Foreign Cultural Policy through the work of the National Institutes of Culture: a comparative study on instrumentalism

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
of
University College London

Institute for Sustainable Heritage
University College London
April 2019

‘I, Dimitra Kizlari, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.'

To my partner, Konstantinos

All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely players;
(Shakespeare, As You Like It, Act II, Scene VII)

Acknowledgements

After three years of an emotional rollercoaster, I am glad to be able to hold at last this monograph in my hands. I cannot thank enough my primary supervisor, Dr Kalliopi Fouseki, for her continuous support and joyful character that made everything look brighter.

My eternal gratitude goes to the Alexander Onassis Public Benefit Foundation and the A.G. Leventis Foundation which both supported me financially the past three years and covered my living expenses in one of the world's most expensive metropoles. My parents deserve more than a simple reference not only because they believed in my dedication to pursue an academic career, but also because it was their life savings – amidst the Greek debt crisis – that paid my tuition fees here at UCL. Last, my brother, Yannis, has always been an inspiration – yet probably unaware of it – as he is one of the few people whom I admire for their endurance and patience.

Coming from a middle-class family, it would be hard to imagine how I would have gone through all the levels of higher education to reach the doctoral level, had it not been for my home country's free educational system and my alma mater, the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. Although the British and the Greek educational systems are worlds apart, one with a similar background to mine will agree that they complement each other in a charming, yet admittedly odd, way. I guess it was in the liminal space between these two opposing worlds that learning took place for me.

Although I have dedicated the whole thesis to my partner, Konstantinos, he could not be missing from this section too. Thank you for providing comfort and solace to my ever-restless soul and for fighting away my insecurities with your optimism. Relocating from Greece to the UK with you was the best transition I could hope for despite the capital controls imposed on our country at the time. Last but not least, I should thank my colleagues and friends at the UCL Central House who made this journey a happy ride and, especially, my close friend Eirini with whom I have shared this experience from the very first moment.

Abstract

Foreign cultural policy, and specifically the work of the National Institutes for Culture, have received minimal scholarly attention so far. The term 'National Institutes for Culture' describes not-for-profit public agencies vested with the task to promote a country's national language and culture abroad to strengthen cross-cultural dialogue through soft means. The present thesis aims to contribute to the domain by exploring how instrumentalism is expressed in the work of these agencies. Instrumentalism describes an approach in policymaking in which an activity is merited based on its extrinsic value, with an emphasis usually on political and economic returns, rather than its intrinsic quality. Foreign cultural policy, as a structured cluster of state actions, is marked by this tension as cultural means are used normatively to achieve non-cultural outcomes.

The Cultural Institutes' legal status and institutional position in the government apparatus both offer fertile ground to study how state control shapes structures and discourses. The project studies six cases from Europe with the aim to compare different governmental practices in foreign cultural policy. Using as an in-depth case study Greece and the Hellenic Foundation for Culture, the researcher informs her initial set of hypotheses and continues to test the assumptions in another five case studies. The selected organisations are the British Council, the Goethe Institut, the Institut français, the Instituto Cervantes and the Swedish Institute. The researcher has used as primary data sources semi-structured interviews with policymakers as well as the mission statements, strategy plans, statutes and budgets of the Cultural Institutes.

The findings indicate that the Cultural Institutes are linked to their sponsoring departments through five channels of supervision: i. funding, ii. agenda setting, iii. evaluation, iv. hierarchy and v. appointment power. Governments use different structural means to control their Institutes, however, there are other paths to ensure compliance. Ideology is the primary way through which governments secure that their interests will be met. Realist discourses, which see culture as an instrument in the service of the state, have long prevailed in statecraft and through a trickle-down effect, they have permeated the field of foreign cultural policy. However, a new school of thought has now surfaced which marries skilfully discourses favouring the extrinsic value of culture and discourses advocating for the intrinsic value of the sector.

Impact Statement

The project contributes to informing current practices in the policy area of culture in external relations. Since the study uses as a unit of analysis six cases from Europe, its immediate policy impact can find effect in more than one national contexts. The greatest strength of this doctorate is, therefore, its comparative angle. Its value has already been formally acknowledged in EU policymaking circles as the author was invited in April 2018 by EUNIC Global (the European Union National Institutes for Culture association which brings under one umbrella all the EU Cultural Institutes) to present part of her findings in a knowledge sharing workshop at the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna. The informal discussions which took place during the two-day meeting have informed the overall approach of the thesis and validated the conceptual basis of the findings. The first published output of this study ('The mechanics of cultural diplomacy') was summarised in an informal report distributed to the heads of the National Institutes of Culture only a few months after its online publication and since then there have been requests for a follow-up report after the completion of the study. The conclusions drawn from this study are of immediate interest to European and EU institutions, nevertheless, I support that the theoretical contribution this thesis makes can be used as a robust interpretative framework to analyse foreign cultural policy attitudes in non-EU contexts as well.

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Abbreviations

ACE	Arts Council England
ASEF	Asia-Europe Foundation
CD	Cultural Diplomacy
CI(s)	Cultural Institute(s)
DA	Deutsche Akademie
EUNIC	European Union National Institutes for Culture
FFO	Federal Foreign Office (Germany)
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
IR	International Relations
MoEERA	Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoC(S)	Ministry of Culture (and Sports)
NPM	New Public Management
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PA	Public Administration
Si	Swedish Institute
USIA	United States Information Agency

1. Introduction

1.1 Background context

Few publications have made such a crackling sound in the field of foreign policy to date as Joseph Nye's 1990 Foreign Affairs article titled 'Soft power'. The cultural turn, which swept the study of the Social Sciences and the Humanities in the 1970s and 1980s, had indeed a transformative effect in re-organising the epistemological priorities and assumptions of various academic disciplines including International Relations (IR) studies (Griffith, 2001). Nye (1990) can be credited to have popularised the idea that influence in the international arena can be equally achieved through a strategy which utilises non-coercive means as much as through hard means like economic sanctions and military interventions. Social values and culture posed engaging channels of communication with the ability to create conditions of mutual attraction which, in any case, formed far deeper and more authentic links. Hard power was not anymore the only means countries could use to stand out in the international arena (ibid).

Around the same time when the soft power concept was being born, at the turn of the 1990s, cultural studies researchers were facing significant intra-disciplinary challenges as the contribution of cultural analysis to solving real-world problems was being put into question. As Sterne (2002) notes, the typical research model in Cultural Studies has been that of the Marxist academic who is largely suspicious of state structures and engages in critical inquiry of the sociocultural phenomena around him/her while remaining uninterested in canvassing pragmatic solutions. This is a mild description of what Bennett (2004, p.238) has called "the anguished debate that took place in the early 1990s as to whether or not cultural studies should even engage with questions of policy." The study of cultural policy was indeed born out of this tension of whether it was meaningful and productive to link critique and practice (Cunningham, 2003). If cultural policy research had not been born yet, or more accurately baptised, it is difficult to argue that cultural analysts were even remotely interested in the foreign dimension of cultural policy. Although Bennett (2004, p.239) argues that "a critical literature on cultural policy, produced both within the academy and outside, had already been accumulating for years"

pointing to publications from the 1970s and 1980s, policy applications and their research had not become central in Cultural Studies yet.

It seems that at the time when International Relations scholars were just starting to re-organise IR disciplinary thinking around the cultural dimension, Cultural Studies scholars were absorbed with their own internal feud. It took another decade for foreign cultural policy to draw the attention of cultural policy researchers. Largely seen as a domain where nation-states compete for prestige and national glorification (Bell and Oakley, 2015), academic research has mostly centered around discourses of cultural nationalism and linguistic imperialism (Phillipson, 1992; Rothkopf, 1997; Tomlinson, 2001). However, work in the field so far has failed to connect the study of foreign cultural policy with the traditional theoretical deliberations of Cultural Studies such as critical theory. It is as if the time delay in recognising cultural policy as the legitimate offspring of Cultural Studies has given room to the discipline of International Relations to ponder upon the possibilities the cultural dimension offered in the study of foreign affairs. The point of entry, thus, has been the added value culture can bring to strengthen the foreign policy statement whose priorities traditionally center around trade and security (US Department of State, 2005). Only the past decade have we seen efforts from the cultural field analysing the discursive challenges culture in external relations presents us with (Paschalidis, 2009; Minnaert, 2014), however, the ideas they bring forward have not permeated mainstream foreign policy thinking - although this cannot be argued for Diplomacy Studies which view relationship building as a basic pillar of the field's epistemology (Bjola and Kornprobst, 2018).

Although Cultural Studies and International Relations, and subsequently cultural policy and foreign policy studies, encounter each other in the exercise of cultural relations, it seems to me that they have failed to cross-fertilise. The two fields engage into the study of cultural relations having divergent intentions and, consequently, use different theoretical and methodological frameworks to interpret its practice. Diplomatic Studies seem to be situated in between the two fields acting as a mediator in an effort to bridge what is mostly an ontological divide although the gripping influence of IR studies has left a prominent mark. This phenomenon has direct implications in how foreign cultural policy is practised as professionals with differing backgrounds enter the system. We, thus, need to examine how this dualism of intent is translated in the work of practitioners and policymakers and evaluate how culture is valued by different policy actors. I argue that definitions

are auxiliary in exposing the underlying assumptions of the actors involved and we would do well to have a brief look at the most popular terms in use before we continue contextualising the present research project.

1.2 A note on definitions

Little did I know when I started this study, how fierce the debate around definitions is. Despite the extended segment around definitions as part of the literature review (chapter 2), I offer here a condensed version of it for reasons of clarity. 'Culture' can be used either in its broad sense to describe a set of values and ways of life or in a narrow sense to denote the cultural and creative production of a particular group (Williams, 1981). 'Foreign cultural policy' is not frequently used in English literature (British Council and Goethe Institut, 2018), in contrast to the terms 'cultural diplomacy' and 'soft power', to which a burgeoning literature can be ascribed (Arndt, 2005; Ang et al., 2015; Isar, 2015; Gallarotti, 2011; Bell, 2016). These concepts should not be seen, however, as perfect synonyms. I avoid using the term 'soft power' as I find it convoluted and case-specific, product of the American intellect, it was developed as a response to an increasingly competitive international arena for the United States and, thus, has as its programmatic priority the concentration of power as we will see in chapter 2.2.2.. The term cannot be avoided altogether as it has become a common feature of their IR parlance as a result of the United States' hegemony in the field (Maliniak et al., 2018). Foreign cultural policy is, I believe, more accurate; it describes state action as the sum of cultural programmes and projects launched by various departments and agencies within the government, whereas cultural diplomacy I see very much as a methodological dimension of how foreign cultural policy may materialise. International cultural relations is another popular term to denote cultural work taking place on the ground, therefore, it can be another expressive dimension of foreign cultural policy.

The aforementioned terms are used invariably both in literature and in practice, although there have been scholarly attempts to set a clear-cut distinction. Arndt (2005) has argued, for example, that cultural diplomacy is a term used to describe state action in the field, while cultural relations describe cross-cultural interactions and networks supported through the work of civil society without government intervention. Despite the effort to set a distinction, the end result is a mosaic of proximal concepts whose boundaries overlay. I should note that I will be using these two terms (cultural diplomacy, cultural relations) freely in the context of this study since I espouse the much broader umbrella term 'foreign cultural policy' as evident in the title of the thesis. Foreign cultural policy is a term used predominantly

in the German context, while the distinction between cultural relations and cultural diplomacy is mostly discussed in the anglophone academic literature (British Council and Goethe Institut, 2018). An interesting distinction comes from Stassen (1987, pp.17-18) who draws a line between the conterminous phrases 'foreign cultural policy' and 'cultural foreign policy'. Foreign cultural policy, he argues, describes "a policy of culture, not a policy subservient to foreign policy", as is the case in 'cultural foreign policy'. A foreign policy which simply uses cultural means to achieve its realpolitik aims is a practice situated far from the humanistic concerns of cultural policy. This is an important remark, which I will revisit in the main body of the thesis, as it points to the agency that different government actors bring into the field and which implies a divergence in views, methods and expectations. Since foreign policy is the purview of Ministries of Foreign Affairs and cultural policy the policy domain of Ministries of Culture, their relationship merits attention. What Stassen (1987) suggests, through his terminological distinction, is that policymakers in Foreign ministries and Culture ministries may have conflicting views as to how foreign cultural policy should be designed and operationalised, much like IR scholars and cultural analysts do as we explained above.

Clarifying definitions has never been a prime objective, nonetheless, a doctorate cannot avoid discussing the textural differences as these are found in the work of others. As I will demonstrate later, some policy actors are more conservative when it comes to terminology and indeed draw lines of distinction, while others are more liberal in how they use, misuse and appropriate terms and concepts. Although, I do not endorse the distinction between cultural diplomacy and cultural relations, it seems to be a valid point of departure in this journey towards the exploration of how foreign cultural policy is organised and practised on a government level.

The policy organs under scrutiny will be the National Institutes for Culture, which are public bodies "focused on the promotion of their national culture and language(s)" (European Parliament, 2016, p.11). The term describes Cultural Institutes (CIs) like the British Council, the Goethe Institut, the Instituto Camões, the Instituto Cervantes etc. These are non-profit organisations which stand at an arm's length distance from the central state apparatus, yet form part of the government. In this light we need to ponder upon the tractability of the term 'policy' to describe the programmes of the Cultural Institutes. If the CIs are public bodies in the strict sense tasked with maximising influence on behalf of their governments,

then the arm's length relationship faces a serious legitimation crisis. On the other hand, if the Cultural Institutes are more akin to civil society organisations, then the role of the state in coordinating transnational relations in the policy area of culture is heavily challenged with the CIs occupying a rather ambiguous space in between the state and the civil sphere. Under these circumstances, I need to examine the role of the Cultural Institutes and their potential for collaboration as different actors (Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Ministry of Culture) are pulling them into divergent directions.

1.3 Research aim and epistemic assumptions

The present Ph.D. thesis is looking at how foreign cultural policy is organised and exercised through the work of the National Institutes for Culture. The governance of foreign cultural policy is the central focus of this study; however, the present thesis is not an attempt to simply map policy structures but goes on to link these structures with specific discourses around cultural value. Instrumentalism, that is the use of "cultural ventures and cultural investments as a means or instrument to attain goals in other than cultural areas", is the core theme behind this doctorate (Vestheim, 1994, p.65). Instrumentalism has been a subject of thorough analysis by cultural policy scholars who have investigated extensively its ethical basis and its possible impacts (Belfiore, 2012; Gray, 2000, 2007, 2008; Hadley and Gray, 2017; Vestheim, 1994, 2007), however, there is little research in how the phenomenon unfolds in foreign cultural policy (Nisbett, 2013). Consequently, the thesis comes to find its place in this developing literature.

The study is an attempt to review instrumentalism and reframe its function by exposing its underlying mechanisms, both structure-wise and discourse-wise. I am linking in this study instrumentalism with agency. It would be useful to explain how the term 'agency' is used since it is a key idea that runs through the thesis. Agency is seen as an overt or covert expression of power that regulates the operation of an actor through specific mechanisms of control (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). Mechanisms, both in their tangible and intangible form, are a key point in this study. I have decided to use the analytical pair 'structure – agency' as the underlying organising principle of my arguments as I find it a fitting framework to analyse the power relationship between the CIs and their reporting departments.

Gray (2012, 2016) was the first one to discuss the implications of the Marxist binary 'structure – agency' in the analysis and practice of cultural policy and this has been a relatively recent development in the field. By contrast, in International Relations the structure – agency debate lies in the deep core of the discipline's epistemic assumptions, therefore, the literature surrounding it is much more developed and nuanced (Wendt, 1987; Carlsnaes, 1992). The dipole 'structure – agency' is a classic research theme in Sociology and the key principles that govern it can find effect in an array of disciplines in the Social Sciences and the Humanities regardless of their sectorial differences. Therefore, it should not be treated as an

exceptional interpretive framework, but more as a guided pathway to assist in the analysis of a practice that sits at the cross-section between two policy areas. I adopt a neo-Gramscian reading of the structure – agency problem and use extensively the idea of hegemony to interpret power asymmetries in foreign cultural policy.

The relationship I am investigating through the structure – agency schema has two dynamic ends. The actors exercising control (government departments) and the actors who are subject to this control (Cultural Institutes) lie at the heart of this study. The question this thesis has set out to answer can be summed up as follows:

RQ: How does the agency of the state apparatus manifest in the work of the Cultural Institutes?

As the focus falls onto the relationship between ministries/departments and their Cultural Institutes, the study will look for data in interviews with policymakers and analyse state documents such as policy frameworks to contextualise the phenomenon and offer evidence-based arguments to answer the research question. The study looks at the phenomenon of instrumentalism synchronically and not diachronically. This suggests that the timeframe of the study ran in parallel with the sampled time period, therefore, instrumental relations were examined in their present appearance although some sparse references to past practices were made by the participants to compare the changing conditions. In addition, the geographical focus falls on Europe and specifically six European countries, which represent different administrative traditions in Europe (Anglosaxon, Germanic, Continental, Scandinavian tradition).

The thesis argues that instrumentalism is not a compact phenomenon that is articulated in the same way across national contexts and across time; on the contrary, it presents heterogeneity. I will be investigating in the chapters to follow the various ways through which governments exercise power over their Cultural Institutes. The aim is to understand how state power is expressed in foreign cultural policy and how cultural value changes according to the agency of different policy actors. The subject is very topical as the latest policy developments on an EU level call for the member-states to cooperate under the concept of "smart complementarity" with the aim to deploy "a strategic European approach" in international cultural relations (European Commission, 2016, p.4). Therefore,

studies highlighting similarities and disparities across various governance models are very urgent since they point to potential sources of dispute, but also highlight areas of convergence.

The study is exploring six paradigms from the European context through a multiple case study analysis. It features the investigation of an intrinsic case study, Greece, and its comparison to another five case studies: the UK, France, Germany, Spain and Sweden. Greece and its Cultural Institute, the Hellenic Foundation for Culture, have been selected as the intrinsic case study due to the familiarity of the researcher with the socio-political context of the country, which is useful given the fact that a meticulous case study analysis requires 'thick description' (Geertz, 1973). The rest of the case studies were selected based on replication logic rather than sampling logic. The researcher chose another five case studies to compare the findings of the intrinsic case study; hence, these five cases are examined with the aim to confirm and enrich or repudiate the findings of the intrinsic case study. More on the rationale behind the research design will be discussed in chapter 3.

The preliminary analysis I conducted during the first year of the Ph.D. informed my overall perspective and made my research objectives more complex. Not only does the state exercise control through various regulatory channels, but there are also more than one actors involved in the exercise of power as Stassen (1987) had accurately identified as discussed above. The Greek case study revealed that the Hellenic Foundation of Culture is an instrument which both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Culture and Sports (MoCS) claim as their territory, although the organisation presently reports to the latter authority. Naturally, I wanted to investigate whether this phenomenon is unique in the Greek case or whether it is a common feature of the governance of foreign cultural policy as a whole. Therefore, I included this new interest in my objectives as seen below (objective 5). The objectives I have set to assist me in answering my research question are captured below. The thesis intends to:

1. Familiarise the reader with the key debates around instrumentalism and highlight gaps in research.
2. Show how Gramsci's theory of hegemony can help interpret power relations in the international scene.

3. Examine how the agency of the state apparatus is expressed in the Greek case study by reviewing the relationship between the Hellenic Foundation for Culture and its sponsoring department.
4. Explore how the agency of the state is expressed in the rest of the five case studies (British Council, Institut français, Goethe Institut, Instituto Cervantes, Swedish Institute).
5. Review the relations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture in all cases.

The epistemic assumptions of this study merit significant attention. Any preconceived ideas and biases need to be pointed out, contextualised and discussed so that the cognitive processes which shaped the conclusion are clear to the reader.

Assumption 1: The instrumentalisation of culture by non-cultural agents is a sensitive topic in cultural policy studies and the default position by cultural analysts – a group which the author identifies herself with – is to frame the instrumental relationship through negative terms. The selection of the Neomarxist lens to interpret the findings points to this interpretative logic which the researcher accepts and adopts. In fact, the theoretical framework concurs with the assumption and may lead the researcher into an ontological loop. It rests to be seen whether the institutional relationship between Departments and National Cultural Institutes in the exercise of foreign cultural policy is indeed as restrictive as cultural analysts paint it to be.

Assumption 2: Building on the previous assumption, the study treats the National Cultural Institutes as victims of government control and presumes that they wish to be free, mutatis mutandis, of that control. The relationship between the Cultural Institutes and their sponsoring departments is viewed as co-optive rather than co-acting, therefore the end result of their interaction is interpreted uniformly through one pair of antithetical values, that of resistance as this can be expressed by the Cultural Institutes in different forms and intensities and that of apathy which may imply compliance and consent. Nonetheless, the structural variance of how governments demand accountability from their arm's length bodies in different national contexts can cancel out the assumption or, at the very least, recalibrate its focus.

1.4 Originality

The thesis adopts a comparative approach in the study of its topic. Such an attempt is admittedly rare since the majority of studies, especially in cultural policy research, concern the investigation of single case studies (Schuster, 1987). This fact makes the need for comparative analyses more pressing (Kawashima, 1995). The study was originally conceived on the grounds that it would offer policy makers critical insight over their own discourses and practices and, at the same time, it would facilitate knowledge exchange across national contexts. Given the focus of the thesis in how the state exercises control over their Cultural Institutes, I assume that governments will be interested in the more tanglible findings of this study, especially the EU member-states under analysis. Although the Cultural Instituttes are primarily a European phenomenon, there is a proliferation of like organisations in the rest of the world, especially in South-East Asia. Consequently, the findings of the study may be of interest to actors and institutions outside Europe.

Theoretical considerations were not side-lined. Quite on the contrary, the theory works as the binding glue between the chapters of the main body and, in its absence, the readers would have great difficulty in contextualising the conclusions. The field is characterised by volatile intentions regarding the instrumentalisation of culture and discourses around the value of culture can be seen to change depending on the audience. I frame the problem using the concept of hegemony by neomarxist philosopher and politician Antonio Gramsci and suggest that so far realist discourses about the value of culture have dominated the policy landscape. Gramsci’s emphasis on ideology as a non-structural means to limit the agency of smaller actors paved the way for new ontological connections to emerge that stretched beyond the traditional Marxist school of thought. I support that the attempt to discuss the dialectic between realist and idealist discourses around cultural value using Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as an umbrella framework is a novel academic contribution in the field which sets apart this study from others which may adopt a more applied angle.

1.5 Thesis structure

The thesis comprises of seven chapters including the present one. In chapter 1, I introduced the research question and the aim of the thesis explaining the rationale behind my choice to focus on power relations in foreign cultural policy. The five objectives I identified are a guiding path to which I will return in the conclusion.

In chapter 2, a conceptual literature review will introduce issues of definitions and present insights on how the phenomenon of instrumentalism has been researched so far mainly in cultural policy studies. Extensive references are also made to a very specific organisational principle in Public Administration (PA), the arm's length relationship, which ensures a relative autonomy in decision-making. The theme of decentralisation is pivotal to understand how cultural value changes according to state control. My overall theoretical perspective is neomarxist as the guiding principles for my analysis are drawn out of Gramsci's theory of hegemony. I maintain that this framework describes adequately how power relationships are constructed especially with regard to the latest developments on an EU policy level.

In chapter 3, I present the rationale behind the selection of the six case studies and explain the research design. The replication logic behind the grouping constitutes a paramount element of the overall design. Additionally, I will present the thematic analysis I conducted using the interview transcriptions and discuss how the codes are linked to form a coherent argument that reveals a whole new set of information about the case studies.

In chapter 4, the in-depth case study will be introduced and analysed. First, the chapter opens with a systematic review of how cultural policy developed in Greece in the 20th and 21st century. Second, the chapter discusses the main priorities of the Greek foreign policy as I find that both foreign policy concerns and cultural policy priorities need to be taken into account when studying foreign cultural policy. Finally, the chapter introduces the main organs responsible for Greek cultural diplomacy to focus eventually on the Hellenic Foundation for Culture.

In chapter 5, the rest of the five case studies are explored. A mini country profile for each of the five cases is set up introducing the reader to the most important debates in the country's cultural and foreign policy. I then proceed to the analysis

of the discourses and practices of the Cultural Institutes of each one of the selected countries (UK, Germany, France, Spain and Sweden).

In chapter 6, I re-synthesise information and critically assess the results of the six case studies bringing into perspective the key themes of the literature review to develop a working theory of how instrumentalism operates in foreign cultural policy. I conclude that instrumentalism is articulated through both structural and dynamic means. The agency of the state is expressed through a series of regulatory mechanisms like funding, agenda setting, evaluation, hierarchies and appointment power. These are structural means of control as described above, but next to these, I have found that a very particular discourse prevails among policymakers in the Cultural Institutes, which does not endorse the distinction between the extrinsic and intrinsic value of culture.

Last, the thesis concludes with a summary of the findings in chapter 7, offers a list of recommendations on how the Cultural Institutes can distance themselves from the workings of the central state apparatus and highlights promising areas for further research.

Following the evidence-based movement that is sweeping higher education, I decided to include the primary data that this thesis was based on in a CD-ROM folded at the back pocket of this thesis. I would like to note that this is a purely qualitative study from the collection and analysis of the data to the way the thesis narrative is built. I am using extensively in this study the first person and avoid speaking in a detached tone about decisions I made. I felt that writing in the third person removes my agency and strips away my responsibilities as the sole designer of this project and author of this study. This thesis remains my first extended penned piece and as all new ventures, in many instances, it may fall victim of its ambition. Yet, I hope that the monograph will inform and problematise my readers as well as offer them moments of enthrallment and relaxation.

2. Conceptual review

While the quest for new publications is a never-ending process when writing a review, there are always some timeless pieces in literature that stand out. May it be for their analytical clarity and methodological rigour or the originality of their ideas, some publications are always taking a central position in cultural diplomacy debates. Not only do certain articles and books make their appearance in nearly every other cultural diplomacy publication, as is the case with the 'soft power' concept, but also the themes the new publications are touching upon suffer from a high degree of saturation. While the present thesis will make references to these classic works, I have also selected several published items that are not usually featured in cultural diplomacy literature reviews, not that there are many of those – in fact, if any. I have chosen to work with readings predominantly from cultural policy. I assume that cultural diplomacy is a sub-field germane to both Cultural Studies and International Relations, or correspondingly to Cultural Policy and Foreign Policy. It is probably the conjuncture between the two disciplines that is worth studying. Both disciplines produce certain rhetorics that assign to the field values of different texture. On one hand, Cultural Studies questions the engagement of culture in the policy arena and, on the other hand, International Relations not only takes this condition for granted, but seeks to increase the political, economic and social benefits derived out of the instrumentalisation of culture.

In the process of thinking through the content material of this literature review, I met with a pressing question regarding the general orientation of this study. I wondered how I should frame the subject; could it be a literature review that would investigate current considerations of the field or a review that explored historical questions regarding the role of culture in international affairs. Time variation was only one parameter that needed to be tuned in. Another one was space which required me not only to select a case study (or indeed many) to start breaking down the research question, but also to investigate literature that is produced by and for a specific locus. Naturally, I could not escape two built-in complications: first, the language barrier which led me to investigate literature published mainly in English and, second, the significance of the researcher's lived context. Lessons from the British case where I work and live in re-appear many times informing my

approach. These two parameters defined the scope of this literature review and guided me to look primarily into publications that investigate British perceptions and experiences. However, the most challenging, by far, task during this doctorate has been how to select and sketch out an appropriate background for foreign cultural policy out of the various options at hand. I, therefore, chose to construct a narrative not grounded in the tradition of International Relations, or Modern History, which would constitute a rather common choice, but in that of Cultural Policy studies. This allows me to successfully support my overarching argument that foreign cultural policy is as much as a realm of culture ministers as is of foreign affairs ministers.

The present chapter is an attempt to review literature deductively, starting from the field of cultural policy and moving on to the subject area of foreign cultural policy. I have identified two recurrent themes in cultural diplomacy literature: the first theme concerns the discussion on definitions and semantic boundaries. The second theme that kept making its appearance in literature was the struggle to pin down and measure the impact of cultural relations on foreign audiences. Evaluation methods constitute a prevalent theme in literature, however, the present study does not concern itself with this topic, so input from this strand of literature was excluded. I start my analysis by reviewing literature on the definitions of culture. Terminology is key in how different policy actors view the practice of foreign relations; I am also looking at cultural policy discourses and examine concepts like cultural elitism, the democratisation of culture and cultural democracy. The objective here is to assess the impact discourses around cultural value have on governance structures and how the latter are adapted to avoid accusations of instrumentalism. Therefore, I examine the concept of decentralisation as a policy choice and specifically the arm's length principle. The last section looks at different discourses around cultural diplomacy and examines how the area is linked to the field of public diplomacy. The second half of the literature review focuses on theories and looks specifically at the concept of hegemony first introduced by Antonio Gramsci and the concept of soft power introduced by Joseph Nye. I argue that soft power is in reality a reworking of the Gramscian idea of hegemony only applied to the international sphere rather than the domestic scene. The binary consent – coercion seems to me to be the perfect analogy for the pair soft power – hard power which Nye is credited to have come up with.

2.1 Defining concepts: culture, diplomacy and instrumentalism

2.1.1 Culture and its polysemy

I argued above that some scholarly works have had exceptional impact in the field and have been cited numerous times by analysts. Such is the case with Raymond Williams and his critical work on culture. Williams has made a unique contribution to the Humanities with his book 'Culture and Society' (1958) which signalled, along with another two publications, the dawn of Cultural Studies as a cross-disciplinary field of academic inquiry investigating the relationship between politics and culture (Hall, 1980). Williams argued that a Cultural Revolution had taken place along with the Industrial Revolution and that the workings of culture were very much connected to the social, political and economic struggles taking place in the public sphere (Williams, 1961). Culture, thus, takes central stage in the analytical mind of Williams.

> *For Williams the word 'culture' meant both 'a whole way of life' (culture in the anthropological sense, synonymous with everyday life) and the forms of signification (novels, films, but also advertising and television) that circulate within a society. Thus the challenge for studying culture was to understand how these two meanings of culture coexist (Highmore, 2002, p.91).*

While the above distinction appears as early as 1958 in 'Culture and Society', Williams added a third dimension in his book 'Keywords: a vocabulary of culture and society' published in 1976. According to this, culture may also mean a process of intellectual enrichment and advancement as we say when someone is 'cultured'. Culture can be a cognitive atlas by which people make meaning of the world around them and one which helps them adapt to various spatial and temporal conditions. Bennett (1995) has pinned down the tension between the varying definitions arguing that the broad conception comes always to challenge the narrow one and vice versa to the point that eventually research is trapped into circular arguments. Despite the critique, the interplay between the three definitional pillars is still relevant and cuts across the thesis as a central theme. I will show that culture in the term 'cultural diplomacy' suffers from a lack of semantic

clarity as the noun gets transformed into its adjectival form. This has a spillover effect on the understanding of how different agents perceive its practice. As a consequence, governmental actors tend to exercise cultural diplomacy from points of view that do not necessarily converge even in the same national context.

Moving away from the world of academia to the realm of supranational agencies, UNESCO (2002) has adopted a broad definition of culture as ways of life putting emphasis on cultural diversity and respect for human rights. The different universal declarations UNESCO has been ratifying over the years in the area of culture are a testimony of how the term has evolved over the course of the second latter of the 20th century and into the new millennium. In the founding document of the organisation, culture, alongside education, is treated as a tool for peacekeeping. Since the political and economic interests of nation-states are not enough to ensure that peace will be respected, this must be based on "the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind", of which culture is a basic component (UNESCO, 1945, n.p.). An all-encompassing definition of the term, and one that is widely endorsed today by policy-making authorities, is found in the Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies (UNESCO, 1982, p.8):

> *Culture cover[s] artistic creation together with the interpretation, execution and dissemination of works of art, physical culture, sports and games and open-air activities, as well as the ways in which a society and its members express[es] their feeling for beauty and harmony and their vision of the world, as much as their modes of scientific and technological creation and control of their natural environment.*

I find the above description intentionally broad but also dangerously empty of meaning blending the Williamsian denotations of the word 'culture' adding to the mix the signification of the word 'civilisation'. The fact that UNESCO is endorsing such a broad understanding of culture allows different nation-states to choose what they find fit for their national projects. The 'anything goes' thesis gives room to policymakers to maneuver and come up with varied legislative solutions. Definitions seem to be inevitably linked to goal-setting in public policy. As Hugoson (1997) notes policy goals are expressed open-endedly either to serve the interests of elite groups who understand how to translate political intentions into action or to prevent politicians from making value judgements about the social mission of

aesthetics. In my study, the Cultural Institutes by choosing specific terms to describe their work, they differentiate themselves from certain actors within the government nexus and side with others mostly outside the state sphere. I will be using the second pillar of William's definition of culture as ways of life and juxtapose this to other understandings of culture as these are expressed in different national contexts.

Now that we have established what we mean by the term culture, we should ask ourselves: 'What is specifically cultural policy?' Cunningham maintains that "cultural policy embraces the broad field of public processes involved in formulating, implementing, and contesting governmental intervention in, and support of, cultural activity" (Cunningham as quoted in Lewis and Miller, 2003, p.14). Cultural activity, however, is a very generic term and does not help us understand which areas of public life cultural policy actually policies. Heritage has traditionally been one of the core pillars of cultural policy, and alongside the arts, it has been one of the legitimising reasons of its very existence (Isar, 2009; Throsby, 2010). The rise of economic determinism in the postmodern world has interestingly augmented the regulatory space of cultural policy. Cultural policy today is covering a wide array of domains and includes the creative industries, educational institutions such as libraries and archives, and also recreational establishments such as zoos, parks and other similar public leisure structures. In many countries, the media or even the sports sector is regulated through the same central authority as the example of the Department of Culture, Media and Sports in the United Kingdom demonstrates (Mulcahy, 2006). In this respect, we should reflect on how domestic priorities in cultural policy feed into the foreign cultural policy statement. As Mitchell (1986, p.8) observes "…external cultural policy cannot be practised in abstraction: its validity will depend on the vitality of the domestic scene, on internal cultural policy. The two should ideally interlock."

Last but not least, I would like to place emphasis on a rather neglected point in literature made by Katz and Cummings (1987). After looking at an impressive number of case studies (thirteen countries), they distinguished between states which focus on safeguarding national heritage compared to those placing emphasis on the development of the creative industries (Craik, 2007). It is this legacy coupled with market stimuli that will determine government tactics and, ultimately, cultural policy strategies. Therefore, to bring two contrasting examples to demonstrate my point, it is a historical necessity for Italy to subsidy opera, but it

comes as a reaction to market pressures for Scandinavian countries to subsidy literature. In the latter case, the domestic audience for language-based cultural goods is rather small, so the need to support creators through state subsidies is great (Richardson, 1988). The distinction between countries with immense historical cultural capital and countries which are committed in developing their cultural and creative industries is a case in point in how states build their international profiles. I wish to flag up this point in the context of my thesis as the comparative analysis I employed endorses the above finding.

Cultural policy can be organised on many layers taking into as a point of reference spatial/geographical criteria, from the domestic to the foreign or from the supranational and the national, to the regional, the urban and the local. As regards the decision making style, it may follow a top-down (centralised model) or a bottom-up logic (periphery model) and, in terms of power relations, it can be hegemonic or empowering (Bell and Oakley, 2015). Not all countries follow the centralised model of decision making, of which France is a classic example, but some choose to relegate powers to the periphery. The Nordic countries are a case in point of such a conception of public policy, where small ministries allow for greater flexibility and encourage increased collaboration with other national, regional and local authorities. These characteristics are not unique to the cultural field but apply to the wider fabric of Public Administration of a given country. A centralised state apparatus employs different tactics to coordinate the state machine and is overall governed by a different organisational culture than a decentralised state. These characteristics have direct implications in how foreign cultural policy is eventually articulated.

The finances of the sector merit critical attention to understand how the power game is set up. It is generally accepted that culture is traditionally not thought of as a high priority area and culture ministers hardly ever enjoy a prestigious position in the cabinet (Gray and Wingfield, 2011). The cultural budget very often does not exceed the 1%-2% threshold even if the definition of culture is a broad one (Gray, 2009). And out of that meagre share, the high arts are ordinarily the most frequent recipients of state subsidies, a phenomenon that has been dubbed *cultural elitism* (Isar, 2009). The financial capability of the Ministry of Culture is an important aspect which should not be sidelined in the analysis. Despite the moral gravity Ministries of Culture may enjoy as their policy area touches upon the sensitive

issue of national identity, they lack significant weight in statecraft in direct contrast to Ministries of Foreign Affairs.

The cultural sector was reorganised – and in the process reconceptualised – as a distinct policy item after the experience of WWII. The first modern ministry of culture[1] was established in 1959 in post-war France by President Charles De Gaulle, who appointed the writer and art theorist André Malraux in the position of Minister of Cultural Affairs (McGuigan, 2004). This is the first instance that we encounter a centralised authority with the gravity of a ministerial department to administrate the arts, culture and heritage. By contrast, Ministries of Foreign Affairs are very old institutions; in fact, it is in France again that we encounter the first modern Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be established as early as the 17th century (Lewis, 2008). Based on this, I argue that the time delay in centralising and politicising cultural policy has given room to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to claim cultural relations as its own, exclusive field of conduct. As we will see in chapter 5 and 6, the UK, Germany, France and Sweden had organised their foreign cultural and educational activity through the Cultural Institutes long before the establishment of a centralised Ministry of Culture in the country. By contrast, Spain and Greece reconceptualised their foreign cultural plans in the 1990s, at a time when a national Ministry for Culture had already taken its place in the Spanish and Greek cabinet respectively. Hence, there has always been a latent tension as to which authority (MFA-MoC) is responsible to coordinate foreign cultural policy.

[1] In the English-speaking world the central state authority that is the source of power over cultural matters is called ‘department’ while in the rest of the world it is called a ‘ministry’.

2.1.2 Culture as the rear window of diplomatic practice

Cultural diplomacy, as a field of practice and research, suffers from what seems to be a perennial problem in most soft domains, the problem of a shared understanding of the terminology. Although the term is used widely, its semantic nuances are slippery making the concept surprisingly hard to define (Isar, 2010). Cultural diplomacy rose as a central component of international politics during the Cold War when the United States transferred the conflict against the Soviet Union to the cultural arena. As the realist tradition held, it was assumed that the effects would have been disastrous were the two powers to engage in open combat (Wohlforth, 1994). The deployment of strategies to tacitly undermine Soviet ideology was seen as an appropriate way to contain communism within its original boundaries. Consequently, there is abundant literature today studying the methods and workings of American cultural diplomacy during the Cold War (Mulcahy, 1999; Bu, 1999; Gould-Davies, 2003; David-Fox, 2011; Prevots, 2012). The book, which has been credited with bringing culture into the fore, is that of Emily Rosenberg (1982), who investigated the influence of the American innovation-focused economy and mass culture on the Soviet social imaginary. This study influenced heavily subsequent historical analyses and assisted in shedding light on this previously unexamined component of the West-East divide.

Still, when front-line diplomats and politicians would think of Cold War diplomacy, they would rarely consider its cultural component as evident in Henry Kissinger's 1994 volume 'Diplomacy'. Kissinger offers an account of the Cold War through the motives, moves and maneuvers of major political figures; this was a traditional historical account which reaffirmed that world politics had, in fact, nothing 'soft' in it. As Gould-Davies (2003, p.193) notes: "Cultural relations are usually completely overlooked in mainstream histories of the Cold War. At most, they are seen as little more than 'low politics', inconsequential in comparison with the high politics of power and security." Hence, it is reasonable to argue that culture has been the 'rear window' of the diplomatic practice. Although still not occupying a central space in International Relations curricula or research programs, cultural diplomacy has, against the odds, evolved into a legitimate object of academic inquiry thanks to 'the cultural turn', which ultimately permeated International Relations studies. Historical analyses, albeit providing original

material to the academic study of cultural diplomacy, have unfortunately little to offer in the context of this study. My research focus falls far from the transnational cultural exchanges that took place between the liberal economies of the West and the socialist regimes of the East during the period of the Cold War. Hence, I have not looked at this, admittedly admirable, volume of publications, but rather turned to critical analyses of CD's contemporary practice.

Culture in international relations has been deployed as an effective tool for relationship building for centuries so much as Richard Arndt has called it "the first resort of kings" (Arndt, 2005). Although mainstream scholarship in cultural diplomacy (CD) tends to seek for the historical lineage of the field locating its practice far back in antiquity, when kings and emperors would exchange gifts as tokens of goodwill to cement their alliance, it is difficult to argue that there is indeed continuity when the terms of reference have changed so dramatically. The procedural, almost teleturgical, transactions that happen between leaders today can hardly pass as cultural diplomacy, although this point is open to conjecture.

Cultural diplomacy, in its modern conception, emanated from Europe and carries with it a colonial burden. In this respect, Walker's (1993) 'inside/out' conceptualisation is a useful idea that informs our understanding of how imperial sovereignty operated. Colonialism entrenched the 'self' to avoid the erosion by the 'cultural other' and, consequently, dichotomised the world into two spheres, the inside (us) and the outside (the others). It ventured to conquer and civilise 'the cultural Other' to avoid being drawn into the wondrous exotic. As Hardt and Negri (2000) aptly point out, imperialism flattens out the organic anomalies of the international system by melting the national boundaries across a range of practices to guarantee access to foreign markets through the forging of particular political subjectivities. It tames the exotic and, thus, expands the space it can influence and exploit. Cultural diplomacy's primary mission was to civilise the cultural Other (Paschalidis, 2009).

I will explore below the narratives that frame cultural diplomacy at its present form to uncover the intentions of the actors involved and later link them with the various definitions in use in the field. I identify two contrasting ideas that characterise discourses about the practice. It has been suggested that cultural diplomacy operates as a neutral space that assists in building rapport. This approach accentuates the humanistic undertones that characterise the field and transforms the diplomatic practice into a more informal experience even allowing

sometimes dissent to be part of the cultural message (Schneider, 2006). This is a very pertinent point to which Constantinou, Kerr and Sharp (2016) also concur. In their words “art is often used instrumentally in diplomacy to project the representation of polity or policy, but such representations as well as counterrepresentations by artists have legitimacy effects that need to be understood and tajen on board by practitioners” (ibid, p.3). When cultural diplomacy is perceived as a path to build communicational bridges, then the exercise of cultural diplomacy is situated closer to the practice of cultural relations (Mitchell, 1986; Arndt, 2005). In this variation, the practice of cultural relations has the capacity to soften, if not cancel out, the political character of diplomacy by introducing a non-political component in the affair. Yet, evidence shows that the milieu where it is practised and the actors who get involved are decisive factors that determine its quality and imprint bringing it closer or distancing it from realpolitik considerations (Doeser and Nisbett, 2018).

It has also been proposed that culture is a form of strategic skill capable of creating alliances through influence and attraction, what Joseph Nye (1990) termed “soft power”. Soft power gives the opportunity to smaller actors to achieve influence outside the traditional arenas of power competition (international trade and armed forces), which are in any case occupied permanently by bigger players. Power dynamics have spread today into other realms principally because of the increased economic interdependence between states and the lateral connections established by global communications which have created new spaces for influence (ibid). Taiwan is a case in point here that illustrates with fantastic clarity how culture can be used to boost alliances and at the same time legitimise a country’s claim for national sovereignty. Taiwan’s strategy in cultural diplomacy is embedded in the cultural policy national plan rather than the foreign policy strategy (Wei, 2017). The turbulent relationship with China, namely China’s refusal to recognise the country as an independent state, has led Taiwan to find ways to create ties with foreign partners which circumvent the official channels of communication. In the latest instance, Taiwanese policymakers have discovered that the active promotion of cultural products abroad can create a strong export package capable of yielding not only political leverage but also financial profit (ibid).

The two converse approaches presented above lie at the heart of tensions around the role of culture in external relations. This problem is nothing more than

an extension of the classic debate in cultural policy literature on the intrinsic and extrinsic values of culture I presented earlier, with both approaches underlining culture's utility albeit towards different directions (social versus politico-economic value). As I have already established, navigating the definitional labyrinth in the field of cultural relations is a particularly challenging affair and very often proves to be an exercise against common sense. Terms like soft power, cultural diplomacy, international cultural relations and, even, public diplomacy appear interchangeably in the academic literature complicating further institutional responsibilities and hindering effective policy analysis (Fisher and Figueira, 2011). These terms appear as synonyms in literature although it is more accurate to argue that they are conterminous concepts meaning they belong to the same overarching semantic cluster. Lately, new terms like heritage diplomacy, film diplomacy or culinary diplomacy have come to add up to the list fragmenting further the literature (Nilsen, 2011; Rockower, 2012; Winter, 2015). As I will argue in this chapter, the use of the aforementioned terms and the semantic confusion that surrounds them has three explanations.

First, the term 'culture' causes a general disorientation to observers and analysts as to what the concept signifies in different sociopolitical contexts and throughout the course of history, as discussed in 2.2. Second, the emergence of a new branch of diplomacy called 'public diplomacy' in mid-20th century, advocated and celebrated mainly by the Americans, has complicated the discourse around cultural diplomacy. Furthermore, governments do not have a comparative glossary of terms by which they legislate, so the concepts are used open-endedly. Third, 'diplomacy' as a term is rather fuzzy since traditionally it has been associated with the world of politics placing emphasis on the political/bureaucratic aspect of the practice. Yet, today 'diplomacy' is trying to break free from this narrow frame. New media have reshaped the way political actors and diplomats consider the purview of the practice (Arsenault, 2009). Taking into account these considerations, what are the definitions that have been proposed for cultural diplomacy?

Reimann (2004) supports that cultural diplomacy signifies all those actions instigated by governments targeting either other governments or people with the aim to communicate artistic creation. The most cited perhaps definition in the literature comes from Cummings (2009, p.1), who argued that cultural diplomacy is "the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding". This definition

embraces a broad interpretation of ‘culture’, wherein ‘culture’ does not merely symbolise the aesthetic and artistic production of a nation, but rather its philosophy of life.

From a realist’s perspective, Cummings’s conceptualisation of cultural diplomacy is rather humanistic, almost too orthodox to be trusted. Is this the reason why political elites invest resources in cross-cultural initiatives? Another excerpt proves quite revealing as to the intentions of at least one big player in the diplomatic arena:

> *It is an axiom of international relations that the more power a country acquires, the more suspicions it provokes when it uses that power. […] But a country can accumulate so much power that in the end it will have no friends at all. And history demonstrates that friendless nations fall to ruin (U.S. Department of State, 2005, p.4.).*

So, cultural relations may be deployed here as a defense mechanism. Cultural diplomacy is used to communicate one’s values, so they are not misunderstood in an effort to balance out the impact of hard power strategies and gain friends. Finn (2003, p.19) comes to endorse this idea through another statement of equal bias: “The United States must realize that the world is watching to see if America's military might will be matched by its efforts to repair damaged societies.” Cultural diplomacy is a communicational strategy that aims to appease anger without paradoxically ceasing offensive behaviour.

Although analysts have warned against this frivolous approach in cultural relations, American foreign policy is dominated by realist thinking which views cross-cultural dialogue as another element of the foreign policy toolkit (Rosendorf, 2009). An illustrative example for this argument is the study by S.E. Graham (2006) of the American delegation in UNESCO between 1946-1956. Graham argues that the United States had a clear instrumentalist vision about their role in the organisation and their participation in the bloc was an effort to control the organisation’s political orientation and steer it away from communist influence.

The third and last conceptual approach I have identified in literature is that of covert influence as this is found in Nye’s soft power (1990). The cultural arena is yet another terrain of competition. A case in point is also the Venice Biennale, the ‘Olympics of the Arts’, as the world’s most renowned arts competition has been called the past years (Cull, 2014; Zaugg and Nishimura, 2015). The exhibition

functions as a tool for showcasing national artistic excellence and assists in rebranding previously ill-reputed states. The rise of African discourses in contemporary art, for example, is helping recast African countries as progressive. The Venice Biennale has become an arena where national subjectivities are re-considered and previously established cultural hierarchies are challenged.

Interestingly, the state is not the only mechanism behind redistribution processes of the symbolic capital. Nisbett (2016, p.120) insightfully observes that the definition offered by Cummings, which we cited above, surprisingly does not make reference to the producers of cultural diplomacy programmes. She notes that this conceptualisation "does not suggest that cultural diplomacy is a state matter, nor that its purpose is political. There has perhaps been a projection of political intent onto it by those latching onto the word 'diplomacy' and its connotations of negotiation, peacekeeping, and international relations." This attachment of cultural diplomacy to its diplomatic baggage has made actors working in the field to look suspiciously toward terms like cultural and public diplomacy rebranding the whole scope of their activities as cultural relations (Cull, 2008a).

As mentioned earlier, academic research has sought to establish a distinction between cultural diplomacy and international cultural relations arguing that the latter "grow naturally and organically, without government intervention" whilst cultural diplomacy falls within the remit of the state (Arndt, 2005, Introduction xviii). As Constantinou, Kerr and Shapr (2016, p.5) note "…linguistic uses are not just instrumental to communication but enact and create the worlds within which we live and operate." Terms such as cultural diplomacy are used open-endedly today pointing to the plural character of how diplomacy is understood and practiced and any attempt to police concepts runs the risk of being labelled normative. What is interesting in the definition shared by Arndt above is the use of the adverb 'naturally' which implies that government initiatives in the field are perhaps unnatural. As Longhurst et al. put it (2008, p.47): "There is in English culture a widespread belief that nature and the natural are truthful and reliable since they are apparently outside the realm of human manipulation". Discussions about nature are implicit to the debate on good and evil where natural acts or things are usually deemed ethical and good. Unethical use(s) of culture are considered by definition opposite to its nature for we are prone to believe that culture is inherently ethical, thus, emptying it of any strategic mission. And it is the same human

disposition, rooted in a different tradition, that has made us look suspiciously towards the state. The neoliberal state is regarded today with disbelief and state actors are increasingly experiencing a decline in their reputation. Therefore, cultural diplomacy bearing the term 'diplomacy' is not seen as legitimate in the eyes of the public and is likely to be perceived as nation branding (Szondi, 2008).

To overcome the practical problems produced by these dualisms (Culture/Ethics, State/Non-ethics), cultural diplomacy has been reframed in an effort to justify instrumentalism. A definition which attributes cultural diplomacy to the sphere of the state naming all other non-governmental activities international cultural relations is a very attractive one, because it provides clarity and offers a solution to the problem of instrumentalism. As Constantinou, Kerr and Sharp (2016, p.6) remind us "…in a world where power and authority seem to be diffusing, people are looking to something which they traditionally understand as and want to call diplomacy as a way of understanding their relations with one another." If the state's mediation is seen as politically incorrect, then the only solution is to take distance from it. It is not exactly clear as to whether this trend is representative of a general Geist in the policy world, or, if the division is an artificial distinction produced by academics. Rivera (2015) acknowledges that the distinction is normative in that it assists in setting operational boundaries and facilitates the work of different actors, who could otherwise face significant overlaps. Fisher (2009) notes that in the case of the Cultural Institutes, there has been a transition from one paradigmatic discourse to another and situates this rhetorical shift at the end of the Cold War. This is especially true for the British Council and the Goethe Institut which have explicitly taken distance from the term cultural diplomacy embracing the more value-neutral term 'cultural relations' (British Council and Goethe Institut, 2018). This discursive change signifies a different set of policy intentions and preferred outcomes; however, it is unclear whether and how practices are keeping up with the rhetoric.

To make clear the semantic boundaries between concepts, I distinguish between three elements related to the practice of foreign policy: *i) agent, ii) medium, iii) audience*. It is these three components that get convoluted in discussions around cultural value and bureaucratic jurisdictions. Culture may denote both the first and second pillar of William's definition: culture as ways of life (pillar II) and culture as the intellectual and artistic production of a given country (pillar I). In both cases, culture is the medium that is used as the basis for

relationship building, however, it can also denote the audience as is meant in the phrase ‘inter-cultural or cross-cultural dialogue’. The agent can be either a state or a non-state actor active in the field. Traditional perceptions around diplomatic work would link the practice of cultural diplomacy to the state while a more informed approach would acknowledge that diplomacy today has broken the rigid political boundaries it was originally confined in.

Cultural diplomacy and international cultural relations are not the only terms that are adopted open-endedly. The same applies for the pairs: cultural diplomacy – public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy – soft power. A recent literature review published by the British Council in cooperation with the Goethe Institut (2018) explores the discursive similarities and differences between like terms. The review concludes that instrumental intentions lie at the heart of the debate around definitions. It is neither the means nor the actors involved or the audience that is targeted which define the practice, it is the intention under which the programmes are crafted that determine the value(s) of culture (ibid). There is a very well-rehearsed literature in cultural policy studies on the subject of values as we observed earlier. However, literature in Diplomatic Studies has proven relatively unresponsive to accusations of instrumentalism.

Public diplomacy has been defined as “a government’s process of communication with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies” (Tuch, 1990 as quoted in Gilboa, 2008, p.57). This is a broad definition that seems to encircle cultural diplomacy practice. Interestingly, Tuch notes here that the initiator of public diplomacy campaigns and programmes is the government, however, for Delaney “both government and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear directly on another government’s foreign policy decisions” (Delaney, 1968 as quoted in Signitzer and Coombs, 1992, p.138). Evidently, the latter interpretation is situated closer to an understanding of cultural diplomacy as cultural relations. In this direction, we can find a wave of publications framing the cultural content as public diplomacy (Melissen, 2005; Cull, 2008a; Szondi, 2008; Hayden, 2012). Figure 1 is a sketch of how the two fields are juxtaposed in literature.



Figure 1. The relationship between public and cultural diplomacy. Source: Author.

Cull (2008a) maintains that cultural diplomacy constitutes only part of the wide array of activities that public diplomacy entails. He groups public diplomacy activities under five broad categories: i. listening, ii. advocacy, iii. cultural diplomacy, iv. exchange and v. international broadcasting, although there is plenty of room for debate as to whether the classifications are indeed mutually exclusive or whether the author has intentionally imposed an artificial boundary between the categories to create the taxonomy. A more flexible classification of public diplomacy activities is that proposed by Cowan and Arsenault (2008) who suggest that communication, dialogue and collaboration are the three layers that constitute the 'arsenal' of public diplomacy. While communication is a one-way channel, dialogue and collaboration are two-way channels with the capacity to create stronger ties. Studies in cultural diplomacy identify dialogue and collaboration as

distinctive of the field although cultural diplomacy in the strict sense may entail one-way communicational initiatives as seen in cultural events hosted in embassy settings (Ang et al., 2015).

The conceptualisation that I find most enlightening is that of Frankel who distinguished between *fast media*, this describes channels like broadcasting and newspaper (essentially the forces behind political communication), and *slow media*, which represents the educational and cultural aspect of communicational exchange (Frankel, 1965 in Topic and Rodin, 2013). I endorse this distinction as I maintain that time is a key parameter that differentiates the practice of cultural diplomacy from that of public diplomacy. Fostering inter-cultural dialogue and building connections between people take considerable time for any effect to show in the short or mid-term. The time horizon of cultural relations is deep and requires long-term investment.

Following a similar rationale which endorses the distinction between the two fields, Feigenbaum (2001, p.38) argues that "the needs of public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy are not always complementary" despite the fact that the two approaches share common methods and operationally the same service may host both public and cultural diplomacy specialists. Citing Mulcahy, Feigenbaum (2001) argues that the professionals responsible for drafting cultural diplomacy agendas have a distinct skill set lying in the soft spectrum of foreign affairs, which ordinarily is manned by political scientists focused on security and defense. This is a unique capital that should be appreciated by governments who now tend to favor short-term informational communication strategies over long-term cultural and educational exchanges rendering the services of such people obsolete (ibid). It is true that the diplomatic profession "is going through some critical transformations with respect to the nature of the actors, issue areas, and methods of diplomatic engagement" (Bjola and Kornprobst, 2018, p.4) and, therefore, practicing cultural diplomacy requires the input of multiple agents inside and outside the government. Thus, it is not anymore a prerequisite for agents practicing diplomacy to have undertaken formal diplomatic training, but it is more about the realisation that the field is in need of people with a 'diplomatic understanding' and 'diplomatic thinking' regardless of educational background (Sharp, 2009).

Interestingly, there are voices in the scholarly community which advocate for greater emphasis in reinforcing the cultural agency in the affair rather than an equilibrium of forces and mechanisms with a mix of professional competences.

Paschalidis (2009) calls for more critical research, from the point of view of cultural policy studies, with the aim to outbalance the instrumentalist approach that prevails in foreign affairs. Stassen (1987) notes that there is a serious semantic distinction between the like terms 'foreign cultural policy' and 'cultural foreign policy' and points to the necessity governments to retreat from controlling the cultural message abroad. A cultural foreign policy, for Stassen, is just foreign policy disguised under a cultural cloak while a true foreign cultural policy is predominantly a policy of culture. This point to me is an excellent example of the clash between the two diametrically opposite intentions in cultural affairs. Instead of oscillating between the two sides, could the middle path be the way forward? Berge (2017, p.27) argues in his thesis on Norwegian cultural diplomacy, and it is this view I share, that the distinction between a foreign cultural policy more inclined to either foreign policy or cultural policy is unproductive. In his words:

> *. . . the study of foreign cultural policy has to involve perspectives from both foreign and cultural policy studies. Rather, the important question is the degree and shape of integration. It also has to maintain a critical distance to normative agencies potentially growing out of any of the various approaches.*

This perspective establishes that foreign cultural policy is a policy area of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as much as of the Ministry of Culture, but also accepts that there are voices from non-institutionalised actors that need to be taken into account. Experience from other contexts indicates that indeed more actors may contribute to the creation of a strong export package. Baker (2013) admits that in the case of the United Kingdom the setting is so pluralistic that apart from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for Culture, Media and Sports, the devolved governments of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, their corresponding Arts Councils and the Department of Trade and Industry have an essential role in shaping the British Council's agenda. In his view, "the UK's overall public diplomacy is strengthened by the lack of any one single statement of foreign cultural policy" (ibid, n.p.). As Bjola and Kornprobst (2018, p.5) have aptly pointed out "…the nature of the national diplomatic environment is changing from one which privileges the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to one which places it within a broader contruct – that of the National Diplomatic System (NDS), which covers the complex network of governmental and non-governmental

institutions that inform and shape a country's international policy objectives." A polyvocal narrative, therefore, seems to be the only certain measure of success for such endeavours, although the agency that each policy actor brings into the relationship should be further explored as government departments may be seen to compete for the same territory and, consequently, undermine the authority of one another (Fisher et al., 2011). In this thesis, I will focus, on a first level, on the interaction of the Cultural Institutes with their reporting authorities and, on a second level, I will look at the relationship between foreign ministries and culture ministries.

2.1.3 Instrumentalism in cultural policy discourse

I mentioned in the Introduction that the debate around instrumentalism is fierce in cultural policy studies and that this condition has largely been taken for granted by foreign policy actors. The cultural field is marked by an inherent polemic: a tension between the humanist commitment to knowledge and progress, which recognises that culture and the arts are good in themselves, against the ostensibly anti-humanist position of instrumentalism, which sees culture as a powerful engine for the production of value in the service of the state. Matarasso and Laundry (1999, p.7) have, thus, justly declared that cultural policy is "a balancing act, not so much between competing priorities as in other areas of policy, but between competing visions of the role of culture in society". This is an important point which shows that the problem of instrumentalism is, unfortunately, endemic in the field of cultural policy. Its transfer and transmutation in the sphere of international cultural relations is inevitable.

Following Matarasso and Laundry's point on the competing visions on the role of culture in society above, I am reflecting here on the theoretical underpinnings of each vision. I will examine three discourses that have characterised the cultural policy project from its very beginning: cultural elitism, the democratisation of culture and, finally, cultural democracy (Gattinger, 2011). *Cultural elitism* presupposes that the cultural products of the high class have a transcending quality, they are thought to have the potential to produce 'better', as in more responsible, citizens. The work of Adorno and Horkheimer (2002) has been the foundational basis of this thesis. They supported that the effortless entertainment of the 'culture industry' operated as a repression mechanism encouraging a consumeristic behaviour which supported capitalism. They claimed that the commodities of the culture industry were not value-free; on the contrary, they were placed strategically in the public sphere to ensure ideological compliance. The high arts, on the other hand, are an end in themselves in that the intellectual capacities deployed to interpret high-brow cultural goods constitute in fact a mental exercise that betters the person (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002).

The changes brought about by the social movements of the 1960s modified the perception of the role of culture – and specifically the role of elite culture – in public life. High-brow cultural goods may have served as a testimony of the grandeur of

human creativity, however, the condition that they educated the docile and naive masses was largely taken for granted. Despite their said transformative effect, the public did not have the practical means to access these cultural treasures, hence, the passivity was perpetuated. The *democratisation of culture* was deemed necessary so all people, regardless of their economic status and educational background, could enjoy the previously inaccessible cultural goods and services. The new paradigm became particularly popular in European states in the 1960s and 1970s, where a tradition of welfarism had already been established at a rudimentary level even before WWII (Gattinger, 2011).

Menger (2010, p.13) adds that cultural policy could no longer afford to remain “anti-utilitarian” due to the ”exogenous shock” of the oil crisis. That’s an interesting observation and, admittedly, a rare attempt to link the developments in the cultural arena with the broader politico-economical conditions of the time. He argues that the welfare model suffered significant pressures in the early 1970s when the rate of economic growth came to a halt as a result of the oil crisis. Public policies which up until then were fully financed by the state were largely seen as unsustainable and soon other sponsoring solutions were sought. At the same time, the overall framing of cultural policy changed to become inclusive rather than paradigmatic and so cultural elitism was replaced by a discourse which advocated the *democratisation of culture*.

Democratising culture in practice, however, was easier said than done. Bourdieu (1986) argued that each social class possessed a mechanism of interpretation of cultural symbols and that, in spite of the effort to offer equal chances of access to citizens to enjoy these highly symbolic cultural goods, participation was not guaranteed. Bourdieu suggested that the cultural capital was reproducing itself through both formal and informal education and that the instruments that assisted in that process were very much concealed. To the world it seemed that the children of the lower classes had a ‘natural’ intellectual disadvantage compared to their bourgeois peers, nevertheless, it was the entire fabric of the state system that reproduced inequalities (Bennett and Silva, 2006). *Cultural democracy* was, thus, suggested as a corrective measure to the democratisation of culture shifting the emphasis from access to participation (Evrard, 1997).

Cultural democracy does not only advocate the lifting of barriers for lower classes, but also welcomes cultural diversity and calls for participatory decision-

making. This change of spirit has introduced an activist agenda in cultural policy present in the programmatic plans of a number of governments since the 1980s (Gattinger, 2011). Cultural democracy may appear as the Holy Grail, but as Street (2011) notes it is another episode in the cultural policy series, where the 'excellent' gets replaced by the 'popular' and now by the 'diverse'.

Undeniably, all instances described above were underpinned by an ideological footing whose propositions were, and still are, fundamentally instrumental. The instrumentalist view has swept the policy making world and has been the dominant paradigm in how successive governments – especially British leftist cabinets – have made sense of cultural value since the 1980s (Belfiore, 2012; Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015a). Historical research, however, has shown that instrumentalism is hardly a new invention. Museums were among the first cultural establishments to take on board the instrumentalist project joining the reformist movement of the late 19th century which encouraged a more utilitarian approach in the organisation and administration of cultural life (Bennett, 1995; O'Neill, 2008). What changed in recent decades is the way governments demand accountability from cultural institutions. After the transparency crisis of the Thatcherite era, a new model of financing the cultural sector prevailed in Britain which became a model for export.

Instrumental cultural policies are fashioned around the thesis that they can achieve social or economic outcomes whose impact is measurable (Belfiore, 2002). In this respect, the dominance of the New Public Management model in western neoliberal economies has been strategic in supporting this ideological turn. Cultural policy has been linked to different areas of public policy making to acquire gravitas either by assisting in the creation of additional revenue streams or by achieving social targets such as the inclusion of minority or other hard-to-reach groups in cultural life. These are areas that enjoy greater visibility and acceptance elevating the status of cultural policy in relation to other public policy areas (Gray, 2000). Arts education, heritage tourism, sustainable cultural development, international cultural cooperation and cultural citizenship have all been political projects aiming to yield political, financial and social gains.

Gray (2009, p.577), however, argues that "the presumption that cultural policies will have mechanistic effects requires serious reappraisal." That being said, a brilliant point by T.S. Eliot brings back to mind the problem of causality that Gray brought to the fore. Eliot wrote once that "culture is the one thing we cannot deliberately aim at" (Eliot, 1949, p.17). He posited that it was impossible to link

social outcomes to specific cultural habits, therefore, the betterment of the human condition could not be predicated on such an assumption. Culture, as a process, should be aimed at, but culture, as a state of being, cannot be guaranteed. Allegations over the usefulness of the cultural sector in strengthening other public policy areas, therefore, fall flat under the weight of such statements, although sufficient evidence to prove or disprove any one thesis has not been presented yet.

The antithesis between the intrinsic value of culture against its extrinsic (or public) value has disconcerted scholars, who find themselves forced to choose between the two sides of a pendulum. On one hand, the realists, as I call them, believe in the instrumental value of culture, hence the obsession with establishing causality and the explosion of interest in measurement frameworks (Madden, 2005). On the other hand, the idealists (or 'purists') support the prioritisation of the intrinsic value of culture and advocate distance between the cultural practice and its alleged impact. However, the purist's currency is progressively failing as the ideas they once represented fall through the cracks of postmodernity. As Holden (2004, p.23) notes:

> *Those arguing that culture has an intrinsic value, and deserves funding on that account, face media hostility and charges of mystification. They are attacked for being 'elitist' and for neglecting issues of access and accessibility. But they have a further problem: they have lost the vocabulary to make their case. The postmodern questioning of concepts such as beauty, truth, delight, transcendence and the like, coupled with the insight that these ideas are temporally and geographically specific, have made using them in debate an embarrassment at best, contemptible at worst.*

The idealists have indeed lost significant territory, nevertheless, the realist camp faces analogous critique. Lee, Oakley and Naylor (2011) argue that the use of the term 'public value' has been exaggerated in cultural policy discourse, especially in the United Kingdom. In its most pragmatic reading, this rhetoric aims basically to increase the budgetary share for culture leading to a loss of cultural value; this is what Hadley and Gray (2017) have termed 'hyper instrumentalism', an extreme form of instrumentalism which negates any positive effect culture may have.

Belfiore (2012) interestingly argues that the dichotomy between 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' values may be false. She maintains that the discourse that surrounds it has not helped in re-imagining an alternative future for cultural policy. Although the debate has dominated academic circles since the 2000s, it has neither contributed in altering fundamental processes like administrative frameworks and funding models, nor has it brought forward a fresh vision over the role of culture in society (ibid). Gibson (2008) warns that not only have we not looked into alternative scenarios, but cultural policies now also run the risk of backpedaling returning to elitist understandings of culture.

Despite the call for a renewal of research themes in cultural policy, the literature around instrumentalism still persists and adds up. Belfiore (2012), who argued earlier that the very distinction between intrinsic - extrinsic values is an intellectual construct, acknowledges the existence of different variations of the phenomenon. She distinguishes between 'positive' and 'defensive' instrumentalism. In the first case, instrumentalism has an ordering effect in that it is able to change negative perceptions of the arts and culture in society and disrupt unfavorable connotations about its value. Culture may offer moral redemption and intellectual enrichment in this variation of the phenomenon. In the second case, defensive instrumentalism can be defined as the effort to make a case for the cultural sector by attaching it to 'harder' forms of politics. Belfiore openly acknowledges toward the end of her essay that the variation she identifies as 'defensive instrumentalism' is essentially 'economic instrumentalism' (ibid). She goes on to develop a condemning rhetoric against it arguing that the value added is financial value disregarding potential non-financial benefits the spill over effect may have. This is a typical line of reasoning developed by cultural analysts who, unlike economists, refuse to see instrumentalism as a shift in the expectations of both cultural consumers and cultural producers (Towse, 2011).

A re-examination of Belfiore's take around 'positive instrumentalism' reinforces the view that Belfiore is actually supportive of the didactic character the arts and culture are said to have favouring one form of instrumentalism (social instrumentalism) over another (economic instrumentalism) although without making direct claims. Is it a question of who benefits eventually and in what form or why benefit at all from the arts and culture? Although Belfiore's distinction helps analysts understand the impact instrumental discourses may have in feeding into or breaking apart long-held norms sustained in public discussions about the role

of the arts and culture in society, it is not useful in practical terms. How does the phenomenon unfold on the ground and what can policy makers do to affect its parameters? These are the questions that Belfiore's analysis fails to address.

Although instrumentalism is a heated subject in cultural policy studies, we should not forget that, as a concept, it sprang out from philosophy to cover today remarkably varied disciplines like economics, political science, and pedagogy, among others. In all of these areas, we can find discussions and studies which juxtapose the realist approach to the romanticised approach of idealism (see for example Shkedi and Laron, 2004). The dichotomy between realism and idealism is as old as philosophy itself with the first discussions in Western thinking recorded in Plato's and Aristotle's writings respectively, however, O'Neill (2008, p.293) reminds us that today we live with the legacy of the philosophical debates of the 19th century rather than that of the 4th century B.C. Greece.

> *The decline in religious belief in Europe, which began in the eighteenth century and rapidly accelerated after the publication Darwin's 'The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection' in 1859, caused a crisis in moral and political philosophy. It led to the emergence of two main post-theological traditions of moral philosophy. Intuitionism, which roughly corresponds with "intrinsic" values, held that actions were right or wrong in themselves, whatever the consequences. Utilitarianism (which is close to instrumentalism) argued that conduct must be judged by its consequences, and whether or not it increased the sum of human happiness. These differences had major political consequences.*

Instrumentalism is indeed the dogma that characterises our epoch. To a certain measure, the collective obsession of decision-makers with evaluation frameworks and indicators in our time is a natural consequence of this condition. The need to link outcomes to actions is a direct result of the social turn towards utilitarianism and a gradual but decisive detachment from hedonism. Therefore, we can safely conclude that the use of culture to achieve non-cultural gains in the international arena is a condition whose underlying mechanisms stretch far beyond the foreign policy intent but are linked to broader socio-political transformations.

2.1.4 Instrumentalism in cultural governance

In order to unpack the problem of agency in foreign cultural policy, I contend that we need to look at how the cultural sector is governed and funded. This will allow us to grasp the micro-reality of the Cultural Institutes which, I support, lies closer to that of the cultural sector. As the CIs draw upon the cultural (and educational) sector to create programmes and projects to channel to foreign audiences, I support that they adjust to their environment by adopting the work ethos of their partners. Therefore, it is urgent to examine how the cultural field is governed.

The state appears to be a critical player for the flourishment of cultural life through the control of production, dissemination and consumption processes of the cultural stratum. Yet, the administration of cultural life is not a modern phenomenon. Affluent hegemons, princes and kings have always acted as patrons of the arts and letters, yet the contemporary perception of policy, in the sense of governing a clear-cut sector through a bureaucratic order, is indeed a development of late modernity (Mangset, 2018). Countries present remarkable policy variations based on the role culture is assigned to play in ordering social life. Historical legacies and management styles also play a critical role in the formulation of cultural policies (Dubois, 2013). Administrative frameworks and funding processes constitute two core dimensions that government instruments use to manage the sector. Thus far, I have reviewed a series of cultural policy discourses and have linked them to the phenomenon of instrumentalism, which too knows various expressions. The question that emerges is how do abstract discourses and values materialise into concrete governance models?

As I have already mentioned, since the 1980s cultural policy has favored a specific institutional design that reflected, and probably still does since an alternative articulation has not arisen yet, the spirit of the times. The advent of the New Public Management, which sought to transfer the provision of services to external agencies, came to challenge the tradition of the classic centralised ministerial system (Hood, 1995; Wettenhall, 2005). Although the creation of quasi-autonomous organisations is not a novel phenomenon, literature in policy agrees that we have witnessed a global convergence on this legal structure since the 1980s (Pollit et al., 2001; Wettenhall, 2003). Instrumentalism is inevitably linked to

the arm's length principle with the two phenomena living parallel lives. The arm's length status ensures the organisation's autonomy from the government but, at the same time, situates it under its aegis. The jargon may differ from country to country, but the general consensus is that non-departmental public bodies, quasi-governmental bodies (also known as quangos), executive agencies and arm's length bodies are all expressions of the same phenomenon (Thiel, 2004).

The arm's length principle is used in many areas of public policy and has been a very popular institutional form in the cultural sector, especially in the creative industries (Hughson and Inglis, 2001). Upchurch (2011) notes that one of the primary reasons why the model has been so successful is that it enables the involvement of 'experts' in the policymaking process, through their recruitment in decision making boards, ensuring quality and relevance. The model is particularly resonant in the arts and cultural sector as the power dynamics it produces do not allow, in principle, direct state, and party, interference as is likely to happen in a centralised department (Williams, 1979). According to Chartrand and McCaughey (1989, p.7), "the principle is the basis of a general system of 'checks and balances' deemed necessary in a pluralistic democracy to avoid undue concentration of power and conflict of interest." Therefore, the arm's length relationship is an organisational invention that protects both the arm's length body from questionable state interference and its reporting department from unnecessary interventions that are often disapproved by the public.

The role of the public is crucial to understand why organisations are operating under this institutional form. The arm's length relationship has a high display value, which makes the organisation appear as more legitimate, hence trustworthy, in the eyes of its audience. When the metaphorical arm is shortened, the organisation loses its credibility and, therefore, its impact is minimised (Kizlari and Fouseki, 2018a). But why is the state framed in negative terms? Lately, we witness a tendency to think of politics more through Machiavellian terms, as if politics is ipso facto amoral. The loss of trust in government as a creative force of meaningful policymaking derives from a loss of credibility of the political actors (Keefer, 2007). Therefore, instrumentalism has been treated as an anathema by practitioners who fear that intimate relations with the government will delegitimise their intentions. It is important to understand that both sides of the instrumental relationship carry agency, and hence, power is distributed across the nexus. The notion of agency

is particularly pertinent to our understanding of the arm's length status and the phenomenon of decentralisation of power behind it.

Decentralisation is a quite convoluted concept in literature and many names appear as alternative to it (privatisation, federalism, devolution, regionalism) without a consensus over their semantic and practical differences (Schuster, 1997; Elgie, 2006). According to the World Bank (2001), there are three types of administrative decentralisation, presented here from the most standard to the most complex and challenging form. I will use the case of the Arts Council England (ACE) to explain how each type of decentralisation is embodied in the cultural policy field.

First, deconcentration describes the process of handing over responsibility from high authority bodies to lower-level units, for example from the capital to the periphery. The transfer of power to the regions does not pass over the execution of policies to the regional authorities, but it supports interactive decision making between the centre and the periphery. This allows the central service to remain focused in designing the grand strategy and coordinating the actions of regional bureaus (Boulenger et al., 2012). In the case of the ACE, the Royal Charter allows the organisation to create area offices tasked with the role to make recommendations and liaise with the National Council in matters of their area. The Council has proceeded with the establishment of five such offices, however, they function purely as advisory bodies without any discretionary power (Arts Council England, 2013).

The second form of decentralisation, and the case in point here, is delegation. The government assigns specific subdivisions of the wider policy area to quasi-autonomous organisations. These can operate under various legal frameworks (e.g., charities, public entities of private law, etc.) which usually require the appointment of distinct boards tasked with both goal setting and operations management. Although these organisations are frequently recipients of state subsidies, they are also encouraged to generate independent revenue. This relocation of power does not mean surrender of power as the central service or department retains the right of control over the organisation through different mechanisms. The blurry waters that surround delegation have been an object of fierce critique. Quinn (1997) in her study of the Arts Council Great Britain, the predecessor of today's Arts Council England, has suggested that the organisation has operated under close scrutiny from the central government despite

assurances over an alleged distance. As early as 1979 Williams, who was then serving as member to the same Council, wrote that the organisation was more at a "wrist's length" status than arm's length (1979, p.159). Given the conditions that both Williams and Quinn met, the last with an intervening period of almost twenty years from the first, Epstein and O'Halloran's (2006) argument is particularly pertinent here. After all, they say, the very decision to delegate powers to an external agency harbours carefully weighed political interests and the only certainty is that these interests will be met.

The third and last type of administrative decentralisation is devolution. This process describes the transfer of responsibilities for the provision of services to the local government, usually city municipalities and councils or, more rarely, to different constituencies. Devolution is the deepest and structurally most challenging form of decentralisation, which once achieved, removes power from the center. Selwood (2010) points to the United Kingdom as a representative, yet not necessarily successful, model of devolution in cultural policy. The Arts Councils of Scotland, Wales and N. Ireland operate autonomously since 1994 from the Arts Council England. Interestingly, there is a number of studies that question the efficacy of the model, especially in the case of Scotland and Northern Ireland (Orr, 2008; Galloway and Jones, 2010; Hadley and Gray, 2017). The foreword of the first annual report of the Arts Council England by Lord Gowrie, who was then serving as Chairman, is revealing as to the intentions of the English:

> *We have devoted much of our time this year to repairing our relationships with the Regional Arts Boards (RABs) and will continue to give this priority. I am not a centralist: I am a passionate regionalist and, indeed, live on the borders of the territory covered by West Midlands Arts and North West Arts. The Arts Council of Great Britain has been devolved into separate Councils for England, Scotland and Wales; I recommended this course of action when I was Minister, though it was some time before it was achieved. While the Arts Council remains at the accountable centre of RAB funding (and strategy), there has been further devolution of influence and responsibility into RAB hands (Arts Council England, 1995, p.5).*

To retain funding and strategy as the core areas of supervision means that devolution is strongly conditioned. As a consequence, tensions were embedded in

the structure and mechanics of the relationship right from the beginning. Figure 2 and Figure 3 below summarise and compare the different types of decentralisation as we viewed them through the case of the Arts Council England.



Figure 2. Forms of decentralisation through the example of ACE. Source: Author.



Figure 3. Levels of decentralisation. Based on Braun and Gilardi, 2006.

Looking at the above tripartite distinction and linking this data to our study, we see that the operation of the Cultural Institutes obeys to the second form of decentralisation. The CIs have been delegated responsibilities on behalf of their sponsoring departments much like the Arts Council England has on behalf of the DCMS above. Table 1 shows where each Cultural Institute in my sample is reporting to, although this classification will be a focal point of our analysis later as new data from the interviews will reveal a different picture for some CIs.

Table 1. The Cultural Institutes and their official sponsoring departments. Source: European Parliament, 2016.

Cultural Institute	***Sponsoring Department(s)***
British Council	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Goethe Institut	Federal Foreign Office
Institut français	Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs
Instituto Cervantes	Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Ministry of Culture and Sport
Swedish Institute	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Hellenic Foundation for Culture	Ministry of Culture and Sports

Decentralisation may have been lauded in this section for its associated benefits, nonetheless, the picture remains partial until we address rival arguments. Breaking up services and delegating duties to external agencies leads to a loss of coordination. Attempts to link horizontally actors is a particularly problematic affair, and in the case of the Cultural Institutes, the sponsoring department seems to have a monopoly over the coordination of its activities as evident by the above table (with the exception of Spain perhaps). Interestingly, a report by the European Union published in 2014 confirmed the convergence of interests between different policy actors and pointed to “the need for transversal international policy strategies” (Isar et al., 2014, p.44), a point which had been raised decades ago by Mitchell (1986). Indeed, the study found evidence of cooperation across departments, however, “formal mechanisms for systematic collaboration between all the relevant ministries was less in evidence that might have been anticipated” (ibid).

In the next sections, I will introduce the theoretical framework I will be using to interpret my findings. I adopt a neo-marxist view and argue that instrumentalist thesis constitutes the hegemonic paradigm in culture in external relations. I also discuss how soft power is an inadequate conceptualisation of how cultural

relations operate in the global context as its paradigm does not seem to be built on an understanding of cultural relations as mutual trust and genuine dialogue but rather using means such attraction and desire. Nevertheless, its significance should not be underestimated as it functions as an indicator of how governments view the role of culture in foreign affairs.

2.2 Theories for cultural diplomacy: from soft power to Gramsci

I am well aware that theories offer different pathways to link data. This is their allure, but also the problem. No theory can adequately cover all the aspects of a phenomenon. Theories are also "fraught with trial and error" and a good portion of them can be falsified (Sutton and Staw, 1995, p.372). However, theorising is exactly this: the very process of collecting and discarding hypotheses and testing them against empirical data (Weick, 1995). In this respect, different analytical lenses can capture different aspects of the subject under question, and if these efforts are seen en masse they can provide a suitable mosaic of interpretations. Concepts and propositions can be drawn from a variety of disciplines and theoretical paradigms.

In the case of cultural diplomacy, a range of traditions can be brought into play spanning from the Humanities to 'harder' subjects in the Social Sciences spectrum (Figure 4). The direction the study takes is naturally guided by the research question, which in my case focuses on power relations, but it is enticing to think of the different courses the thesis can take provisionally using a theory from another discipline as a guidepost.



Figure 4. Potential angles for the study of cultural diplomacy. Source: Author.

During the process of brainstorming interpretations to explain the observations in my study, various theorists crossed my mind. The post-marxist ideas of Foucault on governmentality are always relevant in studies on policy; in this case, one can

explore how cultural diplomacy programmes are the product of – but also produce – specific subjectivities, citizens that can be integrated in the multi-cultural societies of the future (Barnett, 1999). Another theoretical approach that fits the context of this study could be drawn from organisational theory. Max Weber's (1978) study on bureaucracy could be a suitable framework to interpret how different public administration systems impact on foreign cultural policies.

Although these ideas are intriguing in that they explain part of the question, and indeed I will be informing my discussion with concepts and arguments drawn from this literature, I have chosen to work primarily with a different body of work. In this chapter, I will make reference to theories of International Relations to see how ideas over the nature of global affairs have fed into the practice of cultural affairs. As noted, I am not rejecting the ideas of Foucault or Weber; in fact, I seem to find them suitable to describe pieces of the whole and I will be using their arguments to strengthen my analysis as they appear to be in, what Lemke (2002, p.49) calls, "tactical alliance". However, the weight falls on neo-Gramscian analysis of the worlds' mechanics in an attempt to explore the background against which contemporary CD practices are understood and performed. It is worth noting that the thesis does not engage in analysing the classic IR theories (realism, liberalism) in order to interpret diplomatic practice as it accepts that these downplay the role of diplomatic agency placing overwhelming emphasis on the structural conditions which prescribe states' actions (Shapr, 2009; Bjola and Kornprobst, 2018).

In this section I will, first, interrogate the 'soft power' concept and trace its history and role within international relations theory. I aim to situate 'soft power' in its proper context to come to an understanding of the reasons why its popularity has skyrocketed. I support that, in its present form, the field is crushed under the weight of the soft power discourse whose uncontested authority solidified exactly because there seemed to be a vacuum of theoretical frameworks enabling researchers to draw insights from other relevant disciplines. It is undeniable that we have sufficed to this single analytical lens. The grave consequence of such a lack of imagination on our part is that we have disempowered alternative theoretical interpretations from surfacing. Second, I will present Gramsci's idea of hegemony in order to situate my argument over the existence of a hegemonic discourse which favours the instrumentalisation of culture. I will examine the evolution of the concept of hegemony from a theoretical construction crafted to explain the mechanisms of class subordination intra-state to an interpretative framework able to explain

convincingly the developments in the international arena. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony offers fertile ground for discussion in the study of international politics and re-casts thinking away from the traditional class-centric approach (Worth, 2011). Therefore, I will use it as an umbrella framework to interpret the project’s findings in chapter 6.

2.2.1 A neo-Gramscian approach in analysing cultural relations

Why is a leftist political theorist featured in a study on diplomacy? In what ways can Gramsci's ideas provide a suitable framework to explain the struggle for power in the international arena? In the previous section, I explored the soft power concept and argued that it has cast a shadow over the discipline of diplomacy. I can now introduce a more critical approach in viewing international relations. The thesis supports that the concept of 'hegemony' that Gramsci theorised almost a century ago to provide a framework of interpretation for cultural diplomacy practice. Although Cox (1983) admits that Gramsci did not explicitly have in mind the international system of order, au contraire, he was particularly interested in state politics and the ethics of subordination of the working class, his ground-breaking ideas on hegemony can inform anew our thinking on global flows and the powers that organise the international status quo. I have used a number of secondary sources for this section, but I have also looked into the first published edition of Gramsci's writings in 1971.

Gramsci, interested in the modus operandi of power, was looking to explain how and why class inequality was being reproduced intra-culturally in early 20th century Italy. Building on the ideas of Marx on the *base* (means of production) and *superstructure* (ideology and culture), Gramsci moved away from looking at the economy as the exclusive source of class inequality. He drove his analytical lens towards culture arguing that there were ideological reasons that prescribed and perpetuated submissive behaviour. Thus, Gramsci rejected the economic determinism of orthodox Marxism. He suggested that the bourgeoisie uses culture normatively to instill a naturalising idea of inequality to the lower classes. Gramsci put at the heart of this control mechanism the intelligentsia whom he held responsible for normalising power asymmetries (Karabel, 1976). The authority of the intellectuals (scientists, administrators, philosophers) created a sense of history upon which the lower classes depended to make sense of their identity. If this is how things always were, then why combat inequality and overturn the status quo? The hidden charm of hegemony lies exactly in its implicit operation. Hegemonic institutions avoid utilising coercive means of control, instead they organise their action in such a manner to secure consent bottom-up (Gramsci,

1971). Hegemony is, therefore, a form of of dominance, referring to a broader consensual order not limited to state dominance alone (Malo, 2013).

At this point, it would be interesting if we juxtaposed Nye's definition of soft power next to hegemony. Nye (1990, p.168) argues that "co-optive power is the ability of a country to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with its own." Soft power for me is an adaptation of the Gramscian concept of hegemony extended to the international scale. Between the two theorists, there is an intermediate station: the work of Robert W. Cox. Cox (1983) was the first to argue that dynamics and tensions in the national scale have a spill over effect in the international arena and, therefore, hegemony is a robust framework able to interpret the tensions embedded in the world order. It is vital to look in-depth at some of the arguments that Gramsci brings forward to make the links with the international system more evident.

The role of the civil society in manufacturing consent was crucial in Gramsci's mind. In its ideal form, civil society was an alternative political movement fashioned to inform official governance structures and processes. Despite its organic role in nurturing recalcitrant voices, civil society could just as easily form a powerful alliance with the elite helping it implicitly to legitimise its domineering position (Ramos, 1982). To this end, certain professional groups such as the intelligentsia are ancillary. Civil society, in its modern sense, can be a persuasive construction offering renewed possibilities in reimagining the role of the citizens in contemporary democracies contrary to the discourse(s) of "discredited, unfashionable, or obsolete Marxist/socialist parties" (Buttigieg, 2005, p.36). It is probably the first time in Marxist tradition that we find the notion of civil society as an opposite category to the state, as a reformist project for the very idea of the nation-state. However, the politicisation of the civil society, whether intentional or incidental, can severly undermine its relative autonomy (Malo, 2013).

Fontana (2010) tells us that Gramsci's work is built on such dualisms (state/civil society, hegemon/subaltern) where the problem meets its solution each time through pairs of antithetical values. In theory, this is a fully developed universe where each action meets its reaction, however, Gramsci knew that the circle was far from virtuous. He suggested that the 'subaltern' - this describes groups that are forced to remain silent during decision making processes - by obeying the law of History, they exonerate the hegemony of the elites. Therefore, the voiceless

should seek to find a voice to resist suppression. To this end, Gramsci suggested that the development of *class consciousness* should be the center of attention for left political activists, so the subdued groups can be freed of the restraints of their own morality. These proposals are congruent with orthodox Marxism's focus on a *philosophy of praxis* which advocates developing self-understanding in an effort to disrupt the passivity of the subaltern (Haug, 2000).

Gramsci's arguments can be beautifully tied to literature from public and cultural diplomacy. Reimann (2004) notes how embassies today are approaching civil society organisations to establish partnerships. These organisations, which previously exercised fierce critique against government policies, are now becoming strategic partners in the design and implementation of policy frameworks. This led Hardt (1995, p.27) to argue that we are now living in "a post civil society" in which the dualism between state and civil society has collapsed. Gramsci's ideas were immensely popular in the 1970s and 1980s – actually it was only in 1971 that his Prison Notebooks were fully translated and published in English; this fired a strong debate around the role of ideology in contemporary politics and resulted in a series of publications in the Social Sciences around hegemony. Gramsci's work was taken up by both structuralists, in its most representative form, by the work of Louis Althusser (1989) and by post-structuralists by Michel Foucault (1971). Post-structuralists accounts are more relevant to my interpretation of the relationships formed in the international scene and here I owe a brief, yet insightful, mention to the work of Foucault.

Michel Foucault, in contrast to Gramsci who believed that power was centered around two focal points (the hegemonic and the subordinate group), thought that power was diffused (Daldal, 2014). Power is omnipresent and that is why Foucault argued that power was situated in and aimed at the micro-level of individuals and not at the macro-level of class relations. Disciplinary discourses do not simply provide the means to establish consent but prescribe the very conditions of the individuals' understanding. Foucault used the concept of 'biopolitics' to explain how regimes discipline their citizens. Knowledge production lies at the heart of the process, for example the rise of statistics is key to impose self-control in the masses. While Foucault examined these ideas looking at the state as an abstract and empty entity (Hall, 1985), Hardt and Negri, to which we made reference earlier, broadened the scope of biopolitics and reframed it with regard to the international

scene. It is their work I find most appropriate along with Gramsci's ideas to describe the current status quo in global diplomacy.

In the international scale, Gramsci's ideas have found fertile ground in re-imagining imperialism. Cox (1983, p.170) observes that "hegemony is used as a euphemism for imperialism." In its conventional form, imperialism describes:

> *. . . the processes by which a society is brought into the modern world system and how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced and sometimes even bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even promote, the values and structures of the dominating center of the system (Schiller, 1976 as quoted in Tomlinson, 1991, p.103).*

Imperialism operated with this logic for much of its history until the liberation movements of the 20th century. Since then, there has been a transition in how hegemony is exercised, the rules are now replaced by values and coercion has been succeeded by attraction. Robinson (2005, p.560) notes that hegemony, in its most avant-garde reading, describes today the construction of consensus "around a particular historic project". The challenge is to identify the contours of the project which is, by definition, cryptic as Gramsci and other Neo-marxists contended.

Gramsci's call for empowerment naturally found great purchase within postcolonial and identity studies (Fontana, 2010). However, postcolonial studies frequently treated their subject with either a certain degree of romanticism or condescension which, in both cases, denied the agency and influence of the subordinate groups. For this reason, I refrain from looking at the Cultural Institutes as vessels that preserve and continue the colonial tradition. Although a number of these were established in an epoch when colonialism was still in reign, I am arguing that they have moved on paradigmatically and have informed their practice taking into account neo-liberalist considerations as I will later prove in chapter 6.3. They function as an expression of civil society but have also taken on board the instrumentalist project. As Cox (1983) argues, civil societies are both the producers of and the product of hegemonies and they achieve dominance through a tactical alliance with the bureaucratic elites. They are able, through this channel, to legitimise norms, popularise new trends and incorporate or weaken counter-hegemonic ideas to absorb dissonance. Hence, the National Cultural Institutes are situated in an in-between world, in a zone between the state and the civil society.

2.2.2 Through a glass darkly: a note on soft power

This section focuses on a dominant concept in cultural diplomacy literature, the concept of soft power. I will begin by explaining some of the basic premises of the idea, based on Nye's original publications around the subject, to offer some context behind the critique raised against it. I will then focus on Keohane and Nye's conceptualisation of 'complex interdependence', which provided the backdrop for less forceful means of influence to emerge.

Nye coined the term for the first time in a Foreign Affairs article in 1990 where he argued that the collapse of bipolarity after the end of the Cold War would bring about significant changes in how power was thought of and exercised. Nye rejected the shared assumption at the time that the significance of the United States as a world leader was dissipating. He observed that power was changing in nature and that the explicit use of military and economic measures to discipline other players in the global arena was no longer acceptable (Nye, 1990). In the age of institutionalism, countries were increasingly encouraged to resolve their differences through the use of mediating bodies. Persuasion is more effective in the carpeted halls of the United Nations, or other transnational organisations for that matter, than coercion. The shift from explicit pressure to implicit influence occurred gradually in the 20th century as technological changes were interconnecting national audiences (ibid). The public unwittingly acquired a more central position in decisions around International Relations, yet, the quest for legitimacy never became the ultimate game changer in international politics (Ferguson, 2003).

The concept has met both with great purchase and critique the past three decades. Soft power was promoted as the alternative strategy that dominant players needed to tone down the emphasis given to their military and economic weight. It is also a strategy capable of bringing into the limelight smaller players as the definition places emphasis on "the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies" (Nye, 2004, p.11) and not on military might. The criticism was fierce. If 'soft' behaviour was the optimum path to success and was not a normative construction imbued with idealistic undertones, why did hostilities still erupt? Why did soft power not become the universally accepted paradigm? Nye responded that soft power was part of a more complex strategy that included the interchange

of soft and hard power, what he termed ‘smart power’. He distinguished between potential and realised power and argued that countries which overestimate one set of strengths over the other and fail to capitalise on both may find that their status is compromised (Nye, 2009). This convenient realignment of arguments has driven Lanye (2010) to argue that soft power is an ‘unbearably light’ concept.

The malleability of soft power has served as a useful toolkit for policymakers. Despite its popularity, the conceptualisation of power between co-optive (soft power) and ordering (hard power) has met with fierce resistance in academic circles (Hall, 2010). Noya (2006, p.66) argues that “soft power is not power at all.” He goes on to argue that “any resource, including military capabilities, can be soft inasmuch as it is perceived legitimate for a soft purpose.” This proposal is empirically valid if one takes into account the media campaigns mounted by dominant actors aiming to justify violent behaviour against third countries whose actions are considered to pose a threat to global peace. In the same spirit, Lanye (2010) notes that soft power is not a theory per se as it does not explain how countries behave in the international scene. Nisbett (2016) agrees and adds that the theoretical assumptions which underpin the idea are intentionally cryptic to make the concept easily adaptable. While I agree with this point, I argue that we are also at fault here. For IR scholars, Nye’s understanding of power (in any of its forms, hard, soft, smart) must resonate the context it was borne into. Very often Nye’s conceptualisation of power is read separately by the rest of his work which leaves readers with only a partial image of his overall theoretical stance. This is why I wrote in the title that we are looking at soft power ‘through a glass darkly’ that distorts the original meanings vested in it. I aim to rectify this mistake in the following paragraphs.

Before his ground-breaking article in Foreign Affairs in 1990, Nye along with political scientist Robert Keohane, developed during the 1970s the theory of ‘complex interdependence’ (or else liberal institutionalism) to offer an interpretation of the complexities of the international system which the realists were unable to explain. Keohane and Nye (1977) argued that states were less likely to be aggressive against geographically proximate nations since instability in the region can be harmful for themselves. Additionally, since conflicts involve the use of more destructive military technology today, increasing the cost of operations, it is highly likely that states will seek to resolve their differences through peaceful means. The marginalisation of war in political agendas signalled the start of a new era in how

the balance of power was analysed. Power is multifaceted and can be converted from one form to another depending on the situation. The collapse of traditional hierarchies (the high politics of security versus the low politics of economy) called for a more diligent approach in handling international affairs. “When an issue arouses little interest or passion, force may be unthinkable. In such instances, complex interdependence may be a valuable concept for analysing the political process” (Keohane and Nye, 2017, p.170).

Complex interdependence highlighted the importance of domestic issues in the behaviour of states. Although national security issues remain relevant in certain contexts, shared economic interests and common social values, what Keohane and Nye call ‘systemic constraints’, determine state allegiance. The boundaries between domestic and foreign affairs are melting as globalisation advances and territoriality, the most distinct feature of the nation-state, is waning while “non-territorial actors such as multinational corporations, transnational social movements, and international organizations” are becoming central players (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.3). The theory of international regimes allowed a different set of assumptions, more pertinent to the ecology of political economy, to enter IR debates. For Keohane and Nye (1987) international regimes provide indeed a robust interpretative framework, however, contingencies should be reviewed in conjunction to domestic politics. The intersection of international regimes behaviour and intra-state developments is the key to understand the complexity of the current status quo.

Given this background, the soft power thesis overemphasised the role of social values in the equation of complex interdependence. While complex interdependence brought neatly into balance the high politics of security and defense with the low politics of market economy and value systems, Nye prioritised the intangible components of the relationship. Interestingly, I view the introduction of ‘smart power’ in 2004, almost 15 years after the original article on soft power in Foreign Affairs, as a refolding back to the original idea of complex interdependence first introduced in the 1970s.

We also need to acknowledge that the power of attraction is undercut by a dualism predominantly found in Marxist thought. I argue that soft power is a re-working of the Gramscian idea of hegemony (Noya, 2006). Although Nye finds Neo-marxist analyses as overly generalising, I am convinced that his conceptualisation of power is more Gramscian than he is willing to admit. His main

objection lies in the inability of the theory to account for the individual differences observed in the international scene. In his words: “I have regarded neo-Gramscian analysis and the idea of a global historic bloc emerging in the 1970s and dominating discourse as interesting but too procrustean” (Nye, 2010, p.217).

I contend that the similarities between the two approaches regarding power are too great to be ignored. Rather than force (or coercion in Nye’s terms), culture, values and institutions (or soft power) is ingeniously used as an implicit strategy to reproduce, or create, asymmetrical power patterns. It is the terms of reference and the context that have changed. Zamorano (2016) agrees that the concept of soft power is actually an appropriation of Gramsci’s ontological assumptions; whilst Gramsci pointed out to the binary of ‘consensus’ and ‘coercion’ as power structures able to control the working classes and, thusly, solidify the hegemony of the bourgeoisie, Nye altered the terms of reference using the binary ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power’ respectively. Nye’s theoretical contribution rests upon the fact that he linked these ideas to the post-Cold War developments in international politics and took cultural hegemony out of the context that was first developed for (Gramsci’s national scale as opposed to Nye’s international scale). While hegemony gave emphasis to the reproduction of class inequality and required the development of paradigm consciousness to challenge dominant hierarchies intra-state, soft power was more enabling in this aspect and allowed actors to imagine an alternative future in which they could influence power asymmetries to their favour by attraction alone (Gallarotti, 2011).

Zamorano (2016), however, disagrees that soft power is a productive concept which offers pathways in order to change the status quo; on the contrary, he argues that it is a sterile framework aiming to preserve the present conditions as opposed to Gramsci’s ‘philosophy of praxis’ which is a complete universe capable of bestowing the citizens with a transformational role. I am not convinced that soft power as a construct is devoid of the means to change the world order – if it borrows Gramsci’s ideas, soft power should at least incorporate this important contribution to its body of thought. Where Zamorano was right is that Nye supports the capitalist order while Gramsci was looking to develop channels of resistance to undermine the system. This, however, does not mean that soft power is not a potent framework in its own right, only that it is used toward the fulfilment of a different telos.

3. Research methodology

The present chapter is divided into three subchapters, the first is concerned with data collection, the second with data analysis and the third with the limitations of the research. The general methodological framework of the study is captured in the research onion below (Figure 5). The study is purely qualitative in its conception and the research philosophy that governs the thesis falls under the tradition of interpretivism, or else constructivism. Researchers working under this paradigm attest that the world of lived experience is a construct of the social actors who live in it. To understand the object of study, the researcher needs to analyse it through the perspective of the social actors involved (Schwandt, 1994). Constructivism, thus, as a theoretical paradigm calls for inductive reasoning in building the main argument. In this form of reasoning, the researcher draws general remarks after closely examining specific relationships (Creswell, 2013). This approach is compatible to my research question and supports the selection of interviews to acquire primary data. The interviews allow the researcher to get an insider's look of participants' ideas and views to form case-specific conclusions.



Figure 5. The research onion. Source: Adapted from Saunders et al., 2009.

3.1. Data collection

3.1.1. Multiple case studies

The overlaying method used in this thesis both for data collection and analysis is the case study method. As Yin (2009, p.18) notes the case study, "investigates a contemporary phenomenon in-depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident". In this project, I set out to study how state power is articulated and exercised in the work of the Cultural Institutes. There is so little knowledge over how these relationships work that, indeed to paraphrase Yin, the object of study almost does not stand out from its background. The reason why I chose the case study as a method is self-evident if one looks at how the research question is formulated. This study investigates questions of 'why' and 'how' aiming to analyse phenomena in their contemporary settings as they happen, therefore it seeks to explain and trace "operational links. . . rather than mere frequencies or incidence" (ibid, p.9).

The research design features the investigation of one intrinsic (or in-depth) case and its juxtaposition with another five case studies (Figure 6). I selected six European Institutes based on the size and nature of their networks. The selected Cultural Institutes are the British Council, the Institut français, the Goethe-Institut, the Instituto Cervantes, the Swedish Institute and the Hellenic Foundation for Culture. The United Kingdom, France and Germany are historically considered the top three players in the cultural diplomatic arena with their Cultural Institutes sparking great interest among foreign audiences. The 'big three' maintain a global network with presence in all five continents. The researchers decided to include the Instituto Cervantes in the study due to its growth dynamics. The Hellenic Foundation for Culture was chosen as it has a regional presence with a concentration of offices in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Last, the Swedish Institute was selected as it poses an interesting case having only one office in Paris it invests heavily on its online presence. In short, based on the number of their offices abroad, this study features four large-sized and two small-sized Cultural Institutes (European Parliament, 2016, p.37).

At this stage it is important to note that the selection was based on replication logic and not on sampling logic (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Here the statistical frequency of occurrences of the phenomenon under scrutiny is

unimportant. The emphasis is on the ability to make logical inferences based on observation and analytical rigour. The replication method calls for the in-depth investigation of one case study and the juxtaposition of the results with another set of case studies to replicate or reject the findings from the first case (Yin, 2009). The detailed exploration of the case studies was realised using as primary sources interviews and materials that the Cultural Institutes or their respective governments publish like the CIs' statutory frameworks, strategy plans, management statements and budgets whenever these were available. Nonetheless, there is an asymmetry in the collected material since some Cultural Institutes are, in general, more 'vocal' publishing online at least part of their resources (British Council, Goethe Institut, Institut français, Swedish Institute). For other CIs, most of these documents are confidential and are not to be disclosed to third parties outside the organisation (Instituto Cervantes, Hellenic Foundation for Culture). Consequently, gathering same-level data for all my case studies was a major challenge. Wherever it was not possible to acquire primary data, I filled in the information using secondary data derived from the academic literature.



Figure 6. The selection of multiple case studies. Source: Author.

According to Creswell (2013, p.73) "the case study research involves the study of an issue explored through one or more cases within a bounded system." In this project the case studies focus on the operation of organisations tasked with promoting culture in external relations, however, the selected case studies share one more common feature: they all belong to the European and EU context. The underlying assumption is that there is a stronger tradition of policy transfer within the European Union, so the Cultural Institutes will share related foundational philosophies. Also, the fact that European countries have historical trajectories that have intersected at one point or another due to reasons of geographical proximity is an additional argument supporting the above view. The case studies will demonstrate the ways through which agency shapes instrumental relations and why and when state agents antagonise each other.

The case study method has often been accused as being biased since standards for the cross-examination of the output are not usually set and the inferences qualitative researchers make are largely subjective (Stoecker, 1991).

Nevertheless, there are measures that researchers can take to deal with the inherent limitations of the method. Schwandt et al. (2007) have suggested five criteria for the assessment of interpretive rigour in research: fairness (balanced power between the researcher's and the participant's accounts), ontological authenticity (rendering the context visible), educative authentication (common understanding of the produced narratives), catalytic authentication (incorporating feedback from third-party evaluation) and tactical authenticity (participants' empowerment). Likewise, Yin (2009, p.40) expounds four strategies to assess the integrity of the research design: (a) construct validity, (b) internal validity, (c) external validity, and, (d) reliability. The table below (Table 2) shows how the present study has tackled the limitations of the method by employing specific tactics. More information on the tactics can be found in the CD-ROM.

Table 2. Tactics used in this study. Source: Adapted from Yin, 2009, p.41.

Strategies	**Tactic**	**Phase of Research in which Tactic Occurs**
Construct validity	- Used multiple sources of evidence - Had key informants review draft case study report	Data collection
Internal validity	- Used logic models - Did pattern matching - Theory triangulation	Data analysis
External validity	- Used replication logic in multiple case studies	Research design
Reliability	- Developed case study protocol	Data collection

3.1.2. Replication logic and working hypotheses

I will attempt to study the cases collectively aiming to derive further insight over the function of instrumentalism from this strategic assemblage. According to Wiesand (2002, p.376), there are four types of comparison in policy research: i) pre-comparison documentation, ii) top-down comparison, iii) bottom-up comparison, and iv) post-comparison synthesis. I do not accept that these are mutually exclusive categories as Wiesand argues. For example, I support that the top-down and bottom-up angles can be implemented as much in pre-comparison documentation as in post-comparison synthesis. In my study, I adopt a top-down angle and engage in pre-comparison documentation (chapters 4 and 5) and post-comparison synthesis (chapter 6).

Until now, I have not established what replication means although I have used the term amply to imply that comparative research through the use of multiple case studies is as rigorous as single case study analysis. Eisenhardt (1989, p.620) asserts that through replication "individual cases can be used for [the] independent corroboration of specific propositions. This corroboration helps researchers to perceive patterns more easily and to eliminate chance associations." In my project, I investigate in-depth the case of the Hellenic Foundation for Culture that helped me formulate the set of propositions which thereafter are tested in the remainder of the case studies. These cases were selected under the rationale that they either confirm the set of hypotheses that proved to be true for the in-depth case study or refute the whole set or some of the hypotheses. As Yin (2009, p.54) notes: "Each case study must be carefully selected so that it either (a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) predicts contrasting results but for anticipatable reasons (a theoretical replication)." Using the principle of replication, I will test the following set of questions:

- Is instrumentalism expressed differently in different national contexts?
- Are the main actors of cultural diplomacy the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture in all countries?
- Are the actors competing in all cases or not?

I will dedicate here some space to introduce my propositions with regard to the above questions.

A. I have hypothesised that instrumentalism presents significant variability across national contexts and that these alleged differences can be

attributed to broader legislative frameworks and the administrative reality of each country.

B. I believe that the prevalent actors in most cases will be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture, although there must be some policy space carved out for the Ministry of Education since the Cultural Institutes are also tasked with teaching the national language to foreign audiences.
C. My assumption is that the countries which follow a centralised model of governance (France, Spain, Greece) have ministries that act as gatekeepers of their policy area allowing little space for cross-departmental cooperation. In the UK, Germany and Sweden, the long tradition of devolved governance in culture leads me to believe that the model favours interdepartmental collaboration and that decision-making will be more open-ended, hence, instrumentalism will have a lighter effect.

3.1.3. Semi-structured interviews

To explore the case studies, the researcher has used as primary sources semi-structured interviews with representatives from the selected organisations. The thesis is based on 25 semi-structured interviews, 23 were conducted with policy makers from the broader field of foreign cultural policy and another 2 were focus group interviews with foreigners interested in the programmes of the Hellenic Foundation for Culture. Over the course of the past three years, I have unofficially conducted informal discussions with another 4 people in different roles and locales[2], however, these unstructured interviews were unplanned and have not been recorded, so I refrained from counting them in the overall sample; nevertheless, they have informed to a great extent my overall perspective. The majority of interviews cover the intrinsic case study while the rest of the case studies are covered using one to two interviews (Figure 7). I have organised the interviews in three distinct but interconnected projects: Project A deals exclusively with the in-depth case study and includes the interviews the researcher did in Athens. Project B also looks at the main case study but features two focus group interviews with people attending Greek language courses and events at the Hellenic Foundation in Odessa in Ukraine, which was chosen as a case to represent best practices in the organisation. Project C contains the interviews from the rest of the cases and was conducted at a later stage in the research (Table 3).

Sampling was purposive in projects A and C and random in project B. Since the focus of this doctorate falls on strategy design and managerial frameworks, I felt it was more appropriate to sample decision makers for my interviews. The absence of an already established network of contacts and acquaintances was the greatest challenge for me; reaching out to Ministry officials or to the Director of a Cultural Institute is no easy task. In project A, I reached out to a wide range of civil servants mainly from the Hellenic Foundation for Culture, but I also had the opportunity to speak with representatives from the Greek MFA, the Ministry of Culture and Sports and the National Tourism Organisation. In project B, sampling was random and was entrusted as a task to the local Hellenic Foundation office. In project C, I

[2] These were (1) Andrew Murray, former director of EUNIC Global, (2) Elisa Grafulla, Cluster Development Director at EUNIC Global, (3) Stuart MacDonald, consultant and former director of the Institute for International Cultural Relations in Edinburgh, and, (4) Claudiu Sfirschi-Lăudat, director of the Hellenic Foundation for Culture in Bucharest.

mainly sampled participants working in either the Department of Strategy or the Department of International Relations in each CI, since they both deal with the coordination of the global network. For an overview of the questions, take look at Table 11 in Appendix A. I have anonymised all the interviews to comply with data ethics requirements, however, readers can have an overview of the participants' identities through the CD-ROM attached at the back sleeve of the thesis.



Figure 7. Number of interviews for each case study. Source: Author.

Table 3. Breakdown of interviews per project. Source: Author.

Project	**No. of interviews**	**Locality**	**Phase of research**
Project A	12 personal interviews	Athens	Apr 16 – Oct 17
Project B	2 focus group interviews	Odessa	Oct 16
Project C	11 personal interviews	London	Feb 17 – Jun 18

3.1.4 Additional primary sources

On 19 and 20 April, I was invited by EUNIC Global to participate in a knowledge exchange workshop hosted at the Austrian Foreign Ministry in Vienna. The workshop welcomed executives representing the National Institutes for Culture with the purpose to share ideas on the arm's length relationship and its application in their organisations. I was invited to present part of my findings (Kizlari and Fouseki, 2018a) and review the implications different organisational practices may have and which are likely to impede cooperation among member-states in realising the EU strategy for International Cultural Relations (European Commission, 2016). During the two-day event, I had the opportunity to hold informal discussions with all the invited members[3]; this allowed me to gain an even broader understanding of the tensions, the constraints as well as the common areas of interest as the pool of participating countries was bigger than the six cases I am looking at in the framework of this study. I kept thorough notes from the discussions, however, I am not allowed to identify sources as the workshop was organised under the Chatham House Rule which dictates that "neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed" (Chatham House, 2018, n.p.). The information and the general tone of discussions were useful for developing my rationale behind 'the dynamics of cultural diplomacy' in 7.2 and cross-validate my findings in 'the mechanics of cultural diplomacy' in 7.1. I have exchanged contact details with the majority of participants with the aim to continue interviews in an even larger sample[4].

The workshop enabled me to collaborate with EUNIC Global in Brussels to co-design a questionnaire based on the framework I introduced in the paper[5] (Kizlari

[3] The countries that were represented in the workshop, arranged by alphabetical order, were: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, UK. Typically, one representative was sent from each country, however, Austria (the host country) and France were represented by two officials. You can find the list with the workshop participants in the CD-ROM.

[4] I have now conducted another 11 interviews with representatives from: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Finland.

[5] I should thank Andrew Murray, director of EUNIC Global, for inviting me to the workshop as well as Elisa Grafulla, EUNIC Cluster Development Director, and Lina Kirjazovaite, Members and Programmes Manager, for their assistance and valuable guidance through the process.

and Fouseki, 2018a). I was given the opportunity to test the validity of my findings through the survey and to discuss face-to-face the conclusions at the meeting. Unfortunately, not all organisations out of my sample returned the 7-question survey with Spain being entirely absent from the sample. This was expected as the Instituto Cervantes did not participate in this workshop whose attendance was optional for EUNIC members. The rest of the organisations provided baseline information which confirmed my findings at a rudimentary level. You can find the questionnaire in Appendix A (Table 12).

Alongside the interviews, the workshop notes and the questionnaires[6], the study has used as primary sources a number of documents produced by the organisations under study to triangulate data (Bryman, 2004). Annual reviews and budgets, strategic plans, management statements, statutory frameworks or other reports authored by the departments to which the CIs report to or authored by the Institutes themselves have been used to triangulate statements derived from the interviews (Figure 8).

Primary sources: Interviews[7], Annual Reports, Budgets, Parliamentary talks, Statutes, Policy Briefs, Direct Observation, Informal discussions, Survey

Secondary sources: Newspaper articles, Academic Literature



Figure 8. Triangulation of evidence included the above combination of data. Source: Author.

[6] My gratitude goes to Stuart MacDonald for his contribution in designing the survey.

[7] Please note that wherever interview quotes are used in-text, the symbols 'I' and 'P' are used to signify the 'Interviewer' and the 'Participant' correspondingly.

As mentioned, not all Cultural Institutes follow an open data policy. The most problematic case study in terms of data transparency was the Hellenic Foundation for Culture which did not allow me to work in their archive. I was not given access to budgetary information or to the decisions of the Executive Board. Interviews were no less complicated and it took tremendous effort to establish an initial contact and then to snowball the rest of the participants using as a liaison at all times the person who had originally accepted to speak to me. The struggle to acquire data is documented with detail in a methodological article I recently published, where I argue that resistance in interviews can be, under certain circumstances, interpreted as data (Kizlari and Fouseki, 2018b). It seems that the level of introversion or extroversion of the Cultural Institutes is proportionate to their tendency to form partnerships and that policymakers' perceptions of their role may create different attitudes communicationally. The case of the Hellenic Foundation for Culture is sadly typical of the general Geist in Greek Public Administration indicating a complete lack of public accountability. More about the limitations that restricted my research will be presented in 3.3.

3.2. Data analysis

3.2.1 Operationalising the concept of instrumentalism

The operationalisation of a concept requires its adequate conceptualisation first and its analysis in distinct and measurable variables next, otherwise the subject will remain elusive forever anchored in its theoretical milieu. There are two sets of variables to be observed and pinned down: (i) independent variablies, which determine the cause, and, (ii) dependent variables, which point out to the effects of the cause. This technique in distinguishing between measurable variables, regardless of their causation status as explained earlier, is a process through which a qualitative concept is transformed into a quantifiable analytical unit. It should be noted that an operational definition of a concept, being an analytical construct fashioned by the researcher to facilitate the conduct of the research, is not an objective and uncontested unit. It may be challenged, reworked and ultimately reshaped by other researchers who, in the process of investigating different cases, will most likely come up with both new and overlapping sets of variables to measure and define the concept (Lampard and Pole, 2015).

In the context of this study, I explained how instrumentalism in cultural policy studies, although much discussed and theorised, is inadequately operationalised (see 2.1.3 Instrumentalism in cultural policy discourse). Cultural policy research has so far failed to address the problem directly with studies keeping building up on an abstract basis (see Belfiore's distinction of 'defensive' versus 'positive' instrumentalism and also Hadley and Gray's concept of hyperinstrumentalism). Although this study agrees in spirit with these approaches in describing and analysing the phenomenon, it seeks to establish specific aspects of how instrumentalism manifests. This decision has been pivotal to help the researcher formulate interview questions focused on the tangible elements of the phenomenon. Based on Quinn's (1997) analysis, both financial and human resources channeled by the central government towards non-departmental public bodies function as decisive means of control arm's length bodies. Likewise, in Pamment's (2012) analysis on Swedish and British public diplomacy strategies, evaluation rose as the single most factor affecting the relationship between sponsoring departments and arm's length bodies such as the British Council. Taking into account these structural elements of the relationship, I created an

interview questionnaire which revolved around axes like funding and evaluation, which in their turn gave more themes for research (Appendix A).

As this is not a quantitative study which uses a specific scale to measure the phenomenon, I abstained from enforcing a strict distinction between independent and dependent variables as this could have obscured rather than facilitated the research at this point. However, at this stage the conceptual definition still needs to give way to a more operational understanding of the term. I distinguish between Vestheim's (1994) conceptual definition of instrumentalism, which sees it as an expression of misalignment of intended and realised purposes (intrinsic/pure purpose vs. extrinsic/instrumentalist purpose) and a more operational definition of the phenomenon of my own working which I share below:

> *Instrumentalism as a phenomenon in cultural policy describes a set of distinct but interrelated administrative processes which governments use to control cultural agents and shape the cultural message.*

This definition aids the researcher clarify the nature of the object under study. I do accept that the operational definition shared above is neither exhaustive of the concept nor universal and that the very process of operationalising a concept, being context- and time-specific, points to the layers of complexity ingrained in the phenomenon. The literature so far has indicated that (i) funding, (ii) appointments, (iii) evaluation frameworks, as well as, (iv) the legal status of public bodies play an important role in the arm's length relationship. It is these four variables that I will be searching for in the thematic analysis to follow keeping an open agenda as new variables may surface from the subsequent analysis.

3.2.2 Thematic analysis of interview projects

The three interview projects were analysed separately using thematic analysis with the aid of NVivo software (Bazeley, 2007). Initially, all three projects were coded without a pre-designed map of nodes. Rather the researcher tried to recognise patterns of information arising organically from the data. After the completion of the coding phase for Project C, it was evident that the great challenge was to link the projects. Since I am a novice researcher whose knowledge of the software (NVivo) and the method (thematic analysis) are refined through use, I decided to repeat the coding for Project A. I could see that the level of sophistication of my nodes in Project A was considerably low compared to the complexity of the coding map in Project C. Not only was the quality different, but also the nodes themselves thematically touched upon slightly different issues. This was a natural consequence arising from the fact that my research question took its final form after Year 1, so the analysis I did during my first year of research could now be read as obsolete. I needed to create equal conditions for all my projects and, where possible, to draw explicit links between the NVivo projects. Not only did I re-run the analysis for Project A, but before that, I cross-examined the validity of my nodes in Project C using as a reviewer the primary supervisor of this thesis. We decided to code simultaneously from scratch one interview (Figure 25 found in Appendix B) to confirm that my themes were accurately portraying the content of the interviews. As regards project B, the nodes are only presented in the Appendix (Figure 27, Appendix B) since this interview project is not taking a central position in the analysis. Priority is given to Project A and Project C (Figure 26 and Figure 28). In the Appendix, I also provide three figures (Figure 29, Figure 30, Figure 31) which show the density of coding in each project, hence, you can see which interviews have played a key role in cross-validating my propositions.

To make the connections of the NVivo nodes clearer, I have used visualisations to show how the projects come under one analytical umbrella. Using as a signpost the research question, I developed what Attride-Stirling (2001) calls “thematic networks”. This tool is used by researchers as a visual aid that maps interrelations between concepts. The thematic network presents three levels of information:

- the global theme, which constitutes the basic level of analysis around which all other themes are developed.

- the organising themes, which describe aspects of the global theme, and
- the basic themes, which constitute the most basic bits of information.

The global theme 'Discourses around cultural diplomacy' describes the perceptions of policymakers around the word 'culture' (Figure 9). Defining what culture is affects the way cultural relations are both coordinated and politicised. On this account, William's (1976) ground-breaking etymological study on culture remains, to an overwhelming extent, fully illustrative of the true substance of the problem. Different definitions of culture produce different expectations from this policy item, so cultural policy acquires sometimes non-cultural dimensions which cannot be managed by one authority alone.

The rise and clash of ideologies was the key finding of this project which informed my understanding of the conduct of foreign cultural policy in general. 'Culture as end' and 'Culture as means' point to two contrasting ideologies in the field of cultural policy, one more idealistic and one more realistic. 'Politics' and 'Public Administration' were also two themes to which participants would return to through their statements. Naturally, the two are connected and the bridge that links them is ideology, the prevalent theme of chapter 6.2. A common understanding of what ought to be achieved acts as the binding glue between the world of politics and the world of bureaucracy, however, cooperation does not always take place seamlessly. I mentioned above that I re-ran the analysis for project A as the nodes I came up with were not so well developed. However, even in the first year of my research and despite the —irritatingly in hindsight —basic coding I had performed, the themes of 'Politics in Cultural Diplomacy' and 'Policy in Cultural Diplomacy' were visible (Figure 10).



Figure 9. Thematic network for Project A. Source: Author.

Name	Sources	Referen...
Civil Society	7	30
Perceptions and Mentalities	10	114
▼ State	0	0
▼ Policy in Cultural Diplomacy	10	381
▼ explicit policies	10	274
effective policy	10	94
ineffective policy	9	136
▼ implicit policies	5	11
effective policy	1	2
ineffective policy	3	3
towards a new policy	10	78
Politics in Cultural Diplomacy	9	151

Figure 10. First attempt to analyse Project A. Source: Author.

Project C has been coded organically without imposing premeditated codes on the transcripts (Figure 11). The global theme 'The trilemma: Cultural diplomacy, cultural relations, public diplomacy' is analogous to the global theme of Project A 'Discourses around cultural diplomacy'. It concerns itself with differing perceptions around the nature of the CIs' work. To determine whether the Cultural Institutes are exercising cultural diplomacy, cultural relations or public diplomacy, one must look at a number of factors starting with how each Cultural Institute defines culture individually.

One must also explore how the state has organised the supervision of the Cultural Institutes in question. Does the state exercise rigorous controls in an attempt to align the aims of cultural and educational activities with broader foreign policy priorities or does it allow divergence encouraging the CI to self-organise its affairs? The organising themes 'Issues of Strategic Planning', 'What is Culture' and 'State agency' are interlinked acting as communicating vessels. The theme 'Issues of Strategic Planning' is again analogous to the theme 'Public Administration' in Project A as is 'State agency' to 'Politics'. Naturally, the basic themes in the two projects are quite different without this meaning that semantic overlaps are entirely absent, as in the example of 'Funding', Reporting' and 'Research and Evaluation'.



Figure 11. Thematic Network for Project C. Source: Author.

3.3 Inherent and contextual limitations of the research

This sub-chapter combines into one collection the limitations that have defined the boundaries of the study. The section is divided into two parts, one dealing with the inherent limitations of the selected research methods and the other with the contextual limitations which describe the specific problems that arose during the conduct of the research.

3.3.1 Inherent limitations

Case study as an idiosyncratic form of data collection

Case study research is a form of analysis that provides very specific information about a particular context, so the question remains always open as to whether the findings are generalisable. However, this study has tried to overcome this barrier by introducing more case studies to compare the results and, therefore, support the conclusions in a more robust way. Next to that, Yin has pointed to the role of theory in hypothesis testing as a contributing factor in increasing the analytic generalisability of the study. In his words:

> *A fatal flaw in doing case studies is to conceive of statistical generalization as the method of generalizing the results of your case study. This is because your cases are not 'sampling units' and should not be chosen as such. [...] The mode of generalization is analytic generalization, in which a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study (Yin, 2009, p.38).*

The above passage makes clear that the principle of generalisability in qualitative research does not take the same form as in quantitative research. On the contrary, it is the quality of inferences and causal links that is of paramount importance. Therefore, the case study method challenges conventional ideas about the role and nature of generalisability (Donmoyer, 2000).

Purposive sampling increases bias

A range of methods can be used to select interview participants from probability sampling to snowballing or purposive sampling to mention a few of the most popular techniques (Robinson, 2014). The driving force for the selection of the appropriate sampling method should always be the research question. This study is targeting policymakers working in the area of cultural relations. The nature of the project called for purposive sampling although attempts to do snowballing sampling – in the Greek case study at least – were made with little success. I tried to use as points of reference my first-line interviewees to build a network of contacts and delve deeper into the cultural promotion network. Nevertheless, the efforts did not bear fruit. Three times I tried to recruit participants snowballing and actually for the two, recruitment was happening real-time. My participants would take me from their office to other people inside their workplace whom they had assessed as appropriate for me to talk to; unfortunately, their calls would get turned down while I would be waiting outside in the corridor.

Although snowballing sampling did not yield any results, purposive sampling was in part successful. What are the criteria that researchers follow to sample individuals? According to Devers and Frankel (2000, p.264), "researchers seek to accomplish this goal by selecting 'information rich' cases, that is individuals, groups, organizations, or behaviors that provide the greatest insight into the research question." So, the very definition of purposive sampling asserts that the selection is strategic, hence partial to a certain degree. It is the responsibility of the researcher to unearth and highlight where biases may lie. In the context of this study, it is obvious that weight was given to accounts coming from the Hellenic Foundation for Culture and, therefore, the Ministry of Culture and Sports enjoys greater representation as opposed to other state authorities.

High risk of de-contextualising quotes from interviews

One of the great risks of doing interviews is decontextualising the statements of the participants and reframe them in a new narrative which supports the arguments of the researcher. This may imply that the researcher is acting

unethically on purpose with the ulterior motive of manipulating his/her data to suit the research hypothesis. The truth is that frequently researchers may end up weaving narratives that are not well supported by their data but fit their expectations. According to Barbour and Schostak (2005, p.41) "...when the statements are printed, they are taken out of the lived context and placed into another – the public domain, the domain where words are twisted, given alternative meanings, 'interpreted' in the light of other evidence". Identifying researcher's bias is a major step towards responsible research conduct. This thesis has partially addressed this limitation by introducing the Supplement which contains the full list of the transcriptions in the accompanying CD-ROM. The transcriptions offer an insider's view of the interview circumstances to the readers. This is what (Rapley, 2004, p.25) calls the "here-and-now interaction" referring to the special circumstances under which interview quotes are produced. Thus, my readers can access and cross-check the context out of which the selected quotes were taken to verify that words and their meaning were responsibly utilised for the study.

Comparative research lacks depth

Another key issue in case study analysis is what Stark and Torrance (2005, p.35) have called the dilemma of "depth versus coverage". Although depth is prioritised in case study research, comparisons should be drawn wherever possible to discover "the range of possible experiences" (ibid). The conflict between these intentions is visible as one seems to subvert the other (Rihoux, 2006). To ensure robustness researchers ought to select cases within a bounded system and work their inquiry using the same units of analysis (Yin, 2009). Jowell (1998) suggests that researchers should identify aggregate-level contextual variables to give readers a sense of the qualities that characterise the case study as he admits that more often than not researchers tend to compare sets of data in vacuum. To avoid making comparisons in vacuum as Jowel has warned, I identified three variables that will operate as guiding themes to compare and contrast my six case studies. These are explained in detail at the beginning of chapter 5. Briefly, I took into account three dimensions that make each case study unique: the administrative framework of the country under focus, its national history and the socio-linguistic context.

Inaccessible resources due to the language barrier

It is common knowledge in the research community that studies published in languages other than English do not promptly enter the global academic debate. Still, significant research is being undertaken today in the world in other national languages which may never get translated in the 'lingua franca' of science. Studies published in English may receive more citations, however, academics and researchers run the risk of scientific bias if they rely exclusively on English publications (Meneghini and Parker, 2007). Jowell (1998) notes that the language barrier along with a lack of awareness of the socio-cultural differences between national contexts are the prime reasons why researchers usually avoid conducting cross-national research with a large sample of countries. The struggle of doing research in different socio-cultural and linguistic contexts is a limitation which has admittedly compromised the depth in many of my cases; especially the German, the Spanish and the Swedish examples of which the researcher has no knowledge of the language. To overcome the obstacle, I used Google Translate to gain access to such data and have, thusly, translated several documents from strategy plans to budgets and management statements.

3.3.2 Contextual limitations

Lack of published resources for certain case studies

As mentioned earlier the case studies that are under investigation in the context of this thesis do not all provide fertile ground to explore and test the hypotheses. Although Greece is the focus of this study, it has been particularly challenging to access primary sources of information. Quite often, much needed data was nowhere to be found in grey literature, since the Ministry of Culture and Sports does not 'feel' the need to demonstrate transparency. As one of my interviewees admitted:

> *There were requests by international organisations that we were responding to randomly and not in an organised manner. The data we give out are usually not trustworthy. Even the Hellenic Statistical Authority had questions and we responded but they never cross-checked the data. The numbers were more or less given out randomly. This is what we are trying to improve now (I2, P.22, L.10-13).*

That is why the number of interviews is exceptionally higher in this case study than the rest as not only crucial baseline information about the cultural policy of the country is missing, but wherever this can be found its reliability is questionable. On the other hand, the UK, Germany and France are examples that traditionally garner interest and, thus, have been much more systematically researched with an abundance of academic sources and policy reports examining domestic and foreign cultural policy issues (Ahearne, 2011; Dubois, 2013; Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015b; Lacassagne, 2017; Lee et al., 2011; Looseley, 1995; Stassen, 1987; Street, 2011; Wolf-Csanády, 1998; Wesner, 2010). The Swedish and Spanish example are relatively well researched; especially the past two decades there has been an explosion of interest in how these countries perform in the cultural sector both domestically and internationally. The past decade alone an increasing number of studies on national cultural policies and projects are being published in English from Spanish and Swedish research teams respectively (Bonet and Négrier, 2010; Larsson and Svenson, 2001; Duelund, 2008; Rius Ulldemolins and

Zamorano, 2015; Stenström, 2008; Vela and Xifra, 2015). Therefore, a smaller number of interviews were deemed adequate for these cases.

Difficulty in securing a high number of interviews

The Greek case study presented considerable challenges in securing the interviews as highlighted above. The challenge was no less significant for the rest of the cases. The research focused on the arm's length relationship and even more so on strategic planning, therefore, the researcher sampled people working for these departments in the Cultural Institutes. After the first round of interviews, I tried to reach out to more people working in the same organisations, however, it soon became clear that the latter would send me back to the participants I had already recruited. So, any attempt to sample more people willing to talk about issues of planning and funding would end in a loop. People felt that they could not talk about matters outside their expertise and immediate experience, so they always referred me to the departments I had already had an interview with. In any case, data elicited even from a small number of interviews should not be underestimated as the researchers come in contact with the real protagonists of the situation under study. In these circumstances, even a relatively low number of interviews becomes an asset.

> *A small number of cases, or subjects, may be extremely valuable and represent adequate numbers for a research project. This is especially true for studying hidden or hard to access populations such as deviants or elites (Adler and Adler in Baker et al., 2012, p.8).*

Additionally, I decided while I was coding in NVivo to keep a diary to track the frequency with which I inserted new themes. It appears that for the present study the researcher has reached theme saturation after roughly coding the first 18-20 interviews. Thereon, new themes would not arise from the transcripts and for the remainder of the interviews the researcher just added information in the already existing nodes (please consult the relevant file in the CD-ROM). Theme saturation indicates that the study has exhausted its research potential, hence, there is little need for further participant recruitments.

The performative element evermore present in interviews

Many of my interviews contained elements of narrative and often I felt like my participants were 'performing' rather than explaining or arguing. Riessman (2008, p.8) suggests that "...narratives are strategic, functional, and purposeful" although she admits elsewhere in her treatise on narrative analysis that narratives can also be the product of non-conscious choices. Bringing this discussion into the context of my interviews, it seems that the narrative can be defined as the assemblage of memories in patterns that are meaningful to the participant and their subsequent presentation to the researcher as a timeless unit. For an experienced interviewer, narratives may present another layer of data, however, for myself the process of distinguishing between narrative and conversation was always straightforward. The performative element was more visible in those interviews where the participant was more supportive of the instrumentalist approach (I3, I7, I10, I11, I15, I19, I20, I23, I25). During these interviews I felt that I failed to build the same level of rapport with my interviewees, as with other participants, and this led to an interview where the participant praised and defended the strategy followed without making critical comments.

Translating to English

The challenge of conducting research in different cultural and linguistic contexts has attracted recently much scholarly attention in qualitative methods literature (Temple and Young, 2004; Squires, 2009; van Nes et al., 2010). Van Nes et al. (2010) report that research validity might be at stake if the translation from one language to the other is too broad. Charmingly, Roth (2013) rejects this view and contends that point-to-point translation is a metaphysical idea since translation happens unwillingly in our everyday lives. In this project, nearly half of the interviews were conducted in Greek. As I decided to include the transcriptions of the interviews as part of the submission, I needed to translate a number of the interviews in English. I personally translated and edited twice the transcriptions, so the text now follows more accurately the structure and form of the English language. This decision implies that the translation has not been point-to-point, yet, a more open approach was used to convey the original message.

4. Greece as the critical case study

The present chapter opens the analysis section of the thesis through the investigation of the intrinsic case study. The first part offers a profile of the country in question by looking at key features of its national context. A brief history of the Greek cultural policy is necessary to contextualise and explain any developments happening in foreign cultural policy, which will be our main focus in the second part. Both primary and secondary sources are used to construct the biography of cultural policy in Greece which is a surprisingly under-researched area, despite the rich cultural capital the country has at its disposal. Due to meagre secondary resources on the subject, I conducted online archival research using the Government Gazette as a main channel of information about the establishment of government institutions. Although the formation of official state structures is not always representative of the social tensions and cultural preferences of the base, it acts as an indicator of policy intentions and, at the very least and in the absence of other input, it provides in some measure an overview of the Greek cultural policy, even though from a top-down angle.

4.1 Cultural policy

Cultural policy in Greece has not been a subject of exhaustive inquiry. This perhaps can find its explanation in the fact that cultural governance and heritage management became part of university curricula only in the past two decades with cultural and heritage professionals being notoriously ill-equipped lacking in fundamental managerial skills to oversee effectively the administrative and financial aspects of their own work (Kostakis, 2013). In Greece, it is accepted that high levels of expertise in a subject guarantee the capability of the candidate to assume a managerial position in a relevant area. The problem is not endemic in the cultural sector, but it is a feature of the Greek Public Administration as a whole. Moreover, corruption and clientelism create mixed working environments where groups of inexperienced workers staff organisations topped by experts (Spanou, 1996).

I will commence the analysis by synthesising information about the actors with principal responsibility in designing and implementing cultural policy in Greece historically. At the same time, I will illustrate their ambitions and contextualise their activity with regard to broader ideological formations observed in the international scene. The interpretative framework should take into account three features of the political and social life in the country: i) the preference, reliance and import of foreign models of governance, ii) the influence party politics have in public life and, iii) the cultural superiority thesis. In the following section, we will focus on structures and narratives in Greek cultural policy to reveal policy intentions and policy praxis.

4.1.1 Heritage as the trigger for state intervention

A chronicle of the official cultural policy of Greece could place its starting point in 1971 when a distinct Ministry of Culture and Sciences was first established in the country[8]. The organisation has a particularly dark history as it was founded during the military junta, which ruled Greece during the period 1967-1974. After the coup of 1967 and the establishment of the 'regime of the Colonels', culture and heritage would be administered for the first few years by a Directorate reporting to the Secretary of State. In 1971, the Directorate would be elevated to the rank of a ministerial department. This serves as evidence to the importance culture, and especially classical antiquity, had in fostering national identity. The authority supervised not only the policy area of culture and heritage, but also oversaw scientific research and development, which previously formed a unit in the Prime Minister's Office. The speed with which these policy developments were introduced during the years of the junta was unfamiliar for the standards of the field. Since the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece in 1833, the Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs was the institutional home for the administration of a range of cultural matters[9]. For over a century, the arts and culture were largely, but not entirely, under the watchful eye of the Minister of Education.

Next to this problem, there existed, and still does, a profound division within the policy area of culture in Greece. The episteme of archaeology, which is in charge of preserving and studying material heritage, forms a distinct policy field from the arts and, therefore, its conduct traditionally has not been supervised by the same policy instrument. Rather, heritage and the arts lived separate lives for much of the history of cultural policy in Greece until the establishment of the Ministry of Culture in 1971. Until then, the administration of culture and heritage ran, for the most part, in a decentralised capacity through the use of independent agencies. The arts reported to their own subject-specific councils, whereas heritage-related issues would be referred to the Greek Archaeological Service. The agency was

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[8] Φ.Ε.Κ. 166/Α/25-08-1971. The Greek initials 'Φ.Ε.Κ.' stand for the Government Gazette.
[9] Φ.Ε.Κ. 14/Α/13-04-1833. The unit did not constitute a government ministry at the time, but it was a smaller entity under the name 'Secretariat of Religious Affairs and Public Education'.

established in 1833 and supervised archaeological sites and digs throughout the country through a network of local units called ‘Ephorates’ placed in the capital of each administrative division (Dallas, 2013). Today, the two sectors typically constitute the back spine of the ministry’s operations, however, the allocation of responsibilities within the Ministry shows that cultural heritage is more valued. The General Secretary of Culture with a programmatic focus on heritage is a high authority figure in the organisation second only to the Minister (Figure 12). At a lower level, there is considerable discomfort expressed by the Directorate of Contemporary Culture towards the Directorate of Antiquities and Cultural Heritage regarding fund allocation (Kostakis, 2016), a point to which we will return later.



Figure 12. Schematic organigram of the Greek MoCS. Source: Greek Ministry of Culture and Sports, 2018.

It is interesting to see how institutional responsibility over the subject area of culture and heritage changed throughout tie as domestic priorities shifted and foreign influence grew. From its foundation in 1971 until today, the Ministry of Culture (today Ministry of Culture and Sports) has changed its name five times to reflect its new focus and jurisdiction every time[10]. Culture has been artificially

[10] The first instance in this series of rebranding initiatives came in 1985 when it was announced that the ‘Ministry of Culture and Sciences’ founded by the Regime of the Colonels would be dissolved in a bid to clear its clouded past only to re-establishe the authority as the ‘Ministry of Culture’ (Φ.Ε.Κ. 137/Α/26-07-1985).

attached to tourism and education as developments in the last decade alone can demonstrate. In 2009, the Ministry of Culture and Sports merged with the Ministry of Tourism to form the 'Ministry of Culture and Tourism' only for the merger to be disbanded three years later[11]. In 2012, a new merger was suggested and effectuated bringing together the Ministry of Culture and Sports with the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, however, this too would be a short-lived political project[12]. As of 2015, the name changed back to its original 'Ministry of Culture and Sports'. We have established, as part of the literature review, that culture is used as a tool to achieve both tangible and intangible goals, related to financial profit and intellectual refinement respectively. The name change is an excellent example of legislators' intentions to capitalise on instrumental synergies in Greek cultural policy.

We have made a brief mention to the history of the central organ for cultural matters in Greece, nevertheless, to argue that state protection mechanisms and regulatory frameworks for culture, heritage and the arts were first put into place in the 1970s with no other precedent would be false. From the establishment of the state in 1831, the authorities would emphasise the glowing importance the country's national patrimony had, especially material heritage, in the constitution of the Greek identity. Voudouri (2003) observes that state discourses linked heritage to education already from the 19th century, with education being tasked to train young generations in "the excavation and discovery of lost art treasures, their maintenance and protection, so they are not illegally exported from the country"[13]. The angst of illegal trafficking of cultural property as well as the unifying power of heritage trace their history even before the establishment of the state, when the Greeks rose against the Ottoman Empire demanding the liberation of their lands from the Sultan. Captain Makrygiannis, one of the fathers of the Revolution, has famously recorded in his memoirs the following episode:

> *I had two fine statues, a woman and a prince, intact – they were so perfect, you could see their veins. When they sacked Poros, some*

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[11] Φ.Ε.Κ. 213/Α/07-10-2009.

[12] Φ.Ε.Κ. 141/Α/21-06-2012. In 2015, the incumbent government reversed the priorities in the department as evident in its new name 'Ministry of Culture, Sports, Education and Religious Affairs'. Six months later following sharp criticism from creative professionals, ministry executives and the press, the government restored the name to its former status.

[13] Φ.Ε.Κ. 14/Α/13-04-1833, p.94, author's translation.

soldiers got them and they were planning to sell them to some European at Argos. They asked for one thousand talara. I happened to be passing by. I took the soldiers aside and talked to them. 'You should not let these leave our country, even if they give you ten thousand talara. For it is for these we fought (Makrygiannis as quoted in Hamilakis, 2007, p.74).

Hamilakis (2007) notes that this passage is bearer of a new discourse on heritage, one which dominated the imagination of Greek intelligentsia at the aftermath of the Revolution. The passage is said to have been written long after the formation of the Greek state in a conciliatory spirit since Makrygiannis was a well-respected figure in the public life of the newly formed state, and due to his humble origin, he could speak directly to the hearts of the people (ibid). According to the new narrative, Greece and its legacy were thought to have paved the way for the western system of thought. The West, and predominantly Europe, was morally indebted to this little piece of land and its people for all they had offered throughout the centuries to their European neighbours. Several Greek historians note how this argument was, in fact, an imported idea adopted and disseminated by the educated Greek-speaking upper classes (Gourgouris, 1996; Kitromilides, 2003). It was in the 19th century that Greece weaved this powerful narrative based on the discourses of two very different movements, Romanticism and Neo-classicism.

The ideological basis of the Greek War of Independence, and the basis of the modern Greek identity for that matter, is exactly this fusion of two very antithetical ideas. On one hand, the Enlightenment restored the idea the West had for classical antiquity, which medieval religious Europe sought and succeeded in eroding; on the other hand, Romanticism provided the means to re-imagine an alternative reality, in which freedom was not only a possibility, but a right. This shift in mentality was the necessary pre-condition that prepared the ground for revolution. Greece is the motherland, the place where it all started. This was the grand narrative that fuelled the Revolution and is, to this day, the story we say about ourselves to others. Heritage serves as the material evidence that endorses the argument of cultural superiority. This is why heritage, especially the archaeological remains, played such a pivotal role in the politics of the newly formed Greek state. Benedict Anderson (1991) was not the first to point out that nationalism supported the idea

of a common ancestry (which also insinuates the subscription to the idea of a common racial, religious and linguistic heritage), but he was the first to argue that nationalists imagined themselves as part of the same community throughout time, from the past and well into the future. This projection forward implies the idea of an unbroken lineage, a timeless bond that connects the people. The nation is united under the banner of history and is bound to share a common fate in the future. The invention of tradition is paramount to sustain the illusion that the nation is eternal (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1992).

In the case of Greece, the lineage from classical Greece to the modern day was interrupted not just once, by the Ottoman Turks who were after all conquerors, but twice, as the long period of Byzantium was not thought of as equally glorious to the classical past. Despite the obsession of the Europeans, and later on of the Greeks, with the golden age of Athens (5th century B.C.), history is primarily a political project. The gap in the timeline of national history needed to be filled in to support the idea of an identity continuum. It was in the mid-1850s when a rising Greek historian[14] wrote and published a short version of 'The history of the Greek nation from antiquity until contemporary times' (author's translation), in what later would develop to become a magnum opus of several volumes, and a primary point of reference for historiographers studying Greek history. In this work appears for the first time the tripartite lens (Figure 13) that divides Greek history in ancient, medieval and modern and restores the formerly contempted Byzantine period to the historical continuum (Kitromilides, 1998).



Figure 13. The timeline of Greek history. Source: Author.

[14] Constantine Paparrigopoulos is the founder of modern Greek historiography and the author of the 5-volume opus "The history of the Greek nation from antiquity until modern times".

This work set the basis for the construction of modern Greek identity and is the dominant system of thought in education curricula. This indicates that younger generations are still bred on an ethnocentric discourse congruent to the political interests of the Right. To this day, the ideological use of history is the single most contested issue capable of producing and reproducing media headlines for months. The case of the Amphipolis excavations in 2014 in Northern Greece demonstrates the public's infatuation with the hidden treasures of their land. Fouseki and Dragouni (2017, p.745) note that media coverage for the excavations took unprecedented dimensions and resembled "a reality show – an everyday show of agony and thrill". The archaeological news that summer operated as a distraction mechanism for the masses while the government was in negotiations to sign the second economic adjustment programme with the European Commission which would introduce new financial measures and pension cuts. This is what Hamilakis (2016, p.228) calls "archaeo-political performances", the term describes the collective bewilderment with heritage symbols, which aim to entertain the public and divert attention.

The excavations in Amphipolis took central stage in the everyday life of the Greek people as the first findings of the dig were dated to the era of Alexander the Great. The discovery of the tomb of Alexander is a long-held dream not only for the archaeological community, but for the nation as a whole. The building of Alexander's empire is recounted in most national histories, at least in the West, and along with the classical period, it is an era that has assisted in exporting the Greek brand abroad. It is a period that is remembered almost too often. As Paul Ricoeur (2004) has remarked, the conception of historical time is based on this kind of over emphases and lapses of events. Memory is inextricably linked to forgetting. The Greek nation has built its identity on the memory of a glorious past and projects this myth every time it is threatened in pursuit of historical justice[15].

Before the end, I reserved some space here to draw the connection between discourse and governmental practice. The protection of heritage has been, as the title of this section suggests, the motive behind state action. To this day, the distribution of funding in the Ministry of Culture and Sports between the Directorate

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[15] The French historian Ernest Renan argued as early as 1882 that nations are based neither on race, religion or language but rather on the memory of a common past. The present, he said, is also an important time element as it requires consent: people need to wish to stay together and external threats bind them.

of Antiquities and Cultural Heritage and the Directorate for Contemporary Culture follows the same trend. The cultural and creative industries are severely under-financed and under-developed, despite their market potential. By contrast, archaeological excavations, conservation and restoration projects take up the greatest share of the Ministry's budget (Table 4).

Table 4. MoCS 2015 budget. Source: Adapted from Kostakis, 2016.

Policy area	**Expenses per sector**	**Share**
Antiquities & Cultural Heritage	216.512.267,01€	77,2%
Contemporary Culture	61.002.183,06€	21,7%
International Cultural Relations	2.980.866,67€	1,1%
Total budget	*280.495.316,74 €*	*100%*

Interestingly, figures show that the consumption of contemporary cultural products and services surpasses the demand for heritage-related activities such as visits to archaeological sites or museums (Figure 14).



Figure 14. Frequency of cultural visits. Source: Adapted from Avdikos et al., 2017, p.28.

The favouritism towards the preservation of memory undercuts all policy intentions in the field of culture in Greece. Foreign cultural policy could not be an exception as domestic priorities shape the reality of foreign cultural affairs. Even the Minister of Culture and Sports has addressed this historical imbalance in state provision for antiquities and the arts:

> *I must admit that the cultural and creative industries form the weakest wing of the Ministry's policies. We are not doing enough, we are not taking advantage of their potential. It falls upon each Minister to deal*

> *with the issue; some have successfully tackled the problem, others not so much* (Gerounalos, 2012, author's translation).

The passage below, taken from an interview with a policymaker in the official organ for Greece's cultural diplomacy, attributes the problem to professional nepotism:

> *All funding from the European Regional Development Fund that the Ministry of Culture and Sports receives, actually 90% of it, is directed to archaeological works, because the General Secretary for Culture is an archaeologist (I4, P.33, L.26-28).*

Zorba (2014) has argued that certain professional groups are politically favoured because their cause appears as more legitimate in society. In the Greek case, the public has been educated – almost disciplined if one takes a Foucauldian approach – to sacralise antiquity and defend its memory in public disputes (Foucault, 1977). The mission and values of the archaeological community have, therefore, a strong social resonance which is unlikely to be disrupted unless state priorities in teaching Greek history are renegotiated.

4.1.2 Discursive practices and policy priorities today

We have established that heritage has had a dominant position in shaping the social imaginary of the Greek people and that the professionals who safeguard its material artefacts usually take up the highest echelons of power in the Ministry of Culture and Sports. By revisiting specific moments of the modern and contemporary history in Greece, we have explained the rationale behind the cultural superiority thesis. Nevertheless, our discussion on discourses above did not touch on issues of social inclusion, participation and accessibility, which is a topic we analysed extensively as part of the literature review. In the current section, I will cover this subject, and by doing so, I will explain the rationale behind the first and second point of the interpretative framework I introduced: namely, the tendency to import foreign models of governance and the influence party politics have in public life.

Two episodes of historical significance have been offered so far to indicate the break and change in perceptions towards heritage and national identity. First, we made reference to the Greek War of Independence (1821-1829) and the underlying ideological motives this harboured, which linked the material relics of the past to the struggle for freedom of the present. Second, we explained how the military junta, which seized power between 1967 and 1974, centralised power in the field of culture by establishing for the first time in the country a ministerial authority to policy arts, culture and heritage. Through this action, the regime of the Colonels endorsed once again the familiar binary 'national identity - cultural patrimony' and proved that not only is cultural policy inseparable from identity politics, but that cultural memory in the framework of the nation-state requires organised supervision to feed and sustain the ideological construction of the nation.

Looking at the 'longue durée' and not just at photographic instances, has Greek cultural policy taken an elitist or a pluralist approach? How do party politics impact the way culture is framed on a governmental level? Zorba (2009) has argued that in the first decades after World War II, cultural policy in Greece, as any other aspect of public policy for that

matter, expressed the political views and ambitions of the Right. Unlike other European states, which started re-developing soon after the end of the war, Greece plunged into a bloody Civil War that would last five years (1945-1949). It was a war whose outcome would very much determine on which side of the Iron Curtain Greece would be (Close, 1995). The two camps were never of equal power (neither in terms of resources nor in terms of influence in foreign politics) with right-wing military forces presenting a considerable advantage. Time favoured the strong and as American influence grew, mostly due to the financial aid Greece received as part of the Marshall plan, it was clear that the established right-wing government in Athens held the upper hand against the partisans (ibid).

The defeat of the Left in 1949 was inevitable, however, the end of the Civil War did not signal the start of a new era in domestic politics. Instead of working in a reconciliatory spirit, the official state apparatuses isolated and silenced any non-conformant voices. The communist party was dissolved and its recognised advocates were forced to exile (ibid). As Zorba (2009, p.246) argues:

> *Access to higher education or public-sector employment had an ideological prerequisite: a "Certificate of Social Beliefs"*[16]*. Any progressive opinion was in danger of being labelled as "communist" and thus being propelled to the side-lines, effectively marginalized. Cultural expression outside of the borders of the official culture was deemed conclusive of dissidence. […] During those years the mechanism of the State systematically attempted to impose the official culture, which was based on a nationalist identity, the religious credo and the ancient Greek heritage – unilaterally as interpreted by the conservative governments of that epoch.*

[16] It would take 40 years for the 'Certificate of Social Beliefs', which contained information on individuals' political afilliations and preferences, to be publicly condemned, although the collection of intelligence had already been abandoned since 1974. Left protesters opposed, though in vain, the burning of the records arguing that the certificates contained valuable historical information for the study of contemporary Greek politics which should not be erased (Bitsika 2016).

While Zorba above offers a political reading of the elitist approach cultural policy took in the first decades after the war, Konsola (1990) engages in an unproblematic interpretation of state directives of the same period. Focusing on public expenditure, Konsola observes that increasing inbound tourism led the government to invest in the restoration of archaeological sites which were popular attractions for visitors. The interventions, she acknowledges, had a selective character and favoured sites and museums in the capital and its greater region. Without referring to the political developments of the time, Konsola accepts that cultural heritage, especially high-brow culture, had a higher value due to its didactic character compared to other forms of cultural expression, especially intangible heritage.

It may seem that this kind of favouritism was a bitter legacy of the Civil War, nevertheless, a look back in time will reveal that subsequent governments in the past have constrained cultural production and, consequently, consumption through various means, e.g. censorship, lack of legislative incentives to develop certain sectors, refusal to frame certain policy gaps as problems. A good example of how the Greek government has contained cultural expression comes from the Interwar Period; in the 1930s and 1940s, a particular form of popular music, called the *Rebetiko,* was flourishing in the underground Greek music scene. The style would deal with topics such as unrequited love, imprisonment, gambling, poverty and death and had, naturally, great appeal to outcast social groups (prostitutes, mobsters, drug addicts). The themes were deemed degenerate with the ability to corrupt moral citizens and, in 1936, the authoritarian regime in power ordered the closure of taverns which hosted rebetiko musicians (Vlisidis, 2004). Song lyrics were censored in studio before recording and artists would self-censor their work, so they could continue with production. Such episodes point to the moral legitimacy that governments traditionally amassed as guarantors of public order, which allowed them to intervene in the cultural sphere with corrective measures to regulate social behaviour. Evidently, the Greek government has exerted tremendous influence on the aesthetic preferences of creators and has been the primary agent in shaping public taste.

In view of the above, the definition of culture espoused by Greek authorities corresponds to the second pillar of Raymond Williams's tripartite system of signification as presented in chapter 2.1.1. Culture is not ordinary, but ideal. It pertains to the sublime and aims to shape people's loyalties by re-ordering their taste. The Greek ruling class showed a parochial appreciation towards classicist art over contemporary cultural creation. By contrast, the leftist anti-bourgeoise would get enthralled by progressive art movements and would defend disparaged forms of cultural expression. Political loyalties were cemented through lifestyle choices (Bourdieu, 1984). The sacralisation of classical heritage and the subsequent disdain of artefacts belonging to different historical periods (prehistoric, byzantine, ottoman) or the censorship of underground artistic expression (rebetiko music), all serve as testimony to the hegemonic character Greek cultural policy had. The imposition of a specific aesthetic horizon was seen as capable of manufacturing a new socio-political conscience. Cultural policy is, through this lens, a project that aims to discipline the people in a Foucauldian manner. It aimed to produce citizens with a liberal conscience who endorsed the policies of the Right.

Despite the rise of new priorities in the international cultural arena, as specified by organisations like UNESCO, the discursive practices of the MoCS remain to this day unmodified, although the horizon has now expanded to include artefacts belonging to the prehistoric and medieval byzantine period. Nonetheless, the democratisation of culture, or cultural pluralism in a later stage, were never pronounced policy objectives, and despite isolated initiatives[17], government priorities never changed even though the institutional and conceptual obstacles have been identified. In a 2012 speech, the Minister of Culture and Sports identified four problematic areas:

(i) absence of relevant expertise in formulating, executing and evaluating an overall cultural policy plan,

(ii) complicated relationship between the MoCS and its agencies,

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[17] This refers to the establishment of regional theatres in the 1980s and early 1990s to even out the distribution of theatrical services between the centre and the periphery of the country.

(iii) absence of a regional cultural policy plan, and

(iv) inadequate strategies for the promotion of Greek culture abroad (Geroulanos, 2012).

The above weaknesses could well be summarised into the first point. The absence of a concrete cultural policy plan has given birth to all subsequent problems. While the Minister points to a lack of relevant expertise, his executives in the Ministry point to a historical absence of vision in the ministry's affairs:

> *There was policy as an abstract subject. This is a question you pose, for example, as to whether there is policy. I mean there was something that was happening out there, but it was never stated in advance nor was it coordinated (I2, P.14, L.24-26).*

The same interviewee continued later explaining that cultural policy in the country has largely been implicit rather than explicit. To trace the imprint of this policy, one must look at the most impossible places:

> *At the time [around 2000] the politicians travelled a lot - of course they always do, this is part of their job. But there was a pattern in the travels they made [...] Where did they travel to? In their vast majority they went to Brussels, the EU, and they travelled a lot to Eastern Europe. Quite a lot of trips were made there. [...] This shows a certain direction in policy. And you could see it through other means. There was a rise in interest for Modern Greek Studies at the time by Eastern European countries; it was as if modern Greek was English. They would sign up by hundreds in modern Greek language courses and the postgraduate degrees in English or the American universities would attract only 20 students and we would have 200 students, for example. It was a significant difference. So, this is what you had. They never said that my first priority is Eastern Europe, but you could see the trips, the flow of visits, where the subsidies went. So, these were the*

elements that allowed to track down the policy (I2, P.14, L.38-50).

The absence of an explicit plan has had a cascade effect in all levels of cultural administration. Diagnosing the cardinal weaknesses of the organisation's long-term strategy has ironically not contributed to the introduction of radical changes in its practice. This can be attributed to what political scientists call 'path dependence' or, more graphically, 'policy lock-in'. The terms describe the inability of institutions to create new policy paths even when contingencies arise. A rigidly defined policy architecture would prohibit organisational changes to take effect (Garud et al., 2010).

Next to the absence of a concrete policy plan, the working style of Greek Public Administration adds up to the problem. It is a bureaucratic issue that affects the public service in its entirety and which requires fundamental juridical changes.

Our institutions have deep administrative problems. It makes no difference whether we are talking about the Ministry of Culture or the Ministry of Transport. It's the same problem that has to do with how new public executives are entering the system, the distinction of different policy areas across departments, thorough job descriptions, rational and flexible organigrams; but also, there is no policy on how to administrate all this bureaucracy (I2, P.20, L.9-13).

The size and complexity of the bureaucratic machine evidently paralyses and hinders effective policymaking. I argue that this is a common fate of countries with centralised systems of governance. As the same participant acknowledged at different times during the interview, in the Greek case, organisational practices and procedures within the Ministry of Culture and Sports were modelled upon the French system of governance.

I: Would you like to talk to me about your career in the Ministry? Were you always in charge of this Directorate?

P: In Greece we cannot enter a post directly, we follow the French system, you start from the bottom and you build your way up (I2, P.14, L.6-9).

I: We follow the French model in Public Administration which I think is very state-centric at least for my taste and experiences.

P: We have the French model since the era of Napoleon. They [French] have evolved in the peripheries. (I2, P.20, L.18-21).

These are not the only indications proving my proposition that Greece has a tendency to import tested solutions in public management. Looking towards the British example, a white paper published in 2012 recommends the creation of an autonomous Arts Council to administer the cultural and creative industries in Greece. The paper (Giannopoulos et al., 2012) advocates for greater distance between the central service and its directorates to resemble more the British arm's length model.

4.2 Foreign policy

Through a historical approach, I have mapped the political priorities Greek cultural policy has had since the liberation. It is sensible to present here the foreign policy concerns of the country, so the readers acquire a holistic understanding of the fragile politics that govern the field of foreign cultural policy.

Lesser (2005) has noted that Greece's geopolitical interests traditionally concerned the vital space near its borders (South Balkans – Middle East – North Africa). A country of modest size, territorially and demographically, with limited financial capabilities, Greece cannot realistically expect to pursue successfully its interests unilaterally but depends on its membership in international institutions to guarantee its position. Rightfully, thus, Tsakonas and Tournikiots (2003) remark that Greece has sought for security providers to support its foreign policy causes, although they do suggest that there is an expectation-reality gap in political circles as to how much the country can achieve through this means. The country has pursued its participation in agencies like the UN[18], NATO[19] and the EU[20] to achieve its goals. In these circles, Greece has been mostly preoccupied with the high politics of national security and defence. According to Ntokos (2016), Greek foreign policy has focused on the following issues the past decades:

- The potential or actual threat of armed conflict with Turkey, especially through a small-scale operation in the Aegean Sea.
- The end of illegal Turkish occupation in the northern part of Cyprus.
- The destabilisation of the Balkan region after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of new democracies.
- The resolution of the naming dispute with the Former Yugoslavic Republic of Macedonia and the rise of cultural nationalism.

[18] Greece joined the United Nations as one of the 51 founding members of the organisation in 1945 (Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).
[19] Membership to the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation was offered to Greece in 1952 (Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014).
[20] The country joined the European Union in 1981 and became part of the Eurozone in 2002 (Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018).

- The influx of immigrants, notably from countries of the former USSR during the 1990s and, from 2012 onwards, war refugees from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Economides (2007) has argued that Greek foreign policy has taken a distinct European turn since the mid-1990s. There is no other collective organ indeed that has benefited Greece so much as the EU apparatuses. National interests are projected onto the European foreign policy agenda and defended through the EU's legislative and executive organs, whenever these match with the interests of the bloc. The country has used its membership in various ways, from lobbying to vetoing to achieve its goals. Yet, it had not always been clear to Greek political leaders that the accession to the EU is the optimal scenario to ensure the country's future. Objections mainly arising from the Communist Party of Greece have been the centre of parliamentary debates throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s. Tsardanidis and Stavridis (2005) add that today the view that more can be accomplished multilaterally has finally prevailed. This is evident "in the fact that EU membership is no longer a controversial issue among the main political parties in Greece" (ibid, p.217).

In the domestic sphere, apart from political rivalries, Greece is plagued by problems which require its immediate attention; namely, the demographic plunge of the past three decades, the rise in popularity of the far right-wing ideology, bureaucratic stagnation and, the past 10 years, the debt crisis (Ntokos, 2016). On a global scale there are additional critical challenges to be met. It is widely accepted now that the boundaries between areas of 'high' and 'low' politics - or, even, the boundaries between 'domestic' and 'foreign' - are becoming increasingly blurry (Rosenau, 1997). There appears to be a reshuffle in established priorities. Much attention is now given to the role the international political economy plays in remaking the global order. Moreover, climate change is receiving a much greater emphasis in national politics worldwide which has a direct effect in forming or breaking international alliances. Nye's soft power rhetoric (1990) has pointed to a new – or rather politically neglected – sphere of influence. Yet, Greece has consistently considered the geopolitical developments in its region as more urgent. Its foreign economic policy has been directed in the Balkan peninsula especially after the end of communism (Monastiriotis and Tsamis, 2009). Consequently, Greece lags in areas of special focus such as environmental diplomacy and

cultural diplomacy, which are becoming increasingly important as neoliberalism advances.

Despite the country's weak individual international standing, Greece's soft power has the potential to put the country into the map, provided that this regional, so far, asset is transformed to a central political concern. Tzanakis (2015) observes that Greece's position, both geographically but also historically[21], has granted the country with a set of comparative advantages in the cultural sphere:

- The privilege to be the exclusive guardians of Christian Orthodox cultural heritage[22].
- The influence Greek language has in a range of audience groups.
- The existence of a large diasporic community abroad which still maintains strong bonds with the metropolis.
- A positive international image, despite the reputational damage the debt crisis has caused, mainly due to the absence of a neo-colonial past.

The cultural superiority thesis acquires a new layer of meaning here. The rich cultural capital is a legacy that comes with obligations. Kosmidou (2016) argues that the international community has high expectations from Greece in the cultural arena. Nevertheless, she does not tap into the discussion of what exactly it is that is expected. Is it simply increased visibility in the area or can it be the introduction of progressive cultural policies with the ability to move forward the current global paradigm?

[21] In both World Wars, Greece sided with the winners and, indeed, as Churchill has remarked, history is written by the victors. The current state of affairs internationally has been shaped by the rules the Allies set after WWII.

[22] For instance, the land use rights for the Holy Grave belong to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem. This may appear as an insignificant detail, however, the past decades the foreign clergy in the Middle East has gone through an Arabisation process (that is replacing foreign priests with ethnic Arabs). The Greeks are the only ethnicity to have retained a firm footing in the Holy Land (Katz and Kark, 2005). Additionally, the significance of Mount Athos, the land of monasteries, cannot be overstated in Greece's soft power. President Vladimir Putin has visited twice Mount Athos, which is also known by the name 'the Jerusalem of the Russians'.

4.2.1 Instruments and priorities of foreign cultural policy

In this section, I will offer an interpretation of the contextual framework in which the operation of the Hellenic Foundation for Culture is registered. First, I will present the basic instruments responsible for foreign cultural policy in the country and, in the process, I will highlight their key concerns.

The responsibility for the promotion of Greek culture is a complex administrative issue mostly attributed to subsequent changes in the organisation of the central government and less to a nuanced understanding of culture and its role, although this point merits some attention. I agree with my participant from the MoCS who admitted that "the subject is elusive" and that "there are other Directorates with their International Relations bureaus". However, he underlined that "in monetary value, the work that is done by the Department of International Relations of the Ministry of Culture and Sports is significantly larger than the international work of any other Department" (I4, P.16, L.12-17). I have concluded that the mosaic of high authority institutions which are involved in the conduct of foreign cultural policy, ordered from the oldest to take action in the area to the most recent one, are:

- the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
- the Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs (MoERRA),
- the Ministry of Culture and Sports.

A number of lower level organisations, attached to these authorities, also have a key role in the final layout. In Figure 15 below, I have mapped the institutional relationships of these agents.


Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs
Ministry of Culture and Sports
E1 Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs
E2 Directorate for Religious and Ecclesiastical Affairs
General Secretariat for Lifelong Learning and Youth
Department of International Relations and EU
Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post-byzantine studies
Department of International Relations and EU affairs
European Cultural Foundation of Delphi
Hellenic Foundation for Culture
General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad
Center for the Greek Language

Figure 15. Principal government actors in Greek cultural diplomacy. Source: Author.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the oldest ministry in the country, founded by the A′ National Assembly in 1822. It remains unclear as to when a distinct ‘Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs’ was first introduced, but it is safe to argue that given the order of names in the title, the authority first supervised educational matters only for its remit to be expanded later to include cultural affairs. This is reinforced by the fact that the relevant parliamentary committee in the Hellenic Parliament responsible for cultural affairs is also broadly called ‘Committee on Educational Affairs’. Earlier in the chapter, I mentioned how institutional responsibility for culture fell on the ‘Secretariat of Religious Affairs and Public Education’ in the 19th century and gradually, in the course of the next two centuries, separate sector-specific cultural entities were created (e.g. National Archaeological Museum, Athens School of Fine Arts, National Theatre). Consequently, evidence from different areas converges on the fact that the educational and cultural dimensions are viewed not only as symbiotic, but also as synergetic. Culture is merited because of its ability to co-create educational value.

- E1 Directorate for Educational and Cultural Affairs

The E1 Directorate is the specialised branch of the MFA to deal with Greek cultural interests abroad. These are promoted and defended by its embassies and consulates around the world, although the MFA had appointed in the past a very small number of ‘cultural attachés’ under the status of ‘subject-matter experts’. The project has been discontinued and only a handful of these attachés still remain in post[23].

  - Hellenic Institute for Byzantine and post-Byzantine studies

The Directorate additionally oversees the activities of the ‘Hellenic Institute for Byzantine and post-Byzantine studies’ in Venice, which was created in 1951, and has been the first organisation of its kind to be established in the MFA. The organisation has the status of an arm’s length body and is responsible for the research and dissemination of studies on byzantine and post-byzantine history and heritage. Its academic orientation is reflected in its supervision. The institution’s

[23] This subject has been one of the most problematic in my research. Evidence from two different interview sources converges on the fact that there was no policy plan behind this series of appointments, hence, the abandonment of the project.

activities are overseen by the MFA and the MoERRA[24]. On the map I presented above, the relationship between the MFA and the MoERRA is the only horizontal connection across departments to be noted. There are indeed unofficial channels of communication between all authorities, but the absence of defined and structured relationships suggests that the interactions are either irregular or incapable of creating meaningful change.

- E2 Directorate for Religious and Ecclesiastical Affairs

This Directorate was included in the map for both conceptual and pragmatic reasons. Systems of beliefs belong to a broad definition of culture. The relationship between this MFA branch and the MoCS concerns the protection of byzantine and post-byzantine cultural heritage outside the borders of the country.

- General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad (GSGA)

The Secretariat was established in 1983[25] as an arm's length body of the Ministry of the Presidency and it is responsible for establishing and maintaining relationships with the Greek diaspora[26]. They liaise with associations and not-for-profit organisations that expatriate Greeks have established in third countries and organise conferences, meetings and cultural events to boost the sense of community and belonging especially for second and third generation Greeks.

Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs

- Department of International Relations and EU affairs

The Department is responsible for the preparation of documentation on state educational policies and the coordination of educational operations according to EU directives. The Department signs, inter alia, bilateral educational agreements with third countries and, since 2018, it has also absorbed the 'Department for Diaspora, Minority and Multicultural Education', so it now oversees alongside the MFA and the GSGA the education of expatriate Greeks[27].

- General Secretariat for Lifelong Learning and Youth

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[24] Φ.Ε.Κ. 114/Α/19-04-1951.

[25] Φ.Ε.Κ. 49/Α/20-04-1983.

[26] The countries where the GSGA has branches in, and therefore large Greek diasporic communities can be found, are: United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, United Kingdom, Sweden, Belgium, France, Argentina, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Russia, Geogria, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Egypt (Φ.Ε.Κ. 107/Α/08-05-2003).

[27] Φ.Ε.Κ. 31/Α/23-2-2018.

The organisation was established in 1943 as a directorate of the Ministry of Education. In 1989 responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of Culture[28] only for a few years and in 1991 the organisation to be annexed to the Ministry of Education[29]. The Secretariat's activities have concentrated, for the most part, in drafting policies targeted to domestic audiences, although its 'Directorate for Development and Infrastructure' had as a basic mission the cultivation of relationships with young Greeks abroad and, therefore, its remit stands closely with that of the General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad. Throughout the 1990s the Secretariat increasingly broadened its mandate and today it is involved in various European programmes.

- Centre for the Greek language

The Centre, which was established in 1992, is an agency of the MoERRA affiliated with higher education[30]. It supports the teaching of the Greek language both within the country and abroad through the network of offices of the Hellenic Foundation for Culture, the network of Greek-speaking schools (primary and secondary education) and the Centres for Hellenic Studies (higher education). It is the official organ to offer examinations for the attainment of the 'Certificate of Modern Greek language' and is involved in various research projects on Greek literature, linguistics and language policies.

Ministry of Culture and Sports

- Department of International Relations and EU

The Department is responsible for a number of operations from the preparation of bilateral and international agreements on cultural cooperation between Greece and third countries, the monitoring of the international visibility of Greek culture and following up on the implementation of UN Sustainable Goals by related cultural agencies. The Department of International Relations and EU has a complicated history. It first appears in the organigram of the Ministry of Culture and Sciences under the name 'Directorate for Educational Affairs' in 1977[31], although it is possible that it has existed since 1971 when the

[28] Φ.Ε.Κ. 64/Α/03-04-1989.
[29] Φ.Ε.Κ. 139/Α/24-09-1991.
[30] Φ.Ε.Κ. 159/Α/21-09-1992.
[31] Φ.Ε.Κ. 320/Α/17-10-1977.

military junta established the ministry[32]. This is another point that provides evidence to our argument that culture and education were seen as coacting fields.

- Hellenic Foundation for Culture

We will present the Hellenic Foundation in detail in the section to follow.

- European Cultural Centre of Delphi

The European Cultural Centre of Delphi was established as early as 1977[33] and it is the first non-departmental organisation affiliated within the Ministry of Culture to promote Greek culture abroad with a sectoral focus on ancient Greek drama. Although the ECCD does not have an international network of offices (on the contrary, it features only two offices, one in Athens which is the administrative headquarters, and one next to the archaeological site of ancient Delphi), its mission statement points to its outward-looking character. According to the Centre's founding law, its aim is to develop strategies that will unite the peoples of Europe and will promote European values around the world.

The definition of culture espoused in the above mapping is overwhelmingly broad and includes education, religion and the diaspora. The list is not exhaustive; the complexity of the map depends not only on how broad or narrow the definition of culture is, but also on whether or not we should include only organisations that openly adopt the term 'cultural diplomacy' to describe their work. In the latter scenario, the catalogue gets terribly short. The key to understanding contemporary global governance lies in the capacity to identify the range of actors involved in the act of management, as well as to uncover the variety of ways in which they can be connected to one another. Outside the ranks of the MFA, very few organisations espouse the term 'diplomacy' to describe the work of their International Relations departments. In the Ministry of Culture and Sports, the only organisation to adopt the term is the Hellenic Foundation for Culture. It appears that in Greece the term

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[32] Governement Gazettes from that period do not present the organigram of the Ministry of Culture and Sciences, however, Kostakis (2005) confirms our assumption that the 'Directorate for Educational Affairs' formed part of the central service since the establishment of the authority.

[33] Φ.Ε.Κ. 202/Α/22-07-1977.

‘diplomacy’ still points to a traditional approach in foreign affairs as this is practised by state envoys of the MFA.

We should not accept the presentation of the main state actors in the field uncontested. This brief introduction showed that the policy landscape is exceptionally fluid and that organisations may change institutional home, and consequently re-adjust their mission, even within the same term of office. To accept that the situation is in a *permanent state of change* allows for a better understanding of the complexity that characterises the field and enables actors to process and adapt more efficiently to domestic and international developments. I have indicated that institutional histories are a much-neglected point in literature. We do not have yet a solid understanding of how government departments and agencies evolved over time and to dig into the archaeology of institutional histories requires a deep plunge into state archives. I argue, based on the research I conducted in the Government Gazette archive, that the reason behind the bureaucratic confusion that we witness today, at least in the Greek case, is partly due to the fact that the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, established already in 1822 even before the formal establishment of the state itself, has claimed a historical role in the conduct of all aspects of foreign affairs that no other ministry ever dared to openly challenge.

Political fluidity and institutional hegemony are, nonetheless, only a couple of the admittedly many challenges to be addressed. The map would look considerably different had I approached the term ‘culture’ from a pluralist’s perspective to include not only educational and religious affairs, but also sports affairs. This would bring into the design bureaus like the General Secretariat for Sports of the MoCS, the E4 Directorate for Olympic Games and Sports Affairs of the MFA and the National Olympic Committee to mention a few of the overarching agents. It could be even argued that the Ministry of Tourism and its related agencies, which use culture in their promotional materials, are to a certain extent involved in cultural affairs. We need to accept that the scope differs tremendously from context to context. Perceptions over the semantics of the word ‘culture’ are grounded in national languages. The decision to include or exclude any one area will always remain arbitrary and any attempt to draw a defined space runs the risk of being labelled normative.

Policy frameworks have, nevertheless, the ability to disrupt or alter these perceptions as they may operationalise the abstract concept in a way that does

not conform to preconceived ideas. Or, they may reinstate and validate the already accepted definition. In the Greek case, culture was used largely as a proxy in the service of education. The policy frameworks in their current form do not challenge dominant views over the role of culture in society, which is seen as auxiliary to education. Diplomatic activity in related fields, like diaspora relationships or inter-faith dialogue, has again centered around the same theme. One of my participants fervently refused to accept this reality. The Ministry of Culture and Sports carved out an even smaller space for its activities:

> *…should we bring education together with culture? In the Parliament, and even in the terminology of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they use the term 'educational' meaning both education and culture. We [the Ministry of Culture] have not accepted this; I myself do not believe in it. I believe that our policy areas are different both administratively and in terms of budgets. We are not related. They are into governing the higher, secondary and primary education and we are more into the Fine Arts and Archaeology. Are these things related? (I2, P.16, L.29-34)*

This extract serves as testimony to my argument that different interpretations over the scope of culture in policy have created profound confusion to the relevant authorities. However, as Isar et al. (2014) have indicated culture and education are inextricably linked not only through the narrow definition of the term 'culture' as 'the arts and letters' but equally through the broad sense. Investing in education can teach young people values like civic engagement and political participation, the rule of law and human rights.

To conclude, the sector is characterised by a high degree of fragmentation and volatility. Several diverse organisations, some unwittingly, form part of Greece's cultural diplomacy nexus. To accept at once the above listing as it is presented presupposes that the readers accord the same meaning to the term culture, and since this is highly unlikely, the problem offers fertile ground for discussion. My participant from the MoCS even argued that the term cultural diplomacy itself is superficial and should be abandoned:

> *In the sample questionnaire you sent me you were asking whether there is any plan on cultural diplomacy or foreign cultural policy. There*

is so much buzz around the term 'cultural diplomacy', but no real meaning. It is a fancy wrapping in a way. What I mean is that many people who are not genuinely interested in the topic, or they are interested in its glamour, get involved. […] I prefer the term cultural foreign policy. First, I told you that there is a lot of bulshit around the term 'cultural diplomacy'. There is another bureaucratic reason that says that in all this the main organ should be the Ministry of Culture and not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the MFA, they appoint diplomats who do not appreciate the subject they don't have any funding and they always send to us documents dictating what we should do. For example, they may say 'you should organise a music concert at the Greek Embassy in Beijing' without giving us money for this. Well, if we want to do this activity we will and if we don't want to, we won't do it. Does this have any point? (I2, P.15, L.45-49 and P.16, L.21-27).

This is the first instance that we encounter tension between the two ministries. The representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, will never admit that there is friction. He will only say that the working culture in Greece does not allow for better coordination across departmental.

I would like our relations and communication to be more structured. I would like us to meet once a month to discuss our agendas. However, this is extremely difficult, in the ministries themselves there are differentiations that make our work difficult. Many times, the political leadership is not well informed and this makes any effort to cooperate impossible. Frequently the ministries that have common goals do not engage in dialogue; this is the mentality in Greece, not listening. Unfortunately, the absence of a consolidated administrative culture is a great obstacle. This is really important (I3, P.27, L.15-19).

The rivalry is mostly felt, or at least acknowledged, in the Ministry of Culture. For the MFA, there is no question as to the policy space prescribed for each authority. Their work is to coordinate projects that different institutions run to maximise visibility. Let's see how this competition materialises in the case of the Hellenic Foundation for Culture.

4.2.2 The Hellenic Foundation for Culture: from structure to discourse

In this section I will analyse the organisational practices and policies of the Hellenic Foundation for Culture (HFC) and, by the end of the chapter, I will attempt to offer an answer to my research question. The findings from this chapter will need to be compared and cross-validated with the results of the analysis from chapter 5 and the final discussion and preliminary conclusions will be presented in chapter 6. The Hellenic Foundation is the only organisation from the above list which uses systematically the term ‘cultural diplomacy’ to describe its work as interviews are showing. The interviews I have had with other Greek organisations, which could potentially operate auxiliary in the promotion of the Greek brand, showed that their scope is very narrow and that bureaus even in the same department do not coordinate their activities to maximise gains and pull resources. Two reasons may explain this anomaly: first, most organisations working on culture and education abroad were created by successive governments at different time periods, some even decades apart; hence, there has not been concentrated policy activity around the area which has possibly led to institutional memory loss, hence, the establishment of similar structures. Second, there are no guidelines prescribing the balance of power in horizontal synergies; as a result, there is no experience in managing relationships across same-level authorities.

The Hellenic Foundation for Culture was founded in 1992 as Greece’s national cultural and educational institute tasked with the promotion of the Greek culture and language abroad[34]. HFC’s establishment came at a time when the Greek state was trying to defend its international image against what was seen as a threat to its otherwise cemented cultural status. According to Tzoumaka (2005), three were the decisive factors that shook Greece: first, the publication in 1987 of the widely controversial book by Martin Bernal ‘Black Athena’ in which he discussed the origins of the ancient Greek civilisation. Bernal turned down the traditional common-held view that the ancient Greek civilisation is an Indo-European civilisation. He argued that the classical civilisation is directly linked to the Phoenician and Egyptian civilisations supporting the Afro-asiatic roots of the Western world. For the Greeks, this was a defamatory campaign aiming to

[34] Φ.Ε.Κ. 43/Α/23-04-1992.

undermine the country's reputational capital. Second, the publication in 1990 of another book, a new account of European history by French historian Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. Duroselle's one-volume piece places the birth of the European civilisation in the era of Charlemagne omitting the contribution of ancient Greece to the shaping of modern Europe. Third, the Macedonian naming dispute which escalated in early 1992, when the Former Yugoslavic Republic of Macedonia applied to join the United Nations under the name Macedonia. This move was interpreted as an arrogation of the name of the ancient kingdom of Macedonia having, thus, historical claims over the ethnic descent of the ancient Macedonians. In the light of these developments, the Greek government decided, among other actions, to re-organise its foreign cultural policy by establishing a National Institute for Culture, the Hellenic Foundation for Culture. The debate in the relevant parliamentary session right before the vote merits some attention and corroborates Tsoumada's argument. The general feeling was that the national identity faced serious threats:

> *Virginia Tsouderou: The mission, as we have stated in the bill proposal, is the promotion and projection of Greek culture abroad; the classical, the byzantine and contemporary culture. Unfortunately, it is known that until today there was no organised foreign cultural policy. It is widely accepted that one of the most important defence lines of any country is the cultural power of the country. I do not need to remind you, of course, that our national integrity and identity have been eroded by the absence of such a foreign cultural policy plan. As a result, we have encountered phenomena where a big part of the Hellenic culture has been appropriated by the Slavs in the North and by the Turks in the East. And now we also have the Albanians who claim that they were the ones to start the Independence War [against the Ottoman Empire]. There is a general effort, an attack, to appropriate Greek history and contemporary Greek creation. When our identity is eroded, when we lose our identity to others, it is very easy for a theory like that of*

Fallmerayer[35] to become widely accepted (Hellenic Republic, Parliamentary Proceedings, p.4588, author's translation).

These words belong to the shadow Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mrs Virginia Tsouderou, who introduced the bill to the parliament. She was elected as an MP with the liberal right-wing party of New Democracy which held office between 1989 – 1993. She highlights a number of virtual dangers that threatened the country. At the heart of the problem lies the appropriation of history and the corrosion of national values by the country's neighbours. Therefore, we see that the establishment of the Hellenic Foundation for Culture came as a reaction to prevent negative associations about the country's history from taking complete form and prevailing in public opinion.

The Greek government modelled the Hellenic Foundation upon the example of other European Cultural Institutes and vested it with the same administrative flexibilities, particularly the arm's-length legal framework. The Foundation was initially an arm's length body reporting to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Within a few years, three HFC offices were founded: Odessa, Alexandria, Berlin. London and New York were next to follow. However, the choice of Odessa instead of Kiev, and Alexandria instead of Cairo, was not a choice of strategic vision.

I: Looking at the distribution of the offices on the map, I would argue that they have been founded where Greeks have had a historical presence through trade, the Greek diaspora of the 18th century.

P: Yes, there is a Greek community in Cairo. I was raised there. It was not a strategic choice; we were obliged to go there. Of course, it was something that fell within our interests. To do Greek language courses where there are traces of Greek culture. We wanted to maintain that. But very quickly this was matched with our need to attract the local population. That's why we say that we are interested in the locals but, of course, next to them the Greek community brings added value. But

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[35] Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer (1790-1861) was a German historian who supported the idea that the modern inhabitants of the Greek peninsula are not direct descendants of the ancient Greeks and that there had preceded a Slavisation of the local people to the point that there were no authentic Greeks anymore.

also, in Odessa they offered us the space, that's why we went to Odessa and not Kiev (I4, P.40, L.31-28).

These two cities historically held noteworthy Greek diasporic communities that were willing to donate to the Greek state the buildings which would house the HFC offices. With such an endowment, the Foundation turned easily its back to the capitals.

The year 1997 marked a special one in HFC's short life. Until then, the Board of the Foundation and its Director were elected by a General Assembly of members making the election a very transparent process. From 1997 onwards, the Director and the Board would be appointed directly from the Minister shortening the metaphorical arm between the government and the foundation[36].

We were under the supervision of the Foreign Ministry and the Foundation had a General Assembly whose members voted for the Executive Board but two years later – when the government changed – this structure changed. In my opinion the consequences were really bad. Now the Foundation is under the supervision of the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry appoints all the members of the Executive Board with the only exception that the Director's appointment needs to be approved by the Committee of National Defense and Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Parliament. Then it was called Committee of Foreign Affairs. Why am I saying this? Because, of course, you can impose control checks as you are the authority that puts in the money, on one hand, but on the other hand the General Assembly was not only a legitimisation tool, but it operated as an evaluation tool as well. My experience is that so far there has been no evaluation as to what we are working on and there are no guidelines as to where we are heading either (I4, P.30, L.5-15).

In the 1997 bill, the mandate that the organisation was given by the government changed to cover not diaspora education as initially envisioned, but to offer Greek language courses and cultural events to foreign audiences. Another interesting episode in the history of the organisation happened in 2002. That was the year

[36] Φ.Ε.Κ. 183/Α/17-09-1997.

that the HFC came under the supervision of the Ministry of Culture where it remains until today[37]. Various sources in the interviews have made a statement about this. According to one source, many of the coming Directors tried to reverse this situation unsuccessfully. Another interviewee said that she is not confident that being affiliated to one Ministry or the other is even the question. The problem rests on the absence of strategic coordination between the relevant institutions.

> *P: I mean what I would expect as one of the first orders in the agenda to be this: the person in charge in the E1 Directorate of Educational and Cultural Affairs in the MFA and the reps from the International Relations department of the MoCS to come here, sit with us and have a discussion and find out what their goals and objectives are. It doesn't mean we are going to follow them but if we can cooperate in some areas, why not? I mean our job is to further the interests of the state, it'd be good if they told us what their current interests are.*
>
> *I: Do you also think that you should belong to the MFA?*
>
> *P: Not necessarily. I have discussed this with a person at the Danish Institute. So, I asked him 'do you guys report to the MFA or the MoCS in Denmark?' And he said laughing 'yeah it's an ongoing discussion and we have moved back and forth'. And I said 'what do you think? I mean what do you prefer?' And he said 'there are advantages and disadvantages to both. Okay?' I am not convinced that being in the MFA is necessarily better. I am not convinced that the MFA has any better handling on strategy or goals... (I5, P.57, L.8-20).*

The mythology behind the handover is more than interesting. Different sources in the Ministries and the HFC revealed different versions of what happened between the MFA and the MoCS at the time. They all converged to this one point: the Minister of Culture and Sports at the time was preparing to launch the Cultural Olympiad ahead of the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens. For this purpose, he requested from the Minister of Foreign Affairs the Hellenic Foundation for Culture to be annexed to the MoCS to better serve the interests of the Cultural Olympiad. A new agreement had to be signed to mark the return to the MFA but now the

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[37] Φ.Ε.Κ. 33/Α/26-02-2002.

Ministers in office had changed. None of the subsequent Ministers of Culture initiated the process nor their counterparts at the MFA made a move to claim the Foundation back.

P: …the arrangement was an inside agreement between two ministers and our administration claimed it back to the MFA but we didn't have the time to proceed with the idea.

I: Would you like to tell me a bit more about this bras-de-fer, this competition between the two Ministries?

P: Bras-de-fer? Between which authorities?

I: Between the MFA and its E1 Directorate and the Ministry of Culture and its Department for International Relations.

P: Look, the Ministry of Culture is not the responsible authority for these issues. This is the area of the MFA. There is a general foreign policy plan that includes culture as one of the axes. It doesn't come out of nowhere. It's what we call 'soft policy', this is what the MFA epitomises. The Ministry of Culture was charmed by the idea that they will do international relations. This Ministry did not have international relations… they are not giving it back easily and each Minister wants to keep the Foundation for themselves. And the MFA didn't do enough to take it back (I7, P.65, L.43-55).

The Ministry of Culture and Sports appears as unwilling to let the HFC go as they consider its activities primarily 'cultural', while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers the HFC's role 'political'. The clash of ideologies cannot be more evident. What might have started as a personal favor to facilitate special circumstances ended with an Institute deeply disoriented with serious strategic and operational problems to this day. Again, a small extract from the parliamentary discussion back in 1992 when the foundation was about to be established reveals the skepticism that surrounded the dominance of the MFA in the exercise of cultural affairs.

Mimis Androulakis: We need to protect this beautiful idea from many risks. No one in this room would want to see the Foundation becoming

another branch of the MFA whose concerns will correspond to the current foreign policy of the government nor do we want to see it fall victim of party competition […] [M]aybe tomorrow the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whoever that will be, will use the Foundation to do terrible things. We need to agree all of us. Also, getting intellectuals involved is easier said than done. The problem is not just the political parties. You'll see that all sorts of problems will arise, if you alone decide who the founding members will be, without any other agreement (Hellenic Republic, 1992, p. 4589, author's translation).

The above passage forms part of the speech of a left MP, Mr Mimis Androulakis, who belonged to the Coalition of the Left Movements and Ecology (called 'Sypanismos' in Greek). It is interesting that leftist voices within the government feared that state control could stifle the initiative. Also, the fact that the hall was nearly empty during the voting process points to the lack of gravity that foreign cultural policy had in political life. The MP later on pleaded for the session to draw to an end and the voting to be postponed until more MPs were present.

Mimis Androulakis: Minister, it would be wrong today to vote for this matter only in the presence of 10 MPs, 11 if we count the MP who presides, and in the absence of the opposition party (Hellenic Parliament, 1992, p.1490).

The session counted only 11 MPs in a Parliament which numbers 300 Members. Interparty agreement was thought to be necessary, otherwise, the organisation ran the risk to become a branch of the MFA and, by extension, of the party in office each time. Unfortunately, these fears became true as one participant shares today:

[A]s it usually works in Greece, the HFC had two roles to perform. On one hand, it was an instrument of clientelism, so all the branches that were founded in the West were established under this rationale. All the initiatives in the East were not [established under this rationale]. It's not that you wouldn't see similar cases there, but there were local dynamics (I2, P.15, L.15-18).

From 2002 onwards, the foundation continued establishing offices while closing down others, mainly in the West. Now the focus was in the Balkans, an area largely considered by the MFA Greece's natural space. Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia, Tirana, Trieste constitute the landscape of Greece's strategic choices (Figure 16).

Figure 16. The physical network of the HFC. Source: Author.

Eastern Europe, the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean are the regions where the HFC is mainly operating. The financial dimension should not be neglected. Greek businesses thrive in the Balkan peninsula and the Foundation needed to establish Greece's cultural presence in the area.

> *The Foundation established offices in the Balkans because the Balkans were thought to be the continental extension of Greece and the country needed to develop its presence there (I7, P.64, L.39-41).*

Additionally, there are historical bonds with the region as Greek diasporic communities have been living in the wider Balkan region for centuries. After the end of the Greek Civil War in 1949 and the defeat of the Greek Communist party, a great number of its partisans fled the country seeking asylum in the Soviet bloc on the North. Even before that, Greek merchants had settled in the Balkan region establishing major trade routes. These are the interests that the Greek state is

safeguarding by the opening of offices in the area. The HFC's activities do not differ greatly from what the majority of CIs offer worldwide and involve Greek language courses, film screenings, lectures and exhibitions. Additionally, in 2014, the National Book Centre of Greece was incorporated into the activities of the Hellenic Foundation for Culture[38]. So, the Foundation now is also in charge of the promotion of Greek literature, although this has been a very controversial move as the National Book Centre is tasked with the design and implementation of book policies domestically (I3, P.28, L.11-13, I6, P.60, L.49-57 and, P.61 L.1-5).

Among HFC's offices today Odessa and Alexandria are the most valued as they have achieved to engage both with the local society and the Greek community residing in these cities (I5 P.54, L.12-22, I7, P.64, L.41-44). It should not go unnoticed that wherever the venture has widely succeeded was with the approval and aid from the Greek diasporic communities.

> *[The Foundation] was related to the government at first, but it was an organisation related to the Greek Diaspora and all those Greeks who were concerned about the promotion of Greek culture abroad. […] These people were the ones who signed the leases for the first buildings and created the first offices; these were in the US and Europe. And this organisation in its first form was managed by a General Assembly in which people from the wider areas of the arts, letters and economy were taking part. The General Assembly was manned by great Greeks who elected the Executive Board from 1992 onwards. I believe this lasted until 1998 (I7, P.64, L.13-15 and L.18-22).*

In this context, the history of the London office reveals an ugly truth: press releases hinted that the Greek aristocracy in London viewed the HFC antagonistically (Doulgeridis, 2016). The Greek community there had established in 1994 their own cultural organisation under the name 'Hellenic Centre' with the aid of Greek tycoons living in London and the advent of a state Cultural Institute the same year with similar programmatic intentions was not welcome. The management of the diasporic communities is one of the great problems of the Hellenic Foundation. On one hand, there is a distinct effort to create programmes

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[38] Φ.Ε.Κ. 74/Α/26-03-2014.

that appeal to and target foreign audiences, on the other hand, there is pressure to cover the demand for language courses and cultural events for expatriates. Evidence shows that where the state is absent, bottom-up associations are created to cover the needs. Whether these should come under the umbrella of the state or not is a point in question. We need to draw a clear distinction between diaspora diplomacy and cultural diplomacy aimed at foreign audiences. I have analysed extensively the structure and organisational practices of the HFC. The expansion towards East Europe was effectuated under consultation with the MFA to align the operations of the Foundation with the overall foreign policy plan of the country. It is time to move on to investigate the organisation's discursive practices and how these correspond to the overall framework of national cultural policy.

The vast majority of national Cultural Institutes were established with the logic of national projection rather than a genuine preoccupation with fostering cross-cultural dialogue. Today, platforms such as the 'European Union of National Institutes for Culture' (EUNIC), the 'Asian European Foundation' (ASEF) or the 'Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between cultures', for example, have changed the focal point of the National Institutes for Culture. New emphasis is being placed on multilateral relations rather than bilateral relations and fostering cultural interchange instead of a unilateral national promotion of culture. These "collaborative clusters", as Fisher (2013, p.137) calls them, have made even more obvious the link between cultural diplomacy and civil society. The Hellenic Foundation for Culture is part of both EUNIC and the Anna Lindh Foundation network. This has allowed the Institute to follow the latest developments in the field and network with other actors to pursue funding opportunities through partnerships. The organisation is established as a not-for-profit public foundation; this legal framework offers greater managerial flexibility revenue-creation possibilities.

Corporate Social Responsibility is another area that the HFC is investigating in order to seek funds outside the government budget. HFC is a small Cultural Institute operating on budget less than 5 million euros (European Parliament, 2016, p.28). The financial crisis has challenged the traditional mindset of the HFC. To maintain a certain level of activities while on meagre means, the Foundation has taken a different direction. Instead of organising and funding their own activities, HFC's offices abroad were encouraged to act as brokers between already established local festivals and Greek artists looking for exposure. In this

way, the HFC benefits from events that are already well-coordinated and widely advertised without investing capital. Besides brokering, another solution to fight off recession is to host one-off events. The organisation of such events is not as labour intensive and costly as year-round programs which need long-term planning and substantial resources. On the other hand, one-off events do not create 'loyalty' among the participants leaving the CIs without a fixed audience base.

The Foundation traditionally maintains a very conservative line as regards which aspects of the Greek culture will be showcased. One participant shared her experience when the Board of Directors banned the office directors from setting up profiles for their local offices on social media:

> *P: […] They had expressly forbidden them to set up Facebook pages.*
>
> *I: Why? What was the reason?*
>
> *P: It was vulgar. […] You know Facebook is for the masses and we are on a higher level. We are cultured! We are cultivated. We deal with culture (I5, P.48, L.44-47 and P.49, L.20-21).*

This has not changed significantly with different presidencies and the reason might be that the professional profile of the Directors does not vary. From 1992 until today, 9 Directors have chaired the foundation with 8 of them being academics and only one an artist. As the same frustrated participant revealed: "You must always emphasise the seriousness, like the office directors are supposed to have PhDs" (I5, P.49, L.7-8). The idea that academics with their high expertise are potent to run a public foundation runs deeply in Greek Public Administration regardless of the fact that the majority may lack in managerial skills. Not all academics are considered good candidates for these leadership positions, but only those whose subject discipline falls near the cultural and educational activities of such foundations.

> *I: And in which discipline do they have a PhD? I mean…I would go for someone that has a PhD in marketing or management for example.*

P: Yeah, but that would never be on the table. No, no, in the Humanities usually. And the whole story is to emphasise this academic identity (I5, P.49, L.10-13).

Therefore, Humanities Professors strike as ideal to fill in these posts. This befits the perception many authoritative voices in Greece have about culture, viewing it as synonymous to the arts and letters (William's second pillar). This narrow definition of culture does not reflect cultural diversity and limits cultural expression leaving out cultural dimensions that do not abide to the state-approved grand narrative. The constant promotion of antiquity as a narrative (Hamilakis, 2007) instead of contemporary cultural creation indicates that Greece still feels uncomfortable showing its modern face. A large part of Greece's rhetoric in cultural diplomacy concentrates on the return of the Parthenon Marbles from the British Museum to the Museum of Acropolis. According to the MFA, Athens is leading worldwide in three inter-connected areas: i. the repatriation of cultural artefacts to their state of origin, ii. the prevention of the illicit trafficking of cultural property and iii. the protection of cultural heritage in case of armed conflict. (Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). All three areas delineate the priorities Greece has set in its foreign cultural policy and they all relate to ancient heritage more than the cultural and creative industries.

As highlighted earlier, the formation of state structures that would regulate cultural affairs within the nation-state followed the institutionalisation of foreign policy. This lack of synchronism, as argued, has largely resulted in the fragmentation of foreign cultural policy between two authorities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture and Sports. However, another actor, the Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs, may also claim power transforming cultural diplomacy into a field of multipolar contestation. The Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Culture and Sports both provide content to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which, in its turn, coordinates educational, religious, cultural and sports affairs abroad (Figure 17).



Figure 17. The interlinked nature of Greek cultural diplomacy. Source: Author.

The MFA maintains only an accommodating role as it lacks the in-house expertise and authority to mobilise off-centre resources in the production of related projects. The MoERRA and predominantly the MoCS, by contrast, have a legitimate right in claiming this policy space as their own. Therefore, it does not strike as peculiar that both the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Culture and Sports have their own International Relations Departments to coordinate activities abroad. These departments duplicate what already exists in the MFA leading to the pressing question of how close the collaboration or how tense the antagonism is between the MFA and these IR Departments. Since I did not venture to speak to policymakers from the MoERRA, I should confine myself to studying the relationship between the MFA and the MoCS.

As expected, the MFA and the MoCS view cultural diplomacy from very different perspectives assigning different values to the practice. In the MoCS discourse, the perception of culture itself varied according to the conversational context. Culture is interpreted as a means to renegotiate the national identity, it is seen as a vehicle for intercultural dialogue and peace, but also as a force with the potential to transform the national economy. An inner fight has been taking place in the MoCS as the authority is trying to find a balance between realistic expectations and idealistic aspirations. The policy maker from the MoCS held in low regard cultural diplomacy pointing that it is an elegant word of vague meaning (I2, P.14, L.46-49). The aversion to the term can perhaps be attributed to the fact that diplomacy as a

term is interwoven with the activities of the MFA seconding the MoCS in the promotion of culture abroad. It should be noted that the term per se is absent in all texts on the MoCS's website and appears only when there is a reference to the Hellenic Foundation for Culture, an organisation which formerly belonged to the MFA. From the MFA's perspective, the instrumentalisation of culture towards the achievement of political goals was explicit. The terminology changed drastically when the author spoke to the MFA representative. Key phrases like cultural capital, competitive advantage and national power set a different tone in the interview. The strategic goal of the Greek foreign cultural policy is to deploy and export the immense cultural capital that Greece has at its disposal. Soft power was always the strategy through which the country branded itself (Tzanakis, 2015). A participant working in the HFC has, however, a different opinion:

> *Cultural affairs play a very important role now. And I don't think this is good, because they have corrupted the field of culture. In International Relations and in the conduct of politics, the realist school of thought is dominant and they see culture as an instrument of conflict (I4, P.121, L.13-15).*

This is probably one of the most important quotes of my interviews which illustrates with fantastic clarity one of the key findings of this thesis: the clash of opposing ideologies around the value of culture in external affairs. It seems that this policymaker accepts that culture has an intrinsic value. Another interesting observation arose from the interviews: it seems that both Ministries are comfortable with pushing forward antiquity related themes. Another interviewee from the MoCS said: “There is a detachment from classical antiquity. Are we going to let this happen and just watch or are we going to integrate this into our strategy?” (I2, P.18, L.40-41). The participant was not very confident that Greece could move forward with a new narrative which would include re-positioning the country onto the global cultural map through the cultural and creative industries because, as he admitted, “contemporary culture is largely a renegotiation of the Hellenic identity” (I2, P.18, L.44).

Remarkably, both authorities underlined the importance of taking advantage the added value that culture brings to Greek products even though from a different stance. I argue that, for the MoCS, profitable outward looking creative industries mean higher status in the cabinet office and probably a larger share out of the

government budget. For the MFA, it means greater impact abroad with an eye to collective decision-making circles and better prospects for cultural services and products in foreign markets. The asymmetry between these agents is amplified by the fact that the MFA does not have funds to allocate to cultural affairs, consequently, it can only have a coordinating advisory role. By contrast, the MoCS has the capacity to fund its activities, therefore, it can take its own decisions (I2, P.15, L.24-28). As expected, the HFC is negatively influenced by this struggle for dominance between the two authorities. The power conflict between these authorities is much visible in terminology too (I2, P.15, L.21-24). For the MFA, there is no question whatsoever as to which is the responsible authority for this policy area. The Ministry points to other countries where the Cultural Institutes operate under the supervision of the Foreign Office. For the MFA, it is the MoCS that is trying to make the question relevant. However, in Greece and in the case of the HFC, it is the Ministry of Culture and Sports that has the upper hand. What both agents seem to forget is that either cultural foreign policy or foreign cultural policy, it is a public policy that is at stake. Its appropriation by two, or even more, agents without a clear-cut memorandum of cooperation is a policy gap that needs bridging.

At the start of the thesis, I set as my mission to answer the question of how state agency is expressed in the work of the National Institutes for Culture. Having investigated the Greek case, I have found that there is a latent rivalry between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture and Sports concerning the supervision of the Hellenic Foundation for Culture. The Ministry of Culture and Sports, the parent organisation of the HFC, and before it, the MFA, exercise their power over the foundation through a centralised system of appointments where assignments are screened through and approved by the ministry’s leadership. This highly undemocratic administration system finds legitimacy in the fact that the HFC is fully subsidised by the government. Funding supports and legalises the system of appointments. The dissolution of the General Assembly which elected the Board, the relegation of the Executive Board to a powerless advisory board and the nomination of the General Director as Executive Director have all been political maneuvers to concentrate power. The Minister of Foreign Affairs originally, and the Minister of Culture and Sports today, have the authority to recommend and appoint their favorites. The Committee of National Defense and Foreign Affairs which, by name, is the only intermediary body with the power to resist and block

the Ministry's workings, has never rejected any recommendation. This translocation of power has had tremendous impact in the organisation's abilities and subsequent performance. The binary 'funding – appointment system' will be under the microscope in the following chapter, where we will explore the structural means through which other European governments supervise and control their national Cultural Institutes.

4.3 Chapter synopsis

In this chapter, I reviewed the basic priorities of Greek cultural policy and contextualised the country's foreign policy concerns. Heritage, in its material form, provided the initial stimulus for state intervention since the material artefacts of the past served as evidence of the continuous presence of the Greek element south-east of the Mediterranean basin. The nation has a historical right to inhabit these lands and this right must not be forfeited. In this corner of the world there are many who fight for a place in the sun and history for Greece is like a witness to a court. It provides the testimony that secures legitimacy. Whether the danger is real or exaggerated, the Greeks, as a nation and as a state, have never ceased to believe that the country is in peril. The country, for them, has never ceased to fight for its survival. It is the immediate neighbours that pose the biggest threat to the country's sovereignty. This tension has led the country to seek harbour to international institutions to guarantee its position.

Traditionally, Greece has turned to the West in search of support. To gain legitimacy for its cause, the country continually strives to remind the world that it is the cradle of western civilisation, the motherland. The cult of heritage, nonetheless, is not a grand narrative designed to be consumed exclusively outside the borders. It is the myth through which the Greeks experience their identity. It is not surprising, therefore, that the majority of public spending in the cultural heritage sector is directed towards the preservation of memory. Contemporary cultural creation appears as a risky project politically despite the rise of the cultural and creative industries paradigm globally. The same theme undercuts the work of all the cultural agencies vested with the task to promote the Greek brand abroad. There is an overemphasis in ancient heritage than contemporary cultural production.

It is perhaps a consequence to be expected that foreign cultural policy would fail to articulate a bold statement. Foreign cultural policy has always suffered from the absence of any serious political backing and a lack of a strategic vision behind it. Even the establishment of the Hellenic Foundation for Culture has not been a result of any radical political vision; it came as a response to what was perceived as an increasingly hostile international environment. While the foundation started off with a legal and administrative framework that would allow it to unfold its potential, it soon became an organ that served clientelist interests. The Hellenic

Foundation for Culture is linked to the state through two interrelated channels. The state grant that the organisation receives is the only source of income forcing it to accept the reality the government imposes. Instead of prescribing its agenda or mounting rigorous performance evaluations, the government selects the people who will man the organisation. By shaping the dynamic relationships within the organisation, they control the nature and quality of ideas to ensure compliance with the government project.

5. Comparative analysis of five European examples

The last chapter of the analysis brings together the rest of the case studies and resynthesises data around their practice. Admittedly, I do not share the same in-depth of knowledge for these cases as I did for the Greek case study. However, I find merit in looking at various national strategies as this cross-case angle will help me refine my argument. I am building the case studies by, first, analysing key facts regarding the general cultural policy framework of these countries and then continue with essential information about the purview of their foreign policy, so I can introduce, last, the scope of action of their Cultural Institutes. I follow, thus, the exact same organisational logic with the previous chapter, just in a more limited scale, to form brief accounts of how other Cultural Institutes operate. Each vignette is supported by primary (interviews, strategy plans and statutes) and secondary data (academic literature) which respond to four broad themes summed up below:

1. relationship to the government
2. global operations
3. local presence
4. perceptions of terms

In my effort to build brief profiles for the Institutes, I need to consider three factors which will hopefully prevent overstatements about the individuality of each case to surface.

i. Governmental frameworks, which prescribe policy action.
ii. National histories, which shape policy interests.
iii. Socio-linguistic differences, which frame policy thinking.

These conditions create unique circumstances in each country, although it is possible that some similarities across contexts can be found. I proceed, after the analysis of all five cases, in probably the most compelling part of this thesis: the synthesis of general arguments about the operation of the Cultural Institutes. Finally, the data derived from the analysis of all six case studies is used to answer my research question.

5.1 United Kingdom

5.1.1 From the cultural…

British cultural policy is perhaps the most well-researched case in academic literature. Two landmark political developments in the domestic sphere have influenced greatly the orientation and imprint of cultural policy in the UK. First, the introduction of New Public Management in public administration changed drastically the nature of the entire public sector. Privatisation, outsourcing, target-oriented performances constituted the new framework of government operations in late modernity. State cultural agencies inevitably had to re-structure their operations to adapt to the new system. More specifically, the Thatcherite economic policies of the 1980s altered fundamentally the sponsoring functions of cultural institutions. The cultural and heritage sector would no longer be fully supported by the state, instead, the private sector was reminded that it had an ethical responsibility to finance and secure in the long run the sustainability of cultural heritage and contemporary artistic creation through Corporate Social Responsibility investments. This has been the spirit for much of the 1980s and 1990s in the country, although the new economic order did not find fervent advocates within the cultural policy sector (Bennett, 1995).

The second development came in 1997 when Labour's party leader, Tony Blair, took office. The Left unfolded a progressive socialist programme which, in part, broke away from the marketist approach of the previous decades. This policy shift did not signal a complete return to a pre-Thatcherite organisational logic but addressed both business interests and community concerns (Hughson and Inglis, 2001). The new policies focused on devolving authority from the centre to the periphery with the establishment of regional cultural consortia while a general re-orientation of vision took place with an emphasis on the cultural and creative industries (Stevenson, McKay and Rowe, 2010). The focus on the creative economy has since fuelled intense debates which have mostly centered around the notion of cultural value. The prioritisation of economic and social outcomes the arts and culture are said to yield has met with serious opposition in academic circles (Belfiore, 2002; Gray, 2007). Nonetheless, the treatment of cultural goods as market products cannot be read in isolation from the developments in the international political economy.

5.1.2 …to the foreign frontier

As the debate on values was intensifying in the new millennium, another strand of literature focusing on the export of soft capital was gaining significant attention. Bell (2016) has accurately observed that while British economic and political influence has considerably declined in the post-colonial period, the nation has managed to sustain its status as a global player through the export of soft power. However, soft power is not, in this case, "limited to a cultural imperialism that entails making British culture attractive to foreign nations: it now includes the promotion of corporate imperialism – imperialism promoted via British-based companies…" (ibid, p.77). This transmutation of the classic interpretation of soft power distinguishes the British example from the rest of our case studies.

This development corresponds to the general priorities the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has set the past decades for British foreign policy. As Williams (2004) notes, among the traditional concerns of the United Kingdom, transatlanticism, multilaterism and the export of neoliberal values have always prevailed. Neoliberalism has assisted in transforming the rhetoric of soft power into a mixed discourse that blends market interests with social concerns. Interestingly, these policy intentions are masked behind a cloak of morality. New Labour, under Tony Blair, introduced for the first time in British politics this 'moral' discourse in foreign affairs. The discourse is characterised by merging pan-humanitarian values on international development and aid with realpolitik concerns which prioritise the country's national interests. The ideological frame is analogous to the foreign policy behaviour of the United States after the 1990s, so it is plausible to argue that there has been some sort of discursive attraction. While New Labour is credited with setting the new paradigm in Britain, the Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition, which succeeded New Labour in office, has not deviated significantly from this strategy (Gilmore, 2014). This new role for British foreign policy has admittedly expanded the country's space of interests. At the aftermath of World War II, and especially after the period of decolonisation, Britain has been mostly preoccupied with three geographical areas: i) Europe, ii) the United States, and, iii) the Commonwealth countries. As international aid and development cannot be directed by definition to the already advanced world, it is the new democracies that have risen in Africa and Asia, as a result of decolonisation

processes, that gather the interest of national governments and transnational actors today (Sanders and Houghton, 2016).

5.1.3 The British Council

One of the key players in offering development assistance to third countries to maximise UK's soft influence is the British Council. The Council's role has always been pivotal in addressing a wide range of needs not limited to culture and education alone. The British Council and the BBC World Service are the official state channels for British influence abroad as coordinated by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Pamment, 2016).

The British Council was established in 1934 as the 'British Committee for Relations with Other Countries' and its role initially was to fight propaganda mounted by the Axis Powers (British Council, 2018a). Trust in Germany was never fully restored after the experience of World War I and throughout the 1920s there was increased concern that the Germans would prove unworthy allies. Austen Chamberlain, at the time the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had expressed multiple times in his written communication to Lord D'Abernon, the Ambassador of the United Kingdom in Berlin, his fears about Germany. One of the most memorable excerpts from Chamberlain's memoirs reads:

> *The deeper Englishmen and Frenchmen penetrate into each other's nature, the more they will find they have in common; the deeper Englishmen and Germans go, the greater the divergence of faith and spirit which will be revealed between them (Austen Chamberlain, 1937 as quoted in Kucharzewski, 1944, p.630).*

A general feeling of unrest prevailed at the other side of the British Channel too. The French had after all lost to the Germans significant territories (the region of Alsace-Lorraine) during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. The Locarno Pact, which was signed in 1925, aimed to put an end to the feeling of uneasiness cast upon Allied Europe and seal the borders of Germany both in the West and the East (Wright, 1995). While Chamberlain saw in the Locarno Treaty the real end of the Great War, the UK government was persuaded in the early 1930s to start a

cultural relations programme to increase understanding abroad for Britain and its values (Fisher, 2009).

The mastermind behind this idea was Mr Reginald Leeper, diplomat, who had joined the Foreign Office in the early 1920s. He was seconded in the Foreign Office News Department in 1929 and, following a report by Lord D'Abernon submitted at the FCO the same year on the importance of culture in trade relations, he immediately took action by organising touring lectures and shipping books to overseas destinations (Donaldson, 1984). While Leeper is credited by the British Council as the person behind the establishment of the organisation, he would mostly be remembered for his efforts, as head of the News Department in 1935, to recruit BBC as a propaganda instrument in the event of war (Drinkwater, 2011).

Following D'Abernon's report, the 'British Committee for Relations with Other Countries' is established in 1934 with formal proceedings taking place in 1935 (Fisher, 2009). The Council acquires gradually a life of its own. It will take another three years for the first missions to be established overseas, first in Poland and then in Egypt, Italy and Greece (ibid). The network will considerably grow in the next decades to cover today over 100 countries in four continents (British Council, 2018b). However, the initial geographical focus in the East serves as evidence to the fact that the British were looking to stabilise their interests in the periphery of Europe and contain German influence.

The Council originally operated in the form of a limited company until 1940 when it was incorporated under a Royal Charter. Among the objectives of the organisation are: building cultural relations with other countries, promoting the English language and increasing visibility for the United Kingdom (British Council, 1993). One objective, however, stands out: "Encourag[ing] cultural, scientific, technological and other educational cooperation between the United Kingdom and other countries" (British Council, 2013, p.3). The organisation works in a broad spectrum of areas not limited to the arts and culture alone. Additionally, there is no mention of the term 'cultural diplomacy' in the official documents I examined. British Council's Charlie Walker places emphasis on this distinction.

> *…it's not projection of culture, it's more collaboration and building relations. And that goes back to the question you haven't asked yet which is around the nature of our work. Are we doing public diplomacy or are we doing cultural diplomacy? Or cultural relations? You know,*

definitely the latter. So, diplomacy we see very much as the realm of governments; well, there is the term public diplomacy which we tend to see more as messaging, influencing, then we have cultural relations which is really about mutuality. That's one of the keywords we use to talk about our work (I20, P.156, L.9-14).

This strikes as a paradox since the Council is connected to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office from which it receives a grant-in-aid every year. However, the fact that it is an autonomous agency with its own decision-making body operating at an arm's length distance from the government is reflected in the rhetoric of the organisation. Charlie Walker notes that the relationship to the FCO, albeit important, is not exclusive.

The British Council is a registered charity; we are reporting to the government and the FCO, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. And that's that. We are partly funded by the FCO and that kind of smiths the relationship. But we have relations with other Departments. So, we are talking frequently to the Department of Education, the Department for Energy and Industrial Strategy, we talk to the Department for Culture, Media and Sports, of course, and the Department for International Development, so we have relationships with other Departments (I20, P.154, L.28-34).

While other Departments seem to contribute to the Council's programmes as partners, the FCO's role appears as more strategic. The Council is managed by a Board of Trustees whose members are appointed after open recruitment, apart from one member who will be nominated by the Secretary of State (British Council, 2013). The Council also agrees with the FCO on the 'Corporate Plan', which is a contract of objectives subject to renewal every four years (British Council, 2017). Interestingly, the FCO, the only state authority to directly sponsor the Council, contributes marginally to the organisation's budget. For the financial year 2017-2018, the government subsidy amounted to only 14.3% of the total budget of the Council (British Council, 2018b). The rest is self-generated revenue coming from language courses and selling exams, partnerships and other private contracts, although its strong performance in English language teaching and examinations is often credited as the key area of income for the Council (ibid).

The diminishing contribution of the government in the finances of the Council has come as a result of a general retreat on the part of the state in subsidising non-departmental public bodies. In 2010, the coalition government voted for a motion which sought the reform of quasi-governmental organisations in what has graphically passed down in history as 'the bonfire of the quangos'. The reforms would take place in a five-year period and would include merging or abolishing agencies. The bill was introduced in an effort to reduce the budget deficit, however, it led to questioning the very principle of delegation and resulted in re-centralising power (Flinders, Dommett and Tonkiss, 2014).

While the British Council retained its status in name, in reality its autonomy was significantly compromised (Pamment, 2016). The Council was always subject to external audits and quality assurance checks for its offered products (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2014), however, the 2010 reform increased demand for accountability.

> *[O]ne of the things we must do is demonstrate that we are sustainable. We must be a future-proofed organisation. So, we need to show that we are teaming our outcomes, that we are delivering at scale impact and that this is going to last into future; so, we need to develop a structure overseas that is sustainable (I20, P.159, L.10-13).*

Pressures to secure a sustainable future increased as it was announced that the grant-in-aid which the Council received from the FCO would get reduced through the years and that the approved funds would be bracketed towards specific programmes. The Corporate Plan 2017-20 (British Council, 2017, p.28) reads: "Government grant-in-aid is increasingly directed towards ODA, and non-ODA grant-in-aid will reduce to zero in this plan period." I was much interested in exploring the reasons why the British Council is responsible for offering Official Development Assistance as this was a rare occurrence in my study.

> *I: Why are you responsible for ODA activities? It's you and the Swedish institute in my study that handle ODA funds and no one else.*
>
> *P: Oh, really? Right. I suppose the key thing is to look where we operate, where are our major operations are and where we can have the most impact and you know we are operating all across Asia, Africa,*

the Middle East, the Americas etc.; essentially where the majority of countries are ODA eligible I suppose. And what will our work look like in these countries? Well, it will be supporting the development of educational systems maybe at policy level, it would be the training of teachers, it would be promoting the effect of learning English among young people; it might be working with communities and creating community leadership through sport, it may be using the arts as a vehicle for development or to build relationships with conflict zones (I20, P.155, L.46-55).

ODA funding is an important finding to which we will return as we examine the Swedish case. As the grant-in-aid from the government is set to diminish, the British Council was asked to replenish the lost funds by increasing its commercial activities (ibid). A 2015 parliamentary debate on the British Council reveals that there was widespread concern that the organisation's credibility would be compromised as a result of the FCO folding back its support.

John Baron: … [D]oes my hon. Friend agree not only that the British Council is a great institution with a great history, but that it makes a valuable contribution to our country's soft power capability? In fact, Joseph Nye cites the founding of the British Council in the 1930s as the originator of the concept of soft power. Does he agree that funding cuts by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office mean that there is a greater commercial burden on the British Council that risks eroding its credibility and integrity as it tries to become more commercial to make up for those cuts? (House of Commons, 2015)

While the Council has always been capable of self-sponsoring a great portion of its operations – this is much evident by earlier Annual Reports and Accounts – the organisation's aim has never been to make profit through the commercialisation of its activities.

The loss of public credibility may be the key reason behind parliamentary debates, but the commercialisation of British Council's operations has also another more hidden dimension. In 2008 Russia asked from the Council to cease its operations in Saint Petersburg and Yekaterinburg (in these two cities the British Council was housed within the consulate premises) using as a pretext the 1951

Vienna Convention which stipulates that no commercial activities are permitted within diplomatic settings. The episode was seen as a retaliation act after the UK expelled a number of high-profile Russian diplomats following Alexander Litvinenko's death[39] in London in 2006 (Harding, 2007). The related parliamentary discussion is revealing as to how a cultural organisation working in external relations can find itself caught in political crossfire.

> *Mr. Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con): The spark that seems to have ignited this tinderbox in the British Council in Yekaterinburg and St. Petersburg is the status of activities described as commercial, such as language courses. What proportion of the British Council's activities could be described as in any way commercial? The resumption of purely cultural activities, which could not be criticised by the Russians, might be a way forward.*
>
> *David Miliband: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving me the chance to nail this one. The British Council used to operate exams, which were alleged to be, quote unquote, commercial. It never accepted that they were of a commercial nature, but it nonetheless suspended all its exam-based operations to ensure that there was no excuse for Russian action against it. Therefore, the answer to his question is zero (House of Commons, 2008).*

The British Council is not the only Cultural Institute that folds its activities within the consular services, thereby, gaining from tax exemption. A number of Institutes operate under this capacity, either to economise resources or for security reasons. It is a general practice which, despite violating the Vienna convention (1951), is not generally flagged up as an issue. The cooling of the diplomatic relations between Russia and the UK and the subsequent closure of the British Council offices in

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[39] Alexander Litvinenko's case hit international headlines in 2006 when the former secret services officer, who had defected in Britain, fell seriously ill and was urgently hospitalised. After a year of investigations, the verdict was conclusive as to the involvement of Russian authorities leading to Litvinenko's death. British-Russian relations worsened significantly after these events in all fronts (Gardner, 2007).

Russia is a story that has been repeated very recently[40]. In any case, this diplomatic stand-off proves the point that the Council's cultural work is interpreted as another dimension of the British foreign policy toolkit.

5.1.4 Profile summary

Let's summarise the main points raised in this section with regard to the four themes (relationship to the government, global operations, local presence, perception of terms) we introduced at the start of the chapter. The British Council may be an agency of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, nonetheless, it cooperates with other departments to enable the creation of a rounder strategy for the delivery of services and products on the ground. These partnerships, however, are not explicitly traceable neither in funding streams nor in agenda setting. The organisation maintains physical presence in a large number of countries worldwide, however, there are locations where its operations are nested within the standard embassy functions. This is an intriguing situation as the Council purports that they operate outside the governmental realm. It is interesting that based on the imprint of its work - the organisation develops indeed value-driven programmes which touch upon topical societal concerns such as the promotion of active citizenship, equal education and basic human rights - the Council insists on the normative distinction between cultural diplomacy as a state-driven practice and international cultural relations as a civil society tool. Having reviewed these four crucial points, we can now move on to the next section to examine the state of affairs of the Goethe Institut and Germany's overall position in foreign cultural policy.

[40] In 2018, the Russian government ordered the British Council to cease operations in the country after the expulsion from the UK of over 20 Russian diplomats. Britain decided to freeze formal diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation after a nerve agent attack in Salibury in March of the same year against another defect Russian military officer and his daughter, Sergei and Yulia Skripal (Harding, 2018).

5.2 Germany

5.2.1 From the cultural…

Cultural policy in Germany is distinctively different from that of other European countries. At its core lies the political organisation of Germany in *Länder* (federal states) which prohibits the national government from devising and executing a centralised strategy in most policy areas. The federal states are responsible for the provision of the arts and culture and, as a result, there may be considerable differentiations across the country in funding for the sector with federal states in West Germany spending comparably more funds on cultural affairs (Statistische ämter des bundes und der länder, 2012). Nevertheless, decentralised governance is not characterised by continuity and more often than not it has been succeeded by phases of intense concentration of power.

The reasons behind the establishment of the Länder as the principal unit of governance lie in the historical development of the country. Kingdoms and principalities were the basic political formations found in Germany for much of the early Middle Ages until the 10th century A.D. While there have been successful attempts to unite the German kingdoms with King Otto being the first to achieve it, internal feuds ripped apart the Holy Roman Empire. The modern unification of the German kingdoms into one nation-state under Bismarck in the late 19th century had to take into account the fragmented biography of the nation. Each region had its own cultural and linguistic tradition and the dominance of one region over the others would undermine the collective effort for a strong, unified Germany. The solution laid in devolving authority from the centre to the federal states for most public policy areas with the exception of foreign policy, where the gripping influence of Prussia was most evident during the first Reich (Burns and Van der Will, 2003). After the First World War, and during the golden years of the Weimar Republic (1919-1933), devolution was extended to include the cultural sector. Public responsibility for the arts and culture was now shared across a number of players from the government to the federal states, the municipals and the local councils. The dream for polyvocality, however, would not last.

The rise of the National Socialist party to power in 1933 led to the re-centralisation of power in all aspects of public life. In the cultural sphere, the Third Reich aspired to make Berlin the cultural capital of Europe where the most sublime

works of Aryan art would be exhibited. The task was to impose an aesthetic horizon much congruent to the regime (Lippman, 1998). After the end of the Second World War, it was collectively agreed by the Allies and Germany that the country should run on a decentralised capacity as it did prior to the Third Reich. The relegation of powers to the federal states would ensure that both the individual characteristics of the *Länder* would be respected in the federation and that no region could rise to absolute power ever again. The arts and culture laid once again in a mediated terrain of multiple agencies, at least in West Germany. In East Germany, the cultural sector was governed by a central Ministry of Culture which venerated the tradition of *das Volk* (the People). It would take another four decades, and Germany's reunification after the fall of the Berlin Wall, for the country to renegotiate its policy discourses and return as a whole to a decentralised mode of cultural governance.

5.2.2 …to the foreign frontier

While the cultural sphere met multiple disturbances in the course of two centuries and a persistent alteration of focus from the national to the federal and vice versa, the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany met one decisive break. The trauma of World War II would determine exclusively the foreign policy of the German state after 1945. While in the 19th and early 20th century, Germany sought to establish a position of strength within Europe, the conditions would alter dramatically after the defeat of the Third Reich (Gordon, 1994). West Germany would develop a defensive response vis-a-vis the events of the war that would result in implementing a 'policy of responsibility' towards the international community. The country was bound by international agreements not to invest in a military future and, still to this day, the German army is involved in peacekeeping operations launched by multilateral agencies like NATO. The collective guilt for the atrocities of the war would prevent Germany from exhibitions of strength, either political or military, and would slowly turn it into the quintessential trade state (ibid).

Membership to international institutions has long been considered the best route for the country to regain trust and build a positive image in international fora. The politics of reconciliation with countries that have fallen victims of Germany's aggression have dominated foreign policy the decades after the war (Gardner Feldman, 1999). Nevertheless, as Baumann (2002) notes, multilaterism today has

lost its attendant values which focused on relationship building through an equal partnership. The new discourse places emphasis on increasing influence to secure Germany's self-interests. The 'policy of responsibility', which rejected at its ideological basis any realpolitik interventions, has been replaced by a responsibility to police and sustain the world order with Germany at the heart of it.

Nowhere is this development more evident than in the field of foreign cultural policy. Culture, along with security and trade, has been recognised as the third pillar of foreign policy by the Secretary of State, and later Chancellor, Willy Brandt as early as the 1966 (Varga, 2013). West Germany had remained reluctant to articulate a strategy for foreign cultural policy until the 1950s, however, other countries looked to develop related efforts. Throughout the latter half of the 1940s, American legislators were contemplating on a launch of a cultural crusade against the Eastern bloc. Discussions centered around the use of ideas as a vehicle not just to contain communist influence within the Iron Curtain, but also to create ideological breaches within the system by offering tempting counter-narratives of the West. The United States Information Agency (USIA), the United States' organ for public diplomacy, indeed launched several programs that ran throughout the 1950s and in the course of the next decades to battle communist ideology (Cull, 2008b). In the light of these developments, Germany was persuaded to pursue a policy of similar rationale, however, it needed to reconceptualise the governance of *Auswärtige Kulturpolitik*[41] to free its institutions from the ghosts of WWII.

5.2.3 The Goethe Institut

The institutional ecology of foreign cultural policy in Germany is unsurprisingly expanded and involves agents which go beyond a traditional understanding of cultural cooperation limited to the arts and letters alone. There are four organisations that constitute the backbone of foreign cultural policy today in the country: the DAAD[42], the German Exchange Academic Service, which facilitates academic exchanges in higher education and is based in Bonn, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation which develops and oversees international research

[41] Auswärtige Kulturpolitik is the German term to describe foreign cultural policy.
[42] DAAD is the acronym for Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst.

partnerships with German institutions based in Berlin, the ifa[43] which operates as a research centre for international cultural relations based in Stuttgart and the Goethe Institut which is the responsible authority for the teaching of the German language and the promotion of intercultural dialogue based in Munich[44] (Herrschner, 2015). Despite their different historical trajectories and points of departure, these organisations have managed to overcome their internal rivalries, which were the natural consequence of administrative overlaps, and today co-act towards a common goal, the promotion of German culture, science and language abroad. The common denominator for all these agencies is the Federal Foreign Office.

The Goethe Institut is the most critical point of reference when it comes to Germany's policies in language and culture abroad. The Institut has a long, yet dark, history making the need to re-invent it post-war much urgent and tactical. While the Goethe Institut was established after WWII, its predecessor, the *Deutsche Akademie*, was established in 1925 during the interwar period (Goethe Institut, 2018a). The DA was established as a response to two events which operated on different, but conjunctive scales. First, the financial shock and the social unrest which ensued World War I left public institutions and services crippled and the need was dire for Germany to reorganise its public agencies. Second, the invasion of France and Belgium in the region of Ruhr in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1923 bore the need for a cultural offensive against the influence of the Francophonie in the region (Michels, 2004).

The Deutsche Akademie (DA) was, therefore, born as an initiative that had a dual aim: first, to assist the network of German schools abroad which was in financial decline after the Great War and, second, to counterbalance the influence the French had in the region of Ruhr by organising cultural initiatives. Therefore,

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[43] Ifa is the acronym for Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen.

[44] The location of the headquarters of these institutions have played historically an important role as the organisations were connected to the federal state that hosted them through their decision-making bodies. Traditionally, members of the federal government were invited to participate in high decision-making organs, and in return, institutional and financial support was guaranteed. A case in point that showcases the importance of location is the DAAD. When DAAD was founded in 1925 it was initially connected to Heidelberg and the federal state of Baden-Württemberg, but the very same year the organisation moved its headquarters to Berlin to have stronger support from the central government (Michels, 2004).

the institution's primary task was to cater for the needs of German populations living either abroad or under foreign occupation who ran the risk of being assimilated by their host cultures. The German language was thought to be the vehicle that would allow ethnic Germans to retain their identity (ibid). Michels (2004), whose study on the Deutsche Akademie is among the few works on the evolution of German foreign educational policy available in English, underlines the importance of a specific figure within the DA, Franz Thierfelder, in the affairs of the organisation. Thierfelder was a passionate advocate of the so-called 'direct method' in language learning, that is providing oral stimuli to students to learn a new language than focusing on grammatical structure and believed that the language reflected the image of the People (*Die Sprache als Bildnerin der Völker*). All that was needed was the world to be given a glimpse of the German soul and this would be achieved through language learning. Therefore, it was of utmost importance for the DA to reorient its activities to target foreign audiences and not just Germans (ibid). He also believed that the Balkans provided an excellent space for Germany to unfold its linguistic potential much like the British and the French did in their colonies overseas (Manjapra, 2014).

While the organisation remained more or less independent from the Federal Foreign Office in the years of the Weimar Republic, a decisive turn in the affairs of the DA came in 1937 when the Foreign Office centralised its foreign cultural policies upon Nazi command. A number of arm's length organisations were brought under the wing of the Ministry, among them the Deutsche Akademie and the German Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, 2018). After the end of WWII, the Allies decided that the DA, among other organisations which served as propaganda instruments in the service of the Third Reich, had to close down all operations as part of a large-scale denazification process. When the Goethe Institut was established in 1951, on the ashes of the old Deutsche Akademie, it purged all the realpolitik claims it nurtured before the war which saw Germany as the third pole of linguistic power against the English and the French. The Goethe's programmatic focus would centre around teaching the German language to foreigners with the aim to cultivate inter-cultural dialogue (Manjapra, 2014).

This focus is very much present in contemporary discourses of German foreign cultural policy. There is an emphasis on mutuality and exchange, rather than unilateral promotion, which is supported structurally by a highly decentralised

system of public agencies, private institutions and NGOs involved in fostering intercultural dialogue. The Federal Foreign Office has a constitutional obligation to respect these boundaries to avoid the concentration of power:

> *Various private-law organizations are involved through their programmes in the implementation of foreign cultural policy. These are largely free intermediary organizations with different assigned priorities and objectives. In Germany there is cultural freedom; there is no state culture. The non-governmental status of the mediating organisations guarantees diversity and the independence of cultural work abroad. The guidelines of the Federal Government's foreign cultural policy regarding the mediating organisations differ in their respective task profiles and program structures* (Auswärtiges Amt, 2000, p.2, Google translation from German).

Cooperation with the Länder to articulate a common strategy also takes place through mediation. In the same document the conditions under which the central government and the federal states come together to confer are explained.

> *The federal and state governments work closely together in foreign cultural policy. In international law contracts in the fields for which the Länder are responsible, there is a mutual vote on the basis of the 'Lindauer Agreement'[45]; for the vote in international cultural affairs the responsible instrument is the 'Kultusministerkonferenz'[46] which is an instrument of the Länder* (ibid).

The design and implementation of cultural policy, in both frontiers, is a subject of influence of multiple legislative axes. In this framework, I should examine the structural relationship of the Goethe Institut to the various government departments.

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[45] The Lindauer Agreement was singed in 1957 and aimed to solve controversies emanating from the clash of interests between the central government and the federal states in international law. The two sides concurred that for all consular and trade treaties and agreements the federation could act as the rightful representative of the Republic. For cultural agreements, however, the Federation should secure consent from the Länder (Rogoff, 1998).

[46] The 'Kultusministerkonferenz' is the consortium of Ministers of Educational and Cultural Affairs of all 16 federal states (KMK, 2018).

I: I read in the Basic Agreement that you are working closely with the Ministry for Education and Research and also the Ministry of Finance. There is a representative of the Ministry of Finance in the Presidium which I find very interesting. Why is that?

P: The Ministry of Finance is not a direct stakeholder; direct stakeholders are the Federal Ministry for Education…em the Office for Migration and Refugees is also a new stakeholder which looks at the very important issue of immigration. The Ministry of Finance, of course, is important because they manage funding, but it is not a direct stakeholder. It holds the role of observer and the Federal Foreign Office is in constant communication with them (I15, P.115, L.34-42).

It may be that other departments provide input to agenda setting processes, however, it is the Federal Foreign Office that has a statutory right in shaping the organisation's aims and objectives through a contract similar to the one the British Council has with the FCO.

…allow me to explain to you how we work because everything we do is based on the agreement on strategic aims which is agreed by us and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. So, every 4-5 years we are negotiating the Agreement of Strategic Aims with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We are registered as a non-profit association and all activities are goal-oriented and these goals are defined and determined by this agreement between us and the MFA (I15, P.114, L.9-13).

As Fisher and Figueira (2011) have observed elsewhere, the mission and associated goals are rather standard for all Cultural Institutes and the vocabulary used to articulate them is value-laden. The overall goals in this German case are:

1. Furthering the knowledge of the German language

2. Fostering international cultural cooperation

3. Conveying a comprehensive picture of Germany by providing information on cultural, social and political life (Goethe Institut, 2005, p.14).

These statements are ordinary and can be found without a single exception in the mandates of all Cultural Institutes in my study and probably, as I suspect, beyond.

They are intentionally stretched to allow for a wide range of ideas and solutions to come at play. They also strike very altruistic and that is why I am arguing that their mandates are, at their basis, cryptic. They do not reveal the arbitrary nature of cultural work abroad nor do they indicate the thing that is at issue: the international competition for influence in a relatively, for the number of powers in the game, limited space.

The goals are accomplished through the network of global offices which, in the case of Germany, extends to cover four continents reaching nearly 160 offices in total (Goethe Institut, 2018b). The coordination of this vast network takes place through a well-crafted basic strategy upon which the development of local and then regional strategies is premised. The globe is divided into regions, smaller manageable zones, which piled up altogether constitute a well-calculated geography of influence.

> *P: So, within Europe we have four regions, so it's Northwest, Southwest, Southeast and Middle-east Europe. And the regional offices are London for NW Europe, Brussels for SW, Prague for ME Europe and Athens for SE Europe. And Turkey also belongs to SE Europe.*
>
> *I: But how do you choose the headquarters of each region?*
>
> *P: That's an ongoing process more or less. I think ten years ago – yes, it's like that – the regional Institute for SW Europe was based in Paris. [...] They decided to move it over to Brussels because, you know, EU funding plays an important role, an increasing role, so that's why they decided to transfer it. Their most recent decision in terms of changing the regional headquarters to another place was from New York to Washington. So, there were a couple of reasons, but the main reason was that Washington is the capital* (I18, P.136, L.22-32).

The regions are of strategic importance for the administration of the network as evident by the above extract. The gains are carefully weighed against the losses and as the geographical priorities change in time, so does the regional foci. The regional strategy is an instrument that aims to align national strategies and create a pattern of themes that correspond to the goals of the Basic Agreement.

> *I: How do you design the regional strategy? I understand that you [the regional director] are a key person.*
>
> *P: Yes, I am the key person. So, the process starts with a top down consultation. There is the main agreement between the Foreign Office and the Goethe Institut. The strategic goals, currently we have 8 of them. And they are, of course, drafted on a really abstract level. So, they just say 'encouraging cultural collaboration with stakeholders'. So that means nothing and everything. And as soon as they are confirmed by the Foreign Office and us, then they are sent to two of the local branches. Not to the regional office. But to the local branches. And every single local branch has now the role to, on the basis of a SWOT analysis, to describe what it would need to fulfil these really abstract objectives, to make them concrete, to make them come to life and to make them work on a really local – in terms of country – basis. […] [M]y role is then to build or to try to describe how it will work on a regional basis. Bring all these local descriptions together and try to make...it's tricky, because it is in between* (I18, P.136-137, L.41-51 and P.136-137 L.56 and L.1-3).

This highly complicated structure of administration guarantees that the programmes and projects on offer are grounded in the local needs of the population, although one needs to be careful here not to overestimate the bottom-up element. It is the actors already involved in a professional capacity with the network who may participate in this consultation. The overall managerial model of the organisation draws, as natural, subsequent attention. What are the central mechanisms of administration in the Goethe Institut?

The organisation is managed by the so-called 'Presidium', which roughly corresponds to the Board of Trustees of the British Council. Right below the Presidium stands the Executive Board which is comprised by two people following a dual leadership model with one business director and one programmes director (Goethe Institut, 2018c). The most vital administrative organ of the Goethe Institut Association is the General Meeting, which guarantees the transparency of the election process. The General Meeting has the power to appoint the members of the Presidium, who in their turn, propose and appoint the Executive Board upon consultation with the Federal Foreign Office (Table 14, Appendix C). The

involvement of the government does not end there. In a very interesting arrangement, one member of each political party represented in the Bundestag and two representatives from the Länder administrations are invited to participate in the General Meeting as extraordinary members (Goethe Institut, 2009).

Next to the Basic Agreement which sets the strategic agenda of the Goethe Institut and the General Meeting which consists, among others, of parliamentary members, it should be noted that the organisation also receives generous funding from the government through the budget of the Federal Foreign Office. For the year 2015, the Goethe Institut received almost 59% of its total income from the government. The rest is self-generated revenue out of which 34% comes from language courses and examinations and the remainder from third-party contracts (Goethe Institut, 2016). The organisation is accountable through its grant-in-aid to the government. Evaluation, however, is not just a means to legitimise the funding.

> *P: Of course, you have to evaluate the projects. We are very strong in this, we are putting a very strong focus on evaluation. All our work, important big projects are constantly being evaluated because evaluation is part of a process called learning, so we are always learning. With every project there is a chance to learn, to make things better or to avoid mistakes, to get deeper into this intercultural process.*
>
> *I: ...[E]veryone is talking about how cultural diplomacy cannot be evaluated because it has a long-term impact and you cannot trace that. But then you cannot ask for funding if you don't have evidence to prove to your funders that this is working.*
>
> *P: It is not only legitimisation. It is asking ourselves did we really achieve our aims with regard to these 8 strategic goals? We are always asking ourselves: what have we really achieved?* (I15, P.117, L.18-22 and L.27-32)

We have seen that the Goethe Institut has multiple interaction channels with the government and that it is not so distant from the state apparatuses as it may claim. Funding, agenda setting, evaluation bring it closer to the workings of the state. Does this have any impact on terminology? Which terms does the Goethe Institut use to describe its work to third parties?

I: [W]ould you say that the Goethe Institut exercises cultural diplomacy or is it involved in cultural relations?

P: I would say that we are doing cultural relations but, of course, we are always in communication with our stakeholders, with the political stakeholders. So cultural diplomacy is a field where we can offer, for example, educational training on how to inform cultural dialogue. This means you cannot separate completely cultural diplomacy from cultural relations. Building cultural relations is political work. These two things need to be seen in a certain relation and one has to be very aware of the political consequences of doing work in cultural relations and in order to understand what cultural diplomacy really means and make it successful, you need basic knowledge and experience of how intercultural processes are developing. You need very deep knowledge and sensitivity for cultural differences, you need to have knowledge on artistic and cultural expression, you have to know what cultural dialogue really means. And of course, we, as a Cultural Institute, can offer communication and dialogue even education on how intercultural dialogue can be realised. These things cannot be separated, they are very closely connected. To build cultural relations is very political. We are all cultural diplomats, of course, it depends on the interpretation of the expression, of course, but I would not separate these terms categorically (I15, P.118, L.38 and 45-56 and P.119, L.1-2).

This is a compelling point to which we will return as soon as we examine the rest of the cases. While some scholarly works are boldly setting a distinction between the terms, practitioners are reluctant to step forward with a definitive answer.

5.2.4 Profile summary

The Goethe Institut is, according to the interviews, the organisation which measures the greatest distance from the interests of the government apparatus due to the country's unique political set up. However, it should be noted that a large portion of its budget comes from the Federal Foreign Office (FFO) and its

agenda is negotiated with the aforementioned authority. It seems that the FFO is the chief authority to shape the operational reality of the Goethe Institut, although other departments participate to a smaller extent in co-shaping strategic priorities related to their sector (Federal Ministry for Education and Research, Office for Migration and Refugees). The direct link to the foreign ministry enables the Goethe Institut to zone the globe in areas to better coordinate interests. Despite the extensive role of the FFO, the organisation has extended rights over staff selection and sets rigorous election processes to ensure transparency. On the ground, the programs and events on offer do not seem to depart significantly from the products of the British Council and reflect a broad understanding of culture as 'ways of life'. The rhetoric of the participants showed a general preference for the term cultural relations over the term cultural diplomacy, although the interviews mostly pointed to the fact that the participants were aware of the broader debate around definitions out there and understood the implications of espousing either one term.

5.3 France

5.3.1 From the cultural…

France's cultural policy is paradigmatic in the sense that it has set a global precedent in the administration of the cultural sphere. The first ever Ministry of Culture was established in the country in 1959, during the presidency of Charles De Gaulle, with a mission to promote and support contemporary artistic creation challenging the traditional frameworks which prioritised so far the Fine Arts as the exclusive locus of government provision. The French model did not only focus on artistic excellence in the high arts, but was equally obsessed with the nation's cultural heritage, especially with the architectural treasures of its imperial and republican past (Poirrier, 2003). While the point of departure that signalled the state's systematic involvement in the 1960s and 1970s has been the call for the democratisation of culture with André Malraux in the leadership of the MoC, in the ensuing decades and as the political landscape changed with President Mitterand assuming office, cultural policy entered a new era: a period where the popular was not marginalised anymore but venerated. That was the age of cultural democracy with the iconic Jack Lang in the leadership of the Ministry of Culture, but also, ironically, the age of *les grands projets culturelles*[47] (Looseley, 1997).

While discourse-wise the Ministry of Culture prioritised increased social participation, the primary channels of production, distribution and consumption of cultural goods resisted the discursive shift and remained structurally bound to the centre. Cultural policy in France is indeed the prime example of the centralised model of cultural governance. As Ahearne (2003, p.127) has put it: "[i]f we were to imagine a distribution of models along an axis moving from a high degree of centralised power to a high degree of decentralised power, it is clear that the traditional cultural policy frameworks of France and the Federal Republic of Germany would be positioned at opposite ends of the resulting spectrum." Initiatives to decentralise power from the centre to the periphery have not been entirely successful so far. From the establishment of the Ministry's Regional

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[47] *Les Grands Projects de François Mitterand* refers to a period spanning from the late 1980s until the new millennium during which the French government launched an ambitious architectural program in the city of Paris with the aim to restore the declining image of France through the construction and renovation of major cultural landmarks.

Directorates of Cultural Affairs in 1969 in each region of the country to the decentralisation campaign of the 1980s which saw central authorities contracting regional and local authorities for certain cultural services, devolution has had a complex life in France (Négrier, 1997). As French public administration is organised spatially on three interlinked levels – the regions, the counties and the municipalities – it is impossible for any one state agent to overcome sectorally this organisational architecture without decisive changes to the entire system. Broader administrative developments such as the gradual merger of regions already in effect from 2016 and the rise of trends such as intermunicipal collaboration are likely to change the outlook of cultural policy in the periphery (Perrin, 2017).

5.3.2 …to the foreign frontier

In the realm of foreign policy, the imperial past of France has long held the country preoccupied with its dominions. France has historically been one of the leading powers, along with Britain and Spain, to colonise parts of the Old as well as the New World. Out of the vast territories that France has colonised over time, the countries of Maghreb in Northwest Africa have been pivotal in re-shaping France's modern history. A legacy of the Napoleonic wars of the 19th century, the second French empire[48] covered a good part of Northwest and West Africa, Indochina and the Pacific islands (Priestley, 2018). In the turbulent decades that followed WWII, national independence movements erupted in the dominions of both France and Britain bringing classic imperialism to an end. Interestingly, Alesina and Dollar (2000) have argued that the politics of development cooperation today are very much determined by these old imperial relationships and international aid streams flow from the metropolitan countries of Europe to their former dominions. This is especially true for France, which donates generous sums through its international development programmes to the underdeveloped francophone world (OECD, 2018).

[48] The first French empire included dominions in Europe (Belgium, Switzerland, Netherlands and North Italy), the Americas (Canada and the Caribbean) and some trading posts in Africa (Senegal) and Asia (islands of Reunion and Mauritius). Expenditions started in the 16th century, however, conflicts and antagonisms with the British resulted in France losing all its dominions by the early 19th century (Price, 2001).

France may have lost significant territories as a result of decolonisation, yet, it soon found a new political space to experiment. The establishment of the European Economic Community in 1957 (Treaty of Rome) and the resultant gradual foundation of the European Union in 1993 (Maastricht Treaty) breathed new air into the foreign policy aspirations of French politicians. Increasingly seen as a multiplier of France's national interests, the dream for a French Europe has suffered its own crises. Germany's reunification after the fall of the Iron Curtain gave rise to a new powerful player in European affairs (Irondelle, 2008). France would have to counterbalance the influence not only of the British, but also of the Germans which were, even as early as the 1990s, stronger economically than many other European liberal states which already formed part of the European Economic Community (Griziotti and Pantaleo, 2014).

The establishment of the European External Action Service in 2010, a process which had already started in 2003 with the adoption of a common European Security Strategy, signalled another crisis for French foreign policy (Council of the European Union, 2010). While the public referenda in the Netherlands and France in 2005 rejected the proposal on a common European constitution putting brakes on the integration process (Hainsworth, 2005; Taggart, 2006;), officials circumvented the result signing the Treaty of Lisbon (European Commission, 2007b), which is instrumental in the development of a common foreign policy. France has lost its leading position as the EU must accommodate the various and often conflicting interests of its member states in a community that grows with an extraordinary speed.

Despite the regional focus in Europe and the bilateral focus in francophone African countries, France shows strong support towards multilateral organisations in an attempt to contain American influence and expansionism (Gaffney, 2004; Bowen, 2005). This antagonism is rooted to differing visions over the future of post-Cold War Europe and a chasm in lifestyle choices stemming from radically divergent social values (Meunier, 2007). Competition for influence, however, exceeds the standard political and trade rivalries commonly observed among global powers and extends to the cultural sphere as the Anglophone and the Francophone world collide for supremacy.

5.3.3 The Institut français

Nowhere is the foreign cultural policy landscape so complex and dense as in France. Boasting to be the oldest power to take action in foreign cultural affairs, France's efforts to create an international network for the promotion of the French language date back to 1883 when the *Alliance française* was founded (Chaubet, 2004). The full name of the organisation *Association Nationale pour la Propagation de la Langue Française dans les Colonies et L'Étranger* (National Association for the Promotion of the French Language in the Colonies and Abroad) indicates the special place the dominions have had in French foreign policy, although today the goals have adapted to fit the contemporary rhetoric of morality followed by other similar institutions. The protection of cultural diversity and the equal promotion of francophone cultures next to French culture form a distinct discourse which tries to break away from older norms that saw cultural diplomacy as an expression of imperialist thinking. Whether the discourse is convincing, nonetheless, is a point in question. Although Alliance française is the oldest institution to systematise French presence abroad through language courses, it is essentially a non-governmental organisation.

State action in the field came only a few decades later with the establishment of the first Institut français offices in Athens in 1907 and London in 1910. In 1922, the effort was systematised and the French Association for Artistic Action[49] was created on an initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs[50] (Pistone, 2013), which absorbed the until then independent Institut français offices (Cour des Comptes, 2013). The Association was merged in 2006 with the Association for the Dissemination of French Thought[51], responsible for the promotion of French writers, to form a more powerful joint structure, the *CulturesFrance* (Le Sénat,

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[49] AFAA - Association française d'action artistique.

[50] The responsible directorate in the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs to supervise external cultural and educational action is the Directorate-General for Global Affairs, Culture, Education and International Development. This directorate oversees 12 agencies with staggeringly varying missions: 1. Agency for French Education Abroad, 2. Agence Française de Développement, 3. Atout France, 4. Business France, 5. Campus France, 6. Canal France International media cooperation agency, 7. Agricultural Research Centre for International Development, 8. Expertise France, 9. France Médias Monde, 10. France Volontaires, 11. Institut Français, 12. Research Institute for Development (France Diplomatie, 2016).

[51] ADPF - Association pour la diffusion de la pensée française.

2006). The history of French foreign cultural policy is filled with ambitious beginnings, sudden deaths and inescapable mergers as successive governments have left their mark in the field creating a palimpsest of countless administrative reforms. The latest episode in this series of institutional transformations occurred in 2011 when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs restructured its network elevating the Institut français to a dominant position in cultural affairs (Republique française, 2010). The reform must be understood in the context of the *General Revision of Public Policies* launched in 2007 by President Sarkozy as part of his electoral agenda. Alliance française, despite being an NGO, has been contracted to assist the state in its strategic vision and somewhat 300 Alliance française offices around the world – almost 1/3 of its total puissance – are now coordinated by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Institut français, n.d.).

The mission of the Institut français does not deviate from the missions of other Institutes that we have examined, although there seems to be a strong focus on the promotion of the cultural and creative industries, especially publishing, cinema, music and the arts (Institut français, 2016). The Institut français network covers 98 countries worldwide with a budget that exceeds 200 mil EUR according to official data from the Ministry (Laffon, 2010). While the contracted bureaus of the Alliance française play a prominent role in Latin America and Asia, the Institut français is mostly active in the Middle East and North Africa (Cour des Comptes, 2013). In 2011, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs introduced for the first time geographical priorities in its cultural strategy. These extend on three levels:

i) 40 priority countries. These are distinguished by their high potential for development or by the political challenges they represent. They are broadly the G20[52] as well as other countries within the EU with a special focus on the Mediterranean and the francophone countries of North Africa (Forster, 2010).

ii) strategic geographical zones. These are regional strategies to be developed using priority themes as their basis,

iii) the Institut français network (ibid).

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[52] The forum of G20 comprises of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the UK, the US and the EU. Together thhe members represent 65% of the world's population and 79% of global trade (Hutt, 2016).

After the 2011 reform the Institut français is not a non-profit association (association loi 1901) but operates as a state entity of industrial and commercial nature (établissement public à caractère industriel et commercial). The critique for the change of legal status has been fierce, but the response from the government came equally strong:

> *Bernard Kouchner, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs: Stop this permanent critique "we are selling our culture". Cultural activity has long been supported by businesses and cultural enterprises. Thank God! We cannot be satisfied with ourselves when we see what is happening in Germany, Spain, Great Britain or China. Of course, you have to marry these two approaches. A state entity of industrial and commercial nature is more public than an association governed by the law 1901 (Forster, 2010, author's translation).*

A very important feature that distinguishes the French case from the others is the special organisational architecture of the Institut français network. The Institut français Paris is not the headquarters of the Institut français network as is the case with the British Council London and Goethe Institut Munich. The Institut français Paris operates more like a resource centre for the network.

> *We are not the headquarters of a single body. We would like to be, but the government decided not to do that. They decided to keep independent the Institut français network from the Institut français Paris.*
>
> *[…]*
>
> *[The Institut français network] get[s] money not from the Institute français Paris, they get most of their budget from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They are linked with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so the main money, money for equipment, money for the staff, they get that from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On that level they report to the Foreign Ministry. And they also get money from us in Paris but only for specific projects. We are funding the Institute français network through what we call 'appel à projets', they are funded by us for specific projects. For example, if they want to organise a big event, festival, a*

cinema festival, they ask money from us (I22, P.170, L. 21-23 and L.26-32).

As the extract above shows, the financial and juridical functions are used to connect the Institut français network to different levels of the government, from the MFA to the Institut français Paris and, as we will see below, to the Ministry of Culture too. The Institut français Paris is under the joint supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture, although the first authority seems to be dominant in the affair as evident through funding streams and government hierarchy. The Ministry of Culture contributes mostly to the strategic development of the French presence abroad while the overall coordination of the network and sponsoring responsibility falls upon the MFA.

> *[T]he Ministry of Culture is more involved in shaping the strategy and objectives. So, they are aware that this is all their department is doing. If you look at the assignment of the Ministry of Culture, it is said that they contribute to the shaping and implementation of cultural diplomacy. That's true in terms of formal tasks, but in terms of financing operations, they do not offer much. For instance, [the Institut français's] budget is around 30 mil EUR and 28.5 mil EUR comes from the MFA and the rest comes from them* (I25, P.187, L.3-7).

While the Institut français Paris is under the common guardianship of two departments in name, the network is under the exclusive tutelage of the MFA. This complex administrative arrangement is the result of France's unique approach to foreign cultural policy.

> *[C]ultural diplomacy is related to diplomatic activity because for France soft power is part of global diplomacy – in France we do not use the term soft power so much because it is an English term. So, in cultural diplomacy what is important is, of course, culture but also diplomacy. We say cultural diplomacy because it is part of our foreign policy* (I25, P.186, L.17-21).

The question of definitions returns ever more topical as the French case confirms the rather normative distinction between cultural diplomacy and cultural relations advocated by Arndt (2005) and presented earlier in our literature review.

Cultural diplomacy, as is emphatically highlighted, forms part of global diplomacy which includes classic political diplomacy and trade diplomacy. The field of cultural affairs is not symbolically attached to the foreign policy agenda; on the contrary, it absorbs substantial funds from the foreign policy budget amounting almost to 1/5 of its total value[53]. The role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not limited to strategic coordination and funding but extends to programming on the local level through the network of embassies. The Institut français network is linked to the embassy or the consulate in the country where it is located and the Ambassador or the Consul General are responsible for drafting the local Institut français agenda.

> *[B]efore the creation of the Institut français, the buildings were called Centres Culturels français, maybe you remember that. So, it was Centre Culturel français; they had independent directors and these directors most of the times were not diplomats. They used to be directors of theatre, sometimes they were teachers, we had many many teachers in that network. On the other hand, you had the Embassy with the cultural counsellor, cultural attaché, and so on. And at the moment when we created the Institut français, the Ministry decided – I am not sure it's a good idea – but they decided that the Centre Culturel, which was to become Institut français, had to be more linked to the Embassy* (I22, P.174, L.15-22).

The decision to centralise the network was not taken without contemplation. In 2010 the French government ran an experiment and assigned 12 Institut français offices to the Institut français Paris tentatively for a period of 2 years to examine the feasibility of changing the structure of the network to resemble the traditional organisational model adopted by the British Council and the Goethe Institut (Republique française, 2010). The experiment concluded that the Institut français Paris does not have the necessary competencies – in terms of both expertise and financial resources – to undertake the coordination of the entire network which meant that the state would have to invest an extra 50 mil EUR on the annual budget of the agency to build this infrastructure (Le Monde, 2013).

[53] For the year 2013, the percentage dedicated to external cultural action has been 18,1% of the total budget (Cour des Comptes, 2013).

> *[I]t is better to have only one association I think. I have only one-year experience, but my predecessor said it has been very good that 6 years ago they merged this because there were always problems between the director of the Institut français and the Consul General. In all the places in the world my colleagues were complaining about that. And it's a win-win operation because the Director of the French Institut doesn't have any legitimacy, for example, when official political men, businessmen are visiting whereas the General Consul is there representing France, the state. So, the General Consul had no budget to fund exhibitions, to help do things in his area of jurisdiction whereas the Cultural Institute normally has a budget to organise many events. And merging both gives to the director of the French Institut the legitimacy or the powers I could say of the Consul General and it gives the Consul some budget to propose activities in the country (I23, P.179, L.2-12).*

At this point I should draw the readers' attention to an interesting point which has remained unseen due to the reporting style of the results. I21 above was conducted with a representative from the Institut français Paris while I22 was conducted with a representative from the Institut français network. The participant of I21 is a France-based civil servant while the participant in I22 has diplomatic status. The former is not convinced that the experiment to bring the Institut français network under the administrative umbrella of the Institut français Paris was not successful, while the latter insists that the network in its current form is more efficient. The clash of views is understandable if we take into account that these professionals have diametrically opposed personal interests. The first would like to maximise the power of the Institut français Paris which is her institutional home and the other is comfortable with the present status quo which serves his interests. Before the end, I would like to note that I disagree with Fisher et al. (2011) who argued that the merger was simply a structural change designed to cut back expenses and rationalise the network than a strategic reform aiming to reorganise policy priorities. To me, the reform of 2010 showed that France is trying to reach out to foreign audiences in a coherent and coordinated manner through a channel of communication mainly shaped by the discourse of the MFA which sees culture as yet another item on the agenda of global diplomacy.

5.3.4 Profile summary

France undoubtedly has the most complicated institutional ecology regarding foreign cultural policy with dozens of organisations, both private and public, being active in the international arena. The Institut français, as of 2011, is the leading actor of this large and diverse network with representation in over 100 countries worldwide much like the British Council and the Goethe Institut. The distinctive feature of this organisation lies in the idiosyncratic relationship of the Institut français network to the French diplomatic missions. The Institut français offices operate under the guardianship of the embassies and consulates blending cultural policy concerns with foreign policy interests. The funding model warrants attention as the Ministry of Culture also contributes on a small scale to the overall budget. While its contribution is minimal, the programmes on offer are more focused on the arts and culture in the traditional sense although this may be a result of the fact that there are other instruments at the disposal of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs investing in developing a strong civil society. Last, the French participants, much like the Germans, showed that they were aware of the definitional conundrum in the field, but were overall more open to adopting the traditional term ‘cultural diplomacy’ to describe their work. Having reviewed thoroughly the French case, it is time to continue to the next section to analyse the case of the Instituto Cervantes and its remarkable political achievements with regard to the teaching of the Spanish language abroad.

5.4 Spain

5.4.1 From the cultural…

Cultural policy in Spain presents some of the most compelling policy features for researchers to study. So far, we have analysed the case studies of the UK, Germany and France looking at the broader socio-political framework in which these policies are registered focusing on the centre-periphery dynamic and on models of financial provision for the cultural sector. This analytical angle is extremely useful in order to unpack the historical complexities which have defined the modus operandi of cultural policies in Spain.

While the United Kingdom and Germany are highly decentralised, although the phenomenon emerges differently in each case, France is the ultimate example of a centralist and highly bureaucratic state. The Spanish case is situated into a bizarre position on the axis centralisation - decentralisation which Ahearne (2003) described earlier. Spain is not organised in federations as Germany nor are its public policies coordinated by a system of national agencies as in the UK; rather, it is situated in the middle ground functioning as a quasi-federal state to accommodate the diversity of its populations (Bonet and Négrier, 2010).

Before the turbulent 20th century and the dark days of the Francoist regime, Spain was characterised by linguistic and cultural diversity. The Castellan identity and language prevailed both in geographical expansion and speakers' numbers, however, the non-Castellan regions were free to exercise their linguistic rights. The situation was overturned in 1939 when the nationalists took power establishing a totalitarian regime which cracked down on linguistic and cultural pluralism. Castellan language and culture became the only accepted form of Spanishness and several local dialects and languages were, as a result, forever lost (Beck, 1994). During the dictatorship a unitary centralist cultural policy was pursued which placed emphasis on an a-critical consumption of cultural and creative products and services. Sports games and the new technologies of the radio and television were immensely popular serving as lawful distractions to the ferocity of the regime (Villarroya and Ateca-Amestoy, 2015).

The death of General Franco in 1975 heralded the end of an era after almost half a century of dictatorship[54]. The country could no longer turn its back to its cultural diversity and had to find an efficient administrative solution to accommodate those competing forces that threatened to tear its society apart. The 1978 Constitution introduced large-scale administrative reforms that saw the birth of two regional instruments in a bid to create a more flexible, off-centre governance structure: the autonomous communities, which operate on a regional level, and the local councils, which operate on the municipal level. Catalonia, along with Galicia and the Basque country, were the first regions to set up their own semi-autonomous administrations (ibid). The arrangement has created an interesting landscape in the cultural field which facilitates the plurinational identity of Spain. However, the past years there have been attempts to recentralise the sector through the promotion of a reductive, single-minded approach that treats Spanish culture as uniform and fixed (Rius-Ulldemolins and Zamorano, 2014; Rius-Ulldemolins and Zamorano, 2015).

While the first Ministry of Culture was created in 1977[55], in 2011 it was merged with the Ministry of Education in an attempt to rationalise public spending amidst the crisis forming the joint Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport[56]. This is another instance where the cultural and the educational policy fields have been considered coactive and were, consequently, glued together. This synergy is strategic in the promotion of Spanish culture and language abroad and highlights the centrality of these areas in the country's overall foreign policy (Mestres, 2013).

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[54] After democracy was restored in Spain in the late 1970s, the political forces of the country jointly decided that the need was urgent socially to forget the painful years of the Francoist regime. The Pact of Forgetting (Pacto del Olvido) legally came into being in 1977. The Spanish Amnesty Law gave pardon to political prisoners and exiles but, at the same time, protected Franco's supporters from punity. The pact is still in force although significant changes were introduced in 2004 after the People's Party took office.

[55] BOE-A-1977-15200. The acronym BOE stands for Boletín Oficial del Estado.

[56] BOE-A-2011-20644. This has not been the first and only merger in the history of the two organisations. The two Ministries were merged again in 1996 and remained linked until 2004 (BOE-A-1996-9943; BOE-A-2004-6888).

5.4.2 …to the foreign frontier

Imperial aspirations and policies seemed to be a political necessity for the early modern kingdoms of Western Europe. Competition was fierce among the naval powers of the 16th century Europe in the quest for new, unexplored territories. We have shared the accounts of Britain and France and, on a rudimentary level, outlined the territories they conquered, which spread from the Maghreb countries to the southern tip of the African continent and from the Indies to the new, promising lands of North America. Spain's early modern history is inextricably woven to those of other European powers, some present in this study and some omitted for reasons of analytical rigour[57].

Spain's expansionism was expressed in parallel to those of its neighbours which, as we noted, began to explore new geographies in the 15th and 16th century. As soon as *Reconquista*[58] was completed with the Arab Muslims being pushed off from Europe and contained in the Maghreb, Spain began its seafaring explorations to match European competition in the quest for resources. It is futile to attempt a revisiting of the overseas conquests of Spain for they are great in number and dense in facts and myths, however, I will summarise here Spain's geographical expansion to provide a framework for its contemporary foreign policy priorities. Between the 15th and 19th century, Spain had conquered, through blood and iron, most of the Americas with the exception of a large part of Brazil in the South and the US and Canada in the North. What united this diverse amalgam of populations was the Spanish language and the Christian faith, with the latter operating as the legitimising framework that justified the violence of the conquerors (McAlister, 1984). Throughout the 19th century and as national independence movements were shaking continental Europe; the situation was no different in the overseas

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[57] Spanish imperialism cannot be studied in isolation from Portuguese imperialist claims. The two Iberian countries have been strifing for dominance in South America since the 15th century with Portugal having a firm foothold in east Brazil and Spain in the rest of the peninsula. The territorial dispute was settled through papal intervention in 1494 when the Treaty of Tordesillas was signed and a North-South line, commonly known as the Tordesillas meridian, was drawn as an imagined boundary between the conquests of the two countries (McAlister, 1984).

[58] The necessity to expel Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula drove the Christian Kingdom of Spain into a series of military campaigns which unfolded between the 8th and 15th century. This period is known as Reconquista.

colonies of Spain. The country would lose most of its dominions by the end of the century with the final decisive blow coming in 1898. The Spanish-American war resulted in Spain losing its influence in the Caribbean and, ultimately, retreating from the continent (Peceny, 1997).

The Hispano-American countries have resented Spain for its relentless expansionism and for the atrocities the *conquistadores* committed, however, in the post-independence landscape, the United States' interventionism in the region has reverted the situation to the benefit of Spain. The country now acts as a gateway for European interests in the area and vice versa bringing the region closer to another powerful player in global politics and challenging American influence (Torreblanca, 2001). These developments are only the product of the past four decades since Spain was, during the Franco years, cut off from international politics, although a number of international agreements had been made during the dictatorship mostly for strategic reasons, e.g. the UN accession was realised in 1955 (Viñas, 2002).

The normalisation of Spanish foreign policy took years, however, in the grand scheme of things it can be said that the country has overall recovered remarkably fast from the trauma of the junta. In the 1980s, Spain pursued and succeeded in gaining membership in international institutions such as the NATO and the EU[59]. Today, Spanish foreign policy interests are directed towards its former colonies in Ibero-America as well as North Africa and the Middle East, essentially the non-European Mediterranean. While Spain still has some territorial disputes[60] in the region, trade and investments interests lead its foreign policy choices; however, there are numerous political, economic and cultural challenges in the region which overshadow its ambitions to expand its influence in its immediate neighbourhood (Núñez Villaverde, 2005).

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[59] Spain joined the NATO and the EU in 1982 and 1986 respectively (Rodrigo Luelmo, 2016; Moreno Juste and Sío-López, 2016).

[60] Spain has territorial disputes with Morocco over the cities of Ceuta, Melilla, the Chafarinas Islands, the Rock of Alhucemas and the Rock of Velez de la Gomera, and with the UK over Gibraltar (Ceberio Belaza, 2012; Barford, 2013).

5.4.3 The Instituto Cervantes

Spain's international cultural efforts were systematised after World War II with the creation of the General Directorate of Cultural Relations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Before the civil war (1936-1939), Spain had at its disposal various organisations which oversaw its cultural and educational activities beyond its national borders, among them the most notable have been: the Board for the Promotion of Studies and Scientific Research[61] (1907-1936), the short-lived Office of Spanish Cultural Relations[62] (1921-1923) which formed part of the State Ministry, and the Board of Cultural Relations[63] (1926) which aimed at diffusing Spanish culture and the Castellan dialect in Ibero-America (Badillo and Lamo de Espinosa, 2016). However, the creation of the Institute of Hispanic Culture[64] in 1947, which coordinated the embassies in Latin America, was the first step in fashioning a foreign cultural policy strategy under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We need to note that this initiative was largely reactionary as the Institute targeted these Spanish-speaking countries which hosted republicans opposing to Franco's regime (ibid).

In this dense in cultural initiatives political landscape the need to create an organisation that would promote Spanish culture and language beyond Iberoamerica was much evident. The Instituto Cervantes, however, was not created in a vacuum as demonstrated. During the military junta, the government had created other institutions tasked with a similar mission.

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[61] The Spanish name was *Junta para la Ampliación de Estudios e Investigaciones Científicas*. The Board was established by the Ministry of Education the year after Santiago Ramón y Cajal won the Nobel Prize for his work in patho-anatomy. He was the first Spanish scientist to win an award of international significance. He was named president of the Board immediately (Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, 2014).

[62] In Spanish it is *Oficina de Relaciones Culturales Españolas*.

[63] The original name of the organisation was *Junta de Relaciones Culturales*. This Board also formed part of the Ministry of the State very much like its predecessor, the Office of Spanish Cultural Relations. It took on powers similar to the Board for the Promotion of Studies and Scientific Research, essentially duplicating its functions, as it was thought that the first hosted reformists who opposed the policies of the dictator Primo de Rivera (Badillo, 2014).

[64] In Spanish the name is *Instituto de Cultura Hispánica.*

P: [Y]ou had throughout the years of the Franco regime the Hispanic Cultural Institute (Instituto de Cultura Hispanica) and some big capitals like London or New York, Paris had the Instituto d'España. Now there was a big debate throughout the 1970s and 1980s on how to promote culture. How to modernise institutions, it's also that time when they realised the great potential that the Spanish language had for Spanish foreign policy and at that time the centralist government, the Gonzalez government, they decided that the whole thing needed to be re-felt, they didn't like the idea of continuing with the Instituto d'Espagna because it sounded...it was very much associated with the previous regime.

I: So, they needed a re-branding.

P: Yes, so they decided on a new name to re-brand the whole initiative and a model should be something along the lines of the British Council and that's why they came up with this idea of calling it Instituto Cervantes as a result of that. All that we had built previously became Instituto Cervantes (I19, P.145, L.1-12).

A tripartite commission comprising of the Ministries of Education, Culture and Foreign Affairs gave originally shape to the mission of the Instituto Cervantes. The Instituto Cervantes today is a not-for-profit public law organisation attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from which it receives its funding (Badillo Mattos and Lamo de Espinosa, 2016). Indicatively, in 2016, the state subsidy covered 56.5% of the budget while the remainder 43.5% was financed using own income that the organisation generated from its educational and cultural activities (Instituto Cervantes, 2016). However, the issue of the patronage was not a straightforward decision as two participants share.

[W]hen the Instituto Cervantes was created the big debate was whether it should be...there were three possibilities: to be part of the Education Ministry, to be part of the Culture Ministry or to be part of the Foreign Ministry. Education, it didn't make really sense because we are not involved in the formal education, it is adult education and it is something different. Culture, it did make sense but because the idea was to promote our interest abroad, it was decided that it has to be in

the Foreign Ministry. And the idea is that this is a branch of the Spanish diplomatic mission abroad (I19, P.145, L.47-53).

When the Instituto Cervantes was created, it was a big, big step forward for Spanish cultural diplomacy because at the time there were only international programs of both the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But the need for a sort of agency with a certain room for maneuver in the middle of those two Ministries was felt by politicians, by bureaucrats, by the society. The problem was that not all the responsibilities of those two Ministries were given in full to the Instituto Cervantes (I16, P.122, L.16-21).

As we noted the Ministry of Education has merged with the Ministry of Culture and today this agent along with the MFA are said to supervise jointly the Instituto Cervantes (European Parliament, 2016). I was interested to see whether, as in the Greek case, there was competition between the two authorities and what my participant thought of this synergy.

This is small talk about bureaucracies. The MFA in Spain in terms of legislation should just lay the basis for the international operations of other players. They should abstain from running educational and cultural programs themselves. They should build the infrastructure like Cervantes for artists or universities to develop their international strategies, but because of some vested interest in the diplomatic sector they haven't refrained from running programs and they still have some cultural counsellors in a number of Embassies abroad. And the existence of these cultural counsellors to a certain extent is problematic because the legal basis for them to act as cultural counsellors is questionable. The law says that the MFA should just lay the legal, basic infrastructure for other players (I16, P.122, L.29-37).

In the founding document of the Instituto, interministerial cooperation as well as collaboration with other levels of the government is structurally recommended, but not actually planned (BOE-A-1991-7354).

Moving on to the strategic layout and political vision behind the establishment of the organisation, we observe that the mission of the Instituto is double:

The aims of the Cervantes Institute are to:

1. a) Promote universally the teaching, the study, and the use of Spanish and encourage as many measures and actions as possible that can contribute to the dissemination and improvement of the quality of these activities.

b) Contribute to the dissemination of culture abroad in coordination with other competent organs of the government.

2. In its activities, the Cervantes Institute will attend fundamentally to the linguistic and cultural heritage that is common to countries and peoples of the Spanish-speaking community (ibid, p.9067).

What is striking with the Instituto Cervantes is that from its onset, the organisation's remit prescribed the promotion of the culture and language of the Spanish-speaking countries next to that of Spain. This preemptive measure ensured that the interests of Spain and the Hispanic world would not clash in the future leading to antagonisms in the linguistic and cultural sphere. I will share an extended excerpt from one participant who is narrating the story of how consensus among these national actors was reached.

P: [I]t is a tricky balance between aspirations and the sovereign state of Latin American countries but to tell you the truth – to my big surprise – we have managed to act operationally as a promoter of the cultures not only of Spain but also of Latin American countries without any exception – maybe with the exception of Cuba and Venezuela.

I: …because of their political regime I assume.

P: That's it. There is the Board of Trustees, the Patronato in which there is a share of representatives from Latin American countries, there is a whole series of Agreements between cultural institutions and educational institutions in Latin America by which we manage to create joint programs with specific goals in specific countries. So, we have the

policy of taking in all the countries where we are operating, that means the initiatives and proposals of Latin American countries, to make their cultural promotion. So, whenever there is a suggestion from, let's say, Mexico in, for instance, Beijing to do something in the cultural field we take it very seriously, we discuss with them and we try to align their proposal with our main strategy in the field of culture. We carry out this activity or that project together with our partner. This is one of the biggest achievements of the Instituto Cervantes; I mean, it is a national Spanish institution that is regarded by both Spanish public and Latin American publics, both society and government, as an instrument of their own (I16, P.120, L.47-53 and P.121, L.1-9).

I: When did you achieve this consent?

P: Well, it was a gradual process. I mean the law set this goal as one of the top goals of Cervantes to promote both the culture of Spain and Latin American countries. At the beginning, in 1991, it seemed as a non-realistic goal because many here in the Instituto Cervantes were sceptical about the willingness of Latin American countries to work together internationally in the promotion of their cultures and around. But it was a gradual achievement, we had a very low profile at the beginning, so I mean we invited all Latin American partners to consider the institute as their own, we opened a place for them in our strategies both in language and in culture. We said ok, Spanish language is an asset and we share it with you, we cannot pretend to work in language alone, so whenever there will be standards for assessment, standards for teaching and training, we will come to you...and the same in culture. We said to them Spanish culture as such is an important component of Latin American history, so they agreed. They said it's the same with us, our history, our culture, our arts cannot be disassociated from your history, from your art, from the Spanish roots. We managed to operationalise all this by means of programs, of governing structures, of operations on the field. It is quite surprising because whenever I speak about this to my Anglo-Saxon partners they are in shock.

Because they cannot imagine Great Britain acting as a leader of the culture of the Anglo-Saxons (I16, P.121, L.11-26).

This account paints a very positive picture of the relationship between Spain and the Ibero-American countries in the joint management of the Instituto Cervantes. More interviews with partners from the Spanish-speaking world could potentially reveal whether, in reality, there are frictions and latent competition. An equally interesting point open for debate is whether the Instituto Cervantes is the only cultural organisation to bring together these national actors or whether the Spanish-speaking world has at its disposal other venues for cultural cooperation. These encounters bring to mind other similar regional blocs like the Community of Portuguese Countries which "can be seen as new site[s] for the development of cultural policies for collective identity building by an association of states" (Figueira, 2018, p.133).

The effort to involve all the interested parties is plainly seen in the governance structures of the Instituto Cervantes which comprise of the Board of Trustees, the Board of Directors and the Director. The Honorary President of the Board of Trustees is His Majesty the King while the Executive Presidency of the Board corresponds to the Prime Minister who will be accompanied, in addition, by: a) the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Education and Science and the Minister of Culture, b) the Chairman and Vice Presidents of the Board of Directors, c) the Director of the Institute, and, d) twenty-five Members in representation of letters and culture of the Spanish-speaking countries[65]. As evident by the above, foreign cultural policy in Spain is granted serious governmental attention. In no other case so far did we encounter the Head of State and the Head of Government to get involved in the affairs of the National Institute for Culture.

P: [W]e can say that very often the process of expansion of the Instituto Cervantes is often the Prime Minister's prerogative. Many of our branches have opened because of unofficial visits by the King or the Prime Minister and talking with the representatives of the country, these things arise…'well, it would be a very good idea to have an Instituto Cervantes here' (I19, P.146, L.22-25). […]

[65] BOE-A-1991-7354, p.9068.

> *P: Our General Director has general meetings with the Prime Minister every year and there he/she is always being asked 'what are your aims, how are you coping'?*
>
> *I: So, the Cervantes is that important to Spain so that your Director gets to meet the Prime Minister.*
>
> *P: Yes, of course but it depends on the Prime Minister and their interests…I would say that the Cervantes was more important to the previous Prime Minister. I would say that in the years of Aznar, he liked Cervantes very much. He thought it was very important tool. That's why he expected to be told directly by the Director of the Instituto Cervantes what the aims were, so there was a direct connection there. The present Prime Minister Rajoy, he is too busy with the budget, with financial problems. He cannot worry about the Cervantes so it hasn't really worked that way. It depends on the moment and on the Prime Minister* (I19, P.147, L.47-56).

The close ties the Institute has with the central government raise questions about its autonomy. As the participant sharply observes below, the question of distance or intimacy to the government does not warrant an absolute answer.

> *[T]he arm's length concept is open to many interpretations, it's not interpretations, to many degrees. In legal terms we are an arm's length body. In practical terms we are often, more often than not. But in certain cases, very isolated cases, we have indications from the MFA. But I wouldn't say that these indications from the MFA disrupt or are contradictory to our arm's length status. To tell you the truth, I am not sure how I should define the arm's length status. We work around strategy, we take decisions without any interference from the MFA, we tend to say no very often to the MFA, to Ambassadors etc. But sometimes just to keep good relations we are very polite, we listen to them, we analyse their proposal, I mean we take indications from the Foreign Ministry very seriously and very politely, but we tend to do what we think we have to do (I16, P.124, L.4-12).*

Since instrumentalism is linked to definitions, it was reasonable to ask about terminology.

I: My last question is would you say that you are working on cultural diplomacy or on international cultural relations because I see that in the literature there is a difference between the two.

P: Well, yes, there is a difference. It is the same that happens with the arm's length concept. I don't know. We are an instrument by the Spanish Foreign Ministry that was created by the Spanish Parliament to help the government achieve foreign policy goals, that's beyond any doubt like the British Council, like the Goethe Institut, like all of us. We are instruments of the foreign policy of our countries but the means of achieving those foreign policy goals require us to work in a field which is quite far from that of diplomacy which means cultural relations (I16, P.125, L.38-45).

This extract is significant in that it indicates that my Spanish participant is very much aware not only of the debate around the sematic differences found between, or even imposed on, concepts, but also of the fact that the commotion around definitions centers around two Cultural Institutes, the British Council and the Goethe Institut. Is this division an invented dichotomy produced, popularised and perpetuated by these two organisations? I am inclined to answer positively to the question based on both the semi-structured interviews and the informal discussions I have had with participants and other experts in the field during the Vienna workshop, but let's discuss further this point again in 7.3.1.

5.4.4 Profile summary

The Instituto Cervantes is the last organisation out of our sample to have an international network of similar size to these of 'the big three'. While the formal biography of the Instituto Cervantes identifies 1991 as the founding year of the organisation, the reality is that similar structures predated the organisation. The relationship to the government has been uneasy during the Franco years with much of its policies concentrating on building contacts with Ibero-American countries. While the focus today does not fall on this region, the old networks are

present in the board of the Instituto Cervantes. This reflects the priorities of the organisation which center upon the teaching of the Spanish language and, by extension, the culture of Spain and the Spanish-speaking countries. With the foreign ministry having an elevated position today in the affairs of the organisation, it seems that there have been discussions on a governmental level regarding the institutional affiliation of the agency. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Culture were all deemed, more or less, appropriate institutional homes for the Instituto Cervantes, however, its global focus laid the ground for it to be attached to the MFA. As a result, the organisation's representatives were reluctant to differentiate between cultural diplomacy or cultural relations in the interviews. It seems that there is no categorical answer to the question for many policymakers. The Spanish case has provided ample material to reflect on the governance mechanisms and political actors that regulate the environment of the Cultural Institutes, it is now time to continue to the next and last section to analyse the case of the Swedish Institute and its unusual angle in approaching the cultural and educational dimension of foreign affairs.

5.5 Sweden

5.5.1 From the cultural…

The final case study of this comparative analysis concerns the Swedish example. Nordic cultural policies, in general, are characterised by a high degree of decentralisation and an emphasis on state provision for the arts and culture. While there are certainly differentiations within the model, the significance of central state structures in regulating the supply-demand chain and the attention accorded to redistributive egalitarian discourses are distinctive of the Nordic cultural policy model (Mangset et al., 2008; Power, 2009).

In Sweden, the long reign of the Social Democratic Party and the ascendancy of Olof Palme to the position of Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs[66] (1967-1969) initially and then to the position of Prime Minister (1969-1976 and 1982-1985) allowed for a multi-culturalist approach in policymaking to emerge. Immigration played a vital role in post-war Swedish politics. The large number of immigrants Sweden received after the war created a fragmented society in which the newcomers, while financially comfortable, lacked the cultural codes and linguistic skills that would allow them to integrate seamlessly into their new environment. That was the rationale of the Socialist Democrats until Olof Palme rose to power at the turn of the 1970s. His tenure signaled a departure from the politics of assimilation giving rise to the politics of tolerance and cultural pluralism (Tawat, 2017). As part of the state's overall welfare policy, the government introduced its first bill on cultural policy in 1974[67] with a programmatic focus on tolerance and cultural diversity. Political decentralisation and cultural renewal by means of balanced provision were the grands objectives of the new vision. The establishment of the Swedish Arts Council as the responsible organ to implement this policy came into effect the same year.

Along with the ideational transformation of the 1970s, the 1980s brought a different managerial model in the public sector. Pioneered originally by Thatcher in the United Kingdom, the New Public Management model was quickly taken up

[66] In Sweden, cultural policy as a practice was embedded in religious and educational affairs. The Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs was renamed to Ministry of Education and Research in 1968. The latter supervised the subject area of culture until 1991 when a separate Ministry for Culture was created (Harding, 2016).

[67] Swedish Parliament, 1974.

and adapted to fit the Swedish mentality. Citizens' welfare remained the top priority, nevertheless, the structures were now administered not by field experts, but by professionals with a managerial skill set (Larsson and Svenson, 2001). Nevertheless, the new model did not prevent the economic crisis from hitting the sector in the 1990s. The state, at all administrative levels, has been the principal provider, however, welfarism was proving to be expensive and unsustainable. As a solution public - private partnerships were set up to split the costs of sponsoring the cultural sector leading to a loss of cultural value and the rise of economic instrumentalism in Swedish cultural policy (ibid). As new actors were introduced pluralising and diversifying the field, market concerns became more central. At the same time, Sweden's accession to the EU in the mid-1990s pushed towards towards the same direction. The internationalisation of the country's domestic cultural policy resulted in the exposure of the Swedish cultural sector to the recently established, at that time, creative industries discourse. Although the Swedish state retains its historical commitment in supporting financially the sector, especially in the regions, as evident by the last policy reform (Swedish Parliament, 2009), it seems that creative professionals are calling for more private investments in a bid to develop the cultural and creative economy (Stenström, 2008). An inherent tension is, therefore, present in contemporary Swedish cultural policy.

5.5.2 …to the foreign frontier

For much of the 20th century, Swedish foreign policy has been characterised by the desire to stay neutral in an increasingly bipolar world. Its position as a peaceful middle player, resistant to the influence of both the United States and the Soviet Union, allowed it to come forward as a benevolent power in the international community. The fact that the country has refrained from joining military power blocs such as NATO coupled with its generous foreign aid programme running since the 1950s has assisted in establishing a positive international image. However, since Sweden joined the EU in 1995, it lost its long-standing position of neutrality. Additionally, since the destabilisation of the Eastern Neighbourhood and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, Sweden is all the more interested in articulating a clear-cut position in international politics through the pursuit of a multilateral security and defence policy (Eriksson, 2017; Parker, 2017).

Swedish Official Development Assistance (ODA) warrants special attention as the country – despite its small size[68] – has engaged in granting foreign aid exhibiting a capacity similar to that of the rich industrial democracies. The biggest proportion of ODA has historically been directed to sub-Saharan countries, the Middle East and the Eastern Neighbourhood which included the ex-Soviet Republics of the Baltic Sea Region. With the accession of these countries in the EU in 2004, ODA funds could no longer be directed to the Baltic area, however, increased aid now flows towards the Western Balkans (Utrikesdepartementet, 2014a). Sweden is committed to assisting pro-EU countries meet the requirements for accession backing thus the EU enlargement project. Outside Europe, its foreign aid is addressed to under-developed countries investing in sectors laid out by the UN Sustainable Goals (Sida, 2018). Moreover, Sweden is the first country to pursue a feminist foreign policy as of 2014 setting gender equality as the core focus of its human rights agenda (Utrikesdepartementet, 2018b).

[68] For 2017, Sweden is the largest donor worldwide in proportion to the size of its economy donating approximately 1% of its annual GDP to ODA. It has passed the 0.75% target set by the United Nations since 1975 (OECD, 2018).

5.5.3 The Swedish Institute

Originally established as a public – private association in 1945 under the name Swedish Institute for Cultural Exchange[69], the Swedish Institute (Si) was incorporated into a state foundation in 1970 and, in 1998, it became an arm's length body attached to the MFA[70]. Åkerlund (2018, p.146) observes that the Institute has gradually lost its independent character to become today "an agency under direct state control". The reason behind the establishment of the Si, as told by two of my participants, warrants special attention.

> *The Institute was created as a joint venture between the Swedish government and the Swedish business community. The initiative came in 1944 when the Swedish government felt that there was a need to re-establish relations and communication with other parts of the world and was specifically after having visited the United States. Sweden was neutral during the war and was not participating actively in the war. There was a need to explain the position of Sweden and, also, as I said to establish communication, relations, dialogue and trust. This was also felt from the Swedish business community that there was a potential to be part of supporting the rest of the world (I24, P.182, L.25-31).*

> *[I]n 1945 obviously it was the year that WWII ended and Swedish ministers and Swedish representatives of the government, businessmen when they travelled abroad, they were met with some suspicion. People were wondering what did you do during WWII, how come and Sweden was a neutral country and…you know, there was collaboration with Germany or at least...not necessarily collaboration but, of course, there was some sort of... under threat Sweden allowed Germany through the country. So, it was very much based on: 1. Sweden was not very well known, and, 2. Sweden had the position of a neutral country during the war which meant that...one of the Ministers, I think it was the Minister of Trade, went to the U.S., he felt*

69 Svenska institutet för kulturellt utbyte.

70 For a brief history of the organisation, look at the introduction of the Statskontoret 2011:32.

very strongly when he came back that we needed to have an organisation that deals with communicating our country and building relationships with other countries (I17, P.127, L.15-24).

It should be noted that unlike any other case, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sweden is organised in a tripartite structure comprising of a Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, a Secretariat for International Development Cooperation and Climate and a Secretariat for EU Affairs and Trade. These three units are headed by three corresponding Ministers and make up the joint Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Government Offices of Sweden, 2016). Government responsibility for the Si falls on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, although a number of other departments are also involved as partners in decision-making.

You can say that we are governed basically by the principle of our funding. So, the Minister for Development and Cooperation has a strong say. But the Minister for Development and Cooperation also forms part of the MFA, but it is a separate minister. We have funding from the Ministry for Higher Education and we have funding from the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation. So, we have, for the time being, at least four different funding areas. The Swedish government budget is divided into a number of areas and we are funded today by four different areas. And to make it even more complicated, we have the Minister for Trade in the equation. So, we have daily communication reporting to the State Secretary for Trade, but we have good collaboration also with the others. This means that we have at least 5 Ministers and their State Secretaries involved in the administration, or you could say that they are our stakeholders (I24, P.183, L.9-18).

While the tutelage falls on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its three Ministers, another two authorities (Ministry of Higher Education and Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation) are contributing through their budgets to the operations of the Si. Surprisingly, the Ministry for Culture is not one of them. The Ministry for Culture has its own network of agents, most notably the Swedish Arts Council, dealing with the internationalisation of domestic cultural policy priorities. This is an interesting point relevant to how Si staff view their work. The Institute does not regard itself as an actor vested with a cultural mandate. The Ministry of Culture and its related

agencies have their own budget to work on cultural relations and frequently they collaborate with other government departments such as the MFA (Fisher et al., 2011) In fact, the Si is the only case study in this thesis that uses a wide range of definitions to describe its work from cultural cooperation to public diplomacy and strategic communications.

> *[W[hen we compare ourselves with our colleagues in Europe, of course, we belong to EUNIC and we see ourselves as an Institute of Culture, but we always say that we are more than that. We have a wider mandate, because we deal not only with culture, language and education; we deal also with society and communicating our society and building relations between the Swedish society as a whole so that means that our mandate is wider and, yes, we use the term public diplomacy. It's probably even more fair to say that both we and our government use many different terms for what we do and none of us uses it in a very coherent and systematic way. I think that is the case in most countries. I have actually never encountered a country where they have a clear and very unambiguous understanding of exactly why they use the terms they do. . . (I17, P.128, L.5-13).*

> *I mean one way of looking at it we use different terminologies for what we do depending on who we talk to. We can look at the word public diplomacy or even cultural diplomacy and there is one word that is more important than the other and that is diplomacy. And diplomacy is translated to the agenda, the political agenda of the current government. […] So that's why we and any of our colleagues in EUNIC do not want to talk about the word diplomacy, some shy away from it and they say that they do cultural relations activities and, of course, I know that they're also involved in public diplomacy, because they are obliged to use the agenda of the current government. And one thing that we are clear about is the difference between the Swedish Embassy and the Swedish institute. The embassy has the current government's political agenda at the basis of Public Diplomacy whereas at the Swedish institute we have a long-term agenda which you look at more long-term relations. But of course, both perspectives meet in everyday life (I17, P. 128, L.24-37).*

It may have been implied so far that the Si does not have any independence in managing its own programs, especially since so many departments get involved in its affairs. However, the mandate the organisation is given is intentionally broad and the Director has an increased role in decision-making.

> *We are governed by a mandate, this is a little complicated, the government has decided on a 5-year strategy within the development cooperation area. The government works with 5-year strategy plans also including the major Swedish development and aid agency and a few other agencies. This means that these are affecting, of course, our targets and our own strategy. Apart from the mandate we are given, we set our own strategies, we set our own goal structures and we decide basically on key performance indicators and how generally how to evaluate our work. Then we report that to the government on a yearly basis and it is also communicated to a government agency, the National Audit Agency I think is called in English. But we have substantial freedom of setting the organisation, the strategy, the spirit of how we evaluate ourselves and the entire structure for target setting and assessment (I24, P.184, L.55-57 and P.185, L.1-6).*

Nonetheless, it should not go unnoticed that the head of the Si is not elected but appointed in his/her position.

> *The Director is appointed by the government. […] [He/She] ha[s] [his/her] own management team and decide[s] entirely how [he/she] would like to organise that group. And the Board of Directors you mention is not exactly a board, it is an advisory body. [The Director is] the President, the Chair of the advisory body. Very few government agencies have independent Boards of Directors, only the big ones with very large budgets (I24, P.184, L.39 and L.47-50).*

Indeed, the mandate the Institute is given by the government is exceptionally broad as evident by the funding areas in its budget (Utrikesdepartementet, 2018a) and is fixed around global development, especially the UN 2030 Agenda and Sweden's feminist foreign policy (Government Offices of Sweden, 2017; Utrikesdepartementet, 2018b). The areas it is working in can be traced through its budget allocation. These are: i) International Cooperation, which includes building

cultural relations, ii) International Assistance, which focuses on capacity building through ODA, and last, iii) Education and University Research, which covers academic exchanges and scholarships (Swedish Institute, 2016). Emphasis in these areas is certainly not new; in fact, in the first decades of its life, the Swedish Institute for Cultural Exchange used to organise Swedish academic appointments in universities abroad, coordinated the first international development programmes[71] and collaborated with the General Export Association and the Tourist Traffic Association to maximise the value of its services through intra-governmental partnerships (Clover, 2016).

The Swedish Institute is unique in that it is one of the few organisations tasked with promotional activities that has not established a physical network and the only organisation not to among the examples examined in the framework of this research. There is only one office outside Sweden, in Paris, which was founded in 1971[72]. Si's policy is to refrain from opening up physical spaces due to the organisation's limited resources. If there is no representation in the traditional sense, how will the Swedes operationalise their strategy?

> *Sweden has chosen not to have specific cultural institutes abroad. There is something that is called Swedish Institute in Alexandria, there is one in Istanbul and there is one in Athens. But they have a long historic background, they are more academic-based, research-based institutes. There are just 3 or 4 and the exception is Alexandria which is a dialogue institute where Sweden has activities and we cooperate with them. But all those academic institutes, including the Alexandria one, are not a part of our network. They are part of the Swedish government. Sweden has actually chosen not to have a specific system of Cultural Institutes abroad with the exception of Paris. That means that we have to work with others, with other Swedish players. And most importantly that we have to work on an arm's length basis. But we work with them, our Swedish Embassies and Consulates around the world. And they are present, they are on the ground, they*

[71] The big bulk of development programmes is now undertaken by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), which was established in 1995.

[72] The Institute is housed in a historic 17th mansion and is property of the Swedish state bought in 1965 upon initiative of the Swedish cultural counsellor (Statens fastighetsverk, n.d.).

are part of the Swedish public diplomacy (I17, P.128, L.49-57 and P.129, L.1-2).

A question that arises is whether the Institute follows inevitably the priorities of the MFA, since it uses the diplomatic network to launch projects on the ground.

We work with a regional perspective. We divide the world by the same geographical regions as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies with an international focus. […] But we say is that we tend to be focused in countries where the knowledge of our country is good, or where there is a transition from the traditional model of a developing country into a situation in which a broader and more mature bilateral relationship is being developed. […] We could also prioritise countries where we see that we have trade relations, however, we have evidence that we have differences in our value systems. Therefore, there are obstacles for Swedish stakeholders to further develop their relations with that country and then cultural relations or the kind of work that we do could add value to other relations and other stakeholders. (I24, P.183, L.55-56 and P.184 and L.11-13 and L.18-21).

Indeed, the priorities of the Si correspond to a number of strategy documents developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Eastern Neighbourhood, Western Balkans, Turkey, Russia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the developing economies of East and South-east Asia form a priority map for Sweden. The Swedish government has crafted a number of overarching strategy plans to guide a selection of organisations with international focus, among them the Swedish Institute (Utrikesdepartementet, 2014a; 2014b; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c). A small-sized organisation like the Si with limited resources cannot afford to set loose geographical and thematic targets, hence, the need for better coordination with other Swedish agents. Likewise, the Si needs to be audience-focused to upscale its impact.

We cannot function without knowing our target groups. And, yes, we do target young people and we target the influencers. We have also a strategy of our own, which means that we are in our work trying to achieve what we call 'multipliers' or maximisers'. Because we do not have our own network as you know we are a small organisation, we

need to work in ways which means that others are multiplying the work that we are doing (I24, P.184, L.27-31).

We have seen that most of the Cultural Institutes maintain some form of relationship to the diplomatic network abroad although the terms of their cooperation, apart from the French case perhaps, are not clear. Despite repeated efforts on the part of some of my participants to persuade me that their work does not overlap, I found that the administrative boundaries are dubious and permeable. The focus of this research falls predominantly on the Cultural Institutes, yet I sampled two cultural attachés to fill in specific knowledge gaps in my research. The confusion over jurisdiction is present even within the network itself.

[T]he Swedish Institute as you know doesn't have any local Institutes around the world. It's only centralised and I think that is both a challenge, but it also makes it clearer because I can see that with other colleagues that work in the Embassies or the Cultural Institutes...it's a little bit...you don't really know whether you should be collaborating with the Embassy or with the Institute. I work a lot with Nordic countries and cultural counsellors from the Nordic countries and among us there is only the Finns, there is only a Finnish Cultural Institute here and we just decided to become quite pragmatic over the past few years and just to include the director of the Finish Institute as well in the group because otherwise it would be very...should we not work with them? When do we work with our Finnish colleague at the Embassy and when do we work with the Institute? (I21, P.165, L.1-9).

The role of the cultural counsellors is one of the blurriest points when it comes to the execution of projects on the field. Sweden, interestingly, maintains a limited number of cultural attachés in selected capitals worldwide[73] (Kulturrådet, 2018). These are stationed in the embassy, but are non-diplomatic staff appointed and salaried by the Ministry of Culture. It is fascinating to follow how the perspective of these agents is changing perceptions about the role of the arts and culture in foreign affairs.

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[73] These are: Beijing, Berlin, Istanbul, London, Moscow, Paris, Washington and Brussels. Lately, Pretoria in South Africa was added in the list.

I work for the MoC, so of course my job is to work with culture and my job is to work with culture in a way that the MoC views culture. So, we say, for example, that the arts and culture should be dynamic, challenging forged with freedom of expression as its foundation. So, this is not about saying 'what sells best, what creates the best exposure for brand Sweden'. This about saying 'arts and culture should be challenging, it should be diverse, it should not always be sitting very well with the image that you want to promote'. We want to promote things that are of high quality, interesting but also challenge ideas about what being Swedish means. So, I think that there might definitely be points when I can see that being at an Institute which is a little bit further from the government might make that easier than being at an Embassy. […] But I haven't spent a lot of time thinking of whether this is cultural diplomacy or cultural exchange because it's a little bit of both (I17, P.165, L.9-18 and L.22-23).

This is not the first time we encounter a practitioner having an ambivalent attitude towards the issue of definitions. We can safely conclude that this has been a decisive finding of this study: practitioners are aware of the semantic nuances that underpin terms such as cultural diplomacy and cultural relations, however, they are largely hesitant to situate decisively their practice on one end.

5.5.4 Profile summary

Much like the previous cases, the Swedish Institute is a government agency affiliated to the Swedish MFA from which it receives its funding and mandate. The department has even the right to appoint the Si's general director who, in his/her turn, has increased appointment power within the organisation. While the MFA is the dominant state actor in the Si's affairs, the organisation's relationship to the government involves the consultation of other departmental authorities in an effort to create added value for more actors in the cabinet. Nevertheless, having the broadest remit of all the Cultural Institutes, the Swedish Institute almost runs the risk of not being classified as a cultural establishment. Its programmes having historically developed around academic exchanges and scholarships, today feature a much wider range of projects including but not limited to the promotion

of gender equality, environmental awareness and human rights. Its action plan is interestingly structured around overarching strategy plans issued by the government which act as guideposts for a number of international development organisations. The enlarged policy space which it is given inevitably leads to increased flexibility as to how terminology is used. Public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, international relations or even soft power are all legitimate terms to describe its operations. Having reviewed five European case studies, we should proceed to synthesise information about the operation of the Cultural Institutes but before we do so, it would be wise – for reasons of clarity – to provide a synopsis of the points raised in this chapter.

5.6 Chapter synopsis

The analysis of each of the five examples which preceded was organised taking into consideration the domestic cultural policy landscape, the foreign policy concerns and international preferences of each country to end with a detailed profile of its National Institute for Culture. This holistic approach, which incorporates multiple angles, helps us comprehend better the policy choices of the Cultural Institutes. All three layers were examined through a historical perspective to construct eventually a palimpsest of information unique for each case.

For the most part, we have seen that the organisational culture of Public Administration plays a fundamental role in shaping the legislative reality of these organisations and determines their position within the broader administrative system. For instance, the federal organisation of the German state has allowed the Goethe Institut to be quite independent from the central government. In France, by contrast, the state mechanism is highly centralised; as a consequence, the Institut français follows inevitably the same structure. Bureaucratic arrangements have inevitably a direct effect on policy intentions and ambitions. In the case of Spain, which is organised in a quasi-federal form, the Instituto Cervantes is called to include in its mission the promotion of the linguistic traditions of different cultural communities. Evidently, Public Administration systems have an immediate impact on both strategic decisions and programmes.

Additionally, political developments and party priorities influence the strategic direction the Cultural Institutes are taking, and this is true even for the ones that stand at a greater distance from the government. The example of the British Council, which was ordered to close down all operations in Russia after a serious diplomatic stand-off, is illustrative of the argument. We have also seen how high up in the agenda the Instituto Cervantes has been for one former Prime Minister and how conditions changed with the advent of another in power. In Sweden, the Swedish Institute is adhering to the policies of the current government following five-year strategy plans which link diverse policy sectors such as trade, education and development. The Cultural Institutes are bound to live a life of contradictions as they cannot escape being turned into strategic instruments of the government in one way or another. Work in this field is inevitably linked to politics.

Last, for the vast majority of the Cultural Institutes, the contribution of the Ministry of Culture in both decision-making and funding has not been substantial. The Cultural Institutes report, almost without exception, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is the responsible authority to allocate funds and provide the organisations with their annual and quadrennial instructions. In some countries, like the UK and Sweden, a number of government departments participate as stakeholders in the affairs of the CIs. In France and Spain, the MFA and the MoC indeed cooperate to supervise the CIs, nevertheless, the leading role of the MFA remains unchallenged. Last, in Germany the Goethe Institut does not seem to have relations with any other Ministry apart from the Federal Foreign Office at a strategic level but cooperates with other state agents in product delivery.

To conclude, the period after World War II was transformative for European politics as a whole with an increased attention to welfare aid and a vision towards the liberalisation of the market. While the trends have been uniform across Europe, the individual preferences and choices of governments, rooted in a diverse frame of socio-cultural and historical conditions, determined the evolution of each model. What remains for us to do now is to examine en masse the six case studies in order to reach to general observations and concrete propositions over the state's role in the work of the Cultural Institutes.

6. Critical synthesis

In this chapter, I am analysing and synthesising information through various frames focusing and defocusing each time on different aspects of the Institutes' work. First, the section 'the mechanics of cultural diplomacy' looks at the structural interactions between the CIs and their governments linking data from the previous two chapters. Second, 'the dynamics of cultural diplomacy' introduces the theme of ideology in foreign cultural policy arguing that there are invisible forces operating which prescribe policymakers' choices. Third, the section 'Dark histories – Plastic futures' examines the CIs' thematic priorities in the past and present. This part shows how state expectations have shaped the reality of the Cultural Institutes from the very beginning and why it is critical to retain control of these organisations. The three sections en masse provide an answer to the research question.

6.1 The mechanics of cultural diplomacy

In this section, I will examine altogether the structural means through which governments control their Cultural Institutes. These means vary from country to country and, as we will find out, only a selection of these means will be present in each case study. As I am interested in the power struggle between arm's length bodies and departments, I should focus primarily on structural connections between the two parties leaving out issues like the internal dynamics produced by personal relationships which very often tone down power imbalances. I will focus on how state structures relate to each other to come to an understanding of how agency and therefore, instrumentalism, functions.

Borrowing terminology from linguistics I identify two 'modalities' through which state agency is expressed: the deontic modality which describes an event that "is controlled by circumstances external to the subject" and the dynamic modality that asserts that "the control is internal to the subject" (Facchinetti et al., 2003, p.7). Similarly, in foreign cultural policy not all relations between the state and the Institutes are prescriptive, but often there is space for negotiation moderating the asymmetry of power. Simply put, there are cases where the subject, namely the Cultural Institute, has considerable power in shaping its own agenda (dynamic modality) making instrumentalism milder than it has been implied so far. By contrast, there are cases where the Institute has indeed little authority over its matters reaffirming the invasive character of instrumentalism (deontic modality).

It is important to understand that modalities are not fixed states but depend on both the political vision of the party in power and the organisation's capacity to accept or to resist structural changes. As Rivera (2015) showed in his study of the British Council, the past decade the British government has managed to bring the organisation under an arm around the shoulder relationship by demanding transparency of operations and by restructuring funding flows. In the light of these developments the organisation was not able to do much to avoid it (Pamment, 2012). But what can an organisation do to regain or maintain autonomy and how can we monitor the agency of the state when studying these complex policy networks? Quinn (1997, p.130) was right when she pointed out that funding and membership are "means to influence", nevertheless, there are other important bureaucratic aspects that need to be studied when investigating the arm's length

relationship and, consequently, instrumentalism itself. Taylor (1997), for example, examined the operational styles and policy networks in the UK's newly founded at the time Department of National Heritage and found that professional networks act as an important barrier to government control since the engagement of practitioners in decision making dilutes the monopoly of the government.

Based on the discussion on modalities presented earlier, I introduce here a framework in order to track agency in foreign cultural policy and conceptualise the nature of state intervention. I argue that state agency can be traced through the various interactions between the Cultural Institutes and their reporting authorities. These interactions, or else touchpoints, can be studied to reveal the level of autonomy from the state. Looking back at Figure 10 and Figure 12 from section 4.2, I noticed five basic themes that kept re-appearing in my interviews. I combined the analyses as presented in these two figures and have created a thematic network which brings together the most prevalent themes so I can have an overview of the results for all the cases (Figure 18). I explain very briefly below how I came to conceptualise the themes based on observation through the comparison of the two source figures.

Figure 9 presented the global theme 'Discourses around cultural diplomacy' while Figure 11 presented the global theme 'The trilemma: Cultural diplomacy, cultural relations, public diplomacy'. I created the overarching theme 'The governance of cultural diplomacy' which portrays more accurately both the discourses and institutional frameworks which define the work of the Cultural Institutes. Next, I identified five organising themes: 'Bureaucracy', 'Cultural Value', 'Politics', 'Institutional Isomorphism' and 'Path dependences' which roughly correspond to 'Public Administration', 'What is Culture', 'Politics' from Figure 9 and 'The other Cultural Institutes as a paradigm' and 'Historical information' from Figure 11. By comparing and combining the nodes, I brought together the themes from the two interview projects (Project A and Project C) in the search for a common denominator to link the two analyses.



Figure 18. Thematic network merging all the interviews. Source: Author.

As a result of the thematic analysis, I have concluded that we can explore the state's agency through five touchpoints as pinpointed on the figure above and explained below:

1. funding

   The CIs are funded in part by the state. How much does the government contribute to the budget and what is expected in return? Table 5 shows that among the five CIs (note that the Institut français Paris is a separate legal entity from the Institut français network), the British Council is the organisation with

the most impressive record in revenue-creation. Does self-provision guarantee less state intervention? We made a brief mention earlier to the findings of Pamment (2012) regarding the British Council. While the FCO contributes only marginally to the organisation's budget, it prescribes the areas where the British Council will invest its income.

2. agenda setting

   Most CIs in my sample sign agreements with their funding bodies to set the framework of negotiation for the strategic agenda. How do the CIs build their global strategies? Which documents play a predominant role in setting the tone? Table 6 shows that all the overarching documents trace their origin back to the Parliament, however, what is most interesting is that not all of the CIs have intermediate frameworks shaping their micro-reality. We will discuss agenda setting extensively in 7.1.1.

3. evaluation

   Evaluation does not only refer to auditory checks, but also points to performance reviews assessing outputs against set targets. This is an area interlinked to the design of the agenda since evaluation standards are usually decided in parallel with goals.

4. hierarchy

   What kind of governing structures does the CI have (executive boards, advisory boards)? How are they related to the state? Looking at Table 14 (Appendix C) we can draw a wealth of information on hierarchy in the Cultural Institutes. The most complex organisational arrangements are naturally observed in the biggest CIs. The Goethe Institut, the British Council and the Instituto Cervantes feature governance structures with varying levels of responsibilities and roles. The most complicated, by far, relationship to study in terms of understanding hierarchies is the relationship of the Institut français Paris to the Institut français network which I analysed in 6.3.3.

5. appointment system

   Are there democratic and transparent processes for the nomination and election of executives or does the appointment of top management staff fall on the government? In Table 14 (Appendix C) we can see that the British Council and the Goethe Institut are the most transparent organisations electing officials

in their roles while the Institut français, the Instituto Cervantes, the Swedish Institute and the Hellenic Foundation appointments are made by ministers.

The first three touchpoints are characterised by regularity in the sense that cooperation between the reporting authority and the arm's length body is taking place repeatedly, while the last two are characterised by institutional embeddedness and their effect is continuous. Specifically, in funding, government grants are allocated annually to the CIs in a very specific time period that has been agreed by both parties. Strategic planning is also an activity that takes place yearly with the setting of the annual agenda which is negotiated and endorsed again by both parties. On top of that, there is the wider negotiation on the strategic mission of the Institutes which may take place every four or five years depending on the case. Last, evaluation takes effect not only annually, but also every time a renewal of the strategic mission is ahead. The three touchpoints describe the obvious and standard interactions that happen between the Institutes and their reporting authorities and constitute the typical architecture of the system. They describe bureaucratic arrangements, more or less common for all public bodies. Hierarchy and the appointment system are touchpoints which form far more complex relationships and are much more difficult to modify once set as there is little to no space for negotiation. The quality of democratic institutions and the political intentions of each cabinet will determine how appointments and hierarchies are structured.

Table 5 below demonstrates the ratio of state subsidies to self-generated revenue in the budget of the Cultural Institutes. The hypothesis here holds that the higher the percentage of self-generated revenue in the budget, the stronger the case for independence from state directives. Table 6 examines another dimension of the five-point framework I introduced above: remit and agenda setting through official policy documents. The assumption is that the higher the number of policy frameworks, the less space for maneuvering and deviating from state control. In other words, the less strategic coordination from above, the greater the chances of developing an independent agenda. Nevertheless, when it comes to such a complex process as agenda setting, it would be better to examine how the chain of command flows within the organisations to establish whether at a lower level there is room to break away from the state's mandate.

Table 5. Comparison of annual budgets for the year 2015. Source: Various.

Organisation	Grant-in-aid	Own revenue	Total	Conversion to € (XE converter)
British Council[74]	16.5%	83.5%	980.000.000,00 £	1.117.850.000,00 €
Goethe Institut[75]	59%	41%	387.558.000,00 €	-
Institut français Paris[76]	85%	15%	30.274.038,00 €	-
Institut français network[77]	25%	75%	133.000.000,00 €	-
Instituto Cervantes[78]	56.5%	43.5%	115.365.560,00 €	-
Swedish Institute[79]	86%	14%	450.128.000,00 SEK	60.353.000,00 €
Hellenic Foundation[80]	85%	15%	1.501.449,00 €	-

[74] British Council, 2016. Annual Report and Accounts 2015-16, p.54.
[75] Goethe Institut, 2016. Jahrbuch 2015-2016, p.116.
[76] Institut-français, 2016. Rapport d'activité 2016, p.131.
[77] Haize, D. n.d. Les Moyens De La Diplomatie Culturelle Ou Comment Se Tirer Une Balle Dans Le Pied. Available from: https://www.editions-harmattan.fr/auteurs/article_pop.asp?no=32083&no_artiste=23026. This figure does **not** include staff salaries.
[78] Instituto Cervantes, 2016. Memoria del Instituto Cervantes 2015-2016, p.9.
[79] Swedish Institute, 2016. Svenska institutets årsredovisning 2016, p.53.
[80] The budget was requested through personal communication. The report is, unfortunately, available only in Greek.

Table 6. Key documents defining the relationship to the state. Source: Various.

Organisation	Key document	Signing parties
British Council	Royal Charter[81], Management Statement[82], Corporate Plan[83]	HMQ, Foreign Ministry – British Council
Goethe Institut	Framework Agreement[84], Articles of Association[85]	Foreign Ministry – Goethe Institut
Institut français	Presidential Decree[86], Contrat d'objectifs et de moyens[87]	Parliament
Instituto Cervantes	Royal Decree[88]	Parliament
Swedish Institute	Mandate with instruction for the Swedish Institute[89]	Foreign Ministry
Hellenic Foundation	Presidential Decree[90]	Parliament

[81] British Council, 1993. Royal Charter and Bye-laws. Available from: https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/royalcharter.pdf.
[82] British Council, 2013. Management Statement. Available from: https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/2013-07-management-statement.pdf.
[83] British Council, 2017. Corporate Plan 2017-20. Available from: https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/corporate-plan-2017-20.pdf.
[84] Goethe Institut, 2005. Basic Agreement. Available from: https://www.goethe.de/resources/files/pdf17/Goethe Institut_Basic-Agreement.pdf.
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[90] Ελληνική Δημοκρατία, 2001. Νόμος 2949/2001. ΦΕΚ 243/Α/19-10-2001. Available from: http://www.et.gr/index.php/anazitisi-fek.

6.1.1 Agenda setting and flow of command

Agenda setting is one of the five touchpoints I identified linking the Cultural Institutes to their sponsoring departments and is one of the most complicated aspects of the CIs' work. Since the core aim of the thesis is to trace and map the agency of state in order to uncover its effects on the discourses and practices of the Institutes, I should focus on how strategic goals and their associated parameters are decided and communicated within the organisations. I will analyse agenda setting by looking at the global strategy models of three Cultural Institutes (the British Council, the Goethe Institut and the Institut français), which have worldwide representation and long-term experience in how to run their physical networks. The figures presented below are a product of the interviews and have been discussed, revised and validated by a number of participants (for more information look at 'Tactics to construct research validity' in the CD-ROM). As we will see, the rest of the CIs in this project did not have a concrete strategy yet as to how the physical network should be coordinated.

This is an important observation since another conclusion I have reached to after the thematic analysis I ran is that the CIs are constantly referring to each other's work with the highest number of references being made from the smaller CIs regarding the work and example of the larger CIs. Our participants from the Instituto Cervantes, the Hellenic Foundation and the Swedish Institute would often mention in the interviews the practices of the British Council, the Goethe Institut and the Institut français, however, the opposite would not happen. Our data supports that we will witness a degree of homogenisation in how the Cultural Institutes manage their operations in the future. Paschalidis (2009) notes that homogeneity is manifest not only in organisational practices, but also in rhetoric and content. The rhetoric of cultural exchange with a programmatic focus on the export of elite culture has been the model the older Cultural Institutes originally set which the emerging CIs subsequently copied.



Figure 19. Strategic Planning in the British Council. Source: Author.

A notable difference between the model of the Goethe Institut and that of the British Council is how they manage their regional strategies. The Goethe Institut builds its Basic Strategy (Figure 20) based on the Framework Agreement signed between the German Federal Foreign Office and the Goethe Institut Munich. According to my participants, the Goethe Institut gives considerable freedom to the regional directors to co-shape along with the local directors the strategies in their area of jurisdiction. In NW Europe, for example, the Germans follow the reverse logic from the British and entrust the local offices with the responsibility to draft first their programmes. After a year of planning and constant consultation with the regional Goethe Institut office as well as with the headquarters in Munich, all local programmes will come to the hands of the regional director who is the key person to design the regional strategy and allocate funds to the country offices. The regional directors have the capacity to shape the strategic framework of the country programmes and the local programmes but not decisively since the regional strategies emerge last. Despite following the top-down concept in its overall design, this model contains a mechanism that moderates the power of the headquarters and the regional offices (top-down design with a bottom-up component).



Figure 20.Strategic planning in the Goethe Institut. Source: Author.

In the case of the Institut français (Figure 21), the Paris office is not the headquarters. The office is seen more as a resource center that prepares material to be used by the network; for example, cinema is a basic component of France's strategy and the Institut français in Paris negotiates the rights for the films that the Institut français offices worldwide will showcase (I22, P.170, L.26-39). The fact that the Institut français Paris is a resource center for specific projects also means that the Institut français overseas network is not funded by the Paris office as in all other cases (UK, Germany). The overseas offices cover their operational costs by grants coming directly from the French MFA (Commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées, 2017). To work on their programmes they need to apply for funding either to the MFA or to the Institut français in Paris through a call for projects. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs through its embassies signs separate Action Plans with the Institut français franchise of each country and the strategy is built top-down following the lead of the Ambassador each time.



Figure 21. Strategic planning in the Institut français. Source: Author.

As for the rest of the case studies, the Swedish Institute is contemplating a 'smart' expansion of its network in the long term which may include placing staff at the embassies or, even better, collaborating further with EUNIC colleagues or other actors.

> *I would say that creating a physical network would not be in our strategy right now. However, we are looking into the benefit of having collaborators either locally employed within our embassies around the world or locally employed within other Swedish agencies. Or collaborating in general with other Swedish stakeholders. But to build a physical structure would not be part of our strategy. But it is always part of our strategy to have people doing offline activities. We are doing a lot online activities, we have a very strong online presence. But it would add value both to have people on site and to have people on site collaborating as part of a larger 'Team Sweden' (I24, P.183, L.29-35).*

Another Swedish participant added the following regarding the issue of placing additional staff within the embassies:

We would like to entertain the idea of opening up pop-up offices around the world because for our target audiences around the world there is a point in not being at an Embassy when you are doing cultural relations activities or whatever you are doing. Many of the target audiences find it much more interesting and more relevant to be elsewhere than an Embassy. That's also why when we work with our Embassies we always encourage them not to necessarily do the activity at the Embassy because still Embassies invite to dialogue, but they can also be intimidating for some people. So, they ought to be outside in the city or the country. (I17, P.131, L.16-23).

In the case of the Instituto Cervantes our participants representing the organisation support that the CI is very close to reaching a consensus on its global strategy and to appoint regional directors, however, there are serious issues that require attention as the local offices tend to be unruly.

[T]his is one of the problems of our network. The overseas branches are so independent that they are often independent from themselves as well. And this is a big trouble in countries where we have a number of centres like Brazil, or Britain, or Italy, or Morocco. And in those places, we have mechanisms for coordination, but these do not affect very much the degree of autonomy of our centres. That is a big, big drawback of our international operations structure. The Centres are very autonomous, very independent from the Head Office but also very independent from themselves (I16, P.125, L.8-14).

My other participant confirmed that the formulation of regional strategies is one of the greatest challenges the network faces.

The problem I see with that is unless it is written down and unless it is clearly established who is the leader and who is meant to follow the rules, it is not going to be very efficient. Because one thing is coordinating ourselves and say 'okay, this is what we ought to do' and another thing is establishing a clear hierarchy which will allow the strategy to be implemented (I19, P.149, L.44-47).

But what will the strategy model of the Instituto Cervantes look like? As argued earlier, policy transfer may become a typical phenomenon for the Cultural Institutes. The Instituto Cervantes constitutes a case which looks toward the British Council to change its operational model with a strong focus on financial independence.

> *Some would say that the ideal is the British Council but in reality, it is the Institut français that we really look like. And obviously the idea is that we should be more self-financed. That's very important* (I19, P.144, L.20-22).

Likewise, Greece follows the French paradigm in which central state agents play a predominant role in decision making. Strategic planning here is realised in consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (I4, P.41, L.10 and I7, P.64, L.39-41), even though the organisation typically reports to the Ministry of Culture and Sports.

> *I: I read that you report to the Department of International Relations of the Ministry of Culture and Sports.*
>
> *P: Yes, but what is our communication with them?*
>
> *I: I don't know. This is what I want to find out from you. I thought that there were some briefs with the strategy.*
>
> *P: We are not preoccupied with what the Department says and they don't care much about us. It depends on the staff and the people. […]*
>
> *I: I see. I always thought that you maintained a good relationship with the Department of International Relations of the MoCS and that you would have regular meetings and you would know each other.*
>
> *P: We are also at fault here. We are independent and we never thought that we should establish a connection. Secondly, they never came to knock on our door and when they did their mentality was very interventionist. (I4, P.32, L.8-12 and P.82, L.30-34).*

As becomes obvious by the above extract, there is no clear mandate by the government as to how the organisation should pursue its goals. This is a finding

which confirms the data I pulled together and presented in Table 7. Although the absence of prescriptive targets could prove an asset for the Hellenic Foundation for Culture, the organisation has not taken advantage of its autonomy and is in limbo since the first stages of its life.

We have examined the global strategy models of the three oldest and biggest CIs and we found that all three of them use as the basis for their strategies an agreement signed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. State agency through this lens reveals the deontic modality since all the organisations are called to align their cultural and educational strategies with foreign policy priorities as these are dictated by the respective ministries. Although our participants maintained that these agreements are always a subject of discussion and negotiation, the very existence of such documents brings the Cultural Institutes in an arm around the shoulder relationship. By contrast, it may be said that those Cultural Institutes that seemingly suffer from lack of guidance enjoy in reality greater autonomy. The potential to design their own strategy without setting up target-bound contracts is an opportunity to follow an agenda that reflects mainly educational and cultural concerns.

6.1.2 Relationship to the network of embassies

In this section, I am continuing my exploration of the previous theme and delve deeper into the relationship between the local network of offices of the CIs to the network of embassies and consulates the source country maintains on the ground. This approach will help us pin down how the MFA, and by extension the state, is linked to each CI locally.

According to the study ‘European Cultural Institutes Abroad’ (European Parliament, 2016, pp.38-43) published on behalf of the European Parliament, the majority of the Cultural Institutes report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of their country with the exception of the Hellenic Foundation for Culture which reports to the Ministry of Culture and the Instituto Cervantes which reports to both the MFA and the MoC (see Table 1). Interestingly, the information we derived from our interviews comes to challenge the rigidity of the above classification. Although the Instituto Cervantes has an administrative board comprising of representatives of both authorities, the organisation drafts its strategy with regard to the foreign policy priorities of the MFA which do not necessarily reflect the cultural policy priorities of the MoC (I16, P.126, L.2). Similarly, although the Hellenic Foundation for Culture is an arm’s length body of the MoCS, major strategic decisions were always taken in close consultation with the MFA as we saw. Apparently, even when one state actor appears to be the dominant authority, a closer look may reveal that another actor is pulling the strings. However, the typology that the study presented is interesting as it is based on official data collected from the organisations themselves, hence, the discourse is indicative of the (hi)stories the Cultural Institutes say for themselves.

Many CIs maintain presence in certain countries only through their embassies rendering them more dependent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs than if they had their own separate premises and staff. Usually the go-to person responsible for culture within the embassy is the cultural counsellor, however, the profession of the cultural counsellor (or cultural attaché) was never well-established and the job tasks are largely ill-defined rendering the post a particularly problematic affair in the diplomatic ranks (Shmagin, 2008). For most diplomatic missions, the cultural counsellor is considered a quasi-diplomat in the sense that the post-holder carries a diplomatic passport, nevertheless, he/she is not a graduate of the Diplomatic Academy.

In the case of the Institut français, the cultural counsellor at the embassy serves as director of the Institut français franchise in the country bringing the Cultural Institute under the direct control of the French MFA. One participant explains:

> *For example, in Japan the Institut français has many buildings in many cities, but there is the head of what they call 'Institut français Japan' who is the cultural counsellor and is now a diplomat. In Tokyo you have an Institut français building that has its own director, but that director is deputy director of 'Institut français Japan'. And the director of Institut français Osaka serves also as deputy director of 'Institut français Japan'. And when you have Alliance française in the country, the cultural counsellor must also try to coordinate the work of Alliance française (I22, P.174, L.28-34).*

What is striking is that even a private not-for-profit organisation as Alliance française does not act fully independently from the government. In 2011 France fused all networks pursuing foreign cultural policy into one single operator elevating the Institut français to a dominant position in France's cultural diplomacy strategy as we have already seen in 6.3.3. The French government demanded from all other actors to concede their powers to the Institut français and, subsequently, to the MFA (France Diplomatie, 2015). Hierarchy here is the ultimate means that ensures compliance with state priorities.

Quite surprisingly, in the case of Sweden, the cultural counsellors seconded in the embassies are appointed and salaried by the Ministry of Culture, nevertheless, they are working on a budget granted by the MFA (I21, P.161, L.34-37). The Ministry of Culture appoints counsellors for cultural affairs only in key countries with a geographical focus in Europe and EU neighbouring countries (Government Offices of Sweden, n.d.). However, the Swedish Institute is in close collaboration with all Swedish embassies and not just with those that maintain a cultural counsellor (European Cultural Foundation, 2006). In any case, it seems that the complete absence of an autonomous Swedish Institute network has rendered the organisation dependent of the embassy network; however, the symbiotic relationship of the MFA and the MoC in pursuit of their common goals needs further scrutiny.

In the case of the Instituto Cervantes, the relationship to the missions abroad seems to be more flexible compared to the relationship the organisation has with the central government in Madrid. One Spanish participant observes:

> *[T]he operations are determined in big part by what the head office [of the Instituto Cervantes] in Madrid says. So, the Ambassador can propose occasionally some partnerships, activities but this is very minor [sic] interference (I16, P.124, L.34-36).*

This flexibility is well explained since the Instituto Cervantes represents abroad not only Spain but also the majority of Spanish-speaking countries in Latin America through a mixed board of trustees (Instituto Cervantes, 2017). Therefore, it cannot be situated too close to the Spanish embassies worldwide as this would create a conflict of interest. On the contrary, it should maintain a high degree of autonomy to gain further legitimacy for the Ibero-American cause which has been one of the principal priorities of Spanish foreign policy the past decades (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, 2015). The close attention the Spanish government pays to the organisation confirms the importance of the Spanish language in foreign policy and also proves how closely Spanish politicians monitor the relations between metropolitan Spain and Spanish-speaking countries through the mixed board of trustees. In this respect, hierarchical relations once again define the operation of the organisation.

In the British context, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has disengaged from its cultural activities in places where the British Council has representation to avoid confusion and pull resources. British Council's participant notes:

> *Where there is British Council representation, the Embassy would not have a cultural counsellor. Nearly always we are the cultural counsellor or we assume that role. So, in some countries the British Council is diplomatic because the British Council director has diplomatic status (I20, P.154, L.48-51).*

Duignan and Gann (1996, p.424) support this statement explaining that historically although "the Council stood outside the civil service . . . its most senior representatives abroad enjoyed diplomatic status as cultural attachés." This is a suitable design for these cases when the British Council operates as part of the embassy, e.g. in Beijing. This model has emerged out of necessity and is not

endemic in the British case only. It is, however, a particularly convenient arrangement allowing the Cultural Institutes to earn from this spatial symbiosis by generating tax-free revenue. According to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (United Nations, 1961), all revenue created by consular services is exempt from taxes and although the educational activities of the CIs are not traditionally thought of as consular services, they are frequently treated as such. The symbiosis of the organisation with the embassy does not create a superior-subordinate relationship as the organisation works with its own budget and strategy.

In Germany, culture and education as public policy areas are not administered by a centralised ministry in Berlin, but fall under the responsibility of the federal states, the municipalities and the cities as we have established earlier (Blumenreich, 2016). Our participants from the Goethe Institut maintained that the devolved character of the German cultural policy and the trauma of the Second World War has allowed the Goethe Institut to remain at a distance from the government (I.18, P.138, L.1-6). But is the Goethe Institut so independent from the embassy network? As in the British example, some of the Goethe Institut offices form part of the German missions abroad and are housed within the embassy premises, e.g. in Moscow. However, this does not necessarily imply dependence from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the Goethe Institut has its own resources and mandate.

Last, in the case of Greece, the MFA is the responsible authority to appoint cultural counsellors in the embassies. Greece has only a handful of cultural counsellors left in post with most having retired without being replaced, a practice which indicates the status cultural diplomacy has within the Greek MFA (I10, P.83-83). The Hellenic Foundation for Culture has been using these counsellors by sending out grants to support their work thus extending its network (Hellenic Foundation for Culture, 2014). However, there is an administrative bra-de-fer between the MFA and the MoCS that hinders effective policy making (I5, P.57, L.8-20 and I7, P.65, L.43-55). This antagonism remains undocumented in literature on Greek cultural diplomacy, however, similar experience from the Norwegian context shows that cooperation between the two authorities can become particularly problematic when one authority shows signs of dominance (Berge, n.d.).

Building international cultural relations has never been apolitical but lately we witness a tendency to think of politics more through Machiavellian terms, as if politics is ipso facto amoral. The loss of trust in government as a creative force of meaningful policymaking derives from a loss of credibility of the political actors (Keefer, 2007). Therefore, instrumentalism has been treated as an anathema by practitioners who fear that intimate relations with the government will delegitimize their intentions. In the quest for a solution, legislators and practitioners have found different ways to grapple with the problem. Legislators have resorted to complex legal forms to ensure both autonomy and accountability (Pamment, 2012). The Cultural Institutes are linked to the state through various control mechanisms some more visible and others planted into the system detectable only by those involved. The complex architecture of the policy environment and the elaborate legal forms organisations take blur intentionally the lines between what is governmental, hence suspicious, and what is non-governmental. Outside policymaking circles, practitioners denounce the use of the politically-charged term 'cultural diplomacy' to denominate their work turning to the value-neutral term 'international cultural relations'. It is evident, however, that the rhetoric alone cannot re-legitimize the means and that profound restructuring in the Cultural Institutes needs to take place so that rhetoric, programmatic content and organisational architecture are aligned.

As evident, instrumentalism in cultural diplomacy is linked to broader bureaucratic formations which determine its function and underlying structure. We should not forget that instrumentalism as a concept sprang out from philosophy to cover today remarkably varied disciplines like economics, political science and pedagogy among others. In all these areas we can find discussions which juxtapose the pragmatic approach of instrumentalism to the romanticised notion of idealism.

But what are the narratives that tie culture to different areas of public policy and move it away from the tenet 'culture for culture's sake'? The civilising mission of culture which can cultivate the masses and uplift them to play their social role as good citizens has been a narrative that sees culture through the educational lens and puts it at the service of society. There are other forms that instrumentalism can take in which culture can be placed at the service of the economy with the concomitant invention of the 'creative industries' and the treatment of cultural goods as products (Belfiore, 2012). Culture is also used to deliver political outcomes with cultural diplomacy providing an exemplary case to this argument.

Paschalidis (2009) has distinguished among four phases into how foreign cultural policy has developed which pinpoint the different instrumental uses culture has known outside the domestic frontier. Initially culture in external relations was used with a civilising mission to educate the ignorant 'others'. This treatment of culture accentuates its role as a generator of societal value making culture a fine ingredient of social policy. In the second phase, culture was used to display national superiority through the use of cultural symbols which served as a testimony for the sublime nature of the nation. The third phase saw culture acting as a liaison to ease out tensions and stabilise an extremely polarised international field as the case of US diplomacy displays during the Cold War. Paschalidis (2009, p.283) maintains that today foreign cultural policy has passed into the era of "cultural capitalism" which is characterised by an intense focus in profit making through the exploitation of the creative industries. This is a development that seems to have arisen from domestic concerns over the economic value of culture. Naturally, instrumental uses of culture in both the domestic and the foreign frontier tend to coincide as one feeds into the other.

Hadley and Gray (2017) have, thusly, made a convincing case for hyper instrumentalism in cultural policy arguing that when the pragmatic outcomes of the policy are prioritised, they lead to a loss of cultural meaning. Hadley and Gray's conceptualisation is similar to what we have called in this section 'invasive instrumentalism' pointing out to prescriptive relations and asymmetrical power dynamics ('deontic modality' in agency). By contrast, Gray (2008) has pointed out that agency exists in both sides of the instrumental relationship. The cultural sector itself may exhibit a tendency to attach to other realms of policy redefining in positive terms the relationship. As it may have become evident, this notion is not situated very far from our conceptions of 'mild instrumentalism' and 'dynamic modality'. Actors who may seem to subsume their authority to dominant agents can demonstrate their own form of agency remolding, thus, the relationship creating cultural value out of a seemingly impossible relationship. Through a different path I have shown that indeed instrumentalism is a protean phenomenon able to shift appearances across contexts making it an extremely volatile subject to study especially in a field such as culture in external relations where the stakes are always stressingly high.

In the next table, I summarise the conclusions from this section juxtaposing the findings for the six case studies with regard to the five structural dimensions.

Table 7. Aggregate table for the six cases under study. Source: Author.

	Funding	**Agenda**	**Evaluation**[91]	**Hierarchy**	**Appointments**
	Grant-in-aid	Strategic documents	Assessment frameworks	Relationship to embassy	Management structures
British Council	16.5%	Corporate Plan	In-house evaluation as part of the Corporate Plan	Independent	- Board of Trustees (Director appointed by FCO) - Executive Board - Advisory Boards
Goethe-Institut	59%	Framework Agreement	In-house evaluation as part of the Framework Agreement	Independent	- General Meeting (reps from local government and reps from elected political parties in Bundestag participate next to ordinary members) - Board of Trustees - Board of Directors - Advisory Boards
Institut français Paris	85%	Contract of Objectives and Means	In-house evaluation as part of the Contract of Objectives and Means	n/a	- Board of Directors (Director appointed by MFA)

[91] Evaluation refers here to the checks performed to assess the operations against the set goals and does not include the standard audit checks performed by the central government to investigate tax compliance. As evident, the absence of a strategic document to prescribe goals, either financial or operational, is directly linked to evaluation practices that are vague if existent at all.

Institut français network	25%	Country Plan	Evaluation by If Paris + MFA	Dependent	- Ambassador - Director of If local office (appointed by the MFA)
Instituto Cervantes	86.5%	n/a	n/a	Independent	- Board of Trustees - Board of Directors (Director appointed by MFA) - Advisory Boards
Swedish Institute	86%	n/a	In-house evaluation	Dependent	- Director (Director appointed by MFA) - Advisory board
Hellenic Foundation	85%	n/a	n/a	Independent	- Board of Directors (Director appointed by the Minister of Culture)

Before the end, I would like to present in a visually accessible manner the main finding of this first part of the analysis. I have only hinted so far to the idea that there are varying degrees of arm's lengthness and, hence, instrumentalism. Below, I share a figure which aims to situate the National Cultural Institutes on an axis of instrumentalism. The figure was developed based on an assessment of the arm's length status of each case study presented in Table 8 further below.



Figure 22. The varying degrees of instrumentalism. Source: Author.

It should be highlighted that this study being qualitative in nature did not aim to invent a scale that would measure distance or intimacy to the government through quantitative means in the strict sense. The reason is that it is impossible, as I argue, to quantify data which describes dynamic relationships and any attempt to do so shall always remain arbitrary. I rather chose to create broader classes of descriptors like mild and deontic instrumentalism. There is ample space for the agencies to move within their assgined circle and any changes to their conditions (flow of command, funding quotas) can alter their position. The relationship described above is relative, therefore, any new entry to the table could alter the positions of these agencies on the axis.

I concluded that the British Council and the Goethe Institut, while situated further from the state apparutes in terms of appointments and structural connection to the embassies, they remain instrumentalised because of the contractual agreements they both sign with the Foreign Ministry. The Institut français represents the most centralised agency in the sample. The Swedish Institut, due

to its structural connection to the embassies (the organisation does not have its own network of offices so instead it is making use of existing personnel placed within the embassies to run programs) and its financial dependence to the MFA, is situated in the mid range. On the other end, the Hellenic Foundation and the Instituto Cervantes despite being heavily influenced by party politics (I explained earlier how appointments to the Board of Directors go through the central government), they enjoy greater autonomy in their day-to-day tasks due to the absence of set goals and evaluation frameworks. Whether they make use of this autonomy or draft strategy agendas which follow the state narrative and interests is another hot issue. The structural connections, or else touchpoints, of the National Cultural Institutes to their sponsoring departments is, however, not the only means of control and this is why we may find that organisations follow the standard route of instrumentalisation despite being given certain privilieges such as an open agenda.

Table 8. Performance breakdown per touchpoint. Source: Author.

	Funding	**Agenda**	**Evaluation**	**Hierarchy**	**Appointments**	**Total**
British Council	1	1	1	0	0.5	**3.5**
Goethe Institut	1	1	1	0	0	**3**
Institut français	1	1	1	1	1	**5**
Instituto Cervantes	0	0	0	0	1	**1**
Swedish Institut	0.5	0	0	1	1	**2.5**
Hellenic Foundation	0	0	0	0.5	1	**1.5**

Funding = state fund is bracketed towards specific goals
Agenda = existence of contractual agreement
Evaluation = in-house evaluation framework/report submitted to the sponsoring authority
Hierarchy = use of embassy network to launch programmes/events
Appointments = centralised appointments of members in decision making organs

Yes: 1, No: 0, Yes under conditions: 0.5

6.2 The dynamics of cultural diplomacy

In this section, I will explore the immaterialist dimension of foreign cultural policy governance. Governments do not merely demand accountability through the structural means we have seen earlier, they are endorsing specific conceptual frameworks and paths of action which sustain the established system. I argue here that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values is indeed a dichotomy that is losing ground as there has been a reconfiguration of purpose and subsequent relocation of value in what is thought to be 'the middle ground'. In the previous section, I sidelined intentionally dynamic elements like personal beliefs which I hypothesised had the ability to modify power relationships. The study openly acknowledged its structural functionalist underpinnings, however, the overall project should not be narrowly framed as such as this piece will prove. Exploring governance mechanisms is not sufficient to understand how the power game is constituted and played out within and across government departments and agencies. The apparatuses alone do not define the imprint of the practice. There is an almost invisible system of functions that unfolds outside the standard route of administrative control.

The dynamics of cultural diplomacy describe the set of contrasting principles in the governance of cultural relations and point to the return of ideology in Gramscian terms. Gramsci, as we saw in chapter 2.2, believed that ideology is nested to power relations and constitutes the core element of control and subordination. Ideology can mould the perceptions and direct the choices of individuals according to the preferences of the dominant group. The rationale of the dominant group becomes then the hegemonic reality that determines the framework of thinking of smaller actors (Gramsci, 1971; Daldal, 2014). Although Marxists, and neo-Marxists in the case of Gramsci, locate power at two points, the top and the bottom of the social pyramid as this is constituted by class relations (vertical level), the present study is looking at ideology within the same group of subjects (horizontal level). I am exploring here how ideology shapes policy attitudes arguing that it is the locus wherein conflictual opinions about the role of culture in external relations lie and from where individual policy solutions may depart.

6.2.1 The contextual framework

I am linking here the debate around cultural value in Cultural Policy studies to different conceptual understandings of the terms 'cultural diplomacy' and 'cultural relations' as these surfaced in my interviews. I have discussed as part of the literature review the semantic differences between like terms as these were understood, and at times normalised, by scholars. The definitional conundrum though constitutes a relevant debate in practice as well and captures succinctly the different hues of instrumentalism. In the discussions I have had with participants, the signified and the signifier were meshed and soon the language would shift from describing policy intentions to explaining terminology.

I argue that there are actors in foreign cultural policy who are interested in maximising the economic and political influence of their states. I have called those 'realists' as they are primarily concerned with power consolidation and they will use culture as an ordinary means to increase their influence in the international arena. Culture is principally merited for its extrinsic quality to bring financial returns and boost national security. By contrast, there are those who view culture as a vehicle for genuine dialogue and relationship building. I have called this group 'idealists'. The idealists are more interested in power distribution and knowledge transfer through networks and, at the same time, they are more open to acknowledging the non-utilitarian character that culture has. Culture here is valorised both for its extrinsic quality as a social powerhouse as well as for its intrinsic quality. There is, however, a third group whose allegiance sits conveniently at the intersection between the two. I have called this third group 'pragmatists', because they seem to occupy the centre space between the two poles. Culture, according to them, can assist in stimulating economic growth in the interior (financial value), it can help maximise political influence internationally (political value) and, at the same time, it can be a strong driver for social development contributing to well-being (social value) without losing its attendant intrinsic qualities (cultural value).

The thematic network I share below indicates the central role value has in the governance of cultural diplomacy. This figure is the same as the one I introduced earlier (Figure 18), however, for the purpose of this section I am circling three different nodes. I am focusing in the theme 'Cultural Value' and its dependent

nodes ‘culture as end’, ‘culture as means’ and ‘the third pole’ (Figure 23). All these three lines of thought were present in my interviews.



Figure 23. Thematic network merging all the interviews. Source: Author.

6.2.2 Realists, Idealists and the third pole

In this section, I am using nine quotes from nine different participants to illustrate my argument on the existence of three ideological poles in the governance of foreign cultural policy. Each ideological position brackets a specific narrative about the role of culture in external affairs and points out to a different term to describe cultural activity beyond the national border (Table 9).

Table 9. Quotes grouped per ideological group. Source: Various.

Realists	*Quote 1: …culture is not about staging an event, it is politics. It is clearly politics* (I3, P.24, L.52-53).
Realists	*Quote 2: Sometimes the component of cultural policy is so small that we tend to forget it* (I16, P.126, L.2).
Realists	*Quote 3: So, in cultural diplomacy what is important is, of course, culture but also diplomacy. We say cultural diplomacy because it is part of our foreign policy (I25, P.186, L.19-21).*
Idealists	*Quote 4: I prefer the term cultural foreign policy. […] In all this, the main organ should be the Ministry of Culture and not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the MFA, and the responsible directorate there, they appoint diplomats who do not appreciate the subject* (I2, P16., L.21 and L.22-25).
Idealists	*Quote 5: If we can build relationships on an institutional level and if we can get people meeting and talking to each other and chatting and sharing experiences, then we build a strong foundation; there may be political turbulence, but these relationships survive for the long term and that is critical* (I20, P.156, L.37-40).
Idealists	*Quote 6: Cultural affairs play a very important role now. And I don't think this is good, because they have corrupted the field of culture. In International Relations and in the conduct of politics the realist school and tradition is dominant and they see culture as an instrument of conflict (I4, P.33, L.15-18).*
Pragmatists	*Quote 7: …you cannot separate completely cultural diplomacy from cultural relations. Building cultural relations is political work. These two things need to be seen in a certain relation and one has to be very aware of the political consequences of doing work*

	in cultural relations and in order to understand what cultural diplomacy really means and make it successful, you need basic knowledge and experience of how intercultural processes are developing. You need very deep knowledge and sensitivity for cultural differences, you need to have knowledge on artistic and cultural expression, you have to know what cultural dialogue really means (I15, P.118, L.47-54).
Pragmatists	*Quote 8: I have actually never encountered a country where they have a clear and very unambiguous understanding of why they use the terms they do exactly. […] We use different terminologies for what we do depending on who we talk to* (I17, P.128, L.12-13 and L.25).
Pragmatists	*Quote 9: …we do cultural diplomacy; we are the tool of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to organise that diplomacy. And for us cultural diplomacy and international cultural relations are linked. You can't separate the two (I22, P.172, L.57 and P.173, L.1-2).*

Although interpretations over the role of culture in society appear as country-specific in literature (British Council and Goethe Institut, 2018), I found that the national context is not the single most significant factor in assigning value and policymakers' opinions are mainly shaped by their professional experience. I had also wrongly assumed while designing the study that policymakers in foreign ministries would turn out to be hardline realists while legislators in culture ministries would tend towards idealism. Q1, Q3 and Q4 do indeed illustrate with fantastic clarity this assumption. A closer look into the transcripts, however, proved that I was assigning qualities to my participants much congruent to my beliefs of how bureaucrats should perform in their roles and according to their institutional affiliation. The workplace per se did not define ideology. It was a necessary, but not sufficient condition to explain allegiance. I realised that the discourses of my participants changed frequently as the interview moved on. For example, the participant that shared Q1 at the start of our interview, later on noted that "[c]ulture is a bridge for building rapport on a bilateral and multilateral level" (I3, P.26, L.13-14). Towards the end of the interview he shifted again and stated that: "…culture can add to development. It's what we call the creative industries…" (I3, P.26, L.28). The policymaker who shared Q3 went on even to state that: "Cultural relations is a consequence of cultural diplomacy, so we do cultural diplomacy in order to build

cultural relations" (I25, P.186, L.21-22). The policymaker who shared Q4, and whom I labelled as idealist, took a more realist approach as the interview continued:

> *We should be looking at the big countries in Europe that make money out of what they call the marketisation of cultural production and they are assisted in this by the popularity of their language. This is where the linguistic advantage matters* (I2, P.19, L.54-57).

In fact, the majority of policymakers in the sample seemed to be shifting from idealist to realist discourses depending on the context of the question. Why was there such fluidity indeed?

Scrutinising my interview sample even further, I realised that in its majority it consisted of people working in the upper echelons of the bureaucratic world. It was irritatingly homogeneous in that it contained professionals who were not involved in project delivery but were only responsible for the strategic design of CD programmes. The few interviews I held with practitioners working also on the ground[92] showed that professionals who come in contact with foreign audiences comprehend their work more through idealistic terms compared to their peers in leadership positions. The more one is involved with the governance of cultural diplomacy, the more likely they are to make use of pragmatic arguments to justify decisions. The degree of interaction, literally and metaphorically, with the centre of political power is, therefore, the strongest determinant I found.

The hypothesis I mentioned above, and which insinuated the existence of an institutional culture passed on to policymakers, is not entirely at fault. Foreign ministries belong to this constellation of government departments that exert tremendous influence in the cabinet. Although scholars have pointed out to the weaknesses these political giants suffer from (Hocking, 1999), their imprint in decision making circles cannot be questioned. I argued earlier that distance from political circles is a fundamental element in shaping, maintaining or disrupting ideologies. Foreign ministries pursue a clearly delineated political agenda and their mission, unlike other ministerial authorities, is to create or take advantage of systemic opportunities by coordinating the actions of other national agents to

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[92] I6, I18, I19, I21, I23 were conducted with people who were delivering projects on the ground at the moment of the interview.

maximise gains in the international arena. Therefore, their role is de facto instrumental. However, their currency is progressively failing as the conditions that defended their highly strategic function have fallen through the cracks of postmodernity. The quest for legitimacy has shifted priorities in the design of foreign policy.

On the other side of the pendulum, culture ministries were traditionally bastions of left-wing activists advocating fervently for the intrinsic value of culture. Yet, the past decades the creative industries discourse, on a national scale, and the soft power rhetoric, on an international scale, have transformed the intentions and expectations of cultural actors. As neo-liberalism deepens, I argue that the two ministries are attracted towards opposite discourses as a survival tactic to withstand the pressures of both the public purpose movement and the accountability crusade. This attraction has interestingly created a third pole of ideology within the ranks of policymakers, which compromises both theses.

The pragmatists do not accept the single value thesis (extrinsic vs. intrinsic), but maintain that culture has the unique ability to accommodate both intentions. The use of cultural means to achieve instrumental outcomes does not retract or lessen the morality of the medium. The discourse of cultural cooperation is not a veil that obscures foul intentions; it is a course of action with the ability to achieve results on multiple levels. This is a powerful ideological stance as it allows actors to adapt to differing circumstances showcasing a more 'liquid' nature (Bauman, 2000).

The pragmatists also believe in the interdependence of policy sectors and, thus, create *super-narratives* that include items from different agendas. They do not limit themselves to the cultural sphere alone. A good example to illustrate this point comes from Scandinavia. The story of Sweden is that of a nation characterised by high levels of social consciousness with a programmatic focus in environmental protection, gender equality and social welfare institutions. This cuts across the work of at least four different government departments in the country and multiple arm's length bodies (indicatively, Ministry of Environment and Energy, Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, Ministry of Employment, Ministry of Education and Research). In a world that faces a plethora of global issues from extreme poverty to human-inflicted climate change, declining mental health and inequality of various forms, governments will choose to address in their foreign policy strategies these areas wherein they already present a comparative advantage. It is the rise

of the civil society as a central actor in the conduct of international cultural affairs in late modernity that has assisted governments recalibrate their focus and present a more socially sensitive rhetoric.

> *When populations identify more with transnational concerns than those defined by the state, they 'relocate' authority to a non-state entity or figure, which in turn enables the non-state actor to amass moral legitimacy and to influence the behaviour of states from outside (Kelley, 2010, p.289).*

Having realised this shift of power, state agents are now partnering with non-state actors to increase their legitimacy and place emphasis on those global concerns that match brilliantly with their national interests (Castells, 2008). Governments artfully turn inversely the problem by pointing out to the policies they have fashioned to address it, thus, transforming the global concern to a national value, an asset that can later be 'liquidated' through diplomacy. This value must above all have a 'representational quality', that is to represent the country the best to the public eye, both domestic and foreign. Anholt (2011) calls this 'substance' and argues that without it the value would be empty of meaning not only rendering it useless promotionally, but also threatening the reputational integrity of the country and its achievements so far. Culture is just one item on an agenda that has multiple axes. This approach allows the pragmatists to create programmes that resonate stronger to foreign audiences as they link horizontally to a number of problems societies are facing today.

It appears as if there is no space for a non-utilitarian approach and that the hedonic element that always accompanied the cultural practice is reframed in contemporary policy discourses. The problem is exceptionally complex and traces its origins in the philosophy of ethics. It concerns structures and modes of signification which, as Holden (2007) has accurately observed, are bound to space and time. A general retreat of hedonism started in the mid-19th century. This retreat slowly shifted emphasis from the ideal (intrinsic) to the real (extrinsic). What is taking place, however, within the range of instrumental discourses during our times is even more interesting. Foreign cultural policy favours a pluri-utilitarian approach in policymaking transferring the focus on the benefits yielded out of the interplay of the three utilitarian approaches (political – financial – social) with the cultural dimension. Figure 24 below presents how I view the shift from a binary model

where idealism favours the intrinsic value of culture and realism supports the extrinsic values of culture to a non-binary model where there is neither a dichotomy between intrinsic – extrinsic values nor a hierarchical prioritisation of values according to their utility. I support that the non-binary model on the right is increasingly gaining ground in foreign cultural policy.



Figure 24. The interplay of discourses around value. Source: Author.

At this point I wish to flag up a very problematic point in literature. The recent review on cultural value, published by the British Council and the Goethe Institut (2018), mentions that Germany at the start of the 20th century pursued, very much like other nations, an imperialist agenda driven by realpolitik concerns. Against this single-minded approach which viewed cultural relations as a tool for territorial expansion and political influence, liberalism – the review explains – provided an alternative discourse on the use of culture in foreign affairs: "Liberal politicians perceived foreign cultural policy as a way of overcoming the power-focused Realpolitik of the Reich and arriving at a foreign policy driven by economic concerns" (British Council and Goethe Institut, 2018, pp.14-15). It should be made clear that for cultural policy researchers, economic instrumentalism is as much a realist's project as political instrumentalism. A foreign cultural policy plan that treats the cultural other as a consumer is far from ideal. The only form of instrumentalism that has been more palatable for cultural policy scholars – yet not entirely so – is the use of the arts and culture in policies designed to improve the social conditions in which people live. The achievement of social outcomes through cultural means is the new standard, since the fight for the intrinsic value of culture seems to have

been forever lost. Therefore, the figure above could see the tiret 'social value' to pass from the tradition of realism to the tradition of idealism.

I should highlight that ideologies do not necessarily solidify into concrete identities but may remain liquid and malleable. However, the teleturgical nature of bureaucratic work may produce silo mentalities. An interesting question that naturally arises from this observation is this: what can organisations and policy organs do to avoid the crystallisation of ideologies of their representatives? The principle of rotation finds relevance here (Neumann, 2005). Rotation is essentially an act of disrupting delegation processes by reshuffling hierarchies. Taking leading voices in cultural diplomacy governance from prime positions and placing them closer to action could work as a catalyst for them to re-evaluate their policy attitudes. The principle of rotation, which is used in some cultural diplomacy organisations, can be said to be an operation for the decentralisation of power. Naturally, only the largest organisations can afford and support the coordination and management of such a laborious system of secondments[93]. Some of the smaller Cultural Institutes entrust tasks and assign roles to their members for life (Hellenic Foundation for Culture), while others — in the absence of a physical network — make use of an extended system of liaisons installed outside the organisation to assist them in carrying through with their agenda (Swedish Institute). As evident from above, distance from the centre of power may imply either geographical or institutional detachment. In any case, the decentralisation of power is necessary to break alliances and re-organise hierarchies.

I support that the more rigid the institutional requirements are, the more likely it is for bureaucrats to adopt either a realist's perspective or, at the very least, a pragmatist's attitude in order to survive the pressures of their work environment. Resistance to adhere to systemic rules, or even reformation, would be an idealist's project. Nevertheless, noncompliance with the current status quo presupposes the development of *paradigm consciousness* (Femia, 1975). In the absence of it, the Gramscian *philosophy of praxis* cannot come to life, and actors are unable to alter their circumstances (Haug, 2000).

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[93] The Cultural Institutes under study in this project that work with the principle of rotation are the British Council, the Goethe Institut, the Institut français and the Instituto Cervantes.

6.3 A note on the binary 'structure – agency'

The binary 'structure – agency' is a really old idea in Marxist thought, but it is also a relevant theoretical schema in diplomatic research. Diplomatic studies are trying to break free from the close associations that tie its ontological principles to either International Relations theory or Foreign Policy Analysis. In the first instance, focus is given to the structural conditions which determine states' behaviour and, in the second instance, weight is given to the analysis of actors' individual agency usually with the aid of cognitive psychology. However, there are numerous voices the past decade that call for a more nuanced approach in analysing diplomatic behaviour and impact situated away from the shadow of these two fields which so far have been presented as overarching domains engulfing diplomatic studies (Bjola, 2013). Sharp (2009) has pointed out to the need to officially acknowledge that diplomacy operates today in a more expanded space and that it is a form of engagement not only appropriate for managing state relationships, but also facilitating the communication between societies and other non-institutionalised groups. Nonetheless, as Constantinou, Kerr and Sharp (2016) have observed there is a general resistance to developing a metatheory of diplomacy – that is a theory on theories of the diplomatic practice and research and it rests to be seen whether this new wave of research advocating for a distinct body of thought to interpret diplomatic intentions, strategies and outcomes will eventually prevail.

In my study, it seems that the debate around the value of culture is inescapable in academia. Policymakers, however, may not necessarily share the same perceptions with scholars regarding the dichotomy between the extrinsic and intrinsic value of culture. I have found that more often than not they alternate between these theses without ethical dilemmas. It may be true then what Belfiore (2012) has argued that the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic values is a theoretical construct fashioned by scholars in order to analyse policy intentions. This indeed is confirmed by my study, in which I found that the realists and the idealists are not fixed ideological groups, but they emigrate from one category to another depending on the context creating a third body of thought which does not distinguish between values.

The dynamics of cultural diplomacy re-introduce agency in what may have seemed to be a space devoid of intention, where mechanisms regulated and

standardised actors' behaviours in a paternalistic manner. Useful as they may be, the concepts of structure and agency are constrained by their own ontology. One must be really careful not to fall into the trap of prioritising either the structural or the ideological component of the relationship, but rather examine the dichotomy with the aim to understand the interaction between the two spheres (Carlsnaes, 1992). The dynamics and mechanics of cultural diplomacy present the governance of foreign cultural policy as a closed system of interactions. They appear as deterministic apparatuses that prevent exogenous elements from entering the system. Only the agents already involved in the structure are seemingly able to alter its function. Nevertheless, externalities do impact greatly on both operations and discourses in cultural diplomacy.

Next to this, it is worthwhile pondering on the idea that the diplomatic profession is not an insulated set of prescribed practices and diplomats may express personal agency despite their role as representatives of the state (Bjola, 2015). This agency is much stronger when these actors have a quasi-diplomatic status as the case is in cultural diplomacy, hence, even in within the ranks of the MFA we may find traces of change or resistance to instrumentalism. It is, thus, possible that the third pole has emerged exactly because the state's interests are mediated by actors who do not strictly identify with the diplomatic dimension of their work and so do not adhere to the paths of action set for them. Therefore, it may well be that the agency of civil society actors has altered decisively and permanently the rules of the game.

Ideology is always omnipresent in studies about power. It is an abstract web that captures and structures disorganised thoughts and turns them into systemic thinking by ascribing high - low value to social issues. It is a symbolic atlas of navigation so fundamental that it remains unseen. I mentioned above in my analysis that there is an ideology that prevails within the ranks of cultural diplomacy administrators. In its present form, the structures (mechanics) support and favour the flourishing of a very specific ideology (dynamics), that of the realists; or, vice versa, the realists have organised the structural conditions, so they can lead and shape the cultural message. The soft power discourse was, probably despite the intentions of Joseph Nye (2004), auxiliary in this direction. Culture is another weapon in the arsenal of the realists.

I do not apprehend this dominance as a global conspiracy master plan rather as a regional phenomenon which has prevailed mostly due to path dependences

and the absence of a clear political vision to explore new conceptual and regulatory spaces. Although the realists are the dominant group even in a field such as that of international cultural relations, their reign is challenged as the pragmatists will prove to be more resilient and adaptable to ever shifting requirements. One rests to wonder how the tension between the camp of the realists and the camp of the idealists has managed to produce gains for the third pole. The pragmatists benefit from the strengths of both worlds. They encircle both realistic and idealistic arguments about the value of culture and eventually blend the contours of contrast. In the light of these circumstances, we should reflect how we can strengthen the weakest wing (idealists) through policy action to regain balance, especially as market mechanisms branch out and merge with the environment to the point that they become the default ecology of cultural action.

Taxonomies, like the one above, present by rule epistemological risks as their aim is to produce mutually exclusive classes of subjects. In the social sciences, this is not always possible or useful. However, as Wettenhall (2003, p.220) has observed:

> *The development of classification systems is a part of theory-building, which is a sine qua non in virtually all fields of knowledge—there is unlikely to be any serious advance in understanding without it .*

I acknowledge the limitations of my conceptual framework and do not presume to have come up with a total theory to explain the procedural (mechanics) and ideological (dynamics) nature of cultural diplomacy governance. What I have merely done is rework an old idea in political philosophy (structure – agency) and rehearsed it in a new setting (cultural diplomacy governance) injecting ideas from the Neo-Marxist school of thought. Admittedly, a good theory does not and cannot solve all the problems at once, but what it can do is to add a fragment of knowledge and wait for others to pick it up, deconstruct and re-assemble it to fit spatial and time variant contexts.

6.4 Dark histories – Plastic futures

In my effort to analyse the structural and ideological elements which link each Cultural Institute to its government, we neglected to reflect upon an important aspect of the Institutes' operation: the point of departure of each organisation and the general conditions which prevailed at the time of its foundation. To this end, the contextual analysis I offered in chapter 6 is highly relevant as it lays the ground for the construction of the CIs' biographies. There are four statements[94] that I drew from the transcripts on the starting point of the CIs which will may serve as a reminder to the readers of the glowing importance historical events have had in the lives of these organisations. I am not sharing here the exact quotes as the study is already 'heavy' with this kind of primary data, but I merely share the reference where these can be found in my transcriptions. The reason behind the establishment of each Institute is captured in the third column on the right, therefore, there is no need for the reader to trace back to the original dataset (Table 10):

Table 10. Reasons behind the establishment of the CIs. Source: Various.

Organisation	**Quote**	**Reason**
Goethe Institut	(I18, P.137, L.55-57 and P.138., L.1-6)	Battle negative reputation after WWII
Instituto Cervantes	(I19, P.144, L.47-53, and P.145, L.1-14)	Re-brand Spanish institutions after the Franco regime
Swedish Institute	(I24, P.127, L.15-27)	Clear up confusion about Sweden's neutrality during WWII

[94] It must be noted that similar statements from the British Council and the Institut français are only missing because I skipped the related question. This was usually the first question I asked, but often the interview would start organically from a different point of entry. I would soon realise that I needed to turn on the recorder and steer my participant towards the questions of the questionnaire but unavoidably some introductory questions were missed.

Hellenic Foundation	(I4, P.40, L.2-17)	Defend Greek history and identity from usurpers
British Council	No quote – secondary data	Counterbalance German influence
Institut français	No quote – secondary data	Defend the colonial project

These extracts indicate that the establishment of the European National Institutes of Culture under study in this thesis was mostly reactionary. The Goethe Institut and the Swedish Institute were trying to create clarity after the events of the Second World War, while the Instituto Cervantes needed to reinvent itself after the military junta. As regards the Hellenic Foundation for Culture, the need to defend the history and identity of the nation from usurpers stood out as a decisive reason behind the creation of the organisation. HFC's establishment also came at a time when other European countries were also forming similar structures. There seem to have been two major waves, one after WWII and another one at the start of the 1990s, when most Cultural Institutes were born (European Parliament, 2016). The only exceptions in my sample of countries which founded their CIs at a different period are the British Council and the Institut français. While direct statements from the British Council and the Institute français are missing, I am confident I have offered a persuasive explanation of the reasons behind the establishment of the two organisations respectively in chapter 6. For the British Council, it was the growing uncertainty of the interwar years and Germany's increasing influence in Central and Eastern Europe that prompted the UK to take action in cultural relations with the first offices being established in South-Eastern Europe (see 5.1.3 The British Council). For the Institut français, it was the need to create a public agency to promote the French language and thought abroad in a more systematic and guided way and this campaign started from the colonies where France tried to stabilise its influence using culture as a *mission civilisatrice* (see 5.3.3 The Institut français). History has played a vital role in creating or disrupting ties and these complicated relationships are embedded within the strategies of the National Cultural Institutes (Isar et al., 2014).

Consolidating influence in the colonies, defending the national identity and history, counterbalancing foreign influence and battling negative connotations do not register as productive reasons for the creation of institutions tasked with relationship building. The inaugural mission of the Cultural Institutes was far from building cross-cultural dialogue as they attest. Their aim has largely been to encourage language learning as the first line of establishing influence (Figueira, 2010). Language activities were accompanied by a promotion of the country's culture in an effort to create conditions of total learning. There is a number of ethical questions that emerge from this condition: who has the right to decide which cultural goods are representative of the nation? The risk is always imminent, if not already present, to overlook the popular for the rarefied. Inversely, to whom does the elitist speak and what kind of interactions are ultimately encouraged on a state level? Gradually, the logic of one-way promotion was abandoned, at least rhetorically, and replaced by the discourse of mutuality and exchange. While it is unclear when this break and change in perceptions occurred, it is sensible to argue that it was not a specific point in time, but a process that unfolded in parallel to societal changes.

The Cultural Institutes have had ambiguous starting points, yet they managed to survive and adapt. They are not static organisms; they are light and plastic in that they are able to change to fit their environment (Bauman, 2000). Not all of them are characterised by the same degree of plasticity with some being 'heavier' structurally making it more difficult to reorganise their operations. A complex structure is not the only reason behind policy lock-in; creative problem-solving is also hindered by path dependences. Simply put, tested solutions are more appealing than fashioning and implementing new paths of action. These conditions create the perfect environment for policy resistance to emerge within the ranks of legislators, although this has not been the focal point of my study.

The CIs were indeed born out of a desire to further state interests, address national fears and redress historical mistakes and injustices; they carry the stigma of their past and for some, like the British Council and the Goethe Institut, it is important to draw a clear line in rhetoric to show that they have evolved and learned how to read their environment. These were the only organisations in my sample which insisted on distinguishing between cultural diplomacy and cultural relations. For both, cultural diplomacy signified the close encounter of the political with the cultural. By contrast, cultural relations described a condition of mutuality

and implied a certain distance from the workings of the state apparatus. For these institutions, this much cherished distance ensures the legitimacy of their operations.

This is a normative distinction that we need to attack and uproot as it leads to a series of logical fallacies. The struggle to differentiate these terms is a self-imposed mission as there is no empirical evidence, at least to the author's knowledge, that confirms or repudiates the assumption that cultural diplomacy is seen as less legitimate compared to cultural relations. There is simply no study explicitly designed to measure trust in foreign audiences in relation to instrumentalism. It may be true that in the British and German tradition, cultural institutions are generally far off better when they are situated at a distance from the central government, however, in smaller countries being associated to the state may not be a burden, especially if the government enjoys a good reputation abroad as in the case of Sweden. The dichotomy is artificial as I have discussed in that it describes things as they should be and not as they really manifest on the ground. What ensues is a cascade effect that impacts the institutional relationships between actors at different levels. Let's follow the rationale of distinction for a while to see where it will lead us.

In a world where cultural diplomacy is the purview of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Culture or the Ministry of Education can only suffice to a marginal role. It could be said that these agents contribute with their policies to the programmatic content of a national strategy on cultural diplomacy while the MFA, having the gatekeeper's role, follows a policy of coordination. Cultural relations can describe here the non-aligned interactions happening across the spectrum of public administration and outside of it. This implies that cultural relations as a term is not necessarily bound to the activities of the third sector. It points to a condition where any action that sits outside an instrumental agenda can be possibly read as 'cultural relations'. Whether the result is that the interests of the state are furthered, even without prior calculation, does not override the original intention. Under this light, it can be said that Ministries of Culture can exercise cultural relations when it comes to internationalising their domestic cultural policies. It is important here to share an enlightening quote from one participant.

> *Cultural diplomacy pushes forward what it needs for the promotion of the country. By contrast, the MoC is obliged to promote everything that*

> *our culture is producing. The difference is that cultural diplomacy will only promote these goods that are useful, not everything. So, if I only put to the task these goods that are useful, in an extreme case, I will clash with those producers of cultural goods that I don't need (I4, P.33, L.18-22).*

That being said, Ministries of Culture can claim that they are contributing to international cultural relations, especially if they are not making use of the diplomatic network to pursue their goals and as long as they pursue their own agenda which reflects their domestic cultural priorities. In this version, the MFA is the producer of a foreign cultural policy which is highly instrumental and strategic and, evidently, different from an international cultural policy. Fragmenting further the landscape by isolating, tagging and assigning tasks and duties to different organs while keeping them in silos seems to me a disastrous approach in cultural relations and one which inevitably leads to "policy disconnect" (Fisher et al., 2009, p.32). Instead, I would like to argue for an integrated approach in the governance of cultural diplomacy.

The second normative distinction we need to refute concerns the nature of instrumentalism. Instrumentalism is not expressing itself uniformly as I have proved in this thesis. We cannot presume that instrumentalism stays invariable through time. It is important to consider time-variation as a decisive factor impacting the imprint of discourses and practices of the Cultural Institutes. Additionally, interpretations over the ways instrumentalism can emerge are context-dependent, so the phenomenon is not only subject to change across time, but also across space at the same historical moment. Last, we cannot ignore the fact that binary explanations do not work well for social phenomena; we need to acknowledge that the arm's length principle describes *a status of varying geometry* and not a condition in which an organisation is or is not at arm's length.

I need to report, however, some interesting overarching patterns that arose when I linked arm's length practices to public administration systems. More centralised governance structures (Institut français, Instituto Cervantes and Hellenic Foundation) tended to place emphasis on the past and embraced a narrower definition of culture as the arts and letters. The intimacy to central state apparatuses but also the conceptual understanding of the word 'culture' would lead them to embrace the term 'cultural diplomacy' to describe their work. By contrast,

organisations that adopted the New Public Management model in their practices (British Council, Goethe Institut, Swedish Institute) appeared as more flexible with the definition of culture they espoused. For them, culture described a social process and a set of norms while emphasis fell on the future. These CIs were also more likely to work in a series of public policy areas next to culture, namely education, health and the environment. Therefore, they were much more likely to adopt other definitions to describe their work such as cultural relations or public diplomacy. I, therefore, distinguish between two types of contrasting visions that the Cultural Institutes are working towards which are interestingly connected to different definitions.

- The development project – emphasis in the future – cultural relations
- The memory project – emphasis in the past – cultural diplomacy

I mentioned in chapter 5 how the Greek Ministry of Culture copied its functions from the French model. The Hellenic Foundation as well as the Instituto Cervantes, as one participant admitted, have copied the state-centric model of the Institut français and that is why they find themselves in need of reform. The crisis of *le modèle français* is well documented in literature (Méda and Lefebvre, 2006; Dubois, 2010). Even France has entered a long process of reviewing its policies and instruments as we saw in chapter 5.3.3. The model has proven to be unsustainable and the financial crisis offered ample evidence to this. Little by little, as the centre (France) is reforming its paradigm, the satellites (Greece, Spain) will likewise need to update their policy models.

How can Culture Ministries respond to this situation they find themselves in? It is true that the mission of the MFAs is ipso facto political, however, I personally do not espouse the view that Culture Ministries should see themselves as beacons of resistance; for this resistance is empty of meaning and devoid of sense when it is not accompanied by a creative alternative. I would like to lay the case for the rise of a different form of governance: the rise of a *rhizomatic Ministry of Culture*. The concept of the rhizome describes the lateral links between points that ostensibly seem irrelevant and unable to interconnect. The system of the rhizome is a-centrered and a-hierarchical favouring an endless expansion (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987).

The qualitative definition of the rhizome above does not exactly assist in clarifying how a rhizomatic form of governance would manifest. A rhizomatic Ministry of Culture would not attach itself to other public policy areas in order to survive but would mesh its objectives with that of other governmental, private and non-governmental organisations to such a degree that the very concept of instrumentalism itself would become vague. This implies that the ministry has lost its centralised function as the administrative headquarters and authority has been transferred not only to the regions and municipalities, but also to other same-level institutions and the centre is nothing but another point in the system. In post-modernity it is equally important to decentralise the cluttered state mechanism and at the same time internationalise good examples of domestic policies (Giddens, 2013). This situation may appear chaotic but, in fact, we should be reminded that the structured and institutionalised cultural policies of the latter half of the 20th century constituted only a glimpse in the long history of how cultural affairs were dealt with (Mangset, 2018).

The problem is that the very concept of a rhizomatic form of governance is elusive. It slips through the fingers of policymakers who may wish to operationalise it and of researchers who wish to pinpoint concrete methodological frameworks to study it. There have always been fragments of this rhizomatic network of interactions, however, it was never the core principle of cultural governance. It largely ran, if one wishes to use the technological jargon of the millennials, in beta-version. Today cultural governance is becoming more expansive. The rhizomatic pattern becomes the default function. Cultural policy, instead of accentuating jurisdiction and entrenching itself in a limited space, lends itself to different fields. This does not mean, however, that it is losing power over its own matters rather that the channels of control are changing form.

When Zimmer and Toepler (1999) observed that state authorities are retreating from the field to make way for private actors, what they witnessed was only one symptom of a general surge in branching out and away from the centre of governance. The picture was not yet complete; it was indeed the coming years that would bring to the fore new tools to secure compliance. The intense agencification movement of the 1980s brought about colossal changes in how power was understood and enacted. Funding and agenda setting lost their primary function of securing domination. Instead evaluation rose to the status of the ultimate control mechanism in the countries that followed the NPM model.

Hierarchies and appointment systems, the prime tools that secured control in centralised administrations, were never really put on the negotiating table, but they largely remained opaque processes used by political actors throughout modernity and well into the postmodern condition.

7. Conclusion: window with a view

The final chapter of this thesis provides a summary of the key findings and arguments, offers a set of recommendations and lays out a working framework for future research. At the start of this thesis, I set out to trace how the agency of the state apparatus appears in the work of six Cultural Institutes from the EU context (British Council, Institut français, Goethe Institut, Instituto Cervantes, Swedish Institute and the Hellenic Foundation). My aim was to uncover the way this agency was expressed in the operation of the CIs to come to an understanding of the way(s) instrumentalism impacts governance. I assumed that instrumentalism is variable and depends on the national context. National administrative and legislative frameworks have the capacity to make the phenomenon emerge differently in different settings. I assumed that centralised administrations where ministries have a dominant role in decision making will most likely support a more rigid form of instrumentalism whereas decentralised administrations will favour a more flexible approach.

I had also assumed that the relationship between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture would be critical in how foreign cultural policy is designed and enacted. Through the Gramscian concept of hegemony, I theorised that the realist discourse, which sees culture as a tool to achieve non-cultural targets mainly advocated by Foreign Ministries, is dominant (or hegemonic). Interestingly, I found evidence of the existence of an ideological group whose operation so far had remained latent. The group is bearer of a new discourse which marries realist and idealist assumptions about the role of culture in external relations. The third pole accepts the intrinsic value of culture and, at the same time, supports that it has a pluri-utilitarian value; nevertheless, I maintain that the intrinsic value of culture is constantly losing ground in policymaking circles. My proposition is that cultural administrators should get actively engaged in the design of foreign cultural policy with the aim to co-define the values attached to culture and to collectively build the structures used to serve these values. In this way, idealist attitudes will re-direct the standard route of decisions which currently seems to favour a more utilitarian approach in culture in external relations oriented towards security and trade.

7.1 Closing the circle

In creative writing, the circle is a literary device used to take the reader back to the original scene, the place or argument that started the narrative. I posed at the Introduction of this treatise the following research question setting five objectives:

RQ: How does the agency of the state apparatus manifest in the work of the Cultural Institutes?

Objectives:

1. Familiarise the reader with the key debates around instrumentalism and highlight gaps in research.
2. Show how Gramsci's theory of hegemony can help interpret power relations in the international scene.
3. Examine how the agency of the state apparatus is expressed in the Greek case study by reviewing the relationship between the Hellenic Foundation for Culture and its sponsoring department.
4. Explore how the agency of the state is expressed in the rest of the five case studies (British Council, Institut français, Goethe Institut, Instituto Cervantes, Swedish Institute).
5. Review the relations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture in all cases.

I argued in the literature review that foreign cultural policy is the 'rear window' of diplomatic practice, being given only partial attention by both Foreign and Culture Ministries. Yet, the gravity attached to it by EU instruments the past years has the capacity to transform it into a 'window with a view', therefore, the study acquires great relevance in the EU context. The phenomenon of instrumentalism has been mostly analysed with regard to domestic cultural policies, hence, the foreign policy angle I adopt and the fact that I link structures to discourses make the research highly innovative.

I set out to study six case studies across Europe with the aim to understand how instrumentalism is operationalised at the micro-level hoping to grasp the intricacies that make the phenomenon so complex analytically and so diverse

geographically. I assumed that the national framework was the dominant determinant and, in part, my proposition was not misplaced.

While funding and appointments were decisive in the Greek case, the study of other examples pointed to the significance of other variables in the arm's length relationship. In the British and the German example, the existence of state documents (Corporate Plan and Basic Strategy respectively), which set specific time-bound targets, shape and define decisively the relationship between the Cultural Institute and the government. These documents are accompanied by a thorough system of evaluation checks and indicators (especially in the British case) to ensure project quality and public accountability. In the French case, while the centrality of the respective strategy document (Contract of Objectives and Means) cannot be put into question regarding the strategic development of the Institut français Paris, the Institut français network obeys to completely different rules. As the network forms part of the central service of the MFA, the career development protocol in the service determines eventually who will be the head of the Institut français in any given country. Hierarchy is the single most important aspect of control in the Institut français network. In the Instituto Cervantes, the headquarters of the organisation in Madrid seem to hold significant power over their reporting ministries (MFA-MoC). The Board of Directors is a powerful organ regulating the affairs of the organisation; however, the power to appoint members to the Board of Directors is the key which secures the alignment of the organisation's operations with governmental goals. Last, the case of the Swedish Institute revealed that the organisation's relationship to the government is structured around the principle of funding and agenda setting. The operations of the Institute are overall sponsored through the state budget, however each project is registered to a different funding stream which is, in its turn, connected to a different foreign policy priority. This means that the Institute does not receive a lump sum for its operations, but its budget is bracketed towards specific projects that correspond to a series of overarching strategy plans produced and distributed to a range of state actors.

All in all, the research concluded that there are five canals of supervision that the governments use to control the Cultural Institutes: funding, agenda setting, evaluation, hierarchy and appointment power. These are structural channels deployed, either explicitly or implicitly, with the aim to regulate the operation of the CIs. Hierarchy and appointment power do not provide readily a window for

negotiation, hence, they tend to produce binding relationships, whereas funding, agenda and evaluation, due to their recurring character, lend themselves to negotiation. More often than not, governments use multiple channels of supervision to ensure compliance to state directives. As hierarchy and appointment power seem to be distinctive features of the Institut français, the Instituto Cervantes and the Hellenic Foundation for Culture, one cannot help but wonder whether these forces are characteristic of the Napoleonic system of governance. Agenda setting and, consequently, evaluation frameworks as channels of control appeared more emphatically in the cases of the British Council, the Goethe Institut and the Swedish Institute, which represent countries that have incorporated the New Public Management model into their Public Administration systems. It would be probably more accurate to argue that Sweden reserves the space in between these categories since the state has retained its central position in regulating public affairs, even more so than Germany. In any case, a combination of the aforementioned elements, most times, ensured compliance.

Funding was the single most compelling issue for which my assumptions failed me. I hypothesised that the Institutes which were self-generating a large portion of their total income would enjoy greater autonomy. However, the case of the British Council proved that even when public agencies are able to self-sponsor their activities, distance from the government is not guaranteed. Other bureaucratic restraints, like the existence of contractual agreements, prohibit the CIs from acting independently. This suggests that funding is not an independent variable but it is tighty associated with and affected by agenda setting and not vice versa. In any case, it seems that the concept of the 'arm's length status' is fluid and invites discussion. Likewise, instrumentalism does not appear to be a uniform and coherent concept understood under the same terms by my research participants. In this light, instrumentalism can be said to incorporate varying degrees of accountability. I have distinguished between mild and deontic instrumentalism as the two opposites ends of the same spectrum, however, in between there is a *varying geometry* of how accountability is demanded and enacted (proposition A, p.77).

Next to these structural means of control, which shape the operative functions of the CIs, there is another force lurking in the background. This element framed in a decisive manner the reality of the actors involved, however it remained largely unexpressed and only at times was alluded to. While structures were necessary

to sketch out the field of operation of the CIs, the conditions they prescribed were not sufficient to secure conformity to rules. An intangible power moulded the perceptions of the actors: the power of ideology. Realistic discourses give weight to harvesting economic and political returns from the investment in cultural affairs while idealistic discourses are more focused on power distribution and network building. These schools of thought are presented as two opposing ideologies in the governance of cultural diplomacy. On one hand, practitioners working in cultural affairs are called to act on behalf of their government and defend its interests; on the other hand, their work — dealing with sensitive socio-cultural issues — suggests that they need to distance themselves from instrumental concerns. This tension is not an issue exclusively found in foreign cultural policy, but it is a prime feature of cultural policy itself.

The rise of a third pole of ideology which marries these two traditions was an unexpected finding. The third pole is versatile in that it adapts to the changing conditions of the political game. Proponents of this school of thought will move in the space in between realism and idealism borrowing the best elements of both worlds; they will alternate between intrinsic and extrinsic discourses on the value of culture without loyalty dilemmas not because of amorality, but simply because they interpret this variant of reality as the new order. For the third pole, the creative industries discourse and the soft power rhetoric are not incompatible to the true purpose of the arts and culture. The lightness of this tradition is its forte and its nemesis. Despite the speed with which the third pole is increasing its influence, I argued that the realists are still the dominant camp in foreign cultural policy. Whether they have organised the structural means to secure their dominance or whether it is the architecture of the system that has favoured their rise is a question we should ponder upon, although it is unlikely for us to come forward with a definitive answer as the structure – agency schema has the capacity to trap us into an infinite causal loop.

To conclude, I found evidence that instrumentalism in foreign cultural policy is ingrained in both the mechanics and the dynamics of the practice. The state regulates the structures that support accountability while, at the same time, it benefits from the ideology that prevails among its agents. The realists have solidified their hegemony, however, the increasing structural and ideational liquidity that globalisation has brought is challenging their reign. The rise of a world in flux calls for equally malleable forms of supervision. No one authority should be

held solely accountable for foreign cultural affairs. The conflictual relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture in the case of Greece attest to that. The prominent role of the Foreign Ministry in the case of France, Spain and Germany in the conduct of cultural diplomacy is, as I argued, a habit of the past. However, even in the examples of the United Kingdom and Sweden, where an array of agents act as stakeholders in the affairs of the CIs, the Foreign Ministry still retains the lion's share in policying the subject area of culture in external relations. From funding and agenda setting to reporting and managing appointments, the Foreign Ministries are still acting as gatekeepers. Interestingly, while I focused on the relationship between Foreign and Culture Ministries, there are other departments that come into play, most notably the Ministry of Education (which in some countries is a joint institution with the Ministry of Culture). Additionally, the consultation of departments like the Department for International Development in the UK, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in Germany and the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation in Sweden demonstrates that foreign cultural policy through the work of the National Cultural Institutes does not accommodate cultural or educational concerns alone, rather that it is situated in a complex network of interlaced state interests (proposition B, p.78).

Based on the above, I distinguished between two types of discourses in the work of the CIs, which harbour seemingly differing visions over the role of culture in foreign affairs: the 'development project' and the 'memory project'. The 'development project' is oriented towards the future and is preoccupied with the production of programmes that stretch to cover the remits of different departments where the MFA holds the gatekeeper's role. Typically, the 'development project' supports a range of projects on the ground but focuses predominantly on human rights and democratic institutions. Culture, in this version of policy, embraces a wide range of experiences more akin to the anthropological interpretation of the term as 'ways of life'. By contrast, the 'memory project' is fixed around the idea of national identity whose exalted qualities seeks to reaffirm. The projects here concentrate on the intellectual and artistic production of the source country. Culture here is narrowly defined as the arts, letters and heritage. In this arrangement, we are more likely to find that the Ministry of Culture has more weight in the equation although this is not categorical. One should not hastily jump to conclusions about the value and impact of each discourse and declare a preference for one variation or another. Both discourses are instrumental mutatis

mutandis. The ‘development project’ by assisting under-developed economies to renegotiate their value systems aspires to iron out cross-contextual differences which may make local markets inaccessible to investors. Likewise, the core mission of the ‘memory project’ is to project a radiant image of the nation in order to enhance its position in the international scene and accrue the reputational benefits this condition will bring.

The ‘development project’ has interestingly paved the way for a new form of cultural governance which is more collaborative and open-ended. Clusters of government instruments, private institutions and third sector organisations already come together to form multiplicities, however, their interaction in centralised administrations is highly conditioned by the core. The rise of rhizomatic forms of governance which spread in all sorts of directions, is a legacy of the NPM model, although we have not yet seen the phenomenon to emerge in its full form. The cases of France, Spain and Greece are particularly problematic in this respect as the entire civil service runs in a centralised capacity. The Institut français, the Instituto Cervantes and the Hellenic Foundation cannot easily escape this destiny as their functions are embedded within the broader reality of the civil service of their countries. By contrast, organisations like the British Council, the Goethe Institut and the Swedish Institute, whose governments have a strong tradition of devolution, are more flexible, hence, able to form partnerships across and beyond the government nexus (proposition C, p.78).

7.2 Strategies for emancipation

I outline below six strategies that may help the CIs reclaim their distance from the government, if they wish to. I found out that there is a varying geometry of how accountability is demanded and that intimacy to central state organs may well be a desirable state – see the example of the Institut francais. The first five strategies correspond to the five-point framework (funding, agenda setting, evaluation, hierarchy and appointment system) I came up with to describe the mechanics of cultural diplomacy. The sixth strategy is a recommendation which aims to give the CIs more legislative power over their own affairs and bring them closer to parliamentary action. Changes to the already established regime should be negotiated and unilateral exhibitions of power should be avoided. As with any new policy option, these recommendations can be challenged, however, it is worthwhile to ponder upon the possibilities they offer despite the legislative and political obstacles these will meet in different national contexts.

6 Strategies

- *Bracketing self-generated revenue*
- *Interdepartmental advisory committees*
- *Establishing own assessment frameworks*
- *Secondments, assignments and rotation*
- *Elected executives*
- *Consultation in bill drafting*

I have found that the most problematic and contested area to do research in is funding. It is unclear how cash flows impact the way policymakers view their work, however, what the literature indicates is that scholars tend to assign negative value on this work if the share of state subsidies in the budget is high. This is not an outstretched point, nevertheless, the situation in some cases can be far more nuanced. I recommend restricting the prescription of goals in the contractual agreements between Ministries and agencies to government grants alone. This will allow the CIs to bracket the income they create for projects outside the set targets. Additionally, since financial sustainability is a key objective for most CIs, this arrangement can work as an incentive; instead of imposing horizontal cuts in

budgets, thus, forcing the Cultural Institutes to come up with strategies to compensate for the loss of income, they will be motivated to increase their share in the budget in an effort to work on their own agenda. This recommendation implies that the CIs need to invest more, in terms of human resources, on developing partnerships and networks. It also points to the need to provide training opportunities to staff, so that they are able to respond effectively to international, national and regional calls for projects.

In the area of agenda setting, the monopoly of decision-making is likely to result in a one-sided narrative which does not represent the concerns of all interested stakeholders. As a rule, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acts as a gatekeeper and retains an almost exclusive right over the production of national narratives and their dissemination to foreign audiences. Mapping the landscape is essential to understand which institutions can add their voice to create a polyvocal statement. Weakening the monopoly of one ministry implies that other bureaucratic arrangements need to take place first. Each Institute is attached to one authority to which it reports and from which it receives its budget and mandate. The establishment of interdepartmental advisory committees may create a new instrument to which arm's length bodies can be attached.

Another method for the Institutes to establish jurisdictional boundaries is to be given the opportunity to shape their own micro-reality when it comes to assessment exercises. In the field of evaluation, setting their own standards for assessment would allow them to frame their work on their own terms without being forced to adopt 'one-size-fits-all' solutions. Cultural relations is a notoriously challenging area to measure and assess impact in, especially in the long term, hence the CIs should come forward with a bold vision on how to design and put into place evaluation frameworks for their work. Ideally, they could be assisted in this work by a cultural observatory which will monitor and coordinate the evaluation of cultural programmes and projects nationally. The transfer of know-how from other cases would be more than valuable and highly relevant. The creation of such an observatory could also take place as an auxiliary organ under EU auspices with the aim to assist the Cultural Institutes to create cross-country evaluation indicators.

One of the most daunting areas for any legislator to attempt reform would be the area of organisational hierarchies. I have written earlier that the principle of rotation can be a successful means in restructuring the pyramid of hierarchies.

Rotation is an enduring principle in the diplomatic world and one to whose reality all staff must adapt when entering the profession. As not all organisations have the financial and administrative capacity to support this system, or overseas offices to second their employees, they could deploy other measures to ensure their staff are exposed to various work experiences. These could be secondments in other public bodies of similar remit or subject-specific assignments within the same organisation. The first measure requires broader arrangements to take place which may surpass the capacities of the Cultural Institute and may not always be feasible, however, the second measure falls entirely within the spectrum of capacities of individual CIs. Subject-specific projects diversify the responsibilities of actors and enrich their work experience especially when the new assignment is in a different field of operation.

In the same tone, the system of appointments must be revolutionised. While government appointments are the canon in the cases under analysis, there were examples (British Council, Goethe Institut) which featured elected decision-making bodies. The existence of electoral procedures to regulate the affairs of the CIs ensures transparency of operations and creates another security barrier which keeps Ministries away from meddling with the affairs of their agencies. Setting up intermediary electoral bodies which, in their turn, would recommend and eventually elect executives would be a step towards regaining distance from the government. This measure, however, implies that the political system which formerly benefited from the clientelist system of appointments is ready to move onto a new paradigm in governance. While it is doubtful that governments will be willing to forgo their privileges, civil society pressure may force them to become more transparent in the long run.

Last, I argue that the Cultural Institutes, as an extension of the executive branch of the government, should retain the right to be included in consultations around legislation which concerns their work. Typically, the law-making ability rests with the parliament and its elected members. I do not support that this function should become a feature of the agenda of any public body as such an argument would ignore the constitutional reality of modern democracies. Nevertheless, the executive branch of the government should submit recommendations to the legislative branch in matters of its jurisdiction. This may be an already established reality in certain administrative regimes with the British Council and the Goethe Institut both constituting good examples of engagement with the central

government through their decision-making organs, however, the state-centric institutions (Institut français, Instituto Cervantes, Swedish Institute, Hellenic Foundation) are situated far from this reality. Although there is no relevant research which investigates how much the former have achieved in enhancing their status compared to the latter, we can see the positive effect of this interaction in how visible their brand is within the fabric of government agencies.

7.3 Searching for a new topos

To seek for a new paradigm, as the title reads, implies that the existing one is saturated and unfruitful. While I cannot claim that the present discourse and practice have exhausted their potential for they seem to work well to assist the realist school in achieving its goals, I lay the case that foreign cultural policy requires the attention of many more players than just the Ministries of Foreign Affairs. It is the locus where horizontal and vertical axes (multiple government departments and multiple levels of administration correspondingly) meet, and even non-axial points (civil society) connect to the system, forming an interesting constellation of interactions. These conditions require methodological and theoretical approaches that problematise established notions about the role of foreign cultural policy and come forward with firm solutions to the practical challenges ahead. I have grouped, as done previously, the main points that I will discuss in the section below.

Methodological Problems

- *Lack of comparative analyses*
- *Absence of longitudinal studies*
- *The question of causality*

Practical Challenges

- *The professionalisation of the network*
- *The elitist versus the popular*
- *The dialectic between sequential administrative layers*
- *The tension between same-level authorities*

Theoretical Issues

- *Technocracy as an obstacle to emerging voices*
- *The clash of two approaches: the critical versus the speculative*

Methodologically, there are three inter-connected problems that rise ahead. The point of departure for many studies in foreign cultural policy is fixed in one setting. There is a lack of comparative analyses in the field. Comparative studies

will allow researchers to avoid hyperboles about the exceptional nature of each model and may assist in understanding policy mobility better. In addition, we are in dire need of longitudinal studies to investigate the alleged impact of foreign cultural policies. This point, however, raises serious questions about funders' eagerness to sponsor research projects with a long-term horizon. It is doubtful whether legislators are keen to move from discourse to praxis and this scepticism is as much true for cultural professionals as for diplomats alike. The question of causality returns through the back door. Evaluation frameworks and indicators have become a collective obsession of the policymaking world in late modernity. We need to find suitable frameworks to evaluate the work that is being on the ground, but our methods are currently prioritising quantitative data which are not likely to convey the full picture to establish cause and effect.

Next to this, the obstacles that lie ahead have a very tangible dimension. As the boundaries between policy organs remain undefined and the space in between only partially charted, executives and professionals in the field face difficulties understanding which competences are sought after. Navigating a sector with so many variables reshaping constantly its ecology prevents professionals from developing a relevant skillset and forces outdated approaches to governance to persist. The reproduction of specific ideational frames connected to an older generation of professionals also warrants attention. High culture always retained an aura of superiority and has been a hallmark for quality. An elitist reading of the sector has potentially serious implications on the relationships that will eventually be cultivated abroad. The whole supply-demand chain for cultural goods and services will be structured around this basis and we need to be sensitive as to how local communities on the ground translate the cultural message. The input of local administration may prove valuable here. As the dialectic between the global, the regional and the local has blurred the boundaries between different organisational levels, we need more empirical analyses examining how instrumentalism is fashioned, implemented, deflected and, generally, operationalised at different government levels, and even more so, at the intersection between levels. These studies will highlight the policy challenges and research gaps. Last, there is a need to rework and adjust the varied agendas of different state authorities to find a point of convergence that will set the tone for the operation of the Cultural Institutes.

In the realm of theory, there ought to be a re-evaluation of the philosophical approaches available in our arsenal. The gnomes of elite experts have created

hegemonic discourses, as in the case of the ‘soft power’ rhetoric, which paint all proposed policies in the field with the same colours. I made a point in passing in the literature review about the theoretical baggage each professional, and by extension each discipline, brings to foreign cultural policy. This point is important in that it leads to a crucial observation about the nature of the questions we ask our data. I opened this thesis with the following famous Shakespearean quote: “All the world's a stage, And all the men and women merely players”. The excerpt points, for me, to the following idiosyncrasy. The world, as read by most International Relations theories, is one scene and all the countries constitute players vying for influence into the same power game. Is there a more flattening presumption than to treat the entire globe with all its particularities as a compact milieu with the same set of intentions? Then again, for Cultural Studies, what is the point of being critical if not to be constructive? I have concluded that one of the great disparities between International Relations, the intellectual home of Foreign Policy studies, and Cultural Studies, the mother discipline of Cultural Policy studies, concerns the telos (purpose) of each episteme. Cultural Studies offers a critical inquiry of the social phenomena in their past and present appearances with the aim to inform and problematise whilst International Relations studies is interested in interpreting past and present experiences with the aim to predict future developments. Each tradition has its own merit; however, it is the disjuncture between disciplines that interrogate the things that are and the things that have been versus disciplines oriented towards the future that require all our analytical and synthesising capacities to concentrate into one single effort. We need to focus onto bridging the chasm ahead, a chasm we created and deepened with our self-confinement in academic tribes, for it is the liminal space between disciplinary fields that offers the most fertile ground for meaningful experimentation and intellectual advancement in the field of global governance and beyond.

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Appendix A

Table 11. Sample of questions asked during the interviews. Source: Author.

Themes	Questions
Strategic vision	- What is the mission of the [Cultural Institute]?
Strategic vision	- What are the [Cultural Institute's] geopolitical areas of focus and target groups?
Funding	- How is funding being allocated to the [Cultural Institute] and distributed throughout the network?
Strategic partnerships	- Is there a role for the Ministry of Culture or another department besides the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the affairs of the [Cultural Institute]?
Strategic planning	- Which stakeholders take part in building the strategic agenda?
Strategic planning	- How does the coordination of the global network take place? (if the CI maintains global presence)
Evaluation	- How does the [Cultural Institute] measure its performance?
Perceptions	- Would you say that the [Cultural Institute] exercises cultural diplomacy or international cultural relations?

Table 12. Survey questions. Source: Author in collaboration with EUNIC Global.

Theme	**Question**
Legal framework	What is your current legal status?
Funding	Where do you get funding from?
Agenda setting	Who sets your strategic objectives?
Evaluation	Who are you accountable to for the delivery of the strategic objectives?
Evaluation	Are you subject to regular external reviews?
Hierarchy	What is your governance structure? If you have an organisational chart, could you please send it?
Appointment system	Who appoints you?

Table 13. Participants' institution and role. Source: Author.

Name	Institution	Position
Interview 1	European Cultural Centre of Delphi	Former Director
Interview 2	Greek Ministry of Culture and Sports	Director of the Directorate for Contemporary Culture
Interview 3	Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs	E1 Directorate for Cultural and Educational Affairs
Interview 4	Hellenic Foudnation for Culture	Head of Department for International Relations
Interview 5	Hellenic Foundation for Culture	Communications Manager
Interview 6	National Book Centre of Greece	Project Coordinator for Fairs
Interview 7	Hellenic Foundation for Culture	Former Director
Interview 8	Freelancer	Manager of the Image & Identity Department in the Organising Committee for the Athens 2004 Olympic Games
Interview 9	Greek National Tourism Organisation	Director of Market Research and Advertising Department
Interview 10	Embassy of Greece in London	Cultural counsellor
Interview 11	Embassy of Greece in London	Educational counsellor
Interview 12	Hellenic Foundation for Culture	Current Director
Interview 13	Hellenic Foundation for Culture Odessa	Focus groups 1
Interview 14	Hellenic Foundation for Culture Odessa	Focus group 2
Interview 15	Goethe-Institut Munich	Strategy and Evaluation Department

Interview 16	Instituto Cervantes Madrid	Director of Analysis and Strategy Department
Interview 17	Swedish Institute Stockholm	Head of Department of Intercultural Dialogue
Interview 18	Goethe-Institut London	Former Director
Interview 19	Instituto Cervantes London	Former Director
Interview 20	British Council London	Regional Head EU Europe, Wider Europe and Americas
Interview 21	Institut français Paris	Head of Development and Partnerships Department
Interview 22	Embassy of Sweden in London	Cultural counsellor
Interview 23	Institut français Thessaloniki	Institut français director
Interview 24	Swedish Institute Stockholm	Current Director
Interview 25	Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, France	Head of Culture and Media Department

Appendix B

Nodes

Name	Sources	References
What is culture	1	1
Traumatic start	1	1
The politics of acquaintances	1	2
The paradigm of other Institutes	1	4
Politics	1	1
Organisational structure	1	2
Lack of clarity in roles	1	3
Financial crisis	1	2
Exercise of control	1	3
Cultural diplomacy, foreign cultural policy or international cultural relation	1	1
Cultural diplomacy for whom	1	1
Appointment power	1	1

Figure 25. Mock coding using NVivo software on Interview 4. Source: Author.

Nodes

Name	Sources	References
Discourses around cultural diplomacy	12	651
What is culture	10	133
Culture as means-Realism	9	57
Culture as end-Idealism	8	24
Public Administration	12	144
Staff background and skills	5	23
Research and Evaluation	8	21
Reporting	8	11
Historical information	6	11
Funding	9	40
Collaborations with partners	7	24
Politics	12	315
The politics of acquaintances	7	15
Strategy	11	122
Liaising	9	19
Intra-governmental competition and malpractice	12	70
Foreign countries as examples	6	20
Appointment power	6	17

Figure 26. Thematic nodes for Project A. Source: Author.

Nodes

Name	Sources	References
The Hellenic Foundation for Culture	2	20
HFC and the participants	2	13
Relationships to Greece	2	13
Perceptions of Greece in non-material culture	2	24
Perceptions of Greece in material culture	2	13
Other Cultural Institutes in Odessa	2	3
Dreams of Greece	2	16

Figure 27. Thematic nodes for Project B. Source: Author.

Nodes

Name	Sources	References
What is Culture	12	1126
The trilemma. Cultural dipl	11	31
The other Cultural Institute	2	15
State agency	12	338
Vested interests and p	8	60
Relationship to the Parl	6	13
Relationship to the For	12	95
Relationship to other M	11	62
Issues of Strategic Plannin	12	692
Target groups and Are	12	109
Staff Background and	11	38
Mobility and the Pri	8	11
Research and Evaluati	9	18
Reporting	9	20
Organisational Structur	12	98
Major Stratetgic Aims	12	88
New Strategic Prio	11	39
Funding	12	121
Collaboration with part	12	46
Historical Information	11	31

Figure 28. Thematic nodes for Project C. Source: Author.

Internals		
Name	Nodes	References
Interview 4	18	443
Interview 2	15	285
Interview 5	15	191
Interview 3	15	151
Interview 12	15	119
Interview 9	12	115
Interview 10	15	100
Interview 6	15	92
Interview 7	11	74
Interview 1	11	65
Interview 8	9	58
Interview 11	6	24

Figure 29. Density of Coding in Project A. Source: Author.

Internals		
Name	Nodes	References
Interview 13 - Focus Group 1	7	55
Interview 14 - Focus Group 2	7	34

Figure 30. Density of coding in Project B. Source: Author.

Internals		
Name	Nodes	References
Interview 17	27	358
Interview 22	27	331
Interview 21	24	299
Interview 15	26	272
Interview 19	25	262
Interview 16	27	244
Interview 18	22	195
Interview 24	24	156
Interview 20	24	148
Interview 25	21	145
Interview 23	18	74

Figure 31. Density of coding in Project C. Source: Author.

Appendix C

Table 14. Hierarchy and appointments in the Cultural Institutes. Source: Various.

Organisation	Key structures	Appointments
British Council[95]	-Board of Trustees (14 members) -Executive Board (10 members) -Advisory Boards (subject expert boards with no administrative power)	-Board of Trustees (appointed by a Nominations Committee) 1 Chair 1 rep from the country committees of N. Ireland, Wales & Scotland 1 rep from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 11 trustees (currently all from the corporate sector) -Executive Board (appointed by the Board of Trustees) 1 Chief Executive 1 Chief Financial Officer 1 Chief Operating Officer 7 Executive Directors presiding in subject areas (Arts, Education & Society, English, Marketing, Global Human Resources, Global Network, Digital, Partnerships & Innovation)
Goethe Institut[96]	-General Meeting (30+ members)	-General Meeting (appointed by the Board of Trustees and the previous General Meeting)

[95] British Council, Annual Reports and Account 2017-2018, pp.50-62. Available from: https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/2017-18-annual-report.pdf.

[96] Goethe Institut, 2009. Articles of Association, pp.1-8. Available from: https://www.goethe.de/resources/files/pdf17/Goethe Institut_Articles-of-association.pdf.

	-Board of Trustees (12 members) -Executive Board (2-3 members) -Advisory Boards (subject expert boards with no administrative power)	*ordinary members (30 members)* 1 rep from the Federal Foreign Office representing the state 29 personalities from the cultural, scientific and community life of the Federal Republic of Germany *extraordinary members* 1 MP from each party represented in the Bundestag (currently 7 parties so 7 MPs) 2 reps from each one of the 16 federal states (32 reps from the local government) *members by virtue of office* the 12 members comprising the Board of Trustees -Board of Trustees (appointed by the General Meeting) 1 President 6 members elected from the General Meeting in secret ballot 1 rep from the Federal Foreign Office 1 rep from the Federal Ministry of Finance 3 reps from the staff -Executive board (appointed by the Board of Trustees) 1 President of the Board of Trustees 1 General Secretary 1 Business Director

Institut français Paris[97]	-Board of Directors (27 members)	- Board of Directors 1 Director of the Institut français (appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs) 4 MPs 5 reps from the MFA 4 reps from the Ministry of Culture 3 reps from the Ministry of National Education and the Ministry of Higher Education, Research and Innovation 1 rep from the Ministry of Finance 3 reps from the local government 3 subject area experts 3 reps from the staff
Instituto Cervantes[98]	-Board of Trustees (11 members) -Board of Directors (10 members) -Advisory Boards (subject expert boards with no administrative power)	-Board of Trustees 1 Honorary President (His Majesty the King) 1 Executive President (Prime Minister) 1 Director of the Instituto Cervantes (usually appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs but the Minister of Culture can also nominate a candidate) 1 General Secretary (appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs upon recommendation of the Director) 1 President of the Board of Directors 2 Vice-presidents of the Board of Directors

[97] Institut français, 2017. Rapport d'activité 2017, p.77. Available from: http://www.institutfrancais.com/sites/default/files/ra-if-2017-mail.pdf.
[98] Instituto Cervantes, 2017. Órganos rectores. Available from: https://www.cervantes.es/sobre_instituto_cervantes/organos_rectores/consejo_administracion.htm.

		1 rep from the MFA 1 rep from the Ministry of Culture and Sports 2 reps from the Royal Academy -Board of Directors 1 President, who serves as the Secretary of State for International Cooperation and for Ibero-America of the MFA 2 Vice-Presidents, one from the Ministry of Culture and Sports and one from the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 1 Director of the Instituto Cervantes 1 General Secretary 1 rep from the Board of Trustees 1 rep from the MFA 1 rep from the Ministry of Culture and Sports 1 rep from the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 1 rep from the Treasury
Swedish Institute[99]	-Advisory Council (9 members)	-Advisory Council (appointed by the Director-General) 1 Director-General and Chair of the Council (appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs) 2 MPs 2 reps from the corporate sector 2 reps from other government agencies

[99] Swedish Institute, 2018. Organisation. Available from: https://si.se/en/about-si/organisation/.

		1 rep from a think tank 1 rep from Swedish academia
Hellenic Foundation[100]	-Executive Board (13 members)	-Executive Board (appointed by the President with the exception of the state reps) 1 President (appointed by the Minister of Culture) 1 Vice-president 1 Treasurer 1 rep from the MFA 1 rep from the Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs 5 ordinary members 3 subject area experts

[100] Hellenic Foundation for Culture, 2015. Executive Board. Available from: http://hfc-worldwide.org/sample-page-2/executive-board/.