600 millimetres as compared to the 300 - 500 millimetres received by the more arid Tarim basin.⁸

b. Climate

Xinjiang has a typical continental weather pattern with less rain than coastal areas. Winter is long, spring and autumn are short. But it has an average of 7 - 9.6 hours daily sunshine throughout the year. The temperature varies from area to area, with 15 - 20 centigrade below zero in the north and only 8 - 10 centigrade below zero in the south in January. The temperature is not much different

⁷. Tregear, T.R. Geography of China (1966), University of London Press.

⁸. Shabad, T. (1972) China's Changing Map, p. 309, London.

between north and south in summer, with an average of 22 - 26 centigrade. But Turpan Basin, surrounded by high mountains, is the hottest place in China. Its temperature at times between June and August reaches 47.6 centigrade above zero. Due to its special weather conditions, with less water-contained air and less vegetation, it easily becomes hot at noon and cold in the morning and evening in summer time.

c. Landscape

Xinjiang covers a vast expanse of land - 1,650,000 square kilometres or 627,600 square miles, constituting one-sixth of the total area (9,600,000 square kilometres) of the People's Republic of China. For its size Xinjiang has a relatively small population, with an average of 8 persons per square kilometre of land, compared with more than 100 per square kilometre in the country as whole. 37% of the land is devoted to agriculture and livestock; 12% is arable; and 27% is grassland, over half of which is in the mountains. There are over 300 rivers and over 100 lakes. With a total length of 2,179 kilometres, the Tarim River is the longest river in China. These rivers and lakes meet the irrigation demands of the whole Region as well as providing a suitable environment for fish production.

d) Administrative Areas

Administratively, Xinjiang comprises 7 prefectures, 5 autonomous districts, 8 cities, 76 counties and 6 autonomous counties. The seven prefectures are Ili, Tarbaghatay, Altay, Turpan, Aksu, Kashgar and Hotan. In order to protect the rights of various ethnic groups, and perhaps for the purpose of more effective administration, the Chinese government created five autonomous districts and six autonomous counties within Xinjiang in 1950s immediately after the Revolution. The five autonomous districts are:

- 1) Ili Kazak Autonomous District (AD) in the northwest of the region;
- 2) Sanji Hui Autonomous District between Tangri Taghliri to the south and Jungar Basin to the north;
- 3) Bayinghulin Mongol Autonomous District in the southeast;
- 4) Boritala Mongol Autonomous District in the northwest; and
- 5) Kizilsu Kirghiz Autonomous District in the south.

The six autonomous counties are:

- 1) Chapchael Sibo Autonomous County (AC) under Ili Prefecture;
- 2) Mori Kazak Autonomous County under Sanji Hui

Autonomous District;

3) Barikol Kazak Autonomous County under Turpan Prefecture;

4) Yanji Hui Autonomous County under Bayinghulin Autonomous District;

5) Tajik Tashqorgha Autonomous County under Kashgar Prefecture; and

6) Qubuqsar Mongol Autonomous County under Tarbaghatay Prefecture.

2. Population

The population of Xinjiang grew very slowly during more than two thousand years of the Han dynasty until 1911.⁹ In 1949 the total population was just over 4 million. Since then the population has grown rapidly: 7.27 million in the 1964 census, 12.55 million in 1979 and 13.44 million in 1984 - a population growth of 9.1 million in 25 years. Table 1 gives the population by the major ethnic groups in the Region between 1945 and 1984.

⁹. Issues & Studies - A Journal of China Studies and International Affairs, Vol.25 No.2, February 1989, p.133.

Table 1: Population Growth of the Major Ethnic Groups in XUAR in the Years 1946, 1949, 1964, 1979, 1982, 1984 ¹⁰

<u>Ethnic Groups</u>	<u>1945 Pop.</u>	<u>1949 Pop.</u>	<u>1964 Pop.</u>	<u>1979 Pop.</u>	<u>1982 Pop.</u>	<u>1984 Pop.</u>
Uighur	2987824	3291145	3991577	5641593	5955947	6170009
Han	222401	291021	2321216	5156195	5283971	5346267
Kazak	438575	443655	489126	847997	903337	964538
Hui	99607	122501	264017	547618	567689	588289
Kirghiz	69923	66145	69576	105623	112366	119296
Mongol	59686	52453	70743	111148	117510	121379
Uzbek	10224	12174	7683		12188	8792
Tajik	8210	13486	16231	23532	26573	28247
Tartar	5614	5926	2281		4078	3530
Sibo	10626	11668	17125	25994	27377	28736
Russian	19392	19452	1191		2663	4178
Daghur		1805	2720		4359	4617
Manchu	762	1039	2909		9182	8908
others	2506	930				44023
Total	3935350	4333400	7270067		13081538	13440809

Table 2 shows the percentages of the major ethnic groups in the total population in the years stated.

¹⁰. 1) Information for the years 1964 and 1982 is from the 1982 Regional Census.

2) Information for 1949 and 1984 is from Zhong Guo Ren Kuo Nian Jian (Almanac of China's Population), (1985), p.576, Zhong Guo She Hui Ke Xue Yuan Chu Ban She.

3) Population for 1979 is from Xinjiang Uyghur Aptonom Rayonning Omumi Ahwali, (1985), pp.19-21, Xinjiang People's Press, Urumqi.

4) Population for 1945 is from Benson, L. K. (1986) The Ili Rebellion, p.48, also in She Lingyun, Economic Construction in Xinjiang as a Means to Secure Peace, Tienshan Yuegan (Yuekan), October 1947, p.21.

Table 2: Percentages of the Major Ethnic Groups in the Total Population of XUAR Between 1945 and 1984

Ethnic Groups	1945 percent	1949 (%)	1964 (%)	1982 (%)	1984 (%)
Uighur	75.92	75.95	54.91	45.53	45.94
Han-Chinese	5.65	6.71	31.92	40.39	39.77
Kazak	11.14	10.23	6.72	6.91	7.17
Hui	2.53	2.82	3.63	4.34	4.38
Kirghiz	1.78	1.53	0.96	0.86	0.88
Mongol	1.52	1.21	0.97	0.90	0.90
Tajik	0.21	0.31	0.23	0.21	0.21
Sibo	0.27	0.27	0.24	0.22	0.22

Thus in 1949, the Uighurs, with 75.95 of the total population, were the major ethnic group but by 1984 the percentage was only 45.94%. In contrast the Han-Chinese population in Xinjiang in 1984 was 5,346,267, representing an eighteen-fold of the 1949 population. This unusually rapid growth resulted in dramatic changes in the composition of the region's population. In 1949 Han-Chinese constituted 6.7% of the population; in 1984 they constituted 39.77%. The increase has been mainly caused by Han-Chinese immigration. The Chinese authorities have moved a large number of Han Chinese into Xinjiang to 'open and reconstruct the new border, to protect it from foreign invasion',⁶ and to ease the growing population pressure elsewhere.

⁶6. These slogans, as part of the strategic policies, have frequently occurred in official newspapers and magazines since the Revolution.

3. Distribution of Ethnic Groups

There are more than 13 different ethnic groups in Xinjiang. Among them Uighur, Han-Chinese, Kazak, Hui (Tunggan), Kirghiz, Mongol, Tajik, Sibo, Uzbek, Dongxiang, and Tajik each have a population of more than 10,000. Manchu, Daghur, Tartar, Russian and others have less than that.

The Uighurs are oasis-dwellers mainly in the southern oases of Korla, Kucha, Aksu, Kashgar, Yarkand and Hotan. Even in the Ili, Turpan and Kumul (Hami) oases, they are the largest ethnic group.¹² The Kazaks occupy the valleys in the northern Tangri Tagh and the Altay ranges, as well as Barikol Kazak Autonomous County and Mori Kazak Autonomous County. But most Kazaks live in Kazakhstan in the Soviet Union. The Hui are found in the Sanji Hui Autonomous District and Yanji Hui Autonomous County, but the majority is found in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. The Mongols are mainly found in Bortala, Arshang counties of Bortala Autonomous District, Hejing and Hoshut counties in Bayinghulin Autonomous District, and Kubuksar Autonomous County, but most Mongols live in Inner and Outer Mongolia. The Kirghiz are in the Kizilsu Kirghiz Autonomous District.

¹². 1. Xinjiang Uyghur Aptonom Rayonring Omumi Ahwali (General Picture of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region), Xinjiang People's Press, Urumqi, (1985), p.22.

2. Nichols, J. L. (1969) Minority Nationality Cadres In Communist China, pp.56-57, Ph D Stanford University.

They are few in number. Almost all Kirghiz live in the Soviet Union Kirghizya. Tajiks are in the Tashkorghan Tajik Autonomous County in the Kashgar Prefecture. Sibos are concentrated in the Chapchal Sibo Autonomous County.

In summary, Uighurs, Kazaks, Kirghiz, Mongols, Hui, and Tajiks are concentrated in well-defined areas, forming their own compact communities, while Uzbeks, Tartars, Russians, Manchus and others live in mixed communities with other ethnic groups. Nearly 94% of the Han-Chinese are new settlers who arrived after 1949. They are concentrated in big towns and in the Xinjiang Construction and Production Corps which has been set up in all parts of the Region.

4. The People of Xinjiang

Uighurs (Uyghurs)

Racially, the Uighurs are Turkish. Their forefathers were the ancestors of the Turkish people. Their name was recorded in Chinese history books as 'Yuanhe' in the fourth century A.D., when they were nomads wandering around the upper Orkhon River in the north of Mongolia. When the Uighur Empire, which lasted a hundred years (744-840), was destroyed by another nomadic group, the Kirghiz, namesakes of the modern Kirghiz in the USSR and Xinjiang, remnants of the Empire migrated to their present-day area in Xinjiang.

Gradually they accommodated themselves to the oasis cities there,¹³ mixing with the local Persian-Turkish population.¹⁴ According to Bryder, the Uighurs were the first to embrace Manichaeism and made it the state religion of China:

During the Tang dynasty (618-907) Manichaeism prospered, especially after 763, when the Uighurs, a Central Asian tribe, whom China was politically depending on at this time, made Manichaeism the state religion. When the Uighur empire lost political power in 840, Manichaeism also lost strength, and in 843 the religion was prohibited in China.¹⁵

Manichaeism was not the only religion in which the Uighurs were once the believers. Before Islam penetrated Central Asia, the Uighurs accepted Buddhism. When they were converted to Islam at the beginning of the 10th century, they began to use the Arabic script, leaving their previous

¹³7. Here the word 'cities' refers to middle size and small towns in oases which are surrounded by desert.

¹⁴. Benson, L. K (1986:38).

¹⁵. Bryder, P. Where the Faint Traces of Manichaeism Disappear, Paper presented at the Seccond European Seminar on Central Asian Studies, convened in the University of London (SOAS) by the SOAS Centre, 7-10 April 1987. Also in Mackerras, Colin (1973) The Uighur Empire, pp.4-13, University of South Carolina Press, U.S.A.

language to the Mongols.¹⁶ Benson's research indicates this:

During the period of Mongol dominance in the Central Asian steppe, small Uighur Turkic states continued to exist in Xinjiang and educated Uighurs from these oasis cities became influential in the Mongol court. The Uighurs are credited with teaching the illiterate Mongols to write using the Uighur script which the Uighurs themselves later abandoned in favour of the Arabic script, the written form of the Koran and the basis of their new religion.¹⁷

With the decline of Mongol dominance in the 14th and 15th centuries, Uighurs together with other Turkish tribes enjoyed an independent life in the oasis states of Xinjiang. But they became the subjects of the Qing dynasty in the 18th century, when the aggressive Manchu rulers of the dynasty invaded Xinjiang to control the oasis cities on the once famed Silk Route.¹⁸ The Uighurs with the Kazak,

¹⁶. According to Mir Azam (1989, Uyghur Ma'arip Tarihidiki Ochmaes Yultuzlar, p.7), the scripts used by Uighurs in history include classic Orhun-yensai script, traditional Uighur script, Brahma script (mainly occurred in Kara Shaehaer and Kucha), Soghidi script, traditional Suriya script, Sanskrit (old Hindu), Tibetan script and Arabic script.

¹⁷. Benson L.K. (1986:38). Also in Abdulla Talip (1987) Uyghur Ma'aripi Tarihidin Ochiriklar (Readings from the History of Uighur Education), pp.16-5., Xinjiang People's Press.

¹⁸. Ibid.

Uzbek and others often rebelled. The major rebellion took place between 1862 and 1882, during which Yakup Beg unified the southern six districts and declared the independence of Kashgaria State. But these rebellions were put down and so the northwestern region was officially incorporated into the Chinese Empire as "Xinjiang" or "New Frontier" in 1884. However, rebellions did not stop. In the 1920s and 30s the Uighurs, with other Turkish tribes, once again rebelled. Together with the Kazaks, Uzbeks and others they created the Eastern Turkistan Republic which survived from 1944 until 1949. In a word, the Uighurs, like other Turkish-speaking peoples in Central Asia, are a Turkish tribe with a long, bitter history of rebellions and suppression in their fight to regain their lost empire.

Kazaks

The Kazaks are another branch of the Turks. They too are Moslem, speak Kazak, a different dialect of Turkish, and are pastoral nomads. At the beginning of the 18th century they were evicted from their pastoral lands to the west by Jungarian feudalists but following the conquest of Jungaria by the Qing dynasty in the 1760s, they came back. 'Xinjiang's nomads, especially the Kazaks, developed a merited reputation as warriors. Kazak traditional songs and poems emphasize this warrior tradition which was especially strong among Kazaks of the Middle and Lesser

Horde...'¹⁹

Kirghiz

The Kirghiz are also Turkish. They are similar to the Kazaks in lifestyle and language, though they have been much influenced by the Uighurs in southern Xinjiang. Many of them are nomadic, and they live in the mountains along the Sino-Soviet frontier from above Aksu Uqturpan to the high valleys of the Pamirs. These areas now belong to the Kizilsu Kirghiz Autonomous District. The Kirghiz constitute 37% of the population of this District. A minority of the Kirghiz is scattered in the north of the Tangri Tagh range.

Tajiks

Most of the Tajiks are nomadic, but some of them are hill farmers in the inaccessible Pamir-Sarigol region. They belong to Iranian tribes and speak Persian. They make up 88% of the population of the Tashkorghon Tajik Autonomous County which adjoins the Soviet Tajik Republic.

¹⁹. Benson, L. K. (1986:52).

Tartars, Uzbeks

The Tartars (or Noghay) are found in the main cities - Ili, Tacheng and Altay of the Ili Kazak Autonomous District. They are the most Europeanised of the Turkish people in Xinjiang. The Uzbeks are to all intents indistinguishable from the Uighurs. They are scattered in Urumqi, Ili, Tacheng, Kashgar and Mori.

In a word the Uighurs, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Kazaks, and Tartars are the same people with a common tradition and common customs, speaking a common language with slight variations in dialect. They also follow the same religion - Islam. Benson classifies them as a distinct race:

... the people of this area were not, as has been suggested in some recent work, divided into irreparably antagonistic groups. Despite ethnic divisions and variations in lifestyle, the vast majority of the region's people were Turkic Moslems, and this dominant majority was clearly distinguishable as a single group who clearly considered themselves to be separate from the Han-Chinese, not only because of religious differences but also on the basis of distinctive racial differences.²⁰

²⁰. Benson. L. K. (1986:37).

But it has been common practice in central Asia to play one off against another. Kieffer's findings highlight this:

To inhibit the indigenous people from uniting against them, the different dynasties capitalized on the already existing rivalries in the area - favouring one group over another and bestowing official titles on leaders of one tribe in an area. Such patronage not only served to increase hostilities between the native populations, but provided the Han with a way to check the power of the different groups; if one group became too strong, the Han could simply recognize another group.²¹

Han-Chinese

The Han-Chinese have become in recent years the second largest ethnic group in Xinjiang. As already stated, prior to 1949, they were only a tiny minority of city-dwelling garrison troops and merchants. Many of them came from their home provinces because of their appointment as leading officials. Thus Zo Zungtang, who conquered Xinjiang, was a

²¹. Kieffer, T. (1988) Chinese Communist Policy Towards Minorities in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, pp.2-3, MA thesis, Stanford University.

Hunan man and he brought many Hunanese into Xinjiang with him. In the same way Yang Zengsheng, who was governor of the region from 1911-1928, brought many from his native Yunnan Province. Later Chin Shu-jen (Jin Shuren) 'like Yang, stripped Sinkiang of assets for personal gain... permitted the settlement of Kansu (Gansu) Han on Uighur lands,..'.²² Additionally, 'Communist programmes have brought many more Chinese to Sinkiang'.²³

Hui (Tunggans)

Like the Han-Chinese, the Tunggans are not genuinely native to Xinjiang, but originated for the most part from among the Hui Moslems of Gansu and Shansi. These are a racial amalgam of Central Asian, Iranian, and Arab elements that settled among the Chinese during the Tang and Yuan dynasties.²⁴ They share the language of the Han-Chinese. The Chinese government created in 1954 the Sanji Hui Autonomous District and Yanji Hui Autonomous County for them. The Hui constitute 37% of the population of Sanji and

²². Forbes, A. D. W. (1986) Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia, A Political History of Republican Sinkiang 1911-1949, p.239, Ph D, Cambridge University Press.

²³. a) Nichols, J. L. (1969) Minority Nationality Cadres in Communist China, p.56, Ph D, Stanford University.

²⁴. Ibid.

36% of that in Yanji.

Mongols

The word 'Mongol' is the name of only one of the Mongolian tribes. The Mongols in Xinjiang are descendants of Genghis Khan's Mongols who subjugated Chinese Turkestan. Xinjiang Mongols consist of several leagues -allied groups, namely Old Torgot Mongols who are around Jinghe and Wusu in northern Xinjiang, Hoshots in Karashahar, Chahar Mongols in the Boratala Valley and Olot Mongols in the Ili Valley. They believe in Lamaism and speak Mongol. They have been offered autonomous power in the Bayinghulin Mongol Autonomous District, where they form 35% of the population; in the Boratala Mongol Autonomous District 25% are Mongols; and in the Kubuksar Mongol Autonomous County 36% are Mongols.

Sibo, Daghur²⁵

The forefathers of Sibos and Daghurs lived in northern China. Hunting and fishing were an important part of their lives. They were good archers on horseback. Following the conquest of Xinjiang by the Qing dynasty (1644-1911), garrisons were set up along its border. Today's Sibos and

²⁵. Daghur is spelt as 'Dawur' in some Chinese sources.

Daghur are the descendants of the Manchu troops of these garrisons from Sibo and Daghur tribes who fought with the Chien-lung Emperor. They came to Xinjiang after 1763.²⁶ Each has maintained its individual identity and language. The Sibo live in the Chapchael Sibo Autonomous County, forming 26% of its total population.

Russian

Russians are a tiny ethnic group in Xinjiang. The majority of them migrated to the region at the end of the last century; other Russian families fled there from the Russian Revolution. They mainly live in Ili, Tacheng and Altay.

5. Natural Resources

Xinjiang has vast but as yet underdeveloped, natural resources such as oil, gold, copper, zinc and coal. According to a survey, 180 types of minerals have been found in 4000 localities, and include 80% of all the types of useful minerals known in the world.²⁷ A proverb says that the Altay Mountains encompass 72 valleys and every valley contains gold. Besides their gold, the Altay Mountains are

²⁶. Xinjiangning Omumi Ahwali, (1985), p.27, Xinjiang People's Press, Urumqi.

²⁷. Xinjiang edited by Fu Wen (1985), p.178, Xinjiang Photographic Art Press.

famous for the production of mica, and gems. The Tangri Taghliri have deposits of iron, coal, manganese and other minerals. The Kunlun Mountains have resources of jade, asbestos, crystal and metal. Oil, coal, rock salt and gypsum are buried in the sands of the Tarim Basin's well-known Taklimakan Desert and Junggar Basin's Gurbantuggut Desert. China Today reports:

The Taklimakan Desert, the world's second largest, lies in the centre of the Tarim Basin in the southern part of Xinjiang. In 1983 geologists completed a survey which showed that the Taklimakan had great underground resources of water. They also found abundant reserves of oil and natural gas, including two large oil-bearing strata. One, the Central Tarim No.1 Formation, with a daily output of 576 tons of crude oil and 360,000 cubic metres of natural gas, was discovered in 1989. In 1984, the 5,300-metre-deep North Tarim Shacan No.2 well began to produce, with a daily output of 1,000 tons of crude oil and 2 million cubic metres of natural gas. Five other wells in the basin began to produce oil at the beginning of 1989.²⁸ The Kokyar Oil Field in southern Xinjiang is also being developed. The well-known Karamay Oil Field in northern Xinjiang has been one of China's major oilfields since the 1950s. Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, with a population of over one million, rests on a 'sea of coal'. The area of oilfields throughout

²⁸. Oil from the Taklimakan Desert, China Today, Vol.XXXIX, No.6, June 1990, pp.53-55.

Xinjiang totals 80,000 square kilometres, and the region's overall coal reserves are estimated at over 1,000 billion tons.²⁹ 'Geologists say that Xinjiang's coalfields could support the entire world for 60 years.'³⁰

6. Economy

Xinjiang has made great economic progress. At present there are more than 4000 enterprises engaged in various forms of industrial production including iron and steel, coal, oil, electric power, machinery, chemicals, building materials, textiles, sugar, leather and fur, paper, food, and tobacco. In 1984 the gross product of the region's industry and agriculture was 10,538 billion yuan (RMB)³¹ which was over 13 times greater than that of 1949. The area of cultivated land has tripled and 80% of it is irrigated.³² Xinjiang does not only feed its own people but also helps other parts of China with food. The region has 1,470 kilometres of newly-constructed railway from Urumqi to Lanzhou and also from Urumqi to Korla in southern Xinjiang. The airport at Urumqi has become an important stopping point on international air

²⁹. Xinjiang , edited by Fu Wen, (1985), p.178

³⁰. U.S. News and World Report, March 8, 1982, p.63.

³¹. At that time the exchange rate was approximately: 1 US dollar for 3 yuan. Accordingly it was over 3,512 billion US dollars.

³². A Survey of Xinjiang Economic Development, edited by Chen Dayun (1985), p.3-10, Xinjiang People's Press.

routes.

Xinjiang's foreign trade has also expanded. The region has developed trade with more than 50 foreign countries. The combined value of imports and exports has reached 620 million yuan.³³ Cotton exports are conspicuous. In the one year, 1985, almost 53,000 tons of cotton, which was only one-fourth of the total amount produced by the region, were exported. Foreign currency from cotton exports made up more than half of the total foreign currency earned by other exported products.³⁴

Now Xinjiang is about to undertake an ambitious modernization plan to transform China's 'wild-west' into one of its leading economic zones. The central government has already worked out a plan designed to do so.³⁵ Obviously, this plan requires a base of science and technology, and this can only be developed through higher education. Modernization will require a large number of highly skilled workers as a matter of great urgency. In the pursuit of modernization throughout its territory, China has sent huge numbers of teachers and students, mainly from institutions of higher education to western universities

³³. a) Ibid. b) It was thus over 206 million U. S. dollars.

³⁴. Xinjiang Yilnamisi, (1986), p.1548.

³⁵. A Survey of Xinjiang Economic Development, edited by Chen, 1985, pp. 3-10, Xinjiang People's Press.

and research institutions. Very few of these teachers and students, however, are from Xinjiang.

The central Chinese government's policy seems to be that 'the people of Xinjiang must welcome the continued assistance of the Han people'³⁶ in other words, to transfer skilled workers and highly educated technicians and managers from other parts of China and even from abroad. However, the development of education, especially higher education, in Xinjiang itself should be given greater consideration if only to improve the people's living standards. As has been shown, Xinjiang has sufficient economic potential to support such a development. The ex-general Secretary of the Communist Party, Zhao Ziyang, said during the tour of inspection he made of Xinjiang in 1983, 'Xinjiang is a treasure land to be further exploited in the four modernizations drive of our country...'³⁷ In opening up the north-west, Xinjiang should enjoy priority and we should build Xinjiang into an important base for China's economic development...'³⁸

³⁶. McMillen, D. H. (1979) Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977, p.46 Westview Press.

³⁷. The 'four modernizations' refer to the modernization of industry, agriculture, national defence and science and technology.

³⁸. Xinjiang, (1985), p.179.

7. Living Standards

Although the region has very rich natural resources and has made great economic progress, the standards of living of the people, especially of those who inhabit the mountains, grasslands and remote villages, are not very high. They still use candles or kerosene lamps and live in tents and mud houses. In some districts traditional farm tools are still being used. The living standards of those in rural areas are much lower than their counterparts in urban areas in Xinjiang. The average annual per capita income was 363.00 yuan in 1984³⁹ for peasants and herdsmen⁴⁰ and 1,129.00 yuan (about \$376) for state-paid staff.⁴¹ If the region's natural resources are exploited and properly utilized, the living standards will certainly improve. But, in order to achieve this goal, the people will have to be given a higher level of technical and scientific education. What, therefore, is needed is a greater concentration of finance in the region to modernize the infra-structure, and

³⁹. In 1984 the exchange rate was about 1 US dollar for 3.00 yuan. So it would approximately be 121 U. S. dollars.

⁴⁰. In Xinjiang peasants and herdsmen do not have to buy staple food and they do not have to pay much for housing, as they solve these by relying on their labour in the field. But their living standards are low.

⁴¹. Wang Enmao, 1985, Partiyining Milliy Territoriyilik Aptonomiya Siyastining Xinjangdiki Oluq Ghalbisi (meaning: Great Achievements of the Party in its Policy of Autonomous Territory in Xinjiang), a speech delivered at a meeting for cadres held to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Xinjiang Yilnamisi, 1986, PP.20-21.

administration, with much greater emphasis, as this thesis argues⁵ on the inclusion of the non-Han Chinese in the development process, especially by making higher education more available to them.

8. Education, Science and Culture

The traditional education of Xinjiang went through the following different periods: the period of Shamanism and Manichaeism between 552-844 AD; The Idqut Period from 850-1250; the Buddhist era from 75-992, the longest one; the Islamic period of Qara Khanlar centred around Kashgar in the years between 870-1211; the Chaghatai period, with Ili as centre, from 1179 to 1242; the Sa'idya Khan period (1514-1678), with Yarkand as capital; and afterwards.

The education of those periods covered a wide range of subjects with religious orthodoxy as the central theme. It produced many famous writers, architects, engineers, linguists, encyclopaedists, musicians, artists, traders, diplomats, and numerous devoted scholars. Those prominent figures are still remembered by the people in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China, and beyond.

Shamanism and Manichaeism Period

Light was the guiding tenet of Shaman. As the symbol of what was good, people lit candles in the graveyard if someone was sick, or passed away, or a special guest arrived. During the marriage ceremony they made a fire for the bride and let her wander around it before she was taken into the groom's house. People wept when weather was grey or cloudy, as they did at someone's death. Interpreting various dreams was popular.

Shamanism was replaced by Manichaeism, because of the latter's progressive focus which believed that life was the struggle between light and dark, justice and injustice, and greed and generosity. Those who were in favour of light, justice and generosity would flourish, whereas those who did not, would eventually destroy the whole material world together with themselves. A military general in the Uighur Empire (740 - 844 AD), Moyunchur Bokahan, was one of the educationalists prominent in this period. He built temple-schools, arranged one haelpaet (teacher) for every ten households, and eventually introduced Manichaeism as a state religion.

The Idqut Period⁴²

The Idqut period was the cradle of education after the invention of writing among the people in the heartland of Central Asia. Between 850-1250, Idqut became a centre for the cultural linkage of west and east and gave freedom to various religious orthodoxies and schools of thought. During this period those who wrote or copied books were highly praised and honoured. The calligraphic press and block printing were made available to book publishers. The people of Idqut also invented high quality paper. Idqut became famous as the "underground library of Central Asia", because many books and documents, in 8 scripts and 12 languages, have been preserved until modern times, and found by archaeologists.⁴³ Some of them were taken away by the Germans and Russians, and can be seen today in the museums of Moscow and Berlin.

Professional teachers and schools became popular. There was also a Bilga Kengishi (Scholastic Educational Consultancy) in Idqut. The consultants were in charge of offering degrees to taliplar (students) and advising on the education of the public. Though various religions were dominant, they were merely a means of providing overall public education and producing various forms of literature.

⁴². Idqut refers to present Turpan (Turfan).

⁴³. Abdulla Talip (1987:13-57).

Consequently, there were linguists, multi-lingual interpreters, educationalists, poets, dramatists and traditional medical doctors. For instance, the great poets Qalim Kayshi, Keke, Koltarkan, Asih Tutung and Qaranduz, the linguist Sinqu Seli Tutung (in the 10th century, in Bashbaliq, present-day Jimisar), and the famous poet and educationalist, Aprinchur Tekin, (in the 10th century, from Turpan) were some of the prominent products of the Idqut period.

Buddhist Period

In Sanskrit the meaning of the word, 'Buddha', is "to take a right path with clarity of mind". Buddhist education emerged in Central Asia as early as 75 AD and survived for a long time. It encouraged woodcutting, various kind of sculpture, painting, dance, and drama. More scholars, educationalists, scientists, philosophers, architects, and writers emerged under Buddhist education in the region than in the times of Shamanism and Manichaeism. For example, Portidin (232 - 348 AD) was one of the famous Uighur educationalists. He was born in Turpan and became so prominent in studying and teaching Buddhism that he was invited by the Emperor, Yuanzha, to Loyang, where he taught for 38 years until his death at the reputed age of 116. During his career he opened 893 Buddhist temple-schools and had students from Central Asia, China proper, and

elsewhere. The famous Chinese Buddhist scholars Daoan, Faya, Fatai and Fahe were among his students.⁴⁴

Komrajiwa (344 - 413), born in Kusan (present-day Kucha), was another example. He secured a high reputation by teaching Buddhism in many places such as Kusan, Aksu, and Kashgar. Attracted by the Chinese Emperor Yaosheng to Chang'an (present Xi'an) he was appointed a state teacher to his kingdom in 401 AD. He trained about 800 students, among whom were Daosheng, Sinchi, Daoren, and Senshi, who enjoy fame as "four great figures" in Chinese history. Komrajiwa was a great linguist and interpreter, commanding five languages. While teaching at Chang'an, he translated Buddhist orthodoxy into Chinese from Sanskrit. The Buddhist works translated before him were regarded as the "old translation" and his as the "new translation". The Emperor, Yaosheng, said to Komrajiwa: 'You, my great teacher, are full of wisdom and unique in the world....'⁴⁵ When Komrajiwa died at the age of 70, the Emperor himself was present at the funeral.

The music teacher Sujup (in sixth century, born in Kucha), the writer, linguist and teacher, Pirhuylan, (736 - 820, born in Kashgar), the music teacher, Aqari Manda, (between

⁴⁴. Mir Azam (1989), Uyghur Ma'arip Tarihidiki Ochmas Yultuzlar (literal meaning: Famous Figures in the History of Uyghur Education, Xinjiang Yashlar - Osmurlar Nashiryati (Xinjiang Youth - Children Press), Urumqi, pp.1-2.

⁴⁵. Ibid.

the 7th and the 8th century, in Kucha), the poet, Kakmenir, (at the end of 8th and at the beginning of the 9th centuries, in Miran, present-day Charqiliq), also belong to the period of Buddhist education.

The Qara Khanlar Islamic Education Period

The Islamic education of the Qara Khanlar period (870 - 1211) was a turning point, for the people of Central Asia switched from the old script to the Arabic one. This period was a prosperous one for education in the region. Abdulla Talip says:

During the Qara Khanlar period there were primary and secondary schools in all counties and prefectures. In Kashgar, a well-known place for learning, the Sajia Madrassah was set up. This newly-built Sajia Madrassah became a centre for higher education for students, researchers, scientists and teachers from all over Central Asia and abroad.⁴⁶

In Sajia, maths, Yunnan (Greek) philosophy, linguistics, astronomy, traditional medicine, logic, history, geography and other subjects were taught. The encyclopedist, Abu

⁴⁶. Abdulla Talip (1987:38).

Nasir Muhammad Ibrat Uzluk Tarhan, (870- 950, Otrar), the linguist Mahmut Kashgari (1008-1105), the great teacher of the Qara Khanlar State, and Yusup Has Hajip (1016-1090), were some of the prominent educationalists and scientists who emerged in the Qara Khanlar era.⁴⁷

The Chaghatai Period

Because the earliest development of education took place in the heartland of Central Asia, Chaghatai (1179-1242), the second son of Chinggizkhan (Genghis Khan), was dependent on his scholars while he was in power.⁴⁸ The famous teacher, Sirajidin Abu Yakup Ibrat Abu Yusup Sakkaki (1160 - 1228), was his consultant. The diplomat and politician, Qutupidin, was the top consultant, and Mijit was the personal doctor.⁴⁹ While working for Chaghatai, Yusup Sakkaki wrote textbooks on literature, logic, history, geography, medicine, and music, and opened schools in the capital which is the present-day Ili. Mahsutbeg who was in charge of the area

⁴⁷. For more details see Mir Azam (1989), Uyghur Ma'arip Tarihidiki Ochmas Yultuzlar, pp.34-51.

⁴⁸. "The famous Uighur educationalist, TataTunga (12th century), was invited by Gengs Khan to teach his children in his kingdom during his great empire. While he was teaching, Tatatunga invented the Kidan and Mongol alphabets, based on the classic Orhun alphabet of the Uighurs, or in other words he created the first Kidan and Mongol written languages. Chaghatai himself was a student of Tatatunga." op. cit.

⁴⁹. op.cit.

where the Uighurs lived during the Chaghatai regime, opened an institute under his name at Kashgar, and trained numerous students in the years between 1254 and 1289. There was a written examination system. Those who published works of scholarship before graduation got higher degrees.

Mawlana Abaydulla Lutifi (1366 - 1465), Alshir Nawayi (1441 -1501) were two of those who emerged as "pasahatlik adip" (great scholars), and "malkul kalam" (honourable teachers) in the late period of Chaghatai. Lutifi lectured on literature theory, Persian, and Arabic grammar in many institutions. His more than 20 works and a 2,400-line long poem were loved by the people. Alshir Nawayi himself says:

A teacher teaches children how to read, write and speak. He pours out to his naughty students how to behave... from primary to higher institution. The teacher's labour on students is so enormous that one could hardly find words to describe it. Therefore, the teachers' influence on students is very deep indeed. It is worthy for a student to be a servant for his teacher, even if the student becomes a king, a lawyer, or a scientist.⁵⁰

During his career, Alshir Nawayi wrote his buyuk (great) work of poems, Hazani'ul Ma'ani" (sources of meanings),

⁵⁰. op.cit.

which is composed of 48,803 lines in 3,130 sections. He was one of the writers of the texts of 12 Moqam, the classical Uighur music.

Due to the strong influence of such educated people in the Chaghatai regime, more than 300,000 people headed by Uzbekkhan (1312 - 1340) and Tughluq Tomurkhan (1347 - 1363), the descendants of Chaghatai, embraced Islam.⁵¹

The Sa'idya Khanliqi Period

It is said that education reached its peak in the Sa'idya Khan (1514 - 1678) era in and around Yarkand. According to Abdulla Talip, at this time there were over 2,200 schools in Yarkand. Specialized schools, such as "Sipahia" (military), "Shipahia" (medical), "Hoddia" (border-knowledge), and "Ayi Na'i" (ambassadors' mirror), were also set up. Sultan Abdirashdakh (1510 -1570), Amannisahan, Mirza Haydar Kashgari, Qadirkhan Yarkandi, Mawlana Khulki, Mirza Miraq Qalish were amongst the teachers, writers, poets, and doctors of the period. Hoshhat (Calligraphy) was given particular priority in the education of this period. Parents were eager to get their children educated. They

⁵¹. op. cit.

took their children to school saying, "The life of our child is in Allah, his physical body is from us and his future happiness will be from you".

The Dark-Age of Education

Because of the disputes and splits among the religious factions, an advocate of sophism,⁵² Hidaytulla Khoja (1626 - 1694), decided to take control from Said Khan and pushed public education out. All public schools were closed. Scientific subjects were prohibited. This period was remembered as the dark age of education in Xinjiang. This was echoed by the brutal Chinese officials from Qing dynasty (1644 - 1911). They converted the schools into places where they trained soldiers and translators for themselves.

The traders of the old Silk Route across Central Asia never cut off their links with the west. They travelled to many parts of the world such as Petersburg, Finland, Germany, and France... and when they came back, they tried to introduce modern technology. For example, two brothers, Hosayn Bay (1844 - 1926) and Bawdun Bay (1851 - 1928),

⁵². "Sophism" means advancing invalid or misleading arguments. Hidaytulla Hkoja, a representative of a faction, was against progressive religious scholars who actively supported public education. He firmly opposed teaching scientific subjects at schools, believing that was the business of Yawrupa Paranglar (Europeans).

built the Ili Leather Factory in 1907, with the cooperation of the German Dolaq Company. Another trader, Tash Ahun, built a match factory in Yarkan. Together with Wajit Haji, Mosul Haji set up a cotton factory at Astana in Turpan. With the help of those rich traders, industrial and technical colleges for accountants and bookkeepers were set up in Artush, Yarkan and Ili. The brothers, Hosayn and Bawdun Baylar, supported education regularly. They set up a public school, Hosaynia Maktipi (Hosaynia School)⁵³ at Iksaq in Artush in 1885. The school building was modern in style. There were three big classrooms with windows, blackboards, desks and chairs; the walls were painted white; offices, dormitories and tash muncha (Turkish or stone bath-places) were built for both teachers and students. They were boarding students. The school offered maths, Uighur literature, Arabic, Urdu and Persian, history, geography, calligraphy, and physical training. Later on, this school became a centre for training teachers. In 1985, it celebrated its hundredth anniversary.

9. SUMMARY

To sum up, owing to its unique geographical position on the crossroads between East and West Xinjiang has been responsive for centuries to many important outside

⁵³. The school was built by Bawdun Bay under his brother's name, Hosayn Bay.

influences. On the other hand the complexity of its terr^ain which comprises high mountains, lower basins, huge deserts, and intricate river systems has made internal communication extremely difficult.

Xinjiang has from ancient times been a centre of civilization, culture, prosperity and progress. The recent developments, economic, political and educational, as promoted by the central government of the People's Republic of China are not occurring in a vacuum. Since the local people have such a long and distinguished history of their own they have much to offer in promoting these developments. In particular they possess a strong educational base on which to build for the future.

CHAPTER ONE

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

This chapter examines the concepts particularly those relating to equality and ethnicity, which are basic to the arguments advanced in this thesis. It also reviews, both the relevant international and contemporary Chinese literature on the education of minorities.

1. Dialectical Materialism

First it is necessary to mention very briefly the political dogma that underlies the official policies of the People's Republic of China during the years in question i.e. dialectical materialism as manifested in its political strategies.¹ The word 'dialectic' is associated with the philosophical phrase 'dialectical materialism' which has been interpreted by different philosophers at different times and utilised for different purposes. The Chinese Communists view 'dialectical materialism' as the core of Marxist-Leninist theory, believing that it is the unique

¹. For further discussion, see page 81-2, also Chapter Five in political education.

Marxist way of observing objects. They think that objects come first and ideas second, and the criteria for judging subjective intention or motive are social practice and its effects. This general statement can be applied specifically to education. Since this study is about education and inequality in Xinjiang, an inseparable part of socialist China, the best way of examining them, especially in higher education, is to see how far practice actually corresponds with the policy.

According to Hawkins the dialectical approach permits a researcher 'to account for change and movement in the situation of a society',² to recognize the interacting and interdependent relations between different ethnic groups, and to focus on the problematic aspects of stability and structure. This approach is said to be compatible with either systems theory (structural-functionalist) or power-conflict theory, in which the former considers the functional aspects of ethnic groups in the whole society, whereas the latter considers the antagonism which underlies independent and interdependent relations. Although this thesis does not endorse Marxist - Leninism, the dialectical approach, as defined by Hawkins, remains a point of reference.

². Hawkins, J. N. *The People's Republic of China: Education Policy and National Minorities*, Politics and Education, 1983, Pergamon Press, p.126-7.

2. Concepts of Equity and Equality

Definitions of the concepts of 'equity' and 'equality' vary. No matter how different the definitions are, 'equity' is closely linked with more abstract justice, fairness or human rights, whereas 'equality' is generally bound up with feasible or specific contexts viz. the distribution or sharing of various material resources and of social, political, cultural or educational opportunities. Alexander (1982) defines equity as follows:

The terms equity and equality are obviously far from synonymous, although they are sometimes used interchangeably, particularly in discussions about the distribution of educational opportunities... According to some definitions, as we have seen, the desired goal is unequal treatment of unequal. Thus when concepts of equity are being debated, the issue is usually a philosophical rather than an economic one.³

However, Psacharopoulos lays emphasis on the facts of how resources and opportunities are distributed and how society should distribute them among its members. This means that any analysis of equity will not only involve judgement but

and Woodhall, M.
³. In Psacharopoulos, G. (1985) Education for Development, p.252, Oxford University Press, A World Bank Publication.

also different variables viz. age, sex, social class, ethnic groups, socio-economic groups, occupation and others.

According to a UNESCO publication, 'equity' is defined in this way:


The equity objective, broadly conceived, is that every person, irrespective of his place of birth or residence, sex, ethnicity, social-economic status, financial capability, must get as a citizen and human being an opportunity for education of equitable standards and of the kind for which he is best fitted and to the fullest extent of his power that is able to avail of the best opportunities in the post-educational situation. Such an objective may not be fully realistic but if pursued, generate energy and effort for its near attainment.⁴

That is to say equity could be used, or at least explained or illustrated, in terms of equal access, equal participation, equal attainments and equal opportunity.

From my readings on equity and equality the following figure emerges:

⁴. UNESCO (1987) Promoting Equity, Excellence and Efficiency in Higher Education: Implications for Policy, Planning and Management, Bangkok.

Figure 1: Equity and Equality and Their Implications in Education



As the above figure shows equality in education generally and broadly refers to four major issues viz. equality of provision, equality of access, equality of attainments and equality of outcome.

1) Equal provision of educational facilities or, as some scholars call it, equal distribution of resources - availability of educational facilities for all citizens in a society, which is the base for the other issues of educational equality.

2) Equal access to the system - the probability of children from different ethnic and social groups entering into the educational system. Equal access to the system, which is the title of this thesis, is the first and most crucial step. Without getting access into the system, there can be no question of equal attainment through the system, neither can there be any question of equal opportunity after the completion of the process of education. But some argue that equal access is the potentiality, whereas participation is the reality. Provision of access does not necessarily ensure participation.⁵ Although this means that equal access cannot be separated from equal participation, it is again difficult to argue about equal participation without acknowledging the first step, equal access, which also

⁵. UNESCO (1987:11).

postulates, and is signalled by, the equal provision of facilities.

3) Equal attainment throughout the system - the probabilities of children from different ethnic or social groups acquiring the same knowledge at the same level or at a defined point in the system by participating, performing, progressing and completing the process on a competitive or equal basis.

4) Equal outcome as applied to the value of education in its achieving equal access to jobs, a better income, political power, and cultural and social status. All of these can vary in their impact and effect on different kinds of citizens and citizens in different regions, for example men and women; the different ethnic groups; different socio-economic groups; the healthy and the disabled; and urban and rural; developed and undeveloped.

This thesis confines itself to the particular categories of boxes 1, 2 and 3 of Figure 1 referring to their interaction with boxes A, B, C and D, especially to those items in bold face typing.

Inequality is the other side of the coin of equality and is not only confined to individuals, but concerns also groups within a society. These can be regarded as unequal, because they belong to different races or castes or different

ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups. Traditionally group inequality is regarded as 'natural' in some societies. Sometimes there are also legal and moral sanctions to keep things the way they are.

Most societies have introduced formal education as a means of reducing inequality based on ethnic groups. Education is provided for almost all children, so that they will learn similar skills for participation in adult life. In this way, modern societies hope to reduce the inequality based on ethnic-ascribed status.⁶ But the idea that education may narrow the inequalities between individuals and ethnic groups has been found counter-effective, because of the way the school has functioned for centuries. These functions of selecting, training, channelling and eliminating tend to reproduce existing social structures⁷ and also reinforce ethnic-based inequalities. Ethnic inequality in higher education has been substantiated by almost all studies of indigenous ethnic, aboriginal and tribal groups. At times, ethnic inequality is also manifested in inequality between regions.⁸

⁶. Ogbu, J. U. 1978, Minority Education and Caste, New York, Academic Press, p. 1 - 2.

⁷. Bourdieu and Passeron, 1970; in Silanda E. M. (1988) p.7.

⁸. UNESCO (1987) Promoting Equity, Excellence and Efficiency in Higher Education, Unesco Regional Office for Education in Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok. p.9.

Ethnic inequality in education has been perceived by some scholars as due to heredity,⁹ but many believe that it can be seen as a result of various complex processes of interlocking developments in political, economic, cultural and power relationships. Thomas says:

...social analysts are seldom satisfied with inspecting students' achievement-test scores or grade-point averages. Instead, they search for data which show whether certain groups in the society are found in higher proportions in the upper reaches of the enrolment pyramid than are other groups. Does one ethnic group have a higher proportion of students in high school and college than another ethnic group? Do more urban than rural youths stay in school for a longer period of time? ¹⁰

Chinapah analyses pupils' performance in terms of two sets of variables; the school and home-related variables. The author concludes that equality of educational opportunity per se, as seen from the standpoint of school participation and scholastic performance of different groups of children, remains a perpetual dream, without a genuine effort to

⁹. Jensen, A. R. (1969) and in Ogbu, J. U. (1978) Minority Education and Caste, p.3.

¹⁰. Thomas R. M. (1983) Politics and Education, Pergamon Press, pp. 20 - 21.

approach the overall problem of social inequality in society.¹¹ Therefore, measures to improve equality of educational opportunity cannot be divorced from the overall problem of social equality. Although the author refers to the situation in Mauritius, the findings can be generalized and applied to most countries including China.

In multi-ethnic countries fears are often voiced that ethnic groups could become stratified on the basis of the level of education and occupational status achieved by their members.¹² This may lead to unequal access to power and resources on the basis of ethnic group membership. It is further believed by some scholars that ethnicity may become a social and occupational handicap, because it provides a label which can be used by the dominant group to discriminate against the minorities. The assumption is that equality of opportunity in life is only possible in a society that is culturally monistic; that in a plural society ethnicity retention and socio-economic advance are not compatible. This, it has been argued, is the 'ethnic dilemma' faced by members of minority groups.¹³

¹¹. Chinapah, V. Participation and Performance in Primary Schooling, Studies in Comparative and International Education No. 8. 1983, Institute of International Education, University of Stockholm. p.167.

¹². Gordon, M (1980), Human Nature, Class and Ethnicity, Oxford University Press, New York, pp.205 - 209.

¹³. Glazer, N. Affirmative Discrimination: Where ^{is} it going? International Journal of Comparative Sociology Vol. 20 Nos 1-2, 1979, pp. 14 - 30.

Insisting on the inevitability of such a dilemma, however, is to ignore the possibilities of equality of treatment for minorities in a multiethnic society. Both the retention of ethnic culture and the acceptance of this state of affairs by both minority and majority peoples, are quite compatible with equality of opportunity in political and economic life. The condition is that ethnic groups should be accepted as equal partners in society.¹⁴ This is the view supported by this thesis in its investigation of equality of access to formal education, especially higher education, for different ethnic groups in Xinjiang.

3. Multi-ethnic Education in Xinjiang and Equality

As to the policy of the Chinese Communist Party towards national minorities, more specifically its educational policy and practice in Xinjiang, different comments and arguments have been persistent. Some politicians insist that the ethnic minority groups in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China have enjoyed full rights of equality in access to, and provision of, education since 1949. They have frequently appealed to official aims in order to justify the policy they were following. The nature and status of

¹⁴. Smolicz (1981)

these aims have been discussed by philosophers of education both inside and outside China. Some Western scholars believe that the Party inherited the Nationalist policy of education, and on this base education has expanded with the ultimate goal of assimilation. Others argue that, regardless of assimilation, nothing but benefits have accrued to minority peoples since the Communists came to power.¹⁵ Nevertheless observers have discovered that the indigenous people of Xinjiang disagree and have expressed concern about the inequality in the educational provision made for them.

The problems of inequality which, this thesis maintains, currently prevail in higher education are rooted in secondary, and even primary education. Therefore, it is necessary to examine these, in order to identify the real changes and achievements on the one hand, and the concomitant inequalities on the other. This is done in later chapters.

4. Minority Education

The term 'education of minorities' raises a variety of questions and is interlocked with such concepts and expressions as minority and majority, race and ethnicity, ethnicity and culture, ethnicity and assimilation and

¹⁵. op. cit.

racial discrimination;¹⁶ multicultural education and multiculturalism, cultural pluralism;¹⁷ ethnic identity; social equity and educational equality¹⁸ which has already been touched upon in the first section of this chapter; cultural diversity and unity in education;¹⁹ bilingualism;²⁰ and 'new' plural societies and 'old' plural societies.²¹ The sections which follow describe and evaluate these concepts as they relate to national or ethnic minority education.

5. Ethnicity and Ethnic Groups

Ethnicity is not only an important concept but acts also as an insight into observing and investigating group conflicts and their adjustment. It underlies cultural diversity, unity or conflict and the social composition of human communities. Culture and politics interlock as social

¹⁶. World Yearbook of Education (1981); Said Abdul Aziz; Simmons, Luiz R.S (1977) Ethnicity in an International Context, New Brunswick.

¹⁷. Smolicz J. J (1981) Culture, Ethnicity and Education, World Yearbook of Education, pp.17 - 36.

¹⁸. Ogbu, J. U (1978) Minority Education and Caste, Academic Press.

¹⁹. Holmes, B. (1980) Diversity and Unity in Education, George Allen & Unwin, London.

²⁰. Lewis, G.(1986) Bilingualism as Language Planning in the Soviet Union, Western Perspectives on Soviet Education in the 1980s MacMillan Press pp.75 - 96.

²¹. Marimuthu T. Education for Plural Societies, a paper presented in the International Conference conducted by the Department of International and Comparative Education of the Institute of Education, University of London, March 1988.

issues and are thus major sources in the creation of a dynamic concept of ethnicity. Different scholars have given various definitions at different times of this concept. Paulston is of the view that ethnicity is a process by which people call attention to cultural differences - differences that may be either self-proclaimed, or attributed, or both.²² Ethnicity, in his view, is a process of categorization that can, given a certain level of political and critical awareness, be usefully employed by members of groups or by others.

Singleton quotes the views expressed by the Social Science Research Council,²³ which states that ethnicity involves (1) a past-oriented group identification emphasizing origins; (2) some idea of cultural and social distinctiveness; and (3) being a component unit in a broader system of social relations. But at the same time he points out that empirical research into human groups has led us to realize that there is something 'ethnic out there in these, that it carries cross-cultural similarities, and that comparative research will help us understand it'.²⁴ He also stresses that the basic requisite of ethnicity, namely ascribed identity, was initially emphasized as critical by

²². Paulston R. G. Ethnicity and Educational Change: A Priority for Comparative Education, Comparative Education Review, October 1976, pp. 269 - 277.

²³. Singleton, J. Education and Ethnicity, Comparative Education Review, June/October 1977, pp. 329 - 344.

²⁴. Ibid. p. 332.

Barth:

By concentrating on what is socially effective, ethnic groups are seen as a form of social organization. The critical feature then becomes.....the characteristic of self-aspiration and ascription by others. A categorical ascription is an ethnic ascription when it classifies a person in terms of his basic, most general identity, presumptively determined by his origin and background.²⁵

Singleton considers that Barth's emphasis on the interdependence of ethnic groups in ecological context is very important. This interdependence is explained thus: inter-ethnic competition and accommodation are dependent upon respective group patterns of economic survival as well as upon the social political processes by which inequality and social stratification are maintained. In this Singleton gives his own version:

Thus ethnicity as a concept helps to focus on the interrelationship of culture and social structure in the organization of human action associated

²⁵. Barth, F. (1969) Introduction, in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference, ed. Frederik Barth, Boston: Little, Brown, p.13.

with explicit identity ascriptions.²⁶

He has come to a conclusion which suggests that an anthropological approach to the study of ethnicity is essential, emphasising that ethnicity is primarily important today as a political phenomenon of informally organized interest groups. Here the issue involves 'interest group and ethnic group'. Banks defines 'ethnic group' as a group that shares a common ancestry, culture, history, tradition, sense of peoplehood, and states that the group at the same time is a political and economic interest group. An ethnic group is primarily an involuntary one with individual identification optional. According to his definition, Banks regards Polish Americans, Irish Americans, and Anglo-Americans as ethnic groups, but Afro-Americans and Mexican Americans as ethnic minority groups, i.e specific types of ethnic groups²⁷. He further explains that members of an ethnic group have unique physical and/or cultural characteristics.

These concepts of ethnicity discussed by Smolicz, Barth, Banks, and Singleton are relevant to concepts of ethnicity in China and so to this thesis.

²⁶. Singleton (1977:336).

²⁷. Banks, J. A. (1981) Multiethnic Education: Theory and Practice, Boston, Allyn & Bacon. p.53.

6. Minority and Majority

The term 'minority' can be applied to different types of groups, namely a cultural minority group; a political, geographical, or linguistic minority group; a religious minority group, a demographic minority group; a disadvantaged minority group; an intellectual minority group; a socio-economic minority group or a minority group in terms of sex or race. To a large extent, the status of the minority, specifically those that are disadvantaged or dominated by the majority, is determined mainly by historical events such as conquest, political power, or socio-economic domination. Of the three, political power is generally the decisive factor. For example the Han-Chinese in the People's Republic of China, the Russians in the Soviet Union, the English in the United Kingdom can be classified as majorities in terms of political power; whereas the Tibetans, Uighurs, Hui, Uzbek, Kazak, Welsh, and Scots have the common feature of being political minorities and so could be called politically disadvantaged minorities.

In other words, the 'minority group', refers to any racial, national, religious, or linguistic group which is subject to certain discriminations, and is the object of prejudice, from the majority. The term 'majority group' indicates those groups which are different from the minority in political, social, cultural and economic status. In these

aspects, the majority group has certain privileges, advantages, and powers in contrast to the minority groups. As already stated, although the Han-Chinese can be defined as a majority group at the national level, they are the minority within the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region where the Uighurs are a majority group, as far as cultural and demographic factors are concerned.

7. Assimilation

Banks discusses this concept in relation to a particular case - the United States with its very strong historical background of assimilation, which can be traced back to the early period of Anglo-domination, when its values and cultural norms were institutionalized as American norms and as acceptable standards of behaviour. Those who accepted these 'norms' sacrificed their own culture in order to be assimilated. Those among them who were non-English-speaking European immigrants joined the mainstream of Anglo-Saxons and lost their own identity. Banks, describing the assimilationist ideology in America, says:

The assimilationist believes that ethnicity is more important in developing societies than in highly modernized societies and that it crumbles under the forces of modernization and democratization. The assimilationist also views

ethnicity as a force that is inimical to the goals of a democratic society. The assimilationist believes that curriculum materials and teaching styles should relate primarily to the common culture. Emphasis should be on our common civilization, since all American citizens must learn to participate in a common culture that requires universal skills and competencies.²⁸

Experiences of various multiethnic countries like the United States of America, Canada, Australia, India, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China suggest that assimilationist policies do not necessarily promote social stability, but can increase social problems and militate against permanent unity-in-diversity. This thesis confirms these experiences.

The political and economic disadvantages faced by the ethnic minorities often force them to resist the threat of assimilation. 'Assimilation' means to become or cause to become, similar. As a concept, it denotes 'a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons or groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experiences and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural

²⁸. op. cit.

life.'²⁹ Complete assimilation would mean that no separate social structures based on racial or ethnic issues remained. But generally scientists and researchers have believed that, in the contemporary world, the trend develops rather towards a substantial pluralism than to any uniformity.

'Assimilation' has taken a quite different form in Xinjiang since 1949 from that of before 1949, and from that of other multiethnic states elsewhere in the world. The major difference between the Nationalist and the Communist regimes in their approach in Xinjiang can be summed up as follows: an open but passive assimilation on the part of the Nationalists, but a more subtle and active assimilation on the part of the Communists. The ultimate goal of both regimes has been assimilation. Wang En-mao, the former first secretary of the CCP Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region Committee, said: 'The development of socialist economy in our country has inevitably accelerated the contact and ties among the various nationalities and resulted in gradual integration among them. Instead of being a forced assimilation as practised by the reactionary ruling class in the past, this is a result of social and historical progress to which no opposition should be and can be raised.'³⁰ Xinjiang has ethnically segregated

²⁹. Park, R. E. (1921) Introduction to the Science of Sociology, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p.735.

³⁰. Lee Fu-shiang (1973:279).

primary and secondary schools. The mother tongues are the media of instruction in different ethnic schools. However, there is in effect a nationwide unified curricula, with Standard Chinese as a compulsory subject from the beginning of the third grade of primary school. Religious subjects were abolished in schools when the Chinese Communists came to power. All children under 18 have been forbidden by law to learn religious doctrine. Various kinds of political education through literature and other strategies, plus a strict political discipline within schools, have been a soft means of propagating the philosophy of 'one Party', 'one nation', 'the Party is mother to all', 'Chairman Mao is father of all', 'one big family, and 'all nationalities are members of this big family'. Such a process in Xinjiang has been believed by the Han-Chinese to be 'natural assimilation'.³¹

8. Multicultural Education, Multiculturalism and Bilingualism

According to Banks, multicultural education indicates a type of education which is concerned with creating an educational environment in which students from different cultural groups will experience educational equity. He says

³¹. Liu Chun, 'Guanyu Minzu Tunghua Winti' (On the Problem of National Assimilation), The People's Daily (Peking), January 28, 1958, p.3; and in Lee Fu-shiang (1973:277-279).

that it is a politically popular concept, for it is frequently interpreted to mean lumping the special problems of ethnic minorities and other groups together:

(it) would deal not only with the educational problems of ethnic minority groups but with the educational problems of cultural groups such as women, handicapped persons, religious groups, and regional groups such as Appalachian Whites.³²

He believes that many educators support the multicultural education concept, but they neglect the core issues of racism and racial discrimination. He emphasizes the importance of multiethnic education within a broad theme of multicultural education. Smolicz writes:

.... to achieve multiculturalism in an ethnical plural society, the education system must provide at every level (primary, secondary, and tertiary) opportunities for all individuals:

1. to learn the shared values of society, including the national language (which in Anglo-Saxon societies means English);
2. to study their mother tongue in its cultural context (including the acquisition of literacy);

³². op. cit.

3. to gain access to an ethnic community language and culture other than their own:
4. to understand and value the multicultural nature of society and learn to appreciate the various cultures within it.³³

Banks, Barrington,³⁴ and Smolicz are very important, for they emphasize that individuals from both majority and minority backgrounds should have the opportunity to make use of more than one culture in their everyday lives, be it in language, family life, social manners, ideology, or in literature and art. This approach does not assume that every individual is bicultural, as in the case of the balanced bilingual, although the greater the number of such individuals the better.³⁵

Weinreich defines bilingualism as the practice of alternately using two languages, the persons involved being bilingual.³⁶ E. Blocher defines it as follows:

Bilingualism should be understood as a person's

³³. op. cit.

³⁴. Barrington J. M. From Assimilation to Cultural Pluralism: A Comparative Analysis, Comparative Education Vol. 17 No.1. March 1981, pp.59 - 68.

³⁵. Smolicz (1981:21); Banks J. A (1981:19-31); Barrington (1981:59-65).

³⁶. Weinreich U. (1953) Languages in Contact, p.1 in M.I. Isayev M.I. (1977) National Languages In USSR: Problems and Solutions, Progress Publishers Moscow.p.328.

belonging to two linguistic societies to such an extent that it is difficult to establish which language is closer to him, which one should be viewed as his mother tongue, which one he prefers, and in which language he thinks.³⁷

Although there are some differences, both definitions emphasize the individual.

9. Multicultural Terminology in China

The concept of multicultural/multilingual education needs explaining only in so far as it has to be distinguished from monocultural and monolingual education, whereby education is related exclusively to the learner's own culture and native language. In the People's Republic of China the predominant Han-Chinese do not acquire any second language. Nevertheless, multicultural and multilingual education does exist in China, mainly in autonomous areas where the majority are non-Han people, for instance Tibetans and Uighurs, who have acquired, or have to acquire, both their native language and a second one - Standard Chinese. Therefore, multicultural and multilingual education is not found in Chinese terminology. Instead Chinese educationists and politicians use the concept of 'national minority' education in two senses. The first

³⁷. In Isayev, M.I. (1977).

relates to the ethnic identity of the learners and teachers which they recognize, at least officially; the second to political education with emphasis on national loyalty.

However, Chinese educationists and policy-makers, learning from the experiences and strategies of other countries, have started using multicultural terminology in the attempt to achieve their ultimate goal of national assimilation by subtly downgrading ethnic cultures. Thus Yan Xuequn argues that China is a 'unified, multinational and multilingual, socialist country'³⁸ and lists all the linguistic errors made by ethnic minority people during their study of Standard Chinese in grammar, tone, pronunciation and in usage of the characters. However, he neglects to mention the errors made by those minority Han-Chinese who live among the majority of Tibetans and Uighurs in Tibet and Xinjiang. He says that it is inevitable that the ethnic groups should experience linguistic interference from their mother tongues when they learn Chinese:

Our task is to try to reduce and eliminate it by analyzing its origin and finding ways and means for remedy and correction.³⁹

These 'ways and means' are in order to speed up the pace of

³⁸. Yan Xuequn, *Bilingualism in China, Prospects*, Vol. XVI, No.2, 1986. pp.259 - 264.

³⁹. Ibid.

popularizing Standard Chinese and to reduce and eliminate the influence of ethnic minority languages. It is clear that multiculturalism, according to Yan, is meant only for ethnic minorities. It is only the non-Han people who should learn and master Standard Chinese; who have to reduce and eliminate the influence of their own languages, and it is they who should accept the 'norm' of the Han-Chinese. Thus the goal of 'multicultural' education in China is to build the 'ideal state' advocated by Hans,⁴⁰ criticized by Smolicz⁴¹ and all multiculturalists, and generally rejected by ethnic minorities, and even by some majorities.

10. Contemporary Trends in Muslim Education

Winters analyses why the Chinese government tolerates traditional Islamic institutions in Muslim areas such as Xinjiang and Ningxia, in spite of the Communist view of religion as spiritual pollution,⁴² and suggests that the tolerance rests on the need perceived by the Chinese government for educated Muslims to help in the economic development of Muslim areas. He says:

⁴⁰. "Hans claimed that in an 'ideal nation' with political sovereignty all its citizens would speak the same language, follow the same religion, belong to the same race and occupy a well-defined territory". - Holmes, B. (1980) Diversity and Unity in Education, p.1.

⁴¹. Smolicz, J (1981:17-34).

⁴². Winters, C. A. Contemporary Trends in Traditional Chinese Islamic Education International Review of Education, Vol. 30, 1984. pp.475 - 479.

Much of China's future economic development will depend on educated workers. In Xinjiang, many young workers lack basic skills. When some 40,000 workers at Karamay oil field(sic) in Xinjiang were given a secondary level exam to assess their qualifications, only 2 per cent passed the test.

⁴³

The economic way to solve the problem was to 'send Muslim workers to the Middle East who have an above-average knowledge of Arabic and Middle Eastern affairs',⁴⁴ so that they would make full use of their advantages and master the techniques of the oil industry. By this means not only would the Muslim workers be 'qualified' but also it would 'facilitate a smoother transfer of oil industry skills from Arab oil states to China'.⁴⁵

Economic expansion, especially the expansion of the oil industry, is the key. Winters quotes Premier Zhao Ziyang's comment on Xinjiang in 1983 as 'a crucially important treasure house', both for strategic and economic reasons.⁴⁶ Senior Party official Xi Zhongxun's encouragement for

⁴³. Ibid.

⁴⁴. Ibid.

⁴⁵. op.cit.

⁴⁶. Ibid.

Chinese Muslims to cultivate contacts with Muslims abroad in May 1983, and the Red Flag's⁴⁷ notes, in which such contacts play an important role in increasing China's 'political influence', show the Chinese government's real purpose.

A third and final reason for the Chinese government's support for Muslim education, according to Winters, was the fact that Muslim education was there in place before⁴⁸ the Revolution and the size of the Muslim population could not be ignored. As already stated in the Introduction, Muslim education in Xinjiang was centred round the madrassah (mosque-school) and the homes of individual Muslim teachers who were called 'Ahongs' (Uyghur: Ahun, plural: Ahunlar). The educational institutions were either supported by the Muslim community as a whole or financed by rich Muslim citizens.

Thus Muslims already had a public educational system in

⁴⁷. Red Flag, Hong Qi, is an official ideological journal of the Chinese Communist Party.

⁴⁸. The same facts by 1) Abdulla Talip (1987) are cited in his book, Uyghur Ma'aripi Tarihidin Ochiriklar, p.36-38, Xinjiang Haliq Nashiryati, Urumqi.

2) Mir Azam (1989) Uyghur Ma'arip Tarhidiki Ochmaes Yultuzlar Xinjiang Yashlar - Osmurlaer Naeshiryati, Urumqi.

3) Muhtabar (1988) Xinjiang Yekinki Zaman Ma'aripining Tarhi Taeraeqqiyati (The Development of Modern Educational History of Xinjiang), Xinjiang Ijtima'i Paenlaer Tatqiqati (Xinjiang Academy of Social Science), Vol.3 1988, pp.74-90, Urumqi.

China.⁴⁹ Instruction in the schools was in local languages. As already mentioned earlier (Introduction), many Muslim instructors, according to reports, possessed fine libraries of works written in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish as well as Chinese.⁵⁰ But today, although there are some Islamic religious institutions in the traditional sense, most Muslims in China are educated in secular public schools.

Finally Lofstedt in an overview of education, not only for the minorities but also for the whole Chinese people,⁵¹ writes:

Most of the minority areas are the least developed in the country, but they are of great strategic importance, militarily and economically.⁵²

⁴⁹. Many scholars have confirmed these facts. For example Broomhall, M. (1910) Islam in China, London, p.238; Lee Fu-shiang (1973) The Turkic-Moslem Problems In Sinkiang: a Case Study Of The Chinese Communists' Nationality Policy, (Ph.D thesis), New Brunswick, New Jersey; Forbes, A. D. W. (1986) Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: a Political History of Republican Sinkiang 1911-1949, Cambridge University Press; Birnbaum N. (1971) Communist China's Policy Toward her Minority Nationalities: 1950-1965, (Ph.D) St. John's University, New York; Dreyer, J. T. (1976) China's Forty Millions; and Chen, J. (1977) The Sinkiang Story, Macmillan.

⁵⁰. Hutson, I. 'Szechuan Moslems' Muslim World. 10 (1920), pp. 254-255, quoted by Winters (1984:476).

⁵¹. Lofstedt, Jan-Ingvar 'Education for National Minorities in China: An Overview', Journal of Negro Education, Vol.56, No.3, 1987, pp.326-337.

⁵². ibid.

11. Changing Policies

Watson analyzes the People's Republic of China's changing policy towards the education of ethnic minorities.⁵³ Historically the Han-Chinese have occupied only the eastern parts of China which are about 40% of the total. The remaining 60% has been occupied by more than 50 ethnic minorities, the smallest a few hundred people and the largest several million. As has just been shown, due to their strategic importance and richness in natural resources, 'successive Chinese governments have taken great pains to win over the allegiance of the ethnic minorities. Education has been used as a weapon in this process'.⁵⁴ The Nationalist government began to build schools for 'border nationalities' under a scheme of cultural assimilation and national integration and the Communist government has expanded the network. The policies have vacillated but, although assimilation is not acknowledged as official policy, 'it would appear that this is still the ultimate goal of the Chinese Communist Party leadership'⁵⁵ (See also Section 6).

⁵³. Watson, K. Changing Policies Toward the Education of Minority Groups in China, World Yearbook of Education, 1981, Kogan Page, London. pp.99 - 115.

⁵⁴. Ibid.

⁵⁵. Ibid.

In his introduction, Watson says that until recently many outside observers have viewed China as a single entity - a nation blessed with 'a homogeneous culture and a common racial stock'. He, however, believes that differences are remarkable, and gradually became more apparent when the Chinese began entering South East Asia. Some scholars studied the different dialect groups to be found in Hakka, Hokkien, Hailamese, Cantonese, Tiochi and others, and argued as to whether they were subdivisions of the Han-Chinese or whether they could be classified as separate ethnic groups.⁵⁶ Regional and dialectal divisions within Chinese society threatened the unity of the country until the present century, and even more specifically until the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949. Therefore successive Chinese governments have had little time to worry about the non-Han ethnic minorities.

Traditionally imperial dynasties had a policy of ignoring minority ethnic groups, provided they recognised imperial overlordship and did not invade Han-Chinese territory. Watson summarizes this policy as 'a pluralist form of

⁵⁶. Coughlin, R J (1960) Double Identity: The Chinese in Modern Thailand, Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong; Freedman, M (1958) Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia: a review article Pacific Affairs 31; Purcell, V (1966) The Chinese in South East Asia Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, London; and Skinner, G W (1958) Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community in Thailand, Cornell University Press, Ithaca; all in Watson (1981) World Yearbook of Education.P.99.

integration that aimed at little more than control'.⁵⁷ Traditional languages, customs and government systems of ethnic minority groups were not interfered with, provided they expressed their loyalty to the emperor. Actually, 'a few groups absorbed Han-Chinese culture and became indistinguishable from other parts of Han-China',⁵⁸ The Han-Chinese, on the other hand, did not bother to discover the history, customs or language of non-Han groups, regarding themselves as 'superior' in culture, customs and other aspects.

The Nationalist Chinese government (1911 -1949) policy he describes as Han chauvinism towards ethnic minorities. Sun Yat Sen was typical, declaring:

We must facilitate the dying out of all individual peoples inhabiting China e.g. Manchus, Tibetans, Mongols, Tartars....We must satisfy the demands of all races and unite them in a single cultural and political whole.⁵⁹

In consequence, the Nationalist authorities carried out oppressive and exploitative policies towards ethnic

⁵⁷. This is Dreyer's view quoted by Watson; therefore also see Dreyer, J T (1976) China's Forty Millions, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass.

⁵⁸. The Manchus, Zhuang and Bai absorbed Han-Chinese culture and became indistinguishable.

⁵⁹. op.cit.

minorities regarding education as an effective weapon to bring about assimilation and reduce cultural differences. Therefore, they built many schools in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. According to Watson, 837,000,000 yuan were spent on minority education in 1947 alone. He says that food, book and clothing subsidies were also made available that year. To speed up the assimilation processes, ethnic minority place names were replaced by Chinese ones, minorities were encouraged to adopt Chinese surnames, the use of Standard Chinese was imposed, and the wearing of Chinese dress and intermarriage were encouraged.

Most minority groups resisted this assimilation and oppression and there were numerous violent struggles and strikes in ethnic minority areas. Some ethnic minorities tried to develop their own education, culture and economy. For instance, Husayn Bay Bachcha, a widely read millionaire merchant of Artush,⁶⁰ endowed a charitable institution in Artush to build schools and libraries for the education of Muslim children of both sexes, and personally paid for certain promising young men to study abroad.⁶¹ In 1898

⁶⁰. Artush is a county in Kashgar in south Xinjiang.

⁶¹. Skrine describes Husayn Bay Bachcha as follows: "Hosein Bai Batcha was a millionaire merchant of Artush who had read widely and travelled extensively in Europe. On his own initiative he had founded a charitable organization in Artush to build schools and libraries for the education of both girls and boys. He had personally paid for young men to study abroad and was responsible for organizing the Artush trading Company. Macartney went to see him just before going on leave in June 1908 and found him a quiet, unassuming man but a shrewd observer. He was natural leader of the Kashgar and Artush merchants both on account of his

Bawdun Bay started a school at Kashgar where Muslim children were encouraged to take part in various sport activities during their study but Yang Zengxin⁶² closed the school and imprisoned many teachers including Ahmad Kamal from Istanbul.⁶³ According to Forbes, a library was founded in Ghulja in northern Xinjiang in 1920 with the help of the Soviets, but Yang could not tolerate this and closed down the library, banned all publications in Turkic languages and prohibited any political discussions throughout the region. Forbes quotes Skrine as follows:

By means of censorship... and other methods, not only is all written or printed matter dealing with current events excluded from the province, but the dissemination of 'news' in writing among the inhabitants is effectively prevented. The same policy is responsible for the official attitude towards education: all schools except those attached to mosques, at which nothing but reading, writing and the Qur'an are taught by the Mullahs, are forbidden; even attempts by private individuals such as Russian refugees to make a living by teaching foreign

wealth and his ability and he was proposed by them as president of the abortive дума." - Skrine C. P. (1973) Macartney at Kashgar, Methuen, London p.157.

⁶². Yang, Han-Chinese, was the ruler of Sinkiang (Xinjiang) from 1911 to 1928.

⁶³. op.cit.

languages are looked upon with disfavour.⁶⁴

Watson indicates that the major cause for the failure of the Nationalist policy was the absence of diversity in the education offered to ethnic minorities. He says:

Unfortunately, there was too much emphasis on developing a uniform curriculum, and too little on developing local languages and materials....⁶⁵

However, this was only one reason. The resistance of ethnic minority groups to assimilation, cultural integration and political and economic oppression, and the weakness and corruption of the Nationalist government itself are other reasons.

Watson argues that the Chinese Communists inherited minority education from the Nationalists, utilizing minority teachers and occasionally minority languages, and they have expanded on this base, rather than develop an entirely new one.⁶⁶ This view is shared by other scholars such as Dreyer and Pye.⁶⁷

⁶⁴. Forbes, A. D. W. (1986:19).

⁶⁵. Watson (1981).

⁶⁶. Deal, D. M. Policy towards Ethnic Minorities in South West China: 1927 to 1965 in Watson (1981)

⁶⁷. Dreyer (1976) China's Forty Millions; Pye, L.W (1975) China: Ethnic Minorities and National Security in Watson (1981).
cited

He regards the Communist attitudes towards minorities as a 'psychological' weapon in the struggle for power. The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) policy is totally based on Marxist-Leninist thinking and it copied the attitudes of the Soviet Union to minority issues from the beginning, declaring that the minorities would have the right of self-determination.⁶⁸

At the Second Party Congress in 1922, Mongolia [Inner], Tibet and Turkestan were proclaimed as 'autonomous states' and regional autonomy in a 'Chinese Federal Republic' was advocated. In 1930 the Ten Great Political Programmes gave the minorities the right to secede or federate, and the 1931 Kiangsi Soviet Constitution (modelled on the 1924 Soviet Union constitution) explicitly stated that minorities had the right of self-determination and of secession, as well as religious freedom and equality with all nationalities.⁶⁹

But there was a marked shift of policy between 1931 and 1938. The Communists changed their policy from recognizing

⁶⁸. Llata Richard and Barrera Mario in their research: The Chinese National Minorities Policy, (Aztlán. Vol.6. No. 3, 1976, pp. 379 - 409) have come to the same view as Watson.

⁶⁹. Watson (1981).

the right of complete political independence to one of recognizing autonomy only within China. One of the reasons for the shift in the policy was the hostility felt by the ethnic minorities towards the Han-Chinese revolutionaries during the Long March.⁷⁰ This convinced the CCP that 'if the minorities were offered the choice, the majority of them would opt not to join China'. Therefore, it was best not to offer them any choice. The rich natural resources of the minority areas and their strategic location, especially along the Soviet border and in Xinjiang, became increasingly recognized.

Since 1949, on the other hand, the CCP has followed a policy of assimilation through settlement and educational policies which have been designed to further this process. There has been a huge gap between what has been written in the Constitution and its implementation. Initially minorities were encouraged to take a pride in their local culture, history and customs, which were even written into the draft of the 1949 Constitution and reaffirmed in the Constitution of 1954.⁷¹ But the subsequent reality did not

⁷⁰. This view is also shared by other scholars like Dreyer (1976); Wales (1939); Wiens (1962); Ekvall, (1965); Snow, (1937); in Watson (1981).

⁷¹. "Minorities were urged to take a pride in their local culture, history and customs. Territorial rights, equality of all groups, representation in central government, the right to develop their own languages, culture and customs and the guarantee of religious beliefs were written into the 1949 Draft Constitution and reaffirmed in the Constitution of 1954." - Watson (1981) pp.107-108.

conform to the Constitution. Minority cultures, beliefs and customs were strongly criticised between 1966 and 1976, the period of the Cultural Revolution. In some minority schools great emphasis was laid on learning Standard Chinese; furthermore, the Uighur and Kazak languages were drastically reformed and the former Arabic script was replaced by a modified Roman one. But later the Uighurs rejected the reforms, believing that it was a measure designed to cut them off from their own history, and the Arabic script was restored in 1983. Watson also points out that although the media of instruction have been local languages, the curriculum is considerably unified throughout the country, emphasizing Chinese history, geography, the Chinese language, the rise of the CCP, Mao's thoughts, patriotism, and the class struggle, but with some variations in deference to local cultures and customs.

He concludes that the long term aim of the Party is the assimilation and political integration of minority peoples into a unified 'Han state'. With this in mind the Communists developed, expanded and intensified the policy initiated by the Nationalists. Full use has been made of all means to bring the Han-Chinese and ethnic minority peoples closer together - radio, press, speeches, leaflets, and cadre training. 'Assimilation is still an impossible dream while real autonomy for the different groups is

unrealistic'.⁷² This suggests a middle of the road solution. Indeed today there are strong reasons for autonomy. Firstly, the resurgence of national identity throughout the world has had a great influence on the minorities, as the contacts between China and other countries have increased since the introduction of the open-door policy. Secondly, the Party and government have already stated that the 'leftist' mistakes on ethnic minority issues should be corrected. Thirdly, perhaps most importantly, the minority people themselves have begun to regain their self-confidence in their own development. Therefore, it may be said that the achievement of real autonomy within the People's Republic of China is not unrealistic, provided that foreign policy and national defence are looked after by the central government. This desire could be called mutual coexistence in diversity.

Summary

This chapter has discussed various conceptual issues under eleven subtitles viz. Dialectical Materialism, Concepts of Equity and equality, Multi-Ethnic Education in Xinjiang and Equality, Minority Education, Ethnicity and Ethnic Groups, Minority and Majority, Assimilation, Multicultural Education/Multiculturalism and Bilingualism, Multicultural

⁷². Watson (1981) World Yearbook of Education.

Terminology in China, Contemporary Trends in Muslim Education and Changing Policies, and has indicated their relevance to the theme of this thesis.

Two of these issues predominate - assimilation (or rather resistance to it) and the changing policies of government. The former is linked to the recent massive immigration of Han-Chinese into Xinjiang, ostensibly for economic and strategic purposes. The latter results from the modifications made to the original constitutional declarations of the Party and from the later upheavals caused by the Cultural Revolution. Subsuming both these issues are the minority and majority issue and the tensions it has created. In the case of China as a whole, a multi-ethnic country, the Han-Chinese are the ethnic majority and the Uighurs, Kazaks, Hui, Mongolians, Tibetans and others are the ethnic minorities, but within Xinjiang the Han-Chinese are the ethnic minority and the Uighurs the majority. But the Uighurs, although being the majority ethnic group have failed to perform their majority role politically, preserving their majority status only in terms of culture and population. By contrast, the immigrant Han-Chinese, although an ethnic minority in Xinjiang, have effectively played the role of majority dominance. They came as 'guests', to whom the Uighurs and others were 'hosts'. During nearly forty years, however, the respective 'guest' and 'host' status of the immigrant Han-Chinese and the indigenous Uighurs and others has undergone a

fundamental change. For example, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in Xinjiang has always been a Han-Chinese. There have been no non-Han commanding officers in the military corps. Almost all the presidents and directors of universities and colleges are Han-Chinese; as are the heads of most of the local educational bureaux. The original relationship of 'guest' and 'host' between the ethnic Han minority and the ethnic Uighur majority has been reversed.

Therefore, it has not been uncommon for there to have been disputes between the 'hosts', and the 'guests'. The 1962 disturbances took place in Ili and Choqaek; the 1980 clash between Han-Chinese and local people in Aksu; the 1983 clash in Kashgar and Awat; the 1985 strike by more than 5,000 non-Han students, mainly Uighurs, against the atomic tests in Xinjiang, the birth control policy towards non-Han people, the government's neglect of minority education in Xinjiang and against the influx of Han-Chinese into Xinjiang; and the 1988 Uighur students' demonstration in Urumqi and other parts of Xinjiang against political discrimination - all are examples of such disputes.

The two predominant issues form the threads running through the chapters that follow, in which the detailed analysis of non-Han and Han access and performance at the different educational levels illustrate how important and influential these two issues, confirmed with the others, have been in

creating educational imbalances and inequalities, especially at the higher education level, to the disadvantage of the indigenous people of Xinjiang.

CHAPTER TWO

ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION

In this chapter consideration is given first to examination of admission practices to explain the issues of equality in higher education; then to the description of inequality of access to higher education, and thirdly to an exploration of the supply of students from senior middle schools to higher educational institutions in Xinjiang. As stated in the Introduction, the major research question is: To what extent are inequalities in higher education an outcome of higher education admission practices and to what extent are they the outcome of inequalities of supply originating from lower down the system? This chapter focuses on the first part of the question.

Believing that 'the most far-sighted approach to helping minority nationalities is to begin with good education for training and bringing up experienced people'¹, the Chinese government has made great efforts to expand schools, develop teaching programmes and train skilled manpower since the revolution in Xinjiang. It has also been stated

¹. Dilger B, Comparative Education, Vol.20, No.1 1984, page. 162. *The Education of Minorities in*

that 'without a large number of ... experienced scientific, technical and management personnel - it will be impossible to eliminate the de facto inequality among nationalities and fundamentally solve the nationality problem in China.'²

Obviously, 'experienced scientific, technical and management personnel' from among the non-Han people can only be produced through higher education. If that is so, then the question to be faced is to what extent has the government fulfilled its aim to 'eliminate the de facto inequality among nationalities', primarily in access to institutions of higher education for various ethnic groups in the region? In other words, have the different ethnic groups in Xinjiang enjoyed equal access to higher education? If not, why not?

According to the Xinjiang 1982 population census the non-Han population aged 20 - 24 was 637,148 or 62% of the total population of that age group, while the Han population aged 20 - 24 was 388,684 or 38%.³ The 1982 higher education enrolment for non-Han was 9,244 or 57% and for Han 6,947 or 43%.⁴ Thus, the gross enrolment ratio for non-Han was 1.45%

². Hayhoe, R. (1986) Contemporary Chinese Education, p.145, M.E. Sharpe, Great Britain.

³. Regional Population Census, 1982.

⁴. Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi liao, 1982.

Here enrolment numbers did not include the number of Han and non-Han students who were admitted from Xinjiang to institutions of education in other cities and provinces throughout the country. Every year a considerable number of Han-Chinese and a small number of non-Han students go to tertiary institutions in other cities or provinces.

and for Han 1.80%. This presents the contemporary picture of an apparent inequality between Han and non-Han in access to higher education in XUAR.

As already stated, this chapter focuses on the question of equality of access to higher education for different ethnic groups. Four main sources of data are used: 1) gross or crude enrolment ratios for Han and non-Han, 2) new entrants for Han and non-Han, 1950 - 1987, and 3) the growth of higher education enrolments for Han and non-Han relative to their respective populations, 1950 - 1987. These three sources serve as the basis on which the question of equality is examined. Additionally, the other source of data used, viz., 4) progression rates for various ethnic groups, 1980 -1987 are provided to help better to understand admission practices.

It is important to distinguish enrolments from admission. In Xinjiang as elsewhere, enrolment refers to the total number of students present in a particular cycle of education and still in educational institutions during an academic year, whereas admission refers to the number of new entrants or the intake into institutions of higher education at the beginning of an academic year. Indicators of admission practice include the numbers of students enrolled, the percentage of Han and non-Han in the total

Therefore the actual numbers should be higher.

number of new entrants, and the admission targets given to various institutions, districts and counties, and fields of studies. In each year, well before the admission starts, the State Education Commission sets an overall admission target for the region. Then the Regional Education Commission works out more specific details for such admission.

With admission and enrolment practices rather than policy as the central point of the discussion, this chapter will also look at the growth of the enrolments for different ethnic groups relative to their respective populations and relative population age group cohorts, when data permit. Such comparisons are necessary to see how the system affects in practice the different ethnic groups within the general policies of the Chinese government towards Xinjiang.

General Picture of Higher Education in Xinjiang

1. Background

The history of higher education in Xinjiang is a comparatively short one. In 1924 when Yang Tseng-hsing (Yang Zengsheng) was in power, the Russian Law Junior College was founded. Later this college became the Russian Political and Law Institute at the time when Chin Shu-jen

(Jin Shuren) became president of Xinjiang.⁵ Following Sheng Shisai's coming to power in 1935, this Institute was replaced by the Xinjiang Institute.⁶ Its president was Yu Shusong, a member of the Chinese Communist Party engaged at that time in underground activity in Xinjiang. 'Under the leadership of the revolutionary president the Xinjiang Institute became a powerful centre for the spread of Marxism-Leninism and the Party's policy in Xinjiang.'⁷ The Xinjiang Agriculture College was founded by Tu Zhi in 1939 and was integrated into the Xinjiang Institute in 1941 as the Faculty of Agriculture. In 1942 the Urumqi Girls' Institute came into being. It was also integrated into the Xinjiang Institute in 1946, among the staff of which were Lin Jilu, member of the Party and vice-chancellor of the Institute; Du Chungyuan, member of the Party and vice-chancellor; Mao Dun, the famous writer; Zhang Zhongxi and Sa Kungliao, well-known progressive activists. According to

⁵. "Chin Shu-jen (Han-Chinese) became Secretary General of the Sinkiang Provincial Government by time of Yang's assassination in 1928. Succeeded Yang as Provincial Governor in 1928. A corrupt and incompetent man, possibly addicted to opium. Like Yang, stripped Sinkiang of assets for personal gain....Overthrown by coup at Urumqi on April 1933 during invasion of Ma Chungying. Fled to China proper, where he was sentenced to 3.5 years' imprisonment for signing an illegal treaty with the USSR." - Forbes (1986), p.239.

⁶. "Sheng Shisai (Han-Chinese)....remained warlord of Sinkiang from 1933 to 1944 (much of that time as a virtual puppet of the Soviet Union)." - op.cit.

⁷. Abdulla Talip (1987) Xinjiang Ma'aripining Qisqichae Ahwali (literal meaning: A Brief Introduction to Xinjiang Education), p.57, in press. The translation of the quotation is mine.

Abdulla Talip and the Xinjiang Uyghur Aptonom Rayonning Omumi Ahawali ⁸, in 1938 the Institute had the following faculties: the Faculty of Politics and Economics which included Modern Philosophy, the Faculty of Languages, the Faculty of Agriculture, the Faculty of Education, the Faculty of Engineering and the Faculty of Politics and Law.⁹ The name Xinjiang Institute was replaced by that of the Xinjiang Nationalities Institute, on the decision of the regional government in the spring of 1950 immediately following the Revolution. From the beginning of 1955 this Institute started preparing to become a comprehensive general university, and in 1960 it was officially approved as such by the State Council. In brief, higher education in Xinjiang is relatively new and has been developed with the direct involvement of the Chinese Communist Party from its inception.

2. Development

The quantitative expansion of higher education increased the number of higher educational institutions from only one in 1950 to 14 at the end of 1985. By 1987 Xinjiang could claim 20 institutions of higher education including 6 newly

⁸. Literal meaning: General Picture of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, a book written by a group of people organized by the State Nationality Affairs Commission; published by Xinjiang People's Press in 1985. p.416.

⁹. op. cit.

promoted junior colleges. These institutions are:

- 1) **Xinjiang University**, founded in 1935, in Urumqi;
- 2) **Xinjiang Industrial College**, founded in 1953, in Urumqi;
- 3) **Xinjiang August the First Agriculture College**, founded in 1952, in Urumqi;
- 4) **Shi Hezi Agriculture College**, founded in 1959, closed in 1969 and reopened in 1970, in Shi Hezi City;
- 5) **Xinjiang Tarim University of Agriculture and Reclamation**, founded in 1958, closed in 1969 and reopened in 1976, in Aral, Aksu;
- 6) **Xinjiang Medical College**, founded in 1956, in Urumqi;
- 7) **Shi Hezi Medical College**, founded in 1949 by No.1 Military Corps of the People's Liberation Army of Xinjiang, in Shi Hezi City;
- 8) **Xinjiang Normal University**, founded in 1979, in Urumqi;
- 9) **Kashgar Normal Institute**, founded in 1962, in Kashgar;
- 10) **Ili Normal Institute**, founded in 1980, in Ili;
- 11) **Hotan Normal Junior College**, founded in 1978, in Hotan;
- 12) **Xinjiang Institute of Finance and Economics**, founded in 1959, degraded to a technical school in 1962 and restored to its present status in 1980; in Urumqi;

13) Xinjiang Petroleum Institute under the Department of Xinjiang Petroleum, founded in 1959, closed in 1964 and reopened in 1983, in Urumqi; and

14) Xinjiang College of Traditional Chinese Medicine under the department of Health, founded in 1961 as a technical school and upgraded officially in 1985; in Urumqi.

The newly promoted junior colleges are:

1. Xinjiang Coal Junior College under the Department of the Coal Industry;
2. Sanji Normal School;
3. Junior Normal College of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC);
4. Junior College of Economics of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps;
5. Xinjiang Institute of Art; and
6. Urumqi Professional University.

The following junior colleges normally offer 2 - 3 year special courses or higher education programmes:

1. Ili Medical School;
2. Kashgar Medical School;
3. Ili District College of Education under the Educational Bureau of the District;
4. Bortala Normal School, which trains teachers for primary and secondary school teachers, under the Educational Bureau of the District;

5. Xinjiang Business School under the Department of Commerce,
6. Xinjiang Cadre Administration College of Political Science and Law under the Commission of Regional Law Courts;
7. Urumqi College of Education, which conducts in-service-teacher training courses for primary and secondary school teachers, under the People's Government of Urumqi City.

Among the institutions listed above, Shi Hezi Agricultural College, Shi Hezi Medical College, Tarim University of Agriculture and Reclamation, the Junior Normal College of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, and the Junior Economic College of the XPCC previously were under the dual leadership of the Ministry of Agriculture in Beijing and the Education Commission of XUAR. Recently they are said to be under the direct leadership of the Ministry of Agriculture and the State Education Commission. No matter how these institutions' sponsors are defined, they are totally independent from the control of the regional Education Commission for the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps is independent from the control of the regional government. The Corps is a half military, half production organization under the direct control of the Ministry of Agriculture. These institutions are open mainly to the children of Han-Chinese civil servants, workers and farmers of the XPCC. The rest of the institutions of higher education are under the Education Commission of the XUAR.

Total enrolments grew from 336 students in 1950 to 29,801 by 1987, the latter tripling the enrolments of 1965 and 1977. The number of staff grew from 73 in 1950 to 15,764 by 1987.¹⁰ Faculties in the above universities and colleges were also expanded with an increase in the subjects offered.

Postgraduate education which had a very modest beginning in the early 1960s came to a halt in the 1970s. A new start was made in 1978 with less than a hundred students. This figure increased to 344 in 1987.¹¹ Academic degrees were introduced and the first Academic Degree Status ever awarded to Xinjiang was promulgated in February 1980 and took effect on January 1, 1981.

Research Institutes such as the China Academy of Science, Xinjiang Branch, and Xinjiang Academy of Art were also set up in 1960 and 1981 respectively, with a total staff of 3,100 in Science and 253 in Arts.¹²

An examination of these developments in the context of equal provision of, and access to, higher education for

¹⁰. Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong ji Ziliao, (meaning: Educational Statistics of Xinjiang) 1949 - 1980, and 1987.

¹¹. Ibid.

¹². Xinjiang Uyghur Aptonum Rayonning Omumi Ahwali (literal meaning: The General Picture of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (1986), Xinjiang People's Press, pp. 436 - 58.

different ethnic groups in XUAR is of crucial importance to the purpose of this thesis, specifically the representation from different ethnic groups of staff and students and their placement in various subjects. This in turn helps us to understand the development of national minorities in higher educational affairs, as highlighted by the declared policy of the Chinese Communist Party on the one hand and on the other the degree to which the Party's attitude towards the nationality issue combined theory with actual practice.

Changes in Intake and Admission Practices

3. Historical Roots of Selective Admission

Admission to higher education in China is among the most selective in the world and is determined by a system of rigorous examinations as early as at the senior middle school level. Candidates who pass the preliminary examination take a nation-wide unified examination which is held by the central government. Those who do not pass are not admitted to universities or technical colleges. Selection through examination is not an innovation, merely a continuation of the old civil service examination system which can be traced back for 2,000 years to the first time in Chinese history when candidates for official positions

were recruited by special examinations'.¹³ Confucianism was established along with this and became the state doctrine. 'Beginning with the Sung period the examinations became the major road to power and wealth,....'¹⁴ Success meant for participants, of course, a much wider path. The present selective system through strict examinations is not very different from the old one and still provides successful candidates with a ladder to climb to the top in a society where everyone strives to reach the elite. Unfortunately, not everyone can succeed in these rigorous examinations, as they merely select for the places available.

4. More Recent Principles and Practices

Since the Revolution the principles and practices in admission to institutions of higher learning have been reviewed from time to time according to the needs of the Party's specific policy at that time. There were broadly three periods: the period between 1950 and 1966, the period from 1966 to 1977, and the period from 1977 onwards. Although the admission principles and practices kept changing and being revised, in all three periods the selective nature of admission to higher education in Xinjiang as elsewhere in China has remained consistent.

¹³. Henze, J. Higher Education: The Tension Between Quality and Equality, in Contemporary Chinese Education, - Hayhoe, R. (1984:93).

¹⁴. op. cit.

From 1950 to 1966 both class background and academic merit were emphasized in the selection of candidates following the nation-wide unified examination. Thus candidates to be selected to universities and colleges had to have the following qualifications: 1) He or she had to love the Party, the motherland, and socialism enthusiastically, have class consciousness and have studied Marxism-Leninism and the thoughts of Mao Zedong conscientiously; 2) He or she had to be active in the 'three great revolutionary movements' i.e: a) the class struggle, b) production labour and c) scientific experiment; 3) He or she had to have a good academic performance both in ordinary examinations in the senior middle schools and the State Unified Entrance Examination to higher education, which carried more weight in the final selection; and 4) All secondary school graduates had to take a physical examination and reach the standards laid down by the State Physical Culture Commission. In the selection not only the examination results of candidates in the State Unified Entrance Examination were looked at, but also their examination records in the senior middle school were taken into account together with the recommendations of their tutors. Although the political criteria were ostensibly given priority, academic merit was always dominant. Therefore, in the selection those who were most successful in the examinations themselves had the best chance to go to top universities and colleges. It was a thorough and strict

selection process.

During the Cultural Revolution which lasted from 1966 to 1977, the Unified Entrance Examination was abolished and more emphasis was given to practical experience and family background. Political qualifications were given priority. Selection was based on five main criteria: 1) Students had to come from families of workers, peasants or soldiers; only a small proportion were accepted from other social groups; 2) They had to show a very high degree of enthusiasm for studying and applying Marxism-Leninism and the thoughts of Mao Zedong; 3) They had to be about 20 to 25 years old and to have had three to five years' work experience behind them; 4) They had to have reached an acceptable educational level, at least the completion of the junior middle school; and 5) They had to be in good health.

The process of selection began with a request by the individual to the work unit which employed him or her. The request was then discussed by his or her workmates, and if they approved, the candidate was recommended to the local authorities. They would first investigate the candidate if they considered him or her satisfactory before recommending him or her to the university. If not, he or she was replaced by another applicant. Later on, however, cultural tests, which refer to general knowledge of various subjects, such as science, maths, physics, chemistry and

literature offered in secondary schools, were introduced for candidates who had been recommended by the masses on political grounds. This was because, by the early 1970s, universities found that the academic quality of some of the students could not match the courses offered. Thus both recommendation and selection on the basis of academic ability were involved. This mixture of the two seemed to favour the non-Han in Xinjiang, at least from 1973 to 1977, when from the available statistics (see Appendix 7(A)), it can be seen that there was a steady increase in the enrolment for non-Han, compared with the years between 1958 and 1966 when the enrolments for Han-Chinese were much higher than those of non-Han.¹⁵

In practical terms, the politically oriented system which prevailed between 1966 and 1977 was more likely to favour the children of workers and peasants than the present one. But it also increased or created class consciousness among the young people who were born after the Revolution. This was contradictory to the goal of a classless society to which Communism was supposed to lead. Besides, such dependence on a recommendation for the selection of candidates to universities and colleges created an atmosphere in which politicians could take unfair advantage. High ranking cadres tried to push the children

¹⁵. Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao (literal meaning Educational Statistics of Xinjiang, 1949-80, official materials compiled by Xinjiang Education Commission.

of relatives into universities and colleges by 'the back door'.¹⁶

On the other hand, the present system of selection, which has been in effect since 1977, lays great emphasis on the results of the nationwide Unified Entrance Examination, neglecting students' results in the senior middle schools. The requirements for the political qualifications of candidates have been minimized. For non-Han, however, one political criterion has remained a prerequisite in all periods, namely their understanding of the need for the unity of the motherland and for the solidarity of all nationalities.

5. The Present Process of Selective Admission

In their applications candidates must list those fields they wish to study and for each field they designate seven or eight institutions - almost half of the total number of the 20 universities and colleges that there are in Xinjiang. These are within the region but a considerable number of Han-Chinese and a small number of non-Han candidates are offered places in institutions of higher education every year in inland¹⁷ provinces and cities. In

¹⁶. Hayhoe, R. (1984:115).

¹⁷. Han-Chinese use 'neidi - 内地' (meaning: inland) in reference to all provinces excluding the border areas.

actual practice, in the selection of students from Xinjiang to higher educational institutions in other provinces and cities, Han-Chinese students have more choices and chances of being admitted than the non-Han, who mainly go to Beijing National Minority Institute to study politics and Standard Chinese.


The Regional Admission Committee assigns successful candidates to higher educational institutions according to, (1) the availability of places by field, (2) the candidates' examination scores, and (3) their choice of field and institution. When admission quotas fall short of demand, qualified candidates have to accept assignment to specialities and institutions other than their declared choices. Once assigned, students cannot make changes either in speciality or institutions during the course of their studies. But some exceptional candidates who have influential support behind them may be able to select subjects and institutions in accordance with their preferences. In selection full consideration is given to the part of Xinjiang from which the successful students come. This is done in an attempt to provide an equal opportunity of higher education to all districts of the region.

Each year the examination questions set in Beijing have to be translated by selected teachers in an absolutely secret place outside Xinjiang, where they are kept until the

unified examination comes to an end. Questions on some subjects such as Uighur, Kazak literature and Standard Chinese, which takes the place of a foreign language, have also to be set by selected teachers in secret places. They, too, stay in the designated secret places until the examination finishes. Secondly, the examination papers of Uighur and Kazak students are examined by selected Uighur and Kazak teachers in groups, each consisting of eight people. Thirdly, marks are aggregated by subject with the aid of computers, and final results are announced by the Regional Commission on College Admission. When selection starts, those non-Han students who answered questions in their mother tongue are chosen exclusively according to their examination results. For them there is no 'priority' as such. But concessions can be made, when the admission target set for an autonomous district, autonomous county or prefecture is not met. This is said to be necessary to keep the balance between ethnic groups and areas. In areas where admission quotas are filled, some qualified non-Han candidates may equally be kept out of institutions of higher education in Xinjiang.

Figure 1 presents the number of new entrants by Han and non-Han in Xinjiang between 1977 and 1987.

Fig. 1: Numbers of Tertiary Education New Entrants by Han and Non-Han in XUAR, 1977-87¹⁸




This figure reveals that the gap between Han and non-Han students narrows between 1977 and 1980, then widens and narrows between 1980 and 1985, and lastly widens in favour of the non-Han. Despite the greater consideration which is apparently given to the non-Han ethnic groups than to immigrant Han-Chinese, difficulty arises when the

¹⁸. Xinjiang jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao.

allocation of places is made among the different non-Han groups. From Figure 2, which presents the changes in the intake of various ethnic groups including Han in Xinjiang between 1981 and 1987, it can be seen that the Han-Chinese were the largest single ethnic group among the new entrants in the years between 1981 and 1987.

Fig. 2: Numbers of Tertiary Education New Entrants by Ethnic Groups in XUAR, 1981 - 87¹⁹




¹⁹.Ibid

Although there was no disaggregated information available for the years before 1980, it can still be seen from Figure 1 that there were more new entrants from among the Han minority in Xinjiang in the intakes of 1977, 1978 and 1979, but in the years 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1987 the minority constituted the majority of tertiary education new entrants. So while Figure 1 shows that the non-Han new entrants exceed the Han entrants between 1980 and 1987, Figure 2 shows that the largest single ethnic group among them derives from the Han population.

6. Progression from Senior Middle to Tertiary Institutions

However, the progression rate of some ethnic groups such as Uighurs and others, which include Uzbeks, Russians, Tartars and Tajiks, from senior middle schools to tertiary institutions is high. Figure 3 shows this:

Fig. 3: Progression Rates for Ethnic Groups from Senior Middle to Tertiary Institutions in XUAR, 1981-87²⁰



²⁰. op. cit.

From this figure it can be seen that in 1987 average progression rates for each of the groups are: 20% for all the Others, 15% for the Uighurs, 13% for the Sibos, 13% for the Kirghiz, 9% for the Mongols, 7% for Han, and 5% for Hui senior middle school graduates who progressed to tertiary institutions between 1981 and 1987 (See also Appendix 8 (F)). In this progression the 'Others' were in front and the Uighurs were second.

Han-Chinese stood second last in their progression rates from senior middle schools to tertiary institutions. One reason for this low rate is that the number of Han-Chinese in Xinjiang recruited by higher educational institutions in other provinces of China was not included in the Educational Statistics of Xinjiang. Although no information is available on this point for the years before 1987, Ogughuchi Qobul Qilish Haewaerliri recently revealed that in Xinjiang the tertiary education new entrants numbered 14,690 in 1988. Among them 9,211, of whom 5,594 or 60.7% were non-Han, were enrolled by tertiary institutions under the Xinjiang Education Commission. And 5,479 students, of whom 663 or 12% were non-Han, were enrolled by such institutions under the State Education Commission and various Ministries of the central government.²¹ Accordingly, the number of Han-Chinese students enrolled in 1988 was

²¹. Ogughuchi Qobul Qilish Haewaerliri, April 1989, p.1

8,433 or 57.4% of the total, whereas non-Han new entrants numbered 6,257 or 42.6% of the total. Clearly, in overall admission to tertiary institutions the Han-Chinese were still dominant. This indicates that the progression rate calculated according to the Educational Statistics of Xinjiang might not reflect the actual progression rates for both Han-Chinese and the non-Han people in Xinjiang.

Another reason for the low progression rate of Han-Chinese from senior middle to higher education is the massive number of immigrant Han-Chinese among senior middle school graduates, compared with the limited enrolment targets planned by the central and regional governments. Of course, after the targets of enrolments are fixed for Han and non-Han, the candidates are chosen strictly according to their unified examination results. Also the allocation of places in the tertiary sector for Han and non-Han candidates restrict unplanned admissions. In other words, there may be insufficient places in the tertiary sector in the Region, where many different ethnic indigenous groups are demanding representation. Thus, it can be assumed that the low progression rate of immigrant Han-Chinese from senior middle to tertiary institutions is the obvious consequence of the mismatch between their excessive numbers of senior middle school graduates and the limited places available in higher education.

On the one hand, selecting fewer candidates from the

larger number of Han-Chinese senior middle school graduates may not be fair to the immigrants, and on the other hand, not giving a minimal number of places to ethnic indigenous majorities may be equally unfair to them. This is the dilemma the Chinese authorities have been facing. So to reduce potential ethnic unrest, the regional government has set the admission target a little higher for the indigenous non-Han during the past few years.²² Mao Dehua, one of the vice-presidents of Xinjiang, who is in charge of education, and Janabil, vice-chairman of the Party Xinjiang sub-Branch, emphasized this point in their speeches delivered on behalf of the Xinjiang People's Government and Xinjiang Education Commission at the Meeting on Students Admission to Tertiary Institutions.²³ Both expressed it this way:

...In the student admission work the Party's policy on nationality affairs was given prominence and as a result social stability has been ensured.²⁴

Accordingly in the last few years the numbers of non-Han, especially Uighurs, in institutions of higher education have increased. This suggests that higher education is

²². These admission targets for non-Han do not apply to universities and colleges under the direct leadership of the Ministry of Agriculture and the State Education Commission.

²³. The meeting was held in Urumqi from March 22 - 26, 1989. Oqughuchi Qobul Qilish Haewaerliri, April 1989.

²⁴. *ibid.*

expected to contribute to the consolidation of the unity of 'the big family' and promote the solidarity of all nationalities by ensuring that different ethnic groups in Xinjiang are, as far as possible, provided with equal opportunities of higher education.

7. Special Treatment for National Minorities in Selective Admission

Special consideration has been given to applicants of minority nationalities in enrolment of institutes of higher learning in order to admit as many of them as possible.²⁵

Enrolment requirements were lowered for minority students, and most questions could be answered in the vernacular.²⁶

These excerpts emphasize one important point, the declared special treatment for minorities in admission to institutions of higher education in China. But this special treatment in admission applies only to those non-Han students who come from Han-Chinese senior middle schools.

²⁵. Shi Jun, Director of the General Office of the Standing Committee of the NPC, National Minorities Flourishing, China Official Yearbook 1983/84, Dragon Pearl Publications Limited, Hong Kong, p. 457.

²⁶. Dilger, B. The Education of Minorities, Comparative Education, Vol. 20 No.1, 1984, p. 155.

It is not true as far as the majority of ethnic group students in non-Han senior middle schools is concerned. In selection the qualification standards of the non-Han students who graduated from Han-Chinese senior middle schools²⁷ have indeed been lowered. For example, the average marks of Han-Chinese new entrants were 352 in social science and 364 in natural science, whereas those of non-Han new entrants who graduated from Han-Chinese senior middle schools were 220 in social science and 233 in natural science in 1987.²⁸

This concession by the government has been welcomed by many parents and is regarded by some scholars outside and Han-Chinese people inside, China as a great concession towards its national minorities in education.²⁹ However, there have

²⁷. Here Han-Chinese senior middle schools refer to those that are for Han-Chinese students only. In such schools the medium of instruction is exclusively Standard Chinese. They may enrol a few non-Han students who are taught and examined in the Han-Chinese junior middle schools.

²⁸. Oqughuchi Qobul Qilish Haewaerliri, April 1989, p. 2.

²⁹. The 'special treatment' admission policy of the government towards those non-Han students from Han-Chinese middle schools has had some unfortunate effects. Omumi Uqturush quotes an example. Li Jin was from Urumqi. In the 1988 State Entrance Examination he changed his Han nationality to Mongol nationality with false documents and in co-operation with the police. - Oqughuchi Qobul Qilish Haewaerliri, April 20, 1989.

been arguments among the local people about this so called 'special treatment'. Some believe that it is an open encouragement to non-Han children to study Standard Chinese, so that they can go to universities and colleges and find better jobs under Han-Chinese leadership. Others stress the permanent harm which can be caused. An Uighur official said,

No matter how equal they appear in admission, the actual gap reflected in the examination results between qualified Han-Chinese entrants and those under-qualified non-Han who graduated from Han-Chinese senior middle schools still exists. Though the Han-Chinese students may not say anything openly, they know well in their hearts that those privileged non-Han are inferior to them. They will never recognize those who are under-qualified. Perhaps, they recognize them in public but they oppose them in private. As a matter of fact the gap still remains in practical terms. We should not be satisfied with depending on the 'special treatment'. It is important to improve the quality of education for the non-Han and reduce the gap fundamentally, not superficially.'³⁰

Some believe that the concession is a way of representing non-Han young people as loyal and reliable activists to the

³⁰. Personal conversation, December 1989.

Han-Chinese authorities. Others worry about the future, believing that if non-Han children go to Han-Chinese schools from the very beginning and study until they finish higher education, they will not only absorb the language but also the culture. Thus, the policy appears designed to speed up a one-way active national assimilation³¹ (see also Section 7 of Chapter One).

Many non-Han people even oppose others sending their children to Han-Chinese schools. Because of this social pressure, some parents withdraw their children from Han-Chinese schools and send them to schools where the local language is the medium. They worry about the future of those non-Han graduates trained in Han-Chinese schools because of the following problems which arise. Non-Han students who have graduated from Han-Chinese middle schools are, in many cases, regarded as unqualified both academically and morally, not only by Han-Chinese but also by non-Han teachers in institutions of higher education.

³¹. As evidence of assimilation, some non-Han students dared to regard themselves as superior to their Han-Chinese teachers because they could speak perfect Chinese as well as a local language like Uighur or Kazak, although they were not perfect in their mother tongue. They were not tactful before their parents, and other students simply because their Chinese was, in most cases, incomparably better than that of the latter. When these non-Han students met friends and relatives, instead of saying 'Assalamu Alaykum', they would say 'Chi Fan Le Mei you?' (meaning: Have you had your meal?) which is ridiculous and disgusting to non-Han people. As is known, "Assalamu Alaykum" is a world-wide Islamic expression of greeting someone and is commonly used among the Uighurs, Kazaks, Uzbeks and others, While 'chi fan le mei you' is the Standard Chinese expression with the same purpose.

Unlike other non-Han students who are the products of non-Han schools, some of those who come out of Han-Chinese senior middle schools can hardly follow the courses offered because of their weak basic knowledge of the senior middle school courses. When they come to a university into which there was 'priority' entrance, they cannot compete either with those qualified non-Han middle school graduates or with their Han schoolmates. At the end of their university education some of them have to leave without a degree.³²

Furthermore, problems occur even when they finish their higher education successfully and are put on the labour

³². For the first time in the 15-year long history of the Foreign Languages Department of Xinjiang University, 26 non-Han students were admitted in 1980. They were Class 80 - 3, composed of seven different nationalities, namely Uighur, Kazak, Kirghiz, Uzbek, Mongol, Tibetan, and Daghur. All of them had graduated from Han-Chinese middle schools. The deputy head of the Department, Qing Hongxue, selected them. One of them got 204, the highest mark in the class, another one the lowest 151 in the unified examination. Among them, three Kazak and one Uighur were children of staff in the university, one (Kazak) was the daughter of the chief of the Department of Education of XUAR at that time, and two (Kazak) were sons of writers in the Regional Writers Association. There was no doubt about the rest of the students in this class in respect of their privileged and urban backgrounds.

In the second year of their course they were divided into two classes, 'Slow' and 'Normal'. There was a big split between staff and students on this division. Three teachers were in charge of teaching the 'slow' class with six students. After one year of separation they were asked to join the 'normal' class, not because they had caught up with the 'normal' one but because they refused to attend the courses offered. The reason is that the students in the 'Slow' speed class felt that they were being humiliated. Finally, the six students who were kept away from the major courses for a year, were not able to get a degree and left school without one.

market. As it is impossible for those non-Han students from Han-Chinese schools to be placed among the Han-Chinese due to the surplus of the latter, they are assigned jobs among non-Han people with whom they have to communicate in their work and daily life. Unfortunately, non-Han graduates trained in the Standard Chinese face more difficulties in writing and communicating in their mother tongue, dealing with people around them, and integrating with native speakers. Therefore, some parents and communities believe that these non-Han students produced by Han-Chinese schools, though small in number, are victims of a 'brain-drain' aggravated by this special treatment policy in admission. Nevertheless, there are still some who support this policy in admission, simply because, no matter how academically mediocre these students are, they are part of the community in institutions of higher education. This is good, first of all, for the students themselves, then for their parents, and then for their community. It is better to gain something than nothing.

From the long term point of view, these 'brain-drained' non-Han students are, perhaps, becoming a promising new generation of non-Han people. Having reached the age of 30 and acquired certain social, cultural and economic experience, they might then begin to identify themselves as Uighur, Kazak, Uzbek or Mongol.

'From this point of view we made a mistake when we

withdrew our children from Han-Chinese schools in the 1970s. There was a rumour among the Han-Chinese that some of them would say that they would Tian bu pa, Di bu pa, Jiou pa, Uighurs dong Han hua (literal meaning: They fear neither sky nor earth but Uighurs, when they master the Chinese language.³³

At least indigenous ethnic groups are beginning to understand the importance of preparing the younger generation to accept the challenge of the complicated world of today and tomorrow through the power of education. In this, language plays an important role, for those who speak the dominant language control the nation.

8. Problems of the Present Selective System

Lofstedt has observed:

As a highly selective screening mechanism it did, however, entail a number of problems. One problem was that all importance was attached to one

³³. This opinion was given in a conversation by a well-known Uighur writer who died in 1988. Such points of view seem to be shared by many intellectuals, because it has been observed that in most cases those non-Han who have a command of Standard Chinese are treated fairly well in government offices, factories and schools. They are able to discuss issues and problems with their Han-Chinese managers and colleagues by means of the acquired language. In contrast, those non-Han who do not have these language skills are regarded as inferior.

single examination which could only possibly measure a limited number of qualities while other school records were not considered. This also encouraged rote-learning rather than creative and independent thinking and made school work extremely exam-oriented.³⁴

Selection relying on one set of single examination results drove senior middle schools into battlefields where unhealthy competition went on all these years. For example, many senior middle schools, especially urban ones, collected nationwide unified examination questions on all subjects every year. Using these questions, they organized a pre-selection examination well before the unified examination. They would select those who passed, not all of whom had really passed but had done so with covert help, as candidates to the unified examination. This pre-selection examination was actually a disaster, for some who were not top students but good ones, were liable to forfeit their rights to appear in the nation-wide unified examinations. The reason was that they could easily be replaced by the children of cadres, intellectuals and the wealthy. After pre-selection, schools would organize special coaching for the selected students, centring again on the questions used in previous years. In order to make

³⁴. Lofstedt, Jan-Ingvar (1986) Educational Planning in China, Research Bulletins, from the Institute of Education, University of Stockholm, p.21.

sure that the children of the elite would pass the unified examination, in a few cases special arrangements are said to have been made between them and non-elite top students in some schools. Such special arrangements have meant that some top students are asked to help some students who have privileged family backgrounds in the examination itself, with their seating arranged to the best convenience of the privileged. Consequently, students pay more attention to coaching or organized examination studies than to their usual subjects. Additionally, these double selection measures make some students frustrated and destroy their confidence.

A second problem is that dependence on the results of one single unified examination leads students to choose their speciality on the basis of their chances of access to institutions of higher learning rather than on the basis of the needs of society or personal preference. Furthermore, the system favoured key schools in urban areas, where more students have an intellectual family background ³⁵ and are the sons and daughters of cadres and wealthy people. As a result the number of students from rural and mountain areas has decreased since 1977 and the already existing cultural and economic gap has widened between rural and urban areas, and also between white-collar workers and rural and mountain dwellers, not only in Xinjiang but in the whole

³⁵. op. cit.

of the country. Sadly 'the socio-economic bias in the student body resulting from strict academic selection has not been sufficiently acknowledged by educators and planners.'³⁶

Finally, the present selective system has favoured the bureaucracy and led to greater corruption amongst government and Party officials than ever before. For example, there are individuals who try their luck by means of immoral or even unlawful behaviour in admissions to institutions of higher education, in order to pave the way to power and wealth. Such behaviour is increasing in Xinjiang, as throughout the country. For example, in 1984 when the mass campaign to rectify party organizations took place on the campus of Xinjiang University, as it did elsewhere, five army soldiers entered the Foreign Languages Department in the middle of November, two months later than other new entrants.³⁷ Teachers and students were curious about these late students in army uniform. How did they come and why? But they were not allowed to make any inquiry about them. Later it was alleged that those soldier students took the unified examination in Beijing but because their marks did not reach the required standard, it was difficult for them to be accommodated by any

³⁶. op. cit.

³⁷. It has been suggested that a total number of 13 such students entered the university. The researcher saw the 5 mentioned above in the Foreign Languages Department.

institutions of higher education there. Therefore, they were diverted elsewhere through the power of Zheng Wang, who is a member of the Standing Committee of the Party. First they joined the Beijing Unit of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), and then were transferred to the Urumqi Unit, from where they were able to squeeze into Xinjiang University with the direct support of Zheng Wang and Mao Wang En.³⁸ According to declared theories and principles it would normally be impossible for any ordinary people to have access to any institutions at such a time, particularly during the rectification campaign which was aimed at the undesirable unhealthy behaviour of high rank officials within the Party. However, to the public surprise, the five soldiers quietly made their way into higher education even during the rectification. This is only one of many examples. Though Zheng Wang has no direct power in Xinjiang, he is said to have used his position in the central government and among his old allies in the PLA Xinjiang sub-unit. The Chinese have a saying that 'to have power means everything'. The selective system does not apply equally to everyone in all circumstances.

A report published on Oqughuchi Qobul Qilish Haewaerliri

³⁸. Zheng Wang and Mao Wang En were both head of 359 Division of PLA during the anti-Japanese War and they came to Xinjiang in 1949 as heads of the Division. Zheng was president and general Secretary of Xinjiang Party Sub-Committee between 1949 and 1952 when he was removed to Beijing for the reason that he made leftist mistakes in handling nationality affairs. After his removal Mao Wang En succeeded him and is still in power there.

(literal meaning: Bulletin on Admission) gives other examples of such corruption. An Omumi Uqturush (Public Notice), produced jointly by the Education Commission of the XUAR, the Commission on Nationality Affairs of XUAR, and the Bureau of Public Security of XUAR in April 1989, listed students who entered universities and colleges in the selection of 1987 and 1988 through impersonation and cheating.³⁹

Such corruption may be more serious in other parts of the country. According to the People's Daily, Shu Guangli, head of Sangyuan Middle School in Qionglai County of Sichuan Province, collected 13,000 yuan in cash from parents in exchange for examination questions. In May 1989, having found that he would be appointed Chairman of the Examination Rooms in Sangyuan Market, he told his partner, Jin Jiming, deputy Head of Sang-yuan Middle School: "We will earn double incomes". This examination was for those who would be selected to secondary technical schools. Shu and Jin met these parents whose children graduated from this school that year as well as the previous one and told them that, if they were willing to spend money, their children might be helped to pass. Some of the parents agreed and handed over cash. Shu and Jin by changing students' surnames let all the graduates and those about to

³⁹. Oqughuchi Qobul Qilish Haewaerliri, April 20, 1989.

Oqughuchi Qobul Qilish Haewaerliri is a bulletin published by Xinjiang Commission on Admission.

graduate take the examination.⁴⁰

These cases have led many people in Xinjiang to believe that the corruption in the present selective system is not less than it was during the Cultural Revolution both in Xinjiang and in the whole of the country. No report is available about corruption in selecting candidates from among non-Han middle school graduates. However, this does not mean that there was none. There have been many rumours among the local people, but no reported case with sufficient evidence is available. Meanwhile it may also explain the power relationship, already mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, between 'elder brothers' who are Han-Chinese, as 'the guests', and the 'younger brothers', who are non-Han, as the 'hosts'. In fact the above Han-Chinese students gained access to institutions of higher education, by taking examinations in Xinjiang a second time after their failure in their own homeland, despite their claimed status as 'guests'. Having immigrated into Xinjiang they had the chance either to prepare for the examination a second time or to find someone who could take it on their behalf, with the help of relatives settled there. Either way, these Han-Chinese illegally squeezed out an equal number of candidates from the Region itself. Presumably those who turned on the 'green light' for such degraded candidates are either small fry or wealthy and

⁴⁰. This information is from the People's Daily, published in Aksu Geziti (Daily). Ibid.

influential people. No matter who they are, they succeeded in bringing their relatives to XUAR and helping them enter institutions of higher education. The above evidence should help to show that there are better chances for the Han-Chinese to recruit students through the back door and by secret influence than for the indigenous ethnic groups. This is because Han-Chinese, as 'elder brothers', are no longer 'guests'. They have already become the 'hosts', and as we have seen, control school directory boards, police headquarters and registration offices.

The corruption at different levels of government departments, and organizations and among individual officials in the selection of candidates to universities and colleges has been further confirmed by new regulations. The head of the Education Commission of Xinjiang, Nur Tiyip, at the Meeting on Students Admission to Tertiary Schools stressed the following:

...

2) adequate attention should be given to various complaints; notes must be taken of major problems, and we should answer these complaints. In the case of typical problems, not only should investigations be made but also the public should know the results.

He put forward Measures to Maintain the High Morality of

Personnel Attending to Admission Work,⁴¹ which include the following:

1) To obey the law, work for the benefit of the public with greater sincerity, no corruption, no gain by unfair means and no bribery.

2) To be fair and persist in working in accordance with principles and rules. No false evidence should be produced on behalf of others and no changes should be made in certified materials by breaking the regulations.

3) Not to put one's own interest first by taking advantage of power in official work, position and convenience, nor to make deals with others by gathering a group of people around, and not to accept presents or invitations to dinner during selection work.

4) At any stage of admission work not to go through the back door by contacting others, not to buy or sell goods which are in short supply, taking advantage of the work being done.

⁴¹. In addition to the permanent staff in the admission office, every year the admission office employs a large number of temporary staff.

He warned those who were going to participate in student admission:

... At various stages of admission work anyone who does not fit the job or anyone who becomes especially involved in any unhealthy action must be disciplined immediately. Those whose mistake is serious should be dealt with sternly.⁴²

Though these are principles and regulations for the future, they are better understood in the light of both present and past experience. From this point of view, the above-mentioned points admit that problems occurred in previous years of selection. Various kinds of corruption, abuse of power privileges, convenience in work, bribery, relationship networks, commercial influence and false evidence were enlisted into the selection of candidates to institutions of higher education, in addition to their results in the State unified examination. Furthermore, both Janabil, vice-Chairman of the Party's Xinjiang sub-branch, and Mao Dehua, vice president of the regional government, recognize that the people of Xinjiang, especially the non-Han, have justifiable opinions and complaints about student admission.⁴³


⁴². Oqughuchi Qobul Qilish Haewaerliri, April 13 1989, p.3.

⁴³. Ibid, p.2

9. Changes in the Enrolments of Tertiary Institutions

There have been enormous increases in tertiary enrolments since 1950, as Figure 4 below shows.

Fig.4: Tertiary Institution Enrolments and Their Distribution by Han and Non-Han in XUAR, 1950 - 87⁴⁴



⁴⁴. Sources: Xinjiang Education Commission, Enrolments in Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao (Educational Statistics of Xinjiang), 1949-80, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987, Urumqi.

From the graph it can be seen that these enrolments have gone up and down during the past 39 years. The growth was much faster between 1977 and 1987 than it was between 1950 and 1966, and there was a huge fluctuation and even a halt, during the Cultural Revolution. The proportions, of Han and non-Han in the enrolments also changed. From 1950 to 1957 non-Han constituted the majority. This was reversed from 1958 onwards until 1968, when the Han-Chinese became the majority of the tertiary enrolments, except for the years 1974 - 1977 and 1983 - 1987, when the numbers of non-Han were higher than those of Han.

The 1958 reverse in enrolment was most probably the direct consequence of the massive immigration, already mentioned in the previous chapter, of Han-Chinese into the non-Han region promoted by the strategic policy of the government. According to Liao:

Thirty thousand Han Chinese were brought into Sinkiang in 1955 alone. By 1983 the total membership of these corps was put at 2.25 million, or almost half of the entire Han Chinese population in Sinkiang. Finally, from 1961 through 1973, large numbers of young people were sent to Sinkiang as part of the Hsia-fang (sending down to the countryside) movement. This was viewed partly as a strategy of sinicization by the Han Chinese, and also as a policy of filling

border regions with young people of Han origin, with the aim of having a reliable reservoir of manpower in the event of war.

...between 1959 and 1961, a total of 954,800 people migrated into Sinkiang from Kansu, Tsinghai, Shangtung, and Szechwan because of natural disasters in those provinces. Therefore, it is not surprising to note that net immigration into Sinkiang between 1954 and 1984 reached 2.76 million ⁴⁵.

Table 1 presents the number of the students in tertiary education and Table 2 the populations of Han and non-Han in the XUAR in the years 1949, 1964, 1973, 1982, 1984, 1985 and 1987.

Table 1: Han and Non-Han Students at Institutions of Higher Education in XUAR, 1950-87 ⁴⁶

Date	Total	Non-Han	NH%	Han	Han%
1950	336	306	91.	30	9.
1964	6,814	2,560	38.	4,254	62.
1973	3,294	1,727	52.	1,567	48.
1982	16,191	9,244	57.	6,947	43.
1984	19,609	11,200	57.	8,409	43.
1985	26,321	13,978	53.	12,343	47.
1987	29,801	16,919	57.	12,882	43.


⁴⁵. Issues & Studies, A Journal of China Studies and International Affairs, Vol. 25 No.2, February 1989, pp.133-34.

⁴⁶. op. cit.

Table 2: Population of Han and Non-Han in XUAR (1949-1987)⁴⁷

Date	Total	Non-Han	NH%	Han	Han%
1950	4,439,000	4,140,699	93.	298,300	7.
1964	7,441,800	5,060,424	69.	2,321,216	31.
1973	10,890,800				
1982	13,081,538	7,797,567	60.	5,283,971	40.
1984	13,440,080	8,093,813	60.	5,346,267	40.
1985	13,611,400	8,312,482	61.	5,298,918	39.
1987	14,172,400	8,786,888	62.	5,385,512	38.

Figure 5 presents in graphic form the growth of the Han and non-Han population.




⁴⁷. See Introduction, Footnote 10, p.14.

⁴⁸. Ibid.

From this figure it is obvious that the population growth was steadier for non-Han than for Han, and that the number of the non-Han population has been consistently higher than that of the Han. Figure 6 gives the percentages of Han and non-Han in the total tertiary enrolments and their percentages of the total population.

Fig. 6: Han and Non-Han Percentages in Tertiary Enrolments and in the Total Population in XUAR, 1949 - 87⁴⁹




⁴⁹. op. cit.

As the figure shows that the percentages of non-Han in tertiary enrolments were low relative to their percentage of the total population. In contrast, the percentages of enrolled Han were high relative to their percentage of the total population. Figure 7 gives the details of enrolments by ethnic groups. Because no disaggregated information was available, the 12 different non-Han ethnic groups cannot be examined separately for the years before 1980.

Fig. 7: Tertiary Enrolments by Ethnic Groups in XUAR,

1980 - 87⁵⁰



⁵⁰. Source: Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao, 1980, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86 and 1987.

As the Figure 7 shows, compared with other ethnic groups, the representation of ethnic Han was most conspicuous in the tertiary enrolments in almost every year between 1980 and 1987. At the same time the Kazaks have made steady progress over the year. The Uighurs did not lag far behind the others. Their 1987 enrolment was 1.6 times that of 1980. This change can partly be attributed to the 'correction of leftist mistakes' in the government's nationality policy in Xinjiang and partly, perhaps more importantly, to the fight for equal access to higher education and its benefits. Those who have been educated in institutions of higher education have enjoyed increased power at all levels, higher wages, more comfortable houses and a better life in cities and towns. Above all, they have effectively administered the majority, despite their background as minorities. In this respect higher education in Xinjiang has made a great contribution. The Uighurs, especially their intellectuals,

have been fighting for equal access to institutions of higher education in Xinjiang. As a result there has been a reasonable balance in terms of ethnic representation in the students' population in universities and colleges under the Education Commission of the XUAR in the last few years. The problem is with secondary education which cannot match

the speed of development in higher education.⁵¹

Though these are positive changes, they hardly reflect the real enrolment ratios for different ethnic groups in Xinjiang; but from the 1982 regional census it is not difficult to work out these ratios.

Table 3: The Gross Tertiary Enrolment Ratios for Different Ethnic Groups in XUAR, 1982⁵²

	<u>Aged 20-24</u>	<u>Enrolment</u>	<u>ratio</u>
Uighur	488,402	6,855	1.42
Han	388,684	6,947	1.80
Kazak	73,245	1,450	1.98
Kirghiz	8,018	129	1.61
Hui	47,063	156	0.33
Mongol	9,452	247	2.62
Sibo	2,520	176	6.98
Others	8,448	231	2.74

These statistics clearly show distortions in the tertiary enrolments of the different ethnic groups. A contributory reason for these distortions is the imbalance caused by central government's policy of massive Han immigration coupled with its policy of separate, preferential treatment of these tiny minorities.

⁵¹. Personal conversation with one of the Uighur leaders in Xinjiang University, 1988.

⁵². Source: 1) Xinjiang Education Commission, Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao, 1982; 2) 1982 Regional Census.

Summary

In this chapter the quantitative expansion of higher education has been described and analyzed, following a discussion of its historical background. The issues discussed in detail are: 1) the continuous selective nature of admission, 2) the changing principles and practices of admission, 3) the present process of selective admission, 4) the progression from senior middle to tertiary schools, 5) the government's 'special treatment' for national minorities in admission practice and 6) the problems existing under the present selective system. This chapter has also examined the growth of enrolments for various ethnic groups relative to their respective populations, and has compared it to their relevant age group cohorts, wherever such data has been available. The picture that emerges is not simple. For example, in 1984 enrolments of Uighurs exceeded Han enrolments in higher education, and again whilst the general Han domination is clear, it was also less dominant in 1982 and 1983. The next chapter examines in similar detail what higher education provides.

CHAPTER THREE

PROVISION OF HIGHER EDUCATION

As has been discussed in Chapter 1 (Figure 1) the provision of educational facilities may be varied for the different ethnic groups in different areas and these variations are linked with the issue of equality of access. From the standpoint of provision and as a supplement to the previous chapter, this chapter will survey the medium of instruction used, the curriculum followed and the duration of the courses of higher learning. The growth component in the expansion of higher education will be examined according to two indicators. These are: 1) the distribution of Han and non-Han students by field of study and 2) the growth of higher education staff for Han and non-Han relative to their respective populations.

1. Medium of Instruction

The medium of instruction in the majority of the universities and colleges for all subjects, particularly specialised ones, is Standard Chinese. But there are some where the medium is Uighur. Also some special subjects such

as Kazak, Kirghiz, Mongol, and Uzbek literature and language are offered in the appropriate language. According to the 1982 Xinjiang Educational Statistics, 86% of 5,207 non-Han students (who constituted 32% of the total enrolment) in six institutions were taught in Uighur and occasionally, in Kazak or Mongol.¹ Those institutions were: 1) Xinjiang University, 2) Xinjiang Normal University, 3) Kashgar Normal Institute, 4) Ili Normal Institute, 5) Xinjiang Institute of Finance and Economics and 6) Hotan Normal Junior College. Subjects which are taught in Uighur or in other languages are mainly foundation courses to fulfil the target of training secondary and primary school teachers. Students are taught in their mother tongue only in those institutions in which non-Han personnel are available and able to conduct such courses.

All the foundation courses and the scientific and technical specialized courses in the rest of the tertiary institutions are taught in Standard Chinese. But they must have non-Han students and teachers, the majority of whom come from non-Han senior middle schools, where the medium is their mother tongue. Though they study Standard Chinese as a separate subject from the beginning of junior middle school in rural areas and from the beginning of third grade in primary schools in cities, such study is certainly not

¹. There were 12 tertiary institutions in XUAR in 1982. Among them six universities and colleges offered courses in Uighur, and Kazak and Mongol literature in these languages to the majority of their non-Han students.

enough to prepare non-Han students to follow courses offered in Standard Chinese in tertiary institutions.

In consequence, they take an extra year's intensive course of Standard Chinese at the beginning of their entry, before they start their assigned field of study. This process is known by Western scholars as a 'preparatory course' and is not be taken into account either in academic or professional qualifications, when these students graduate, take up employment and earn wages. The non-Han teachers in these tertiary institutions are nevertheless required to deliver lectures in Standard Chinese to both Han and non-Han students. For example Uighur, Kazak, and Sibo lecturers and teachers in Xinjiang August First Agricultural Institute, Xinjiang Medical College, and Xinjiang Technical College teach their courses in Standard Chinese, even to their Uighur and Kazak students. But it is said that these non-Han lecturers always help the non-Han students after class, answering or explaining questions in their mother tongue, in addition to conducting 'patriotic education'. Thus one can assume there is a degree of tough competition and challenge not only for non-Han students but also between non-Han teachers and their Han colleagues in tertiary institutions. In Xinjiang University, some Han-Chinese leaders directly or indirectly demanded that both staff and students should use Standard Chinese as the exclusive medium. But it has not been easy to change this overnight. The old way still remains.

2. Duration of Tertiary Education

The duration of tertiary education in XUAR varies from institution to institution and from speciality to speciality programmes within them. There are different types of instructional programmes, mainly the regular 4 - 5-year one, and the 2 - 3-year special short programmes (See Appendices^{3, 4} for details). Some institutions offer both kinds of programmes, 4 - 5-year programmes as well as 2 - 3-year ones simultaneously, and others offer only more specialised ones. For example, Xinjiang University, Xinjiang Technical Institute, Xinjiang Normal University, Xinjiang Institute of Finance and Economy, together with five institutions under the Ministry of Agriculture, have 4-year programmes in all the sub-fields of study, while Xinjiang August First Agriculture Institute and Xinjiang Medical College have both 4 and 5-year programmes. Hotan Normal Junior College has only 3-year programmes. Students enrolled in most of the institutions under the Xinjiang Education Commission can be categorized in five types:

- (1) Students enrolled according to State assignment are assigned jobs by the State when they complete their study. In most cases they have to spend 4 to 5 years in tertiary education, depending on their specialties.
- (2) Students sponsored by certain units and

organizations need 4 or 5 years to finish their tertiary education and have to go back to work for their sponsors.

(3) Students doing special cadre training.²

(4) Students enrolled in teacher special training schemes. The students, both in special cadre training and teacher special training, are mainly offered 2 or 3-year programmes.

(5) Self-financed students. They are responsible for their own fees, allowances, accommodation and even their future jobs. They can be issued higher education certificates after 2 or 3 years of study and then have to find jobs by themselves. The State is not responsible for doing so.

Most of the students in categories (3), (4) and (5) are enrolled by individual institutions, perhaps with the permission of the Regional Education Commission, but outside the State enrolment plan.

The 4 or 5-year programmes were designed mainly to train research scientists, engineers, political cadres and college and secondary-school teachers. The 2 or 3-year special-courses are designed to train mid-level technicians

². Some institutions offer short training courses on planning and management only for those cadres who are in-service.

and teachers for specialized secondary schools. Training teachers for general secondary and primary schools is the task of Xinjiang Normal University and other similar institutions.

The curriculum of the 2-year programmes was based on that of the 4-year programmes, but with a reduced number of instructional hours and a different emphasis in content. Generally, the 2-year programmes allowed a greater percentage of the total scheduled time for training in specialized subjects than did the 4-year programmes, since the former were to provide adequate specialized training in a much shorter time than the latter.³

3. Curricula

Courses in tertiary institutions include those in social science, natural science, engineering, petroleum, coal and chemical engineering, geology, economics, trade, commerce, politics and law, agriculture, forestry, medicine and pharmacy, and teacher training (see Appendix 5 for the distribution of enrolments by field of study). There are more Han students in subjects such as medicine and

³. Tianjin Ribao (Tianjin Daily), December 4, 1952.

pharmacy, foreign languages, computer engineering, and cadre special training, whereas there are more non-Han students in teacher training, forestry and petroleum. This was particularly so before 1985. Since 1985 some of the other main subjects have also been offered to non-Han and their number has started to increase. One of the reasons for the unequal Han and non-Han enrolments to different subjects is the shortage of non-Han teachers specializing in them. Another reason is that there are too many Han candidates for the limited number of places planned. The reason for more places in the field of teacher training, forestry, and petroleum for non-Han students is therefore, the availability of teaching staff for these specialties. Furthermore, there exist normal institutions which were founded long before the Revolution and are partially controlled by devoted non-Han administrators.

Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the official, government-approved policies in higher educational administration and planning, resource allocation and personnel recruitment have undoubtedly aggravated the unequal distribution of places.

Disparities in Expansion

4. The Imbalance Between Han and Non-Han in Institutions

In the expansion of enrolments, the representations of different ethnic groups vary from institution to institution. For example, the overwhelming majority of enrolments in all institutions and junior colleges under the Ministry of Agriculture is Han-Chinese, whereas the Kashgar and Hotan normal colleges are open mainly to Uighurs who are the absolute majority in their areas, a reflection of a compact community in higher education. However, in Ili District Junior College of Education Kazaks constitute the majority. The institutions under the State Education Commission are open mainly to the children of staff and farmers of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, which is itself under the direct control of the central government. Such institutions are not prepared to enrol local non-Han students, although they are situated in Xinjiang. This segregated system also reflects a somewhat pragmatic yet complicated picture of higher education in Xinjiang.

5. Disparity in the Expansion of Higher Education Staff

Since 1949 the growth of staff in higher educational institutions has not been balanced in terms of ethnic

composition both in teaching and non-teaching posts, in geographical distribution and in quality. Table 1 shows the disparity.

Table 1: Numbers and Percentages of Han and Non-Han Staff in Tertiary Education in XUAR, 1949 - 87⁴


Date	Total	Non-Han	NH%	Han	Han%
1950	73	54	74.	19	26.
1964	3,276	645	20.	2,631	80.
1973	3,801	837	22.	2,964	78.
1982	10,450	2,490	24.	7,960	76.
1984	12,077	3,392	28.	8,685	72.
1985	13,124	3,838	29.	9,286	71.
1987	15,764	4,701	30.	11,063	70.

These statistics show that the percentages of Han staff was over 70%, whereas that of non-Han staff was less than 30% in six out of the seven years listed. The population of Han for the same years, which was discussed in Chapter 2,⁵ comprised 40% of the total population, at its peak in 1982 and 6.7% at its lowest in 1950. These figures show that the gap between the Han and the non-Han staff has been enormous as far as their respective percentages of the total population are concerned. Figure 1 below shows the growth of higher education staff by Han and non-Han and Figure 2 their percentages of the total staff from 1949 to 1987.

⁴. Source: Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao, 1949-80, 1982, 1984, 1985, and 1987.


⁵. See Table 2 in Chapter Two.

Fig. 1: Number of Han and Non-Han Tertiary Education Staff
in XUAR, 1950-87⁶



⁶. Source: Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao, 1949-80, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987.

Fig. 2: Han and Non-Han Staff Percentages of the Total Staff in Tertiary Education in XUAR, 1950-87⁷




From Figure 2 it can be seen that only in the years 1950 and 1951 did non-Han staff constitute the majority of all staff in higher education. In 1952 there was a dramatic shift to an absolute majority of Han, which they have maintained ever since, although there have been some fluctuations from time to time. Figure 3 compares the

⁷. Source: Ibid.


development and balance of teaching and non-teaching staff from 1950 to 1987. Figures 4 and 5 present respectively Han and non-Han teaching and non-teaching staff as percentages of the total teaching and non-teaching staffs in tertiary education for the same period.

Fig. 3: A Comparison Between Teaching and Non-Teaching Staff Numbers in Tertiary Education in XUAR, 1950-87⁸




⁸. Ibid.

Fig. 4: Han and Non-Han Staff As Percentages of the Total Teaching Staff in Tertiary Education in XUAR, 1950-87⁹



⁹. op. cit.

Fig. 5: Han and Non-Han Staff As Percentages of the Total Tertiary Education Non-Teaching Staff in XUAR, 1950-87¹⁰



From these figures it can be seen that (1) there has been more non-teaching staff than teaching staff, (2) Han constitute an absolute majority in both teaching and non-teaching staff numbers, (3) the expansion of tertiary staff has been faster and greater for Han with frequent ups and downs, whereas it has been much slower and smaller but

¹⁰. op. cit.

steadier for the non-Han. Thus Han teaching staff increased 2,210 times between 1950 and 1987, whereas non-Han teaching staff increased 214 times in the same period. The teaching staff - student ratio for Han was 1:15 in 1950 and improved to 1:3 by 1987. The ratio for non-Han was 1:28 in 1950 and was 1:7 by 1987."¹¹

As for the geographical distribution of higher education institutions, 11 of them are in the capital, one in Kashgar, one in Hotan, one in Ghulja, one in Sanji and five in the newly-built cities and towns of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, which, as already stated, is a half military and half production unit of the Chinese People's Liberation Army scattered all over Xinjiang.

The total number of staff, mostly Uighurs, in the two institutions located in southern Xinjiang, namely Kashgar Normal Institute and Hotan Normal Junior College, was 1,051 in 1985 and included 295 or 28% Han-Chinese. The number of teaching staff was 493 (47%) and that of non-teaching staff numbered 558 (53%) and included 179 or 32% Han. 368 or 75% out of the total teaching staff were Uighurs. There were 116 or 23.5% Han-Chinese teaching staff. The total number of enrolments in these two institutions was 2,607 with 486 Han-Chinese in 1985.

¹¹. Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao (Educational Statistic of Xinjiang), 1949-1980, 1987.

These figures underline that (1) there was, as already stated above, a high percentage of non-teaching staff, (2) the majority of teaching staff was Uighur, which suggests that there were comparatively more Han administrators and political instructors in these institutions and (3) the Uighurs comprised the majority of the enrolments.

As was mentioned earlier, the majority of the students in the five institutions under the Ministry of Agriculture are Han-Chinese. The same is true of the staff in Shi Hezi Medical College, Shi Hezi Agricultural College, Tarim University of Agriculture and Reclamation, the Normal Junior College of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, and the Economic Junior College of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. All give a picture of unbalanced distribution of institutions and their development, student enrolments and staff between Han and non-HAN (see also Appendix B). Both among the teaching and non-teaching staffs the non-Han constitute the minority.

6. Reasons for Staff Disparities

The unbalanced development as between teaching and non-teaching staff in institutions of higher education can be partially explained by the fact that 'most Chinese universities are residential self-contained units with a

number of non-teaching activities on the school campuses such as farming, book-printing, social welfare etc.'. ¹² It can further be explained by the policy of the Party: to **put politics in command**. From the date of its foundation the People's Republic of China has clearly declared that **'in China the Communist Party exercises leadership in everything'**. ¹³ This overall leadership of the Party in all fields has been constantly repeated in the constitution. Institutions of higher education are among the most vulnerable to the direct control of the government and the Party in their structural organization. Thus, besides purely administrative personnel, there are political cadres in the universities and colleges. For example, in Xinjiang University, in addition to the Administrative Directory, there is a Party Committee headed by the Party Secretary which is in charge of the Party sub-branches in the 11 faculties, in the Departments of Personnel, Politics, Propaganda, Organizational Work, General Affairs, Finance, Research, Security, Spare-time Education, the Deans' Office, Publishing House, Printing Factory, Training Centre, attached Middle and Primary Schools, School Farm, School Kindergarten, the League Committee, and the Union. ¹⁴ Each Party sub-branch in the units listed is composed of a

¹². Lofstedt (1986:36).

¹³. A Chinese - English Dictionary, Commercial Publishing House, Beijing, 1978, p.435.

¹⁴. The Union is composed of staff and health assistants, and cleaning workers in the university.

Party sub-branch secretary with three to five Party members, who can be either non-teaching or teaching staff. According to 1982 Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Ziliao (Educational Statistics of Xinjiang), the total number of staff in institutions of higher education was 9,340, out of which 43% were teaching staff, 11% teaching ancillary personnel such as librarians, and laboratory workers, 27% cleaners and 20% administrative and political non-teaching staff. The total number of staff in university-run factories and farms was 610 and there were 500 staff in other units such as attached schools and hospitals.¹⁵

The necessity for political organizations in institutions of higher education was confirmed as well as highly praised, by Kuan Oulo, Deputy Director of the Cultural and Educational Department of the Party's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region Committee, when he commented on the function of communist ideology in the colleges of Xinjiang.

The party leadership in the colleges has been greatly strengthened, especially since the rectification movement and the struggle against local nationalism in 1957. At the present time, the Marxist-Leninist thought and the Party's political work have already become the heart of

¹⁵. Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao, 1982, p.37.

all activities in them.¹⁶

The fundamental role of the various Party organizations in universities and colleges is to train and recruit new model staff and students into the Party ranks, to expand and consolidate Party organizations, to exercise leadership in teaching and learning, with emphasis on the policies and strategies of the Party, and to carry on ideological work among the staff and students of the different ethnic groups. Lee Fu-hsiang views this work as a kind of patriotic education:

In fact, ideological training has constituted a part of the curriculum in the higher educational institutions of Sinkiang. In a resolution passed by the First National Conference on the Education of National Minorities held in 1951 under the auspices of the Education Department of the Central People's Government, it was declared that "a political education program centring on patriotism should be systematically put into practice in the region inhabited by minority people so as to bring forth a spirit of unity, amity and cooperation among the various nationalities, to advance their sense of identity with the great motherland, and to strengthen

¹⁶. Lee Fu-hsiang (1973:264).

their allegiance to the central People's Government in a common struggle for the defence and construction of our country."¹⁷

This resolution made it a priority that institutions of higher education in Xinjiang should train successors from among the various national minorities through the curriculum and also through political education, which was believed to be absolutely necessary in regions such as Xinjiang where there were frequent 'separatist' movements.

The disparity between the ethnic groups in the growth of staff in Xinjiang can be interpreted in different ways. According to the survey conducted for this research, it can be interpreted in two major ways: one is the Party's higher educational policy which has heavily concentrated on the importation of Han in staff development and the other is the disloyalty of non-Han intellectuals to the Han-Chinese authorities.

¹⁷. op. cit.

7. The Continuous Importation of Personnel

In 1950 immediately after the Communist Party of China took over Xinjiang peacefully, there was only one institution which had 73 staff, out of whom 74% were non-Han. By 1952 the total staff numbered 1,382 which was 18 times that of 1950 and the non-Han staff numbered only 184 or 13% of the total. This was indeed a rapid change in the composition of staff within the very short period of two years. The majority of the new Han-Chinese staff was imported to Xinjiang from Shanghai, Nanjing and other inland provinces, because of the urgent need of the Party to consolidate its power by developing higher education, which in turn would help to construct 'the new border', Xinjiang. But this was not the end but the beginning of staff importation. Every year when universities and colleges throughout the country began to assign graduates to work in different parts of China, the Xinjiang government, headed by Mao Wang En, would send a so called welcoming team to Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Shenyang, Dalian, Nanjing and elsewhere, asking for graduates to work in Xinjiang. For example, as late as May 1985, a group headed by the Xinjiang Deputy President, Huang Baozhang, went to 24 institutions of higher education in the above-mentioned cities inviting graduates to work in Xinjiang; and it was reported that at the end of the same

year 634 imported graduates had settled there.¹⁸ This 1985 campaign of inviting graduates from outside Xinjiang was directly organized and led by the Youth League of the Central Committee, the State Education Commission and the State Commission on Nationality Affairs. This coordinated action between central government behind the curtain and local government on the front stage has had as its aim

... to preserve and consolidate the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, the people of Xinjiang must welcome the continued assistance of the Han people, actively assist one another in construction, pay serious attention to education in patriotism and socialism ... and wipe out counter-revolutionaries....¹⁹

This policy resulted in a very heavily unbalanced growth of Han and non-Han staff. The total number of Han staff in 1987 was 11,063, an average increase of 316 persons a year during the past 35 years (the years of 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970 are excluded), whereas the total number of non-Han staff the same year was 4,701, an average increase of only 134 persons a year.

¹⁸. Xinjiang Yilnamisi (literal meaning: The Yearbook of Xinjiang), 1986, Xinjiang People's Press, Urumqi, p.1606.

¹⁹. McMillen, D. H. (1979:46)

Staff, especially teaching staff, are the heart of higher education, the development of which is the core of all other development in the region. Not giving priority to local people will certainly affect the production of skilled personnel from among the non-Han people and will eventually create and enlarge a cultural and economic imbalance between the indigenous people and the immigrants.

8. The Alleged Disloyalty of the Non-Han

The disloyalty of non-Han intellectuals to the Chinese government, both at the local and national levels, has been another barrier to their equal growth alongside their 'elder brother' Han intellectuals in Xinjiang. In all mass campaigns in Xinjiang even after the Revolution, some non-Han intellectuals, especially Uighur and Kazak ones, would always try to find opportunities to express their opinions on real autonomy issues, which in turn has irritated the central government and its legal representative, Mao Wang En, over the past 39 years.

For example, in the mass campaigns in Xinjiang such as those of Land Reform in 1952-53, Anti-Rightist (Anti-Local Nationalist) in 1957-58, the Great Leap Forward 1958-59, Anti-Revisionist 1962-63, Socialist Education 1964-65, the Cultural Revolution 1966-76, and Anti-Spiritual Pollution 1982-84, non-Han intellectuals were active participants at the beginning of each campaign, but became victims at the

end of them under the central government's declared policies of 'let a hundred flowers blossom' and 'respect for the opinions of minorities'. The non-Han intellectuals pointed out that:

Most government offices used only the Chinese language and refused to reply to Uighur comrades who wrote in their native language... there were too many Han cadres and not enough minority cadres, and the minority cadres did not voice opinions or criticisms for fear of punishments as local nationalists.²⁰

They also denounced the policy of promoting minority cadres only on the basis of their political beliefs and not on the basis of their working abilities. These disloyal denunciations made the government condemn them openly through trained loyalists. The ex-president of Xinjiang, Saifudin, in his speech to an enlarged conference of the XUAR Committee of the Party confirmed this:

...since the outset of socialist transformation in Xinjiang in 1956, local nationalism had been renewed among the national minorities to a serious extent, particularly among the intellectuals.²¹

²⁰. op. cit.

²¹. Op. cit. p.92

Under the pretext of opposing the popularization of the new Uighur-Kazak languages, they had attacked the leadership of the Party ... and undermined the unity of all the nationalities.²²

Despite this alleged disloyalty of some non-Han intellectuals, the government continued to invest in the training of 'minority' teachers. Thus in the 1950s, before the ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and China broke out, some non-Han graduate students, lecturers and teachers from Xinjiang were sent to the Soviet Union for further study. In 1965 when the Chinese Government announced the withdrawal of its students, they all refused to come back except one.

Examples of ethnic unrest, especially strikes by university and college students in Xinjiang, were perceived as due either to the lack of political ideological education by teachers and instructors, or to the stimulation of nationalist feeling among the non-Han, particularly Uighur, students. There were strikes by students in December 1985 and in June 1988 in Urumqi and elsewhere in Xinjiang. So the local government immediately sent a working team to major institutions of higher education in the city with Xinjiang University as the major target. The working team members primarily organized the staff to engage in

²². Ibid. p.185.

political study with the aim of digging out the 'roots', 'backbones' and 'plotters' of the students' strike. All these incidents have convinced the government that it should lay emphasis on importing staff rather than on investing in training and expanding non-Han staff. The Party Xinjiang-Sub Committee further emphasized this importation by implementing the Decision on the Reform of the Structure of Science and Technology by the Central Committee of the Party (October 9, 1985) which suggests:

Strengthening the leadership of the Party over the reform of the structure of science and technology...

...in the reform of the management of scientific and technical personnel.... experts and professionals from various fields who are urgently needed should be attracted from inland provinces and even from abroad in an objective and selective way.²³

This suggestion has ensured that Xinjiang will continually depend on importing staff to develop scientific and technical matters, although the problem could have been solved within the Region through developing higher education among the people already there. Indeed advocating the importation of skilled manpower from inland provinces

²³. Xinjiang Yilnamisi 1986, pp.1578 - 1581.

seems to contradict the Party's declared policy of self-reliance. Such contradictions between theory and practice cannot win the trust of the people, especially the non-Han people. By ignoring their opinion, the Party will only perpetuate the imbalance between immigrant staff and non-Han staff, merely in order to strengthen the leadership of the 'elder brothers' over the 'younger' ones.

Summary

This chapter has discussed and analyzed in detail with supporting tables and graphs eight aspects of the provision of higher education in Xinjiang viz. Medium of Instruction, Duration of Tertiary Education and Curricula, the Disparities in the Expansion, the imbalance between Han and Non-Han in Institutions, Disparity in the Expansion of Tertiary Staff, Reasons for Staff Disparities, the Continuous Importation of Personnel, and the Alleged Disloyalty of the Non-Han. What emerges is confirmation of the influence of the two key issues of immigration and Party policies first noted in general terms under Conceptual Issues, Chapter I. What also emerges is how complicated the situation is, thanks mainly to past fluctuations in education policies reflected in admission practices. In order better to explain the inequalities and disparities that have already been identified, it is now necessary to examine closely where the whole process

leading to admission to higher education begins, i.e. in the primary schools.

As stated earlier, with a view to promoting equality through education among the various ethnic groups in Xinjiang, the Chinese government has made great efforts in formal education since 1949, but has it achieved its goal at the primary level? In other words, to what extent and in what way have the different ethnic groups in Xinjiang enjoyed equality in school intake, enrolment, quality and in expansion at that level? If they have not enjoyed equality, why not? Of central importance to this thesis is the question: How far do the issues of equality in primary education ultimately affect the equality in access to higher education? Chapter Four attempts to answer these questions.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRIMARY EDUCATION

This chapter traces the question of inequalities in access to, and provision of, higher education in Xinjiang from the point of view^{of} inequalities of supply rooted in primary education.

1. Changes in Intake

In Xinjiang the primary school intake has increased greatly since the Revolution from 26,222 pupils in 1949 to 328,980 by 1987. The admission rate was 19% in 1949, and according to regional government documents, 97% in 1987. The latter rate is high for a remote border region compared with the average 93% admission rate for the 7-12 age group in the rest of China. Table 1 presents the numbers of new entrants, 1949-1980 (sub-divided where available by Han and non-Han).

Table 1: Numbers of New Entrants, Han and Non-Han in XUAR, 1949-80¹

Date	NO.of New Entr.	Non-Han	Han
1949	26,222	(No disaggregated information is available for the years between 1949 and 1965)	
1950	52,920		
1951	39,098		
1952	51,201		
1953	64,736		
1954	85,778		
1955	95,443		
1956	125,440		
1957	135,462		
1958	314,998		
1959	206,522		
1960	239,663		
1961	302,626		
1962	178,787		
1963	190,470		
1964	218,770		
1965	279,912		
1966	248,379	146,715	101,664
1967	169,665	77,715	91,935
1968	206,057	101,733	104,324
1969	232,413	121,223	111,190
1970	266,162	141,011	125,151
1971	333,782	180,468	153,314
1972	408,678	(for the years 1972 to 1979 unavailable)	
1973	455,468		
1974	385,025		
1975	450,860		
1976	442,299		
1977	433,626		
1978	459,802		
1979	417,972		
1980	433,089	230,126	202,963

Numbers of primary school new entrants are graphically presented in Figure 1.

¹. Xinjiang Education Commission, Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao (Educational Statistics of Xinjiang), 1949-80, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986 and 1987.

Fig.1: Numbers of Primary School New Entrants in XUAR,
1949- 80




Table 1 shows that growth has not been steady. For example, in 1950 the intake was double that of 1949 and then

suddenly and unaccountably dropped in 1951. The years between 1966 and 1968 saw a greater decline for non-Han pupils than for Han. In 1978 the total intake was double that of 1968. This was an unusual development in a short period of ten years. With regard to the different ethnic representation in intake, there is no specific information available for the years from 1949 to 1979. However, documents since 1980 reveal that there has been a steady decline in intake for ethnic Han-Chinese. Table 2 shows the numbers of new entrants, by ethnic groups, enrolled between 1980 and 1987 and their increase as well as decrease at different times.

Table 2: Numbers of New Entrants by Ethnic Groups in XUAR, 1980-87²

<u>Name</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Han</u>	<u>Uighur</u>	<u>Kazak</u>	<u>Kirghiz</u>
date					
1980	433,089	202,963	162,128	38,421	3,340
1981	427,439	194,851	164,254	37,731	3,319
1982	434,334	175,821	188,824	38,162	3,801
1983	(no information available for this year)				
1984	415,792	143,361	200,116	40,042	3,745
1985	374,643	124,622	177,106	40,406	5,241
1986	359,007	114,439	172,793	41,757	3,950
1987	328,980	96,826	164,429	39,154	3,865

continued -


	<u>Total</u>	<u>Mongol</u>	<u>Sibo</u>	<u>Hui</u>	<u>Others</u>
1980	433,089	4,900	1,370	18,606	1,360
1981	427,439	5,300	1,834	19,020	(NA) ³
1982	434,334	5,194	1,406	19,502	(NA)
1983	(information unavailable for this year)				
1984	415,792	4,722	1,313	20,743	1,750
1985	374,643	4,352	693	20,428	(NA)
1986	359,007	5,015	810	18,144	2,027
1987	328,980	4,424	641	17,579	616

². Ibid.

³. 'NA' = no information available

Different ethnic entrants as the percentage of the total new entrants is presented in Figure 2.

Fig. 2: Primary School New Entrants by Ethnic Groups as % of Total Primary School New Entrants in XUAR, 1980 - 87



The above figure shows that the Han intake went into something of a decline, whereas it was positive and comparatively stable for Uighurs, Kazaks, Kirghiz and Hui. The increased intake of non-Han ethnic groups since 1980 can be interpreted as a partial correction of the former policy, yet there still remains a disparity between the different ethnic groups, when their respective school age populations are considered. This disparity is illustrated appropriately later on (p. 201).

A major reason for the decline of ethnic Han-Chinese is the policy of birth control. Another is the widespread encouragement and extension, of the 'production responsibility' system which has certainly increased rural productivity, but has had a negative effect on primary school intakes and drop-outs. The State Education Commission currently is conducting research in a variety of rural areas of China to ascertain how far the problem has developed and what steps are necessary to rectify it.⁴

Furthermore, the traditional Chinese perception of education that it provides the means to upward social and economic mobility has been altered by this production responsibility system. Parents of many children, who do not have much hope of higher education, after sending them to

⁴. Fraser, S. E. China: Inequalities and Rural Educational Development, New Education, Vol.9 Nos. 1 & 2. 1987. p.95

school, tend to withdraw them early. Thus children in farms and production corps were taken from school either to help on the farms or take part in their parents' private businesses, which have boomed throughout the country since 1980. A special report about the Production and Construction Corps of Xinjiang says that even in the Corps more than ten thousand farmers are engaged in private business 'thanks to the policy of production and personal responsibility'.⁵ Parents, as well as their children, are realistic and practical.

Moreover, many schools which were formerly run by the Education Commission of the Region have been handed over to local authorities in accordance with the new system. Ostensibly this is a means of decentralising power in education; but actually it is a means of shifting financial responsibility from the central government to local authorities and the people. If the local authorities are concerned about the importance of local primary education and they have enough funds, the local primary schools continue and prosper. If the situation is the other way round, many schools are jeopardised and can close.

Additionally, no agricultural or technical knowledge is included in the curriculum. Schools are seen as nothing more than places to acquire basic literacy. Once their

⁵. Xinjiang Yilnamisi(Yearbook of Xinjiang), p. 2206.

children finish Grade Three and have acquired basic literacy, some peasants see no point in keeping them at school.

Finally, poor physical facilities compounded with untrained staff and unqualified teachers provide little to attract parents to send their children to school.

2. Duration of Primary Schooling

Normally children start their primary education at the age of six or seven; but in the countryside some over-age children have the opportunity to enter.

Full-time urban schools have two terms running from September to January and February to July, and pupils attend for six days a week. In a calendar year 40 weeks are allocated for study, with ten weeks for winter and summer vacations, and two weeks for miscellaneous activities such as camps and visits. In the part-time schools, terms are determined according to local conditions. In some schools some children study for half the day and work for the other half, and other children work and study on alternate days. In areas where the population is scattered, the teachers travel round from hamlet to hamlet, so that the school only meets once or twice a week in each place. In other cases, classes are held in the morning, afternoon and evening to

cater for different groups of pupils.

Han-Chinese primary schools were six-year schools before 1966 or thereabouts. They then became five-year schools until early 1980. The non-Han primary schools were four-year ones until early 1960, when they changed into five-year ones. Extension of the duration of schooling is regarded as a means of raising its quality. Therefore, in 1982, the State Education Commission decided to extend the full-time five-year school system into a six-year one.⁶

In response to this decision, the regional authorities of Xinjiang attempted to change Uighur primary schools into six-year ones, in order to bring them in line with the Han-Chinese ones. However, the attempt was made difficult due to strong objections from parents and communities, and especially from intellectuals who argued that there was no need to change. One of their reasons was that it should not take non-Han pupils so long to learn how to read and write in their mother tongue and to grasp the elementary knowledge required for primary pupils. The objectors did not believe the longer the duration of primary schooling the better its quality. On the contrary, they believed that the longer the duration of education the more expensive it became. In fact, much depends on the ability of both teachers and learners to make full use of the time

⁶. Hayhoe, R. (1984:52-54).

available and get the most benefit from it, saving more time for further study later at other levels and for more real work in society.

This notion does not suit Han-Chinese pupils, because of the great difficulties they have to face in learning the Chinese characters. In Han-Chinese schools language study takes up about half of all primary education, because the Chinese writing system is not alphabetic and each character must be memorised as a separate unit. For general purposes a basic knowledge of 3,000 is needed, but to read a wide range of books and literature easily and with no reference to a dictionary, one needs to know about 7,000 characters. Completers of primary school are expected to know about 3,000.⁷

Unlike Standard Chinese, Uighur and similar languages are alphabetic, there being 32 letters in the Uighur alphabet. Pupils have to spend only a few months learning the spelling rules during the first Grade. Then when they master the basic simple rules of writing, they are able to read and write simple texts. Most of the children in cities finish learning the Uighur alphabet in the kindergarten or at home even before they enter primary school.

⁷. Watson, A. (1975) Living In China, Batsford, 1975, p.134.

3. Curricula

The subjects taught in primary schools include Chinese (in Han-Chinese schools), Uighur (in Uighur schools), Kazak (in Kazak schools), Kirghiz (in Kirghiz Schools), Mongol (in Mongolian schools) and Sibo (in Sibo schools); arithmetic, elementary nature study, a foreign language (English, Russian or Standard Chinese - see below), politics, physical education, music and drawing. An elementary knowledge of nature and politics are for pupils of the third Grade and above. A foreign language is taught only in Han-Chinese schools in cities, whereas in non-Han primary schools in cities Standard Chinese is offered from the beginning of the Fourth grade as a foreign language and a compulsory subject. Table 5 indicates the way in which these subjects are distributed according to the number of class hours and level.

Table 3: Present Curriculum for Five-year Non-Han Primary Schools⁸

Grade	1	2	3	4	5	Grand Total
Ideological&Moral	1	1	1	1	1	180
Grammar			3	3	3	
Writing & Speaking	7	7	5	4	4	
Principles of Writing	3	3	2			
Artistic Writing	2	2	1	1	1	
Sub-Total	13	13	11	8	8	1836
Standard Chinese				4	4	288
Arithmetic	7	7	8	7	7	1296
Elementary know.of N			2	2	2	216. ⁹
Geography				2		
History					2	
Sport	2	2	2	2	2	360
Singing & Music	2	2	2	2	2	360
Drawing	2	2	1	1	1	252
Labour				1	1	72
Total hours of course:	26	26	27	30	30	5004
After Class						
Self-study	3	3	2	2	2	
Sport	2	2	2	2	2	
Scientific& Re.Act.	1	1	1	1	1 ¹⁰	
Pioneer Activity	1	1	1	1	1	
Total hours	7	7	6	6	6	
Combined Total:	33	33	33	36	36	

The table shows that priority is given to elementary literacy to which 1836 hours or 36% of the total time is assigned; whereas the time given to arithmetic makes up only 26% of the total. Sport, singing and music cover 14%; 180 hours are for ideological and moral education, which lasts throughout the five years.

⁸. op.cit.

⁹. * elementary nature study.

¹⁰. *scientific and recreational activity

4. Medium of Instruction

As already stated in the Introduction, Xinjiang's population is composed of 13 different ethnic groups, of whom at present immigrant Han-Chinese constitute 40% of the total, the Uighurs 46%, Kazaks 7% and the rest around 7%. Although Chinese and Uighur are used as official languages, literacy in the script of the other recognized mother-tongues is the main educational goal of the primary schools. In Han-Chinese primary schools the medium of instruction is Standard Chinese, whereas the medium of instruction in Uighur, Kazak, Kirghiz, Mongol and Sibo schools is the respective mother-tongue of each. Educational facilities are provided for different groups according to local conditions and their special demands. In areas with a concentration of one major linguistic group, the children in that group attend schools up to senior secondary levels which have been specially established for them. Textbooks in Uighur, Kazak and Mongol languages are available for primary, junior and senior middle school students. Sibo and Kirghiz textbooks are provided only for primary school pupils. Table 4 gives the number of schools for the various linguistic groups for the years between 1980 and 1987.

Table 4: Numbers of Primary Schools by First Language in XUAR,

1980-87¹¹

date	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1987
Name							
Han	3,685	3,592	3,524	3,485	3,401	3,190	2,835
Uighur	3,709	3,588	3,528	3,452	3,470	3,524	3,663
Kazak	769	850	801	775	803	764	781
Mongol	46	71	96	66	54	46	73
Sibo		11	11	8	8	8	8
Kirghiz		131	175	63	126	86	89
Mixed		510	398	412	391	486	364

These statistics show that there has been a steady decrease in the number of Han-Chinese schools. Within seven years 850 schools disappeared. The exact reason is not known, but two possibilities suggest themselves among others which will be referred to below. One, as already discussed in the earlier part of this Chapter, is that there have not been enough school-age children due to the strict policy of birth control, especially the application of the 'one child for one couple' policy (Actually Han-Chinese in Xinjiang are allowed to have two children because they are living in a border area.) The second possibility is that, due to the introduction of the 'Kai Men Zheg Se' (meaning: open door policy),¹² they send their children to schools in coastal areas, from which most immigrant Han-Chinese come and in which education is better developed. If their children start their primary education there, they will

¹¹. Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987.

¹². 'Open Door' policy refers to the policy of the early 1980s when China began to trade with other countries and invite them to invest in China.

have a better chance to squeeze into the key schools which, in turn, will help them to go to top universities and even to go abroad.

Compared with the decrease of Han-Chinese schools, the decrease of other schools is smaller. In the same period 46 Uighur primary schools have disappeared,¹³ but Kazak and Mongol schools have actually increased. Sibo schools remain stable. This recent development is to be attributed partly to the 'Open Door' policy of the government and partly to the majority of non-Han not being immigrants. Therefore, it is necessary to look at the various linguistic groups and their enrolments in schools. See Table 5 below:

¹³. There was a big adjustment in 1983 during which some of the 'Men Ban' (meaning: schools run by people or people-run schools) were closed.

Table 5: Primary School Enrolments by Ethnic Groups Between in XUAR, 1949 - 87¹⁴

	1949	1952	1957	1980	1981	1982
Han	15,423	33,937	67,716	1,038,263	1,016,713	983,465
Uig.	135,543	218,371	334,898	749,720	725,183	736,180
Ka.	34,530	53,884	53,598	151,429	149,367	145,192
Hui	4,920	8,741	16,297	72,156	74,275	75,620
Kir.	3,222	5,478	7,047	14,640	13,923	14,019
Mong.	2,808	4,862	5,840	18,328	19,832	19,686
Sibo	1,430	2,063	2,467	5,288	5,675	5,644
Tajik	296	998	1,710	3,463	3,040	3,089
Uzbek	948	1,248	1,107	554	605	749
Tartar	668	821	452	245	258	332
Daghur	204	351	360	628	584	617
Manchu	29	76	163	284	271	455
Russn	2,759	2,890	602	4	27	106
other (n.k)		(n.k)	(n.k)	354	741	822
-continued-						
	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	
Han	927,738	865,618	802,038	726,691	657,337	
Uig.	750,025	821,618	870,586	907,320	902,357	
Kazak	143,968	149,768	161,531	171,758	179,246	
Hui	73,034	78,295	82,463	88,192	91,523	
Kir.	14,221	15,567	17,134	19,156	19,717	
Mong.	19,149	17,142	19,744	20,164	19,581	
Sibo	5,969	5,485	4,719	4,494	4,405	
Tajik	3,427	3,820	3,987	4,592	4,751	
Uzbek	1,033	891	943	794	823	
Tartar	306	297	316	343	316	
Daghur	622	658	622	732	650	
Manchu	524	2,262	630	747	936	
Russian	249	350	400	431	476	
other	744	(n.k.) ¹⁵	1,063	2,737	2,786	

Figure 3 below gives the relevant percentages:

¹⁴. A) Source: Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao

B) There is no disaggregated information available for the period between 1957 and 1980.

¹⁵. 'n. k.' indicates that information is not known for this year.

Fig. 3: Primary School Enrolments by Ethnic Groups as % of Total Primary School Enrolments in XUAR, 1949 - 1987




Table 5 shows that the number of pupils of most linguistic groups at school significantly increased in absolute terms between 1980 and 1986. The enrolment for all ethnic groups increased between 1949 and 1980. The number of Russian pupils decreased from 1957 until 1980, when they again began to increase steadily. Apparently the Russians resident in Xinjiang had been victims of the political and ideological conflict between the Russian and Chinese authorities. This is another example of how politics have affected education.

A close examination of Figure 3 reveals some surprising facts. The percentage of immigrant Han pupils was nearly 8% in 1949, climbed to 51% by 1981, and then started to decline steadily. They were only 35% by 1987, with an average annual decrease of 2.61%. By contrast, the percentage of Uighur pupils decreased from 69% in 1949 to 36% by 1981, but began to increase afterwards.

Two reasons for the decline of Han-Chinese pupils already have been suggested on page 150. Other reasons can be attributed to the following events. Firstly, the former General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Hu Yaobang, visited Tibet and Xinjiang early in the 1980s and during his visit discovered that these two areas were overcrowded with immigrant Han-Chinese. They had occupied other people's land and prospered there, leaving the

indigenous people in poverty and backwardness. This not only affected the Chinese government's international reputation but was seen as being unfavourable to the solidarity of all nationalities. Furthermore, there was already an adverse reaction by the indigenous people to this situation. If they really wanted to assume independence, there should be no reason not to let them do so. Hu Yao-bang, an open-minded intellectual, made speeches in the areas which he inspected, and discussed with local cadres how to improve the living standards of the local people. When he went back to Beijing, he told the authorities about the real situation in Tibet and Xinjiang and suggested that the government should withdraw some of the Han-Chinese from them. But his suggestion was turned down without consideration, and he himself fell from power due to his differences with others.¹⁶ However, although he fell from power, his report on his inspection visit to the border areas induced the authorities to modify their policy.

¹⁶.This information was first revealed by a BBC journalist in a conversation with the researcher in April 1988. In August of the same year there was another conversation between the researcher and a staff member of the Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline. The researcher said 'It is said that Hu Yaobang suggested that Han-Chinese in Tibet and Xinjiang should be withdrawn. Is that so?' He explained 'There was once a discussion in central government whether Han-Chinese should be withdrawn or not. But Central Government received many letters from Han-Chinese in Xinjiang, refusing to be withdrawn....' Question: 'Hu Yaobang fell from power because of his suggestion, didn't he?' Answer: 'Hu's collapse is mainly due to his disagreement with Lao Deng.' ('lao' means elder/older, used by Chinese to express his/her respect to someone.)

There have been continuous complaints by the indigenous people about their economic situation as well as about education. The most serious complaint was seen in the strike of students¹⁷ throughout Xinjiang in December 1985 when the students put forward their own opinions and demands. One of them was that national minority education was being neglected. There were not enough schools for children, schools lacked learning and teaching facilities, and the quality of education remained behind that of the others. Again in the inland provinces teachers and students started going abroad for further study from the beginning of 1978, whereas in Xinjiang no one was sent abroad. Although the strike was suppressed and some students were punished, it had a positive effect on education afterwards. The Uighurs, who had reduced access to education, began to realise the importance of educating their children under circumstances in which the government could not provide funds. Some wealthy people and philanthropists started to help by building new schools, repairing old ones, providing materials for heating facilities, and even establishing schools under their own names. Keram Imin, who spent 40,000 yuan of his own money on building a primary school for his village in Hotan, is an example.¹⁸ Another, Barat Tohti, is one of the best of the local cadres who actually supported

¹⁷. See also Summary of Chapter One.

¹⁸. Xinjiang Ma'aripi (literal meaning: Journal of Xinjiang Education), No.1 1987 p.9.

education. He took a lead and collected over 41,000 yuan, allocated 17 'mu' (a unit of area = 0.0667 hectares) of fertile land in the village and built a school on 592 square metres in his village of Xurhana in Hotan in 1985 ¹⁹. As he expressed it: 'I am getting old. During my lifetime I have to leave enough land to build a school'. According to one report, 14 counties repaired or rebuilt their schools spending a total of 722 million yuan, of which 39% was from government, 6.9% from the local budget, 2.4% from school savings and 51.3% from the peasants.²⁰ Needless to say with this policy of 'people-run and government-subsidy', Uighur pupils began to increase slowly in numbers from 1982.

Kazak and Kirghiz pupils had the same fluctuations as the Uighurs after 1949, but the increased enrolment of Hui pupils was not only positive but also very steady. This is partly a reflection of the flexibility of the Hui people who do not have their own language. When they meet their Chinese friends, they say 'We have a common language', but whenever they meet their Uighur neighbours, they say 'We have common beliefs'. And partly it can be attributed to their location, because most live in urban areas involved in small businesses such as managing restaurants, selling milk and yoghurt, and running little shops. Anyway, it

¹⁹. *ibid.* p.90.

²⁰. Xinjiang Yilnamisi, (literal meaning: Yearbook of Xinjiang, Xinjiang People's Press, 1986. p.1757.

helps them to get their offspring educated.

5. Expansion and Inequality

In the 1930s, there were 580 schools with 90,333 students set up by the nationalist government²¹ and 1883 primary schools with 130,035 pupils, sponsored by the 'Uighur Union', set up in the same period with the support of revolutionary Han-Chinese such as Shen Yanbing and Zhang Zhongxi.²² To wipe out illiteracy, 206 schools for adults, with 15,952 students, were set up by the government, while 740 such schools with 138,444 students were sponsored by the Union. According to one publication, there were 500 schools run by the government, and 1800 schools sponsored by the Union, with over 250,000 students in all.²³

Today there are primary schools in Xinjiang right down to the village level. According to official documents, in 1987 there were 7,813 schools, of which 2,835 were for Han-Chinese, 3,663 for Uighurs, 781 for Kazaks, 73 for Mongols, 8 for Sibos and 89 for Kirghiz.

²¹. Xinjiang Tarihi Matiryalliri, (literal meaning: Historical Materials of Xinjiang), Xinjiang People's Press, 1982, Vol.5, pp.172 - 198.

²². op.cit pp.172-176.

²³. Nimshihit Sayrami (1980) ,Yurak Sozi (literal meaning:the words of the heart), Beijing Millatlar Nashiryati (literal meaning:Beijing National Minority Press, in 'Xinjiang Historical Materials', 1982.

Table 6 shows how the numbers, with percentages, of Han and non-Han pupils increased between 1949 and 1980.

Table 6: Primary School Enrolments by Han & Non-Han in XUAR, 1949-80²⁴

Date	Total	Non-Han	Non-Han(%)	Han	(%)
1949	197,850	182,427	92.	15,423	8.
1950	271,578	249,908	92.	21,670	8.
1951	305,263	276,772	91.	28,491	9.
1952	333,735	299,798	90.	33,937	10.
1953	356,440	318,952	89.	37,488	11.
1954	372,607	329,057	88.	43,550	12.
1955	385,291	337,738	90.	50,553	10.
1956	456,657	395,856	87.	60,801	13.
1957	492,260	424,544	86.	67,716	14.
1958	730,485	646,172	88.	84,313	12.
1959	819,374	705,778	86.	113,596	14.
1960	897,230	746,344	83.	150,886	17.
1961	844,618	663,915	79.	180,703	21.
1962	745,768	549,747	74.	196,021	26.
1963	766,013	541,526	71.	224,487	29.
1964	882,666	608,180	69.	274,486	31.
1965	1,039,027	704,002	68.	335,025	32.
1966	1,087,554	684,034	63.	403,520	37.
1967	1,062,464	616,253	58.	446,211	42.
1968	1,071,517	605,803	57.	465,714	43.
1969	1,090,326	592,473	54.	497,853	46.
1970	1,131,440	624,397	55.	507,043	45.
1971	1,220,077	673,627	55.	546,450	45.
1972	1,369,225	752,320	55.	616,905	45.
1973	1,553,390	844,532	54.	708,858	46.
1974	1,720,000	903,619	53.	816,381	47.
1975	1,861,263	996,377	54.	864,886	46.
1976	1,889,733	1,039,627	55.	860,106	45.
1977	1,958,056	1,059,912	54.	898,144	46.
1978	2,028,771	1,043,827	51.	984,944	49.
1979	2,007,734	1,043,825	52.	963,909	48.
1980	2,055,513	1,017,250	49.	1,038,263	51.

These percentages are displayed graphically in Figure 4.

²⁴. Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao, Xinjiang Jiao Yu Wei Yuan Hui, 1949-1980, 1980, Urumqi.

Fig. 4: Primary School Enrolments, Han and Non-Han as % of the Total Primary School Enrolments in XUAR, 1949-80




Table 7 shows the development of primary school staff, Han and non-Han, from 1949 to 1980.


Table 7: Numbers and Percentages of Han and Non-Han Primary School Staff in XUAR, 1949 - 80²⁵

Date	Total	Non-Han	Non-Han(%)	Han	Han(%)
1949	9,647	8,451	88.	1,196	12.
1950	9,268	7,991	86.	1,277	14.
1951	9,864	8,326	84.	1,538	16.
1952	10,963	9,090	83.	1,873	17.
1953	11,882	9,806	83.	2,076	17.
1954	12,387	10,007	81.	2,380	19.
1955	12,876	10,248	80.	2,628	20.
1956	14,525	11,458	79.	3,067	21.
1957	15,651	12,315	79.	3,336	21.
1958	19,865	16,229	82.	3,636	18.
1959	23,064	18,103	78.	4,961	22.
1960	27,893	20,288	73.	7,605	27.
1961	29,518	19,550	66.	9,968	34.
1962	29,997	18,010	60.	11,987	40.
1963	31,507	18,046	57.	13,461	43.
1964	35,519	19,885	56.	15,634	44.
1965	41,069	22,900	56.	18,169	44.
1966	42,077	24,596	58.	17,481	42.
1967	42,372	24,917	59.	17,455	41.
1968	43,808	25,558	58.	18,250	42.
1969	46,384	26,906	58.	19,478	42.
1970	48,740	26,184	54.	22,556	46.
1971	56,168	27,935	50.	28,233	50.
1972	58,072	31,679	55.	26,393	45.
1973	70,174	35,457	51.	34,717	49.
1974	79,742	38,832	49.	40,910	51.
1975	83,439	42,068	50.	41,371	50.
1976	83,853	44,080	53.	39,773	47.
1977	87,221	45,652	52.	41,569	48.
1978	90,894	47,983	53.	42,911	47.
1979	93,653	50,716	54.	42,937	46.
1980	99,189	53,181	54.	46,008	46.

These percentages are shown graphically in Figure 5 below.

²⁵. Ibid.

Fig. 5: Primary School Staff, Han and Non-Han as % of the Total Primary School Staff in Xinjiang, 1949 - 80



From tables 6 and 7 above it is evident that the 1949-1980 increase in absolute numbers, both of pupils and of teachers, was impressive; the increase of Han-Chinese is particularly striking. They also show that the number of non-Han pupils declined sharply in years 1961, 1962, 1963, 1967, 1968 and 1969, whereas the number of Han pupils increased. The decline in the number of non-Han pupils can partly be related to the financial circumstances of the schools, and to the famine resulting from the natural disasters which took place early in the 1960s.²⁶ But it is mainly linked to the minority policy of the central government towards Xinjiang during the period of the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute and the well-known 'Cultural Revolution' which lasted for 10 years from 1966 to 1976.

The majority of non-Han primary schools built during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) were collectively funded schools, for which the local People's Communes were financially responsible. These Communes normally had meagre savings and when faced with natural disasters, they had primarily to feed the peasants and herdsmen. Thus, there

²⁶. The natural disasters were: a) three years of drought in some areas along the Yangtze River; b) a big flood in the areas along the Huang He River; and c) economic constraint because China began to repay all its debts to the Soviet Union, in accordance with the latter's demand, within three years, 1960 - 63. Thus there was not enough food to eat in those years. This was further confirmed by a senior Han-Chinese scholar, when the researcher asked about 'the natural disasters', in a conversation in London, 1990.

was less finance to maintain non-Han primary schools in those difficult years. On the other hand, the majority of Han-Chinese primary schools were located in urban areas and amongst the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps; and urban primary schools were funded by the state. Therefore they were secure with continuous, regular long-term funds available.

Indeed the economy of the whole country was hit seriously by these natural disasters between 1960 and 1963. People did not have enough to eat and wear. Schools were short of facilities. Boarding schools, especially in rural areas, faced great problems in feeding pupils. Teachers would teach in the morning and after lunch they took their pupils out to collect wild vegetables as a supplement to the school meals for the following day, but these extra vegetables could hardly solve the famine. Pupils started to leave for home secretly, although school discipline was very severe, if they were caught. Though accurate information is unavailable, it was said that many people, including of course children, died of hunger in many of the counties of Xinjiang. In order to survive, many non-Han people emigrated to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

At the same time, soon after the Soviet government withdrew its experts and technicians from China, the government

launched a nation-wide campaign against revisionism.²⁷ As a 'first front line against revisionism' Xinjiang was the major target of the campaign. In this campaign many intellectuals were questioned, criticised, and dismissed on suspicion that they were close to the Russians and were in contact with them. As a result a still larger number of people left Xinjiang. 70,000, mainly Kazak, fled to the Soviet Union after a revolt in 1962²⁸, while wave after wave of Han-Chinese began to flood into Xinjiang in order to 'stabilize' the political situation. This led to a new and urgent need to build and expand primary schools for the children of the newcomers.

At the time when the Cultural Revolution was at its climax, schools became a political stage for criticising and remoulding 'bourgeois intellectuals'. Classrooms became 'fighting posts' to struggle against old ideas, old customs, and old beliefs - mainly the belief in Islam -

²⁷. There was a deep ideological conflict between the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Communist Party in handling national and international affairs. The USSR began to display its superpower status over other nations, especially communist allies. From the Chinese Communist Party's point of view the Soviet Bolshevik Communist Party betrayed Marxism-Leninism, and exercised big nation 'hegemonism', by criticizing the Albanian Communist Party headed by Anwar Hoxha and interfering in China's internal affairs. The CCP believed that the Soviet Communist Party had restored capitalism by introducing private enterprise and spoiled young Russians through western music and dance.... So there was a nation-wide campaign against the Soviet Union in China from 1962 until 1980.

²⁸. Dilger, B. The Education of Minorities in Comparative Education Vol. 20 No. 1 1984. p. 158.


through being 'armed with Mao Zedong's thoughts'. The recitation of his pamphlets and abstracts from his work became a major course for pupils. Staff and pupils divided into two groups, sometimes more, according to their points of view on the situation, and occasionally there would be a clash between the different factions in schools. Confronted with this uneasy situation, parents were worried that their children would not learn anything. Furthermore, they feared they would be misled in their social activities and even that their safety would be jeopardised. Therefore, they preferred their children to stay at home rather than go to school. This is another reason for the decline in the number of non-Han pupils during those years.

On the other hand, the great increase in the total number of pupils was due to the endless immigration of Han-Chinese. The growth of the ethnic Han-Chinese population (Introduction and Chapter One and passim) has brought, as has been shown, an irreversible change to the composition of the Region's total population. This, as an indicator for education, in turn has had the greatest effect on the expansion of primary education. The immigrants have had to be assured that their children would have proper schooling, since most of them have come to Xinjiang in accordance with the central government's strategic policy. Some of them were unsuccessful in their own cities and provinces, and others, for example, criminals, were deported to the region due to their disreputable background. Whatever they were

before, they were regarded as being good volunteers by responding to the government's call. Therefore, their children could not go on without schooling. Otherwise the government policy of stocking Han-Chinese along the border under the name of 'construction' might not succeed, and in turn border security could not be assured.

While developing primary education for immigrant Han-Chinese, the central government has also had the acknowledged basic obligation of looking after the indigenous people's education, if only to ensure both unity and stability. If in this context the percentages of Han and non-Han in total primary school enrolments are compared with their respective percentages in the population as a whole, the differences between Han and non-Han enrolments in the primary sector illustrate the existence of inequality. See Figure 6 below.

Fig.6: Percentages of Han & Non-Han in the Total Population & Their % of Primary School Enrolments in XUAR, 1949-87 ²⁹



²⁹. Source: a) Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao, 1949-1987; b) See Introduction, Footnote 10, p. 14.

The above figure first shows the huge gap between the percentages of Han and non-Han total populations and the percentages in the total primary enrolments in the 1950s. It then shows that this gap narrowed sharply between 1955 and 1964. Although the changes in the total population and enrolments brought the numbers of Han and non-Han closer, the non-Han percentages in the primary school enrolments were higher than their percentages of the total population in the years of 1955, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65 and 1987. By contrast, the percentages of Han in the primary school enrolments in those years were lower than their percentages in the total population of Xinjiang. After 1965 the changes in percentages of Han-and non-Han in the total population slowed down. Yet the changes in the primary school enrolments kept the same pace until 1982, with a faster increase of Han. Since then the percentages of Han have begun to decline, whereas the percentages of non-Han has increased. See Table 8 below.

Table 8: Crude Enrolment Ratios for Han and Non-Han in

XUAR, 1950-87³⁰

<u>Date</u>	<u>NH Pop.</u>	<u>NHPr.Enr.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>HanPop.</u>	<u>HanPr.Enr.</u>	<u>%</u>
1950	4,140,699	249,908	6.	298,301	21,670	7.
1955	4,643,074	337,738	7.	474,727	17,553	4.
1964	4,948,851	608,180	12.	2,321,216	274,486	12.
1965	5,357,989	704,002	13.	2,533,011	335,025	13.
1979	7,344,212	1,043,825	14.	5,215,488	963,909	18.
1982	7,797,567	1,002,511	13.	5,283,971	983,465	19.
1984	8,093,813	1,097,363	13.	5,346,267	865,618	15.
1987	8,786,888	1,227,547	14.	5,385,512	657,337	12.

These statistics suggest that the inequality was not always of the same pattern. The enrolment ratio was high for non-Han in 1955, 1964 and 1987. In the rest of the years listed above, Han had a higher ratio than non-Han.

From a study of the 1982 regional census the enrolment ratios for different ethnic groups can be seen clearly. This census provides information about 0-14-year olds. As already mentioned (Duration of Schooling in this chapter), primary schooling was of five years duration for non-Han after 1965. It was also of five years duration for Han during the Cultural Revolution and after, until 1983. The duration of junior middle school education was three years for both Han and non-Han. Assuming that children start schooling at the age of 6, then almost all primary and

³⁰. Source: 1) Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao, 1949-1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987; 2) See Footnote 10, page.14.

junior middle school pupils should be between 6 and 14 years old. The following table gives the gross enrolment ratios for the various ethnic groups in primary and junior middle schools in 1982.

Table 9: Gross Enrolment Ratios of Primary and Junior Middle School for Different Ethnic Groups in XUAR, 1982³¹

	<u>Aged 0-14</u>	<u>Pr.Sch.Enr.</u>	<u>J.MS Enr.</u>	<u>Total Enr.</u>	<u>Ratios</u>
Uighur	2,403,175	736,180	139,397	875,577	36.
Kazak	428,074	145,192	38,045	183,237	43.
Kirghiz	49,671	14,019	2,614	16,633	33.
Hui	237,658	75,620	20,110	95,730	40.
Mongol	51,275	19,686	6,071	25,757	50.
Sibo	10,788	5,644	2,086	7,730	72.
Han	1,945,835	983,465	466,519	1,449,984	74.
Other	48,978	6,170	2,296	8,466	17.
Total	5,175,453	1,985,976	677,138	2,663,124	51.

These statistics show that the enrolment ratios varied greatly between the different ethnic groups. The highest ratio (74%) was for Han and the lowest (17%) for the Others. Only 36% of the primary and junior middle school age group children came from the major ethnic group, the Uighurs.

To sum up, both the Han and non-Han enrolments increased enormously but were accompanied by inequality. The various political campaigns affected the non-Han more seriously than the immigrant Han. This, in turn, led to an unbalanced growth between the two. As a result, the major ethnic

³¹. Source: 1982 Regional Census and 1982 Nian Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao.

group, the Uighurs, have been put at a disadvantage. Such inequality at both the primary and junior middle school levels is bound to have a serious impact on the equality of access to the senior middle, secondary technical, and secondary normal schools, and so ultimately to higher education.

6. Inequality in Literacy

There are considerable disparities in the respective literacy levels of Han-Chinese and non-Han groups as Table 10 shows:


Table 10: Levels of Literacy and Illiteracy by Ethnic Groups (Aged 6+) in XUAR, 1982³²

Name	Literate	Illiterate	Total Pop.of	
	Aged 6+	Aged 6+	Aged 6-11	Aged 6+
Uighur	2,802,813	2,167,359	477,126	4,970,172
Kazak	519,234	202,390	80,981	721,624
Kirghiz	52,640	38,229	10,034	90,869
Mongol	67,626	30,080	8,513	97,706
Hui	286,674	191,852	44,970	478,526
Tajik	11,119	10,475	2,458	21,594
Others	62,442	33,940	8,647	96,382
Total	3,802,548	2,674,325	632,729	6,476,873
Han	3,835,949	901,726	180,970	4,737,675
<hr/>				
Total	7,638,497	3,576,051	813,699	11,214,548

These levels of literacy and illiteracy as percentages of their respective populations (aged 6 +) are shown graphically in Figure 7.

³². 1) 'Aged 6+' include all people who were 6 and over 6 years old. 2) 'Aged 6-11' refers to those who were at the age between 6 and 11. 3) Source: Ibid.

**Fig.7: Levels of Literacy and Illiteracy by Ethnic Groups
(Aged 6 +) in XUAR, 1982**




**Table 11: Illiteracy Levels of Han and Non-Han (Aged 6+) in
XUAR, 1982³³**

	Total	Han	Non-Han
Population(aged 6+)	11,214,548	4,737,675	6,476,873
Illiterates(aged 6+)	3,576,051	901,726	2,674,325
illiterates(aged 6-11)	813,699	180,970	632,729

³³. op.cit.

The comparison of these illiteracy levels as percentages of their respective populations (aged 6+) is shown in Figure 8 below:

Fig. 8: Han and Non-Han Illiterates as Percentages of Their Respective Populations (Aged 6+) in XUAR, 1982



From Figures 7 and 8 it is obvious that there is not only a disparity among the different ethnic groups in the development of primary education but a serious one. Out of

4,737,675 Han aged 6 years and over, 19% were illiterate in 1982, whereas out of 6,476,873 non-Han aged 6+, 41% were still illiterate. The figures also reveal that 43% of the Uighurs, 40% of the Hui, 42% of the Kirghiz and 48% of the Tajiks aged 6+ years were illiterate. The total number of illiterate children between 6 and 11 years old was 813,699, of whom illiterate Han children constituted 22% and the non-Han 78%. The figures also show the great enrolment gap between the Han-Chinese and the rest.

7. Reasons for the Inequalities in Literacy and Enrolments

The reasons for the inequalities in literacy and enrolment are various. Not only politics but also economics, geography, customary beliefs and language have had a strong influence.

a. The Economic Aspect

Most parents want to send their children to school but their economic circumstances can block the path. This is particularly true in remote rural areas. For example, Hotan district in south Xinjiang is culturally one of the oldest but economically one of the poorest, regions on the list of

the State Council ³⁴. In 1982 its total primary school enrolment rate was 81%, of which the enrolment rate for Hotan city was 94%, but only 68% for some of rural and pastoral counties.³⁵ From the illiteracy percentages it can also be seen that 43.6% of Uighurs out of 4,970,172 were illiterate or semi-literate in 1982. Most of them were peasants in the rural areas of Hotan, Kashgar and Aksu Districts, where the communications are not developed and the natural resources have not yet been tapped. Therefore, the majority of the people there are poor and the education of their children has been difficult to finance.

b. Geography

Xinjiang is a vast region where people, mainly non-Han ethnic groups, are scattered among mountain ranges, along the rivers and even in the forests and deserts. Children of these people cannot easily go to formal schools. Instead their schools are arranged either in nomads' tents or in caves, and in a cold winter the schools do not maintain normal teaching and learning. Again, some parents simply cannot send their children to school due to the distances involved. On the other hand, most of the immigrant Han-Chinese, except those in the Xinjiang Production and

³⁴. Xinjiang Ma'aripi, No.1 1987. p.6.

³⁵. Source: 1982 Regional Census.

Construction Corps who are very self-supporting, live in cities and towns. Table 12 gives the percentage of Han-Chinese in cities both at the capital and at county levels.


Table 12: The Percentages of Han-Chinese in Urban Cities in XUAR, 1985³⁶

<u>Name of City</u>	<u>total Pop.of city</u>	<u>Han-Chinese & Percentages</u>	
Urumqi (capital)	1,172,335	868,789	74.
Kuytung	222,125		96.
Ghulja	74,727		32.
Chochaek	119,023	77,813	65.
Altay	168,438	105,363	63.
Bortala	102,811	56,367	55.
Sanji	233,400	177,800	76.
Turpan	196,847	87,778	20.
Komul	270,261	180,000	67.
Korla	219,048	138,611	63.
Aksu	339,183	186,769	55.
Kashgar	146,317	47,374	24.
Hotan	112,837	17,297	15.
Karamay	185,341	142,674	77.
Shihezi	549,900		96.

These percentages are shown graphically in Figure 9 below:

³⁶. Xinjiang Yilnamisi (The Yearbook of Xinjiang), 1986, Xinjiang People's Press, Urumqi.

**Fig.9: Percentages of Han-Chinese in the Urban Areas Listed
in Table 12**



In addition, it should be noted that by 1985 the total population of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps was 2,222,400, out of whom 948,300 were staff (white

collar workers), and 228,400 were non-Han.³⁷ Of the 15 urban areas listed, 11 are inhabited by immigrant Han-Chinese who comprise over 55% of their total population. In two cities the immigrants represent 96% of the total; in three, over 74%; in four, over 62%; and in two over 55%. Generally the immigrant Han form the majority of the urban population and the non-Han the majority of the rural population.

Statistics, too, show that there were more school-age children in rural areas than in urban ones. According to the Regional census of 1982 the school-age group in urban areas constituted only 28% and those in rural areas 72% of the total school-age group population of that year. See Table 13 below:

Table 13: Urban and Rural Populations As Percentages of the Total Population of XUAR, 1982³⁸

<u>total pop.</u> <u>of urban areas</u>	<u>total pop.</u> <u>of the region</u>	<u>total pop. of rural</u> <u>and mountain areas</u>
3,714,841 (28%)	13,081,538 (100%)	9,366,697 (72%)
of whom(aged 7+11)	of whom(aged 7+11)	of whom(aged 7+11)
521,076 (28%)	1,865,291 (100%)	1,344,215 (72%)

Although the school-age group in rural areas formed 72.% of the total school-age group in the Region, its average admission rate was under 80%, whereas it was 99% for urban children. At the same time the admission rate for Han was 99%, whereas it was only about 80% for non-Han children.

³⁷. Xinjiang Yilnamisi, 1986. pp.101-478, 2102.

³⁸. 1982 Regional Census.

The admission rate for pastoral children has varied from area to area, the highest being 91% and the lowest 41%. For example, in 1981 the number of 7 - 11 year-old children in the pastoral areas of Altay was 10,895, of whom 8,991 or 82.5% entered primary school. In the pastoral areas of Sawan County, Chò'chaek, the number of 7 - 11 year-old children was 4,820 of whom only 1,982 or 41% entered primary school.³⁹

This also indicates the similarity between the lower admission rates for rural and pastoral children and for non-Han indigenous children in general. It also indicates that there was a higher admission rate for all urban children including Han. Such comparisons are rather roundabout, but they do prove that primary education has been rapidly developed in favour of the urban areas. In other words, the immigrant Han-Chinese children have been enjoying a higher admission rate and better education in cities and towns, where schools are totally funded by the state. In contrast, the children of Uighurs, Tajiks, Kirghiz, Mongols, Kazaks and others have had to struggle to get equal education in the rural and pastoral areas, where schools are mainly funded by local authorities and the people, with only a state subsidy to help them.

³⁹. Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Ziliao, 1981, pp.334 - 40.

c. Customary Beliefs

Some parents, especially older ones in rural areas, would still prefer to send their children to religious schools run by religious individuals in their houses. As long as they have any chance to avoid being ordered to a public school, they try to persuade their children not to go. Their major concern is that their children might be brain-washed into forgetting their ancestors' beliefs, culture and traditions.

d. Language

It has already been stated, that there are 13 different groups in the Region. At least six autonomous counties under five autonomous prefectures or other administrative districts carry the name of one particular language group. In reality, that one particular language group does not necessarily form the major one in that particular autonomous area (See the Introduction). In these autonomous prefectures and counties education is available both in that particular group's language or in Standard Chinese. Han-Chinese children and that particular ethnic group's children go to separate schools specially built for them. But in these autonomous prefectures and counties there are also other language groups whose children, in some cases,

have found it difficult to have equal educational provision due to the lack of textbooks, teachers, classrooms, and schools.

8. Inequality in Quality

The concept 'quality' can be applied to a variety of things (See Chapter 1). For the purpose of this chapter, the meaning of this word is applied in its narrower sense to the quality of educational facilities provided for urban and rural children and so to the levels of academic attainment achieved by both.

A gap exists between the quality, as so defined, of rural and that of urban, schools. Urban primary schools, we have seen, are state schools, whose teachers are paid by the government; and they are reasonably well supplied with facilities and materials, and are run more uniformly on a basis of a full five-years' education in non-Han schools and a six-year education in Han-Chinese ones. Naturally these schools, having better human and material resources, are more likely to turn out pupils much better qualified for the next level of education.

Although the quality of urban schools varies considerably amongst themselves, on the whole they have good facilities. A full-time urban school generally has new buildings with

well-lit rooms, workmanlike, if old-fashioned, school desks, good blackboards, and a useful range of modern teaching aids including tape-recorders, film and slide projectors, and general science equipment. There are sports grounds with facilities for various sports - especially basketball, table-tennis and volley-ball - and special areas where displays can be made of political propaganda, health and welfare information, and the pupils' own literary and artistic efforts. Most of these schools have a library, and central heating is available in all of them. There are, of course, some exceptions. Not every urban school has all the amenities just described. By contrast, many rural schools operate, as already mentioned, in any place available, such as converted mosques, peasant houses or tents. In the poorest rural areas there is no proper equipment and in certain schools mud tables and mud chairs are still used, together with a wooden portable blackboard.⁴⁰ Many rural schools run double sessions due to the shortage of space, and the school teaching and learning programme has often to be changed to suit the urgent needs of local production. Thus rural schools can be half-time, part-time, busy season and slack season schools, although they have to follow the same curriculum as the urban ones.

⁴⁰. In August 1988, during an informal and friendly conversation, one of the high officials in Aksu district revealed this information.

A survey conducted by some members of Xinjiang Univeristit Oqughuchilirining Pan-Madiniyat Oyushmisi (literal meaning: Science and Culture Association of Xinjiang University Students) during the winter vacation of 1987 revealed that a number of Uighur primary and middle schools even in Ghulja City in northern Xinjiang were suffering from the lack of an adequate and safe learning environment. In 1985 there were 53 primary schools of which 10 were Han-Chinese. The rest were for the Uighur, Kazak and Russian children in the city. The total number of pupils was 28,976, out of whom 23,344 were non-Han. The total number of teachers was 1,449 ⁴¹. It is to be noted that Ghulja was the cultural centre of Xinjiang in the 1940s.

Members of the student association visited 12 schools in the city and its outskirts, 7 of which were primary schools

⁴².

No. 12 Primary School

The school, formerly run by the City Educational Bureau, was handed over to local authorities in 1985 to become one of the collectively run schools. Due to the lack of finance, old buildings remained unrepaired, worn-out furniture could not be replaced and the school had to run

⁴¹. Xinjiang Yilnamisi, 1986. p.138.

⁴². This information is from an unofficial magazine, Pan Wa Madinyat (literal meaning: Science and Culture) published by the Students Association, No.1 1988, pp-14-23

double-sessions. In a heavy rainstorm in 1987, the roofs of many classrooms were badly damaged and were not repaired.

No. 4 Primary School

This school, built in 1895 by Mutallip Halpim, has a history of nearly one century and once was one of the state-run urban primary schools in the city. There were 52 staff and 1,050 pupils in 1987. For the past 18 years, the school has been troubled by a shortage of safe buildings and classrooms, and pupils have had to attend double-sessions. Over the last three years, 10 classrooms which were dark and damp had been in danger of falling down. Complaints were made to the local authorities, the City Educational Bureau, and even to the head of the Xinjiang Education Commission, but the problems were not solved. In the rains of 1987 8 classrooms collapsed, and the other two were in danger of falling down at any time. In response to the life safety issue, the school closed for 15 days in November 1987. Later on, when the school started again, some pupils still had to use the two remaining shabby classrooms, and the majority had to share classrooms with students of No.5 Uighur Middle School. In fact, they borrowed the out-of-use classrooms of No. 15 Han-Chinese Primary School. There is a sharp contrast between two different ethnic schools, one built a century ago (No. 4) and even under socialism still involved in begging, whereas the other (No.15), set up after the revolution, enjoys

better facilities and prospers.

The annual cost per pupil in No.4 School was said to be only 100 yuan. According to the instructions of the top authorities, the school leaders collected 6000 yuan from parents. People asked whether difficulties of space would be solved with the above meagre sum of money, whether the education of children in this school would be strengthened, and how this situation could be reconciled with the grand 'Four Modernisations'?

According to the survey, the situation in Ghulja City No. 9 Uighur Primary School was no different from the above. In fact it was more serious. The school has a history of 57 years and in 1987 had 54 staff and 956 pupils, but there were only 8 rooms divided into 20 classes. Therefore, the pupils of 12 classes had to attend double-session courses. Half of the pupils in 8 other classes studied in double sessions in two classrooms of the No.1 Han-Chinese Primary School, which had suffered a fire and were therefore unused. The rest of the pupils studied in rooms borrowed from the Ghulja Agricultural School. Whenever there was rain or a sandstorm, the school had to stop normal teaching in order to prevent accidents and secure the safety of its pupils. There were only two rooms for the staff, one for administrative activities and the other for 47 teachers. Because of such limited facilities, the pupils of Grades 3, 4 and 5 were not offered history, geography, elementary

knowledge of nature, drawing and music, all of which they should study. The school was damaged in the rains of 1987 and so lost 360 hours of normal teaching.

Kepakyuzi First and Second Village Primary School was reported to be on the edge of closing. It had 593 pupils with 25 teachers of whom 19 were State-paid, two paid by the collective (community based-fund-raising organization), and the rest were hired temporarily with the meagre savings of the school. It had no teacher for physical education. Pupils were put into 11 classes. None of the classrooms had glass windows and they were small and damp. Pupils often shared chairs and benches and those in four classes used a mosque in the village. For teachers only two rooms were available. The same situation was seen in the rest of schools visited. It is even more serious in remote mountain schools.

The reason for such inadequate education facilities for Uighurs and other non-Han groups in cities and rural areas is partly due to the lack of effort by local authorities, because in local administration the chief is almost always a Han-Chinese whose job is merely to interpret and apply the policy of the central government. The budget, too, is allocated by a finance department whose head must be a Han-Chinese. Thomas states:

The broad issues of how much schooling will be given

to the population and who in that population will receive what kind of education are issues generally settled by political bodies outside of the school system....

The broad scale decisions about amounts and kinds of schooling that different segments of society will receive are finally made by political bodies. And the most crucial of these bodies are the ones authorized to allocate funds. As often noted, those who control the purse strings will ultimately control the decisions.⁴³

9. Summary

This chapter has examined primary education under eight subtitles viz. Changes in Intake, Duration of Primary Schooling, Curricula, Media of Instruction, Expansion and Inequality, Inequality in Literacy, Reasons for Inequality, and Inequality in Quality and has analyzed in more detail, the last named and the reasons for the inequality.

In consequence the educational prospects of primary school completers have been uneven as between town and country, between counties with better economic and cultural foundations and those with poorer ones, and between Han-

⁴³. Thomas R. M. (1983:8).

Chinese in urban areas and non-Han people in rural areas. Maintaining a tolerable balance between immigrant Han-Chinese and the indigenous people, between poor and rich areas, and between dedicated and non-dedicated local leaders has therefore been most difficult to achieve even when the central government has willed it.

What has happened, and is happening, in secondary education is dealt with in the chapter that follows where the next level of education is similarly discussed and analyzed.

CHAPTER FIVE

SECONDARY EDUCATION

'Secondary education' in Xinjiang mainly refers to general secondary schools (which include junior and senior middle schools) and secondary specialized schools (which include secondary technical and secondary normal schools). In many rural areas there may be only junior middle schools. In urban areas general secondary schools, which contain both junior and senior sections, are available. Such schools are often called complete secondary schools, with the more successful junior middle section graduates moving on to the senior middle section in the same school.

A question posed by this thesis is to what extent inequalities in higher education in Xinjiang are the outcome of inequalities of supply originating from lower down the system and to what extent are they the outcome of higher education's own admission practices. This chapter describes inequalities in supply resulting from the secondary school intake, enrolments, changes of school duration and the curriculum, and attempts to explain the inequalities in expansion and quality which led to these inequalities of supply of secondary school graduates for

higher education since 1949.

To examine what occurred in secondary education for the different ethnic groups, the following data as direct or indirect indicators of access will be examined: (1) the number of junior and senior middle school new entrants in Xinjiang and the number of primary and junior middle school graduates between 1949 and 1980; (2) junior middle school new entrants by ethnic group as percentages of primary school completers by ethnic group, between 1980 and 1987; (3) the proportion of ethnic groups as percentages of the total populations in autonomous prefectures and counties; (4) senior middle school new entrants by ethnic group as percentages of all ethnic groups completing junior middle school, between 1980 and 1987; (5) the number of junior middle schools where a local language, as the first language, is the medium of instruction; (6) junior and senior middle school enrolments by ethnic groups between 1980 and 1987; (7) junior and senior middle school enrolments by Han and non-Han between 1950 and 1980; (8) secondary technical and normal school new entrants between 1949 and 1980; (9) secondary technical and normal school new entrants by ethnic groups between 1980 and 1987; (10) basic information about secondary normal schools; and (11) the growth of enrolments by Han and non-Han in secondary specialized schools between 1950 and 1980. For convenience in presenting the data, this chapter comprises two main sections: A) general secondary schools and B) secondary

specialized schools, each of which is subdivided into numbered sub-sections which deal with the data as outlined in the preceding paragraph.

General Secondary Schools

There were fluctuations in the number of new entrants in both junior middle schools (or lower middle schools) and senior middle schools (or higher middle schools) from 1949 to 1980, although both have generally increased since the Revolution.

1. Junior Middle School New Entrants (1949-80)

In 1949, out of 4,832 pupils completing primary school, 31% were admitted into junior middle schools. By 1960, this figure had risen to 71%.¹ Just one year later there was a sharp decrease in the intake, due to financial difficulties caused by natural disaster. Thus out of 117,864 pupils completing primary school in 1962, only 28% entered junior middle schools. The 1964 intake saw a sudden increase, 74% of the primary school completers being accommodated in junior middle schools (Source: Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao, 1949-80, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984 1985, 1986, and 1987.

¹. The dramatic increase of the junior middle school intake in 1960, the first year of 'natural disasters in China, was the inevitable result of rapid expansion of primary schools during the Great Leap Forward between 1957 and 1959.

These documents will be utilized throughout this chapter).
But almost all of the junior middle schools were closed in
1967, the year of the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution.
Table 1 below gives details:

**Table 1: Number of Primary School Completers and Junior
Middle School New Entrants in XUAR, 1949-80²**

Date	No. of Pri. School Gra.	No. of Junior New Entrants	Junior Entrants as % of Pri. Gra.
1949	4,832	1,508	31.
1950	6,945	3,333	48.
1951	12,861	4,900	38.
1952	18,590	7,320	39.
1953	32,173	7,836	24.
1954	37,751	8,763	23.
1955	40,006	11,732	29.
1956	45,230	25,379	56.
1957	53,122	23,944	45.
1958	63,224	35,439	56.
1959	68,486	46,670	68.
1960	89,678	63,511	71.
1961	86,480	43,446	50.
1962	117,864	32,446	28.
1963	73,587	34,953	48.
1964	45,024	33,503	74.
1965	77,080	42,411	55.
1966	105,206	37,597	36.
1967	116,437	19,932	17.
1968	126,601	25,699	20.
1969	150,410	89,772	60.
1970	173,553	89,947	52.
1971	141,980	113,766	80.
1972	143,321	130,558	91.
1973	195,370	112,220	57.
1974	154,001	125,750	82.
1975	194,283	156,939	81.
1976	244,335	224,382	92.
1977	272,254	245,702	90.
1978	288,359	255,687	89.
1979	265,428	224,388	85.
1980	292,515	236,432	81.

². Source: Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao.

The above table shows that the junior middle school intake in Xinjiang since the Revolution has expanded, though it has not been a steady expansion. It had two big fluctuations during the periods of natural disasters and the Cultural Revolution. These fluctuations have been explained in Chapter 4.³

2. Senior Middle School New Entrants (1949-80)

In contrast with the expansion of intake into junior middle schools, the rate of growth of entrants to senior middle schools was less between 1949 and 1980. This is because the latter is more costly than the former. The economic situation as well as inadequate educational planning in Xinjiang seem to have been the obstacles. Table 2 gives the details.

³. See for details Chapter 4.

**Table 2: Senior Middle School New Entrants As Percentages
of Junior Middle School Graduates in XUAR, 1949-80 ⁴**

Date	No. of Junior M. School Gra.	No. of Senior M.S. New Entr.	Senior Middle S. N Entr. % of J. Gra. ⁵
1949	352	205	58.
1950	538	294	55.
1951	612	277	45.
1952	895	316	35.
1953	1,581	905	57.
1954	2,556	956	37.
1955	3,629	978	27.
1956	5,332	1,799	34.
1957	5,760	2,218	39.
1958	8,690	4,008	46.
1959	14,204	7,300	51.
1960	18,215	6,540	36.
1961	23,162	6,511	28.
1962	23,850	5,601	23.
1963	22,697	6,629	29.
1964	19,333	7,111	37.
1965	20,759	7,587	37.
1966	25,938	5,637	22.
1967	24,596	4,140	17.
1968	33,977	158	0.5
1969	54,369	872	21.
1970	43,866	2,689	6.
1971	63,028	11,115	18.
1972	60,011	30,802	51.
1973	61,493	28,020	46.
1974	86,257	40,337	47.
1975	89,387	48,109	54.
1976	106,249	68,504	64.
1977	114,122	70,876	62.
1978	141,572	68,261	48.
1979	175,793	73,291	42.
1980	186,012	80,957	44.

From this table it can be seen that the senior middle school intakes, too, have not grown steadily since 1949. 58% of junior middle school graduates went to senior middle

⁴. op.cit.


⁵. Gra. = Graduates.

schools in 1949, whereas only 37% did so in 1965, one year before the Cultural Revolution. The intakes to senior middle schools saw a steady increase after 1972. These intakes, as percentages of junior middle school graduates, reached 44% in 1980, which were, however, still lower than that of 1949. This reveals some problems in the educational system: In the expansion of primary and secondary education there has not been harmonization between each level. Additionally, fluctuations in intake have been caused by various political and social campaigns over the past 39 years. With regard to new entrants by ethnic groups into junior and senior middle schools, there is no disaggregated information available from 1949 to 1980. However, the number of new entrants to general secondary schools has increased steadily since 1980.

3. Junior Middle School New Entrants (1980-87)

According to the Educational Statistics of Xinjiang the number of new entrants to junior middle schools was 236,432 in 1980, and reached 261,732 in 1986. 80% of primary school completers entered junior middle schools in 1980, while 85% of primary school completers did so in 1986. Figure 1 presents the data by ethnic groups.

Fig.1: Junior Middle School New Entrants by Ethnic Groups
As % of Primary School Completers by Ethnic Groups in XUAR,



This figure clearly shows that, although the overall intakes to junior middle schools have increased since 1980, the increases have not affected all ethnic groups equally. Thus junior middle school intakes as percentages of primary

⁶. op. cit.

school completers for Sibo and Mongol children were over 100% during the last 8 years. (This apparent anomaly comes from the inclusion of repeaters in the figures for Sibo and Mongol junior middle schools). Such a high transition of Sibo and Mongol children from primary to junior middle schools suggests that more schools were made available in these areas with the support of the regional government. The intakes for Kazak children were over 80% and they remained steady. Kirghiz intakes show fluctuations. 96% of their primary school completers went into Kirghiz junior middle schools in 1981, whereas only 68% did so in 1982. These fluctuations in junior middle school intakes for Kirghiz children can be explained in many ways, but most probably the nomadic life of the Kirghiz parents was the main reason. The intakes for Han-Chinese were over 90% and remained steady. Over 73% of Hui primary school completers went to junior middle schools between 1980 and 1987. All these percentages show that the internal efficiency of junior middle school education in Xinjiang was reasonably high.

In contrast, the average intakes for Uighur children during these 8 years were the lowest. Only about 62% of their primary school completers entered junior middle schools. There are many reasons for this. As explained in Chapter 4, most of the Uighurs live in rural areas, mainly in the southern part of Xinjiang, where natural resources are not yet tapped, the communications have not been developed, and

the living standards of the peasants are low. Thus poverty, lack of confidence that the children of peasants would gain access to higher education when they finish their secondary education, and the perceived irrelevance of secondary education to the growth of the local economy are reasons for the very low intakes. Besides, the government's strategic policy of 'check and balance'⁷ in educational planning bears some responsibility for them. Under this policy, which has particular relevance to the theme of this thesis, there have been insufficient funds available for investment in secondary education in rural areas, especially in south Xinjiang. In the northern and eastern parts of Xinjiang there are also large numbers of Uighurs, but most of these areas are divided into various autonomous districts and counties named after special ethnic groups. Table 3 presents the ethnic composition of 5 autonomous prefectures and 6 autonomous counties.

⁷. Lee Fu-shiang in his thesis, The Turkic-Moslem Problems in Sinkiang, described the situation in Xinjiang as follows:

'....all of the autonomous zhou [prefecture] and autonomous counties are multi-national in terms of their ethnic composition.'

Aside from the divide and rule formula, the Chinese Communist policy-makers also resorted to the method of check and balance in dealing with the Sinkiang Moslems, namely, the use of Mongols, Hui and Sibos as a political lever to counter-balance the power of Turkic Moslems.' Lee Fu-shiang (1973:171-176), See also quotation below.

Table 3: Percentages of Ethnic Groups in the Total Populations of Autonomous Prefectures and Autonomous Counties in XUAR, 1982⁸

	<u>total Pop.</u>	<u>Han</u>	<u>Uig.</u>	<u>Ka.</u>	<u>Hui</u>	<u>Kir.</u>	<u>Mong.</u>	<u>Sibo</u>	<u>Tajik</u>
Sanji Hui Au.									
Prefec.	1,187,294	75%	4%	8%	11%				
Ili Kazak									
Prefec.	3,022,591	66.	14.	10.					
Mori Kazak Au.									
County:	81,106	73.	5.	20.					
Barikol Kazak									
County:	99,930	73.	1.	24.		0.9			
Chapchal Sibö									
County:	137,000	41.	27.					13.	
Bayinghulin Mongol									
Prefec.:	784,606	54.	35.		5.		5.		
Bortala Mongol									
Prefec.:	293,058	64.	17.	11.	3.		7.		
Kubuksar Mongol									
County:	37,233	30.	3.	29.			36.		
Yanji Hui									
County:	113,673	53.	25.		20.		2.		
Kizilsu Kirghiz									
Prefec.:	326,805	4.7	65.			29.			
Tashkorghan Tajik									
County:	22,032		8.			6.		82.	

Table 3 indicates that in these so-called autonomous prefectures and counties, except Kizilsu where the majority are Uighurs, Tashkorghan with its 82% Tajik, and Qapqal, Han-Chinese are in the majority. Lee Fu-shiang describes this situation:

By creating the various autonomous areas in Sinkiang in such a peculiar way, the policy-makers of the Chinese Communists have apparently aimed at strengthening the ruling power of Han Chinese against any potential challenge from the

⁸. 1982 Regional Census.

Turkic Moslems, especially the Uyghurs who have played a leading role in the political activities of Sinkiang Moslems.... Nothing could pose a more critical threat to the ruling power of the Han-Chinese in that province than the existence of an alliance among the non-Chinese Moslems.⁹

In such prefectures and counties educational planning and other forms of public administration give preference to Han-Chinese and the host ethnic group. Naturally this ethnic group has or should have privileges in transition, admission and school expansion equal to those of the Han-Chinese. For example, the number of students in each class varies from school to school. In Xinjiang, between 1981 and 1987 there was an average of 293 students in each Kazak junior middle school, with about 29 students in each class; an average of 193 students in each Kirghiz junior middle school, with about 29 students in each class; 396 students in each Mongol junior middle school, with about 30 students in each class; but there were an average 464 students in each Uighur junior middle school, each class having about 40 students. In each Sibo junior middle school the average number of students was higher, about 600, with each class having an average of 36 students. Circumstances in Han-Chinese junior middle schools were quite different. Between 1980 and 1987, the average number of students in each Han-

. op. cit.

Chinese junior middle school was 692, with about 43 students in each class.¹⁰ This can be attributed to the fact that most Han-Chinese junior middle schools are day schools in urban areas, where the population density is high due to the influx of the Han immigrants. Besides, day schools can accommodate more students than boarding schools.

4. Senior Middle School New Entrants (1980-87)

Since 1980 the overall numbers of senior middle school new entrants have grown steadily with concomitant inequalities. The number of new entrants was 73,959 in 1980 and rose to 96,858 in 1986. 39% of junior middle school graduates went to senior middle schools in 1980 and 46% of them did so in 1986. But the 1987 intake to both junior and senior middle schools in Xinjiang dropped by 7% from that of 1986. This was because of the new government policy, already mentioned in Chapter Four, of the 'production responsibility system' which has had a more delaying effect on secondary education in Xinjiang compared with that in other provinces and cities of China.¹¹ Another reason was the government's new

¹⁰. Source: Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao.

¹¹. As has already been pointed out in Chapter 4, the primary school sector has been hit seriously by this 'responsibility system' throughout Xinjiang. According to the research conducted by the World Bank in 1985 and others, not only the primary sector but also the secondary sector of China's education have been affected by this government policy since 1980. For details see A World Bank Country Study - China, 1985; Lofstedt, Jan-Ingvar (1986) Educational Planning in China, Department of Education, Institute of International Education, University of Stockholm; and Chambers, D. & Gardner, J. (1985) Education


policy of 'vocationalisation of upper secondary schools'.¹² This policy of the vocationalisation, which covers skills needed for jobs in agriculture, commerce, and industry, as well as personal services, is designed to alleviate apparent skill shortages as well as reduce heavy pressure on university places.¹³ Details of new entrants by ethnic groups, 1980-87 is shown in Figure 2.

Profile - China, published by the British Council, London.

¹². Here 'upper secondary' refers to senior middle schools.

¹³. op.cit.

Fig. 2: Senior Middle School New Entrants by Ethnic Groups
As % of Junior Middle School Graduates by Ethnic Groups in
XUAR, 1980-87¹⁴



This figure reveals that the highest rate of transition from junior to senior middle schools was achieved by the Sibo and Mongol children. The Hui children are found at the bottom. On average 66% of Sibo junior middle school graduates went into senior middle schools. On average 65% of Mongol and Kirghiz, 58% of Kazak, 50% of Uighur, 41% of Han-Chinese, and only 28% of Hui children did so.

¹⁴. op. cit.

The Hui children, who have enjoyed a high representation in both primary and junior middle schools, are the most disadvantaged group in this transition. The most important reason for this is language. The Hui people do not have their own language, although they are different from the Han-Chinese in culture and religion. Therefore, they do not have specified Hui schools in Xinjiang composed of various ethnic groups, each competing for its own representation. Therefore, the Hui children share schools only with Han-Chinese. Thus one difficult task for Hui children is that they have to make a double effort in order to get their proper share in the transition from junior to senior middle schools, even in their Sanji Hui Autonomous District, and Yanji Hui Autonomous County, where the majority are Han-Chinese. Unlike the Hui, the Sibo, Mongol, Kazak, Kirghiz, Uighur and Han-Chinese have their own specified schools, because their own languages are used as media of instruction. In some cases, too, self-evaluation within schools can protect the ethnic interest as a whole, although progression is determined by the examination result of students. Schools specified by the first language may not only define the educational quality of students but can claim greater funds, if they have more students and resolve some of their own problems, which depend on local circumstances such as finance, the availability of teachers and other facilities, provided that the local bureaucrats, who mainly consist of Han-Chinese, are really concerned

about the development of local education.

5. Medium of Instruction

General secondary educational facilities have been made available to the different ethnic groups in Xinjiang since 1949. The medium of instruction is the mother-tongue in Han-Chinese, Uighur, Kazak, Kirghiz, Mongol and Sibo junior and senior middle schools, teachers, books and other resources being provided, as just stated, according to local demand and circumstances. Where there is one ethnic group living with other ethnic groups, both junior and senior middle schools have been specially built for the children of that one ethnic group. Those from other ethnic groups may then go either to Han-Chinese middle schools in that particular area or to the schools specially built for the compact ethnic group. Hu Shiao-chung describes this:

Although the teaching medium in most of the nationality schools was Chinese, the educational system and practice in autonomous regions were patterned along the Communist lines....Once the general direction of a new party line was clarified, the aim of education for both Han and all other peoples was the same: to cultivate successors of the revolutionary cause....While much of the traditional religious and social

expressions were purged, many new terms, particularly those concerned with Chinese and Communism, were introduced mainly in colloquial form. It was expected that through the new media, used primarily in schools, a new mentality could be implanted.¹⁵

Here again is an interesting insight into the great issue of assimilation already identified in Chapter One. With such schemes in mind, Uighur and other ethnic schools which existed before the Revolution have been changed and developed, and new schools for both Han-Chinese and other ethnic groups have been built and expanded. Table 4 presents the numbers of schools for the various language groups, 1981-1987.

**Table 4: Numbers of Junior Middle Schools by First Language
in XUAR, 1981-87¹⁶**

Date	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Chinese	769	809	781	762	762	675	650
Uighur	327	347	336	366	343	362	359
Kazak	133	152	154	152	156	128	132
Kirghiz	9	13	12	9	13	15	13
Mongol	8	12	14	18	16	15	18
Sibo	2	2	2	2	3	3	3
Mixed	100	74	50	44	60	59	58
Total	1,348	1,409	1,349	1,353	1,353	1,254	1,233

¹⁵. Hu, Shiao-chung (1973) Education In The People's Republic of China, 1949-1971, Ph D, George Peabody College for Teachers, p.427.

¹⁶. op. cit.

This table shows that one of the most notable changes in school numbers is in mixed schools which are schools where Han-Chinese and other ethnic groups such as Uighur, Kazak, Sibo, and Mongol work together in the same school-buildings. Non-mixed schools are totally separated from one another. During the Cultural Revolution Han-Chinese schools integrated with local non-Han ones in many towns,. For example, Aksu No. 2 Han General Secondary Key School (e.g.including junior and senior sections) integrated into Aksu No. 1 Uighur General Secondary Key School in 1972.¹⁷ As a result there were arguments and disputes between Han and non-Han staff and students about the allocation of offices, classrooms, dormitory buildings, finance and proper representation of non-Han staff on the school board of directors. After a ten years' struggle Aksu No.1 Uighur General Secondary School got rid of the Aksu No.2 General Secondary School, which went back to its original place in 1983. There were 100 such integrated schools in 1981, but only 58 of them were left in 1987, showing that a little less than half of them either separated or closed. This phenomenon reflects the difficulties occurring in the

¹⁷. 'Key' school means to have more priority in terms of finance, state-funding, better facilities, better qualified teachers, and strictly selected pupils or students. In China there are key middle schools and even key primary schools. There is even a limited number of key universities such as Beijing University, Qinghua University, Shanghai Fudan University, Guangzhou Zhongshan University, and Tianjin Nankai University; They are selected by either central or regional education bureaux.

process of assimilation, just re-emphasized earlier in this chapter, through education.

Because, as stated, Han, Uighur, Kazak, Kirghiz, Mongol and Sibo schools are totally separated from one another, each is in charge of its own enrolment under the leadership of the local educational bureaux, which are in turn controlled by the Regional Education Commission.

6. Junior Middle School Enrolments (1980-87)

Unlike primary school enrolments which declined, overall enrolments for the junior middle schools increased between 1980 and 1987. As Table 5 below shows:

**Table 5: Junior Middle School Enrolments by Ethnic Groups
in XUAR, 1980-1987¹⁸**

<u>date</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Han</u>	<u>Uighur</u>	<u>Kazak</u>	<u>Kir.</u>	<u>Mongol</u>	<u>Hui</u>
1980	675715	442211	156441	42078	2635	6130	21469
1981	657453	442599	142358	39527	2593	6772	19545
1982	677138	466519	139397	38045	2614	6071	20110
1983	698500	482589	141863	39213	2931	6638	20433
1984	713948	493080	145715	39537	2793	6908	20771
1985	731951	486769	166298	42402	2986	7407	21112
1986	762342	489715	188917	44284	3369	8012	22374
1987	775817	482521	201088	48513	3911	8311	25211

This table makes it clear that enrolments into junior middle schools since 1980 have been dominated by Han-

¹⁸. op. cit.

Chinese, their enrolments of 442,211 or 65% of the total in 1980 increasing to 482,521 or 62% in 1987. This decrease in percentage from 65 to 62 was due to the increased enrolments of Uighur children from 156,441 or 23% of the total in 1980 to 201,088 or 26% of the total in 1987.

7. Enrolments for Senior Middle Schools (1980-87)

Senior middle school enrolments have also grown rapidly since 1980 with high percentages for the Han-Chinese. Kazak and Mongol students have also enjoyed higher representation, as far as their age group populations and their numbers of junior middle school graduates are concerned. Table 6 gives details.

**Table 6: Senior Middle School Enrolments by Ethnic Groups
in XUAR, 1980-1987¹⁹**

Date	Total	Han	Uighur	Kazak	Kir.	Mongol	Hui	Sibo
1980	147446	97106	34376	9958	590	1315	2938	666
1981	155816	99970	38074	10635	779	1952	2950	808
1982	165619	108183	37851	11794	748	2249	2957	1040
1983	192914	117768	37023	12195	1002	2175	2919	1113
1984	192914	129693	41640	12908	756	2365	3503	1003
1985	223405	152206	47366	14291	894	2846	3640	1020
1986	261191	174178	58181	17128	1105	3649	4265	1279
1987	270586	175208	63073	19723	1277	3864	4495	1248

¹⁹. op. cit.

This table shows that the 1987 increase in senior middle school enrolments of Uighur students was a sharp one, rising from 58,181 in 1986 to 63,073 in 1987, and so, as has just been pointed out, had a slight effect on the Han-Chinese percentages of the total enrolments. At this juncture another point has to be made. As is described in the section on 'Changes in Intake', the representation of Kazak, Sibö, Mongol, Kirghiz, Hui and Han-Chinese children was higher than that of Uighur children in transition from primary schools to junior middle schools. At least 70% of each group made the transition. But in overall enrolments the representation of the Han-Chinese is overwhelmingly higher both in numbers and percentages of the total enrolments. Kazak, Kirghiz, Mongol, Sibö, and Hui together represent less than 7% of the total and their increase or decrease has not affected the increase or decrease of the Han-Chinese representation. But, as already mentioned, the nearly 3% increase in junior middle school enrolment of Uighur children in 1987 reduced the percentage of Han-Chinese children in the total enrolment from 65% in 1980 to 62% in 1987, despite their numerical increase in absolute terms. This has something to do with the large population of Uighurs and their large proportion of the school age group, which have always been followed with interest by the Han-Chinese authorities in their educational planning and decision-making in Xinjiang.

8. Duration of Schooling

The majority of primary school completers can progress to junior middle school at the age of twelve. Senior middle schools enrol junior middle school graduates when they are 14 or 15 years old. Their graduates can enter institutions of higher education, or in some cases go to secondary technical schools. The norm for full middle schooling (junior and senior) was six years before 1966 for both Han and non-Han children, and was changed to five years during and after the Cultural Revolution up to 1983. Some schools still offer a five-year course, but most schools, both Han and non-Han, restored the original six-year schooling after 1983. Junior middle school graduates go either to senior middle schools or to secondary specialized schools such as vocational schools, secondary normal schools or agricultural schools. But in fact many of them, especially those who are from rural and mountain areas, have to go home and become peasants, farmers²⁰ and herdsmen at the age of 14 or 15.

²⁰. There are difference between farmers and peasants in China. Farmers refer to those who work in farms normally run either by the state or by local authorities; farmers have regular salaries. Peasants are individual agriculturalists and do not have any salaries.

9. The Curricula

Although curriculum diversity exists in the general secondary schools, it can also reflect local inability to follow central guidelines rather than official encouragement to vary them. Table 7 is a schedule for Uighur general secondary schools in 1981 and may be regarded as typical for a six-year middle-school system. Literature, mathematics, physics and Standard Chinese remain the major subjects on the timetable. At this level, however, Standard Chinese is placed before the science subjects, physics and chemistry being given less time than Standard Chinese and mathematics. Although a foreign language - usually English - is also allocated at the senior middle schools, actually it has not been offered in most non-Han ones because of the lack of teachers to teach it. Besides, the authorities having agreed to offer a foreign language in non-Han senior middle schools at the beginning of the 1980s, later withdrew their offer. The major reason was that many non-Han schools were too keen on offering foreign languages despite teacher shortages, and were neglecting the promotion of Standard Chinese teaching. Furthermore, students were much more interested in learning a foreign language than Chinese. Parents also hope that their children are offered one foreign language as a subject. Why do parents and their children prefer a foreign language to Standard Chinese, which is the official language? In addition to the cultural gap between Han-

Chinese and non-Han people in Xinjiang, Standard Chinese has less attraction for the local people who believe it that is not a scientific language. Nor are the Han-Chinese themselves at the front of technological development. They themselves, through acquired foreign languages, are learning their technology from foreign countries. Many non-Han people in Xinjiang want to improve their inferior status through a direct approach rather than a slow indirect one. From this point of view there can be no harm in offering foreign languages in non-Han secondary schools, where the financial situation and staff permit. This does not mean abandoning Standard Chinese.

Politics, still a compulsory subject in each year, is in a prominent position. Physical education remains important. History,²¹ biology and geography receive less attention than does Standard Chinese. Music and fine arts are given a small amount of time.

²¹. In non-Han schools the history of the Chinese Communist Party and the modern history of China are taught instead of history of Xinjiang and the various nationalities in the Region.

Table 7: Schedule for Uighur General Secondary Schools, 1981²²

Subjects	Junior Middle School			Senior Middle School			total (periods)
	Year1 (periods per week)	Year2 (periods per week)	Year3 (periods per week)	Year1 (periods per week)	Year2 (periods per week)	Year3 (periods per week)	
Politics	2	2	2	2	2	2	396
Uighur:							
Literature	3	3	3	4	4	4	
Grammar	3	3	3	-	-	-	
total	6	6	6	4	4	4	996
Chinese	4	4	4	4	4	4	792
Mathematics	7	6	6	5	5	5	1158
Physics	-	4	3	3/4	3/4	4	624
Chemistry	-	-	3	3	3	3	390
Geography	3	2	-	3	-	-	266
History	3	2	-	3	-	-	266
Biology	2	2	-	-	-	3/2	216
Physiology	-	-	1	-	-	1	66
Physical							
Education	2	2	2	2	2	2	396
Music/Song	1	1	1	-	-	-	102
Fine Arts	1	1	1	-	-	-	102
Foreign							
language	-	-	-	3	3	3	288
weekly total	31	31	30	30/31	29/30	30/31	
after class							
Review	4	4	4	3	3	3	
Scientific							
Activities	2	2	2	2	2	2	
Sport	2	2	2	3	3	3	
Youth League&							
PioneerActivity	2	2	2	2	2	2	
total	10	10	10	10	10	10	

Junior secondary: teaching 34 weeks; examination revision 4 weeks; labour 2 weeks; Total 40 weeks.

Senior middle school: teaching 32 weeks; examination revision 4 weeks; labour 4 weeks; total 40 weeks

²². Source: Abdulla Talip, Uyghur Ma'aripining Taeraeqqiyati, 1987. P. 31.

This curriculum gives a high academic content to general secondary education, which has in turn stimulated a demand for higher education that cannot be met. At the same time, it has disgorged a stream of young people on to the labour market who lack intermediate technical skills and require extensive preliminary training, before they can become skilled workers, farmers and peasants.

The political education in secondary schools and secondary specialised schools serves, first of all, to train students as successors who have to be developed morally, academically and physically and be given an all-round development. It has been closely linked to various political and social changes at different times in China. In the 1950s it was focused on obeying the law, promoting friendship among the nationalities e.g. friendship between Han and non-Han people. The political education in the 1960s was to improve and raise class consciousness and identify class 'enemies'. On this point Hu Shiao-chung says:

By 1964 a new nationwide purge in the name of 'Socialist Education' was already under way. Since then, the party leadership has reverted to its former tough policy towards the minorities. As in China proper, "classes" were created among the nationalities at the end of 1962, and "class

education" received renewed emphasis.²³

Further quoting Mao's concepts that "the question of nationality is the question of classes", he argues that in China the question of nationality is connected with the question of classes and the long-term goal of the Chinese Communists was to abolish nationalities, 'national peculiarities' and differences through the extinction of classes 'with the coming of communism'. Thus, political education in secondary schools has emphasized a stand on the side of the workers and poor and lower-middle peasants, building up the views of dialectical materialism and beliefs in 'one motherland, one party and one road (i.e. the socialist road)' and drawing clear distinctions concerning the cardinal issues of right and wrong. The aim of such an education was to prepare students for the later 'two line, two road and two class' struggle which was carried on for ten years between 1966 and 1976 and is now acknowledged as a disaster. The struggle between the so-called 'two lines - proletariat revolutionary and bourgeois reactionary, two roads - socialist and capitalist and two classes - working class and exploiting class' has been an endless one for power among the high ranking officials in China.

²³. Hu Shiao-chung (1973:426).

Thereafter political education in secondary schools in the 1970s was aimed at recognizing the disasters brought to China by the Cultural Revolution and the need to stick to the Party's four principles, namely 'to uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong's thoughts, adhere to the Party's basic line for the entire historical period of socialism, persist in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and insist on marching forward along the socialist road'. The major content of the political course in secondary schools since 1980 has been to obey the law, to keep clean, to be moral in deeds, to be kind in words and to love science.²⁴

Despite the importance given to political education and the changes it underwent in the curriculum of the schools, the majority of young people are suspicious of the view that communism is inevitable in China and Xinjiang. A survey of students' attitudes in China revealed that 'courses on political theory, as well as political activities generally, are considered not very useful (82.35 percent)... When asked to appraise the moral qualities required of college students, the highest percentage (34.8 percent) chose 'patriotism,' followed by 'having communist ideals' (28 percent) and 'upholding the truth' (14.6 percent).'²⁵ According to Abdulla Talip a similar survey

²⁴. See note on page 246.

²⁵. Rosen, S. Chinese Education, No. 7 1985, 1985-86.

on the attitudes of general secondary students in both Uighur and Han-Chinese schools in Kashgar in 1984 reveals that the majority of the students, most notably the majority of Uighur students, lack belief in the future and communism.

The reform of the Uighur and Kazak scripts had caused considerable damage to the curriculum of Uighur secondary education between 1966 and 1980. Numerous textbooks written in Arabic script, already published and being used throughout Xinjiang before 1965, were destroyed, due to the introduction of a modified roman script. A large number of staff was organized to change textbooks in Arabic script into the new one. Short training courses were conducted all over Xinjiang for general secondary school teachers, cadres, workers and leaders to enable them to teach in schools, read newspapers, and write romanized Uighur script in their daily work. It took a long time to reprint all those newly translated textbooks and many schools were confronted with shortages. This in turn inevitably affected the quality of teaching and learning. Worst of all, those who were taught in the modified romanized Uighur script suffered, at least for several years, by having to re-learn the Arabic script, when the romanized script was officially discontinued in 1983. It is commonly believed that the so-called language reform of the Uighur Arabic script set back Uighur culture and education more than ten years. But the reform had other motives. According to Birnbaum:

In the critical areas of minority nationality, religion, language, literature, and history, the CCP has tried to reshape the contents of these disciplines to make them work as tools to aid in the implementation of CCP policies.... New scripts have been written for the minority peoples. If the Communists are successful, the children of the minority peoples will be unable to read their ancestors' histories and literature in the old scripts, completely divorcing them from their own past. Moreover, all former teaching materials not in complete accord with current CCP policies are in danger of destruction. In many cases, textbooks were severely edited or were taken en-toto [sic] from Chinese Communist sources and directly translated into the new minority scripts.²⁶

This is yet another example of the attempt to assimilate (See Chapter One). But with the re-introduction of the Uighur Arabic script the danger of divorcing the young from their own past has been greatly reduced.

²⁶. Birnbaum N. (1971) Communist China's Policy Toward her Minority Nationalities:1950-1965 (Ph. D), St. John's University, New York, P.209.


10. Expansion and Inequality

The development of Xinjiang's general secondary education since 1949 has been more impressive than that of primary education, but the widening inequalities between the different ethnic groups in this development has been much more dramatic.

11. Junior Middle School Enrolments (1950-80)

In 1950, junior middle schools enrolled 5,263 students. By 1980 enrolments had grown to 675,715. For the purposes of this chapter an examination of the growth according to Han and non-Han is necessary. See Figure 3 below.

Fig.3: Junior Middle School Enrolments, Han and Non-Han, as % of Total Junior Middle School Enrolments in XUAR, 1950-80 ²⁷



From this figure it can be seen that the enrolment growth between 1950 and 1961 was steady, with an average of 84% non-Han and of 16% Han-Chinese represented. The non-Han students increased from 4,257 in 1950 to 100,924 by 1961,


²⁷. op. cit.

while the Han-Chinese students rose from 1,006 to 21,832. However, after 1962 the respective representations of Han-Chinese and non-Han students were reversed, so that the period between 1962 and 1964 saw a steady decline of non-Han enrolments and a steady increase of Han-Chinese ones. Thus, non-Han enrolments declined from 100,924 in 1961 to 57,565 in 1964, nearly half of the former number, while the Han-Chinese enrolments increased from 21,832 to 32,339 during the same period.

12. Senior Middle School Enrolments (1950-80)

The situation in senior middle school enrolments is similar. Their overall enrolments grew from 470 students in 1950 to 147,446 by 1980. But it is necessary to examine the growth for Han and non-Han separately in order to find out the degree of equal or unequal development. This is shown in Figure 4 below:

Fig. 4: Senior Middle School Enrolments, Han and Non-Han, as Percentages of Total Senior Middle School Enrolments in XUAR, 1950-80 ²⁸



This figure shows that there has been a dramatic change in the composition of the senior middle school populations in Xinjiang since 1949. 74% of total enrolments were non-Han in 1950, whereas by 1980 they constituted only 34%. The increase of Han-Chinese in senior middle school enrolments was huge, especially between 1971 and 1980, their senior

²⁸. op. cit.

middle school enrolments growing from only 6,939 in 1971 to 97,106 in 1980. This unusual increase reduced non-Han percentage enrolments greatly, though they had grown from 348 students in 1950 to 50,340 in 1980. The decrease of non-Han and the increase of Han-Chinese early in the 1960s resulted partly from natural disasters (see Chapter 4), but mainly from the government policy towards Xinjiang taken immediately during and after the Sino-Soviet dispute of 1962. As already stated, this event, followed by the natural disasters, persuaded the Beijing regime to accelerate the speed of pouring immigrants into the Region in order to 'stabilize' the situation.

The Cultural Revolution further sped up the reversal in general secondary school enrolments of Han and non-Han. From the beginning of 1967 the non-Han enrolments in both junior and senior middle schools started declining, whereas the enrolments for Han began increasing, from 51,069 students in 1967 to 197,177 in 1973 (The latter covered 70% of the total junior middle school enrolment) and are indeed surprising. The sharp contrast leads one to think that both the anti-revisionism campaign and the Cultural Revolution in Xinjiang aimed at reducing, if not totally destroying, education for non-Han, especially for Uighurs, while increasing and expanding education for the Han.

The enrolment process links one level to another, the increase or decrease in the one influencing the other. The

increased inequality in the enrolments to primary schools has led to greater inequality in the enrolments to junior middle schools and the inequality in senior middle and secondary specialized schools is rooted in the junior middle schools, all caused, as repeatedly emphasized, by the expansion of the Han through immigration and settlement. Therefore, it is not difficult to conclude that enrolment inequality in Xinjiang is mainly a political factor rather than a cultural one. But economic factors have also helped to increase the inequality between Han and non-Han. As Mao Zedong said 'Running schools.... does not cost the state a cent'²⁹ because both junior and senior middle schools in rural areas are collectively run schools. The majority of the rural population in Xinjiang being non-Han, these 'collectively-run' schools have always had to cry out for help from the state. They have suffered from shortages of qualified teachers, safe buildings and classrooms, standard textbooks, laboratories and proper food for their boarders. In response, the central government has never failed to call on the people, whoever they are, Han or non-Han, to run schools through 'self-reliance' and the 'economic way'. Its propaganda never ceases to report that various 'model schools' run themselves in this way, which it approves.

²⁹. Hu, Shiao-chung, op.cit. (1973:576).

A report in Xinjiang Ma'aripi provides an example of such people-run, model schools. Kayrak Junior Middle School was built in 1979, mainly by the effort of peasants of six villages in Upper Artush County in Kashgar. It occupies a total space of 2,115 square metres, with 13 classrooms, 12 offices, a dining-hall and a truck park. In 1980 in order to keep the school open, the school built a humdan (brick-furnace) which could contain 100,000 bricks at a time. Bricks produced by unpaid student employees were sold on the markets of Artush, Kashgar, Kansu and Ulughchat. Using part of the income from the brick-products, the school bought a truck in 1982. Using this truck made the brick business easier for the school and definitely increased the net income. The truck was used, on the one hand, to carry bricks, and on the other as a local taxi. Besides, the school has 8 mu of land from which it produced grain and fodder. Within six years the total net income from their brick, truck and grain business reached 47,500 yuan, out of which 5,000 yuan were spent on repairs, 6,000 on the dining-hall and erecting a steel gate for the school, and 6,800 on daily necessities for students and teachers. With another 5,000 yuan a wall was put up round the school. More than half the income was still left. By doing all this, the school has become a model one of self-support through self-reliance and the economic way, saving the state more than

100,000 yuan.³⁰

This is only one of numerous reports which frequently appear in the Xinjiang Ma'aripi under the special titles of 'a model of running a school through self-reliance and the economic way', 'model persons and collective units giving financial support to local schools' and 'model cadres helping local education'. It is considered a good thing for rural schools to get various kinds of support from the local people and to depend on students' labour. But from a long-term point of view, the propaganda underpinned by the 'self-reliance and economic way' policy can lead rural schools along the highly risky road of making schools commercial centres and child-labour camps. As far as academic standards are concerned, it is impossible for students from such cheap schools to compete with students out of urban schools, where everything is done for them by the state. The result will be in two directions - one towards better schooling, better jobs and better lives for children in urban areas, where the majority are Han; the other towards poor schooling, unemployment and hard lives for those in rural areas. Such divisions will eventually lead to conflict, confrontation and even revolt. As discussed earlier (Chapter One), the situation in Tibet and the 1985 strike by non-Han, mainly Uighur, students in

³⁰. Xinjiang Ma'aripi (Education of Xinjiang, monthly journal), No.6, 1987, p.58-59.

Urumqi have proved this.

There are other examples of financial shortages in people-run schools. Members of the Science and Culture Association of Xinjiang University Students made an investigation of schools in Ghulja City during the winter vacation of 1987. 5 out of 12 schools visited were middle schools. Details of two of them are given below.

Ghulja City No.12 Middle School

The school, built in 1979, had a total number of 413 students with 34 staff. Students were divided into 12 classes and attended double-sessions. The school was administered by the City Education Bureau from the date of its founding until 1985, when it was handed over to the local authorities as one of the collectively run schools. 7 out of 12 classrooms collapsed in the rains of 1987. Classrooms were dark and damp. The ceiling of one of these had to be propped up by ten pillars. There was only one office for all the 30 teachers to prepare their lessons, work out plans and carry out other activities such as meetings. There were not enough chairs for them to sit on, so they had to share or use the chairs in turn. Some of those who could not get one had to stand. There were no reference materials nor adequate teaching aids, let alone equipment for physical education. Having faced such serious difficulties, the school's board went to the City

Educational Bureau many times, asking for financial help. But the head of the Educational Bureau told them that they should go to the local authority which was in charge. But the Secretary of the local administration was a person who had only the education of a primary school second year pupil.

Ghulja City No.16 Middle School

Ghulja City No.16 Middle School was also built in 1979. 17 out of the 76 original staff had not been appointed. Four teachers were sick due to poor living conditions. 12 among the total staff were workers. The remaining 41 teachers had to carry on teaching 1,200 students in 24 classes, each with an average of 18 to 20 periods a week. In the heavy rains of 1987 18 classrooms were sealed off, because of the danger of collapse. In consequence, the students of 6 classes in Grade 1 had to stop schooling for 45 days. Those in Grades 2, and 3 could not continue their courses for 15 days. There were not enough benches and chairs even in Grade 2. Three students had to share one bench. The limited chairs and stools were worn out and unrepai³¹red. These are two examples among many.

³¹. Pan Wa Madinyat (literal meaning: science and culture), an unofficial magazine published by the Students Association, No.1 1988, p.38 and 42.

Secondary Specialized Schools

As already stated, some of the junior middle school graduates go to senior middle schools, some go to factories, farms and the countryside and some to other institutions which exist at this level and are of increasing importance. Some of these are specialized secondary schools, which are divided into secondary normal (teacher-training) schools and secondary technical schools. Although they usually admit junior middle school graduates, it has not been uncommon for senior middle school graduates to be admitted.

1. New Entrants (1949-80)

According to the Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao, between 1949 and 1960 the number of new entrants to secondary technical schools in Xinjiang increased greatly. Only 80 new students entered secondary technical schools in 1949, whereas 8,329 did so in 1960. Natural disaster and inadequate expansion during the Great Leap Forward between 1958 and 1959 crippled all secondary schools. Therefore, in 1962 the number of new entrants dropped to only 233. The Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976 brought a halt to the secondary technical schools in 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970. New students started entering again only from the beginning of 1971 and in 1980 reached 8,038, which was

still lower than the figure for 1960.

The intakes into secondary normal schools in Xinjiang had fluctuations similar to those in other sectors, but since 1971 they have rapidly increased due to the increased demand for primary school teachers urgently needed for the expansion of primary education. Table 8 shows these fluctuations and increases.

Table 8: Numbers of Secondary Technical and Normal School New Entrants in XUAR, 1949-80 ³²

date	technical	normal	total
1949	80	626	706
1950	264	1,481	1,745
1951	281	2,052	2,333
1952	324	2,717	3,041
1953	716	1,313	2,029
1954	435	1,139	1,574
1955	2,152	1,194	3,346
1956	2,953	2,073	5,026
1957	2,096	1,749	3,845
1958	4,855	1,924	6,779
1959	6,108	3,430	9,538
1960	8,329	5,634	13,963
1961	4,520	2,179	6,699
1962	233	274	507
1963	2,103	720	2,823
1964	2,753	1,856	4,609
1965	4,724	2,601	7,325
1966	862	1,067	1,929
1971	619	340	959
1972	1,110	3,300	4,410
1973	2,977	3,522	6,499
1974	3,223	5,181	8,404
1975	3,550	6,890	10,440
1976	3,692	6,221	9,913
1977	4,375	6,000	10,375
1978	6,530	6,090	12,620
1979	8,038	8,295	16,333
1980	7,007	7,681	14,688

³². Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao, 1949-80.

This table also shows that secondary technical and secondary normal education has been more seriously affected by abrupt policy changes since 1949 than any other level of the education system. During the Cultural Revolution, many technical and normal schools were actually closed down. School buildings were converted into factories or houses; equipment was dismantled and handed over to various enterprises or even scrapped. Teachers were reassigned to other duties or dispersed to the countryside.

2. New Entrants (1980-1987)

However, since 1980 the intakes into secondary specialized schools have shown a steady improvement. The increase is more obvious for Han than non-Han people in secondary technical schools. On the other hand, there was a reasonable representation of Uighur students in secondary normal schools, although the intakes began declining after 1981. Table 9 shows secondary technical school by ethnic groups in Part A, and secondary normal school by ethnic groups in Part B.

Table 9: A) Secondary Technical School New Entrants by Ethnic Groups in XUAR, 1980-87 ³³

date	total	Han	Uighur	Kazak	Hui	Kir.	Mongol	Sibo	other
1980	7,007	3,666	2,499	525	94	10	104	33	76
1981	4,860	2,513	1,645	440	90	51	42	46	33
1982	4,906	2,549	1,711	292	80	22	101	22	129
1983	5,633	2,930	1,980	429	94	21	83	45	51
1984	9,208	4,861	3,206	555	144	75	148	120	99
1985	10,158	5,702	3,156	805	186	70	91	48	100
1986	10,031	5,426	3,016	928	172	72	232	39	146
1987	11,110	6,467	3,183	937	205	48	111	55	104

Table 9: B) Secondary Normal School New Entrants by Ethnic Groups in XUAR, 1980-87 ³⁴

date	total	Han	Uighur	Kazak	Hui	Kir.	Mong.	Sibo	Other
1980	7,681	2,592	3,884	903	98	33	149	6	16
1981	4,891	1,631	2,514	517	49	25	143	1	11
1982	3,040	951	1,438	415	48	55	121	3	9
1983	3,709	1,366	1,518	541	51	50	174	1	8
1984	4,225	1,611	1,749	483	71	56	243	2	10
1985	3,761	1,195	1,636	457	67	42	296	44	21
1986	4,397	1,457	2,083	464	78	86	202	4	23
1987	3,876	1,435	1,652	427	92	46	202	2	20

The above tables show that in both the technical and normal sectors the different ethnic groups had been competing, but that in the technical sector there was a rapid increase of Han new entrants after the adjustment. Before 1981 there was a tendency for secondary technical and secondary normal schools to admit a considerable number of senior middle school graduates. Therefore, in the early 1980s the State

³³. Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987.

³⁴. *ibid.*

Education Commission demanded that secondary specialized schools should strictly obey the rules and principles of admission policy i. e. they should admit only junior middle school graduates or equivalent qualified candidates, so changing from 2,513 new entrants in 1981 to 6,467 in 1987. In this way, the lower transition of Han-Chinese from junior to senior middle schools is perhaps partially explained. In other words, Han-Chinese junior middle school graduates may have actually enjoyed higher representation in the secondary technical education sector.

As shown by the table, the representation of Uighur students, who had been a disadvantaged group in comparison with students from other ethnic groups in primary school intake and had become the most disadvantaged of all groups in the transition from primary to junior middle schools (See Chapter 4 for details), is higher as far as secondary normal schools are concerned. Here it is necessary to point out that the total secondary normal school enrolment for 1987 constituted only 3% of the total enrolment for all secondary senior and technical schools. In this tiny sector the Uighur students had high representation. How did this happen and why? At least five reasons can be given:

First, the Uighur secondary normal school system was the earliest one established in Xinjiang. According to the Xinjiang Daily, there were secondary normal schools as early as the 1910s in some counties and districts. Such

schools were in existence as early as the 1860s according to Western sources, and Chinese scholars suggest that normal education was considered important before 1911.³⁵

According to Dabbs:

Robert B. Shaw felt the urge to improve on geographical knowledge. ... While Johnson was the first Englishman to travel in Eastern Turkestan and return to report, Shaw has the distinction of being the second and of being the first to send out a letter from that area.

....

One of the surprising results of this expedition was the picture drawn of Yarkand as a flourishing city of 100,000 people, with active commerce, 60 "colleges", many primary schools, and a great variety of consumers' goods, even ice for cooling sherbets. The enlightened rule of Yakub Beg encouraged public works. The area, then, meant to Shaw a huge outlet for trade goods in cloth and

³⁵. Hu Shiao-chung in his Ph D thesis describes minority education before 1949 as follows:

Contrary to the popular belief that "before 1941, very few of the national minorities had anything but the scantiest provision for education, education for minority nationalities in China Mainland [sic] had already been developed to a fairly sophisticated degree before 1949,.... In Sinkiang, for example, each of the 53 hsian [sic] had one to six primary schools before the establishment of the republic. Yu Shu-lin attributes this growth to the emphasis laid on normal education. - Hu, Shiao-chung (1973)

tea, a whole pot of which was considered a normal portion for each man upon rising in the morning.³⁶

Shaw's reference to 60 'colleges' in Yarkan in 1868 may be an exaggeration, but at least it proves that there were schools which were on a higher level than primary ones, because he lists 'colleges' as distinct from 'many primary schools'.

Since 1949, the provision of normal schools has been modified so that other counties and districts possessing only senior middle schools, have built their own secondary normal schools. The following table gives the details for 1984:

³⁶. A) Dabbs, J. A. (1963) History of the Discovery and Exploration of Chinese Turkistan, Mouton & Co. The Hague, p.51-52. Shaw, "A Visit To Yarkand and Kashgar," [Extracts] in Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, Vol.14 1870, pp.-124-137.

B) According to Dabbs, Shaw received the Patron's Medal of the Royal Geographical Society and wrote about geography until his death in 1879. His famous work was Journey to Kashgar (1871).

Table: 10 20 Secondary Normal Schools in XUAR, 1984 ³⁷

name No.of	location foundation	time of instruction	medium of class	No.of student	No.of staff
Kashgar Normal School: Kashgar	1935	Uighur	21	667	204
Aksu Normal School: Aksu	1934	Uighur	15	606	134
Yarkan Normal School: Yarkan	1944	Uighur	8	333	95
Qariqash Normal School: Qariqash	1980	Uighur	3	140	30
Hotan Normal School: Hotan	1972	Uighur	8	332	51
Kizilsu Normal School: Artush	1956	Uighur	14	395	74
Bayinghulin Normal School: Karashahar	1937	Uighur	7	285	104
Ili No.1 Normal School: Kunaes	1975	Kazak	9	351	?
Ili No.2 Normal School: Ili City	1974	Chinese	8	299	60
Chochaek Normal School: Chochaek	1963	Chinese,	15	545	121
Bortala Normal School: Bortala	1972	Kazak H.U.K.M. ³⁸	13	445	170
Karamay Normal School: Karamay City	1976	Uighur,	11	431	126
ShiHezi Normal School: Shihezi City	1975	Chinese	9	352	?
Sanji Normal School: Sanji City	1959	Chinese	20	772	208

³⁷. Xinjiang Yilnamisi, 1986, pp. 1939-1741, Xinjiang Khaliq Naeshiryati, Urumqi.

³⁸. The media of instruction are in four languages. They are Standard Chinese, Uighur, Kazak and Mongol, because courses are conducted in separate classes according to the students' languages groups.

Manas Normal School: Manas	1979	Chinese	5	236	51
Guchung Normal School: Guchung	1972	Chinese	6	254	63
Altay Normal School: Altay	1965	Chinese,	16	520	88
Komul Normal School: Komul	1959	Kazak Uighur,	8	309	?
Turpan Normal School: Turpan	1976	Chinese Uighur,	13	532	104
Mongol Normal School: Urumqi	1953	Chinese Mongol	6	24	50
Urumqi Normal School:1916		Uighur ³⁹			

From this table it can be seen that most Han and other secondary normal schools were built during or after the Cultural Revolution, whereas the majority of the Uighur normal schools were built before 1965.

The second reason, for the high representation of Uighur students in secondary normal schools is that among 20 secondary normal schools in Xinjiang, 55% are ones where the medium of instruction is Uighur. This means that there are more Uighur teachers and more room for Uighur students

³⁹. A) According to Xinjiang Gazette, there was a big celebration on the 23rd anniversary of the founding of Urumqi Secondary Normal School on the first of December 1939. Xinjiang Geziti (Xinjiang Daily), December 1, 1939; in the Hoover Institute Library in Stanford University, California). Later on this school became the Urumqi Institute of Education.

B) Source: Xinjiang Yilnamisi (literal meaning: the yearbook of Xinjiang, 1986 (Xinjiang People's Press, Urumqi), P.1739-1740; and also from Abdulla Talip (1987) Uyghur Ma'aripining Taeraeqqiyati (literal meaning: development of Uighur Education.

in normal schools. Third, the growing population of Uighurs produces more school-age children. Thus expansion at the primary school level is understandable, and the demand for Uighur primary school teachers produced by secondary normal schools has gone on increasing.

Fourth, in Uighur education there has always been a strong belief that teachers are the foundation of education and the engineers of human beings. This common belief keeps the secondary normal schools going, although numerous teachers have been heavily criticized, punished and some even persecuted in successive social campaigns, most notably during the movement against local nationalism between 1957 and 1958 and during the Cultural Revolution.

Finally, like others, the Uighurs, realising the advantages and the capacity of the secondary normal schools, have slowly expanded them with the support of local government, since secondary normal schools are in charge of their own admissions under the leadership of the local educational bureaux. They can decide the number of entrants according to the local demand for primary school teachers, in addition to providing finance, staff and observing other conditions. Since normal school graduates are assigned to teach within their own prefecture or district, enrolment plans are also fitted to the needs for local teachers. All these reasons explain why the intakes of Uighur students to secondary normal school have remained high. Of course, some of these reasons also apply to other ethnic groups, such as

the Kazak and Mongol. The data can be seen to prove that Han-Chinese had neglected secondary normal school education, focusing rather on senior middle schools which are the stepping-stones to the institutions of higher education. That is why most of the Han secondary normal schools were built during or after the Cultural Revolution. They are now catching up.

3. Medium of Instruction

In secondary technical schools the medium of instruction is, in most cases, Standard Chinese, but in some schools subjects are taught in Uighur. In schools where the medium of instruction is Standard Chinese, non-Han students spend an extra six months or a year studying it before they start special subject courses. In contrast the mother-tongue is the medium of instruction in all Han-Chinese, Uighur, Kazak and Mongol normal schools.

4. Enrolments (1980-1987)

Between 1980 and 1987 Han-Chinese students were still over-represented in the enrolment of secondary technical schools. Such over-representation is an unavoidable consequence of the unusual expansion at the primary and junior secondary levels, caused by the demographic expansion of Han-Chinese through immigration and settlement in Xinjiang since 1949 (chapters One and Four and *passim*).

Secondary normal school enrolments in the 1980s have decreased both in numbers and percentages for Uighur and Kazak entrants, whereas they have increased for Han-Chinese, Kirghiz, Sibo, Hui and Mongols after the adjustments of 1980 and 1981. The increasing demand for primary school teachers for the groups mentioned above has promoted this growth during the last few years. At the same time, this growth seems aimed at keeping a fair balance between all ethnic groups in secondary normal schools. Table 11 gives details of recent developments:

Table 11: A) Secondary Technical School Enrolments by Ethnic Groups in XUAR, 1980-87 ⁴⁰

<u>date</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Han</u>	<u>Uighur</u>	<u>Kazak</u>	<u>Kir.</u>	<u>Mongol</u>	<u>Hui</u>	<u>Sibo</u>
1980	22,766	13,111	7,252	1,394	101	274	334	161
1981	15,012	6,954	6,019	1,184	78	264	294	98
1982	19,121	9,224	7,426	1,402	145	264	375	131
1983	14,676	6,911	5,527	1,361	90	244	298	111
1984	19,252	9,596	6,975	1,531	139	324	315	185
1985	23,477	11,978	8,147	1,845	164	389	428	191
1986	25,558	13,405	8,467	2,202	179	373	476	129
1987	28,143	15,042	9,021	2,649	158	397	508	115

⁴⁰. op. cit.

Table 11: B) Secondary Normal School Enrolments by Ethnic Groups in XUAR, 1980-87 ⁴¹

date	Total	Han	Uighur	Kazak	Kir.	Sibo	Hui	Mongol
1980	19,596	6,988	9,621	2,049	105	62	261	448
1981	15,278	5,074	7,879	1,568	57	10	172	465
1982	9,869	3,333	4,718	1,192	57	6	141	376
1983	7,817	2,731	3,478	963	102	6	126	386
1984	8,898	3,202	3,647	1,197	104	6	164	543
1985	9,774	3,385	4,079	1,206	80	47	200	730
1986	10,673	3,613	4,774	1,027	149	53	205	794
1987	11,699	4,077	4,848	1,374	188	55	245	430

5. Duration of Schooling and the Curricula

In secondary technical schools there is neither a clearly defined nor unified national curriculum. New entrants can be distributed over the following subject areas: industry, medicine, finance and economics, agriculture, politics and law, forestry, fine arts and physical education. Secondary technical education lasts two to three years, depending on the students' language background and the medium of instruction used in the schools they have come from, while secondary normal schools need three years for both Han and non-Han.

⁴¹. op. cit.

6. Expansion and Inequality

Secondary specialized education in Xinjiang has not achieved such an ethnically balanced expansion as general secondary education. Tables 12 A and B present their growth by Han and non-Han, 1950-80.

Table 12: A) Secondary Technical School Enrolments, Han and Non-Han in XUAR, 1950-80 ⁴²

date	Total	Non-Han	Han	NH %	Han %
1950	433	271	162	63.	37.
1951	545	280	265	51.	49.
1952	795	406	389	51.	49.
1953	1,200	575	625	48.	52.
1954	1,282	645	637	50.	50.
1955	2,907	1,189	1,718	41.	59.
1956	5,496	2,959	2,537	54.	46.
1957	7,234	4,532	2,702	63.	37.
1958	10,425	5,159	5,266	49.	51.
1959	13,405	6,412	6,993	48.	52.
1960	17,225	8,913	8,312	52.	48.
1961	16,989	8,586	8,403	51.	49.
1962	6,043	2,861	3,182	47.	53.
1963	5,590	2,686	2,904	48.	52.
1964	5,977	2,749	3,228	46.	54.
1965	9,855	4,104	5,751	42.	58.
1966	8,094	2,729	5,365	34.	66.
1967	6,159	2,298	3,861	37.	63.
1968	1,380	1,131	249	82.	18.
1969	528	172	356	33.	67.
1970	32	32			
1971	619	417	202	67.	33.
1972	1,110	464	646	42.	58.
1973	4,040	332	3,708	8.	92.
1974	6,390	(un.a)			
1975	7,531	3,162	4,369	42.	58.
1976	7,879	(un.a)			
1977	8,655	(un.a)			
1978	11,765	4,583	7,182	39.	61.
1979	18,785	6,940	11,845	37.	63.
1980	22,766	9,655	13,111	42.	58.

⁴². op. cit.

Table 12: B) Secondary Normal School Enrolments, Han and Non-Han, in XUAR, 1950-80 ⁴³

date	Total	Non-Han	Han	NH %	Han %	
1950	2,393	1,663	730	69.	31.	
1951	3,307	2,530	777	77.	24.	
1952	5,357	4,181	1,176	78.	22.	
1953	5,117	4,277	840	84.	16.	
1954	4,355	3,901	454	90.	10.	
1955	3,345	3,114	231	93.	7.	
1956	4,131	3,732	399	90.	10.	
1957	4,499	3,973	526	88.	12.	
1958	4,829	4,112	717	85.	15.	
1959	7,119	5,669	1,450	80.	20.	
1960	11,298	9,106	2,192	81.	19.	
1961	9,231	7,497	1,734	81.	19.	
1962	3,302	2,546	756	77.	23.	
1963	2,363	1,609	754	68.	32.	
1964	2,836	1,654	1,182	58.	42.	
1965	5,003	2,863	2,140	57.	43.	
1966	4,818	2,096	2,722	43.	57.	
1967	3,237	1,421	1,816	44.	56.	
1968	728	249	479	34.	66.	
1969	146	12	134	8.	92.	
1971	340	180	160	53.	47.	
1972	3,522	1,702	1,820	48.	52.	
1973	6,560	3,780	2,780	58.	42.	
1974	8,591	(No disaggregated information is available)				
1975	12,430	6,892	5,538	55.	45.	
1976	12,771	(un.a)				
1977	12,574	(un.a)				
1978	12,103	6,396	5,707	53.	47.	
1979	20,209	10,980	9,229	54.	46.	
1980	19,596	12,608	6,988	64.	36.	

The above tables show that both secondary technical and normal school enrolments have grown during the past 30 years, but with serious fluctuations, in 1962, 1963, and 1964. Almost all secondary technical schools came to a four-year halt for Han and a six-year halt, between 1968

⁴³. op. cit.

and 1974, for non-Han. Secondary normal schools closed in 1968, 1969 and 1971 for both Han and non-Han. In the overall enrolment growth in secondary normal schools non-Han had a higher percentages than Han, whereas in secondary technical schools the situation was the other way round.

From the tables it can also be seen that secondary technical school enrolments increased more rapidly than those of secondary normal schools, although both sectors suffered, as we have seen, from abrupt changes in government policy. If the enrolment growth of both secondary technical and normal schools is compared with that of senior middle schools, it is seen that the latter has expanded much more. In comparison, secondary specialized schools have been neglected. For example, the number of secondary specialized schools increased from 11 in 1949 to 97 in 1985 and the number of students from 1,975 to 32,251 in the same period, the latter comprising only 14% of the total senior middle school enrolment for the same year. In contrast, the growth of senior middle school education has been more rapid. The number of schools increased from 4 in 1949 to 794 in 1985, while the number of students grew from 454 to 233,405 during the same period.


One reason for the unbalanced expansion is the persistence of traditional attitudes among officials, teachers, parents and students. In spite of highly competitive entrance

examinations for university education, many are not willing to support technical courses, because they effectively rule out access to institutions of higher education. Yet secondary specialized education, especially in Xinjiang, is of great importance in solving unemployment among youth and promoting the local economy.

7. A Comparison Between Han and Non-Han in Changes of Secondary Enrolments and Their Respective Populations

In the previous sections of this chapter changes in enrolments for Han and non-Han in junior, senior middle schools, secondary technical, and secondary normal schools have been examined separately, and the findings have shown that there have been gaps between Han and non-Han in the expansion of all these schools. It is now necessary to make a comparison between Han and non-Han percentages of secondary enrolments, and their respective percentages in the total population of the Region. Figure 5 shows them:

Fig. 5: Percentages of Han and Non-Han in Total Secondary School Enrolments and of the Total Population of the XUAR, 1950-87⁴⁴



From this figure it can be seen that the percentages of both the Han and non-Han went through erratic changes.

⁴⁴. Sources: 1) Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao, 1949-1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987; 2) See Introduction, Footnote 10, p.14.

Between 1950 and 1959 non-Han constituted over 80% of the secondary school enrolments, though their percentages in the enrolment were slightly lower than their percentages of the total population. Their percentages were higher than their percentages of the total population for 1960 and 1961, but after that their percentages began to decline, while those of the Han increased, until 1970. Thereafter, between 1970 and 1987 Han constituted over 60% of the total secondary enrolments, during a period when their numbers were less than 40% of the total population. However, the figure shows a new trend emerging after 1984, when the non-Han enrolments began increasing slowly and those of the Han declining.

As already stated *passim*, the shift in the composition of the population because of planned immigration of Han-Chinese to Xinjiang has contributed to the decrease in the non-Han percentage. As a result of this rapid shift, enormous changes in non-Han percentages of secondary school enrolments have occurred, leading to an unbalanced and unequal representation of Han and non-Han in secondary schools since 1965. In practically all years from 1949 to 1987, except for 1960 and 1961, the percentages of Han in secondary school enrolments were higher than their percentages of the total population.

The 1982 regional census provides the data of the gross enrolment ratios for different ethnic groups in secondary

education.

Table 13: Gross Enrolment Ratios of Senior Middle, Secondary Technical and Secondary Normal Schools For Ethnic Groups in the XUAR, 1982 ⁴⁵

	<u>age 15-19 total Enr. (Sn.Enr. STechEnr. SNEnr.)</u>					<u>Ratios</u>
Uighur	616768	49995	37851	7426	4718	8.
Han	649542	120740	108183	9224	3333	9.
Kazak	109113	14388	11794	1402	1192	13.
Kirghiz	11664	950	748	145	57	8.
Hui	71452	3473	2957	375	141	5.
Mongol	14892	2889	2249	264	376	19.
Sibo	3399	1177	1040	131	6	35.
other	13187	997	797	154	46	8.
Total	490017	194609	165619	19121	9869	13.

This table shows how varied the enrolment ratios for the different ethnic groups were in the senior middle, secondary technical and secondary normal schools in 1982, when the Hui ratio was the least, and the Sibos the highest. There seems little doubt that inequality in secondary education has become an important contributor to the inequality of access to higher education.

⁴⁵. 1982 Regional Census and 1982 Nian Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao.

Summary

This chapter has given a detailed examination of secondary education in its two divisions of general secondary schools and secondary specialized schools. Each division separately analyses the statistics for middle school enrolments and secondary education new entrants, as well as the medium of instruction, duration of courses and curricula. From the data, the inequality which accompanied expansion has also been discussed.

The general result of this examination is that the different ethnic groups in Xinjiang have varied in their rate of admission to all forms of secondary education. Next, it has been shown that the overall growth of the secondary school intakes in Xinjiang have been greater than the growth of intakes into primary schools. In particular, secondary specialized school intakes have fluctuated. However, at both levels the population of pupils/students entered from the different ethnic groups have changed most dramatically since the Revolution in 1949. More importantly, the trend of inequality, noted in Chapter Four on primary education, has been shown to persist at the level above it, i.e. throughout the secondary educational sector. The next chapter deals with how the results of such inequality lower down persist right through from primary to the top and so affect the student flow and supply into higher education.

CHAPTER SIX

STUDENT SUPPLY TO HIGHER EDUCATION

In the previous chapters primary, secondary and tertiary enrolments have been examined separately over a period of time. Here an attempt is made to examine the resultant student supply, both Han and non-Han, to higher education. Though the school system has expanded to meet the increasing demand for education from the growing Han and non-Han populations in Xinjiang, the gulf between the two in their respective enrolments at school has persisted since the Revolution. As already demonstrated in the Chapters mentioned above, the percentages of the Han population at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels have far exceeded those of the non-Han in relation to their respective percentages of the total population of Xinjiang.

A systematic analysis of the student supply requires a complete picture of student flow throughout the educational system. The ideal way of drawing a picture of this flow is to obtain complete sets of data on the number of Han and non-Han (if possible in the various ethnic groups) graduates from, and

new entrants to, different stages of the education system, together with information about repetition and drop-out. This is a most difficult task to accomplish in the case of the Region, because reliable data is not always available, and there are gaps in it.

However, from the current data that is available, it is possible to look into the pupil/student flow process from, at least, three different angles: 1) samples of pupil/student flow from primary to higher education between 1970 and 1987; 2) the progression rate for Han and non-Han from one education level to another in some of the years between 1966 and 1987 for which the data are available; and 3) the educational attainment/failure rates of Han and non-Han at each level. The separate examination of these three different processes should help in analyzing pupil/student supply and assessing the strength of pupil/student supply as an explanation of inequality in higher education in Xinjiang. Finally an effort will be made to analyze the causes contributing to the inequality of the supply.

1. The Pupil/Student Flow

In order better to study this flow from primary to higher education, it is necessary to review the pattern of the

duration of schooling already mentioned in chapters 3, 4, and 5. Han primary schooling lasted 6 years until 1966, when it changed to 5 years and remained so till 1983; whereas non-Han primary schooling has lasted for five years since 1965. Both Han and non-Han junior and senior middle schooling was for 6 years, 3 years of each. This was changed to 5 years, junior 3 years and senior 2 years, during the Cultural Revolution and so continued until 1983. Since then the former 6 years have been restored, although a small number of 2-year senior middle schools has existed until very recently.


There has also been a difference in duration for Han and non-Han, due to the extra year of compulsory Standard Chinese study for the latter at the tertiary level. Between 1949 and 1987 regular higher education has been four years for Han and five for non-Han. Some special subjects like medicine and engineering require five years for Han and six for non-Han. Some institutions and colleges also offer two to three year short courses. Therefore, tertiary graduates can be composed of: 1) students who have completed four/five years of regular courses; 2) those who have specialized in five\six year special scientific and technical subjects; and 3) those who have completed two to three year tertiary short courses. Generally speaking the regular course students make up the majority which is the focus of this examination of the Han and non-Han student flow through the educational system.

New entrants to higher education are normally selected from senior middle school graduates. The exception was during the Cultural Revolution period. Senior middle school new entrants are selected from junior middle school graduates, while junior middle school entrants are selected from among primary school completers. Secondary technical and secondary normal school new entrants come from both junior and senior middle school graduates.

2. Samples of Student Flow from Primary to Tertiary Institutions (1970-85)


The assumed time-scale is that the primary school non-Han new entrants of 1970 should have been completing regular tertiary education by 1985, while Han new entrants of the same year to primary school should have completed their tertiary education by 1984. In both cases consistent data with regard to numbers of repeaters is unavailable.

Fig. 1: Pupil/Student Flow of Non-Han in XUAR, 1970 - 1985



* 1 cm = 10,000

Fig. 2: Pupil/ Student Flow of Han in XUAR, 1970 - 1984



If Figure 1 is compared with Figure 2 a marked difference is seen in the student flows of Han and non-Han. In 1970 non-Han primary school new entrants numbered 141,001, of whom only 41% entered junior middle schools in 1975; whereas 79% of 1970 Han primary school new entrants, i.e. 125,151 pupils did so. By 1978 34% of non-Han and 75% of Han who entered their respective primary schools in 1970 completed junior middle school. By 1980 only 13% of non-Han and 37% of Han, junior middle school entrants of 1978 completed the senior middle school. These statistics show that the gap between Han and non-Han in the supply to tertiary education is more conspicuous at the secondary level. Specifically, nearly 60% of non-Han primary school 1970 entrants failed even to reach the door to junior middle schools by 1975. In contrast only 21% of Han failed in the same period. Obviously, the supply rates of non-Han and Han became a crucial issue at the time of entry to junior middle school. Unfortunately, information about 1975 primary school completers in terms of Han and non-Han is not available. Therefore, there is no way to examine their respective drop-out rates within the primary sector between 1970 and 1975. However, with regard to these drop-out rates a follow up examination is conducted later in this chapter in a different way. As a confirmatory example to the previous findings, another sample of Han and non-Han student flow is also discussed. See Figures 3 and 4 for details.

Fig. 3: Pupil/Student Flow for Non-Han in XUAR, 1971 - 1986





Fig. 4: Pupil/Student Flow for Han XUAR, 1971 - 1985



Though the information on primary school completers and junior middle school new entrants by Han and non-Han is not available for 1976, from what is available it is not difficult to find that 71% of Han and 37% of non-Han who entered the primary school in 1971 succeeded in completing junior middle school education by 1979. This suggests that again there were more non-Han failures in the flow from primary to junior middle school levels. After their completion of the junior middle schools, not all of them entered senior middle schools. 45% out of 109,443 Han junior middle school graduates of 1979 entered senior middle schools in the same year, whilst 37% of 66,350 non-Han junior middle school graduates did so. Here the question arises as to what extent this is due to a shortfall in the supply of non-Han students or in the supply of educational facilities or in both. If it is not caused by the shortfall in the supply of educational facilities, why have the already disadvantaged non-Han at the junior middle school level continued to be more disadvantaged in gaining access to the senior middle schools?

It is interesting to note that at the final stage - at the point of tertiary graduation - the percentages of non-Han are apparently higher than Han in contrast to their respective starting points. In 1985, non-Han tertiary graduates

constituted 1.42% of their primary school new entrants of 1970, whilst 1.26% of 125,151 Han primary school new entrants of 1970 graduated from the tertiary institutions in 1984. In 1986 the non-Han tertiary graduates constituted 1.2%, whereas the 1985 Han ones constituted only 0.92% of their 1971 primary new entrants. The last sample of the student flow figure presents further confirmatory evidence of this. Figure 5 shows the non-Han student flow from 1972 to 1987.

Fig. 5: Pupil/Student Flow for Non-Han in XUAR, 1972 - 1987

$$\frac{3,609 \times 100}{67,719} = 5\%$$





Fig. 6: Pupil/Student Flow For Han in XUAR, 1972 - 1986



Although the figures are incomplete, they show that in respect of student flow within the regional education system the attainment is a little higher for non-Han than Han at the tertiary level (Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4). This means that once the non-Han are in the educational system, especially at the secondary level, they move to higher education more readily. Unfortunately the bottle-neck for them appears too early, viz. at the time of entry to junior middle schools. In contrast the bottle-neck for Han pupils occurs at the very end of secondary education, viz. at the time of entry to tertiary education. Figures 7 and 8 show this.

Fig.7: Pupil/Student Flow For Non-Han from Primary to Tertiary Education in the XUAR, 1970 - 85





Fig.8: Pupil/Student Flow for Han from Primary to Tertiary Education in the XUAR, 1970 - 84



3. Progression from One Level to the Next

By examining the pupil/student flow from primary to tertiary education it can be seen that more Han than non-Han moved from primary school to senior middle school. There are many reasons for this and also for why more Han students completed senior middle school courses. One of the reasons is the disparity in numbers when pupils enter. Available statistics suggest that not all primary and junior middle school completers were enrolled into the schools above them. This makes it difficult to explain the disparity in non-Han pupil supply in moving from primary to secondary schools. Therefore, it is important to examine how many of those Han and non-Han who completed one level progressed to the next. Table 1 gives the evidence:

Table 1: The Numbers of Primary School Completers and of Junior Middle School New Entrants by Han and Non-Han in the XUAR, 1966-1987¹

<u>yr</u>	<u>HnPri.Com.</u>	<u>HnJn.Entr</u>	<u>Hn %</u>	<u>NHPri.Com.</u>	<u>NHJn.Entr</u>	<u>NH %</u>
1966	40,218	16,555	41.	64,988	21,042	32.
1967	44,648	14,929	33.	71,789	5,003	7.
1968	51,369	19,986	39.	75,232	5,713	8.
1969	59,463	61,120	103.	90,947	28,652	31.
1970	80,032	56,468	71.	93,521	33,479	36.
1971	78,577	67,334	86.	63,403	46,432	73.
1980	161,934	146,399	90.	130,581	90,033	69.
1981	163,861	148,826	91.	133,663	84,417	63.
1982	172,157	155,632	90.	137,868	86,210	63.
1983	178,238	161,943	91.	138,989	87,312	63.
1984	166,059	153,262	92.	129,934	87,771	68.
1985	156,292	148,307	95.	132,753	99,124	75.
1986	161,552	153,276	95.	145,495	108,456	75.
1987	146,998	137,250	93.	170,822	111,328	65.

This table reveals a very complicated situation. There were more non-Han primary school completers than Han in the years 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, and 1970. But, among the junior middle school new entrants in the years quoted there were less non-Han than Han. Only about 7% of non-Han primary school completers entered junior middle schools in 1967 and 1968; whilst in the same years 33% and 38% of Han primary school completers did so. The progression rate was also lower for non-Han than for Han in the years 1966, 1969, and 1970, even although there were more non-Han than Han primary school

¹. Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao, 1949-1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987.

completers. Again, the 1969 progression rate for Han did not follow this pattern, because the Han junior middle school new entrants outnumbered the Han primary school completers. However, in the years between 1971 and 1986 there were more Han than non-Han primary school completers. During this period the supply pattern from primary to junior middle schools emerges as follows: the larger the numbers of Han primary school completers, the larger their numbers into the junior middle school; whereas the smaller the number of non-Han primary school completers, the smaller their numbers into the junior middle school. In 1987 the situation changed with regard to the numbers of non-Han primary school completers who in that year outnumbered the Han ones. But, again despite their larger numbers, the former were less successful than the Han in progressing to junior middle school. In a word, no matter how numerous the non-Han primary school completers were, the numbers of them entering junior middle school were consistently smaller than their Han counterparts. These facts give strength to the assumption that the comparative short supply of the non-Han to higher education was not due to their lack of desire for, or suitability for, such education. The following graph illustrates what happened:

Fig. 9: Progression Rate for Han and Non-Han from Primary to Junior Middle Schools in the XUAR, 1966 - 1987




Table 2 shows the progression rate at the next level.

Table 2: The Numbers of Han and Non-Han Junior Middle School Graduates and Senior Middle School New Entrants in the XUAR, 1966 - 1987²

<u>yr</u>	<u>HanJn.Gra.</u>	<u>HanSn.Entr.</u>	<u>Han%</u>	<u>NHJn.Gra.</u>	<u>NHSn.Entr.</u>	<u>NH%</u>
1966	11,714	2,309	20.	14,224	3,328	23.
1967	11,492	3,844	33.	13,104	296	2.
1968	15,075	50	0.33	18,902	108	0.57
1969	25,748	241	1.	28,621	631	2.
1970	30,079	1,375	5.	13,787	1,314	10.
1971	48,505	9,455	19.	14,523	1,660	11.
1975	64,278	35,072	54.	25,109	13,037	52.
1978	94,096	46,465	49.	47,476	21,796	46.
1979	109,443	48,861	45.	66,350	24,430	37.
1980	118,293	46,567	39.	67,719	27,392	40.
1981	124,661	50,619	41.	65,703	30,338	46.
1982	120,670	53,113	44.	55,123	28,625	52.
1983	127,989	56,181	44.	55,371	29,333	53.
1984	129,354	59,063	46.	56,288	31,997	57.
1985	139,188	60,051	43.	59,936	33,641	56.
1986	143,749	61,227	43.	66,068	35,631	54.
1987	143,866	54,532	38.	71,743	33,583	47.

It is to be noted that the numbers for the years between 1971 and 1978 are inconsistent. Between 1978 and 1987 the numbers of Han junior middle school graduates constituted the majority of all junior middle school graduates. Similarly the numbers of Han senior middle school new entrants formed the majority of all senior middle school new entrants in the same period. In the years, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987, the progression rates, in percentage terms, were a little higher for non-Han although they cannot compete with the Han in absolute numbers at the senior middle school level. This is because the non-Han were seriously discouraged from

². op. cit.

entering junior middle schools (See Table 1 and the explanations of it on the following page). Figure 10 illustrates what happened.

Fig. 10: The Progression Rate for Han and Non-Han from Junior Middle to Senior Middle Schools in the XUAR, 1966 - 87




Table 3 shows the progression rate at the level above i.e. from senior middle school into tertiary education.

Table 3: Number of Senior Middle School Graduates and Higher Education New Entrants by Han and Non-Han in the XUAR,

1977 - 1987³

<u>yr</u>	<u>HnSn.Gra.</u>	<u>HanTrt.Entr</u>	<u>Han %</u>	<u>NHsn.Gra.</u>	<u>NHTrt.Entr.</u>	<u>NH %</u>
1977	33,241	1,896	6.	9,831	1,522	15.
1978	41,817	2,572	6.	12,152	1,530	13.
1979	38,982	1,804	5.	15,746	1,331	8.
1980	42,256	1,781	4.	18,114	1,971	11.
1981	46,067	1,320	3.	21,047	1,736	8.
1982	44,522	1,792	4.	24,982	2,003	8.
1983	49,507	2,328	5.	28,039	2,806	10.
1984	46,110	2,902	6.	26,081	3,595	14.
1985	41,442	4,694	11.	26,654	4,484	17.
1986	37,708	3,683	10.	20,877	4,153	20.
1987	51,759	3,815	7.	22,188	4,412	20.

This table shows that more non-Han than Han students made their way to higher education between 1980 and 1987 with the exception of 1985. Their progression rates throughout the ten years from 1977 to 1987 were consistently higher than those of the Han, in spite of the differences in the respective numbers of senior middle school graduates. However, it is difficult to assume that the non-Han were the better achievers at the tertiary level. This is partly due to the unavailability of information on the numbers of Han and non-Han tertiary education new entrants who went to institutions under the State Education Commission and the Ministries of central government outside the XUAR during the years before 1987. Indeed, according to the latest (1989) information revealed by Xinjiang Ma'arip Geziti (Xinjiang Education News)

³. op. cit.

and Oqughuchi Qobul Qilish Hawarliri (News Letter on Student Admission), the overall Han new entrants to tertiary education outnumbered the non-Han ones. For example, in 1988 the total number of new entrants was 14,690, but 9,211 of them, of whom 60.7% were non-Han, entered institutions under the Xinjiang Education Commission. The rest, that is 5,479 students, of whom 12% were non-Han, entered institutions under either the State Education Commission or other Ministries of central government.⁴ Thus, Han tertiary new entrants numbered 8,433, that is more than 57% of the total tertiary new entrants for the year. In 1989 the total number of tertiary new entrants was 13,405, but only 6,903 of them, of whom 4,315 were non-Han, entered the regional tertiary institutions. The rest, that is 6,502 students, of whom 1,145 were non-Han, went to tertiary institutions outside Xinjiang.⁵ Accordingly, the total number of Han students was 7,945, which constituted over 59%, whereas that of the non-Han was 5,460 or nearly 41%, of the total.

Summing up, in progressing from one educational level to another, the Han students performed far better than the non-Han from primary up to general secondary schools. As already

⁴. Oqughuchi Qobul Qilish Haewaerliri (News Letter on Student Admission), April 13, 1989, No.2, p.1.

⁵. Xinjiang Ma'arip Geziti (Xinjiang Education News), May 19, 1990, No.11, p.1.

stated (pages 257 and 258) the disparity between Han and non-Han entrants is most marked at the junction between the completion of primary school and entrance to junior middle school. Thereafter in progression from senior middle to the tertiary levels, whilst the non-Han did much better than the Han in Xinjiang, it is difficult to draw any accurate conclusions due to the unavailability of data on Han and non-Han tertiary new entrants who entered higher education in other parts of China.

4. Attainment Within Each Education Level

In the previous sections of this Chapter, the student flow by Han and non-Han from primary to tertiary education, and the progression from one educational level to the one above have been examined. It is also essential to examine the respective internal performances of Han and non-Han children in educational attainment. If the numbers of Han and non-Han new entrants at one level at a given time are checked against the numbers who completed this level at another or an expected time, a clearer picture of their respective performances emerges as the following table shows:

**Table 4: Numbers of Han and Non-Han New Entrants and Graduates
in Corresponding Years in XUAR ⁶**

A) Primary Level

non-Han

<u>Date of entry</u>	<u>No. of New Entrants</u>	<u>Expected date of completion</u>	<u>No. of those who completed</u>	<u>%</u>
1966	146,715	1971	63,403	43.
1980	230,126	1985	132,753	58.
1981	232,588	1986	145,495	63.
1982	258,513	1987	170,822	66.

Han

<u>Date of entry</u>	<u>No. of New Entrants</u>	<u>Expected date of completion</u>	<u>No. of those who completed</u>	<u>%</u>
1966	101,664	1971	78,577	77.
1980	202,963	1985	156,292	77.
1981	194,851	1987	146,998	75. ⁷

This table shows that among those who already had access to primary schools the drop-out rate was higher for non-Han than for Han and so contributed to the inequalities between them. Some of the hard evidence on this has already been given in Chapters 4 and 5. It is generally accepted that the higher drop-out rate of non-Han was and still is, due to poor economic circumstances.⁸ Some parents in some of the rural

⁶. op. cit.

⁷. Here Han primary schooling is taken as lasting 6 years in accordance with the 1983 document from the State Education Commission.

⁸. The researcher conducted many informal interviews during her initial fieldwork in Xinjiang between June and October 1988. Also, during her study-tour between May and August 1990 in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Sacramento, Seattle, Pro--ssor,

areas cannot afford the necessary decent dress for children to wear at schools, nor pay for their books, minimized fees and other charges. This is because 'compulsory education' is not totally free in Xinjiang. Compulsory education' means that parents and local authorities must take full responsibility for, and largely finance, basic education.⁹

Of course, there are other reasons for the higher drop-out rate. One of them can be traced back to kindergarten or pre-school education. 75% of the total population of Xinjiang is rural and of them non-Han constitute the majority. In most cases there are no kindergartens for pre-school-age children in rural areas, with the exception of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps camps. Rural children generally start to learn, when they actually enter a primary school. But kindergartens have become popular in the urban areas, the majority of whose population is, as already stated, Han. As a consequence, Han children have got better access to pre-school education. By 1983 there were 385 kindergartens with a total number of 80,569 children, of whom non-Han children

and New York she interviewed 13 Uighurs and one Kirghiz who were from various institutions of higher education in Xinjiang and currently studying in the United States. During her study in London between 1987 and 1990 she also interviewed 12 Uighurs, some of them were and are, students and some of whom came on official work. Almost every one cited poverty as the main obstacle to peasants having their children educated.

⁹. See Chapter 4 and pages 272 and 273 for further details.

numbered only 14,180 or about 18%. With the rapid expansion of other educational services, kindergartens have also expanded enormously, so that in 1987 there were 1,119 kindergartens for 120,259 children. But of these only 38,914 or 32% were non-Han. This disparity was bound to affect later educational performance and success.

Another reason is the difference in the quality of educational services available in the rural and urban areas which must affect the children's eventual success. One cannot expect children sitting on mud benches, writing at mud tables, and shivering with cold in damp classrooms, to achieve the same results as those who enjoy a far better learning environment in the urban schools (See Chapters 4, 5).

**Table 5: Numbers of Han and Non-Han New Entrants and Graduates
in Corresponding Years in the XUAR¹⁰**

B) Junior Middle School

Non-Han

<u>Entry Date</u>	<u>No.of NEntr.</u>	<u>Expected date</u>	<u>No.of Graduates</u>	<u>%</u>
			<u>of Graduation</u>	
1966	21,042	1969	28,621	136.
1967	5,003	1970	13,787	276.
1968	5,713	1971	14,523	254.
1975	58,204	1978	47,476	82.
1978	106,921	1981	65,703	61.
1979	88,385	1982	55,123	62.
1980	90,033	1983	55,371	62.
1981	84,417	1984	56,288	67.
1982	86,210	1985	59,936	70.
1983	87,771	1986	66,068	76.
1984	87,771	1987	71,743	82.
Average				70.

Han

1966	16,555	1969	25,748	156.
1967	14,929	1970	30,079	201.
1968	19,986	1971	48,505	243.
1975	58,204	1978	94,096	162.
1978	148,866	1981	124,661	84.
1979	136,003	1982	120,670	89.
1980	146,399	1983	127,989	87.
1981	148,826	1984	129,354	87.
1982	155,632	1985	139,188	89.
1983	161,943	1986	143,749	89.
1984	153,262	1987	143,866	94.
Average				88.

These statistics are startling. The non-Han who completed junior middle school outnumbered their own new entrants until 1971, e.g. in 1970 and 1971 there were over twice as many for

¹⁰. op. cit.

both the non-Han and Han. Even as late as 1978 the Han were almost twice as many. This can partly be explained by the great disorder caused by the Cultural Revolution, when first the educational processes of admission and completion were disrupted, and second reliable statistics became much more difficult to obtain. And it can partly be attributed to the immigration of Han to the Region, many of whom came with their children and settled down temporarily during this upheaval. But by looking at the more reliable Han and non-Han percentages since 1979, one can see how the gap widens between them. Within the last 7 or 8 years an average of just over 70% non-Han and more than 88% Han junior middle school new entrants completed the course in the expected time given to studies.

Another problem at this level is also observable. In addition to poor economic conditions, the difference in quality between rural and urban educational services, and the irrelevance of education to the growth of the local economy, as noted in Chapter 4, the value of education from the point of view of many parents is minimal. A small number of them are short sighted. More particularly they are pessimistic about the future for their children, because there is little chance for them to make their way upto further education. Therefore, some parents keep their children at home once they have completed primary education, believing that they can give the children

basic training at home, teaching them how to become a tailor, a cook, a carpenter, a smith, a shop assistant, or a tractor driver, and even teaching them how to become a good trader. Some non-Han parents have not realized that, because of their lack of technology and necessary knowledge, their children will pay a high price, when modernization sweeps away the traditional way of life throughout the countryside and modern technology takes over from old methods of production. Their present feeling of security with plenty of land, domestic animals and sufficient food, cannot continue for long.

The reasons for the greater success of Han-Chinese children are the face of the other side of the coin, i.e. a better learning environment, better economic conditions and less interruption to regular courses. Additionally, from the point of view of Han parents, education is priceless; and paves the way to power, which to them means everything. Confucianism is rooted deeply in their minds and has encouraged them to sacrifice everything, if necessary, for the education of their children. Many of the immigrants were forced to settle down in Xinjiang and so do not have any intention to help border minority people and reconstruct the new border. The real thought in their minds has been to earn more money; get their children into universities and colleges in other provinces; find jobs there, if possible; and eventually go back together with the children to their own birthplace. If they cannot

fulfil this aim, the alternative is to help their children to become political cadres, directors, managers, engineers, scientists and technicians ahead of the indigenous people. This can only be achieved through a good education.

Table 6: Numbers of Han and Non-Han New Entrants and Graduates in Corresponding Years in the XUAR¹¹

C) Senior Middle School

Non-Han

<u>Entry date</u>	<u>No.of NEntr.</u>	<u>Expected date</u>	<u>No.of Graduates</u>	<u>%</u>
			<u>of Graduate</u>	
1978	21,796	1980	18,114	83.11
1979	24,430	1981	21,047	86.15
1980	27,392	1982	24,982	91.21
1981	30,338	1983	28,039	92.43
1982	28,625	1984	26,081	91.12
1983	29,333	1985	26,654	90.87
Average				89.15

Han

1978	46,465	1980	42,256	90.94
1979	48,861	1981	46,067	94.28
1980	46,567	1982	44,522	95.60
1981	50,619	1983	49,507	97.81
1982	53,113	1984	46,110	86.82
1983	56,181	1985	41,442	73.77
Average				89.87

According to these data the gap between Han and non-Han success percentages remain smaller in the senior middle schools, further supporting the argument that non-Han children

¹¹. op. cit.

do not necessarily lag behind Han, if they are provided with the same quality of educational services. Because almost all the non-Han senior middle schools are located in cities and towns, the teaching and learning environment is totally different from those of the rural and mountain areas. There are, in many cases, libraries, laboratories, a cinema, nowadays even a T.V. network, well-lit classrooms, cafeteria, dormitories and sports grounds in such urban schools. Also they have on offer regular and unified course schedules to follow.

In summary, the progression percentages from one educational level to another, and the educational attainment of the Han and non-Han within each education level, present a complex picture of the student supply to tertiary education. First, there has been the problem faced by the non-Han in getting access to junior middle schools; thus on average only 67% of the non-Han primary school completers moved to junior middle schools in the years between 1980 -1987, but on average 92% of Han primary school completers did so. This has had a serious impact on the supply of non-Han students to senior middle schools. Second, regardless of the numbers of non-Han graduates, large or small, their new entrants became the minority, whereas the Han became the majority. Third, there were more non-Han than Han who failed to complete primary and junior middle school education. All these contributed to the

inequality between Han and non-Han in supply. As already discussed, it is important, too, to highlight that supply is not merely the supply of students. It is also a matter of the supply of educational facilities, in addition to other factors which are dealt with below.

5. Other Factors Affecting Supply

The ultimate test of the success of a government's multi-ethnic educational policy is the number of people from all ethnic groups who can benefit from it. The examination of the growth of enrolments in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 and the pupil/student supply in this chapter point to inequalities, some of which, as we have seen, are also briefly mentioned on earlier pages of this chapter. The more important ones are now discussed more fully below.

a. Lack of Educational Facilities for Rural Children

The primary and secondary schools in rural areas were, and still are, short of classroom buildings. In addition there are no schools at all available in some remote and mountain areas (See Chapters 4 and 5). It was first reported in 1987 that 1,170,000 square metres of classrooms in primary and secondary

schools under various educational administrations in Xinjiang were classified as unsafe, and it was predicted that this figure would increase to 1,500,000 sq. metres by 1990. It was calculated that 225 million yuan would be necessary for the repair or replacement of the unsafe classrooms. But only an extra 6 million yuan for 1987 and an annual increase of 20 million yuan for subsequent years, were promised by the regional government in order to complete this task by the year 1990.¹²

The Xinjiang regional government did not try to hide the fact that it itself alone could not afford to finance the basic education of its citizens. Therefore, it was openly stated that:

The State cannot wholly take the responsibility of the development of educational affairs, particularly the development of basic education. In some areas the idea to depend totally on the State in developing education must be overcome and changed completely. The principle of 'a four-sides' contribution', the State,

¹². Zhong guo Kaminist Partiyae Xinjiang Uyghur Aptonom Rayonluq Kamteti, Xinjiang Uyghur Aptonom Rayonluq Haliq Hokumitining Aptonom Rayonimizning ma'arip Hizmitidiki Hazirqi Bir Naechchae Asasi Maesilae Toghurisidiki Qarari. (literal meaning: A Joint Decision on Some Issues of Present Educational Work in Xinjiang by CCP Xinjiang Sub-Committee and the People's Government of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region), Xinjiang Ma'aripi, Vol.10, 1987, p.11-14.

authorities (districts, counties), villages and schools, should be put into practice. This means that the State may allocate some funds, local budgets may contribute some, villages and farms may collect some, and schools may solve part of their finance through hard work and self-reliance. Various forces must be continually encouraged to contribute to education....The locals will be responsible for basic education.¹³

This statement makes it very clear that the responsibility for basic education belongs to counties and county level cities, districts and prefectures. It is easy for some rich counties and districts to build and run schools, but it is extremely difficult for poor areas to take on such a responsibility. But once the decision was announced, they had to follow it. No matter what areas they are in, rich or poor, they have to 'mobilize and call the masses to contribute to the education of their own children'. Thus, in the final analysis, it is the responsibility of the parents, and schools must co-operate. Numerous reports have been written in newspapers and magazines about the contributions to education by commercial firms, departments such as the department of transport, factories, schools, villages and people showing what has been done. Here

¹³. Ibid.

are some examples from rural areas.¹⁴

Hotan County is one of the 8 poor counties in Southern Xinjiang which frequently faces difficulties in financing its schools. One way to do is to demand that the schools become self-reliant. Consequently, teachers and pupils of primary and secondary schools in this county engaged in various kinds of production work such as agriculture, forestry, fruit farming, livestock, carpet-making, transport, raw material processing, repairs, commerce, engineering and chalk production. They had in all 50 mu of land and 900 head of domestic animals. Through hard work they earned a total sum of 284,000 yuan, of which they spent 275,000 yuan on the repair of classrooms, the improvement of living conditions in schools, and on the provision of textbooks for the children from the poorest families. Their effort gave some relief to the county's difficulties. Atawulla Turdi, an Uighur, the headmaster of Dakui Middle School of Hotan County, was praised as a national model for running schools through self-reliance and hard work.¹⁵

Layka Village Middle School was also run through its own

¹⁴. With regard to inadequate or lack of educational facilities in rural areas, some hard evidence have been given in Chapters 4 and 5. Here are more supplementary materials from different rural areas.

¹⁵. Xinjiang Gazette (Xinjiang Daily), October 6, 1989.

efforts. The school was built in 1960 with 137 mu of land, including 25 mu of orchards, 30 mu of forestry, 24 mu of pasture, and the rest for plants and vegetables. Teachers and students produced 51,825 kilograms of grain and 150,000 kilograms of vegetables in 1988. They also had an annual income of 10,000 yuan from their trees and woods. Students also became builders in the village, earning 112,000 in contract construction. Some of the teachers' housing problems were also solved by students' labour. Besides, they ran restaurants, shops, and a repair shop for electric instruments and from them they earned 51,613 yuan. By the end of 1988 the school had a total income of 245,416 yuan with a net interest of 132,872 yuan.¹⁶ These are only two examples of many schools which were run through self-reliance. The problem left without any answer is the quality of education itself, which greatly suffered. One of the main contributors to the low rate of the student flow for the non-Han is the heavy emphasis put on these schemes of self-reliance.

There were also reports on individual contributors. As has been mentioned earlier in Chapter 5, Ghulja was hit by the heavy rain which lasted for more than 50 days in late autumn 1987. As a result many classrooms were closed for safety reasons. According to the latest report, despite its meagre

¹⁶. Hotan Gazette (Hotan daily), February 21, 1989, p.3.

funds, Ili District supplied 1,000,000 yuan from its local budget to repair the damaged classrooms. Meanwhile, for the same purpose, a total sum of 9,189,000 yuan was collected from individuals. With that money 39,649 square metres of unsafe rooms, which constituted nearly 30% of all rooms, has been either repaired or replaced since 1988.¹⁷

In Qaghilik County, Kashgar, more than 180,000 yuan donated by 47 units and 3 business men, were spent on the repair and the improvement, of the facilities.¹⁸ In Awat County of Aksu District in the south a total of 92,500,000 yuan was contributed by individuals.¹⁹ More than 700,000 yuan were donated by small business owners, religious scholars and other well-off peasants in Toksu County of Aksu.²⁰

By October 1985, the first primary school was opened in Yuklkun Village, Hotan County, not by the State but because of a peasant, Keram Imin, an Uighur, who spent on the whole project a total sum of 30,000 yuan from his private savings.²¹

¹⁷. Xinjiang Gazette, May 5, 1989.

¹⁸. Kashgar Gazette, October 10, 1989.

¹⁹. Aksu Gazette (Aksu Daily), December 15, 1988.

²⁰. Aksu Gazette, March 25, 1989.

²¹. Xinjiang Osmurliri (Xinjiang Pioneer Daily), January 14, 1986, p.2

At the expense of his own earnings another Uighur, Mattursun Ahun, built a primary school for Dongbagh Village, a newly-built one with 31 families, in the Kirya County of Hotan in 1985. He provided pupils with free education, books, pens and school bags, and whenever any pupil was sick, he paid all the medical bills. In summer 1989, in addition to the repair of old classrooms, he built new ones and an office, and raised the teacher's monthly salary from 60 yuan to 80 yuan.²² When he was asked why he was so enthusiastic to spend his money for others, he replied that he had enough problems due to his own lack of knowledge and he did not want the young to have the same misfortune. He added that he became rich thanks to the economic reform policy of the government, and it was his pleasure to repay.

Sadir, another Uighur, who had come back from a foreign country to his birthplace, built up his private firm, the Metal Window Company. When he made a profit, he did not forget the education of the poor. At a Meeting to Appeal for the Support of the Whole Society to Education conducted by the Hotan District Education Foundation, Sadir donated his 50,000 yuan savings.²³

²². Xinjiang Gazette, January 17, 1989.

²³. Xinjiang Gazette, April 23, 1989.

'The wise will always bear in mind the distant future'. This is a popular proverb among the people in Koshtagh Village, Guma County, Hotan. With this long-term interest in mind, the villagers collected 350,000 yuan in cash. They built 9 schools for scattered small sub-villages and repaired 3,000 square metre of unsafe classrooms. They set up a 2,505 metre long fence round the schools and solved the bench and chair shortage as well.²⁴

These are only a few examples of running schools through the efforts of the local people led by the local authorities, yet they provide sufficient evidence to highlight the lack of regular and long-term funding of primary and secondary education in rural areas by the State. It is not surprising that it is those who were born and brought up in the rural areas who were the under achievers in education. According to Xinjiang Educational Statistics, out of 4,344 primary school completers, 75% entered junior middle schools in urban areas of Hotan District in 1987; whereas out of 18,343 primary school completers in rural areas, only 37% of them did so. The situation was worse at the secondary level. In Hotan in the same year, 4,111 students finished junior middle schools of whom only 14% were admitted to senior middle schools. The following Figures 11, A and B, show details:

²⁴. Xinjiang Gazette, January 21, 1989.

Fig. 11: (A) Progression Rates from Primary to Junior Middle School in Rural and Urban Areas in the XUAR, 1987





Fig. 11: (B) Progression Rates from Junior Middle to Senior Middle School in Rural and Urban Areas in the XUAR, 1987




These figure show the huge gap between urban and rural areas in progression from primary to junior middle, and from junior middle to senior middle schools. As already stated, the low progression rates for rural areas can partly be attributed to the quality of education, but it can be mainly attributed to

²⁵. Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Ziliao, 1987, pp. 390-99, 510-515. Numbers of completers/graduates and new entrants quoted here do not include the numbers of Xinjiang Production & Construction Corps.


the lack of schools and other educational services in these areas. There can be no doubt that there were many deserving primary and junior school completers who could not find places in the junior and senior middle schools. The low progression rate in rural areas can hardly be attributed to the bad performance or stupidity of rural children. It has to be re-emphasised that achievement depends a great deal on adequate educational facilities, the quality of educational services and the cultural environment provided for the children during their long course of education. Looking at all the facts, there is little justification to conclude that rural children are slower than their urban counterparts. There is evidence that non-Han children in urban areas successfully competed with Han in progression rates, provided that adequate and equal educational facilities were available to both. Figures 12, A and B, clearly show overall differences.

Fig. 12: (A) Han & Non-Han Progression Rates from Primary to Junior Middle School in Urban Areas in the XUAR, 1987



This figure shows that in progression to junior middle school both Han and Non-Han new entrants outnumber their respective primary school completers in urban areas. The main reason for this anomaly is that some wealthy peasants and farmers near towns and cities send their children to urban junior middle schools so that they can progress to next level of education.


Fig. 12: (B) Progression Rates from Junior Middle to Senior Middle School in Urban Areas in the XUAR, 1987



From this figure it is clear that non-Han did far better than Han in their progression from junior to senior middle schools. Once they reached the gate of junior middle schools, they succeeded in entering senior middle schools. Their high progression rates confirm that non-Han students are not uncompetitive. In many autonomous districts and prefectures senior and junior middle schools run side by side. In other words where there are junior middle schools there are also


senior middle schools, or, at least, senior middle school classes which can offer courses at that level. As has been mentioned earlier (Chapter 4), Han and non-Han schools are separate in the Region.

Fig. 13: (A) Han & Non-Han Progression Rates from Primary to Junior Middle School in Rural Areas in the XUAR, 1987



This figure supports the argument that there are not enough junior middle schools for all the successful non-Han primary school completers from rural areas.

Fig. 13: (B) Progression Rates from Junior Middle to Senior Middle School in Rural Areas in the XUAR, 1987 ²⁶



This figure provides the evidence that not only the non-Han but also the Han, even if they are small in number, in rural areas become the victims of the short supply of educational facilities. In a word, there are considerable gaps between urban and rural areas in Xinjiang, as elsewhere in China.

²⁶. op. cit.

These gaps are reflected in the development of culture, of education, of the economy, of standards of living and therefore of the general quality of life. People in urban areas are better off than the people in rural areas. This is especially true, as has been shown all along, in the case of education. Urban education has been better developed than rural education and in consequence has been responsible for contributing to the inequalities in access to any education.

Many immigrants are members of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps in 10 Agricultural Divisions, and in 3 Engineer Construction Divisions, with a population of 2,222,400.²⁷ These are independent production and construction divisions under the State Agriculture Ministry and have newly-built towns such as Shihez and Kuytung. These divisions have built and expanded their own schools at all levels, wholly, or at least with an absolute majority of, Han. These schools are funded directly by the Ministry of Agriculture. The following table gives the details:

²⁷. Xinjiang Yilnamisi (the Year Book of Xinjiang), Xinjiang People's Press, Urumqi; 1986, P.2102.

Table 7:(A) Han & Non-Han Progression Rates from Primary to Junior Middle School in Urban and Rural Areas of Xinjiang P&C Corps, 1987²⁸

<u>1. Urban</u>	<u>Pr.Sch.C.</u> 9,038	<u>J.M.Sch.Entrants.</u> 9,517	<u>Rates</u> 114%
<u>2. Rural</u>	<u>Pr.Sch.C.</u> 50,706	<u>J.M.Sch.Entrants.</u> 47,303	<u>Rates</u> 93%
<u>3. Han(urban)</u>	<u>Pr.Sch.C.</u> 8,791	<u>J.M.Sch.Entrants.</u> 9,151	<u>Rates</u> 104%
<u>Non-Han</u>	<u>Pr.Sch.C.</u> 247	<u>J.M.Sch.Entrants.</u> 366	<u>Rates</u> 148%
<u>4. Han(rural)</u>	<u>Pr.Sch.C.</u> 47,209	<u>J.M.Sch.Entrants.</u> 44,266	<u>Rates</u> 94%
<u>Non-Han</u>	<u>Pr.Sch.C.</u> 3,497	<u>J.M.Sch.Entrants.</u> 3,037	<u>Rates</u> 87%

Table 7:(B) Han & Non-Han Progression Rates from Junior to Senior Middle School in Urban and Rural Areas of Xinjiang P&C Corps, 1987²⁹

<u>1. Urban</u>	<u>Jun.M.Sch.Gra</u> 12,145	<u>Senior M.S.Entr.</u> 6,484	<u>Rates</u> 53%
<u>2. Rural</u>	<u>Jun.M.Sch.Gra.</u> 53,531	<u>Senior M.S.Entr.</u> 21,348	<u>Rates</u> 40%
<u>3.Han(urban)</u>	<u>Jun.M.Sch.Gra.</u> 11,856	<u>Senior M.S.Entr.</u> 6,335	<u>Rates</u> 53%
<u>Non-Han</u>	<u>Jun.M.Sch.Gra.</u> 289	<u>Senior M.S.Entr.</u> 149	<u>Rates</u> 52%
<u>4. Han(Rural)</u>	<u>Jun.M.Sch.Gra.</u> 51,445	<u>Senior M.S.Entr.</u> 20,413	<u>Rates</u> 40%
<u>Non-Han</u>	<u>Jun.M.Sch.Gra.</u> 2,086	<u>Senior M.S.Entr.</u> 935	<u>Rates</u> 45%

²⁸. Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao, 1987, pp. 391-99 and pp. 510-15.

²⁹. Ibid.

From these tables it is clear that there is not much difference between urban and rural, and between Han and non-Han, pupils/students in their progression from one education level to the next. The reason is self-explained, that is both rural and urban schools are funded by the state and farmers in these corps have regular salaries therefore they can keep their children at school as long as possible.

b. The Staff Factor

The success or failure of an educational system is determined by many factors. Teachers are one of the major ones. Teachers are regarded as engineers of human beings and their role in producing successful candidates able to move from one educational level to another is invaluable. An adequate supply of them, especially qualified teachers, is of the great importance in producing these successful candidates. Both the authorities and the non-Han people themselves are well aware of this. In 1950 from the primary to the tertiary level there was a total number of 10,110 staff, of whom 8,552 or 85% were non-Han. Thanks to expansion after 35 years, in 1985, the staff numbered 221,937. However, only 101,591 or 45% were non-Han. This dramatic change in Han and non-Han staff development varied at the different levels, as the following table shows:

Table 8: Numbers of Han and Non-Han Staff in XUAR, 1950 and 1985 ³⁰

	<u>1950</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Increase in</u> <u>1985</u>
<u>Primary Total</u>	9,268		113,361		11 times ³¹
Non-Han	7,991	86.	64,392	57.	7 times
Han	1,277	14.	48,969	43.	37 times
<u>General Secondary</u>	380		84,593		221 times
Non-Han	264	70.	29,114	34.	109 times
Han	116	30.	55,479	66.	477 times
<u>Secondary Technical & Normal</u>	389		10,859		27 times
Non-Han	243	62.	4,247	39.	16 times
Han	146	38.	6,612	61.	44 times
<u>Tertiary</u>	73		13,124		179 times
Non-Han	54	74.	3,838	29.	70 times
Han	19	26.	9,286	71.	488 times

These numbers speak for themselves. The imbalance was most marked in the general secondary (junior and senior middle) schools and at the tertiary levels. Thus the Han staff constituted more than 30% of the total in general secondary schools in 1950, but more than 65% of the total in 1985. In tertiary education Han staff made up 26% in 1950, but more than 70% of the total by 1985. More staff follow greater enrolments. The fast development of Han staff, therefore, reflected and kept pace with, the rapid growth of Han

³⁰. Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Ziliao (Educational Statistics of Xinjiang), 1949-1980 and 1985.

³¹. 'Times' indicates that the number of staff for 1985 increased X times that of 1950.

enrolments at all levels. It is safe to conclude that the staff factor has been one of the important contributors to the inequalities in access to, and supply of, formal education, for Han and non-Han in Xinjiang.

SUMMARY

This chapter has attempted to examine the overall supply of students, in spite of there being problems in obtaining complete and consistent data about the number of Han and non-Han graduates and new entrants at all levels in the Region between the years 1949 and 1987. With the data that are available the following have been examined: 1) the student flow in terms of Han and non-Han from the primary to tertiary level, with three samples, for the years between 1970 and 1987; 2) the Han and non-Han rates of progression from one educational level to the next for the years from 1966 to 1987; 3) for the same period the Han and non-Han educational attainment/failure rates within each level; and 4) the gap between Han and non-Han rural and urban pupils in their progression.

The evidence shows that there have been inequalities between Han and non-Han in the matter of supply. The supply factor is not merely a question of student numbers. It is, as well, a

matter of the supply of adequate educational facilities. The shortage of secondary schools, especially junior middle schools, in rural areas has seriously discouraged many non-Han primary and junior middle school completers from progressing from primary to secondary education. This chapter has also been devoted to explaining some further factors which affected progression and so led to inequalities in supply.

In the examination of the student flow for Han and non-Han from the primary to tertiary levels, it has been found that a greater population of Han than non-Han have moved from primary right up the system until the point of entry to the tertiary education.

In the years between 1980 and 1986 both Han primary school completers and Han junior middle school new entrants made up the majority and their progression rate was disproportionately high in relation to that of the non-Han. In a word, no matter how numerous the non-Han primary school completers were, their number among the total junior middle school new entrants was consistently smaller than that of their Han counterparts. Evidence shows that it was not due to any lack of desire of non-Han to participate which has caused the short supply of students to higher education.

Thereafter the progression from junior to senior middle

schools presents a consistent picture of a Han majority, both in the number of junior middle school graduates and senior middle school new entrants, in the years between 1980 and 1987. During this period, in percentage terms, the progression rate was a little higher for non-Han, although there was no way for them to compete with the Han in absolute numbers at the senior middle school level. The obvious reason is the inequality between Han and non-Han in progression emerged at the juncture of their completing primary school and entering junior middle schools. At this point the non-Han became the minority of junior middle school new entrants. This ultimately pushed them into a minority position at the end of the junior middle school level.

However, this position was reversed between 1977 and 1987, because, in progression from senior middle to tertiary education, the rate was consistently higher for non-Han than it was for Han in contrast to the latter's more numerous senior middle school graduates.

The educational attainment/failure rates of Han and non-Han within each educational level have also been examined and it has been found that there were more non-Han dropouts than Han at the primary and junior middle school levels. In the senior middle schools non-Han performed more or less the same as Han in completing this level.

The crucial causes for the inequality in the student supply are attributed to the following major factors. Firstly, there has been a shortage of finance for rural schools as the state would only completely finance its urban schools. Rural schools did not get regular financial support from the state and so frequently faced difficulties in keeping open. Secondly, in many rural areas the educational facilities were and still are, inadequate for the children living in these areas. Thirdly, there have been no schools at all for the children in some of the very underdeveloped areas. To solve this problem the state has called for contributions from local organizations and individuals, a call which has born fruit in several areas. During the last few years, for the first time in the long history of 40 years of socialist revolution, primary schools have been set up by wealthy peasants in many villages of southern Xinjiang. Fourthly, there has been an imbalance between the Han and non-Han in staff development. Many rural non-Han schools have suffered from the shortage of non-Han staff, especially of qualified academic staff. Fifthly, various educational charges have been beyond the poor parents' ability to pay because compulsory education is not totally free in Xinjiang. Finally, the different expectations that Han and non-Han parents have for their children have had an impact on their attitude towards the value of education. All these factors have contributed, in different ways, to the

inequalities in supply of Han and non-Han throughout the system.

CONCLUSION

Experts in world politics have proclaimed that we have entered the age of ethnicity in international politics. They discovered that 'a sample of 132 states shows that only 12 (9.1%) can be considered ethnic free'.¹ Educationalists advocate that education should be based on respect for cultural diversities, not only at a national level but also at an ethnic level.² They insist that the demand for education, especially for higher education, as a human right, is most easily satisfied in countries where there is substantial provision for different ethnic minorities.

The People's Republic of China, consisting of a quarter of the world's population, is a multi-ethnic state with 55 recognized minority nationalities. The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in far western China also has a multi-ethnic population scattered in oases, among mountains,

¹1. Said, Abdul Aziz and Simons, Luiz R. S. (1977) Ethnicity in an International Context, pp.15-19, New Brunswick, New Jersey.

²2. UNESCO (1986), Final Report - International Consultation on Ways of Improving Educational Action at the Level of Higher Education, to Provide Students with the Necessary Knowledge of Problems Relating to Peace and Respect for Human Rights and the Rights of Peoples, P.7, Athens - Delphi, 20 -24 January.

on plains and along rivers. The majority of its indigenous people are Turkic speaking. The non-unified Turkish dialects, in addition to Mongolian and Standard Chinese, present a multi-linguistic and multi-cultural situation. This diversity in language and culture, together with the complicated geography of the Region, have caused a wide variety of difficulties in organizing and developing a coherent educational system in the Region. Yet, despite the difficulties, the Chinese government has succeeded to some extent in promoting the education of the minority nationalities with the ultimate aim of assimilating and integrating them into the main stream of Han-Chinese, and so maintaining the Han-Chinese protection of the Region.

Great efforts have been made. The educational network stretches from the Altay Mountains in the north to the vast Tarim Basin in the south. Institutions from primary to tertiary have expanded enormously; the numbers of staff and enrolments at all levels have increased drastically; segregated schools and different lengths of courses are allowed for the various ethnic groups; local languages are tolerated as media of instruction for those non-Han who have their own language, and live in a compact community in a particular area; but nationwide unified curricula, within the context of socialism and

communism under the dictatorship of the proletariat, have been applied to all from the primary level to the tertiary level. Thus, in the past 40 years of socialist revolution and construction under the Chinese Communist Party, the education of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang has developed to various degrees. However, developments have been concomitant with a persistent gulf between the majority non-Han and the minority Han-Chinese immigrants and their locally born children in the growth of enrolment and staff numbers, in school expansion, in the provision of educational facilities, and in the flow of students up through the system.

The main research questions, formulated at the beginning of this study are: What is the degree of inequality in access to formal education, especially higher education in Xinjiang? To what extent are the inequalities in higher education the outcome of inequalities of higher education admission practices; and to what extent are they the outcome of supply originating lower down the system? Accordingly, very close attention has been given to examining the changes in the admission practices and enrolment expansion of higher education, linking such changes to disparities in the provision of higher education, to social and political changes brought about by planned political campaigns, and to the shift in

general centralised policies during the past 40 years. This study has also examined the relations between the changes in higher education enrolments and the changes in the demography of the Han-Chinese and non-Han populations, especially since 1949. In tracing the roots of inequalities in access to higher education, a very thorough examination has been made of the changes in intakes, enrolment expansion, enrolment ratios, and the provision of education at the primary and secondary levels. At the same time, the student pattern of supply from primary to tertiary education, and the progression rates of Han-Chinese and non-Han in completing one level and moving to the next, are examined. Thus, the major causes for the inequality in access to, and provision of, formal education, particularly higher education, for Han-Chinese and non-Han in the XUAR have been identified.

During the examination in depth of higher education its admission practices and principles have also been explored. This in-depth examination reveals that these admission practices and principles have been changed in accordance with the demands of the Party's educational policy at different times, more specifically for the periods, from 1950 to 1966, from 1966 to 1977 and up to the present.

The present selective admission through rigorous examination has been analyzed and regarded as the continuation of the old system which started as early as 2000 years ago. The old system based on Confucian philosophy and passed on from generation to generation, has been a part of education policy in different forms and with different methods under different regimes for a very long time. Though there have been significant changes and reforms in the selective admission system since the Revolution in Xinjiang as throughout the country, its highly selective nature has remained consistent.

In selective admission process, corruption, power privileges, commercial influence, family ties, political deals, bribery, and cheating have originated among high ranking Party and government officials and spread all over the region and the country. There have been many complaints and reports, supported by solid evidence, about this. According to such evidence the degree of corruption is higher among the Han Chinese than among the non-Han, because there are more Han-Chinese in high positions, important agencies and economic units, which have been convenient paths to show the 'green light' in the dark. The inequality has been seen as being partly due to the admission practices of higher education of its

own, favouring those few non-Han who are trained in schools where Standard Chinese is the medium and so stimulates assimilation. To this the resistance has been remained undiminished.

A study of primary school enrolment ratios for Han and non-Han has shown that the inequalities were not always of the same pattern. Thus in the years 1955, 1964 and 1987 non-Han had higher enrolment ratio than Han-Chinese, whereas in the years 1950, 1965, 1979, and 1984 the opposite was true. The 1982 regional census has indicated that the primary and junior middle school enrolment ratios varied greatly between different ethnic groups. The highest ratio was more than 74% for Han-Chinese; the lowest was 17% for Others. Slightly more than 36% of the primary and junior middle school age group from among the majority ethnic group, the Uighurs, had access to primary and junior middle schools.

It has also been demonstrated that during the natural disasters in the early 1960s, and the time of the Cultural Revolution, the non-Han were affected more seriously than Han-Chinese in enrolments to primary schools. At these very periods there was a sharp decline for non-Han but a steady increase for Han-Chinese in enrolments. This, in turn, resulted in an unbalanced

growth of primary school enrolment between the two which in turn led to an imbalance between Han-Chinese and non-Han people in their rates of literacy and illiteracy. The 1982 regional census reveals that of Han-Chinese who were six years and over, 19% were illiterate; whereas of non-Han aged 6+, 41% were illiterate - this after 32 years of socialist education in Xinjiang. The census also discloses that of the total number of illiterate children between six and 11 years of age illiterate Han-Chinese children constituted 22% whereas the non-Han were 78%. This evidence underlines the undeniable fact of inequality of access to, and provision of primary education.

Similarly the statistical data analyzed in the thesis shows that the growth of overall enrolment at the secondary level has gone through erratic changes. Following ten years of a steady increase from 1950 to 1960, the non-Han secondary enrolment went into a decline in 1961, 1962 and 1963, while there was a continuous increase in Han-Chinese enrolment. During the Cultural Revolution, Han-Chinese enjoyed absolute priority in secondary enrolments, with a steady increase and high representation throughout the period between 1967 and 1977. The last ten years, 1977 to 1987, saw a further widening of the gap between Han-Chinese and non-Han. When

the percentages of Han and non-Han in secondary enrolments are compared with their respective percentages in the total population, it has been shown that between 1970 and 1987 the Han-Chinese constituted over 60% of the total secondary enrolment, although they constituted less than 40% of the total population of the Region. This, too, underlines the respective inequality in access to secondary education. This inequality led in turn to the imbalance between Han-Chinese and non-Han educational attainment at the secondary level. The 1982 regional census reveals that of the total number of those who were at secondary schools or completed the secondary schools, 63% were Han-Chinese and only 37% non-Han.

The years between 1950 and 1967, witnessed very slow progress in higher education with a slightly higher representation of non-Han relative to Han-Chinese until 1958, but with considerable lower representation of the former between 1959 and 1966. Higher education was hit very badly by the Cultural Revolution but since 1977 the situation has become fairly stable. Thus, there has been a steady increase in enrolments with a slant towards the non-Han. But no matter how high the percentage of non-Han relative to Han in tertiary enrolments has been in some years, their percentages from 1950 to 1987 have always been lower than their percentage of the total

population. Again this shows that there has been inequality of access to higher education. In a word, in education from the primary to the tertiary level, rapid expansion has been accompanied by increased inequality.

The comparative growth of the enrolments for Han-Chinese and non-Han at various levels of education are startling but even more startling has been the expansion in favour of the immigrant Han-Chinese minorities since 1949. The Chinese authorities in their desire to show the great achievements of minority nationalities in education under their leadership, reveal information only on the expansion of schools and enrolments for these minorities, by comparing their situation before 1949 with that of the present. However, they keep to themselves the crucial information on the expansion of education for the Han-Chinese immigrants in the border areas such as Xinjiang. All the statistics quoted above are indicators of how their overall policy works and how it has already affected the local people.

The statistics, that have been analyzed repeatedly, emphasise that the degree of inequality between Han-Chinese and non-Han is not the same at all levels of education for all of the time from 1949 to 1987. The inequality between the majority non-Han and the Han-

Chinese minority in enrolment growth has clearly been more acute in secondary schools than in the primary schools and tertiary institutions. It has been widening since 1969 and has become even more marked today. Such findings make it indisputable that inequality in higher education is only an end product. The evidence marshalled in this thesis shows that its roots lie in the primary and secondary schools, particularly in the junior middle schools.

The achievements in educational expansion in Xinjiang may testify to the efficiency of the central government's strategic policy. But at the same time they also emphasise its failure to put its constitutional theory and declarations into practice with regard to equal rights for the different ethnic groups. However, it is not fair to blame the central government as being entirely responsible for this increased inequality, if, as it is maintained, more non-Han than Han-Chinese were reluctant to complete their courses of study at the different education levels. This is why the detailed examination of the pupil/student supply from primary all the way up to tertiary education has been so important.

This pattern of supply and flow, as shown in Chapter 6, from the bottom to the top of the educational system

makes it more evident that there is inequality between Han and non-Han. Three samples of supply and flow in the years between 1970 and 1987 consistently reveal the trend, namely that more Han than non-Han moved from primary to senior middle schools. For example, 37% Han-Chinese and only 13% of non-Han, who entered primary schools in 1970, graduated from the senior middle school in 1980. Similarly, 30% Han-Chinese and 12% non-Han primary school new entrants of 1971 came out of senior middle schools in 1981. But the flow shows a different picture at the point of tertiary graduation, because the non-Han achieved better at the tertiary level, in contrast to their low starting point at the bottom of the educational system. For example, 1.42% of the non-Han primary school new entrants of 1970 graduated from tertiary education in 1985, whilst only 1.26% of 1970 Han primary school new entrants did so. From among the 1971 Han-Chinese and non-Han primary school new entrants, 1.2% of non-Han and 0.92% of Han completed tertiary education in 1986 and 1985. These figures indicate that as long as the non-Han people of Xinjiang are provided with adequate educational facilities, especially secondary educational facilities, they perform as well as their Han-Chinese counterparts at the top level.

Furthermore the statistics revealed in this thesis, the

progression rate for Han and non-Han (Chapters 2 & 6 on progression), from one educational level to the next show that the rate has always been higher for Han than non-Han, from primary up to entry to higher institutions, regardless of the numbers of the Han and non-Han graduates from the different levels. Thus 71% of Han and only 36% of non-Han primary school completers of 1970 entered junior middle schools in the same year. The imbalance continued, so that 93% of the Han and 65% of the non-Han primary school completers in 1987 were admitted to junior middle school. The 1969 Han junior middle school graduates outnumbered even their own primary school completers. These hard statistics prove very clearly that it is not simply an issue of non-Han refusing to complete their primary education and prepare themselves for junior middle school. The crux is the inadequate supply of schools.

The result of this examination of the progression from junior to senior middle schools has shown that Han-Chinese consistently made up the majority both of the total junior middle school graduates and of senior middle school new entrants in all the years between 1980 and 1987. This is an inevitable consequence of the higher rate of progression of Han from primary to junior middle schools.

In contrast to this rate, non-Han had a higher one than Han in their progression from senior middle to tertiary education between 1977 and 1987. But from this it cannot be concluded that the non-Han were better achievers. It is partially because of the lower rate of progression of non-Han from primary to senior middle schools. Also and mainly, it is because the percentage of the non-Han tertiary school new entrants is not at parity with the percentage of the age group of non-Han population of the Region (Chapters 3, section 9).

Next, the examination of the education attainment/failure rates (Chapter 6, sections 4 & 5) of Han-Chinese and non-Han at each educational level, shows that the dropout rate has been higher for non-Han than for Han at the primary and junior middle school levels. At the senior middle school level, the non-Han achieved practically the same completion rates as the Han. Thus an average of 89.15% non-Han and 89.87% Han senior middle new entrants of the years between 1978 and 1985 later completed their studies in the expected years.

All these findings point to the following conclusions:

- 1) In the student flow more Han than non-Han moved

through the system from primary level up to the senior middle school level;

2) At the final level - the point between the entry to, and completion of, tertiary education, the non-Han seemed the better achievers only in relation to attainment lower down the system;

3) In progression from one education level to another, the Han exceeded proportionately the non-Han from primary to junior, and from junior to senior middle schools;

4) In progression from primary to junior middle schools the disadvantages suffered by the non-Han pupils is evident, and it is exactly at this juncture that the inequality between Han-Chinese and non-Han had its roots and grew vigorously [Chapters 5 (section 3) and 6 (sections 3,5)];

5) The non-Han have had high progression rates from the senior middle schools to higher education;

6) In educational attainment of Han and non-Han at each of the educational levels, the Han did far better in the primary and junior middle schools; and

7) conversely the non-Han did almost as well as the Han when completing the senior middle and tertiary levels.

The thesis constantly emphasises that the causes of the inequality are many. They are:

- 1) a lack of self-effort on the part of the non-Han, as they have had higher dropouts than the Han in the primary and junior middle schools, particularly in rural and mountain areas;
- 2) the demographic factor of massive immigration by Han-Chinese from inland provinces into the Region, underpinned by the government's strategic policy, which has in turn created financial difficulties for the local schools;
- 3) the widening gap between rural and urban areas reflected in the culture, the economy, and the standards of living and therefore of the quality of life;
- 4) the lack of adequate educational facilities for rural non-Han children, so that until recently devoted individuals had to build schools for village children at the expense of their own savings, previously there not being any primary schools at all in some of the distant rural areas;
- 5) the unequal development of Han and non-Han staff, especially in higher education; and
- 6) the lack of the regular financing of rural schools by the state.

Amongst all these causes, the two main ones are those identified in Chapter One. These are: the abnormal changes in population through immigration accompanied by attempts at assimilation and the erratic policies of the central government towards the ethnic minorities in northwest China. These two have been most decisive.

Not only have the policies been erratic (See Introduction, Chapters 2, and 4). The widening gap between the indigenous majority and the immigrant Han minority in the development of education is far from corresponding with the original officially propagated and sustained policy that 'the constitution stipulates China's socialist relationship of equality, unity and mutual assistance among all China's nationalities, (and) guarantees the equal rights of all nationalities...'³ Examples of this mismatch between policy and practice are to be found throughout this thesis.

The findings briefly recapitulated above have further implications. First, they indicate that the rather simplistic view of educational inequality in Xinjiang as being the product of consistent ill-will and deliberate

³4. Shi Jun, (1984) National Minorities flourishing, China Official Yearbook 1983/84, pp.455-457, Dragon Pearl Publications, Hong Kong.

and successful assimilation on the part of both the central and local authorities (a view favoured when research for this thesis began) is on balance mistaken. The situation has been and still is, much more complicated, thanks to variations in central government policies and the resilient responses of Xinjiang's ethnic groups to them. The practice of educational reform and expansion has never been entirely one-sided and to the constant detriment of the non-Han, in spite of the resultant inequality. The non-Han have in many respects been beneficiaries, as can be seen by their record in higher education. Many errors and injustices have been committed against them, but their reluctance - and at times active resistance - in the face of the changes imposed on them have meant that they have not been swamped. Total assimilation has not occurred and the identities of Xinjiang's ethnic groups have survived.

Next, the findings should be of some interest and value to other researchers in the field of multi-ethnic education, particularly at the tertiary level. Most of the educational literature on equality/inequality as related to minorities, some of which is reviewed in this thesis, concentrates on other continents and other countries, e.g. Africa and the United State of America. The experience of the People's Republic of China in

Xinjiang has much light to shed on the subject. Few governments have had to try to find an educational solution to such a complex situation as that of Xinjiang - a region of vital strategic importance, of great economic potential, and of lively nationalistic situations.

The solution, as this thesis confirms, has not yet been found, but very recent developments in Xinjiang, in China as a whole and beyond emphasise the urgent need to do so. What is happening now in the neighbouring USSR and in Eastern Europe should serve as a warning. As the opening sentence of this Conclusion states, the age of ethnicity has arrived - and not without reason. The old highly - centralized, monolithic, doctrinaire politics of the past are dead or dying.

The response of China, the most populous country in the world, to the challenge should repay study and it is hoped that this thesis makes a modest contribution to further research and to the international literature that should follow. Much remains to be done. In addition to those referred in Chapter 1 (Figure 1) with regard to equity and equality in education, especially higher education for different ethnic groups, such issues, e.g. language policy, the centralization versus localization,

media of instruction in educational institutions, increased urbanisation, and the unsettling effects of massive immigration - are now burning issues in Europe.

In conclusion, the following policy solutions are suggested in the full knowledge that, because of the financial implications, they may seem idealistic and so border on the unrealistic.

The existing inequality in education has led, and will continue to lead, to an imbalance between a large number of better educated and more skilled people from among the immigrant Han-Chinese minority on the one hand, and the less educated and less skilled people from among the indigenous non-Han majority on the other. Therefore, very positive action must be taken.

Unless the 8 years of basic compulsory education in vast rural areas of Xinjiang is provided for all children without any charge; unless adequate educational facilities, especially at the secondary level, are made available for those non-Han in rural areas of the south; unless special funds are allocated to train non-Han teachers in rural schools and to produce extra numbers of non-Han teachers for all levels, primarily for the secondary level; unless some infra-structural changes are

embarked on with regard to educational administration at county, district and prefecture levels by introducing non-Han devoted intellectuals, scholars and educationalists; and, finally, unless a very special effort for at least 15 to 20 years is made to reduce the present imbalance in formal education, particularly higher education, for all there will be no way to narrow down the inequality between Han and non-Han. Though it is a complex matter to achieve relative equality between the indigenous non-Han majority and the immigrant Han minority in the short term, yet it is not absolutely impossible, as long as a reasonable amount of the income from the oil industry of Xinjiang, controlled by the central government, is allocated to the education of the underdeveloped non-Han in the Region.

A genuine effort in education on the lines suggested above to change the imbalance between educated and skilled Han-Chinese and non-Han manpower, should help to reduce the increasing disputes between 'elder brothers' and 'younger ones' in the political and economic fields of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. The reduction of this imbalance between Han and non-Han and the acceptance of the latter by the former as equal partners will certainly contribute towards healing the troubled relationship between 'hosts' and 'guests'. Diversity and

tolerance in education are the best means to ease the resentment of the non-Han towards the Han, caused by the imposed measures of attempted assimilation, and the developing inequality between the indigenous people and immigrants, underpinned by education policies. Educational equality promotes the equality of material life in the political, economic and cultural fields. Such real and practical equality could play an important role to maintaining the unity of one 'big family', which is the country's long cherished aim. If these conditions are achieved, higher education in Xinjiang will have a bright future in the twenty-first century.

Appendix 1:

A Brief Note on the Method Used in the Research

1. Time Spent on the Fieldwork

The initial, yet most important, part of the fieldwork was carried out between June and October in 1988 in Xinjiang and elsewhere in the People's Republic of China. Subsequent work was carried out from May to August in 1990 in the United States of America.

During the fieldwork semi-structured interviews were conducted in various parts of China, U.S.A., Paris, and London. These have already been mentioned in some of the footnotes in the thesis. Official documents, e.g. Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao, 1949 - 87, (Educational Statistics of Xinjiang), the 1982 regional census, policy documents, PhD theses, books, and articles from journals, newspapers, unofficial publications and manuscripts, which are directly or indirectly related to this study, have been collected or inspected.

2. Sources of Data

During the research, not only a nationwide but a

worldwide survey, by means of the computer and personal visits, was carried out across a variety of educational literature including material on higher education for ethnic minorities in the People's Republic of China and elsewhere in the world.

1. In English

A) The following have been researched: PhD theses, microfilms, micro-fiche, slides, books, journals, magazines and newspapers; and the publications of research groups organized by international agents, e.g. UNESCO, World Bank etc. on issues of formal education, including higher education for ethnic groups across the international scene, and on minority issues, especially issues of north-western minorities of China. Out of all these resources, the PhD theses are the most valuable. Such PhD theses concerned with Xinjiang Turkic-speaking people are limited in scope and confined either to the history of the Uighurs and other Turkic-speaking Moslems, or to the policies of successive Chinese regimes towards the region and its people. Many articles written on minority education have appeared in books and journals, yet they are mostly concerned with the educational policy of the Chinese Party since its coming to power.

2. In Chinese

A) Policy documents, related literature, official statistical data, journals, magazines, newspapers and unofficial publications on the issues of education, as well as of higher education, for national minorities in the People's Republic of China. Among these the Educational Statistics of Xinjiang are utilized as the main data source for the thesis.

3. In Uighur

Official documents, e.g. regional census, books, journals, magazines, newspapers and unofficial publications in Xinjiang have been examined:-

Xinjiang Ma'aripi (Journal of Xinjiang Education)

Xinjiang Paen-Tehnika Zornili (Xinjiang Journal of Science)

Xinjiang Ayalliri (Xinjiang Women)

Xinjiang Yashliri (Xinjiang Youth)

Paen wae Maedinyaet (Science and Culture)

Oqughuchi Qobul Qilish Haewaerliri (News Bulletin On Student Admission)

Xinjiang Ma'arip Geziti (Xinjiang Education Daily)

Xinjiang Geziti (Xinjiang Daily)

Xinjiang Osmurliri (Xinjiang Pioneer Daily)

Urumqi Kaechlik Geziti (Urumqi Evening)

Ili Geziti (Ili Daily)

Sanji Geziti (Sanji Daily)

Turpan Geziti (Turfan Daily)

Komul Geziti (Qomul Daily)

Aksu Geziti (Aksu Daily)

Kashgar Geziti (Kashgar Daily)

Hotan Geziti (Hotan Daily)

1982-Yil 1-Iyol Xinjiang Uyghur Aptonom Rayoni 3-Qetimliq Ahalini Omumyuzluk Taekshurush Boyichae Omumlashturulghan Matiryallar Toplimi (1982.7.1. Regional Census). Among these the last one provides a wide range of information on education, population, birth-rate, natural growth of population, literacy/illiteracy and unemployment etc. Some local newspapers offer a lot on educational facilities provided by the state and by individuals.

Special Notes:

1) Sources of Appendices 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 are Xinjiang Jiao Yu Tong Ji Zi Liao (Educational Statistics of Xinjiang), 1949-1980, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987.

2) Source of Maps, Location of Xinjiang in the People's

Republic of China, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region on from pages and A Map of Ethnic Groups of Xinjiang in Appendix 9 is Chiao-Min Hsieh (1973) Atlas of China, McGraw-Hill, U.S.A.

3) The Map of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps in Appendix 10 is McMillen, D. H. (1979) Chinese communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977, Westview Press, Folkestone, England.

4) Throughout the thesis, all quotations, titles of documents, books, and articles, names of newspapers, journals, and other publications, and names of places and people, from Chinese and Uighur source materials have been translated into English by the researcher. Therefore, she takes responsibility for any errors and would welcome any suggestions on improving the translations.

Appendix 2: Statistics on Primary Education

A) Numbers and Percentages of Primary School Enrolments by Han and Non-Han in XUAR, 1949-87

date	totalEnr	HanEnr	NHEnr.	HanEnr. %	NHEnr. %
1949	197,850	15,423	182,427	7.80%	92.20%
1950	271,578	21,670	249,908	7.98%	92.02%
1951	305,263	28,491	276,772	9.33%	90.67%
1952	333,735	33,937	299,798	10.17%	89.83%
1953	356,440	37,488	318,952	10.52%	89.48%
1954	372,607	43,550	329,057	11.69%	88.31%
1955	355,291	17,553	337,738	4.94%	95.06%
1956	456,657	60,801	395,856	13.31%	86.69%
1957	492,260	67,716	424,544	13.76%	86.24%
1958	730,485	84,313	646,172	11.54%	88.46%
1959	819,374	113,596	705,778	13.86%	86.14%
1960	897,230	150,886	746,344	16.82%	83.18%
1961	844,618	180,703	663,915	21.39%	78.61%
1962	745,768	196,021	549,747	26.28%	73.72%
1963	766,013	224,487	541,526	29.31%	70.69%
1964	882,666	274,486	608,180	31.10%	68.90%
1965	1,039,027	335,025	704,002	32.24%	67.76%
1966	1,087,554	403,520	684,034	37.10%	62.90%
1967	1,062,464	446,211	616,253	42.00%	58.00%
1968	1,071,517	465,714	605,803	43.46%	56.54%
1969	1,090,326	497,853	592,473	45.66%	54.34%
1970	1,131,440	507,043	624,397	44.81%	55.19%
1971	1,220,077	546,450	673,627	44.79%	55.21%
1972	1,369,225	616,905	752,320	45.06%	54.94%
1973	1,553,390	708,858	844,532	45.63%	54.37%
1974	1,720,000	816,381	903,619	47.46%	52.54%
1975	1,861,263	864,886	996,377	46.47%	53.53%
1976	1,889,733	860,106	1,039,627	45.51%	55.01%
1977	1,958,056	898,144	1,059,912	45.87%	54.13%
1978	2,028,771	984,944	1,043,827	48.55%	51.45%
1979	2,007,734	963,909	1,043,825	48.01%	51.99%
1980	2,055,513	1,038,263	1,017,250	50.51%	49.49%
1981	2,010,494	1,016,713	993,781	50.57%	49.43%
1982	1,985,976	983,465	1,002,511	49.52%	50.48%
1983	1,941,009	927,738	1,013,271	47.80%	52.20%
1984	1,962,981	865,618	1,097,363	44.10%	55.90%
1985	1,966,306	802,038	1,164,268	40.79%	59.21%
1986	1,948,151	726,691	1,221,460	37.30%	62.70%
1987	1,884,884	657,337	1,227,547	34.87%	65.13%

B) Numbers and Percentages of Primary School Staff by Han and Non-Han in XUAR, 1949-87

date	total	Non-Han	Han	NH%	Han%
1949	9,647	8,451	1,196	87.60%	12.40%
1950	9,268	7,991	1,277	86.22%	13.78%
1951	9,864	8,326	1,538	84.41%	15.59%
1952	10,963	9,090	1,873	82.92%	17.08%
1953	11,882	9,806	2,076	82.53%	17.47%
1954	12,387	10,007	2,380	80.79%	19.21%
1955	12,876	10,248	2,628	79.59%	20.41%
1956	14,525	11,458	3,067	78.88%	21.12%
1957	15,651	12,315	3,336	78.69%	21.31%
1958	19,865	16,229	3,636	81.70%	18.30%
1959	23,064	18,103	4,961	78.49%	21.51%
1960	27,893	20,288	7,605	72.74%	27.26%
1961	29,518	19,550	9,968	66.23%	33.77%
1962	29,997	18,010	11,987	60.04%	39.96%
1963	31,507	18,046	13,461	57.28%	42.72%
1964	35,519	19,885	15,634	55.98%	44.02%
1965	41,069	22,900	18,169	55.76%	44.24%
1966	42,077	24,596	17,481	58.45%	41.55%
1967	42,372	24,917	17,455	58.81%	41.19%
1968	43,808	25,558	18,250	58.34%	41.66%
1969	46,384	26,906	19,478	58.01%	41.99%
1970	48,740	26,184	22,556	53.72%	46.28%
1971	56,168	27,935	28,233	49.73%	50.27%
1972	58,072	31,679	26,393	54.55%	45.45%
1973	70,174	35,457	34,717	50.53%	49.47%
1974	79,742	38,832	40,910	48.70%	51.30%
1975	83,439	42,068	41,371	50.42%	49.58%
1976	83,853	44,080	39,773	52.57%	47.43%
1977	87,221	45,652	41,569	52.34%	47.66%
1978	90,894	47,983	42,911	52.79%	47.21%
1979	93,653	50,716	42,937	54.15%	45.85%
1980	99,189	53,181	46,008	53.62%	46.38%
1981	106,548	57,233	49,315	53.72%	46.28%
1982	118,092	61,818	56,274	52.35%	47.65%
1983	117,857	63,249	54,608	53.67%	46.33%
1984	115,597	64,445	51,152	55.75%	44.25%
1985	113,361	64,392	48,969	56.80%	43.20%
1986	111,245	65,734	45,511	59.09%	40.91%
1987	110,024	66,326	43,698	60.28%	39.72%

C) Numbers of Primary School New Entrants by Han and Non-Han
in XUAR 1949-87

Appendix A(3) Number of New Entrants, Han and Non-Han in
XUAR, 1949-80

date	NO.of Entr.	Non-Han	Han
1949	26,222	(No disaggregated information is available for the years between 1949 and 1965)	
1950	52,920		
1951	39,098		
1952	51,201		
1953	64,736		
1954	85,778		
1955	95,443		
1956	125,440		
1957	135,462		
1958	314,998		
1959	206,522		
1960	239,663		
1961	302,626		
1962	178,787		
1963	190,470		
1964	218,770		
1965	279,912		
1966	248,379	146,715	101,664
1967	169,665	77,715	91,935
1968	206,057	101,733	104,324
1969	232,413	121,223	111,190
1970	266,162	141,011	125,151
1971	333,782	180,468	153,314
1972	408,678	(for the years 1972 to 1979 unavailable)	
1973	455,468		
1974	385,025		
1975	450,860		
1976	442,299		
1977	433,626		
1978	459,802		
1979	417,972		
1980	433,089	230,126	202,963
1981	427,439	232,588	194,851
1982	434,334	258,513	175,821
1983	(no information available for this year)		
1984	415,792	272,431	143,361
1985	374,643	250,021	124,622
1986	359,007	244,568	114,439
1987	328,980	232,154	96,826

D) Numbers of Primary School New Entrants by Ethnic Groups in
XUAR, 1980-87

Appendix A(4) Number of New Entrants by Ethnic Groups in
XUAR, 1980 - 87

date	total	Han	Uyghur	Kazak	Kirghiz
1980	433,089	202,963	162,128	38,421	3,340
1981	427,439	194,851	164,254	37,731	3,319
1982	434,334	175,821	188,824	38,162	3,801
1983	(no information available for this year)				
1984	415,792	143,361	200,116	40,042	3,745
1985	374,643	124,622	177,106	40,406	5,241
1986	359,007	114,439	172,793	41,757	3,950
1987	328,980	96,826	164,429	39,154	3,865

- continued -

	total	Mongol	Sibo	Hui	Others
1980	433,089	4,900	1,370	18,606	1,360
1981	427,439	5,300	1,834	19,020	(NA) ¹⁰
1982	434,334	5,194	1,406	19,502	(NA)
1983	(information unavailable for this year)				
1984	415,792	4,722	1,313	20,743	1,750
1985	374,643	4,352	693	20,428	(NA)
1986	359,007	5,015	810	18,144	2,027
1987	328,980	4,424	641	17,579	616

Appendix 3: Statistics on Xinjiang University

A) Xinjiang University: Distribution of Students by Speciality, 1981

specialities under faculties	type	duration	total	non-Han	Han
A.State Assign.					
Chinese Dept.					
Chinese litera.	humanity	4	195	9	186
Uighur Litera.	humanity	4	235	235	
Kazak Litera.		4			
Journalism		4			
History Dept.					
History	humanity	4	239	145	94
Dept.of politics					
political theory	humanity	4	394	225	169
economic manage.		4			
Law Dept.					
Politics & Law	P.& L	4	42	42	
Chinese Lang.Dept.					
Chinese	humanity	4	174	174	
Uighur		4	101	14	87
Kazak		4	24	4	20
Uighur litera.SF.		3			
Chinese		1			
Foreign Lang.Dept.					
English		4	121	41	80
Russian		4	24	4	20
Math Dept.					
math		3			
Math	N.Science	4	516	304	212
electronic comp.		3			
computing math		4	89	60	29
Physics Dept.					
general physics		4	375	186	189
radio electronics		4	129	98	31
radio		3			
Chemistry Dept.					
general Chemistry?		4	324	159	165
analy.chemistry		4	145	82	63
Biology Dept.					
Biology		4	322	183	139
Geography Dept.					
natural geography		4	278	143	135
hydrology		4	127	34	93
total			3,854	2,142	2

B) Xinjiang University: Distribution of Students by Speciality, 1982

specialities under faculties	type	duration	total	non-Han	Han
A.State Assign.					
Chinese Dept.					
Chinese litera.	humanity	4	161	10	151
Uighur Litera.	humanity	4	271	271	
Kazak Litera.		4			
Journalism		4			
History Dept.					
History	humanity	4	259	169	90
Dept.of politics					
political theory	humanity	4	371	242	129
economic manage.		4			
Law Dept.					
Politics & Law	P.& L	4	133	132	1
Chinese Lang.Dept.					
Chinese	humanity	4	166	164	2
Uighur		4	69	8	61
Kazak		4	24	4	20
Uighur litera.SF.		3			
Chinese		1			
Foreign Lang.Dept.					
English		4	101	39	62
Russian		4	48	28	20
Math Dept.					
math		3			
Math	N.Science	4	450	297	153
electronic comp.		3			
computing math		4			
Physics Dept.					
general physics		4	362	215	147
radio electronics		4	128	98	30
radio		3			
Chemistry Dept.					
general Chemistry?		4	340	192	148
analy.chemistry		4	108	79	29
Biology Dept.					
Biology		4	308	213	95
Geography Dept.					
natural geography		4	292	171	121
hydrology		4	124	62	62
total			3,778	2,429	1,349

C) Xinjiang University: Distribution of Students by Speciality, 1985

specialities under faculties	type	duration	total	non-Han	Han
A.State Assign.					
Chinese Dept.					
Chinese litera.	humanity	4	155	6	149
Uighur Litera.	humanity	4	242	242	
Kazak Litera.		4	40	40	
Journalism		4	149	100	49
History Dept.					
History	humanity	4	399	269	130
Dept.of politics					
political theory	humanity	4	329	214	115
economic manage.		4	210	117	93
Law Dept.					
Politics & Law	P.& L	4	353	241	112
Chinese Lang.Dept.					
Chinese	humanity	4	183	180	3
Uighur		4	89	11	78
Kazak		4	20		20
Uighur litera.SF.		3			
Chinese		1			
Foreign Lang.Dept.					
English		4	127	48	79
Russian		4	61	46	15
Math Dept.					
math		3			
Math	N.Science	4	350	232	118
electronic comp.		3	62	32	30
computing math		4	51	2	49
Physics Dept.					
general physics		4	277	162	115
radio electronics		4	152	102	50
radio		3			
Chemistry Dept.					
general Chemistry?		4	373	231	142
analy.chemistry		4	57	34	23
Biology Dept.					
Biology		4	287	168	119
Geography Dept.					
natural geography		4	280	164	116
hydrology		4	94	54	40
Economic Geography		3			

C) - continued -

specialities under faculties	type	duration	total	non-Han	Han
B.on Contract					
Chinese litera.	humanity	4	2		2
Uighur litera.		4	8	8	
history		4	6	5	1
political theory		4	8	6	2
economic manage.		4	4	4	
natural geography	N.Scienc	4	6	5	1
politics & law	P. & L.	4			
natural geography	N.Scienc	2	40		40
Chinese	humanity	3			
Chinese	humanity	4	4	4	
English	humanity	4	2		2
Math	N.Scienc	4	10	8	2
radio	N.Scienc	4			
physics	N.Scienc	4	7	5	2
biology	N.Scienc	4	7	4	3
chemistry		4	8	6	2
analy. chemistry		4	2	2	
political theory		2	40		40
hydrology	N.Scienc	4	1		1
math		2	40	40	
C.Cadre Training					
Chinese litera.		2	45	4	41
Russian		2	26	6	20
political theory		2	174	9	165
economic manage.	humanity	2			
radio electronics		3	86	9	77
analy. chemistry		3	42	5	37
history		2	37	8	29
politics & law	P. & L.	2	73	10	63
electronic comp.	N.Scienc	3	24	2	22
hydrology		2	30	3	27
D.Teacher Special Training					
Chinese	humanity	2			
English	humanity	2			
politics & law	P. & L.	2			
physics	N.Scienc	2			
political educatio on ideology	T.Traini	4	70	28	42
math	T.Traini	2	22	2	20
E.Self-Financed					
Uighur litera.	humanity	3	44	44	
politics & law	P. & L.	4	53		53
Chinese	humanity	3	29	29	
radio electronics	N.Scienc	3	40	2	38
Biology		3	32		32
economic manage.	humanity	3	52	2	50
economic geography		3	40	2	38
history		2			
physics		3			
total			5,454	2,957	2,497

D) Xinjiang University: Distribution of Students by
Speciality, 1987

specialities under faculties	type	duration	total	non-Han	Han
A.State Assign.					
Chinese Dept.					
Chinese litera.	humanity	4	151	5	146
Uighur Litera.	humanity	4	226	226	
Kazak Litera.		4	41	41	
Journalism		4	214	153	61
History Dept.					
History	humanity	4	408	272	136
Dept.of politics					
political theory	humanity	4	268	176	92
economic manage.		4	314	189	125
Law Dept.					
Politics & Law	P.& L	4	393	266	127
Chinese Lang.Dept.					
Chinese	humanity	4	191	189	2
Uighur		4	97	20	77
Kazak		4	20	8	12
Uighur litera.SF.		3	43	43	
Chinese		1	47	47	
Foreign Lang.Dept.					
English		4	119	57	62
Russian		4	92	39	53
Math Dept.					
math		3	28	28	
Math	N.Science	4	332	215	117
electronic comp.		3	64	3	61
computing math		4	52	33	19
Physics Dept.					
general physics		4	267	156	111
radio electronics		4	156	107	49
radio		3	39	1	38
Chemistry Dept.					
general Chemistry?		4	294	181	113
analy.chemistry		4	120	67	53
Biology Dept.					
Biology		4	245	126	119
Geography Dept.					
natural geography		4	275	160	115
hydrology		4	97	55	42
Economic Geography		3	40	2	38

D) - continued -

specialities under faculties	type	duration	total	non-Han	Han
B.on Contract					
Chinese litera.	humanity	4	2		2
Uighur litera.		4	19	19	
history		4	9	9	
political theory		4	18	16	2
economic manage.		4	4	4	
natural geography	N.Scienc	4	13	12	1
politics & law	P. & L.	4	4	4	
natural geography	N.Scienc	2			
Chinese	humanity	3	56	56	
Chinese	humanity	4	8	8	
English	humanity	4	3	2	1
Math	N.Scienc	4	26	25	1
radio	N.Scienc	4	2	2	
physics	N.Scienc	4	17	16	1
biology	N.Scienc	4	17	17	
chemistry		4	23	22	1
analy. chemistry		4	2	2	
political theory		2			
hydrology	N.Scienc	4			
math		2			
C.Cadre Training					
Chinese litera.		2			
Russian		2	3		3
political theory		2	198	85	113
economic manage.	humanity	2	36		36
radio electronics		3	53	9	44
analy. chemistry		3	43	5	38
history		2			
politics & law	P.& L.	2			
electronic comp.	N.Scienc	3			
hydrology		2			
D.Teacher Special Training					
Chinese	humanity	2	61	61	
English	humanity	2	33	5	28
politics & law	P.& L.	2	76	6	70
physics	N.Scienc	2	39	39	
political educatio	T.Traini	4	26	2	24
on ideology					
math	T.Traini	2			
E.Self-Financed					
Uighur litera.	humanity	3			
politics & law	P.& L.	4			
Chinese	humanity	3			
radio electronics	N.Scienc	3			
Biology		3			
economic manage.	humanity	3			
economic geography		3			
history		2	64	34	30
physics		3	36	4	32
total			5,524	3,329	2,195

Appendix 4: Statistics on Xinjiang Normal University (XNU)

A) XNU: Distribution of Students by Speciality, 1981

specialities under faculties	type	duration	total	non-Han	Han
A.Reg.& special					
Dept.of political education					
political education	T.train.	4	35	4	31
political ideology		4			
Literature Dept.					
Chinese litera.		4	164	15	149
Mongol litera.		4	27	27	
Uihgur litera.		4			
Chinese litera.		2			
Uighur litera.		2			
Mongol litera.		2			
Dept.of Chinese Languages					
Chinese		4	24	24	
Uighur		4			
Chinese		2			
Dept.of Foreign Languages					
English		4	43	3	40
English		2			
Dept.of Education					
school education		4			
audio-visual educa.		2			
History Dept.					
history		4			
history		2			
Math. Dept.					
mathematics		4	150	41	109
mathematics		2			
Physics Dept.					
physics		4	79	7	72
physics		3			
physics		2			
Chemistry Dept.					
chemistry		4	79	39	40
Biology Dept.					
biology		4	20	4	16
biology		3			
biology		2			
Geography Dept.					
geography		4	20	3	17
geography		2			
Dept.of Physical Training					
physical culture		4	154	78	76
physical culture		2			
Music Dept.					
music		3			
music		4	32	14	18
total			827	259	568

B) XNU: Distribution of Students by Speciality, 1982

specialities under faculties	duration	total	non-Han	Han
A.Reg.& special Dept.of political education				
politcal education T.train.	4	76	45	31
political ideology	4			
Literature Dept.				
Chinese Litera.	4	110	11	99
Mongol litera.	4	27	27	
Uihgur litera.	4			
Chinese litera.	2			
Uighur litera.	2			
Mongol litera.	2			
Dept.of Chinese Languages				
Chinese	4	52	52	
Uighur	4	28	1	27
Chinese	2			
Dept.of Foreign Languages				
English	4	83	19	64
English	2			
Dept.of Education				
school education	4			
audio-visual educa.	2			
History Dept.				
history	4			
history	2			
Math. Dept.				
mathematics	4	111	78	33
mathematics	2			
Physics Dept.				
physics	4	76	43	33
physics	3			
physics	2			
Chemistry Dept.				
chemistry	4	70	39	31
Biology Dept.				
biology	4	20	4	16
biology	3			
biology	2			
Geography Dept.				
geography	4	20	3	17
geography	2			
Dept.of Physical Training				
physical culture	4	148	81	67
physical culture	2			
Music Dept.				
music	3	20	5	15
music	4			
Dept.of Fine Art				
painting	3	16	3	
total		857	411	446

C) XNU: Distribution of Students by Speciality, 1985

specialities under faculties	duration	total	non-Han	Han
A.Reg.& special				
Dept.of political education				
political education T.train.	4	155	84	71
political ideology	4			
Literature Dept.				
Chinese litera.	4	155	10	145
Mongol litera.	4	67	67	
Uihgur litera.	4	76	76	
Chinese litera.	2			
Uighur litera.	2			
Mongol litera.	2			
Dept.of Chinese Languages				
Chinese	4	60	60	
Uighur	4	28	1	27
Chinese	2			
Dept.of Foreign Languages				
English	4	80	36	44
English	2			
Dept.of Education				
school education	4	40	7	33
audio-visual educa.	2			
History Dept.				
history	4	40	7	33
history	2			
Math. Dept.				
mathematics	4	193	118	75
mathematics	2			
Physics Dept.				
physics	4	109	76	33
physics	3			
physics	2			
Chemistry Dept.				
chemistry	4	165	102	63
Biology Dept.				
biology	4	75	37	38
biology	3	38	38	
biology	2			
Geography Dept.				
geography	4	78	78	
geography	2			
Dept.of Physical Training				
physical culture	4	185	90	95
physical culture	2	38	38	

C) - continued -

specialities under faculties	duration	total	non-Han	
			non-Han	Han
Music Dept.				
music	3	23	13	10
music	4			
Dept.of Fine Art				
painting	3	25	11	14
painting	2			
B. on Contract				
Uighur litera.	4	2	2	
math.	4	2	2	
physics	4	1	1	
chemistry	4	2	2	
biology	4	1	1	
political education	4			
history	4			
physics	3			
physical culture	4			
C. Teacher Special Training Class				
political educa.	2	165	5	160
Chinese litera.	2	113	5	108
English	2	57	5	52
history	2	124	3	121
math.	2	46		46
physics	2	40	1	39
chemistry	2	51	1	50
biology	2	35	1	34
physical culture	2	92	53	39
music	2	37	4	33
painting	2	61	2	59
D. Self-Financed				
Uighur litera.	2	37	37	
math.	2	40		40
total		2,536	1,074	1,462

D) XNU: Distribution of Students by Speciality, 1987

specialities under faculties	duration	total	non-Han	Han
A.Reg.& special				
Dept.of political education				
political education T.train.	4	152	79	73
political ideology	4	72	38	34
Literature Dept.				
Chinese litera.	4	156	7	149
Mongol litera.	4	72	72	
Uihgur litera.	4	119	119	
Chinese litera.	2	49	3	46
Uighur litera.	2	40	40	
Mongol litera.	2	30	30	
Dept.of Chinese Languages				
Chinese	4	56	56	
Uighur	4	25	1	24
Chinese	2	26	25	1
Dept.of Foreign Languages				
English	4	80	42	38
English	2	50	2	48
Dept.of Education				
school education	4	82	49	33
audio-visual educa.	2	37	4	33
History Dept.				
history	4	75	43	32
history	2	31		31
Math. Dept.				
mathematics	4	219	117	102
mathematics	2	40		40
Physics Dept.				
physics	4	135	72	63
physics	3	40	40	
physics	2	46	2	44
Chemistry Dept.				
chemistry	4	154	95	59
Biology Dept.				
biology	4	111	74	37
biology	3			
biology	2	75	3	72
Geography Dept.				
geography	4	110	75	35
geography	2	38	1	37
Dept.of Physical Training				
physical culture	4	177	115	62
physical culture	2			

D) - continued -

specialities under faculties	duration	1987		
		total	non-Han	Han
Music Dept.				
music	3	22	13	9
music	4			
Dept. of Fine Art				
painting	3	24	11	13
painting	2	59	6	53
B. on Contract				
Uighur litera.	4	6	6	
math.	4	4	3	1
physics	4	1	1	
chemistry	4	2	2	
biology	4	4	4	
political education	4	4	4	
history	4	1	1	
physics	3	1	1	
physical culture	4	5	5	
C. Teacher Special Training Class				
political educa.	2	91	58	33
Chinese litera.	2			
English	2			
history	2			
math.	2			
physics	2			
chemistry	2			
biology	2			
physical culture	2			
music	2			
painting	2			
D. Self-Financed				
Uighur litera.	2			
math.	2			
total		2,521	1,319	1,202

Appendix 5: Type of Higher Education Enrolments

A) Type of Enrolments by Han and Non-Han in Individual Institutes in XUAR, 1985

name of institutes and type of enrolments	total	non-Han	Han
Total	26,321	13,978	12,343
1.State Assign.	21,997		
2. on Contract	424		
3.Cadre Training	1,305		
4.Teacher Special Training	1,221		
5.Self-fnanced	1,374		
A.Inst.under Central Government	3,823	1,576	2,247
1.State Assign.	3,338		
2.on Contract			
3.Cadre Training	336		
4.Teacher Special Training	86		
5.Self-Financed			
(1)Shi Hezi Medical College	1,023	210	813
1.State Assign.	830	208	622
2.on Contract			
3.Cadre Training	113	2	111
4.Teacher Special Training	48		48
5. Self-Financed	32		32
(2) Shi Hezi Agri. College	1,733	441	1,292
1.State Assign.	1,600	439	1,161
2.on Contract			
3.Cadre Training	73	1	72
4.Teacher Special	29		29
5.Self-Financed	31	1	30
(3)Tarim Univer.	1,033	368	665
1.State Assign.	874	368	506
2.on Contract			
3.Cadre Training	150		150
4.Teacher Special Training	9		9
5.Self-Financed			

A) - continued -

(4)Xinjiang PCC *1 Normal Junior College 1.State Assign.			
(5)Xinjiang PCC Junior College of Economics 1.State Assign.			
B. Inst.under Regional Gover.*2	20,789	11,787	9,002
1.State Assign.	17,023		
2.on Contract	393		
3.Cadre Training	969		
4.Teacher Special Training	1,135		
5.Self-Financed	1,269		
(1)Xinjiang Univ.	5,454	2,957	2,497
1.State Assign.	4,340	2,695	1,645
2.on Contract	195	97	98
3.Cadre Training	537	56	481
4.Teacher Special Training	92	30	62
5.Self-Financed	290	79	211
(2) Xinjiang Tech. College	1,841	959	882
1.State Assign.	1,772	957	815
2.on Contract	7		7
3.Cadre Training			
4.Teacher Speical Training			
5.Self-Financed	62	2	60
(3)Xinjiang Inst. of Petroleum	432	255	177
1.State Assign.	432	255	177
2.on Contract			
3.Cadre Training			
4.Teacher Special Training			
5.Self-Financed			
(4)Xinjiang Aug.1st Agri.College	3,178	1,036	2,142
1.State Assign.	2,819	1,662	1,157
2.on Contract	43	25	18
3.Cadre Training	116	56	60
4.Teacher Special Training			
5.Self-Financed	200		200

A) - continued -

(5)Xinjiang			
Medical College	1,639	962	677
1.State Assign.	1,551	937	614
2.on Contract			30
3.Cadre Training			
4.Teacher Special			
Training	19	19	20
5.Self-Financed	69	6	63
(6)Xinjiang Inst.of			
Traditional Chinese			
Medicine	284	127	157
1.State Assign.	284	127	157
(7)Xinjiang Normal			
University	2,536	1,074	1,462
1.State Assign.	1,630	949	681
2.on Contract	8	8	
3.Cadre Training			
4.Teacher Special			
Training	821	80	741
5.Self-Financed	77	37	40
(8)Ili Normal			
Institute	1,067	514	553
1.State Assign.	856	249	607
2.On Contract			
3.Cadre Training			
4.Teacher Special			
Training	40	40	
5.Self-Financed	171	100	71
(9)Kashgar Normal			
Institute	1,865	1,379	486
1.State Assign.	1,494	1,133	361
2.on Contract	70	70	
3.Cadre Training			
4.Teacher Speical			
Training	163	106	57
5.Self-Financed	138	70	68
(10)Hotan Normal			
Junior College	742	742	
1.State ASSign.	654	654	
2.on Contract			
3.Cadre Training			
4.Teacher Special			
Training			
5.Self-Financed	88	88	

A) - continued -

(11)Xinjiang Inst. of Fiance & Eco.	1,577	877	700
1.State Assign.	1,191	699	492
2.On Contract	70	30	40
3.Cadre Training	316	148	168
4.Teacher Special Training			
5.Self-Financed			
(12)Xinjiang Coal Junior College			
1.State Assign.			
(13)Xinjiang Sanji Normal Junior College			
1.State Assign.			
2.on Contract			
(14)Urumqi Professio University			
1.State Assign.			
2.On Contract			
(15)Xinjiang Art Institute			
1.State Assign.			
1.on Contract			
C.Branch Schools, Tertiary Education Classes	1,709	1,138	571
1.State Assign.	1,636		
2.on Contract	31		

*1 = Xinjiang Production & Construction Corps
 *2 = Regional Government refers to the Government of XUAR.
 * State Assign. = State assignment
 * Inst. = institute
 * Cadre Training = cadre speical training
 * univ. or univer. = university
 on contract = Students who are sponsored by organizations
 and have to go back and work for them.
 source: Xinjiang Educational Statistics, 1985, 1987

B) Type of Enrolments by Han and Non-Han in Individual Institutes in XUAR, 1987

name of institutes and type of enrolments	total	non-Han	Han
Total	29,801	16,919	12,882
1.State Assign.	26,810	15,545	11,265
2. on Contract	1,024	583	441
3.Cadre Training	832	353	1,024
4.Teacher Special Training	962	402	479
5.Self-fnanced	173	36	137
A.Inst.under Central Government	4,451	1,258	3,193
1.State Assign.	4,306	1,255	3,051
2.on Contract			
3.Cadre Training	145	3	142
4.Teacher Special Training			
5.Self-Financed			
(1)Shi Hezi Medical College	1,119	228	891
1.State Assign.	998	226	772
2.on Contract			
3.Cadre Training	121	2	119
4.Teacher Special Training			
5. Self-Financed			
(2) Shi Hezi Agri. College	1,901	514	1,387
1.State Assign.	1,877	513	1,364
2.on Contract			
3.Cadre Training	24	1	23
4.Teacher Special			
5.Self-Financed			
(3)Tarim Univer.	1,186	492	694
1.State Assign.	1,186	492	694
2.on Contract			
3.Cadre Training			
4.Teacher Special Training			
5.Self-Financed			

B) - continued -

(4)Xinjiang PCC *1			
Normal Junior			
College	105	12	93
1.State Assign.	105	12	93
(5)Xinjiang PCC			
Junior College of			
Economics	140	12	128
1.State Assign.	140	12	128
B. Inst.under			
Regional Gover.*2	23,948	14,727	9,221
1.State Assign.	21,171	13,425	7,746
2.on Contract	955	514	441
3.Cadre Training	687	350	337
4.Teacher Special			
Training	968	402	968
5.Self-Financed	173	36	137
(1)Xinjiang Univ.	5,517	3,332	2,185
1.State Assign.	4,633	2,865	1,768
2.on Contract	223	214	9
3.Cadre Training	330	102	228
4.Teacher Special			
Training	235	113	122
5.Self-Financed	96	38	58
(2) Xinjiang Tech.			
College	2,356	1,322	1,034
1.State Assign.	2,331	1,308	1,023
2.on Contract	25	14	11
3.Cadre Training			
4.Teacher Speical			
Training			
5.Self-Financed			
(3)Xinjiang Inst.			
of Petroleum	535	330	205
1.State Assign.	531	328	203
2.on Contract	4	2	2
3.Cadre Training			
4.Teacher Special			
Training			
5.Self-Financed			
(4)Xinjiang Aug.1st			
Agri.College	3,202	1,934	1,268
1.State Assign.	3,013	1,839	1,174
2.on Contract	53	41	12
3.Cadre Training	96	54	42
4.Teacher Special			
Training			
5.Self-Financed	40		

B) - continued -

(5)Xinjiang			
Medical College	1,945	1,193	
1.State Assign.	1,895	1,143	
2.on Contract	30		
3.Cadre Training			
4.Teacher Special			
Training	20		
5.Self-Financed			
(6)Xinjiang Inst.of			
Traditional Chinese			
Medicine	277	124	153
1.State Assign.	277	124	153
(7)Xinjiang Normal			
University	2,521	1,319	1,202
1.State Assign.	1,881	1,118	763
2.on Contract	28	27	1
3.Cadre Training			
4.Teacher Special			
Training	612	174	438
5.Self-Financed			
(8)Ili Normal			
Institute	1,148	826	322
1.State Assign.	1,117	795	322
2.On Contract			
3.Cadre Training	31	31	
4.Teacher Special			
Training			
5.Self-Financed			
(9)Kashgar Normal			
Institute	1,991	1,519	472
1.State Assign.	1,892	1,420	472
2.on Contract	35	35	
3.Cadre Training			
4.Teacher Speical			
Training	64	64	
5.Self-Financed			
(10)Hotan Normal			
Junior College	832	832	
1.State ASsign.	832	832	
2.on Contract			
3.Cadre Training			
4.Teacher Special			
Training			
5.Self-Financed			

B) - continued -

(11)Xinjiang Inst. of Fiance & Eco.			
1.State Assign.	1,949	1,262	687
2.On Contract	87	81	6
3.Cadre Training	231	164	67
4.Teacher Special Training			
5.Self-Financed	37	2	35
(12)Xinjiang Coal Junior College	482	318	164
1.State Assign.	482	318	164
(13)Xinjiang Sanji Normal Junior College	643	215	428
1.State Assign.	563	213	350
2.on Contract	80	2	78
(14)Urumqi Professio University	419	97	322
1.State Assign.			
2.On Contract	419	97	322
(15)Xinjiang Art Institute	131	108	23
1.State Assign.	130	107	23
1.on Contract	1	1	
C.Branch Schools, Tertiary Education Classes	1,402	934	468
1.State Assign.	1,333	865	468
2.on Contract	69	69	

*1 = Xinjiang Production & Construction Corps

*2 = Regional Government refers to the Government of XUAR.

* State Assign. = State assignment

* Inst. = institute

* Cadre Training = cadre speical training

* univ. or univer. = university

on contract = Students who are sponsored by organizations
and have to go back and work for them.

source: Xinjiang Educational Statistics, 1985, 1987

Appendix 6: Enrolments and Staff in Secondary Education

A) Numbers and Percentages of Junior Middle School Enrolments by Han and Non-Han in XUAR, 1950-87

date	Total	Han	HJEnr.%	NH	NHEnr.%
1950	5,263	1,006	19.11%	4,257	80.89%
1951	9,138	1,430	15.65%	7,708	84.35%
1952	13,877	1,900	13.69%	11,977	86.31%
1953	17,471	2,364	13.53%	15,107	86.47%
1954	22,000	3,319	15.09%	18,681	84.91%
1955	26,035	4,269	16.40%	21,766	83.60%
1956	44,176	6,767	15.32%	37,409	84.68%
1957	56,082	9,973	17.78%	46,109	82.22%
1958	72,362	11,249	15.55%	61,113	84.45%
1959	99,648	14,740	14.79%	84,908	85.21%
1960	134,916	19,148	14.19%	115,768	85.81%
1961	122,756	21,832	17.78%	100,924	82.22%
1962	90,680	25,200	27.79%	65,480	72.21%
1963	85,970	27,649	32.16%	58,321	67.84%
1964	89,904	32,339	35.97%	57,565	64.03%
1965	102,511	37,804	36.88%	64,707	63.12%
1966	113,339	47,654	42.05%	65,685	57.95%
1967	107,660	51,069	47.44%	56,591	52.56%
1968	97,847	56,338	57.58%	41,509	42.42%
1969	131,514	90,666	68.94%	40,848	31.06%
1970	170,524	110,931	65.05%	59,593	34.95%
1971	214,864	146,099	68.00%	68,765	32.00%
1972	279,664	183,739	65.70%	95,925	34.30%
1973	281,566	197,177	70.03%	84,389	29.97%
1974	311,386	224,338	72.04%	87,048	27.96%
1975	360,513	246,583	68.40%	113,930	31.60%
1976	466,917	296,541	63.51%	170,376	36.49%
1977	592,472	364,684	61.55%	227,788	38.45%
1978	678,010	416,667	61.45%	261,343	38.55%
1979	657,853	406,318	61.76%	251,535	38.24%
1980	675,715	442,211	65.44%	233,504	34.56%
1981	657,453	442,599	67.32%	214,854	32.68%
1982	677,138	466,519	68.90%	210,619	31.10%
1983	698,500	482,589	69.09%	215,911	30.91%
1984	713,948	493,080	69.06%	220,868	30.94%
1985	731,951	486,769	66.50%	245,182	33.50%
1986	762,342	489,715	64.24%	272,627	35.76%
1987	805,817	482,521	59.88%	323,296	40.12%

**B) Numbers and Percentages of Senior Middle School Enrolments
by Han and Non-Han in XUAR, 1950-87**

date	Total	Han	HSEnr.%	NH	NHEnr.%
1950	470	122	25.96%	348	74.04%
1951	375	101	26.93%	274	73.07%
1952	440	195	44.32%	245	55.68%
1953	1,241	361	29.09%	880	70.91%
1954	1,953	496	25.40%	1,457	74.60%
1955	2,281	719	31.52%	1,562	68.48%
1956	3,443	960	27.88%	2,483	72.12%
1957	4,776	1,336	27.97%	3,440	72.03%
1958	7,230	1,849	25.57%	5,381	74.43%
1959	12,228	3,129	25.59%	9,099	74.41%
1960	15,622	3,785	24.23%	11,837	75.77%
1961	16,858	4,625	27.44%	12,233	72.56%
1962	14,427	5,358	37.14%	9,069	62.86%
1963	15,402	6,383	41.44%	9,019	58.56%
1964	17,021	7,083	41.61%	9,938	58.39%
1965	19,260	8,033	41.71%	11,227	58.29%
1966	23,291	11,272	48.40%	12,019	51.60%
1967	23,235	12,682	54.58%	10,553	45.42%
1968	18,622	10,279	55.20%	8,343	44.80%
1969	1,628	491	30.16%	1,137	69.84%
1970	3,273	1,607	49.10%	1,666	50.90%
1971	18,039	6,939	38.47%	11,100	61.53%
1972	44,278	26,098	58.94%	18,180	41.06%
1973	56,757	37,609	66.26%	19,148	33.74%
1974	81,329	58,543	71.98%	22,786	28.02%
1975	97,074	68,452	70.52%	28,622	29.48%
1976	116,631	83,558	71.64%	33,073	28.36%
1977	134,878	93,108	69.03%	41,770	30.97%
1978	128,376	89,539	69.75%	38,837	30.25%
1979	135,403	91,777	67.78%	43,626	32.22%
1980	147,446	97,106	65.86%	50,340	34.14%
1981	155,816	99,970	64.16%	55,846	35.84%
1982	165,619	108,183	65.32%	57,436	34.68%
1983	192,914	117,768	61.05%	75,146	38.95%
1984	192,914	129,693	67.23%	63,221	32.77%
1985	223,405	152,206	68.13%	71,199	31.87%
1986	261,191	174,178	66.69%	87,013	33.31%
1987	270,586	175,208	64.75%	95,378	35.25%

C) Numbers and Percentages of Staff by Han and Non-Han in
Junior and Senior Middle Schools in XUAR, 1949-87

date	total	Non-Han	Han	NH %	Han%
1949	311	142	169	45.66%	54.34%
1950	380	264	116	69.47%	30.53%
1951	601	456	145	75.87%	24.13%
1952	980	781	199	79.69%	20.31%
1953	1,448	1,158	290	79.97%	20.03%
1954	1,799	1,444	355	80.27%	19.73%
1955	2,072	1,645	427	79.39%	20.61%
1956	2,980	2,435	545	81.71%	18.29%
1957	3,880	3,063	817	78.94%	21.06%
1958	4,510	3,521	989	78.07%	21.93%
1959	6,465	4,998	1,467	77.31%	22.69%
1960	8,929	6,711	2,218	75.16%	24.84%
1961	10,123	7,092	3,031	70.06%	29.94%
1962	9,205	5,499	3,706	59.74%	40.26%
1963	9,173	5,081	4,092	55.39%	44.61%
1964	9,876	5,150	4,726	52.15%	47.85%
1965	10,182	5,224	4,958	51.31%	48.69%
1966	9,788	5,339	4,449	54.55%	45.45%
1967	11,181	6,185	4,996	55.32%	44.68%
1968	11,314	6,282	5,032	55.52%	44.48%
1969	13,724	6,479	7,245	47.21%	52.79%
1970	15,753	6,735	9,018	42.75%	57.25%
1971	18,751	7,657	11,094	40.84%	59.16%
1972	24,008	8,384	15,624	34.92%	65.08%
1973	29,443	7,985	21,458	27.12%	72.88%
1974	35,972	8,702	27,270	24.19%	75.81%
1975	36,439	11,173	25,266	30.66%	69.34%
1976	41,675	12,618	29,057	30.28%	69.72%
1977	51,662	15,657	36,005	30.31%	69.69%
1978	57,725	18,813	38,912	32.59%	67.41%
1979	60,034	20,413	39,621	34.00%	66.00%
1980	65,223	21,967	43,256	33.68%	66.32%
1981	71,116	23,451	47,665	32.98%	67.02%
1982	78,302	25,455	52,847	32.51%	67.49%
1983	81,994	27,036	54,958	32.97%	67.03%
1984	81,664	27,526	54,138	33.71%	66.29%
1985	84,593	29,114	55,479	34.42%	65.58%
1986	87,968	31,168	56,800	35.43%	64.57%
1987	90,704	33,213	57,491	36.62%	63.38%

D) Numbers and Percentages of Staff, Han and Non-Han, in
Secondary Technical & Secondary Normal Schools in XUAR, 1949-

87

date	total	Non-Han	Han	NH %	Han%
1949	383	258	125	67.36%	32.64%
1950	389	243	146	62.47%	37.53%
1951	415	264	151	63.61%	36.39%
1952	548	363	185	66.24%	33.76%
1953	658	455	203	69.15%	30.85%
1954	720	446	274	61.94%	38.06%
1955	814	468	346	57.49%	42.51%
1956	1,593	859	734	53.92%	46.08%
1957	2,000	1,076	924	53.80%	46.20%
1958	2,771	1,273	1,498	45.94%	54.06%
1959	2,987	1,293	1,694	43.29%	56.71%
1960	5,214	1,740	3,474	33.37%	66.63%
1961	4,742	1,630	3,112	34.37%	65.63%
1962	2,624	915	1,709	34.87%	65.13%
1963	2,331	829	1,502	35.56%	64.44%
1964	2,364	803	1,561	33.97%	66.03%
1965	2,867	923	1,944	32.19%	67.81%
1966	2,832	821	2,011	28.99%	71.01%
1967	2,822	804	2,018	28.49%	71.51%
1968	2,803	796	2,007	28.40%	71.60%
1969	2,802	847	1,955	30.23%	69.77%
1970	2,750	804	1,946	29.24%	70.76%
1971	2,678	742	1,936	27.71%	72.29%
1972	2,647				
1973	2,711				
1974	3,184				
1975	3,265	1,273	1,992	38.99%	61.01%
1976	3,784	1,518	2,266	40.12%	59.88%
1977	3,998				
1978	5,621	2,134	3,487	37.96%	62.04%
1979	6,159	2,331	3,828	37.85%	62.15%
1980	7,899	2,825	5,074	35.76%	64.24%
1981	9,140	3,176	5,964	34.75%	65.25%
1982	9,405	3,288	6,117	34.96%	65.04%
1983	9,814	3,724	6,090	37.95%	62.05%
1984	10,189	3,855	6,334	37.83%	62.17%
1985	10,859	4,247	6,612	39.11%	60.89%
1986	11,698	4,739	6,959	40.51%	59.49%
1987	11,712	4,713	6,999	40.24%	59.76%

Appendix 7: Numbers of Enrolments and Staff in Higher Education

A) Numbers of Enrolments and Staff by Han and Non-Han in Higher Education in XUAR, 1949 - 87

date	number of enrolments			number of staff		
	TotalEnr	NHEnr.	HanEnr.	Staff	NH	Han
1949	379	185	194	104	46	58
1950	336	306	30	73	54	19
1951	499	455	44	104	70	34
1952	1,582	808	774	1,382	184	1,198
1953	1,714	956	758	1,385	216	1,169
1954	1,921	1,143	778	1,159	276	883
1955	2,125	1,264	861	1,793	368	1,425
1956	3,445	2,112	1,333	2,428	645	1,783
1957	3,909	2,537	1,372	2,146	696	1,450
1958	4,564	2,529	2,035	2,028	780	1,248
1959	5,148	2,255	2,893	2,894	781	2,113
1960	5,909	2,178	3,731	3,875	741	3,134
1961	6,414	2,437	3,977	4,085	736	3,349
1962	6,512	2,271	4,241	3,100	679	2,421
1963	6,619	2,431	4,188	3,171	698	2,473
1964	6,814	2,560	4,254	3,276	645	2,631
1965	7,740	3,129	4,611	3,412	699	2,713
1966	7,453	3,080	4,373	6,278	801	5,477
1967	6,744	2,716	4,028	5,263	798	4,465
1968	4,159	1,753	2,406	5,258	798	4,460
1969	1,992	1,181	811	3,923	794	3,129
1970	331	258	73	4,253	855	3,398
1971	74			4,436	854	3,582
1972	1,652	645	1,007	3,978		
1973	3,294	1,727	1,567	3,801	837	2,964
1974	4,499	2,406	2,093	3,616	975	2,641
1975	5,209	3,206	2,003	3,773	1,051	2,722
1976	6,274	3,972	2,302	4,420	1,379	3,041
1977	7,706	4,327	3,379	4,993	1,640	3,353
1978	10,213	4,890	5,323	5,428	1,693	3,735
1979	11,393	5,125	6,268	6,531	1,655	4,876
1980	14,242	6,443	7,799	8,583	1,906	6,677
1981	16,495	7,965	8,530	9,293	2,143	7,150
1982	16,191	9,244	6,947	10,450	2,490	7,960
1983	16,438	9,379	7,059	11,374	3,081	8,293
1984	19,609	11,200	8,409	12,077	3,392	8,685
1985	26,321	13,978	12,343	13,124	3,838	9,286
1986	29,670	16,216	13,454	14,196	4,135	10,061
1987	29,801	16,919	12,882	15,764	4,701	11,063

**B) Numbers of Enrolments by Ethnic Groups in Higher Education
in XUAR, 1980-87**

date	total	Han	Uighur	Kazak	Kirghiz
1980	14242	7,799	4,689	1,020	57
1981	16495	8,530	5,840	1,242	76
1982	16191	6,947	6,855	1,450	129
1983	16438	7,059	6,961	1,436	119
1984	19609	8,409	8,547	1,599	134
1985	26321	12,343	10,762	1,997	143
1986	29670	13,454	11,680	2,212	180
1987	29801	12,882	12,376	2,425	199

date	Hui	Mongol	Sibo	others
1980	142	166	181	188
1981	164	200	164	279
1982	156	247	176	231
1983	173	263	186	241
1984	204	248	202	266
1985	252	272	237	315
1986	260	285	226	305
1987	271	356	207	330

**Number of Post Graduate Students
by Han and Non-Han in XUAR, 1980-87**

date	total	non-Han	Han
1980			
1981			
1982	44	2	42
1983	55	1	54
1984	80	5	75
1985	179	18	161
1986	258	30	228
1987	344	29	315

Appendix 8: Progression Rates

**A) Junior Middle School New Entrants As % of Primary School
Completers by Han and Non-Han in XUAR, 1949-87**

date	TPSGra.	TJMSNEntr.	Pro. %	NHPSGra.	NHJSNEntr.	NHPro. %
1949	4,832	1,508	31.21%			
1950	6,945	3,333	47.99%			
1951	12,861	4,900	38.10%			
1952	18,590	7,320	39.38%			
1953	32,173	7,836	24.36%			
1954	37,751	8,763	23.21%			
1955	40,006	11,732	29.33%			
1956	45,230	25,379	56.11%			
1957	53,122	23,944	45.07%			
1958	63,224	35,439	56.05%			
1959	68,486	46,670	68.15%			
1960	89,678	63,511	70.82%			
1961	86,480	43,446	50.24%			
1962	117,864	32,446	27.53%			
1963	73,587	34,953	47.50%			
1964	45,024	33,503	74.41%			
1965	77,080	42,411	55.02%			
1966	105,206	37,597	35.74%	64,988	21,042	32.38%
1967	116,437	19,932	17.12%	71,789	5,003	6.97%
1968	126,601	25,699	20.30%	75,232	5,713	7.59%
1969	150,410	89,772	59.68%	90,947	28,652	31.50%
1970	173,553	89,947	51.83%	93,521	33,479	35.80%
1971	141,980	113,766	80.13%	63,403	46,432	73.23%
1972	143,321	130,558	91.09%			
1973	195,370	112,220	57.44%			
1974	154,001	125,750	81.66%			
1975	194,283	156,939	80.78%		58,204	
1976	244,335	224,382	91.83%			
1977	272,254	245,702	90.25%			
1978	288,359	255,687	88.67%		106,921	
1979	265,428	224,388	84.54%		88,385	
1980	292,515	236,432	80.83%	130,581	90,033	68.95%
1981	297,524	233,243	78.39%	133,663	84,417	63.16%
1982	310,025	241,842	78.01%	137,868	86,210	62.53%
1983	317,227	249,255	78.57%	138,989	87,312	62.82%
1984	295,993	241,033	81.43%	129,934	87,771	67.55%
1985	289,045	247,431	85.60%	132,753	99,124	74.67%
1986	307,047	261,732	85.24%	145,495	108,456	74.54%
1987	317,820	248,578	78.21%	170,822	111,328	65.17%

A) - continued -

date	HanPSGra.	HJSNEntr.	HanPro. %
1949			
1950			
1951			
1952			
1953			
1954			
1955			
1956			
1957			
1958			
1959			
1960			
1961			
1962			
1963			
1964			
1965			
1966	40,218	16,555	41.16%
1967	44,648	14,929	33.44%
1968	51,369	19,986	38.91%
1969	59,463	61,120	102.79%
1970	80,032	56,468	70.56%
1971	78,577	67,334	85.69%
1972			
1973			
1974			
1975		98,735	
1976			
1977			
1978		148,766	
1979		136,003	
1980	161,934	146,399	90.41%
1981	163,861	148,826	90.82%
1982	172,157	155,632	90.40%
1983	178,238	161,943	90.86%
1984	166,059	153,262	92.29%
1985	156,292	148,307	94.89%
1986	161,552	153,276	94.88%
1987	146,998	137,250	93.37%

B) Junior Middle School New Entrants As % of Primary School

Completers by Ethnic Groups in XUAR, 1980-87

date	HanPSGra.	HJMSEntr.	HanPro.	Uyg.PSGra.	Uyg.JSEntr	Uyg.Pro.
1980	161,934	146,399	90.41%	96,296	61,698	64.07%
1981	163,861	148,826	90.82%	100,091	56,189	56.14%
1982	172,157	155,632	90.40%	103,123	58,027	56.27%
1983	178,238	161,943	90.86%	104,197	58,318	55.97%
1984	166,059	153,262	92.29%	95,277	59,245	62.18%
1985	156,292	148,307	94.89%	98,803	69,745	70.59%
1986	161,552	153,276	94.88%	107,590	77,076	71.64%
1987	146,998	137,250	93.37%	129,627	76,468	58.99%

date	Ka.PSGra.	Ka.JSEntr.	Ka.Pro.	HuiPSGra.	HuiJSEntr	HuiPro
1980	19,659	15,528	78.99%	9,503	7,741	81.46%
1981	18,423	15,102	81.97%	10,054	7,910	78.68%
1982	18,626	15,084	80.98%	10,589	7,853	74.16%
1983	18,745	15,817	84.38%	10,143	7,469	73.64%
1984	18,479	15,294	82.76%	10,275	7,730	75.23%
1985	17,707	15,700	88.67%	10,411	8,037	77.20%
1986	19,304	16,289	84.38%	11,622	8,695	74.82%
1987	21,626	18,112	83.75%	12,802	10,182	79.53%

date	Kir.PSGra	Kir.JSEntr	Kir.Pro.	SiboPSGra	SiboJSEntr	SiboPro
1980	1,550	1,127	72.71%	696	735	105.60%
1981	1,338	1,293	96.64%	655	686	104.73%
1982	1,589	1,083	68.16%	758	806	106.33%
1983	1,564	1,239	79.22%	831	904	108.78%
1984	1,568	1,193	76.08%	748	679	90.78%
1985	1,269	1,168	92.04%	676	699	103.40%
1986	1,942	1,509	77.70%	890	917	103.03%
1987	1,694	1,569	92.62%	753	778	103.32%

date	Mong.PSG	Mong.JSEn	Mong.Pro.
1980	2,174	2,309	106.21%
1981	2,331	2,480	106.39%
1982	2,439	2,427	99.51%
1983	2,537	2,490	98.15%
1984	2,731	2,549	93.34%
1985	2,735	2,800	102.38%
1986	2,933	2,847	97.07%
1987	2,836	2,877	101.45%

**C) Senior Middle School New Entrants As % of Junior Middle
School Graduates by Han and Non-Han in XUAR, 1949-87**

date	TJSGra.	TSMSEntr.	Pro. %	NHJSGra	NHSMSEntr	NHPro. %
1949	352	205	58.24%	220		
1950	538	294	54.65%	310		
1951	612	277	45.26%	472		
1952	895	316	35.31%	733		
1953	1,581	905	57.24%	1,261		
1954	2,556	956	37.40%	2,135		
1955	3,629	978	26.95%	2,977		
1956	5,332	1,799	33.74%	4,401		
1957	5,760	2,218	38.51%	4,698		
1958	8,690	4,008	46.12%	7,222		
1959	14,204	7,300	51.39%	11,653		
1960	18,215	6,540	35.90%	15,382		
1961	23,162	6,511	28.11%	19,340		
1962	23,850	5,601	23.48%	20,826		
1963	22,697	6,629	29.21%	17,440		
1964	19,333	7,111	36.78%	13,270		
1965	20,759	7,587	36.55%	12,902		
1966	25,938	5,637	21.73%	14,224	3,328	23.40%
1967	24,596	4,140	16.83%	13,104	296	2.26%
1968	33,977	158	.47%	18,902	108	.57%
1969	54,369	872	1.60%	28,621	631	2.20%
1970	43,866	2,689	6.13%	13,787	1,314	9.53%
1971	63,028	11,115	17.64%	14,523	1,660	11.43%
1972	60,011	30,802	51.33%			
1973	61,493	28,020	45.57%			
1974	86,257	40,337	46.76%			
1975	89,387	48,109	53.82%	25,109	13,037	51.92%
1976	106,249	68,504	64.47%	32,158		
1977	114,122	70,876	62.11%	41,098		
1978	141,572	68,261	48.22%	47,476	21,796	45.91%
1979	175,793	73,291	41.69%	66,350	24,430	36.82%
1980	186,012	73,959	39.76%	67,719	27,392	40.45%
1981	190,364	80,957	42.53%	65,703	30,338	46.17%
1982	175,793	81,738	46.50%	55,123	28,625	51.93%
1983	183,360	85,514	46.64%	55,371	29,333	52.98%
1984	185,642	91,060	49.05%	56,288	31,997	56.85%
1985	199,124	93,692	47.05%	59,936	33,641	56.13%
1986	209,817	96,858	46.16%	66,068	35,631	53.93%
1987	215,609	88,115	40.87%	71,743	33,583	46.81%

C) - continued -

date	HanJSGra.	HanSSEntr	HanPro.%
1949	132		
1950	228		
1951	140		
1952	162		
1953	320		
1954	421		
1955	652		
1956	931		
1957	1,062		
1958	1,468		
1959	2,551		
1960	2,833		
1961	3,822		
1962	3,824		
1963	5,250		
1964	6,063		
1965	7,857		
1966	11,714	2,309	19.71%
1967	11,492	3,844	33.45%
1968	15,075	50	.33%
1969	25,748	241	.94%
1970	30,079	1,375	4.57%
1971	48,505	9,455	19.49%
1972			
1973			
1974			
1975	64,278	35,072	54.56%
1976			
1977			
1978	94,096	46,465	49.38%
1979	109,443	48,861	44.65%
1980	118,293	46,567	39.37%
1981	124,661	50,619	40.61%
1982	120,670	53,113	44.02%
1983	127,989	56,181	43.90%
1984	129,354	59,063	45.66%
1985	139,188	60,051	43.14%
1986	143,749	61,227	42.59%
1987	143,866	54,532	37.90%

D) Senior Middle School New Entrants As % of Junior Middle School Graduates by Ethnic Groups in XUAR, 1980-87

date	HanJGra.	HanSEntr.	HanPro.	Uyg.JGra.	Uyg.SEntr	Uyg.Pro.
1980	118,293	46,567	39.37%	47,869	19,184	40.08%
1981	124,661	50,619	40.61%	44,493	20,571	46.23%
1982	120,226	53,113	44.18%	36,325	18,509	50.95%
1983	127,989	56,181	43.90%	36,061	18,842	52.25%
1984	129,354	59,063	45.66%	36,570	20,802	56.88%
1985	139,272	60,051	43.12%	40,456	22,694	56.10%
1986	143,749	61,227	42.59%	44,471	23,688	53.27%
1987	143,866	54,532	37.90%	48,408	21,939	45.32%

date	Ka.JGra.	Ka.SEntr	Ka.Pro.	HuiJGra.	HuiSEntr.	HuiPro.
1980	10,814	4,954	45.81%	5,601	1,268	22.64%
1981	11,385	5,901	51.83%	5,932	1,526	25.72%
1982	10,121	6,061	59.89%	4,923	1,547	31.42%
1983	10,190	6,438	63.18%	5,340	1,467	27.47%
1984	10,324	6,891	66.75%	5,515	1,751	31.75%
1985	10,283	6,746	65.60%	5,273	1,641	31.12%
1986	11,535	7,265	62.98%	5,491	1,578	28.74%
1987	12,334	7,283	59.05%	6,263	1,427	22.78%

date	Kir.JGra.	Kir.SEntr	Kir.Pro.	SiboJGra.	SiboSEntr	SiboPro.
1980	727	422	58.05%	691	425	61.51%
1981	702	431	61.40%	692	410	59.25%
1982	626	376	60.06%	644	491	76.24%
1983	655	467	71.30%	594	424	71.38%
1984	687	400	58.22%	586	431	73.55%
1985	594	458	77.10%	626	430	68.69%
1986	779	526	67.52%	729	490	67.22%
1987	852	545	63.97%	671	346	51.56%

date	Mong.JGra	Mong.SEnt	Mong.Pro.
1980	1,372	798	58.16%
1981	1,933	1,136	58.77%
1982	1,826	1,230	67.36%
1983	1,880	1,207	64.20%
1984	1,884	1,271	67.46%
1985	1,891	1,205	63.72%
1986	2,044	1,537	75.20%
1987	2,206	1,493	67.68%

E) Higher Education New Entrants As % of Senior Middle School
 Graduates by Han and Non-Han in XUAR, 1949-87

date	TSMSSGra.	TTSEntr.	Pro. %	NHSMSSGra.	NHTSEntr.	NHPro. %
1949	24			1		
1950	27	252	933.33%	2		
1951	36	296	822.22%	25		
1952	27	1,152	4,266.67%	9		
1953	31	485	1,564.52%	2		
1954	70	971	1,387.14%	30		
1955	181	740	408.84%	109		
1956	452	2,374	525.22%	300		
1957	593	1,293	218.04%	415		
1958	755	1,249	165.43%	529		
1959	1,388	1,948	140.35%	925		
1960	1,531	2,202	143.83%	953		
1961	2,587	1,768	68.34%	1,900		
1962	4,605	1,285	27.90%	3,470		
1963	3,528	1,589	45.04%	2,493		
1964	3,644	1,773	48.66%	2,162		
1965	3,848	2,370	61.59%	2,164		
1966	4,916			2,331		
1967	4,024			1,668		
1968	4,957			1,868		
1969	17,482			7,583		
1970	898			684		
1971	562			400		
1972	1,995	1,687	84.56%			
1973	7,234	1,647	22.77%			
1974	23,268	1,307	5.62%			
1975	33,619	1,568	4.66%	7,522		
1976	41,223	2,400	5.82%	10,684		
1977	43,072	3,418	7.94%	9,831	1,522	15.48%
1978	53,970	4,102	7.60%	12,153	1,530	12.59%
1979	54,728	3,135	5.73%	15,746	1,331	8.45%
1980	60,370	3,752	6.22%	18,114	1,971	10.88%
1981	67,114	3,056	4.55%	21,047	1,736	8.25%
1982	69,504	3,795	5.46%	24,982	2,003	8.02%
1983	77,546	5,134	6.62%	28,039	2,806	10.01%
1984	72,191	6,495	9.00%	26,081	3,593	13.78%
1985	68,096	9,178	13.48%	26,654	4,484	16.82%
1986	58,585	7,836	13.38%	20,654	4,153	20.11%
1987	73,947	8,227	11.13%	22,188	4,412	19.88%

E) - continued -

date	HANSMSGHTNEntr.		HPro.%
1949	23		
1950	25		
1951	11		
1952	18		
1953	29		
1954	40		
1955	72		
1956	152		
1957	178		
1958	226		
1959	463		
1960	578		
1961	687		
1962	1135		
1963	1035		
1964	1482		
1965	1684		
1966	2585		
1967	2356		
1968	3089		
1969	9899		
1970	214		
1971	162		
1972			
1973			
1974			
1975	26097		
1976	30539		
1977	33241	1896	5.70%
1978	41817	2572	6.15%
1979	38982	1804	4.63%
1980	42256	1781	4.21%
1981	46067	1320	2.87%
1982	44522	1792	4.02%
1983	49507	2328	4.70%
1984	46110	2902	6.29%
1985	41442	4694	11.33%
1986	37931	3683	9.71%
1987	51759	3815	7.37%

F) Higher Education New Entrants As % of Senior Middle School

Graduates by Ethnic Groups in XUAR, 1980-87

Date	HanSGra.	HanTEnter.	HanPro.	Uyg.SGra.	Uyg.TEnte	Uyg.Pro
1980	42,256	1,781	4.21%	13,003		
1981	46,067	1,320	2.87%	14,154	1,312	9.27%
1982	44,522	1,792	4.02%	17,281	1,422	8.23%
1983	49,507	2,358	4.76%	18,912	2,050	10.84%
1984	46,110	2,902	6.29%	16,906	2,895	17.12%
1985	41,442	4,694	11.33%	17,807	3,481	19.55%
1986	37,708	3,683	9.77%	13,644	2,765	20.27%
1987	51,759	3,815	7.37%	14,797	3,161	21.36%


Date	Ka.SGra.	Ka.TEnte	Ka.Pro.	Kir.SGra	Kir.TEnte	Kir.Pro.
1980	2,967			126		
1981	4,031	231	5.73%	239	23	9.62%
1982	4,498	343	7.63%	337	52	15.43%
1983	5,555	405	7.29%	338	31	9.17%
1984	5,623	434	7.72%	336	40	11.90%
1985	5,864	629	10.73%	396	37	9.34%
1986	4,540	578	12.73%	342	53	15.50%
1987	3,709	587	15.83%	288	61	21.18%

Date	HuiSGra.	HuiTEnter	HuiPro.	Mong.SGra.	Mong.TEnte	Mong.Pro
1980	1,266			334		
1981	1,543	25	1.62%	569	71	12.48%
1982	1,321	44	3.33%	803	45	5.60%
1983	1,321	60	4.54%	1,056	83	7.86%
1984	1,305	70	5.36%	1,004	32	3.19%
1985	1,078	85	7.88%	611	97	15.88%
1986	910	86	9.45%	861	76	8.83%
1987	1,333	76	5.70%	1,091	120	11.00%

Date	SiboSGra.	SiboTEnter	SiboPro.	OtherSGra	OtherTEnt	OtherPro
1980	250			168		
1981	260	38	14.62%	251	46	18.33%
1982	427	42	9.84%	315	55	17.46%
1983	490	62	12.65%	367	85	23.16%
1984	516	58	11.24%	391	64	16.37%
1985	530	68	12.83%	368	87	23.64%
1986	225	52	23.11%	355	72	20.28%
1987	464	57	12.28%	508	113	22.24%


Appendix 9: Map of Xinjiang

Ethnic Groups in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region



Appendix 10: Map of Xinjiang

Location of Xinjiang Production & Construction Corps Units Compared to Agricultural Areas



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