## <sup>1</sup> Away from Home, Better at School. The Case of a <sup>2</sup> British Boarding School\*

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#### Abstract

In this paper we study whether substituting family inputs with school 9 resources in an academically oriented environment has an impact on achieve-10 ment in high-stakes national examinations. We use administrative data for 11 England to estimate the effect of attending a selective boarding school that 12 admits an unusually high share of pupils with low socio-economic status 13 on attainment at the end of compulsory education. By using propensity 14 score matching we obtain comparable control groups in selective non-boarding 15 schools. Our main finding is that the probability of being in the top decile of 16 achievement in the exams increases by about 18 percentage points compared 17 to 59% for controls. 18

<sup>19</sup> Keywords: ability, achievement gap, boarding, education, grammar school,

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## 22 1 Introduction

Gaps in achievement by socio-economic status (SES) are a global policy challenge 23 (see for a review Sirin, 2005; Reardon, 2011). In England these gaps are observed 24 as early as the primary education phase and usually do not change over time or 25 tend to increase as students progress through the education system (Dearden *et al.*, 26 2011). While gaps by SES tend to be concentrated among pupils who are initially 27 low achievers, they have also been found among high achievers (Crawford *et al.*, 28 2014; Jerrim, 2017). This may have high opportunity costs if pupils who have the 29 potential to perform well at school are held back or slowed down by the environment 30 in which they have grown up. 31

Most policies designed to counteract the influence of deprivation on pupil achievement are based on the assumption that increasing school inputs boosts academic outcomes. However, the effect of these policies may be confounded by parental responses to the change in school inputs (Todd and Wolpin, 2003, 2007): family inputs may reinforce the role of school policies if parents respond by investing more into their children's development or dilute it if they invest less.<sup>1</sup>

Boarding schools offer the opportunity to observe a context where family in-38 puts are substituted for school inputs, i.e. they reduce the role of family inputs for 39 all pupils, since they offer education during the day and lodging at night. How-40 ever, obtaining clean estimates of the effect of attending a boarding school on pupil 41 achievement is an empirical challenge as it may be confounded by a selection effect 42 if boarding school pupils and pupils in other schools differ substantially in ability or 43 family resources. This problem has been circumvented in recent studies which ex-44 ploit lotteries to oversubscribed boarding schools to estimate the clean effect of these 45 types of educational institutions on achievement. Randomly admitted pupils obtain 46 substantially higher test scores than non-admitted ones in boarding schools in poor 47 neighbourhoods in the US (Curto and Fryer Jr, 2014). Related research exploit-48 ing random admission in an elite school in France obtains similar results (Behaghel 49 et al., 2017). 50

<sup>51</sup> This paper is the first to study the effect of boarding education in England. <sup>52</sup> The aim of our empirical analysis is to investigate the effect of boarding education

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Recent examples of school policies include the introduction of sponsored Academy schools in disadvantaged areas in the UK (Eyles *et al.*, 2016) and of Charter schools in the US (see a review in Epple *et al.*, 2016), as well as more narrowly targeted interventions in urban schools in the UK, such as Excellence in the Cities (Machin *et al.*, 2004).

by studying a selective boarding school called Christ's Hospital (CH hereafter). 53 This school admits talented pupils from different backgrounds and funds the cost 54 of their education with a variety of means-tested bursaries. For our analysis we 55 use rich administrative data of pupils in England and measures of achievement at 56 the ages of 7, 11 (Key Stage 1 and 2) and the results of compulsory school final 57 exams at age 16 (General Certificate of Secondary Education, GCSE hereafter) for 58 five consecutive cohorts of pupils. We use propensity score matching to find, for 59 each pupil at CH, a pupil in a selective day school who is as similar as possible in 60 observable characteristics. 61

CH is financially supported by a wealthy foundation which funds means-tested 62 bursaries for the majority of its pupils and is devoted to helping high achievers with 63 low SES. We assess the effect of boarding by comparing CH pupils to those in other 64 selective schools that do not provide boarding (i.e. selective day schools). Our first 65 control group includes pupils who attended grammar secondary schools and whose 66 primary school was in the same local authority as those attended by pupils who 67 then went to CH. This ensures that both school and non-school environment are 68 comparable for CH and control group pupils. While grammar schools are academ-69 ically selective like CH, they differ in that they do not offer boarding and have 70 substantially fewer resources. For the second control group we select pupils from 71 independent schools, which are often as well-resourced as CH but tend to be less 72 academically selective. CH pupils have lower SES and somewhat higher achievement 73 in primary school tests than pupils in the two control groups. The characteristics 74 of its pupils make CH an outlier in English private education. This confirms the 75 importance of using rich measures of primary school achievement and SES in our 76 empirical design to estimate a clean effect of attending CH. 77

We find that the achievement of pupils attending CH is significantly higher at 78 GCSE than for pupils in either grammar or independent day schools. The probability 79 of at least five GCSEs at A-A<sup>\*</sup> (i.e. of being in the top two deciles in the distribution 80 of the number of GCSEs at A-A<sup>\*</sup>) is 18 percentage points higher or 30% relative 81 to the mean value for the control groups. We assess whether there is heterogeneity 82 in our main results and we find that the effect for girls is slightly higher relative to 83 boys although the difference is not significant. Similarly, we detect no significant 84 difference between pupils with high and low SES, which suggests that the effect is not 85 concentrated on high-SES students, but is equally large among low-SES students. 86 Crucially, predetermined characteristics for pupils at CH and for controls groups 87

in grammar and independent schools are balanced. Our main results are robust to a placebo test assessing whether an extensive set of predetermined outcomes is systematically different for pupils at CH and pupils in grammar or independent schools. They are also robust to a sensitivity analysis assessing the bias of the main results in the presence of selection on unobservables.

Our paper offers a proof of concept that a boarding secondary school admitting 93 high ability pupils with a lower SES than pupils in other selective day schools can 94 improve their achievement. Our results contribute to the school choice literature by 95 suggesting that currently available alternatives to standard schooling options may 96 play a role in reversing the achievement gap at the end of compulsory schooling for 97 disadvantaged pupils. Our results also contribute to the recent policy debate over 98 the use of boarding schools for disadvantaged children in England (Department for 99 Education, 2014, 2016), a debate which So far has not been informed by a thorough 100 quantitative. 101

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the institutional setting for compulsory education in England and the data that we use in the empirical analysis. Section 4 outlines the econometric strategy. Section 5 describes the main results, section 6 reports the results of a sensitivity analysis and section 7 concludes.

## <sup>107</sup> 2 Literature review

In this section we describe the findings of the literature in economics on the effects 108 of boarding on academic and non-academic outcomes. Boarding secondary schools 109 for bright pupils with low SES have been introduced in recent years in the US. 110 SEED schools in Washington and Baltimore are the only urban public schools that 111 combine the charter school model with a 5-day-a-week boarding program in poor 112 neighbourhoods. Curto and Fryer Jr (2014) estimate the impact of attending SEED 113 schools, i.e. the joint effect of a charter school and a boarding school, on achieve-114 ment by exploiting a lottery-driven admission system that is used when a school is 115 oversubscribed. They compare the achievement of students admitted and rejected 116 by the lottery and find that achievement in SEED schools is higher by about 20%117 of a sd in reading and maths, with the results being mainly driven by females 118

In France public 'boarding schools of excellence' for poor and high achieving pupils have been opened in deprived suburbs of large French cities. Behaghel *et al.* 

(2017) exploit an admission lottery to study the effect of attending one such school 121 in the suburbs of Paris. They find that by the end of the first year, achievement 122 in French and in maths is lower (by 6.5% and 3.7% of a standard deviation, s.d. 123 hereafter) although these differences are not significant. A subjective measure of 124 well-being, obtained by way of a survey, is also weakly significantly lower (29.8% s.d.)125 and is driven by frictions in adapting to the boarding environment. In contrast, after 126 the second year maths scores are significantly higher (28% s.d.) while they are lower 127 in French (11.5% s.d.) although this difference is not significant. Well-being is also 128 significantly higher than in the first year (11.8% s.d.), driven by significantly higher 129 scores to the question on whether children feel at home. Improvement in maths is 130 driven by those students who were in the top three deciles of the distribution of 131 maths scores when they enrolled. 132

Curto and Fryer Jr (2014) and Behaghel et al. (2017) quantify the effect of 133 boarding school on achievement for low SES pupils by exploiting admission lot-134 teries. The authors obtain clean estimates of the effect of boarding by using this 135 quasi-experimental setting. However using lotteries presents a drawback: since over-136 subscribed schools are in higher demand than others that are not oversubscribed, 137 their quality is likely to be higher because they may have more resources or more 138 motivated and better qualified teachers. As quality is unobserved, estimates of 139 the boarding school effect obtained by exploiting lotteries may be upward biased. 140 However, note that this limitation applies also to our setting because CH is over-141 subscribed. 142

In a study based on observational data Andersson and Johansson (2013) investi-143 gate the effect of boarding primary education in a rural Swedish county in the 1940s. 144 Pupils living far away from primary schools were allowed to board accommodation 145 where they were given food and lodging and out-of-school time was dedicated to 146 work, tidiness and obedience. These pupils were more likely to come from a less 147 advantageous background than the rest of pupils enrolled in local primary schools. 148 Andersson and Johansson (2013) find that boarding has a positive effect on achieve-149 ment at the end of primary school and this effect increases monotonously with the 150 number of semesters pupils had boarded. However, they find no effects of boarding 151 on a set of mid to long-term outcomes such as years of education and earnings. 152 Andersson and Johansson (2013); Curto and Fryer Jr (2014); Behaghel et al. (2017) 153 are the only studies in economics, to the best of our knowledge, that investigate the 154

<sup>155</sup> effects of boarding education.<sup>2</sup>

Overall, the evidence summarised in this section shows that disadvantaged pupils in boarding schools tend to achieve more and that this seems to be driven by higher motivation and study effort. Our study contributes to the literature by adding evidence for England and showing that boarding education has a positive effect on the achievement of pupils from different backgrounds.

## <sup>161</sup> **3** Institutions and data

We describe the English education system in section 3.1, our treatment and control groups in section 3.2 and 3.3 and our data in section 3.4.

#### <sup>164</sup> 3.1 National curriculum

There are 11 years of compulsory education in the English state school system, 165 divided into primary and secondary phases and four Key Stages. Primary school 166 starts with Key Stage 1 (age 5 to 7) and is followed by Key Stage 2 (age 7-11). 167 Secondary school starts with Key Stage 3 (age 11 to 14) followed by Key Stage 4 168 (age 15-16). All Key Stages end with a national standardised assessment that is 169 based either on an evaluation carried out by teachers, at the end of Key Stage 1 and 170 3, or on the results of externally marked tests, at the end of Key Stage 2 and 4. We 171 present this system in Table  $1.^3$ 172

The National Curriculum in England sets targets that pupils are expected to 173 achieve in each subject and each Key Stage. These targets are expressed as levels 174 that range between 1 and 8 on an integer scale and define a precise set of skills 175 acquired by a pupil by the end of the Key Stage; a list of the expected level for each 176 Key Stage is reported in the final column of Table 1. An interesting feature of this 177 system is that at the end of Key Stage 2 pupils are assessed twice: first by their 178 own teachers based on their daily interaction over the academic year; and second by 179 external examiners who mark their exam papers.<sup>4</sup> 180

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Boarding schools have been studied in psychological research with a focus on their consequences on pupil well-being, with mixed findings (Lester *et al.*, 2015; Wires *et al.*, 1994; Fisher *et al.*, 1986; Martin *et al.*, 2014; Hodges *et al.*, 2016; Schaverien, 2004, 2011).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>GCSE exams are taken in the final year of compulsory education, at the end of Key Stage 4. A single regulator ensures that the same standards are applied across different exam boards and over time. (Machin *et al.*, 2018).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Key Stage 2 tests are marked using an integer score from 0 to 100. Targets are cutoff values in test scores that are set out to help pupils, parents and schools interpret progress throughout

Phase	Age	School	Key	Assessment	Expected
		year	Stage		achievement level
	5-7	1-2	1	Teachers	2
Primary				(state schools)	
School	7-11	3-6	2	External & Teachers	4
				(state schools)	
	11-14	7-9	3	Teachers	5 or 6
Secondary				(state schools)	
School	15-16	10-11	4	External (GCSE)	5 GCSEs
				(all schools)	at A*-C

Table 1: Compulsory education in England

#### <sup>181</sup> 3.2 Christ Hospital

CH is an independent selective and boarding-only mixed school located in West Sus-182 sex, South-East England. It is a Christian institution which according to its mission 183 statement is dedicated to providing a stable background and boarding education of 184 high standard to 830 boys and girls, having regard especially to children of those 185 families in social, financial or other particular need. Thanks to its own financial en-186 dowment, it can pay over 80% of the costs of its pupils' education. In addition, these 187 resources permit a large selection of optional subjects to be offered in the academic 188 curriculum, and pupils become involved in a broad range of extracurricular activities 189 including music, art, drama, public speaking, community action and sport, making 190 use of the extended non-teaching time available in a boarding environment.<sup>5</sup> 191

Applicants to CH have to meet its academic standards and also be judged suitable 192 to board. They are expected to be working towards level 5 at Key Stage 2 in 193 English, Maths and Science. After a first selection based on school reports, successful 194 applicants are invited in for an initial assessment in English and Maths. Those who 195 pass are invited to a second assessment stage consisting of additional English and 196 Maths tests a few months later and also to stay in the school overnight to help 197 the school assess their suitability to board. Calculations from CH show that each 198 assessment stage screens approximately 50% of all applicants. Overall, achievement 199 at Key Stage 2, SES and suitability to board are CH admission criteria.<sup>6</sup> 200

compulsory education.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>The name of Christ Hospital School is also used in the empirical analysis in compliance with guidelines on disclosure control that can be found in point 9.5 in the National Pupil Database Agreement for the supply of data and after obtaining written approval from the Department for Education.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Anecdotal evidence suggests that CH relies mainly on word of mouth by its alumni for pub-

#### <sup>201</sup> 3.3 Control groups

We study the effect of boarding education on achievement by comparing pupils 202 attending CH, our treatment group, to pupils in two control groups selected from 203 grammar schools and non-boarding independent schools. Mixed grammar schools 204 are highly selective, academically oriented for historical reasons and include different 205 school types. In our data about 54% are Foundation and 24% are Voluntary Aided 206 or Voluntary Controlled, which are not controlled by Local Authorities (LAs). The 207 remaining 22% are Community grammars, which are not independent of control from 208 LAs.<sup>7</sup> Independent schools are fee-paying private institutions attended by about 7% 209 of all pupils, many of these are boarding schools. They set their own examinations 210 at the end of each academic year and the only national assessment their pupils sit 211 during compulsory schooling is GCSE. Independent schools admit small number of 212 pupils on means tested bursaries: we expect to find most of our matched controls 213 from the small number of pupils that independent schools admit on means-tested 214 bursaries.<sup>8</sup> 215

We define our first control group of pupils from selective day schools using two 216 steps. First we include all pupils who attended grammar schools. We choose these 217 schools because they are similar to CH in that they are academically selective, 218 but differ because they have substantially fewer resources. Then we select those 219 grammar school pupils who went to primary schools in the same local authorities 220 as those attended by pupils who went on to attend CH. We do this to ensure that 221 the CH pupils and those in the control groups face the same choice set of secondary 222 schools, live in the same geographical area and have experienced the same local 223 government. 224

We start building our second control group using all pupils in independent

<sup>8</sup>The percentage of pupils attending independent schools varies between about 5% for pupils aged 5-10, 8% for those aged 11 to 15, and 18% for those aged 16 to 18. About 13.5% of pupils are boarders in independent schools and only 1% of all independent schools has only boarding pupils. The average termly boarding fee is 8,780 pounds while the average termly day fee is 3,903 pounds. Bursaries, scholarships and discounts are available: around 8% of pupils have received means-tested bursaries and 1% of all pupils paid no fees at all (Independent Schools Council, 2014).

licity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>There are six types of state schools in England which differ for their degree of autonomy from the LA and by type of governance: community schools, voluntary controlled schools, foundation schools, voluntary aided schools, city technology colleges and academy schools. Between the nonacademies the two extremes in terms of autonomy are Community schools, run predominantly by the LA, and Voluntary Aided schools managed by their governing body. Academies are completely independent from LAs and receive their fundings directly from the central government.

schools, which are academically selective to varying degrees and have far more resources than state schools (Green *et al.*, 2012). From that pool we select those pupils who attended schools which have a Christian foundation, like CH, and who were in primary school in the same LAs at those attended by CH pupils. Pupils from grammar or independent Christian schools who were in a primary school in the same LAs as those attended by pupils at CH are approximately 10% of all pupils in grammar and in independent schools.

Figure 1: Number of CH pupils by local authority where they went to primary school



Figure 1 shows the numbers of CH pupils who went to primary school in each LA 233 in southern England. The location of CH is marked using a white triangle. It also 234 shows the set of all grammar and independent secondary schools attended by pupils 235 who were in a primary school located in the same LA as those attended by CH 236 pupils, marked using circles and diamonds respectively. LAs from which no pupil 237 goes to CH after completing primary school are not shown. The map shows that 238 grammar schools are fewer relative to independent schools and the closest grammar 239 is located further away from CH than the closest independent school.<sup>9</sup> 240

Grammar schools are a type of state school, so they are funded by government through the LAs. Independent schools receive no direct government funding, though about 80% of them are constituted as charities receiving significant tax exemptions (Independent Schools Council, 2014). They receive most of their income in the form of fees. Table 2 shows proxies of teaching resources separately for CH, for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>The full map can be found in Figure A.1 in the Appendix. It reports grammar and independent schools separately by whether they were attended by pupils similar to those at CH, i.e. matched controls, based on the propensity score that will be defined in section 4.

	CH	Grammar	Independent	State
Pupil/teacher ratio	8.80	16.44	7.91	14.65
Pupil/Full-time qualified teachers ratio	9.91	18.87	6.80	13.89
Pupil/Part-time qualified teachers ratio	50	62.50	8.40	38.46

Table 2: Resources in different types of schools

our control groups and for state schools derived from the school-level data provided 246 by the Department for Education (School Workforce Census for the school year 247 2006/07). The teaching resources of CH are similar to those of independent schools. 248 However, CH has a substantially lower pupil/teacher ratio, defined both using the 249 total number of teachers and the number of full-time qualified teachers, relative to 250 grammar schools. The table shows that both CH and independent schools have 251 higher resources relative to state schools and that grammar schools have similar 252 resources to state schools. Finally the table shows that CH and grammars do not 253 use part-time teachers very much compared to independent schools. 254

### 255 **3.4 Data**

Our analysis is based on individual-level administrative data of pupils in England 256 called the National Pupil Database (NPD), which integrates information on a wide 257 range of socio-demographic characteristics with detailed assessment records. The 258 final dataset of about 2.5 million pupils contains information on five cohorts who 259 attended primary state schools and sat their Key Stage 2 tests in years 2002-2006 260 and GCSEs at the end of Key Stage 4 in years 2007-2011. Out of all pupils in 261 the data, 429 went to CH after completing primary education in state schools, an 262 average of 86 pupils each year. About 70,000 went to secondary grammar schools 263 and about 80,000 to independent ones. 264

We match pupils at CH with pupils in grammar or independent schools using achievement at Key Stage 1 and 2 and additional predetermined characteristics. We include Key Stage 2 test scores to ensure that CH pupils and matched controls have similar achievement at age 11. We do this because selective secondary schools screen pupils almost exclusively based on their attainment at this stage of education.<sup>10</sup> In

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Pupils who want to attend selective schools in England are usually required to sit specific examinations, such as the 11 Plus, during the last year of primary school. The results of these examinations are not publicly available and they cannot be used in our empirical analysis. However the correlation between these additional test results and Key Stage 2 exam scores is likely to be high as both examinations test curriculum skills. Allen and Bartley (2017) finds that the English

addition Key Stage 2 tests are externally marked and therefore less likely to be affected by teachers' biases. We also include teacher assessments at Key Stage 1 to ensure that CH pupils and matched controls have similar initial achievement at age 6-7.

We use the following socio-demographics in matching pupils from CH with those 274 in grammar and independent schools: gender, ethnicity and two proxies for SES. 275 The first of these proxies is the income deprivation affecting children index (IDACI), 276 measuring the share of children in low income households by local area. The second 277 is a dummy equal to 1 if a pupil is eligible for Free School Meals (FSM) because her 278 parents receive some form of income support. We also consider distance from CH, 279 defined as the distance between the primary schools attended by pupils in year 6 280 and CH.<sup>11</sup> 281

Finally we create proxies for motivation, a specific type of non-cognitive skill, 282 by exploiting information on pupil achievement by subject at Key Stage 2 from 283 two comparable sources, teacher assessment (TA) and test scores. TAs are carried 284 out before teachers know their pupils achievement in tests. We start by creating a 285 dummy equal to 1 if TA by Key Stage 2 subject is greater than 4, the achievement 286 level at Key Stage 2 which the Department for Education expects from pupils at 287 the end of Key Stage 2. Teachers observe their pupils on a daily basis over the 288 academic year therefore their assessment includes both a measure of cognitive skills, 289 such as logic and numeracy, and a consideration of their non-cognitive skills, such 290 as motivation. These two measures are typically hard to disentangle for teachers. 291 National test scores are instead predominantly a measure of cognitive and curriculum 292 skills. A TA greater than the level achieved in a given national test is an indicator of 293 high motivation as the teacher has formed a belief on that pupil overall attainment, 294 that includes both curriculum skills and attitude towards learning, and this is higher 295 than the clean measure of achievement as Key Stage 2 test. Therefore we define 296 our measure of motivation as a dummy equal to 1 if the difference between a pupil's 297 TA and the achievement in the national test is positive in at least one subject. We 298 report this measure of motivation in the summary statistics in Table 3 and we use 299

element of the 11 Plus shows a correlation of 0.62 with reading score at Key Stage 2; similarly, the maths element is correlated at 0.68 with maths at Key Stage 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Our choice to use FSM and IDACI as joint proxies for low SES is supported by results in Crawford and Greaves (2013) showing that a novel dichotomous measure of educational deprivation based on rich survey data correctly classified as deprived 80% of children with FSM status and 72% of children in the top quartile of the IDACI distribution.

<sup>300</sup> it in the estimation of the pscore.

TAs are richer measures of pupil achievement than test scores because teachers 301 observe their pupils on a daily basis. Although teachers have to support their TAs 302 with examples and by answering detailed questions provided by the Department for 303 Education to ensure that their assessments are in line with national standards, these 304 assessments are more subjective than externally graded tests. We argue that the 305 dummies we created to capture whether TAs and test levels differ, measure specif-306 ically non-cognitive skills such as motivation, whereas teacher bias is a relatively 307 minor issue in a setting of high ability pupils.<sup>12</sup> 308

	СН	Crom	nor CH	Indopon	dont CH	All scho	ala CH
	UII	Grann		Indepen	dent-Off	All Schoo	JIS-UII
		Diff.	p-value	Diff.	p-value	Diff.	p-value
Female	0.443	0.033	0.213	-0.080	0.002	0.048	0.044
White	0.599	0.210	0.000	0.187	0.000	0.221	0.000
FSM	0.146	-0.111	0.000	-0.112	0.000	-0.001	0.939
IDACI	0.227	-0.079	0.000	-0.101	0.000	-0.016	0.101
IDACI > median	0.629	-0.137	0.000	-0.217	0.000	-0.001	0.974
KS1 Eng reading DfE	0.126	-0.134	0.006	-0.499	0.000	-0.932	0.000
KS1 Eng writing DfE	0.184	-0.195	0.000	-0.516	0.000	-0.850	0.000
KS1 Mat DfE	0.117	-0.127	0.017	-0.454	0.000	-0.935	0.000
KS2 Eng score	75.801	-2.702	0.000	-8.566	0.000	-18.986	0.000
KS2 Maths score	88.361	-1.366	0.002	-10.051	0.000	-25.002	0.000
KS2 Sci score	70.653	-1.631	0.000	-5.179	0.000	-13.024	0.000
KS2 Eng lev. $>4$	0.857	-0.106	0.000	-0.288	0.000	-0.558	0.000
KS2 Mat lev. $>4$	0.894	-0.033	0.042	-0.263	0.000	-0.582	0.000
KS2 Sci lev. $>4$	0.928	-0.055	0.000	-0.197	0.000	-0.481	0.000
1+ KS2 TA gt tests levels	0.162	0.044	0.026	0.035	0.070	0.060	0.001
Miles to CH	31.749	30.575	0.000	8.371	0.000	0.000	
Miles to closest grammar	1.932	-0.891	0.000	0.377	0.040	0.000	
N	377	6,421		7,183		2,713,111	

Table 3: Summary statistics

The first column of Table 3 shows summary statistics for the most important observable characteristics that we use to match CH pupils with pupils in our control groups. The central columns show differences between our control groups and CH, along with p-values of the null hypothesis of no difference. Finally, the two last columns on the right-hand side show differences between the population of pupils in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>In contrast (Burgess and Greaves, 2013) look at the whole population of pupils, with greater heterogeneity by socio-demographics and achievement, and show that teachers may exhibit a bias in their TAs in favour of certain groups of students.

all schools in England and CH. The table shows that the share of females is similar
across groups, though somewhat lower for independent schools, while the share of
white pupils is lower at CH. We find that IDACI and FSM is higher at CH relative
to grammar and independent schools when we look at proxies for SES.

Table 3 shows that achievement is higher for CH pupils relative to all other 318 groups. This holds both for achievement in Key Stage 1 tests, which we report 319 rescaled following the conversion table in Department for Education (2017), and 320 in Key Stage 2 tests. The difference in attainment across schools appears more 321 noticeable when we compare shares of students scoring in tests above level 4, the 322 expected level at Key Stage 2. The share of pupils whose TA in at least one Key 323 Stage 2 subject is greater than the test level achieved in the same subject varies 324 from 16% to 23% for our full data sample. Finally, for pupils attending grammar 325 schools the distance to CH is twice that for CH pupils while the distance to CH 326 is only slightly higher for those pupils attending independent schools, as shown in 327 Figure 1. Overall, Table 3 suggests that to obtain clean estimates of the effect of 328 on achievement at GCSE, we need to compare CH pupils with pupils in grammar 329 and independent schools with similar SES and achievement in Key Stage 1 and 2 330 tests.<sup>13</sup> 331

We create the following three outcomes of interest for our empirical analysis: a 332 dummy equal to 1 if the number of GCSEs at A is at least 1; a dummy equal to 1 if 333 the the number of GCSEs at  $A^*$  is at least 1; a dummy equal to 1 if the number of 334 GCSEs at A or A<sup>\*</sup> is at least 5. These outcomes are typically good predictors of the 335 decision to enrol in post-compulsory education (Chowdry et al., 2013). Figure A.2 336 in the Appendix, which reports histograms of the continuous variables underlying 337 our outcomes of interest at GCSE separately for CH, grammar and independent 338 schools and for our full dataset with about 2 million pupils, shows that CH pupils 339 do better on average and are over-represented among the top achievers with 5 or 340

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>Distances are computed by using publicly available data on school postcodes and on longitude and latitude coordinates associated to postcodes, measured by using the World Geodetic System 1984 (Ordnance Survey website). These information is then converted into Ordnance Survey Maps northing and easting coordinates thanks to a Helmert transformation (Watson, 2006) to eventually obtain distances in miles. We use the postcode of each pupils' primary schools rather than that of their home as the latter information is sensitive. We argue that our results would not change substantially after obtaining pupils' postcodes to compute a more precise measure of the distance between home and secondary school, as anecdotal evidence suggests that distance to primary school tends to be typically low and it seems to be subject to moderate variation across pupils (Burgess *et al.*, 2015).

<sup>341</sup> more GCSEs at A or  $A^*$ .<sup>14</sup>

## <sup>342</sup> 4 Econometric strategy

We estimate the effect of going to CH on achievement in the compulsory school leaving exams by using propensity score (pscore) matching, an econometric strategy based on selection on observables. This is possible thanks to the unique admission criteria based jointly on merit and on SES and to the rich set of pupil observable characteristics in the administrative data.

$$\Delta^{ATT} = E[A(1) - A(0) \mid D = 1]$$
(1)

Let D be a dummy indicating whether pupils go to CH, with D = 1 for pupils 348 at CH (treatment) and D = 0 for those in a selective day school (controls). Let 349 also A(1) and A(0) be the potential outcomes, i.e. achievement, for treated and 350 for controls. Let X be a set of predetermined observable characteristics for pupils. 351 Our parameter of interest is the average treatment on the treated (ATT), which we 352 denote  $\Delta^{ATT}$  and define in our setting as the mean effect of attending CH, i.e. the 353 treatment group, rather than a selective day school, i.e. the control group, as shown 354 in equation (1). 355

To recover via the law of iterated expectations the unobservable term E[E[A(0)]]356 D = 0 | D = 1 in equation (1) we rely on the assumption that admission to CH 357 depends only on observables, also known as selection on observables or Conditional 358 Independence Assumption (CIA). Under this assumption assignment to the treat-359 ment or to the control group is independent on the treatment D conditional on the 360 set of observables X, formally  $A(1), A(0) \perp D \mid X$ . However, when the number of 361 observable characteristics in the vector X is high, it may not be possible to find for 362 some pupils at CH pupils in control schools with the same observables X, unless the 363 number of observations in the data is very high. This problem, known as curse of 364

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>In choosing our outcomes of interest we focused on the highest grades in GCSEs, i.e. A or A<sup>\*</sup>, since all secondary schools we consider are selective and those pupils tend to achieve towards the high end of the distribution of grades in GCSEs. We did not choose the probability of achieving five or more GCSEs at A<sup>\*</sup>-C, a lower grade as that is about 98% in selective schools and, similarly, the mean number of GCSEs taken by pupils in these schools is 10 and shows little variation across schools. Achievement in English and Maths at GCSE are not used as outcomes as this information is not available for CH and for some independent schools in NPD data.

dimensionality, is solved by using the probability of going to CH given observable characteristics X or pscore, i.e. P(D = 1 | X).

We ensure that for each pupil at CH there is one or more with very similar 367 observables in the control group by imposing the common support (CS) condition, 368 i.e.  $0 < P(D = 1 \mid X) < 1$ . Finally, after estimating the pscore with a logit 369 model, we match treated pupils with very similar pupils from the control group by 370 using the nearest neighbour matching method. We obtain two sets of estimates by 371 using two different control groups: grammar and independent schools. While in our 372 preferred specification we use the nearest neighbour method to match pupils, we 373 also assess the sensitivity of our results to using different matching methods based 374 on the pscore.<sup>15</sup> 375

The assumption we have made in our analysis so far was that the choice faced 376 by talented pupils was binary: either CH or another type of selective school, such 377 as an independent school. However, at the end of primary school a talented pupil 378 may have been granted admission to CH as well as to a grammar and an inde-379 pendent secondary school. This characteristic can be accounted for by extending 380 the binary propensity score matching framework to the case of multiple treatments 381 thanks to the matching estimator proposed in Lechner (2002). By allowing multiple 382 treatments, the treatment variable D in our setup is no longer binary and can take 383 multiple values instead. In our setup of secondary school choice, D is equal to 0 if 384 a pupil chooses an independent school (which we set as the baseline) although this 385 choice does not affect results, to 1 if the choice is a grammar one and to 2 for CH. 386

We first estimate a multinomial logit model of school choice using the set of 387 observables X as covariates. We then compute the predicted probabilities  $\hat{P}^{j}(X) =$ 388  $\hat{P}(D = j \mid X)$  of attending an independent school (j = 0), a grammar school 389 (j = 1) or CH (j = 2). To estimate the effect of attending CH relative to, for 390 example, an independent school we compute the conditional probability  $\hat{P}^{2|2,0}(X) =$ 391  $\frac{\hat{P}^2(X)}{\hat{P}^2(X)+\hat{P}^0(X)}$ . Finally, we use the estimated conditional probability in Lechner (2002) 392 as a balancing score in a matching estimator setting with multiple treatments to 393 estimate the unobserved term  $E[E[A(0) \mid D = 0, P^{2|2,0}] \mid D = 2]$ , i.e. to match 394 pupils at CH (D = 2) and pupils in independent schools (D = 0) with very similar 395 values of the conditional probability  $P^{2|2,0}$ . We repeat the procedure to estimate the 396 effect of attending CH relative to a grammar school.<sup>16</sup> 397

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>ATT estimation with binary treatment was conducted using the Becker and Ichino (2002); Leuven and Sianesi (2015) software routines.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>ATT estimation with multiple treatments was conducted by implementing the algorithms

## 398 5 Results

We begin this section by showing the estimates of the pscore and means of predetermined characteristics separately for pupils at CH and for those in the control groups in subsection 5.1. We then show propensity score matching estimates of the effect of going to CH on achievement in the compulsory school final exam in subsection 5.2. We present a sensitivity analysis in section 6.

# 404 5.1 Propensity score and balance of predetermined charac 405 teristics

We estimate the propensity score by using a logit model and the following predeter-406 mined characteristics as independent variables: achievement levels in Key Stage 1 407 English and Maths tests rescaled following Department for Education (2017); scores 408 in Key Stage 2 tests; dummies for whether achievement levels by subject at Key 409 Stage 2 are greater than 4; gender and white ethnicity dummies; a dummy for FSM; 410 a dummy equal to 1 if IDACI is above the median; measures of distance. We also 411 create proxies for non-cognitive skills, such as motivation and resilience, by exploit-412 ing information on pupil achievement by subject at Key Stage 2, as described in 413 section 3.4. The measure of non-cognitive skills we use in the pscore estimation is a 414 dummy equal to 1 if Key Stage 2 teacher assessment is greater than test achievement 415 in at least one of the three subject tests. 416

We select the richest possible set of predetermined characteristics that were bal-417 anced in each pscore block determined by the matching algorithm we use (Becker 418 and Ichino, 2002). The advantage of estimating the pscore by using five cohorts of 419 data is that larger samples improve the quality of the matching between CH pupils 420 and pupils with very similar observable characteristics in the control groups. The 421 full list of variables can be found in Table 4, along with descriptive statistics. The 422 table is divided in two vertical panels, with the panel on the left and right showing 423 means for predetermined characteristics used when the control group is pupils in 424 grammar and independent schools respectively. For each predetermined characteris-425 tic we report the mean for those pupils at CH for whom the matching algorithm has 426 found a match, i.e. match treated pupils, for matched controls and for non-matched 427 controls. 428

Table 4 shows some differences between control groups in the predetermined proposed in Gerfin and Lechner (2002); Lechner (2002); Frölich *et al.* (2004).

Table 4: Mean of controls for CH pupils and (non-)matched controls

		C	Frammar			Independent				
	Used in	sed in Matched		Non-matched	Used in	Ma	tched	Non-matched		
	pscore	CH	$\operatorname{controls}$	controls	pscore	CH	controls	controls		
Female	Yes	0.443	0.430	0.478	Yes	0.443	0.437	0.359		
White	Yes	0.599	0.632	0.819	No	0.599	0.681	0.791		
FSM	Yes	0.146	0.148	0.029	Yes	0.146	0.124	0.030		
IDACI	No	0.227	0.186	0.146	Yes	0.227	0.204	0.122		
IDACI > median	Yes	0.629	0.585	0.486	No	0.684	0.637	0.459		
KS1 Eng reading DfE	Yes	0.126	0.089	-0.014	No	0.525	0.495	0.003		
KS1 Eng writing DfE	Yes	0.184	0.175	-0.021	Yes	0.533	0.525	-0.009		
KS1 Mat DfE	No	0.117	0.111	-0.017	Yes	0.477	0.480	-0.001		
KS2 Eng score	Yes	75.801	75.113	72.988	Yes	75.801	76.625	66.770		
KS2 Maths score	Yes	88.361	88.264	86.925	Yes	88.361	87.903	77.835		
KS2 Sci score	Yes	70.653	70.466	68.941	Yes	70.653	70.546	65.222		
K2 Eng lev. $>4$	Yes	0.857	0.810	0.748	Yes	0.857	0.841	0.555		
K2 Mat lev. $>4$	Yes	0.894	0.902	0.858	Yes	0.894	0.870	0.619		
K2 Sci lev. $>4$	Yes	0.928	0.917	0.871	Yes	0.928	0.900	0.723		
Miles to CH	No	31.749	63.006	62.286	Yes	31.749	30.911	40.576		
Min dist CH-gram	Yes	1.932	1.514	1.014	No	1.932	1.752	2.336		
1+ KS2 TA > tests levels	Yes	0.162	0.163	0.208	Yes	0.162	0.189	0.198		
N		377	337	6.084		377	339	6.844		

characteristics that were used to estimate the pscore. For example the dummy 430 that equals 1 if a pupil's IDACI is greater than the median value of the index is 431 used as a measure of SES when the control group are pupils in grammar schools, 432 instead the IDACI score is used in the matching when the control group are pupils 433 in independent schools. The table shows that differences between mean values for 434 treated and matched controls are substantially smaller than the difference between 435 mean values for treated and non-matched controls. This is the case for example for 436 KS1 test achievement and for the distance in miles between a pupil's primary school 437 and CH.<sup>17,18</sup> 438

Figure 2 shows the estimated propensity score distribution for CH pupils and for matched pupils in each of the two control groups separately. Reassuringly the relative frequency of low pscore values is higher for pupils in the control groups and vice versa for high pscore values. The *common support*, measured on the horizontal axis, is the interval of propensity score values over which the probability of observing pupils, measured on the vertical axis, is positive both for the control and for the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>Figure A.3 in the Appendix reports differences in predetermined characteristics separately for each value of the 8 estimated pscore blocks used in our specification, with the number of blocks determined by the matching algorithm (Becker and Ichino, 2002). Differences between treated and matched controls are small and not significant for each predetermined characteristic and in each pscore block.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Figure A.4 in the Appendix shows scatterplots of the percentage of pupils who are eligible for FSM, as well as having an IDACI above the median, and the percentage of pupils who obtained the top level in Key Stage 2 tests, i.e. 5, in all three subjects, by using school-level data. CH stands out with an intake of low SES and high ability pupils.

Figure 2: Kernel density estimate of the propensity score



treatment group. This varies from 0 to about 0.9 and to 0.7 for grammar and independent schools respectively.

#### 447 5.2 The effect of CH on achievement

In this section we report ATT estimates of the impact on achievement of attending a boarding selective school rather than a day selective school. Overall the positive and significant ATT estimates in Table 5 support our hypothesis that providing an academically oriented environment in non-school hours, such as the one in CH, improves attainment.

		Gramm	ıar	Independent			
	ATT	Controls		ATT	Controls		
		Matched	Non-matched		Matched	Non-matched	
1+ GCSE with A	$0.069^{**}$	0.867	0.865	0.093***	0.844	0.752	
S.e.	0.023			0.024			
1+ GCSE with A*	$0.172^{***}$	0.666	0.560	$0.127^{**}$	0.711	0.518	
S.e.	0.034			0.032			
5+ GCSE with A-A*	$0.186^{***}$	0.584	0.505	$0.172^{***}$	0.597	0.413	
S.e.	0.036			0.035			
Ν		337	6,084		339	6,844	

Table 5: Effect of attending CH on results in school-leaving exams

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

We use nearest neighbour matching with replacement as our preferred method to match controls to treated and we set at 0.01 the maximum distance in pscore that is allowed to perform a match. The estimates in Table 5 are based on pupils within the

common support and show that the probability of achieving at least 1 (1 + hereafter)456 GCSEs with A for CH pupils is significantly higher, by 6.4 and 9 percentage points 457 (ppt hereafter) relative to grammar and independent schools respectively. This is 458 7.3% and 10.6% higher relative to the value for matched controls, also reported 459 in Table 5. The probability of obtaining 1+ GCSEs with  $A^*$  is also significantly 460 higher, by 17 and 13.3 ppt or 25.5% and 18.8% relative to grammar and independent 461 schools. Finally, the probability of obtaining 5+ GCSEs with A-A\* is 18.6 and 18 462 ppt higher or 31.8% and 30.6% relative to the control groups respectively. Overall, 463 the point estimates are higher when using the dummy equal to 1 if pupils obtain 464 1+ GCSEs with A<sup>\*</sup> or 5+ GCSEs with A-A<sup>\*</sup>. Pupils who obtain these results are 465 approximately in the top two deciles of the distribution of achievement in GCSE 466 exams among all pupils in the administrative data and in the top half if we only 467 consider pupils in our control groups, as shown in Figure A.2 in the Appendix.<sup>19</sup> 468

In addition to ATT estimates and mean values of outcomes for matched controls, 469 Table 5 shows mean values for non-matched controls. This allows us to compare our 470 ATT estimates with naive estimates obtained as the difference in mean achievement 471 between CH pupils and non-matched pupils in grammar and in independent schools. 472 Naive estimates have the same sign as our ATT estimates although they are greater 473 since the mean value of the outcomes for non-matched pupils is smaller than for 474 matched ones. Under our untestable identifying assumption of selection on observ-475 ables, naive estimates are then biased upwards relative to our ATT estimates. This 476 comparison suggests that had pupils gone to grammar or independent day schools 477 instead of CH, they would have obtained higher scores than the average in those 478 schools.<sup>20</sup> 479

<sup>20</sup>Table A.5 in the Appendix reports estimates of the CH effect obtained using pscore estimates, as in Table 5 and OLS estimates. The table shows that under our identification assumption OLS estimates tend to differ from pscore estimates. Differences between the two sets of estimates are likely to be driven by the failure of the common support condition and the linear functional form assumption. Our main results are robust to using analytical standard errors and to a large-sample bias when matching on continuous variables, e.g. Key Stage 2 scores and the IDACI, by using

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Estimates obtained after excluding pupils outside the 'thick' support region of the pscore, which is defined in Black and Smith (2004) as a more conservative condition than the common support, are in line with our main results and can be found in Table A.1 in the Appendix. Our main results are also robust to allowing for multiple treatments, i.e. CH, grammar or independent schools, rather than a binary one, following Lechner (2002) and can be found in Table A.2 in the Appendix. In addition, results obtained using different matching methods, e.g. kernel or radius matching, are in line with our main results and can be found in Table A.3 in the Appendix. Finally, we find no difference in the CH effect by SES or gender. These results can be found in Table A.4 in the Appendix.

To summarise, ATT estimates of the effect of attending CH are positive and significant. They are greater when using proxies for high achievement at GCSE as outcomes (i.e. 1+ GCSEs at A\* or 5+ GCSEs with A-A\*) which is equivalent to the top end of the distribution of achievement at GCSE computed over pupils in all schools and in the top half when considering pupils in CH, grammar or independent schools. They are a robust to a number of changes in our preferred specification, as shown by additional results which can be found in Table A.1-A.3 in the Appendix.<sup>21</sup>

## 487 6 Sensitivity analysis

In this section we assess the validity of the conditional independence assumption (CIA), because it is the identifying assumption in our empirical analysis. In section 6.1 we report results of a placebo test on predetermined characteristics that were not included as controls in our pscore. In section 6.2 we implement the sensitivity analysis proposed by Ichino *et al.* (2008) to assess whether and to what extent our main results are affected by a failure of the CIA.

#### 494 6.1 Placebo test

The administrative data we use in the empirical analysis include a rich set of pupil 495 predetermined characteristics. To estimate the pscore we conservatively select from 496 this set only those characteristics which are balanced in each block of the estimated 497 pscore. The blocks are determined by the matching algorithm in Becker and Ichino 498 (2002). This allows us to perform a placebo test to support the credibility of the 499 conditional independence assumption (CIA) in our setting. Specifically we test 500 whether the pre-treatment characteristics not included in the pscore estimation are 501 balanced in the treatment and control groups. These variables which are defined 502 the methodology proposed in Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2011). We do not report these estimates

although they are available upon request.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>We find that the balancing property is satisfied only when we use grammar school pupils as controls if we only match pupils based on a subset of all data available on achievement in Key Stage 2 tests, either on achievement levels or point scores. We find that the estimates of the CH effect relative to grammar school pupils tend to be 30% smaller for the probability of obtaining 1+ GCSE at A and, in contrast, 10-20% larger for the probability of obtaining 1+ GCSE at A-A\* or 5+ GCSE at A-A\*. When we use independent school pupils as controls the estimates of the CH effect cannot be interpreted meaningfully because the balancing property is not satisfied. We obtain similar results if we define all pupils in grammar or independent schools as our control group, rather than just those who were in primary schools in the same LAs as CH pupils. These results are not reported but are available upon request.

<sup>503</sup> pseudo-outcomes in Imbens and Rubin (2015) are known to be unaffected by the <sup>504</sup> treatment assignment under the CIA and therefore there should be no systematic <sup>505</sup> differences in them by treatment status if the matching is successful.

		Gramma	ar	Independent			
	ATT	С	ontrols	ATT	С	ontrols	
		matched	non-matched		matched	non-matched	
KS1 Eng. reading DfE		0.070	-0.014	0.038	0.487	0.003	
S.e.				0.055			
KS1 Eng. writing DfE		0.168	-0.021		0.537	-0.009	
S.e.							
KS1 Mat. DfE	0.049	0.068	-0.017		0.486	-0.000	
S.e.	0.078						
KS2 Eng TA $\geq 4$	0.003	0.995	0.997	0.003	0.995	0.929	
S.e.	0.005			0.005			
KS2 Mat TA $\geq 4$	0.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000	0.929	
S.e.	0.000			0.000			
KS2 Sci TA $\geq 4$	0.000	1.000	0.999	0.000	1.000	0.960	
S.e.	0.000			0.000			
KS2 Eng TA $> 4$	-0.003	0.836	0.756	0.032	0.801	0.531	
S.e.	0.030			0.030			
KS2 Mat TA $> 4$	-0.003	0.902	0.865	0.045	0.854	0.608	
S.e.	0.023			0.026			
KS2 Sci TA > 4	0.032	0.875	0.838	$0.050^{**}$	0.857	0.636	
S.e.	0.025			0.025			
KS2 Eng TA $>$ test	-0.034	0.098	0.111	-0.027	0.090	0.095	
S.e.	0.021			0.021			
KS2 Mat TA $>$ test.	0.016	0.058	0.072	-0.016	0.090	0.083	
S.e.	0.020			0.021			
KS2 Sci TA $>$ test.	0.003	0.040	0.059	-0.005	0.048	0.054	
S.e.	0.015			0.016			
KS2 Eng TA $\neq$ test	-0.029	0.172	0.211	-0.077**	0.220	0.228	
S.e.	0.029			0.030			
KS2 Mat TA $\neq$ test.	0.011	0.114	0.126	-0.034	0.159	0.164	
S.e.	0.026			0.026			
KS2 Sci TA $\neq$ test.	-0.016	0.117	0.150	-0.029	0.130	0.205	
S.e.	0.025			0.025			
Miles to CH	-31.752***	63.501	62.286	0.108	31.641	40.576	
S.e.	3.372			2.674			
Miles to closest grammar	0.042	1.889	1.014	0.242	1.689	2.336	
S.e.	0.225			0.229			
Miles to closest indep.	$-1.554^{***}$	2.568	2.263	$0.265^{***}$	0.748	0.919	
S.e.	0.224			0.097			
Ν		337	6,084		339	6,844	

Table 6: Difference in pre-treatments not used to match CH pupils with controls

The following pseudo-outcomes are used in our placebo test: Key Stage 1 achieve-506 ment levels in Reading, Writing and Maths, rescaled following the approach proposed 507 by the Department for Education (2017); a set of binary outcomes based on pupil 508 teacher assessment (TA) at the end of Key Stage 2; a set of proxies for pupil non-509 cognitive skills consisting of dummies equal to 1 if at Key Stage 2 the difference 510 between a pupil achievement level in the TA and in tests by subject is positive or 511 negative. Additional information about our proxies for non-cognitive skills can be 512 found in section 3.4. Finally we include measures of distance in miles between a 513 pupil's primary school, CH and the closest grammar or independent schools. 514

Table 6 reports pscore matching estimates of the difference in the aforementioned 515 pre-treatment characteristics for CH pupils relative to their matched controls in 516 grammar and in independent schools. The differences are small or close to zero and 517 not significant for all measures of achievement at Key Stage 1, for all measures of TA 518 and of difference between TA and test achievement at Key Stage 2 when the control 519 group are pupils in grammar school and for all but two when the control group are 520 pupils in independent schools. Two out of three measures of distance from primary 521 school are balanced when the control group are pupils in independent schools. Only 522 one out of three is balanced when the controls are grammar school pupils. This is 523 due to the considerably lower number of grammar relative to independent schools 524 mechanically leading to lower distance measure for CH pupils relative to matched 525 controls in grammar schools, as shown in Figure 1. Overall, these results suggest 526 that the CIA is plausible in our empirical setting.<sup>22</sup> 527

Finally, we performed an additional placebo test with the same logic as the aforementioned test, except we now quantify the differences in Key Stage 2 tests for CH pupils and matched pupils in grammar and independent schools by conditioning only on their achievement in Key Stage 1 tests and on socio-demographics. The aim of this test is to assess whether it is possible to find control students whose achievement predicts the future achievement of CH before the start of secondary school. Table

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>The missing values in Table 6 indicate that a given predetermined characteristic was used for a given control group and therefore the placebo test with that predetermined characteristic was not performed as it would not be informative. Extra results of our placebo test obtained using other measures of achievement at Key Stage 1 can be found in Table A.6 in the Appendix. We also performed a slightly different version of the placebo test in which we only estimate the propensity score by using achievement at Key Stage 2 and socio-demographics. Thus we fully exclude from the pscore estimation all measures of achievement at Key Stage 1 and we assess whether these are still balanced. Table A.7 in the Appendix reports the results. Differences in measures of achievement in Key Stage 1 tests tend to be balanced for both control groups, except for reading.

A.8 in the Appendix reports pscore matching estimates obtained by adding dummies 534 for whether achievement by subject in Key Stage 1 tests was above the median to 535 the main measures of achievement in Key Stage 1 (see Table 4). This pscore spec-536 ification passes conventional diagnostics as covariates are balanced in each pscore 537 block while they are not if we add to our main specification the additional measures 538 of achievement in Key Stage 1 tests. Table A.8 shows that Key Stage 2 achievement 539 by subject is balanced for CH pupils and for matched controls in grammar schools 540 with similar Key Stage 1 achievement and socio-demographics except for English 541 and science where CH pupils have higher achievement. In contrast, achievement 542 at Key Stage 2 is only slightly balanced when matched controls are pupils in inde-543 pendent schools, with significantly higher achievement of CH pupils in all subjects. 544 Overall, this placebo tests confirms that CH pupils and matched grammar schools 545 pupils are overall comparable while independent school pupils less so, which is not a 546 complete surprise since independent schools tend to be less selective on merit relative 547 to grammar schools, as we discussed in section 3.3. 548

However this placebo test has a number of limitations due to the low performance 549 of Key Stage 1 assessment as a predictor of achievement in Key Stage 2 tests. While 550 CH pupils are all high achievers in Key Stage 2, not all high achievers in Key Stage 551 2 perform equally well in their previous assessment (Key Stage 1). This is shown in 552 Table A.9 in the Appendix by the 20-30% of pupils with low performance in Key 553 Stage 1 and high performance in Key Stage 2 tests both when we use data on all 554 pupils in our dataset and when we focus only on CH pupils and pupils matched to 555 them based on similar values of the propensity score used in our main specification. 556 First, Key Stage 1 tests are not externally assessed, while Key Stage 2 tests are, 557 which may introduce a bias due to teachers' unobservable characteristics. Secondly, 558 data on Key Stage 1 achievement is less precisely measured since pupils obtain 559 categorical information about the level achieved in each subject while in Key Stage 560 2 tests they obtain both integer scores in the interval 1-100 and the corresponding 561 categorical achievement level. Thirdly, pupils take Key Stage 1 tests at age 7. This 562 is an early age at which pupils exhibit high heterogeneity in aspects of cognitive 563 development, such as cognitive flexibility, goal setting and information processing, 564 which are positively associated with educational achievement. By the age of 9, 565 empirical research in psychology shows that heterogeneity in cognitive development 566 decreases (Anderson, 2002). 567

#### <sup>568</sup> 6.2 Sensitivity of CH effect to calibrated confounders

We assess the sensitivity of our main results to a failure of the CIA by implementing 569 the methodology proposed by Ichino *et al.* (2008). This consists of considering a 570 binary unobservable confounder that has an effect on the both the selection into 571 treatment and on the untreated outcome. An example of unobservable confounders 572 in our setting are non-cognitive skills since they can have an effect on the prob-573 ability of attending CH and an effect on GCSE achievement, which can differ for 574 pupils in CH relative to those in grammar or independent schools. By imposing the 575 parameters of the confounder distribution we can predict a value of the confounder 576 for each individual in our sample. The simulated confounder can then be added to 577 the set of matching variables to obtain an estimate of the ATT. This procedure is 578 repeated 1000 times and the final estimated ATT is the average of the ATTs over 579 the distribution of the simulated confounder. If this ATT, obtained including the 580 simulated confounder, is similar to the ATT obtained without confounder, the CIA 581 is more likely to hold than if they are substantially different. 582

Similarly, we can use the simulated values of the unobservable confounder to obtain an estimate of its effect on the relative probability of a positive outcome for the non-treated (outcome effect) and on the relative probability of treatment (selection effect). These relative probabilities are obtained as average odds ratios after estimating for each set of simulated confounder values a logit model for the probability of a positive outcome of the untreated and another one for the probability of treatment. We now provide a more detailed description of this methodology.

We let U be the unobserved binary confounder and its distribution be fully determined by the four parameters  $p_{ij} = Pr(U = 1 | D = i, A = j, X)$  measuring the probability that the unobserved term is equal to 1 given that the treatment D, i.e. attending CH in our setting, is equal to i and the outcome A, i.e. achievement, is equal to j, with  $i, j = \{0, 1\}$ .

$$\Gamma = \frac{\frac{Pr(A=1 \mid D=0, U=1, X)}{Pr(A=0 \mid D=0, U=1, X)}}{\frac{Pr(A=1 \mid D=0, U=0, X)}{Pr(A=0 \mid D=0, U=0, X)}}$$
(2)

<sup>595</sup> By assuming  $p_{01} > p_{00}$ , i.e. that the unobserved confounder has a positive effect <sup>596</sup> on the untreated outcome, and accounting for the relationship between U and X, <sup>597</sup> Ichino *et al.* (2008) define the outcome effect  $\Gamma$  as the effect of U on the probability <sup>598</sup> of a positive outcome A and compute it as the odds ratio of U after estimating the logit model of Pr(A = 1 | D = 0, U, X), as shown in equation (2). The selection effect  $\Delta$  is defined as the effect of U on the probability of treatment, i.e. D = 1, and it is computed as the odds ratio of U after estimating the logit model of Pr(D = 1 | U, X), as shown in equation (3).

$$\Delta = \frac{\frac{Pr(D=1 \mid U=1, X)}{Pr(D=0 \mid U=1, X)}}{\frac{Pr(D=1 \mid U=0, X)}{Pr(D=0 \mid U=0, X)}}$$
(3)

<sup>603</sup> Based on values of  $p_{ij}$  obtained by using the empirical distribution of a relevant <sup>604</sup> covariate, a value of U is imputed for each pupil in the dataset. The variable U is <sup>605</sup> then treated as any observed covariate in X to first estimate the pscore and then <sup>606</sup> the ATT using nearest neighbour matching. Varying the values of the sensitivity <sup>607</sup> parameters  $p_{ij}$  and repeating the pscore and ATT estimation in a simulation 1000 <sup>608</sup> times, the average of the ATT over the distribution of U is obtained.<sup>23</sup>

In our setting, achievement in Key Stage 2 tests at age 11 and SES are observ-609 able characteristics used by CH to select its pupils while suitability for boarding is 610 unobservable to the econometrician. Therefore, we assess the sensitivity of our main 611 results to unobserved binary covariates whose distribution is similar to the one of 612 observed measures of pupil ability, as at least part of a pupil's ability is typically 613 unobserved and may be correlated with the pupil's resilience to adapt to boarding. 614 We use two measures of achievement in Key Stage 1 test as ability proxies, the 615 English comprehension test and the Maths task test, rescaled following Department 616 for Education (2017). Since we do not use them as predetermined characteristics 617 when we estimate the pscore they may differ for pupils in the treated and control 618 groups. We also use a dummy equal to 1 if the distance between primary school 619 and the closest grammar or independent secondary is greater than the median value, 620 because it is an observable measure of the opportunity cost of attending CH although 621 is not used in estimating the pscore. This may be a relevant factor for secondary 622 school choice as the further away a pupil lives from CH the higher the psychological 623 effort required to adapt to boarding. 624

Panel A of Table 7 shows estimates of the effect of CH obtained on our three measures of achievement at GCSE by using pupils in grammar schools as controls. Estimates on each row are obtained by using a confounder U distributed accord-

 $<sup>^{23}</sup>$ A more detailed description of the econometric details behind the sensitivity analysis is found in section 4 in Ichino *et al.* (2008).

	$p_{11}$	$p_{10}$	$p_{01}$	$p_{00}$	Outcome	Selection	ATT	S.e.			
		Da	nol 1 :			effect $\Delta$					
		1 0	net A. g	jrummu	i schools						
1+ GCSEs with A											
Neutral confounder	0.515	0.517	0.493	0.485	1.031	1.112	0.072***	0.024			
KS1 Eng compr. test DfE	0.005	0.107	0.005	0.006	1.200	2.387	$0.049^{*}$	0.027			
KS1 Mat task test DfE	0.008	0.069	0.001	0.000		12.497	0.045	0.027			
Closest grammar school	0.530	0.517	0.496	0.498	0.996	1.149	$0.048^{**}$	0.027			
			1+ GC	SEs wit	th A*						
Neutral confounder	0.501	0.553	0.499	0.496	1.014	1.058	$0.172^{***}$	0.034			
KS1 Eng compr. test $\mathrm{DfE}$	0.015	0.000	0.009	0.000		2.276	$0.185^{***}$	0.041			
$\rm KS1$ Mat task test $\rm DfE$	0.015	0.000	0.002	0.000	4.101	12.752	$0.188^{***}$	0.041			
Closest grammar school	0.521	0.566	0.487	0.508	0.919	1.152	$0.193^{***}$	0.042			
		ć	5+GCS	SEs with	A-A*						
KS1 Eng compr. test $\mathrm{DfE}$	0.013	0.011	0.010	0.000	27.628	2.279	$0.187^{***}$	0.044			
$\rm KS1$ Mat task test $\rm DfE$	0.016	0.000	0.002	0.000		12.064	$0.190^{***}$	0.044			
Closest grammar school	0.517	0.570	0.483	0.510	0.901	1.158	$0.188^{***}$	0.045			
		Pan	el B: in	depende	ent schools						
			1. 0	OSE and	:+b A						
Neutral confounder	0.480	0 586	$1 \neq 0.0$	0.513	0.038	0.053	0 003***	0.024			
KS1 Eng compr. tost DfF	0.460	0.380	0.497	0.015	1.074	0.900	0.095	0.024			
KS1 Mat task tost DfE	0.005	0.107	0.000	0.000	3 154	2.524	0.105	0.031			
Closest indep_school	0.470	0.000	0.0408	0.210	0.037	0.878	0.071	0.030			
Closest indep. school	0.470	0.414	1+ GC	SEs wit	0.331 th A*	0.010	0.105	0.001			
Neutral confounder	0.524	0.474	0.500	0.490	1.044	1.090	0.127***	0.032			
KS1 Eng compr. test DfE	0.015	0.000	0.009	0.001	12.526	1.866	$0.142^{***}$	0.038			
KS1 Mat task test DfE	0.739	0.536	0.655	0.287	4.746	1.988	0.095**	0.040			
	0.374	0.447	0.492	0.521	0.893	0.627	0.130***	0.040			
Closest indep. school	0.467	0.461	0.472	0.535	0.779	0.914	0.136***	0.040			
		ć	5+GCS	SEs with	$A - A^*$						
Neutral confounder	0.483	0.450	0.497	0.494	1.013	0.925	$0.172^{***}$	0.035			
$\rm KS1$ Eng compr. test DfE	0.013	0.011	0.011	0.002	13.169	1.876	$0.164^{***}$	0.042			
KS1 Mat task test DfE	0.775	0.474	0.701	0.320	4.961	1.933	$0.117^{***}$	0.044			
Closest indep. school	0.468	0.460	0.473	0.523	0.818	0.912	0.158***	0.043			

Table 7: Sensitivity analysis of CH effect using confounders calibrated following ability and distance proxies

ing to the aforementioned predetermined characteristics not used to estimate the propensity score. The first four columns on the left-hand side show values of the probabilities  $p_{ij}$  characterising the distribution of U by using the empirical distribution of the covariate on a given row, then the outcome and selection effect are shown and, finally, ATT estimates and their standard error. Panel B shows the the same information when pupils in independent schools are the control group.

<sup>634</sup> For each outcome variable, Table 7 shows estimates obtained using a neutral

confounder, i.e. with all  $p_{ij}$  set equal to approximately 0.5, in the first row. On the two following rows the unobserved confounder is distributed similarly to observed measures of achievement at Key Stage 1. In the final row the confounder follows the empirical distribution of a dummy equal to 1 if the distance to the closest grammar secondary or to the closest independent secondary is greater than the median.

Overall, the estimates in Table 7 show that both their magnitude and precision 640 are in line with our main results. When we look instead at the outcome effect, i.e. 641 the effect of U on the probability of higher achievement, and at the selection effect, 642 i.e. the effect of U on the probability of attending CH, the table shows that the 643 value of both effects is very close to one in the case of neutral confounder. This 644 is expected as by setting all  $p_{ij}$  to 0.5 the confounder is close to i.i.d. If we now 645 focus on proxies for unobserved ability, the majority of the values of the outcome 646 and selection effect are greater than 1, with the outcome effect being greater. This 647 suggests a positive selection into CH and a positive effect on achievement for CH 648 pupils with high unobserved ability. 649

For distance measures, the results in Table 7 show that both the outcome and 650 selection effect of a confounder proxying the cost of attending a selective day school 651 are close to 1. The selection effect tends to be greater than one when pupils in 652 grammar schools are the control group, which suggests a positive selection effect 653 due to a lower opportunity cost of attending CH if the closest selective day school 654 is far. When pupils in independent schools are the control group, the selection 655 effect is slightly smaller but very close to one, suggesting that the selection effect 656 plays a small role. These results hold qualitatively for all the three outcomes we 657 consider. Additional results using measures of socio-demographics, other measures 658 of achievement at Key Stage 1, the type of school attended at Key Stage 2 and 659 measures of motivation not used in the pscore estimation can be found in Table 660 A.10 in the Appendix.<sup>24</sup> 661

## 662 7 Discussion

In this paper we use English administrative data to test the hypothesis that attending Christ Hospital (CH), a boarding school admitting a higher share of high ability

 $<sup>^{24}</sup>$ The analysis of killer confounders in Ichino *et al.* (2008), which consists of jointly increasing the extent of selection and of outcome effects until a pair of values for these effects that 'kills' the main results is found, is not reported as it is not informative about the nature of the unobserved information, e.g. ability or opportunity cost, that may bias our main results.

<sup>665</sup> pupils with lower socio-economic status (SES) than comparable selective day schools <sup>666</sup> improves achievement in compulsory school final exams (GCSEs). Our propensity <sup>667</sup> score matching estimates show that the probability of achieving A or A\* in five or <sup>668</sup> more GCSEs is 18.6 percentage points higher compared to 58.4% for matched pupils <sup>669</sup> in grammar schools, i.e. an increase by about 30%. We find similar results when <sup>670</sup> the control group are independent school pupils.

CH differs from independent day schools in that it provides boarding and tends 671 to be more selective based on pupil ability. Therefore, when pupils in indepen-672 dent day schools are the control group our estimates can be interpreted as the joint 673 effect of boarding and of pupil ability selection. However, we argue that the poten-674 tial selection bias in our estimates is small. The reason is that since independent 675 schools display a high variability in pupil ability, ranging from very high for pupils 676 admitted with a bursary to a lower level for fee-paying pupils, high ability pupils 677 at independent schools can be repeatedly matched to similar pupils at CH, thus 678 making boarding the most plausible mechanism underlying our estimated effect. 679

On the other hand when pupils in grammar schools are the controls, our estimates 680 capture the overall effect of substituting family with school inputs and of having 681 access to better school inputs since CH is boarding and has more resources. Although 682 we cannot separately quantify the boarding effect and the resources effect without 683 additional assumptions, the fact that we obtain similar results with the independent 684 day schools control group, where resources are much closer to those of CH, suggests 685 that boarding is an important part of the explanation for the difference between 686 exams performances of matched pupils at CH and in grammar school. 687

Our results contribute to recent studies exploiting lottery-based admission into 688 oversubscribed boarding schools, in the US (Curto and Fryer Jr, 2014) and in France 689 (Behaghel et al., 2017), by being the first to undertake a comparable analysis on 690 England. By estimating the treatment effect on the treated (ATT), we offer com-691 plementary evidence to the quasi-experimental one obtained using a local average 692 treatment effect (LATE). A common limitation of our study and the two related 693 quasi-experimental ones on boarding schools is low external validity, as they all use 694 either a single boarding school or a small number of them as the treatment group, 695 which makes them unrepresentative of the universe of boarding schools in a country. 696 ATT has a somewhat "stronger" identification assumption based on selection on 697 observables, i.e. lower internal validity relative to quasi-experimental studies. While 698 we would like to match pupils by restricting our attention to those applying to CH 699

and compare achievement at GCSE for marginally (non-)admitted ones based on 700 their performance in the selection process, this is not possible due to privacy laws. 701 However, our extensive sensitivity analysis that includes a placebo test assessing 702 the differences in predetermined characteristics not used to match pupils and a 703 methodology developed by Ichino *et al.* (2008) to test the extent to which selection 704 on unobservables may bias our estimates, offers support to our estimation strategy 705 based on selection on observables. In our study, this suggests that unobservables 706 associated with admission to CH such as ability, motivation or the opportunity cost 707 of attending a different school, do not play a major role in our analysis. We believe 708 that this is consistent with the fact that both the treated group, i.e. CH pupils, and 709 the control group, i.e. either grammar or independent school pupils, are screened 710 based on ability and motivation. 711

Our paper also contributes to empirical studies estimating an educational pro-712 duction function to assess the effect of school-based policies that aim to counteract 713 the negative influence of low SES on pupil achievement (see for a survey Todd and 714 Wolpin, 2003). We isolate the effect of boarding in a simple setting in which parental 715 inputs, which can be a confounding factor of shool-based interventions, are low for 716 all boarders. This cannot be done in the production function, because unobserved 717 family inputs may either decrease if school and family inputs are substitutes or 718 increase if they are complements. 719

Our analysis paves the way for a number of extensions. We have so far focused 720 on a single selective and boarding school but also considering state boarding schools, 721 a number of which are Academies, may help us obtaining as treatment group one 722 that is more representative of secondary school pupils than the highly selected one at 723 CH. We have not yet looked at the probability of continuing with post-compulsory 724 education, namely sixth form, achievement in A-levels, admission into prestigious 725 universities, degree choice and achievement and labour market outcomes since ac-726 cess to this individual-level data is subject to authorisation by the Department for 727 Education. In addition, an extension that is particularly relevant to inform policy-728 decisions over the role of boarding education for high ability pupils with low SES is 729 performing a cost-benefit analysis of subsidising these pupils. Finally, peer effects 730 are assumed away under all reduced form empirical strategies, such as propensity 731 score matching or instrumental variables. However, they may play a role for CH 732 pupils and for those in selective secondary day schools. While we believe that this is 733 an interesting and partly unanswered question, the lack of data on pupils' networks 734

<sup>735</sup> limits the possibility of exploring this empirical issue.

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## **Online Appendix**

Figure A.1: Number of CH pupils by local authority where they went to primary school



839



Figure A.2: Histograms of achievement at GCSE



Figure A.3: Covariates differences for CH relative to grammar and independent by pscore block

Figure A.4: Achievement at Key Stage 2 (KS2) and SES by secondary school



	(	Grammar s	chools	Ir	Independent schools			
	ATT	С	ontrols	ATT	Controls			
		Matched Non-matched			Matched	Non-matched		
1+ GCSE with A	$0.078^{***}$	0.866	0.864	$0.081^{***}$	0.856	0.752		
S.e.	0.024			0.025				
1+ GCSE with A*	$0.173^{***}$	0.657	0.558	$0.084^{**}$	0.742	0.516		
S.e.	0.036			0.035				
5+ GCSE with A-A*	$0.193^{***}$	0.575	0.504	$0.158^{***}$	0.611	0.411		
S.e.	0.038			0.039				
Ν		293	6,023		279	6,763		
		Pscore t	hick support 0-0.	1				
1+ GCSE with A	$0.088^{***}$	0.855	0.861	0.009	0.915	0.745		
S.e.	0.029			0.027				
1+ GCSE with A*	$0.185^{***}$	0.626	0.546	0.042	0.745	0.495		
S.e.	0.042			0.042				
5+ GCSE with A-A*	$0.189^{***}$	0.542	0.492	$0.118^{**}$	0.590	0.386		
S.e.	0.045			0.047				
N		223	$5,\!534$		204	6,280		

Table A.1: Effect of attending CH for pupils in the pscore thick support

Table A.2: Estimates of CH effect using pscore from multinomial lo	git
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		Gramm	ar		Independent				
	ATT	Controls		ATT	Controls				
		Matched	Non-matched		Matched	Non-matched			
1+ GCSE with A	$0.051^{**}$	0.885	0.865	$0.109^{***}$	0.828	0.753			
S.e.	0.023			0.026					
1+ GCSE with A*	$0.181^{***}$	0.656	0.530	$0.154^{**}$	0.684	0.511			
S.e.	0.035			0.033					
5+ GCSE with A-A*	$0.176^{***}$	0.595	0.478	$0.146^{**}$	0.623	0.391			
S.e.	0.037			0.036					
Ν		331	1,595		331	2,774			

	Grammar								
	Ne	arest 1	neighbour			Kerne	1	Radius $(0.1)$	Mahalanobis
	Becker	and	Leuven	and	Normal	Bivariate	Epanechnikov	-	
	Ichino (2	2002)	Sianesi (	2015)					
1+ GCSE with A	$0.064^{**}$		$0.072^{***}$		$0.059^{***}$	$0.051^{***}$	$0.051^{***}$	$0.059^{***}$	$0.072^{***}$
S.e.	0.023		0.024		0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.022
1+ GCSE with A*	$0.170^{***}$		$0.172^{***}$		$0.231^{***}$	$0.206^{***}$	0.209***	0.229***	$0.172^{***}$
S.e.	0.034		0.034		0.022	0.023	0.023	0.022	0.029
5+ GCSE with A-A*	$0.186^{***}$		$0.188^{***}$		$0.223^{***}$	$0.203^{***}$	0.206***	$0.222^{***}$	$0.202^{***}$
S.e.	0.036		0.036		0.024	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.032
Ν	6,421		6,798		6,798	6,798	6,798	6,798	
						Independe	nt		
	Ne	arest 1	neighbour			Independe Kerne	nt l	Radius (0.1)	Mahalanobis
	Ne Becker	arest 1 and	neighbour Leuven	and	Normal	Independe Kerne Bivariate	nt l Epanechnikov	Radius (0.1)	Mahalanobis
	Ne Becker Ichino (2	arest 1 and 2002)	neighbour Leuven Sianesi (i	and 2015)	Normal	Independe Kerne Bivariate	nt l Epanechnikov	Radius (0.1)	Mahalanobis
1+ GCSE with A	Ne Becker Ichino (2 0.090***	arest 1 and 2002)	neighbour Leuven Sianesi (1 0.093***	and 2015)	Normal 0.145***	Independe Kerne Bivariate 0.124***	nt Epanechnikov 0.128***	Radius (0.1)	Mahalanobis 0.042**
1+ GCSE with A S.e.	Ne Becker Ichino (2 0.090*** 0.024	arest 1 and 2002)	neighbour Leuven Sianesi (1 0.093*** 0.024	and 2015)	Normal 0.145*** 0.015	Independe Kerne Bivariate 0.124*** 0.016	nt 1 Epanechnikov 0.128*** 0.016	Radius (0.1) 0.151*** 0.015	Mahalanobis 0.042** 0.021
1+ GCSE with A S.e. 1+ GCSE with A*	Ne Becker Ichino (2 0.090*** 0.024 0.133***	arest 1 and 2002)	neighbour Leuven Sianesi (: 0.093*** 0.024 0.127***	and 2015)	Normal 0.145*** 0.015 0.226***	Independe Kerne Bivariate 0.124*** 0.016 0.166***	nt Epanechnikov 0.128*** 0.016 0.175***	Radius (0.1) 0.151*** 0.015 0.229***	Mahalanobis 0.042** 0.021 0.114***
1+ GCSE with A S.e. 1+ GCSE with A* S.e.	Ne Becker Ichino (2 0.090*** 0.024 0.133*** 0.032	arest 1 and 2002)	neighbour Leuven Sianesi (1 0.093*** 0.024 0.127*** 0.032	and 2015)	Normal 0.145*** 0.015 0.226*** 0.021	Independe Kerne Bivariate 0.124*** 0.016 0.166*** 0.022	nt Epanechnikov 0.128*** 0.016 0.175*** 0.022	Radius (0.1) 0.151*** 0.015 0.229*** 0.021	Mahalanobis 0.042** 0.021 0.114*** 0.030
1+ GCSE with A S.e. 1+ GCSE with A* S.e. 5+ GCSE with A-A*	Ne Becker Ichino (2 0.090*** 0.024 0.133*** 0.032 0.180***	arest 1 and 2002)	neighbour Leuven Sianesi (: 0.093*** 0.024 0.127*** 0.032 0.172***	and 2015)	Normal 0.145*** 0.015 0.226*** 0.021 0.253***	Independe Kerne Bivariate 0.124*** 0.016 0.166*** 0.022 0.188***	nt Epanechnikov 0.128*** 0.016 0.175*** 0.022 0.198***	Radius (0.1) 0.151*** 0.015 0.229*** 0.021 0.255***	Mahalanobis 0.042** 0.021 0.114*** 0.030 0.119***
1+ GCSE with A S.e. 1+ GCSE with A* S.e. 5+ GCSE with A-A* S.e.	Ne Becker Ichino (2 0.090*** 0.024 0.133*** 0.032 0.180*** 0.036	arest 1 and 2002)	neighbour Leuven Sianesi (; 0.093*** 0.024 0.127*** 0.032 0.172*** 0.035	and 2015)	Normal 0.145*** 0.015 0.226*** 0.021 0.253*** 0.024	Independe Kerne Bivariate 0.124*** 0.016 0.166*** 0.022 0.188*** 0.025	nt Epanechnikov 0.128*** 0.016 0.175*** 0.022 0.198*** 0.024	Radius (0.1) 0.151*** 0.015 0.229*** 0.021 0.255*** 0.024	Mahalanobis 0.042** 0.021 0.114*** 0.030 0.119*** 0.033

Table A.3: Estimates of CH effect obtained using different matching methods

## Table A.4: Split sample estimates of the CH effect

	Gender										
		Grammar			Independent						
	Male	Female	F-M	Ma	le	Female	F-M				
1+ GCSE with A	0.048	0.054	0.006	0.0	52	0.090***	0.037				
S.e.	0.031	0.034	0.046	0.0	31	0.034	0.046				
1+ GCSE with A*	$0.190^{***}$	$0.180^{***}$	-0.011	0.0	57	$0.132^{***}$	0.075				
S.e.	0.049	0.045	0.067	0.04	16	0.042	0.062				
5+ GCSE with A-A*	$0.186^{***}$	$0.186^{***}$	-0.000	0.08	31	$0.180^{***}$	0.099				
S.e.	0.051	0.049	0.071	0.0	50	0.048	0.070				
Ν	393	319		39	4	320					

	$\mathbf{FSM}$									
	(	Grammar		I	Independent					
	No	Yes	Yes-No	No	Yes	Yes-No				
1+ GCSE with A	0.037	0.073	0.035	0.090***	$0.127^{*}$	0.037				
S.e.	0.024	0.069	0.073	0.026	0.076	0.080				
1+ GCSE with A*	$0.127^{***}$	$0.182^{*}$	0.054	$0.065^{**}$	$0.418^{***}$	$0.353^{***}$				
S.e.	0.035	0.102	0.108	0.033	0.105	0.110				
5+ GCSE with A-A*	$0.152^{***}$	0.145	-0.007	$0.149^{***}$	$0.327^{***}$	0.178				
S.e.	0.038	0.109	0.116	0.037	0.110	0.117				
Ν	620	93		620	91					

#### IDACI greater than or equal to the median

		Grammar		Independent			
	No	Yes	Yes-No	No	Yes	Yes-No	
1+ GCSE with A	0.064	$0.072^{***}$	0.007	0.035	$0.122^{***}$	0.087	
S.e.	0.040	0.028	0.049	0.040	0.030	0.050	
1+ GCSE with A*	$0.107^{*}$	$0.215^{***}$	0.108	0.009	$0.195^{***}$	$0.186^{**}$	
S.e.	0.056	0.041	0.069	0.059	0.039	0.071	
5+ GCSE with A-A*	0.086	$0.194^{***}$	0.108	0.052	$0.229^{***}$	$0.177^{**}$	
S.e.	0.058	0.044	0.073	0.064	0.043	0.077	
Ν	271	448		222	489		

#### FSM and IDACI greater than or equal to the median

	Gra	mmar sch	ools	Independent schools			
	No	Yes	Yes-No	No	Yes	Yes-No	
1+ GCSE with A	0.039	0.067	0.028	0.082***	0.062	-0.020	
S.e.	0.024	0.072	0.076	0.025	0.072	0.077	
1+ GCSE with A*	$0.130^{***}$	$0.222^{**}$	0.093	$0.073^{**}$	$0.354^{***}$	$0.281^{**}$	
S.e.	0.035	0.105	0.111	0.033	0.109	0.114	
5+ GCSE with A-A*	$0.160^{***}$	0.156	-0.004	$0.155^{***}$	$0.250^{**}$	0.095	
S.e.	0.038	0.115	0.121	0.037	0.117	0.123	
Ν	636	79		633	81		

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

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	FSM and IDACI in the top quartile								
		Gramm	ar	Iı	lent				
	No	Yes	Yes-No	No	Yes	Yes-No			
$1+\mathrm{GCSE}$ with A	0.050	0.051	0.001	0.084	0.119	0.035			
S.e.	0.024	0.077	0.081	0.025	0.083	0.087			
1+ GCSE with A*	0.148	0.231	0.083	0.069	0.452	0.384			
S.e.	0.035	0.113	0.118	0.032	0.114	0.119			
5+ GCSE with A-A*	0.172	0.154	-0.018	0.143	0.310	0.166			
S.e.	0.037	0.124	0.129	0.036	0.124	0.129			
Ν	649	69		644	72				

FSM and IDACI in the top decile

	Grammar			Independent			
	No	Yes	Yes-No	No	Yes	Yes-No	
1+ GCSE with A	0.067	0.062	-0.004	0.096	0.031	-0.064	
S.e.	0.024	0.094	0.097	0.025	0.073	0.077	
1+ GCSE with A*	0.159	0.125	-0.034	0.064	0.531	0.467	
S.e.	0.035	0.128	0.133	0.032	0.142	0.145	
5+ GCSE with A-A*	0.180	0.281	0.102	0.128	0.438	0.310	
S.e.	0.037	0.144	0.149	0.036	0.148	0.152	
Ν	664	54		661	51		

#### No FSM and IDACI in the bottom quartile

	Grammar				Independent			
	No	Yes	Yes-No		No	Yes	Yes-No	
1+ GCSE with A	0.089	0.100	0.011		0.096	0.111	0.015	
S.e.	0.027	0.054	0.060		0.026	0.064	0.070	
1+ GCSE with A*	0.229	0.141	-0.088		0.160	0.022	-0.137	
S.e.	0.038	0.074	0.084		0.035	0.092	0.098	
5+ GCSE with A-A*	0.236	0.100	-0.136		0.196	0.089	-0.107	
S.e.	0.041	0.076	0.086		0.038	0.103	0.110	
Ν	554	166			626	89		

#### No FSM and IDACI in the bottom decile

	Grammar				Independent			
	No	Yes	Yes-No		No	Yes	Yes-No	
1+ GCSE with A	0.087	0.176	0.089		0.093	0.208	0.115	
S.e.	0.026	0.079	0.083		0.025	0.085	0.088	
1+ GCSE with A*	0.184	0.059	-0.125		0.142	0.083	-0.058	
S.e.	0.035	0.111	0.116		0.033	0.138	0.142	
5+ GCSE with A-A*	0.207	0.147	-0.060		0.176	0.125	-0.051	
S.e.	0.038	0.121	0.127		0.036	0.145	0.150	
Ν	646	67			669	48		

		Gramma	r		Independent			
	ATT	OLS	OLS ATT-OLS		OLS	ATT-OLS		
			% diff.			% diff.		
1+ GCSE with A	$0.069^{**}$	0.046***	-33.2	0.093***	$0.077^{**}$	-17.5		
S.e.	0.023	0.014		0.024	0.015			
1+ GCSE with A*	$0.172^{***}$	$0.194^{***}$	12.8	$0.127^{***}$	$0.114^{**}$	-10.1		
S.e.	0.034	0.021		0.032	0.020			
5+ GCSE with A-A*	$0.186^{**}$	$0.180^{***}$	-3.1	$0.172^{***}$	$0.149^{**}$	-13.8		
S.e.	0.036	0.021		0.035	0.021			
Ν		6,798			7,560			

Table A.5: Estimates of CH effect using pscore matching and OLS

Table A.6: Difference in KS1 achievement measures not used to match CH pupils with controls

	Grammar				Independent		
	ATT	C	ontrols	ATT	С	ontrols	
		matched	non-matched		matched	non-matched	
KS1 Eng reading task DfE	0.106	-0.091	0.003	-0.003	0.515	0.041	
S.e.	0.136			0.076			
KS1 Eng comprehension test $DfE$	0.100	0.040	-0.015	0.054	0.409	-0.014	
S.e.	0.076			0.062			
KS1 Eng writing test DfE	0.024	0.104	-0.014	0.024	0.490	-0.002	
S.e.	0.080			0.064			
KS1 Mat using and applying DfE	0.056	0.062	-0.012	0.019	0.453	-0.004	
S.e.	0.077			0.067			
KS1 Mat number and algebra DfE	0.038	0.047	-0.014	-0.011	0.460	0.000	
S.e.	0.078			0.068			
KS1 shapes and measures DfE	0.068	0.013	-0.010	-0.061	0.481	0.003	
S.e.	0.078			0.066			
KS1 Sci enquiry DfE	$0.158^{**}$	0.019	-0.010	0.101	0.323	0.008	
S.e.	0.077			0.069			
KS1 Sci life and living processes DfE	0.106	0.065	-0.016	0.067	0.345	0.001	
S.e.	0.078			0.069			
KS1 Sci materials & properties DfE	0.037	0.079	-0.014	0.028	0.329	0.012	
S.e.	0.078			0.070			
KS1 Sci physical processes DfE	$0.155^{*}$	-0.014	-0.012	0.009	0.353	0.007	
S.e.	0.081			0.070			
N		988	6,085		1,274	6,844	

		Gramm	ıar	Independent			
	ATT	С	ontrols	ATT	С	ontrols	
		matched	non-matched		matched	non-matched	
KS1 Eng. reading DfE	$0.164^{**}$	-0.038	-0.007	0.130**	0.395	0.007	
S.e.	0.075			0.059			
KS1 Eng. writing DfE	$0.182^{**}$	0.003	-0.013	0.094	0.438	-0.004	
S.e.	0.079			0.074			
KS1 Mat. DfE	0.033	0.084	-0.015	0.103	0.373	0.005	
S.e.	0.077			0.068			
KS1 Eng. read. task DfE	0.050	-0.036	-0.000	0.131	0.381	0.043	
S.e.	0.115			0.094			
KS1 Eng. comp. test DfE	$0.187^{**}$	-0.047	-0.009	0.110	0.353	-0.012	
S.e.	0.076			0.062			
KS1 Eng. writing test $DfE$	0.092	0.037	-0.010	0.088	0.426	0.001	
S.e.	0.079			0.066			
KS1 Mat Use and app. DfE	0.106	0.012	-0.010	0.065	0.407	-0.001	
S.e.	0.078			0.067			
KS1 Mat num. and alg. DfE	0.027	0.058	-0.013	0.075	0.374	0.004	
S.e.	0.078			0.069			
KS1 sha. and mea. DfE	0.031	0.051	-0.013	0.051	0.369	0.009	
S.e.	0.078			0.069			
KS1 Sci enq. DfE	0.056	0.120	-0.014	$0.127^{*}$	0.298	0.009	
S.e.	0.076			0.068			
KS1 Sci lif and liv. proc. DfE	0.115	0.056	-0.016	0.106	0.305	0.002	
S.e.	0.076			0.069			
KS1 Sci mat. prop. DfE	0.027	0.089	-0.014	0.043	0.315	0.011	
S.e.	0.077			0.070			
KS1 Sci phy. proc. DfE	0.090	0.051	-0.016	0.055	0.307	0.009	
S.e.	0.077			0.072			
Ν		353.000	6306.000		352.000	7272.000	

Table A.7: Difference in pseudo-outcomes when using only KS2 test achievement and socio-demographics to match CH pupils with controls

		Gramm	ar	Independent			
	ATT	С	ontrols	ATT	Controls		
		matched	non-matched		matched	non-matched	
KS2 Eng TA $\geq 4$	-0.000	0.997	0.997	0.041***	0.956	0.930	
S.e.	0.004			0.011			
KS2 Mat TA $\geq 4$	0.000	1.000	1.000	$0.023^{**}$	0.977	0.930	
S.e.	0.000			0.009			
KS2 Sci TA $\geq 4$	0.003	0.997	0.997	$0.025^{***}$	0.975	0.961	
S.e.	0.004			0.008			
KS2 Eng TA $> {\rm test}$	$-0.039^{*}$	0.103	0.110	-0.030	0.094	0.096	
S.e.	0.022			0.021			
KS2 Mat TA $>$ test.	0.019	0.056	0.073	-0.025	0.099	0.082	
S.e.	0.019			0.022			
KS2 Sci TA $>$ test.	-0.006	0.049	0.059	0.019	0.023	0.055	
S.e.	0.016			0.014			
KS2 Eng TA $\neq$ test	$-0.062^{**}$	0.205	0.209	$-0.052^{*}$	0.195	0.231	
S.e.	0.030			0.029			
KS2 Mat TA $\neq$ test.	0.039	0.085	0.128	-0.024	0.149	0.164	
S.e.	0.024			0.027			
KS2 Sci TA $\neq$ test.	-0.024	0.125	0.152	$-0.045^{*}$	0.146	0.206	
S.e.	0.025			0.026			
KS2 Eng score	$2.239^{***}$	73.592	73.083	$3.907^{***}$	71.924	66.879	
S.e.	0.708			0.840			
KS2 Mat score	0.353	87.933	86.953	$5.738^{***}$	82.549	77.985	
S.e.	0.657			0.937			
KS2 Sci score	$1.046^{**}$	69.469	68.923	$2.629^{***}$	67.886	65.198	
S.e.	0.454			0.551			
KS2 Eng lev $>4$	$0.081^{***}$	0.774	0.750	$0.139^{***}$	0.717	0.556	
S.e.	0.030			0.031			
KS2 Mat lev ${>}4$	-0.003	0.896	0.859	$0.173^{***}$	0.720	0.624	
S.e.	0.023			0.029			
KS2 Sci lev ${>}4$	0.021	0.904	0.870	$0.099^{***}$	0.827	0.721	
S.e.	0.022			0.025			
Ν		463	6,314		488	7,108	

Table A.8: Difference in KS2 achievement (ATT) when using a rich set of KS1 achievement measures to estimate the pscore

Table A.9: Cross-tabulations of achievement in KS1 and KS2 by subject  $% \mathcal{C}$ 

CH and grammar s	schools	pupils
------------------	---------	--------

	(a)				(b)		
		K2 E	ng lev.			K2 1	Mat le
		< 5	$\geq 5$			< 5	$\geq 5$
VC1 Engloy	< 3	1,153	1,753	KS1 Met law	< 3	667	1,78
K51 Elig lev.	$\geq 3$	500	3,392	K51 Mat lev.	$\geq 3$	269	4,08
	(c)				(d)		
		K2 S	ci lev.			K2 1	1 + lev
		< 5	$\geq 5$			< 5	$\geq 5$
KS1 Sci lov	< 3	605	$2,\!403$	$KS1 \downarrow low$	< 3	132	1,407
issi sei iev.	> 3	234	3,556	$1.51 1 \pm 100$	$\geq 3$	71	5,18

### CH and independent schools pupils

	(e)				(f)		
		K2 E	ng lev.			K2 N	lat lev.
		< 5	$\geq 5$			< 5	$\geq 5$
KC1 Englag	< 3	2,668	1,733	KC1 Mat la	< 3	2312	1632
K51 Elig lev.	$\geq 3$	484	$2,\!675$	K51 Mat le	'. ≥ 3	379	3237
	(g)				(h)		
		K2 Se	ci lev.			K2 1-	+ lev.
		< 5	$\geq 5$			< 5	$\geq 5$
KS1 Sei lov	< 3	1663	2464	KS1 1 + la	, < 3	1143	1841
KSI SCI lev.	$\geq 3$	297	3136	K51 1+ le	$\geq 3$	187	4389

### CH and matched pupils in grammar schools

	(i)				(j)		
		K2 E	ng lev.			K2 N	Iat le
		< 5	$\geq 5$			< 5	$\geq 5$
KC1 Englass	< 3	81	161	KS1 Mat lav	< 3	51	169
K51 Eng lev.	$\geq 3$	37	435	KOT WAT ICV.	$\geq 3$	22	472
	(k)				(l)		
		K2 S	ci lev.			K2~1	+ lev.
		< 5	$\geq 5$			< 5	$\geq 5$
KS1 Sci lov	< 3	46	227	$KS1 1 \perp low$	< 3	9	121
TAST SCI IEV.	$\geq 3$	9	432		$\geq 3$	2	582

## CH and matched pupils in independent schools

	(m)					(n)		
		K2 E	ng lev.				K2 N	fat lev.
		< 5	$\geq 5$				< 5	$\geq 5$
VS1 Englag	< 3	68	175	KS1 M	fot low	< 3	59	162
K51 Elig lev.	$\geq 3$	40	433		tat lev.	$\geq 3$	25	470
	(o)					(p)		
		K2 S	ci lev.				K2 1	+ lev.
		< 5	$\geq 5$				< 5	$\geq 5$
KS1 Sei lov	< 3	43	219	KG1	1 + low	< 3	9	124
Kor oci iev.	$\geq 3$	18	436	KSI	ı⊤ lev.	$\geq 3$	2	581

## Table A.10: Sensitivity analysis of CH effect to all calibrated confounders

	$p_{11}$	$p_{10}$	$p_{01}$	$p_{00}$	Outcome effect Γ	Selection effect $\Delta$	ATT	S.e.
		Panel A	: gramr	nar sch	ools			
		1+	GCSEs	with A				
Neutral confounder	0.515	0.517	0.493	0.485	1.031	1.112	$0.072^{***}$	0.024
		Soci	o-demog	raphics				
African	0.138	0.172	0.009	0.004	2.886	19.695	0.038	0.030
Uaribbean Pangladashi	0.013	0.000	0.002	0.002	1.131	6.205	0.045*	0.027
Pakistani	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.003	1.000	•	0.047	0.020
Indian	0.013	0.034	0.063	0.025	2.795	0.230	0.045	0.021
Other ethnicity	0.242	0.138	0.128	0.096	1.398	2.189	0.044	0.028
Born in 4th trimester	0.188	0.069	0.218	0.265	0.776	0.777	$0.047^{*}$	0.028
EAL	0.193	0.138	0.115	0.069	1.793	1.910	0.044	0.028
SEN	0.013	0.034	0.023	0.049	0.470	0.542	0.048	0.027
SEN action	0.010	0.034	0.014	0.037	0.375	0.716	$0.049^{*}$	0.027
SEN action plus	0.003	0.000	0.006	0.010	0.733	0.654	$0.049^{*}$	0.027
SEN statement	0.000	0.000	0.003 KS1	0.002	1.791		0.048*	0.026
KS1 Eng. compr. test DfE	0.005	0.107	0.005	0.006	1.200	2.387	$0.049^{*}$	0.027
KS1 Eng. writ. test DfE	0.315	0.483	0.290	0.183	1.843	1.256	$0.046^{*}$	0.028
KS1 Eng. spell. test DfE	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000			$0.074^{***}$	0.024
KS1 Mat. task test DfE	0.008	0.069	0.001	0.000		12.497	0.045	0.027
KS1 no missing	0.933	1.000	0.962	0.970	0.794	0.597	$0.047^{*}$	0.027
VC9 V-1 -: 1-1t	0.400	KS:	2 and di	stance	1 1 4 9	1 515	0.046*	0.099
KS2 Vol. alded or contr. scn.	0.490	0.552	0.397	0.305	1.143	1.515	0.046*	0.028
KS2 Foundation set: KS2 Eng. TA $>$ test	0.030	0.000	0.055	0.000	0.892	0.519	0.045	0.028
KS2 Mat. TA $>$ test	0.082	0.000	0.066	0.120	0.595	1.112	0.050***	0.027
KS2 Sci. TA > test	0.045	0.042	0.051	0.103	0.473	0.801	0.050***	0.027
Distance from CH (miles)	0.100	0.138	0.505	0.597	0.689	0.106	0.031	0.028
Closest grammar school (miles)	0.530	0.517	0.496	0.498	0.996	1.149	$0.048^{**}$	0.027
Closest indep. school (miles)	0.270	0.345 1+ (	0.494 GCSEs	0.520 with A *	0.906	0.387	0.043	0.028
Neutral confounder	0.501	0.553	0.499	0.496	1.014	1.058	$0.172^{***}$	0.034
A f.:	0.147	Soci	0-demog	maphics	1 090	10 525	0.104***	0.045
Aman Caribboan	0.147	0.105	0.010	0.000	1.838	19.535	0.184	0.045
Bangladeshi	0.000	0.013	0.002	0.003	2 894	0.505	0.150	0.041
Pakistani	0.000	0.000	0.010	0.002	0.899		0.185***	0.041
Indian	0.017	0.000	0.068	0.043	1.624	0.221	0.191***	0.042
Other ethnicity	0.238	0.224	0.148	0.091	1.766	2.131	0.182***	0.042
Born in 4th trimester	0.178	0.184	0.213	0.238	0.864	0.768	$0.191^{***}$	0.042
EAL	0.204	0.118	0.135	0.075	1.951	1.846	$0.186^{***}$	0.042
SEN	0.011	0.026	0.020	0.035	0.575	0.544	$0.186^{***}$	0.041
SEN action	0.011	0.013	0.013	0.023	0.559	0.736	$0.185^{***}$	0.040
SEN action plus	0.000	0.013	0.004	0.009	0.526	0.718	$0.184^{***}$	0.040
SEN statement	0.000	0.000	0.003 KS1	0.003	1.147		0.185***	0.040
KS1 Eng. compr. test DfE	0.015	0.000	0.009	0.000		2.276	$0.185^{***}$	0.041
KS1 Eng. writ. test DfE	0.357	0.176	0.366	0.158	3.089	1.198	$0.190^{***}$	0.042
KS1 Eng. spell. test DfE	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000			$0.172^{***}$	0.034
KS1 Mat. task test DfE	0.015	0.000	0.002	0.000	4.101	12.752	0.188***	0.041
KS1 no missing	0.943	0.908 KS	0.957 2 and di	0.971 istance	0.681	0.614	0.187***	0.041
KS2 Vol. aided or contr. sch.	0.513	0.408	0.401	0.383	1.078	1.511	$0.193^{***}$	0.043
KS2 Foundation sch.	0.025	0.039	0.045	0.065	0.689	0.517	$0.189^{***}$	0.041
KS2 Eng. TA $>$ test	0.069	0.075	0.084	0.142	0.556	0.636	$0.187^{***}$	0.042
KS2 Mat. TA $>$ test	0.069	0.119	0.055	0.093	0.569	1.143	$0.187^{***}$	0.041
KS2 Sci. $TA > test$	0.033	0.104	0.035	0.088	0.375	0.824	$0.189^{***}$	0.041
Distance from CH (miles)	0.099	0.118	0.473	0.577	0.659	0.109	0.161***	0.044
Closest grammar school (miles)	0.521	0.566	0.487	0.508	0.919	1.152	0.193***	0.042

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

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	$p_{11}$	$p_{10}$	$p_{01}$	$p_{00}$	Outcome effect Γ	Selection effect $\Delta$	ATT	S.e.
	Pane	el A: gra	ummar s	schools	(cont.d)			
		510	00E	:4L A A	*			
Neutral confounder	0.508	5 + G 0.530	0.501	0.491	1.043	1.076	0.188***	0.036
	0.000	Soci	o-demog	raphics				
African	0.161	0.070	0.010	0.006	1.879	19.254	$0.175^{***}$	0.048
Caribbean	0.006	0.030	0.002	0.002	1.032	6.979	$0.192^{***}$	0.043
Bangladeshi	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.003	2.344		$0.188^{***}$	0.043
Pakistani	0.000	0.000	0.010	0.011	0.915		$0.190^{***}$	0.044
ndian	0.018	0.000	0.073	0.042	1.824	0.221	$0.195^{***}$	0.045
Other ethnicity	0.249	0.190	0.147	0.099	1.594	2.129	$0.182^{***}$	0.045
Born in 4th trimester	0.182	0.170	0.211	0.237	0.868	0.770	$0.189^{***}$	0.045
EAL	0.216	0.100	0.137	0.080	1.835	1.836	$0.183^{***}$	0.045
SEN	0.009	0.030	0.021	0.032	0.660	0.542	$0.190^{***}$	0.043
SEN action	0.009	0.020	0.012	0.022	0.554	0.739	$0.189^{***}$	0.043
SEN action plus	0.000	0.010	0.005	0.008	0.753	0.674	$0.189^{***}$	0.043
SEN statement	0.000	0.000	0.004 KS1	0.003	1.775		0.187***	0.043
KS1 Eng. compr. test DfE	0.013	0.011	0.010	0.000	27.628	2.279	$0.187^{***}$	0.044
S1 Eng. writ. test DfE	0.375	0.170	0.381	0.167	3.078	1.193	$0.188^{***}$	0.045
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000			$0.186^{***}$	0.036
<b>S1</b> Mat. task test DfE	0.016	0.000	0.002	0.000		12.064	0.190	0.044
KS1 no missing	0.933	0.950 KS	0.957 2 and d	0.970 stance	0.696	0.617	0.189***	0.044
(S2 Vol. aided or contr. sch	0.489	0.510	0.404	0.381	1.098	1.520	0.189***	0.044
S2 Foundation sch	0.024	0.040	0.043	0.065	0.657	0.524	0.190***	0.044
(S2 Eng. TA $>$ test	0.071	0.065	0.086	0.134	0.610	0.642	0.189***	0.044
S2 Mat TA > test	0.068	0.109	0.056	0.087	0.624	1 152	0.187***	0.043
S2 Sci TA > test	0.023	0.121	0.035	0.082	0.403	0.857	0.191***	0.044
Distance from CH (miles)	0.109	0.080	0.475	0.562	0.704	0.108	0.157***	0.046
losest grammar school (miles)	0.517	0.570	0.483	0.510	0.901	1.158	0.188***	0.045
losest indep. school (miles)	0.255	0.340	0.469	0.527	0.795	0.388	0.178***	0.045
	P	anel B:	indepen	dent sci	hools			
Veutral confounder	0.480	1+ 0.586	0.497	0.513	0.938	0.953	0.093***	0.024
		Soci	o-demoa	raphics				
frican	0.138	0.172	0.011	0.022	0.519	12.933	0.118***	0.037
aribbean	0.013	0.000	0.009	0.033	0.286	0.908	0.105***	0.030
Bangladeshi	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.004	0.954		0.107***	0.030
akistani	0.000	0.000	0.011	0.008	1.523		0.104***	0.031
ndian	0.013	0.034	0.021	0.023	0.974	0.649	0.105***	0.030
Other ethnicity	0.242	0.138	0.159	0.178	0.878	1.615	$0.105^{***}$	0.032
Born in 4th trimester	0.188	0.069	0.243	0.262	0.904	0.672	$0.101^{***}$	0.031
CAL	0.193	0.138	0.099	0.111	0.888	2.116	$0.105^{***}$	0.032
EN	0.013	0.034	0.059	0.273	0.168	0.135	$0.074^{**}$	0.030
EN action	0.010	0.034	0.041	0.134	0.281	0.204	$0.090^{***}$	0.031
EN action plus	0.003	0.000	0.014	0.085	0.150	0.163	$0.093^{***}$	0.031
EN statement	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.054	0.075		0.094***	0.031
S1 Eng. compr. tect DfF	0.005	0.107	NS1 0.006	0.006	1.074	9 294	0.105***	0.091
(S1 Eng. writ tost DfE	0.000	0.107	0.000	0.000	3 300	2.024	0.100	0.031
(S1 Eng. spall tast DfF	0.090	0.000	0.327	0.240	1 050	2.420 2.900	0.070	0.030
SI Mat tack for DFF	0.027	0.655	0.470	0.511	3 154	2.209	0.004	0.031
S1 no missing	0.108	1.000	0.040	0.270	1 265	⊿.390 0.069	0.104***	0.030
	0.000	1.000 KS	2 and di	stance	1.200	0.002	0.101	0.000
XS2 Vol. aided or contr. sch.	0.490	0.552	0.401	0.343	1.278	1.529	$0.100^{***}$	0.032
S2 Foundation sch.	0.030	0.000	0.041	0.041	1.023	0.692	$0.105^{***}$	0.030
$\rm KS2~Eng.~TA > test$	0.072	0.042	0.097	0.089	1.102	0.713	$0.103^{***}$	0.031
$\Delta$ S2 Mat. TA > test	0.082	0.000	0.075	0.105	0.696	0.960	$0.104^{***}$	0.031
XS2 Sci. TA > test	0.045	0.042	0.049	0.068	0.710	0.871	$0.104^{***}$	0.030
Distance from CH (miles)	0.438	0.345	0.491	0.540	0.825	0.768	0.101***	0.031
Josest grammar school (miles)	0.388	0.379	0.510	0.492	1.076	0.619	0.105***	0.033
	11 170	0.414	0.400	0.514	0.097	11 070	0 109***	0.091

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

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	$p_{11}$	$p_{10}$	$p_{01}$	$p_{00}$	Outcome	Selection	ATT	S.e.
	Panel	B: inde	pendent	t schools	s (cont.d)	enect $\Delta$		
		1.1	TOOF-	:41 1 *				
Neutral confounder	0.524	0.474	0.500	0.490	1.044	1.090	0.127***	0.032
		Soci	o-demog	raphics				
African	0.147	0.105	0.008	0.020	0.424	14.016	$0.154^{***}$	0.046
Caribbean	0.011	0.013	0.008	0.022	0.383	1.003	$0.144^{***}$	0.038
Bangladeshi	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.004	0.552		$0.144^{***}$	0.038
Pakistani	0.000	0.000	0.010	0.010	1.049	•	$0.139^{***}$	0.038
Indian	0.017	0.000	0.022	0.021	1.085	0.657	0.141***	0.038
Other ethnicity	0.238	0.224	0.176	0.150	1.218	1.515	0.133***	0.040
Born in 4th trimester	0.178	0.184	0.231	0.266	0.830	0.690	0.133***	0.040
EAL	0.204	0.118	0.107	0.096	1.140	2.003	0.131***	0.041
SEN	0.011	0.026	0.040	0.191	0.184	0.152	0.115***	0.039
SEN action	0.011	0.013	0.028	0.104	0.200	0.225	0.124***	0.039
SEN action plus	0.000	0.015	0.009	0.030	0.171	0.171	0.129	0.039
SEN statement	0.000	0.000	0.005 KS1	0.052	0.080	•	0.155	0.059
	0.519	0.548	0.458	0.290	2.068	1.590	0.119***	0.039
KS1 Eng. compr. test DfE	0.015	0.000	0.009	0.001	12.526	1.866	0.142***	0.038
KS1 Eng. writ. test DfE	0.727	0.500	0.632	0.264	4.777	2.028	0.094**	0.039
x1 Eng. spell. test DfE	0.667	0.467	0.548	0.290	2.970	1.945	0.106***	0.040
KS1 Mat. task test DfE	0.739	0.536	0.655	0.287	4.746	1.988	0.095***	0.040
KS1 no missing	0.943	0.908	0.943	0.937	1.122	0.978	$0.141^{***}$	0.039
		KS	2 and di	istance				
KS2 Vol. aided or contr. sch.	0.513	0.408	0.413	0.357	1.270	1.499	$0.130^{***}$	0.040
KS2 Foundation sch.	0.025	0.039	0.040	0.042	0.967	0.683	$0.142^{***}$	0.039
KS2 Eng. $TA > test$	0.069	0.075	0.084	0.107	0.769	0.747	$0.140^{***}$	0.039
KS2 Mat. $TA > test$	0.069	0.119	0.071	0.097	0.718	1.007	$0.141^{***}$	0.039
KS2 Sci. $TA > test$	0.033	0.104	0.036	0.073	0.483	0.988	$0.143^{***}$	0.039
Distance from CH (miles)	0.448	0.355	0.468	0.542	0.744	0.798	$0.130^{***}$	0.040
Closest grammar school (miles)	0.374	0.447	0.492	0.521	0.893	0.627	$0.130^{***}$	0.040
Closest indep. school (miles)	0.467	0.461	0.472	0.535	0.779	0.914	$0.136^{***}$	0.040
		5+G	CSEs w	ith A-A	*			
Neutral confounder	0.483	0.450	0.497	0.494	1.013	0.925	$0.172^{***}$	0.035
A f	0.161	Socu	o-demog	maphics	0.220	14 190	0.100***	0.050
Annean Annean	0.101	0.070	0.000	0.019	0.329	14.120	0.160***	0.050
Jaribbean	0.000	0.030	0.000	0.021	1.050	1.039	0.169***	0.042
Dangiadesni	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.005	1.050		0.100	0.041
ndion	0.000	0.000	0.006	0.012	1.459	0.622	0.104	0.045
)ther ethnicity	0.010	0.000	0.020	0.010	1.452	1 553	0.154***	0.041
Born in 4th trimester	0.182	0.150	0.105	0.100	0.823	0.698	0.157***	0.043
EAL	0.102	0.100	0.220	0.205	1.072	2.018	0.157	0.045
SEN	0.009	0.030	0.028	0.173	0.143	0.152	0.133***	0.043
SEN action	0.009	0.020	0.022	0.095	0.218	0.232	0.146***	0.042
SEN action plus	0.000	0.010	0.006	0.050	0.110	0.177	0.152***	0.043
SEN statement	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.028	0.036		0.158***	0.043
			KS1					
KS1 Eng. compr. test DfE	0.013	0.011	0.011	0.002	13.169	1.876	$0.164^{***}$	0.042
KS1 Eng. writ. test DfE	0.743	0.511	0.679	0.297	4.988	1.977	$0.112^{**}$	0.045
KS1 Eng. spell. test DfE	0.675	0.494	0.585	0.310	3.138	1.876	$0.122^{***}$	0.044
KS1 Mat. task test DfE	0.775	0.474	0.701	0.320	4.961	1.933	$0.117^{***}$	0.044
KS1 no missing	0.933	0.950	0.947	0.936	1.215	0.944	$0.165^{***}$	0.042
		KS	2 and d	istance				
KS2 Vol. aided or contr. sch.	0.489	0.510	0.422	0.361	1.291	1.481	$0.151^{***}$	0.044
KS2 Foundation sch.	0.024	0.040	0.040	0.042	0.978	0.692	$0.165^{***}$	0.042
KS2 Eng. TA $>$ test	0.071	0.065	0.078	0.107	0.718	0.769	$0.163^{***}$	0.042
KS2 Mat. TA $>$ test	0.068	0.109	0.067	0.094	0.692	1.012	$0.165^{***}$	0.041
XS2 Sci. TA $>$ test	0.023	0.121	0.030	0.070	0.424	1.031	$0.167^{***}$	0.043
Distance from CH (miles)	0.456	0.350	0.483	0.517	0.873	0.774	$0.155^{***}$	0.043
Closest grammar school (miles)	0.377	0.420	0.506	0.506	1.003	0.621	$0.153^{***}$	0.044
Closest indep. school (miles)	0.468	0.460	0.473	0.523	0.818	0.912	$0.158^{***}$	0.043