WAR IN THE CLASSROOM

A Philosophical Treatment of the Problems Posed

by War for Educators

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Abstract

This thesis addresses the problems inherent in teaching on war in schools. The focus is on the moral acceptability of killing in war, and the issues this raises for educators. It argues that war can only properly be presented in the curriculum as a controversial issue.

In the first chapter it is maintained that war is undeniably a moral matter. Beliefs about aggression are explored to show that international military conflict is not an unavoidable feature of human existence and that war is a prima facie evil. Grounds for the absolute prohibition on taking life are then examined in Chapter 2, to demonstrate that pacifism is not an uncontestable stance. Just war thinking is investigated in Chapter 3. The immunity of civilians demanded by just war theory is shown to present particular difficulties in relation to twentieth century warfare.

From the analysis in the first three chapters, the controversiality of war becomes plain. Some reactions to Peace Education, explored in Chapter 4, reflect the anxieties felt by many at the prospect of the moral dilemmas of war being debated in the classroom. The problems for the educator are exacerbated by fears of indoctrination and doubts over the value of teaching on war in schools.

In Chapter 5 principles which ought to inform all teaching on war are identified. It is claimed that war must be explicitly presented as a controversial issue and that the teaching should be unbiased, balanced and impartial, adhering to coherence and consistency. Application of these principles to methodology is followed by reflection, in Chapter 6, on the selection of content for teaching on war. Consideration is given to knowledge and understanding, skills, values and dispositions. It is argued that nuclear war should be included and that the value of peace can legitimately be taught.

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INTRODUCTION

Teaching about war presents various difficulties for educationalists today. Central to these is the moral problem of whether or not killing in war can ever be justified. The intentional taking of human life is typically perceived as the ultimate wrongdoing, yet it is rarely questioned in the context of war. 'War is, for most people, the big exception,' (Norman, 1995: 1). Whether or not homicide in war is appropriately viewed as a special case is important to the way in which the subject is approached in the classroom. Clarification is needed, for teachers' beliefs are likely to affect what is taught and learnt in school.

The topic of war is already included in the school curriculum in various subject areas and there is no reason to suppose that it will suddenly disappear. For many who left school some years ago, history seemed to comprise a series of wars. Despite many recent changes to the content of history lessons, it is still difficult to imagine students completing their schooling without having heard war mentioned by a teacher. Increasingly past wars are examined from differing perspectives, but in history the attempt will be primarily aimed at gaining a more, rather than less, accurate description of events. Nevertheless questions of justification are inevitable in discussion. Attitudes to war may be more directly confronted in literature classes, where, as in First World Poetry, they are often inextricable from and can constitute the subject matter. In other lessons too, war is likely to figure - as an explanation in geography perhaps. In all these examples war is part of the explicit content of lessons, but it is also likely to be tackled in another way in Personal and Social Education or as part of moral education. Here the issue of war may be used to explore the students' own beliefs and to develop thinking in the moral sphere. War, as a topic, may be used as a vehicle for other learning. Discussion of war is not only confined to what might be called the 'formal' curriculum. Children's

private reading and the films they enjoy frequently concern warfare and our pupils see media coverage of current wars on television and in the newspapers. Consequently the subject may be raised by them informally and talked of at length in tutor periods.

What teachers say about war in all these situations is likely to have some effect, if not always the desired one, and so could count as teaching on war. Their own beliefs are likely to be reflected in the way they treat pupils and the way in which they present their subjects. Our attitudes to war and peace generally may be implicit in our teaching and figure on the hidden curriculum in addition to what is made explicit in syllabuses.

War is a difficult topic for teachers to address in the classroom. This is not to suggest that it is conceptually more difficult than other subjects, in the sense of it being somehow 'harder to learn' in the way that it is often suggested that physics, for example, is particularly difficult to grasp, but that it is a controversial issue which is peculiarly and politically sensitive. It raises fundamental moral questions about the taking of human life in a legal pursuit - the waging of war. Many aspects of war raise deeply disturbing questions, but the focus here will be narrowed to whether or not war is morally justifiable, in that it involves intentional killing, and reflection on how this is best dealt with in schooling.

Before discussing how the subject of war should be presented in the educational context, it is necessary to examine the pre-eminent underlying difficulties.

Firstly, in Chapter 1, it will be argued that war undeniably falls within the moral sphere. It is important to recognise that the degree to which war is perceived as an unavoidable aspect of the human condition affects the extent to which it is seen as a proper object of moral judgement. Although it does not seem conceivable that

killing in war could ever be thought of as something human beings have no control over, children in school, echoing their elders perhaps, frequently speak as if this is the case:

> Some people say it is pointless to discuss the morality of war, since, even if it is always immoral, it can never be eliminated, for reasons having to do with human nature. (Glover, 1977: 253)

Consequently it is relevant to expose the muddled reasoning that can lead to the assumption that we are naturally aggressive animals and, as such, carry little or no moral responsibility for the prevalence of war in our existence. It will be shown that aggression may be a human characteristic, but that it is not one we are biologically pre-programmed to act upon. It will be maintained that all aggressive behaviour is open to moral scrutiny, and that claims based on aggression, to the effect that war is entirely unavoidable, are mistaken.

War surely should not be simply set aside as the exception to the widely held conviction that deliberate killing is morally abhorrent. This is not to say that all intentional killing is plainly murder, or that warfare is necessarily always wrong. Nevertheless consideration must be given to the claims of pacifism. In the second chapter it will be argued that killing is a prima facie evil, but that the absolutist position prohibiting all intentional taking of life is untenable. This is not because pacifism is logically absurd in being self-contradictory as Narveson (1979: 447) believes, but because examination of the different grounds for believing that human life should be inviolate will reveal that an absolute prohibition on homicide cannot be upheld.

Whether or not killing in war could ever be the lesser of two evils is a further question. If it is not clear that pacifism is the only possible moral stance to war, attention to ways in which people's deeply felt abhorrence to killing are thought to be reconcilable with warfare is illuminating. The just war tradition is based on the presumption that war is an evil, but sometimes a necessary one. It charts attempts

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to limit the evil, by identifying the circumstances in which it is justifiable. Exploration, in the third chapter, of the just causes and the right conduct of war embodied in the tradition will make clear that few wars in this century would satisfy the criteria. Modern just war thinking addresses particularly those problems that technological progress has brought to the waging of war and adds to our understanding. Just war thought, both traditional and modern, outlaws the killing of 'innocents'. There are difficulties in identifying exactly who should count as non-combatants, but it will be maintained that the prohibition on military action which will certainly destroy centres of civilian population should be an absolute principle. The practice of war in the late twentieth century rarely seems to conform to this condition. It might seem that the Doctrine of Double Effect could be invoked to distinguish circumstances in which violation of the immunity of civilians could be permissible. However, analysis of the criteria of Double Effect will demonstrate that methods of warfare which inevitably bring about the deaths of 'innocents' cannot be justified. Even if wars and the killing of soldiers can in some limited circumstances be justified, it seems impossible that killing non-combatants could be similarly allowable.

In the light of these moral considerations, reflection on how we should present war in the classroom is obviously vital. Chapter 4 will address Peace Education, that specific approach to teaching issues of war and violence more generally, which was widely debated in the nineteen eighties. The principles and guidelines, detailed in the literature on Peace Education, must be an invaluable basis for any further commentary on teaching with respect to war. Its critics were vociferous and their objections cannot be ignored for they include charges of indoctrination and other accusations which, if true, ought to be taken seriously by any educator.

Plainly war is controversial and, in the final chapters, it will be claimed that it should be explicitly presented as a controversial issue in schools. The nature of that

controversiality implied by the description, 'a controversial issue' in the context of the curriculum, will be explored and it will be argued that it is possible to teach on war without indoctrinating or otherwise contravening educational principles, despite the apparently intractable moral dilemmas raised. War needs to be understood as a moral issue, but it is also undeniably a political matter, and it should be addressed within both moral and political education. To be effective, cross-curricular implications must be recognised. Principles will be identified for how war should be treated in schools. These in turn will be shown to inform the selection of content for teaching on war.

There is no intention to provide a blueprint for all teaching related to war: the situations in which the topic arises, both in lessons and in other areas of school life, are too varied for this to be a profitable exercise. Rather, it is hoped that attention will be drawn to the educational principles and considerations which should underpin the choice of methodology and content when teaching on war as a controversial issue.

CHAPTER 1

Aggression and the Moral Status of War

Fundamentally war is a moral problem. This may seem self-evident, but teachers should remember it is a truth not always recognised. It is obvious that people worry about war, the shedding of blood and the devastation of the land, but it is often believed that when there is talk of rights and wrongs, this is an expression of feeling and not a debate about morality. Many seem to consider war to be outside the sphere of moral judgement. In this chapter it will be argued that such a belief is untenable and that war is essentially a moral matter.

The conviction that war is beyond morality seems most commonly to be based on an assumption that war is a consequence of a human characteristic - aggression. The connection between war and aggression is easily made:

> *War* is a special type of aggression. It involves aggression between groups in which the individuals are in some degree organised towards achieving a common goal. It is usually institutionalised, with individuals occupying distinct roles (soldier, general, munitions worker etc.). (Groebel & Hinde, 1989: 5).

When human beings are fighting in conflicts between tribes, states or countries, we call it 'war' and those who start wars are called 'aggressors'.

However, the reasoning, which leads some to conclude from this that war is unavoidable, is confused and confusing. Some clarification is needed.

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Aggression is seen as natural. Conceived of as inborn and a determining influence, it is sometimes believed to be uncontrollable. If this were true, then we could not avoid violence and war, and all talk of the morality of war would be otiose in a context where we should have no choice and so no responsibility. The wildness of such an assumption does not make it any the less dangerous and it will be necessary to demonstrate its absurdity.

Of course, it cannot be the case that no one ever has any option over whether or not to engage in fighting, since very obviously, in individual instances, some will lash out and others not. People recount how they have exercised control and refrained from hitting another, and, as far as we can tell, they are relating how they have chosen to avoid violence (and expecting approbation for making the right choice.) Pacifists may choose to become conscientious objectors and refuse to be soldiers. The suggestion cannot be that, due to the way human beings are, going to war is some sort of reflex like the knee-jerk and yet some notion of aggression as an irresistible impulse persists.

It is not the belief that human beings are programmed to fight and kill at each and every opportunity, such that war is completely beyond the sphere of human responsibility, which primarily occupies me, although I do think this is implicit in some assumptions and therefore its foolishness needs to be exposed. Instead, my interest centres on the way in which beliefs about aggression can make it seem that war is unavoidable, in a weaker sense, in the long term.

This view is probably more accurately expressed as the idea that we cannot avoid as a species warring with each other. The feeling seems to be that violence will occur sooner or later, because it is in our nature. In one of his thrillers, *Straight,* Dick

Francis (1989: 296) tells the fable of the horse that consents to carry the scorpion across the river: in mid-stream the scorpion stings the horse. In its death throes, the horse asks why, since they will both now perish. 'Because it's my nature', comes the answer. The conviction that people cannot help but go to war may be analogous: we do not have to kill on every occasion offered, any more than the scorpion does, but eventually our aggressive nature will lead us to wage war. It may be possible to check it for the time being, but it cannot be completely eradicated from human existence. Some choice and responsibility can be exercised, but it is limited. Ultimately, whatever the cost, reason will be swamped by instinct and we shall find ourselves at war.

Goldstein includes in his 'mythology of aggression' exactly this cluster of beliefs:

> War is an expression of the aggression instinct. It is unavoidable because humans have an inborn need to satisfy their aggressive urges. Peace is an aberration, a temporary period between wars. War has always been, and hence will always be, with us. (Goldstein, 1989: 11)

I am sure Goldstein is right in suggesting that these myths lie behind many beliefs about war and that they colour our efforts to deal with international conflict. It is crucial to appreciate that aggression and war are not inescapable features of our lives, since, as Bateson points out,

> The prophecy that, in time, humans are bound to fight each other is liable to be self-fulfilling. (Bateson, 1989: 47)

Teachers and pupils alike need to understand the weakness of the evidence and reasoning that underlie these myths. Sociobiological assumptions will be examined in this chapter to show that there are no good grounds for a deterministic view of aggression and to emphasise that aggression is open to moral scrutiny.

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To see war as the outcome of ultimately ungovernable aggression would be to accept a dangerously abridged sphere of moral decision making, but, even if it is conceded that our capacity for aggression does not doom us to warfare, thinking of aggression and war as somehow 'natural' may still distort moral judgement. 'Natural' frequently carries evaluative implications which can obscure or cause us to suspend proper assessment. These too will be addressed.

Finally, it will further be argued that aggression itself is morally dubious and war, an expression of aggression, must be a prima facie evil.

In this chapter, my concern is with the erosion and diminution of the supposed extent of our moral responsibilty with regard to war. I do not assume that people generally feel none whatsoever about killing in war, but it is clear that many unreflective claims imply the inevitability of aggressive behaviour and the futility of moral disapproval, so my criticism does not focus on a straw dummy. There is real cause for anxiety and the issue is serious, for the degree to which we presume we are subject to 'natural' impulses is the degree to which our autonomy and capacity for moral choice is impaired.

Since so much hangs on various perceptions of aggression, the first task will be to clarify what is meant by aggression.

I   What is aggression?

I i)   What does 'aggression' mean?

Aggressive behaviour is usually defined as a hostile act, offensive rather than
defensive; verbal or physical behavior intended to cause harm. By extension,
aggressive feelings involve the wish to harm and to strike first. Characterising
aggression as offensive rather than defensive, does not, I think, preclude or make
nonsense of the aggressive defence of territory, children or anything else. It can
suggest merely the readiness to engage in hostilities or the pre-emptive strike
thought necessary to defence.

The main problem with this definition seems to revolve about the intention to do
harm, since, it is claimed, people can act aggressively or feel aggressive without
any such intent.

I am happy to agree that people can *behave* in a way typical of aggression, but
unwittingly and thus without the intention to wound. In this instance it seems
perfectly proper to describe conduct as appearing aggressive, much in the way that
we might identify jealous behaviour while those exhibiting the signs claim sincerely
that they feel no such thing, merely a sense of righteous anger. In both cases the
claims not to be aggressive or jealous may or may not be true and the behaviour
consequently may be the reality or the lookalike appearance of reality.

Given a broad, but not vacuous, interpretation of notions like harm, wound, and do
ill, this surely is a characteristic of aggression. Assertion is establishing and

maintaining one's own rights without encroaching on another's (Hicks, 1983: 16), and it is distinguished from aggression in exactly this respect. To be aggressive is to subordinate the rights of others to one's own and to infringe upon them. This certainly conforms to everyday experience where in ordinary social intercourse assertion is acceptable, even desirable in some situations, while aggression is frowned upon.

Attacking the keyboard or mowing the lawn aggressively seems to have little to do with overriding anyone's rights, but this is because we do not attribute rights to piano keys or lawns. To act aggressively still suggests action careless of the harm which may be done.

It may be argued that people are often exhorted to be aggressive in the context of games or sports without any connotation of overriding rights or inflicting damage. However, in team games the language of war is commonly used metaphorically. Pleas from the terraces to 'slaughter' the opposing team, even to 'kill 'em' are surely rarely to be taken literally. It may be that talk of aggressive play in football is just so much vivid imagery. Alternatively, when no metaphor is intended, what is in question may be a misuse of language. Groebel and Hinde suggest that,

> phrases such as 'an aggressive salesman' confuse
> aggressiveness with assertiveness and, in our view
> lead to unnecessary confusion. (Groebel & Hinde,
> 1989: 4)

Perhaps when aggression is demanded in football it is a confused exhortation to be assertive.

There is no reason to accept that 'aggression' does not imply a willingness to wound. 'Aggression' can mean merely taking pre-emptive action, but this should

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not obscure the wider usage which implies a willingness, if not the full blown intention, to override the rights of others and to do them harm.

I ii)   Feeling and being aggressive

It is important to recognise that to speak of 'feeling aggressive' or 'experiencing aggression' is to talk of having an emotion, distinguishable from a sensation. Whereas feeling hot or nauseous is to have a sensation, feeling aggressive is not. Aggression is not even generally locatable in the way a sensation is. (There would be something very odd about feeling aggressive in one's arm.) Aggression may be accompanied by sensation, just as we may feel hot or cold with anger, but no one specific sensation can be related to aggression. Furthermore, we may feel aggressive without experiencing any identifiable sensation at all. Aggression is not the same as nor reducible to a sensation, but, along with other emotions such as jealousy, it has a cognitive element. The degree of aggression felt, or indeed whether or not any aggression at all is experienced, is dependent on an appraisal of circumstances, however minimal that might be.

To be aggressive may be to act aggressively. The action is not evidence for some inner state of aggression: there need be no 'ghost in the machine' (Ryle, 1963: 17). To engage in aggressive action, physical attack perhaps, is not necessarily to act in addition to or because of experiencing feelings of aggression. Just as to be happy may be to caper about with delight, so to be aggressive may be to hit someone. Such action is not necessary to being aggressive: one may be aggressive in a variety of ways. Some people show little when they are happy and some may be aggressive without engaging in any hostile actions. So there is no reason to

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suppose that aggressive behaviour is an automatic consequence of some inner aggression or unavoidably accompanies it. Fighting wars is not an inevitable consequence of aggression. Even if it could be demonstrated that human beings are characteristically aggressive, the rotweilers of the higher mammals, it still would not follow that war is unavoidable.

Obviously conduct and emotion are distinguishable one from another, but we do not have to assume that the former is caused by the latter, and aggressive feelings do not have to be seen as motives for aggressive behaviour. When we explain people's actions in terms of 'because they are aggressive', we are not always giving a causal explanation or identifying a motive. As Ryle (1963: 86) suggests in his analogy of the glass shattering when hit by the stone, the implication may be that the behaviour is characteristic of a propensity (to be aggressive in our case), not a consequence of an inner 'event'. I may have a propensity for aggression, but this need not cause me to act and lash out any more than the glass causes its own shattering.

When we term someone 'aggressive' we are noting a disposition or tendency to behave in certain ways in certain circumstances. We may be judging an inclination to view situations hostilely. It would, of course, be mystifying to attribute aggression in the dispositional sense if there had never been any instances or episodes in which aggression were evidenced. We infer that others are aggressive from the frequency or degree/intensity of a range of different behaviours, including personal reports of feelings, rather than simply assuming the existence of an inaccessible, nebulous, inner state.

I iii)   Aggression is not a thing

Aggression clearly has no concrete reality, locatable in space. To conceive of it as a thing is obviously absurd, but aggression is sometimes talked of as if it is an object or an entity which is fixed and measurable. Such reification cannot be ignored in exploring what aggression is, for it all too easily obscures the fact that aggression is a human reaction to people and events.

We do not have aggression in the way we have arms and legs. We experience aggression in situations, towards some thing or person. Aggression itself is not an object; it has an object.

Some scientists who have attempted measurement of aggression seem to reify it, not as a thing in the outside world, but nevertheless as some thing which has finite existence within a person. This can lead to extraordinary misconceptions - that it is a trait reducible, for example, to mouse-killing behaviour and that it is something individuals have in fixed quantities. These are sufficiently outrageous to deserve attention here.

Aggression has been conceived of as something, not directly observable, but an intangible underlying quality that animals have. Nebulous qualities are not open to direct scrutiny, but associated behaviour may be. It is assumed that examination of behaviour can provide evidence to throw light on the quality or trait. Consequently, 'aggression' in rats has been measured by observing the speed with which they kill mice.

I am drawn to agree with the authors of *Not in our Genes* when they note,

> Sometimes this is described under the name 'muricidal' behaviour in the literature,which presumably makes the experimenters happier that they are measuring something really scientific, (Rose, Kamin & Lewontin, 1984: 90).

What is also likely is that circularity of argument immediately creeps in. Once measured, aggression can be perceived as measurable and pinned down as something rats have in greater or smaller quantity. The quality underlying muricide in rats is yet more worryingly taken to be identical with aggression in other species, despite any absence of mouse-killing behaviour. Human aggression may be expressed in shouting, kicking, grimacing or going to war, but it has been assumed that,

> the underlying quality is identical with that which underlies muricide in rats. (Rose, Kamin & Lewontin, 1984: 91)

The fact that aggression has apparently been measured under experimental conditions gives 'scientific' credibility to this strange assumption.

Talking of aggression as a thing seems to reinforce perception of it as an entity which is fixed and measurable. It seems odd to imagine that people have an amount of aggression which is fixed in the way that I.Q.s have been thought of as unalterable, but that does appear to be the implication of some 'scientific' measures.

Geneticists today are unlikely to believe that the measurement of a trait such as aggression is an appropriate scientific exercise to attempt. Since Mendel's work with peas, it has long been recognised that counting instances of specific, easily identifiable characteristics provides strong evidence in genetic enquiry, but that traits such as aggression are not reducible to these. (Having said this, it is relevant

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to note that, despite some objection from the scientific world, the media have recently made much of the supposed discovery of genes for homosexuality and criminality. People could hardly be blamed for believing that there are genes for aggression and that aggression is quantifiable.) Quantification alone is not enough; broader terms of reference would be needed if we were to essay measurement. Any meaningful measurement of aggression would need to resemble the measurement of I.Q. or musicality and rely on evaluative notions of better, worse, more or less complex etc. Measuring aggression is thus evaluative in a way that straight counting is not. 'How aggressive?' is not the same type of question as 'How many?'

We do speak of people being more or less aggressive, but very often what is meant is surely that some react aggressively more often than others or under different conditions. Whether or not people behave aggressively depends for different people on different things. A minor collision in a car provokes aggression in some and not in others. We do not just carry with us a certain amount of aggression waiting to be unleashed. Scientific measurement is either a non-starter, because we do not all experience aggression at any one particular stimulus and so reliablity in testing will be a problem, or so specific, measuring particular aspects of behaviour, as to be worthless in shedding any light on aggression in general. The speed with which a subject might resort to hitting an experimenter could be measured in a variety of situations, but it would reveal little more than a description of what happened on those occasions. It would not tell how aggressive the person were.

People do not have aggression in the way they may have long legs. Because aggressive behaviour is at least in part a response to external circumstances, it is a more complex matter. There is no reason to suppose that it is some *thing* of we

each have a fixed quantity. However we talk of it, we have aggression only in the sense that we feel aggressive and behave aggressively, or have the propensity to do so.

Aggression then is a human attribute, and, in a sense, 'natural', but to describe it as such should not be taken to lend weight to the mistaken belief that we should or indeed can do little to curb it.

The following is an attempt to show that there are no good grounds for assuming that aggression is 'natural' in the sense of being an inescapable part of the human condition and something over which we can have no control. In so far as we can do otherwise, it is pertinent to raise questions about the morality of aggression and war.

II Is aggression natural?
sociobiological assumptions examined

To say that aggression is natural sometimes is to say that it is part of human nature. Human nature has been judged by many in recent years to be almost exclusively a biological matter and, significantly, the relevant biology has been perceived as deterministic. Consequently, when aggression is believed to be part of human nature, very often it is also believed to be unavoidable and inevitable.

Plainly it would be foolish and quite inappropriate for me to engage in any dispute over the empirical claims which are the supposed basis for biological determinism. Nevertheless, it is necessary to examine the nature of these claims in order to appreciate the dubious foundation on which they are based and their implications.

To talk of aggression being part of human nature is to be rather vague. Terms such as 'instinctive' and 'innate' are little more use when employed in everyday speech. What is meant usually seems to comprise one or more of the following overlapping, but none the less separable, ideas: i) aggression is rooted in our animal ancestry, ii) aggression has evolved and is an adaptation, iii) aggression is present at birth and unlearned. Some reflection on these may be illuminating.

II i) Aggression is rooted in our animal ancestry

The belief that human aggression is rooted in our animal ancestry is strongly influenced by Konrad Lorenz (1966) who argued that animals are instinctively violent and that we carry these same destructive impulses in our genes. Goldstein (1989: 12), claims that the evidence which purports to show that the higher primates are instinctively aggressive is not convincing. Whatever the truth of this, even if our ancestors were instinctively aggressive, it would not follow that we too are necessarily genetically programmed, as it were, to be equally violent. Even if apes have aggressive instincts, human beings may not have inherited them. Sometimes we inherit the red hair of one parent and sometimes not. Genetic ancestry is a complicated matter.

The argument for genetic determination here rests on a similarity perceived between humans and some other animals, such that they appear to have common ancestry. Both apes and humans behave aggressively at times, but comparable behaviour alone is insufficient to prove common inheritance. This is not merely because behaviour is a poor guide to genes, but because biological similarities may be analogous rather than homologous. (The wings of bats and birds are termed analogous, since, although they have the same function, they are formed quite differently and thus offer no proof of common ancestry.) Only homologous features demonstrate genetic heritage. Traits which seem homologous between the higher primates and humans may not be so.

Easily forgotten in this context is that the most recent common ancestor from whom apes and human beings could have inherited any shared characteristics is thought to have existed at least two million years ago, since when the human brain is said to have increased in volume about fourfold (Rose et al., 1984: 255). Arguments about aggressive behaviour based on animal ancestors must seem dubious in the face of this extraordinary change. We may have changed equally dramatically in many other respects too.

Given that conclusions about human aggression are sometimes drawn from contemporary studies of animal behaviour rather than from evidence relating to common ancestry, their force is further weakened. The attempt to show that aggression is in our genes by examining animal behaviour may well be a misconceived enterprise, but it is something which permeates biological determinism.

II ii)   Aggression has evolved and is an adaptation

The idea that aggression has evolved presupposes that aggressive action

contributes to the survival and/or reproduction of the individual or species, perhaps

in winning food, territory or a mate. Immediately it is obvious that the benefit of

aggression is dependent on external conditions, such as food shortages resulting in

competition for resources. Bateson points out that,

> expression of cooperative or aggressive behavior is
> likely to be conditional in all those animals that have
> the equipment to detect changes in conditions.
> (Bateson, 1989: 37)

The nature of the evolved trait is presumed to relate to states of affairs in the world

and therefore it is profitably exercised only in some circumstances, especially since

aggression carries with it the risk of injury. Different circumstances might favour

cooperative rather than aggressive behaviour. Many species appear to resolve

conflicts without recourse to aggression at all, let alone in the form of inter-group

war:

> In many highly successful species, groups (whether
> they be schools of minnows, flocks of starlings or
> herds of wildebeeste) form, merge and break up to
> the mutual benefit of all concerned and without any
> aggression at all. (Huntingford, 1989: 30).

So, if aggression is a characteristic which has evolved, it is not one in operation all

the time, but will only be exercised in certain situations by some animals and not all

of those which have the capacity to respond to the prevailing conditions.

Aggression then may indeed be an adaptation to states of affairs in which animals

evolved. However, acceptance of this hardly bridges the gulf between any likely

sets of circumstances which confronted our ancestors, animal or early human, and

some of the cicumstances we might meet aggressively today. What conceivable situations producing the claimed adaptation could be comparable to religious and political conflicts which can fuel modern war?

The fear in humans, provoked by a threat to territory perhaps, may be the same as or similar to that experienced by other animals, but the behaviour which constitutes the response to that fear can be so markedly different that it is difficult to see it as an adaptation. Hitting out with a blunt instrument might be an adaptation traceable to biting or clawing, but telephoning the order to launch an attack seems different in kind. The explanation for impersonal and technological warfare surely cannot be simply biological adaptation. Adaptation hardly explains the prospect of first strike in a nuclear war.

Destructive fighting, between groups in the animal world, which appears to be organised with various individuals playing distinct roles, does exist and might be thought the precursor to human war, but, according to Huntingford this is far less common than might be supposed. The most salient examples of injurious, large-scale, inter-group fighting is found in ,

> the social Hymenoptera, a class of animals (including the ants, bees and wasps) *that is very different from our own species in evolutionary terms.* (Huntingford, 1989: 31, my italics)

So military warfare might look like an adaptation of animal behaviour, but such large scale fighting within the species is apparently only found in animals from whom we do not claim direct ancestry.

In any case, some forms of modern warfare do not sit easily alongside notions of survival of the individual or the species. Nuclear exchanges seem irreconcilable

with the promotion of the survival of the species or even the continuation of a particular family grouping.

> If you fling a nuclear weapon at your enemy, you are unlikely to increase the chances that either you or your family will survive. (Bateson, 1989: 38)

At best, the likely outcome is too uncertain and indiscriminate: at worst, the obliteration of both group and species is a serious possibility. It might be thought that the need for territory to ensure the survival of the group, which comprises conditions in which aggression comes into play, can still arise and it is the expression of that aggression which has altered (or evolved), but, in so far as a particular form of aggression plainly endangers the survival of all, it cannot be simply the result of evolution and adaptation.

II iii)   Aggression is innate

'Human nature' often refers to that which is assumed to be innate. Although 'innate' is often used to encompass more than its precise biological meaning, nevertheless, the implication of heredity is presumably intended, and this in its turn suggests genetic transmission. If aggression were innate in this sense, then people would be more or less aggressive according to their genetic inheritance. While the truth of this is hotly debated, such enquiry may be a red herring. Even if aggression were an inherited characteristic,

> a genetic difference that produces a behavioural difference does not mean that the behaviour pattern in question is unaffected by other factors. (Bateson, 1989: p. 39)

So genetic inheritance need not be deterministic with respect to aggressive behaviour and environmental influences are not ruled out.

'Innate' can also imply 'present at birth' and thus unlearned. Again, it is assumed that much hangs on this. Acceptance of the idea that aggression is innate seems to carry with it acceptance that aggression is an unalterable fact of human life, something which, if present, we must just learn to live with. But irrespective of whether or not it can be shown scientifically that aggression is initially learned or unlearned, it is evidently not the case that patterns of behaviour are immutable. Aggressive behaviour certainly seems to be affected by learning. Punishment and rewards have their effect, even if it is not always the desired one. Both human beings and other animals apparently learn to discriminate between situations where aggression succeeds and fails in achieving the end in view. People learn to change the way in which they give expression to their aggression. That a behavioural characteristic is initially unlearned does not show that learning cannot alter it.

In the light of the above, it is obviously not necessary to deny that biology contributes to the existence of human aggression in order to show that beliefs about aggression based on a crude version of biological determinism are ill-founded. Aggression and its expression in human war is not simply natural in the sense of genetically determined.

Aggression is an attribute of persons. Persons have to be understood as more than biologically natural entities in order to make any sense of moral agency. Aristotle made this clear:

> ... none of the ethical virtues arises in us by nature,
> for no natural thing can be unnaturally trained. For
> instance a stone which naturally moves downwards
> cannot be trained to move upwards. Neither by
> nature, nor contrary to nature, then, do the virtues
> arise in us. (Aristotle, 1975: 28, *1103a*)

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It is difficult to imagine that even the most rigid adherent of sociobiological beliefs actually does live and function as if there is nothing more to human beings than a collection of predetermined and predetermining biological characteristics. Nevertheless some people do talk and write as if there is no more to personhood than can be explained in scientific terms.

Arguments from biological determinism are pernicious in that they are often used to suggest that aggression and war are beyond our control and thus not subject to ethical judgement. Recognition of their insecure base is therefore vital.

When aggression or war is termed 'natural', it would be foolish to imagine that what is intended is always a reference to biological determinism. 'Natural' is rarely used with any precision and can have various connotations, many of which relate to beliefs about the moral status of what is described.

Bertrand Russell believed that there will always be those who claim, 'wars will never stop; it would be contrary to human nature', (Russell, 1936: 179). The claim may be that our biology leads inexorably to war, but reference to 'human nature' and to what is 'natural' often carries other associations too. Insofar as these also can affect moral attitudes, it is important that they are recognised. In the following section various implications of 'natural' will be explored in order to emphasise that aggression and war should not be viewed as beyond human agency, above interference or desirable in being a 'natural' good.

III Some worrying implications of claiming that aggression is natural.

Even when it is plain that aggression is not natural in any sociobiological sense, it can surely be accepted that it is part of human nature. People laugh, cry and they are aggressive among other things. There is nothing particularly worrying about the idea that aggression is a human characteristic. What is disturbing is when 'natural' is taken to imply unavoidable and inevitable in this context. This is disturbing not only because it is a very obvious misconception, but also because reasoning based on it seems to lead in dangerous directions - reasoning that seems to go as follows: 'If aggression is natural and inevitable, then we must put up with it, like the weather. We must accept it as a given: it is acceptable in the sense of being beyond the moral sphere.' When this slides into legitimising the status quo, it puts aggression and even war beyond reproach. There is no point in wanting to alter the situation and it is odd even to question it. Aggression and war are just features of our existence.

III i)   The implication of conceptualising aggression as a law of nature

Sometimes it appears that this view of aggression is based on an assumption that its existence is an example of a law of nature. Much as we perceive the movements of planets as constituting a law of nature, so aggression is merely an instance of natural law.

Whether or not this description is apt, this idea becomes a matter for concern when the corollary is that laws of nature are only to be interfered with at our peril.

Physical phenomena, such as planets, are not governed by laws in the sense that they transgress when they do not conform to our theories or laws. The 'laws' describe events, and it is these descriptions which conform (or fail to conform) to reality. To see conduct, including aggressive behaviour, in these terms is to see it as something beyond any human agent's control.

Thus to invoke the 'laws of nature' as a reason for allowing or encouraging aggression is odd in the extreme. It is to maintain on the one hand that aggression is not subject to human agency, and thus beyond questions of justifiability, and on the other to imply that people *ought* to allow its natural course. The old adage that 'ought implies can' should not be ignored. Logically, if people cannot choose autonomously with respect to aggression, we cannot be morally blamed or praised for allowing it.

It might be argued that moral choices are pertinent to natural phenomena, for rain is natural, but we can prevent it falling in a certain place by seeding the clouds so that it will fall earlier elsewhere, and we can bring about good or ill by such action. But this does not show that there is no inconsistency in speaking of a moral duty to give natural aggression its head. Whether or not we are morally justified in causing the rain to fall in one place rather than another depends on the consequences, not on the simple assumption that it is morally wrong to interfere with a natural phenomenon. Only if aggression is perceived to be not merely an expression of the laws of nature, but something within our control, can we make sense of the idea that we

have a moral obligation to allow or stop it. It is self-contradictory to assert otherwise.

III ii)   The implication that we should not interfere with what is natural

Recommending non-interference may also be implicit when 'natural' is used, as in 'natural childbirth', as if meddling with nature is somehow always deplorable and the repression of what comes naturally is damaging. The implication that we should not intervene in processes we call 'natural' is frequently identifiable when green issues are under discussion. Some respect for the natural world and a healthy fear of causing unpredictable catastrophes must be eminently reasonable, but I should not wish to extend non-intervention to everything which could be termed 'natural'. On occasion, the use of antibiotics seems highly desirable, while to let an illness follow its natural course is not always a good thing. When it carries this connotation, it is evident that 'natural' is selectively employed, commonly applied to trees and hedge rows, and rarely to some other phenomena of the natural world such as germs. Just because something is natural in this sense it does not always mean that it is wrong to interfere.

III iii)   The implication that what is natural is desirable

The connotations of 'natural' can go beyond the idea that what is natural is just a feature of our existence and something we must accept. 'Natural' can imply 'acceptable' in a positive sense. For some what is 'natural' , in contrast with what

is 'unnatural' seems to approach a good per se. Shampoos, perfumes and hair brushes are sold by one retailer as part of 'The Natural Collection', presumably to distinguish them from the undesirable synthetics and artifice of competitors. 'Natural' is often used evaluatively, suggesting preferable, in sharp contrast to the distaste evinced when people talk of 'unnatural perversions'. To see aggression and war as natural can be to see it as something desirable or to be preferred.

III iv)   The implication that what is natural is laudable

What is natural can be acceptable in a slightly different sense - morally acceptable, even a good. In part, this idea derives from a sociobiological set of beliefs which raise the 'survival of the fittest' theme. Those who survive are not just lucky, but the fittest. If aggression has led to survival, then it is a valuable characteristic. Those who exhibit aggression are the best specimens. What has survived is not just acceptable, it is the height of the evolutionary tree to date - the best yet. It can become more than acceptable; it can be laudable. The corollary of this must be that those who are victims of aggression are weak: they are doomed, deserving all they get. The aggressive salesperson deserves the sale, and the foolish, weak buyer deserves to be taken for a ride. The aggressive fighter deserves to win the war and the pacifist lacks merit in being without red-blooded aggression. Most scientists would certainly blench at this interpretation of evolutionary theory, but the metaphors used by some do contribute to such interpretations. The imagery of the selfish gene has much to answer for. To say that aggression is natural can mean that it is praiseworthy.

Of course aggression is not always spoken of with approval and it would be ludicrous to imagine otherwise. Noting that aggression is natural is sometimes accompanied by the suggestion that people need to 'get it out of their systems'. Among the the beliefs about human aggression he lists as prevalent in Western Society, Goldstein includes,

> Failure to express anger results in heart disease,
> stress, and high blood pressure.

and

> Children should be allowed to play aggressively.
> This will get it out of their system and they will be
> better behaved as a result. (Goldstein, 1989: 11)

The implications here are confusing. On the one hand, a certain complacency towards the moral status of aggression is evident - a sort of mental shrug along with the thought that, 'It's only natural,' - and on the other, there is evidence of some uneasiness that unless it is channelled into appropriate spheres it might have nasty consequences.

The confusion is particularly evident when what is put forward as a harmless outlet is itself violent . Boxing often seems to be recommended as a sport in which people can use their aggression in a disciplined and controlled fashion. As Goldstein warns, there is a belief that,

> The aggressive instinct can be controlled through
> substitute activities, such as football games.
> (Goldstein, 1989: 11)

It does not require too great a leap of the imagination to see that the underlying assumption is often that natural aggression will otherwise find a more dangerous outlet.

It is clear then that, although it is not always so, loosely to describe aggression as 'natural' can lead to perceptions that it is unavoidable, acceptable or even desirable. Our beliefs with regard to aggression are important because they appear to affect our attitudes towards it and what we do about it. In what sense aggression is believed to be natural matters.

Aggression must be understood as an emotion and a mode of behaviour - natural, in that it is a human attribute, but neither unavoidable nor necessarily good.

Since it is thought to be causally or otherwise closely related to warfare, one further line of enquiry into aggression should be pursued. Having established that it is not outside the arena of moral questions, it is important to ask if aggression itself is morally objectionable for if it is, then it is unlikely that war could be morally neutral.

IV Is aggression a prima facie moral evil?

IV i)   Is aggression morally neutral?

Midgley (1984: 91) is certain that aggression is not necessarily wicked. She is surely right that not all wickedness is aggressive: the two are not synonymous. At

the individual level, presumably one can lie or break a promise without feeling or acting aggressively. On a larger scale, injustices are perpetrated by neglect as well as with the intention to harm. Whether or not all aggression is wicked does however seem to be a more complex issue.

Once again it may be useful to draw a distinction between the emotion (feeling aggressive) and the behaviour. Midgley writes of the 'positive function' of aggression, suggesting that children need to feel it before they can control it and learn 'the difference between justified and unjustified anger,' (Midgley 1984: 89). It must be true that people have to experience an emotion before they can control it, if only in the sense that there would be nothing to control otherwise. It is not equally obvious that people are all similarly a prey to their emotions. Perhaps somewhat implausibly but not inconceivably, it might be that some never have this propensity and thus never learn, or need to learn, control over their aggressive feelings. Be this as it may, Midgley implies that aggressive feelings per se are neither evil nor good, but they can be put to good or bad use. I cannot agree. Anger may be neither evil nor good, yet have good or bad consequences, but aggression seems different.

Prima facie, aggression is morally questionable in that it involves the intention to harm or to override the rights of others (whereas anger need not). Rage appears to be an entirely appropriate emotion to feel when confronted by a terrible act of cruelty. Further, it might be deplorable, and show a sad lack of moral sensitivity, if one were not enraged. But if aggression is not exactly the same as anger, in that it includes the will to wound, then it is less clear that there are occasions on which one ought to feel aggression.

IV ii)   Is feeling aggressive morally wrong?

It could be argued that feelings, wishes and intentions do not enter the sphere of morality unless they are enacted or affect others in a fairly direct way, but if our beliefs affect our attitudes and our attitudes influence our deeds, the potential for private feelings of an aggressive nature not having some effect in the long term, on other people, is small. Feeling aggressive may be a moral matter.

It does not seem to me that thinking a thing, as it were, is as bad as doing it, although some thoughts may be worse than some deeds. (Dwelling on refinements of torture one would apply if one dared must be more wicked than the sharp word spoken in mild irritation, but toying with thoughts of murder cannot be as bad as perpetrating the crime.) So the actual physical attack on another is likely to be less easily justified than the aggressive emotion. Conversely, if actual violence can be justified, it is likely that aggressive feelings can be too.

Suppose I were to come upon a woman mistreating a dog. My emotional response, anger, is morally appropriate. (I am a moral agent. There is no suggestion that my feelings are automatic or totally unavoidable.) Although my response is affected by my appraisal of the situation as well as my abhorrence of cruelty, I have not been intentionally provoked by the person against whom my anger is directed: indeed, she is unaware of my presence. All seems relatively unproblematic while what I feel is anger and until I contemplate action. Is it not only justifiable, but probably my moral duty, to take some action - but what action? Instantly to kill the woman seems to be to go too far. I do wish to arrest the mistreatment and also to discourage her from such cruelty in the future. This aim seems worthy enough and, provided both that I pursue it with the minimum force necessary to achieve it

and ensure that this minimum force is not in itself disproportionate to the end in view, my action seems justified. Suppose now that my emotional response is rather more than anger; it is aggressive. I feel like killing her. While not as morally reprehensible as actually commiting murder, it surely seems that this also is too 'violent' a response to this situation. Should not my feelings, as well as my actions, be more matched to my appraisal of the circumstances?

It is true that we do often talk of 'feeling like killing' people, but usually this is a graphic attempt to convey the intensity of our rage, irritation or whatever. (This is not to say that it is never literally meant, only that frequently we use the phrase without having the full-blown intention to commit murder. We may even momentarily want to kill, but have no intention of satisfying this desire.) If actual killing is ever justifiable, presumably in the same circumstances 'thinking it' is also morally tolerable. The factors which give good grounds for actions are surely likely to constitute acceptable reasons for experiencing certain emotions. And yet this does not seem to ring quite true for aggression. If I kill without sufficient justification, I have committed a morally unacceptable act. The action is judged according to appraisals of the circumstances. Simply wanting to take another's life, without any further grounds will not suffice as moral justification. Experiencing the urge to hurt someone is significantly different from feeling the fury of moral outrage. While moral outrage implies my conviction that my feelings are justified, the emotion, aggression, may be dependent on a cognitive appraisal of circumstances, but need not involve reasoning in terms of self-justification. That is to say, in feeling aggressive I need not be asking whether or not I have good grounds for hurting a person. I may just want to. Such a desire is no inescapable wash of feeling: in the light of appraisal, there may be reasons which lead to the aggression, but they may be of the type, 'Because I don't like her face'. In other

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words, they are not the sort of reason which could comprise moral grounds. If this constitutes aggression, it appears improbable that it can be morally acceptable.

It seems plain that, if killing the woman is too violent a response to her cruelty, then aggressive feelings of this extreme character will also be open to moral objection. A less violent response is called for. If, on the other hand, violent action can be justified, then the urge to perform that act must also be justifiable. Yet unexpectedly there remains an intuitive difficulty when we contemplate this apparent corollary. Sometimes only wanting to act seems wrong while performing the deed appears laudable. An actual attack must in certain situations be desirable - as the only conceivable means of arresting evil - but merely experiencing the feeling of wanting to inflict harm cannot be. Pope is not alone in finding repugnant someone, 'willing to wound, yet afraid to strike', (Pope, 1963: 604, *Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot*, l. 203). Feeling aggressive without any intention of acting aggressively is not always a lesser evil than an aggressive deed.

IV iii)   Can aggression be justified?

The physical act of attacking is not of course always aggressive in the sense of intended to hurt. That it does hurt is incidental at times to some other purpose. I might launch myself in a rugby tackle at someone who appears to be about to assault a small child. My attack is in order to prevent the assault. It is very likely that my victim will be hurt in falling, but this is not the point of my tackle. My attack is only aggressive in that it is proactive, a first strike as it were, and is justifiable as an act to protect the child.

A similar rationale might also be invoked to account for people's tolerance of the fooballer who plays aggressively (in the literal not metaphorical sense) with the paramount aim of scoring rather than wishing harm to opposing players, yet whose style of play inevitably is physically intimidating. It might be argued further that, provided the player's actions fall within the rules of the game, it is morally acceptable. However, although the rules may not preclude it, football is surely not essentially about intimidating the opposition. Goals can be scored without aggression. When aggressive play is intended to threaten, psychologically or physically, I suggest that it is morally questionable and difficult to justify.

The one sport where aggression is evidently not inappropriate must be boxing. The whole aim is to attack and inflict physical violence on one's opponent. But it is noteworthy that the morality of boxing is questioned for exactly the reason that the infliction of physical harm is an intrinsic part of the sport - within the rules of the game.

When aggression in games implies only 'Get in first' and positive action, then it must be unobjectionable. A chess player might well agree. But whereas in chess physical intimidation is presumably ruled out, it is not obvious that this is the case in football. In physical games, the advice, 'Be aggressive!' can imply far more than, 'Take the initiative.' It does often carry overtones of potential violence. Personal intimidation in chess is plainly inappropriate. Why should it be tolerated as 'gamesmanship' in other activities? The abusive whisper or threatening behaviour may be impossible to outlaw from football and thus not against the rules of the game, but this does not make it morally acceptable.

That aggression which primarily involves the willingness or intention to wound must be hard to justify. When a dentist, for example, is drilling aggressively, heedless of her patient's pain, this is surely undesirable, and is plainly distinguishable from the dentist's action in causing a patient momentary pain in order to achieve a relatively pain free future.

Aggression does seem to be a prima facie evil and morally dubious in many areas of life. This is not to say that it is necessarily always unjustifiable. In war, as in boxing, to act aggressively is presumably entirely appropriate - war involves wounding others. If (but only if) we accept the morality of warfare, then, in military action, aggression must be acceptable, even desirable. Similarly, in war, the aggressive feelings we might be encouraged to harbour towards the enemy may be useful in so far as they enable us to condone or actually engage in killing.

Nevertheless, aggression is not per se morally neutral or a moral good. It may be justifiable in some circumstances, a necessary evil perhaps, but justification is needed. Although aggressive deeds and feelings may be valuable in waging war, their moral acceptability will be dependent, in the first instance, upon the morality of war.

Plainly war is a moral issue. It has been argued that when war is perceived as an expression of human aggression, there is no reason to suppose it is the result of an irresistible natural impulse and completely unavoidable. Moral judgements are entirely appropriate and should not be pre-empted by any assumptions that aggression is natural and therefore acceptable or desirable. More than this,

aggression and war are not morally neutral, but prima facie evils requiring justification.

If this is true, it makes sense of the way in which we do as a matter of fact question the rights and wrongs of aggression, killing and war. Whether or not killing and war can ever be justified is a further question which must now be addressed.

CHAPTER 2

Is killing always wrong?
- an examination of arguments against homicide.

War involves killing. Given that we do not have to regard war as a terrible inevitability, beyond human agency, the moral problem posed must be faced. The deeply felt abhorrence towards taking life may reflect the belief that homicide is wrong, but many are at the same time convinced that deciding whether to fight or not presents a real dilemma: the taking of human life is an evil, but to kill in war may be justifiable if it averts greater evil.

Absolute pacifism, on the other hand, denies that killing another person is ever morally acceptable.

> While virtually everyone believes that there is a strong moral presumption against the violence and killing involved in war, pacifists differ from most of us in their belief that this presumption can never be overridden, that the challenge to provide moral justification for war can never be met. (McMahan, 1993: 386)

The absolutist usually adheres to a prohibition on killing as a matter of principle, which applies irrespective of the consequences that failure to kill might bring. The potentially evil consequences may include death and large scale destruction, but, for the absolute pacifist, there can be no moral justification for going to war.

It will be argued here that, although it is not self-contradictory, the absolutist position is inadequate, and that it cannot be wrong, in all circumstances and without exception, intentionally to kill.

It will be shown that the presuppositions on which the inviolability of human life might be based are unsatisfactory and unconvincing. Examination of various claims about the special value of life reveals many problems and suggests that there are cases where killing is the morally preferable option. Such analysis is well-trodden ground (see Dworkin, 1993; Glover, 1977; Norman, 1995; Singer, 1994), but it is not always familiar to those contemplating teaching on war and thus cannot be ignored here. Part of the moral complexity of war which needs to be appreciated comprises the difficulty of establishing the inviolability of human life.

It might be thought that arguments about individual lives have little relevance to war but,

> It is doubtful, however, that an *absolute* rejection of war can be coherently grounded on anything other than an absolute prohibition of certain types of acts necessarily involved in war - e.g. intentional violence and killing. (McMahan, 1993: 386)

My concern is to demonstrate that no sufficient reason can be found to uphold an absolute prohibition on one type of act, killing, which is intrinsic to the whole concept of war. What is at issue can often be illuminated by reference to acts such as suicide, euthenasia, and capital punishment, which primarily involve individuals rather than large groups. Futhermore, it should be remembered that, however many thousands are destroyed by an act of war, the numbers represent the loss of individual lives.

The intention in this chapter is to establish that an absolutist position on the taking of human life is dubious and that it cannot be demonstrated that all killing, and therefore killing in war, is inevitably immoral. Whether or not pacifist beliefs are well-founded is of central importance.

I   Is pacifism self-contradictory?

In his essay, *'Pacifism: a Philosophical analysis'*, Narveson argues that pacifism is self-contradictory. He declares that to claim violence is morally wrong is:

> to say that those to whom it is done have a right not
> to have it done to them. (Narveson, 1979: 447)

This does not look promising for two reasons. As Teichman makes clear, firstly, pacifism need not be based on the premise that moral claims are to be identified with rights claims, and, secondly, the premise itself is extraordinary. It is not a logically necessary truth that every moral wrong has a correlative moral right which it violates. Teichman gives as an example cowardly behaviour, often regarded as morally contemptible, but which does not necessarily violate any rights, since, 'it is possible to act in a cowardly way even when alone on a desert island.' (Teichman, 1986: 32)

Even if a weaker claim is being made to the effect that violence is a special case of moral wrong doing and violates a particular right not to be injured or killed, the next stage in Narveson's argument is similarly hard to swallow. As Glover is quick to point out,

> he argues that for people to have such a right
> includes having the 'right to anything else that might
> be necessary (other things being equal) to prevent the
> deprivation occurring.' (Glover, 1977: 257)

Glover is surely correct in noting that, 'To think that something is wrong does not entail that potential victims of that act have a no-holds-barred right of self-defence,' (Glover, 1977: 257). Having a right not to have one's pocket picked does not automatically carry with it the right to shoot the pick-pocket. Entitlement to act in protection of one right cannot be a carte blanche to override the rights of another.

Narveson himself earlier concedes this when he writes,

> we do not have a right to kill someone for rapping us
> on the ribs for example. (Narveson, 1970: 64)

Nevertheless he does go on to argue that if rational persuasion fails then 'we have a right to the use of force,' (Narveson, 1979: 73). Glover explicitly assumes, although Narveson is writing about violence more generally, that the flawed logic of the argument is unaffected if it is applied to killing. This is, I think, correct given that Narveson does not specify that only force short of homicide is permissible.

Glover draws attention to the logical conclusion of Narveson's argument:

> absolute pacifism is inconsistent because, in saying
> that violence or killing is wrong, we are committed to
> the view that we have a right to use violence or
> killing if necessary to protect our own right not to be
> the victim. (Glover, 1977: 257)

Narveson could be right in assuming that we have the right to kill in self-defence, but such a right cannot be derived solely from the right not to be killed. Having the right not to be tortured does not give me the right to torture my would be torturers in order to protect myself. The two rights are not so intimately connected. Further grounds would be required to provide justification.

Narveson's position then, itself lacks coherence and does not show that absolute pacifism is self-contradictory.

My only doubt regarding the apparent absurdity of Narveson's claim concerns the interpretation of his actual words. The words, 'anything else that might be *necessary*' (my italics), could suggest the minimum necessary to prevent one's right being infringed and that minimum could be to kill, but if this is so a further factor has been brought into play. No longer is the right to kill being derived solely

from the right not to be killed. We are justified in killing if nothing less will protect us. Expressed in this form, Narveson's own inconsistency is not as blatant as Glover would have us believe.

What is important here is that if Narveson is maintaining that absolute pacifism is self-contradictory then he is mistaken. Absolute pacifism cannot and does not sanction the taking of life in order to protect one's own right not to be killed, even if such a right were allowed.

While it cannot be shown to be self-contradictory, an absolute prohibition on the taking of human life may be untenable because it is based on weak or false premises.

II The right to life

Pacifism is sometimes based on the presupposition that we have a right to life.

The right to life is often spoken of as 'a moral right', as if it has special status distinguishing it from those rights which have been socially agreed. 'Moral rights' is certainly not intended to refer to rights which people can confer and withdraw. Sometimes the implication is religious - moral rights are God-given - and sometimes the implication is that such rights are a priori - just given. Either way no reason can be adduced for their existence and they are evidently categorised as uncontestable and not open to question.

Norman bluntly states,

There are no self-evident moral rights. The concept of a moral right may have a use, but it is not morally basic, and whether or not we have particular moral rights such as a right to life can be determined only by appealing to prior moral considerations. (Norman, 1995: 40)

I agree, but would emphasise that, when the moral right to life is invoked, the implication intended is that a principle which has ultimate priority is being called upon. If this is so, the right to life is being invested with the weight of a moral first principle - a matter for belief rather than argument. The right to life would be an absolute.

An absolute right to life would always be overriding and commitment to it would deny the possibility of any justification for killing. As we have seen, Narveson appears to adhere to some doctrine of rights, but he cannot hold that the right not to be killed and our right to kill to preserve one's own life are both absolutes because self-evidently they are likely to come in direct conflict. His must be a belief in prima facie rights, such that some rights can take priority over others.

As an absolute, the right to life is difficult to embrace since it permits no consideration of other factors, including those which so exercise us in debates over life and death, and there may be occasions when one's right to life can only be upheld if someone else's is violated. Acceptance that there is an absolute right to life must rest on an intuition that I cannot share.

The right to life is surely a prima facie right, such that other factors could in principle take precedence, and a right like others that, 'one can choose to exercise or not to exercise,' (Singer, 1994: 218). Perceived in this way, it has no special significance to distinguish it from the idea that killing is a great, but not necessarily the greatest, evil. In this sense, the right to life cannot underpin absolute pacifism.

None of this is to suggest that there can be no right to life or that all reference to rights, and specifically to the right not to be killed, has no place in law: the objection is to a defence of absolute pacifism being based on rights, moral or otherwise.

Agreement that people should have the right to life is undeniably desirable:

> Universal acceptance and secure protection of the right to life of every person is the most important good that society can bestow upon its members. (Singer, 1994: 218)

Talk of rights, in relation to moral questions of life and death, can be useful in underlining the idea, not only that people must face the moral responsibility for conferring or withdrawing them (since the attribution of rights, I would maintain, is a human activity and not God-given), but also that we can waive our rights or choose to exercise them. My rights cannot morally take precedence over yours, merely in virtue of being mine, but some notion that my life is peculiarly my business, and that I am entitled to make certain decisions about my life, 'though not about yours, does seem germane. I may wish my life to be brought to an end and thus wish to waive any right to life that I may have for,

> We value the protection of the right to life only when we want to go on living. (Singer, 1994: 218 - 219)

Support for suicide and voluntary euthenasia rests heavily on this assumption, and the acceptability of free choice, as a volunteer soldier, to risk being killed in war may depend on the same concept of being able to waive rights. (It is after all difficult to talk of waiving without appealing to rights - a case of sailors at war being drowned and waiving as it were!) Rights talk seems itself to preclude absolutism in this context. The notion that we can relinquish rights, irrespective of whether or not we ought to, makes no sense unless it is prima facie rights that are under discussion.

An absolute right to life would be consistent with absolute pacifism, but it does not appear to be a tenable proposition. A prima facie right to life, on the other hand, provides no foundation for an absolute prohibition on killing. More than claims about a right to life would be needed to show that killing in war or elsewhere is never justifiable.

III   The intrinsic value of life

Arguments to the effect that killing is always wrong because life is intrinsically valuable are as weakly based as those dependent on 'moral rights'. Dworkin is keen to show that, properly understood, the intrinsic value of life has special status which can give rise to the belief that killing is always wrong.

> We believe, that it is intrinsically regrettable when human life, once begun, ends prematurely. We believe, in other words, that premature death is bad in itself, even when it is not bad for any particular person. (Dworkin, 1993: 69)

Pointing out that, 'the abstract idea of life's intrinsic value is open to different interpretations', he goes on to explain this:

> Something is intrinsically valuable...if its value is independent of what people happen to enjoy or want or need or what is good for them. Most of us treat at least some objects or events as intrinsically valuable in that way: we think we should admire and protect them because they are important in themselves, and not just if or because we or others want or enjoy them. (Dworkin, 1993: 71 - 72)

Life, Dworkin argues, can be valued instrumentally and subjectively, but it is the feeling that life is also valuable per se that he claims gives rise to the belief that it is wrong to kill. He distinguishes intrinsic value from instrumental and subjective

value by claiming that intrinsic value is independent of what people enjoy, want or need in order to gain other ends.

But the whole notion of intrinsic worth is more problematic than Dworkin allows. He too readily dismisses philosophers who reject the notion of intrinsic value, as those who insist,

> objects or events can be valuable only when and because they serve someone's or something's interests. (Dworkin, 1993: 69)

The mistake lies in his restricted interpretation of 'interests', 'desires' and 'enjoyment'. Having reduced subjective value to 'enjoying', he then diminishes the concept further by making it synonymous with a personal preference for things such as whisky (or in his case 'whiskey'). In the light of this, his claim that the value ascribed to life is fundamentally different from and additional to instrumental or subjective/personal worth is convincing, but what he says is true only in a superficial sense. Assuredly life may be valued over and above any instrumental factors and in a way different from a mere personal preference, but this hardly demonstrates that intrinsic value is disconnected from people's desires or needs.

To value anything can be to desire in a wider sense something related to its existence, to gain pleasure rather than pain from it. I may value something, not personally, in the sense that I want it or like it, but because others do so and, all other things being equal, I would rather they were satisfied rather than unsatisfied. I desire it in that I should choose for rather than against it. So, while I agree that things can be valuable in ways other than instrumentally and purely subjectively (which for Dworkin amounts to personal tastes), I have trouble recognising intrinsic value, completely disassociated from people's desires. Surely any value is attributed by people. Value cannot be a property of objects independent of any valuers. If literally no-one ever valued a particular work of art, then it would not be

valuable. Dworkin himself appears to arrive at this conclusion without realising it, when describing how we do not value everything in itself and thus do not consider everything inviolable. Instead, he maintains, we select what we take to be 'sacred', and,

> our selections are shaped by and reflect our needs
> and, in a reciprocal way, shape and are shaped by
> other opinions we have. (Dworkin, 1993: 80)

The notion of intrinsic value is variously expressed. Two distinct locutions are commonly used: 'valuable in itself' and 'valued for itself'. I take it that 'valuable in itself' most nearly encapsulates the Dworkin's idea that intrinsic value is a property. 'Valuable in itself' is an additional feature of life, over and above any other quality; one which is decisive when judging inviolability. 'Valuable for itself' is slightly different. It does not signify any added value, but is a description of how we value something and does not provide a further reason why something should be valued.

Dworkin sees the two as synonomous when he contends that objects of intrinsic value are those which are honoured, 'not because they serve our desires or interests but for their own sakes' (Dworkin, 1993: 69), but he is in error. I agree that we are familiar with valuing things for themselves, but find the idea that something has value in itself less comprehensible. To value something for its own sake is to value it for no reason beyond its own qualities and attributes - not for instrumental reasons, not for some nebulous extra value, but for itself alone. I enjoy a particular whisky for its taste and smell, the care with which it has been aged and the whole experience of drinking it. I can enjoy it, not in order to drown my sorrows or to demonstrate my sophistication to the neighbours, not as a means to a further end, but for itself. There is nothing alien about this, but it is noticeable that valuing something for itself is a relatively diminished concept and might amount only to what Dworkin terms 'subjective' or 'personal' valuing.

'Value for its own sake' is something people decide and is not a given. It thus does not carry the weight intended by 'intrinsic value' and seems more aptly used with reference to preference, liking and subjective forms of valuing.

Not only do I think Dworkin is mistaken in his characterisation of intrinsic value, but it must also be clear that it could not be the basis for an absolute prohibition on taking life. I concede that sense can be made of life valued for itself, but it is open to me not to value life for itself and so this interpretation of intrinsic value will not provide a secure base for the inviolability of life.

When people appeal to intrinsic value they are usually using it as a 'reason terminator', (Gregory & Woods, 1974: 51 - 64). 'Because it is intrinsically valuable,' serves as a final reason to bring to a close discussion of why people should not take life. But if intrinsic value is attributed in the light of other criteria, it cannot properly function in this way and there is nothing odd about asking for further reasons. Dworkin himself has conceded this. We do not just believe life has intrinsic value and whisky has not: we come to this conclusion in the light of other values we hold. It must be unlikely then that the absolute wrongness of killing can be established simply by invoking intrinsic value, for it evidently lacks the logical status of a first principle.

Dworkin would agree that appreciation of the 'intrinsic value' of life does not logically commit one to an absolute prohibition on killing - he is merely claiming that as a matter of fact many base their objections to taking human life on a notion of intrinsic value.

The notion of intrinsic value is not necessary to an understanding that life is especially valued and that killing seems a moral enormity. Sometimes 'intrinsic' may just be employed to add emotive force to what is said, signifying no more than

'special'. It may be the case that life should be specially valued, but not because it has intrinsic value.

There does seem to be something fundamental about valuing human life. As human beings, we can value many things and mourn their loss, but without some human life there is no valuing and no mourning. Of course without people, other forms of life might continue and this could be seen as valuable, but, as far as we know, there would be no 'valuing' in any meaningful sense of the word. We can only value life, even when that includes life in the future after we are all dead, while we are alive to do so.

Valuing life, or anything else, is an attribute of persons and it is our attitude to life and the taking of it which is at stake. To value life especially does not necessarily demand that one values a particular life, including one's own, over and above everything else. One could wish one's own life over, yet value life generally. It would not be inconsistent to believe that killing is a desperate evil and, simultaneously, that it can on occasion be justified, in the same way that the breaking of promises can. Commitment to the value of life itself does seem desirable, but it need not be commitment to an overriding value.

The idea that we should value life itself is further complicated by the difficulty experienced in attempting to define 'life'. If it is problematic to distinguish life from death, any absolute prescription with regard to life would seem to be built on shifting sand.

IV   The difficulty of defining 'life'

Life, it might be maintained, is simply a biological matter - human beings and other organisms are either alive or dead. But it is not always easy to distinguish between life and death. This is not primarily an empirical problem, although factual considerations are relevant. There are times, for example, when we cannot know whether patients on life-support systems will ever regain consciousness. If we knew they would one day recover, presumably they would be deemed alive still, but we cannot know with certainty. Advances in medical technology have brought about a situation in which there often is no easily identifiable moment of biological death.

And yet the difficulty is not exclusively one of identifying that life is present or absent in accordance with criteria. It is that of deciding which criteria are in some significant sense valid. Life, of course, can be defined for legal purposes in a variety of ways: the criterion used might be lack of heartbeat, the cessation of breathing or brain death. But the criterion used should not be perceived as a simple medical fact. It is a condition decided upon.

> The moment when death is said to occur cannot be *discovered* by medical science, but rather must be *chosen*. (Truog, cited by Singer, 1994: 42)

The choice cannot be a purely formal matter arrived at merely to solve a problem posed by technical difficulties in hospitals. Because the intentional extinguishing of life is a moral matter, we want to know whether or not a person has been killed in reality. The lines drawn have significance in the real world. The parameters of what counts as life are notoriously difficult to decide, but they are crucial precisely because moral decisions hang on them.

There are now situations where we have to decide if people on life-support systems count as living and will be 'killed' if we pull the plug. To fire shots into a dead body may or may not be wrong, but it cannot be the same moral wrongdoing as shooting someone who is alive in order to bring about their death. Moral judgement will depend on whether or not a person who counts as living has been shot.

This problem is peculiarly inherent in all arguments founded on the value of life when life is conceived of in predominantly biological terms, for the point of reference, life itself, may be indeterminate.

If the alternative to life is death, it might be thought that an absolute ban on killing would be more firmly based on a moral abhorrence of death.

V   Is death evil?

Death may be feared, but it would be nonsense to talk in terms of the very fact of death being a moral evil. Mortality is part of what it is to be human, a defining characteristic of the human condition. That we shall each die is certain and dying naturally is something that happens to us, not an action which over which we can exercise moral restraint. As Wittgenstein pointed out,

> Death is not an event in life: we do not live to
> experience death. (cited by Glover, 1977: 51)

The moral questions arise in the contemplation of premature death by human agency. We can properly grieve over death as a consequence of illness, if all that is humanly possible cannot prevent it, but this is not the same as the moral

repugnance we can feel over the death of someone killed or allowed through inaction to die.

> A human death at any age is a loss, the removal of a unique individual life, but what is tragic is an early death. We mourn especially the death of a child, whose evident potentialities will never be realised. (Norman, 1995: 59)

To kill and bring about the frustration of these potentialities is to do more than obliterate a biological entity, although even that obliteration may horrify.

The taking of life is not like having an arm amputated - we cannot manage without life or in spite of its loss. The enormity of killing a human being is in part to do with the fact that death is irreversible and the victim cannot be recompensed, but it is surely more than this too. What morally appals is not death viewed as the end of a biological life. The concern is with the curtailing of a good rather than the evil of death itself:

> If death is an evil at all, it cannot be because of its positive features, but only because of what it deprives us of. (Nagel, 1986: 9)

It is what death implies that is important. Neither the value of life nor the evil of death, while life and death are seen in biological terms, are sufficient to show that we should never take human life.

The presumption that killing is an evil must be inextricably tied to assumptions about the good that is being curtailed - the value of human life even if this is not seen as an absolute value. The value attributed to life may relate to the quality of life rather than the fact of life itself.

VI The quality of life

It does not seem possible that any absolutist arguments against killing could be derived from the quality of life, since it is usually invoked in an attempt to legitimise the intentional ending of life. The quality of life is assumed to be an alternative ethic rather than an elucidation of the value of life.

> Every legislator, every doctor, and every citizen needs to recognise that the real issue is whether to affirm and protect the sanctity of all human life, or to embrace a social ethic where some human lives are valued and others are not. As a nation, we must choose between the sanctity of life ethic and the 'quality of life' ethic. (Ronald Reagan, 1983, cited in Singer, 1994: 106)

Scrutiny of the quality of life is important, not to emphasise that it would be impossible to infer from it the absolutist position, but to introduce arguments to show that killing is not always morally deplorable. This is by no means straightforward, since the quality of life is a problematic concept.

The quality of life is not an isolatable property of a thing called 'life'. It must surely be experiential. It may be subjectively experienced - something personally felt such as happiness or misery. If a person is in extreme pain, wishing to die, then many may concede that helping to bring about her death might be justified. But the concession would be related to the person's own estimate of the quality of her own life and her own fate freely chosen. My claim to my own happiness or suffering, and thus to the quality of my life, is incorrigible. You cannot argue me into accepting that my life is happy by pointing to my fortunate circumstances and the fact that I have everything people normally desire. You can only give me reasons why you feel I ought to be happy. You cannot make me so. I might change my mind about the quality of my life, gaining insight from your homily, but only if my

happiness were exclusively dependent on my previous misapprehension of my circumstances and this is unlikely in the extreme.

Degrees of pain and pleasure involve a relationship between a person and the external world, and how a person feels about her situation in the light of values held. What makes one happy can be misery to another. Only I can ultimately be certain whether or not I am happy. So when I claim that the quality of my life is such that I wish to die, the fact that it is my appraisal of my life is centrally relevant in deciding if to kill me is morally acceptable. Respect for autonomy has joined, and I would argue overruled, reference to quality in deciding whether euthenasia is justified. The quality of life could be used to justify suicide or voluntary euthenasia, but not as grounds for killing in other circumstances.

If we forget this crucial subjective element in talking about the quality of life and think of it as something we can easily judge for others, the potential problems multiply.

In underestimating the personal, we must be in danger of ignoring the subjective nature of what in fact brings pleasure or misery. To judge another's quality of life solely by reference to what we might find tolerable or intolerable could permit unsolicited killing in cases where we normally, unhesitatingly rule it out. Extreme facial disfigurement has probably led to some suicides, but it does not always result in the wish to die, and the idea of killing everyone in this position on the grounds that quality of their lives is intolerably impaired, must appal. The moral choice with respect to someone else's life requires a greater degree of certainty than one's own unverifiable beliefs.

When we refer to the quality of life, very often we mean it evaluatively and not in a purely descriptive sense. We mean it is desirable, as in 'quality time'. The quality

of life is greater at times, and at a low ebb at others. Despite the experiential aspect, some objective assessment is possible. We can often tell when some people are experiencing more quality of life than others. Just because I cannot be certain with regard to another's happiness is no reason to suppose I can have no intimation at all. We do not need to engage in telepathy in order to justfy our assumption that living wracked with relentless pain is to experience less quality of life than living without pain.

Because people can have more or less of the quality of life, it might be thought it can be quantified. In a sense, of course, experience tells us this is so. However, although the quality of life might be desirable, it does not follow that more inevitably equals better. That food is a good does not entail the more the better. Eating too much makes us ill. We can have too much of a good thing in this sense.

It is possible that the longer we live, the more 'quality' we could be said to experience, and, if our lives are reasonably contented, that the quality of life will be added to in time. I think to some degree this must be so, and it is why we regret so bitterly the death of a young person. But this is not to claim that longevity always brings better quality of life. A longer life increases the potential for a worse as well as a better quality of life. The quality of life cannot be quantified merely in terms of longevity.

We can have too long a life. Insufficient quality of life, or lack of it, causes some to wish their lives terminated. They feel their lives are no longer worth living and seek death.

Even when a poor quality of life is viewed as a justification for suicide or voluntary euthenasia, it must be stressed that choosing with regard to someone else's life is different. It is inconceivable that it could be right to justify decisions on people's

life and death by reference solely to their greater or lesser quality of life. Surely the greater the quality of life people have is not identifiable with their being more deserving of not being killed.

It is not clear if 'the quality of life' is intended to refer only to the individual's life or if it is more generally applicable, referring also to some total quality of life we might all share in. If a serial killer is terrorising the neighbourhood, then it might be suggested that the quality of others' lives will be very much improved by the murderer's death (and that, since the killer is deeply unhappy, his poor quality of life will be simultaneously and mercifully ended.) Once again it is difficult to imagine this being the morally conclusive factor. It surely does not legitimise killing the murderer, since it is possible the desired improvement in the quality of life could be achieved by other means, such as imprisonment and psychiatric treatment for the killer. Further, if calculations of this type were permissible, what would there be to stop us killing the aged and infirm relative, whom we feel sure has a poor quality of life, in order to inherit and thus improve our own situation? The sum total of quality of life could be important, but it should not be decisive.

Thus far nothing has been said about the quality of life to show that the absolutists are wrong. However, the danger, of equating more or less quality of life with more or less moral justification for taking that life, can be avoided. If, instead of focussing on a sliding scale of amounts of quality, we attend to whether or not any quality at all resides in a life, the situation is likely to be very different.

The quality of life could be conceptualised as something a person either has or has not. The idea that people can be biologically alive (in a deep and long-term coma perhaps) but so injured that they have no quality of life whatsoever is familiar, (see the cases of Tony Bland, Nancy Cruzon and Joey Fiori cited in Singer, 1994: 57 ff.). Dworkin (1995), Glover (1977) and Singer (1994) all conclude that life in a

persistent vegetative state amounts to no life at all and that it is morally permissible to terminate it. Absolutists would deny this, so it is necessary to look more closely at what it is to be alive and have quality of life in order to show the weakness of their position.

VII   Consciousness

Any concept of the quality of life must imply consciousness, for without consciousness there would be no experiencing of anything, valuable or otherwise.

It cannot be convincingly argued that it is always wrong to kill people because they are conscious beings.

To be conscious is to be aware, a state which excludes both sleepers and those who have fainted or are under anaesthetic. Plainly, pacifists or not, we must all be loath to accept that it could be right to kill people when they are asleep, but not when they are awake.

On the other hand, while the distinction between waking and sleeping is not attractive as a relevant criterion, we may be less reluctant to invoke the difference between one in an irreversible coma and one who is not. The irreversibility is what makes the difference. By definition, a person in an irreversible coma will never again be conscious.

It must be a capacity which is under scrutiny rather than a temporal state. While sleeping, a person is unconscious, but has not lost the capacity to be aware. In

being deprived of the possibility of ever regaining consciousness, one has already

lost all possibility of experiencing life. I do not mean that the quality of life is

minimal, poor or desperately bad - I mean that it does not make sense to speak of it

at all. This may be in Singer's mind when he writes,

> Life without consciousness is of no worth at all.
> (Singer, 1994: 190)

But the capacity for consciousness alone could not supply sufficient reason to

refrain from killing. As Glover (1977: 46 ff.) so cogently argues, a major problem

with consciousness on this minimal level is that we appropriately ascribe it to

animals too, but most of us blench at the prospect of there being no moral

difference between taking the life of a cow and the life of a human being:

> If the whole basis of the ban on killing were the
> intrinsic value of mere consciousness, killing higher
> animals would be as bad as killing humans. (Glover,
> 1977: 50).

I am not saying it is not wrong to kill cows, only that it seems worse to kill human

beings, and that a moral distinction between the two acts is surely assumed by

many pacifists. Alhough there must be some pacifists who are also vegetarians,

there is nothing written into pacifism which forbids killing animals. The

prohibition concerns human life.

So the capacity for mere consciousness is insufficient to identify the value of

specifically human lives and to establish that they should never be intentionally

ended. More would be needed to differentiate between human and other life.

We cannot allocate a different moral value to the killing of cows and the killing of

people, simply in virtue of human beings belonging to a different species, since this

fails to identify a morally relevant distinction. A richer concept of consciousness,

however, might provide relevant features to justify the differentiation. It is

sometimes claimed that people have a 'higher consciousness', either in distinguishing some animals from others - human beings from lobsters for instance - or in pointing to a heightened consciousness achieved for some, because they are especially intelligent, sensitive or even perhaps have mystical powers.

When the suggestion is that humans, unlike other animals, are more conscious in being self-conscious, able to think about long term past and future, able to imagine more and engage in abstract thought, then we must be wary of merely redefining persons rather than recognising an attribute in virtue of which a person is deserving of special treatment. If all human beings by definition have a higher consciousness, then in appealing to that attribute we are simply restating that human beings should never be killed.

Only when we mean that all those with the attribute can be distinguished from those who have it not, are we recognising a possible criterion. It would be a criterion which could give some 'higher' animals entitlements which some humans would not share. This might be acceptable, but it is impossible that absolutists consistently could find it so.

If it were intended to signify a degree of awareness, such that 'higher' meant better, greater and more valuable, a dangerous dimension of sophistication would have been added. 'The better the consciousness the greater the entitlement not to be killed', is no more attractive as a rule than 'the greater the intelligence, the more deserving of life'. Any notion of life which is dependent upon, 'the possession of relatively sophisticated mental capacities, and if, moreover, the possession of these is a matter of degree,' will be unsatisfactory since,

> the way is then open to saying of anyone who has
> limited intelligence ... that really he or she has no life
> and there is no objection to killing him/her.
> (Norman, 1995: 57)

So the capacity for consciousness, rather than any sophistication of consciousness, may be important, but is insufficient on its own to provide a basis for an absolute ruling against the killing of people. Human life is not given special value by consciousness, although consciousness may be presupposed by the notion of life having special value.

One of the weaknesses of using consciousness is that it fails to distinguish between human and other lives. In that it is often regarded as a defining attribute of persons, appeal to autonomy in order to show the wrongness of killing might seem more promising.

VIII   Autonomy

To have autonomy is taken to mean to be, within the limitations of the human condition, self-directing and self-regulating, having control over one's own life, free to decide upon and pursue one's own fate. It is to have the capacity to choose and to act on one's own choices.

To believe that taking life is wrong because to kill someone who does not wish to die is to override that person's autonomy is far from absurd, but it could not rule out all killing. Many writers, including Norman (1995) and Glover (1977), find arguments based on autonomy unsatisfactory. I agree. Although it will be shown that Glover's arguments examined below are not conclusive, it will be clear that respect for autonomy would permit suicide and voluntary euthenasia. Moreover, although dying in war is not the same as suicide and euthenasia, to kill in war is not always to override a person's autonomy.

In establishing that the autonomy principle does not preclude killing in all cases, Glover raises the dilemma of a hypothetical set of people who have no reluctance to die and contends,

> If our only objection to killing were based on the autonomy principle, there would be no objection to killing the whole community. (Glover, 1977: 79)

I am not sure this is so. If, as Glover implies, there is no reason to suppose that the people in the community lack autonomy despite their complacency with regard to death, then presumably they have made an autonomous decision to continue living. Commitment to the autonomy principle would not permit their lives to be taken. After all, both suicide and murder would be open to them. In so far as they are not bringing about their own deaths, perhaps in the belief that both suicide and murder are wrong, it has to be as a result of an autonomous decision, however lightly taken. Would it be possible not to be reluctant to die and yet to continue living without choosing to do so? I suppose one might not care either way and accept life or death according to, for example, the throw of the dice, relinquishing one's autonomy in this respect. But still there would remain an implicit choice to leave it to chance rather than, for example, to be killed as a result of another person's decision. Killing them in either case still looks likely to be an act infringing on their autonomy.

Glover has not demonstrated that arguments for pacifism, based on the principle that it is wrong to override a person's autonomy, will permit killing in this instance.

Commitment to the autonomy principle may not allow the taking of life in this example, but it is difficult to see how it could lead directly to an absolute prohibition on killing. Part of the attraction of autonomy as a foundation for arguments over life and death is that at least here there is a factor relevant to our wishes with respect to our own lives. However, these same wishes may include the desire to die and it

must make permissible some cases of suicide since taking one's own life can be an autonomous act.

It might be said that to rely on autonomy alone is to fail to take account of the belief that, even if a person chooses to commit suicide, we could be justified in intervening and overriding her autonomy. In other words, some implications of the autonomy principle do not sit easily with a common moral belief.

This is not self-evidently true. Intervention in those cases which characteristically cause anxiety would not necessarily involve the infringement of autonomy. The occasions on which we are likely to feel justified in preventing suicide are surely exactly those when we feel that the intended act is not the result of a fully autonomous decision. The conditions of autonomy include, not only freedom from external influence, but also freedom from some influences internal to a person - irresistible impulses, addiction, states of mind and emotions so strong that they preclude or radically impair the exercise of reason. An autonomous decision does not demand the absence of all illness or emotion, but it does require that it is made in the light of reasons, rather than exclusively emotion. (One might be angry or jealous but still not to the degree to which this would interfere with one's reasoning powers. It is only when overwhelmed by passion, blinded by rage perhaps, that a person's autonomy is endangered.) An inability to make decisions, to think straight and a loss of self-identity are frequently cited as symptoms of serious depression. This too must amount to loss of autonomy. We feel people are not responsible for their own actions if they commit suicide when the 'balance of the mind is disturbed' and believe that intervention is justified. What are we pointing to but their lack of autonomy? Glover's contention that, 'if the only principle applying in matters of life and death were the autonomy principle, we would often find ourselves debarred from intervening' (Glover, 1977: 79 - 80), seems to overstate the case.

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It is true that we could not consistently respect autonomy and prevent suicides which we judged to be the result of autonomous decisions, but the intervention would not be ruled out in all those cases when it is very often believed justifiable.

I am not entirely clear whether or not commitment to pacifism necessarily precludes the moral acceptability of suicide and voluntary euthenasia, but, if the absolutist stance maintains that all taking of human life is wrong, it cannot be based on respect for autonomy. If the concern is only with unsolicited killing, adherence to the principle of autonomy has yet to be shown inadequate.

To take the life of someone who does not wish to die would be to infringe on that person's autonomy. Will it follow that all killing, in war for instance, is wrong? If soldiers have freely chosen to pursue a career which clearly puts their lives at risk, although they would choose not to be killed given the option, the autonomous decision to become soldiers might take precedence. The implication must be that they are contracting to do all that is involved in being members of the armed forces, up to and including being killed, and moreover, despite not wishing to die, they are committed to foregoing some actions (such as desertion) by which they could avoid being killed. Priorities can be identified among one person's autonomous choices when they conflict. Some killing in war may be on par with allowing suicide and permitted by the autonomy principle.

Noting this does not resolve the situation when two people's autonomy is in conflict - the question of who is in the right during fighting, when one soldier's autonomy seems inevitably threatened by another's. However it could be argued that this is not, in theory, a situation where two people's autonomous choices are in conflict. In making the decision to become soldiers, people have implicitly relinquished some autonomy - autonomy over certain aspects of their lives - as if waiving a right. They have agreed to obey orders unquestioningly in certain

situations and those orders may be to override a reluctance to face death and to kill. To think of soldiers as infringing their enemies' autonomy when shooting them is mistaken. Like monks who surrender some of their autonomy in promising obedience, the question of their autonomy in that respect need not repeatedly arise.

There is no presumption that this never arises. A change of mind is very possible. With new insight in the face of imminent death, one might well arrive at the autonomous decision that one does not wish to be killed for queen and country, and rescind the decision made on joining up - but equally, one might not. One might fear death and yet prefer it to dishonour. As a result of an autonomous decision, one could still choose to be killed. Respecting autonomy does not seem to prohibit all killing of others.

And yet choosing to meet death in this fashion is not the same as deciding on suicide or opting for euthenasia. The situation on the battle field is significantly different. There is a clear distinction between sincerely soliciting death and being willing to die if necessary. The soldier may have surrendered the entitlement to take each and every means of avoiding being killed, but this is not the same as wanting to die. The soldier courts death only in the sense of intentionally risking life. A soldier could be suicidal and yearn for death, but, given that on the field of battle a person is carrying weapons which can be turned to self-destruction, the case is not altered. If the soldier does not kill himself with the means so readily to hand, we should be wary of the conviction that he has taken a fully autonomous decision to do so, and recognise the belief, that in killing we merely shall be allowing suicide or euthenasia, might be mistaken.

Death in war is cannot be equated with suicide or euthenasia. If killing on the battlefield is compatible with respect for autonomy it is for different reaons.

The argument would have to be that to kill in war would not necessarily override a soldier's autonomy per se. In killing a soldier there need be no conflict between respect for that autonomy, embodied in the freely taken decision which commits him or her to accepting death in battle, and the permissibility of killing him or her. It is respect for this autonomous choice alone that would not be overruled by the enemy forces meting out death, but it is enough to show that the pacifist stance against killing cannot be dependent on autonomy.

While adherence to the principle of autonomy permits some killing that non-absolutists believe is morally tolerable, it is far from satisfactory. As a guiding principle, it does not allow for those who cannot make decisions about their own lives. It seems unlikely that the new born baby is in a position to conceptualise life and death, let alone to make a preference known. If this is true, then to kill the baby would not be to override anyone's autonomy. Pacifists and non-pacifists alike are likely to find this morally abhorrent. Examination of autonomy as a criterion is illuminating, but reveals its inadequacy as a means to distinguish morally acceptable from morally unacceptable killing.

To show that pacifist ideals are untenable, it is necessary to address this issue further and seek a richer conception of living which goes beyond consciousness and autonomy.

IX   Having a life

James Rachels (1986) draws a distinction between 'being alive' and 'having a life'. This must resonate with all those who urge us now to, 'Get a life!' They imply that

being alive is not good enough; we need in addition to 'get hold of life', to 'start to live' rather than passively going along with the routines of living.

It might seem that nothing more is being recommended here than the need for quality of life, but, in Rachels' terms, having a life is a precondition of any qualitative life and might be quite distinct from anything normally intended by 'quality living'. (One could have a life of abject misery, lacking all apparently desirable features.) Having a life has more to do with the capacity for self-consciousness and the capacity for experiencing quality - good or bad - in our lives, than with our experiences of life themselves. At the same time, the idea encompasses that value we attach to people's lives as being, peculiarly and significantly, individually theirs. Having a life is not the same as having a quality life and it goes beyond any purely biological concept of living.

Rachels explains that there can be more to living than merely being alive:

> Insects, while they are doubtlessly alive, do not have lives. They are too simple. They do not have the mental wherewithal to have plans, hopes or aspirations. They cannot regret their pasts, or look forward to their futures. (Rachels, 1986: 26)

Insects do not have the capacity for autonomy and for that self-consciousness which makes it sensible to talk of a quality of life. Rachels' distinction allows a conception of life as a good which should not be lightly curtailed. Simply to be alive biologically will not serve as sufficient distinction to prohibit killing, but to possess the wherewithal to have a life might.

> Consequently the rule against killing does not apply to living things which are not capable of having lives, including many animals and some humans. (Norman, 1995: 55)

This, at last, begins to coincide for many of us with our felt experience that it may not be always be wrong to end life and our simultaneous belief that killing is a moral enormity. Biological existence is necessary to any possibility of having a

life, but perhaps there are states which count as living yet in which one might as well be dead.

The idea of having a life in Rachels' sense, accommodates the individuality of each person's life, with its unique biography, and allows for my sense of ownership over my life. Repecting having a life takes account of autonomy. It is not simply that I have a biography: it is that my biography is one that only I live. What makes my life mine is that I experience it uniquely and, in the light of my own emotions, feelings, understandings, desires and personality, formulate my hopes and purposes. We may all experience fear, but my fear is not your fear even if we are both afraid of spiders.

> What is tragic about an early death is, therefore, not just that it deprives the person of a certain quantity of worthwhile experiences, but that it interrupts and frustrates their living of their own life. (Norman, 1995: 59)

The special value of life is in the living of it. The distinguishing feature should be that a person has the capacity to have a life. Both new-born babies and people who are temporarily unconscious can have this potential, but not all those who are living have it. The way is open to give those who will never in the future be aware, or able to plan and hope, a different moral status that may allow taking their lives, while protecting the lives of others who cannot make their wishes known.

> The new-born child, though as yet it lacks a sense of its own past and future, has embarked on the process of learning, of interacting with its environment and forming relationships with others, and has thus taken its first steps in making a life. (Norman, 1988: 199)

Talk of a capacity may seem to raise speculations about the future, such that we dare not claim irreversible incapacity. 'Will tomorrow bring technological advances so that those deemed incapable today will be recognised as capable in 24 hours time?' is a daunting question, but it need not postpone all judgement eternally.

Valuably, it does encourage us to take note of uncertainty and to err on the safe side. We can only decide if we think somone has the capacity to have a life with reference to evidence already available. While we cannot predict the future with certainty, nevertheless past experience tells us that healthy babies do become autonomous people, even if we are reluctant to claim they have autonomy at birth. The first person who recovers from cortical death will supply good reason for not including death of the cortex in the factors used to establish whether someone is living or not. After all, we do not need to foreclose on the possibility of medical advances: we can include in our decision making probability and the state of current research. Lack of logical certainty does not doom us unacceptably to completely arbitrary choices.

The notion of having a life that is significantly one's own, is not only compatible with the idea of autonomy, it is presupposed by it. To be autonomous, the decisions I make must be distinguishably my own, not merely those foisted on me by other people, culture or routine. In turn, responsibility is dependent upon autonomy. To the extent to which I lack the freedom to act from choice, to that degree I am not responsible for my actions and cannot be held blameworthy. Moral disapproval of killing depends on culpability and responsibility. Intentionally to kill is to be responsible for another's death. Having a life, in Rachels' terms, is not just to have something of quality, not just to have something peculiarly mine rather than yours, but also to have something over which I can be held especially responsible.

The capacity for having a life then makes sense of the capacity for moral agency. It underlines the potentiality for doing good. This too is part of the quality, the value, we attribute to human life. Having a life also carries the potentiality for wrongdoing, but to deprive a person of life is to extinguish potential for good and ill. It is to take away an important aspect of personhood.

Having a life is different in kind from existing. The difference is not simply a matter of degree. A human being living a life is not just more alive than a Ming vase; a teenager is not just more alive than a baby; a person is not just more alive than a lobster. Having a life is to be a person.

The awfulness of killing a person includes but does not depend upon the fact that it takes away something irreplaceable. A person's life is unique; even identical twins cannot have the same life (Norman, 1988: 200). To take a life is an irreparable act and the loss of life generally is the loss of something of value. It could be said that breaking a Ming vase destroys for ever something valuable and it is grievous in its own way, but not in the same way as the destruction of human beings. The Ming vase may be unique, irreplaceable (indeed its value is in part dependent on these characteristics) and, once broken, it is irreparable. It is valued for its qualities. So what is distinctive about destroying people? Surely it is that human beings have lives to lead. A person has qualities which it would be absurd to include in the properties of a vase. This is not merely a matter of degree. Human beings are not just more beautiful, better made, worth more than Ming vases; they are different, they are living. Animals too live and breathe. Their living too is different in kind from the vase's existence, but it is not necessarily the living of human beings. Autonomy, the ability to lead one's own life, to act wittingly, pursuing purposes and capable of moral action - this is what is so distinctive about persons. To the extent to which any animals share these characteristics, to that extent they too will count as persons in moral judgements. But while they lack the capacity for autonomy and morality, they, and any human being in this position, will not. (This is not to say that they are not proper objects of moral concern, for we can undoubtedly do wrong to them. It is to emphasise that, without the capacity for having a life of their own, they are not full persons.)

Respecting the distinctive quality of personhood, viewed as the capacity for having a life, provides a principle for moral judgements about the taking of human life which permits suicide and voluntary euthenasia, when they are the consequence of autonomous decisions. It also allows some differentiation between those in long term states of unconsciousness. It does not legitimise the killing of people who have lives and do not want to die.

I would maintain that the notion of having a life is an appropriate concept of life which enables morally acceptable decisions about life and death to be made. Killing those who can have no life is not necessarily wrong.

Absolute pacifism prohibits the intentional killing of others without exception, and is thus incompatible with 'having a life' as a guiding principle.

The assumption so far has been that pacifism could be based on a principle relating to the value of life. The morality of taking life is however often debated in quite different terms. It could be argued that it is always wrong to kill, not because human life comprises an overriding value, but because the consequences of killing never outweigh the prima facie evil of taking life. Consequentialist arguments therefore require scrutiny.

X Utilitarian arguments

Utilitarianism judges killing to be wrong only to the extent to which it adds to the pain in the world or reduces the pleasure. Since it does not give any exceptional

significance to the taking of life, this belief is unlikely to yield an absolute prohibition on homicide, but the possibility should be explored.

The wrongness of killing from a utilitarian perspective would be assessed according to the consequences:

> to kill someone normally causes great suffering and deprives the victim of possible happiness. (Norman,1988: 198)

Taking life has no special status except insofar as it is that which causes most harm. Killing would not be wrong in itself, carrying independent weight in the moral balance.

Norman rejects this view, attacking what he sees as the inadequacy of a utilitarian stance, while allowing,

> that the principle of not taking human life cannot be an absolute principle. (Norman, 1988: 201)

In his paper, *'The Case for Pacifism'* (1988), he explores the difficult problem posed when two people's lives conflict and one's life can only be preserved by 'sacrificing another's life.' The example he uses is the situation where A is threatening B, and B's life can be saved only by killing A. To choose between the two on utilitarian grounds, weighing which will add most to the sum of happiness in the world, would not be right he claims.

Intuitively, I agree with his conviction that it would not be right to do so. It is not self-evident that the generous philanthropist, shedding sweetness and light while contributing enormously to the happiness, both short and long term, of whole populations, is more deserving of life than the saintly hermit who has no effect on others.

Nevertheless, some problems do attend the example Norman uses. In order to demonstrate the implausibility of the utilitarian position, he needs to show that there are instances when a choice between lives is unavoidable, and one person can justifiably be killed in virtue of being responsible for bringing about this situation rather than for consequentialist reasons. The problems are threefold.

Firstly, it is not plain to me that examples which present the stark choice of kill or be killed, are so obviously plausible.

As soon as the attempt is made to flesh out some details, it seems that an alternative course of action, trying to disable the aggressor, must exist and that this would be the morally preferable option. At close quarters, stabbing or shooting the intending murderer, A, in the heart is not the only possible course of action.

The invention of examples where the option is either both must die or one's life must be sacrificed is easy, but I find it difficult to include in these the actual threat which would be relevant to B's decision in the way Norman requires. If A and B are climbing roped together and A falls, it is quite conceivable that B will be in a situation so precarious that she cannot haul up A without losing her footing and causing them both to plunge to their deaths. If she does nothing or waits too long to act, since there is no possibility of rescue, both will die from exposure or from the fall when B loses her own grip on the rock face. B might then be justified in cutting the rope, thus killing A, but acting in the only way which will save her own life. However, if both protagonists are aware of the dangers of their position, A cannot be reasonably supposed to be about to attempt the murder of B. He might have murderous intent, even be waving a loaded gun in her direction, but it is not a real threat to B, unless A is also intent on suicide. A might be responsible for the life-threatening situation, through inexcusable neglect of safety precautions perhaps, but A cannot kill B right now without killing himself. The choice would

not be the same as that in Norman's outline. (To introduce suicidal impulses into the scenario would be to intoduce a confusing complication and a different reason why a person might be said to be deserving of death.)

If considerable distance is imagined between the protagonists, A's threat could be real and without suicidal implications. A and B perhaps are soldiers. A, in the distance, is lining up his weapon. He is a noted marksman and is undoubtedly about to shoot B dead. B's only means of preventing this is to fire her own weapon at A. Unfortunately, B's weapon fires a hail of high velocity bullets any one of which will kill anyone it touches. This looks more like the situation Norman intends. But is not the option available to shoot at a point near enough to shock, thus destroying A's aim, but far enough away to avoid hitting him? (If it is suggested that the speed of response required is such that niceties of judgement are out of the question, then the answer must be that, in that event, B is not necessarily in a position to be able to make a fully autonomous decision and cannot be held entirely responsible for killing A.)

I am not contesting Norman's claim that B would be justified in killing A, I am not trying to invoke Double Effect and I do accept that, B might misjudge and thereby kill A, but nevertheless I maintain that B's choice is still not restricted to kill or be killed. With Anscombe, I would maintain,

> If he kills the man who attacks him or someone else
> it ought to be accidental. (Anscombe, 1981: 68)

The conditions Norman needs - i.e. the necessity for B to sacrifice the life of the intending murderer - are not as easily incorporated into hypothetical situations as we are encouraged to believe and thus the example employed is not convincing.

Secondly, because Norman wants to provide an instance where Utilitarianism is obviously wrong and respect for life (his solution) right, the culpability of the attacker, A, is crucial:

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> The relevant consideration is surely that A is
> threatening B's life and that therefore if the choice
> has to be made it is A's life that must be taken, since
> it is he who is responsible for the fact that one or the
> other life must be sacrificed. (Norman, 1988: 201)

But what if B is a serial killer, although still not threatening the life of A? While B is still not responsible for this particular moment of choice, B has already been responsible for sacrificing other lives and is likely to kill again and, as an adherent of capital punishment perhaps, A's threat may not be unconnected with this. Is it so obvious that B is not responsible for the situation and can be justified in killing A? Indeed, Norman himself might accept that this would provide an instance of where B rather than A has, 'through the wickedness of his own action, brought it upon himself,' (ibid.: 201).

I have no wish to argue that in these circumstances B has forfeited all claim to life and that it is B who must be sacrificed, but only to suggest instead that the death of A is not always as easily swallowed as it might appear, and that the attractive notion that 'he who is responsible for the fact that one or the other life must be sacrificed' is more nearly the description of a gut reaction than of a self-evident criterion when deciding matters of life and death. More importantly, if responsibility for the existence of the moment of choice between two lives carries with it a lesser claim to life, the slippery slope to endorsing the killing of those who are responsible for similar dilemmas is imminent. Those whose policies cause doctors to have to choose which of two patients should be sacrificed might fall into the same category. Or, if it is insisted that murderous intent must accompany the responsibility which entails forfeiture of some entitlement to life, this could be employed as an argument for capital punishment - something which Norman makes explicit elsewhere (1995: 187) that he does not espouse.

Thirdly, the unsatisfactory nature of the Utilitarian's approach to killing is better exemplified in *Utilitarianism - For and Against*, where the choice is between killing one person or refusing to do so, thereby causing the deaths of many men (Williams, 1973: 98). (In the course of a botanical expedition, Jim stumbles on a small South American town square where the execution of a random group of inhabitants is about to take place. The officer in charge of the execution party offers the option to our hero and all the villagers plead with him to kill one man, and save the rest from certain death.) Here the utilitarian commitment to maximising happiness, does seem to entail that killing another person would be justified while yet, as Williams points out, most of us intuitively recoil from this conclusion. It is not that the reasoning seems to lack all moral force, nor that the bringing about of other deaths by inaction is insignificant; it is, as Williams makes clear, the doubt that this is the whole story - the incompleteness of the reasoning - that so disturbs us:

> A feature of Utilitarianism is that it cuts out a kind of consideration which for some others makes a difference to what they feel about some cases: a consideration involving the idea, as we might first and very simply put it, that each of us is specially responsible for what *he* (sic.) does rather than for what other people do. (Williams, 1973: 99)

There is a deeply felt distinction between the responsibility for the act of killing and for deaths resulting from a failure to act which is excluded from a purely utilitarian calculation. This distinction is not reflected in Norman's example here, and yet this is a central inadequacy of the utilitarian approach.

Irrespective of the validity of the distinction drawn between acts and omissions, I am conscious of Hare's comment that it is easy,

> to think up cases in which a utilitarian calculation would seem to justify actions contrary to principles which most of us, at least when we are not philosophising, hold sacred. On careful inspection it will turn out that these cases are either fictitious or at least highly unusual, or else that the utilitarian

> calculations are very sketchily done, leaving out
> considerations which in practice would be most
> important. (Hare, 1974: 53)

Objections to the consequentialist view are often in the nature of intuitions. (What other than intuition tells Norman that some prospects may be worse than killing?) They may be none the worse for that. The intuition that it is wrong intentionally to kill may be a belief in a fundamental value other than the maximisation of utility, and a recognition that a plurality of values is possible. Since Norman does not completely dismiss utilitarian concerns, he is accepting that we may consistently hold a variety of values. Norman's objection to Utilitarianism is that Utilitarians do not value life per se, only in so far as it contributes to the maximisation of happiness.

Norman maintains,

> the judgement cannot be a purely utilitarian one, nor
> can it be simply a matter of calculating alternative
> levels of freedom and oppression. The wrongness
> of killing carries an independent weight, and it
> weighs very heavily in the balance, but we cannot
> rule out the possibility that it might be outweighed by
> a sufficiently great prospect of the alleviation of
> oppression or suffering. (Norman, 1988: 201 - 202)

I share with Norman the intuition that killing just is wrong and also agree that this cannot be an absolutist position, for other values may take precedence. Nevertheless, I find it more difficult to set aside utilitarian considerations than Norman apppears to.

The utilitarian case is not ultimately destroyed by such criticisms so, if it were demonstrable that causing death necessarily, always and inevitably, added to the sum of pain in the world and reduced happiness, utilitarian arguments could be employed in the cause of absolute pacifism and a total prohibition on killing. But this must be impossible. While at first sight taking life might appear to bring about

more misery than happiness, it is certainly not inconceivable that the reverse might be the case. Williams' hypothetical example has made this plain. Jim will cause more pain than happiness if he refuses to kill.

An absolute veto on killing then cannot be derived from the principle of utility, since there will be cases where the value of a human life is outweighed by the pain averted in ending it. Utilitarianism provides a means of judging when taking life is justifiable. What it does not do is to reflect the widely held conviction that special importance should be attached to life, and that this should have independent weight rather than being merely something that may or may not contribute to the sum of happiness.

We have seen that there seem to be no strong grounds for the belief that killing is always morally unjustifiable. The premises that we have a right to life or that life has intrinsic value are flawed. A predominantly biological concept of life, the notion that death itself is evil and a generalised abstract idea of the quality of life all similarly provide inadequate foundations on which to build a coherent position. Consciousness and autonomy both failed as criteria to distinguish satisfactorily between those that we might find morally acceptable to kill and those that we should not. An enriched conception of being alive, having a life, took into account autonomy and would permit suicide, euthenasia and possibly the killing of fighting soldiers. While it might be that a pacifist stance tolerated suicide, absolutism must preclude the unsolicited killing of others and utilitarian arguments would not necessarily support this principle.

The intentional taking of life has been recognised as a prima facie wrong, such that moral justification is needed to make it acceptable. I find no rational grounds for assuming that it is always unjustifiable and conclude that there may be worse deeds

than killing a person - killing many people perhaps, or causing catastrophic and appalling consequences by failure to kill.

However, believing that it is not always wrong to take human life (even when this includes soldiers in battle) is not to accept that all killing in war is justifiable. Wars themselves may be catastrophic and more than soldiers are killed. Whether or not there can be a just war now requires investigation.

CHAPTER 3

Can killing in war be justified?

We have seen that people are not doomed as it were to respond aggressively, resolving all their differences by physical attacks, so war is not entirely beyond our control and is thus open to moral scrutiny. Despite the fact that the prospect of killing other people appals, it also seems that an absolutist stance against the intentional taking of life is not self-evidently the only morally acceptable one. It is not yet clear if killing in war falls into the same category as suicide and euthenasia, where at least doubt remains and deliberately taking life might be justifable. Whether or not homicide in war can ever be justified is a further question.

I Just War Theory

It appears relevant then to examine the notion of the just war. 'Just war theory' is perhaps rather a glib phrase. 'Theory' suggests a coherent set of principles and criteria, but while these are identifiable, they seem to owe as much to history as to philosophy. The shifts of emphasis between the different grounds cited as justification for war would seem attributable as much to historical circumstance as to any linear progression in philosophy.

There appears to be no single identifiable concept of the just war. Different beliefs about what comprises a just rather than an unjust war have been evident through the

centuries. We thus share with our ancestors concern about the moral acceptability of warfare, but accounts of what constitutes that acceptability have varied with time. The notion of the just war comprises a major Western moral tradition which has developed through the ages, reflecting the changes in moral and religious attitudes, and taking account of what might be termed 'technical advancements' in the methods of warfare. When we refer to 'just war theory' we are invoking a description of criteria which provide justification for some wars and set limits on the destructive violence of war.

It is possible to trace the derivation of various threads in twentieth century thinking on just wars from classical and mediaeval times, but the twists and turns in these threads have been influenced by changing circumstances - changes in 'jurisprudence, statecraft and in concepts of the patria and the realm,' (Russell, 1975: 297). The world of nuclear weapons is so far removed from the hand-to-hand fighting of the past that traditional ideas of the just war could be thought irrelevant to the moral dilemmas posed by modern warfare. But it is exactly because they comprise a tradition and are part of our history, that present day just war thinking cannot profitably be examined in isolation. While there is no inexorable evolution of theory along a certain path, nevertheless it is because people had those ideas previously that the specific beliefs held now are possible. We cannot think about the morality of war without employing the concepts of the tradition.

The very desire to distinguish wars that are 'just' from those that are not is surely recognition of the need to limit the potential ill effects of warfare. Although this must seem to many today a moral imperative, because the ill effects are morally abhorrent, the restraint called for may have sprung from more pragmatic reasoning. Indeed, what Welch (1993) terms 'Realist' accounts of war dismiss justice as a motivation, maintaining either that states are insincere in claiming to be motivated

by justice or that what is perceived as justice is always self-serving. So there are political theorists who would ignore moral perspectives on war or reduce them to something nearing expediency. Welch himself argues that justice can be a motive for war, but when he comments, 'Only those issues that touch their (the national leaders') perceived entitlements succeed in engaging their senses of justice.' (Welch, 1993: 2), his notion of justice does seem more legalistic than moral.

It is relevant to note that this makes clear that there are at least three possible ways of looking at what counts as 'just': moral, non-moral and legalistic. Discussing what counts as a just war can be a little like discussing what is right in a game. Some might say that to play is morally acceptable since it will give pleasure, but in a specific instance it would be morally dubious to beat an opponent by too great a margin if you know this will cause the loser to commit suicide. The concerns in this example are clearly moral. (In this context, a war to regain territory might be morally acceptable, but, if the only means of winning is to lay waste the enemy country and kill the the whole population, the enterprise might be morally questionable.) In contrast, another might reason that to allow one's boss to win the game will be in your best self-interest and thus the 'right' course of action. (A war waged solely to enlarge an empire, without any intention to benefit the people, might parallel this.) Pure self-interest is surely not appropriately described as 'moral'; indeed, many would see it as immoral. I prefer the term 'non-moral', since the pursuit of self-interest need not, I assume, always be wrong - it would depend on other factors such as the effect on others. A third possibility falls outside the moral sphere. The legalistic player might believe that, given the game is a game and not a moral issue, that one plays according to the rules - what is right is anything which falls within the rules. (An analogy here might be the use of defoliants in Vietnam which was not expressly forbidden by the Geneva Protocol, signed by the U.S.A. in 1970, since it comprised a chemical attack on crops rather than on people, but nevertheless had terrible side-effects including birth-defects

among the offspring of the affected and thus 'stretched the terms of the Geneva Protocol to its limits' (Gander, 1987: 19).)

It seems quite possible that, within the tradition, wars could have been accounted 'just' in senses other than those in which moral considerations dominate, but the fact that on occasion the criteria for just wars have been interpreted in what I have called 'legalistic' ways should not obscure the fact that it is a moral tradition. 'Just war tradition represents above all a fund of practical moral wisdom,' (Johnson, 1984: 15). The intention here is to explore the morality of warfare, not to discuss just war criteria reduced to the rules of a game.

While the following exploration of the tradition comprises reflection on what has historically been accepted as just, the moral problems encountered in evaluating the conditions under which killing in war could now be accounted justifiable are illuminated.

I i)   The just war tradition

The distinction between just and unjust wars was drawn long before the Middle Ages, although perhaps we inevitably associate it with Augustine and Aquinas. Certainly there are examples in the Old Testament of wars believed to be justified in so far as they were fought against enemies of the faith and in classical times the Hellenes thought all wars waged against non-Hellenes were justified (Russell, 1975: 292). Implicitly, civil war seems to be what is ruled out, insofar as it necessitates the killing of one's own people, but those who are not of the same faith or who spring from a different ethnic or cultural tradition are not accorded the same rights or protection. Whether this is the result of a moral judgement, the outcome of viewing outsiders as less than persons, or whether it is the rationalisation of self-

interest, others comprising a threat to the survival of the group defined in terms of religion or nationality, is not obvious. It could of course be both. What now seems to be a tension between ethics and pragmatic considerations is evident from the earliest mentions of just wars, but the need to exercise some restraint on fighting, for whatever reason, is evident.

By the Middle Ages the concept of justice in the context of war had become assimilated into a legalistic concept, that of legality (Russell, 1975: 197) reflecting the role of temporal law, yet distinctively theological considerations weighed heavy. Attempts to reconcile the Christian teaching against violence with the need to wage war in order to preserve the faith were inevitable. As many have pointed out, just war theories perhaps provide the best compromise the church could devise between aggression and Christian pacifism.

II Jus ad bellum & jus in bello in the tradition

Walzer (1977) maintains that just war thinking always encapsulates the dualism which involves judgement with reference to two logically independent criteria: the reasons for going to war and the means adopted in waging war. Aristotle appears first to have used the term 'just war', but only later came the distinction between 'jus ad bellum' and 'jus in bello'. In order to sanction killing in war, both the rightness of going to war and the morality of the way in which it is fought became necessary conditions.

Over time 'jus ad bellum' and 'jus in bello' came to include:
a)   War should only be fought for just causes;
b)   It should only be fought with the right intention;

c)   It should only be waged by a legitimate authority;
d)   It should be undertaken as a last resort, only when other peaceful
      resolutions have failed;
e)   The war should be conducted in a morally legitimate manner.

II a)   Just causes

The idea that the justness of a war can be dependent on its causes was developed by
the Romans and 'causa belli' was cited as a necessary precondition for 'justum
bellum'. This concept of just causes is still influential. Various conditions have
been and still are judged just causes.

The belief that war should be a means to a higher goal has long been accepted as a
just cause, but to accept this is to accept little of substance. It is only to agree that
war should not be an end in itself - an assumption already implicit in the whole
enterprise of distinguishing the just from the unjust wars.

However, the higher goals have been variously detailed.

II a) i)   To benefit those governed

Aristotle believed that to wage war in order to obtain an empire for the benefit of the
governed was acceptable. It is not clear to me if 'the governed' picks out the
population already within the empire who will gain from its expansion by perhaps
the addition of richer lands, or if the term refers to those who are to become part of
the enlarged empire and thus gain, perhaps by being ruled more justly. A further
possibility is that one state might fight to acquire an empire not for its own people,
but for another populace, to give them an empire of their own. Whichever was
intended, Grotius (*De Jure Belli ac Pacis:* 131) later expressed the vital condition

that the acquisition of an empire should indeed be beneficial to the governed and no mere pretext for warfare. Given this caveat, and trusting that 'beneficial' implies that the benefit intended is greater than would otherwise be the lot of the governed, this does seem reasonable although still more open to interpretation than is comfortable. It might, for example, allow the waging of war to bring communism or democracy to a people, living under a benevolent despot perhaps, who were content with their lot or who did not wish for the more 'beneficial' circumstances the war was intended to bring about. Judging what is beneficial is likely to be coloured by the values of the aggressor.

Nevertheless, it is plain that to go to war only to subjugate another populace would not be just:

> To crush and bring into subjection peoples who have
> done you no harm, for no other reason but simply
> for the love of dominance, what is that but to behave
> like a big band of robbers. (Augustine, 1963: 73)

II a) ii)   To prevent enslavement

Another higher goal which provides adequate reason for war has been seen as to prevent one's own enslavement. Given that the actual state of slavery is no longer internationally tolerated although slavery undoubtedly still exists in some parts of the world, the prevention of one's people's enslavement would presumably still count as a just cause for those convinced there can be jus ad bellum. To prevent one's own enslavement would be to avoid a state of affairs necessarily evil and unbeneficial.

Attempts to justify waging war in order to resist domination by an external power may be a modern variant of this, but they could also be seen in terms of self-defence. Recognition of self-defence as a just cause is enshrined now in the

Charter of the U.N. (Article 2 (e)), but it is far from unproblematic, deserving separate consideration below, outside this predominantly historical account, in the discussion of modern just war thinking. For the moment it is only necessary to add that the Roman Catholic Church now admits only self-defence as grounds for fighting a war (Ruston, 1981: 15 - 16).

II a) iii)   To punish

The idea that punishment constitutes a just cause, if not an easily recognised higher goal, is likely to be the least attractive one today - or so I thought until the Americans launched Cruise missiles at installations in Iraq to show Saddam Hussein that his actions against some of the Kurdish factions in his country could not be allowed to pass without military consequences. When justifying the strike in the media great emphasis was placed on the wickedness of Saddam Hussein and the language employed was of punishment and desert rather than of means and ends.

Augustine's belief in punishment as a just cause sprang from the tradition that war must be a consequence of sin and a remedy for it. This permitted violence against an entire people, soldier and civilian alike, since the guilt was assumed to be that of the nation as a whole. The whole notion of punishment in the context of the activities of states is problematic. Cannot only people be guilty of sin in the way that only people commit crimes? If the crime is perpetrated in the name of the state, must we assume consent such that all the populace are culpable? Although the state undoubtedly has an identity and a momentum, as it were, distinct from the sum of the population, there does not seem to be an entity, 'the state' which is punishable without punishing individual citizens. Most often, where the state does not act on universal consensus, it is the leaders who cause the 'sinful' acts to occur. If they

are not solely responsible, they are at least more culpable than many others, yet how could waging war on a country punish only the guilty?

Maintaining that war is a consequence of sin, seems to imply that punishment is seen as retributive, a direct response to sin. The very fact of the sin is sufficient justification in itself for waging war on the sinners. The godly have an intuition of desert and judge war to be the appropriate punishment. This prospect has little appeal, not least because justification which rests on intuition seems inadequate. The military attack on Saddam Hussein in 1996 may have been in retribution, but also appeared to spring from a consequentialist perspective on punishment. It was felt necessary to teach him a lesson, to show him and others that he could not get away with his misdeeds - in other words to reform the offender, and to deter him and others from commiting similar offences. Without wishing to judge the morality of this particular offensive strike here, it is relevant to note that the punitive aspect of the attack seemed to be emphasised in order to justify military action for which no other just cause could be cited. Punishment was invoked as if it would function as an overriding just cause, exactly as it might have been in the past.

A state could punish with war when it had been lawfully wronged according to Grotius, or to avenge injury in the view of Augustine and Aquinas. Dugard (1983) claims that Grotius went further in maintaining that the recovery of property would provide a just cause, presumably because the original theft would be an example of unlawful injury. Waging war to recover lost goods does not seem completely identifiable with punishment, but is related to it. The Falklands War was presented as a war to recover property and there was evidence in Britain of the feeling that Argentina must be punished for invading and claiming British territory. The Falklands War exemplifies some of the problems attached to this just cause. It was not clear beyond doubt which country was rightfully reclaiming the territory and it was evident that many people were dubious whether doing so merited the cost in

lives. It was not universally agreed that, even if Britain had just cause, other factors were not more important. War seemed disproportionately evil to the good sought by it.

For various reasons then punishment, even when it includes the recovery of property, is hard to view as a cause sufficient to justify going to war.

II a) iv) To convert

Also related to punishment (although distinguishable from it) is war to convert the infidel. As non-believers, infidels must be sinners and deserving of punishment. The brutal simplicity of this reasoning has little appeal today and it has been said that Christian dogma was used in this way only to rationalise and give legitimacy to killing. Dugard may well be right in saying,

> From the earliest days, therefore the doctrine of the
> just war served the cause of one faith or ideology at
> the expense of another. (Dugard, 1983)

Waging war and killing many certainly does not seem to be the most efficient way of converting people, if conversion is a matter of conscience and conviction. Those killed will not have been converted and, although the survivors might well claim to have been converted out of fear, a sincere change of faith seems an unlikely direct consequence of being conquered. I suppose it must be conceded that, if a longer term view is taken, inter-marriages and social interaction once peace is re-established could bring about the desired effect, but the persistence of religious faith in the face of oppression and religious martyrdom is not unknown. While war to convert the infidel may not be totally senseless, its justifiability must be dubious.

If to convert is to save others from eternal damnation or from a state of evil worse than death, or even if it is conceived of as a humane way of eradicating a competing religion (humane in comparison with genocide), then what must count as a 'higher end' is in view. This alone will not make many Holy Wars any more palatable. The crusade in 1209 against the heretical Cathars, provides an example of the wholesale destruction which could result from doctrinal differerences. Noted for their pacifism, the Cathars surrendered town after town, but the inhabitants were put to the sword or burnt at the stake. Pope Innocent III was apparently motivated by a wish for the extermination of 'an organised Church that offered a real alternative to the Catholic Church' (Regan, 1994: 138). It could be argued that the annihilation of the sect prevented more Catholics falling into sin by joining the Cathars, but it is unlikely that the conversion of the heretics themselves was intended. Perhaps it was believed that a Cathar was better dead than living in heresy, an early version of the 'better dead than red' which we have heard this century and which suggests that political ideology as well as religious faith might be used to justify war.

Despite the alien flavour of conversion by violence, it is not inconceivable that this idea contributes to some conflicts in the twentieth century. What appear to be wars of faith at the moment are often predominantly driven by political ends, but it would be foolhardy to ignore the force of religious belief and the possibility that some profoundly believe that ensuring the predominance of one's own religion is just cause for war.

Not only could faith apparently legitimise the employment of military force, but to fight could be seen as a religious duty, embraced more ardently perhaps than any temporal obligation to state or country. Nevertheless, to be willing to die for one's faith or beliefs is comprehensible, but that it is justifiable to kill in order to convert others is difficult to accept.

II a) v)   To achieve peace

The most familiar just cause, and perhaps the most attractive, is to achieve peace. Our doubts about war suggest that peace is necessarily better so it must constitute a higher goal. Augustine held that peace comprised a higher goal and thus provided just cause.

> It is agreed then that peace is the desirable end of war. Everyone by making war seeks peace.
> (Augustine, 1963: 342)

Johnson seems to find this self-explanatory, merely adding, 'or at least a more secure peace than that which obtained beforehand' (Johnson, 1984: 3).

However, prima facie, some contradiction lurks here. While the assumption might be that people are entitled to fight back, as it were, in order to re-establish peace, the idea that one might instigate war in order to bring about peace does seem problematic, but both these views are quite widely held today.

When war is justified on the grounds that it will bring about peace, it is as if some subtle paradox is being appealed to. I use the phrase 'paradox of peace' to encapsulate the notion that peace can involve war. The expression of this belief is often confused, but at least two stances can be distinguished. One is the assumption that too much peace results in war and the other, that war may be necessary to achieve peace.

The paradox of peace would seem to have all the charm of the paradox of freedom - that is to say, not a great deal when it is subject to closer scrutiny. (The paradox of freedom appears to reveal that paradoxically, 'freedom ... must lead to very great restraint, since it makes the bully free to enslave the meek' (Popper, 1945: 265). Whether a logical or an empirical point is being attempted here is unclear. But surely it is nonsensical. Logically freedom precludes constraint: lack of restraint is

a necessary condition of freedom. To suggest this is a paradox is merely to disguise the somewhat unpalatable belief that not all freedom is desirable and that some restraint is good. R.S. Peters' formulation of the paradox of freedom implies this when he says, 'Too much freedom leads to too little' (Peters, 1970: 186). 'Too much' suggests an undesirable excess. Peters, of course, clearly maintains this is an empirical truth and does not derive it, as Popper seems to, from a logical absurdity.)

Just as there is no paradox of freedom, so there can be no paradox of peace. To say that an inordinate quantity of peace leads to war is simply to claim that, as a matter of fact, peace is impermanent. It cannot be held that peace causes war any more than health causes illness. The suggestion must be that, the world being what it is, peace is likely to be broken by war. There is no necessary causal relationship between the two.

The idea that war may be necessary to achieve peace is equally unparadoxical. It merely expresses the belief that 'peace' is not always desirable and that war is sometimes preferable.

It should be remembered in this context that 'war' and 'peace' are wide terms, properly applicable to more than military conflict and its absence. Like freedom, peace can be a matter of degree. One may be at peace with a neighbouring nation, yet engaged in violent conflict within one's country. This need not obscure the logical truth that, to the extent to which a person is in violent conflict with others, that person is not at peace.

Nevertheless, there is no necessary inconsistency in claiming to value peace while being willing to fight in order to protect, for example, democracy, nor is the problem apparently raised a paradox. In valuing peace one may be valuing a

peaceful society where lack of injustice makes for the absence of violent conflict. Quite consistently one may also believe it is better to relinquish some degree of peace temporarily and so go to war with the intention of preserving and strengthening that peaceful state of society. Roger Scruton argues on these lines when he writes that the peace movement ought to work,

> at whatever the risk for the overthrow of the only system which has so far succeeded in suppressing movements like itself. (Scruton in *The Guardian* newspaper, 29 March, 1983)

There are no grounds here for the accusation that Scruton deprecates peace per se; only for the claim that he evidently values one sort of peace more than another. For Scruton, war to bring about a peaceful society is preferable to the absence of war allowing the perpetuation of a society which does not value peace.

> Those who are willing that an existing peace should be disturbed, do not hate peace, but desire to change to something they judge better. (Augustine, 1963: 342)

Committed pacifists apart, many who declare in favour of peace accept the notion of the just war without any necessary inconsistency or indeed the existence of a paradox. Only those who believe with Benjamin Franklin, 'there never was a good war nor a bad peace', can properly be charged with self-contradiction if they cite peace as their justification for engaging in military conflict.

Despite the fact that belief in fighting for peace is not incoherent, it is still a troubling thought, and the simplicity of Franklin's statement is alluring. The advent of nuclear weapons has added a further dimension to the potential evils of warfare which will weigh heavy in the balance of the probable consequences of going to war. It cannot be denied that peace must count as a higher goal, but the cost of achieving it via war today may be too great.

II b)   Right Intention

Only in certain, highly specific circumstances would reasons for going to war count as just causes. Jus ad bellum requires that wars be fought: for a higher goal such as peace; to prevent enslavement of one's people; to gain an empire to benefit the governed; in self-defence; in order to punish; to achieve the restoration of goods or to convert the infidel. In Aquinas' terms the attacker must have 'recta intentio' - one of these 'proper' intentions - if his cause is to be a just one. Broadly the intention must be to avoid evil and advance good.

It is interesting to note that avoiding evil does not appear to encompass the prevention of war. None of the causes which provide right intention permits or takes account of the concept of preventive war. The injury, the sin, the state of affairs giving rise to these just causes logically precedes them, eliciting attack as a response. In the case of punishment or religious conversion, the notion of attacking to prevent the occurrence of a worse war is irrelevant. Generally just causes give grounds for going to war, for attacking first, yet they do not include the prevention of being attacked. In the past, self-defence has been viewed as fighting to defend oneself when attacked, in response to actual violence. What then are we to make of contemporary politicians' claims that pre-emptive strikes are justifiable? Does the threat or fear of attack at some point constitute a reality, an event, comparable to the first spear being cast? Augustine believed that the duty of love for the innocent victim obliged a Christian to intervene to protect the innocent. The same duty of love was due to the aggressor and limited the means used in protecting, but those limits might, it is true, include the death of the aggressor. The U. S. Bishops in *The Challenge of Peace*, explicitly cite Augustine's justification for 'lethal force to prevent aggression against innocent victims' (1983: 25), but proceed to confuse the issue as they expand on it. They write that, when faced with,

> the fact of attack on the innocent, the presumption
> that we do no harm even to our enemy, yielded to the
> command of love, understood as the need to restrain
> an enemy who would injure the innocent. (The U.
> S. Bishops, 1983: 25)

'The fact of attack' could refer to a strong conviction or the likelihood that attack is imminent, but a more straightforward reading is surely that an actual event is intended: when the innocent have been attacked it is justifiable to restrain the attackers by force. On the other hand, 'would', in 'who would injure the innocent', could well be a future conditional, as in 'if they were to attack, they would inflict injury' which implies that self-defence could be prophylactic.

I incline to the view that it is not obvious that Augustine supported preventive aggression nor that the U.S. Bishops are convinced of its justice. Appeals to self-defence may only sanction retaliatory action rather than pre-emptive strikes as is widely believed. Preventive aggression seems to be a modern concept and not legitimised as a right intention.

II c)   Legitimate authority

'Jus ad bellum' is not simply a matter of just causes and right intention. The declaration of just war has long been considered the prerogative of a legitimate authority. The 'legitimate prince' of Aquinas, who could justly engage in killing for the welfare of those entrusted to his care, has given way to the concept of the legitimately elected leader. In current Roman Catholic doctrine at least, such a leader is defined as one elected by a majority of the people (according to Dr. J. Winter of Pembroke College, Cambridge, at a CUDS seminar in 1986), but increasingly who is to count as a legitimate authority becomes uncertain.

In early medieval times, war was seen as a function of divine providence, so that in a sense legitimate authority was derived from God. Although war was designed to punish crime and sin, and providence governed the outcome, victory it seemed was not necessarily granted to the just party. This attempt to marry beliefs about just wars with the apparent realities of warfare reveals an unease echoed elsewhere in theorising. Russell notes 'Augustine's tentative recognition' (Russell, 1975: 21) that both sides in a war could have just cause and concluded that the problem would then be who had the greater justice. In retrospect, across the centuries, it is also obvious that if a ruler were a just one (in other words one who has the right to go to war) then in fact he would be likely to consider his own cause just. The enemy, almost by definition, is unjust, and so the legitimate prince is judge, jury and executioner in his own cause.

Because the prince does not engage in the killing alone, but is the author of war, his legitimate authority extends to soldiers acting on his behalf. What should a soldier do if unconvinced of the ruler's legitimacy or of the justice of his cause? Augustine was uncompromising. In refusing to kill, a soldier would be guilty of treason. It is apparently irrelevant whether or not soldiers believe in the justice of the cause for which they are to fight. They have relinquished their autonomy in this respect and their prime duty is to the prince, not to their own consciences. Substantially, one suspects for predominantly pragmatic reasons, this view is held today by those in the armed forces.

The Nuremburg trials made clear that not all actions could be justified by reference to orders from superiors in the armed forces. Obedience to a higher authority could not legitimise wrong acts, such as torture. However, this ruling only applies to conduct outside that deemed appropriate in war. It does not release soldiers from the obligation to kill in war if ordered to do so, whatever their private convictions. Killing and fighting in war is not illegitimate. Soldiers are not automatically war

criminals because they have fought for an unjust cause. The responsibility for the causa belli belongs to the legitimate authority.

II d)   War as a last resort

It might appear that once established as a legitimate authority, a ruler is allowed considerable freedom to initiate war within just war theory. However, at least as far back as Aquinas, it was believed that war should be only a last resort. While there were just magistrates who could resolve disputes, there could be no excuse for waging war. This assumption was reiterated in the Vatican II document *Gaudium et Spes*, 79:

> As long as the danger of war persists and there is no
> international authority with the necessary competence
> and power, governments cannot be denied the right
> of lawful self-defence, once all peace efforts have
> failed. (Ruston, 1981: 15)

In other words, while there remains the possibility that war can rationally be avoided and differences resolved peacefully, fighting between nations is inexcusable.

The question of jus ad bellum, then can be seen as an exploration of how to limit wars, as a restraining set of conditions to reduce the frequency of war.

> War is justifiable only if war can be limited.
> (Kenny, 1984: 16)

Behind this lies the presupposition that peace is a prima facie good and war is not.

> In traditional moral philosophy, violence itself is
> never considered a moral good; only an unjust
> situation may require violence as a necessity to
> remedy the situation in the name of justice.
> (Pottenger, 1983)

It does not follow then that war itself is always evil, only that it is believed to be a sad necessity at times to prevent evil or to bring about good.

The nature of warfare has not yet been addressed. Notions of jus ad bellum only inadequately satisfy the felt need to reconcile the evil of killing with the apparent necessity of war. It is the idea of jus in bello which focuses attention on criteria for limiting the conduct of war.

II e)   The right conduct of war - a matter of morality, not mere expediency

Much talk of warfare too easily disguises the fact that war itself necessarily involves violence and killing. The weapons employed are intended to mete out injury and death: that is what they are for. As Paskins and Dockrill (1979: 106) point out, fighting whose rules were aimed at precluding fatality would not be war. In the light of this, the whole idea that there ought to be jus in bello does seem to comprise a significant moral leap. While one might cynically argue that there were and are considerable pragmatic reasons for jus ad bellum, relating to the prevention of constant slaughter and the destruction of crops and livestock, the desire to restrain the way in which wars are waged is not so easily reduced to expediency. Jus in bello concerns the avoidance of unnecessary killing, the treatment of prisoners, the protection of non-combatants and, more recently, discriminate and proportionate means.

II e) i)   Unnecessary killing

A precursor to just war thinking, Cicero noted that war should be waged with virtue, courage, faith and honour. Consequently he advised mercy to the enemy when the end of the war was in sight. Unnecessary death was to be avoided once it was plain which way victory would go. (It must be admitted that this stricture could be waived if the enemy had themselves acted with particular barbarity. Some notion of revenge for cruelties suffered was allowed.)

How could this aspect of jus in bello have arisen if not from moral sensibility? Expediency might well play a part. In hand to hand combat the protagonists cannot help but be aware of their opponents as people, so the desire to do as you would be done by makes sense - moral perhaps, but also arguably very expedient. If you are known to torture your antagonists to death, you are surely inviting the same fate.

Is it the case that, in long distance warfare, we are similarly willing to restrict our practices to the least painful primarily in order to receive similar treatment, and that this is the source of the rules of war?

The bombing of Dresden and LeMay's saturation bombing of Tokyo, permitted by British and American governments respectively, might seem to show otherwise. 'On March 9, 1945, for example, 334 American B-29 bombers hit Tokyo in a single attack that destroyed 267,171 buildings and killed 84,000 civilians (wounding 40,000 more), while flattening 16 square miles of the city,' (Toffler & Toffler, 1993: 42).

Some people evidently were not willing to confine their attacks to legitimate targets and those deliberate attacks on civilians seem to have been perpetrated reckless of possible retaliation. However, there are other possible explanations. There may

have been an assumption that the enemy would not or could not retaliate in kind and thus pragmatically there was no reason to engage in mutual restraint - in other words we were willing to restrict our attacks only as long as retribution was possible - but the reason given, and the most likely explanation, was that the destruction of cities would break the morale of the enemy and shorten the war, thus saving many lives in the long term. (The lives taken into account were presumably those of the allies and, specifically, in the bombing of Tokyo, of American soldiers. We cannot be looking here at an intention to minimize the total number of deaths expected in the action and it must be unlikely that overall loss of life on both sides in the war, including that of Japenese civilians, was part of the equation.) This is not so much a complete rejection of expediency as a weighing of practical considerations to decide how best to bring about a morally desirable end. The quick end to the war was deemed more important than the immunity of innocents. The morality of this is still debated, but whether the decision was right or wrong, it was plainly not one born simply of fear of reprisal.

II e) ii)   The treatment of prisoners

The virtue of showing mercy to the enemy has not passed down to us in an unbroken line.

> The idea that kindly treatment of P. O. W's might be a moral imperative, having universal validity, would appear in the context of a holy war nothing short of blasphemous. For it would imply that there might be something to be said for being kind to devils.
> (Paskins & Dockrill, 1979: 203)

Nevertheless killing prisoners has long been forbidden by just war theory and international law.

It seems clear that distinctively moral considerations are raised by the traditional rules for right conduct in war. This appears to be borne out by the prohibition on

killing prisoners. It has been argued that the effect, on the opposing army, of killing prisoners is such that it enrages them, hardening their determination to win. But surely the reason it excites especial fury (beyond that experienced when one's friend is killed in a 'fair' fight), is the presumption that it is cruelly unjust. In other words, the injustice of murdering prisoners is presupposed in this reasoning.

The idea that fear of horrible consequences if one is taken prisoner might spur soldiers to greater efforts has more force. Propaganda in time of war frequently concentrates on the cruelty of the enemy, and Argentinian soldiers going to the Falklands, presumably to encourage them to fight to the death, were apparently told that the British would kill all prisoners. Nevertheless, I am still not convinced that a reluctance to engender fear in one's antagonist could fully explain the prohibition on killing prisoners. After all, extreme fear in the enemy soldiers might be very useful, leading them to desert.

Alvin and Heidi Toffler argue that in pre-industrial times prisoners were spared for practical reasons.

> Once agriculture made it possible to create food
> surpluses, however, and prisoners could generate
> more food than required to keep themselves fed, it
> became more profitable to enslave rather than to eat
> or kill them,' (Toffler & Toffler, 1993: 224).

Today, even when prisoners are set to work in the fields, as they were in England during World War II, it is not obvious that profit was the sole reason, nor that it should have been. Moral judgements are made about the building of the Burma railway, and they depend on the inhumanity with which the prisoners were treated. No longer is it widely accepted that the treatment of prisoners should be simply a matter of expediency.

When prisoners are merely held, imprisoned, far from accounting for the convention of not slaughtering those taken prisoner, practicalities suggest that

killing them would be profitable: guards would be released to get back to the battlefield, there would be a saving of resources in terms of food at least, and there would be no question of people escaping to rejoin the enemy.

In mediaeval times, valuable prisoners, hostages, were carefully looked after while the possibility of ransom remained, but again there appears to be no equal advantage now in protecting prisoners from death. Accepting the immunity of prisoners is surely accepting a moral precept.

The parameters of what was considered acceptable in war are found in the customs and practices of mediaeval knights. However they arose, by this time the rules of war amounted to a code of honour. Whether this is separable from a moral code is not obvious. Conventions pertaining to knights include strictures more appropriate to manners and etiquette, but some certainly would seem to have moral origins. What is important is that breaches of a code of honour result in disgrace. The fear of this fall from grace is nearer a religious motivation than obedience to secular law, and may well have had greater effect. Allegiance to something beyond self-interest and practical factors has been given - and this may well encompass moral sensitivity.

Just war theory seems to be an odd mixture of pragmatic and moral constraints, but jus in bello cannot be reduced to mere expediency.

II e) iii)   The protection of innocents

Killing the innocent has long been held to be wrong, yet poses several dilemmas. These revolve about the identification of the innocent. As noted above, non-combatants were not necessarily innocent in Augustine's view. When a nation was

guilty of sin, perhaps by being non-believers, then all deserved death, irrespective of their participation in the fighting.

It could be argued that we need to guarantee the immunity of civilians for the same reasons that we do not want to be always fighting - because we are dependent on the crops and livestock that they tend. Soldiers need food and there is nothing left to fight for if everyone dies of starvation. This might be the case when small agricultural communities are imagined, but long ago a civilian population might include non-combatants who contributed little either to the war effort or to the running of the state. Many aristocratic women over child-bearing age could hardly have been thought essential to the survival of the community and yet they would have been counted among the 'innocents'. Their protection therefore is surely a purely moral matter and, as such, is a principle which makes a strong contribution to the restriction of conduct in war. Indeed it constitutes one of the most important principles by which we still judge the morality of war, despite the difficuty of adhering to it in practice.

Aquinas first seems to have raised the question of immunity for non-combatants, perceiving them innocent of wrong-doing. Children, women and peasants did not seem to deserve the same fate as soldiers. However, although a soldier might fear killing an innocent person in the heat of battle, his error might not have the disastrous consequence one might suppose, for, in the middle ages it was believed that if a just man were unjustly killed he would be led to glory and to God.

When Beziers was surrendered, the crusading soldiers were troubled by the difficulty of how they could distinguish the heretic Cathars from other townsfolk. The Abbot of Citeaux, leading them, is famous for replying: 'Kill them all; God will know his own,' (Regan, 1994: 140). Is it too cynical to suggest that, while not intending to kill innocents, the actual effect of such a tenet would be minimal in

practice on the safety of non-combatants straying onto the battlefield and innocent victims of sieges?

In mediaeval times it was perhaps not too difficult to distinguish soldiers from women and peasants, but there must always have been problems. When does a child holding a weapon become a soldier? The situation is now even more confused. Who counts as a combatant? Women are certainly no longer exempt on the grounds of gender - they too can now join the armed forces. No more can we equate 'combatant' merely with a person in the thick of battle. The one launching the missile from the bunker and the general directing the attack are 'fighting' as surely as the soldier with fixed bayonet.

But so much is obvious - their trade is still soldiering. Something in the role of being a member of the armed forces (even one on cook-house duties) seems logically to carry with it the duty of killing and dying in war if fate demands it. In a sense they are fair game.

Yet it is questionable whether or not this is the case for even all those in the forces. Were all soldiers to have assumed this role both wittingly and voluntarily there could be little confusion. However, the co-opted or pressed soldier who is allowed no freedom of choice about joining up hardly seems to be in the same category. Even mercenaries may have elected to engage in war only in the limited sense of preferring to fight for money rather than to suffer inevitable starvation. They too may have been coerced, if by circumstance rather than the recruiting officer. The practicalities of the situation require that there shall be no distinction within the military. If reluctant soldiers were permitted to opt out on the grounds of conscience it would be absurd to contemplate enforced conscription. Coerced or willing, all soldiers are supposed to fulfil their duties and these may include killing or being killed. Not to fight amounts to treason. It could not be otherwise on a

practical level. In battle it would not be possible accurately to distinguish between conscripted and voluntary recruits and so no moral blame could be attributed even if it were presumed wrong to kill the unwilling soldier. Nevertheless, the moral uncertainty persists. When conscientious objection is not a real option, distinguishing between willing and unwilling combatants might be thought formally desirable, yet in practice remain an impossibility. The moral problem may be that of conscription itself, in that it must lead to 'innocents' in the forces.

The distinction between a combatant (consenting or otherwise) and an innocent is further blurred in modern warfare. Whereas killing the smith who forged the weapons may once have seemed a relatively inconsequential attempt to shorten a war, the destruction of a munition's factory and all its workers could well be significant in determining the outcome. The factory may contribute enormously to the war. Munitions workers, clearly not technically members of the military, nevertheless do seem to be contributing to the war in a way that other civilians, engaged in the manufacture of cosmetics for instance, do not.

Of course, this does not mean that that it is always impossible to distinguish non-combatants.

> People whose mere existence and activity supporting
> existence by growing crops, making clothes, etc., -
> such people are innocent. (Anscombe, 1981: 53)

There need be no doubt about small children and babies. Immunity for the innocents is not an entirely futile aim, but the uncertainties do present problems.

The treatment of prisoners and the protection of civilians demanded by jus in bello can be readily accepted as having moral force. That these restrictions on the means of waging war have at times been ignored or obeyed for predominantly pragmatic reasons does not take away their moral significance. While considerable doubt

must remain about the ethical value of some of the 'just' causes in traditional jus ad bellum, the restraints on the conduct of war embodied in the just war tradition amount to moral imperatives.

Not all the elements in the just war tradition have survived into twentieth century just war thinking. Some have been lost as religious and moral views have changed, some have been modified as the world has become international, and others seem to have been ignored as the means of fighting wars have been transformed by technology. But still, despite smart bombs, the most recent wars have involved hand to hand fighting. War still involves soldiers killing soldiers. It has not changed essentially and the desire for a just war theory remains.

III   Modern Just War Thinking

In this century, our capacity for destruction in war has increased to a degree unimaginable for those who contributed to the early just war tradition. In addition to the moral problems inherent in any war, new problems have arisen for just war thinkers. Aerial bombing has meant that the killing of civilians in war is almost commonplace and technological advances have brought us weapons of unprecedented and awesome power. Those moral dilemmas which are distinctively 'modern' are primarily those arising from the conduct of war, how we kill and whom we kill in war. Modern just war thinking focuses particularly, but not exclusively, on jus in bello.

Newly invented means of waging war have not brought with them essentially new difficulties in identifying just causes. This is not to say that jus ad bellum is now straightforward, but to emphasise that the problems are not different in kind from those experienced in earlier times. The drawing of political borders which do not conform to universally recognised national, ethnic or religious divisions may complicate people's perceptions of just causes and make the distinction between, for example, civil war and international war difficult to draw at times, but the fundamental questions are the same.

Technological advances do not change the question posed in asking when it is morally acceptable to go to war. Modern just war thinking continues to address the same issues raised by jus ad bellum and appears to reaffirm that war in self-defence, for instance, is justifiable. However, closer attention to linguistic meaning, characteristic of much twentieth century philosophy, reveals some difficulties which now need to be taken into account. Queries about what 'self-defence' might properly comprise affect whether or not wars can be legitimised on this basis.

III i)   War in self-defence

There is broad agreement that self-defence constitutes just cause, and for many now this is the only morally acceptable reason for going to war. It was noted earlier that Vatican II recognised self-defence as the only adequate reason for modern warfare (Ruston, 1981: 15). However, closer scrutiny of what might be meant by 'war in self-defence' shows that the notion is far from unproblematic. Although it is relatively easy to understand, if not agree with, a notion of some entitlement to attempt to save one's own skin as in self-defence, for a *nation* to claim the right to self-defence is to invoke a more elusive concept.

A country going to war presumably does so in the certainty that not all skins will be saved. Soldiers go to war in the belief that it is their duty to die in action if the circumstances demand it. Acceptance of war and soldiering is acceptance of dying in action in a way that acceptance of the notion of self-defence cannot be acceptance of dying in the cause of self-preservation. One might fail to defend oneself and therefore die, but it would be a contradiction in terms to claim that success in self-defence might necessitate dying.

'Warfare' implies that soldiers are not fighting merely in personal self-defence. Although, in certain situations, fighting may comprise an act of self-preservation, military engagements are part of a broader canvas. In theory at least, such conflicts consist of something more than many individuals, all engaged in fighting for their own lives. The army goes to battle on behalf of other citizens, in defence of the country or state. It is difficult to get a grip on the idea of a nation's 'self-defence' when it involves one group of people defending another. Soldiers may as a matter of fact be defending themselves in battle, but their raison d'etre is the defence of the nation. Undoubtedly, unless perhaps they are mercenaries, they will count as members of the nation, but, even when the nation is seen as a collection of individual people, the armed forces will be fighting for other people who are not in the services too. Personal self-defence alone does not encompass my risking my life to save another, but a country's going to war in self-defence necessarily involves the ultimate risk for some in order to preserve others' lives. Killing to protect others is not the same as killing in self-defence. Self-defence is an inappropriate justification for both risking death and killing in war.

Invoked as a justification for war, self-defence often seems to amount to a protection of liberty, political freedom or religious choice rather than life itself. 'Self-defence' on a national scale seems to imply the protection of a way of life

rather than the prevention of the destruction of the population. As Norman suggests,

> if ideas of territorial integrity and political sovereignty
> are to play a significant role in the moral argument we
> would have to move beyond the self-defence analogy.
> (Norman, 1995: 136).

He is surely correct when he goes on to say that the 'life of a political community' would have to be shown to have 'a value comparable to that of human life itself' (Norman, 1995: 137) before war in its defence could be morally justifiable.

The Holocaust and any attempts at 'ethnic cleansing' are, of course, terrible and notable exceptions in which the obliteration of a people has been at stake and, presumably, in the face of which, defensive fighting would be analogous to personal self-defence. Indeed, it is more than analogous; it amounts to the same thing. If any killing in self-defence is morally acceptable, war as a collective defence of a people against genocide must be.

However, when 'self-defence' is offered as a justification for wars that are not waged in literal self-defence, clearly it is inadequate.

III ii)   War to defend a third party

> Modern versions of just war theory tend towards the
> position that the only just war is a war of defence
> against aggression. From that point of view, wars of
> intervention cannot be morally justified. (Norman
> reported in *Philosophy Today*, 1997: No. 24)

Nevertheless, it is often supposed that there may be exceptions, and recent events in the Persian Gulf, Bosnia and elsewhere, have vividly brought this dilemma to

public attention. Going to war to protect others from genocide must seem legitimate.

The claim that this is wrong, and that wars of intervention are unjust, rests on what Norman regards as 'an untenable notion of national sovereignty'.

> It rests on an analogy between the rights of individuals and the rights of states, and on the claim that states are morally entitled to defend their rights to territorial integrity and political sovereignity in the same way that individuals are entitled to defend their rights to life and liberty. (Norman, 1997, ibid.)

In other words, because states do not have the same rights to life and liberty as individuals, it cannot be maintained that,

> wars of intervention are in principle unjustifiable by comparison with wars of defence. (Norman, 1997, ibid.)

It is not clear therefore that modern just war thinking could convincingly rule out all wars fought to protect others.

However, if going to war requires justification on par with that assumed for self-defence, further problems are apparent.

Waging war to defend another country is not a relatively simple case of personal self-defence, nor even that of fighting to prevent the obliteration of one's own people. There is no sense in which the army is responsible for the situation which might make the cause just. The soldiers are not defending their own country and they will not benefit in any direct way from the good effect they may bring about. While they could be described as fighting for a better world, this must seem a very distant goal, especially as their own world is not immediately (nor even perhaps foreseeably) threatened. Why should these soldiers risk death?

When war is waged to prevent deaths, it is apparent that we are facing a choice between lives, but whereas the notion of killing in self-defence can present the choice of kill or be killed, the situation is rather different in the context of war in order to save others' lives. Those who may be among the casualties are also those attacking to save the third party (the potential victims of genocide perhaps). The army fighting to save the victims has the choice between, 'fight and kill, risking death' or 'do nothing: save no lives and do not risk death'. This is not the forced choice of the person contemplating killing another in self-defence, where not to act is to surrender one's own life.

Ought we to send people to certain death, effectively to kill them, in order to ensure that other people live? It is the job of soldiers to lay down their lives in a just war, one might say, and they may have voluntarily agreed to fight for their own people, but, when the war is to save a foreign population from genocide, it does seem to give preferential treatment to all but them. The lives of the potential victims of genocide are implicitly valued more than the lives of those who will fight.

It may be the duty of soldiers to fight in a good cause to which their government is committed, even when this is to protect those who are not their own people, but it is not equally evident that civilians, ignorant perhaps of the situation, could have a similar obligation. In modern times, waging war on foreign soil does not exclude all risk to civilians at home. Bombs and missiles can be used at long range. It is difficult to see how the lives of one set of non-combatants could ever morally be given preference over the lives of another group of civilians.

These, of course, are not new problems, but they complicate the identification of just causes and begin to suggest that just war theory, modern or traditional, cannot easily legitimise going to war for even those reasons widely accepted today.

III iii)   Weapons

Modern just war thinking is more often thought of as characteristically concerned with jus in bello and the moral problems arising from the effects of the weapons we now have at our disposal.

Jus in bello was to limit the conduct of war. Morally, it was not accepted that 'anything goes' and today people feel the same. Over the ages there may always have existed an odd tension between producing more and more effective killing machines and the desire to kill only in some ways and not in others. In this century this has become a matter of immense public concern. War has reached unparalleled levels of mass destruction. Furthermore, some of the weapons available to bring about this destruction are significantly different in kind:

> some of our legislators still seem to think that a nuclear explosion is just a very much bigger bang, but not really different in kind from that of TNT. Hence the irrelevant arguments that more people died in Dresden than in Hiroshima, or that the 'innocent' have always suffered in war. The issue is not simply that horrific numbers are killed, but the nature of the forces by which they are killed, and the effects of releasing these forces into the environment. (The Bishop of Salisbury, 1984: 15)

Moral problems are posed by both the scale and nature of the destruction modern weaponry has the capacity for.

International law now includes prohibitions on certain types of weapon, because they are believed to be beyond justification. Presumably, until relatively recently, no one type of weapon appeared so much worse than another that its use was seen as unjust in the just war tradition. Be that as it may, on 17 June 1925, thirty eight nations signed the Geneva Protocol, under the auspices of the League of Nations, and in the late 1950s many Western Nations renounced chemical warfare altogether.

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> The United States finally stated that it was
> terminating all its chemical (and biological) warfare
> research, testing and production in November 1969.
> (Gander, 1987: 123).

This must be reassuring and morally praiseworthy, but there is something extraordinary about the fact that we can be willing, even eager to kill people, yet mind how we do it. Some deaths undoubtedly involve more suffering than others. I do feel strongly that to die from napalm is worse than from an arrow or being shot. (How far this is due to a romanticised notion peddled by the cinema I'm not sure. Being shot in the stomach presumably is to experience dying in excruciating pain and yet this is an accepted risk of war.) Efficiency might demand that soldiers do not pause to torture their enemies to death, but I suspect that napalm is no less 'efficient' than throwing a spear - indeed in terms of the certainty with which it kills and terrifies, the number of people incapacitated and the relatively small effort needed to launch it, it must be far more efficient. I cannot think of a sheerly practical reason why napalm should be internationally forbidden, and this does seem to epitomise an appropriate moral abhorrence of a particular form of warfare.

The banning of other forms of war, such as chemical and biological warfare, is not so evidently the reflection of exclusively ethical sensitivity. While they are seen to be unjust in that they threaten civilian populations, they can also be dangerous to more than the enemy. A less that pure note of self-preservation sounds. However, concern for the health of future generations is not reducible to mere expediency or self interest, even if the anxiety is predominantly for one's own country. There is also moral concern. Together with chemical and biological weapons, nuclear arms are capable of causing long term damage to the environment, and have the potential to affect far more than could be described as a limited military target. The deployment of nuclear weapons is still debated and the arguments do revolve about moral issues.

This all seems to suggest a widespread belief that the fact of death is not the worst thing a soldier faces. Some ways of dying are more abhorrent. Killing may not be the greatest evil of war. Moral sensitivity extends to the ways in which we mete out death and takes account of who will suffer. Modern just war thinking highlights these concerns.

III iv)   The immunity of non-combatants

Modern warfare is highly dependent on the production of arms. Apparently the United States during the Second World War not only sent 15 million men to war, but mass-manufactured nearly 6 million rifles and machine guns, over 300,000 planes, 100,000 tanks and armoured vehicles, 71,000 naval vessels and 41 billion rounds of ammunition (Toffler & Toffler, 1993: 40). Presumably this is why attacks often seem to centre on the destruction of factories and sites rather than on the opposing soldiers. Destroying either the source of the arms or the silos in which they are deployed inevitably seems to involve killing civilians. Given the secrecy surrounding the locations of such places and the apparent inaccuracy with which bombs are delivered, a larger bomb than is needed to destroy the plant is likely to be used to ensure success. Thus not only those working to manufacture or to maintain the weapons are at risk, but also other citizens in the vicinity. And yet,

> The principal wickedness which is a temptation to those engaged in warfare is the killing of the innocent. (Anscombe, 1981: 53)

This then raises an issue central to twentieth century just war thinking. If, in some cases, it is impossible for practical purposes (and war is nothing if not an essentially practical matter) to distinguish usefully between those actively engaged in war and others, how then to limit the destruction and keep the violence judged necessary to a morally acceptable level? That there is a desperate need for some

limitation is undeniable in the face of some statistics: since 1945 an estimated 7,200,000 soldiers have been killed in wars, but when civilian casualties are included the total deaths rises to between 33 and 44 million (Toffler & Toffler, 1993: 13).

Two principles have emerged in recent theory in response to the new problems raised by the nature of modern warfare, since the advent of aerial bombing: discrimination and proportionality. Both these principles have their origins in the just war tradition. The 'discrimination' intended is that between innocents and others, and the idea that the war should not result in disproportionate evils was embodied in Fransisco de Vitoria's canons of warfare, when he adds that people must not be sacrificed unnecessarily, (Ruston, 1981: 15).

III v)   Discrimination

An act of war is described as 'indiscriminate' in so far as its intention is to kill non-combatants. On this account, a weapon cannot be intrinsically indiscriminate. Whether or not the principle of discrimination is adhered to rests on the *intention* behind a weapon's use and not, as one might have assumed, on its effects. Perhaps indiscriminateness is most easily perceived as being at one end of a continuum stretching from accidental to intentional: at the one extreme is the arrow aimed at a military target but which, caught by the wind, lays low the farmer, and, at the other is the missile purposefully directed at the farming community.

It is not the scale of the weapon's destructive capacity which distinguishes it as indiscriminate, but the intention underlying its use. Were there weapons whose only conceivable purpose was to kill civilians, then these would be intrinsically

indiscriminate, but it is impossible to imagine what these could ever comprise. When weapons are designed to kill people, they can be used to destroy armies since armies are composed of people. Large scale weapons may, as a matter of fact, prove fatal for non-combatants, but this contingency is irrelevant to the principle of discrimination. A weapon itself cannot be indiscriminate, only its use can be properly so described.

The most obvious examples of the indiscriminate use of weapons are those cases where missiles capable of destroying whole cities are deployed as a threat. The force of the threat is precisely that the warheads, if used, will kill non-combatants even if aimed at military installations or personnel. Thus, on the grounds of indiscrimination, the particular use of such deterrent weapons is deemed morally abhorrent, but it is not the case that all arms whose use is likely to involve non-military casualties are indiscriminate in themselves. Prudence may demand that we refrain from using biological and chemical weapons because of their probable consequences, but such action need not always be 'indiscriminate'. Far-fetched as it might seem, biological weapons could be launched against a population, all of whom would count as combatants (perhaps all the children are dead and only a desperate band of soldiers survives in the middle of a windless desert safely far away from any other human life), and thus would not be indiscriminate.

Such weapons would however be ruled out if proportionality were invoked.

III vi) Proportionality

Proportionality is seen in terms of the balance of means against ends (always given that the ends in view are justifiable). Paskins and Dockrill (1979) imply that

proportionate force is that force which is the minimum necessary to achieve the goal.

Some weapons or systems of weapons must be disproportionate to any end whatsoever, and thus are intrinsically disproportionate. Any which have the capacity to destroy the entire population of the world would fall into this category. Weapons which have radically unpredictable consequences must also necessarily be disproportionate, for notions of proportionality must prohibit knowingly invoking the unpredictable.

VII vii)   Nuclear weapons

Acts of war involving the use of arms can be both indiscriminate and disproportionate as when a nuclear warhead is used with the intention of killing all and sundry within a huge area. However, while nuclear arms will always be disproportionate due to their long-term, unpredictable effects, their use will not invariably be indiscriminate - the intention behind their use may be the destruction of an exclusively military target. Similarly a weapon could be used as a threat against a whole population and thus indiscriminately, yet be the minimum force judged necessary to achieve a particular goal, so not disproportionate.

Nuclear warfare, it would seem, can never be justified in just war thinking. The use of nuclear weapons would inevitably be disproportionate. Equally, to threaten reprisal in the form of a nuclear attack is unjustifiable, since the deterrent effect is dependent upon the intention of indiscriminate destruction.

> It is only because these weapons are so horrible that
> the threat of using them has any plausibility as a
> means of preventing war. (The Bishop of Salisbury,
> 1984: 17)

If the two principles, discrimination and proportionality, are accepted as necessary to jus in bello, then one is inexorably drawn to the conclusion that at least,

> Nuclear deterrence is the (conditional) intention to wage disproportionate and indiscriminate war; nuclear deterrence is therefore straightforwardly and unequivocally wrong. (Paskins & Dockrill, 1979: 2)

The advent of nuclear weapons has brought the need to confront new problems, not just larger in scale but different in kind. Total war used to mean war waged with virtually no restraint, war aimed at civilians as well as military targets and it was consequently deplored, but we now face situations where it may be impossible to employ modern weaponry without in effect pursuing total war. Nuclear weapons, held in the quantity we are now used to, could annihilate all human life, irrespective not only of people's civilian status within a country at war, but irrespective of whether their country is at war at all. Further, as they are understood at present, even if these weapons were not employed to destroy everyone, the effect of their use on future generations is likely to be injurious. So we have now a situation in which innocents are inevitably at risk from certain acts of war.

It is difficult to imagine how much modern warfare can be justified at all. Ruston notes that the teaching of the Catholic Church now recognises:

> that many causes which may have justified war in the past can now no longer do so because of the far greater destructive power of modern war to combatants and civilians alike. The fact that war has now become an affair engulfing whole peoples - not merely rulers and their professional armies and those unfortunate citizens who happened to be in the way, as in the past - has led not to the abandonment of the principles of discrimination and proportionality, but to their renewed emphasis. The rethinking required is not with a view to explaining how the innocent may nowadays be legitimately killed. It is, on the contrary with a view to explaining how most modern warfare - especially that which uses weapons of mass destruction - would violate the most fundamental values of humanity which have always

underlain the Christian teaching on the Just War.
(Ruston, 1981: 17)

That reconciliation, of Christian precepts and war, sought in the just war tradition seems increasingly elusive. I agree with Walzer that 'nuclear war is and will remain morally unacceptable' (Walzer, 1977: 283). However, we need not leap to the conclusion that all war is wrong in every conceivable circumstance. Although we evidently have the capacity now to engage in warfare which seems to lack all moral justification, the actual practice of war still includes combat which is closer in concept to hand-to-hand fighting than to nuclear war. Soldiers still perish from bullets fired by other soldiers and civilians are still killed in circumstances that do not amount to total war. Modern just war thinking rightly introduces concerns with wholesale destruction, but this does not make redundant those considerations which are central to just war theory. Contemplation of the horrors of nuclear weapons should not obscure anxiety over the immunity of innocents in theatres of war which are less sophisticated, but where their destruction seems none the less unavoidable.

The protection of civilians continues to be basic to just war theory although the practice of war rarely seems to reflect this moral sensitivity.

> The policy of attacking the civilian population in order to induce the enemy to surrender, or to damage his morale, seems to have been widely accepted in the civilized world, and seems to be accepted still, at least if the stakes are high enough. It gives evidence of the moral conviction that the deliberate killing of non-combatants - women, children, old people - is permissible if enough can be gained from it. (Nagel, 1979: 59)

It might appear that a distinction can be drawn between the direct attack on a civilian population and attacks on military targets which nevertheless inevitably bring about the deaths of innocents. The possibility of such a distinction, which could be morally significant, suggests that the Principle of Double Effect could be applied in the attempt to legitimise some warfare which kills civilians.

IV The Principle of Double Effect

Faced with a prima facie evil, sometimes justification seems possible if it can be shown to be a necessary evil, necessary that is to some higher end. One way of addressing this is via the Principle of Double Effect.

Central to the Principle is that actions can have, not only the intended effect, but two sets of consequences, and that a distinction can be drawn between that which is intended and that which is foreseen but unintended - a side-effect. The example most commonly cited in explanation is that of the doctor who gives a pain-killing drug to alleviate a patient's agony, in the knowledge that this same drug will contribute to and hasten death. As Mackie (1977: 161) points out, this can be distinguished from administering a drug to kill the patient and *thereby* bring an end to suffering. If the pain-killing injection is given *because* it will hasten death, then the intention has been to terminate a life (Norman, 1995: 87). Whereas intentionally to bring about death in this context may be wrong, application of the Principle of Double Effect opens the possibility that while the intention is to do good and reduce pain, the side-effect, even though inevitable, would not constitute the same evil.

A second familiar example is that in which the chemotherapy prescribed to save life is known to cause hair-loss. The act of giving the chemotherapy has the intended consequence of saving life and the foreseen, but unintended, side-effect of causing hair loss.

The purpose of the principle is to provide a criterion against which to judge the permissibility of an act which, if intentionally performed, would be counted a wrong doing.

There is no suggestion that we are not responsible for such unintentional consequences or that they do not matter, only that they do not comprise a breach of an absolute prohibition, in this instance against homicide. In war, when 'innocent' civilians are killed in a bombing raid on a railway line perhaps, there is no suggestion that those who ordered the raid are not responsible nor that the death of the civilians is necessarily permissible purely in virtue of being 'incidental'. It might or might not be judged acceptable against various criteria - in this case perhaps the criterion of proportionality. If the consequence of the action were loss of life, disproportionate to the potential good achievable by the obliteration of the military target, then the bombing could not be permissible even to those espousing Double Effect. So, an action is not removed from the sphere of moral justification because its bad consequences are unintended, but some effects, which would otherwise be deemed reprehensible, may be morally tolerable in virtue of being unintended.

Acts of war frequently seem to encompass effects beyond the primary aim. To investigate whether or not these comprise morally permissible acts, consideration of the conditions of Double Effect and their application to war seems useful.

(The conditions below are a paraphrase of those given in the New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1967: 1020 - 2, cited by Uniacke, 1994: 99)

IV a)   The moral status of the act

> *The act itself must be morally good or at least indifferent.*

The act under scrutiny is not of course the killing of civilians; this is the side effect. The act in question could be described as the military action which carries with it the deaths of innocents - warfare itself. If non-combatant fatalities are to be justified by

Double Effect, the warfare of which these are consequences must have the required moral status.

IV a) i)   War is a prima facie evil

Neither going to war nor waging war, per se, appears a likely candidate for a morally good act or a morally indifferent one demanded by the first condition of Double Effect. Just War theory arose, in part at least, precisely because acts of war are seen as, prima facie, moral ills and thus requiring justification in the form of both jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The central problem of war is that it involves killing and injuring human beings. Although a person might be a fighting soldier and survive without ever killing or hurting another, war cannot be imagined without any reference to death and injury. This is not merely a contingent matter - killing is part of what is meant by 'war'. No amount of sanitised language about forces being depleted, units destroyed, attacks made or targets bombed can disguise the fact that fundamentally people's lives are at stake. The killing in war is more than extraordinarily probable - it is exactly what war is about. Is it possible to have war (in a non-metaphorical sense) without killing? Perhaps the odd battle, but if none were ever killed on any battlefield then, whatever the enterprise, it would not be war.

Insofar as it involves, or rather actually *is* killing, war is hardly 'indifferent' and indeed must be an evil. War is a very different proposition from self-defence. Self-preservation in itself, is generally held to be a legitimate aim, morally indifferent or even a moral good. For some it amounts to an obligation: we do not merely have the right to preserve our own lives; we ought to do so whenever possible. But no such moral duty to engage in military conflict for its own sake seems remotely credible. Waging war requires justification. Already we are once removed, as it were, from a moral obligation. War itself cannot be morally neutral or a moral good, it is a prima facie evil.

IV a) ii)   War in a just cause

However, suppose that the reason for engaging in military conflict is to achieve peace or to prevent the enslavement of the people, and that other relevant factors have been taken into account. In other words, it is a justified war that is under scrutiny. By definition now the moral status of the act is good. But this looks very like a tautology - which of course it is. A 'just war' means a morally acceptable war and if it is morally acceptable, why is it necessary to seek further justification? It is needed because such a tautology amounts to no more than an assertion that certain causes are just.

It might be argued that, if war (in virtue of being a just war) were to be given the same ethical status as self-preservation, Double Effect could be invoked to justify killing in war in the same way that it could make permissible killing in personal self-defence. We can conceptually separate a war from the waging of that war. A just war might be one having just cause, and the killing occurs in pursuit of that just cause. But we are not comparing like with like. War still is not directly comparable with self-defence. The 'act' in question with regard to its moral status now is not war itself; it is the end, the result intended, which provides the *reason for going to war*. Thus the end in view, preventing enslavement for example, is comparable with self-defence and not war, the step taken to achieve this end. Killing in both cases could comprise the necessary means by which the end is to be achieved. The problem set out in this way is not how to justify killing in war, as if war and killing were separable. It is whether or not wars (particular instances of killing) can be justified in order to achieve morally good ends. It is the moral status of these ends that is in question when this condition is under consideration.

In laying down criteria for jus ad bellum, just war theory already takes account of this. The first condition adds little to our understanding of these just causes, but it

could be said to underline the just war theory's demand that war should only be undertaken in pursuit of a higher end.

IV a) iii)   The moral status of acts of war

So far the discussion of this first condition has focussed on war itself rather than on the different acts of killing that might be perpetrated in waging war. Double Effect is more appropriately invoked with regard to these acts of war. Acts of war which might count as morally indifferent or good could be the bombing of military installations and depleting the enemy forces, for, if war is ever justifable, these would be a necessary and permissible part of warfare.

So the first condition may be applicable to some acts of war and, if the other conditions can be satisfied, Double Effect could be important in establishing the moral legitimacy of actions which, because they cause the deaths of civilians, seem to be ruled out by just war theory.

IV b)   Intention and the bad effect

> *The agent may not positively will the bad effect but may permit it. If he could attain the good effect without the bad effect he should do so. The bad effect is sometimes said to be indirectly voluntary.*

The second condition concerns the prohibition on willing the bad effect. The bad effect of an action might be a side-effect or an unavoidable concomitant. It presupposes that one can be sure that something will happen as a result of an action, yet not intend it. The killing of innocents could never be properly described as 'unintentional' if it is essential as part of the aim of an act or to the means of its achievement.

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IV b) i)   Intentions and side-effects

The death of civilians might well be foreseeable, yet plainly not the intended the goal. In no sense are the deaths of civilians a means of bringing about the destruction of an airfield for example. Double Effect might permit the bombing of the airbase even although non-military personnel are known to be there.

Yet this does seem difficult to accept. Knowing something should surely be one of the factors taken into account when forming an intention, and one among those reflected upon in deciding the rightness of the intention.

If the presence of innocents could not have been predicted, then their deaths would be accidental. If, on the other hand, pilots, did not know civilians would die, but the knowledge were available, then whether or not they were deemed morally culpable for the accident would depend in part on whether their ignorance were due to some negligence. In other words, if the pilots could not possibly have known, then they would be less guilty than if, with a modicum of effort, they could have found out, and this seems reasonable.

In contrast, Double Effect would apparently permit us wittingly to allow the deaths of civilians. The knowledge that innocents will die does not necessarily make the pilot more guilty. Provided the intention is to demolish a legitimate military target, realising that civilians will die does not make the bombing inevitably unacceptable. Double Effect thus runs counter to much ordinary moral reasoning and seems of dubious value.

The use of aerial bombing as a weapon of war has brought us face to face with a new problem. Often we cannot deny the knowledge that civilians will die, and yet

to many bombing raids seem an appropriate way to wage war and morally distinct from the deliberate attacks on civilian targets. Double Effect may provide the criteria by which we can distinguish one from the other, but there must be doubt over the plausibility of this being morally significant in relation to such bombing.

Presumably cases where the side-effects are probable, but uncertain, can be justified in a variety of ways. However, the Principle of Double Effect is particularly intended to apply to those where they are certain or concomitant, and less easily shown to be morally acceptable. It requires a distinction to be drawn between intended and unintended, albeit certain, effects.

This distinction can be difficult to uphold in some instances. The intention to save life by chemotherapy is clearly not the same as the intention to cause hair loss. This predictable result of chemotherapy is not identifiable with the means by which life is saved nor is it essential to saving life. It is a side-effect and unintended.

It is, however, less obvious that the deaths of civilians, when the airfield is bombed, fall into the same category. If they are known to be there, it is difficult to intend bombing the buildings without intending to bomb the people. In acts of war, when the amount of force employed makes the death of innocents certain, to speak of the killing as 'unintentional' and 'a side-effect' is surely inexcusable hair-splitting.

IV b) ii)   Permission and consent

It might be thought that one salient difference between paradigm cases of side-effects in Double Effect and the side-effect which comprises the killing of non-combatants revolves about the notion of consent. (I am indebted to Graham

Haydon for raising this possibility.) It may be pointed out that the patient who will suffer hair loss can consent to or refuse the treatment. Even when the sufferer is in no state to consent, as could be the case for a dying woman needing the relief of morphine which will also hasten death, consent may be given by relatives acting in her interests and on her behalf. In permitting the bad effect, the doctor administering the drug may depend on the patient's consent.

No similar concern for consent seems to be taken into account for the civilians who will die in the bombing raid. While they conceivably might agree to lay down their lives in this way, any right they may have to consent or refuse is ignored or overridden. This then would appear to provide a reason why Double Effect should not be invoked to justify the foreseeable killing of innocents.

However, closer scrutiny makes it obvious that the cases are not parallel. The patient whose consent ought to be sought is not comparable to the civilians. The civilian deaths actually constitute the side-effect, equating to the hair loss. The pilot who drops the bomb, like the doctor, requires consent, but it is the author of the bombing who is in the position of the patient in this respect, and it is precisely whether or not that authority would be right to give consent to the bombing which is at stake in asking if the consequent loss of life is permissible.

This said, the issue of whether or not permission might involve consent with regard to side-effects, does draw attention to what exactly would be permitted. In the paradigm cases, patients' consent may be sought about matters which primarily affect those people - their hair loss or the time of their own death. Those who sanction bombing raids are not so intimately involved in the side-effect. They are consenting to the deaths of others, not to their own. The intuition that this is an important distinction may not be pertinent to this condition, but it is not irrelevant

to the application of the Principle of Double Effect. The moral weight of innocent

lives will be further considered in reflection on the fourth condition below.

IV b) iii)   Incidental effects

A major difficulty in addressing 'unintended' but foreseen bad effects is that a side-

effect may be very closely related to the action and yet incompatible with (so not

related to) the good effect. Saving a nation by acts which necessarily involve

killing some citizens may be better compared with examples other than the paradigm

cases. The deaths of civilians in bomb attacks should perhaps be described as

'incidental' rather than as 'side-effects'.

Uniacke (1994: 102 ff.) claims that the terms 'side-effects' and 'unavoidable

concomitants' are too restrictive in their compass and wants to extend the range to

include effects more directly related to the action taken. She cites two difficult cases

which would seem at first glance permissible, but which Double Effect would

appear to exclude. The first is that of the surgeon who, in a desperate attempt to

save a life, performs an operation in the knowledge that it will probably kill the

patient. The patient dies. The death of the patient is entirely incompatible with the

aim of the surgery, completely unintended, and yet cannot be properly described as

an unavoidable concomitant or a side-effect. The patient's death may have been

probable, but it is not certain and yet it is a direct consequence of the operation.

The other example cited is that of the mother who throws her child out of a burning

building to save its life, while realising that the fall may kill it. Again the outcome

of this action is not *indirectly* connected to the intention or to the means by which it

is to be achieved, but is a direct consequence of the purposive action taken. In both

cases, the action taken could either kill or save (whereas hair loss would be a certain

consequence of chemotherapy, but would not endanger the aim of saving life). Uniacke therefore feels that the terms 'side-effects' and 'concomitants' are too limiting and cannot properly be thought to cover these two difficult cases. She therefore proposes 'incidental' as a more useful notion. Throwing the child from the window is the means employed to save life, and the consequent death of the child cannot be adequately described as a side-effect of this although it is incidental to the desired end.

Uniacke seems to be claiming that there is an obvious difference, but not necessarily a morally significant one, between the attempt to save life that carries with it, alongside, a non-life-threatening ill effect and those attempts which of themselves comprise either saving life or causing death. This may well be correct and in some cases the brute risking of 'either/or' (incidental) may be morally permissible, just as the 'along with' (side-effect or concomitant) is perceived to be. Perhaps it is morally admissible, when no other solution is available, to risk killing the innocent while there is the faintest chance that the action will not kill, but save the life in question. The destruction of a military headquarters where people are being tortured and executed might fall into this category.

When an action comprises an attempt to save life which itself carries a risk to life, it surely can be morally justifiable as Uniacke maintains. An attack on a military establishment, where non-combatant prisoners are being tortured and killed, may be comparable with dropping the child from the burning building, in the faint hope that it will survive. However, it is important to emphasise that this is not analogous to giving a drug which alleviates pain, but also hastens death, any more than it is analogous to chemotherapy which causes hair loss. The pain-relieving medicine does not constitute a *risk*. It will certainly kill and cannot save life: it is not the either/or solution of the mother's desperate act or the surgeon's life-threatening operation.

If deaths, in those cases where killing is risked in the hope of saving life, are best described as 'incidental', then so be it, but there seems to be no need to stretch the conditions of Double Effect to embrace such examples. Exactly that lack of certainty with regard to the outcome suggests that applying the Principle of Double Effect is unnecessary and irrelevant. Such cases can be judged according to other criteria: the moral conviction of the need to do something in order to achieve the desired end, the lack of alternatives and the probability of outcome weighed against the imminence of death if no action is taken. To risk 'incidental' killing must on occasion be justifiable as a last resort, but falls outside the compass of the doctrine.

IV b) iv)   Unnecessary bad effects

The further caveat included in this second condition concerns necessity. The idea of necessity comes into force with, *'If he could attain the good effect without the bad effect he should do so.'* An agent must not inflict unnecessary harm.

This would demand not only that war should be a last resort, but also that the killing of civilians could never be justified if the war could be pursued without it. Unnecessary war is already ruled out by just war theory, and it appears that the second condition of Double Effect does not add usefully to this in terms of justification.

It does however raise the question of whether or not bombs which will inevitably kill innocents can ever be justified. After all, we have choice with regard to the weapons we use. Civilians will always be at risk in war, but it must be preferable that the risk is confined to accidents, rather than extended to include unintentional, but foreseen effects of military action.

IV c) Means and Effects

The good effect must flow from the action at least as immediately (in the order of causality, though not necessarily in order of time) as the bad effect. In other words the good effect must be produced directly by the action, not by the bad effect.
Otherwise the agent would be using a bad means to a good end, which is never allowed.

IV c) i) Using a bad means to a good end

The third condition demands that the intended end be a result of the act and not of the bad effect. A case such as the bombing of Dresden would be prohibited, since the claimed good effect, shortening the war, was to be achieved by the bad effect, the destruction of a city. The slaughter of civilians was to be the breaking of morale which would bring about a more rapid conclusion to the war. If this is an accurate account of the fire bombing of Dresden, then Britain was *'using a bad means to a good end, which is never allowed.'* As Anscombe unequivocally maintains, it is murderous to attack the innocent,

> For murder is the deliberate killing of the innocent, whether for its own sake or as a means to a further end. (Anscombe, 1981: 53)

The Principle of Double Effect firmly prohibits the killing of innocents in order to achieve victory. This same condition could also preclude the use of a threat to civilians in order to ward off attack. As suggested earlier, the force of nuclear deterrence is that it is a threat to obliterate whole populations and not just armies and military objectives. The good effect of the threat, the prevention of war, is expected to be a direct consequence of threatening a people irrespective of their military status. If this is so, the belief that nuclear deterrence is inadmissible in modern just war thinking is upheld by Double Effect reasoning.

The death of innocents, a bad effect, is obviously not always the means employed to achieve the end in view. Wars, in theory at least, can be won or lost without civilian casualties. Conventionally, the killing of non-combatants has been seen as a tragic effect of war, not the justifiable means by which military goals were won.

It might be thought that when a war is brought to a conclusion as a consequence of civilian losses, provided that the killing of those non-combatants was not used as the means to bring about that result, such losses would be permissible. Sometimes a result can be brought about through actions, although those same actions were not done *in order to* bring about that result. Uniacke (1994: 102) cites becoming physically fit by means of doing manual work, even though the work is done solely to earn extra money. A comparable example might be the situation in which military headquarters are bombed solely to stop the torture there, but, since this involves destroying a large part of the city, it proves to be an act decisive in ending the war. In other words, the deaths of innocents, prisoners and citizens, might achieve the good effect, without having been the intended means. However,the good effect would have been produced directly by the bad effect, and this would again amount to having used a bad means to a good end.

IV c) ii)   Unified acts

The third condition presupposes a distinction between the action (the means) and the bad effect, but, as we have seen, such a distinction can appear impossible when certain acts of war are contemplated. The use of lethal force is surely perilously close to, if not identical with, killing.

> Where the necessary degree of force is foreseen as lethal, the act on which the good effect supervenes is too close to a description of the bad effect (killing the person) not to *be* the so-called bad effect. (Uniacke, 1994: 121)

If the size of bomb deemed necessary is such that civilians will certainly be killed,

the dropping of that bomb must constitute what Grisez calls a 'unified act' (Grisez,

1975: 92). In some instances we cannot choose to wage war without choosing to

engage in killing non-combatants any more than, we can choose to light a match, in

what we know to be a gas filled room, without choosing to blow ourselves up (c.f.

Uniacke, 1994: 115). When acts of war and killing civilians are not divisible, the

third condition of Double Effect cannot be satisfied.

IV d)   Proportionality

> *The good effect must be sufficiently desirable to*
> *compensate for the allowing of the bad effect. In*
> *forming this decision many factors must be weighed*
> *and compared, with care and prudence proportionate*
> *to the importance of the case. Thus, an effect that*
> *benefits or harms society generally has more weight*
> *than one which affects only the individual, and an*
> *effect sure to occur deserves greater consideration*
> *than one that is only probable; an effect of a moral*
> *nature has greater importance than one that deals only*
> *with material things.*

IV d) i)   'Sufficiently desirable'

It is not clear, from *'The good effect must be sufficiently desirable to compensate*

for the allowing of the bad effect', whether the good effect must outweigh the bad

or merely not be outweighed by it.

When it is plain that the result of an act of war brings a greater good, outweighing

any bad side-effects, the military action seems morally justifiable. There can be

little question that a relatively small number of injuries is preferable to genocide,

just as bruising an intending-murderer must be the preferred option to the death of

the potential victim. Similarly, a few civilian deaths might be considered morally

preferable to the killing of many. However, even if this is the case, it is not obvious that acts of war should be permissible where the consequent loss of life to civilians is judged to be merely comparable in order of magnitude.

It is possible to imagine a scenario where war is waged to save a group of people from certain death, to prevent genocide perhaps, and that the war will involve the deaths of a similar number of civilians. (Let us for the moment also imagine that all the other factors, such as ensuring the future safety of a state, implicit in such a situation and which would need to be weighed, are non-existent. This is a matter where only the number of deaths is under consideration.) Such a war is not self-evidently wrong, but it does seem a further step is needed before that war can be thought morally desirable. Allowing that an action is not necessarily wrong is not the same as believing that it is morally right and ought to be performed.

While it might be conceded that the loss of a few to save many is better than the loss of many to save a few, killing one set of people in war to prevent the slaughter of another group seems to be a mere trading of lives and not automatically acceptable. Unless blatantly preferential treatment is to be given to one group of innocents over another, the problem remains intransigent if only comparability is allowed to be _ 'sufficiently desirable'. Instead, the phrase must surely suggest 'outweigh' if it is to make the bad effect permissible.

The Principle of Double Effect does emphasise the need to take into account other factors such as precedent, the particular evil of wiping out a whole people and culture perhaps, or even the need, some might say, for an expression of moral outrage. Proportionality in war involving loss of life seems to demand particular attention to other factors and it is plain that material benefits are never as important as 'effects of a moral nature'. Nevertheless, there is something odd in this context

about the notion that an action could be justified by an equal, balancing amount of good.

When lives are in question, the bad effects surely cancel out most imaginable goods, such that there is likely to be no good effect to provide justification. This must amount to the need for the good to outweigh the bad.

VI d) ii) The moral weighting to be given to the lives of innocents

Dying to save life can be morally acceptable or even laudable, but it does appear that choosing to die in a good cause is very different from being coerced into doing so. It is the job of soldiers to lay down their lives in a just war, one might say, and they may have voluntarily chosen this as their duty. Some civilians too, in a democracy, may be committed to the war and have effectively chosen to risk their lives in a good cause, but it is surely not uncommon for non-combatants at least to be unwitting and involuntary victims of war. Just war thinking assumes that there is a moral distinction between killing civilians and killing soldiers and there is no reason to suppose that Double Effect overrides this. The Principle of Double Effect requires that relevant factors should be taken into account, 'with care and prudence'. The lack of moral obligation and choice for many, if not all, civilians should be weighed too, since the deaths of innocents would constitute a greater evil than the deaths of people freely committed to war. When calculating whether or not the good effect is sufficiently desirable to allow the bad effect, it is important to recognise the particular moral weight attached to the lives of innocents.

Although the Principle of Double Effect can be seen as unsatisfactory in many respects, especially when applied to acts of war, scrutiny of the conditions has raised some issues which might otherwise have passed unquestioned, and has shown that the principle is no crude version of ends justifying means. It certainly does not offer a carte blanche for all destruction believed necessary to achieve good ends.

The attraction of Double Effect is that it addresses the problem of when one should pursue a right action even when it is obvious that this will involve harm. The principle appears at first glance highly relevant to war, insofar as it might be assumed to give legitimacy to the unavoidable killing of civilians and thus supplement just war thinking. However, it is crucial to realise that the principle cannot appropriately be invoked to solve all the problems inherent in the demand for the protection of innocents and to avoid what Anscombe describes as, 'double think about double effect', (Anscombe, 1981: 58).

Examination of Double Effect is illuminating and significant, not because it reveals that the principle legitimises what might otherwise seem to be unjustifiable acts, but because it underlines the difficulties of such attempts.

If war is to be presented appropriately in the classroom, children will have to be alerted to the moral complexities and educated to address them for themselves.

CHAPTER 4

Teaching on War:

Peace Education - one approach to presenting war in schools

Exploration of the morality of war has shown that war is a highly controversial issue. War is not an unavoidable part of our lives. As Glover maintains, 'It is not yet clear that men have an ineradicable predisposition to war,' (Glover, 1977: 253) and consequently we should not ignore the moral dimension. In Chapter 2, it was seen that no arguments satisfactorily demonstrated that intentional taking of life is always wrong, but it was concluded that the taking of a life worth living, in Rachels' sense (Rachels, 1986: 26), is a prima facie evil. On the assumption that those who die in wars are not generally suicidal or the proper subjects for euthenasia, the justification of that killing which is part of warfare continues to be problematic. While just war thinking seemed to allow that fighting in self-defence must be morally acceptable, even this, like other just causes, was seen to be difficult to establish. The conduct of war has been complicated by the weaponry now at our disposal, such that protection for non-combatants may be impossible in much modern warfare. This calls into question whether or not the use of, for example, nuclear weapons, even in deterrence, could ever be morally right. Examination of the Principle of Double Effect revealed that the killing of innocents was not easily justified.

All this suggests that teaching on war is likely to be problematic. Teachers will wish to educate children so that they appreciate the moral complexities and are in a position where they can make moral judgements with regard to war. How then should war be presented in schools?

One way of presenting issues relating to war is in the context of Peace Education. In that it comprises the most recent, specific and systematic approach to addressing issues of war widely in the curriculum, Peace Education should not be ignored.

There may always have been teaching on war in schools. Certainly war is not a topic which will be new to the classroom. As suggested in the introduction, children discuss it informally, and various aspects of war are studied in different subject areas. However, until relatively recently, it is perhaps unlikely that the moral problems of war have received detailed academic treatment as a planned element in the curriculum. The drive to introduce Peace Education has been one attempt to rectify this. In seeking principles which ought to inform teaching on war, it would be foolish to ignore the significant contribution of those advocating Peace Education.

In this chapter, in the first section, the general aims of Peace Education will be examined to discover if they are those which should guide all teaching on war. In the second section objections to Peace Education will be addressed in order to provide a more detailed scrutiny of the problems which face educators presenting war in the classroom.

(It should be noted that 'Peace Education' will be used in reference to that area of study which was defined in the nineteen eighties by Hicks and others. 'Peace Studies' is conventionally used to refer to courses in institutions of higher or secondary education, but such courses can also appropriately be called Peace Education. 'Peace Education' will be employed as an umbrella term, to include what is taught to younger children, only using 'Peace Studies' when it is the title used in other texts. Any distinction between 'Peace Studies', a timetabled course, and 'Peace Education', which might also refer to crosscurricular and informal teaching, will not be employed here.)

I Peace Education

Various authors, including Halstead (1985), Hicks (1988) and the NUT (1984), have detailed the evolution of Peace Education in recent years. There seems to be general agreement that, in the nineteen seventies and eighties, Peace Education appeared to be the natural heir to what had been known as World Studies and indeed was advocated by many of those previously involved in that field, such as Hicks and Bridges.

As it happened, any large scale introduction of Peace Education into our schools lost impetus with the advent of the National Curriculum, which from its inception took centre stage in controversies about the curriculum. The days of international conferences between scientists and educators debating the possibilities and implications of Peace Education drew to a close, at least for the time being. More immediate concerns about the practical implementation and consequences of the National Curriculum took over. Lister sadly notes that now,

> Peace Education, in terms of practice, is a rare and
> exotic plant, flowering on Welsh clifftops and
> conspicuous by its absence in the prosaic life of the
> ordinary schools. (Lister, 1984: 72).

Nevertheless, the ideas of those keen to have Peace Education in both primary and secondary schools have touched many teachers and influenced their practice. Certainly these ideas are relevant to the problems surrounding the presentation of war in schools.

I i) What is Peace Education?

Peace Education means different things to different people:

> To some it means a re-appraisal of the content and
> context of all that we teach; for some it means
> specific slots in the timetable in which to concentrate
> on issues like disarmament, racism, sexism, and
> human rights; for some it seems like the introduction
> into lessons of political indoctrination or propaganda.
> To some it is a hope for the future - an opportunity
> bring about a world without war; for some it is a
> threat - a challenge to the established patterns of
> authority and pedagogy. (NUT, 1984: 11)

Some evidently fear the inclusion of Peace Education into the curriculum, while others welcome it with enthusiasm. It may be that the differing views arise from a confusion about what is meant by the title.

Definitions of Peace Education are invariably expressed in terms of aims or objectives. Thus Hicks writes that 'a definition is appropriate', then gives the following list (attributed to Duczek) of what it attempts to do:

> i)   sharpen awareness about the existence of
>   conflict between people and within and
>   between nations;
>
> ii)   investigate the causes of conflict and violence
>   embedded within the perceptions, values and
>   attitudes of individuals, as well as within the
>   social, political and economic structures of
>   society;
>
> iii)   encourage the search for alternatives,
>   including non-violent solutions, and the
>   development of skills necessary for their
>   implementation.
>
> (Hicks, 1986: 13)

The Nottinghamshire report also employs Duczek's wording, commenting that this is 'the most concise definition of Peace Education which we have come across', (Nottinghamshire LEA Working Party, 1981: 4). I should have to agree, but more detail is needed before we can see how far teaching on war should follow the precepts of Peace Education.

The Nottinghamshire report elaborates, including in its proposals specific reference to warfare, weapons and disarmament (ibid., 1981: 4 ff). There can be no doubt that Peace Education is intended to encompass issues of war, but its scope extends beyond it. To understand the importance of Peace Education's contribution to teaching on war and recognise some of the problems, three key features need to be explored: the ideas of conflict resolution, education for peace and the notions of negative and positive peace.

I ii) Conflict resolution

Whatever the beliefs of their opponents, peace educators certainly do not mean by 'peace' solely the absence of military conflict, let alone that the content of Peace Education should be limited to the rights and wrongs of nuclear warfare. But Peace Education does concern conflict and the resolution of conflict. It is,

> an attempt to respond to problems of conflict and
> violence on scales ranging from the global and
> national to the local and personal. (Hicks, 1988: 5)

There is no suggestion that, in this context, peace entails the absence of conflict per se.

> Its vision of a peaceful world is not one in which
> there is an absence of conflict. (Fell, 1988: 75)

Situations of conflict are inevitable in our world, 'an inescapable part of our lives' (Burnley, 1988: 53). Conflict seems to be part of the human condition. This is not to say, that human beings are naturally aggressive and doomed to injure each other in pursuit of the satisfaction of their instinctive drives, for it was clearly demonstrated in Chapter 1 that there are no good grounds for such a claim. Rather it is to suggest that part of what it is to be a person is to experience individual desires which are likely to run counter to the wants of others. Where limited goods

are available, there may be conflicting needs. Even the hermit or the desert island castaway may suffer from inner conflict when it is difficult to decide between different needs or desires and their relative position in one's own hierarchy of values.

To accept that conflict is unavoidable is not necessarily to accept that war and violence are equally irresistible. Not all conflicts take the form of wars and not all conflicts cause people to resort to violence. Neither does conceding that individual desires are likely at times to conflict directly relate in any way to a belief that human beings are naturally bellicose. As we have seen, many biologists as well as philosophers have made plain that violence towards one's own kind cannot be simplistically attributed merely to what is inherent in the human race or its genes (see Hinde, 1989; Rose et al., 1981; Midgley: 1979 & 1984).

If we are not predestined, as it were, to pursue our ends with violence, then the experience of conflict need not always be a violent or warlike one. The discussion of aggression in Chapter 1 indicated that the exact degree to which our behaviour is a product of our biological inheritance or our social circumstances is difficult to determine. Disentangling precisely what is innate from what is learnt, where the possibility of both contributing to certain behaviour is admitted, may be beyond us. However, the importance of recognising that both our biology and social factors are relevant to the way in which we resolve conflicts is underlined in the curricular aims of the Nottinghamshire report. One of the ten proposed aims is,

> To appreciate some of the biological and social
> factors which influence human behaviour.
> (Nottinghamshire LEA Working Party, 1981: 5)

Peace Education is concerned to bring about understanding that conflict need not always lead to violence. If violent behaviour is to any extent learnt then people can presumably learn to cope with conflict without recourse to violence, aggressive

behaviour or war. Children need to understand that even if it were the case that we have an inborn propensity towards aggressive behaviour, this may still be suppressible. Legal, moral and religious codes rest on the supposition that in general we do have some control over our behaviour. People obviously have the capacity for murder (since murders are committed) and some evidently experience the urge to murder, but the assumption is that being able to murder one's neighbour does not entail that one therefore does so, and that urges to act violently ought to be repressed. There seems to be no good reason to discard these assumptions when contemplating the behaviour of our species as a whole. So while conflict may be present in our lives, peaceful resolutions to international conflicts may be possible.

Perhaps it is useful to recognise conflict as a state of affairs and violence as behaviour or action. Human action is conventionally distinguished from reflexes over which people have no control. The capacity for action which may be inbuilt is not the same as a genetic imprint such that specific behaviour is inescapable on the receipt of certain stimuli. Having the capacity for violent action then is very different from being programmed to react violently in given circumstances. Accepting a capacity for violence in a situation of conflict is not accepting violence as an automatic response to a state of affairs we term 'conflict'.

It is interesting to note that the military at least recognise this distinction and, furthermore, clearly doubt the strength of any biologically based propensity to kill. Thus, according to Guardian newspaper reports in 1982, en route to the Falklands, indoctrinatory programmes were implemented without which it was believed members of the armed forces could not have brought themselves to kill their fellow human beings. Norman draws attention to this:

> The hardened combat veteran can perhaps kill with
> equanimity, but the hardening process is necessary.
> An important part of military training is breaking
> down the psychological inhibitions against killing.
> (Norman, 1995: 183)

Violent behaviour and war then are not an inescapable part of our existence, but conflict itself may be unavoidable. Peace educators would not suggest that conflict is undesirable, although this idea is sometimes attributed to them. If altruism is held to be a virtue, then perhaps conflict too has its value. Altruism can presumably only be exercised when there is competition for goods (in the widest sense). It is difficult to imagine how one could learn what altruism is or develop the disposition to act altruistically without at least recognising that the desires of others can conflict with one's own and learning what it is to put another's needs and wishes first.

So teaching about conflict resolution is intended to incorporate consideration of the nature of conflict, with emphasis on the possibility of non-violent solutions. In addition, in line with the aims of Peace Education (Hicks, 1986: 13) cited above, it should include investigation of the causes of conflict. Teaching on war too, at least for older children, would be incomplete if there were no exploration of the causes of international conflicts, and some consideration of just war theory and the difficulties of identifying jus ad bellum noted in Chapter 3.

It would seem that conflict is something children will meet in their lives, both present and future. Those who engage in Peace Education are surely right to teach about conflict and its resolution.

> Conflict is an important element in children's lives. They experience it in arguments at home, in quarrels or fights at school, in violence portrayed in the media. They also meet it in history, social studies and many other parts of the school curriculum. If they are to cope well with life they need to have the capacity to understand and to deal with conflicts. (Nicholas, 1983: 1)

How they can and should deal with it is at the core of Peace Education, and I would maintain it is germane to teaching on war. I do not wish to imply that fights in the playground are directly analogous to international warfare - to suggest they are would be to distort the reality of war in all its complexity - but the understanding

that physical violence is not always necessary or desirable as a means of resolving conflicts is very relevant.

The strong emphasis on conflict resolution within Peace Education may make 'Conflict Studies' seem a better title. However, Peace Education aims not only to teach about conflict, not simply to give some neutral presentation on the subject, but to contribute to bringing into being a more peaceful world.

I iii)   Education for peace

The fact that this area of studies is called 'Peace Education' rather than 'Conflict Studies' is significant. The desire to educate children with regard to conflict does spring from a belief that there is too little peace in the world today and that non-violent resolution of conflict is to be preferred.

'Peace Education' highlights the concern for peace and the value in which it is held. It may reflect the concern felt by many teachers at how little peace is overtly dealt with in the curriculum, in comparison with the time devoted to the consideration of wars in history for example. (Dealing with the significance of wars must often involve reflection on the conditions for peace, but perhaps teachers feel that this is inadequate in being peace addressed in the context of war, rather than lessons explicitly focussed on peace.)

However there can be little doubt that Peace Education, as explicated by Hicks (1983, 1986 & 1988) is intended to be education *for* peace, indeed he explicitly writes of 'Education for Peace' and lists among the attitudes which should be fostered in children:

> Commitment to justice:
> Students should value genuinely democratic principles and processes and be ready to work *for a more just and peaceful world* at local, national, and international levels. (Hicks, 1988: 15, my italics.)

This must be desirable, for peace is surely a good thing worth striving for and there seems to be a widely shared and profound desire for peace.

> We are all ready to make the declaration that we are opposed to war, 'the easiest of commonplaces' as Burke called it. We are all in favour of peace. The desire for a life free of fear, free of violence is one of the most human aspirations. All religious traditions give voice to it. All governments will fromally protest that this is their most fundamental aim. (Reid, 1984: 124)

But there is another reason for conceding that we should encourage pupils to value it. It may be that the only alternative is to teach children to devalue it. It seems illegitimate to talk of teaching about x as if it is possible to engage in the safe transmission of information relating to x somehow untainted by any questions of value. While it is possible to draw a formal distinction between educating *about* and educating *for*, this can obscure the truth in practice. We cannot teach all the facts about anything (even if we know them - and somehow know we know). In school we are limited by time, resources and our own inadequacies. Consequently we select from all we know, what we hope to teach. Concerned to educate those in our care, we choose what we believe to be relevant and important, rather than irrelevant and trivial, in the light of our educational aims and objectives, our knowledge of children and how they learn. In the end, this selection reflects our judgement, values and bias. We are inevitably doing more than presenting facts or neutral information. Implicitly we are presenting values too. Any discussion of peace is hardly appropriately so termed if matters of value are neglected, but this apart, it seems impossible that we *could* educate exclusively about peace without

presenting values: instead we are always teaching to some extent for or against peace.

Peace Education is intended to promote favourable, not unfavourable, attitudes towards peace and it therefore seems appropriate that this bias is reflected in the name.

Nevertheless, as a title, 'Peace Education' may seem recklessly provocative, suggestive of the inculcation of pacifism. But encouraging children to value peace is not the same as promulgating pacifism. To value peace is not necessarily to hold it as either one's first principle or one's only value. In Chapter 3 it was noted that one can value peace without believing that war can never be justified. In drawing attention to the value of peace, a teacher is doing more than offering peace as an option and is partisan in this respect, but this is quite distinct from the intentional inculcation of pacifist ideals. Teaching on war could legitimately include teaching the value of peace.

Peace Education is not confined to promoting that peace which is the opposite of war. Its concern is also with peaceful living in a more general sense. What 'peace' might mean needs a little clarification in this context.

I iv)   'Negative' and 'positive' peace

'Peace', in the literature of Peace Education, is commonly said to have a negative and a positive sense.

> To the generation of the First and Second World wars the value of so-called 'negative peace' was clear. A world without war seemed a valuable and central goal. By the late 60's and 70's however as a new generation matured there emerged a greater concern for the creation of what John Galtung and

others called 'positive peace', or peace with justice.
(Reid, 1984: 125)

In his characterisation of positive and negative peace, Curle suggests that peace is analogous with health:

> Both are defined negatively in terms of their opposites. Health is what we enjoy when we are not suffering from bubonic plague, schizophrenia, the common cold or some other identifiable disease. Peace is what we enjoy when we are not at war or in some other state of unpleasant and distinctive conflict. As everyone knows, however, being healthy is much more than not being ill; it is feeling alive, whole and full of energy. (Curle, 1984: 8)

It is 'being healthy' which is thought of as positive and the absence of disease as negative. This is an attractive notion and one which appears to identify different aspects of health, but it is also confusing. Surely to be healthy is to be without illness and no more. Talk of being 'full of energy' is somewhat of a red herring. Physically exhausted after a hard game of squash, one could not be properly described as 'full of energy', yet one could still be in the pink of good health. Lack of energy may or may not be a sign of ill-health - it depends upon the case.

Instead of conceiving of health as having negative and positive aspects, could it not be viewed as a continuum? The less we are affected by any disease or illness, the more healthy we are. The absence of bubonic plague does not necessarily coincide with 'feeling alive' and full of good health, but this may still be because one has a minor ailment or impairment to health such as a vitamin deficiency, in other words, because one is not completely healthy. The root of my quibble may be in the mention of 'identifiable disease' which does not seem to allow that mild discomforts and lethargy can be symptoms of some slight illness. In addition, it should be remembered that feelings are not necessarily indicative of one's state of health. If grief prevents me from feeling aglow with good health, it need not signal

that I am unhealthy. Surely I can be both healthy and grieving. To suggest otherwise is to stretch the meaning of 'health' too far.

In the same way it would seem that the absence of unpleasant conflict *is* peace. There is no additional positive element. Complete peace obviously is not merely the absence of war, but the absence of *all* violence (not only physical violence) is exactly what peace is. Aspin would argue that I am wrong:

> just as there is a widespread feeling that 'health' amounts to more than the mere absence of disease, so there is cosiderable regard for the view that a state of 'not-war', 'not-conflict' or 'non-oppression' does not add up to the 'peace' that is represented widely as a desirable *terminus ad quem* for statesmanlike endeavour and practical politics. (Aspin, 1986: 128)

However, in charactersing a more positive account of peace, Aspin recalls the comment,

> it begins with the fostering of self-esteem or personal well-being in the individual.
> (Report of the Peace Education Conference, New Zealand, cited by Aspin, 1986: 129)

This suggests that he is concerned with aims of Peace Education and what might be needed for more peaceful living, rather than defining peace.

O'Connell (1984: 24) writes of negative peace as being 'a necessary though not a sufficient condition of positive peace'. He maintains that negative peace, the absence of violence, is only one element of peace and that another basic element, 'cooperation among persons', is also necessary to an adequate characterisation of peace.

Again this seems a misrepresentation. Many, many things can contribute to unpeacefulness and lack of cooperation is one of them. Cooperation is surely only contingently necessary to peace and is not the logically necessary condition

O'Connell seems to claim. While being uncooperative may exacerbate or cause strife, one could surely be at peace and yet not in a situation where cooperation is relevant. 'Non-cooperation' perhaps can be distinguished from 'uncooperation'. I should prefer maintain that, as I argued in Chapter 3, the degree to which anything which creates unpeacefulness is absent, to that extent there is peace.

However, when 'negative' and 'positive' are not applied to peace but refer to people's attitudes or the measures they may take with respect to peace, the terms alert us to a useful distinction.

In teaching for peace, and in teaching on war, it must be important to realise that, as O'Connell says,

> The negative element of peace which is the avoidance of discord or inflicted disorder is often the most psychologically salient of the elements of peace,

and,

> The danger of concentrating on negative peace is that practitioners and theorists alike may neglect to work on constructing the foundations of peace. (O'Connell, 1984: 24)

Surely we do need to learn to become less disposed towards violence, to achieve more control over some expressions of emotion, to acquire communication and other 'peace making' skills. If wars are to be avoided, it must be important work actively to bring about those conditions which give no cause for international conflict.

On the one hand I see these as prerequisites for avoiding violence, but on the other I recognise them as positive rather than negative measures. Perhaps too the idea of 'positive' underlines the option of focusing on what people and nations share in common rather than on their differences, on those things which make peace possible rather than its opposite, on having positive feelings, as we say, rather than

negative ones towards one another. When 'positive peace' identifies actively

seeking more peaceful ways of life in contrast with merely avoiding violent conflict,

I have no quarrel with the phrase.

Hicks distinguishes between negative and positive peace rather more precisely. He

defines negative peace as the absence of personal violence and positive peace as the

absence of structural violence.

Structural violence is described as indirect and,

> the ways in which people may also suffer as a result
> of social, political and economic systems. (Hicks,
> 1988: 6).

Injury or even death resulting from injustice is as real as that which is the

consequence of being attacked physically. Systems which establish or perpetuate

any denial of human rights are thus very properly seen as violent. Concern for

eradicating structural violence carries with it concern about the nature of a just

society or even world, and how it is created. (This seems very much in keeping

with the aims of O'Connell et al. although they use the phrases 'negative peace' and

'positive peace' slightly differently.) Structural violence, characterised in these

_terms, is surely likely to be one cause of war and its absence is something to be

- sought.

Curle (1984) is evidently thinking in similar terms when he writes,

> Peace, in the positive sense, means a state of human
> living together, whether the scale be large or small,
> characterised by conditions that make for the
> realisation of human potential.

and

> Unpeacefulness implies the exact opposite, a state of
> affairs that is detrimental to the fulfilment of our
> potential. By physical means, as in war, or by
> psychological manipulation, economic exploitation,
> political oppression, or many other subtle methods,
> we damage each other's chance of achieving
> realisation. (Curle, 1984: 8)

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Although not all the uses of the phrases 'negative peace' and 'positive peace' are entirely satisfactory, when 'positive peace' identifies actively building peaceful circumstances and the absence of structural violence it does seem useful terminology, and picks out concepts relevant to teaching on war.

My purpose in examining Peace Education has not been to debate its importance as a discrete subject named on the curriculum, but to clarify what it is. Because I wish to confine my evaluation of Peace Education to those aspects which concern war, consideration of specific content which has been put forward by Hicks et al. will be included in the final chapter on the content of teaching on war.

It is evident that Peace Education is intended to include consideration of war and its central concerns, examined above, should be taken into account when deciding how best to teach on war.

Before exploring further the principles which should underpin such teaching, it is important to look at some of the criticisms which have been levelled at Peace Education, for objections to its inclusion in the school curriculum are likely pertain to teaching on war in more general terms.

II Objections to Peace Education Examined

Objections to Peace Education are typically levelled at its content or the form it might take, yet it seems to me that, underlying much criticism, there are doubts

about its aims and confused presuppositions which require clarification. By examining objections to Peace Education, the intention is to draw attention to some of the problems which face teachers when presenting issues of war in the classroom, and to identify those which must be taken into account in deciding on principles for teaching on war.

Some of the objections examined in this section concern what are feared to be likely consequences of such teaching, while others focus on the methodology or subject matter. The categorisation of anxieties over Peace Education into separate objections is necessarily somewhat artificial since they are often closely related and implicit in many is the fear that such teaching will be indoctrinatory.

The charge that Peace Education will amount to indoctrination is extremely serious and must be addressed specifically, together with idea that it will comprise propaganda. Criticisms that Peace Education will not aid the achievement of a more peaceful world and, in sharp contrast, that it will endanger peace are also important. It may seem that the accusation that Peace Education is irrelevant is of little significance, but this too raises pertinent issues and will be explored.

The first idea to be scrutinised relates to the value of peace. The assumption that peace is universally valued might seem to be inappropriately described as an objection to Peace Education, but it will be shown that it can lead to the notion that Peace Education is unnecessary.

II a)   'Peace is universally valued.'

The assumption that peace is universally valued is widespread. Riddell, in his

introduction to the Nottinghamshire report, confidently asserts,

> We are in no doubt that every thinking person
> subscribes to the view that all the difficult problems
> which face us in our country, in society as a whole
> and on an international scale should be resolved by
> peaceful means. (Riddell, 1981: 3)

Wragg's oft echoed remark endorses this view:

> I don't actually know anyone who is against peace.
> Try as I might to trawl through my memories of all
> the people I have ever known, I cannot for the life of
> me find one who is against the notion of living in
> peace. (Wragg cited by Aspin, 1986: 131)

Yet Peace Education explicitly intends to promote the value of peace - this is its

overarching aim. If peace were universally valued there would be less reason to

educate for peace.

II a) i)   Disagreement over what peace is

There are undoubtedly disputes over peace and war, and these seem to indicate that

there is little consensus over the value of peace. Aspin suggests that one reason for

such disputes is that, while people may agree on the desirability of peace, they

differ in their conceptualisation of what this might mean:

> What debates about peace often come down to is the
> articulation of notions of human being and human
> flourishing that are radically different. Thus
> discussions about the nature of peace often involve
> fundamental differences in our metaphysics of man
> and society - of what counts as human nature, human
> welfare, and an acceptable basis of social relations
> for its optimum realisation. (Aspin, 1986: 131)

Common ground may be lacking, but if the problem is mainly one of language, in the articulation of our ideas, there is some cause for optimism. It may be possible to develop a language which has,

> some sort of common logic for the elucidation and
> evaluation of even the most fundamental ideological
> differences as to what *counts* as human welfare and
> harm. (Aspin, 1986: 131)

Without this common conceptualisation people will continue to differ, but, given some shared understanding of fundamental concepts, movement towards agreement will be facilitated.

II a) ii)   Disagreement over how best to achieve peace

Those who believe that peace per se is valued to such an extent that debates on the subject of peace are in fact only arguments about how best to achieve it, also seem to believe that fundamentally there is consensus on the value of peace. If this were the case, it would not be necessary to promote its value and Peace Education could be exclusively a matter of bringing about increased understanding of how to cope with conflict and bring about the conditions necessary for a peaceful world.

It may well be that most discussion of peace is actually talk about how best to achieve it, but, illuminating though this might be with respect to what people talk about, it does not show that there is consensus with regard to the value of peace.

II a) iii)   There are those who do not value peace

I would suggest that there is nothing like universal agreement that peace is desirable. It is surely evident that there are those who value war and not peace. There are people who wage war in the belief that it will lead to peace, but there are

also those who do so because they enjoy fighting or for extrinsic personal benefits (other than peace) which may accrue.

This is not reducible to any misunderstanding of what peace is, nor is this an issue of how peace might be achieved. It may be a matter of priorities, but I do not refer here to the conviction that a preference for a peaceful unoppressed life might on occasion lead one to choose war rather than peace as explained in Chapter 3. There is a distinction between those who value peace and justify war by reference to just causes, and those who subordinate peace to personal gain.

Choosing in favour of war over peace for purely personal profit is very different from opting for war as a sad necessity to gain a 'higher end'. The mercenary who glories in battle, *irrespective of the cause*, cannot be held to prefer peace. Those who choose to earn money from the sale of arms, *indifferent to the outcome* of the conflicts in which their weapons are used, cannot consistently claim to hold peace in high esteem or to view war, and the absence of peace, as a sad necessity. It might be argued that the mercenary still values a different sort of peace, financial security for one's family at home perhaps, but this would merely underline the elevation of a form of self-interest over exclusively moral concerns.

To deny that a considerable number of people do not, as a matter of fact, hold peace in high esteem is to ignore or to dismiss reality. This is not to say that peace is not valuable, but to establish that any assumption that all those who discuss peace are agreed on its value is unwarranted, and that it may not be the case that all arguments about peace are merely about how best to achieve it.

Any attempt to judge the extent to which peace is valued is complicated by our use of language. 'Peace' has perhaps always had an emotive force as well as descriptive content. Despite Orwell's warnings, we largely accept and are inured to

the erosion of the descriptive content of many words - so much so that the deployment of first strike weapons is rarely noted as absurdly inappropriate to defence. Just as any predominantly emotive word can be used to disguise arguments, so 'peace' can be employed as a rallying cry to banners more appropriately emblazoned 'war'.

The strength of 'peace' as a call to arms is that it evokes approbation. But this is not always the case. In some contexts, the emotive force of the term seems to change direction. In some situations, wartime perhaps, to say someone favours peace may be to denigrate that person. Doves have been jeered at by hawks in peace time too. To declare too often in favour of peace may be to be seen as 'wet', a denigratory term for many politicians.

Consequently, we cannot infer from the way in which the word is used, that peace is always held in high esteem. Current usage suggests otherwise.

This is underlined in the oft repeated wry comment that 'War Studies' would cause less stir than 'Peace Education'.

> What fascinates me is peoples' reaction to the word 'peace'. War studies are much more acceptable to a lot of people. (Hicks in the Guardian, 1981: 21 April)

There are, of course, no grounds for the belief that all who object to peace education implicitly disparage peace, but the contingency that some may do so remains. Moreover, one reason for the perception that Peace Education is needed must be an awareness that peace is not universally valued and that it would be unwise to suppose that all our pupils value it.

II b) 'Peace Education cannot contribute to or further the pursuit of peace.'

In the belief that peace is valuable, the importance of working for a more peaceful world via education is recommended in the UNO Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

> Education...shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial and or religious groups and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintainence of peace. (UNO cited by Aspin, 1987: 12)

There are those who see this as an unattainable desire, and for this reason take the view that Peace Education is therefore futile.

It must at once be conceded that there is no logically necessary relationship between the implementation of Peace Education and the furtherance of peace. Studying peace does not necessarily lead to valuing peace any more than studying mathematics leads students to value mathematics - unless something more is meant by studying than is usual.

Even were a person to come to value peace via her studies in Peace Education, it would not logically follow that she had the ability to contribute to it, just as one who values literature is not necessarily capable of writing poetry. The ability to do something is a necessary condition of actually doing it, but it does not follow that those who develop the ability to further peace will actually do so. Given that a person can do something, it is always a further question whether or not that person will in fact do it. So to concede that Peace Education will not necessarily contribute to peace is surely to concede very little. It is not to admit that it is logically impossible.

The question is rather whether or not the adoption of Peace Education can and is likely to contribute to the achievement and perpetuation of peace. Some information would seem relevant to the formation and modification of attitudes, and some knowledge to the making of rational decisions. If a person is ignorant of any alternatives to war as a means of settling disputes, she is in no position to value peace nor to opt for peaceful resolutions.

If Peace Education provides relevant information, fosters understanding and develops skills, it comprises the provision of that which is likely to contribute to peace. To exclude Peace Education from schools is to leave to chance whether or not pupils have access to these facts, and to take no steps to further the cause of peace. In so far as it furthers understanding of the issues involved and dispels ignorance and incomprehension, to that extent it is at least likely to foster some active concern for peace. All teaching on war should take account of the need for that knowledge and understanding necessary to giving children real choice in relation to peace and war.

In strong contrast with any who feel Peace Education is not worth attempting because it has little or no chance of success, are those who fear it will be all too successful in promoting peace as a value and will inculcate a reluctance to fight if not downright pacifism.

II c)   'Peace education will endanger peace.'

This rather extreme view is implicit in the objection that peace education will succeed in fostering certain attitudes to peace and war such that it will inevitably lead to pacifism. The reasoning appears to be that this nation-wide pacifism will

then be taken as a sign of military weakness, encouraging our enemies to attack.

Reid cites this assumption as one objection to Peace Education:

> Peace Education will not be acceptable to the wider
> public and to the State ... because it plays into the
> hands of our enemies, (Reid, 1984: 129)

Marks (1984) expresses the fear that teachers of Peace Education will have the

effect of those people who talk incessantly of peace and were castigated for this by

Plato:

> on account of this fondness of theirs for peace,
> which is often out of season where their influence
> prevails, they become by degrees unwarlike, and
> bring up their young to be like themselves; they are at
> the mercy of their enemies; whence in a few years
> they and their children and the whole city often pass
> imperceptibly from the condition of free men to that
> of slaves. (Plato, cited by Aspin, 1986: 122)

The presuppositions on which this objection rests are at least questionable. The

assumption that Peace Education will inevitably engender pacifism is dubious in the

extreme. For exactly the reason it must be conceded that Peace Education would

not necessarily promote peace, it cannot be held that it will necessarily produce

pacifists. Only successful brainwashing and indoctrination would inevitably bring

about the programming of unshakeable pacifists. These methods of belief and

attitude modification are held to be entirely inappropriate to the educational context,

so much so that fear of them comprises a further objection examined below.

Whether or not pacifism will in fact result from Peace Education without employing

indoctrination must, at the moment, be a matter of conjecture in the absence of long-

term empirical studies. But it is in any case important to recognise that it is still a

further question whether a nation whose youth is predominantly pacifist will be

seen as vulnerable, and yet another whether or not this would encourage attack. I

have no wish to discuss the psychological effect on other nations of a hypothetical

situation in which all citizens of one country have embraced pacifism, nor to debate

the consequences of regarding other countries as potential enemies. I am not qualified to do so - but perhaps if I had engaged in peace education at school I should be more knowledgeable, have greater understanding and be better able to attempt such evaluations.

It does seem the claim that Peace Education will endanger peace cannot be proven and possibly the very fears implicit in this objection might be allayed were a form of peace education to be introduced in schools, for, as was made plain in the previous section, the inculcation of pacifism has no place in educating for peace. This too should be the case in any teaching on war.

II d)   'Peace is a matter for the experts.'

Perhaps believing that the safety of the state to be at stake, some might argue that Peace Education concerns issues of war and peace so vital and momentous that they should be left to the experts - among whom teachers and pupils are not numbered. The argument seems to assert that the complexity of politics and military stategy is such that none but the expert is appropriately qualified to give anything other than an over-simplified, and thus distorted, picture. The implication of such assertions is that inadequate understanding (presumed to be inevitable in the classroom) will have dire consequences: bluntly, a little learning on this subject is a dangerous thing.

If it were true that incomplete comprehension of peace had appalling effects and this were unavoidable, there would be good cause for alarm, but even then would this be good reason to allow only the experts to present, debate and make decisions on these matters?

II d) i) Who are the experts?

In this context, by 'experts' is generally meant those who are authorities in the fields of science, political and military affairs, both academics and professionals. They are experts in virtue of being better informed and more experienced in these areas than the ordinary teacher or pupil.

Given that they know and understand more of such things than we do, should we not be content to leave peace and war in their hands, accepting their conclusions and following their instructions? Of course we should not. As educators, teachers surely share a reluctance to accept conclusions when permitted only limited access to the reasons for them, or no access at all, on the assumption that they and their pupils are incapable of the requisite understanding. There is a strong sense of undue paternalism about the implied suggestion that we should not expect explanations which will inevitably be beyond our ken, and this sits uneasily with the educational aspiration to develop knowledge rather than simply inculcating facts. Even when it is intended to be in their best interests and for their own good, teachers and their pupils should not be deprived of the right of rational enquiry into matters of peace and war in an educational setting.

While I think it right that teachers should not attempt to teach subjects they know nothing of, this is not the situation here. Teachers and pupils will have some knowledge and understanding of the issues. Some will have relevant specialised knowledge of at least the scientific aspects. In *The facts of life'*, Harris emphasises the importance of raising such issues in school:

> schools are one of the few, if not the only, institutions to which many citizens will have access, which can hope to help with the clarification of the issues involved, and with providing at least *some* of the relevant scientific and medical information. (Harris, 1986: p. 101)

Some expertise on these matters resides in schools, but, more importantly, competent teachers must be deemed experts on teaching and learning. If people are to understand issues of peace and war, then teachers be among the experts needed.

II d) ii)   Military and political expertise is not enough

Superficially it might seem reasonable to trust experts in relation to war. On the whole, we are happy to allow doctors to diagnose, prescribe and effect cures. Although our faith in a doctor's expertise may at times be misplaced, to most of us it is preferable to giving an unqualified layperson a free hand in the operating theatre. It may seem similarly sensible to permit political and military experts to sign treaties and to wage wars.

However, not all problems related to medicine or war are to be solved in this comparatively simple way. A medical degree is not always the only nor the best qualification for deciding issues which concern our health. The doctor may be the best person to perform an abortion, yet not the best qualified to decide whether or not that abortion should be carried out. Equally, the assumption that peace is exclusively the domain of political and military expertise is plainly wrong.

It has been established in the preceding chapters that war poses moral problems. Whether or not we ought to go to war is a moral issue. Moral considerations are often relevant to decisions made about the conduct of war, and when they are, they are invariably overriding. In purely military terms, it might be sound on occasion to kill all prisoners, thus saving on staff in the form of guards and on supplies, while at the same time, ensuring a reduction in the enemy forces. Morally, as we saw in Chapter 3, in the discussion of jus in bello, this might be quite unacceptable.

II d) iii)   Professional interests may exert undesirable influence

Political and military knowledge is not sufficient qualification for moral decision-making. Moreover some political and military experts may actually be less well-placed to make moral decisions in their fields than the layperson, precisely because their careers lie in those areas. A deep anxiety about one's popularity with the electorate is not a worry the lay person has to contend with, yet which may be sufficiently strong to impair the moral judgement of a politician.

There may be reasons other than self-interest of the supposed experts for not relying too far on what they have to say about warfare. The activity of research can generate an all-consuming eagerness to solve a problem and a narrowly focussed view of the enterprise. What makes people experts is their engagement with their world - in this instance the world of nuclear science. In his first Boutwood lecture, MacKinnon points to:

> a chasm, not simply of language, but of outlook between those who, by reason of their special expertise, are more or less at home in that world, and the rest of mankind, who find the realities too horrifying, ultimately too inhuman to envisage for more than the passing moment. (MacKinnon, 1981: 8)

MacKinnon talks of the attitudes of the Los Alamos scientists, and how their excitement and enthusiasm for their task was replaced by very different feelings when they realised what they had achieved.

> Yet when success in the full sense of August 6 1945 crowned their labours, it was as if in a moment of time the language, the traditional, often embarrassing language of penitence replaced almost by force the idioms of enthusiasm that had come readily to their lips in the exciting months of preparation. (MacKinnon, 1981: 6 - 7)

As Oppenheimer discovered, the horrifying realities may be more important to us as human beings than the successful conclusion of scientific endeavour. For both scientists and military personnel, the immersion in worlds where specific problems require solution and where there are specific ends in view may be a limiting factor. Yes, they have more knowledge and understanding of some aspects of weaponry and warfare, but not only might they be lacking in moral expertise, the moral sphere might be outside their viewfinder.

II d) iv)   Should we rely on moral experts?

If there were moral experts as well as political and military experts, easily identifiable, the problem of whether or not we should leave peace to them would remain.

I have no wish to suggest that some have access to moral truths hidden from the rest of us, but would concede that some people are better than others at making moral judgements. Nevertheless, such people do not form a class comparable to other sets of experts, to whom we might apply to answer our questions and solve our problems. One might formally draw up criteria by which those who are better rather than worse at moral reasoning might be distinguished, but it is difficult to imagine how such criteria might be applied. A degree in moral philosophy would not necessarily signal the specific expertise needed nor the ability to pick out other experts. Undoubtedly training in moral philosophy would be useful in clarifying and analysing the nature of particular ethical dilemmas, but more is needed. The expertise required includes practical wisdom and being a good person, and there is little reason to suppose that moral philosophers are morally better persons than others.

Far more important, even if there were an identifiable set of moral experts, the notion of leaving moral problems to them is unacceptable - morally unacceptable. To rely on the moral understanding of others and to surrender one's choice of moral action in unreflectingly accepting their advice, is to relinquish part of being a person. A person thinks and acts morally in virtue of doing so with some relevant autonomy. In simply conforming to the ideas of the expert, one has abdicated from making further moral choices with respect to their sphere of enquiry and cannot properly be said to think or act morally in any consequent conformity. (This is not to suggest that no expert judgement is ever relevant to making moral decisions, but to maintain that mere conformity to another's advice cannot be autonomous thought or action. It is of course distinct from applying to experts for their specialised understanding of a particular area and, relying on their authority in specific matters, taking their views into account in arriving at one's own decision.)

Neither Peace Education nor any teaching on war should be ruled out on the grounds that its content is best left to the experts. Even were political and military expertise to be complemented by moral expertise, to suggest that issues of peace should not be presented and discussed in schools, but dealt with only by experts is to deny to teachers and pupils a significant part of personhood. We may not be all equally qualified to or good at making moral judgements, but to permit others to decide for us is to stop being moral at all. We need to achieve more expertise ourselves and to acquire the disposition to act in the light of it, not to leave it to others:

> if a question which affects the lives, the deaths and
> the future of all of us is one on which only experts
> can speak, then that fact itself should properly terrify
> us all. (Williams, 1982: 288 cited in White, 1988:
> 44)

II e) 'Peace education is irrelevant.'

Not everyone is convinced that matters of peace and war are relevant to us all. Norman Tebbit (reported in the *Guardian*, 1983), complained that some peace plays he had seen in a school were 'irrelevant'. He did not make clear exactly to whom or to what he considered them irrelevant. Given that his complaint related to what he had seen in a school, it seems quite likely that he meant that questions of peace are irrelevant to school children - irrelevant in the sense of having no bearing on their lives - and yet this appears extraordinary.

II e) i)   Peace Education is not irrelevant to children

Surely issues of peace and war, violent and non-violent resolutions of conflict, are among those which affect anyone who has direct experience of the human species. As noted in the introduction, for many of us, images of war, both factual and fictional, cross our television screens almost daily and it is difficult to distance the problems they raise. We readily identify with characters in films and books, while news coverage reminds us that deployment of our own forces involves sons and daughters, wives and husbands, brothers and sisters of people we know. It cannot be that peace and war have no bearing at all on the lives of school children.

It could be that 'irrelevant' is intended to suggest 'unimportant'. The implication might be that, although the lives of all children and adults are touched by such problems, it is only in a negligible way. The very triviality of of the subject makes it irrelevant to the education of children in school. This seems equally absurd. How could matters of life and death count as unimportant?

II e) ii)   Relevance is not a strong justification for Peace Education

The issues addressed in Peace Education are surely relevant, not irrelevant, to pupils in school, in the sense of affecting their lives in important ways. However, it should not be imagined that, in denying its irrelevance, the corollary must be that relevance is a prime justification for the inclusion of Peace Education, or any other topic, on the curriculum.

Assumptions about what is relevant can be mistaken. What a teacher may think relevant to children of widely differing backgrounds, cultures and religions is not always accurate. What is relevant today may not be tomorrow; what is relevant here may not be there. In his analysis of key ideas in A. S. Neill's educational philosophy (Barrow, 1978: 72 - 73 and elsewhere), Barrow makes clear the inadequacy of relevance as a criterion for deciding what should be taught.

Similar concerns may play some part in the anxiety of Cox and Scruton (1984) when they disparage Peace Education for being relevant. However, in their demand for irrelevance and remoteness, they imply far more. They of course are objecting that, in virtue of being relevant, Peace Education lacks a significant academic credential.

> As for Cox and Scruton's demand for irrelavance, remoteness and abstractness as the sole determinants of academic and educational respectability: their adducing of such criteria suggests covert prescription rather than any well-founded analysis of what 'true education' (whatever that might be) might look like. (Aspin 1986: 125)

As Aspin goes on to point out,

> The demand for irrelevance would seem immediately to rule out much of the staple of contemporary higher education, at any rate: medicine, law, engineering, economics, policy analysis... (Aspin 1986: 125)

Although Aspin's comment suggests that irrelevance employed as a criterion might have some wide reaching practical implications, it does not provide a strong argument in favour of relevance as a justification for subjects such as Peace Education.

Relevance, in the abstract, cannot be a satisfactory justification. In educating with relevance as a first consideration, we risk limiting pupils to their own here and now. The notion of relevance needs treating with some caution lest it is used to justify an exclusive concern for that with which children are already familiar, their own 'present and particular' (Bailey, 1984).

If on the other hand, what is 'really relevant' is held to be the introduction of new ideas and wider horizons, an education that takes account of the unpredictability of the future and enables children in a significant way to create their own adult lives rather than merely implementing our visions, then it must be desirable in education.

The term 'irrelevant' is so vague as to be meaningless when applied without any context to give it substance, but this objection should not be ignored. If irrelevance to children and to their present and future concerns is intended, it is inappropriate and unjustifiable to describe Peace Education as irrelevant. When teaching on war, educators should keep in mind that it is not a trivial matter and that their pupils' present and future lives may be touched by war.

II f)   'Peace Education will inevitably be indoctrinatory.'

This is perhaps the single most serious objection to Peace Education, for if it were true that we could not teach about peace and war without indoctrinating, as educators we should have to refrain.

II f) i)   Indoctrination

'Indoctrination' in education, although not always in other contexts, is a pejorative term:

> educators seem agreed, on the whole, that it is bad.
> What they are not agreed about entirely is what it is
> about indoctrination that makes it bad. (Bailey,
> 1984: 142).

A brief glance at the wealth of literature within philosophy of education on indoctrination is sufficient to make one aware that differences of opinion on the subject abound (see Atkinson (1965), Bailey (1984), Gregory & Woods (1970), Gribble (1969), Snook (1972), White (1967) and many more.) Snook, in both *Concepts of Indoctrination* (Snook ed., 1972) and *Indoctrination and Education* (Snook, 1972), draws attention to various debates over the criteria which might pick out a case of indoctrination conceptually.

There is no need to engage in argument over all the various claims here, since the central points relevant to this discussion are relatively uncontroversial. There is agreement that beliefs are appropriate objects of indoctrination. Those who would maintain that facts can be the content of indoctrination would not deny that beliefs can also be indoctrinated.

With Bailey, I believe that behind the different views on the concept of indoctrination,

is the common ground, not always made explicit,
that to indoctrinate someone is to get that someone to
hold a belief in ways and on grounds that are non-
evidential. (Bailey, 1984: 142)

I therefore take indoctrination to be at least the inculcation of unverifiable belief,

without regard for the logical status of that belief: that is, the uncertain taught in

such a way that no note is taken of its uncertainty. If beliefs about peace and war

were to be taught as facts, indoctrination would be likely to occur.

Clearly the value of peace is logically uncertain. Much that is fact may contribute to

the study of peace, but statements relating to the value of peace and to the morality

of war do not in the end express propositions capable of truth or falsity. That there

lurks the danger of indoctrination in all teaching of values cannot be denied.

II f) ii)   Peace Education is not inevitably indoctrination

Scruton et al. maintain that indoctrination is more than a contingent danger in Peace

Education. They claim that it is not only,

often taught in a biased and irresponsible way, but
that it could be taught in no other way. (Cox and
Scruton, 1984: 40)

However, the study of peace and war need not involve indoctrination any more than

does the study of religion or English literature. Where material and ideas are

presented in such a manner that a distinction between matters of fact and and

questions of value is clearly retained and understood, there need be no

indoctrination.

Peace Education no less than any other education demands that teaching is

evidential, respecting the capacity for understanding and the autonomy of the

learner. Teaching which fails in these respects might be a form of training,

preaching or propaganda, but could not properly be termed 'education'. More than this, as Hicks emphasises in his article in *Peace and Security,*

> Since one of the aims of education for peace is to develop children's critical judgement, so that propaganda in *any* form may be more readily identifies, this seems an unwarranted criticism.
> (Hicks, 1988)

Peace Education then, would pay particular attention to the dangers of unreflective acceptance of ideology or political doctrine, deliberately developing those skills needed as a protection against indoctrination.

It might be argued that the beliefs related to peace are of particular and crucial importance, so that even to risk indoctrination in this context is unjustifiable. But to accept that more hangs on our attitudes to war and peace than our beliefs about the quality of Shakespeare's sonnets is not to accept that indoctrination is more likely in peace studies. Alerting children to the dangers of indoctrination seems to be part of Peace Education, so that it may be less likely here than elsewhere on the curriculum.

II f) iii)   The danger of unintentional indoctrination

Snook claims that intention is both a necessary and sufficient condition of indoctrination:

> A person indoctrinates P (a proposition or set of propositions) if he teaches with the intention that the pupil or pupils believe P regardless of the evidence.
> (Snook, 1972: 47)

This would seem to deny that the possibility of unintentional indoctrination, but, whether it satisfies the criteria for indoctrination or not, an approach so heavily biased towards one viewpoint that it appears one-sided, may have the same effect as indoctrination.

Such presentation is calculated to result in ignorance or incomprehension of any conflicting opinions so that pupils might well assume that there is only one possible view, mistakenly assuming it to be undeniably correct and coming to believe it in unshakeable way.

I would argue that it is possible to indoctrinate unintentionally, attempting unbiased teaching, but in practice giving the pupils only one option. Snook, although not allowing this terminology, might well concede that this comprises one of the 'problematic cases', since it would be an example of,

> Teaching any subject without due concern for understanding. (Snook 1972: 65)

A lack of due concern for understanding, and effectively only one view, is being offered if, while able to describe their own beliefs clearly, teachers' explanations of alternatives are so incompetent or beyond the cognitive ability of their pupils that they cannot be assimilated.

There is nothing to suggest that this is more likely in Peace Education than in any other subject where the content involves consideration of beliefs, but it must always be important to take steps to minimise the risk. Incompetence is not confined to peace educators and all responsible teachers should be conscious of the need to avoid it.

While some, with Snook, might not wish to allow 'unintentional' or accidental indoctrination, there may well be consensus that the state of affairs being described is as deplorable as intentional indoctrination and for the same reasons.

II f) iv) Could giving compelling reasons be a form of indoctrination?

Critics of Peace Education are not, I think, primarily accusing teachers of what is plainly incompetence in any lesson, and they do often seem to imagine that intentional indoctrination is the aim, but they may also fear that the arguments against all war are so convincing that any opposing viewpoints appear to children to be totally untenable. This would not easily fit indoctrination conventionally delineated, but the fear may be that it would amount to the same thing - somehow choice is being denied them.

It does seem odd that those who very evidently are not pacifists and recognise no convincing arguments for the pacifist position, could yet be worried that peace education must raise arguments so compelling that unshakeable pacifism is even a likely consequence. But let us suppose that these people see more clearly than I and, while themselves rejecting the arguments, they yet fear with good reason that our pupils will be taken in and become pacifists.

If it were the case that war could undeniably be shown to be always, in every conceivable instance totally unjustifiable, then in allowing children access to this insight, peace educators might be likely to inculcate pacifism. (Remembering the infinite capacity some children appear to have to ignore all reason and evidence, I admit this does not seem very likely, but it could happen.) However, this should not be the case. While it is widely believed that there can be just wars, Peace Education ought to take account of this and is intended to do so (Yarwood & Weaver, 1988: 99). In presenting the just war tradition, examined in Chapter 3, teachers can refute the accusation of giving a picture so coloured as to lead their pupils to reject all war per se.

II f) v) Peace Education may protect pupils against indoctrination

There is no good reason to suppose that the indoctrination of beliefs about peace would be avoided by the rejection of Peace Education in schools. All subject areas dealing with values and beliefs are, in principle vulnerable to indoctrination. However, Peace Education is specifically intended to ensure that children can protect themselves from indoctrination. Hicks includes in his list of the objectives for Peace Education, that,

> Students should be able to approach issues with an open and critical mind and be willing to change their opinions in the face of new evidence and rational argument. They should be able to recognise and challenge bias, indoctrination and propaganda. (Hicks, 1986: 16 and 1988: 14)

Some feel that much of what is taught in schools implicitly presents, without reasoned explanation and as fact, the case in favour of war and the violent resolution of conflicts. There is some force in this. Teachers often cite in this respect the celebration of heroes famed for their prowess in war and the popular tales in which the protagonist wins love, fame and fortune by killing dragons or knights. O'Connell too believes there is a need for a stress on peace in teaching on war, and that this might valuably be echoed in its label.

> I think however that it gives a psychological advantage to war to construct the relevant theory in its name. (O'Connell, 1984: 30)

Peace Education, engaged in with due regard for the status of beliefs about peace and for rationality, could provide a necessary corrective and protection against indoctrination.

I would maintain that indoctrination is both morally objectionable and educationally inappropriate, whether in Peace Education or in any other educational programme of study, but there are no grounds for the assumption that the danger of indoctrination in teaching on war and peace is such that it constitutes an adequate objection to Peace Education itself.

It would be foolish to deny that heavily biased presentation of war in the classroom is possible, but it is not inevitable. Neither indoctrination itself, nor any activity which has the same effect, is an acceptable teaching method in educational institutions. This must be one of the precepts on which teaching on war is based.

II g) 'Peace Education will be a vehicle for subversive propaganda.'

This may seem to be merely a more extravagant and emotive expression of the previous objection. Propaganda and indoctrination are very closely related and both are clearly objectionable in the classroom for similar moral and educational reasons. Nevertheless, the accusation that peace education will be a vehicle for subversive propaganda is worthy of separate consideration since it focuses more obviously on the actual views attributed to teachers of Peace Education.

In the nineteen eighties, the objection that Peace Education would facilitate the dissemination of certain ideologies, characterised by a disregard for the truth, was familiar. Reports in the media, echoing the extract from the TES below, were common.

> Teachers pressing for the introduction of peace
> studies into schools this week rejected allegations
> made by Dr Rhodes Boyson, education junior
> minister, that they are simply a front for appeasement
> and surrender to totalitarianism.

> Dr David Hicks, secretary to the 200-strong Peace
> Education Network, denied that teachers are planning
> to indoctrinate children into support for unilateral
> disarmament and pacifism. (TES: 7.5.82)

A decade later, accusations such as those levelled by Boyson are perhaps unlikely

and sound embarrassingly paranoic. Teachers are no longer used to charges of

subversion. Nevertheless, the belief that Peace Education is related to subversive,

political propaganda should not be forgotten. Increased confidence may have

quieted some fears of the political establishment and the demolition of the Berlin

Wall may have exorcised fears of Soviet communism, but there is no reason to

suppose that teaching about war and peace will not again to be denigrated as

subversive propaganda.

When he was Peace Education Officer for the Quaker Peace Service, in 1981, John

McConnell expressed his increasing dismay that, 'peace education is becoming a

party political issue'. Others share his worry, realising that for many of its

opponents Peace Education is inextricably associated with political beliefs, not just

in the broad sense but more precisely in terms of party politics.

The assumption seems to be that these political beliefs are of a particular type,

variously and somewhat confusingly described as 'left wing', 'socialist' or

communist' and more specifically as those held by people in favour of unilateral

disarmament. Marks (1984) maintains that teachers responsible for peace studies

courses have a clear political agendum, which is,

> the favourable representation of a view of the need
> for 'peace studies' that may be associated with the
> Marxist - Leninist political imperatives that underlie
> and govern 'Peace Studies' courses in state schools
> in countries under Soviet domination or control.
> Courses in peace studies in the UK, he claims, run a
> gamut from merely stressing the need for good
> manners to outright political indoctrination. (Aspin,
> 1986: 121)

It has been implied that, somehow by definition, to be pro-peace is to to be firmly at one end of the political spectrum.

> An interest in in studying peace equalled commitment
> to unilateral disarmament, which equalled a pro-
> Soviet stance, which meant appeasement and
> surrender being taught in schools. (Hicks, 1987: 7)

It is questionable whether or not teachers of Peace Education are in fact always of one of these political persuasions and, if they are, whether Peace Education is used as a vehicle for spreading their beliefs. Athough both of these possibilities seem unlikely to me, I should not wish to seem to dismiss them as unimportant since for many they constitute a genuine anxiety. But hard evidence is necessary to prove the point either way, evidence to which we do not have access.

My concern is that, in attempting to argue the facts of the case, there can be a failure to to recognise what is often the real issue - the accusation of subversion. 'Subversive' appears often to comprise questioning or contradiction of government policy. Consequently there is often nothing to be gained from arguing that not all those in favour of disarmament are communists or that discussion of peace and war in school is not calculated to to endanger the state. When 'subversive propaganda' is taken to mean the expression of views which are in any way incompatible official policy, then a different issue is under debate.

When subversion consists in the production of terrorists, there are many good reasons why we should blench at the prospect, but when subversion merely describes the discussion of alternative views on peace and war it would seem that good reason to refrain from presenting them is harder to find. That the government may be opposed to certain views about war does not of itself seem sufficient grounds for excluding presentation of those views in the classroom.

Reid associates 'subversive' with questioning the established order, and maintains,

> Peace education is subversive of teachers, and
> schools. (Reid, 1984: 129)

He does not however perceive this to be a bad thing, but rather a strength.

> Peace students are likely to be more restive, more
> questioning than the general run and it would be
> wrong if this were not the case. (Reid, 1984: 129)

I would agree. When 'subversive' means the development of critical evaluation and
the opposite of unquestioning acceptance, Peace Education ought to be subversive
and so should any teaching on war. When, on the other hand, it is intended to
signify an exclusively left-wing, unilateralist conspiracy which threatens the state,
subversive propaganda has no legitimate place in education.

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The objections to Peace Education examined here do not comprise an exhaustive
list, for this section was not intended primarily as an exercise in discovering or
refuting accusations. The intention was to highlight issues relevant to deciding how
war and peace should be dealt with in the classroom.

The objections of some of Peace Education's critics do draw attention to educational
considerations, such as the need for unbiased teaching, which cannot properly be
ignored. The extravagant nature of some of the allegations makes clear the depth of
anxiety people may experience about teaching on war and the consequent practical
problems to be addressed, if parents are to understand its value.

CHAPTER 5

Teaching on War: the underlying principles

It will be clear from the preceding chapters that there are many problems for the educator wishing to address issues of war in the classroom. They arise from the nature of the topic and from anxieties about methodology. In the classroom these become problems for which practical solutions need to be sought.

Peace Education has been put forward as a way in which such matters can be confronted in the curriculum, but, as we have seen in Chapter 4, its critics have been vociferous and their objections must be taken into account if the anxieties of parents and the wider community are to be allayed. Educators for peace are surely right when they suggest that we should be working for a more peaceful world and claim that this task, far from being inappropriate to teaching in schools, should be addressed in an educational setting. The difficulty of pursuing war in modern times in a morally tolerable fashion, noted in Chapter 3, is such that a more peaceful world must be desirable.

War and peace should not be left to putative experts, for the reasons cited in Chapter 4. Not all teachers will be among the most knowledgeable of the population with regard to the latest weaponry or military strategy. Nor will all educators claim to be in the best position to judge the political circumstances which give rise to wars. But teachers can properly claim expertise in teaching. They are precisely the people concerned and able to present the topic in an educational manner. They, above all, will be committed to ensuring that their teaching is not indoctrinatory. In addition, teachers have a specific understanding of childhood

and of the particular individuals in their classes. Consequently they are well-placed to approach issues sensitively, without causing undue anxiety or distress.

In order to contribute to a more peaceful world we need to do various things: to educate children so that they understand the implications of war, both moral and factual, so that they can make informed decisions, arrive at their own judgements and act in the light of these.

To achieve this it is necessary first to ascertain those principles which should inform all teaching on war. It will be argued that war is a controversial issue and that the principles specifically relevant to classroom practice in this context emanate from its controversial nature.

The place of teaching on war in the curriculum will be explored. In Chapter 1 it was demonstrated that war undoubtedly falls within the moral sphere. It will be maintained not only that moral education is indispensible to education on war, but also that war must be a topic addressed explicitly in the moral context.

The practice of war is also a political matter. 'Wars are not random events; they are the products of decisions,' (Welch, 1993: 9) and these decisions are political. I would not deny that, as Welch argues, politicians may be motivated by moral concerns such as the desire for justice, but their decisions are also likely to be related to that which specifically concerns the state and to judgements made within a particular political context such as democracy. Consequently, political education is essential to understanding the contribution citizens can make to the creation of a more peaceful world, and it will be submitted that war should explicitly be addressed in this context too.

Today, moral and political education in school is most often offered through the curriculum rather than occupying a designated slot on the timetable. Considerations which ought to underlie cross-curricular teaching and concerns relating to the hidden curriculum, will be identified.

The principles formulated will provide criteria for how war ought to be taught, the methodology, including where on the curriculum it should appear. (They will also be vital in the proper selection of content, but this will explored be separately in the following chapter.)

I War as a controversial issue in school

I i)   There is disgreement on the issue

A topic is said to be controversial if there is considerable disagreement about it - when it is the object of controversy.

> In a sense an issue is controversial 'if numbers of people are observed to disagree about statements and assertions made in connection with the issue'. (Stradling, 1984: 1)

People do disagree about war. Pacifists claim that it can never be morally acceptable to take human life, but Chapter 2 revealed it cannot be demonstrated this is self-evidently true. Others argue that war can be justified and that loss of life in war may be a necessity in pursuit of a higher end. The means by which war is waged have been debated over the centuries and in Chapter 3 it was noted that the deployment of modern weapons has added further dimensions to the scope for argument. The pursuit of war remains highly controversial.

I ii)   It is a weighty issue

In the educational context, a controversial issue is one which is not only commonly debated, but which is in some way important and felt to be crucial. Many issues raised by any consideration of war can be seen to be important and weighty in the way that the rival merits of tinned and frozen peas are not. The school curriculum need not, and of course could not, include all differences of opinion. As Hare explains:

> The value issue of apartheid is controversial, however, not because we believe that a case has been made against our conviction that racial groups should be treated equally, but because we regard the consequences of the system to be so pernicious that we must be concerned. (Hare, 1985: 112)

War, by definition, is life-threatening and its consequences so dire that it is clearly a vital issue.

Furthermore, wars have more than the academic interest for us that some potentially fatal illnesses might have. Unless we are at risk ourselves or number sufferers among those we know, we may be concerned about meningitis for example, but it is unlikely to be crucial to or affect most of our lives. War is different. At any one time, it may be what happens to other people, but all too often we are brought up short by the involvement of our own forces. News coverage of military action, vividly presented in the media now brings even distant conflicts close to home. Our living rooms feel the draught of the guided missile. It is no longer easy to ignore war and to feel entirely uninvolved. The living memory of the horrors of the First and Second World Wars and their place in both documentaries and fiction ensure that none of us remain entirely untouched by the knowledge of war.

Questions about war are important in all our lives. It is likely to be of concern to us individually, but it is also a matter of public interest - a matter for us as citizens.

Hare's first criterion for the description, controversial, is plainly satisfied by debate over war, since,

> it is a dispute of some significance in a public forum.
> (Hare, 1985: 112)

In other words, war is controversial, not merely in being argued over, although this is certainly the case, but also in that more significant sense intended when controversial issues on the curriculum are talked of.

As a weighty matter, it is likely to be the subject of hot debate rather than idle argument. The passion with which aspects of war are debated may be some reflection of their felt significance, but, given that people have apparently come to blows over trivialities, the heat generated in an argument is not necessarily a good guide to the importance of a subject in the wider scale of things. War is controversial, not merely in the sense that people disagree about it, nor because it provokes impassioned advocacy ('though both these may be true), but because the issues it raises are appropriately close to our hearts and crucial to us as persons and *therefore* do often provoke hot debate.

I iii)   It is a question of value

Heated arguments often arise when one or more of those involved has no knowledge or understanding of the relevant factors which could prove the case one way or the other, but these are not usually controversies described as 'controversial issues'. A question can also be controversial when there is insufficient evidence available to resolve it with certainty. Some questions in astronomy would fall into this category, when the problem to be solved is essentially an empirical one, but the technology needed to discover the answer is not yet available. There is nothing which logically precludes a solution in the future, but, at present, even the most

erudite experts do not have access to the the means of arriving at the answer. Some questions of war must be unanswerable in this sense, but these are not what is meant when war is cited as a controversial issue.

'Controversial', used in the context of schooling, most often refers to areas of enquiry which are not exclusively empirical and in which no conceivable scientific advance would provide verifiable and conclusive evidence that one's assertions were true. Issues relating to war are controversial,

> precisely because they are not capable of being settled by appeal to evidence. These are issues where the disagreement centres on matters of value judgement. (Stradling, 1984: 2)

Just like other controversial issues approached in the classroom, war raises questions of value, many of them moral questions, which are controversial in their logical status. They are issues which are inherently controversial. The nature of these is such that they cannot be resolved by reference to facts alone. Knowing that Napoleon treated his prisoners in a certain way will not of itself suffice to tell us how prisoners ought to be treated. Moral conflicts often appear to be disagreements about what is or was the case, but whether an action was morally right or wrong is significantly different from whether or not a deed actually took place. It is not only a matter of what happened, but of a judgement about the moral value of the event. (I do not wish to claim here that there are no moral truths, nor to suggest that moral judgements are mere expressions of taste, but to stress that we cannot know something is morally right solely by reference to the same sort of evidence which would entitle us to claim knowledge of exclusively empirical matters.)

Facts and reasoning are not totally irrelevant, and indeed may be of critical importance. The realisation that the effect of nuclear weapons is unpredictable is obviously highly relevant to deciding whether or not we ought to use them, but this information cannot make redundant the value judgement involved in arriving at

what should be done. The rights and wrongs of war and how it is waged are not simply factual matters, nor can they be arrived at merely via logical reasoning. The more knowledge we have, the better informed our judgement may be and the sounder our reasoning, the safer our conclusion is likely to be, but there is a logical stopper on the extent to which factual knowledge and logic can be appropriately employed in answering questions about what we ought to do. Something more is required: a belief in moral principles, values, which are in essence unverifiable and the disposition to decide by reference to them.

War is a question of value and controversial in this sense too.

I iv)   Controversy surrounds teaching on war

It is material to note that, in addition to the controversial nature of war as a topic, controversy arises over its inclusion on the school curriculum and the methodology. Chapter 4 revealed that teaching on war in school, at least in the form of Peace Education, is strongly contested.

Controversy over the inclusion of certain subjects is familiar. A subject can be controversial in this sense, without being essentially a matter of value. Whether or not modern languages should appear on the primary school curriculum seems to arise at regular intervals, but verb endings are not in themselves inherently controversial or value laden. The controversiality arises over whether or not young children should be learning modern languages rather than something else.

In contrast, there seems to be broad consensus that sex education should be part of schooling. The controversy about sex education relates less to whether or not it should be included at all and more to the form it should take, the methodology

employed and the specific content taught. Like moral education, sex education raises questions about how people ought to behave, so its content is also inherently controversial.

To summarise: war counts as a controversial issue for curricular purposes because it is widely debated, because it is a matter of importance and of public concern, and because it is an area of enquiry which raises questions of value which are controversial in their logical status. Controversy also surrounds the actual practice of teaching on war.

If teaching on war is to be educationally valuable, it must be recognised as a controversial issue and treated as such in the classroom. What might this mean for the teacher? What principles or criteria ought to be applied to teaching on war?

II Principles for teaching on war

II i)   Teaching on war should be unbiased.

It has been maintained in earlier chapters that the controversial nature of war entails that questions, such as 'Is it right to go to war?', are essentially open-ended. They are questions of value which, it was claimed above, are not susceptible to incontrovertible proof. Consequently teaching on war is dealing with an area where differences of opinion are rife and where people's views may be deeply felt and tenaciously held.

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Because questions of value are inherently debatable and in the final analysis the appropriate object of belief rather than knowledge, it is often feared that teachers will improperly inculcate their own beliefs when addressing controversial issues. It was maintained in the examination of objections to Peace Education, in Chapter 4, that there is no reason to suppose that teaching about war and peace need be indoctrinatory, but it cannot be denied that fear of biased teaching affects many teachers themselves as well as parents and people in the wider community. Teachers may be very conscious of the possibility of that unintentional indoctrination described in Chapter 4, and aware that, if children in effect receive only one view of a controversial issue, such teaching amounts to indoctrination, yet still be uncertain about the question of bias.

To be biased is to favour one view unduly, ignoring or dismissing the strength of counter claims. In discussing bias here, it is the promulgation of teachers' opinions that is of concern, not the fact that they hold opinions, biased or otherwise. Indoctrination might be thought of as an extreme form of biased teaching, insofar as it ignores any opposing views, but biased presentation can occur without that indoctrination characterised in Chapter 4.

To teach in a biased manner is to openly espouse one view rather than another, when to do so is to go beyond one's legitimate authority. As Crick explains,

> I have a ... modest and tentative authority as a
> *political philosopher* in analysing what kind of
> principles, rules or standards can be sensibly
> invoked in debate about political differences (which
> has nothing to do with the differences themselves).
> But I have no kind of authority whatever in
> propagating *political doctrines*, that is to say what
> should be done. I may say so, I do frequently say
> so; but in doing so either abuse my authority in
> speaking thus on formal or academic occasions.
> (Crick, 1977: 38 - 39)

In the same way, a teacher's authority does not extend to particular moral or political beliefs with regard to war. To present pacifist arguments is one thing, but

to sneer at all other viewpoints and to claim that pacifism is the only acceptable moral stance is quite another, exceeding one's authority as a teacher.

Acknowledgement of this can be difficult. While not consciously intending to indoctrinate, teachers may feel that the need to foster a certain opinion is so strong that they are tempted to engage in 'proselytisation' (Bridges, 1986: 25 ff.).

It is not difficult to imagine the conviction that racism, for example, is so obviously morally obnoxious that strong persuasion is needed to bring an end to the ingrained racist attitudes and behaviour exhibited by some pupils. Reasoned discussion and allowing children to come to their own conclusions seems fraught with danger and unlikely to achieve the desired result. Why should teachers shrink from biased teaching if this will eradicate racism (or gung-ho attitudes to war for that matter)? As Bridges explains, the ends cannot justify the means in this context. Proselytisation is incompatible with values which, with Bridges, I take to be central to education in this country:

> For example, it appears at least to to offend against most notions of respect for other people and their opinions. It appears to to conflict with social values to do with personal autionomy, which in the educational context often seems to require that pupils come to understand the choices open to them and to make these choices freely, intelligently and authentically for themselves. (Bridges, 1986: 25 - 26)

Teaching children what they ought to believe, could not be acceptable, whether this comprises an exercise in 'flagrant bias' (Crick, 1977: 39), indoctrination or direct instruction. Even in what might be widely agreed to be a good cause, such teaching cannot be educational. Its probable result would be the replacement of one unfounded belief with another and contributes nothing to a child's education:

> We simply replace one dogma, one prejudice, one unintelligent and irrational belief or one closed mind by another. (Bridges, 1986: 26)

Instead we want children to understand that some evidence is relevant to deciding what to believe, and that some beliefs are better grounded than others. Some reasoning is compelling, and a person's convictions about race and war need not be randomly chosen, not mere likes or dislikes, and not immune from moral evaluation. All this falls within the teacher's authority for these are educational matters. Biased teaching or proselytisation, which passes on beliefs themselves as if they are pieces of information, will hinder this understanding.

A biased presentation is unlikely to enable pupils to take seriously and respect the diversity of beliefs. Crick recalls how Harold Laski's impassioned airing of his views in lectures rarely stimulated students to form their own opinions and asks,

> If university students did not respond by 'creative antagonism' to this one-way dialectic, how much less likely that school pupils will? They will either accept or reject not just it, but the whole problem or subject. (Crick, 1977: 39)

The teacher of controversial issues must be concerned to help pupils to take them seriously and arrive at judgements to which they are personally committed. Impassioned advocacy or proselytisation is unlikely to achieve this.

There may be wide agreement that teaching for a more peaceful world is desirable, but to advocate pacifism as if it is the only tenable position would be to distort the case and to be dishonest.

> The obligation on the teacher to present the issue fairly, (and it is an analytic truth in such cases that each side has some merit) is derived from the concept of education which involves the pursuit of truth. An unsupported opinion from the teacher favoring one side does not contribute to this feature intrinsic to the idea of education. (Hare, 1985: 117)

Pacifism, as we saw in Chapter 2, cannot be shown to be self-evidently true. Just war theorists hold very different views. Teachers have a duty to do justice to both sides in the debate.

Reference to evidence and reasoning will not remove all danger. Explaining why, in the teacher's view, it is wrong to kill, while, for example, castigating as flimsy opposing arguments, will still be to exhibit unacceptable bias. The adducing of reasons as if they are obviously overriding may imply that the proposition is proven and incontrovertible, and be as misleading as simply asserting it as fact.

Issues of value are fundamentally controversial in a way that empirical matters are not. The two must not be presented as if they are similar in kind, since,

> A teacher cannot teach and demonstrate the truth of a
> proposition like 'pacifism is always right' as he (sic)
> can teach and demonstrate the truth of the proposition
> 'oil is less dense than water' or 'plants need light in
> order to grow.' (Bailey 1973: 35)

Honesty and regard for the development of understanding demand that teaching on war and any other controversial issue should be unbiased if, as it should be, the teacher's commitment is to education rather than to particular views on the issues (see The Schools Council Humanities Project, 1970).

This said, avoiding presenting issues in a biased manner may not be easy. Other principles may usefully complement the idea of unbiased teaching. Undue weight given to one viewpoint amounts to bias, so the notion of balance too would seem relevant.

II ii)   Teaching on war should be balanced

In order to avoid inculcating only one opinion, it is often agreed that we should present a balanced view of controversial topics - not merely passing on our own particular opinions but ensuring that children have access to the range of opinion.

Dearden (1984) analyses the concept of a balanced curriculum. He is not discussing specifically the teaching of controversial issues, but nevertheless his comment that balance is related to breadth is noteworthy. As he points out, to some extent this is a matter of logic: balance demands that more than one element is needed, (Dearden, 1984: 62). So the very idea of balance in teaching on war presupposes that diversity of views typical of controversial issues noted earlier. Attention to balance would logically preclude the presentation of only one perspective and the resulting indoctrination, intentional or unintentional.

Furthermore, 'balance' can suggest due weighting given to competing views and thus lack of bias. Balance would seem to be highly relevant to addressing war in the classroom.

However, attractive as it sounds, what balance might mean in practice is not always easy to identify.

The idea of balance,

> assumes prior judgements as to the elements between
> which you are to find a balance. (Dearden, 1984:
> 61)

Sometimes these judgements are relatively simple in that two views, which are in direct opposition to each other, are plainly evident. A person might be for or against fox-hunting, and thus balance would require that both cases were presented. But on many issues more than two positions are possible. Views on the morality of

war are likely to range from those of absolute pacifists, through those which would allow some defensive wars, and those which concede the justice of some aggressive wars to, at the other end of the spectrum, militarism.

Judgements over which views need to be offered in school in order to achieve balance may be difficult. They cannot be evaded on the assumption that all available options can and should be dealt with in the classroom. Teachers cannot always be aware of all the different perspectives on an issue. Decisions on what should be presented may also be imperative due to limits on time and resources in schools.

In addition, it should be remembered that it is at least arguable that the expression of some viewpoints is inappropriate in certain circumstances. The claim is not that some views should never be mentioned in the classroom, but rather that to teach the views which amount to extreme racism or mindless war propaganda, for example, *on equal terms with* more reasoned discussion must be inappropriate. This is not just a matter of presentation, such that if these positions were politely articulated in a low key manner they would be acceptable in the classroom. It is a question of the nature of such beliefs.

Racism and war propaganda are, by definition, biased. To be racist is to judge irrationally, invoking race when this is an irrelevant criterion, and 'propaganda' means an attempt to bias opinion. To offer these on par with more rationally justifiable views could comprise what Crick terms,

> that gross bias which leads to inaccurate perceptions
> of the nature of other interests, groups and ideals.
> (Crick, 1978: 67)

Balance does not demand that all views on controversial issues are taught as equally acceptable. Balance is the antithesis of bias, and while educators should rightly be

concerned to avoid teaching 'inaccurate perceptions', they should moreover realise that, whatever else balance may imply, it cannot mean 'gross bias'.

I should not wish to maintain that views of dubious moral value should never be aired in class, nor that they should be permitted and then instantly refuted with the full weight of teacher authority, but would emphasise that they, in common with other opinions on controversial issues proffered by teachers or pupils, should be open to rigorous scrutiny. It is that teaching which effectively permits no contradiction, and thus is biased, which should be excluded from schooling.

Deciding what is necessary to balanced teaching on war must therefore include judgements on methodology, on how various positions are presented.

Balance requires that diverse views should be addressed, and not that every opinion can or should be presented in the same way. While it would be inadequate to consider only the cases for and against pacifism, ignoring other shades of opinion on war, it is also clear that balance does not call for militaristic propaganda.

Some very practical questions remain. It is not immediately clear, for example, if balance demands that various stances be given equal weighting nor if weighting might translate into time. There are qualitative as well as quantitive considerations to be remembered. A two minute well-prepared talk, followed by a short interesting film is likely to have more impact than a thirty minute speech from one unused to teaching. But to conceptualise the call for balanced presentation in this rather crude fashion is a mistake.

> A balanced diet does not consist of equal parts by
> weight of each essential foodstuff; it includes
> *sufficient* of each of the necessary elements.
> (Dearden, 1984: 61)

In the same way, a balanced presentation of views in the classroom requires judgements to be made with regard to what would be sufficient and necessary to provide an unbiased learning environment.

Judging the likely effect of different types of presentation is part of what it is to be an effective teacher. If the resources on pacifism are all new and enticingly packaged, while the teaching materials for the just war are limited to a dog-eared book written in inaccessible language, it is not impossible to realise that balance in this respect is lacking. Judgement will be required if justice is to be done to the various positions, but it is the sort of professional judgement teachers have to make all the time. The notion of balance can provide a criterion by which to make decisions about resources and presentation.

If it is the child who is to receive a balanced education on the subject of war (and surely that is what is intended, rather than balance solely judged according to what is provided in school) it would seem that prior learning should be taken into account. Is it necessary that the school rehearses what children already have heard outside school? Perhaps teachers need not present the full range of views, but compensate, choosing to teach that which has not been experienced elsewhere. Wellington asks,

> how is the teacher to judge or even collect information on the facts' and views fed to pupils outside school? This is an impossible task. In addition, the information and attitudes pupils acquire outside school will vary enormously from one to the other. To redress the balance for all would require a separate curriculum for each pupil. (Wellington, 1986: 164)

This seems to overstate the case somewhat, rather in the way that objectors to child-cetred education often point to the impossibility of teaching each pupil individually and conclude that therefore the whole theory is untenable. Of course it is true that teachers could never know exactly all the details of each child's background, but

this does not mean they have no idea at all of what children have learnt and what they believe. Teachers too watch television and go to popular films. They have some insight into prevalent opinions which are likely to influence their pupils. Teachers meet parents and there is opportunity to discover something of individual children's experiences. Pupils themselves can be encouraged to share their thoughts and their beliefs.

Their prior learning in any subject is likely to vary tremendously. By listening to them teachers discover what needs to be taught and at what level. To presume that even whole class lessons will always comprise didactic delivery of information to a passive group of unknown children, who may or may not have heard it all before, seems extraordinary. All teaching must surely allow for individual differences.

Wellington's comment, though, should not be ignored. It provides a salutary reminder that teachers should not make careless assumptions about what their pupils might share in common and what they may individually believe, and it indicates that balance, conceived in precise quantifiable terms, will be impossible. But it does not show that all balance is unattainable and not worth striving for.

Teaching on war should not be one sided or loaded toward any one stance, and some balance can and should be preserved in presenting a range of opinions. If teachers attend to balance they can avoid merely inculcating their own views and thereby avoid bias.

The notion of balance helps a clearer understanding of what it would be to teach in an unbiased manner. It provides a criterion plainly relevant to the choice of resources and the content of lessons and is important in this respect, but little has been said with regard to the teacher's own stance in the classroom. This too needs to be considered.

II iii)   Teachers should be neutral when teaching on war

For some to be unbiased is to be neutral. A person is thought to be neutral when he or she favours no one side over another. A neutral presentation cannot be biased.

Much that has been written, questioning and defending neutrality in relation to teaching controversial issues, is particularly aimed at the idea of the neutral chairing of discussions in the classroom (Bailey 1973, Bridges 1986, Elliot 1973, Ruddock 1986, Singh 1988 et al.).

Rudduck (1986) is not suggesting that teachers should not actually prefer one position, only that they fulfil a neutral role in not expressing their preferences during discussion of controversial issues. They should adopt procedural neutrality, and thus avoid the biased teaching they fear. She explains,

> Our assumption was that schools would not want to
> assert an institutional position on controversial issues
> in the face of the diversity of view held by teachers.
> We also assumed that teachers would be cautious
> about exposing their own views unless they could be
> sure that their authority as teachers would not lead
> pupils automatically to accept their view as the right
> one. (Rudduck, 1986: 9)

The adoption of a neutral stance is claimed to facilitate the airing of diverse opinions, encourage critical scrutiny of views and permit children to think things out for themselves. The success or otherwise of neutral chairing is in the end an empirical matter, but the idea raises some pertinent questions.

If neutrality were to suggest to pupils that teachers are unwilling to make up their minds or uncaring with regard to an issue, it would be undesirable. We do not want pupils to receive the impression that their mentors are just sitting on the fence about controversial issues:

> Teachers must not give the impression, however, that they are devoid of any commitment. (Singh, 1988: 99)

Ruddock denies that this will happen:

> This is a misconception, for it is important to discuss with pupils why the teacher is adopting a procedural neutrality. Indeed it is precisely because teachers do have strong personal commitments on the issues under discussion and recognise that pupils have a right to develop similar commitments that they might wish to adopt the convention of the neutral chairperson during classroom discussion. (Rudduck, 1986: 10)

This must be right and explanation of the aims of the exercise vital. But Singh claims there is a further difficulty:

> while the principle of the neutral chair is correct in advocating that teachers should maintain open enquiry and encourage rationality, it fails to take into account that such ideas may require the teacher to take the opposite view. It may demand that teachers put forward counter arguments in order to redress the balance. (Singh, 1988: 97)

If all opinions are to be subject to similar interrogation in the interest of balance, he may be correct that counter arguments are needed, but there is nothing to necessitate the presentation of these immediately, within the discussion. Teachers could supplement the debate after the discussion, when procedural neutrality has been replaced appropriately by a more didactic role. While not suggesting that all discussion should be followed by a teacher commentary, which would be likely to destroy all that is intended by Rudduck, I would note the availability of this option, for a different danger lurks if it is forgotten.

Although teachers may be retaining neutrality in some sense, in offering views to which they are not personally committed, they will be adopting the role of devil's advocate. On the one hand, pupils may imagine the arguments offered are actually

the teachers' and that, whatever has been said before, believe the teachers are introducing bias. On the other, when it is evident that there is no personal commitment, teachers may be thought to be insincere or reducing the discussion to an academic game in which arguments must be marshalled as part of the rules. As an educational experience, the recognition of counter arguments is essential, but their importance is in the pursuit of well-founded judgements. Discussion of controversial issues is not a game which is won and lost. There is no winning side.

> The discussion should protect divergence of view among participants and not force consensus. (Rudduck, 1986: 8)

It can also be argued that for a teacher to express her own opinion is not necessarily to be coercive or to arrest critical discussion. More than this, Warnock views such declarations as a duty:

> Unless a teacher comes out into the open and says in what direction he believes the evidence points he will have failed in his duty as a teacher. For what his pupils have to learn is not only in an abstract way, what counts as evidence, but how people draw conclusions from evidence. (Warnock, 1975: 165)

Those who recommend procedural neutrality do so in the conviction that authority conventionally attributed to teachers in practice carries weight and personal declarations will in fact, albeit unintentionally, bias a discussion. Experience suggests this is very likely, but if children can be persuaded that, irrespective of who makes them,

> All statements are subject to rational criticism (Bailey, 1975: 126),

then there can be no justification for teachers to hide or disguise there own opinions.

Insofar as procedural neutrality on the part of the teacher actually does remove blind acceptance of the teacher as the authority, encourages independent thinking and the

expression of diverse views and fosters reasoned reflection, it must be the antithesis of bias, and an appropriate strategy to employ in the teaching of controversial issues. Pupils need not only see teachers in the role of neutral chair and assume a disturbing lack of commitment to any views on war. It is a practical way to avoid adding weight to any one view during open discussion.

This same 'procedural neutrality' can be achieved by many teaching strategies which put learning explicitly in the hands of the pupils themselves. Role play and improvising scenes with puppets can allow quite young children to express and explore their own beliefs, examining a diversity of opinions safely. Examples of games can be found in books such as *Winners All* (Pax Christi, 1980) and, for older children, *Conflict and Change* (Nicholas, 1983). Brainstorming, values clarification exercises and hypothesising in the classroom all can contribute to reflection on personal values in a protected environment.

Examination of procedural neutrality has convinced me that it is best described as a teaching method, rather than a principle by which to identify methodology or content. Procedural neutrality is a practical solution to one aspect of the problem of bias. It complements the idea of balance in offering a teaching strategy believed to minimise the possibility of a teacher's views carrying undue weight in class discussion.

But there must be more to the teaching of controversial issues than this neutralising of bias. Educators are concerned about what should children learn, as well as what they should not learn. They not only want children to be protected from the teachers' bias, but also to learn not to be biased.

A further criterion, which relates especially to the teacher's own stance but also offers teaching by example, is still needed to stand alongsided balance in illuminating what unbiased teaching must be.

II iv) Impartiality

The opposite of bias is surely impartiality. To be biased is to be partial, to favour one claim unduly. The judge who gives longer sentences to women than to men, irrespective of the nature of their crimes, is biased and is demonstrating partiality towards men. Gender, the criterion used, is irrelevant and the judgement has been made irrationally. To be impartial is to decide on the basis of good reasons, not to prejudge without, or despite, appropriate evidence.

Impartiality demands objectivity, the ability to assess beliefs, evidence and argument on their objective merits, not swayed by self-interest or prejudice. This surely is what we are hoping for when discussing controversial issues in the classroom. Impartiality does not preclude one from having strong convictions, in the way that neutrality might seem to, but it does mean that my views are not necessarily better than yours solely in virtue of being deeply felt, mine or a teacher's.

> To be impartial is to consider views and interests in the light of all possible criticisms and counter-claim, and to ignore any kind of special pleading, whether from authority or whatever, from myself or whomsoever. (Bailey, 1975: 127)

The teacher's stance in the classroom should surely always be characterised by impartiality and children should be educated so that they acquire impartiality and recognise when it is appropriate.

With impartiality as a criterion, teachers could, without impropriety, sincerely admit their own views.

> the teacher who takes a stand on one side of a
> controversial issue may nevertheless do justice to
> other points of view, and present his own position as
> subject to revision. (Hare, 1985: 117)

Hare (1985) and Bailey (1973) both maintain that being open about one's own beliefs is desirable and therefore preferable to assuming a neutral stance. I would agree that sincerity is morally desirable, but would contend that it is not incompatible with the procedural neutrality expounded by Ruddock (1986). Neutral chairing of discussion is a practical strategy to prevent the introduction of undue influence in a very specific classroom situation. A neutral chair can still be an impartial teacher.

Impartiality should underpin all teaching on war. It should be a feature of of all education in any subject area, but although it is self-evident that chemistry teachers who claim a proposition is true merely 'because I say so', are failing in their task, the need for impartiality can be overlooked in lessons on controversial issues. And yet it is in the sphere of values that impartiality is crucial.

I have to endorse Sir Keith Joseph's words in this instance, when he asserts,

> The teacher's presentation needs to be as objective as
> he can make it, in the sense that what is offered is
> indeed true; that the selection of facts gives a clear
> picture which is neither unbalanced or superficial;
> that facts and opinions are clearly separated; and that
> the pupils are encouraged to weigh evidence and
> argument so as to arrive at rational judgements.
> (Keith Joseph, cited in Bridges, 1984: 31)

Teaching war as a controversial issue then should be impartial. An impartial presentation is necessarily unbiased in the senses outlined in the preceding sections. Attention should be given to balance and neutrality in selecting resources and

choosing teaching methods, for these will be needed if impartiality is to be maintained.

III War and Moral Education

III i)   Moral education is necessary to teaching on war

War is clearly a matter of life and death and the morality of war is heavily dependent upon the acceptability of intentional killing, shown in Chapter 2 to be a particularly intransigent moral problem. Moral education is surely necessary if people are to be able to make wise judgements on such complex issues, for, as I argued in Chapter 4, they cannot rely on others, even assumed experts, if they are to judge morally.

'Moral education' is intended to refer to more than teaching pupils to be good, in the sense of training them how to behave in a morally acceptable manner or inculcating in children a set of moral values (c. f. Straughan, 1982: 9 and Pring, 1984: 61 ff.). Moral education aims to put children in a position where they can become moral agents, developing moral views which are significantly their own and the disposition to think and act in accordance with these. This will involve consideration of moral principles and establishing priorities, for,

> acquiring the dispositions *is* to some extent accepting
> priorities. Learning to tell the truth is in part learning
> not to lie even when lying would bring one's friends
> or family advantage. (White, 1990: 50)

I am not suggesting that teachers should suddenly devote an enormous amount of time to holding moral philosophy lectures and seminars in schools in order to equip children to deal with the moral questions of war, let alone that we should confront

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reception classes with questions about when it might be morally acceptable to turn off a life-support system. Nevertheless, some consideration of, for example, the prima facie value of human life, must be essential in teaching on war.

Teaching on war would be incomplete if respect for life is not addressed. Without reflection on the place of human life in our hierachy of values, it is difficult to imagine how the pacifist position could be understood or evaluated. Moral education provides initiation into moral principles and moral reasoning without which understanding war would be completely inadequate.

This is not to argue that other curriculum areas are irrelevant. Some subject teaching can contribute valuably in disabusing pupils of mistaken assumptions that war is unavoidable and thus outside the ethical sphere. Biology teachers are well placed to explain the inadequacies of any crude form of biological determinism, for they, in virtue of their particular expertise as biologists, are likely to understand its weaknesses and be aware of criticisms such as those explored in Chapter 1. It may be that explicit discussion of sociobiological assumptions with older children would pre-empt the misunderstanding which could lead to the conviction that aggression and war are reducible to biological impulses. Both biology and English language lessons are appropriate environments in which to address the varied meanings of 'natural'. Similarly an historical or religious perspective on the just war could help children to appreciate the causes of war and how moral attitudes to them have changed in ways suggested in Chapter 3.

Some knowledge of the means employed in modern warfare is needed if young people are to have informed views on war. Harris claims,

> The so-called biotechnical revolution will continue to
> present us with complex dilemmas, (Harris, 1986:
> 101)

and, if the public is expected to participate in deciding them,

school is an obvious and important source of
knowledge which will help to inform debate on these
issues. (Harris, 1986: 100).

He stresses that schools can provide at least some of the relevant scientific and

medical information relevant to moral judgement, which is why the controversial

issues of life and death are appropriately addressed in the classroom. Knowledge

from various academic disciplines is needed to make better rather than worse moral

judgements.

However, such teaching would be only part of what is needed, albeit a prerequisite

for moral evaluation of war. It would be inadequate to approach the topic only in a

biological context, or in other curricular areas where the objectives of the lessons

are likely to be the acquisition of predominantly empirical understanding. Initiation

into moral discourse is also necessary, if children are to be given what they need to

make proper judgements about war.

It might be thought that moral education will provide children with the tools to deal

with a range of moral problems, including those related to war, so it is not

necessary to introduce it specifically as a topic. This would be a mistake.

III ii)   Why should war be included in moral education?

One of the stated aims of the National Curriculum is to promote the moral

development of pupils, (Education Reform Act, 1988: Section 1). The wherewithal

for arriving at moral judgements and acquiring the expertise to think morally cannot

be approached in a vacuum. Children need to exercise their abilities and to practise

on moral dilemmas. It might be argued that, even so, there is no need for

discussion of war to be included. There are plenty of other topics which could be

used as vehicles for the development of moral reasoning and the formation of moral values. Why war?

I do not wish to reiterate those reasons why war should be included in a form of Peace Education noted in Chapter 4, nor to attempt justification by suggesting that it is a stimulating topic, likely to capture the attention of jaundiced children (although I think this is often true), but to maintain that without an area of study called 'Peace Education', there would still be good reason for introducing reflection on war as part of moral education.

It was argued in Chapter 1 that war is a moral matter and cannot be properly regarded as somehow outside the ethical sphere. Nevertheless, it is also a desperately practical matter and, in discussion of practicalities, the moral dimension can be all too easily overlooked or improperly diminished in importance. While teachers debate with their classes the wisdom of using the long bow rather than the cross bow, what it is 'right' or 'good' to do often has little moral significance and refers only to what will work best.

Exactly because it is not always discussed as (or recognised to be) a moral matter, it is vital that war is addressed as such in schools, in an explicitly moral context.

War concerns killing human beings, but the moral problems of war require attention to specific considerations in addition to those seen in Chapter 2 to have bearing on the intentional taking of life. Deciding whether or not war in self-defence is justifiable demands that the effects of war and weapons are understood. Unless moral education includes particular reference to warfare, teaching on war will be inadequate.

Part of learning about war in the context of moral education is to see that there is no one easy answer. Children may come to hold pacifist views or become confirmed militarists, but, if moral education is successful, they will not have merely adopted without reflection some attractive ideology propagated by government or teachers, family or friends. They will have arrived at their own moral viewpoint, will understand that there are competing arguments, have informed reasons for their opinions, and their views will be autonomously held. They will have learned to question the morality of war, but this will be questioning the wrongs as well as the rights of warfare. Questioning is the very antithesis of indoctrination and a defence against it. Looking at war within moral education is crucial if the moral dimension of its controversiality is to be appreciated.

IV   War and Political Education

IV i)   Political Education is necessary to teaching on war

Morality is not only a personal matter - and neither is war. Characteristically morality is a feature of interpersonal relationships, and in a democratic state, these extend into the political sphere.

War is a political matter in being part of government policy. Schools should prepare children to make their contribution as citizens:

> Teachers have a responsibility to help their pupils
> understand and formulate their views on important
> areas of public debate. (NUT, 1984: 6)

Soon after completing their schooling, children become voters. Foreign policy is an area of politics and they should be aware that decisions are made relating to war and these are political decisions which we may have to live with, but which are made in climates we can affect.

Although the moral implications of war are crucial, it cannot be understood exclusively in moral terms.

> War is a calculated political phenomenon undertaken at the behest of those in power in a society for political and economic gain. 'Hostilities' begin without the least hostility between individuals except as deliberately created by the organs of propaganda. People kill each other in wars for all sorts of reasons, not the least of which is that they are forced to do so by the political power of the state. (Rose et al., 1984: 251)

Furthermore, people's attitudes to war are politically sensitive in that governing in a democracy requires a measure of consent. Wars are fought between states not individuals and relate to governmental policy. I think we have to assume that the topic of war raises peculiarly political problems.

The potential for a diversity of views on whether or not one's country should go to war is enormous. It is very obvious that, although there is considerable agreement that war can be justified, there not total consensus on the matter. Pacifism is recognised as an intellectually respectable alternative and famous pacifists are admired even by some who cannot agree with their principles. The lack of universal consensus, whether it is in relation to the morality of war generally or the expediency of a particular military engagement, is likely to worry politicians.

In the conviction that all war is necessarily wicked, judging one's government to be morally culpable is surely near to wishing to be rid of them - something politicians must dread. But self-interest aside, widespread disagreement over government

policy with regard to military engagement could cause serious problems. More is at stake than individual politicians or one party retaining power. A refusal on the part of the populace generally ever to participate in fighting would be more than a minor difficulty for a government committed to keeping armed forces and whose defence policy includes the threat of armed reprisal.

It is conceivable that war only requires that sufficient people can be coerced into fighting, but a democracy contemplating the possibility of war needs broad consent and sufficient citizens willing to fight in both principle and practice. Those who believe that some wars are justified and that the country may have to go to war are dependent on the agreement of others to a very significant extent. To engage in wars demands more than money from taxes; it requires large numbers of people actively to contribute to the war effort.

> It can easily be seen that if a large part of the youth of a nation were to object to war in general or to a particular war, that nation would have little chance of success in war, whether or not conscientious objection were legally recognised. Its armies would probably be demoralised.
> (C of E Board for Social Responsibility, 1982: 102)

Individuals or small groups cannot wage war alone. War presents a situation, where survival largely depends on the actions of others. If sufficient people chose against war, there would be profound political consequences, which may include, but also go far beyond, the self-interest of politicians who wish to continue in power.

So war very evidently is a political issue in a variety of ways. It is part of our political lives as citizens, it relates to governmental policy and often to party political interests.

What is learnt with respect to war therefore should be informed by political education for it is a political matter. 'Political education' is a term which might in practice be applied to many different sorts of teaching. There have long been debates, such as those discussed by Crick (1977) and Heater (1969), about what it ought to comprise. It is used here to refer to teaching which includes information about political systems,

> and the way in which political processes really operate, (Gardner, 1969: 47)

but in which it is also recognised that,

> The teacher's task is, at whatever level, primarily a conceptual one, not a matter of conveying an agreed corpus of factual information. He needs to build up and extend an elementary vocabulary of concepts through which we both perceive the world and use them to try to influence it. (Crick, 1977: 14)

Political education will be needed if much of the political practice of war is to be understood and if pupils are to have the opportunity to influence this practice.

IV ii)   Why should war be included in political education?

To maintain that political education is necessary to understanding war is insufficient to show that war ought to have a place in political education in school. It might appear that the political aspects of war, if not the moral dimension, receive adequate coverage outside the classroom. Not all a child's education is acquired in school and much of what we each have learned about modern war has been gleaned from information in books and the media generally,

> Most of the children say they learnt about nuclear weapons by watching television, but parents, teachers, newspapers, videos, books and friends are also mentioned as sources of information. (Jones & Saunders, 1984: 10)

This is information which is in the public domain in two senses. It is permitted and available, rather than being secret or private, but is is also widely disseminated through public channels. Since war is so public and brought to our attention so often, it might be thought that sufficient knowledge can be gained without further effort in the classroom.

Jacobsen argues that public information,

> a neutral term that covers information irrespective of
> its use for good or evil purposes, (Jacobsen, 1984:
> 52)

is inadequate if we wish to give children a genuine insight into the problems of peace and security. Instead he calls for 'public enlightenment' which has an 'intellectual/rational' component and an 'emotional/commitment component'. (He makes clear that he is not thinking of indoctrination into a specific ideology, but addressing how educators should contribute to informing the public about these problems.)

In educational institutions, whatever else is aimed for, the development of the intellect and rationality occupies a high place in the hierarchy of purposes, which it need not in the media. Entertainment value or specific party political interests may justifiably take precedence outside the classroom, but not inside. Schools are ideally situated to contribute to public enlightenment on war in political education.

I take Jacobsen to be highlighting, in his call for the emotional/commitment component, the need for political education which has among its aims the cultivation of a disposition. As White explains,

> A main aim of school education is to create the
> disposition to think that these political matters are
> worth bothering about and that it is worthwhile
> continuing the search for knowledge about them,
> wherever that leads (White, 1987: 24).

War is surely a political matter of first importance, about which children need political understanding. In Britain young people have the right to vote at 18 and,

> properly to exercise that right they need to have been politically educated so that at least they understand the issues and how their resolution, one way or another, will affect their lives and those of others in their society and beyond it. (White, 1984: 33)

Political education is essential in any democratic society if our children are to become participating citizens with knowledge and understanding of their roles, and war should be one of the topics studied in a political context if pupils are to be capable of contributing to public debate and influencing political decisions about international military conflict.

Teaching on war can be viewed as part of,

> a very long and honourable tradition in the English Curriculum...in which teachers accept that one of their roles is to help young people understand the world in which they live and in particular the processes and machinery by which political decisions are made - the tradition of 'civics'. (John Slater at a DES/Regional course, cited by Hicks, 1986: 12)

In *'Consultation on values in education and the community'*, the statement of societal values begins,

> We value truth, human life, justice and collective endeavour for the common good of society. ((National Forum for Values in Education and the Community, 1996: 3)

War is surely one of the greatest evils which threatens the common good of any society. To argue that it is imperative to encourage reflections on the justice of war, is not to argue that war can never be justified, but while wars may or may not have been won on the playing fields of Eton, it is unlikely that wars will be stopped

unless the possibility is discussed in appropriate educational contexts, in both the moral and political dimensions of the curriculum.

V Cross curricular teaching on war

Reflection on war might most profitably find its place in moral and political education. This may be explicitly addressed in periods allocated for Personal and Social Education, but moral and political education should not be restricted exclusively to designated lessons. An approach which is cross-curricular in a variety of senses is vital. (I believe this applies to some aspects of political education, but more generally to moral education so will confine my remarks in what follows to the latter.)

V i) Moral education should not be confined to special lessons

We do not wish to give children the impression that moral thinking is only important in specific lessons. If we are unhappy at the way children seem unable to use any mathematical reasoning in geography lessons, we must also be concerned to avoid the impression that morality is a subject confined to certain times in the week. In this sense moral education should be cross-curricular, with a whole school approach planned, ensuring that the moral aspect is not lost when war is considered in history or geography. Just as the skills of literacy are important in all lessons, not just English, so too is morality.

V ii)   All teachers should be involved

The nature of moral education needs to be understood by all teachers, irrespective of whether or not particular individuals have special responsibility, involvement or expertise in the area. This is because consistency of approach is needed. If moral education is aimed at putting children in the best possible position to arrive at their own moral judgements, it will be confusing if, for example, some teachers manifestly ignore or constantly denigrate pupils' own opinions.

Not every teacher will address war in the same context and indeed for some the topic might never arise, but all the staff in a school need to have access to what is explicitly taught so that the child's experience of schooling is coherent, and contradictory messages can be avoided. For a popular teacher to maintain that war just is wrong, dismissing the problematic status of moral propositions, will be likely both to confuse pupils and complicate the task of those who teach Personal and Social Education.

V iii) _ Morality should be a cross-curricular dimension

The presentation of the moral aspects of war should also be cross-curricular in a slightly different sense. Teaching generally should not only be consistent with moral education, but ethical implications should explicitly be raised in different areas of the curriculum when relevant.

Higgs argues forcefully that science courses must include reference to moral responsibility and accountability. She quotes the words of one engaged in designing the X-ray laser pumped by a nuclear explosion that formed the basis of the 'Star Wars' defence system:

> My view of weapons has changed. Until 1980 or so
> I didn't want to have anything to do with nuclear
> anything. Back in those days I thought there was
> something fundamentally evil about weapons. Now
> I see it as an interesting physics problem.
> (Hagelstein cited in Higgs, 1987: 26)

Her point is not that Haggelstein has altered his moral stance, but that he has now rejected any moral view of his work.

We should not give our pupils the idea that the application of science, or any other subject, can be completely isolated from ethical concerns. To do so would be to provide an inadequate education, and to fail to provide what Peters termed 'cognitive perspective', (Peters, 1966). In providing an education for all children, it must not be forgotten that among those we teach are tomorrow's research scientists - people whose careers are particularly associated with their scientific education - and we must ask whether we want them to perceive their studies as value free.

Where consideration of war is part of historical or literary study, or any other subject, that it presents moral problems should not be forgotten. This is not to say that lengthy moral debates should ensue from any mention of warfare in each and every lesson, but rather to assert that the pursuit of historical understanding and literary appreciation ought not to obscure or seem to deny the underlying moral dimension. Some of our pupils will go on to hold high office in politics and in the armed forces, and exert particular influence over their country's fate in international conflicts. If we have not educated them to recognise moral questions wherever they arise, we should not be surprised if they approach intellectual problems in a purely pragmatic way.

V iv)   The hidden curriculum

Much of what has been said about cross-curricular teaching concerns the hidden curriculum. Learning that moral thinking is not peculiar to P.S.E. lessons and that citizens have responsibilities for political decisions with regard to war depends on the hidden curriculum as well as on any explicit syllabus.

The 'hidden curriculum' is intended to signify that which is taught implicitly rather than overtly. The hidden curriculum can encompass the lessons children learn from how they are treated in school, from what is displayed on the walls of classrooms and from the resources available.

It is commonly assumed that values are most often absorbed from the hidden curriculum. Concern for others is frequently presumed to be learnt from the ethos of a school rather than from explicit teaching. Bridges defends procedural neutrality on these grounds:

> if the societal values that teachers wanted to promote were in fact of a roughly democratic order, they might well discover that their ends were better served through the so-to-speak 'hidden curriculum' of procedural neutrality than through any explicit attempt at their promotion. (Bridges, 1986: 30)

He goes on to cite the Humanities Curriculum Project trials (1970):

> The evaluation study suggested that marginally, but by a statistically significant degree, teachers who adopted the stance of procedural neutrality were more likely to encourage tolerant interracial attitudes than those who sought actively to promote such attitudes. (Bridges, 1986: 30)

It has been found that teacher behaviour, such as displaying children's work, praising achievement, preparing lessons thoroughly, being punctual, and displaying trust by giving pupils responsibility, correlated highly with less bullying and rudeness.

> It was striking that the schools in which children were expected to take responsibility for their own things had better outcomes with respect to

attendance, behaviour and delinquency. (Rutter et
al., 1979: 132)

By example, in what they say and do, teachers may all be responsible to some
extent for the values our pupils come to hold and their actions.

It is a common misconception that teachers can have no influence over the hidden
curriculum. It is pointed out that messages our body language sends might count as
part of the hidden curriculum, but our habits and gestures are usually involuntary.
That being the case, there is little which can be done. However, even our habitual
gestures can be brought to our attention. Video taping one's own teaching is not
impossible. It may be difficult to eradicate all unwanted nasty grimaces or pointing
fingers, but made aware of the problem, a teacher can at least take steps to counter
their effect. Once conscious of the fact that I wince visibly at every mention of
pacifism and that my pupils interpret this as disapproval, I could make efforts to
correct this impression.

Teachers can monitor their own behaviour and presentation in many ways. Check
lists can be designed against which they can check resources for balance and pupil
evaluation sheets can reveal what impression they received of a lesson or course.
Monitoring of that which contributes to the hidden curriculum is important to reveal
to teachers what otherwise might remain hidden. Pupils can be usefully involved in
deciding what criteria should be used and what should be examined, and led to
reflect on how beliefs may be influenced. So while the hidden curriculum
comprises that which is not overt on any syllabus, it need not all be hidden from
either teachers or learners. Much can be brought into the open.

Once aware of influential aspects of the hidden curriculum, it can to some extent be
subject to control. Teachers can use it to reinforce intended learning and exclude

some unintended teaching. Planning should include attention to the hidden curriculum.

A school might, in addition, plan especially for the hidden curriculum. Staff could decide to focus especially on the value of impartiality for a period of time. To have lessons devoted to the need for impartiality would seem odd and unlikely to have the desired effect, but for all teachers to call attention to it during lessons and extra-curriculum activities, to stress and praise attention to evidence and to exhibit it overtly in their dealings with children would be to use the hidden curriculum to educate. If the intention of the teachers is made plain, there need be no objection that they are engaged in manipulatory practices or exerting undue influence.

The hidden curriculum ought to be, as far as possible, a vehicle for intended learning. It must logically be true that we can never know, and therefore control, all that is taught implicitly in school. Seeking to know all that one reveals to pupils is on par with a long-sighted person attempting to diagnose the deficiency in her own eye. The nature of the sight impairment will interfere with the diagnostic procedures. Absolute certainty is unattainable. But this is not to say that nothing can be discovered. If the hidden curriculum is influential, teachers ought to examine it, using all means available, not relying only on their own assessment. What is learnt in school should not be left to chance when it is possible to do otherwise.

I would contend that the hidden curriculum plays a large part in teaching values and that consequently it is of great importance in the area of controversial issues. In so far as it remains hidden from teachers, it will only accidentally contribute to desired learning. To the extent to which it is hidden from pupils, schools risk anti-educational lessons being learned. Illich (1973) argues that schools inculcate, via the hidden curriculum, an uncritical acceptance of the existing social order.

Uncritical acceptance of a set of values is antipathetic to teaching on war as a controversial issue.

Whether or not lessons should be set aside for the exploration of war and, if they are, whether or not these should be subject based lessons or included in the Personal and Social Education programme, is likely to depend on very practical considerations. Which is best will vary according to practices in different institutions and the particular needs of different children. I should not wish to prescribe any one approach to timetabling, but I would maintain that, whatever the decision reached, the work should have a cross-curricular dimension in the senses outlined. The approach to war ought to be cross-curricular and include attention to the hidden curriculum. It should be a whole school matter and planned as such.

In this chapter the intention has been to show how the controversiality of questions raised by war requires that teaching on war adheres to certain principles and educational considerations. These have application, not only to the manner in war is presented, but also to my next concern - the educators' problems encountered when selecting content.

CHAPTER 6

Teaching on War: selection of content

The content for any subject area is not merely a 'given', such that there is never any difficulty in knowing what should be taught. Despite its prescriptive nature, even the National Curriculum, does not stipulate exactly what should be addressed in any lesson and,

> teachers have not yet been relegated to the role of mere operatives who mechanically follow instructions handed down to them. (Bonnett, 1994: 8)

Certain outcomes are expected, but professional choices have to be made about how best these can or should be achieved.

The content of all courses is selected.   Teachers have some professional responsibility for the content, and for the criteria applied in deciding on it. The task is not unique to teaching on war, but some criteria have particular importance and relevance for planning in this area.

The backcloth to selecting content for teaching on war is that which lies behind the whole approach to teaching war as a controversial issue. Implicit in what has been written in Chapter 5 is that content should be chosen in accordance with impartiality, if justice is to be done to the controversiality of war. Account must be taken of balance, and the content should present a picture reflecting and reinforcing the aim of teaching in an unbiased manner.

Just as it was recognised that to prescribe precise timetabling was inappropriate, so now I do not wish to prescribe exactly what should be dealt with on any particular course. Again, the search will be for guidelines to inform the choice of content.

The intention is to identify considerations relevant to all teaching on war, wherever it occurs in the curriculum, and not to provide material specific to any single lesson or particular cross-curricular needs.

Nuclear war raises special problems which merit separate scrutiny. These go beyond the appropriacy of giving children information about a distinct form of modern warfare, and relate to many of the wider questions which confront the educator teaching controversial issues. Although 'nuclear war' may appear to suggest specific content, exploration of whether or not the topic should be addressed in the classroom throws into sharp relief problems immanent in all teaching of controversial issues. It seems fitting therefore that it should be examined at the end of this chapter.

When engaged in education we are commonly held to be developing knowledge and understanding, skills, values and dispositions. What would these mean in terms of the content of teaching on war?

I   Knowledge and Understanding

I i)   Information

I take the teaching of knowledge and understanding to mean more than the transmission of information when,

> information, typically involves facts being passed on
> from one person to another or others by word of
> mouth, print of something similar. (Bailey, 1984:
> 53)

This is not to say there is no place for information in teaching, but to note that it would be insufficient for education. The development of knowledge and understanding in children involves our pupils knowing and understanding for themselves, not simply accepting and retaining what someone else has said. It involves gaining some grasp of explanations, reasons and evidence, and making sense of what is taught so that it is meaningful to the learner.

Some information, about weapons for example, might be highly relevant to a particular discussion with particular children, but to specify which facts ought to be learnt by all children has limited value, (Bailey, 1984: 54). It is more important that they should know when information is relevant, and how to find out the facts when they need to. Knowledge and understanding of war should not be reduced to information.

I ii) Relevant broad areas of knowledge and understanding

In teaching on war, it is evident that some essential broad areas of knowledge and understanding can be identified. In Chapter 4, the importance of introducing pupils to the idea that biological factors do not rule all our responses to conflict was reiterated, and it must be the case that some consideration of the arguments presented in Chapter 2 are necessary if children are to perceive war as a moral problem.

Chapter 3 demonstrated the moral complexity of war and the taking of human life. The dilemmas which contribute to this complexity are not self-evident. Examination of the Principle of Double Effect showed how a widely accepted and apparently reasonable defence of bombing civilians was difficult to uphold on

closer scrutiny. Introduction to knowledge and understanding of pacifism and just

war thinking is essential to moral education with respect to war.

Balance also requires that both war and peace are studied. Hicks is right in saying

that the just war and international conflicts (including contemporary wars) would

need attention and that,

> Students should study different concepts and
> examples of peace,

and,

> look at the work of individuals and groups who are
> actively working for peace. (Hicks, 1983: 17)

When exploring the objections to Peace Education, it was noted that it has been

perceived as a necessary corrective to what is conventionally put before children in

school. Certainly any study of heroic figures should not focus exclusively on those

known for their courage or success in fighting. If teaching is to be unbiased it must

include scrutiny of those whose fame rests on their pacifist ideals or their work to

help the victims of war. Balance may, in Chapter 5, have appeared to be, in some

respects, an inadequate or vague criterion, but it is not difficult to see that it

demands some opportunity to address the miseries of battle as well as the glories.

Stories used with young children should include tales where non-violent means of

resolving conflicts are successfully employed. Dragons can be outwitted or

placated without battles at times! To ensure we do not offer only one view of war,

as an exciting and heroic practice, is not merely to exercise prudence and avoid

indoctrination, but to take steps to present the world as it is, in its variety.

In Chapter 4, the central concerns of Peace Education were explored. These

included ideas of positive and negative peace. Insofar as structural violence might

result in war, this too would need addressing, if children are to understand that it is

possible to work to prevent war and for peace.

Many writers have suggested particular content which could be used. Various papers in *Education for Peace* (Hicks ed., 1988) contain useful ideas, in addition to those put forward in books of a more practical nature such as *Conflict and Change* (Nicholas, 1983) and *A Repertoire of Peace Making Skills* (Carpenter, 1977). It is not necessary to set out more specific lesson ideas here, but teachers should realise that teaching materials are published with the express purpose of providing alternatives to content which might be thought to suggest that war is the only obvious option or to give an improbably rosy view of warfare.

Areas of knowledge and understanding should be selected according to what is deemed essential to the making of moral judgements about war and with regard for what is needed to avoid biased teaching.

I iii)   Appropriacy to the age and ability of pupils

Issues of war vary in their complexity and are not all suitable for teaching with all age groups. Account must be taken of pupils' 'cognitive state' (Hirst & Peters, 1970: 80), and their readiness to acquire knowledge and understanding in terms of ability, prior knowledge, and emotions. There can be no suggestion that graphic accounts of the holocaust be presented to six year olds.

I should also wish to resist the idea that in teaching younger or less able children we can always do so by simplifying difficult material, by scaling things down as it were. Some things are conceptually difficult in themselves or require considerable experience of the world if they are to be properly understood. International diplomacy is not reducible to negotiations over pocket money or swopping toys. Squabbles in the playground are not an adequate analogy for war and should not be presented as if they are. Whilst involvement in decision making in school may

give children some idea of what it is to face choices about what should be done for the common good, it,

> gives little of the feel of what it is like to confront the kind of problem which exercises the state...simply to have the power over life and death puts these, qualitatively, in a different category. In that sense, the macrocosm is not in the microcosm. (Entwistle, 1969: 192)

Detailed examination of questions about, for example, patriotism and conscientious objection are consequently perhaps best left to the secondary ages, but the primary school can begin to develop the knowledge and understanding which is necessary to evaluating issues like these. The understanding of what it is to be loyal, and what it is to do what one believes to be right may be gradually built up and modified, but this process begins very early and can be nurtured in primary schools. Not wanting to land a friend in trouble is not a simplified version of patriotism, but it is a comprehensible aspect of loyalty and may contribute to later understanding of patriotism.

When choosing content for specific groups of children, account must be taken of its appropriacy to their ages and abilities. Teachers' knowledge of their own pupils should inform their selection, just as it does in any other lesson planning.

Nuclear war is among those areas which require particularly sensitive judgement with regard to appropriacy, but its inclusion in the content of teaching on war also raises other considerations and it is a topic which merits separate scrutiny below.

Content then should not be restricted to mere information, but ought to include those relevant facts without which reflection would be ill founded. Areas of knowledge offered should be those representative of diverse aspects of war and

necessary to understanding differing moral positions with respect to war. Choice of content must be appropriate to the age, circumstances and level of understanding of pupils.

II Skills

To have a skill is to be able to do something, to know how to. Learning about war in an educational context may include the acquisition of skills. Skills thought essential are commonly cited as those which Hicks identifies: critical thinking, cooperation, empathy, assertiveness, conflict resolution and political literacy, (Hicks, 1986: 16).

It is important that we should develop these in children, but I am not convinced that they are all directly relevant to teaching on war or that they are all best characterised as 'skills'.

II i)   Critical thinking

Critical thinking is the least problematic of the categories and is clearly vital when addressing war as much as any other controversial topic. It is necessary to impartiality. Of course our pupils should be taught to,

> be able to approach issues with an open and critical
> mind and be willing to change their opinions in the
> face of new evidence and rational argument, (Hicks,
> 1986: 16).

Being able to approach issues in this way does amount to having certain skills - we can practise becoming more reflective and not instantly leaping to conclusions.

Learning to put aside, at least momentarily, our prejudices and to cultivate objectivity is to learn how to do something, and, together with other skills is best learnt from example, explanation, instruction, demonstration and practice. I would hope that the development of critical thinking is a central part of any educational endeavour. It is important in teaching on war since, in developing it, teachers cannot be indoctrinating and are helping children to resist indoctrination. But it must be equally important in any education. To claim that it is a skill necessary to teaching on war approaches claiming that reasoning is essential. Of course it is, but that is part of what it is to engage in education rather than training or conditioning.

II ii)   Political literacy

The skills of political literacy, in contrast, would seem especially relevant to making judgements about war and to influencing public debate, and seem to be presupposed in calling for war as a topic within political education. Nevertheless doubts are raised when Hicks explains what he means by 'political literacy':

> the ability to influence decision-making thoughtfully,
> both within their own lives and in their local
> community, and also at national and international
> levels. (Hicks, 1986: 16)

'The ability to influence decision-making' is too broad a notion to be accepted as educational. It may be a skill, but it is not necessarily desirable. The thoughtful exercise of coercion and charismatic leadership could be broken down into skills, but, since they are antithetical to educational ends such as respect for persons, it could not be desirable to encourage them in schools. Politicians are often trained to acquire a 'sincere' facial expression, to score points in debate and even to adopt hairstyles which are assumed to instil confidence in the electorate. Such training can be aptly described as the acquisition of skills - but influential as these might be,

they have no place in the content of the curriculm. Education is not about teaching children how to manipulate others skilfully.

Furthermore, knowing how to go about influencing decision-making by making one's views heard (without manipulation) in the political arena sounds like having skills, but is I suspect largely reducible to knowing *what* to do (propositional knowledge rather knowing how) and acquiring the disposition to do it. In other words, the ability to influence decision-making is not achieved via predominantly skills based learning and I should prefer to omit reference to political literacy as a set of skills.

In referring to 'political literacy', Hicks may be alluding to the ability to communicate. Developing the abilities to articulate one's views (and perhaps thereby to contribute to decision-making) is likely to be a prerequisite for political action and thus important to learn.

Such abilities are often termed 'skills', but it should be noted that they are not like many physical skills which can be learnt through trial and error, rehearsal and practice, with minimal instruction and demonstration from a teacher. Presenting views coherently is not reducible to very limited skills such as speaking audibly. Effective communication has a strong cognitive element. Such abilities should not be regarded as if they are completely different or isolated from deeper knowledge and understanding. Because so much skills talk in education can suggest that abilities are relatively easily taught and learnt in the way that mechanical skills may be, it does not seem to me that that political literacy (or even communication) is most usefully categorised as a skill.

Political literacy surely has more to do with understanding what courses of action are open to citizens, familiarity with political concepts such as democracy and a

grasp of the limitations of political thinking. All this is the stuff of political education. If the need for political education in teaching on war, claimed in the previous chapter, is accepted, then the call for the political literacy skills may be redundant.

II iii)   Assertiveness, cooperation & empathy

Assertiveness, cooperation and empathy are more easily perceived as necessary to the understanding of peace as an alternative to war. Learning these may be acquiring attitudes, but being assertive, cooperative and capable of empathy also involves skills. Many children need practice in being assertive, in cooperating and empathising. It is not enough merely to understand that these ways of being exist and are available, desirable options. Knowledge and understanding is often insufficient to enable people to be assertive rather than aggressive. One can try to cooperate and fail, because one lacks the necessary social skills, but one can also practise and learn how to put oneself in another's shoes. Drama and role play provide excellent opportunities for the trying out of all these skills.

Assertiveness, cooperation and empathy are desirable attributes, but they are not of equal consequence in all areas of study. They may be helpful in learning mathematics and physics, but they are not central to mathematics and physics in the way they may be to literature and history. They do have particular relevance to learning about war.

In Chapter 1, it was argued that assertiveness is distinct from aggression in that it does not deny the rights of others. War seems to involve overriding people's rights, and the understanding that people can negotiate assertively (an understanding gained partly by acquiring abilities) is important. Understanding

what it is to cooperate and how difficult it can be in practice throws light, not only on cooperation as an option, but also on cooperative efforts in the waging of wars. Empathy, in addition to knowledge, must be needed if we are to comprehend why wars happen and to work towards a more peaceful world. Learning to be assertive, to be cooperative and to empathise is not reducible to, but aptly includes the acquisition of skills.

II iv)   Conflict resolution

It was noted in Chapter 4 that Peace Education has been called 'Conflict Studies'. Certainly its main aim could be described as teaching how to resolve conflicts without recourse to violence. When the focus is narrowed to teaching on war, somewhat reluctantly I have to question whether or not conflict resolution, as a skill or set of skills could have anything to offer over and above critical thinking, assertiveness, cooperation and empathy. Hicks outlines that conflict resolution demands that,

> Students should be able to analyse conflicts in an objective and systematic way and be able to suggest a range of solutions to them. Where appropriate they should be able to implement the solutions themselves. (Hicks, 1986: 16.)

Again ' being able to' sounds like knowing how and having skills, and we do talk of the skills of analysis. However, the analysis of conflicts is part of what it is to think critically about war. It is not a further skill needed. The ability to implement solutions is likely to depend on the exercise of assertiveness etc. in public debate. I cannot see that anything more is involved when implementation is characterised as a skill.

Teaching on war, in common with all educative teaching, should include the skills of critical analysis. Whether or not it is appropriately characterised as a skill, there can be no doubt that political literacy too is vital. Communication, assertion, cooperation and empathy may not be of equal relevance in all subject areas, but ought to be intentionally developed in a cross curricular approach to the teaching of war.

III Values

In Chapter 5, the discussion of unbiased teaching suggested that it is unacceptable to inculcate any one set of substantive values, whether the teacher's or the school's. It was claimed that children should be educated to reflect on the diversity of values and come to hold their beliefs about controversial issues for themselves. Although it is plain that indoctrinatory or unbalanced teaching should not be employed, the question of whether *any* values should be intentionally taught was not addressed.

Before exploring which values might be justifiably taught in relation to war, certain assumptions need clarification.

III i)   Values education

There is increasing reference to values education in schools. This is not merely a change of terminology, such that the title, Values Education, will replace Personal and Social Education or Moral Education in the curriculum (although this might well happen). It is surely intended to call attention to the centrality of values in that

spiritual, moral, social and cultural development demanded by the National Curriculum (1988) and to underline that children should be educated with regard to values.

It is endorsing the view that schools should not be simply training children to behave in certain ways or teaching them to believe certain statements of value just because teachers say so.

> There is a need to explain how values permeate every
> assumption and shape the selection of material.
> (Barker, 1987: 109)

Schools should be educating about values, initiating pupils into the sphere of moral and other value judgements.

Part of this initiation must be recognition of the controversial nature of values and the diverse values that are actually held. However, it is evident that there is also now an assumption that there are some values on which 'our society can agree', (National Forum for Values in Education and the Community, 1996: 1) and, if these can be identified, that they should be taught.

III ii)   Shared values

In 1996, SCAA produced, 'Consultation on values in education and the community', which reported the findings of the Forum which was composed of 150 members, representing national organisations with concern for young people or education. A questionnaire on the document further broadened the consultative process. It can be seen then that, if the values proposed in the document are finally endorsed by respondents, they will be widely 'shared'.

It is made explicit that the statements of value are not intended to be

a definitive and complete list of all the values people hold, (National Forum for Values in Education and the Community, 1996: 1)

and it was emphasised that,

the shared values will not necessarily be the values that all people believe to be the most important. By their nature, for example, 'shared values' do not include those distinctive of any particular religious or cultural group. (ibid., 1996: 5)

Evidently, the values sought are those on which agreement seems possible and indeed likely. There is no claim that such values are the objects of universal consensus, only that there may be agreement on values, 'that schools should promote on society's behalf', (ibid., 1996: introduction)

While broad agreement would, in practical terms, facilitate the teacher's task, it would not justify the intentional inculcation of specific values in school. Other grounds are needed and I think they can be found.

III iii)   Fundamental values

Some values seem to be fundamental to understanding morality, democracy and education. The statement of values in the consultative document includes:

We value truth, human rights, the law, justice and collective endeavour for the common good of society. (National Forum for Values in Education and the Community, 1996: 2)

We value others for themselves, not for what they have or what they can do for us.(ibid., 1996: 2)

and

We value each person as a unique being of intrinsic worth, with potential for spiritual, moral, intellectual and physical development and change. (ibid.,: 3)

These may be prerequisites of participating fully in a democratic society, of being educated and of being a moral agent. A respect for truth must be necessary to being educated. The mathematics or science lesson that takes no account of truth and falsity could hardly be educational. Valuing the common good, law and justice is part of what it is to value democracy. Plainly the intention ot the document is to promote respect for life as a shared value and this too seems legitimate.

> Respect for human life could perhaps be regarded as
> a universal value. (Silberbauer, 1993: 27)

This may the case, not merely because contingently there is agreement about it, but also because without appreciating a value such as this, it is difficult to see how one could understand what it is to be moral agent.

So these may be values without which there could be no moral education as described in Chapter 5, or political education in a democratic state. They are fundamental then in being necessary to gaining proper understanding of war.

III iv)   Substantive and procedural values

A distinction is often made between substantive and procedural values:

> whilst we may want children to learn to choose for
> themselves over differing substantive values,
> procedural values such as 'respect for truth',
> fairness' and 'tolerance are essential for any study of
> politics or peace. (Hicks, 1986: 12)

Procedural values seem aptly named, for without them the process of coming to understand cannot proceed, and they are fundamental in the way claimed above. They are fundamental to gaining education and both moral and political understanding.

Nevertheless, it is relevant to note that procedural values are in no way incontrovertible. They are not different from substantive values in this respect. Neither are they uncontroversial or neutral, in virtue of being fundamental. 'We value human rights' is a statement of value reflecting the desirability of democracy - an evaluative concept upon which the British, but not every, political system, is based. 'We value each person as a unique being of intrinsic worth', is similarly basic to moral thinking, but not itself ethically neutral (c.f. Cohen, 1969: 160). Because such values are fundamental to the way of life we aspire to in this country, they can be rationally recognised and shared, but they too can be and are contested.

If values can be identified which are fundamental to education, teaching them must be legitimate. This is not to suggest schools should inculcate them without reference to rationality. Impartiality demands that explanations are given and logic attended to.

III iv)   Should substantive values be taught?

Substantive usually refers to values of a more obviously partisan nature, given the procedural framework. It was argued, in Chapter 2, that the prima facie evil of killing may be derived directly from the fundamental value of respect for persons, but while agreeing on this, people are still very likely to differ in their substantive valuing of nuclear deterrence, pacifism, capital punishment and many other issues. The value of voting may be intimately related to the fundamental value of democracy, but which party one votes for is a substantive matter.

Unbiased teaching certainly seems to demand that substantive values are not directly inculcated for all those reasons connected with the controversial nature of values. But this is not to say, because they are not fundamental, they should not be

explored in the classroom. Not all teaching is direct instruction or indoctrination. It was claimed above that broadly the content of teaching on war should include knowledge of different stances taken. Reference to a range of substantive values is plainly part of this. Teaching on war should include teaching about values; not just about their controversial nature, but about specific substantive values too.

III v)   Teaching the value of peace

To hold peace as a value seems superficially to be to hold a substantive value, but I would argue that understood properly, this is too intimately related with fundamental values to be merely substantive. If valuing others as of intrinsic worth is a fundamental value in the sense outlined, then the prima facie wrongness of killing asserted throughout must be closely associated with this. To kill others without justification is to act in a way inconsistent with valuing them as of intrinsic worth. It is a prima facie evil and requires justification. War necessarily involves killing. Its opposite, peace, must be a prima facie good. I do not suggest that it is of absolute value, but that it is valuable.

It seems to me that the value of peace can be demonstrated and, just as we might regard one who could not see that killing is morally objectionable at all as sadly lacking in moral understanding, so too we ought to think one who sees nothing morally desirable in peace is morally uneducated. Children should not only be taught that people value peace, but also they should be taught to value peace themselves.

Once again it is necessary to reiterate what has been said in Chapter 4, that to teach the value of peace is not to teach that peace is of overriding value and need not

therefore be to exhibit bias towards pacifism. Provided that the teaching is not indoctrinatory it need not be coercive.

Proper account should be taken of the controversial nature and diversity of values, but this is not a situation in which balance is relevant. Schools do not have to balance their promotion of respect for persons with denigrating others, and it is no more necessary to present the view that peace is an evil as if it is of equal worth.

Children should be alerted to the value of peace and furthermore can be justifiably encouraged to see that peace is a prima facie good.

III vi)   Value clashes

The teaching of any controversial issue risks situations where the beliefs of parents or others in the wider community come into conflict with what is being taught in school. Even if educationalists are agreed on the importance of procedural values, people may dispute what they believe is actually being taught. There is fear on the one hand of biased teaching and on the other, since people usually want what they believe right to be taught, of a failure to tell children what to believe.

Clashes of value are more than an academic problem for educators. They can cause dire practical problems. Diplomacy and negotiation is needed if conflicts of values are to be averted or resolved satisfactorily in practice. This is not to accept that only compromises which satisfy no-one can result, but it does mean that sensitivity to parental attitudes is needed.

Beliefs about pacifism are likely to be strongly held if they are the root of complaints. Disagreement which seems to be an attack on a cherished belief is

threatening in a way that argument over facts is not. Our values and beliefs are significantly part of who we are and we should recognise this and respect others' values. Further, a child's belief that her parents are right may be one of these cherished beliefs at primary school age, and we should not recklessly make public our disagreement, causing unnecessary distress. We do need to deal gently and delicately with children and parents when value clashes are likely to arise, not merely to avoid complaints which could escalate into newspaper headlines (although awareness of this possibility would be wise!), but also because we should respect views which may be part of a person's self-identity.

What then is to be done if some parents are likely to be horrified at the idea that a school should address the moral problems of war ? Without wishing to avoid confronting the problem, it is relevant to mention first that many battles between parents and schools arise because the parents are insufficiently well-informed about what is going on and are under some misapprehension. Making available accurate information is obviously inadequate. Not everyone realises they have access to what their children are being taught or how to gain that access. The content of what is to be taught together with explanation of how the topic will be presented must be understood. In the interest of achieving parental support as well as understanding, it appears that frank discussion at an open meeting before final decisions on the teaching are taken is advisable. This is not simply a matter of good personal relations and a strategy more likely to encourage consensus. It also provides a forum for genuine discussion, where parents' views can be taken into account and teachers' plans modified. Many potential conflicts over what should be taught can be pre-empted in practice.

Nevertheless, despite this, there must always be the possibility that, after delicate negotiation and prolonged exchanges of views, a direct clash remains - some parents perhaps passionately believe that war is always wrong and oppose any

discussion of just war theory while school policy demands that it should be discussed.

There are no good grounds for accepting that teachers qua teachers are the only proper arbiters of what should be presented to children in the sphere of values held with regard to war, but, by the same token, parents and others do not always know better. It was claimed in Chapter 4 that there are no experts on whom we should rely in the field of moral values, and this must be so with regard to values generally. Expertise, in terms of specialised knowledge and understanding, certainly exists, but values education is aimed at developing people's values in the light of what experts have to offer, not at blind acceptance of what any one expert might maintain. A particular parent might count as an expert on some aspect of war, but it would not make that person the only possible arbiter of what ought to be taught on war in school.

It should not be imagined that the difficulty could easily be resolved in practice, if teachers were willing to ignore such considerations. Troublesome clashes of values are unlikely to be avoided by passing the decision making over to the parents themselves. Even if parents were willing to decide for us, the whole nature of values makes any consensus unlikely.

Educationalists may not be best placed to decide on all issues of value, but they are well-versed in making decisions on educational values. They do have a particular relevant expertise in deciding curriculum issues. If reflection on nuclear war, for example, is demonstrably of educational worth, then there are grounds for its inclusion even if some people object.

Plainly children should be introduced to the variety of values held in relation to war. While no specific values should ever be *merely* inculcated, it does seem that certain values need to be shown to be fundamental and that the value of peace can justifiably be taught. It must be understood that clashes of value are possible, but that teachers cannot properly avoid the reponsibility for making value judgements about what is taught in schools.

IV   Dispositions and empowerment

Despite Cox and Scruton's reservations about children being 'encouraged to be aware of their responsibility for world disarmament' (Cox & Scruton, 1984: 32), young people do need to understand their responsibility and its limits. Kelly argues,

> One of the major tasks which education must perform in a democratic society is the proper preparation of young citizens for the roles and responsibilities they must be ready to take on when they reach maturity. (Kelly, 1995: 101)

Part of this preparation must be the acquisition of dispositions to behave in accordance with one's beliefs and values.

The consultation document on values states firmly,

> The Forum felt strongly that because it is the expression of our values in behaviour that most concerns society, the statement of values should not be seen simply as an exercise in abstract moral reasoning. The Forum decided, therefore, that the values should be presented in such a way as to exhibit the relationship between values and behaviour. (National Forum for Values in Education and the Community, 1996: introduction.)

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Putting values into practice should also be part of teaching on war as a controversial issue. Being able to act responsibly and effectively requires more than intellectual appreciation of what courses of action are open and more than practising skills. It requires the disposition to accept the importance of war and to act in the light of one's beliefs when action is possible.

This introduces a further element, intrinsic to moral and political education, but debated with great vigour with reference to teaching on war. Education in these areas is inadequate if confined to the rational and factual. I do not refer here to the question of values, but to the notion of empowerment - the idea that it is insufficient to understand and hold certain beliefs, and that moral and political education demands that one develops the disposition to act in the light of those beliefs *and the power to do so*. It is not enough to appreciate the value of truth if the disposition to be truthful, and to seek truth rather than falsity, is not also developed. It is not enough to want to pursue one's values if one does not know how to do so. Understanding what and how one can contribute and involves empowerment.

To many people the idea of cultivating dispositions and suggesting that we should be giving children the wherewithal to act on them sounds alarm bells. But a moment's reflection should quiet them.

It might be feared that the dispositions in question could include the propensity to become a soldier or to join CND. But while pupils might develop these tendencies, the dispositions which will serve education on war would not include particularities such as these and are likely to be far less controversial.

Bailey lists some dispositions which will serve a liberal education (Bailey, 1984: 113). These include the disposition to attend to something or somebody, to concentrate on something and to inquire - to try to understand. All would seem

extremely useful, even necessary, to learning in school. But the disposition to take seriously one's own moral and political decision making, and the disposition to act in accordance with it, rather than contrary to one's reasoning, do more than serve an educational function. It is not *by means of* these that we gain moral or political education - it is part of what it is to be moral or political. If we have not developed these we are not morally or politically educated. I am not claiming that a flippant attitude to a certain moral problem or the failure to boycott certain products, when you feel you ought, signals a failure in education, but I am saying that without these dispositions one cannot act morally or politically.

Even if it is conceded that the nature of the dispositions we wish to nurture is not morally or politically specific, it might be felt that teachers will go beyond their brief and teach that one should always engage in action. Of course, also, we want people to exercise the virtues and not just to know about them (Bailey, 1984: 103), but the fostering of dispositions is not the same as compelling children to do something.

Dispositions are prerequisites for moral and political action, but they do not inexorably lead to action.

> A disposition to do something can be witheld even after being acquired, but it clearly cannot be exercised if it has never been acquired in the first place. (Bailey, 1984: 113)

I have suggested earlier that being able to act is dependent upon knowing what actions are available as options and that having certain skills may be helpful. It is also important that the disposition to act in accordance with autonomously held beliefs is cultivated and that children are empowered to do so.

V The academic status of the content of teaching on war

In Chapter 4 reference was made to Cox and Scruton's allegation that Peace Education, in being 'relevant', was not a genuine academic discipline. Whether or not the controversial issues relating to war are 'really' academic, and whether or not only topics which count as academic should be approached in schools is not, I think, central to the discussion here. However, the accusation is not irrelevant. If Peace Education is not an academic discipline, it is likely that the content is somehow not academic. If the charge could not be refuted, it would pose practical problems for planning a coherent approach in the school and might lack credibility in the view of parents and school governors. An historical perspective on war given in history, probably a genuine academic discipline in the eyes of Cox and Scruton, would perhaps pass unquestioned, but debating the morality of war in values education might well be ruled out.

Aspin (1986 and 1987) and White (1988) have countered this objection at length and in rigorous detail, demonstrating that the charge is difficult to uphold, not least because it is expressed in confusing and implicitly self-contradictory rhetoric. Only those arguments which seem to relate to the content of teaching on war will be given in this section.

V i)   Should the content be 'remote'?

The assertion, that academic credibility resides in giving the pupil 'problems too remote or too abstract to be comprehended within his (sic) own limited world' (cited by Aspin 1986: 123), is open to unfortunate interpretation. It could be taken

to mean that children should be studying issues outside their existing cognitive famework.

> If that *is* what they contend, then it is difficult - if not impossible to conceive how such understanding might ever be attained. (Aspin, 1986: 125).

As an end in view, to move beyond one's present understanding must be the aim for all learners, but to begin the learning process with what is 'too abstract to be comprehended' in one's own world would be to make the acquisition of new ideas impossible.

It seems Cox and Scruton cannot mean 'remote' in this sense for they also argue that Peace Education is inappropriate in schooling because,

> children have yet to acquire the historical knowledge, articulate expression, and grasp of argument that would enable them to discuss them profitably. (White, 1988: 40).

This indicates that Cox and Scruton do accept that some already acquired knowledge, understanding and skills are relevant to gaining new concepts, skills and ways of thinking. The argument here also seems to rest on a view of learning as linear, such that if x is necessary to the understanding of y, x must be studied first. Logically this must be true, but in a temporal sense, and where x and y are broad areas of study, it is often the case that we learn things alongside each other (White, 1988: 43). We do not always need to learn x before y in time.

'Remoteness', I suggest, is not a useful notion to be invoked when selecting the content of teaching on war.

V ii)   Is it sufficiently complex?

Cox and others seem to complain that issues of war and peace are too complex to be appropriately studied in school and yet to contradict themselves in also scorning Peace Education for being a soft option (Cox et al., 1986: 40), lacking that complexity which is the hallmark of a 'real' academic discipline. While one might swiftly agree that something so easily learnt that all children can grasp it without any schooling need not be included on the curriculum, this is evidently not the case here. Indeed, the subject matter has been described as complex. Instead these critics seem merely to be offering gratuitous abuse, fastening on the term 'soft' with its connotation 'unworthy of academic study'. If they do mean that teaching on war is easy, and are prescribing the adoption of a 'hardness' criterion, it is difficult to see how this stipulation can be applied even to the composition of a very traditional curriculum which they apparently favour. If 'hardness' is employed as a criterion by which to judge the appropriacy of subjects taught in school, there seems little to recommend Latin (advocated elsewhere by Scruton) over Sanskrit (White, 1988: 43).

Despite the difficulty of taking seriously claims that the content of teaching on war is not part of a genuine academic discipline, such accusations give some measure of the horror with which it can be is regarded by some academics and which can obscure rational reflection about it. The immense controversiality of nuclear warfare as a topic is likely to exacerbate any similar feelings.

VI Nuclear warfare

Nuclear war, although a large area of enquiry, is too specific in its focus to be what was intended above by 'broad areas of knowledge and understanding'. Nevertheless, it is a subject which raises diverse issues in relation to teaching, and its inclusion in the school curriculum is so hotly debated that it cannot be omitted from any serious enquiry into what should be taught on war.

Because nuclear war is thought to be politically sensitive, it may be tempting to omit it from the content offered. Teachers often fear repercussions from parents, society generally and the media if they broach these subjects in school. This is not a completely groundless fear. The Bishop of Salisbury recalls 'the violent reaction in some governmental quarters' to the BMA's report on the medical effects of nuclear weapons, and warns,

> When one talks about educating people in such matters, the response of those in power can be very hostile. (The Bishop of Salisbury, 1984: 14)

In proffering advice on the implementation of Peace Education, the NUT concludes,

> Teachers will be nervous of what the Heads will say; Heads will be anxious lest there are repercussions from parents or govenors; even education officers are anxious lest they invoke comment from councillors. (NUT, 1984: 15)

Should all reference to nuclear war be avoided on the grounds that parents or others are very likely to object strongly? Whether or not potential opposition from parents demands that particular topics, such as nuclear war, should be omitted from teaching on war is an important question in the light of teachers' fears. Here it will

be argued that expediency does not demand that schools avoid the topic of nuclear warfare.

Furthermore, I wish to maintain that it should form part of the content of teaching on war. Perhaps it is no longer the topic of hot debate it was in the nineteen sixties, but nuclear weapons still exist. To present war without attention to the problems of the nuclear age would be to ignore a significant aspect. Since the breaking down of the Berlin wall and the signing of non-proliferation treaties, the arms race seems to have receded from view, but knowledge and understanding specifically of nuclear war is still vital, for a variety of reasons. These too will be examined below.

VI i)   Expediency

Although disputes with parents and others may have serious consequences for a school, and despite the fact that teaching on nuclear war is perhaps more likely to cause dissension than some other aspects of controversial issues, it is not obvious that such teaching should be excluded from the curriculum.

Expediency is not necessarily served by its exclusion. This is because the disquiet that surrounds nuclear war as the object of study in school often arises for one of two reasons.

Disapproval may focus on the way in which such topics are presented and the particular information given. In other words, the unease concerns not the nature of the subject matter, but what it is imagined is being said about it. In this case the same anxiety could surface with regard to any topic being taught and can only be allayed by information sharing, good teaching that commands trust and respect, and

perhaps time, showing that children are not all leaving school fanatical supporters of unilateral disarmament or whatever is being feared.

The alternative cause of disapproval may be that nuclear warfare is a politically dangerous topic, in the sense that it is believed that addressing it will inevitably raise questions about current government policies. In Chapter 3, modern just war thinking was seen to lead inexorably to the conclusion that the use of nuclear weapons could not be morally justified, and yet Britain remains a nuclear power. Worries about a governmental backlash ought to be unnecessary, since our government was a signatory to, and thus endorsed, the United Nations statement:

> Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organisations are urged to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels. (First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, 1978, Clause 106, cited in NUT, 1984: 6)

Nevertheless, many teachers are nervous that they will be criticised if they raise matters concerning nuclear disarmament. But failure to address these particular issues is unlikely to remove this cause for disquiet. Pacifism is not government policy and, together with many issues concerning the morality of war, could also be construed as a politically sensitive subject, yet teaching on war must, as we have seen, involve discussion of pacifism if it is to be impartial, unbiased and balanced.

It was pointed out in Chapter 5 that war is necessarily a political matter. Much more than nuclear war would have to be jettisonned if teaching war as a controversial issue were to exclude all politically delicate matters. It must be a mistake to think that teachers can pre-empt criticism merely by omitting one aspect of war.

In maintaining that excluding reference to certain aspects of war will not placate certain objectors, there is no intention to imply that prudential censorship ever ought

to be an overriding determinant of the content of the curriculum - only to make plain that even expediency will not be served by the omission of this particular topic.

Prudence may suggest that teachers should take especial care to explain their reasons for presenting nuclear war in the classroom, but this is not only a matter of expediency. Good practice surely demands it, as claimed above, in the exploration of value clashes.

Justification for addressing nuclear issues in teaching on war is now required to show that not only need nuclear war not be omitted, but that there are good reasons for its inclusion.

VI ii)   It is a key issue

UNESCO listed the 'maintenance of peace; types of war; disarmament' as one of the seven 'major problems of mankind that all students should study', (cited in NUT, 1984: 11). Nuclear war may be the greatest problem of our age. Whether it is or not, it is believed to be enormously important:

> since today a large proportion of the population feels
> that the peace and security problem is of the utmost
> importance (whether it is or not), that problem has de
> facto (be it justified or not) become a first-order
> moral problem for Western democracies. (Jacobsen,
> 1984: 51)

The public concern, which can find its expression in complaints about teaching which addresses nuclear warfare, may be one reason for engaging in that teaching:

> Increased awareness of the threat of nuclear
> annihilation both increases the demand for teachers to
> cover peace and disarmament issues in the classroom
> and at the same time makes their task more
> controversial. (NUT, 1984: 6)

Nuclear war is a key issue in modern life, relevant to all. Children ought to be educated to address it for, as Pike and Selby point out,

> It smacks of dangerous elitism to to suggest that only those able and prepared to continue education beyond 16 should have the opportunity to reach an informed understanding of key global issues. (Pike & Selby, 1986: 47).

While nuclear weapons continue to be held in any country, they must be a significant factor in international diplomacy. The dropping of nuclear bombs is a matter relating to the common interest, in the widest possible sense, to the interest of the whole world. If children are to be prepared to contribute in the political forum, informed understanding is essential.

Given that Britain is a nuclear power still, nuclear warfare presents a number of political problems. In 1981, Ryle claimed these went beyond wars.

> Nuclear war is now so important an issue, that the Economy and collapse of British Industry are secondary, though not unrelated problems. Indeed, if the nuclear industry disappeared its immense assets could support 10 - 100 times the number of jobs in other areas of industry, could revitalise a wide range of activities and put in hand the production needed to solve the many problems which we, and particularly the Third World, face. (Ryle, 1981: 31)

The economic situation may have improved for Britain in recent years, but the economic cost of retaining nuclear weapons has not. If young people are to solve other world problems, they need to be educated with regard to nuclear war.

VI iii)   It poses distinctive moral problems

The potential for indiscriminate and disproportionate use, noted in Chapter 4, puts nuclear arms, alongside chemical and biological weapons, in a different category from other arms. Their unpredictable effects pose distinctive moral questions about

war, which cannot be explored without direct reference to such weapons. Whether or not their use, even as a threat, could ever be morally justifiable appeared improbable.

Exploration of just war thinking might provide a necessary balance to pacifism, but itself raises problems. Modern just war thinking led to the conclusion that nuclear deterrence is morally unacceptable (noted in Chapter 4) - in other words, a policy to which our government is publicly committed - is morally wrong.

Modern history includes events in World War II and reflection on the morality of nuclear weapons cannot be evaded:

> When children learn about Hiroshima, it soon becomes abundantly clear that this kind of warfare is not limited to military targets but also waged against civilian populations with no attempt to protect children, women or old people. At this stage children's worst fears become credible - separation from parents being linked with terrible injuries, radiation sickness, starvation and death. (Jones & Saunders, 1984: 2)

Moral consideration of nuclear weapons seems unavoidable for the teacher dealing with war, partly because because it includes distinctive issues in modern just war thinking and partly for more pragmatic reasons - children are likely to raise these very issues without prompting.

VI iv)   Children's concern about nuclear war

There is evidence that nuclear war in particular was a matter of concern to young people in the nineteen eighties.

> When asked the two questions - Which of the problems facing this country worries you most? Which of the problems facing the whole world worries you most? - a national sample of 10- to 17-

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year-olds in Britain showed a diverse range of concerns. (*Guardian* 1987). In answer to the first question unemployment was most frequently mentioned, followed closely by nuclear weapons and war... In answer to the second question famine and poverty were most often mentioned, followed again by nuclear weapons and war. (Hicks, 1988: 3)

Tizard cites research done in America which showed that,

Less than half (40 per cent) rated nuclear conflict as their major worry, although at some point in the questionnaire the great majority expressed some anxiety about the issue. (Tizard, 1984: 64)

When the Avon Education Peace Project carried out a survey of attitudes to nuclear weapons among English secondary school children in four comprehensive schools, of the 561 young people participating, it was found that 91% would not expect to suvive in a nuclear war and 46% actually expect to die in a nuclear war (Jones & Saunders, 1984: 3). That this was a cause for considerable anxiety is evident in some of the written comments quoted in the report of the survey:

When I was in Junior school my friend said there was going to be a nuclear war I had nightmares untill (sic) I discovered it wasn't true. (aged 11/12 in Jones & Saunders, 1984: 10)

and

I learnt about nuclear war when I was about 10. I felt very scared indeed and I still am. (aged 11/12 ibid.: 4)

That children are concerned about the prospect of nuclear war is not sufficient justification for its presence on the curriculum, but it does suggest that it is not perceived as 'irrelevant' and inappropriate for the reasons quoted as an objection to some subject matter described in Chapter 4.

VI v)   Addressing nuclear war be in the classroom may

alleviate distress

Reid recalls how at a meeting of teachers,

> there was heated disagreement about whether the real
> horrors of nuclear war should be presented to
> children of primary age. Children it was argued did
> not have the emotional resources to cope with the
> possibility of nuclear war. (Reid, 1984: 127)

Cox and Scruton share this anxiety, (Cox & Scruton 1984: 25). The fears

expressed by them and the teachers may in fact be dismay over the way in which

they imagine such matters are to be presented, and these could be allayed by

pointing out that attention should be paid to appropriacy (noted earlier in this

chapter) in the selection of that knowledge and understanding which is put before

children in school. However, this will not always be the case.

Some aspects of warfare which could be studied are likely to be emotionally

disturbing, but this may be exactly why they should be addressed in schools - a

justification for it rather than a strong objection to it. It can be argued that teaching

on nuclear war in schools will not provoke distress, but reduce it.

In reflecting on the the potential for despair when imagining the horrors of nuclear

warfare, Holbrook quotes a child's poem written in school, of which the following

is the final stanza:

> We did not want to make war.
> While others fought, we prayed. We were neutral
> But they dropped their bombs on us.
> The birds are still now:
> And so is everything else.
>
>   (Susan Broadhurst.)

He concludes:

> By contemplating the possibilities of doom in this
> way, and in exploring their own involvement in

> human hate, young people can, I believe, go on to
> discuss and explore the ways in which human beings
> may hopefully tackle the urgent problems of peace
> and living together. (Holbrook, 1982: 4)

In 'Education about nuclear issues: is there any hope?', White stresses that teaching about such issues,

> would also include an attempt to deal with the fears
> and apprehensions that young people have about
> nuclear matters,

and that,

> it at least has the potential to make people feel that it
> is in their power to make changes, (White, 1987:
> 23).

Teaching should surely not carelessly add to pupils' emotional distress. Certainly where children already experience anxiety about war, it must be important not to increase it, for educational reasons at least since,

> It is not at all clear that increasing their anxiety will
> stimulate thought, or change their attitudes, although
> this may occur in some cases. Beyond a certain
> level, anxiety overwhelms the capacity to think.
> (Tizard, 1984: 65)

We want children in school to think clearly and to improve their thinking.

But it need not be assumed that raising such issues in school will necessarily add to children's emotional turmoil and thus impair their powers of reasoning.

> The finding that a sizeable proportion of children as
> young as ten years old see nuclear war as likely,
> even if their development is not damaged by this
> worry, suggests that teachers need not be too
> concerned about raising such a terrifying subject with
> them. (Tizard, 1984: 64)

Teachers then may not need to fear that they are initiating terror by mentioning a topic that their pupils are already aware of. Moreover, if they are already worried,

accurate information might dispel much irrational anxiety, and the sharing and expression of worries could be emotionally beneficial.

From the Avon survey cited above, it is evident that some of the worries of these children were based on discoveries made outside the educational environment, and not as a result of teaching in school. The concept of nuclear war is already familiar to them:

> Even children's programmes, comics and toys
> ...now often feature some form of computer warfare,
> the threat of total extermination by alien forces and
> even mushroom clouds.' (Jones & Saunders, 1984:
> 2)

Children are generally aware of the existence of nuclear arms, but often have little understanding of the facts. Tizard notes that,

> Anecdotal evidence suggests that very young
> children may have bizarre and confused conceptions
> about nuclear war (Tizard, 1984: 70).

It does seem probable that suitable knowledge and understanding fostered in an educational environment can diminish ill-founded fears. But I would not wish to justify the inclusion of nuclear issues solely on what might be seen as therapeutic grounds or to maintain that it will always make children feel better. Whilst dispelling that ignorance on which profound anxiety is based can be part of education, education should not be identified with therapy.

VI vi)   Children should care about nuclear war

It may seem that actually children are not anxious or concerned in the way implied above. White may be correct in suggesting that many children exhibit little interest in nuclear matters (White, 1984: 27).

However, this could be true for psychological reasons which may,

> include avoidance ('I don't want to think/hear about it'), resignation ('If it happens, it happens') and a blocking of feeling. (Tizard, 1984: 65)

Jones and Saunders quote comments from children which appear to reflect these psychological strategies:

> 'I don't let the thought enter my mind and I don't care because nobody else does' (aged 14/15),

> 'there is nothing we can do about it' (aged 13/14)

and

> 'There's no real need to worry because if there is a war we will all die anyway.' (aged 13/14)

> (cited in Jones & Saunders, 1984: 4)

Should education arouse concern where children apparently have none?

Not all fears about the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons are without a rational base. Indeed, for those previously ignorant, understanding the effects of nuclear bombs may engender profound concern where there was none before. It is one thing to talk of addressing concerns children bring into the classroom, but quite another to appear to add to their worries. And yet perhaps children should care. If they do not, we must ask whether or not this is appropriate.

Not to feel grief at the death of a dear friend would be a sign of something wrong, an unusual lack of one set of emotions. It may not be the teacher's role to try to deal with this, but teachers should certainly be worried and consult with professionals who might be able to advise. It is at least possible that a completely uncaring attitude to nuclear war is analogous to a lack of appropriate emotion.

It cannot be maintained that it would be likely to affect a person's life in the way an inability to experience grief might be presumed to, and there can be no justification

for calling in child psychologists for this reason alone. However, one might well wonder what a pupil who did not care in the least about the prospect of nuclear war knew about the subject. If not caring one way or another is a consequence of not knowing, and if it is knowledge worth having, then the school's responsibilities might extend to providing the knowledge and thereby potentially adding to a pupil's worries. This is not to suggest that teachers should frighten children who would otherwise have been fearless, but to point out that knowing can be worthwhile and yet uncomfortable.

To care seriously about something is not necessarily to be subject to the fears which numb and impair thinking. Education is not aimed at terrifying children, but can,

> include an attempt to deal with the fears and
> apprehensions that young people have about nuclear
> matters. (White, 1987: 23)

Debilitating anxiety can be assuaged by sensitive teaching, rather than exacerbated (although not always nor for all people). At the same time, it is possible to come to appreciate the serious implications of nuclear weapons without succumbing to uncontrollable panic or mindless despair.

Teachers may have a responsibility to encourage caring about nuclear war. If the reported claims about not caring spring from a feeling of impotence and are expressions of avoidance, resignation or blocking feeling, as Tizard (1984: 65) explained they might, then perhaps they should be addressed directly.

VI vii)   Public enlightenment

Jacobsen sees mechanisms, 'of the denial and repression type' (Jacobsen, 1984: 55), as barriers to the public enlightenment he advocates and points out that these

need to be overcome if greater knowledge of nuclear matters is to be encouraged. He argues that,

> ignorance is not only bad in itself in a nation of supposedly educated people, it is also a threat to democracy in an age when facts about weapon technology and foreign policy are growing increasingly complex. (Jacobsen, 1984: 51)

It may then be part of the teaching role to contribute to breaking down the barriers, not in the interest of psychological therapy, but in order to educate for, as well as within, a democracy.

Participant democracy requires citizens who can contribute to and further debate on nuclear warfare. We do need to address at least the prerequisites for arriving at informed opinions in school. Children will undoubtedly learn about nuclear war outside the classroom, but this is unlikely to be adequate. What Keeble has to say about the arms race has broad relevance to nuclear war in general:

> The arms race is too rarely mentioned in the classroom. Yet it has immense implications for all of us and all of our information about it has been received through the channels of the mass media. (Keeble, 1984: 50)

Schools can provide more. Scientific literacy, for example, is needed for understanding the likely effects of a nuclear war and thus to be able to begin to evaluate the legitimacy of using nuclear weapons. For many of us, the opportunity for gaining scientific literacy is during our schooling.

Particular controversy may surround the inclusion of nuclear warfare in the content of education, nevertheless it should now be clear that there are positive reasons why nuclear war ought to comprise part of the content of teaching on war.

In summary, nuclear warfare is a 'key global issue' which I would argue is still important in all our lives and should not be ignored in schools for fear of criticism. It presents distinctive moral problems in modern just war thinking, it is a topic about which there is and should be serious concern, and it ought to be one area of knowledge and understanding explicitly raised in education about war.

The grounds for teaching content related to nuclear war are intended to include the fact that many pupils are concerned about nuclear war, and that not to educate on a topic of this grave significance will have pernicious effects, one of which may be unnecessarily to perpetuate extreme anxiety which might impair autonomous decision-making.

If nuclear war is a key global issue and a matter of public debate, then we want children to be able to reflect with clarity on the subject, not numbed or panic stricken by the very thought. Insofar as such education contributes to overcoming fears incited by ill-informed accounts in the wider world, propagated by families, friends, and the media, nuclear war should be examined in school.

Teaching on war can be part of the hidden curriculum or made explicit in lessons. The content we choose to put before children in school is likely to reflect our values, and it can reinforce or contradict the lessons we intend to teach. The selection of content must be made impartially with regard to what we judge children will need and with a view to balance. The choice should both reflect, and help pupils to appreciate, the diversity of beliefs about the morality of war, enabling them to develop their own values. Those areas of knowledge, skills, values and dispositions which are prerequisites for learning the moral and political implications of war must be taught if education about war is give people the opportunity to work for a more peaceful world.

Bertrand Russell believed,

> To abolish war altogether is not impossible; indeed,
> so far as technical considerations are concerned, it is
> far more possible now than at any former time. It is
> also more important, since war is a greater menace
> than it was, and will be a greater menace than it is.
> The obstacles to the abolition of war are of three
> kinds, political, economic, and psychological; all
> three are serious and cannot be removed quickly.
> (Russell, 1936: 172)

He explains that 'psychological' obstacles can only be removed by 'education, moral and intellectual', (Russell, 1936: 179). Exploration of the principles and considerations which should inform teaching on war has shown that removing political obstacles too is largely dependent on education, and that education can contribute to the eradication of psychological barriers. Not all who are educated will wish to further peace, but it must be unlikely that anyone will be able to influence moral and political opinion on war without education.

CONCLUSION

War is a great evil, perhaps the greatest that human beings face. Certainly the very scale of the loss of human life in modern warfare, even when waged by conventional methods, is unparalled. If anything is to be done to minimise the destruction that is war, teaching on war in schools is crucial. This thesis attempts to delineate the moral complexity of war and to show how it relates to the proper treatment of war in the classroom.

To bring about less war and more peace in the world must be to reduce the evil. This presupposes that war is a human activity over which control can be exercised, and that,

> biology does not condemn humanity to war.
> (The signatories to The Seville Statement on Violence
> in Groebel & Hinde, 1989: xv)

In the first chapter, examination of prevalent beliefs that humans inevitably engage in international war because they are in some sense naturally aggressive, demonstrated that war is not beyond human agency. Unless this is understood there will be no awareness that we have some choice with regard to war. Without this understanding, one is effectively deprived of the option, and cannot decide in favour of peace or work for it. The task of revealing the limits of purportedly 'scientific evidence' is best started in schools, since it is here that most people gain their knowledge of science.

Once recognised not to be merely the product of an uncontrollable impulse, war is susceptible to moral judgement. I have argued that war is undeniably a moral matter, and agree with Norman, that the central problem of war is that it involves the killing of others:

> War is the deliberate killing and maiming of human beings in vast numbers. And though the physical acts of war, such as shooting and bombing, do not normally involve any discrimination between the intent to kill and the attempt to maim, it is, I think, the fact of killing that is morally fundamental. (Norman, 1995: 37 - 38)

It was claimed in Chapter 2 that, although the intentional taking of human life is a prima facie moral ill, nevertheless it could not be the case that it is always wrong. No sound premises were found on which the inviolability of life could be based. Moral sensitivity and reasoning do not necessarily point to pacifism as the only acceptable stance on war. If suicide and voluntary euthenasia are ever morally tolerable, respect for autonomy might not preclude the killing of fighting soldiers.

Given this, the possibility that there can be morally justifiable wars must be allowed. There may never yet have been a just war, but this does not affect the possibility that some evils are greater than war and can only be eradicated by war.

Although just war thinking does not so much provide a justification for war as prescribe conditions to limit it, reflecting the moral climate through the ages, it is an important attempt to reduce the destructive effects. The conditions, outlined in the third chapter, identify and proscribe wars and acts of war which are felt to be morally unjustifiable. It may be impossible to use some twentieth century weaponry without killing innocents, and it might appear that therefore all wars today must be morally deplorable and the alternatives available bleak - either we pursue just causes by unjust means or we embrace pacifism, refusing to act in good cause. But human beings make decisions with regard to declaring wars and decide how to pursue them. The pressures influencing choice may be great, but they are not inevitably overwhelming. Governments can and do decide to reject certain methods of prosecuting wars. The Geneva Protocol (1925) and the banning of chemical and biological weapons (1969) bear witness to this.

Citizens in democratic states share in the moral responsibility for the way in which wars are waged. Decisions about war are serious and the area of debate complex. Young people need to be educated on the issues if they are to have the opportunity of contributing. Pacifism, just war theory and modern just war thinking cannot be ignored. These should be part of the vocabulary of the educated person. Moral education can furnish the conceptual understanding essential to evaluating war, but reflection specifically on the philosophical difficulties of pacifism and just wars should be encouraged:

> To take seriously that notion that there may be indeed
> some occasions when extraordinary means may be
> used, and to reflect that these may be expected to be
> rare indeed, may help to move moral debate over
> contemporary war. (Johnson, 1984: 190)

In recent years, Peace Education, constituted an attempt to provide systematic teaching on these matters, with the declared aim of working towards a more peaceful world. This significant contribution to teaching on war in school could not be sensibly ignored. Investigation of what was intended and evaluation of the objections to it in Chapter 4, were both useful in deciding how teaching on war ought to be approached in schools, what should be kept in mind and what the real dangers are. Evidently there is a need to make clear the option of non-violent conflict resolution and to recognise that we cannot avoid addressing the value of peace. Attention was drawn to fears that teaching will be biased, amounting to propaganda or indoctrination, that it will not aid the search for greater peace, and that it will not be relevant to children in school. For the educator, the problems are not confined to those inherent in the morality of war. They include anxieties about educational practice. Guidelines for teaching on war must be sought in the light of these too.

Because issues of war are inherently contestable, it was concluded in Chapter 5 that they should be taught as controversial issues and their controversial nature

understood. If educators are to avoid merely transmitting their own opinions, teaching on war ought to be unbiased and attention should be paid to balance. Exploration of these notions revealed that both conceptual and practical problems attend them, but that nevertheless they are useful. The principle of impartiality was identified as that which should underlie all teaching on war. Although the idea of neutrality was found to be confusing, it was established that procedural neutrality could be employed to overcome the practical difficulty of teachers' personal influence affecting their pupils' ability and willingness to express and develop their own value judgements about war in discussion.

How war should be presented in school also involves the question of where it should figure on the curriculum. I argue that, since it is a matter of such moral importance and complexity, that it must be part of moral education. It is not enough to know that beliefs about war vary. Practice in evaluating moral claims is needed and this is the province of moral education. We need to do,

> more than describe the judgements and justifications that people commonly put forward. We can analyse these moral claims, lay bare the principles that they exemplify. We can reveal commitments that go deeper than partisan allegiance and the urgencies of battle; for it is a matter of evidence, not a pious wish, that there are such commitments. (Walzer, 1977: xxix)

If children are to be able to contribute to public debate and effect any change, political education too must be important. In order to ensure that people really have the option to exert influence in a democratic society, they must receive education about ways and means in the political sphere. The reduction of war, or its abolition, is not simply something to be reflected upon in the abstract. Understanding, of the political situation and of how political changes can be brought about, combined with moral judgement is necessary because,

> It is obvious that we will not abolish war simply by altering states of mind. It is necessary to find better political arrangements and to find some way of

reducing the dangers created by the existence of
nation states. But political changes are not totally
separate from changes in our thinking: the causal
influence goes both ways. One change must be to
stop regarding killing in war as almost by magic
immune from moral criticism. (Glover, 1977: 285)

It was claimed in the introduction that, insofar as teachers engage in any discussion

about it with their pupils, they will be contributing to teaching on war. Clearly, war

cannot be confined to specific areas of the curriculum nor mentioned only by certain

teachers. It is inevitably a cross-curricular matter. It is also plain, that whether or

not the moral and political implications of war are explicitly taught in Personal and

Social Education or in other lessons, learning about it will occur via the hidden

curriculum. Consequently it must be emphasised that the principles of coherence

and consistency should be kept in mind in planning the whole school approach.

In being educated in relation to war, children need to acquire the knowledge and

understanding, skills, values and dispositions which are needed to influence

political decision-making in practice. Content of teaching on war should be selected

in line with the principles of impartiality, coherence and consistency, but other

considerations are also germane.

I maintain that the content should not be restricted to information, and that it should

be balanced, such that the broad areas of knowledge and understanding do not

present a one-sided picture of war. The suitability of content to the particular pupils

being taught must be considered and, 'in appropriate contexts this will include a

discussion of nuclear issues, of war and militarism', (NUT, 1984: 15).

Being moral requires that one is capable of conducting one's life in accordance with

autonomously held moral values, and that one has the disposition to do so. War

poses questions both of individual significance ('Should I join the armed forces?')

and relating to the public interest ('Should our country disarm?'). These are

questions about what should be done. A further consideration which should inform teaching on war is the need to differentiate between nurturing desirable skills and dispositions which empower pupils and teaching them what course of action they ought to pursue.

Treating war as a controversial issue demands that children are initiated into the whole sphere of values, but I would also add that the value of peace is fundamental and can legitimately be taught alongside other 'shared values' (SCAA, 1996) provided that due care is taken to avoid indoctrinatory practices. It cannot be the case that teachers are entitled to teach pupils that they ought to value peace above all or work for peace in specific ways. The whole point is that we cannot be sure what ought to be done and must each come to our own judgements. That is why teaching on war in an educational environment is so vital. Nevertheless killing and waging war are prima facie evils and peace a good - this much can legitimately be taught.

Schools provide, for most people, their best opportunity for acquiring the relevant knowledge and understanding. In the classroom controversial issues can be explored and views tested against other opinions. The educational aims of teachers and their professional expertise can give children protection from propaganda, peer group pressure and mindless acceptance of the apparent status quo.

Investigation of the morality of war confirms the view that war ought to be addressed in schools explicitly as a controversial issue, thus ensuring that everyone has the opportunity to reflect on it in a specifically educational environment.

So much seems plain, but this enquiry has necessarily been limited. Its focus on dealing with war in the classroom made explicit that teaching on war is not a simple matter and that the role of all teachers, whatever their special subject or

responsibility, is vital. The whole question of how teachers might best be prepared to play their part could not be addressed within the thesis, but this omission should not be taken to indicate that it is not of importance. Indeed, scrutiny of war in the classroom has implicitly revealed the need for attention to the issues in teacher education.

Dealing with controversial issues in school may long have been a feature of teacher training courses, but there is no reason to suppose that the particular difficulties of teaching on war will always be raised. Values education is likely now to figure conspicuously in teacher education in Britain, but again this does not mean that the value of peace or values in relation to war will necessarily be discussed.

Furthermore, although values education undoubtedly raises questions of philosophical importance, and intending or inservice teachers are likely to be alerted to these, the demise of most of the courses entitled 'Philosophy of Education' in this country suggests that few will be well-prepared to grapple with them. Of course philosophy of education is taught, but in a variety of guises. Cambridge University continues to include compulsory and relatively substantial courses in initial teacher training with that title, but in many institutions the philosophical perspective may be subsumed under 'Moral Education', 'Values Education', 'Professional Studies' or 'Ethics for Teachers'. While not wishing to suggest that philosophical rigour is automatically diluted by the use of a different label, it must be likely that the uniquely philosophical approach increasingly escapes many or that it fades against the insistence of the practical for some students.

Philosophy, at least a basic grounding in moral philosophy and philosophy of education, should be an integral part of the education of all teachers, not an optional study nor one associated with particular curriculum areas in which war might be presumed relevant. Not only is war, and possibly any other controversial issue,

evidently a cross-curricular matter as suggested above, but also the ethical perspective has relevance in almost all subjects. In Chapter 5 it was noted that scientists and historians would have particular contributions to make to teaching on war, but, of all the specialisms, perhaps only mathematics can be adequately taught without reference to moral implications. That is to say the content of mathematics appears to be an autonomous sphere, an abstract which need not relate to human interaction. The actual enterprise of teaching mathematics or anything else cannot, of course, be isolated from ethical concerns and all teachers therefore ought to be appropriately prepared in their training to appreciate and pursue moral questions. All teachers need initiation into philosophical thinking since these are not simple matters. Exploration of the problems posed by war for educators highlights the dangers of ignoring philosophy and the risk of misrepresenting issues in the classroom.

In Chapter 1 it was pointed out that the moral status of war is not self-evident to everyone. It may be necessary to highlight the ethical aspects of war for teachers, in order to bring about good practice in schools. Appreciation and evaluation of attempts to justify both pacifism and war demand some sophistication of philosophical understanding, and their implications are not easily understood without some intellectual grasp of ethics. If teachers are to foster understanding of the ethical dilemmas, they must have access to a philosophical framework. However thoughtful, reflection on killing in war is likely to remain at the level of 'common sense' in the absence of distinctively philosophical analysis. Examination of, for example, Double Effect in Chapter 3 revealed that a principle which superficially appears to provide justification for knowingly causing the deaths of civilians has little force when subjected to deeper philosophical scrutiny. Teachers must be able to confront the moral problems of war with more than well-intentioned 'common sense' if children are to have the chance properly to seek ethical solutions.

The field is open for empirical research to discover what form of education most satisfactorily prepares teachers to address war in the classroom. The question cannot be pursued here, but neither can it be profitably tackled without reference to the principles and considerations which ought to circumscribe the enterprise of teaching on war. Philosophical attention too is needed to ensure that the appropriacy of content and methodology is not lost from sight in the desire to identify and promote that which 'works in practice'. Practical solutions should not be dislocated from the values which permeate education. They should be seen within the broader framework set by the ends in view, and appraisal of these ends is in part a philosophical matter. Equally, how teachers ought to be educated is not merely a question of what can be shown to be most efficient in purely practical terms: the means themselves are open to moral evaluation.

War does need to be specifically included in teacher education, if the topic is to be properly dealt with on the curriculum, and teachers may need to be prepared to reflect on further issues which could not be considered in this thesis. Here the concern was with international warfare, but the morality of taking hostages, terrorism and civil insurrection are hard to ignore when talking about war with young people today. The philosophical skills and understanding teachers gain, whether in their initial training, in inservice courses or higher degrees, must be sufficient to the task of confronting new problems their pupils may raise. A continuing dialogue, between philosophers of education and teachers, is needed if teaching on war is to address many of the relevant issues adequately.

However indirectly, the consequences of war affect everyone. Children are surely entitled to an education which enables them to tackle moral dilemmas relevant to their lives. The educated person is one who is able to recognise the moral dimension of war and engage with it. The education offered in schools by teachers must take account of this.

It has not been my claim that the furtherance of international peace ought to be the main aim of teaching on war, only that unless war is presented in an educational manner in the classroom many children will grow up without the understanding or capacity to work towards greater peace in the world. It is only as a result of educated reflection that further moral restrictions on war are likely to come into effect. Teaching on war, which is properly educational, is vital for,

> Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed. (UNESCO, 1945, quoted in Mitchell, 1978: 35)

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