

St. Augustine's Platonic Sources as Intertexts

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Joseph Byrd Stanfiel
University College London
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
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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

St. Augustine's Platonic Sources as Intertexts

This thesis attempts to determine whether Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, ever read Plato's dialogues. In the *Confessions*, Augustine cites the importance of certain *libri Platoniorum*, books of the Platonists, to his own understanding of the nature of God and the universe. It is clear from his account that exposure to these books was a watershed event in his life. The insights communicated by them contributed to his conversion to Christianity and laid the foundation for the development of his own Christian philosophy.

The questions of the identity of the *libri Platoniorum* and of Augustine's knowledge of Plato generally have been addressed in scholarship many times before. Previous studies have used the methodology of *Quellenforschung*, comparing the texts of Augustine's writings with those of Plato's dialogues and comparing them for similarities, almost always doctrinal. It was assumed that close correspondences would indicate Augustine's familiarity with Plato and suggest his influence on particular Augustinian doctrines.

The present study differs from all preceding scholarly works in that it develops and applies a new method that allows for philologically based comparisons of texts. Some half-century of scholarship on allusions in ancient literature has revealed specific and demonstrable characteristics of allusion, techniques applied by the ancients to effect allusions and linguistic markers that indicate the presence of allusions. A body of theoretical knowledge has also been developed to interpret the significance of allusions. The current study approaches Augustine's citations of previous authors as literary allusions. Borrowing from allusion scholarship, it develops a methodology for identifying Augustine's allusions and suggests means of interpreting their significance. The findings of the study are replicable and easily evaluated; the method devised can be applied not only to Augustine's Platonic readings, but also to his knowledge and use of literature generally and to the relationships between ancient authors and texts across genres.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines the question of whether Augustine read any of Plato's dialogues. It is a question worth asking because Augustine was an enormously influential figure both in the development of the Catholic doctrinal tradition and in Western intellectual history. For the theological historian, this question is compelling because it suggests pagan philosophy as a potential source for Augustine's Christian thought. The issue is also of acute interest to the intellectual historian because of the rare opportunity Augustine provides to observe the philosophical development of one of the ancient world's most important thinkers. Augustine himself makes much of his own philosophical and theological development in the *Confessions*. He describes there the importance of the *libri Platoniorum* to his conception of God and creation, but never mentions the titles or authors of these works. Generations of scholars have agreed with Augustine that influences so integral to his development are important to an understanding both of that development and its literary results. As J.J. O'Donnell said in defence of his own interest in the question of Augustine's influences, 'the history of what a subject reads and hears is potentially as useful to the reconstruction of the development of a lifetime's thought as the history of what the subject wrote, said and did.'¹

Rather than ask why it is of interest to examine Augustine's knowledge of Plato, it may be more appropriate to ask why the issue must be revisited after it has been investigated already by so many scholars. Augustine's readings have been the subject of numerous studies and a scholarly consensus has been reached: the *Timaeus* is the only dialogue Augustine read, and even that only in Cicero's partial translation. This was the conclusion of the first such study of the 20th century, Angus' 1906 dissertation, and was established as the final word on the issue some four decades later by Courcelle in his classic study in *Quellenforschung, Les Lettres Grecques en Occident de Macrobe à Cassiodore*.

The characterisation of Courcelle's study as the last word on the question of Augustine's Platonic reading is the position of the scholarly community both literally (the phrase comes from Hagendahl²) and practically. No full-length treatment of the question has been undertaken since Courcelle. The intervening fifty-three years have seen exhaustive examinations of Augustine's

¹ O'Donnell (1980), 144.

² Hagendahl, 10

Latin reading, studies of his doctrinal affiliations and speculations as to the identity of the *libri Platoniorum*. However, each of these studies (which are discussed in Chapter Four) takes Courcelle's conclusion as a premise. Each is also conducted in a manner consistent with the *Quellenforschung* methodology advocated and practiced by Courcelle.

At about the same time that Courcelle was ending debate on the question of Augustine's Platonic influences from France, a new critical approach to the phenomenon of literary citation and influence was being developed in Italy. Pasquali's 1942 article *Arte Allusiva* is widely regarded as the genesis of modern scholarly attention to literary allusion in ancient literature. In the nearly sixty years since that publication, a broad scholarly literature has developed that has yielded countless insights into the ancient practice of one author including citations in his text to the words or images of a previous author. That literature has also generated and refined sophisticated literary critical tools for identifying such citations and interpreting their significance.

The phenomenon that *Quellenforschung* studies sought to understand is the relationship between two texts seemingly connected by content and/or style. Early studies in *Quellenforschung* that addressed the relationship between Augustine's writings and Plato's concentrated on doctrinal similarities. Later, this approach was augmented by the identification of philological parallels drawn between the texts. Such connections, doctrinal and philological, were taken to be evidence of a text being a source for Augustine and exercising consequent influence over his thought.

The scholarship on literary allusion has much to contribute to an examination of Augustine's readings and influences. It has found a conscious practice among ancient authors to reproduce significant terminology and even entire lines from the writings of previous authors in new works, and to suggest by similar language distinctive descriptions, characters, situations and metaphors from earlier texts. Numerous examples of this allusive phenomenon have been collected, enough to make it possible to characterise the practice, generate identifiable linguistic markers that indicate the presence of allusions, produce well-founded theories of ancient literary production and support explanations as to the significance of the relationships between texts. In Chapter Four, methodological shortcomings of traditional studies in *Quellenforschung* are identified, including a lack of specificity in determining textual parallels and the absence of any theoretical framework for interpreting the significance of these parallels. The chapter then suggests

ways in which theory and practice of literary allusion scholarship might address these shortcomings.

The first three chapters of this thesis provide a doctrinal context for Augustine's works. Several ideas fundamental to his Christian philosophy are traced from their beginnings in Plato to Augustine himself. Chapter One considers these positions as they would be found in the pagan Platonic tradition. Chapter Two examines the reception of Platonic philosophical ideas among Christians in the first four centuries AD. Chapter Three is an examination of Augustine's own Christian philosophy.

The purpose of these background chapters is to acquaint the reader with the doctrinal relationship that existed between pagan and Christian thought. Augustine, it will be seen, is a part of that relationship and was heir to a Christian Platonic tradition that dated back to the very beginnings of Christianity. These first chapters show that this relationship is patent and uncontroversial. They also suggest that the sheer number of potential sources of Platonic doctrines for Augustine render a doctrinally based source study futile. The conclusions of this short survey demonstrate the necessity of a philological basis for any such study that hopes to sift a single identifiable source from the array of possibilities.

Chapter Four reviews previous studies that have addressed the question of Augustine's Platonic readings. It also identifies methodological shortcomings in those studies and suggests advances on old methodology to address those shortcomings. Chapter Five lists the findings generated by an application of the new method. Chapter Six analyses those findings.

This thesis offers an application of sixty years of scholarship on literary allusion and intertextuality to the question of Augustine's Platonic readings. The result is a new method that offers a genuinely new perspective to researchers and offers both practical and theoretical advances on traditional *Quellenforschung* methodology. Rather than an end, it promises a beginning: a new approach for examining Augustine's literary, philosophical and cultural development. If the findings of this method contradict old conclusions, this study will serve to reinvigorate an old debate. If they corroborate these, the scholarly consensus will be supported by hard evidence generated in a study that can be replicated and evaluated.

CHAPTER ONE

The Platonic Tradition

This chapter surveys the primary sources of Platonism with regards to their positions on issues that would become integral to Augustine's Christian philosophy: the nature of God, good and evil, the nature of the soul, separation from and reunion with the divinity and the happy life. The sources examined are Plato, as originator of the school, representative Platonists who begin and carry on the process of systemisation, and the Neoplatonists, primarily Plotinus, who are responsible for the version of Platonism Augustine knew best and with which he most certainly came into direct contact. The point of the survey is to establish a coherent set of beliefs, broadly understood, that could be considered the tenets of the Platonic tradition as Augustine would have found it.

Plato

Plato is arguably the philosopher who exercises the greatest influence over Augustine's own intellectual and theological development.³ While it is the opinion of many scholars that he read nothing by Plato with the exception of Cicero's translation of *Timaeus* 27d-47b⁴, Augustine certainly was aware of the existence in history of a philosopher named Plato. He was aware that the philosophy that attracted him was Platonism (he knew that the texts that had such an impact on him were *libri Platoniorum*, *Conf.* 7.9.13). He knew Plato founded the Academy and was aware of the history of Platonism from Plato's death to Plotinus (*CD* 8.12). He was also aware of many specific positions at least attributed to Plato, which influenced his thinking. So, while Augustine may not have read much of Plato's own work, the influence of Platonism on him was great. An examination of Plato, as the starting point and foundation of Platonism, is an appropriate place to begin an inquiry into the Greek philosophical tradition as Augustine would have encountered it.

Plato devised no general dogmatic system. For example, the forms are mentioned often, but their presentation is concerned with the issue under debate and not with the creation of a doctrine of forms. Plato poses more questions about them (in the *Parmenides*, for instance) than he provides answers. But there is consistency in the dialogues. While there is no definition of the

³ Chadwick (1986), 8.

⁴ Courcelle (1969), 171; Hagendahl, 586; O'Daly (1999), 256.

forms that Socrates would approve of, certain qualities are attributed to them consistently, e.g. transcendence, intelligibility, some relationship between them and the material world. The purpose of this section is to gather discussions from various dialogues so as to present the consistencies of several of Plato's positions. These positions will be the starting point of the establishment of a dogmatic system called Platonism that will be developed over the centuries until Augustine's own time.

God

In the *Timaeus*, Plato introduces into philosophy for the first time the image of a creator God.⁵ This creator is a *δημιουργός*, a skilled workman who does not create a universe *ex nihilo*, but instead imparts form from a model not of his making on pre-existent matter.⁶ The creation requires premises that introduce (at *Tim.* 28a) a dichotomy of intelligible and sensible existence. What can be perceived by the senses--the world we live in--is a type of existence that is always changing, always in a state of coming to be and passing away. This is the created world, what comes to be (*γενόμενον*), the sensible *ὄρανός* (*Tim.* 28b). It is bodily, visible and tangible (*Tim.* 31b). What has real existence, on the other hand, is not subject to change. It is an eternal world of no physicality, of no sense perception. Instead, what has true existence transcends the created world and is apprehended by reason alone.

The creator based this sensible world on an intelligible model (*Tim.* 29a). The model is perfect and unchanging and contains all intelligible living creatures. Every kind of life in the created world was brought into being by the creator because it had an analogue in his intelligible model. Each variety of life, divine, mortal, plant and animal, is necessary to preserve the unity and completeness of the intelligible model.

Both the intelligible model and the created world are also living intelligent creatures (*Tim.* 30d). The created world is, in fact, some kind of non-eternal God for which the creator has made soul, a combination of eternal and bodily existence mixed with a combination of sameness and

⁵ Cornford, 34.

⁶ A controversy in the ancient world existed over whether to understand the *Timaeus* literally or metaphorically, especially with respect to the demiurge's creation of the universe; see O'Meara (1993), 70-2, Witt, 17, 135-140.

difference (*Tim.* 35a). God put reason within soul and soul within the body of the creature that is the universe (*Tim.* 30b).

Plato describes God himself as good and truthful. He is the cause of all good things and is never harmful nor commits any evil (*Rep.* 379b). He is the fairest and best possible of all beings, and lives forever simply in his own form, never changing nor subject to change (*Rep.* 380d-381c).

God's nature is eternal. He can never cease to exist (*Phaedo* 106d). God and the living model from which he made the universe do not simply exist forever (*Tim.* 37d), but exist outside of time. The intelligible model is an eternal being. God wished to make the sensible universe an exact replica of the intelligible, but that was not possible. So God made a moving likeness of eternity, and brought this likeness, time, into being simultaneously with the created world (*Tim.* 37d-38a). Time consists of past, present and future conditions of being that are the products of motion and change. These do not apply to eternal beings, which exist unchanging in a state of perpetual present. As time came into being with the created universe, there was no time before the creation of the sensible world.

The nature of the creative work of Plato's God is the imposition of order on disorder. It was God's intention that the created world be good, as close to his own perfection as possible. To that end, he applied order to the disordered visible sphere (ὄσον ἦν ὄρατόν, *Tim.* 30a).⁷ God placed this chaotic matter in a receptacle and, as if cleaning corn in a winnowing basket (*Tim.* 52e), he shook out from the disorder the elements--fire, air, water and earth--to which he gave shape, proportion and number. From these elements he made the rest of material creation.

While God imposes order on chaos, and fashions in the material world a copy of eternal perfection, Plato stresses that he works within limitations. The demiurge operates on materials that he does not create. He does not create the intelligible model nor the forms within it, he does not create matter, nor does he create the Receptacle of Being (*Tim.* 49a), which is the space in which the sensible world comes to be (*Tim.* 52a).

Matter, especially, imposes a limitation on God. It is recalcitrant: it resists order. The elements combine to make all the features of the sensible world (*Tim.* 55ff.). However, these combinations of elements are subject to physical causes. What we would call physical laws govern

the form and movement of matter once the elements have been created. All physical features of matter, and all tactile qualities they possess are determined by necessity. Necessity is not an entity, but a description of the physical causes that govern material existence. God, who determines to make the most perfect world possible, makes use of the physical causes of necessity in forming the universe. Some sort of tense equilibrium results: all phenomena in the sensible world will have a necessary cause, but beyond that, there will be a divine cause because all that has been, is or will be comes about by God's will (*Laws* 709bc, 716a). At the same time, necessity produces limitations: not even the Gods themselves strive against necessity (*Prot.* 345b).

Good and Evil

Besides the creator God, there is another deity in Plato: the Idea of Good (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ 'Ιδέα, *Rep.* 505aff., 508bff., 517bff., 534bff.). Ideas are introduced by Plato as intelligible entities of which phenomena in the sense world are copies. They are not argued for⁸, but offered *a priori* to explain the nature of existence (e.g. *Phaedo* 99b). Plato says that each idea (εἶδος), good, bad, just, unjust, is a single transcendent entity that becomes a multiplicity, i.e. becomes all of the various things in the sense world attached to the concept, when mingled with material existence. The forms truly exist, are unchanging, and by virtue of this, are the only legitimate objects of knowledge (*Rep.* 476aff). We may think of forms as those intelligible objects contained within the single living intelligible creature, which served as the model for the demiurge in his creation of the sensible world in the *Timaeus*. The forms have true existence, all phenomena in the sense world have existence only to the degree to which they participate in the distinctive reality of the intelligible world, i.e. a thing is beautiful in so far as it partakes of the form of beauty which is absolute beauty (*Phaedo* 100c).

The Good is a transcendent entity that gives order and comprehensibility to the intelligible world. It is the idea of good, not any given good thing (*Rep.* 507b). This is Good absolute, not 'relative to various interests and criteria...'⁹ Plato says that judgements of the sensible world are made with reference to the intelligible world: two stones can be compared against a previously

⁷ Although Plato does not refer to this substance as matter (ὕλη), that is how this and other references to the visible side of the dichotomy have been understood by later philosophers.

⁸ Annas, 217.

known idea of equality (*Phaedo* 74a). The idea of the Good is that transcendent reality that allows any given object to be called good by reference to it. It is 'what is unqualifiedly good and never evil.'¹⁰

This idea of Good is the reality that gives truth to objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower. It is the cause of knowledge and truth (*Rep.* 508e). The forms give reality to sense objects, but it is the good that gives reality to the forms. Shorey understands this to mean that '(w)e really understand and know anything only when we apprehend its purpose, the aspect of the good that it reveals.'¹¹

Plato offers analogies to help convey this difficult concept. The idea of Good is like the sun in the world of sense (*Rep.* 509b). As sunlight makes all visible objects visible, objects of knowledge--those things that are intelligible and not sensible (the forms)--receive their comprehensibility from the presence of the Good. The Good gives the forms their existence (οὐσίᾳ) and essence (τὸ εἶναι) while the Good itself transcends essence.

In another analogy to explain the Good, Plato says that human beings are like prisoners in a cave, looking at the shadows on the cave wall made by figures manipulated before a fire behind us (*Rep.* 514aff). Most are content with the shadows, although a few escape their chains and turn around and attempt to leave the cave for the world above. Because they are used to the darkness of the cave, those who have left can at first only perceive the brightly lit real objects indirectly or as reflections. Later they strengthen their sight to view real objects, and even the sun. The form of the Good, in this illustration, is the Sun.¹²

This image of the cave and its prisoners 'illustrates the contrast between the world of sense perception and the world of thought.'¹³ The reflections on the cave wall are our perceptions of the sensible world. The world outside is the intelligible world that has true existence. The soul's ascent and contemplation of the world above is its ascension to the intelligible (*Rep.* 517b): the transcendent universe containing objects that truly exist. Although it is unwise to draw too close a connection between the dialogues, Plato offers more information about this transcendent world in an illustration from the *Phaedrus*. There (at 247b-d), he describes a place beyond the heavens

⁹ Annas, 244.

¹⁰ Annas, 244.

¹¹ Shorey, 104.

¹² Annas, 242-271 examines Plato's metaphors that describe the idea of Good.

where true being dwells, incorporeal and intelligible. There, he says, the soul discerns justice itself, temperance itself--true knowledge of true being. The intelligible world is the world that actually exists. The forms are there.

There are two sources of creation in Plato's cosmogony, the demiurge and the idea of Good. As the material world in the *Timaeus* myth owed its existence to the work of the demiurge and the intelligible living creature that served as its model, the forms, which are the content of that intelligible model, owe their existence to the idea of Good. The concept of one deity responsible for the creation of the material world and another transcendent entity that is the origin of all existence will become standard as Platonism develops.

Each phenomenon of the material world gains its existence from its participation in a corresponding form; it is no different for Good. All the various good things in the sense world are called that because of the presence of absolute goodness in it (*Gorg.* 497e). Creation itself is good, and the visible world that God created--the οὐρανός--is the best of all things that have become (*Tim.* 28a), and gives its creator joy (*Tim.* 37d).¹⁴

While a god was responsible for imparting order on chaos, bringing about the visible world, which is good, he is not responsible for the presence of evil in the universe. Plato says that this god is good and good can only cause good; he is blameless with respect to evil (*Rep.* 379c).

Evil (τὸ κακόν) for Plato is the thing that 'destroys and corrupts in every case' (*Rep.* 608e). Individual evils exist for each good, rust for metal or mildew for grain. Evil, then, is 'that element in our world which causes things to fall short of perfection.'¹⁵ It is the failure to realise ideal condition (*Prot.* 345ab), presumably the ideal ordered condition of God's good creation. In the *Sophist* (228a), Plato identifies two kinds of evils: the dissolution of kindred elements, which is disease, and the want of measure, which is deformity. Good, then, is a matter of order, proportion and balance of elements while evil is disorder, disproportion and imbalance.

The universe, while good, was not created perfect, but only as perfect as was possible (*Tim.* 30a). Evil came about because of matter. The universe began as chaotic and disordered matter. While God gave it order and all the virtues it possesses, evils arise due to the universe's

¹³ Shorey, 118.

¹⁴ see also O'Daly (1999), 256.

¹⁵ Dillon, (1991),c. This definition is from another context, but applicable here.

primal chaotic condition. In turn, the universe, a single living entity, engenders this evil in the living creatures that are included in it (*Stat.* 273c). It is simply the nature of bodies to be subject to change, and therefore to the degeneration that is evil (*Stat.* 269d).

Evil was engendered into human beings also as a result of the material elements used to create them. The demiurge created lesser divinities as guardians over creation (*Tim.* 40a); he directs these to create mortal beings because if he himself were to do it, men would be immortal and equal to the Gods. The lesser divinities mix immortal soul with mortal bodies and the result is a violent reaction from the communion of these two elements. Sensation is created when soul is embodied, also violent passions such as fear and anger. The perfect proportion and movement that held the universe together became twisted and altered by this meeting. Reason is crippled when intellect is placed in a body. Plato sees evidence for this in the absence of intelligence in a newborn baby, i.e. the recently embodied soul. Men are left to struggle against their violent passions using reason. If they master these passions, they would live in righteousness; if mastered by them, they would live in unrighteousness (*Tim.* 41c-44a).

Evil, as it exists as an abstraction, is simply a potential for corruption and degeneration that is inherent to all those phenomena composed of matter. For a human being, it seems that evil is the condition of being mastered by passions rather than mastering them with reason. Being embodied souls, it is the condition of humanity to be in perpetual inner struggle. The loss of this struggle is evil.

Plato also insists that no person ever willingly does wrong or commits an evil act. Every case of human evil is a case of the insufficiency of reason to recognise the right course of action. Those who do wrong are simply in error. Either evil is not recognised for what it is (*Meno* 77d-78a), or the consequences of an action are misunderstood (*Prot.* 352aff.). No one recognising evil for what it is, and fully understanding the consequences of his action both on himself and others, ever chooses evil.

The causes of this inability to properly recognise evil and its consequences are also beyond a man's control. In the *Timaeus* (86bff.), Plato says that evil actions are due to disorders of the soul, namely madness (μᾶνία) and ignorance (ἄμωθία). These he attributes to bodily diseases, which are in turn brought on by excesses of pleasure or pain. The desire to pursue one or avoid the other leaves a person unable to see or hear correctly; the resulting condition is that of

bodily illness that infects the soul. '(W)hen his soul is rendered sick and senseless by the body, he is commonly held to be not sick but deliberately bad (*Tim.* 86cd).'

Plato posits a physiological cause for excessive desire to pursue pleasure, particularly sexual pleasure, and to avoid pain. Humans are simply subject to their physical nature. 'No one is willingly bad; the bad man becomes so because of some faulty habit of body and unenlightened upbringing, and these are unwelcome afflictions that come to any man against his will (*Tim.* 86e).'

Men choose what is evil because their physical circumstances distort the ability of their souls to make the best choices. Men are also subject to the values of their surroundings. If the environment of one's city or household leads a person to do bad, 'the blame must fall upon the parents rather than the offspring, and upon those who give, rather than those who receive, nurture (*Tim.* 87b).'

For Plato, truly evil actions require purposeful and knowledgeable choices for evil. He denies the possibility of such choices. Madness, brought on by bodily disorders, and ignorance, due both to the same disorders and to bad environment, hinder the soul from right discernment of consequences and from acquiring appropriate knowledge requisite to a genuine choice for evil.

Plato maintains that humans are responsible for their own wickedness. God being good and a cause only of good, is blameless both in the case of the existence of evil and in the case of human wickedness (*Rep.* 379c). Humanity must bear the responsibility and consequences of its evil even though no one of us chose willingly to commit evil. The answer to this seeming contradiction lies in the remedy for evil, which is within the grasp of men. The good man is not good by nature (*Meno* 89a). Instead, the ability to choose good is a matter of education. Even though nature and environment might incline a person to unwilling evil, 'a man must use his utmost endeavour by means of education, pursuits, and study to escape from badness and lay hold upon its contrary (*Tim.* 87b).'

Education consists of turning the soul from the things of the material world until it is able to value and contemplate the things of the intelligible world (*Rep.* 518c).

The Soul

Soul ($\Psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$) for Plato is the life that animates body (*Phaedo* 105d). A living being consists of material body and immaterial soul (*Epinomis* 981a). This includes the universe itself, which, as we have seen, is a living creature. Its body is animated by world-soul (*Tim.* 34cff.), the creation of which predates the creation of the material universe. World-soul is rational and created

to govern the physical universe. Rational and immortal soul was placed in human beings to serve the same function (*Phaedrus* 246c). The soul in a human being is immortal (*Phaedo* 105d, *Meno* 81b, *Phaedrus* 245a among many others), being made of a slightly less pure version of the substance that was used to create the world-soul (*Tim.* 41d). It is indestructible, surviving its separation from body, which is death (*Phaedo* 64c).

As soul is all that animates the body, it is responsible for all bodily functioning. Its structure is tripartite. In the *Republic* (435aff.), Plato names these parts as the seat of reason, of passions and of appetites. The rational part of soul, the intellect, is created for governance and is intended to rule the rest. Passions include noble emotions such as anger and pride. These protect the organism, defending it from enemies when necessary. The appetites attend to the body's needs including food, sleep and sex. In the just soul, i.e. one that is ideally ordered, each of the soul's parts attends itself exclusively to the tasks suited to it and all make vital contributions to the well being of the whole. In addition, passions and appetites allow themselves to be governed by reason in such a soul. The *Timaeus* (69a-e) places the three parts of soul within the body: reason abiding in the head, passions in the cavity between the neck and diaphragm, and the appetites with the internal organs below the diaphragm. This arrangement reflects the relative proximity of each part of soul to reason.

When the soul is separated from the body, the event that marks the death of the latter, the immortal soul is submitted to judgement (this statement is made many times, including: *Phaedo* 109d; *Ep.* 7, 335ab; *Gorg.* 526b; *Phaedrus* 248d-249a; *Ap.* 41a; and *Rep.* 614b-621d). This judgement separates the good from evil, whereupon the good are rewarded and the evil punished. The nature of the judgement is described in a story told to Socrates (*Gorg.* 523a-526d). There, he says the habits of the soul are obvious on its appearance after death just as the habits of the deceased are manifest on a corpse. Coming before their judge, the good are rewarded with a happy existence in the Isles of the Blessed while those who have led evil lives are condemned to punishment called Tartarus. This is an arrangement made by the Gods because in life similar judgements were poorly made by men. The punishment of Tartarus acts either as a temporary purgatory for those who can be improved, or as an eternal torture to others who are incurable.

Plato's most detailed account of the judgement of souls is the myth of Er, in *Republic* 614b-621d. Er is a warrior, slain on the battlefield, and allowed by the Gods to return from the

dead to tell of the fate of souls. He says that after death, souls stand before a judge who directs the just upward to heaven and the unjust downward. Each spent one thousand years either in heavenly delight or in horrible torture, each act of kindness or crime being repaid tenfold. The worst offenders--the tyrants and murderers--are thrown into Tartarus where they suffer eternal punishment. Souls returning from their rewards and punishments return to a meadow and after several days go before the fates where they select for themselves a new mortal life. The character of each mortal life lies open to the souls; they may lead the life they choose. Because of this, each individual is responsible for the consequences of his life. God is blameless. It is emphasised that there is an acceptable life, one that is not evil, for all the souls assembled. Following the selection, the fates ensure the necessity of the content of each life and souls are made to drink from the river Lethe, which causes them to forget everything of the afterlife when they emerge again embodied.

Separation from and Reunion with the Divinity

For Plato, the state of estrangement from the divinity is not due to an event or act, but is instead a consequence of the constitution of the human soul and the manner in which humanity was created. In the *Timaeus* cosmogony, the demiurge creates the material universe by faithfully following a perfect, eternal and intelligible model. Plato says the demiurge directed the lesser divinities to create mortals because if he made them himself, they would be perfect and equal to the Gods (*Tim.* 41cd). It was the demiurge's purpose that mankind not enjoy perfection.

The result of this creation is a creature both capable of rational thought and vulnerable to degeneration. The joining of matter and soul resulted in a chaotic twisting of the perfection of creation. Man's reason was bewildered in the process. Mortal soul, the appetites and passions, the irrational parts of the human soul, was created, beginning a struggle between the rational and irrational that would define mortal life. At *Statesman* 269c-270a, Plato suggests a fall of sorts. God stopped actively directing the perfect universe he created, and the universe, on its own volition, reversed its rotation. This reverse was due, however, to the inherent inability of matter to endure an unchanging state (*Stat.* 269d). The universe simply manifested the imperfection engendered in it.

The nature of mankind's imperfection is the same. As discussed above, Plato says no one does wrong willingly. The commission of an evil act is due to the natural condition of the human soul, a rational element struggling against irrational passions and appetites. It is further subject to the disorders of the body and the corrupting influences of environment. Man is not responsible for the presence of evil in the created universe; he is not responsible for his own proclivity toward evil or the difficulty he faces in doing good. Man's responsibility, and the quality upon which he is judged, is to improve his natural condition so as to avoid evil.

The key to the salvation of the soul in Plato's metaphysics, which is the enjoyment of eternal life with the Gods following death, lies in a person's ability to free his immortal part from the corruption inherent in the body. Happiness is found in the next life for anyone who has purified his soul by separating it as much as he can from the body (*Phaedo* 67d). As illustrated in the *Timaeus* story of the creation of mankind, the soul was damaged by embodiment; it is affected by the disorders of the body. The source of all evil is body. The task for a human being seeking a reward in the afterlife, and freedom from evils in this life, is to purge bodily taint from his soul

The individual who accomplishes this task of purification is the philosopher, whose job it is to free and separate his soul from his body (*Phaedo* 67d). Recall that the complete separation of body and soul is the death of the body. For Plato, the philosopher spends his life preparing for death by practising this separation (*Phaedo* 67d). The philosopher is able to purify himself through concerning himself with soul only, thereby attaining knowledge of true being (*Phaedo* 66b); i.e. the intellectual apprehension of the true natures of things like justice and beauty. Body hinders the soul's acquisition of this knowledge (*Phaedo* 65bc).

The soul of the philosopher calms the passions and urges of the body and follows reason instead (*Phaedo* 84ab). By following reason, by concerning himself with soul, the philosopher is able to gain this knowledge of true being, i.e. of the things of the intelligible world. He gains wisdom from this knowledge and the contemplation of these unchanging truths (*Phaedo* 79c). The reward for such a lifestyle is the happiness of being guided in all matters by wisdom (*Meno* 88c), and an afterlife in the company of Gods (*Phaedo* 69cd; *Gorg.* 526c).

The Happy Life

Purification of the soul from the taint of body is the goal of the philosopher's existence and the key to enjoying eternal rewards. Living this way, Plato tells us, is a matter of imitating the gods. In the illustration of the soul as a winged chariot in the *Phaedrus* (246a-249c), Plato says the gods' chariots have two good horses and can therefore climb beyond heaven where true being dwells, incorporeal and intelligible. There, they can discern true being: justice itself, temperance itself, true knowledge, which nourishes the gods' souls. It is up to humanity to try and follow, to minimise the influence of the ignoble horse that represents the body, so the chariot can rise allowing a glimpse of the place beyond heaven where exists true knowledge of what truly is. In following the gods, the human soul can know some truth and free itself of the sorrow that is incumbent upon material existence.

In the *Symposium* (210b-212b), Plato provides a practical guide to following the gods to knowledge of true being. One who loves the beauty of an individual person or thing should educate himself, stoke his desire, to rise to an understanding of the beauty of the soul in that person or in the creator of that beautiful thing. From this, he will contemplate the beauty of laws and institutions, i.e. beauty as it resides in non-material objects. Next, he will understand beauty

inherent in the sciences, actually in all knowledge. Beauty will then be grasped abstractly, as a property possessed by these things. Such a realisation will then result in the knowledge of, in the vision of, the very soul of beauty: an eternal, unchanging, intelligible entity that is the source of all beauty. Contemplation urges one upward from a love of beautiful things to knowledge of beauty itself. Contemplation and a love (ἔρως) of wisdom, in the terminology of the *Phaedrus*, have helped the charioteer overcome the defiance of the ignoble horse so he can follow the Gods to knowledge of what truly is.

The result of a life spent in contemplation, i.e. the philosopher's life, is a journey up to an understanding of the eternal, the unchanging, the intelligible, the true. The life of contemplation begins with concern for the soul, the immortal piece of man, and care that reason should rule body. The wisdom that results from such a life enables the philosopher to gain happiness in all his mortal undertakings (*Meno* 88c), and to welcome the end of that life for the reward awaiting him in the next.

Platonism After Plato

Following the death of Plato, the Academy was led by philosophers who sought to create a coherent and internally consistent system of his thought. Using his dialogues and oral teachings, the latter mostly preserved for us in the works of Aristotle and his commentators, a Platonic dogma was developed. It was at this time that philosophy was formally divided into physics, ethics and logic. This work was performed by philosophers in the Academy, of course, but Aristotle and the Peripatetics made contributions via criticism of Plato. In fact, the distinction between the schools was sometimes regarded as only nominal in the ancient world.¹⁶ This section will review briefly the major directions of this development in the Old (347- 20BC) and Middle (220BC-AD255) Academies. The Middle Academy gave way to a new reinterpretation of Plato by Plotinus, which marked the beginning of Neoplatonism.

Academic philosophy based the universe on first principles, the One or Monad and the Indefinite Dyad. The One is a unity, a dynamic principle that acts on the basic unlimitedness or otherness of the passive Dyad. The Indefinite Dyad is a duality, infinitely extendable and divisible; it is also the irrational part of the soul. Essentially, the One imposes its order on the formlessness of Dyad to bring about the universe. The Forms were increasingly associated with number, a phenomenon first encountered in the oral teachings of Plato.

Speusippus and Xenocrates were the first heads of the Academy following Plato's death. In their works, which exist now only as fragments, they accepted and developed these two first principles. Speusippus considered the One and Dyad as first principles, the seeds of all else. For him, the One is an utterly transcendent entity. It is the cause of Being and Goodness, but cannot be called Good or even existent. It is beyond existence.¹⁷ The One is the source from which being springs, but would not bring about existence on its own. For that, the Indefinite Dyad, the source of all differentiation and individuation, is necessary. Speusippus claimed that God was Intellect ($\nu\omicron\upsilon\zeta$), but this was not the One, which transcends even God. This hierarchy will not be held again by leading Platonists until Plotinus.¹⁸

¹⁶ Cicero, following Antochus of Ascalon, says that the Academic and Peripatetic schools observe the same doctrine, *Academica* 1.20.

¹⁷ Witt, 19; Merlan, 94.

¹⁸ Dillon (1977), 18.

For Speusippus, the supreme principles were neither good nor evil. The One transcends good and evil. Dyad, despite its association with diversity and material existence, is also morally neutral. The interaction of these principles was necessary for the creation of the material universe; without this interaction, the One could not produce diversity or plurality. Neither is this interaction responsible for evil. Evil is the result of no action or purpose. Instead, it results from a deficiency, and inability to control natural qualities of diversity.¹⁹

While Speusippus was an influence on Plotinus and later Neoplatonists, Xenocrates, as the first Platonic systematiser, was to shape the immediate development of the Academy.²⁰ His first principles were Dyad, a principle of multiplicity and unlimitedness, and Monad, or Intellect. This is, perhaps, akin to Aristotle's conception of God as self-contemplating divine mind: the later Academy is most heavily influenced by Xenocrates' conceptions of Platonism, and this Aristotelian conception of God dominates Platonism until the time of Plotinus.²¹ The Monad is the supreme principle, the male principle, and immaterial. It dwells transcendent in the realm of fixed stars. Xenocrates' Dyad is the female principle, evil and disorderly, ruling beyond the heavens but below the fixed stars.²² The Dyad, too, is immaterial, the Soul of the universe. This was not World-Soul, however, which was a product of the Monad and Dyad.

Both Speusippus and Xenocrates thought the universe was not created in time; they considered the *Timaeus* account of creation as a distinct event to be metaphorical. For Speusippus, the universe came about through the transcendent cause of all, the One, imposing form on the Dyad, which is the cause of all differentiation and individuation. Matter is somehow related to the multiplicity principle. Neither the One nor Matter had ethical attributes: the One is beyond good and evil, matter is a value-free entity necessary for the creation of the universe.

For Xenocrates, Plato's forms were ideas in the mind of God.²³ These were eternal and the 'paradigmatic cause of all regular natural phenomena,' the standard interpretation of the Ideas in the Middle Academy.²⁴ Following the oral teachings of Plato, Xenocrates associated the forms

¹⁹ Merlan, 90, 102-112.

²⁰ Witt, 14.

²¹ Dillon (1977), 24; 38.

²² Witt, 16.

²³ Dillon (1993), 94.

²⁴ Dillon (1977), 28.

with number. Its creation, and the consequent creation of the universe, was the result of Monad placing limit on the unlimited multiplicity of the Dyad.

For Xenocrates, soul was the mediator between the intelligible and material worlds, being made of parts of each. Soul is the product of number, itself a product of the One imposing limit on the multiplicity of the Dyad. Sameness and otherness, i.e. stability and change, are added to number to generate soul, which is self-moving.²⁵ Soul contains a rational and irrational part, both of which are immortal.

The early Academy held the Aristotelian doctrine of virtue as a mean between extremes of excess and deficiency. Happiness for both Speusippus and Xenocrates is a Stoic-sounding 'freedom from disturbance.' Both prescribed the exercise of virtue with the goal of minimising passions and strong emotions. For both, life according to nature was important. Xenocrates thought that this meant a life consistent with an ethic inherent in humanity discernible in man's basic instincts for survival. This definition lays greater importance on material life than is to be found in later Platonism. Xenocrates states that happiness requires bodily and external goods, and that virtue involves noble actions and good habits and attitudes with regard to external goods.

Aristotle influenced Neoplatonists, especially Porphyry,²⁶ and made contributions to the development of the Platonic notions of God and soul particularly. His influence on Augustine is considerable, but secondary. An analysis of that influence is outside the scope of this thesis. Augustine's direct knowledge of Aristotle appears to be limited to the *Categories* (*Conf.* 4.16.28). He seems to have drawn from this work on at least two occasions. In Aristotle's description of four classes of things that are (*Cat.* 1^a20), he says that what is in a subject is not a part and cannot exist separately from what it is in. His example is that knowledge of grammar is in the soul. Augustine employs this concept arguing for the immortality of the soul based upon its knowledge of eternal disciplines (*JA* 1.6). At *Cat.* 12.14^a26, Aristotle lists among the ways one thing can be prior to another, 'what does not reciprocate as to implication of existence,'²⁷ i.e. if there are 2, it can be implied that formerly there was 1, but not the other way around. Then he lists order, for example sound elements precede syllables in grammar. Augustine makes use of these definitions in his discussion of the nature of the relationship between God the father and God the son (*DT* 6).

²⁵ Witt, 20.

²⁶ Porphyry's *Isagoge* is an introduction to Aristotle's *Categories*.

The most significant doctrinal development in the last two centuries BC in the Academy was the rise to prominence of scepticism. Reacting to a Stoic definition for a standard for the perception of truth, Arcesilaus denied that anything could be known. The doctrine that developed from this observation held everything in doubt, and urged the wise man to withhold assent in all matters. This doctrine was important in Augustine's philosophical development; it was communicated to him through Cicero, but has no bearing on the positions under examination in this chapter and is therefore outside its scope.

Another phenomenon found in Platonism that will become very important to Augustine, is the development of a doxographical tradition.²⁸ One writer of such a handbook of Plato's doctrines was Albinus.²⁹ His *Διδασκαλικός* is an interpretation of Plato. Although probably in no part original,³⁰ this work is a good example of the handbook tradition, and a good source for the development of at least one branch of Platonism in the first century AD.

Albinus continues the tradition of two first principles. His are matter, which is not body but potential body, and Idea, or God's thoughts. God is a transcendent entity, a self-contemplating divine mind, which orders 'the heavenly Mind and the Soul of the World in accordance with himself and with his thoughts.'³¹ God is perfectly self-sufficient, eternal, Good, the cause of all things and the source of truth. He is also without parts, immutable and immaterial. God is responsible for the creation of the material world, which he brought about by an act of will and accomplished by imparting form on chaotic matter.³²

Albinus accepts Plato's tripartite division of the human immortal soul. The rational part of the soul, he says, is immortal. What is good for man, according to Albinus, emphasises a transcendent experience rather than the bodily and external goods present in the doctrine of the Old Academy. The highest good is contemplation of the final good, which is the transcendent God. The point of philosophy is the striving after wisdom, which is the turning away of the soul from body. Further, the purpose of life is living like God, which consists of being in control of one's natural faculties, moderating the passions and using reason to transcend the concerns of this world.

²⁷ I have used Ackrill's translation of *Categories*.

²⁸ Concerning Platonic handbooks and their importance to Augustine, see Solignac; Dillon (1977), 267-306; Courcelle (1969), 167; and O'Daly (1999), 259-261.

²⁹ Albinus is also identified as Alcinous by Dillon (1993).

³⁰ Dillon, (1977), 268.

³¹ Dillon (1977), 283.

The opposite of transcending the world's concerns is, for Albinus, what has caused a descent of the soul. He attributes this descent to wantonness (ἀκολασία) a sinful wilfulness on the part of the soul's free will in error, and a love of the body (φιλοσωματία). Soul suffers from the affections of the body as a penalty for incarnation. God is not responsible for the evil men either do or suffer.³³

In the first two centuries AD, Platonism dominated ancient philosophy. In spite of the efforts at systemisation, however, there was no real unified Platonic system.³⁴ The Academy had absorbed much of Stoic doctrine. Even in the first century BC, Antiochus of Ascalon, who headed the Academy, claimed a substantial agreement in doctrine not only between Plato and Aristotle, which had long been considered the case, but also with the Stoics.³⁵ The Platonism that existed prior to Plotinus and the Neoplatonists in the mid-3rd century was a syncretic philosophy: a mix of elements from what were once distinct schools.³⁶

Neoplatonism

Neoplatonism is a modern term denoting a development of Platonism beginning in the mid 3rd century AD. The Neoplatonists did not make any distinction between their own interpretations of Plato and the tradition they inherited.³⁷ They considered themselves to be Platonists, as did all the ancients up to and including Augustine.

Neoplatonism, as much as it was a philosophy, was a pagan religious rival to Christianity.³⁸ It was part of a general migration of religious ideas from the east to Rome that also included Gnosticism, Manicheism and the cult of Mithras among many more. The migration was a response to the fear and uncertainty generated among the population by a series of unprecedented disasters in the empire. Foreign invasions, civil wars, social and economic crises shook faith in traditional institutions and made new religious demands to assuage popular distress.

³² Witt, 133.

³³ Witt, 120.

³⁴ Dodds, 103.

³⁵ Sharples (1996), 109.

³⁶ Stead, 54.

³⁷ See *Ennead* 5.1.8ff. for an example of Plotinus' conscious following of Plato.

³⁸ Gregory, 194.

Plotinus was the founder of Neoplatonism and the source for much of its doctrine. He was born in Egypt in AD 204/5. He took up philosophy in his 20's, studying under Ammonius Saccas for eleven years. Later, he accompanied the campaign of emperor Gordian III against the Persians in 238-44, hoping to expose himself to eastern philosophy. Gordian was killed in his army's defeat; Plotinus was able to effect a narrow escape, after which he settled in Rome. There he founded no school, but attracted numerous followers. Near the end of his life when his philosophy was fully developed, Plotinus composed a series of treatises based upon his own ideas and discussions with students. At the time of his death in 270, these treatises were known only to a few close followers.

Plotinus' student Porphyry is responsible for editing his works and distributing them widely. Porphyry joined Plotinus' circle in 263 and remained for six years. After Plotinus' death, Porphyry led a Roman Neoplatonic school. At the end of the third century, he collected and edited Plotinus' treatises, arranging them in six groups of nine according to subject matter. Porphyry then published the resulting volume of *Enneads* and made them generally available. He also composed a biography of Plotinus from which we have most of our knowledge of his life. In addition to his role as editor and disciple, Porphyry would become well known throughout Mediterranean Christendom due to his anti-Christian polemical works, which exist today only as fragments. Augustine's frequent mentions of Porphyry's writings attest to their influence.

The *libri Platoniorum* discussed by Augustine in the *Confessions* (7.9.13 - 20.27) that are so influential to his philosophical and theological development are thought to be Neoplatonic works. The insights engendered by the *libri Platoniorum* lead Augustine to a new understanding of God, good and evil, and the soul's relationship to God. The identity of these Platonic books, whether they are some of the *Enneads* or works of Porphyry, is the subject of a long-standing and vigorous scholarly controversy.³⁹ The evidence that the *libri Platoniorum* are the *Enneads* includes the large number of Plotinian citations in Augustine's work, especially in books 9 and 10 of *De Civitate Dei*,⁴⁰ and Augustine's statement that he based *De Beata Vita* (1,4) on reading

³⁹ The following treatment is necessarily condensed as the controversy is off the point of this survey. For a good summary of the question from its beginnings in 1888, see O'Meara (1958), 91-99; Beatrice, 248 covers more recent scholarship.

⁴⁰ e.g. Beatrice, 251.

paucissimi libri Platonis.⁴¹ O'Connell finds parallel imagery between Augustine and Plotinus that is not found in Porphyry.⁴²

The argument that Augustine was influenced by reading Porphyry⁴³ relies on Augustine's use of his works, primarily *De Regressu Animae* and *Philosophy from Oracles*⁴⁴ in a lengthy discussion of demonology beginning at *CD* 10.9. Augustine was also familiar with Porphyry's *Letter to Anebo* and *De Imaginibus*;⁴⁵ Porphyry seems to be the appropriate target of Augustine's statement of the shortcomings of Platonism in *Conf.* 7.9.14 as well.⁴⁶

Identifying the *libri Platoniorum* is difficult because Plotinus was known in the west primarily through Porphyrian editions and commentary.⁴⁷ Further, many of Porphyry's own works were either adaptations of the *Enneads* or contained numerous abstracts of them.⁴⁸ Finally, the question is further complicated by the problem of identifying which works would be available to Augustine in Latin translation, the mediating influence of the Christian Platonist community among which Augustine lived in Milan, and the many other sources of Neoplatonism available to Augustine.⁴⁹

The numerous difficulties in identifying the *libri Platoniorum* have led many scholars to throw up their hands and admit that the question cannot be answered,⁵⁰ or to suppose that these works were of Plotinus and Porphyry in some combination.⁵¹ As Hadot says, it is impossible to distinguish between Plotinus and Porphyry as a source for the Neoplatonic doctrine in Augustine's early works.⁵²

⁴¹ This reading is disputed with the alternate *paucissimi libri Plotini* now widely accepted. This matter is discussed in Chapter 4, p. 113ff.

⁴² O'Connell, 20, 38.

⁴³ This would be Porphyrian texts in Apuleius' Latin translation according to Marrou (1938), 36.

⁴⁴ e.g. Courcelle (1969), 180; O'Meara (1959), argues that these are one and the same work; Beatrice assumes O'Meara's conclusion and argues that *Against the Christians* was also the same, and that this single work of Porphyry's is Augustine's *libri Platoniorum*.

⁴⁵ Courcelle (1969), 185-6.

⁴⁶ O'Meara (1958), 105; Beatrice, 253.

⁴⁷ Flamant, 573.

⁴⁸ Hadot, 209; Teselle, 45.

⁴⁹ O'Donnell (1992), vol. 3, 418; on the question of alternate sources of Neoplatonism for Augustine, see Solignac, 113-148.

⁵⁰ e.g. Hadot, 210; O'Daly (1987), 9.

⁵¹ e.g. Courcelle (1969), 180; O'Donnell (1992), vol. 3, 423.

⁵² Hadot, 207.

The only distinction Augustine seems to draw between the two comes after his awareness of Porphyry's anti-Christian works.⁵³ In matters of doctrine, the concern of this study, Plotinus and Porphyry come to Augustine as a unit.⁵⁴ Consequently, references to Plotinus or the *Enneads*, our source of Neoplatonic doctrine, are to be understood in this survey as standing for this unit.⁵⁵

The Neoplatonists maintained the Platonic dichotomy between an intelligible and sensible universe. The intelligible universe was the realm of three levels of divine being. At the top of this system, the One gives existence to all else. At the bottom is matter, which is the least existent, least real phenomenon. Plotinus (*Enn.* 5.5.11) suggests that the material world is like the dream world of a man who slept through his life, taking that world to be real. The object of living for the Neoplatonists is waking from that dream world to see the reality of the intelligible world, the first step to returning to the One and Authentic Existence.

God

The Neoplatonic system includes three divinities or divine hypostases. The source of all Being, the first hypostasis, is the One (τὸ ἓν). The One is a transcendent entity, a complete unity, which generates a divine intellect (νοῦς). The intellect contains and is the entirety of the intelligible universe. By contemplating itself, nous generates the All-Soul (ἡ Ψύχη ἡ τοῦ παντός), which is responsible for generation of individual souls and for creating the material universe. At one point or another, each is referred to in the *Enneads* as God (ὁ θεός), e.g. the One at 5.5.12, Divine Intellect at 5.1.5, All-Soul at 6.7.1.

The One is an utterly transcendent entity, beyond all Being. The *Enneads* describe it variously as a perfect simplex, a self-containing first principle (2.9.1); a Unity beyond Being (6.9.2); self-defined (6.9.3); sizeless, measureless, beyond the Divine Intellect or God (6.9.6), limitless, beyond magnitude (6.7.32); and utterly without multiplicity (6.7.17). This last

⁵³ Teselle, 237; O'Donnell (1992), vol. 3, 422.

⁵⁴ O'Donnell (1992), vol. 3, 423.

⁵⁵ In spite of the difficulty in teasing out Plotinian from Porphyrian influences in Augustine, there are a number of doctrines Augustine attributes specifically to Porphyry. In particular, Augustine discusses Porphyry's principles at *CD* 10.23, which he himself identifies with the first two members of the Trinity, but which Porphyry refuses to do (*CD* 10.28). For an examination of Augustine's doctrinal knowledge of Porphyry *per se*, see O'Daly (1999), 124-34, 208, 215-6, 258-9.

description points to the difficulty in describing such a concept. Any quality that can be ascribed to the One suggests a lack of the opposite quality, which implies duality. Plotinus avoids this. His conception of perfect unity attempts to avoid the criticisms of such a concept found in the *Parmenides*. He insists that the One is omnipresent but held nowhere, not inhibited from presence at any point, yet not contained (5.5.9). Thus it is present and not present (cf. *Parm.* 138b). Further, it is neither at rest nor in motion, as neither can occur for that which has no place for either (5.5.10, cf. *Parm.* 139b).

Ultimately, Plotinus advances the idea that his first principle is simply definitionless, a negation of plurality of which nothing can be said (5.5.6). The One has no attributes: it is the source of all things, but is not any of them (5.5.13). It is the source of existence, but beyond existence (5.1.7), the source of Being, but beyond Being (5.1.10). It is beyond qualities altogether. No predicative statement can be made of the One (6.7.38); its nature is such that nothing can be affirmed of it (3.8.10).

The One is first principle and potentiality (δύναμις) of the universe (*En.* 3.8.10). Generation from the One is a circumradiation, as light coming from the sun (5.1.6). The One's emanation brings Being, the Divine Intellect, into existence. This emanation is eternal: the light of the One is always radiating, and as long as it radiates, the lower order which is dependent upon it, continues to exist. All existence, then, is a trace of the One (5.5.5). The One itself remains unchanged by this emanation; i.e. it does not diminish as a result of giving existence to other entities. It is as a spring, which has no source outside itself (3.8.10).

In an apparent paradox, Plotinus argues that the One, which is beyond qualities, is Good, and that these two have an identical nature (*En.* 2.9.1). This contradiction is removed by Plotinus' definition of Good. It is the self-sufficing principle that is the source and spring of All (6.7.23). The One is the Good of the universe in that from it all things have their Being (5.5.9). One thing is understood to surpass another in goodness if it is in fuller possession of Authentic Being. The One is the source of Being, in that it is responsible for the creation of the Divine Intellect and the rest of the intelligible and material universes, and for sustaining the entire created universe eternally. The closer any entity comes to the One, the closer to the source of Being. Such an entity actually exists more fully when inclined toward the transcendent unity. This means it possesses greater goodness

as well. Things are Good by participation in Good (5.5.13); things participate in Good when they incline themselves toward the source of Good.

Finally, a trait of the One that is of interest because of its utter rejection by Christianity is the indifference it demonstrates to the universe it created. Plotinus says the One is unchanged by creation. It has no need of its derivatives, which are unnecessary to it. While it is responsible for the existence of all in the intelligible and material universes, the One ignores them completely (5.5.12). In fact, the One is unaware of what it has produced. Being without self-knowledge or self-awareness, it does not know itself or anything else (6.7.38). The source of all things leaves them, indifferently, to their own existence (5.5.12).

The act of creation of the One is a vision, which is the product of its self-quest. That vision is the Divine Intellect (*En* 5.1.7). In this act, the One became a manifold; i.e. it created the Divine Intellect by its desire to know itself (3.8.8). Plotinus says that the Divine Intellect reveals the One as its rays reveal the sun (5.1.7). The Divine Intellect is the Good made diverse (6.7.15); the unity created an image of itself that is less than itself. It is a duality, totality of all, a universal, but not a unity.

The Divine Intellect is manifold in that it is a conscious living being; it is able to contemplate which implies an object of contemplation, a duality. Its contents are the same as the One: all there is in the intelligible realm (*En*. 4.4.32, 6.9.5). Plotinus says it is identical with truth; it is the entirety of all things (τὰ ὄντα πάντα, 5.5.3). What stands as undifferentiated unity in the One, i.e. the entire content of the intelligible realm, is reproduced in the Divine Intellect as distinct Ideal Forms. It is the container of these Ideal forms; the Ideas are its thoughts (6.7.2). The Divine Mind is conscious of its contents, knowing all unceasingly, so it is at once the entirety of the content of the intelligible realm and cognisant of the entirety of that realm: it is and knows all.

While the One exists aloof from and indifferent to all else, the Divine Intellect is aware that it has come from the One (*En* 5.1.7), and loves its begetter (5.1.6). It understands its source and attempts knowledge of the One by introspection (5.5.7); the Divine Intellect is not the Good, but must maintain its life by contemplation of the Good. It is less than the One, but greater than everything else, a Divine Mind that eternally focuses itself on its source (5.1.5). In spite of this love of the One and need for Good to maintain itself, we are assured that it is some rebellious quality in the Divine Intellect that has resulted in its secession from the One, and the establishment

of its own manifold existence. This Divine Intellect exists as the manifold cause of the soul of the universe (5.1.5). It contains all that potentially exists as Forms (3.8.9) and is, therefore, the original which serves as a model for the creation of this world (3.8.11). Each of the forms that it contains serves as an exemplar for an object in the material world. The Divine Intellect, as an intelligible being, also exists as an eternal being. It knows no future or past, but is aware of everything--that is, aware of the contents of itself--as an eternal present. This eternity is another kind of form, in that it serves as the model for time in the material sphere (5.1.4)

The third divinity in the Neoplatonic system is the soul of the universe; All-Soul, which is an offspring of (*En* 5.1.7) and image of the Divine Intellect (5.1.3).⁵⁶ Since the Divine Intellect contains the entirety of the intelligible realm, soul already existed within it; the generation of soul was a natural outcome of the fullness of its source. As an immaterial being, soul is measureless and permeates the universe so that it is ever present simultaneously.

Soul is the creator and administrator of all living things in the material realm. It enters into material expanse, permeating and giving life to the earth, sea and heaven (*En* 5.1.2; 4.4.11). The soul of the universe is the analogue to Plato's demiurge, a single unchanging and eternal being which creates the sense world by imparting form to matter. The sense world, in turn, is also a living being with a soul of its own. The All-soul creates a living material cosmos that is made in the image of an archetype: the living intelligible cosmos, which is the Divine Intellect (5.8.12).

The All-soul has two phases. In its higher phase, it is in eternal contemplation of the One. Soul is not content with contemplation of its own source, but looks instead to what engendered its source, the first principle (*En* 5.5.3). It is involved entirely in the intelligible world. This higher phase is a higher emanation from the Divine Intellect, referred to as a Reason-Principle: a hypostasis identified with the deliberative thought of the demiurge in *Timaeus*. This higher level is in perpetual intellectual contact with the Divine Intellect.

The lower level of soul, Nature, is responsible for the generation of an inferior offspring, which is the material realm (5.1.7). Nature contemplates the One as well, but also goes forth from

⁵⁶ Plotinus, on some occasions, suggests a distinction between the $\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, which is the third divine hypostasis, and the All-Soul ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$). This study's discussion of his doctrines with respect to the third hypostasis does not address this distinction because Plotinus does not make it consistently and such a distinction raises the seemingly insoluble problem of the function of the

the One; 'streaming life from life' to be the source of Being in the material world (3.8.3). It communicates the Ideas to matter, imparting form upon them. Together, these phases are the total λόγος, the creative, as opposed to purely contemplative, divine force in the universe. The creative act is performed by an eternal being in contemplative union with its eternal source, thus the creation of the material universe is an eternal creation with soul responsible both for the universe coming into existence, and continuing its existence. Before soul, Plotinus says that all was the blankness of matter, an absence of Being (5.1.2). But he also says that the universe was not created in time: there was no time when the universe had no soul, no time when body did not exist without soul, and no time that matter was not set in order (4.3.9; 5.8.12). Time began with the ensoulment of body, the introduction of change and successiveness.

The creation of the material universe was not a planned act, but is the necessary manifestation of Soul's contemplative act, and an expression of the order of the intelligible world. The order of the material universe is rational because it accurately represents the order of its intelligible model. There is nothing in the life of the universe that is the result of chance (*En.* 6.7.2). Everything that exists in the material universe exists first in the intelligible (6.7.12). Consequently, there is no planning involved in the creation or administration of the universe (6.7.1), but a divine order maintains the sensible world because it is a copy of the divine order of the intelligible.

We are to think of the material universe as a good thing. It is a display of eternal wisdom as an image of intellectual divinities (*En.* 2.9.8), and in so much as it is this, it reveals the plan and will of the One (2.9.9). In creating the material realm, Soul imparted form on matter as much as it was possible to do it (2.9.17); Soul's goal was to make its creation as close as possible to the intelligible model from which it worked (5.8.8). Whatever there is lacking in the universe is due to matter not being mastered, refusing to submit to form (4.4.38). But, as Plotinus warns the Gnostics, it is better to simply recognise the necessary inferiority of the material realm to the One than complain about faults in the cosmos (2.9.13).

Good and Evil

Ψυχή that is the third hypostasis but not the All-Soul. For a discussion of this issue, see

For Neoplatonists, the One is the Good of the universe. The reason for this is that the One is the source of Authentic Existence. All else that exists does so to the measure that it exists by a derivation from the One. As the rest of the universe gains Authentic Existence from its participation in the One, the One is its Good.

Generally, the Good for each given thing is what is immediately superior to it. A good confers some great benefit on the thing that is lower: matter gains form and order from Idea; body gets life from Soul; on up to Divine Intellect which has only the One as its Good (*En.* 6.7.25). All of rational life must strive to the next higher level of Existence, where it finds its immediate Good.

An individual thing has the potential to be what its nature strives toward. Rational beings have the potential for Authentic Existence in its purest form--the source of all Being. So, what the rational individual lacks to reach the next highest level of Being is its Good (*En.* 6.7.27). It is not the striving that makes the goal Good, but the goodness of the goal that provokes the striving. The task of the rational individual is to ascend to the source of Good. Even the desire of it is its Good (1.6.7).

Evil, for the Neoplatonists, is simply the opposite of Good. With the One as the source of Authentic Existence, and the entire intelligible realm generated from that original Good and Being, the entire intelligible realm is Good. There is no evil until the intelligible meets matter in the creation of the sensible world (*En.* 6.7.15). Were it not for Matter, there would be only levels of Good without evil (1.8.2). As the One is the source of Existence and good, matter, being formless and taking no part in the Reality of the intelligible, has no Existence. Evil matter is the source of rebellion against form; it is the source of disorder, irregularity, dissolution (6.7.20). Matter is the evil for each thing that exists because inclining towards it leads one further from Real Existence.

In spite of matter's status, Plotinus warns against hating it. The natural manifestation of the One includes the material realm. Matter, when it accepts form, is necessary to that manifestation (*En.* 4.8.6). The material world possesses a weakened form of beauty, but it is beautiful (2.9.13). So, even matter participates in the Good. Given this, contempt for this world leads to despising the divine and to evil actions (2.9.16).

Blumenthal (1971).

The Soul

According to Plotinus, the All-Soul and the individual human soul are not different, nor is the human soul a part of the All-Soul. Instead, he says that there is one identical soul and every individual manifestation is that soul in its entirety (*En.* 4.3.2). Soul extends throughout the universe (3.8.5), but a type of differentiation takes place as soul is embodied. Degrees of power among manifestations of soul come about because some souls have assumed body; souls differ in their distance from the higher world, i.e. how close they are to matter (4.3.6). While the individual human soul is divine (5.1.10) and shares the same Form as the All-Soul, it is corrupted by its association with body. This corruption leads to the perception of an individual identity, a combination of soul and body. The result is a universal soul at once divided and undivided, analogous to the differentiation of the One in the Divine Intellect.⁵⁷

Man combines soul and body, but being matter, body resists the rationality and order soul brings (*En.* 6.7.5). Each soul descends from All-Soul to a body that is made for it, according to the similarity between the dispositions of the body and soul (4.3.12). Souls have different characters due to the qualities of the bodies they dwell in, their environments in embodied life, and the natural tendencies they bring to body (4.3.15). Souls neither go willingly to a body, nor because they are sent. Instead, the movement is natural and spontaneous, an expression of the justice that holds the universe together (4.3.13).

Soul possesses a version of the three divine hypostases within itself. Its highest phase is always in the presence of the divine. Its reasoning ability remains perfect and untouched by contact with body. This reasoning phase of the soul--intellectual soul--is our eternal connection with the intelligible world, the divine that is in us (*En.* 5.1.10; 2.9.2). A second phase, the intermediate soul, is compelled to care for the body. It is involved simultaneously in the intelligible and material worlds. The last phase of soul is the lowest, concerned with the material sphere exclusively. This lowest soul is drawn to matter and attempts to pull the intermediate soul along with it. The higher soul remains in the intelligible, but communicates what it draws from contemplation to the lower phases. The character of the individual human soul is the measure to which the intermediate soul remains aloof of the bodily demands of the lower phase and focuses

⁵⁷ In *Ennead* 5.7, however, Plotinus attributes individual human identity to the presence of a Form of each individual, τοῦ καθέκαστον ἰδέα.

itself, via meditation, on the higher. From a posture of contemplating the higher, the individual may ascend to the next level of Being, and ultimately to a union with the One.

When body dies, soul leaves it for the intelligible world then returns to the material world where it takes a new body (*En.* 4.3.12). An ascending soul, that is one that is sufficiently free from the taint of body, remembers the lower world and recognises other souls when it reaches the limits of the material world, which is heaven. Its character survives and can be recognised by others (4.4.5). When the soul is in the intelligible world, however, it will not remember its own identity, or anything at all of its life in the material realm (4.4.2). There are two reasons for this lack of memory. First, the intelligible world is one outside of time. There is no change there, no events happening successively and no perception of future or past. Consequently, there is no discursive thought and no need of memory (4.4.1). Secondly, individual identity is due to a combination of soul and body. Socrates exists only as long as Socrates' soul remains in his body (4.3.5). The unembodied soul returns to the intelligible to become part of a unity, without the differentiation that individual identity represents.

Returning to the material world, each soul comes to a body made for it according to each soul's character (*En.* 4.3.12). Some souls, however, fail to climb completely out of the material world; they are not entirely disembodied at death. These pass from one body to the next without rest (4.3.15). Again, different destinations for a soul are due to varying dispositions of the individual souls, always guided by the justice that orders the universe (4.3.24). A soul that had been in a human being can even pass into an animal if its disposition merits the change (6.7.6). The soul descending from the intelligible back to the material realm regains some part of its memory when it arrives again in heaven. Its former character is preserved partially when it re-activates memories of its previous life in the lower world (4.4.5).

The success or failure of the soul is judged in an afterlife. Souls bear the responsibility for their own fates once they have become embodied for the first time (4.3.15). Souls that have kept themselves from body as much as possible can return to All-soul for rest. Those that have acted evilly suffer punishments. These souls are carried, unknowing, to their suffering. They fall naturally and necessarily to their appropriate places no matter what resistance a soul might offer. Their punishments and their ultimate escapes from punishment are determined by the justice and harmony of the universe (4.3.24). But death is not to be dreaded for a good soul. Cleansed from

the taint of body, it becomes all Idea and Reason, free of body and once more a part of the divine (1.6.6).

Separation from and Reunion with the Divinity

Souls become separated from their divine source due to evil brought about by their audacious desire to be separate and autonomous (5.1.1). Good and evil are terms with specific contextual definitions in the Neoplatonic system. The One is Good and for all other entities in the universe, what brings them closer, by ascent, to the One is their good. Evil is the opposite, to hold something else in higher esteem than the One leads one away from the One and is by definition evil. Our Being becomes fuller by turning to the One; to turn away is a lessening (6.9.9). The desire for self-rule is a choice to place one's own will above that of the One. As the One is the source of Intellect and Being, such a choice is irrational. From it our souls descend into evil, which is non-Being (6.9.11).

We human beings are cut off from the highest Good because we have made this choice for self-rule and have become subject to our bodies (*En.* 6.9.9). Our soul suffers when we withdraw from the vision of True Being and we instead rely on our own intellects to discern truth using proof and evidence (6.9.10). We value the lowest level of Being, the ensouled material world, rather than the source of its life and immortality. The result is an ugly soul, deeply afflicted with the taint of body, teeming with desires for the carnal and torn with internal discord (1.6.5).

The process of reunion with the divine includes renouncing material things and teaching the soul to recall its place in the intelligible world and its worth as a part of the divine order (*En.* 5.1.12). To rediscover this understanding, we must completely withdraw from the external world and instead contemplate the divine in ourselves (6.9.7). Soul attains divinity by making upward steps based upon what is derived from the Good (6.7.36). If we can know ourselves, we will know our source (6.9.7); the contemplation of the divine that is our own intellectual soul begins our ascent to a reunion with the One.

When soul has ascended by contemplation from an understanding of its own divine phase to the source of that phase, it finds the Divine Intellect. This divine mind or Divine Intellect exists above the All-soul as the container of the entire intelligible universe, holder of the Ideal forms. Even when soul arrives at the Divine Intellect, it must rise higher. Contemplation of the divine

intellect begs the question of its maker (*En.* 3.8.11; 5.1.5; 6.7.16). The soul must rise above intellect to the Good. (6.7.22).

From the divine intellect, soul must reach the One by a leap, by transcending intellect and duality itself (*En.* 5.5.4). Soul ascends to the Divine Intellect within itself and puts trust in intellect, as through it is the vision of the Unity. However, as soul seeks out the intelligible by putting aside its perception of sense, it has to seek the One by putting aside intellect. To transcend intellect, we must put aside intellect and all that it teaches. The soul must seek to believe in the One, but not to define it or think of it in any positive way. The ascent is gained through vision only, and if the visionary is looking for a form in his vision of the One, he will not see it (5.5.6). Soul must go beyond knowing; knowing and the knowable have to be put aside. Rather than depending upon knowledge, we must trust our belief that the One exists.

The end of the intellectual journey is reunion with the One, a setting aside of soul's separation from the divine (*En.* 5.8.11). Arriving at a union with the One means that the soul cannot distinguish between itself and the object of its intuition (6.9.3). The soul that mingles with the Supreme becomes the Unity, its very self is in abeyance as it is filled with God (6.9.11). Arriving at the One, soul puts aside all shape; it has transcended Good and Evil. Within the Unity, Soul perceives nothing, not even its own identity (6.7.34). Here, soul has left behind the taint it suffered from embodiment and reversed the estrangement from the One brought about by its own self-will. It is reunited timelessly with the source of Good and the origin of its Being.

The Happy Life

The happy life for the Neoplatonists is 'liberation from the alien that besets us here,' (*En.* 6.9.11). The alien is matter, to which the real human being, the immortal soul, is attached in the material universe. The happy life is one that brings about this liberation; it is turning away from all that is material. Instead, we should look within ourselves to find the divine. It is possible to know the First Principle by contemplating the divine in ourselves (*En.* 3.8.9). Knowledge of the Supreme, and liberation from the material is achieved through an understanding of the ever-higher levels of Being that are products of the One (3.8.10). We can look within ourselves to begin this ascent because our own soul is the lowest product of the One's emanation.

Practically speaking, this ascent is an intellectual journey begun with an understanding of our affections in the material realm. While we are drawn to beautiful things, it isn't matter that we love, but the Form that is imposed on matter (*En.* 6.7.3). The exaltation felt by a lover of beauty perceiving a beautiful thing is actually the soul admiring those noble qualities in another object that it loves in itself. These noble qualities are what have Real Being in the material realm. The restless discomfort that often accompanies being in the presence of beauty is the soul recognising these transcendent qualities and longing to break away from the body to go instead to the source of the transcendent (1.6.5). This desire to ascend to the source is the first step to liberation from the alien body. Our task is to train our souls to perceive these transcendent qualities (1.6.9), so as to fit ourselves for the vision of the pure emanating light (5.5.8).

The consequence of a happy life in the here and now must be a complete disinterest in the material realm. A wise man is one who understands the real value of things; he understands that the intelligible realm is all that is Real, and that whatever of value is possessed by the material realm comes from the intelligible. A wise man, then, is not concerned with the seeming injustices of this world. What are often identified as evils such as inequalities of wealth and poverty, even murder are unimportant. He understands mortal life as a training ground for an immortal existence that follows death. If he is wronged in this life, it is of no consequence to him as an immortal (*En.* 2.9.9). The wise man avoids investing himself in this life. He avoids public life such as the desire for political power. Neither does he participate in private life; children and marriage draw a man to take pleasure in the carnal and are hindrances to contemplation (4.4.44).

The wise man identifies with the divine in himself, understanding that he is a manifestation of the All-soul. This identity means that the wise man conducts himself virtuously: he has continence, restraint and self-possession. He is not disturbed by the material realm, which is outside of this identity (*En.* 2.9.18). Knowing the real values of things means not despising the material world, however. It does possess goodness, merely an inferior goodness. To despise this world is to have contempt for the goodness it possesses. It means allowing the world to disturb one's identity with the All-soul and erosion of the virtuous living that is a product of that identity (2.9.15, 16). In short, one living the happy life is inclined inward and upward. He seeks what is higher than himself without placing greater value on the world of matter than is deserved. He believes there is a divine order in the world and strives toward the perfection that is the source of that order knowing that perfection is not possible for a man alone (2.9.9).

Latin Communicators of the Platonic Tradition

The works of Plotinus and/or Porphyry that make up the *libri Platoniorum* are possibly the only direct contact Augustine made with the Greek philosophical tradition. The remainder of his literary exposure to the Greek philosophical tradition was through Latin intermediaries in the form of derivative philosophical works, doxographies and translations.

The Latin intermediaries who were Augustine's main sources for Platonism included Cicero, first and foremost. Cicero was ideally suited to communicate the philosophical ideas of the east to Rome. During his adolescence, the Stoic philosopher Diodotus lived in Cicero's family home. In 81 while in Rome, he heard lectures of the sceptic Philo of Larissa. Cicero was later to go to Athens and study at the Academy under Antiochus of Ascalon and then with the rhetorician Molo in Rhodes. He became familiar with the Academic, Stoic, Peripatetic and Epicurean schools. He composed his own philosophical works, usually in the form of literary discussions of various viewpoints, during his exile beginning in 58 and then again following the death of his daughter in 45 until his death. Cicero was also responsible for translations of Plato's *Protagoras* as well as a large section of the *Timaeus*, and passages from the *Apology*, *Gorgias* and *Menexenus*.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Cf. Powell (1995), especially 279-80 which lists Cicero's translations, quotes and adaptations of Plato.

Augustine would have known of Cicero from an early age. Cicero's works were the cornerstone of Augustine's education.⁵⁹ Augustine probably read most of Cicero's works as a young man⁶⁰ including the *Hortensius*, which was the impetus behind his turn to philosophy (*Conf.* 3.4.7). While his knowledge of Cicero is evident from his earliest writings, Augustine probably did not take up a systematic reading of Cicero until 410 when he began to prepare to write *De Civitate Dei* (which contains one third of all his references to Cicero).⁶¹ Even in the absence of an earlier systematic study, Cicero was always Augustine's primary source of Greek philosophy.⁶² Cicero would also inspire many of Augustine's own important influences including Apuleius, Ambrose and Jerome.⁶³ In Cicero's works, Augustine would have been exposed to doxographical surveys of Greek philosophical positions, including Platonic and Academic doctrine, as well as direct transmissions of Plato's works via translation and argumentative response.

Cicero's philosophical works are written in a dialogue form and filled with explications of and arguments concerning philosophical positions held by the main schools on a variety of issues. In them, Augustine will have learned of Epicurean and Stoic views on theology (*De Natura Deorum*); free will and divine foreknowledge (*De Fato*); the nature of soul, pain, anxiety, passions, goodness and happiness (*Tusculan Disputations*); and divination (*De Divinatione*). In addition, views on these issues are discussed variously from the pre-Socratics, Academics, Peripatetics, among others. Cicero articulates and defends Academic scepticism (*Academica*), and offers a history of the Academy (*Ac.* 1.43-46),⁶⁴ and a history of the development of philosophy in Rome beginning with Pythagoras (*TD* 4.1-7).

There is much of Plato's own philosophy, and that of the Academy, available in Cicero. Beyond the discussions of Academic philosophy within the various doxographical portions of Cicero's works, a fundamental Platonic concept, that of the dichotomy between intelligible and sensible existence, is discussed in *TD* (1.58). This work also mentions Plato's tripartite division of soul (1.20), the immortality and afterlife of soul (1.24, 53, 53, 71-73, 97), anamnesis (1.57). *De Natura Deorum* offers criticism of Plato's demiurge in the *Timaeus* (*ND* 1.18). Cicero provides

⁵⁹ Marrou (1938), 19ff.

⁶⁰ Testard, 109.

⁶¹ Hagendahl, 523; O'Donnell (1980), 157, 171.

⁶² Hagendahl, 569; O'Daly (1999), 240.

⁶³ MacKendrick, 258-9; Sharples (1991), 25-33.

important details of Plato's life and place in philosophy. In *Academica*, for example, he asserts a close relationship between Academic and Peripatetic philosophies, citing Plato as the source for each (1.17), and states erroneously that Plato divided philosophy into ethics, logic and physics (1.19). Augustine repeats this error in *De Doctrina Christiana* (2.129). In *De Re Publica*, Cicero says that Plato combined Pythagorean metaphysics and Socratic moral philosophy (1.16, repeated by Augustine at *CA* 3.17.37), and mentions a journey to Egypt made by Plato following the death of Socrates (1.18, repeated by Augustine at *DC* 2.107-8).

Cicero's final contribution to Augustine's knowledge of Plato and Platonism would have been through direct and indirect transmission. Augustine seems not to have known of Cicero's possibly complete translation of the *Protagoras*. But he was well aware of the *Timaeus* translation and quotes it often (29 citations of 12 different passages identified in previous scholarship).⁶⁵ In addition to the translations, *De Re Publica*, is based upon and a response to Plato's *Republic*. Here, Cicero conveys many of Plato's views through criticism directed at the *Republic*, including Plato's beliefs in the equality of women at *Republic* 397e-398a, and communal property at *Republic* 416d-417a (both found in fragmentary form in *RP* 4.2-6). Most importantly, the *Dream of Scipio*, which is the last book of *RP*, is based upon Plato's myth of Er (*Rep.* 614b-621d). This describes a view of the afterlife with many features familiar to Platonism including the body described as a prison for the soul (*RP* 6.14, 15); human souls originating in the soul material of the divine planets (6.16); an astronomical system with earth as the bottom immovable sphere in a series of descending levels (6.18-19); an immortal and eternal human soul as the product of an immortal and eternal cause of the universe (6.25); and a life after the body's death that includes punishments and rewards for human souls depending on their devotion to earthly or heavenly pursuits while on the earth (6.26).

Seneca and Apuleius must receive mention as fellow transmitters of Greek philosophy to the west and influences on Augustine's thought at least on specific issues. Seneca was of less interest to Augustine as tutor and powerful advisor to Nero, and ultimately a suicide, than as a source of Stoic philosophy⁶⁶. He knows of Seneca through the spurious correspondence of Seneca

⁶⁴ Augustine repeats this history in his own analysis of scepticism (*CA* 2.6.14-15), per Hagendahl, 499.

⁶⁵ Hagendahl, 131-138, but see chapters 5 and 6 below.

⁶⁶ Hagendahl, 678, n. 1.

with St. Paul reported by Jerome,⁶⁷ but Augustine is certainly familiar with Seneca's lost work *De Superstitione*.⁶⁸ He quotes it often in *CD* 6.10-11 in the context of a critique of pagan religious rites. The work also contained a doxographical account of various philosophical views on the nature of God.

Apuleius was born in North Africa in the third century AD and was known to Augustine as a Neoplatonist (*CD* 8.12). He was aware of many of Apuleius' works including *De Mundo* (the source of Augustine's catalogue of natural disasters at *CD* 4.2⁶⁹), *Metamorphoses* (called *The Golden Ass* at *CD* 18.18), *Apologia* (referred to but not named at *CD* 8.19), and *De Deo Socratis*, an explication of the nature of lesser gods, *daemones*. The work is the subject of a lengthy attack on *daemones* by Augustine in *CD* 8 and 9. Apuleius also knew Greek and translated the *Phaedo*, but it is not certain whether Augustine read this translation or not.⁷⁰

Summary

In the six centuries between Plato and the Neoplatonists, Platonism experienced considerable change in the form of systemisation and development. Even so, a fairly clear and consistent Platonic doctrine can be discerned concerning the issues examined in this chapter.

Plato himself introduced a dichotomy of intelligible and sensible existence. A creator God, the demiurge, fashioned the material world as a copy of a perfect intelligible model. All objects in the material world were copies of ideal forms, which enjoyed real existence in the intelligible, intellectual realm. Plato also introduced a transcendent entity, the Idea of Good that was the source of Being, but beyond Being.

The Middle and Neoplatonists maintained Plato's distinction between intelligible and sensible existence, and the intelligible realm's position as paradigm of the sensible. The Middle Platonists held that there were two different gods in the intelligible world, a transcendent supreme principle and an active demiurgic creator, joined by a third deity, the World-Soul, which was a mediator between the intelligible and physical worlds, and creator of the material universe. Neoplatonists formalised the three divinities into a hierarchy of hypostases: the all-transcendent

⁶⁷ Hagendahl, 677.

⁶⁸ Hagendahl 680; O'Donnell (1980), 164, O'Daly (1999), 250.

⁶⁹ O'Daly (1999), 253.

One, Divine Intellect, a multiplicity emanated from the One, and the All-Soul, product of the Divine Intellect, creator of the material realm and consubstantial with individual human souls.⁷¹

Good, for Plato, was the Idea of Good, a transcendent entity that shone, like the sun, on the intelligible universe giving Being and Goodness to it. All good things were good by virtue of participating in the Idea of Good. The greater their participation, the greater their share of good. The Middle Platonists regarded the Monad and Dyad as beyond concepts of good or evil, but the Neoplatonists re-established a transcendent source of Good--the One this time--which, again, shone like the sun in the intelligible world. Each thing's good was what brought it to the next step in its ascent toward the One. Evil, both for Plato and the Neoplatonists, originated in matter, which resisted the divine form imparted to it. Goodness provided the created world with form and order; evil matter was formless and disordered. Moving away from the source of Good toward matter was evil for any particular thing.

From the beginning, all Platonists held that man had a soul that was at least partly rational and immortal. Plato believed that souls of individuals separated from the body at death and were judged afterwards according to the individual's deeds while embodied. The just were rewarded and the evil were punished before returning to earth in new bodies. The Neoplatonists also believed in a life for the soul after the death of the body in which rewards and punishments were administered to the just and unjust. They agreed with Plato that certain unredeemable souls received permanent punishment. They were also in agreement with Plato that the wisdom gained through living a good life would benefit the soul when it was next reincarnated.

Human beings were separated from the deity by virtue of the fact of their corruptible material nature both for Plato and the Neoplatonists. For both, the taint of the body is sufficient to remove mankind from the goodness and real existence of the intelligible world. Only in Albinus' doxography is there any hint of a conception of sin similar to that held by Christians, a separation of mankind from God due to man's evil actions. For Plato and the Neoplatonists, man does commit evil, but simply as a manifestation of his nature. Plato even maintains that no one does evil willingly or knowingly. The reunion of man and God for Plato and the Neoplatonists is possible

⁷⁰ Marrou (1938), 34, Alfarcic, 231 and n. 5 and Combès, 14 [quoted in Courcelle (1969), 170 note 58] say yes, Courcelle (1969), 170 says no.

⁷¹ Cf. Blumenthal and p. 28 note 56 above.

through an individual's effort to purge himself of the taint of body and ascend intellectually from the world of matter and multiplicity to the intelligible realm and simple unity in the transcendent.

The happy life for all Platonists involved the reduction of the demands of earthly life to the minimum possible. Plato championed a life of contemplation of the intelligible, of reducing the demands of the body, and above all of the rational soul ruling the irrational passions. Speusippus and Xenocrates also emphasised a command of the passions, but included the benefit of some material goods in a happy life. The Neoplatonists prescribed complete detachment from earthly concerns, including family life. For them, anything that interfered with contemplation and distracted one from the intelligible was to be avoided.

These views formed a generally cohesive Platonic tradition that centred on the belief in a transcendent intelligible existence far superior to the material existence of sense perception that was the quotidian world. This tradition became a dominant world-view in the Roman Empire during the first centuries AD. This was the pagan world's strongest inspiration on Augustine's thought. It influenced him directly and through transmission and translation in his own Latin culture. Augustine would also be exposed to Platonism in what was for him a more forceful way: the Christian Platonism of the church fathers.

CHAPTER TWO

Christian Platonism

This chapter examines the reception of Platonism in the early Christian community, including the use by early Church figures of Platonic philosophical concepts in the interpretation of the scriptures and development of theology. The relationship between Christianity and the Greek philosophical tradition is varied, profound and complex; a comprehensive account of that relationship is beyond the scope of this survey. This chapter examines the tenets of three figures in the early Church who were influenced heavily and self-consciously by Platonism in the development of their theological conceptions, whose views became either generally accepted in the Church or set the terms of theological debate in the developing Church, and whose writings could reasonably be said to have influenced Augustine directly or indirectly.

From the Greek east, Clement of Alexandria is sometimes called the father of Christian Platonism for his self-conscious adaptation of many Platonic concepts to interpret the Christian scriptures. He also applied an allegorical interpretation especially of the Old Testament in addressing scriptural elements that seemed incompatible with his Platonic views. Origen, a younger contemporary of Clement's and fellow Alexandrian, systematized Clement's doctrines, further developed allegorical exegesis, and applied philosophical reason to theological issues to the point of having his orthodoxy called into question. From the Latin west, where Platonism and Greek philosophy generally enjoyed much slighter hegemony among Church figures, Ambrose will be examined. Although not philosophical in any strict sense, Ambrose communicated Platonist doctrines such as immaterial existence and Christ as the logos of God to a young Augustine. The same positions discussed in the previous chapter with respect to the Greek philosophical tradition will be examined for these Church figures: the nature of God, of good and evil, of the soul, of the separation from and reunion with the divinity, and of the happy life.

Christian Platonism in the Greek East

Even as the Apostle Paul was warning Christians to be wary of philosophy (at Col. 2.8, or Rom. 1.19-23), the foundations of a Platonic interpretation of Christian doctrine were being laid in

Egypt. Philo of Alexandria (c. 20BC-AD50) came from a wealthy and prominent Jewish family. He participated in a delegation to Rome in order to bring a dispute between the city's Greek and Jewish communities before Caligula.⁷² Philo was well educated in Greek philosophy and applied this knowledge in the composition of exegetical works on the Jewish scriptures.⁷³ He identified God's word, which was his means of creation in Genesis 1 with the divine λόγος of the Platonic and Stoic traditions, mediating between the transcendent deity and humanity, and representing divine wisdom in the created world and human intellect.⁷⁴ This idea arguably influenced the writer of the Gospel of John who said at 1:14 that the logos that created the world was incarnated and came to live on the earth.⁷⁵ Philo also interpreted the scriptures as allegories, which opened them up to philosophical interpretations and influenced generations of Christian apologists, especially those who lived in Alexandria in the centuries immediately after.

Clement of Alexandria

Clement of Alexandria (c. 160-215) was one of the figures of the early Christian Church in the Greek east, who sought to use philosophy to elucidate Christian doctrine. Almost nothing is known of his life. He says he went all over the Mediterranean world studying under various teachers (*Stromateis* 1.1). Eusebius (*History of the Church* 6.6) says that Clement was the head of a catechetical school in Alexandria. He also offers the only specific date in the life of Clement, that the composition of *Stromateis* occurred during the reign of Septimius Severus, AD193-211 (*Hist.* 5.11).

Alexandria was, in the time of Clement, a place where Christianity included an increasing number of educated Greeks among its converts. The familiarity of these converts with the Greek philosophical tradition made acute the issue of the proper relationship between the Greek and Christian traditions. Clement knew and was positively disposed to Greek philosophy (*Strom.* 1.1), especially Platonism.⁷⁶ He regarded philosophy as a gift to the Greeks from Christ as a preparation for the gospels. He also subscribed to an allegorical interpretation of the scriptures, especially the

⁷² Cf. Philo's *Legatio ad Gaium* and Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History* 2.5.1

⁷³ For Philo's place in the Jewish exegetical traditions, see Wolfson, Vol. 1, especially the first two chapters, 3-163.

⁷⁴ Wolfson, Vol. 1, 97, 254-5.

⁷⁵ Brown, 72.

⁷⁶ Carsey, 95

Old Testament, by which he could understand them as communicating concepts familiar to philosophy.

Clement's philosophy is unsystematic. Systemization in philosophy is often taken to mean the presence of an overarching metaphysic within which all elements of existence are explained. To say Clement is not systematic does not simply note the lack of such a metaphysic. He contradicts himself on details, uses technical terminology without explanation and sometimes uses such terminology in different ways in different contexts. He is far from clear on many points. In fact, he claims in *Stromateis* that he obfuscates purposefully to keep the truth from the uninitiated (1.1). In spite of this, his synthesis of the Greek and Christian traditions was influential. His conception of God is 'intelligible only from the premises of Platonic immaterialism.'⁷⁷ He is regarded as the father of Christian Platonism.⁷⁸

God

Clement subscribes to the Christian belief in a trinity that describes a single God in which God the father, God the son and God the holy spirit form a unity. His conceptions of the father and son will be described below; he is more or less quiet on the identity and nature of the holy spirit. His emphasis when describing the trinity is on unity. He says that God is an unoriginated being who is omnipotent and One. The first-begotten son is also this One. It is through him that the universe came into being (*Strom.* 6.7).

Clement conceives of God as an immaterial, omnipotent, eternal being who is the origin of the universe. His conception is of God the father as One (ἕνα), unbegotten (ἀγέννητος), indestructible (ἀνώλεθρος), and existing always (ὄντα αἰεί, *Protreptikos* 6). God alone has true existence (ὁ ὄν, *Paedagogos* 1.8), and is, in fact, existence itself (οὐσία, *Strom.* 4.26). God is also goodness itself (*Strom.* 6.6), and the cause of everything that is good in the universe (*Protr.* 2). This quality of goodness is essential to God. In explaining the allegorical meaning of Gen. 2:2, which says that God rested following creation, Clement says that God cannot actually rest. As God is goodness itself, if he were to cease doing good, he would cease to be God (*Strom.* 6.6).

⁷⁷ Carsey, 74

⁷⁸ Carsey, 96.

Clement asserts that only negative knowledge of God is possible, i.e. God cannot be known for what he is, but rather what he is not. God is the all--a unity that is indivisible, infinite and without form or name. Clement says there is nothing predicated of God. He explains that predicates are properties that belong to a thing either in itself or from mutual relations. The description of such properties does not apply to God (*Strom.* 5.12). God is neither an event nor that to which an event happens (*Paed.* 1.8), he has neither genus, nor species nor difference. He is not individual or number.

God, according to Clement, is beyond all conception of human thought (*Strom.* 5.10). Names do not describe God. He may be called the one (ἕν), good (τάγαθόν), mind (νοῦς), absolute being (τὸ ὄν), father, God, creator or lord (κύριος). While none of these express God, they are collectively an indication of the power of the omnipotent. Clement denies that God is demonstrable by science, which depends on knowledge of primary and antecedent principles for its understanding. He says there is nothing antecedent to God to give insight into divine nature (*Strom.* 5.12).

Clement conceded that Greek philosophy was correct with respect to many of its conceptions of God. With Antisthenes, for example, he agreed that God is unique and cannot be known from a likeness. In enthusiastic agreement, he quotes the Stoic Cleanthes at length on the nature of God (τάγαθόν): ordered, just, hallowed, pious, self-ruling, useful, beautiful, divine, severe, without passions, eternal, blameless and unchanging. With the Pythagoreans he holds that God is a unity, which is wholly present in the entire universe at all times. Clement also agrees with the Pythagorean conceptions of God as the creator of the universe and supervisor (ἐπίσκοπος) of all creation. He also holds with them that God is mind (νοῦς, *Protr.* 6). He adopts a Pythagorean term--monad--in describing God as the first principle, i.e. origin and impetus, of the universe (*Protr.* 9). By way of explanation, he says that in God's capacity as being itself (οὐσία), he is the first principle of creative power (ποιητικός); in his capacity as goodness itself, he is the first principle of ethics; in his capacity as νοῦς, God is the first principle of reasoning (λογικός) and judgment (κριτικός, *Strom.* 4.25).

Clement's Christian conception of God differs starkly from the Greek conception in one significant respect: he asserts God's benevolence toward mankind. He says God loves all creation and that he cares for man and takes care of him (*Paed.* 1.8). God punishes human beings and this punishment is therapeutic.⁷⁹ The sufferings of humanity are like medical treatments for the soul, purging them of impure elements that lead men from God. For Clement, these punishments are manifestations of the power of God inspecting, helping and instructing humanity (*Strom.* 2.2).

The son of God, Christ, is the second member of the trinity. Clement describes his nature as identical to that of God the father: the father and son are identically sinless, blameless and have passionless souls. The son, who is Christ, has the form (σχημα) of God and is God (*Paed.* 1.2). He is most perfect, most holy, most regal and most beneficial. In the same way as the father was described (*Protr.* 6), the son is not divided, but present everywhere at all times while being contained nowhere. He is entirely immaterial and intellectual. He existed before the creation of the universe, and was always without passions (ἀπαθής), never acted upon, and without experience (*Strom.* 7.2). The son is also the source of everything spiritual and material (*Strom.* 4.25). At the same time, however, Clement suggests a difference in ontological status between the father and son. He says that the nature of the son is nearest to (not identical with) the one who alone is omnipotent (τῷ μόνῳ παντοκράτῳ προσεχέστατη). He also says that, unlike the father, the son is susceptible to scientific demonstration and description (*Strom.* 7.2), although this may refer to his incarnated self.

Clement follows the tradition linking the son with the logos of God (*Protr.* 10, *Strom.* 7.7).⁸⁰ This word of God is not to be understood as a spoken word, but a manifestation of God's wisdom and kindness (*Paed.* 1.3). The son is the image (εἰκὼν) of God, a son of νοῦς, the light who is the archetype (ἀρχέτυπον) of light. He is a son in that he was begotten by the father, but at the same time he existed before the creation of the universe (*Protr.* 1). It is through the logos that all creation came into being (*Strom.* 7.2). He is now the minister (διάκονος) of his father's

⁷⁹ While Clement's conception of God as benevolent is not a part of the Greek philosophical tradition, his idea that God's punishment is therapeutic has its origin ultimately in Plato (*Rep.* 614ff.)

⁸⁰ Clement's conception of the logos is manifold and owes debts to a variety of Jewish-Alexandrine and Platonic philosophical sources cf. Lilla, 199-212. See especially 208-9 for Clement's association of the logos with τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ υἱός.

will (*Paed.* 1.2) who orders the universe according to that will and administers all creation, both immaterial and material (*Strom.* 7.2).

Interpreting the divine logos as Christ, Clement says the role of the son/logos is to act as mediator between the divine and human realms and to act as a saviour of human beings who have become separated from the will of and knowledge of the father (*Protr.* 10). This was accomplished through an incarnation in which the logos became the human being Jesus. He was to reveal God to men, reconcile disobedient souls to God, and to make it possible for humanity to overcome the corruption and death that is a consequence of its fallen state (*Protr.* 1).

This revelation is accomplished in several ways. The most obvious for humans is the physical human life Christ led which serves as an immaculate example for all human lives (*Paed.* 1.2). The example of the incarnated son reveals the character of the father to the senses (*Strom.* 5.6). The son's other means of communicating divine revelation is through the dispensation of wisdom to human beings, which allows an understanding of God and ascent of the soul. All human wisdom of any kind is a species of the divine logos (*Paed.* 1.3). Philosophy, by which the Greeks were able to come to know God, was a gift from the son designed to prepare them for the revelation contained in the (New Testament) scriptures (*Strom.* 7.2). The type of knowledge yielded by wisdom and the use of reason is imperfect, however. Genuine knowledge of God the father, for Clement, is gained only through a belief in the son (*Strom.* 5.7).

The universe was created by God by means of the son. In another concession to the tenets of philosophy, Clement explicitly accepts Plato's postulation of immaterial, intellectual existence as opposed to material and sense-perceived existence. God, the monad, is in the intellectual world (*Strom.* 5.14). The father created the immaterial world of ideas out of nothing, of non-existence. He made an invisible heaven and earth, by an act of his will. In accordance with this divine model, the son gave shape and substance to the material universe (*Strom.* 5.6). Through the logos, God created the first principles of matter (*Protr.* 5). The creation of the material world was the imposition of order on matter. Clement also distinguishes the timeless, eternal existence of the immaterial world from the temporal material world, declaring that time itself was created with the material world (*Strom.* 6.6).

Good and Evil

Good, for Clement, is merely what God is. God is goodness itself (*Strom.* 6.6), and the cause of every good thing in the universe (*Protr.* 6). For a human being, goodness is having a will in conformity with God as demonstrated to man by the son. Such conformity is also the definition of right reason, i.e. reason rightly conceived. Virtue is also defined by Clement as the state of a person's soul rendered harmonious by reason (*Paed.* 1.13). These two definitions are regarded as restatements of the same principle. The gnostic, which is Clement's name for the Christian with right reason and understanding of God, exemplifies three virtues, which illustrate the concept of conformity to God's will.⁸¹ These include righteousness (δικαιοσύνη), which is the concord of the parts of the soul (what parts of the soul that virtue puts in harmony is discussed below); wisdom (σοφία), which is knowledge of things divine and human; and holiness (ὁσιότης), which is the worship of God. These correspond to the gnostic's moral, physical and logical occupation with God.

With good being defined as what God is, evil, for Clement, is the absence of God. As virtue is harmony with right reason, the opposite of virtue, sin, is what is done through error of reason and contrary to reason, i.e. what is done in unreason. Sins are defined according to this criterion: lust is conceived as desire that is disobedient to reason; fear is weakness that is disobedient to reason; pleasure is elation that is disobedient to reason (*Paed.* 1.13).

With Clement's emphasis on God's lack of passion and sins being defined in terms of carnal desires that do not follow reason, it would appear that his system rests upon a distinction between intellectual goodness and carnal evil. However, Clement is explicit in his statement that the body is not to be vilified, as monastic Christians and Neoplatonists like Porphyry were to do. Clement notes that the human frame stands erect so that the mind may more easily contemplate heaven, that the senses provide data necessary for knowledge, and that the body's parts are arranged so as to facilitate their good and proper use rather than carnal pleasure. He concludes that the body is a good thing by noting that God chose it to be the receptacle of the soul (*Strom.* 4.26).

Clement makes a distinction between voluntary and involuntary sins. Involuntary actions are those that are not the result of conscious judgments made in one's right mind, including actions that are committed in ignorance or by necessity (*Strom.* 2.14). One category of involuntary sin is

⁸¹ Cf. Lilla, 142-89 for a discussion of Clement's views on gnosis and the gnostic.

error (ἁμαρτημα). This is the state of not knowing what to do or being unable to do what should be done. Another is misfortune (ἀτύχημα), which is to do something by accident: to believe that you are doing one thing when actually doing another. Clement's example is the killing of a friend whom you believe to be an enemy. Voluntary sin (ἄδικημα) is always criminal. It is unmitigated, willful commission of wrong, grave robbery is Clement's example (*Strom.* 2.15). Intention is the key when determining the category of sin. When one commits an act of wrongdoing with the intention to carry out the act that he carries out to the ends he seeks, it is voluntary sin.

Clement does not pass over involuntary sin without a warning, however. He insists that while we may not be able to avoid error altogether, we can train ourselves and enhance our abilities to know what to do and be able to act appropriately. Such training is rigorous. However, if we do not subject ourselves to this kind of training, which involves making ourselves subject to God's will through his commandments, it amounts to abandoning ourselves to the yearnings (ἐπιθυμία) of the body. By neglecting to act rightly, we will inflict a willful wrong (ἄδικήσομεν) on our souls.

The Soul

Clement understands human beings as consisting of a physical body made of matter and a rational soul breathed into man by God. The soul is a rational image of God's divine logos. The logos is the image of God, the human soul is an image of that logos, i.e. the rational human mind (νοῦς) is the image of the logos. The mind, not the body, is what we really are (*Strom.* 5.14). It is by virtue of being made an image of the logos that we are rational (λογικός, *Protr.* 10). This derived rational ability is the basis for man's ability to perform good actions (*Strom.* 6.16). The soul's connection with the logos is eternal. On the strength of that connection, Clement concludes that the soul is co-eternal with God's logos (and God). Like the logos itself, souls were begotten by God before the creation of the universe (presumably the material universe, *Protr.* 1).⁸²

Clement conceives of the soul as having distinct parts. In a list of the faculties of man, he includes the five senses, powers of speech and procreation and three immaterial features: the

⁸² However, at *Strom.* 3.13, Clement says that souls were created with the universe and are not co-eternal with God.

spiritual principle (πνευματικός) which is communicated to the body at the time of its creation; next is the ruling power of the soul (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν τῆς ψυχῆς) which is the rational element; and finally there is the characteristic of the Holy Spirit, not granted to man at birth, but coming about through faith. The soul introduced at birth seems to be the quality that makes body live. It is responsible for sense perception, desire, emotions, nourishment and growth, and the conversion of will to action via a corporeal spirit (τοῦ σωματικοῦ πνεύματος). The rational part of the soul pre-exists the body and animating quality (*Strom.* 6.16). The righteousness that is the result of a concord of parts of the soul is achieved when the rational soul rules those parts that are responsible for simple animation and passions. This is not to suggest that the soul is good or body bad by nature. The soul is superior to the body, but the two are simply diverse elements that make up a human being. Soul's union with body is not a bad thing unless the rational part of the soul allows the lesser parts to rule it, corrupting it with the passions of the body, causing it to diverge from the exercise of right reason, and weighing it down with sin.

Clement believes the soul survives the death of the body and endures punishment before reaping a final reward. If men repent, he says, they are saved, if not they are judged (*Protr.* 11). Repenting has to do with living a good life, i.e. a life according to Christ's example. Such souls are granted everlasting life (*Protr.* 1), an eternity separated from sin (*Strom.* 4.3). After purification leads a soul to become pure at heart, it is restored to its natural place in the divine sphere in everlasting contemplation (*Strom.* 7.10). Even after death there is still a chance for souls to repent. Clement says that it is easier then as souls are no longer distracted by the demands of bodies and perceive more clearly (*Strom.* 6.6).

Punishment, according to Clement, is meted out to all, and is deserved as a consequence of sin. This punishment is temporary and therapeutic. It acts as an application of medicine to a sick body and demonstrates God's good will toward men and his desire to save every soul (*Paed* 1.8).⁸³ The fate of all souls after death, then, is to endure a punishment that purges sins and then to enjoy an eternal reward of contemplation and knowledge of God (*Strom* 7.10).

In addition to providing souls with therapeutic purifying punishments, God created souls with an inherent desire to seek the divine. Fellowship with God is in man's nature, Clement says, in

⁸³ See p. 49 above and note 79.

the same way it is in a horse's nature to pull a plow.. God implanted a quality in the human soul that causes it to seek God. Consequently, it is natural for humans to come to a knowledge of God (*Protr.* 10). Being raised to God is a man's unique function (τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον). A soul properly trained in true philosophy will prefer the spiritual and turn away from the ἐπιθυμία of the body. A soul, then, has an innate sense of right, which is the means to salvation provided that this sense is obeyed. God thus guarantees a universal salvation through the soul's immanent nature and the opportunity for the soul's purification after the death of the body.

Separation from and Reunion with the Divinity

The estrangement of mankind from divine perfection is attributed by Clement to sin committed by the first man, Adam. The first man was created innocent and completely free of sin. He sinned in that he succumbed to bodily lusts (ἐπιθυμίαις) and disobeyed God. This sin caused him to lose his original innocence, corrupting his nature in that his mind came under the influence of irrational impulses. It also introduced death into the world as a consequence. The kind of death Clement had in mind was not the end of the body's animation, but a spiritual death: the state of a soul in sin connected to body (*Protr.* 11). Clement did not subscribe to a belief that Adam's sin corrupted all of humanity. Instead, he ascribed each person's corruption--and each person is corrupted--to his own free will. 'The blame falls on him who chooses,' (*Paed.* 1.8).

In order for mankind to overcome its corrupted condition, regain its rationality and resume its harmonious relationship with the divine realm, God created a mechanism for the salvation of the human soul. Foremost in this mechanism was the incarnation of God's son, his wisdom and logos. Christ was God incarnated, sent into the material world to free humanity from the state of spiritual death (*Protr.* 11), and reconcile disobedient souls to God (*Protr.* 1). In his role as the wisdom of God, the son is the source of wisdom for rational souls (*Paed.* 1.3). For humans to believe in the incarnated son is to enter into a unity with God. Disbelief amounts to continued estrangement from God (*Strom.* 4.25). Further, as the son's metaphysical status allows humanity the capacity for rationality, his physical manifestation was provided as an example of the perfect human life for all to imitate.

Clement conceives of two levels of life for the Christian. The lower of these has as a basic premise faith in Christ as the son of God. He asserts that to be ignorant of the father is death (*Strom.* 5.10). This life grants the insight that purification of sins comes through confession. While the lower life lacks a proper understanding of immaterial existence and the nature of God, it does provide a foundation of instruction and preliminary preparation for the afterlife of the soul (*Strom.* 5.11).

The higher life of the Christian is an intellectually driven existence in which the mind endeavours to divorce itself of the body and all its passions (*πάθη*, *Strom.* 5.11), and rise above the sphere of generation, i.e. the created universe, to the realm of ideas (*Strom.* 4.25). This process is of a soul raising itself to God (*its ἔργον οὐκ ἐῖλον*) through training in true philosophy: the application of pure mind to objects with no attention being given to the world of sense (*Strom.* 5.11).

The higher life demands true piety (*θεοσεβεία*), which is unswerving abstraction from the body and its passions. This abstraction begins by making an intellectual advancement to the first intelligible (*νόησις*), beginning with the properties that make it up. From this body, we abstract physical properties, taking away the dimensions of depth, breadth and length until we reach a point which is a unit having only position. Abstracting the property of position from the unit leaves only a conception of unity. If we abstract the properties that belong to that conception, both corporeal *and* incorporeal, we find Christ, presumably in his role as the logos and wisdom of God. Advancing beyond there, we may reach the conception of the omnipotent God, knowing not what he is, but is not. Clement says that this region of God is what Plato called the place of ideas (*χώρα Ἰδεῶν*, *Strom.* 5.11). The end of this journey of abstraction is knowledge of and contemplation of God (*Protr.* 10).

The power and inclination to intellectually advance to the region of God is a gift from God and part of the mechanism for the soul's salvation. The process of abstraction is assisted by that quality in the human soul that inclines the will toward God, and is hidden in it by faith (*Strom.* 5.12). Faith is implanted in human beings and guides them to choose what is best (*Protr.* 10). Our faith, in turn, is stoked by our free will, which is aroused by wisdom and inspired by the Holy Spirit

(*Strom.* 5.13). Human inclination toward faith, wisdom and knowledge is part of a divine effluence that is God's gift to all, but especially those who spend their lives in thought (*Strom.* 5.14).

The last piece of the mechanism of salvation is God's purifying punishment, which is visited upon every soul after its separation from the body. This punishment is a beneficial correction, and an instructive reproof that serves to cut out bodily passions from the soul (*Paed.* 1.8). All souls endure it, all are purified, and all are restored to their original condition of deification, i.e. a unity with God (*Strom.* 2.6; 5.78), and to enjoy him in everlasting contemplation (*Strom.* 7.10).

The Happy Life

As all souls are ultimately restored to perfection, the happy life for Clement does not mean the life that should be led to recover the kingdom of God. Instead, it is the life that leads to taking a pure soul into the next life (*Strom.* 4.4). The first step in that life is faith.

As was noted above, the presence of faith is required to lead any kind of Christian life. It is defined by Clement as an internal good, which confesses God's existence and glorifies him without actually searching for him. It is a starting point for knowledge, offering an intuitive understanding of essentials (*Strom.* 7.10). Faith in Christ as the son of God leads to a recognition of divine wisdom and the ability to act rationally (*Protr.* 1). One leading the lower Christian life is led by faith to a fear of God that induces obedience. Fear among the faithful who move on to the higher Christian life, the life of the gnostic, gives way to knowledge and understanding (*Strom.* 7.10). It is this knowledge that leads to the process of abstraction and analysis.

The perfect life led by Christ is the example for all Christians to follow (*Protr.* 2). Those who do are given everlasting life (*Protr.* 1). Christ is divine wisdom; his incarnated existence is wisdom as it is manifested in a human life. Clement conceived of Christ as passionless and this is the quality that must be emulated to receive salvation. Wisdom is rational, rationality is choosing spiritual rather than carnal things. Wisdom makes the mind less vulnerable to the desires of the body. The sins Clement called involuntary are due to irrational acts, i.e. the acts of a mind unduly under the influence of the body's demands. Imitation of Christ means minimising the effects of body on mind so as to act rationally and reduce the potential for involuntary sin. The knowledge of God gained from wisdom, which is in turn granted through faith is what makes right action

possible. Clement concedes that even non-gnostics seem to act rightly. Their rightness is only apparent, however. No one who lacks the knowledge wisdom grants can act rationally (*Strom.* 7.10). It is the imitation of Christ's wisdom and passionlessness that allows for rational action and right conduct.

The gnostic, who alone lives the happy life, is one with the knowledge of God and potential for rational action. In practical terms, the virtues exercised by the gnostic include those things that result from turning away from what is carnal. He never prefers the pleasant to the useful; never resents or harbours a grudge; takes pity on those who mistreat him on account of their ignorance; grants no value to the pains and pleasures of the world; and gives in to his bodily desires only to the degree that they are necessary (*Strom.* 7.11). The gnostic acts out of self-possession (ἐγκρατής) and practices self-restraint. He is calm, lives righteously (i.e. with his mind governing his body), and does good works. In short, the gnostic leading the happy life is the master of himself (*Strom.* 2.19).

Not surprisingly, Clement's gnostic is not fazed by natural death. The death he is concerned with is the spiritual death that is the fellowship of a soul in the state of sin with a body. The gnostic seeks eternal life, which is eternal separation from sin. As the origin of sin is the soul's union with body and temptations it brings, the gnostic considers the separation of soul and body in natural death to be a good thing (*Strom.* 4.3).

Martyrdom is also easily endured for the gnostic, who gives up his body to whomever asks for it. Through his indifference to the pains of the body, his self-possession and endurance, the gnostic can actually be a teacher to his tormentor (*Strom.* 4.4). He is concerned only with the state of his soul as it enters the next life. Having lived a life seeking value in the immaterial, despising what is carnal, and exercising virtue, the gnostic leaves his body in the confidence that he yields up a pure soul after death and, by virtue of it, will rise to eternal life in unity with God.

Origen

Origen (c.185-c.254) was a younger contemporary of Clement and fellow native of Alexandria. He was Coptic, not Greek, and was born into a Christian family. His father was beheaded in Alexandria in the persecution of 202 according to Eusebius (*Hist.* 6.1). He was well educated and widely travelled. Responsible for providing for his family after his father's execution,

Origen became a teacher in a catechetical school. He grew to prominence in the Eastern Church through his voluminous writings, which are mostly sermons, commentaries and scholia. He died after having been imprisoned and tortured in the persecution under Decius in 251.

Origen was well acquainted with Greek philosophy, and may have studied under Ammonius Saccas, who was to become Plotinus' teacher some ten years later.⁸⁴ He was positively disposed to Platonism, and composed a work, *Stromateis*, which now exists only in fragments, intending to show the harmony between Jesus and Plato.⁸⁵

He believed in the absolute truth of certain doctrines handed down by the Apostles, the plain meaning of which was not to be doubted. Everything else about Christian theology was open to speculation, however, including details about the nature of the truthful apostolic doctrines. He supported his speculations by applying allegorical interpretations to Biblical passages, especially those whose literal sense indicated physical or moral impossibilities, or which were inconsistent with an enlightened conscience.⁸⁶ Origen's speculations were to get him excommunicated while his writings became the focus of a theological controversy in the late 4th century. Nevertheless, he exerted great influence in the early Church where his readers included Augustine.⁸⁷

God

Among the apostolic doctrines that Origen regarded as absolute truth and beyond doubt was God's manifestation as a trinity including the father, son and holy spirit. Also a part of this truth is that God the father is a unity, created the universe, and Christ is his son. The son was

⁸⁴ This information comes from Porphyry (*Life of Plotinus* 3). Most scholars doubt that the Origen he speaks of is the same one, e.g. Chadwick (1966), 68.

⁸⁵ Chadwick (1966), 71.

⁸⁶ Bigg, 136-7.

⁸⁷ Origen wrote a statement of his beliefs, *De Principiis*, which is the source for much of this chapter's discussion of his theology. That work exists now only in a paraphrased Latin translation by Rufinus of Aquileia made in 398. Rufinus claims explicitly to have changed Origen's words where they conflict with contemporary orthodoxy (Rufinus' preface to *De Principiis*, 2). It was Rufinus' contention that Origen himself was orthodox, but that texts of his works were corrupted by malicious heretics (preface, 3). As a result, that translation contains, 'not only long additions and omissions, but mistranslations, some deliberate...paraphrases in which the point and force of the original is completely lost, and countless minor alterations...' (Butterworth, xlvi). There are, however, numerous Greek fragments from Origen. Some attributed specifically to Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, including two extended passages in particular (3.1; 4.1-3, 11) that fill gaps left in Rufinus' translation. These have been collected and inserted into a text of *De Principiis* by Paul Koetschau (Leipzig, 1913). The examination of Origen's theology in this chapter will use Koetschau's text where *De Principiis* is used. As Rufinus admits to changing Origen's words, the Greek texts will be considered authoritative when there is a conflict.

begotten before everything and created everything. The holy spirit is united in honour and dignity with the father and son (*De Principiis* 1.4). This analysis will examine Origen's conception of the trinity in relationship to itself then consider the individual natures of the elements of the trinity.

Using recognised apostolic truths as his premise, Origen speculated that God the father is incorporeal and eternal. The father is also the source and origin of the son and holy spirit, an origination that took place outside of time (*DP* 2.2.1), and was accomplished by an act of will (*DP* 1.2.6). God was always the father of the only-begotten son (*DP* 1.2.2). This begetting is a function of the nature of the father: the son was begotten of the father as brightness is begotten of light (*DP* 1.2.4). The son is the wisdom of God, which always existed as God always existed. There was no time when God did not have the power of wisdom (*DP* 1.2.9). Further, because the divine nature is incorporeal, the father begets the son, who proceeds from the divine mind without any division or diminution of that mind. There is also no separation between the father and son. The son is an image of the invisible God, an image that preserves the unity of the nature and common substance of the father and son (*DP* 1.2.6). The trinity is God who at once does good, creates and sustains all; these activities are functions of God's nature so there was no time that God was not engaged in them (*DP* 1.4.3).

While the trinity has a common nature and substance, there is a hierarchy within it according to Origen. The father of truth and son who is truth are two distinct hypostases (ὄντα δύο τη ὑπόστασει πράγματα, *Contra Celsum* 8.12). The son, then, is not the truth in comparison to the father, but in relation to us who are not able to perceive the truth of the omnipotent God: the son is an image of God and reveals divine truth to us. Human beings can only know the son, the image, and not the father (*DP* 1.2.6). In the same way, the father is goodness itself and the son an image of that goodness. The son's actions are good and he is incapable of any evil, however, he is not good purely and simply without qualification as the father is (*DP* 1.2.13). The father does not possess the qualities of truth and goodness, but is truth and goodness. The son's truth and goodness are derived from the father. The son, then, while superior to every rational creature, is less than the father. The holy spirit, while having greater power than any other holy being (angels, *daemones*, powers), is still less (*DP* 1.3.5).

God the father is a spirit and entirely incorporeal (*DP* 1.1.4, *CC* 7.38). He is immeasurable, incomprehensible and without material characteristics (*DP* 1.1.5), omnipotent and unchanging (*DP* 1.2.2). God is a unity (μονός⁸⁸), oneness (ἕνως) throughout; he is the fount of all mind or intellectual existence, the first principle of all things (*DP* 1.1.6). God's nature is simple, i.e. not resulting from the mixture of any substances, and indivisible (*DP* 2.8.2, *CC* 7.38).

Origen's conception of Christ the son is as a living being who is the wisdom of God (*DP* 1.2.2). Although it is difficult to think in terms of temporal sequence when time was not yet created, there was a time when Christ was something other than what he is now. He originated as a rational soul with the same nature as any other rational soul in that he was capable of good and evil. Through qualities in his nature, he chose to cling unchangeably to righteousness. Consequently, the goodness he once exercised by choice became part of his nature. Christ began as a human and rational soul, but because of this change in nature, the possibility of sin was removed from him (*DP* 2.6.5). The son was once a quality of God, i.e. God's wisdom that came to have its own existence. However, because this occurred outside of time, there was no time when the son did not exist (*DP* 1.2.9). God granted participation in himself to all rational creatures to the degree that each loved him and clung to him. Christ adhered to God in inseparable union from the beginning and as a result came to be the wisdom and logos of God (*DP* 2.6.3).

The son is reason, wisdom, truth and righteousness by nature (*CC* 8.13). As wisdom, the son always existed, i.e. God never existed without wisdom. God's wisdom, the son, also contains the beginning, causes and species of the whole creation (*DP* 1.2.2). There was never a time when a prefigurement of all that would later exist did not exist in wisdom (*DP* 1.4.4).

The son is the truth and life of all that exists. Nothing would live without life; nothing can exist that is not derived from truth (*DP* 1.2.4). Christ is the source of being for all rational beings as well: rational beings could not exist unless reason existed first; nothing could be wise if wisdom did not exist. We are to understand all the titles of the son (wisdom; son, life, word, truth, etc.) as indicative of his works and powers and not descriptive of him in any real way as he is without corporeal existence (*DP* 1.2.4). He is unalterable, unchangeable, and every good quality in him is predicated substantially (*DP* 1.2.10).

⁸⁸ As we are dependent upon Rufinus' admittedly altered Latin translation of Περὶ Ἀρχῶν,

With respect to his incarnation, the son had a divine and human nature. His divine nature acts as a medium between God and the material world (*DP*. 2.6.3). (The transcendent father, in Origen's conception, was unable to mix with matter except by a medium.) As the wisdom of God, he was the interpreter of God to man and means by which human beings can gain knowledge of the father (*DP* 1.2.3). Origen appears to introduce a metaphysical distinction between the son's divine and human natures, saying that Jesus the man obtained the lot of being Christ because of his goodness (*DP* 2.6.4). However, he is quick to suggest that this is only a speculation and that the reality of God's wisdom existing in a man is beyond human understanding (*DP* 2.6.2).

The holy spirit's existence, for Origen, is entirely intellectual (*DP* 1.1.3). He is co-eternal with God the father and the son; there was never a time when he did not have knowledge of God (*DP* 1.3.4). Every rational creature receives a share of the holy spirit, just as each receives a share in the wisdom and word of God (*DP* 2.7.2). All those who gain knowledge of the father through the son do so by the power of the holy spirit (*DP* 1.3.4). The holy spirit is potential in every man, but is actually present only in those who are worthy (*DP* 2.7.3), i.e. those who believe in God (*DP* 1.3.5). The holy spirit also has a role as the Paraclete. Believers partake in the holy spirit and as a result receive divine comfort in the form of gladness of heart (*DP* 2.7.4).

According to Origen, God created all rational and material existence, and did so as an expression of his own goodness (*DP* 2.9.6). The father bestowed existence on all; participation in the son, who is the logos and wisdom of God, made them rational creatures. Participation in the grace of the Holy Spirit made all rational creatures holy (*DP* 1.3.8). Origen shows a loyalty to Platonism, holding that God made as many rational creatures as he could control because even divine power is finite (if it were infinite, it would be incomprehensible even to itself, *DP* 2.9.1).

The visible universe was created when God applied order to matter, creating only as much matter as he could reduce to order. When Moses says that in the beginning God created the heavens and earth in Gen. 1:1, he is not referring to matter, according to Origen. Instead, the original creation was of an ideal heaven and earth from which the material versions took their names (*DP* 2.9.1).

The material universe is an immense living animal, the parts of which were put in order by God and are held together by the power and reason of God (*DP* 2.13). God created matter (ὕλη),

technical terminology is cited in the original only when it comes from Greek fragments.

the substance of the physical world; it is not co-eternal with him (*DP*. 1.3.3). Bodies take their existence when qualities (hot, cold, dry, wet, etc.) are applied to matter. Matter has existence by itself without qualities, yet is never found existing in the universe without them. Different kinds of bodies result from various qualities being imposed on matter. The dichotomy of existence presented is rational and material rather than immaterial and material because Origen says that all beings have body except the trinity, and that even those rational creatures that inhabit heaven have bodies of ether (*DP* 1.6.4, 2.2.2).

The question of time and eternity in Origen is unclear with respect to rational creation. On the one hand, he says that God, who is unchanging, cannot be called almighty unless there is something over which he has power (*DP* 1.2.10). As it is imperative in this scheme that God always be almighty, this statement would suggest that rational creation, at least, is co-eternal with God. Origen confirms this at *DP* 3.5.4 where he states that rational creatures have a beginning before creation, and that they existed in eternal, invisible, incorporeal worlds. At *DP* 2.9.2, however, he states clearly that rational beings were created and that there was a time they did not exist. Elsewhere, he counsels against drawing conclusions on the issue (*DP* 1.4.5).⁸⁹

He is much clearer on the visible world which he says was created at a definite time, and would one day end in time (*DP* 1.7; 3.5.1). If the world had no beginning, Origen says, it would be incomprehensible even to God, an intolerable impiety (*DP*. 3.5.2). To the common pagan objection to an eternal God creating a temporal universe: what was God doing before the creation and why did he take so long to do it, Origen answers that God did not begin to create after a period of inactivity (*DP* 1.4.5). Instead, before this world existed, there were other worlds and after this one has come to an end, others will follow it (*DP* 3.5.3).

Good and Evil

Origen conceives of goodness as an aspect of God's nature: he is the origin and source of all goodness. Goodness exists essentially only in the trinity (*DP* 1.6.2). More specifically, original goodness exists only in the father. Even the son possesses only an image of the father's goodness (*DP* 1.2.13). While all rational beings are capable of good (*DP* 1.8.3), it does not exist in their natures, but as an accidental quality, which can be gained and lost (*DP* 1.2.4). Its presence in a

created being, even as an accident, is the result of God's beneficence (*DP 2.9.2*). Goodness for a rational being is clinging to God's goodness, i.e. acting in such a way as to be consistent with his reason (*DP 1.5.1*).

Evil, for Origen, is not a substance, but the lack of goodness: to withdraw from good is to immerse oneself in evil (*DP 2.9.2*). For a rational creature, evil is the failure to conduct oneself in a way that is consistent with reason (*DP 1.5.1*). God the trinity is goodness and is reason, so genuine reason equals genuine goodness.

The evils that are apparent in the world are manifestations of the diversity introduced into the universe by the free will of rational beings that did not adhere to reason (*DP 3.5.5*). The position of every created thing from angels and demons to all living things in the world came about as a result of rational beings exercising their free will (*DP 1.5.3*). All rational creatures are capable of good and evil. Demons were not created as such, but as rational beings equal and alike to all others (*CC 4.65*). Even the devil was not created evil, but fell into it through his own unreasonable actions (*DP 1.8.3*). Matter is not evil or responsible for evil. Instead, each person's mind is responsible for the evil that exists in him (*CC 4.66*), and for the evils in the world that he must suffer.

The Soul

For Origen, all living creatures have souls (*DP 2.8.1*), and man is an immortal soul that uses a mortal body (*CC 7.38*). While humans have body and soul in common with animals, men have in addition to soul a vital spirit (*DP 3.4.1*). The soul stands higher than body but less than spirit. It is responsible for more complex emotional states such as ambition, avarice, jealousy, envy and pride (*DP 3.4.2*). The will of this intermediary soul fights against the will of the spirit, which is the seat of rational thought. It is neither good nor evil. Origen warns, however, that it is better for the middle soul to follow the wickedness of the body than stay fixed in the sphere of its own will and become as an irrational animal (*DP 3.4.3*).

The intermediate soul did not always exist. There was a time when rational creatures were exclusively mind. Origen conjectures that mind became soul as a result of a falling away from God. If God's love is fire, what is holy is hot. Soul ($\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$), he suggests, comes from the Greek

⁸⁹ These contradictions may be explained by Rufinus' changes to the text.

word 'to grow cold' (ψύχεσθαι) meaning that the soul is a thing that grew colder after once being in a hot divine state (*DP* 2.8.3).

Spirit, mind, is superior to all bodily natures and is not a product of matter (*DP* 1.7.1). That mind is immortal is guaranteed by the fact that it is capable of perceiving and knowing God: because the mind can possess the eternal, it must be eternal. Even if mind falls away from perception and understanding, the potential for it is always there (*DP* 4.6.9).

Origen says that all living creatures have souls (*DP* 2.8.1). All living beings, in fact, began as minds possessing the same rational and immortal nature (*DP* 1.8.1). The list of living beings in such a condition includes celestial bodies, the stars, sun and moon (*DP* 1.7.4), angels, and mankind, who became a living soul after having received the breath of God. God the father has a soul (*DP* 2.8.1) as does the son (*DP* 2.8.2).

An afterlife exists in Origen's theology in which a soul receives appropriate reward or punishment (*DP* 1.5). The afterlife involves the resurrection of some sort of body that continues to clothe the soul (*DP* 2.10.1). While the body that rises will be different from our earthly body, it will not immediately be uncorrupted or immortal. This will be accomplished in stages. First, souls receive a more perfect and incorruptible body. Later, souls achieve incorporeal existence when bodily nature dissolves into non-existence from which it came (*DP* 2.3.3).

The punishment that is meted out to souls after the death of the body is visited upon this new and more perfect body. It is not an everlasting punishment. When the body is punished, the soul is purified until it is restored to its original perfect condition. Punishment consists of fire. Each soul kindles its own fire. Sinners are not put into flames kindled by someone else or which existed before. The sins of each individual soul are the fuel for each individual fire. The burning is the tormented conscience of each soul as it is exposed to a record of all its sinful deeds (*DP* 2.10.4). The soul also feels torment from its dislocation from goodness. The fire, however, purifies and renews the soul and brings it into a stronger connection with good (*DP* 2.10.8). All souls must endure this purification process before they are given a reward after the end of all things, which is a likeness to God conferred according to merit (*DP* 3.6.1).

Separation from and Reunion with the Divinity

For Origen, the sin of Adam did not produce a general corruption of humanity or general estrangement from divinity. Instead, each soul is created with a capacity for good or evil (*DP* 1.7.1) and the fate of each living thing is the result of the free will it exercises (*DP* 1.5.5). In the beginning of all creation, all souls were pure and served God. They all possessed a rational and immortal nature and existed as intellectual beings (*DP* 1.8.1). Despite being created incorporeal, if rational creatures become negligent in adhering to God (who is reason, goodness and existence itself), they become less reasonable, less good and actually exist less: they descend into bodily existence (*DP* 1.4.1).

The devil, by his own free will, was the first to resist God, and was exiled from the divine realm as a result. Others followed his example and revolted: some sinned deeply and became demons, some hardly at all and became angels. Some souls did not sin deeply enough to become demons but sinned too much to be angels. To accommodate the various natures of these sinful creatures, God created the present world and bound souls to bodies as a punishment (*DP* 1.8.1). Bodies were assigned by God in proportion to the sin of each soul. Celestial bodies, which are living ensouled creatures, sinned very little and were given bodies of ether as a result. Demons were given bodies of air; men were given bodies of flesh (*DP* 1.7.5).⁹⁰ This process gave rise to all the diversity there exists in the material world, as there is nothing in God to give rise to diversity.

The position of every created being from the highest archangel to the lowest plant on earth came about as a result of the individual exercise of the free will of each (*DP* 1.5.3). Individual merit determines the duties of angels, service of celestials and circumstances of human beings (*DP* 1.8.1-2). The position of Christ himself, as described above (page 57), was the result of his firm adherence to God. Human souls that began their existence as wholly spiritual entities sometimes 'lose their wings' and are joined with bodies due to an inclination toward evil. First they become men. After dying, if a man has led a life of indulgence and irrational passion, his soul descends to the body of an animal. If it falls further in life as an animal, the gift of sensation is withdrawn from it in its next existence and it becomes a plant (*DP* 1.8.4).

⁹⁰ Why demons, who sinned more than humans, were given aerial bodies that appear in Origen's cosmogony to be superior to human bodies of flesh is not explained.

The diversity of circumstances of all creatures on the earth is also due to the actions of each individual soul prior to bodily existence. The suffering of children, congenital blindness, living in poverty or at the mercy of a tyrant are all punishments earned by souls by virtue of their falling away from God in varying degrees. Origen claims that even the improvement of one's circumstances on earth is not due to luck or bodily good, but is a manifestation of a movement of the soul, i.e. a rise to what is eternal.⁹¹

The process of decline from the spiritual to material has a counterpart by which God makes it possible for all souls to be renewed and restored to unity with him (*DP* 1.6.3). God instils a desire to know him in each soul. This manifests itself as a desire for knowledge both of what is divine and of the causes of things in the material world. Pursuing this desire for knowledge orients a soul toward God and prepares it to receive knowledge in the next life (*DP* 2.11.4).

After the death of one who has lived a holy life in search of knowledge, the soul remains in an earthly paradise. This is a time of instruction regarding the causes of things on earth. Those who are pure at heart, i.e. those who are least indulgent in bodily pleasures in life, learn more quickly and ascend from the earth to the air. Arriving at the kingdom of heaven, they attend many stations and live in many places learning what happens before rising to the next level (*DP* 2.11.6). When in heaven, the soul is given knowledge of the stars and of God's reason for all his works. Ascending from this level, the soul learns of immaterial existence. There it remains, developing its intelligence and attaining perfection through contemplation that allows it to remain there (*DP* 2.11.7). Those souls that rise high enough to join themselves to God are made wholly spiritual so as to be one spirit with God. In the end, these become spiritual beings and have knowledge of all because their mind is illuminated through God's word and wisdom (*DP* 1.8.4).

God's creation of the world was for the purpose of accommodating the diversity in his creation that came about through the varying degrees of sinfulness of each of the rational creatures he made (*DP* 2.9.6). Each human soul assumes its rightfully merited position in the world and each celestial soul was brought into the visible world against its will to serve. The world was created to accommodate those souls undergoing discipline in it as well as the celestial powers appointed to serve and assist them (*DP* 3.5.4). The end of the world will result in the restoration of some, but the need for punishment in others. That diversity which will be a characteristic of the end of the

⁹¹ The disparity between this statement and what is widely observed on earth is not explained.

world will give rise to diversity in a new world, also specially created to accommodate souls in new situations (*DP* 2.1.3). The next world will have the function of providing punishment and will see the restoration of some and decline of others. The diversity that marks the end of the next world will require still another world that will begin in diversity.

The end of the process will be judgement day, when God judges each soul and allots to it a merited place. Origen's conception of this end of time is drawn from 1 Cor. 15:28 which describes a time when everything is subjected to God, including the son, and then God may be all in all. He takes the subjection mentioned to be a good thing for those who are subjected. It involves their salvation and restoration to a unity with God (*DP* 3.5.7). The subjection is, in fact, the purpose of the numerous material worlds. While God created humans in his image, i.e. possessing rational mind, God's likeness is not bestowed until this end time. That is a product of the discipline exacted by successive material existences, acquired by humanity's effort to emulate God (*DP* 3.6.1). Ultimately, it is accomplished by reason rather than force (*DP* 3.5.8), and involves conformity of all to the reason and goodness of God.

After the end, this likeness to God will be conferred on all according to merit. Christ then intercedes to turn likeness into unity. At this point, when all are in unity with God, all existence is as it began: rational and essentially good (*DP* 3.6.1). At this time there will no longer be the diversity that gave rise to the material world. Even the devil will be purged of evil (*DP* 3.6.4-5).

Origen is clear that the passing away of the material world does not mean its annihilation, but a change in its form (*DP* 1.6.4). He is less clear on what this change actually is. Either all bodily substance will be resolved into the divine nature (*DP* 3.7.9), or as all creatures join God in unity and God is incorporeal, all creation will become incorporeal (*DP* 3.6.1-2), or the bodies of restored rational souls develop a spiritual and purified body that remains forever (*DP* 3.6.6). Perhaps in the end, at the consummation of the world, all material becomes refined as the lightest bodily substance, ether. Origen doesn't know (*DP* 1.6.4). In any case, there is always the potential for the return of the material world as all creatures, even in unity with God, will continue to have free will. They are still capable of evil and vulnerable to a fall (*DP* 3.6.3). In that case, the whole process would start again.

The Happy Life

The *summum bonum* for all rational creatures is to become as like to God as possible. As mentioned above (p. 62), God's image, our rational minds, is granted upon creation, but his likeness is not given until the end, and then it is given according to merit. The purpose of a human life is to acquire as much of God's likeness as possible via efforts to imitate him (*DP* 3.6.1). What exactly we are to imitate is the incarnated son who was wise and always chose what was good (*CC* 4.4).

Practically speaking, an imitation of God involves purging oneself of the evils of the body, addressing oneself to what is spiritual and putting aside the demands of the flesh as much as possible. If a rational being forgets what is best and loses sight of what benefits him, he leads a life that holds bodily existence as its main value. If the soul values the common good of society, it enjoys an intermediate existence and will apply itself to serving the state and obeying its laws. The highest and best life, however, is one devoted to inquiry into truth and the causes of things (*DP* 2.11.1). The rewards of heaven are entirely spiritual (*DP* 2.11.2). A soul that devoted itself to knowledge on the earth will be best prepared to receive the likeness of God in heaven.

Knowledge of God is the spiritual good and ignorance of God is an evil (*CC* 4.65). Imitating God, pleasing God, involves applying oneself to the spirit, which means to knowledge. The longing for knowledge of the causes of things is instilled by God, following that longing is the happy life that prepares the rational soul for life after death. At the end, knowledge of all creation will be given to us, knowledge of spiritual, moral and of material things (*DP* 2.11.5). For Origen, the intellectual life is the good life that prepares us for an intellectual eternity.

Christian Platonism in the Latin West

Christianity developed in the Latin west without a significant Platonic influence in its initial three centuries. If early Christian figures in the west were aware of the Platonic tradition at all, they were typically hostile. Jerome, for example, said, 'what communication is there between light and darkness? ...What has Horace to do with the Psalms, Vergil with the evangelists, or Cicero with the apostle?' (*Ep.* 22.29). Tertullian also famously remarked, 'what has Athens to do with Jerusalem?' (*Apology* 46).

Latin Christianity did not open itself to philosophical influence until the conversion in the middle 4th century of the Neoplatonist Marius Victorinus, an African who taught rhetoric in

Rome.⁹² Before his conversion, he had composed works on grammar, commentaries on Cicero, and had made translations of works by Aristotle, Plotinus and Porphyry. After his very celebrated conversion he wrote theological works including a conception of the trinity described in Neoplatonic terms.⁹³ His influence was felt by Ambrose and Augustine.

Ambrose

The first Latin father of the Church to incorporate Platonism into his Christian theology was Ambrose (334 or 340 - 397). The son of the Praetorian Prefect of Gaul, Ambrose was brought up as Christian and received an outstanding education that included Greek language and philosophy. He embarked upon a successful political career that culminated in 370 when he was appointed governor of Aemilia and Liguria in northern Italy. Ambrose's seat of government was headquartered in Milan, which was becoming the most important city in the western empire. The imperial court had abandoned Rome earlier in favour of more strategically important sites. Gratian had moved the court from Trier to Milan at about the time of Ambrose's arrival.⁹⁴ When called upon four years later to mediate in a dispute over the Episcopal succession in that city, he was chosen for the post and gave up his political career to assume the bishopric in 374.

As bishop, Ambrose involved himself in several high profile controversies involving the emperors. In 382, his staunch support of Gratian helped keep the Altar of Victory out of the senate house over the objection of Symmachus, the Prefect of Rome. Later, Ambrose opposed emperor Valentinian's mother Justina, an Arian who demanded that Arians be allowed to worship in a basilica in Milan. He also opposed Valentinian's successor Theodosius I when the emperor ordered the bishop of Callinicum to pay for the restoration of a synagogue which had been destroyed by Christians in a riot. Ambrose prevailed in both these disputes, which had the effect of establishing the bishop's position that the Church was superior to the state.

As a philosopher, Ambrose was unsystematic and unoriginal.⁹⁵ What this means to the reader is that while he is usually consistent, many of Ambrose's positions are not worked out in

⁹² Chadwick (1966), 3.

⁹³ The story of Victorinus' conversion is told by Augustine in *Conf.* 8.2.

⁹⁴ Moorhead (1999)

⁹⁵ Moorhead, 56.

great detail. He will also depend upon the reader's knowledge of orthodox theology; he often does not explain his terminology. He wrote scriptural commentaries, theological works, and works that addressed some specific aspect of Christian culture: the clergy, marriage, and virginity. He was influenced by Platonism and was especially familiar with the *Enneads*, from which he sometimes takes models for his own positions.⁹⁶ He subscribed to the Alexandrian scheme of allegorical interpretation of scripture, finding literal, moral and spiritual/mystical meaning, especially in Old Testament texts.

Ambrose's philosophical importance is not so much what he said, but to whom he said it. As bishop of Milan, he came to have an important catechumen in his congregation. He communicated his Platonic interpretations of scripture and allegorical exegesis through his sermons to a young Augustine, ideas that catalysed the development of Augustine's own Christian philosophy.

God

Ambrose, writing in a post-Nicene context, conceived of God as a trinity involving the father, son and holy spirit who share a unity of nature and substance (*Hexameron* 2.5), and are co-eternal (*Hex.* 2.1.1). God is one and the trinity is one (*De Fide* 1.1.8). The father, son and holy spirit are incorporeal, i.e. spirits without bodies. The father, son and holy spirit are a perfect trinity meaning that in each is the fullness of divine nature (*divinitas*) and unity of powers (*DF* 1.1.10). In the father, son and holy spirit is the same power and the same will to act (*DF* 4.7.75).

While we may refer to a trinity, the entities that make it up have a common substance (*indistincta substantia*), and although in some fashion they are distinct, it is a distinction without separation or plurality (*DF* 4.8.91). So, while the son is begotten of the father, this does not imply a difference either in substance or time. God is a single thing, the son is not divided from the father, instead the son is begotten of the father before time began (*ante tempora*, *DF* 1.1.6). The father and son are two persons but one nature. The son, Christ, shares with the father all attributes that belong to the essential nature of the Godhead (*divina natura*, *DF* 1.2.15; 1.2.17).

The distinction between the elements of the trinity is also real: Christ is a distinct person (*DF* 1.2.16). But this individuality has to do with person while unity has to do with nature (*DF*

⁹⁶ Cf. Courcelle (1950), 120-2

5.4.45). Unity, Ambrose explains, is not a number, but is the principle of all numbers (*DF* 1.2.19). The unity of the divine nature (*divinitas/deitas*) cannot admit of plurality because plurality, again, concerns numbers while the divine nature does not admit of number (*De Spiritu Sancto* 3.13.93).

There is no hierarchy among Ambrose's trinity. The son is not lower than the father because the father generated (*generavit*) the son (*DF* 4.8.90). There was no time when the son did not exist (*DF* 1.18.120). To those who argue that a father by definition must predate what he is a father of, Ambrose says that analogies with earthly reproduction do not apply: the begetting of the son is an incorporeal event (*DF* 1.10.67). Further, begetting is the natural function of the father as a father and not a necessary outcome of his powers, i.e. God begets in his nature as father and not in his nature as the omnipotent (*DF* 4.8.82). Christ is God, coming forth from the eternal existence (*qui est*); there is no diversity between them (*DF* 2.3).

In spite of all the arguments to the contrary, however, Ambrose at times suggests a substantive distinction in the trinity. What the father is, the son sets forth as an image, he says (*Hex.* 2.5). He also distinguishes between the father and son on the one side and holy spirit on the other, saying that the holy spirit is not commingled (*confusus*) with the father and son, but is separated and distinct (*SS* 1.9.106).

The nature of the father is incorporeal (*De Isaac vel Anima* 4.26), good, eternal, perfect, omnipotent and true (*DF* 1.2.14). The father existed before the creation of the world and is the beginning of everything (*Hex.* 1.2.5). God is the *summum bonum* and source of all good in the universe; all things that are good are so by virtue of drawing their goodness from God (*DI* 8.78). The mind that dwells on God does not know evil (*DI* 7.61). God is also the source of all existence, not simply in that he created everything, but he is life itself, the *fons vitae*. As if existence were a discrete thing, all things that exist draw their being from him (*DI* 8.78).

God the father also appears to be somehow aloof from the world. He gives to others, but receives nothing from others (*DI* 8.78). Ambrose also says that the matter of the universe should not be linked with the invisible and unapproachable divine nature. Reasoning that an object whose parts are subject to corruption is itself subject to corruption, Ambrose concludes that the world is not a part of God (*Hex.* 1.3.11). God seems to be removed from the world in some essential and permanent way, begging the question of how it is that a human being is to gain knowledge of him.

Ambrose follows scripture to assert that the son is the word of God. He says this is because the son is unstained (*immaculatus*). The son is the virtue of God because he is perfect, the wisdom of God because he is one with the father in eternity and divinity, the son of God because he is begotten of the father. He is also a mediator that makes the father, otherwise aloof from the material world, available to human beings. Ambrose understands John 14:6, *nemo venit ad Patrem nisi per me* to mean that the mere conception of God by human beings is impossible without the help of the son. Further, the understanding that is necessary in order for a human to ascend to God is accomplished only through the son (*DF* 1.10.63, *De Bono Mortis* 12.55). It is the son in his aspect as God the word that can be understood, imperfectly, through contemplation of the universe he created (*DI* 6.53). Our knowledge of divine things, then, is necessarily of the son, who somehow makes the father known through his agency.

Any ontological distinction between father and son is apparent rather than actual. Anything from the scriptures that suggests something emotional, passionate, worldly, or human with respect to the son describes his incarnated humanity. At John 14:28 for example, when Christ says *Pater maior me est*, this distinction refers to his humanity (*DF* 2.8.59). Even the terms 'greater' and 'less' describe conditions appropriate to corporeal subjects, Ambrose says, and have no meaning when applied to God (*DF* 2.8.65). Nor should we be concerned about any implied ontological inferiority with respect to the son's generation by the father. That generation is beyond human understanding. We are to know that the son was begotten, Ambrose says, not dispute the means of the begetting (*DF* 1.10.64-5). It is the son, however, that is involved in humanity. He takes pleasure in fertile souls and is nourished on the virtues of such a soul (*BM* 5.19). Man's connection with God, then, is through the son.

At *De Spiritu Sancto* 3.18.132-43, Ambrose gives four marks by which God is known: he is without sin, he forgives sins, he is not a creature but the creator, and he receives but does not give worship. These are characteristics of the holy spirit, he says, so the holy spirit is God. The holy spirit, as the name would imply, is incorporeal (*SS* 1.5.62), uncreated, good, not liable to corruption or change (*SS* 1.5.63-4). Its function is as Paraclete (*SS* 1.4.58), and source of sanctification and power of the immaterial creatures God created (angels, demons, powers). The substance of the holy spirit is superior to these creatures (*SS* 1.5.62) and it enjoys an immortality that is unqualified rather than that of the immaterial creatures who derive their immortality from

God (*DF* 3.3.19-20). It must also be borne in mind that while the holy spirit is *spiritus* as is the rest of the trinity, it is also somehow distinct, separated from the father and son (*SS* 1.9.106).

For Ambrose, God is responsible for the creation of material and immaterial existence by an act of his will (*Hex.* 1.3.8). Angels, dominations and powers that make up the immaterial, existed before the material universe was created, but are not co-eternal with God. These were created as well (*Hex.* 1.5.19). Both the substances and causes of all that exists materially and immaterially are contained in God's divine mind (*Hex.* 1.2.7). The material world was not a copy of an ideal existence outside God, but formed in conformity to a self-proposed model, i.e. unlike Plato's demiurge, the mind of God is the source of both immaterial and material existence (*Hex.* 1.2.5). God's creation of the material world was not simply as a designer of forms, but as a creator of natures (*Hex.* 2.1.2).

Also in contrast to the Platonic model, Ambrose says that God made the material world out of no matter and no substance (*De Excessu Fratris Satyri*, 2.6.4). Matter did not exist until God created the four elements that make up the material world: air, fire, water and earth (*Hex.* 1.6.20). God also created all the material causes on which the substance of the visible world is based (*Hex.* 2.1.2). As mentioned above (p. 71), as the world is subject to corruption and change, God cannot be a part of it (*Hex.* 1.3.11), meaning that the world is not a living ensouled creature: Ambrose is clear that the holy spirit of his conception is not the Platonic world-soul. The material world is mortal, it derived its existence from God and will end one day according to his will (*Hex.* 1.5.19).

Ambrose completes the dichotomy between material and immaterial existence by elaborating the distinction between time and eternity. The material world is not only corruptible and mutable, but is also temporal where the immaterial world is eternal (*Hex.* 1.3.9). An effect of God's will anticipated the perception of time (*Hex.* 1.3.8). He created time when he created the material world (*DF* 1.2.14). The world is temporal in that it was created at a particular moment, i.e. it began in time. It will also have an end in time. The world is not co-eternal with God who does not exist in time (*Hex.* 1.3.10, *DF* 1.2.14).

Good and Evil

God is the source of all good things according to Ambrose (*DI* 7.61). He is the only entity that is good by nature (*DI* 8.79). Good lacks nothing and provides measure, perfection and termination to all things. Everything subsists in good and depends on good (*in quo universa constant et de quo omnia pendent*, *DI* 7.60). Ambrose says that good is love (*caritas*) that purifies the hearts of the holy (*DI* 8.77) and that the nature of good is life (*vita*) that endures forever, the source of which is Christ (*DI* 8.79).

Ambrose says Holy spirit is called good by virtue of its immutability (*SS* 1.5.64), and also that immortality without the possibility of change is the condition of the trinity only (*DF* 3.3.20). This link of goodness with the impossibility of change suggests that God's goodness is not the same as our goodness, which is derived from him. Our goodness consists in virtue and moral conduct, which means valuing the eternal rather than the material (*DBM* 4.14, 6.24; *DI* 3.6).

Ambrose defines evil as a lack of good (*DI* 7.60). It is not a substance, but an accident that is a deviation from the goodness of the nature of the universe as created by God (*Hex.* 1.8.28). As evil is a deprivation of good, Ambrose reasons that evils arise from goods; good became apparent through evils. Knowledge of good and evil depends on the existence of evil as a contrast to good: evil is implicit in the definition of good (*DI* 7.60).

Evil, for Ambrose, is in each of us as a product of the activity of each soul's free will. Goodness and rationality are the same and arise from the nature of God. The soul, also, is excellent by nature but generates its own evil if, through irrationality, it becomes immoderately inclined to bodily pleasures. The choice for matter is a choice against spirit: it is a choice for what is irrational and against what is rational. By making this choice, the soul departs from goodness and is filled with evil. Its intention to seek evil fills the soul with vice (*DI* 2.5). The soul that does not choose the spiritual, the rational, the good, does not dwell in God and becomes the source of its own evils (*DI* 7.61).

Evil in this life, for Ambrose, is all that is inclined toward matter rather than spirit. Indulgence of bodily pleasures, material luxuries, and carnal desires distract the soul from pursuing what is good, spiritual and eternal. These distractions impede the strength of the soul and hinder its concentration (*BM* 3.9.12). Material wealth and feminine beauty are the primary corrupting influences. The desires they provoke create evil in the soul, the consequence of which is the corruption, mortality and disquiet that harass the soul while it exists in the body.

The Soul

The soul (*anima*) is, for Ambrose, an immortal and incorporeal entity that animates the body. The soul infuses life to the body. Death is the separation of body and soul--when the soul departs, life departs (*BM* 2.3; 9.42). Soul is living (*vivens*). It rules and gives life to a body, which is otherwise without life or sense (*DI* 2.4). When a person identifies himself, he is identifying his soul. We are our souls while the body merely clothes the soul (*DI* 8.79). The soul is the user and the body is the used: one is what we are while the other simply belongs to us (*BM* 7.27; *Hex.* 6.7.42). When scripture says that God made man in his image and likeness (*Gen.* 1:26), it refers to the soul. It is man's entire essence. Without soul, a man is nothing but dust (*Hex.* 6.7.43). Soul is incorporeal, so is not blood, which is flesh, or a harmony of parts of the body because such a harmony is also flesh. Neither is the soul air nor fire nor actuality (*ἐντελέχεια*, *DI* 2.4). The soul is immortal by its nature. It cannot admit death any more than light can admit darkness or snow can admit heat (*BM* 9.42).

Ambrose suggests that the soul is an intellectual entity. He says, as cited above (p. 72), that the needs of the body impede the strength of the soul and hinder its concentration (*BM* 3.9.12). And in developing the idea that the soul and not the flesh are made in the image of God, he says that what is made in the image of God is what is perceived by mind and not body (*Hex.* 6.8.45). More specifically, perhaps the soul possesses an intellectual entity rather than is identified as one. The *spiritus*, Ambrose says, is the ruling part of *anima* and the strength of *anima* (*BM* 10.44).

The purpose of the *spiritus* or the intellectual *anima* is to give the body life, rule it and enlighten it (*BM* 7.26). Ambrose illustrates this in an image drawn from scripture (*Song of Songs* 6:12), that the soul is as the chariot of Amminadib. The soul is a chariot that carries a good master. It has four good horses which are the virtues of the soul--prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice--and four bad horses representing passions of the body: wrath, lust, fear and injustice. These horses are often at odds and hinder each other. Mind, the good master, urges on the good horses and restrains the bad. If allowed to lead, the good horses fly up, ascending from the earth, raising up the soul to higher regions (*DI* 8.65). Such is the proper function of the soul. When Christ says that the 'kingdom of God is within you,' Ambrose understands this to denote a condition of being in which the soul is in control of the body's passions.

Ambrose believes that the soul survives the death of the body and undergoes a judgement after which it is either rewarded or condemned (*BM* 4.13-14). The soul of a virtuous man rises to what is on high and remains with the pure, immortal and everlasting good (*BM* 9.42). Ambrose describes this as a process through which a just soul is given joy apportioned over seven *ordines*. These joys include the rational soul overcoming the flesh, a lack of recollection of vices, relief from fear of judgement day, and consolation in the soul's anticipated glory (*BM* 11.48). Souls are freed from the prison of the body in a resurrection through which they receive tranquillity, splendour and glory. This resurrection includes a bodily resurrection: the earth gives up the bodies of the dead whose souls have been in chambers in heaven. Ambrose rejects transmigration of souls explicitly (*BM* 10.45). Following the resurrection, just souls enjoy the knowledge of their own resplendent light and finally exultation and rejoicing when they receive the reward (*BM* 11.48) of remaining eternally with the good. Damnation is reserved for those who sin and refuse to repent. This is an advantage to them in that damnation prevents them from increasing their number of sins. Refusal to repent would increase the severity of their merited punishments (*BM* 7.29).

Separation from and Reunion with the Divinity

Ambrose did not subscribe to any notion of original sin as the source of evil and of estrangement of mankind from God. Man is estranged from God, but this is due to the workings of each individual soul's free will, which chooses bodily pleasures over spiritual striving and becomes filled with evil as a consequence. This condition is described by Ambrose as a death of the soul; such a condition is the only evil. The sin of the first man, while not responsible for the evil that exists in souls other than his own, is responsible for death as a potential condition for the soul, however.

The death of the soul is the state of soul being filled with evil due to sin. It is also estrangement from God who is the opposite of evil. Each soul brings about its own estrangement due to free will. By nature the soul is the very best thing (*optima*), but is subject to corruption through its irrationality. Ambrose defines irrationality as an inclination toward bodily pleasure, which is evil (*DI* 2.5). Evil, then, is the opposite of God, of good, and of rationality. It has already been pointed out that Ambrose rejected the idea that flesh or matter generally is responsible for evil (*DI* 7.60). Instead, it is the soul's choice to submit itself to the desires of the body in an

immoderate fashion that is the sin, the evil, and the estrangement from God that must be repaired if the soul is to achieve salvation.

The virtuous soul will spend eternity with pure, everlasting and immortal good (*BM* 9.38). Its salvation, its eternal life with God, comes about through knowledge of the divine and good works (*De Officiis* 2.2.5). Ambrose explains through two allegorical interpretations from *Song of Songs* (the soul in spiritual marriage to Christ at 5:1-7, entering a garden of mind at 8:13-14) that knowledge depends on earnest desire to seek God (*BM* 5.19; 6.50-4). And, as inclining itself to body rather than mind the soul immerses itself in evil, by abstaining from bodily pleasure, the soul inclines itself to the divine and recovers its place with God (*BM* 7.62).

To raise the soul to heavenly things, mind must exercise virtues and curb bodily passions, as portrayed in the image of the soul as the chariot of Amminadib (*DI* 8.65, p. 73 above), where virtues and passions were described as horses pulling a chariot, to be encouraged and controlled by the driver. The exercise of virtue is the only good for humans. It is not enhanced by corporeal good nor diminished by bodily suffering (*DO* 2.2.5). Ambrose directs us to introspect, for the soul to look within itself to discern God and discover the value of the spiritual (*DI* 7.61). 'Let each man,' he says at *DI* 8.78, 'divest himself of baser coverings and approve [the soul] when she is cleansed of the mire just as gold is purified by fire.' Salvation is accomplished by this spiritual journey away from body and toward what is spiritual: 'Let us, therefore, flee to our most true fatherland' (*Fugiamus, ergo, in patriam verissimam, DI* 8.78), he says. The soul discovers its rightful place by making such a spiritual journey. It is able to discern what is good by becoming good via good works. Such works combined with the introspective search for God cleansed the inner eye, making it accustomed to see what is bright and clear, purifying the soul so that it can perceive God, the nature of good (*DI* 8.79).

The afterlife, for Ambrose, includes bodily resurrection but is otherwise exclusively spiritual in its nature. On judgement day, bodies arise from the earth and the souls that inhabited them emerge from their individual quarters in heaven (*BM* 10.45). The evil, the souls of which were deeply troubled in heaven in anticipation of judgement day, are left to the torment of recollecting their vices. The reward of the just is freedom both from anxiety over judgement day and of the recollection of their vices after resurrection (*BM* 11.48). Instead, they are able to see God face to face, i.e. to gain knowledge of God and be united to him by meditation (*BM* 11.49).

The Happy Life

The happy life for Ambrose is one that leads to eternal life on judgement day. It is achieved by seeking the divine and freeing the soul from the body. The body causes problems for the soul. The senses that gather data for it can deceive; heavenly truth cannot be comprehended with body. Instead, we are to introspect, using the mind to withdraw from the body and contemplate what is like itself, i.e. what is immaterial. Only when the mind is separated in such a way from the body can it correctly perceive spiritual truth (*BM* 3.10). The key is introspection: attend to yourself. To know yourself means to know one's own soul and mind (*Hex.* 6.7.42). The goal of introspection is to know the nature of the spiritual realm and seek it, which is equal to imitating God (*BM* 9.41). Purification of the soul is achieved through the exercise of virtues, four of which are identified: prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude (*DI* 8.65)

As the material sphere is of no importance to one seeking the divine, a wise man will regard the death of the body as a good. While body is not evil, soul is liable to sin through contact with body. As death frees the soul from the prison of the body (*BM* 2.5), it removes the possibility of sin. In the just, it removes the possibility of death of the soul, a condition of estrangement from God caused by sin (*BM* 2.3). In the just, death returns the soul to its original place of repose and the body to rest (*BM* 3.8). Death is a benefit even to one who is evil as it stops him from sinning. His soul may suffer as a result of the sin committed in life, but the end of the life of the body means an end to the guilt the embodied soul accumulates (*BM* 4.15). Everyone as long as he lives is subject to a fall, even in old age (*BM* 8.35). The good realised from paradise, and from the death that is necessary to get there, is a freedom from the demands of the body and from the consequent sin (*BM* 12.55).

Summary

Because the figures in this chapter are linked not only by their sympathy to Platonism, but also by their commitment to Christian theology, their views are highly similar. All conceive of a deity that is a trinity: God the father, God the son, and God the holy spirit. All attempt in one way or another to explain the trinity as both a unity and a collection of three distinct entities.

Beyond this unique conception of God, Clement, Origen and Ambrose all describe the deity, and much else in their metaphysical systems, in terms very familiar to the Platonic tradition.

A premise taken by each is the truth of immaterial existence that transcends the material world. Given this premise, each describes God (either as God the father, the trinity, or without distinguishing between the two concepts) as a unity that is incorporeal, immutable, eternal, i.e. having no beginning or end, and who created the universe. Each describes God as omnipotent, except for Origen who finds conceptual, metaphysical limits to God's power. Each also describes God as being goodness itself and existence itself. This means that all creatures derive whatever goodness they have and whatever existence is theirs by participation in the ideal goodness and existence of the father, similar to the way in which Plato describes good things partaking of the ideal good. The Christian Platonists do not usually use this terminology, but the mechanism they describe seems very similar.⁹⁷ Each also describes a God that is beyond human conception and aloof from the material world, unknowable and unapproachable by humans who require some mediating principle to attain genuine knowledge of the divine.

Each describes a son of God who was generated from the father, in a generation that was not in time. Clement establishes the idea of Christ as the logos of God; Origen and Ambrose follow this conception. The three describe the son as the divine mind (and divine wisdom) of God, an intellectual principle that is the means by which the universe was created. The son, for each, is the mediating figure. He is the only means by which human beings can come to know the transcendent God. Perhaps because of this mediating activity, each feels compelled to suggest a different ontological status for the son, despite arguments of trinitarian unity. Clement says that the son is susceptible to scientific demonstration whereas the father is not. Origen has an elaborate story to explain what seems to be a development of the son into the wisdom of God and concludes explicitly that the son is less than the father. Ambrose says the son is an image of what the father is essentially, suggesting a lesser status for the son. Origen, before him, had used this reasoning to draw a distinction between the natures of the father and son.

Each mentions a holy spirit but provides little explicit information about it; Clement names it but thereafter virtually ignores it. The holy spirit has divine status for each. It is the Paraclete, or comforter of believers, for each. Ambrose denies that the world is a living creature,

⁹⁷ Origen does say at *DP* 2.6.3 that rational creatures derive what rationality they possess from participation in the son. It is a passage that exists only in Rufinus' Latin, however, making comparisons of terminology difficult. Rufinus' term *participatio*, from *participo* is an appropriate rendering of Plato's μετέχω (e.g. from *Phaedo* 100c).

essentially denying the concept of a world soul. This, perhaps self-consciously, amounts to a denial of the third figure of the Christian trinity as an analogue of the Platonic world-soul.

Good for all three follows easily from their conception of God as the source of goodness: good is what God is; evil is the absence of God. Evil has no substance, but is an absence of goodness. None subscribe to any belief in original sin.⁹⁸ God, for each, is blameless and perfect. He is not responsible in any way for the existence of evil. For each a good God created a good universe. Evil may have entered into it by the devil's resistance to God (per Origen) or the sin of Adam (per Ambrose), but the evil that is in each soul came about as a consequence of the free will of each soul. For Origen, this happened in a previous immaterial existence so each human being comes into the world already in a state of corruption and suffering the just punishments for that corruption. Clement and Ambrose leave the process of corruption to each individual.

Each of the Christians under examination regards the soul as the real essence of a human being. It is the animating principle that gives life to an otherwise lifeless body. Each considers the soul to have at least two parts: one rational which is the ruling principle of the soul, the other broadly analogous to that middle part of soul that is responsible for the noble passions in Plato's scheme. The meaning of the scriptural statement that man was created in the image of God is, for each, that this highest soul is rational, deriving this quality from the logos of God.

Each believes that the soul survives the death of the body to be judged by God, then punished or rewarded as merited. In a departure from what would become orthodox Christianity, none of the Christian Platonists examined in this chapter regarded punishment of souls in the afterlife as a permanent affair. Punishment, for each, is purifying and therapeutic. To the extent that they are explicit on the matter, each seems to opt for a universal salvation, which, in the case of Origen, includes even the devil himself. Paradise for each was highly intellectual, involving increasing knowledge of God, and ultimately a spiritual unity with the deity. As far as the transmigration of souls, Clement is quiet on the subject. Origen explicitly accepts that human souls can return even as animals or plants (which possibility Plato did not include). Ambrose is equally explicit in denying transmigration.

⁹⁸ None held such a belief in the manner described by Augustine, p. 96 below. Ambrose maintains that individuals are responsible for their own sins, see p. 75.

Human beings became estranged from God by virtue of their own free will, which led to a state of corruption, according to all three. The choice made by the soul that led to corruption was valuing body above spirit. The current state of corruption can be overcome by devoting one's life to the pursuit of what is divine, eternal and immaterial while despising the body and goods of the material world. The process by which man is reunited with the deity, for all three, depends upon an ascent of the soul from the material to immaterial then to knowledge of God. This process is made possible and encouraged by God who makes a desire for knowledge immanent in the soul, and who sent the incarnated son into the world as an example for humans to follow.

The Happy Life for Clement, Origen and Ambrose is the imitation of God, which involves a life of virtue and valuing what is divine. This life includes putting into practice the conceptual goal of indifference toward material goods in favour of seeking only what is immaterial along with a uniquely Christian element: faith. Each of the Christian Platonists deduces from these premises that the genuinely wise and just person looks upon death as a good thing: a separation of soul from the demands of the body.

The Christian Platonists depart from the Platonic tradition in places where a Platonic interpretation of Christian theology becomes untenable. The trinity itself has an analogue in the Platonic tradition, which is especially well developed by the Neoplatonists. God, however, while aloof from the material world, is also directly involved with it, for the Christian Platonists, and cares for mankind at least in his aspect as the son. The Christians, except for Origen, do not subscribe to transmigration of souls. They also provide for a universal salvation, as the Platonists and most later Christians do not. The most important doctrinal difference between the secular and Christian Platonists is the belief of the latter in the incarnation of the son. This was a controversial belief, often ridiculed by the likes of Celsus or Porphyry, but vigorously defended by Christians, who were obligated to do so because of the unmistakable support of the doctrine in the New Testament.

The similarities between these Christian Platonists and the Platonic tradition were the result of a reverence for Greek philosophy, especially Plato, and a self-conscious borrowing from that tradition in interpreting the Christian revelation. Each was very familiar with Platonism, obviously having read Plato in Greek. All openly cite and quote Plato, ceding the truth of his philosophy where it seemed deserved. Clement even thought that philosophy was a gift by God to

the Greeks as a preparation for belief in Christ. All cultivated allegorical exegesis, especially of the Old Testament, that allowed them to explain away scriptural elements that were inconsistent with their Platonic interpretations. Ambrose, for example, considers *Song of Songs* 6:12, a mention of the soul as a chariot, as a metaphysical statement from which Plato derived his soul as chariot image (*Phaedrus* 247bc). The tradition is also behind his conception of the ascent of mind from material to immaterial at *De Isaac* 8.78, where he quotes Plotinus' exhortation (*En.* 1.6.8) to flee to the fatherland.⁹⁹ All three regard Plato as so close to the truth that they accuse him of stealing his ideas from the Old Testament.

The result of this blending of theology with philosophy by the early Christian Platonists was to establish the legitimacy of many Platonic concepts for Christians and created a number of premises for intellectual Christians of the Latin west in the last century of empire. Some of these premises included the truth of immaterial existence generally and the immaterial nature of God, specifically. It established an emphasis on man's intellect as the image of God, and on removing the mind from body as the path to reunion with God. It established God as goodness itself and being itself and conceived of evil not as a substance, but an absence of goodness. Alexandrian tradition also both provided allegorical interpretations of scripture and legitimised the practice for future theologians. This made possible the inclusion of many extra-scriptural concepts from philosophy, and exclusion of much literal interpretation that seemed to conflict with it.

Such beliefs became part of a Christian Platonist tradition, which would have been potent in centres of culture and education in the west. It is not unusual that Augustine would have come into contact with them when he encountered the intellectual religious communities of Rome and Milan. It is also not unusual that they played so important a role in his conversion and subsequent philosophical and theological development.

⁹⁹ Courcelle (1950), 111.

CHAPTER THREE

Augustine's Christian Philosophy

This chapter discusses Augustine's intellectual development and examines his own Christian philosophy as it manifests itself in his positions on the nature of God, the nature of good and of evil, the human soul, estrangement from and reunion with the divinity, and the happy life. His positions on these issues are then discussed with doctrinal parallels drawn with potential source texts. Finally, conclusions are offered as to the efficacy of an examination of Augustine's philosophical sources using a doctrinal approach. As there is some development in Augustine's theology over the course of his long career, the explication in this chapter will depend mostly on the later works, especially the *Confessions*, *De Trinitate* and *De Civitate Dei*.

Augustine was born in a small North African town, Thagaste, in the Roman province of Numidia in 354. In contrast to Ambrose's wealthy background and powerful family, Augustine was of humble origins. In spite of their lack of means, his parents aspired to a professional career for Augustine. He received a classical education at Thagaste, later in neighbouring Madauros, and finally, with the help of the locally prominent Romanianus, in Carthage. He then took a position teaching rhetoric in Carthage before moving on to Rome and ultimately to the imperial court in Milan. There, he came to know Ambrose, who was the Catholic bishop of the city. Through Ambrose and the local Christian community, Augustine converted to Christianity, being baptised by Ambrose on Easter, 387. Shortly after his conversion, Augustine retired from professional life and returned to Thagaste to found a monastic community. While he was travelling in North Africa in 391, the people of Hippo Regius forced ordination upon Augustine. He served the community as its priest and was made bishop in 396. His career in the bishopric was marked with involvement in ecclesiastical and theological controversies, chiefly against the Donatists, Manichees and Pelagians. He died at Hippo during the Vandal siege in 430.

Augustine believed that the stories of his conversion and his general development theologically and philosophically were important. He recounts his entire intellectual biography in the *Confessions* and also provides shorter treatments of it in *De Beata Vita* (4ff.) and *De Utilitate Credendi* (20ff.). He is reared in a Catholic household (*UC 2, Conf. 1.11.17*), but his real spiritual

and intellectual journey begins at the age of 19 when he reads Cicero's *Hortensius*. This (no longer extant) dialogue is a protreptic for the philosophical life. Augustine claims that the dialogue cured him of any desire for wealth (*Soliloquia* 1.17). By all accounts, exposure to it is a signal moment in his development; it moves Augustine to pursue a life of the mind.

His growing philosophical outlook and increasing intellectual demands led Augustine to abandon Catholicism. The scriptures seemed coarse and facile to him in comparison to Cicero (*Conf.* 3.5.9). In this state of disenchantment with Catholicism, Augustine came into contact with and converted to Manicheism. The attraction of the sect for him seems to have been its rationalism and its criticisms of Catholicism. Specifically, the Manichees wanted to know how a good and omnipotent God can create a universe containing evil, the exact physical nature of God, and the meaning behind scriptural (Old Testament) texts that portrayed the Jewish patriarchs engaging in immoral conduct (*Conf.* 3.7.13). These criticisms resonated with Augustine and lured him into the Manichee faith. He remained with them in Rome and Milan, where he was able to use his contacts within the sect to secure professional advancement.

Augustine remained nominally a Manichee for much longer than he supported the faith with any conviction. His growing disillusion was capped by a meeting with Faustus, a Manichee intellectual who was articulate and personable, but unable to address any of Augustine's doctrinal concerns. This disillusionment with the sect moved him to fall back on the scepticism of the New Academy, which Augustine learned from Cicero (*Academica*).¹⁰⁰ Scepticism held that the very prospect of real knowledge was to be held in doubt. Its fundamental doctrine is stated in *Academica* 2.6.17: '...if nothing can be perceived and opinion is a most shameful thing, then the wise man will never assent to anything.' Augustine found this doctrine to be an effective tool against the putative rationalism of his Manichee hosts in Italy (*Conf.* 5.10.19). He offers no details of his discussions with them, but the effect of sceptical criticism was clearly to kill his moribund attachment to the sect.

In taking up Academic scepticism as a weapon against the Manichees, Augustine had unwittingly brought in a philosophical Trojan horse. A sceptical attack against Manicheean doctrine proved deadly. But Augustine did not at first understand that the consequence of accepting the Academic doctrine is the corrosive effect scepticism has on one's confidence in the

certainty of any philosophical system, or even the possibility of certain knowledge (*Contra Academicos* 2.9.23). While Augustine was able to use sceptical arguments as a *coup de grace* with respect to his faith in the Manichee sect, the doctrine also had the unexpected effect of challenging his faith in the efficacy of intellectual inquiry.

Augustine overcame scepticism to his own satisfaction with arguments in the dialogue *Contra Academicos*. While the certain knowledge he derives in that dialogue is of dubious value (essentially, he establishes only the truth of disjunctive statements, mathematical equations and purely subjective statements), the exercise was successful. 'Augustine did not care how extensive a title to knowledge he had acquired by ridding his mind of the Academic arguments. The important thing was to have rid his mind.'¹⁰¹ His objections to the doctrine were less logical than religious. His beliefs drove him to reject the consequences of scepticism: the negation of virtue, of knowledge of God, and of free will (*CA* 2.8.20).

The void left by Augustine's rejection of Manicheism was not immediately filled by Catholicism because he felt that many of the Manichee criticisms of that faith were still valid. He still objected to what he regarded as an absurd Catholic belief in a material God; he was also troubled by the problem of the existence of evil and stories in the Old Testament that seemed to praise unethical behaviour.

Augustine's move to Milan to take a position as rhetor in the imperial court brought him into contact with Ambrose, the city's Catholic bishop. In his sermons, Ambrose addressed Augustine's Manichee-inspired doubts of Catholicism by insisting that God was incorporeal (*Conf.* 6.3.4). He also taught that stories in the Old Testament that seemed to glorify violence, cruelty, adultery and the like were not to be understood literally. Instead, Ambrose introduced Augustine to allegorical exegesis, attributing literal, moral and spiritual meanings to scripture (*Conf.* 6.4.6).

Under Ambrose's influence, Augustine came to understand God as immaterial (*BV* 4). He held to a belief that God cared for humanity. He believed also in an immortal and immaterial human soul (*Conf.* 6.16.26, *BV* 4) and in the justice of divine punishment of evil committed by human free will (*Conf.* 7.3.5). Augustine is not yet a Christian, but subject to the influence of Monica and Ambrose, he becomes a catechumen of the church.

¹⁰⁰ Rist, 42-4.

¹⁰¹ Kirwan, 33-4.

At this time, Augustine also read Platonic philosophy for the first time. An unnamed (but excessively proud) man in Milan gave him some books of the Platonists translated into Latin by Marius Victorinus (*Conf.* 7.9.13). It is difficult to say precisely which books he read in Milan, but the resulting doctrinal tradition that he associates with Plato, Plotinus (*CA* 3.18.41, *CD* 8.12), Porphyry, Iamblichus, Apuleius (all *CD* 8.12) and even Vergil (*CD* 22.26) clarifies and reinforces the conceptions of God and the universe which Augustine had developed from Ambrose's sermons.¹⁰²

What Augustine saw in Platonism was a philosophical system that provided rational support for his own ideas of the nature of God, mankind and the universe, which he had derived from a new understanding of Catholic doctrine engendered by Ambrose. Platonism asserted a dichotomy between an intelligible world grasped only by the mind, and the material world, a copy of the true intelligible world, grasped through the senses. This sensible, created world has no absolute being; only the intelligible world has true existence (*Conf.* 7.11.17). The human soul is immortal and has true existence in the intelligible world (*Conf.* 7.10.16). God is the origin of all existence, and all existence is good (*Conf.* 7.13.19). The sufferings of mankind, which he takes to be evil, are misconceptions of the overall goodness of creation brought about by our finite point of view (*Conf.* 7.13.19). Most importantly, Platonism held that God was incorporeal and immutable (*Conf.* 7.20.26) and through the rational argumentation the Platonists advanced to support their view, Augustine came to truly understand incorporeal reality and the incorporeal God.

Augustine maintained uniquely Christian beliefs not found in the Platonist books such as God's benevolence toward mankind and the incarnation of the son. The influence of Ambrose and of the Platonist books helped him overcome those Manichee criticisms of Catholicism that had never adequately been addressed. The Platonic dichotomy between material and spiritual reality confirmed for him that God existed. Ambrose's allegorical interpretations of scripture provided a tool for explaining away passages of scripture that seemed to praise the immoral behaviour of the patriarchs as well as those that seemed to contradict interpretation along Platonic lines.¹⁰³

¹⁰² For a discussion as to the possible contents of the *libri Platoniorum*, see Chapter Four, p. 116ff. and bibliographical references.

¹⁰³ Augustine was not content with Ambrose's literal, moral and mystical meanings of scripture. He devised a science of language as signs, articulated most completely in *DC*--the birth of modern semiotics.

Platonist influences gave Augustine a new tool with which to understand the Christian revelation. The *libri Platoniorum*, especially, set him to search for incorporeal truth (*Conf.* 7.20.26). That new understanding was the catalyst of Augustine's conversion and the basis upon which he created a philosophy that was primarily Christian, but also profoundly Platonic.

God

Augustine holds firmly to what he regarded as Catholic orthodoxy on the question of the holy trinity: the father, son and holy spirit are of a single substance (*substantia*) and form a divine unity--not three Gods but one (*DT* 1.4.7). The father alone, son alone, or holy spirit alone are all God, each is as great as the trinity as perfection does not increase when added to perfection (*DT* 6.7.9-8.9; 6.9.10). When Augustine speaks of God, he is speaking of the trinity.

Augustine says that the trinity is one 'substance' or 'essence' either of which are, for him, translations of οὐσία. However, each member of the trinity is distinct and for each relative statements can be made that do not pertain to the other two, i.e. statements that are not germane to οὐσία. Augustine reports that the Greeks distinguish between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, but he does not keep the distinction. Where Greek Christians refer to one οὐσία and three ὑποστάσεις in the trinity, he says there is one essence or substance (*essentia, substantia*) and three persons (*personae, DT* 5.8.10).

What is said of the most exalted (*praestantissima*) being in and of itself is said in respect of substance (*DT* 5.8.9). There is no substantive difference between the father, son and holy spirit, no qualities that one possesses that the others do not. The father is good, the son is good and the holy spirit is good. This does not represent three goods, but one. Whatever is said of God in himself is said both singly of father, son and holy spirit as well as collectively.

Augustine's conception of God, the trinity, is spirit, i.e. God has no physical dimension but is wholly present everywhere (*Conf.* 3.7.12). He is not corporeally perceptible and also transcends the human intellect (*De Vera Religione* 67). He is not subject to passion (*DT* 5.8.9). He is eternal in that he exists outside of time. Rather than our experience of past, present and future, God exercises his infinite understanding by comprehending all in a stable, eternal present (*Conf.* 11.13.16; *CD* 11.21, 12.19). He is omnipotent and immutable, the creator of all good things and

just ruler of all (*LA* 1.5; *CD* 12.2). God controls all creation, nothing happens in it but by his will or permission; as God perceives all in an eternal present, his omniscience includes foreknowledge of every event in the life of the universe (*CD* 5.9).

There is nothing accidental in God; whatever he is, he is essentially (*DT* 5.4.5). There are two aspects to this statement. First, for God, it is not one thing to be and another to be great (*magnus*). For him to be is to be great (*DT* 5.8.9). If somehow he were to cease to be great, he would also cease to be God. God is also essentially great in that he is a transcendent and ideal greatness that is the source of all greatness in the universe. Great things that exist in the world are great by virtue of participation in essential greatness; God is the greatness partaken of by great things (*DT* 5.10.11).

All things predicated of God have the same ontological status. His goodness, eternity, omnipotence, truth, are all essential to God both in that these predicates are not qualities but substance--there is not some time when God is good and another when he is not--and in that he is the source of these qualities in the universe for all things that possess them (*DT* 5.10.11, 15.5.8). God is the source of these qualities for those things that possess them, but his essence is not diminished by their participation in him. God's essential wisdom is the source by which souls become wise, but his wisdom remains (*DT* 7.1.2).¹⁰⁴

The essence of God includes existence itself. When Augustine says that God is the author of all being, he means on the one hand that God created all that exists in the universe. Another sense of this statement is that God is being itself (ὄνσῆς, *CD* 12.2). Augustine interprets *Exodus* 3:14 where God identifies himself as 'he who is' as a statement that God is the highest existence from which all things that exist derive their existence (*CD* 8.11, 12.2). God does not know creatures because they exist; they exist because he knows them (*DT* 15.15.22). There is no other existence in the universe than God and what is derived from God. The only way a nature can be contrary to God is for it not to exist at all (*CD* 12.2). Further, all of God's predicates are one: his wisdom is equal to his greatness, which is equal to his goodness, which is equal to his truth, etc

¹⁰⁴ Augustine describes this relationship between God as the essential source of all qualities and the objects of the world that participate in them with an explicit appeal to the Platonic doctrine of the forms. He understands the forms to be uncreated immutable principles of things and locates them in God's mind (*De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus* 46). In fact, he believes this is Plato's own doctrine (*CD* 12.27). For a discussion of Augustine's understanding of this doctrine and its Middle Platonic origin, see O'Daly (1987), 189-99.

(DT 6.7.8). For Augustine, then, all positive qualities, existence included, are possessed by the things that possess them because they partake in the essential goodness, omnipotence or being that is God. All positive qualities of the universe are 'Godness' of some sort.

While the trinity is a unity for Augustine and is the same as God, the father is not the son, the son is not the father, and the holy spirit is not either of the others (DT 5.8.9). The three persons are distinct and non-essential statements can be made of each that do not apply to the others. All statements that describe one but not the others are not in respect of substance, but are spoken relatively (DT 5.8.9). An example of a statement that seems to make a distinction of substance is that God the father is unbegotten while the son is begotten (*genitus*). Augustine says that while these two terms are diverse, they do not denote a difference of substance, but are relative (DT 5.7.8). The father is not essentially a father nor is the son essentially a son. These terms describe the relationship between these two persons: the father is the father only in respect of the son and only by virtue of the fact that he begot the son; the son is the son only in respect to the father and only by virtue of being begotten by him.

Similarly, the father is called the beginning (*principium*) in relation to those things that are from him (DT 5.13.14). He is the beginning of the son because he begets him, and presumably, although Augustine does not say this, of the holy spirit because that spirit proceeds from the father. The son is also said to be the beginning (John 8:25), but this does not represent a second beginning. In this instance, according to Augustine's interpretation, the title refers only to the fact that the son is co-eternal with the father and also the creator of the universe. Another relative statement is God's title of lord (*dominus*), which, again, is not to be understood substantively. It refers only to his relationship with creatures: he is not essentially a lord, but is called that by human beings by virtue of his rule over them. Augustine rejects the idea of God as an essential lord because that would make the created world co-eternal with him.¹⁰⁵

The essential unity of the trinity does have a footnote: the son possesses a dual status by virtue of his incarnation and human nature. As the son, he was begotten but not created by God, with an equal nature and form to the father, immutable, consubstantial and co-eternal with the

¹⁰⁵ Cf. *De Principiis* 1.2.10 where Origen draws the opposite conclusion about the nature of human souls from his reasoning on the omnipotence of God.

father (*De Libero Arbitrio* 1.5; *CD* 11.10; *Conf.* 7.9.14; *DT* 4.20.27). He is a pure emanation (*manatio*) from God, as light from light (*DT* 4.20.27).

The son's divine nature also includes his role as the Word of God, another relative statement. The father and son together are one wisdom and essence, but not one word. Being described as the word does not denote his substance. The son is the word relative to whose word he is (*DT* 7.2.3). Augustine appears to follow the tradition of identifying the son as the *logos* of God, although he sticks with the Latin *verbum* in most discussions.¹⁰⁶ As the word or wisdom of God, the son is unchanging eternal light, the source of light to the universe (*CD* 11.9). Although Augustine also suggests a difference of substance in his statement that man was made through the son because had he been born of the father, he would be equal to God (*DT* 7.3.5).

The son's role as God incarnate establishes a new status for him. While he is the most perfect human being--he had flesh but did not sin (*CD* 10.24), he took on a real human mind and soul in respect of which he became less than God (*Conf.* 7.19.25; *DT* 1.7.14-10-11.22 and *passim*). The son's human nature allows him to be a mediator between the divine and human realms. The divine never makes direct contact with what is material; even the son, as the divine word, is utterly removed from what is mortal (*CD* 9.15, 17). The son's incarnation somehow accomplished this, proving that the divine nature cannot be polluted by flesh. He became linked to mankind by his mortal body while retaining his eternal place and nature among the divine (*CD* 9.17). References to the son being sent into the world describe his human nature. Being co-eternal with God and equal to the father in omnipresence, the son was already in the world as God (*DT* 2.5.7).

The distinctness of the holy spirit is less well developed by Augustine. He is both the holiness and the spirit of the father and son (*CD* 11.24). The holy spirit proceeds from God, but again, was not created by God so as to imply any inequality between the persons of the trinity (*DT* 2.3.5). The spirit is the love of God as the son is the word of God; the apparent distinction indicating a relative rather than substantial statement (*DT* 15.17.29-30). The holy spirit, like the son, is said to be sent into the world. Again, it is co-eternal and equally omnipresent to God so was in the world already. The sense in which the holy spirit was sent also had to do with the son's

¹⁰⁶ When Augustine discusses the *verbum*, it is clear that he is identifying the word of God with the *logos*. However, he makes the identification explicitly only at *de diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* 63: '*in principio erat verbum' quod Graece logos dicitur Latine et rationem et verbum significat.*

incarnation: Augustine says the impregnation of Mary was accomplished by a manifestation of the holy spirit (per Matt. 1:18, *DT* 2.5.8).

The creator of the universe is God the trinity through the agency of his wisdom and word, the son (*DT* 5.13.14; *CD* 11.9). The word by which God created was intelligible and eternal, not a vocal utterance (*CD* 11.8). The creative action was an expression of God's will, which is eternal, i.e. God wills something once and forever (*Conf.* 12.15.18). That eternal word or reason of God is the beginning from which he created all things and governs the existence of the material world (*Conf.* 11.8.10). God also created a mutable, temporal universe without any change or temporal movement in himself (*DT* 1.1.3).

Augustine conceives of creation as the imparting of form onto formless matter, both of which God made out of nothing by his word (*Conf.* 12.8.8, 13.33.48). Form is immaterial existence, eternal and immutable, that is responsible for investing matter with the qualities that make it into recognisable things. Without form, all mutable things degenerate into nothing (*LA* 2.44-5). So, matter participates in form, which originates in an ideal rather than material world. Matter itself is furthest removed from God, and so is the nearest thing to non-existence (*VR* 21).

The origins of form and matter lie with God. Rather than Plato's demiurge, who assigns order to chaotic matter he has found, Augustine's God created formless, chaotic matter and gave form to it without any interval of time (*Conf.* 13.33.48). He interprets Gen. 1:1, that in the beginning God created the heaven and earth, to stand metaphorically for the creation of a spiritual heaven and formless matter. The heaven he imagines is a spiritual creature and ideal world derived from God that is the form God will assign to formless matter, the 'earth' spoken of in *Gen.*, but not the earth on which we now live (*Conf.* 12.17.24).

In turn, the intellectual creature, this ideal world, derives its attributes from the supreme form, which is truth, making God the first principle of all things (*CD* 11.23). We can understand by truth the unity of God, all of whose predicates are one and are essential. The form that orders the material world is derived from God's transcendent form (*LA* 2.49). Every substance, then, material or immaterial is either God or comes from God (*LA* 3.36). Since God is supreme goodness and supreme existence, all creation shares in God's goodness when it derives its existence from him. All existence is good; God created a good universe because he himself is good (*CD* 11.21; *LA* 2.46).

Among the things created by God is time--temporal extension. Before the creation of the material world, there was nothing, God created time when he created the universe (*CD* 11.13). This was Augustine's answer to critics who asked what God was doing for all that time before he decided to create the universe. All the 'events' attributed to God, including the begetting of the son and proceeding of the holy spirit, are eternal and not within time. The passage of time for Augustine is a mental phenomenon in human beings (*Conf.* 11.27.35-6).¹⁰⁷ God's experience is not of the perception of past, present and future, but awareness of all in a stable and eternal present moment (*CD* 11.21).

Good and Evil

In agreement with all three of the Christian fathers who were examined in the last chapter, Augustine considers God to be absolute essential goodness. God is the one sole simple good, it is not one thing for God to be and another for him to be good; uniquely in the universe God both is and is good (*CD* 11.10; *DT* 6.4.6-5.7). This simple nature of God is one that cannot lose its attributes (*CD* 11.10). Goodness, as all of those things predicated of God, are not qualities but essence, and consequently cannot be taken away without God ceasing to be God.

Good things in the universe have this quality by virtue of their partaking of the absolute goodness, which is God. A concept of this essential goodness can be formed if we consider goodness in all its manifestations, then remove the manifestations, i.e. those things that are good by participation in the good. What is left is goodness itself, which is God (*DT* 8.3.4-5).

The natures of creatures, i.e. of human beings and angels, are good in the sense that they have the potential to live rightly if they wish (*LA* 2.2). Created natures are capable of goodness by participation in the absolute goodness that made them (*CI* 1.8.37). Good angels are good because they continue to participate in God's goodness; evil angels are wretched because they are deprived of participation in God (*CD* 9.15). Man himself can be good by exercising his free will in making right choices (*LA* 2.3).

¹⁰⁷ Augustine has an especially nuanced discussion of the nature of time at *Conf.* 11. Its emphasis is on the nature of time as it is perceived by human beings; an excellent explication of this book is found at O'Daly (1987), 152-61. For the present discussion, however, it is sufficient to note only the existence of Augustine's dichotomy between temporal and eternal.

Augustine says that all goodness, all substance of any kind comes from God; evil, then, is not a substance but an absence of good (*CD* 11.9, 22; *Conf.* 3.7.12; *CI* 1.9.44-5). God created everything good; evil is nothing. A nature does not receive evil by participating in absolute evil, but through the privation of good. There are no natures that are evil, there is no substance that is evil, there is, in fact, no evil in the universe as created by God (*VR* 39, 44; *CI* 1.8.37). The only evil in the universe is in individual wills (angelic and human), and mankind is the author of that evil that he commits (*VR* 44, *LA* 1.1).

For Augustine there is another kind of evil in the universe besides what man commits, that is the evil he suffers. God is the author of this apparent evil; human misery is his just punishment for the evils that men do (*CD* 22.24). In spite of the justice of this suffering, God uses the penalty of human misery for good. Death, for instance, is used to exercise the faith of believers. Augustine says it is good to endure evils piously (*DT* 13.16.20). The suffering of infants is used by God to correct their parents, soften their hearts and exercise their faith (*LA* 3.68). Even animal suffering, surely not a result of sin, has an edifying effect on mankind (*LA* 3.69). God uses human misery in another way, punishing sinners by condemning them to commit more sin. He abandons them to their lusts and punishes them for it by making them commit further sins (*CI* 5.3.10, 5.4.15).

This view of human and animal misery is Augustine's argument against those who cite the apparently unjust suffering of the innocent as an indictment against the justice of God. He says this is like basing criticism of a poem upon the hearing of a single syllable (*VR* 43). Our inability to perceive simultaneously the whole of creation in all its ages makes us unable to perceive the grand order of God, and to understand suffering, even innocent suffering, in its proper context (*Conf.* 3.7.13).

Augustine's thought focuses less on the abstraction of evil than on the more vivid concept of evil doing: sin. He defines sin as a voluntary turning away from the greatest good, which is God, in favour of lesser, temporal goods (*VR* 76). As God is absolute goodness, participating in him fully is the task for mankind. Man generates evil in himself, i.e. he sins, when he values, contemplates, pursues material things for their own sakes and voluntarily abandons the highest good (*VR* 22, 68, 76; *LA* 1.34, 2.53). Augustine emphasises the voluntary nature of sin. He says the sources of sin are spontaneous thought and assenting to persuasion, both of which are voluntary (*LA* 3.29). Because sin is always voluntary, it is always evil and always justly punished (*VR* 27).

The mind commits sin when its intention serves a bad action (*DT* 12.12.17). It is this intention to sin that is an evil will. The intention is brought on by avarice, a desire for more than is sufficient. This desire is an evil will and the root of all evil (*LA* 3.47). Evil will has no cause (*CD* 12.6). There is no efficient cause because an evil will is not effective, but defective. Turning from supreme existence is a defective motion (*CD* 12.7).

For Augustine there are two kinds of sin, one a defective act of will, the other an inherited contagion, original sin. According to this doctrine, every child is born a sinner by virtue of its origin in sexual intercourse (*CD* 16.27). Sex itself, propagation, is God's use of an evil, lust, for a good end, reproduction. Nevertheless, the act still communicates evil to the child who must then be cleansed of the contagion by baptism (*CI* 3.7.15). Original sin is in every infant and is the only sin ascribed to a person who did not will to sin (*CI* 6.9.24).

Augustine conceives of original sin as a manifestation of the corruption of human nature, which is a consequence of Adam's disobedience to God. All broke God's covenant in Adam's first disobedience (*CD* 16.27)¹⁰⁸. As a result, man's mind no longer controls his lust and children were conceived in the evil of lust, which never obeys the will (*CI* 3.13.27-14.28). Infants suffer in this life through God's just punishment of the inherited sin they carry, and which eliminates them from eternal life (*CI* 3.1.4, 4.10). Only baptism can deliver babies from original guilt. Augustine is not sure what happens to unbaptised infants except to say that they do not inherit the kingdom of God (*CD* 2.4.8, 3.12.25).¹⁰⁹

Because the punishments that make up this life must be justly sent by God, Augustine emphasises that sin comes about through man's free will (*LA* 2.3). God created human natures good in that they are capable of good (*CI* 1.8.38). This capability is the result of the gift of free will that lets man choose good and evil freely (*CI* 1.8.40). The cause of all the miseries of this life,

¹⁰⁸ This position depends upon Romans 5:12: *Propterea sicut per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt*. The Latin *in quo*, which translates εφ' ᾧ, allowed Augustine to read the passage 'in whom all sinned'. The Greek fathers read the passage 'in that all sinned' and took Paul's statement to mean that humanity did not inherit Adam's sin, but the penalty he received for his sin, which was death. This issue is prominent in *Contra Iulianum* where Augustine uses Ambrose's authority as evidence for his interpretation of the passage against Julian's view, which appears to be that of the Greeks. In fact, Ambrose seems not to have supported the idea of original sin as Augustine conceives it, but his views are closer to those of Julian. Cf. Blowers, 839.

¹⁰⁹ Kirwan, 71: While this doctrine seems terribly harsh, and earned Augustine criticism from many corners, he found original guilt necessary to escape the argument from evil to atheism--i.e.

the change in our nature that estranged us from God, the prospect of death, and eternal damnation is our own free choice of evil (*LA* 1.35). Given such consequences, it may seem that free will was not such a great gift for God to bestow, however, Augustine's answer is that free will is necessary because no one would have the potential for good, no one could live rightly without making a free choice (*LA* 2.49).

Among the essential properties attributed to God by Augustine is an eternal omniscience that means that he foreknows all events in the universe including the results of our free choice. Augustine spends much energy denying that God's foreknowledge somehow negates our free will in favour of some kind of determinism. Foreknowledge itself is a misnomer. God's awareness is eternal, meaning that he knows events that are the future only by our limited temporal perception. God knows what we will will, but it is still our free choice; his foreknowledge does not compel any to sin (*LA* 3.7; *CD* 14.27). God foresaw evil, but this knowledge does not mean that he created man's nature evil or that he is in any way responsible for the presence of evil in men (*CD* 11.19). There is no determinism, no necessity to man's actions. If God's knowledge denoted necessity, it would mean that man had no free will (*LA* 3.6).

Soul

Augustine shared the conception of soul as the life force of the body. A living thing consists of the body and the soul (*anima*) that gives it life (*CD* 13.24; *BV* 2.7). Death is the separation of the soul from the body (*CD* 13.23). The soul is incorporeal, without any physical dimension, inextended and invisible; it is not material in any way or the blending of bodily elements (*QA* 13; *IA* 17). The human soul is immortal and rational (*DT* 4.5.16; *IA* 1, *QA* 13). Its purpose is to govern the body (*QA* 13; *DT* 14.4.6).

Augustine demonstrates the immortality of the soul by a number of arguments. Deception always exists, he says. The objects of deception are the senses, so the senses always exist. The senses are dependent upon the soul, therefore the soul always exists (*Sol.* 2.1-4). Truth is eternal, a discipline such as grammar or geometry is truth, and so every discipline is in the soul as its subject. If a discipline is immortal, then the soul in which it resides is immortal (*IA* 1; *Sol.* 2.24). In a

the prospect of innocent suffering meant that God was not good or not omnipotent, or simply didn't exist. Augustine chose to argue that innocence was only apparent.

similar argument, he claims that soul is rational in that it has reason in it, that reason and the soul are inseparable, that reason exists forever, and therefore that the soul, which contains reason, is immortal (*IA* 6-11). He also seems to borrow an argument from Plato, stating that as the soul is life, the definition of death is the departure of the soul. The soul cannot depart from itself, i.e. it is life and cannot therefore admit death (*IA* 16, per *Phaedo* 105c-e, though also at Ambrose *BM* 42). These are speculations from early dialogues, but were not supplanted. A late consideration Augustine does make is that the soul is not eternal, i.e. its immortality is not essential. Instead the soul is sempiternal owing to the fact that its immortality is derived from God and can be taken away, metaphorically, through sin and the loss of God (*DT* 4.5.16).

Augustine has many speculations as to the nature of the soul's composition. Generally, he adopts a bipartite division of the soul into rational and irrational faculties; the rational must control the irrational because of the latter's vulnerability to disturbances from the body's emotions and desires.¹¹⁰ Early conceptions include a division of the soul into four elements: one associated with basic biological functions; one with lower human characteristics such as laughter; another associated with higher human characteristics such as love of praise, glory, and ambition; and reason ruling over all of them (*LA* 1.18). He also finds a tripartite division along the lines of mere existence which man shares with plant life, sense perception shared by man with animals, and intelligence, which is unique to man (*LA* 2.7).¹¹¹ A more elaborate system finds seven levels of the soul: life, sensation and lowest biological function, memory, introspection and moral judgement, purification from moral corruption, desire to understand truth, and eternal contemplation of truth (*QA* 33).

The axis upon which Augustine operates most, however, is that of rationality and irrationality. The unique quality of human souls is their rationality. Animal bodies have a living soul (*anima*), but lack the rational spirit (*spiritus*) of human beings (*CD* 13.23). The rational substance of the mind (*mens*) is unique to man, by which he can judge what is unchangeable, discern eternal reasons for corporeal things, cleave to intelligible and unchanging truth; in the well-ordered man it also governs the irrational (*CA* 1.5; *DT* 12.2.2, .3.3, 14.4.6).

¹¹⁰ O'Daly (1986), 322-3.

¹¹¹ Another version of the tripartite division is sense perception, an interior sense that judges sense data and reason (*LA* 2.9-12).

Augustine's interpretation of Gen. 1:26, that man was created in the image of God, is that the image refers to the rational soul, which can use its reason (*ratio*) and intelligence (*intellectus*) for understanding (*intellegendum*) and perceiving (*conspiciendum*) God (*DT* 14.4.6). It is the mind that is in the image of God, not mere life that man shares with animals (*CD* 11.2). The image of God in the soul itself is in the form of a trinity (*DT* 7.6.12, 10.11.18). He finds numerous trinities: the mind's properties of being, knowing and willing; or memory, intelligence and will; or the mind loving itself: lover, loved and the love itself (*DT* 7.6.12 - 9.2.2). Each of these represents a single essence with distinct parts. Love and knowledge, for example, are not contained in the mind as mere qualities, but exist substantially as the mind itself does (*DT* 9.4.5). As in the holy trinity, each part of the mind is predicated relative to the whole, but exists substantially (*DT* 9.4.7).

Augustine is less sure about the origin of the soul. He begins his examination of the question in *LA* by declaring the soul's life prior to this one a mystery (1.24). He continues there to offer four opinions on the origin of souls: that each soul is created specifically for each new person; that the soul is pre-existent and assigned by God to each new person; that a pre-existing soul comes to body of its own accord; and that the soul, like the body, is a product of sexual reproduction (*LA*3.59). After finding fault with each, he seems to throw up his hands claiming not to know where souls come from and that knowledge of the past is not as important as knowledge of the present or future (*LA*3.63). Later, he suggests that all *anima*, including the lower irrational soul, was made by God in the first moment of creation (*de Genesi ad litteram* 5.5.14, 6.6.1).

As mentioned above, Augustine regards death as the separation of soul from body. Soul survives this separation, and is reunited with a resurrected body at the time of judgement. Soul and body then rise to face bliss or unimaginable agony depending upon merit (*DC* 1.38). As his seven levels of soul makes clear, the final home for the soul is an eternal vision and contemplation of the truth--God who created it (*QA* 33). Those who are not saved through God's grace face everlasting death, which is everlasting estrangement from God (*CD* 22.22).

Separation from and Reunion with the Divinity

Man's estrangement from God has two origins. The first is the genesis of evil in the fall of the devil. The devil was an angel, a created spiritual being who turned his will away from God (*CD* 11.9). As God is essential and absolute existence, goodness, omnipotence, truth and every

other quality in the universe, this turning away amounted to a lessening of the devil's own existence, truth, and power. He willed something contrary to God's will; his pride made him turn to himself rather than God. (*VR* 26; *LA*3.76). This prideful choice of self-will over divine will manifested itself spontaneously in the devil's mind and represented the first sin (*LA*3.75). Other angels followed the devil in this sin and were punished by confinement in the lowest parts of the world until the day of judgement (*CD* 11.33).

The second source of mankind's estrangement from God is his own sin, which was brought about by the evil of the devil. Mankind existed in a spiritual and material paradise, which provoked envy in the fallen devil. Desiring to corrupt man, he deceived Eve into disobeying God's command not to eat of the forbidden fruit. This introduced disobedience and evil into paradise. But the first sin was Adam's. While Eve was deceived by the devil in his serpent guise, Adam chose to join her in disobedience (*CD* 14.11). Adam's sin was, in fact, the same as the devil's. His act of disobedience was preceded by an evil will: following his own will rather than God's. The corrupted soul loves its own power and seeks something beyond God's law. It is a sin to desire what God forbids (*DT* 12. 9.14;*CD* 14.10). By this act of will, he turned away from God toward himself, and committed man's first sin (*CD* 14.13).

Man's soul was corrupted by the sin of the will (*CI* 1.5.10). After that first sin, man's nature changed; his soul became vulnerable to the violent and conflicting emotions of the body, which had previously been under its will (*CD* 14.12, 21). His body became subject to decay and death as a consequence (*CD* 14.1; *DT* 13.16.20). Sin also changed the nature of procreation. Before the fall, there was sexual union without lust, which either did not exist or followed the will (*CI* 3.25.57, *DT* 13.18.23). Had man not sinned, man would have continued to exist in paradise, being fruitful and multiplying in lustless sexual union until it had produced the number of predestined *sancti*. Thereafter there would have been the bliss of the angels: no sin, no death, no fear or desire (*CD* 14.11). Instead, through Adam's first sin, man became subject to death, life on the earth became a hell on earth and lust became necessary for sexual union. The last became the mechanism for the inheritance of original sin that marked every human child thereafter (*CI* 3.26.59).

Because of man's limited and temporal perspective, it seems that after the creation, God responds to events. He punished Adam and Eve for their sin, he prepared hell for sinners and he

created a plan to save humanity from its just punishment of eternal estrangement. Actually, all these things are part of his foreordained and unchanging plan for the universe (*CD* 12.22). Before the creation, God foreknew that Adam would sin, fall and make all mankind subject to death (*CD* 12.23). He also foresaw those who were predestined to be saved through his grace and have eternal life (*CD* 14.27). He could have prevented man's fall, or the devil's fall. Instead, he wanted to keep their free will intact. God's plan controls the universe and man's sin does not change that plan at all (*CD* 14.27).

Mankind's reunion with God, man's salvation, is part of God's plan. Christianity is God's dispensation to man's salvation; Christ's incarnation is evidence of his mercy (*VR* 19-20, 30). Those who believe by faith will be saved. These are pre-destined by God's grace and not because of their own merit. (*CI* 5.4.14, *DT* 5.6.17). The exact number of predestined elect is the same as the number of angels who sinned with the devil and fell into permanent estrangement from God (*CD* 11.13). No one deserves salvation, but God's grace is given gratuitously. All those saved are saved because God is merciful; those who are condemned are condemned justly. The saved have no cause for pride, the condemned no cause for complaint (*CI* 4.8.41, 46). Those who are pre-destined not to be saved participate in God's plan by existing for the benefit of the elect; they show those who are saved, but don't deserve to be, their rightful due (*CI* 4.8.45, 5.4.14). The predestined condemned include babies who died unbaptised, but in spite of appearances, God does nothing unjustly (4.8.44-6).

The importance of Augustine's Christian ethic lies in the mediator, the necessity of which God foresaw and provided as means to salvation for mankind (*CD* 12.23).¹¹² The son is the mediator in that he acquired a human nature when he became incarnate, but retained his divine nature (*CD* 9.15). His most important role in God's plan of salvation is as a sacrifice that redeems sinners and enables them to have eternal life (*DT* 4.2.4, 13.10.13-14). Augustine asserts that the son is the principle (rather than principles, as Porphyry would have it) that purifies the soul and the flesh of sinners (*CD* 10.24). The sacrifice is the crucifixion. The son, being perfect, did not deserve death, but undertook it as a substitute for the death deserved by humans. The sin of Adam placed man in subjection to the devil (*DT* 3.11.15-12.16). Augustine puts responsibility on the devil for the son's crucifixion. The son became subject to the devil, endured death, and conquered

the devil and death by righteousness (*DT* 13.14.18-15,19). The result is that those among mankind who believe that Jesus was the incarnated son of God benefit from this sacrifice by having their just punishment, the second death of the soul, rescinded (*DT* 13.16.20).

The son's sacrifice was a premise for salvation. He also led a perfect human life and stands as an example to all who aspire to live rightly (*VR* 31-4). The most salient feature of the son's life, and the feature men are to imitate, is his esteem of the immaterial rather than the material. Following this example is the process of sanctification (*DT* 14.16.22-17.23). It makes men more like God and makes men draw nearer to reunion with God (*CD* 9.17). In the same way that turning the will away from God engendered evil in our souls and began our estrangement from God, turning our minds from the temporal to eternal and ascending from the corporeal to spiritual leads to purification from sin and reunion with God.¹¹³

Augustine gives his own personal example of such an ascent in the *Confessions*. The ascent is a product of introspection (7.10). His made his own ascent in the course of conversation with his mother, Monica, while in Ostia following his conversion. They discussed the life of the *sancti*. The discussion led them past sensual pleasures and began an ascent through various levels of bodily existence in the heavens: the sun, moon and stars. Beyond that they came to their own souls, then beyond their souls to the region of unending abundance (*regionem ubertatis indeficientis*), which is eternal wisdom. In that instant, they were able to partake of eternal wisdom before having to return to the temporal (9.10).¹¹⁴

Ascent to knowledge of eternal wisdom requires purification of the mind. Augustine conceives of the process of purification as a trek to our homeland, a flight from this world, which is made possible only by grace (*DC* 1.12; *CI* 2.9.2). Unlike the philosophers who believe that one can purify one's soul for contemplation of God by the exercise of virtue, Augustine holds that it is God who moves us from the temporal to eternal (*VR* 45). Sin disqualifies man from true understanding of God. It represents a barrier between man and God that can be purged away only by God.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Burnaby, 72.

¹¹³ O'Daly (1986), 324.

¹¹⁴ Augustine's is unique among descriptions of introspective ascent in that it was achieved while in conversation. Otherwise, the account owes much to *Ennead* 5.1.2. See the entry for *Confessions* 9.10.25 in the *Previous Citations* list of Chapter 5, also Henry (1981), 16-17.

¹¹⁵ Burnaby, 71; 75.

Salvation, then, requires freedom from sin. As sin includes both wilful acts and inherited contagion, it requires two processes for purification both of which are initiated by God. First, every infant must be baptised to purify it from original sin passed to it through the lust by which it was conceived. The second is belief in Jesus as the incarnated son, which includes imitating his perfect human life by moving the mind from the temporal to eternal. This also is possible only through God's initiation. One's salvation from or condemnation to eternal torment was predestined before the creation of the world, and entirely dependent upon God's grace. This is God's plan and is entirely just.

Augustine held to a doctrine of bodily resurrection. The soul survives the death of the body, ultimately to face eternal bliss or torment. For Augustine, the body was then resurrected, in an incorruptible, spiritual, immortal and eternal condition, at the time of judgement to join the soul in its fate (*CD* 13.17, 22, 23, 22.16; *DT* 14.18.24; *DC* 1.36, 38). Although the doctrine of bodily resurrection had been advanced by Christians before (e.g. Origen *DP* 2.10.1; Ambrose *BM* 10.45), such a doctrine goes against the current of Platonic separation of body and soul. Augustine reached back to Plato himself for support, pointing out that the demiurge created stars as lesser Gods with eternal bodies of fire (*CD* 13.17 per *Timaeus* 41a-d, *CT* 11.40-1). The doctrine inspired more practical criticisms as well. Augustine was compelled to argue that infants and children are resurrected as adults, women maintain their feminine form but lose the ability to inspire lust in men, and that in the case of cannibalism, flesh returns to the original owner rather than remain with its consumer (*CD* 22.14, 17, 20).

The fate shared by body and soul included eternal life for the righteous. The body was renewed as a perfect entity containing some properties of the spirit. The mind was renewed in the image of God which means it regained the ability to effortlessly control the desires of the body and cease the struggle between spirit and flesh, and between rational and irrational soul, that tested it throughout earthly life (*DT* 14.16.21, 24; *CD* 21.3).

The resurrected self may include a body, but the condition of the body seems spiritual and so it is difficult to see what role body has in an eternal reward. The bliss of the afterlife as described by Augustine is an intellectual phenomenon. The soul returns to its home, i.e. is reunited with God, and enjoys an eternity of vision and contemplation (*QA* 33). The *sancti* possess everlasting peace that is both an end to the struggles between body and spirit as well as an end to

the striving after God. Those in eternal paradise see God face to face in that they know his revelation fully and in that in the renewed body, vision is capable of seeing the immaterial (*CD* 22.29). The work of rational process is no longer necessary as the mind enjoys the repose of eternal contemplation (*DT* 15.25.45). This contemplation does not imply a unity with God, however. Augustine is explicit that even when we become like God, i.e. are renewed in God's image, we are never equal to him (*DT* 15.16.26).

The punishment endured by the unsaved does have a physical dimension. On the one hand, there is the metaphysical language of the second death, the death of the soul, which suggests a punishment of eternal non-existence. As the body dies when the soul leaves it, the soul dies when God abandons it (*DT* 4.3.5). Given that God is the absolute of every quality and every substance and that to possess these qualities and substances is to participate in God, the second death seems to amount to an absence of all qualities and substance up to and including existence. Augustine, however, does not consistently subscribe to this metaphysical hell. Instead, he interprets literally those verses of the New Testament that foresee a punishment of eternal fire for the devil and his angels (e.g. Matt. 25:41, Rev. 20:10). He imagines this fire as a genuinely eternal (i.e. without temporal end) bodily punishment, not a temporary purgation. While all who are not saved suffer this eternal torture, he concedes that there are varying degrees of punishment meted out according to merit. Unbaptised infants receive the lightest condemnation of all (*CI* 5.11.44).

The Happy Life

The happy life for Augustine is one that achieves eternal life after death. Three aspects of such a life include purification of the mind, right conduct, and above all faith. Eternal life is provided only for those who believe in God and particularly that Jesus was the incarnated son. Faith is accepting a truth based upon the authority of God in the form of the scriptures rather than insisting upon empirical evidence. The truth of God and particularly of the trinity is beyond human understanding (*CD* 11.2, *DT* 7.6.2). In fact, it is error to seek God by mortal reasoning or try and understand him by virtue of our intellect alone (*DT* 1.1.1). God must be known by faith before he can be known by reason (*DT* 8.4.6). Faith is the starting point of divine knowledge (*DT* 9.1.1). We will not seek anything unless we believe there is something to find and God gave faith to us so

we would believe we need his help (UC 28-9; CD 19.4). Given this, Augustine urges us to believe and seek to understand the trinity with God's help (DT 9.1.1).

While faith may appear to be an anti-rational position for a philosophising church father, Augustine arrived at the state of faith, that of believing on authority, by contemplation (*Conf.* 6.5.7). It does seem rationally indefensible to believe what cannot be scientifically demonstrated. Upon reflection on the sources of knowledge, however, Augustine came to believe that reason is very often based upon authority. Friendship, for example, is possible only if we believe a friend's testimony on his authority alone (UC 24). Any knowledge we possess of the material world that was not gathered first hand relies upon the authority of books or verbal testimony including stories of other lands or of past events in history (*Trin.* 15.12.21; UC 25). Finally, even so basic a matter as our own parentage cannot be rationally proved without reliance on authority (UC 26). Paternity, so Augustine says of his time, was proved by the testimony of the mother. Even the fact of maternity depended upon testimony of the mother and other witnesses. One can only be sure of his parentage if he accepts the authority of their testimony. Children would not serve their parents unless they could believe entirely in the facts of their parentage as reported by others and accepted on faith.

Faith in authority, then, is a fully valid intellectual concept. At some point it must be recognised as the basis for most of our knowledge of the material world, i.e. all that we do not perceive directly must be accepted on authority. It is not only a legitimate basis for conclusion, but also an absolutely necessary one for the health and well being of society, and for the achievement of the purification of mind that is required to gain wisdom. It allows one to be guided by the authority of scripture, which can dispel the pride that afflicts philosophers and distracts them from truth. It is the necessary first step that places a person on the path of wisdom and provides the motivation both to seek and to become worthy of that wisdom.

Faith in the existence of God leads to our desire of him. Faith in Jesus as the son of God entails following his example in leading a good life. Living rightly is striving toward God and imitating Jesus' contempt for the earthly, the material, the transitory, and the temporal. Augustine says the world is divided into things we enjoy (*fruor*) because they make us happy in and of themselves, and things we use (*utor*) to bring us those things we enjoy. Only what is eternal is to be enjoyed for itself, i.e. the holy trinity; all else is to be used (DC 1.9). This precept assumes the

premise that God is the highest good. To enjoy anything else is to elevate a lower good above the supreme good--to value a something that derives its goodness from elsewhere rather than the source of the goodness itself. Such misapplication of values was the cause of the falls of the devil and of man.

If we enjoy only God, the answers to questions regarding certain practical matters become apparent. The desires of the body should be minimised. Augustine advises the Christian to seek bodily tranquillity by abstaining from what is unnecessary including excessive eating, drinking, sleep or sex. Any pleasure of the body is to be avoided if undertaken for its own sake. He also warns against intellectual indulgence, saying Christians should avoid astrology, pagan religions and other superstitions. He warns that while knowledge of the material world is sometimes useful in helping us understand scripture, to pursue knowledge for its own sake is a vice. Burdensome pagan studies are to be avoided.

In addition to warnings against material and intellectual indulgence, Augustine warns also against emotional indulgence in the form of excessive love of humanity. Man is to be used and not enjoyed (*DC* 1.38). Love of another person is temporal and carnal. Such a love was the cause of the fall (*VR* 88). A person should strive toward God and desire the eternal. When a person loves himself for himself rather than on account of God, it amounts to a love of a lesser good. So when we are instructed: love your neighbour as yourself, Augustine says this means to love your neighbour on account of God and not for himself (*DC* 1.42-3). If we enjoy only God, we do not love a friend for himself, but on account of God (*Conf.* 4.9.14). Further, we should not even love our own children because they are ours, but what in them belongs to God. A genuine love of God, eternal truth, calls us toward what is incorporeal. If we love what we are called toward, we must hate what we are being called away from including our friends and family (*VR* 88). One who loves God will not be sad at the death of any person, nor made unhappy by the unhappiness in others (*VR* 91).¹¹⁶

Augustine is aware that Christians are not the only people who aspire to a happy life by seeking what is eternal and living a life of moderation. Theirs is false virtue, however. Good works do not help pagans, Jews or heretics, but only the faithful (*DT* 12.7.11). Man's will is capable of good only by divine grace. The apparent virtues of pagans are in the acts rather than in

the will. If a pagan couple demonstrate modesty or a pagan man demonstrates charity, these are not the genuine virtues (*CI* 3.15, 16, 30). Real virtue comes about by a desire to gain true wisdom, Christian truth. Real virtue must be the product of faith and an inclination toward what is eternal (*CI* 4.3.18, *DT* 14.1.3). Even mercy, when it is counter to the will of God, is evil. Genuine virtue must entail belief in God and a desire to act according to his will.

Augustine suggests that the life that leads to eternal life includes faith, love of what is eternal and living rightly. What seems to undermine his conception of the happy life is predestination. Before the creation of the universe, God knew the identities of the elect who would be saved, and knew that their number would be only as great as the number of angels who fell with the devil. All others exist to benefit the elect. Further, an inclination toward the eternal is a gift from God; the type of ascent Augustine and his mother made at Ostia is not possible for the unaided human intellect. The ability to live rightly is reserved for believers and the faith that leads to belief is also a gift from God not brought about by any human action. Genuine desire to show goodness for those who do not receive these gifts is sin that condemns them. God's gifts are bestowed as a result of God's will and not due to merit. Without these gifts, even the most well intended non-believer is condemned.

Perhaps because of this lurking shadow over human endeavours, Augustine rejects the possibility of genuine happiness in this life. The change in our nature due to the first sin made life on this earth a hell, a punishment. Even if we manage to live virtuously, our minds forever struggle against the desires of our bodies and emotions. Our condition is one of constant war (*CD* 19.4). Further, whatever peace and contentment we may know in this life cannot in the end make us happy. All human good qualities are fallible and can be lost; the potential for sin is always with us (*CD* 19.4, *CI* 2.4.8). The only happiness can come in expectation of the world to come (*CD* 19.4). Genuine happiness means immunity from death, deception and distress, and assurance that one is forever immune (*CD* 14.25). The war in our minds, the temptations of our bodies, the anxiety over our mortality, the fear over losing what we love and the futility of our attempts at virtue are unavoidable parts of earthly existence. For Augustine, true happiness cannot be found in this life.

¹¹⁶ One is reminded of Augustine's shame at his show of grief during Monica's funeral (*Conf.* 9.13).

Summary

Augustine's conception of God is speculation beginning with the Catholic orthodox position that the divinity is a trinity made of father, son and holy spirit. His formula for this is that the three are a unity, three persons but one substance. For Augustine, 'God' and 'the trinity' are interchangeable. God is an incorporeal spirit, immutable, omnipotent, just and eternal. God has no accidental properties; all predicates of God are substantive. When we say God is great, we mean that God is absolute greatness and that all great things in the universe are great by virtue of participating in the greatness that is God. We also mean that God is essentially great: there is no time when he is not great. For God, to be and to be great is the same. This is true of all his predicates, which are all equalities and form a unity (God's goodness=God's greatness=God's omnipotence=God's justness, etc.). Among God's predicates is existence, so God is existence itself. All that exists does so only by partaking of God's existence. The three persons who make up the trinity are all co-equal, co-eternal and consubstantial, but statements are made of each that do not apply to the others. These are to be understood as statements of relation and not essence.

The son is distinct from the other two in that he had a divine and human nature by virtue of his incarnation. In his human nature, he is less than the father or holy spirit, or even himself in his divine nature. The son is the word and wisdom of God, the means of creation of God. Augustine follows the tradition of equating the son with the logos of Greek philosophy: God's divine mind and creating principle. Augustine also holds the orthodox positions that the son is the mediator between the divine and human and that he occupies a central role in the process of reuniting man with God.

Augustine is more intent on preserving the integrity of the holy trinity than he is on working out precisely what the holy spirit entails. Relative statements about it that shed some light on its nature include that it is the spirit of the father and the son and is the love of God in the same way that the son is the word of God. The holy spirit is also somehow responsible for the incarnation of the son.

Augustine is merely orthodox by attributing creation of the material universe to God, who creates everything from nothing by means of his word. Augustine expounds upon this concept of creation by the word, asserting that the son is this word, and that the word is not a spoken utterance in time, but an eternal act of will. He holds that the heaven and earth God created first were an

ideal world containing the ideal forms of all objects that would appear in the material world, and formless matter onto which God imparted form, although without an interval of time.

Augustine's examination of the nature of time is more thorough and complex than that of any previous Christian writer. He describes time as a mental phenomenon that is exclusively a quality of material life. God, the trinity, is outside of time. Instead, he exists in eternity where his perception is not subject to distinctions of past, present and future. In his omniscience, God perceives all events in a stable present moment. We can speak of events that took place outside of time only metaphorically, as the word 'event' implies temporal sequence. So, while it would seem logical to demand that the father pre-existed the son because he begot him, that 'event' took place outside of time and does not suggest temporal priority.

Good, for Augustine, is God. He is absolute and essential goodness. All good things that exist in the world are good by virtue of their participation in God's absolute goodness. Such a system demands that evil is not a substance at all, but the relative absence of goodness.

The evil that exists in the universe exists only in individuals, and man is the author of that evil. His voluntary turning away from the essential good is sin, the actions of an evil will. There is no outside source of this evil in man's will. It appears spontaneously and is the outcome of man's misuse of God's gift of free will. There is also apparent evil in the universe, the evil that man suffers. This is not evil at all, but God's just punishment for sin. Every apparent injustice in the world is part of this just punishment. Man would see the justice in it if his perspective were not temporal and imperfect.

There are two kinds of sin for Augustine, the voluntary act of will and original sin. Original sin is not the first sin of Adam, but a contamination of the nature of each human being, which is punishment for that first sin. Among the changes to man's nature that resulted from Adam's disobedience is the necessity for lust in the reproductive process. Lust is an evil, which God uses for good in reproduction. However, it is still evil and infects each child born from sexual reproduction. Infants who suffer in this life do so deservedly because of their contamination by original sin.

The soul, for Augustine, is *anima*, the life force of the body. This *anima* is incorporeal and immortal. He conceives of the soul's composition as bipartite: an irrational element that is responsible for the biological functions and emotions and a rational element that governs the

irrational in the well-ordered man. When scripture describes man as having been created in God's image, Augustine says the statement refers to the rational element, or *spiritus*. This rational element contains trinities, which reflect a single essence with distinct parts, which mark the *spiritus* as an image of the divine trinity.

Augustine is non-committal about the origin of the soul. He sees problems with any explanation and generally declines to reach conclusion. He understands death as the separation of soul from body. Soul survives this process to face judgement, then either eternal bliss or punishment.

Separation from the divinity, for Augustine, is a fall from an original state of perfection precipitated by an evil will turning away from God in disobedience. This act estranged the perpetrator and all of mankind from God.

Reunion is part of God's grand plan. He foresaw the commission of sin and provided a means of salvation for mankind who would otherwise be lost to death of the body and a second death afterwards of eternal estrangement of the soul from God. The mechanism for carrying out this salvation is the incarnation of the son. His death was a sacrifice that saved mankind from the necessity of this second death. His life was an example for living rightly in that he valued only the spiritual and despised the material.

Augustine also held the uniquely Christian belief of the resurrection of the body. The soul separates from the body upon death, but is reunited with a body that has spiritual properties in advance of judgement. The body then shares the soul's fate in eternal contemplation of God or eternal estrangement from God and subjection to torture in eternal fire. This punishment is not purgative or temporary, as it appears in Clement and Origen, for whom it is a stage in the process of universal salvation. Instead, it is a permanent state of torture for non-believers.

The happy life, for Augustine, is one that leads to eternal life. The characteristics of such a life include faith in God and in the fact that Jesus is the incarnated son. This faith makes the believer a beneficiary of the son's sacrifice, and eligible for eternal life. The happy life must also be one that follows the example shown by Jesus. This means seeking the eternal and despising the material. Augustine understands this as enjoying only what makes us happy and is intrinsically good, namely God. He says all else is to be used in an effort to enjoy God. Practically, this means minimising the desires of the body, attending to its needs as they become necessary, not taking

pleasure in them. The Christian should not seek knowledge for its own sake. The Christian should also be aware of the temporal nature of his love for human beings, and not love himself, his friends, his family or even his children for themselves. He claims a real Christian does not grieve at anyone's death nor is unhappy at the unhappiness of any other.

The concept of the happy life ultimately breaks down for Augustine due to his adherence to the doctrine that God is responsible for all good things. The process of salvation includes faith, which purifies the soul and prepares it for seeking God, and the following of Jesus' example of conduct. These are good things, and must ultimately come from God. There is no belief and no virtue without God's grace. Human beings have no say in participating in the process of salvation. The elect were predestined from before the beginning of the world. Consequently, there is no happiness possible in this earthly life where we are punished for sin. We must wait for the next life to achieve real happiness. Even then, however, happiness will be realised by the elect only, who played no part in their own salvation.

Conclusion

It is fairly easy to establish a doctrinal relationship between Augustine's works and Plato's, as is clear from the previous chapters. Augustine accepts the most basic Platonic premise, that of the dichotomy of material and immaterial existence. Like Plato, he understands God to be eternal, immutable and immaterial. He shares Plato's belief that this immaterial God created the material world. Augustine also follows Plato's conception of immaterial forms that are the source of all properties possessed by objects in the material world.

Plato states that God is responsible for all good things. Augustine believes the same thing. He even declares that God is the metaphysical source of all goodness in the universe, ascribing to God attributes very much like those Plato attributes to the Idea of Good. While each believes that God created the material universe, neither attribute to God responsibility for the presence of evil in that universe.

Both Plato and Augustine hold that man possesses a soul, which is a product of the immaterial world and man's link to that world. Each understands the soul to possess rational and irrational elements. Each believes that the soul survives the body to be judged according to its

actions in its incarnated existence. Each believes further that the judged soul will be punished or rewarded, and further that the ultimate reward will be eternity with the deity.

Plato and Augustine agree that humanity is estranged from the divine, although their explanations of this separation have significant differences. For each, however, human nature as it is now constituted is corrupt because of the taint of carnal existence on the pure rationality of soul. Each also holds that there is a possibility for return to purer spiritual existence, and that this return requires a human being to purge himself of this taint and ascend via the intellect from material to immaterial existence.

In addition to those suggested above, there are many very specific doctrinal correspondences between Plato and Augustine. Augustine follows Plato in defining the soul as the life force that animates the body (*CD* 13.24; *BV* 2.7 and *Phaedo* 105d), and shares his definition of death as the separation of the soul from body (*CD* 13.23 and *Phaedo* 64c). Augustine also understands the act of creation to consist of God imposing order onto matter (*CD* 11.15, 12.8, 13.33), following Plato's description (*Tim.* 30a). Further, Augustine's highly nuanced discussion of the natures of time and eternity at *Conf.* 11 owes something to Plato's analysis from *Tim.* 37d-38e: each holds that God created time when he created the material world. Each also contrasts human experience of past, present and future with eternal perception of all events in a perpetual present.

While it is clear from the preceding chapters that a doctrinal relationship exists between Plato's works and Augustine's, it is equally clear that the establishment of this relationship is not the same thing as a determination of direct influence of one upon the other. Augustine is introduced to Christianity in his adulthood through the Christian Platonist Ambrose and a Christian Platonist community in Milan. He is a self-conscious follower of that tradition and believes Plato to have been divinely inspired. He understands Paul's allusion to philosophers who discover God but do not worship him (*Rom.* 1.20-23) as a reference to the Platonists.

A Platonist doctrinal tradition had been established that was already ancient in Augustine's time; there was also a well-established Christian Platonist tradition that had introduced and refined a Platonist hermeneutics. The result is a body of doctrine that was more or less uniformly held by Platonists on both sides of the divide. The conception Augustine has of God as an immaterial, eternal and immutable trinity is the standard view of all the Christian Platonists

reviewed in this thesis. Their position is, in turn, an adaptation from Middle and Neoplatonist refinements of Plato's original conception of the deity. Plato's conception of God as the source of all goodness in the universe was altered by the Middle Platonists, but re-established and refined by Plotinus. The conception of God as synonymous with good is a standard Christian Platonist position by Augustine's time. Likewise, all Platonists, Christian and pagan, follow Plato's conception of the soul as immortal and the body's life force. All accept the idea of a judgement of the soul after its separation from the body after which it would be rewarded or punished. The similarity between Augustine's and Plato's positions regarding the estrangement of humanity from God is also a similarity Augustine shares with every pagan and Christian Platonist. The potential for reunion with the deity and that reunion depending upon a life of freedom from the demands of the body and rational control of the passions are also positions uniformly held in the Platonic tradition. Augustine departs markedly from that tradition only where Christian doctrine demands it: he denies metempsychosis and asserts God's caring for humanity and the incarnation of Christ.

The longevity and ubiquity of the Platonic tradition represent virtually insurmountable problems for the scholar intent on establishing source and influence based upon doctrinal similarities. The survey of pagan and Christian Platonist positions in this thesis is limited in terms of philosophers and doctrines. That several possible sources for any given Augustinian position suggest themselves from this survey is only a hint at the extent of the difficulty faced by the doctrinal scholar. The source for any given doctrine of Augustine's could be one of the thinkers represented in this survey or could be any number of lesser figures known to scholars or among those lost to us in time. The source may be any number of philosophical handbooks or commentaries that circulated throughout the Latin west; again, these may be known, known of, or altogether lost. Finally, Augustine lived among a Christian Platonist community in Milan. The oral tradition may account for his doctrinal sources.

So many permutations of Platonic doctrine, both written and oral, were available to Augustine that it is beyond the ability of doctrinal analysis to establish any given source. Doctrinal comparisons between Augustine and the tradition may be able to eliminate parts of that tradition. O'Daly, for example, is able to eliminate Plato as a source for Augustine with respect to the forms by identifying in Augustine's position the Middle Platonic innovation of the forms as ideas in the

mind of God.¹¹⁷ While this may establish a *terminus post quem* in a source study, it cannot positively establish a link with any given source after that point. Doctrinal analysis can then proceed to ever more nuanced comparisons between texts, but must ultimately cross the line into philological analysis if it is to make that positive link.

¹¹⁷ O'Daly (1987), 193.

CHAPTER FOUR

Literature Review and Method

This chapter discusses the studies that have addressed the question of Augustine's sources in the 20th century, each of which are studies in *Quellenforschung*. After enumerating and commenting upon each of these studies, the chapter will point out the methodological deficiencies of *Quellenforschung* and offer an alternative for further research into the question. A discussion will follow of the phenomenon of literary allusion especially as it relates to the literature of ancient Rome. The chapter will then discuss intertextuality and describe the function of literary allusion within a proposed theory of literary production. A new method of addressing Augustine's citations will then be proposed, which will recognise the identified shortcomings of *Quellenforschung*. The chapter will conclude with a justification of the proposed method and speculation on the nature of the expected results of its application.

Literature Review

The question of Augustine's sources has been taken up many times in the scholarship, almost exclusively as studies in *Quellenforschung*, i.e. those that 'proceed from surviving works to a comparison with other surviving works of ancient literature and usually confine themselves to identifying parallels between various literary artefacts.'¹¹⁸ As applied, the method consists of identifying parallel passages from the works of an author and those of a putative source. These passages are then compared for doctrinal similarities, for grammatical similarities such as vocabulary or syntax, or for textual similarities; i.e. phrases or sentences that are alike in both works.¹¹⁹ Augustine's work has been subjected to many versions of these studies and a consensus has emerged with respect to his reading of both Greek and Latin source material.

The following review lists chronologically the methods and findings of all 20th century studies in *Quellenforschung* that address Augustine's reading of Plato, as well as several others that examined his Greek or Latin sources generally. The results of those studies that dealt with

¹¹⁸ O'Donnell (1980), 145.

¹¹⁹ Courcelle (1969), 5-7.

Augustine's reading of Plato will be discussed in greater detail after the review; their findings will be examined citation by citation in the next chapter.

In the first analysis of the question in the 20th century, Angus seeks to ascertain the identity of all the sources Augustine used in composing the first ten books of *De Civitate Dei*.¹²⁰ He began by identifying every case in these books where a literary source was required, then read all of Augustine's principal works for quotations to establish his familiarity with various authors. Finally, Angus read all of the works in Latin or Greek that Augustine might have had at his disposal as well as some that he could not have known to compare them with passages identified as needing a literary source in *De Civitate Dei*.¹²¹ The comparisons he makes include doctrinal, grammatical and philological similarities, but are not specified as such. Angus rules out any original Greek sources for Augustine by determining from the content and manner of his Greek citations that the bishop did not know that language sufficiently to read original texts. He finds that Plato's works were not among the *libri Platoniorum* Augustine spoke of at *Conf.* 7.16.23. Angus says that Augustine had not only never read Plato in Greek, but also had never read a complete translation of any Platonic work.¹²² He dismisses the internal evidence of *De Beata Vita* 1.4, in which Augustine claims to have read *paucissimis libris Platonis*, as a scribal error: suggesting *Plotini* rather than *Platonis*.¹²³ Augustine's knowledge of Platonism came instead, he says, from partial translations such as Cicero's *Timaeus*, works of the Church Fathers, from Neoplatonist readings--Plotinus and Porphyry--and from an oral tradition.¹²⁴

The goal of Alfarc's study is to reconstitute Augustine's intellectual evolution. He began by reading all of Augustine's works in the order of their composition, per the *Retractationes*, and examined all the biographical details of the bishop as presented in the *Confessions* and his letters.¹²⁵ Independently of Angus, Alfarc concludes that Augustine did not know enough Greek to read original writings. Finding a series of literal citations ascribable to various Platonic dialogues,

¹²⁰ Angus (1906).

¹²¹ Angus, 6-8.

¹²² Angus, 240.

¹²³ Angus, as most modern scholars who follow him, chooses *Plotini* as *lectio difficilior*.

¹²⁴ Angus, 242.

¹²⁵ Alfarc (1918), III-V.

he does, however, find that Augustine had read translations of the *Phaedo* and *Timaeus* and possibly others.¹²⁶

Alfaric uses internal evidence to identify the *libri Platoniorum* of *Conf.* 7.9.13. At *CD* 8.12, Augustine names Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus and Apuleius as those whom he regards as Platonists. Alfaric eliminates the Latin Apuleius because Augustine had said at *Conf.* 7.9.13 that the works he read had been translated from Greek into Latin. Iamblichus is eliminated because there is no other evidence of Augustine's familiarity with him.¹²⁷ Citing *BV* 1.4, Alfaric points out Augustine's explicit mention of Plotinus as a source, reading *Plotini* rather than *Platonis*. Finally, he conducts a doctrinal analysis, comparing *Conf.* 7.13.23 with Platonic and Plotinian source material to conclude a relationship with the latter.¹²⁸ Alfaric finds Plotinus and Porphyry as the primary sources of Augustine's Platonism with Plato himself only a partial influence. His conclusions with regard to Plotinus are based upon similarities of doctrine and terminology; the conclusions concerning Porphyry are based upon doctrinal similarities.¹²⁹

Combès lists three sources of information that he uses in his own source study: internal evidence from Augustine's writings, Augustine's citations of Greek and Latin sources and ancient doctrines his writings espouse.¹³⁰ He also uses internal evidence in the same way as Alfaric in order to narrow the field of potential Platonists to Plotinus and Porphyry. Consistent with previous studies, Combès reads *BV* 1.4 as *Plotini*.¹³¹ His conclusion is that the *libri Platoniorum* consisted of works by Plotinus. He conducts a predominantly doctrinal analysis to conclude that Augustine had read a small number of Greek philosophical texts in translation, including some Platonic dialogues, but that Augustine's Greek did not allow him to read originals.¹³² Augustine's main source of Platonism was a variety of secondary works in Latin.¹³³

Theiler's study is an entirely doctrinal comparison concerned with the identity of the *libri Platoniorum*. Having eliminated Plato as a possibility, he looks instead to establish a doctrine in Augustine that can conclusively be called Porphyrian: 'If, in a post-Plotinian Neoplatonist, a

¹²⁶ Alfaric, 231-2.

¹²⁷ Alfaric, 375.

¹²⁸ Alfaric, 376.

¹²⁹ Alfaric, 516-18.

¹³⁰ Combès (1927), 1.

¹³¹ Combès, 10.

¹³² Combès, 14.

¹³³ Combès, 29-33.

doctrine appears that can be compared in content, form and context to one in Augustine, but not, or not to the same degree, to one in Plotinus, it can be regarded as Porphyrian.¹³⁴ He concludes that the *libri Platoniorum* are entirely works of Porphyry.

Henry's 1934 study endeavours to measure Plotinus' influence on the Latin west. He lists three types of indications that are methodologically sound as indications of one author's debt to another: historical testimonies from an author or his contemporaries; textual citations whether explicit or not; and a collection of precise allusions to the source used by an author.¹³⁵ His method is primarily literary and uses doctrinal similarities as evidence of influence only if they are presented with some sort of mark that makes the doctrine's origin clear or in an immediate context that clearly suggests a borrowed concept.¹³⁶

Attempting to identify the *libri Platoniorum*, Henry begins with the evidence of *CD* 8.12 to reduce the field to Plotinus and Porphyry. His conclusion of Plotinus as Augustine's primary source is based then on explicit mentions of Plotinus in Augustine's works, the presence of literal quotations of Plotinus in the *Confessions*, and by a side-by-side analysis of Augustinian and various Neoplatonic texts. An example of the sort of mark that must be present to indicate a borrowing is shown at *De Quantitate Animae* 32.68, where doctrine regarding the nature of the embodied soul is attributed to *doctissimis viris*.¹³⁷ Henry finds that doctrine at *Enn.* 4.2.1. 71-76. Upon examination of Augustine's use of Greek, it is concluded that he learned the language only late in life, and was able by 415 to read Plotinus in the original.¹³⁸

In a later study, Henry again seeks to determine the *libri Platoniorum*, this time within the context of an examination of Augustine's account of his vision at Ostia (*Conf.* 9.10.23-26).¹³⁹ Again, he begins by taking account of the internal evidence: testimony regarding the *libri Platoniorum* (*Conf.* 8.2.3) and Augustine's version of his conversion as it appeared in *BV* 1.4 that suggests he read Plotinus. Henry then finds two quotations of *Enn.* 1.6 in *CD* (not specified) and finds paraphrases of the same treatise in *Conf.* 7 & 8. He also notes the explicit mention at *CD* 10.23 of *On the Three Principal Hypostases* (*Enn.* 5.1). He concludes the study with a comparison

¹³⁴Theiler (1933), 4. Translation by G.J.P. O'Daly.

¹³⁵ Henry (1934), 17-18.

¹³⁶ Henry (1934), 68.

¹³⁷ Henry (1934), 75.

¹³⁸ Henry (1934), 137.

¹³⁹ Henry (1981), 13-19.

of the vision at Ostia passage from *Confessions* and the two *Enneads* he has identified as sources in order to find exact locations of source material. This analysis discovers specific textual parallels as well as doctrinal similarities. He equates the *libri Platoniorum* with the *paucissimis libris Plotini* and concludes that *Enn.* 1.6 and 5.1 account for all Augustine's sources for the Ostia passage.

Marrou's source study is conducted within the context of an examination of the nature of Augustine's culture, i.e. whether it is predominantly Greek or Latin in origin. He finds that Augustine's literary culture was almost entirely Latin as his writings show no evidence of having read any Greek work in the original.¹⁴⁰ Marrou conducts a side-by-side textual comparison between Augustine's works and those of possible sources and finds citations of Plato, all of which can be accounted for by Latin translations or secondary sources.¹⁴¹ The *libri Platoniorum*, already admitted to be Latin translations of Greek works, are identified as some part of the *Enneads*.

Courcelle addresses the question of Augustine's Greek sources within a comprehensive study of the Greek sources of Latin writers in the late empire. He rejects the doctrinal method as insufficient to prove influence. He also rejects stylistic comparisons as too open to speculation and interpretation. Instead, Courcelle settles on a philological method that includes: 'frequent re-readings and parallel analyses of a Greek text and a Latin text that have never yet been compared.'¹⁴² While he concludes that Augustine did achieve a knowledge of Greek sufficient to read original texts by old age, he is not concerned with the matter of translations, thinking it of secondary importance whether a book effected an influence in translation or in its original language. He finds citations that persuade him that Augustine had read the part of *Timaeus* translated by Cicero. He rejects every other citation indicating a possible source in Plato as the product of secondary material.¹⁴³

Testard's source analysis is conducted within an examination of Cicero's influence on Augustine. As there are copious references to Cicero in Augustine's works, Testard elects to use only direct citations or explicit references. Basing his work on an exhaustive list of citations, he removes all those that he regards as banal. Following the chronological order of Augustine's

¹⁴⁰ Marrou (1938), 33.

¹⁴¹ Marrou (1938), 34.

¹⁴² Courcelle (1969), 6.

¹⁴³ Courcelle (1969), 170-1.

works, Testard searches through all citations that reveal a development in Augustine's thought, in his attitude toward Cicero, and in the manner in which he cites Cicero.¹⁴⁴

O'Meara's 1958 article is a doctrinal analysis that focuses on a theme: that Platonists recognised the need of the masses to use authority rather than reason to arrive at the "fundamental truth of the Father and His Word." They looked for an appropriate authoritative vehicle, examined and rejected Christianity. O'Meara says that, within Augustine's works, this theme is exclusively associated with Porphyry. He compares fragments of Porphyry, which are mostly drawn from Augustine with passages from several of Augustine's works that address this theme. His conclusion is that doctrinal similarities indicate Porphyry as the source for this theme in these works.¹⁴⁵

In another study linking Porphyry and Augustine, O'Meara attempts to show that the work *De Regressu Animae*, attributed to Porphyry in *CD* 10 is the same as a Porphyrian work called *Philosophy from Oracles*. O'Meara begins by examining Augustine's quotes of *DRA* from *CD* and comparing them with quotations from Eusebius' discussion of *PFO* (in *Preparation for the Gospels*).¹⁴⁶ He elects to conduct a doctrinal comparison, declining to look for philological similarities due to the enormous number of texts and because his goal is to establish that the two works in question had the same content. O'Meara concludes that *DRA* and *PFO* are the same work and an important source for Augustine in *CD*.

Within a study that seeks to establish the influence of *Enn.* 6.4 & 5 upon the *Confessions*, O'Connell proposes an interesting modification of the *Quellenforschung* method. His assumption is that the *Enneads* are so well known to Augustine that a more subtle analysis is necessary to discover their influence. He says that, 'the more thoroughly a source is assimilated, the more profound its effective influence, and the more freely the influenced author can manipulate, recombine and express the material which he has made his own.'¹⁴⁷ He says that a traditional philological examination of such a text will not uncover a source that may be exercising a 'subterranean' influence. His new technique is to look beyond word resemblances or doctrinal parallels to 'parallel patterns of thought and image' that are evidence of source material.¹⁴⁸ Beginning with a doctrinal link between *Confessions* and *Enn.* 6.4 & 5, O'Connell proceeds to

¹⁴⁴ Testard (1958), 179-182.

¹⁴⁵ O'Meara (1958), 102-3.

¹⁴⁶ O'Meara (1954), 9.

¹⁴⁷ O'Connell, (1963), 4.

point out a shared set of images to describe the relationship between the individual and omniscient deity, which do not appear in Porphyry. The manner in which Augustine uses these images combined with the shared content of his own works with Plotinus' combine to indicate Plotinus as Augustine's exclusive Neoplatonic source.

In an attempt to broaden the methodology of Augustinian studies, du Roy applies numerous techniques in his study aimed at determining the evolution of Augustine's Trinitarian thought. He claims to use a *méthode phénoménologique* and *méthode structuraliste* combined with a *méthode génétique* to this end.¹⁴⁹ Taking his inspiration from Eric Goldschmidt's structuralist study of Plato's dialogues,¹⁵⁰ du Roy looks for the 'deep structures' of Augustine's thought as it runs from its source material to a fully-developed conception of the Christian trinity as found in *De Trinitate*. His source investigation, however, which he admits is not the point of his work, is not a systematic or cohesive component of the study. The result is a list, derived through doctrinal comparisons, of several of the *Enneads* postulated by du Roy as sources for Augustine's trinitarian conceptions.¹⁵¹

Hagendahl's investigation 'is a work of philological research on Augustine's knowledge and use of profane Latin literature.'¹⁵² He accepts the findings of Combès, Courcelle and others that Augustine did not know enough Greek to read original works. In this study, Hagendahl collects citations and named quotes in Augustine's works of each author with the intention of addressing three issues: the extent of Augustine's reading, his methods of citation, and whether he quotes from memory or from books. His criteria are literary; he accepts the premise that 'literary influence can be established for certain only on the basis of textual correspondence between two texts...'¹⁵³ A chronological analysis is also performed so as to 'examine which authors and works have been mentioned, quoted or used in different periods or on a certain occasion.'¹⁵⁴ The result appears in two volumes. The first lists named references and citations author by author. The second volume provides analysis. The product of this study is a list of works Augustine read and when he read them.

¹⁴⁸ O'Connell, 5.

¹⁴⁹ du Roy (1966), 15.

¹⁵⁰ Goldschmidt (1963).

¹⁵¹ du Roy, 70, n. 1 and *passim*.

¹⁵² Hagendahl (1967), 9.

¹⁵³ Hagendahl, 11.

Perhaps Hagendahl's most important finding for the purposes of the present study is the distribution of classical citations in Augustine's works. After an early period of composition coinciding with the influence of the *libri Platoniorum*, Augustine's works contain numerous classical references. There is then a dearth of pagan elements in his theological works from his conversion to AD413. What follows is a period in which Augustine's works contain the greatest number of classical citations of any in his life. Hagendahl reasons that this was due to a close reading of pagan texts, which Augustine made in preparation for writing *CD*. His last writings are again marked by an absence of pagan elements.¹⁵⁵

Hadot attempts to identify the *libri Platoniorum* in his 1971 study of Marius Victorinus. He begins with the internal evidence of *Conf.* 7.9.16 regarding the content of the Platonist books and takes up the statement in *BV* 1.4 suggesting Plotinus as the source. Hadot then examines the extant translations of Greek works made by Victorinus and compares certain terminology in them with translations from the *Enneads* made by Ambrose. He argues that only a philological approach can answer the question of the identity of the *libri Platoniorum*, arguing that it can be answered in certainty only if there are specific literary citations in Augustine's early work of these translations. His examination reveals specific quotes in Augustine from the translations of Plotinus made by Ambrose. As Victorinus' translations are lost, he instead examines terminology from Victorinus' translations of Aristotle, finding no parallels. Without any such citations from Victorinus' translations, Hadot insists that the question must be addressed by the doctrinal method, which he rejects. He concludes that it is not possible to determine the exact content of the *libri Platoniorum*, but suggests that they are works of both Plotinus and Porphyry.¹⁵⁶

The study of Augustine's sources made by O'Donnell suggests an addition to the traditional doctrinal, grammatical and philological techniques of *Quellenforschung*. His 'minimalist approach' asks 'when and under what circumstances we may conclude that a given author actually sat down to read the work of a presumed source.'¹⁵⁷ Taking Hagendahl's list of citations as a starting point, O'Donnell takes for his use only those for which it can be demonstrated that Augustine was working from a text in-hand. His work is confined to Latin pagan texts because

¹⁵⁴ Hagendahl, 702.

¹⁵⁵ Hagendahl, 702-707.

¹⁵⁶ Hadot (1971), 203-210.

¹⁵⁷ O'Donnell (1980), 146.

there is no question about which of them were available to Augustine. He then proceeds author-by-author looking for patterns of citation for an indication of where and under what circumstances Augustine read a given work. His result is a detailed list of authors, works and time limits within which each could have been read. His findings confirm Hagendahl's conclusion that Augustine undertook a profound re-reading of classical texts after 410 in preparation for writing *CD*.

Beatrice begins his study by narrowing the potential authorship of the *libri Platoniorum* to Plotinus and Porphyry based upon internal evidence (*CD* 8.12, *Conf.* 8.2.3). Working from an assumption that these books were the only Greek literature Augustine would ever read, his stated method for determining which is Augustine's source is based upon a study exclusively of direct citations of Plotinus and Porphyry in his completed works.¹⁵⁸ Beatrice then conducts a study relying mostly on a comparison of the content of Augustine's works with Porphyry's as informed by various third sources. He not only agrees with O'Meara's conclusion that *De Regressu Animae* and *Philosophy from Oracles* are the same work and influenced Augustine greatly, but that this work is identical with the *libri Platoniorum*, and the only Neoplatonist work he would ever read.¹⁵⁹

O'Daly investigates the sources for *CD* as part of a comprehensive study of that work. He concludes that Cicero's partial translation of the *Timaeus* is the only 'extended' Plato that Augustine read for *CD*, listing eight confirmed references to the dialogue and two others, which, in agreement with Courcelle, are thought to be from lacunae in the translation.¹⁶⁰ O'Daly also addresses the question of a Plotinian or Porphyrian source, beginning with internal evidence and moving to an examination of citations. He concludes that Porphyry is the chief influence based upon an examination of the nature of those citations and doctrinal similarities.

A consensus has developed in the scholarship on the question of Augustine's reading of Platonic dialogues. Angus' conclusion that Augustine could not read Plato in Greek has carried through the century's scholarship almost unqualified. His finding that Augustine knew Plato only through incomplete translations such as Cicero's *Timaeus* is nearly identical with O'Daly's findings with respect to *CD*. Alfarcic and Combès found evidence that Augustine may have known *Timaeus* translations by both Cicero and Calcidius.¹⁶¹ They also concluded that he had known the *Phaedo*

¹⁵⁸ Beatrice (1989), 250.

¹⁵⁹ Beatrice, 255.

¹⁶⁰ O'Daly (1999), 255-7.

¹⁶¹ Alfarcic, 231, note 4; Combès, 14, note 5.

in Apuleius' translation--Alfaric even says Augustine read this '*attentivement*'.¹⁶² Each proceeds to identify further citations of the *Meno*, *Symposium* and *Republic* but with scepticism, suggesting instead that they came from intermediary works.¹⁶³ Marrou found the same citations of *Timaeus* and *Phaedo* and followed the conclusion that Augustine had seen translations of each, but later determined that Cicero's translation was the only one actually read, the others being from philosophy handbooks.¹⁶⁴ Marrou's change of heart came after reading Courcelle's analysis of Platonic citations in Augustine which concludes that all Augustine's citations of Plato can be attributed to secondary works except seventeen references to *Timaeus* taken from Cicero's translation. Courcelle's position has been regarded as the final word on the subject,¹⁶⁵ and recently confirmed by O'Daly.

Criticism of *Quellenforschung* Methodology

This catalogue shows that those studies addressing the question of sources have used very similar methodology since the beginning of the 20th century and that conclusions that are a part of the scholarly consensus that developed around this question are not significantly different than those of the first study in the group. Whether purposefully operating within the tradition of *Quellenforschung* or not, each of these source investigations involves the comparison between texts of various elements either doctrinal, textual or both. In every case, these studies depended upon the identification of passages in Augustine that made reference in some way to an antecedent text and the assignment of source status upon those texts that appeared sufficiently similar.

This reliance upon the identification and comparison of parallel texts has drawn criticism both from scholars who employ *Quellenforschung* methodology and those who do not. Often the supposed original source no longer exists and must be reconstructed. Speaking of Theiler's doctrinal study finding lost works of Porphyry as Augustine's *libri Platoniorum*, Schwyzer points out that such studies depend 'almost entirely on speculative lost sources so conclusions are neither demonstrable nor refutable.'¹⁶⁶ Henry further states that doctrinal comparisons are not sufficient as

¹⁶² Alfaric, 231, note 5; Combès, 14, note 6.

¹⁶³ Alfaric, 232, note 1; Combès, 14, notes 6-9. Alfaric also cites a possible reference to *Phaedrus* but says it probably comes from a Vergil commentator.

¹⁶⁴ Marrou, 34 and 635, note 17.

¹⁶⁵ e.g., by Hagendahl, 10

¹⁶⁶ quoted in O'Meara (1958), 9.

proof of an immediate doctrinal relationship. They ignore the possibility of intermediary sources and take for granted that the work under study has really profited from the source assigned to it.¹⁶⁷ Courcelle doubts the efficacy of doctrinal studies especially as applied to late antiquity because by that time the ideas in question had been around for centuries and students freely plagiarised their masters. Doctrinal relationships between two authors, he claims, do not necessarily prove influence. The doctrinal survey in the first three chapters of the present study suggests the sheer number of Platonic, Neoplatonic, Christian or doxographical sources for various Platonic ideas available in late antiquity, and demonstrates the difficulty, if not futility, of determining source material based upon doctrine.

Doubt has also been shed on studies in *Quellenforschung* that confine themselves to textual similarities. Many scholars have noted methodological imprecision with respect to the identification of parallels. Every critic proposes a different set of parallel passages and they do not make it clear what principles they follow when identifying parallels.¹⁶⁸ O'Donnell notes the difficulty in identifying passages and proposes his own 'minimalist' approach as a means of checking the conclusions of traditional source study methods. He points out that these conclusions are often controversial because 'there is a natural temptation to see parallels where none exist and assume dependence where coincidence, misreport and hazy memory are really to blame.'¹⁶⁹ West also concedes the potential for such a tendency: 'we have been so eager to find correspondences that we were bound to succeed, the mesh of our net was so narrow that we were bound to catch something.'¹⁷⁰ Mandouze, in a study that tests the limits of this method by comparing the findings of three scholars examining the Ostia passage from *Conf.* 9.10.23-26, notes an enormous number of alleged *rapprochements*, most of which are not significant. He sees no distinction made by scholars between sources and vague reminiscences and frequently finds his scholars assigning different sources to the same reference. His conclusion is that it is impossible to judge most claims of influence or source with any certainty using such a method.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁷ Henry (1934), 18-20.

¹⁶⁸ Knauer, in Harrison, 391-2 speaks of Vergil commentators, but the charge is applicable generally.

¹⁶⁹ O'Donnell (1980), 145.

¹⁷⁰ West, 49.

¹⁷¹ Mandouze, 83-4; Henry (1934), 68, notes the problem also, pointing out how critics who used the parallel text method often come to opposite conclusions from the same premises.

Most egregiously, scholars employing philological comparisons do not state specifically what features they seek for their comparisons. Angus states that he looked in the first ten books of *CD* for all passages for which a literary source was required, but does not say what criteria he used to identify such passages. Courcelle says he employed 'frequent re-readings and parallel analyses of a Greek text and a Latin text that have never yet been compared,' but does not suggest exactly what features he will compare in his analyses. Hagendahl says he looked for textual correspondences as a means of determining sources, but specifies neither what textual characteristics he seeks to compare nor how he will identify correspondences when he finds them. What criteria were applied to identify textual similarities in these studies is sometimes, but not always, apparent in the discussion of findings. Henry, for example, cites Plotinus' repetition of various forms of ἡσυχός in *Enn.* 5.1.2 and Augustine's repetition of *sileat* in *Conf.* 9.10.25 as parallels. The problem is that he does not say in any specific way that he is looking for word repetitions of this sort before he begins his search for parallels. As with almost all studies in this review, there is a methodological gap in Henry's work. Criteria for the identification of parallel passages are not stated explicitly, leaving the impression of a non-systematic study that cannot be replicated or evaluated.

Quellenforschung studies also tend to lack a theoretical framework within which to interpret the identified parallels or determine their significance. O'Connell justifies his own innovation in source methodology by noting that 'textual parallel type studies are able to link two philosophers only in terms of some implied theory of memory and how it operated in the case of the "influenced" thinker.'¹⁷² In traditional source studies, such a theory is implied rather than explicit. This does not escape Conte who says, 'without a basic model of literary production...the philologists' collecting of comparative and contrasting materials...suffers from what I respectfully name "comparisonitis"--collecting for the sake of collecting.'¹⁷³ The importance of a parallel lies not in its presence, but in its importance to the later work. Source critics seem never to question the relevance of the parallels they identify.¹⁷⁴ The identification of a parallel has been equated with source and influence. This connection is dubious and requires theoretical justification in any case.

¹⁷² O'Connell, 5 n. 21.

¹⁷³ Conte, 23.

¹⁷⁴ Knauer, 392.

Traditional source studies have lacked an interpretative methodology and, on account of this, have missed the significance of the textual parallels they analyse.

In summary, the studies in *Quellenforschung* reviewed above, especially those addressing the question of Augustine's reading of Plato, have suffered from a lack of specific methodology regarding the identification of parallel passages and have neglected the interpretation of passages identified. The number of studies and their thoroughness has probably compensated somewhat in the matter of identification of parallels. However, a method is needed to fill the theoretical gaps in the identification of parallel passages and to provide a critical basis to determine their significance.

Literary Allusion

Literary allusion, or reference, imitation, echo, is the 'use of language that recalls a specific antecedent.'¹⁷⁵ Words or phrases of an earlier work are repeated in some conspicuous way by the alluding author. Some meaning is drawn from the model and brought to the new work. A considerable body of scholarship has been developed concerning the existence and use of literary allusion, especially in Roman literature. This body of scholarship has insights to offer with respect to the issue of the discovery of literary sources and influence.

An example of literary allusion is found in Dylan Thomas' *Fern Hill*, which begins 'Once below a time.'¹⁷⁶ Clearly, the reference is to the fairy tale opening of 'once upon a time.' The meaning of this phrase must be discerned from a reading of the poem. It may be nonsense and preparing us for a work of nonsense. If nothing else the reference to and alteration of the familiar opening warns the reader to pay attention to details because the author is playing with language and offering the unexpected.

Allusions are a means by which an author can add nuances to his work, meaning borrowed from the model text. The device was especially important to Roman literature. Catullus, for example, begins the elegy to his brother, *Multas per gentes et multa per aequora vectus* (conveyed through many peoples and through many seas). His brother's grave lies near Troy; Catullus must travel far from his home to get there. The line is an allusion to the opening of the *Odyssey* (1.1-4):

ὄς μάλα πολλὰ
πλάγχθη, ἐπεὶ Τροίης ἱερὸν πτολίεθρον ἔπερσε·

¹⁷⁵ Thomas (1986), 175.

¹⁷⁶ This example is in Lee, 3.

πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω,
πολλὰ δ' ὄ γ' ἐν πόντῳ πάθειν ἄλγεα ὄν κατὰ θυμόν

who was greatly buffeted about after destroying the great citadel
of Troy; he saw the cities of many peoples and learned their ways
and on the sea suffered many sorrows in his heart.

In making this allusion, 'Catullus thus gives his line a hidden reserve of literary energy...'¹⁷⁷ It conveys the similarities of Catullus' situation with Odysseus': the wide-ranging travel and involvement with Troy. The allusion also provides an atmosphere in that it borrows the melancholy mood of Homer's opening, appropriate for Catullus' purposes. In a similar vein, Vergil uses the phrases *nonne vides* (*Georgics* 1.56; 3.103, 250) and *quod superest* (*Geo.* 2.346; 4.51), which are common in Lucretius.¹⁷⁸ These allusions recall *De Rerum Natura* in a general way, possibly to provide atmosphere or 'to instil generic veracity' in Vergil's didactic poem.¹⁷⁹

In making a reference to an earlier work, an author can communicate an idea without having to state it explicitly. The following example is cited by the 5th century commentator Macrobius (*Sat.* 6.1.39):

vendidit hic auro patriam dominumque potentem
imposuit, fixit leges pretio atque refixit (*Aen.* 6.621-2)

This man sold his country for gold and placed on it
a powerful master; he made and unmade laws for a price.

vendidit hic Latium populis agrosque Quiritum
eripuit, fixit leges pretio atque refixit (*Varius De Morte*, fr.1)

This man sold Latium to the people and took away
the citizens' fields; he made and unmade laws for a price.

In his depiction of the underworld, Vergil says the worst punishments are meted out to those who harmed the country because of their greed. His imitation of Varius, who is describing Marc Antony, allows Vergil to accuse Antony without actually naming him.¹⁸⁰

In another allusion, Vergil is, again, able to express an idea without stating it explicitly. On the morning of their hunting trip, during which Venus has already revealed that she will make Dido and Aeneas fall in love, he enters and is compared with Apollo. The end of the description contains a telling detail:

¹⁷⁷ Conte, 32-3.

¹⁷⁸ Thomas (1986), 175.

¹⁷⁹ Thomas (1986), 175.

¹⁸⁰ Pasquali, 278.

Qualis ubi...
ipse iugis Cynthi graditur mollique fluentem
fronde premit crinem fingens atque implicat auro,
tela sonant umeris: haud illo segnior ibat
Aeneas...(Aen. 4.143-9)

Just as when...
(Apollo) himself walks on Delian ridges and fashioning his flowing
locks, he gathers them with a tender frond and entwines it with gold,
arrows resounding upon his shoulders: no more slothful than this did
Aeneas move...

Vergil emphasises the noise of the arrows in the quiver Aeneas has on his shoulders. This detail is a reference to another description of Apollo:

τόξ' ὤμοισιν ἔχων ἀμφηρεφέα τε φάρετρον
ἔκλαγξαν δ' ἄρ' οἴστοι ἐπ' ὤμων χωόμενοιο,
αὐτοῦ κινηθέντος (Il.1.45-7).

...holding on his shoulders the bow and quiver, covered at both ends.
The arrows clanged upon the shoulders of the God
who walked angrily.

Vergil compares the arrows Aeneas carries with those of Apollo. The phrase *tela sonant umeris* emphasises the sound made by the arrows and is an allusion to the same emphasis in the *Iliad*, conveyed by the onomatopoeic ἔκλαγξαν. Presently, Apollo will fire his arrows into the Achaian army, spreading plague among them. The allusion compares Aeneas with Apollo the plague-bearer. Without stating the idea openly, Vergil suggests a sinister role for Aeneas and a more malignant condition for Dido than the love sickness Venus plans.¹⁸¹ There is instead an atmosphere of doom created around the Carthaginian queen, which will be realised in the events of the text, and a comment on the noxious role of Rome in the history of Carthage.

Sometimes allusion indicates a relationship between texts that is extended and thematic. In such cases, the author intends to send the reader back to the source material. In this very significant allusive technique, it is often the case 'that the full force of the reference and significance for the new setting can only be recovered through consultation of a larger context of the model that has in fact been recalled.'¹⁸² Thomas offers the following example of a description of a man irrigating land in the *Georgics* (1.104-110),

quid dicam, iacto qui semine comminus arua
insequitur cumulosque ruit male pinguis harenae,
deinde satis fluium inducit riuosque sequentis,

¹⁸¹ Lyne (1987), 123.

¹⁸² Thomas (1986), 178.

et, cum exustus ager morientibus aestuat herbis,
ecce supercilio cliuosi tramitis undam
elicit? illa cadens raucum per leuia murmur
saxa ciet, scatebrisque arentia temperat arua.

What of him, the man who casts his seed, then hand
to hand
Harries the field, lays low the unfertile ranks
Of sand, then coaxes rivulets to follow
His hoe among the tilth? Who, when exhausted
The earth swelters with dying verdure, look,
Down from the brow of a sloping pathway tempts
A trickle that murmurs purling over the pebbles
To cool the parched-up ground?¹⁸³

which is a rendering of *Iliad* 21.257-262:

ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἀνὴρ ὀχετηγὸς ἀπὸ κρήνης μελανύδρου
ἄμ φυτὰ καὶ κήπους ὕδατι ῥόον ἡγεμονεύη,
χερσὶ μάκελλαν ἔχων, ἀμάρης ἐξ ἔχματα βάλλων·
Τοῦ μὲν τε προπέοντος ὑπὸ ψηφίδες ἄπασαι
ὀχλεῦνται· Τὸ δέ τ' ὄκα κατειβόμενον κελαρύζει
χώρῳ ἐνὶ προαλεῖ, φθάνει δέ τε καὶ τὸν ἄγοντα·

And as a man running a channel from a spring of dark water
guides the run of the water among his plants and his gardens
with a mattock in his hand and knocks down the blocks in the channel
in the rush of the water all the pebbles beneath are torn loose
from place, and the water that has been dripping suddenly jets on
in a steep place and goes too fast even for the man who guides it.¹⁸⁴

Vergil's text is very close to Homer's and is certainly an imitation of the earlier passage. The context of the Homeric simile, however, is Achilles' battle against the divinity that is the river Scamander. This context is not brought out in the lines to which the allusion is made. As Thomas says, 'it is the context, and not the simile itself, which informs (Vergil's) deeper poetic intentions.'¹⁸⁵ Those intentions are to associate the farmer's act of irrigation with Achilles' especially desperate struggle. That association is lost even if a reader recognises the allusion to Homer unless he applies the context of the model to the new text.

Another example of an alluding poet communicating through the context of his literary reference is Ovid's description of Tereus, utterly overcome by lust for Philomela at *Metamorphoses* 6.465-6:

Et nihil est, quod non effreno captus amore
Ausit...

¹⁸³ This translation is from L.P. Wilkinson.

¹⁸⁴ This translation is from Richmond Lattimore.

¹⁸⁵ Thomas (1986), 179.

And captured by unrestrained lust, there is nothing
that he does not dare

This line is an allusion to Plato's *Republic* (571c): οἶσθ' ὅτι πάντα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τολμᾷ
ποιεῖν, 'You know that in such a state it dares to do everything.'

A few lines later, Ovid is still speaking of Tereus:

Regales epulae mensis et Bacchus in auro
Ponitur; hinc placido dantur sua corpora somno.
At rex Odrysus, quamvis secessit, in illa
Aestuat et repetens faciem motusque manusque,
Qualia vult fingit, quae nondum vidit, et ignes
Ipse suos nutrit cura removenente soporem (*Met.* 6.488-93).

A royal feast is placed on the tables and Bacchus in
gold cups; thereafter their bodies are given to peaceful sleep.
But though (Philomela) has retired, the Odrysian king
burns for her and, recalling her face and movements and hands,
he pictures what he wants but has not yet seen, and he
feeds his flames, his disquiet pushing sleep away.

This image is borrowed from a discussion of the nature of the irrational part of man found in the
same passage of the *Republic*:

ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἄλλο τῆς ψυχῆς εὕδῃ, ὅσον λογιστικὸν καὶ ἡμερον
καὶ ἄρχον ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ θηριῶδες τε καὶ ἀγριον, ἢ σίτων ἢ μέθης
πλησθέν, σκιρτᾷ τε καὶ ἀπωσάμενον τὸν ὕπνον ζητῆ ἵεναι καὶ
ἀποπιπλάναι τὰ αὐτοῦ ἦθη.

...whenever the rest of the soul, the reasoning, peaceful and ruling part, slumbers;
it is then that the savage and wild part, gorged with food or drink, leaps up,
pushing sleep away, and seeks to go and satisfy its lusts.

Ovid has portrayed Tereus in the role of the irrational soul; the point of this allusion is lost without
the Platonic context. This section of the *Republic* describes the nature of tyranny. Ovid's version
of this myth does not merely portray Tereus as a terrible man for his rape and mutilation of
Philomela, but associates him with the tyrannical ruler and the tyrannical personality explicated in
Plato's text. Once discovered, this association invests Ovid's Tereus with a depth of character that
has significant implications for our interpretation of the episode. The association is discovered
only by an examination of the larger context of the Platonic passages alluded to by Ovid.

Two 20th century novel titles illustrate the power of the smallest allusion to bear
interpretative significance as well as the necessity to examine context in order to actualise that

power. The title of Hemingway's *For Whom the Bell Tolls* is an allusion to the famous quotation from John Donne's *Meditation 17*. There, Donne argues that all mankind is interdependent and diminished by the death of any individual: 'ask not for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee.' The novel is a story of the Spanish Civil War, including an implicit argument against the policy of non-involvement pursued by the western democracies. Borrowing from Donne's argument, Hemingway suggests that the defeat of Republican Spain will diminish Europe and lead to fascist aggression against those countries that declined to fight it there. The allusion contained in the title conveys this complex idea in a few words by directing us to apply the context of Donne's sermon to Hemingway's text, offering an interpretative key to the novel.

Similarly, Joyce's *Ulysses* has no character named Ulysses. Instead, the title is a one-word allusion to the *Odyssey*; the larger context of the allusion is the entire content of the *Odyssey*. The title sends the reader back to Homer's epic as an interpretative guide to Joyce's novel. The entirety of the *Odyssey* must be kept in mind and applied to a reading of *Ulysses*. Without understanding the relationship between the two works, the larger significance of Joyce's work is lost.

Means of Effecting Allusion

Allusions are effected by external and internal markers. These markers are linguistic features that are sufficiently different from the rest of the text to indicate reference to an outside source. External markers are those linguistic features that are 'external to the events of the immediately surrounding narrative.'¹⁸⁶ Included among external markers are overt mentions of similarity, concealment, variation, antiquity, occurrence or memory.¹⁸⁷ These markers are common in Roman neoteric poetry, but are often called Alexandrian footnotes due to their origin with the Alexandrians.¹⁸⁸

External markers can be elicited using any number of linguistic features and function so as to make a 'general appeal to tradition.'¹⁸⁹ Broadly speaking, they are words or phrases that point to either a specific antecedent or a generic tradition by suggesting the need for an outside source. An example encountered earlier was found at *De Quantitate Animae* 32.68, where Augustine attributes

¹⁸⁶ Hinds, 3.

¹⁸⁷ Wills, 30.

¹⁸⁸ Ross, 78.

¹⁸⁹ Hinds, 2.

doctrine regarding the nature of the embodied soul to *doctissimis viris*.¹⁹⁰ Such a cryptic reference immediately poses the question 'which learned men?' To answer that question, the reader must look to the philosophical tradition and find a source that addresses the issue Augustine has in mind.

Another example of such language indicating allusion is found in the opening of Catullus 64, which begins a section describing the departure of the Argonauts:

Peliaco quondam prognatae vertice pinus
dicuntur liquidas Neptuni nasse per undas

Once upon a time pine trees, born on Pelion's peak, are said to have
swum through Neptune's clear waters.¹⁹¹

The presence of *dicuntur* forces the reader to ask where this is said. The word at once suggests the presence of some source text and highlights the numerous allusions in the first 18 lines of the poem. In those lines, Catullus alludes to five different versions of the Argo story, essentially the poetic tradition of the story.¹⁹² In addition to these examples, other words and phrases that may suggest allusion to either individual sources or a tradition include *ut fama est*, *ut aiunt*, *ut mihi narratur*, *perhibent*, *certior auctor* or other such linguistic appeals to tradition.

Conscious references to memory might also serve as external markers. At *Met.* 14.812-6, Ovid portrays Romulus' father, Mars, reminding Jupiter of his promise to make Romulus a God when Rome was no longer in turmoil:

'tu mihi concilio quondam praesente deorum
(nam memoro memorique animo pia verba notavi)
"unus erit, quem tu tolles in caerula caeli"
dixisti: rata sit verborum summa tuorum!
adnuat omnipotens...

'One day at a meeting of the Gods--I call it to mind, and have
recorded your devoted words in my remembering heart--you said,
"There will be one whom you will lift up into the blue spaces of
the sky." Fulfil your promise now.' With a nod of his head, the
all-powerful consented.

A similar speech is made by Mars in the *Fasti* (2.483-89), which was composed concurrently with *Metamorphoses*. These speeches allude to Jupiter's promise in the exact same language. The promise referred to is found in Ennius' *Annales* 65: '*Unus erit, quem tu tolles in caerula caeli*'

¹⁹⁰ See p. 119.

¹⁹¹ Hinds, 2, provides the example; the translation is also his.

¹⁹² See Thomas (1982), for a discussion of the allusiveness of Catullus 64.1-18.

templa.¹⁹³ The allusion itself is this repeated line. The external marker, *memoro memorique*, states the necessity of a source text and signals the reader to be alert for the allusion to come.

An example of a similar linguistic phenomenon is Lucan's allusion to the *Aeneid* announced at *De Bello Civili* 1.685-6:

hunc ego, fluminea deformis truncus harena
qui iacet, agnosco...

Him I recognise, that disfigured trunk lying upon the river sands.

The prophet who is speaking describes the mutilated and headless torso of Pompey after the defeat of his army. The marker here is *agnosco*, easily missed in this context but pointing nevertheless to an allusion to *Aen.* 2.557-8:

...iacet ingens litore truncus,
avulsisque umeris caput et sine nomine corpus

he lies a mighty trunk upon the shore, the head torn from the
shoulders, a nameless corpse.¹⁹⁴

Vergil's description is of the mutilated and headless torso of Priam after the fall of Troy. Lucan clearly recalls Vergil's image and language. The marker, *agnosco*, urges the reader to ask, 'from where?' The immediate sense is that the seer recognises the features of an image in her vision. The reference is also to the image in the earlier work. In addition to words overtly suggesting memory, other terms intimating recollection that might serve as external markers include forms of *recordor*, *repeto* or *refero*.¹⁹⁵

Allusion can also be signalled by any word that refers to events in the text that require an outside source for logical coherence. Temporal adverbs can serve this function. The adverb *quondam* was present at *Met.* 14.812: *tu mihi concilio quondam...dixisti*, which reinforces the language of memory in line 813 to announce Ovid's allusion to Ennius. Others that could signal allusion include *iterum*, *nunc*, *nunc quoque* or *olim*.

Adjectives that suggest earlier phenomena can also be external markers: *insignis*, *antiquus* or *notus*, for example. The last of these appears in the Lycaon story of *Met.* 1. Jupiter tells the assembled gods that he fears for the safety of the lesser deities that live on earth because of the violence of humanity:

¹⁹³ Conte, 57-8 provides the example and translations.

¹⁹⁴ Hinds, 8, provides the example and translations.

¹⁹⁵ Wills, 30.

an satis, o superi, tutos fore creditis illos,
cum mihi, qui fulmen, qui vos habeoque regoque,
struxerit insidias notus feritate Lycaon? (*Met.* 1.196-8)

Can you, Gods, believe they are safe
when Lycaon, who is renowned for his savagery, set a trap
for me, I who hold and rule the thunderbolt, who hold and
rule all of you?

The adjective *notus* begs the question 'known from where?' and refers the reader to the various Lycaon stories from myth and literature that would establish his reputation for ferocity. It alerts the reader to look for allusions that utilise that tradition and indicate Ovid's source.

External markers, then, are words or phrases that urge the reader to seek an antecedent, whether specific or a tradition, and in doing so indicate the presence of an allusion. These markers act as quotation marks might in a modern text; they alert the reader that a reference is being made.¹⁹⁶ It is up to the perspicacious reader to pay attention to these markers, identify the allusions they signal, and deduce any source texts alluded to.

Imitative words, phrases, images or content within the context of surrounding lines are internal markers of allusion. Perhaps the most basic and obvious example is a completely repeated line as Ovid repeats Ennius at *Met.* 14.814. Another example is *Aeneid* 6.458-60, Aeneas' address to Dido in the underworld:

...per sidera iuro
per superos et si qua fides tellure sum ima est,
invitus, regina, tuo de litore cessi.

I swear by the stars,
by the Gods and by whatever faith there is beneath the earth,
unwillingly, o queen, did I depart from your shore,

a clear allusion to Catullus 66.39-40:

invita, o regina, tuo de vertice cessi,
invita, adiuro teque tuumque caput...

unwillingly, o queen, did I depart from your mane,
unwillingly, I swear by you and your head...¹⁹⁷

Vergil's imitation of Catullus is clear by imitation of several words and phrases, most especially line 460, which is nearly a quote of Cat. 66.39. The fact of the allusion, the fact that Vergil imitates Catullus and calls the reader's attention to the earlier text, is patent.

¹⁹⁶ Wills, 31.

¹⁹⁷ Lyne (1994), 188-9.

Internal markers also include the imitation of unusual linguistic features. The more unusual the feature being recalled, the more obvious and detectable is the allusion. Henry points out one such allusion to Plotinus by Augustine. In *On the Three Principal Hypostases*, Plotinus advocates ascension from the physical world to the immaterial. At *Enn.* 5.1.2, he describes the process:

Σκοπέισθω δὲ τὴν μεγάλην ψυχὴν ἄλλη ψυχῇ οὐ σμικρὰ ἀξία τοῦ σκοπεῖν γενομένη ἀπαλλαγείσα ἀπάτης καὶ τῶν γεγοητευκότων τὰς ἄλλας ἡσυχῶ τῇ καταστάσει. Ἡσυχον δὲ αὐτῇ ἔστω μὴ μόνον τὸ περικείμενον σῶμα καὶ ὁ τοῦ σώματος κλύδων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶν τὸ περιέχον· ἡσυχος μὲν γῆ, ἡσυχος δὲ θάλασσα καὶ ἀήρ καὶ αὐτὸς οὐρανὸς ἀμείνων.

Let the soul examine the great universal soul, which is distinct from it but by no means a lowly soul, to see if by means of its quiet attitude it has freed itself from those things, which deceive and allure others and has become worthy to look upon it. Let us suppose that the same quiet exists within the body which envelops it and that its tumult is stilled and that quiet even pervades all that lies about it: the earth, the sea, the air, and the very heavens which are superior to the other elements.

Plotinus emphasises the quiet of the process with the distinctively rhetorical device of repetition of forms: ἡσυχῶ, ἡσυχον, ἡσυχος. In his description of the ecstatic experience he and his mother had at Ostia, rising above the material world to the immaterial and ultimately to God, Augustine imitates the features of Plotinus' text (*Conf.* 9.10.25):

Dicebamus ergo: 'si cui sileat tumultus carnis, sileant phantasiae terrae et aquarum et aeris, sileant et poli et ipsa sibi anima sileant, et transeat se non cogitando, sileant somnia et imaginariae revelationes, omnis lingua et omne signum et quidquid transeundo fit si cui sileat omnino...

Therefore we said: 'If to anyone the tumult of the flesh has fallen silent, if the images of earth, water and air are quiet, if the heavens themselves are shut out and the very soul itself is making no sound and is surpassing itself by no longer thinking about itself, if all dreams and visions in the imagination are excluded, if all language and everything transitory is silent...

That Augustine is alluding to the Plotinian text is conveyed by his imitation of the ἡσυχος of the *Ennead* by the word *sileant*. The function of this word in Plotinus was to emphasise the quiet disconnectedness from the sense world necessary to spiritual ascension. Augustine, the great rhetorician, repeats Plotinus' term twice as many times in his text. Beyond the imitation of this conspicuous rhetorical feature, Augustine leaves no doubt to the reader that Plotinus is his model, repeating tumult of the flesh (*tumultus carnis*), and the silence of the lesser elements of earth, water

and air (*sileant phantasiae terrae, et aquarum et aeris*).¹⁹⁸ The effect of this intertext is to identify the Christian ascent described by Augustine with the ascent described by Plotinus. Augustine's doubling of Plotinus' repetition of the various 'silence' terms appropriates the idea of the ascent, suggesting that it is more appropriately a Christian concept now being reclaimed by superior rhetorical force.

Ovid provides another example of allusion effected by the imitation of a conspicuous literary feature. His model is a verse in the exchange of songs between Damoetas and Menalcas at *Eclogue* 3.78-9:

Phyllida amo ante alias: nam me discedere flevit
et longum 'formose, vale, vale,' inquit, 'Iolla'.

I love Phillis before all others: for she cried to see me go
and said a long 'farewell, farewell my beautiful Iollas.'

Ovid's allusion is found at *Met.* 3.499-501. In this passage, Narcissus is on the verge of death:

ultima vox solitam fuit haec spectantis in undam:
'heu frustra dilecte puer!' totidemque remisit
verba locus, dictoque vale 'vale' inquit et Echo

This was his last sound, gazing into the familiar pool:
'alas, the boy loved in vain' and the place gave back
those same words, and when he said farewell 'farewell' said Echo too.

The repeated *vale vale* is an especially witty and appropriate farewell for Echo.¹⁹⁹

Opening lines or passages are common places for allusion. Any word or phrase or linguistic feature can potentially be the object of imitation for allusive purposes in a later text. The more conspicuous the feature, the more likely the allusion will be noticed. Opening lines or passages are usually dramatic, memorable and thematically significant. Because of this, they lend themselves especially well to imitation and, in turn, are excellent venues for imitative allusion.

An example of the importance and effectiveness of allusion in an opening passage is the Catullus 64 opening mentioned above. In all, five different versions of the Argo story are alluded to in the first 18 lines. Another example is found in what is certainly the most famous opening line in Latin poetry: *arma virumque cano, Troiae qui primus ab oris* (*Aen.* 1.1). This epic opening recalls the opening of the *Odyssey*, Ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολύτροπον, and the 'first

¹⁹⁸ Henry (1981), 16-17.

¹⁹⁹ The example is in Hinds, 6. Coleman, 120, points out that the second syllable in the second *vale* in Vergil is short, 'a variation on the preceding *vale*, with correction of the vowel in hiatus.'

two words of the poem recall the epic dimensions of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* respectively, united in the poem of Aeneas.²⁰⁰ In each of these examples, allusions are made to models that are highly significant for the rest of the work. Both the existence of these allusions and their significance are communicated by their presence in the opening line. Another example is found in Tacitus who begins his history of Germany (*Germania omnis*, Germany as a whole) with an echo of Caesar's opening to *Bellum Gallicum* (*Gallia omnis*, Gaul as a whole). Again, the allusion is prominent because of its position at the opening, and signals a relationship between the works.

It is important to note that, while most internal markers of allusion are imitations of some linguistic feature, non-linguistic elements can also serve to effect an allusion. Thomas concedes the possibility of the presence of allusion if one author shares a rare 'myth, geographical or astronomical detail' with another.²⁰¹ Content can also effect allusion. Ovid at *Amores* 3.11b.33-4 says,

luctantur pectusque leve in contraria tendunt
hac amor hac odium; sed, puto, vincit amor

They struggle and draw my fickle heart in opposite directions,
love now this way and hate now that; but I think the winner is love.

Hinds finds 'no difficulty in recognising the allusion to (and resolution of) Catullus 85':

odi et amo. quare id faciam, fortasse requiris.
nescio, sed fieri sentio et excrucior

I hate and I love. Why do I do so, perhaps you ask.
I know not, but I feel it and am crucified by the pain.

Catullus is Ovid's model even though there are no clear markers, although '(a) strong case can be made that the words and antitheses of Ovid's couplet...do indeed show specific responsiveness to the words and antitheses of the Catullan epigram'.²⁰²

One final example of allusion conveyed without lexical imitation is Vergil's imitation at *Aen.* 1.34ff. of *Od.* 5.269ff. In the Homeric scene, Odysseus has found calm seas for his raft until he is spotted by Poseidon. Following an angry monologue, the god stirs up a storm that destroys the raft and Odysseus makes it safely to shore only with the divine help of Athena who calms the storm. In Vergil's scene, Aeneas and his crew are sailing smoothly from Sicily when Juno spies

The effect is an onomatopoeitic lingering farewell. This effect is reproduced by Ovid and is even more compelling as an onomatopoeitic echo.

²⁰⁰ Conte, 71.

²⁰¹ Thomas (1986), 174, n. 13.

them. After an angry monologue, she stirs up a storm that destroys their ship. Aeneas and a small band are able to make it to Libya only with the divine help of Neptune who calms the storm. It is this striking content similarity that effects the allusion to the *Odyssey*. There are no clear imitations of conspicuous diction or phrases, instead the 'scenic imitation is so evident that detailed literal imitations could be neglected.'²⁰³

²⁰² Hinds, 26-8.

²⁰³ Knauer, 396.

Methodological Difficulties of Allusion

Now that the nature of allusion, its appearance in a text and its function have been examined, it must be asked if the concept of literary allusion addresses those methodological problems recognised as shortcomings of *Quellenforschung*. The problems of that method were identified as a lack of methodological precision in the identification of parallel passages and a lack of theoretical framework in which to interpret the significance of identified parallels.

The scholarship of literary allusion has provided many specific criteria for identifying allusions. The introduction of the concept of external markers has provided specific and identifiable features that do seem to have been a self-conscious means of indicating allusion in Roman literature. The identification of words or phrases that were used to mark allusion forms a descriptive list rather than a prescriptive one, however. While examples can be identified and listed, those lists of external markers are not exhaustive. The critic is armed with specific markers in his search for allusions, but must also be alert to as-yet unidentified words and phrases that serve as external markers as well. Further, external markers do not actually convey allusions as much as indicate their nearby presence; the critic remains dependent upon other means to identify allusions themselves. As a weapon in the arsenal of the scholar, external markers must be regarded as effective but incomplete.

The difficulty of methodological specificity is still present, however, in the use of internal markers--imitative words, phrases or other literary features--for identifying allusion. West and Woodman warn of the difficulty in establishing genuine imitation, noting that 'similarity of thought or phrase' can appear because two writers are using a common source, because two texts can be describing conventional situations, or because two works belonging to the same genre are subject to the norms of that genre.²⁰⁴ Morgan provides philological criteria for identifying genuine allusions. She says that similarity in word choice, shared positions of words in a poetic line, or shared metrical anomalies are enough to be sure of imitation.²⁰⁵ Thomas is also concerned with providing criteria to establish a literary reference (his preferred term) from 'accidental confluence', which he says is mere linguistic coincidence inevitable when authors are working with a shared or related language. He offers two criteria for differentiating the phenomena: the proposed model

²⁰⁴ West & Woodman, 195.

²⁰⁵ Morgan, 3.

must be one with which the alluding poet is 'demonstrably familiar' and there must be some reason for the reference, i.e. it must be susceptible to interpretation.²⁰⁶ Likewise, Lee maintains that some word similarities are not connected but are merely part of the poetic tradition. To prove the connection between two works, he says there should be a close verbal similarity between the two, and 'no probability' of a common source for both authors independently.²⁰⁷

All these scholars recognise the essential subjectivity of identifying allusive language and attempt to provide criteria to allow for the inclusion of all genuine literary imitations while excluding similarities of language that are not purposeful. Unfortunately, none of these authors seems to have been able to adequately define genuine allusion. We are warned that philological similarities must be paramount. Morgan insists on this, adding that 'similarities of theme or thought are important only after philological evidence exists independently of thematic parallels.'²⁰⁸ Her remedy, however, is simply to remind us that we are looking for 'similarities' of words or poetic features. Lee wants only 'close' verbal similarities. But aside from urging us to err on the side of conservatism when identifying allusions, these criteria do not make for a more precise search.

The criteria suggested also do not help us distinguish allusions from the accidental similarities of a shared tradition, genre or language. Lee wants to exclude the possibility of a shared common source, but does not say how. Thomas wants to include only authors who have a demonstrable connection. The problem with that criterion is that it depends entirely on the success of previous critical work: if scholars have not already identified a connection, one cannot safely be assumed. This precludes any initial identification of connection. In the end, we are without specific linguistic criteria that would separate genuine imitation of a source text from an accidental similarity of language. As Morgan admits, 'any list of imitations must be subjective.'²⁰⁹

Scholars of literary allusion have made interpretability of allusions a criterion for judging their validity. The consensus among such critics is that a significant allusion is one in which the alluding author intends that the reader apply the text and context of the antecedent model to the new text. In his examination of Catullan allusion, Zetzel says that the author 'clearly intended the learned reader to compare the context of the source with the new adaptation and use the original to

²⁰⁶ Thomas, 174.

²⁰⁷ Lee, 5.

²⁰⁸ Morgan, 3.

²⁰⁹ Morgan, 6.

enhance appreciation and understanding of (Catullus') poem.²¹⁰ Thomas, again, emphasises that the 'intention is for the reader to be *sent back* to models, consulting them through memory or physically then to return and apply his observations to the new text.'²¹¹ Similarly, in the *Amores*, Morgan says that 'Ovid expects the reader to identify the specific Propertian elegy imitated; the reader's knowledge must be thorough.'²¹² It is the contention, then, that the alluding author intends that his reader will perceive his allusive signal, recover the model text and interpret the new text in the light of that model. The process requires a sophisticated and well-read audience. As Pasquali noted decades ago, 'allusions do not produce their intended effect unless the reader remembers clearly the text to which they refer.'²¹³

The criterion of interpretability as a test of the validity of a purported allusion represents a methodological advance over *Quellenforschung*. As Thomas puts it, 'there must be some reason for the allusion--that is, it must be susceptible of interpretation, or meaningful.'²¹⁴ The literary critic who argues for an allusion must provide that reason or admit his proposed reference is either inconsequential or non-existent. Studies in *Quellenforschung*, as has been shown, have neglected this criterion. The presence of a parallel between texts was taken as indicative of source and influence without any theoretical or methodological justification. Because of this assumption, parallels usually went uninterpreted. Interpretation of allusions provides an advance for the critic in that it offers both a means of judging the genuineness of allusive passages and addresses their significance to the new work.

In spite of this advance, however, the doctrine of interpretation depends on two assumptions that are problematical for the scholar. These assumptions are forcefully controverted by R.O.A.M. Lyne, who refers to them as the 'intentional fallacy'--a concept originating in 'new criticism'--and the 'fallacy of audience limitation.' While some may argue that allusions indicate intention and that this assumption can be used to interpret the significance of an allusive passage, it remains true that we have no way of knowing an author's intention beyond what we read in the text itself. Lyne says that appeals to 'intention' are really appeals to a scholar's own 'preconception of

²¹⁰ Zetzel, 255.

²¹¹ Thomas (1986), 172, n. 8. Cf. p. 177: 'Virgil's chief purpose in referring to a single *locus* is' simply stated: he intends that the reader recall the context of the model and apply that context to the new situation...'

²¹² Morgan, 107.

²¹³ Pasquali, 275.

what the author might or could intend.²¹⁵ Further, Lyne points out that 'intention' is a psychologically problematic concept. An individual may intend something with full consciousness, in some subliminal way, or even unconsciously (per Freud). Even if the author were present to ask, it would be nearly impossible to apply authorial intent in a scientific way to the interpretation of a text. In the case of the ancients, we have no evidence of intention and could not trust it if we did. An interpretation simply cannot be defended on the basis of intent.

The second fallacy Lyne identifies is that of audience limitation. It has been argued that the purpose of an allusion is to direct the reader to a model text, which he will then apply to the new text. As has been noted, the reader must be well read and alert to the many subtle ways allusion is marked. This idea has led to the rejection of certain interpretations on the grounds that its audience could not have possessed the requisite knowledge or had the opportunity to peruse the text as closely as would be necessary to identify an allusion. Lyne points out that this position rests on indefensible premises: '(w)e know for whom our writer was writing; we know what sort of effects they could absorb and understand. Therefore if a scholar posits the sort of effect that the imagined audience could not have grasped, he must be in error.'²¹⁶ Just as there is no evidence of an author's intended textual effects, there is also no evidence of the capacities of an author's intended audience. Further, such a belief would necessitate a theory of literary creation that describes the manner in which an author writes for a specific audience and includes nothing beyond what that audience would understand. Such a theory negates the findings of a literary critic of any more than average perspicacity, and is clearly not the belief of the critical community.

To answer the question at the beginning of this section, the scholarship of literary allusion does address the methodological problems associated with *Quellenforschung*, but does not resolve them entirely. The methodological specificity that *Quellenforschung* studies lacked with respect to identifying parallel passages is provided by external markers of allusion and to a lesser extent by purported internal markers. Problems still exist in that there are external markers yet to be identified and therefore which cannot be prescribed methodologically. However, the function of these markers has provided grounds for criteria that can be used to evaluate the validity of new discoveries. Internal markers are still problematical as their identification is still left to the

²¹⁴ Thomas (1986), 174.

²¹⁵ Lyne (1994), 199.

subjective judgement of the critic. No objective means of distinguishing allusions from accidental similarities of language on a linguistic basis has been developed either. However, internal markers taken in conjunction with external markers and subjected to the test of interpretability promise a more scientific and specific means of identifying allusive parallels than was available to traditional *Quellenforschung* studies.

Scholars of literary allusion also put forward interpretability as a means of testing the genuineness of imitative features and emphasised it as the significance of those imitations. Whether or not there is some reason for an allusion is still in the realm of subjective judgement. However, this criterion does advance the critic's ability to identify allusive parallels by providing one more test of validity. That the significance of an allusion rests not in its mere presence or in the assumption that it represents a source text for an author, but in its ability to inject an unspoken meaning into the new text is the most important advance literary allusion scholarship provides for the present study. This concept is a means by which two texts can be connected in a significant way, a means that confirms a relationship between texts that the identification of parallels alone cannot. The theoretical framework for interpreting allusion does rest on two flawed premises, however. These premises, or fallacies as Lyne has it, must be addressed so that the criterion of interpretability can be applied to texts in the current study in a scientific and meaningful way.

Intertexts and Intertextuality

The methodological shortcomings of the scholarship of literary allusion can be at least partially remedied by recourse to intertextual theory. That body of theory assumes that a text is not a self-sufficient whole and does not act as a closed system. This is because a writer is first a reader of texts, so any work of literature contains references, quotations and influences from every source to which an author was ever exposed. The textual picture is further clouded by the process of reading. A reader brings with him to that process all the texts to which he has been exposed. The result is a 'cross-fertilisation' of the book being read and all previous texts read by that reader.²¹⁷

²¹⁶ Lyne (1994), 197.

²¹⁷ Still & Worton, 1. 'Text', in this context, must be understood broadly: not just written material but all cultural products. Intertextualists would include all media products, folklore, cultural assumptions, religious beliefs or gossip in the category of 'text'. For this study, however, the term will denote only written matter. The modern reader is unaware of most of the intertextual workings of literature that comes from previous historical eras, as Still & Worton point out (p. 8). Most of

An intertext is 'one or more texts which the reader must know in order to understand a work (of literature) in terms of its overall significance.'²¹⁸ In the terminology of the previous discussion, an intertext is a model text to which an allusion is made in a later work. Intertextuality is the relationship between a text and its intertext, i.e. between a work and its model.

As literary allusions are signalled by internal and external markers, intertexts are signalled by ungrammaticalities. These are 'gaps in the internal logic of the text'.²¹⁹ These gaps can be merely a 'textual strangeness that alerts the reader to the presence in the text of an almost-hidden foreign body which is the trace of an intertext.'²²⁰ Strangeness in a text can be any element--a word, phrase or rhetorical figure--that cannot be explained by the context. The element that does not fit, the ungrammaticality, is the announcement of the presence of an intertext. The gap in meaning signalled by an ungrammaticality is filled by an intertextual grammaticality, i.e. the meaning derived from the referenced passage of the antecedent text.

Ungrammaticalities do not indicate the specific intertext. That is accomplished by imitative language, the 'internal markers' of literary allusion. They do, however, indicate to the reader that the intertext is necessary and that meaning must be sought from outside if the text is to be understood in all its significance.

While not expressing the idea with intertextualist terminology, the concept of the ungrammaticality has been noted before as indicative of literary allusion. Lee, for example, notes that reference to a previous work can be effected by 'a logical or syntactical misfit, or one not fully intelligible without the referenced work.'²²¹ His example is Ezra Pound's lines from *Hugh Selwyn Mauberley*:

Died some pro patria
non "dulce" non "et decor"...

The lines are a reference to Horace *Ode* 3.2.13: *dulce et decorum est pro patria mori* (it is both sweet and proper to die for one's country). Even in ignorance of Horace, we could tell that Pound is referring to something outside his own text. The presence of Latin in an English text is certainly

the contemporary cultural intertexts of Shakespeare and his audience, for instance, are irretrievably lost. The only historical intertexts which we can know with any certainty are surviving literary texts. 'Text' in this study will refer to these.

²¹⁸ Riffaterre in Still & Worton, 56.

²¹⁹ Riffaterre in Still & Worton, 58.

²²⁰ Still & Worton, 25.

²²¹ Lee, 10.

an awkward and conspicuous element. The presence of the quotation marks is also indicative of an outside source. The translation is also awkward: Died some for their country, not "sweet" not "and proper," making it what Lee calls a 'quotation under stress of alteration'. The stress is the product of the awkwardness of a quote that works in its original but does not quite fit the new situation, i.e. an ungrammaticality. The meaning lacking in Pound's lines is found by recourse to the intertextual grammaticality in Horace's.

Another example of this phenomenon is Vergil's allusion to Apollonius of Rhodes, signalled by his imitation of the simile:

talia per Latium. quae Laomedontius heros
 cuncta videns magno curarum fluctuat aestu,
 atque animum nunc huc celerem nunc dividit illuc
 in partisque rapit varias perque omnia versat,
 sicut aquae tremulum labris ubi lumen aenis
 sole repercussum aut radiantis imagine lunae
 omnia pervolitat late loca, iamque sub auras
 erigitur summique ferit laquearia tecti (Aen. 8.18-25).

Such were the events throughout Latium. Perceiving it all
 the hero of Laomedon's line tosses on a great surge of troubles
 and directs his thoughts now hither, now thither, casting them
 into different areas, turning them to every aspect:
 like flickering light from the sun or shining moon's
 semblance which is reflected from water in brazen vessels
 and darts everywhere, now rising skywards and striking
 the panelled ceiling of the lofty house.

Aeneas' thoughts, in Vergil's simile, are compared to rays of light reflected from a cauldron. The simile is borrowed from Apollonius where it describes the fluttering of Medea's heart:

ἀλλὰ μάλ' ἐπὶ γλυκερὸς λάβεν ὕπνος.
 πολλὰ γὰρ Αἰσονίδαο πόθῳ μελεδήματ' ἔγειρεν
 δειδυῖαν ταύρων κρατερόν μένος, οἷσιν ἔμελλεν
 φθεῖσθαι ἀεικελίῃ μοίρῃ κατὰ νειὸν Ἀρης.
 πυκνὰ δέ οἱ κραδίη στήθεων ἐντοσθεν ἔθυιεν,
 ἡελίου ὥς τις τε δόμοις ἐνι πάλλεται αἴλιγῃ,
 ὕδατος ἐξανιούσα τὸ δὴ νέον ἠὲ λέβητι
 ἠέ που ἐν γαυλῷ κέχυται, ἠ δ' ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα
 ὠκείῃ στροφάλιγγι τινάσσεται αἰσσοῦσα·
 ὥς δὲ καὶ ἐν στήθεσσι κέαρ ἐλελίζετο κούρης.

But sweet sleep did not take hold of Medea. In
 her love for Jason, many cares kept her
 wakeful, for she feared the mighty strength of
 the bulls by whose agency he was likely to die
 in an unseemly fate in the field of Ares. Fast

did her heart throb in her breast, as a sunbeam
in a house quivers, reflected from water, water
that has just been poured in a cauldron or pail;
and hither and thither does it dart and shake on
the eddy; even so the girl's heart quivered in
her breast.

The simile works in Apollonius' text; dancing reflected light might illustrate a rapidly beating heart. The same simile is awkward in Vergil's new setting; the image works less well standing for anxious cogitation. Even if we knew nothing of Vergil's intertext, we could see this awkwardness, this ungrammaticality, as an indicator of the presence of something outside the text. The ungrammaticality is a gap in the meaning of the text that can be filled only by seeking that extratextual element, the intertextual grammaticality from Apollonius.²²² Some relationship between Medea and Aeneas must be anticipated to fill that gap.

Thomas also connects textual awkwardness with reference to outside sources when he notes the 'baroque' opening of Catullus 64 (1-18), which contains allusions to five different versions of previous Argo stories. He says this awkward opening is the 'result of a strained attempt to accommodate the inherited tradition to a new context' and points out that 'sometimes the seams show.'²²³ These seams are signals of those allusions Thomas finds in the text. Even if we were unaware that there were previous Argo stories, their presence would indicate an intertext. The awkwardness, the stress, the ungrammaticality that these seams represent can be addressed only with recourse to the various intertexts where grammatical elements resolve the gaps in meaning of Catullus' text.

Intertextual relationships are interpreted within the context of a theory of literary production that understands these relationships as fundamental to the process of creation. As writers are first readers of texts and repositories of textual information, any text 'is constructed as a mosaic of quotations.'²²⁴ It is built on textual elements derived from the relevant literary tradition, i.e. the genre of which the work is a part.

Intertexts are signals of the relationship between a specific literary composition and its genre. They are references to the norm of the genre which 'delimits the common space within

²²² This example and translations are taken from Lyne (1987), 125-7.

²²³ Thomas (1986), 193.

²²⁴ Kristeva, 37.

which (a new work) can both emulate tradition and speak with a fresh voice.²²⁵ Literary style is the 'simultaneous manifestation of deviance and norm together to achieve greater artistic effect...Poetic invention exists in this relationship between norm and deviation.'²²⁶ Intertextual relationships establish reader expectations and direct the reader's attention to both traditional norms and the violation of those norms. Literary works must be perceived within this system of norms and variations in order to communicate. A work that had only original elements would be doomed to incomprehensibility.²²⁷

When Vergil begins the *Aeneid* with the traditional epic opening, that opening establishes the norms of the tradition of which the *Aeneid* is a part. Intertexts communicate that relationship with the tradition. The reader becomes alert to epic norms. When Vergil departs from those norms, or departs from the specific cases described in the intertexts, something new is created, communicated and highlighted for the reader.

Similarly, the composition of the Cassiciacum philosophical works in the dialogue form establishes the norms of literary genre in Augustine's early writings. The intertexts communicate the relationship between those works and the genre as it was formed by Plato, Aristotle and Cicero. In such a context, 'literary echoes are not passive representations of *topoi*, but places where the tradition deliberately intrudes into the text'.²²⁸ Augustine's dialogues are in conflict with that tradition, sometimes upholding and sometimes violating the norms of the genre. Intertexts emphasise these similarities and differences. It is in that relationship between the new and old that literary creativity takes place. It is within intertextual relationships that the significance of the new work is communicated.

Intertextual theory augments scholarship on literary allusion to allow it to plug the methodological holes identified with *Quellenforschung*. In addition to the internal and external markers offered by allusion scholarship, intertextual theory puts forward the concept of ungrammaticalities. These examples of textual awkwardness mark the place where some foreign element has been imported into a text. Ungrammaticalities do not identify the specific intertext, but do serve as one more weapon in the critic's arsenal.

²²⁵ Conte, 81.

²²⁶ Conte, 82.

²²⁷ Conte, 91.

²²⁸ Segal, introduction to Conte, 10.

Intertextual theory also addresses the two logical fallacies identified by Lyne, which undermine the interpretation of literary allusions. Allusion is a purposeful reference by an author to a previous work in order to convey some meaning to his own text. The reader must recognise the clues to the antecedent text in order for the allusion to function. Intertexts, by contrast, are understood to be the natural products of the literary process. A writer creates a work out of the raw material of other works in that genre which he has already digested. Inevitably, his new expression will contain elements of this genre-language. The interpretative emphasis is on the intertextual relationships as expressed in the text. In examining an intertext, we do not ask what the author intends or whether his audience would have understood the intended effect. Instead, we ask only what the effect of the intertextual relationship is on the text before us. The questions of the author's intention and of audience perception are superfluous to this critical process.

Method

The goal of the present study is to determine if Augustine read any of the works of Plato either in the original or in Latin translation. The method of this study advances from the premise that references made by Augustine to earlier works are to be understood as evidence of intertextual relationships. The principle will be observed that references to previous works convey significance beyond the denotative meanings of the words in their textual context. As advocated by the scholarship of literary allusion, identified antecedent works will be consulted with the original passage and its context applied to the new situation. Lee has noted the basic but sometimes overlooked truism that one can only allude to works that predate the current work. This study would add that one can allude only to a work that one has read. If a genuinely interpretable intertextual relationship is found to exist between Augustine's works and any of those to which he makes reference, it will be regarded as demonstrated that Augustine read the original passage, if not as a part of an entire work, then at least in its original context.

This study will compare passages identified as references to Plato's works in Augustine to the original Platonic texts. It will begin with passages identified by previous studies in *Quellenforschung* as references to Plato. Added to these will be passages identified by the presence of internal and external markers and by ungrammaticalities, as specified and exemplified in the discussions above.

Once identified, passages from Platonic texts and their contexts will be compared with the alluding passages in Augustine in order to identify intertextual relationships. The criterion applied to this examination will be whether the original passage and its context provide meaning to Augustine's text that suggests an interpretable relationship. This study will not confine itself to intertextualist theory in interpreting these passages. Emphasis will be placed, however, on the relationship between texts rather than authorial intent. While it seems indisputable that authors did engage in the activity of allusion in a purposeful way, and this proposition is important to the likelihood of Augustine engaging in it also, it is the goal of this study to minimise the dependency of interpretation on any concept of intent. Instead, Lyne's position will be adopted: we may not know how exactly to interpret the relationship, 'but the intertext is there and the reader must confront it.'²²⁹

The texts used in this study will include those from each author most likely subject to intertextual relationship. While most previous study of Augustine's sources has concentrated on the Cassiciacum dialogues and the *Confessions*, this study will examine later works. Augustine's lack of knowledge of Greek would have kept him from reading original Greek texts until at least 415.²³⁰ While this study will not address the issue of his reading of Plato in Greek v. Latin, it must be acknowledged that familiarity with Greek would have increased the number of texts at Augustine's disposal and magnified the chances of a Platonic text being available to him. Further, Hagendahl, followed by O'Donnell, found that most of Augustine's references to classical pagan works occur in works published after 413.²³¹ Between his conversion in 391 and that time, there is 'almost a total lack of pagan elements'.²³² It appears that he undertook a significant study of pagan works in preparation for writing *De Civitate Dei*. This study will involve the works identified by Hagendahl that contain the greatest number of classical references. These include *De Civitate Dei*, the final three books of *De Trinitate*, and *Contra Iulianum*, all of which were composed between 413 and 429, a date after which pagan material is again absent from Augustine's writings.²³³ Owing to the size of *De Civitate Dei*, only those books that address Plato and ancient philosophy explicitly will be examined: books 8-10, 13, 19 and 22.

²²⁹ Lyne (1994), 187.

²³⁰ Angus, 270-2; Marrou (1938), 635; Courcelle (1969), 152-165.

²³¹ Hagendahl, 705; O'Donnell (1980), 147.

²³² Hagendahl, 703.

The works of Plato that will be examined in this study include the *Phaedo*, *Meno*, *Symposium*, and *Timaeus*. Possible references to all these were identified by earlier studies. The *Phaedo* and *Symposium* were also apparently available to Augustine's fellow African and rough contemporary, Macrobius.²³⁴ In addition, the *Phaedo* was translated into Latin by another fellow African, Apuleius. It is the consensus of previous studies that the *Timaeus* is the only Platonic dialogue Augustine knew and read. He makes lengthy quotes from it, and most of it was also available to him in Cicero's Latin translation.

This study assumes that Augustine, at any point in his life, would have read Plato if given the opportunity. He frequently refers to him in glowing terms and suggests that Plato and his followers discovered the revealed truth of the scriptures by reason alone. He acknowledges his debt to the Platonists, and recognises Plato as their leader and foremost representative.

Given the status accorded to allusion in Augustine's education and the usefulness of it in advancing his theme of taking what is valuable from pagan philosophy and using it for Christian ends, it is considered likely that an examination of Augustine's texts for literary allusions will yield fruit both in identifying parallels and interpreting their significance. At the very least, this study will confirm the findings of previous scholarship but reinforce those findings with results derived from a more systematic and scientific method.

²³³ Hagendahl, 706.

²³⁴ Henry (1934), 170-2; Courcelle (1969), 20-1.

CHAPTER FIVE

Results

This study identified citations of Plato in several of Augustine's works in a systematic and methodologically consistent way, and then attempted to identify the cited texts. Augustine's text and the original were then compared to determine if any interpretable intertextual relationship exists between them and thereby to determine if Augustine actually saw the passages to which reference is made in their original context.²³⁵

Before undertaking to identify cited passages, however, it is necessary to examine those passages of Augustine identified as citations to Plato in previous scholarship. The following citations were drawn from previous studies concerned with Augustine's reading of Plato. A total of 51 different citations of five Platonic dialogues were identified in Augustine's works by eight 20th century studies.²³⁶ Of these citations, 34 were identified as potentially referring to passages in the *Timaeus*, seven to the *Phaedo*, five to the *Republic*, four to the *Symposium*, and two to the *Meno*. Following is a list of citations and the scholars who identified them. Each citation is given in the form provided by the scholar by whom it was identified. These are followed by the cited passage in full and a brief commentary, both of which are to be attributed to this study.

Citations Identified in Previous Studies

Timaeus

note: CT = Cicero's *Timaeus* (*Tim.* 27d - 47d, lacuna from 43b-46a)

1. CD 6.1- refers to Calcidius' *Timaeus* (no specific citation)

CD 6.1.1 - Courcelle = CT 11.40

CD 6.1.17-22: *utrum non unum Deum, qui fecit omnem spiritalem corporalemque creaturam, propter vitam, quae post mortem futura est, coli oporteat, sed multos deos, quos ab illo uno factos et sublimer conlocatos quidam eorundem philosophorum ceteris excellentiores nobilioresque senserunt.* (The underlined phrase is an example of the external marker called a footnote).

CT 11.40: Vos qui deorum satu orti estis...quorum operum ego parens effectorque sum, haec sunt indissoluta me invito...

²³⁵ The issue of whether or not Augustine saw a passage in Greek or in Latin translation becomes salient when examining cited passages for verbal, grammatical and syntactical similarities to Platonic originals. How this issue was addressed is discussed in Chapter Six, p. 194.

²³⁶ Source studies by Angus, Alfarc, Combès, Marrou (1938), Courcelle (1969), Testard, Hagendahl and O'Daly (1999) are included in this analysis.

This citation is a doctrinal similarity only; there is no intertextual relationship.

2. *CD* 8.11 - Courcelle = *CT* 4.11 (see also *CD* 22.11.4-5)

CD 8.11 - Hagendahl = *CT* 4.13/*Tim.* 31b.

CD 8.11 (cf. *CD* 11.21)-O'Daly

CD 8.11.27-30: ...in *Timaeo* autem Plato, quem librum de mundi constitutione conscripsit, Deum dicit in illo opere terram primo ignemque iunxisse.

CT 4.13: quam ob rem mundum efficere molens deus terram primum ignem iungebat.

As O'Daly says, *CD* 8.11 points out some similarities between the creation as described in Genesis and *Timaeus*: Augustine also suggests that Plato (through Cicero) calls the air *spiritus* and could therefore be misunderstanding *spiritus Dei superferebatur super aquam* from Genesis. All this is part of Augustine's discussion of the idea that Plato was familiar with Genesis. From these examples, it seems clear that Augustine saw this section of Cicero's *Timaeus*. There is still, however, no intertextual relationship. Plato is referred to here within an argument that he may have been familiar with the scriptures; his words are offered as authentication.

3. *CD* 8.11 - Hagendahl = *CT* 5.15/*Tim.* 32b

CD 8.11.33-39: Deinde ille (Plato) duo media, quibus interpositis sibimet haec extrema copularentur, aquam dicit et aerem; unde putatur sic intellexisse quod scriptum est...Parum quippe attendens quo more soleat illa scriptura appellare spiritum dei quoniam et aer spiritus dicitur quattuor opinatus elementa loco illo commemorata videri potest.

This certainly refers to *CT* 5.15/*Tim.* 32b: ita contigit ut inter ignem atque terram aquam deus animamque poneret eaque inter se compararet et pro portione coniungeret, ut quem ad modum ignis animae sic anima aquae, quodque anima aquae id aqua terrae proportione redderet; qua ex coniunctione caelum ita aptum et ut sub aspectum et tactum cadat.

This is a continuation of the discussion in *CD* begun at 8.11 above, addressed in the comment on citation 2. The similarity is doctrinal, without any intertextual relationship.

4. *CD* 8.15 (40)- Angus = *Tim.* 31b

CD 8.15 - Hagendahl = *CT* 5.15/*Tim.* 32b.

CD 8.15.40-45: Nam et illa ratio Platonis, qua elementa quattuor proportione contextit atque ordinat, ita duobus extremis, igni mobilissimo et terrae immobili, media duo, aerem et aquam, interserens, ut quanto est aer aquis et aere ignis, tanto et aquae superiores sint terris,

^Cicero's *Timaeus* 4.13: quam ob rem mundum efficere molens deus terram primum ignem iungebat.]

Augustine's specific citation continues to *CT* 5.15: ita contigit ut iter ignem atque terram aquam deus animamque poneret eaque inter se compararet et pro portione redderet; qua ex coniunctione caelum ita aptum est ut sub aspectum et tactum cadat.

Augustine's purpose is to dispose of Plato's hierarchy of elements as evidence to support the argument that creatures of the higher elements are higher forms than those that inhabit the lower elements, specifically to argue against using Plato to say that *daemones*, who inhabit the air, are superior to humans who inhabit the earth. His characterisation of Plato is a decent summary

indicating that he has read the *Timaeus* passage. However, there is no intertextual relationship, just a species of citation for authority.

5. CD 9.23(1) - Angus = *Tim.* 41a

CD 9.23.1 - Courcelle = CT 11.40 re: Gods created by God

CD 9.23.1-4 - Hagendahl = CT. 11.40/*Tim.* 41ab

CD 9.23.1-4: Hos si Platonici malunt deos quam daemones dicere eis que adnumerare, quos a summo Deo conditos deos scribit eorum auctor et magister Plato: dicant quod volunt...Si enim sic immortales, ut tamen a summo Deo factos, et si non per se ipsos, sed ei, a quo facti sunt, adhaerendo beatos esse dicunt: hoc dicunt quod dicimus, quolibet eos nomine appellent.

The reference is again to *Tim.*41ab/CT 11.40 seen above at citation 1. There is no intertextual relationship. The reference is an explication of the Platonic text and doctrinal in nature.

6. CD 10.29 (66) - Angus = *Tim.* 30b

CD 10.29 - Combès - cites Calcidius' *Timaeus* (no specific citation offered)

CD 10.29 - Alfarcic = *Tim.* 30b from Calcidius, not in Cicero

CD 10.29.2 - Courcelle = CT 4 (see also *Retractationes* 1.11)

CD 10.29.66-68 - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 30b/CT 3.10

CD 10.29 - O'Daly = *Tim.* 30b; 32cd; 37cd/ Cicero's *Tim.* 10, 16, 28

CD 10.29.66-68: Platone quippe auctore animal esse dicitis mundum et animal beatissimum, quod vultis esse etiam sempiternum.

This citation is a doctrinal reference only to, among others, *Tim.* 30bc (CT 3.10: hunc mundum animal esse idque intellegens et divina providentia constitutum); *Tim.* 30d (CT 4.12: animal unum aspectabile, in quo omnia animalia containerentur effecit); *Tim.* 32cd (CT 5.16: primum ut mundus animans posset ex perfectis partibus esse perfectus, deinde ut unus esset...); *Tim.* 37cd (CT 8.28 but lacuna)

There is no intertextual relationship and no real evidence that Augustine read this in context. The reference is so vague that the concept could have come from a secondary source.

7. CD 10.30 (3)- Angus = *Tim.* 41e-42d, cf. *Phaedo* 81; *Phaedrus* 246b, 249b; *Laws* 904e, 903d; actually from *En.* 3.4.2

CD 10.30.2-5 - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 42bc/CT 12.45

CD 10.30-O'Daly = *Tim.* 42bc / CT 45

CD 10.30.2-5: Nam Platonem animas hominum post mortem revolvi usque ad corpora bestiarum scripsisse certissimum est.

CT 12.45: qui autem immoderate et intemperate vixerit, eum secundus ortus in figuram muliebrem transferet, et si ne tum quidem finem vitiorum faciet gravius etiam iactabitur et in suis moribus simillimas figuras pecudum et ferarum transferetur...

This is another reference to doctrine without any intertextual relationship.

8. CD 10.31 - Combès - cites Calcidius' *Timaeus* (no specific citation offered)

CD 10.31 - Alfarcic = *Tim.* 41b from Calcidius, not in Cicero

CD 10.31 - Courcelle = CT 11 re: universe/Gods have beginning but no end

CD 10.31.7-11 - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 41ab/CT 11.40

CD 10.31.7-11: Ut enim hoc Platonici nollent credere...quamquam et de mundo et de his, quos in mundo deos a Deo factos scribit Plato, apertissime dicat eos esse coepisse et habere initium, finem

tamen non habituros, sed per conditoris potentissimam voluntatem in aeternum mansuros esse perhibeat.

Tim. 41b/CT 11.40-1: sed quoniam estis orti, immortales vos quidem esse et indissolubiles non potestis, neutiquam tamen dissolvemini, neque vos ulla mortis fata perement nec fraus valentior quam consilium meum...).

This is the same passage referred to already at citations 1 and 5. It is a doctrinal similarity only.

9. CD 11.21- Combès - cites Calcidius' *Timaeus* (no specific citation offered)

CD 11.21 - Alfarcic = *Tim.* 37c from Calcidius, not in Cicero

CD 11.21 - Courcelle = CT 3

CD 11.21- Hagendahl = *Tim.* 37c-38c/CT 8.28-9; *Tim.* 29e-30a/CT 3.9

CD 11.21-O'Daly = *Tim.* 28a; 29e-30a; 37c / CT 4, 9-10, 28; 37c = CT 28 but lacuna in Cic.

Two statements from 11.21 refer to Plato, one at lines 5-7: Et Plato quidem plus ausus est dicere, elatum esse scilicet Deum gaudio mundi universitate perfecta.

This is a reference to *Tim.* 37cd: Ὡς δὲ κινήθην αὐτὸ καὶ ζῶν ἐνενόησε τῶν αἰδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἀγαλμα ὃ γεννήσας πατήρ, ἠγάσθη τε καὶ εὐφρανθεὶς ἔτι δὴ μᾶλλον ὁμοιον πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα ἐπενόησεν ἀπεργάσασθαι.

There is a lacuna at this point in Cicero's *Timaeus*. Combès and Alfarcic have concluded from this fact that Augustine read these words in another (Calcidius') translation; Courcelle, Hagendahl and O'Daly believe he read it in Cicero's text before it became corrupted.

There is another reference at lines 49-51: *Hanc etiam Plato causam condendi mundi iustissimam dicit, ut a bono Deo bona opera fierent...* that refers to *Tim.* 29e-30a/CT 3.9: *probitate videlicet praestabat, probus autem invidet nemini; itaque omnia sui similia generavit. haec nimirum gignendi mundi causa iustissima. nam cum constituisset deus bonis omnibus explere mundum mali nihil admiscere...*

Both of these are doctrinal references within the context of using Plato as evidence for Augustine's point that God and his creation are good. Due to the lacuna, we can only speculate as to the closeness of Augustine's words to CT 8.28; however it seems that Augustine had seen the text of CT 3.9, as he repeats Plato's (Cicero's) words with the only change being the employment of indirect statement. There is no intertextual relationship in either case, however.

O'Daly includes *Tim.* 28a/CT 4 as a possible text for reference; it is a very vague statement of the good of creation based upon a good model. This could be a reference, but I think the other passages are sufficient to account for Augustine's statement.

10. CD 11.21 - Courcelle = CT 3.10 (a second citation)

Courcelle offers: *sic ratus est opus illud effectum esse pulcherrimum* as another possible text referred to by Augustine re: the created world being good. This passage is the continuation of a discussion that includes CT 3.9 quoted above. It is not a distinct citation.

11. CD 12.18 - Courcelle = CT 11 (see 10.31, 13.18)

Courcelle suggests that this passage in CD is a reference to the same passage at CT 11.40 (*Tim.* 41b) concerning the universe and gods, which have a beginning but no end. It is difficult to see the reference. There is a statement denying that God is a craftsman, clearly aimed at Plato. In any case, it is a vague doctrinal reference without any intertextual relationship.

12. CD 12.24, 26 - Courcelle = CT 11

Courcelle suggests that there are passages here that refer to lesser gods creating mortals. The connection here is extremely tenuous and exclusively doctrinal. CD 12.24 argues that God created man in his image; 12.26 argues against angels (gods) being the efficient cause of man's creation. There is no explicit mention of Plato, literary similarities or intertextual relationship.

13. CD 12.25, 27-Alfaric = *Tim.* 41c in Calcidius, not in Cicero
CD 12.25 - Combès - cites Calcidius' *Timaeus* (no specific citation offered)
CD 12.25.2-7, 12.27.1-3 - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 41CD/CT 11.41
CD 12.25, 27-O'Daly = *Tim.* 41CD / CT 41

CD 12.25.2-7 argues against a doctrine attributed to Plato that lesser gods made mankind: Illi autem qui Platoni suo credunt non ab illo summo Deo, qui fabricatus est mundum, sed ab aliis minoribus, quos quidem ipse creaverit, permissu sive iussu eius animalia facta esse cuncta mortalia...

CT 11.41: ut igitur mortali condicione generentur, vos suscipite ut illa gignatis imiteminique vim meam, qua me in vestro ortu usum esse meministis.

Augustine's account accurately describes Plato's, but the reference is vague and doctrinal; there is no intertextual relationship.

CD 12.27.1-3. summarises the same passage from *Timaeus*: ita sane Plato minores et a summo Deo factos deos effectores esse voluit animalium ceterorum, ut inmortalem partem ab ipso sumerent, ipsi vero mortalem adtexerent.

This is the same kind of reference as 12.25 and many others: Augustine probably did read these passages of the *Timaeus*, but there is no intertextual relationship, only a doctrinal reference and opposing argument.

14. CD 12.26 - Courcelle = CT 11 re: the creation of mortals indispensable to perfection of universe

The *Timaeus* passage referred to here is given as CT 11.41/ *Tim.* 41b: Tria nobis genera reliqua sunt, eaque mortalia; quibus praetermissis, caeli absolutio perfecta non erit.

No reference to this passage can be found in CD 12.26. There is a reference at 12.27, however, see citation 15 below.

15. CD 12.27 - Alfaric = *Tim.* 52b from Calcidius, not in Cicero
CD 12.27 - Combès - cites Calcidius' *Timaeus* (no specific citation offered)
CD 12.27-O'Daly = *Tim.* 30cd / CT11-12

CD 12.27.28-30: Et si Deus, quod adsidue Plato commemorat, sicut mundi universi, ita omnium animalium species aeterna intelligentia continebat...

Tim. 30cd/ CT 4.11-12: omnes igitur qui animo cernuntur et ratione intelleguntur animantes complexu rationis et intelligentiae, sicut homines hoc mundo et pecudes et omnia quae sub aspectum cadunt, comprehenduntur.

Alfaric suggests this passage refers to *Tim.* 52b, which is not a part of Cicero's translation: φάμεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πού τὸ ὄν ἅπαν ἐν τινὶ τόπῳ καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινά, τὸ δὲ μήτε ἐν γῆ μήτε πού κατ' οὐρανὸν οὐδὲν εἶναι.

Augustine could have drawn the conclusion from *Tim.* 30cd/ CT 4.11-12 alone (although he does say that Plato *quod adsidue...commemorat*, suggesting at least one other reference). Neither reference is any more than a vague doctrinal similarity and there is no intertextual relationship.

16. *CD* 12.27.5-9 - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 42b/ CT 12.45
CD 12.27-O'Daly = *Tim.* 42bc / CT 45 (see also *CD* 10.30)

CD 12.27.5-9: Porphyrius...cum suo Platone aliisque Platonicis sentit eos, qui inmoderate atque inhoneste vixerint, propter luendas poenas ad corpora redire mortalia, Plato quidem etiam bestiarum...

Tim. 42bc/CT 12.45: qui autem inmoderate et intemperate vixerit, eum secundus ortus in figuram muliebrem transferet, et si ne tum quidem finem vitiorum faciet gravius etiam iactabitur et in suis moribus simillimas figuras pecudum et ferarum transferetur...

This citation is a clear doctrinal reference only without any intertextual relationship.

17. *CD* 12.27.23-36 - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 41b/ CT 11.41

CD 12.27.23-26: Nam si nulla causa est vivendi in hoc corpore nisi propter pendenda supplicia: quo modo dicit idem Plato aliter mundum fieri non potuisse pulcherrimum atque optimum, nisi omnium animalium, id est immortalium et mortalium, generibus impleretur?

CT 11.41: Tria genera nobis reliqua sunt eaque mortalia, quibus praetermissis caeli absolutio perfecta non erit: omnia enim genera animalium complexu non tenebit, teneat autem oportebit, ut ex eodem ne quid absit.

This is a paraphrase of Plato and shows that Augustine had probably read this passage. He uses Plato as evidence against the Neoplatonic belief that embodiment is a soul's punishment. The reference is at once a citation of the authority of Plato and a doctrinal similarity. There is no intertextual relationship.

18. *CD* 13.16 - Alfarc - refers expressly to Cicero's *Timaeus*
CD 13.16-Combès - cites Cicero's *Timaeus* (no specific citation offered)
CD 13.16 (2)-Marrou - quotes Cicero's *Timaeus* (no specific citation offered, refers to Combès)
CD 13.16.1- Courcelle = exactly quotes CT 11.40
CD 13.16 - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 41ab/ CT 11.40
CD 13.16-O'Daly = *Tim.* 41ab / CT 40, see also *CD* 22.26

This is a direct and attributed quotation of the *Timaeus* in *CD*. Here are Augustine's quote and the original passage:

CD 13.16.25-34: Vos qui deorum satu orti estis, adtendite: quorum operum ego parens effectorque sum, haec sunt indissolubilia me invito, quamquam omne conligatum solui potest; sed haudquaquam bonum est ratione uinctum velle dissolvere. Sed quoniam estis orti, immortales vos quidem esse et indissolubiles non potestis; ne utiquam tamen dissolvemini, neque vos ulla mortis fata periment, nec erunt ualentiora quam consilium meum, quod maius est uinculum ad perpetuitatem vestram quam illa quibus estis <tum cum gignebamini> conligati.

CT 11.40: Vos qui deorum satu orti estis adtendite. quorum operum ego parens effectorque sum, haec sunt *indissoluta* me invito: quamquam omne conligatum solvi potest, sed haud quaquam *boni* est ratione uinctum velle dissolvere. sed quoniam estis orti, immortales vos quidem esse et indissolubiles non potestis, ne utiquam tamen dissolvemini, neque vos ulla mortis fata *perement* nec

fraus valentior quam consilium meum, quod maius est vinculum ad perpetuitatem vestram quam illa quibus estis tum cum gignebamini conligati.

This citation is clearly a verbatim quote with Augustine either copying directly from an open text or composing from a very good memory. The discrepancies between his language and the original militate against the former. Quotes show that Augustine read *Timaeus* (at least Cicero's translation of this passage), but there is no intertextual relationship.

19. CD 13.16.60-63 - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 41ab/ CT 11.40
CD 13.16 - O'Daly = *Tim.* 41ab/ CT 40

CD 13.16.60-63: cum eorum auctor et magister Plato donum a deo summo diis ab illo factis dicat esse concessum ne aliquando moriantur, id est a corporibus, quibus eos conexuit, separentur.

Within the context of an argument against Porphyry concerning the immortality of the body, Augustine refers to the paraphrase shown at citation 17 above. The citation is a doctrinal reference only, with no intertextual relationship evident.

20. CD 13.17-O'Daly = *Tim.* 30b; 32cd; 37cd / CT 10, 16, 28, see also CD 10.29

CD 13.17.4-9: Cum ergo deus ille summus fecerit eis alterum quem putant deum, id est istum mundum, ceteris diis, qui infra eum sunt, praeferendum, eundemque esse existiment animantem, anima scilicet, sicut asserunt, rationali vel intellectuali in tam magna mole corporis eius inclusa...

A reference to the doctrine that the universe is a living ensouled being, found *passim* (see citation 6 above). Again, the citation is a doctrinal reference that suggests no intertextual relationship.

21. CD 13.17.27-32 - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 41ab/ CT 11.40

CD 13.17.27-32: quandoquidem, ut nec ea quae orta sunt occidant nec ea quae sunt vineta solvantur... posse Deum facere confitetur Plato?

This citation is another reference to the lengthy quote shown at citation 18 above. It is a doctrinal reference only, and represents no intertextual relationship.

22. CD 13.18 - Courcelle = CT 11 (see 10.31, 12.18)
CD 13.18.11-13 - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 41ab/ CT 11.40

CD 13.18.11-13: Dei, cuius omnipotentissima voluntate Plato dicit nec orta interire nec conligata posse dissolui...

This is still another reference to the quote at CT 11.40 first cited at citation 1. It is a doctrinal similarity only, not an intertextual relationship.

23. CD 13.18 - Combès - cites Calcidius' *Timaeus* (no specific citation offered)
CD 13.18 - Alfarcic = *Tim.* 45b in Calcidius, not in Cicero
CD 13.18 - Courcelle = *Timaeus* 45b - lacuna in Cicero text, but uncorrupted when Augustine read it
CD 13.18.43-53 - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 45b, repeats Courcelle's conclusion, apparently with approval
CD 13.18 - O'Daly = *Tim.* 45b / CT 48, but lacuna in Cic.

CD 13.18.43-46: Si dii minores, ...commisit Plato, potuerunt...ab igne remove re uendi qualitatem, lucendi relinquere quae per oculos emicaret.

This statement corresponds to a lacuna in Cicero's translation.²³⁷ Plato's words are: τοῦ πυρὸς ὅσον τὸ μὲν κάειν οὐκ ἔσχε, τὸ δὲ παρέχειν φῶς ἡμερον, οἰκείον ἐκάστης ἡμέρας, σῶμα ἐμηχανήσαντο γίγασθαι. τὸ γὰρ ἐντὸς ἡμῶν ἀδελφὸν ὄν τούτου πῦρ εἰλικρινές ἐποίησαν διὰ τῶν ὁμμάτων βεῖν...ἢ δὴ ὄραν φαμέν (*Tim.* 45b-d).

24. *CD* 13.19.14-17 - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 41ab/ *CT* 11.40

CD 13.19.14-17: diis immortalibus antepone, quibus Deus summus apud Platonem munus ingens, indissolubilem scilicet uitam, id est aeternum cum suis corporibus consortium, pollicetur.

Another reference, as Hagendahl points out, to that part of *CT* 11.40 quoted at citation 18 regarding the nature of the lesser gods. This is another use of Plato's authority and a doctrinal similarity only.

25. *CD* 13.19.17-20 - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 41cd/ *CT* 11.41

CD 13.19.17-20: Optime autem cum hominibus agi arbitratur idem Plato, si tamen hanc uitam pie iusteque peregerint, ut a suis corporibus separati in ipsorum deorum qui sua corpora numquam deserunt, recipiantur sinum.

Hagendahl takes this as a reference to *CT* 11.41, and the thrust of it is: (*CT* 11.41/ *Tim.* 41d) ita orientur animantes, quos et vivos alatis et consumptos sinu recipiatis. The first part of the statement refers instead to *CT* 12.45 (*Tim.* 42b): atque ille qui recte atque honeste curriculum vivendi a natura datum confecerit ad illud astrum quocum aptus fuerit revertetur.

These are doctrinal similarities only.

26. *CD* 13.17-19-O'Daly = *Tim.* 31b; 32bc; 35c-36e; 42c; 45b / *CT* 13, 15, 22-26, 45, 48 Cf. *CD* 8.11, 15; 22.11

Here, O'Daly groups several doctrinal references, all of which contribute to Augustine's argument in favour of the resurrection of bodies. Two of these references have been listed separately at citations 20 and 23 above. Augustine, at *CD* 13.17.4-9 may also be referring to *CT* 7.22.8-26/ *Tim.* 35c-36e regarding the harmonious proportions that make up the universe. Aside from those, other possible references include:

CD 13.17.48-51: Hanc enim animam Plato ab intimo terrae medio, quod geometrae centron uocant, per omnes partes eius usque ad caeli summa et extrema diffundi et extendi per numeros musicos opinatur.

This is a summation of a lengthy and detailed account of the supreme God's creation of the universe and the elemental proportions therein at *CT* 7.22 - 24/ *Tim.* 35c-36b.

CD 13.19.32-34: illi uero, qui stultam duxerint uitam, ad corpora suis meritis debita siue hominum siue bestiarum de proximo reuoluantur.

This statement is a reference to *Tim.* 42c/ *CT* 12.45: qui autem imoderate et intemperate vixerit, eum secundus ortus in figuram muliebrem transferet, et si ne tum quidem finem vitiorum faciet gravius etiam iactabitur et in suis moribus simillimas figuras pecudum et ferarum transferetur.

²³⁷ Fragments given by the Teubner text to fill the lacuna: urere...lucere...per oculos emicare defenstrix...(CT 13.48) come from this Augustine text.

As mentioned, all these references are doctrinal and appeal to Plato's authority to advance Augustine's argument. There are no intertextual relationships here.

27. *CD* 22.11.4-5 - Courcelle = CT 4.11? (see also *CD* 8.11)

CD 22.11.3-5: quoniam scilicet magistro Platone didicerunt mundi duo corpora maxima atque postrema duobus mediis, aere scilicet et aqua, esse copulata atque coniuncta.

Courcelle says this is another reference to CT 4.11 (4.13; *Tim.* 31b): quam ob rem mundum efficere molens deus terram primum ignemque iungebat.

Rather than 4.13, this reference appears to be to CT 5.15 as Hagendahl claims (see citation 28 below). The *CD* passage describes the middle elements of air and water, as at 5.15, rather than of earth and fire, as at 4.13.

28. *CD* 22.11 - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 32b; CT 5.15 (two references)

Hagendahl cites the following passages

a. *CD* 22.11.1-10: contra quod magnum Dei donum ratiocinatores isti, quorum cogitationes novit Dominus quoniam vanae sunt, de magistro Platone didicerunt mundi duo corpora, maxima atque postrema duobus mediis, aere, scilicet et aqua, esse copulata atque coniuncta. Ac per hoc, inquiunt, quoniam terra abhinc sursum versus est prima, secunda aqua super terram, tertius aer super aquam, quartum super aera caelum, non potest esse terrenum corpus in caelo; momentis enim propriis, ut ordinem suum teneant, singula elementa librantur.

b. *CD* 22.11.75-7: Postremo si ita est elementorum ordo dispositus, ut secundum Platonem duobus mediis, id est aere et aqua, duo extrema, id est ignis et terra, iungantur...

as references to

CT 5.15: Sed cum soliditas mundo quaeretur, solida autem omnia uno medio numquam, duobus semper copulentur, ita contigit, ut inter ignem atque terram aquam deus animamque poneret eaque inter se compararet et pro portione coniungeret, ut quem ad modum ignis animae, sic anima aquae, quodque anima aquae, id aqua terrae pro portione redderet.

These two *CD* passages are different parts of the same discussion, all of which concerns bodily resurrection and whether or not Plato's doctrine of the creation of the elements, their respective weights and the ratios between them is evidence for or against. It seems that both refer, as Hagendahl suggests, to CT 5.15, and are entirely doctrinal with an appeal to the authority of Plato. There is no intertextual relationship.

29. *CD* 22.26 - Courcelle = exact quote of *Tim.* 41a/CT 11.16

CD 22.26 - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 41ab/ CT 11.41

CD 22.26.16-29 is another quote attributed to Plato, although no mention of Cicero this time as at citation 18: Sic enim eum locutum narrat Plato: Quoniam estis orti, inquit, immortales (vos quidem) esse et indissolubiles non potestis; non (neutiquam) tamen dissoluemini neque vos ulla mortis fata periment nec erunt valentiora quam consilium meum, quod maius est vinculum ad perpetuitatem uestram quam illa quibus estis (tum cum gignebamini) conligati.

Although slightly edited this time, this is the same quotation as at *CD* 13.16 (citation 18). Hagendahl includes the text in *CD* before and after the quote as part of the reference. This text discusses Plato's meaning in the context of using it against Porphyry to argue for the credibility of a bodily resurrection. Just as the first time he uses the quote in 13.16, it is not an intertextual relationship.

30. *De Cons. Evang.* 1.35.51 - Marrou cites Calcidius' *Timaeus* (no specific citation offered)
De Cons. Evang. 1.35.53 - Courcelle = *Tim.* 29c/ CT 3
De Cons. Evang. 1.35.53 - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 29c/ CT 3.8

CE 1.35.53: Nam et quidam eorum nobilissimus philosophus Plato, in eo libro quem Timaeum vocant, sic ait: 'Quantum ad id quod ortum est aeternitas valet, tantum ad fidem veritas.' Duo illa sursum sunt, aeternitas et veritas, duo ista deorsum, quod ortum est et fides. Ut ergo ab imis ad summa revochemur adque id quod ortum est recipiate aeternitatem, per fidem veniendum est ad veritatem.

A direct quote from *Tim.* 29c/ CT 3.8 regarding the created cosmos as a copy of the eternal: cum autem ingressa est imitata et efficta simulacra, bene agi putat si similitudinem veri consequatur: quantum enim ad id quod ortum est aeternitas valet, tantum ad fidem veritas.

This is a doctrinal similarity and an appeal to Plato's authority only.

31. *De Trinitate* 4.18.24 - Courcelle = *Tim.* 29c/ CT 3
De Trinitate 4.18.24 - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 29c/ CT 3.8

DT 4.18.2412-14: Dixit quidam et illorum qui quondam apud graecos sapientes habiti sunt: Quantum ad id quod ortum est aeternitas ualet, tantum ad fidem ueritas. (footnote)

This quotes the same passage as citation 30 above. This is interesting to the present study in that it is introduced by a footnote. It is a direct quote designed to appropriate Plato's authority for Augustine's argument.

32. *Sermon* 241.8.8 - Courcelle = exact quote of CT 11.16
Serm. 241.8.8 - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 41ab/ CT 11.40
Serm. 241.8.8 - O'Daly - reference to *Timaeus*, no citation offered

Serm. 241.8.8.: Inducitur Deus a Platone ipso alloqui deos, quos fecit de corporali et de incorporali substantia, atque inter caetera dicere illis: quoniam estis orti, immortales esse et indissolubiles non potestis." Iam ad istam vocem illi intremiscere oterant. Quare quia immortales esse cupiebant, et mori nolebant. Ergo ut eis auferret timorem, secutus adiunxit atque ait: " Non tamen dissolvemini, neque vos ulla mortis fata periment, nec erunt valentiora quam consilium meum, quod maius est vinculum ad perpetuitatem vestram, quam illa quibus colligati estis."

This citation is clearly a quote and reference to the many-times quoted and referenced CT 11.40. As in all the other quotes, there is no intertextual relationship. There is also a summary of and reference to the content of this quote earlier in 241.8.8. Both these references are doctrinal and appeal only to the authority of Plato.

33. *Sermon* 242.5.7. - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 41ab/ CT 11.40
Serm. 242.5.7 - O'Daly - reference to *Timaeus*, no citation offered

Serm. 242.5.7: Nonne in libro Platonis, quod hesterno die demonstravi, legitur dixisse Deus non factus diis a se factis: "Quoniam estis orti, immortales quidem esse et indissolubiles non potestis; non tamen dissolvemini, neque ulla vos mortis fata periment; nec erunt valentiora quam consilium meum, quod maius est vinculum ad perpetuitatem vestram quam illa quibus estis colligati?"

Another CT 11.40 quote, again used doctrinally, this time to support an argument concerning God's will. There is no intertextual relationship.

34. *Retractationes* 1.11 - Courcelle = CT4 (see also *CD* 10.29.2)

Ret. 1.11.4 - Hagendahl = *Tim.* 30b/ CT 3.10

Ret. 1.11.4.52-55: Sed animal esse istum mundum, sicut Plato sensit aliique philosophi plurimi, nec ratione certa indagare potui, nec diuinarum scripturarum auctoritate persuaderi posse cognoui.

CT 3.10.11-14: quam ob causam non est cunctandum profiteri...hunc mundum animal esse idque intellegens et divina providentia constitutum.

Augustine shows awareness of this doctrine, as he has before (see nos. 7 and 10 above). But the reference is doctrinal, names Plato and is not intertextual.

Phaedo

note: Apuleius' *Phaedo* attested to in Sidonius *Ep.* 2.9.5

35. *CD* 1.12.37 - Angus - cf. Socrates to his friends re: his burial in *Phaedo*, also *TD* 1.43.102-104

Verum tamen sepulturae curam etiam eorum philosophi contempserunt. (footnote)

Angus connects this with *Phaedo* 115c-116a, Socrates' response to Crito's question of how they should bury him. The citation is a doctrinal reference and seeks to use the authority of the *philosophi* to support Augustine's own argument in the passage that a burial is not important to a Christian.

36. *CD* 1.22.1 - Courcelle - re: Cleombrotus' suicide after reading *Phaedo*, not from Plato, but *TD* 1.34

As Courcelle points out, this is not a reference to Plato at all (Cleombrotus' story cannot actually be in the *Phaedo*).

37. *CD* 8.3 - Combès - cites Apuleius' translation of *Phaedo*, no specific citation offered - accepted without comment by Marrou; he is later persuaded by Courcelle and recants

CD 8.3 - Courcelle - not *Phaedo* 108c, as he says Combès claims (but no specific citation in Combès), too indirect to be reference

None of these scholars offers any specific lines or passages that carry the reference. No possible citation is discernable in *CD* 8.3 of *Phaedo* 108c directly or indirectly. Socrates discusses the *Summum Bonum* at *Phaedo* 97d (the subject matter of *CD* 8.3.34ff) and the importance of purified intelligence to grasp ultimate causes of things at *Phaedo* 65b-69d, esp. 69cd (the subject matter of *CD* 8.3.14-20); and the cause of the universe in the will of the supreme God at *Phaedo* 97c-99a (the subject matter of *CD* 8.3.13-14), i.e. that mind is the cause of Socrates' movements, not anything physical. But all these are vague doctrinal similarities and not indicative of an intertextual relationship.

38. *CD* 10.30 - Alfarc = *Phaedo* 70c

CD 10.30 - Combès - cites Apuleius' *Phaedo*, no specific citation offered, accepted without comment by Marrou; he is later persuaded by Courcelle and recants

CD 10.30.28-30 - Courcelle - not *Phaedo* 70c, but Porphyry

CD 10.30.28-30: Qua sententia profecto abstulit, quod esse Platonicum maxime perhibetur, ut mortuos ex vivis, ita vivos ex mortuis semper fieri.

This statement refers to Plato's doctrine of opposites producing their opposite at *Phaedo* 70c-72e. The reference is doctrinal only.

39. CD 13.19 - Alfarcic = *Phaedo* 108c; also possibly *Phaedrus* 247e, 248c

CD 13.19 - Combès - cites Apuleius' *Phaedo*, no specific citation offered, accepted without comment by Marrou; he is later persuaded by Courcelle and recants

CD 13.19.17-23 - Courcelle - not *Phaedo* 108c, but a Vergil commentator

CD 13.19.17-20: Optime autem cum hominibus agi arbitratur idem Plato, si tamen hanc vitam pie iusteque peregerint, ut a suis corporibus separati in ipsorum deorum, qui sua corpora numquam deserunt, recipiantur sinum

This passage is analogous to Plato's doctrine at *Phaedo* 108c. That soul in Plato is rewarded which lives its life καθαρώς τε καὶ μετρίως in Augustine *pie iusteque* (each uses two adverbs to describe the rightly lived life). It would be interesting to see Apuleius' translation, as Plato's adverbs could conceivably have been rendered as Augustine's Latin and the connective *-que* is analogous to τε καὶ. Alfarcic's alleged connection with the *Phaedrus* is less clear, being only generally about the same subject matter. Courcelle, on the strength of Augustine's quote of *Aen.* 6.750-2 immediately following this citation, suggests that it comes from a Vergil commentary. Augustine uses the same *Aeneid* quote following his citation of Plato at CD 10.30.28-30, however, which does not refer to the same doctrine. Even with the possible repetition of language, the reference is another in which Plato's name and a Platonic doctrine are used for authority. The citation is a doctrinal similarity only.

40. *De Cons. Evang.* 1.12 - Alfarcic = *Phaedo* 60d

De Cons. Evang. 1.12 - Combès - cites Apuleius' *Phaedo*, no specific citation offered, accepted without comment by Marrou; he is later persuaded by Courcelle and recants

De Cons. Evang. 1.7.11-12 - Courcelle - not *Phaedo* 60de, but from *De Deo Socratis*

CE 1.7.12: Socrates autem, quem rursus in activa, qua mores informantur, omnibus praetulerunt, ita ut testimonio quoque Dei sui Apollinis omnium sapientissimum pronuntiatum esse non taceant, Aesopi fabulas pauculis versibus persecutus est, verba et numeros suos adhibens rebus alterius, usque adeo nihil scribere voluit, ut hoc se coactum imperio sui daemonis fecisse dixerit, sicut nobilissimus discipulorum eius Plato commemorat: in quo tamen opere maluit alienas quam suas exornare sententias.

Phaedo 60d: Ο οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν, Νῆ τὸν Δία, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. Περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν ποιημάτων ὧν πεποίηκας ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Απόλλω προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλοι τινές με ἤδη ἤροντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Εὐηνος πρόην

Augustine alludes to this odd tidbit from *Phaedo* in order to use the anecdote in his argument against those pagans who ask why Jesus never wrote anything. It is another citation consisting of an explicit mention of Plato's name and some doctrine, or in this case anecdote, attributed to him. There is no interpretable intertextual relationship.

Symposium

41. CD 8.14.1 - Angus - not *Symposium* 202, but *De Deo Socratis*, no specific citation offered

CD 8.14.1-4: Omnium, inquiunt, animalium, in quibus est anima rationalis, tripartita diuisio est, in deos, homines, daemones. Dii excelsissimum locum tenent, homines infimum, daemones medium. (footnote)

Augustine relates the concept of humans, gods and *daemones*, which exist between them, as three categories of beings that have a rational soul. The doctrine is related also at *Symposium* 202e-

203a, but without any distinguishing literary features that might suggest more than a doctrinal similarity. Augustine acknowledges that the doctrine is found in many writers, but attributes this citation to *Apuleius Platonicus Madaurensis* and his work *de deo Socratis*.

42. CD 8.14.31 - Angus - Plato *etiamsi non diis...* not *Symposium* 203, but *De Deo Socratis*, no specific citation offered

CD 8.14.23-37: ex quo (de deo Socratis) genere numinum Socrates habebat adiunctum et amicitia quadam conciliatum, a quo perhibetur solitus admoneri, ut desisteret ab agendo, quando id quod agere uolebat, non prospere fuerat euenturum; dicit enim apertissime et copiosissime asserit non illum deum fuisse, sed daemonem, diligenti disputatione pertractans istam Platonis de deorum sublimitate et hominum humilitate et daemonum medietate sententiam -- haec ergo si ita sunt, quonam modo ausus est Plato, etiamsi non diis, quos ab omni humana contagione semouit, certe ipsis daemonibus poetas urbe pellendo auferre theatricas uoluptates, nisi quia hoc pacto admonuit animum humanum, quamuis adhuc in his moribundis membris positum, pro splendore honestatis impura daemonum iussa contemnere eorumque inmunditiam detestari?

Within the context of a brief discussion of the doctrine introduced at citation 41 above, Augustine mentions Socrates' *daemon*, the Platonic reference to which is in the same passage from *Symposium*. But, again, it is stated explicitly that his source is *De Deo Socratis*. Augustine is also unclear as to whether or not Plato's position is accurately described, and is unclear on the details of Plato's application of the idea.

43. CD 8.18 - Alfarc - not *Symposium* 203a *Platonem dixisse perhibent*, probably from *De Deo Socratis*

CD 8.18 - Combès - not *Symposium* but from *Academica* (no specific citations); accepted by Marrou without comment

CD 8.18 - Courcelle - not *Symposium* 203a but *De deo Socratis* (Thomas ed. p. 11, 10)

CD 8.18.14: ...quoniam nullus deus miscetur homini, quod Platonem dixisse perhibent, isti ad deos perferant preces hominum et inde ad homines inpetrata quae poscunt.

This doctrine is espoused at *Symposium* 203a, but it is also attributed to Plato at *De deo Socratis* 4, 6. As that work has been the source of most of book 8 to this point, it is reasonable to assume that it is the source here. Combès (with Marrou's apparent assent) suggests the *Academica* as a source, offering no specific passage. However, there does not seem to be any passage in that work that addresses this doctrine.

44. *Epist. ad Nebridium* 3.2 - Courcelle - not *Symposium* 203b but (per Theiler) *Porphyry Sententiae* 33.17

Ep. 3.2: merito philosophi in rebus intellegibilibus diuitias ponunt, in sensibilibus egestatem. There is nothing in *Symposium* 203b to compare with the quote. While the idea that there is wealth in intelligible things and poverty in sensible things is in *Symposium*, the doctrine, broadly speaking, is everywhere in Plato's works. The reference is doctrinal only. (footnote)

Meno

45. *De Trin.* 12.24 - Alfarc - not *Meno*, but *TD* 1.24.56

De Trin. 12.24 - Combès - not *Meno*, but *TD* 1.24.56; accepted by Marrou without comment

De Trin. 12.15.24 - Courcelle - not *Meno* 81e-84a, but *TD* 1.24.56

DT 12.15.24.1-8: Vnde Plato ille philosophus nobilis persuadere conatus est uixisse hic animas hominum et antequam ista corpora generent, et hinc esse quod ea quae discutuntur reminiscuntur potius cognita quam cognoscuntur noua. Retulit enim, puerum quendam nescio quae de geometrica

interrogatum sic respondisse tamquam esset illius peritissimus disciplinae. Gradatim quippe atque artificiose interrogatus uidebat quod uidendum erat dicebatque quod uiderat.

The Platonic doctrine of recollection is discussed at *Meno* 82b-85c, but Augustine's reference is very vague. Socrates asks many specific questions of the slave boy within the context of solving the geometry problem. Cicero summarises the process: *Socrates interrogat quaedam geometrica de dimensione quadrati*. Augustine's description of the scene summarises further: *puerum quemdam nescio quae de geometrica interrogatum*. His reason for mentioning the passage is to offer an alternative explanation to the phenomenon of seeming to remember information. The citation is a doctrinal similarity only; Plato's name is invoked for authority.

46. CD 14.8.3 - Courcelle - not *Meno* (re: Alcibiades' tears), but TD 3.32.77

CD 14.8.3 - Marrou - an indirect reference to Plato (no specific work mentioned) from TD 3.32.77

CD 14.8.101-105: Nam et Alcibiadem ferunt (si me de nomine hominis memoria non fallit), cum sibi beatus videretur, Socrate disputante et ei quam miser esset, quoniam stultus esset, demonstrante fleuisse. (footnote)

Courcelle must be mentioning this as a refutation of Marrou's suggestion. Alcibiades does not appear in the *Meno* (the situation described is close, but not very close, to *Symposium* 218d-219e). This citation is made within the context of Augustine's explication of the Stoic *constantiae*. It is a doctrinal reference only, while Socrates' name appears for its authority.

Republic

47. CD 2.14 - Angus - not *Republic* book 2; 3, 398, but *De Re Publica* (no citation given)

CD 2.14.6-11: An forte Graeco Platoni potius palma danda est, qui cum ratione formaret, qualis esse civitas debeat, tamquam adversarios veritatis poetas censuit urbe pellendos? Iste vero et deorum iniurias indigne tulit et fucari corruptique figmentis animos civium noluit.

Here Augustine refers to Plato's decision to exclude poets from his ideal state. Angus notes that this comes from *Republic* 398a; it is also found in a fuller context at 605a-607c. This reference represents a doctrinal similarity only, no intertextual relationship.

48. CD 2.14.9 - Angus - not *Republic* 365d, but Cicero (no work or citation given)

This is the same type of reference as above (a second citation within the same discussion in CD), although the exclusion of poets is not at 365, but at 398 and 605-7.

49. CD 4.18.8 - Angus - not *Republic* 379bc; 381b (cf. *Theaetetus* 176b); no such definitive statement in Plato, inference not reference

CD 4.18 - Courcelle - not *Republic*, but from *De Re Publica* (all Gods beneficent)

CD 4.18.8: Certe omnes deos utriusque sexus...non nisi bonos existimare debemus. Hoc Plato dicit...

Again, a doctrinal statement that is present at *Republic* 379bc, but there are no indications on Augustine's part of any original context, nor any literary features that mark themselves as indicative of any reference to Plato. The citation is a doctrinal similarity only.

50. CD 8.13.5 - Angus - not *Republic* 378-80 (cf. *Theaetetus* 176c); inference not expressly stated in Plato

CD 8.13 - Combès - from *Republic* (no citation offered), but via *De Re Publica* (no citation)

CD 8.13.5-7: Sed habemus sententiam Platonis dicentis omnes deos bonos esse nec esse omnino ullum deorum malum.

This is the same general doctrinal appeal, with Plato's name for authority, as citation 49.

51. CD 22.28 - Alfarcic = *Republic* 614b, but seems to know it indirectly (via Cicero, Labeo or Varro)

CD 22.28 - Combès - from *Republic* (no citation) but taken from *De Re Publica* (no citation); accepted by Marrou without comment

CD 22.28 - Courcelle = *Republic* 614b; corresponding passage from *De Re Publica* is lost, but Macrobius (*Somnium Scipionis* 1.1.9) gives Cicero's opinion of it re: myth of Er

CD 22.28.1-4: Nonnulli nostri propter quoddam praeclarissimum loquendi genus et propter nonnulla, quae veraciter sensit, amantes Platonem dicunt eum aliquid simile nobis etiam de mortuorum resurrectione sensisse. Quod quidem sic tangit in libris de re publica Tullius, ut eum lusisse potius quam quod id verum esse adfirmet dicere uoluisse.

This is the most general kind of reference to the myth of Er from *Republic* 614ff. Augustine attributes his information to *De Re Publica*. If it were not for this mention of Cicero and his opinion that Plato was speaking in fun (from Macrobius), it would be difficult to know to which work of Plato's Augustine refers. There is nothing here to suggest an intertextual relationship because there is nothing to suggest that Augustine was aware of the citation's context, that he knew Plato's text or even the name of it.

The current study is different from previous studies that addressed the question of Augustine's reading of Plato in that it considers references made by Augustine to earlier works as literary allusions, which invest the new text with meaning beyond the denotative meanings of the words in their textual context. Specifically, the original context of the citation is to be applied to the context of the alluding work and examined for an intertextual relationship.

The study uses ungrammaticalities, footnotes, and shared language or other prominent linguistic characteristics to identify references to earlier works and attempt to identify the original source of the reference, its intertext. When a source was identified, the original context of the passage was to be compared with the context of the new passage for evidence of an interpretable intertextual relationship. If a comparison of the original and new contexts did reveal an interpretable relationship, it was to be concluded that Augustine had read the original passage in its original context.

When the method was applied, ungrammaticalities and footnotes were identified in a close reading of *De Civitate Dei* books 8-10, 13, 19 and 22; *De Trinitate* books 13-15; and the entirety of *Contra Iulianum*. Prominent linguistic features shared between these works and the *Phaedo*, *Meno*, *Symposium* and *Timaeus* were also sought. In addition, those citations of Plato of the type

identified in previous scholarship were also collected. The criteria applied to the identification of the last category of citations included the mention of Plato's name or some other clearly identifying feature as a marker along with a doctrine attributed to him. The study also collected similar citations of Vergil: i.e. those that either mentioned Vergil's name or made some other clearly identifying reference to him along with some passage attributed to him. It is well established that Augustine read and was extremely familiar with Vergil's entire corpus. It was thought that a comparison of the attributed references to Plato with those to Vergil could yield insight into Augustine's use of such references, and possibly into the matter of Augustine's reading of Plato.

The identification of an ungrammaticality or footnote is not the same as determining the source of an intertext. When markers were identified, every effort was made to identify the source as well. To that end, clues in the text were examined which might identify the source text. Reference notes in the various texts were also used for this purpose, as is discussed below. In addition, and as a last resort, citations in Hagendahl and Courcelle were consulted. On three occasions, these authors detected citations of Vergil in Augustine that were not identified by the current study. Augustine's allusions were communicated in these citations by shared language with Vergil, which were not marked by an ungrammaticality or by a footnote. These three are listed last under the heading 'other citations'.

There are five categories of citations listed: ungrammaticalities, footnotes, attributed citations of Plato, attributed citations of Vergil, and others. In each case the textual passage in question is highlighted. Source texts, if one has been identified, are listed below. Citations associated with intertextual markers also include a discussion of the original context of the cited passage, the context in which Augustine uses the passage and an interpretation of the intertextual relationship between the two. Attributed Plato citations are listed with references to where the doctrine in question is found in the Platonic corpus. When doctrinal references are made to passages in Cicero's *Timaeus* that had been identified as a source text in previous scholarship, the location only is listed. When citations are given to passages that had not previously been identified as a source text, the appropriate *Timaeus* passage is quoted in full. Attributed Vergil citations include the original referenced lines.

Newly Identified Citations

Ungrammaticalities

1. CD 8.10.46-52: Haec itaque causa est cur istos ceteris praeferamus, quia cum alii philosophi ingenia sua studiaque contriuerint in requirendis rerum causis, et quinam esset modus discendi atque uiuendi, isti uersitatis et lux percipiendae ueritatis et **fons bibendae felicitatis**.

lux percipiendae ueritatis is a common enough image of God that no explanation in the text is really necessary for the reader to accept it as rhetorical language. In the case of *fons bibendae felicitatis*, no such expectation has been established. It is an ungrammaticality but no intertext is identified in the passage.

2. CD 8.18.13-15: Amant quippe illi scaenicas turpitudines, quas non amat pudicitia; amant in maleficiis magorum **mille nocendi artes**, quas non amat innocentia.

tu potes unanimos armare in proelia fratres
atque odiis uersare domos, tu uerbera tectis
funereasque inferre faces, tibi nomina mille,
mille nocendi artes. (*Aen.* 7.335-8)

The phrase *mille nocendi artes* is an ungrammaticality because it is a poetical element out of linguistic and logical character with its context. It comes in the midst of a sustained attack against Apuleius' position that *daemones* are sometimes good. The reference is to Vergil's description of the underworld divinity Allecto who is so terrible an entity that *odit et ipse pater Pluton, odere sorores/ Tartareae monstrum* (7.327-8). She is hated because *cui tristia bella/ iraeque insidiaeque et crimina noxia cordi* (7.325-6). The effect of this intertext is that all *daemones* become associated with Allecto's malignity, advancing Augustine's case that they are always evil.

3. CD 8.23.6-8: Ille autem Aegyptius (sc. Hermes Trismegistos) alios deos esse dicit a summo Deo factos, alios ab hominibus. Hoc qui audit, sicut a me positum est, putat dici de simulacris, **quia opera sunt manuum hominum...**

Ps 113b (114-115).4: Simulacra gentium argentum et aurum, opera manuum hominum.²³⁸

The phrase sounds artificial in this context. If not an ungrammaticality, it is simply the artificial rhetorical language Augustine often uses. No intertext is identified.

4. CD 8.23.67-70: Citius enim fit, **ut homo in honore positus pecoribus non intellegens comparetur**, quam ut operi Dei ad eius imaginem facto, id est ipsi homini, opus hominis praeferatur.

Ps. 48 (49): 13: Et homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit. Comparatus est iumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est illis.²³⁹

The ungrammatical phrase is metaphorical language that does not fit smoothly next to the prosaic discursive language of its context. The intertext is discussed in Chapter Six.

²³⁸ I am indebted to Dr. Anne Sheppard for the identification of this intertext.

²³⁹ Scriptural citations in this chapter are compared with the Vulgate text. It may be argued that Augustine would have used an earlier Latin text. However, the fragments from the *Vetus Latina* that are used to reconstruct a text considered the most likely for Augustine are drawn from Augustine's works. The Vulgate text was selected to avoid the circular exercise of comparing citations in Augustine to themselves.

5. CD 8.23.96-8: ...sicut religio loquitur, quae nec fallit nec fallitur, non sicut **iste quasi omni uento doctrinae hinc atque inde perflatus** et falsis uera permiscens dolet quasi perituram religionem, quem postea confitetur errorem.

Eph. 4.14: ut iam non simus parvuli fluctuantes, et circumferamur omni vento doctrinae in nequitia hominum, in astutia ad circumventionem erroris.

The ungrammatical phrase introduces an unclear and unexplained metaphorical element that suggests an outside source. The intertext is discussed in Chapter Six.

6. CD 9.16.70-73: Quid quod, si uideri et uidere contaminat, uidentur ab hominibus dii, quos uisibiles dicit: **clarissima mundi lumina** et cetera sidera, tutioresque sunt daemones ab ista hominum contaminatione, qui non possunt uideri, nisi uelint?

...uos, o **clarissima mundi lumina**... (*Georgics* 1.5-6).

This ungrammaticality refers to a passage from Apuleius. The language is repeated at lines 74-5, as an emphasis of its alien quality. Vergil's line addresses the stars as gods. Augustine's critique of Apuleius regarding *daemones* emphasises the inconsistencies in Platonic doctrine if stars are gods. The effect of the intertext is to call attention to this inconsistency. Augustine appropriates Apuleius' authenticating reference to Vergil to advance his own point.

7. CD 10.11.30-3: ...quae de hoc genere fallacium malignorumque spirituum, qui extrinsecus in animam ueniunt humanosque **sensus sopitos uigilantesue deludunt**...

morte obita qualis fama est uolitare figuras
aut quae sopitos deludunt somnia sensus. (*Aen.* 10.641-2).

The highlighted language is ungrammatical in that it introduces poetical language into the text. The context is otherwise a straightforward explication of Porphyry's *Letter to Anebo*, which suggests that that work may be the intertext that supplies the grammaticality, although it is not. The intertextual relationship is described in Chapter Six.

8. CD 10.11.46-48: cur adtrectatum **re Veneria** non exaudiant inprecantem, cum ipsi ad incestos quosque concubitus quoslibet ducere non morentur...

The phrase is an ungrammaticality only from the standpoint of Augustine's text. The citation is from an extended paraphrase of Porphyry; the ungrammaticality is borrowed from that text, so the intertext is probably irretrievable.

9. CD 10.15.4-6: ...in quibus et persona ipsius Dei, non quidem per suam substantiam, quae semper **corruptibilibus oculis inuisibilis permanet**...

A similar ungrammaticality is found at CD 13.16.11-12, where the intertext is identified as scriptural: *Unde illud est quod de scripturis nostris in superiore libro commemorauimus: Corpus enim corruptibile adgrauat animam.* NB. *Wisdom* 9:13-15 is also quoted but not attributed except as *scriptum esse recolo* at CD 12.16.6-11 which was not taken up as part of this study.

Corpus enim quod corrumpitur aggravat animam, et terrena inhabitatio deprimit sensum multa cogitantem. (*Wisdom* 9:15).

The ungrammatical language is unexplained in the context. References to the body being corrupt are not uncommon, however, and the ungrammaticality, especially at *CD* 10 could be explained in this way. There is no intertext between *CD* 10 and the verse from *Wisdom*. If there is a reference, it is unattributed authentication to support Augustine's theory of history that mankind is gradually led to perceive the invisible and eternal.

The use of the *Wisdom* verse at *CD* 13 is explicitly for authentication, in support of an argument Augustine says he could make against the Platonists regarding the separation of body and soul.

10. *CD* 10.32.151-3: Non talia sancti homines in ista uniuersali animarum liberandarum uia gradientes tamquam magna prophetare curarunt...

The reference is ungrammatical in that it is not explained in the context. These *sancti* could be prophets or Church fathers who held such a doctrine (e.g. Clement of Alexandria or Origen). In any case, no intertext is suggested by the context.

11. *CD* 19.14.26-8: In the context of a discussion of rational man, who in trying to master the beastly part of his soul with the intellect, needs divine guidance: Et quoniam, quamdiu est in isto mortali corpore, peregrinatur a Domino: ambulat per fidem, non per speciem

2 Cor. 5:6-7: Audentes igitur semper, scientes quoniam dum sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a Domino: (per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem)

The ungrammaticality is here a reference not explained by the immediate context. The context of Paul's statement is that Christians suffer in this world but should be confident of being rewarded in the next. The confidence that sustains him is divinely given. Augustine's context is similar to Paul's. The effect of the intertext is to remind the reader of the plight of Christians in a fallen world, that no entity of this world can prevent suffering and that relief is a divine gift to be collected in the next life. The *peregrinus* image returns at *CD* 19.17.5.

12. *CD* 22.6.21-3: Within a discussion of the apotheosis of Romulus: Tum deinde posteris seruare fuerat necesse quod acceperant a maioribus, ut cum ista superstitione in lacte quodam modo matris ebibita...

TD 3.1.2: ...ut paene cum lacte nutricis errorem sxisse videamur.

The phrase is ungrammatical in that it introduces an element and metaphorical language that is not explained entirely by the context. The reference to Cicero is not a strong intertext, but instead a case of unattributed authentication. Augustine repeats the phrase at *Conf.* 3.4.8.

13. *CD* 22.6.52-4 In the same discussion, the issue now is the status of the wolf that raised Romulus and Remus: Certe enim etsi non meretrix fuit lupa illa, sed bestia, cum commune fuerit ambobus, frater tamen eius non habetur deus.

The phrase introduces an ungrammatical element--the connection of a wolf and prostitute--that is not made clear by context. The outside source is Roman slang. *Lupa* as a term for prostitute appears in Plautus (*Ep.* 3, *Truc.* 3.1.2), Cicero (*Mil.* 21.55), Livy (1.4.7), Juvenal (3.66), the 4th century historian Sextus Aurelius Victor (*Orig. Gent. Rom.* 21) and Lactantius (*Institutiones Divinae* 1.19).

14. *CD* 22.26.37-8: Sic enim non in eis erit illa dira cupiditas, quam posuit ex Platone Vergilius, ubi ait:

The ungrammatical phrase is out of context poetical language that appears to be identified immediately with Augustine's attributed quote of *Aen.* 6.751. The intertextual source of the ungrammaticality, however, is not the passage quoted here. Instead, it is from *Aen.* 6.719-21, which appears as an attributed quote at *CD* 14.5.24-7:

o pater, anne aliquas ad caelum hinc ire putan-
dum est
Sublimis animas iterumque ad tarda reuerti
Corpora? Quae lucis miseris tam dira cupido?

Augustine highlights the phrase *dira cupido* in the sentence following the quote; when it appears again at 22.26.37, it is recognisable to the reader.

The context of the quote in the *Aeneid* is a conversation between Aeneas and Anchises in the underworld. Anchises points out souls that have drunk from the Lethe and await new incarnations. Aeneas voices his surprise at their desire to become embodied again.

Augustine's context at 22.26.37 is a simultaneous argument against Porphyry that souls always seek to escape embodiment and against Plato that when resurrected souls are embodied, it is into eternal and incorruptible bodies. The effect of the intertext is to colour Plato's idea with Aeneas' distaste of it: Plato's contention that souls enter into new bodies on the earth is greeted with horror by Aeneas. This, after Vergil is here and often referred to as a Platonist, also has the effect of undermining Plato's position by highlighting the dissent from it by those who follow him.

15. *CI* 1.4.12 (PL 44, 647): Quae tuorum argumentorum vel **acies vitrea, vel plumbei pugiones** in illorum conspectu exseri audebunt?

De Fin. 4.18.48: Bonum omne laudabile; laudabile autem omne honestum; bonum igitur omne honestum. O plumbeum pugionem!

Ep. ad Att. 1.16.2: re: Cicero's contention that Hortensius has miscalculated with respect to his handling of Clodius' trial: sed ductus odio properavit rem deducere in iudicium, cum illum plumbeo gladio iugulatum iri tamen diceret.

Augustine has just listed opinions of several Church fathers on the subject of original sin and baptism that contradict Julian's. This question comes amidst several rhetorical questions that suggest that Julian has not been reverent to Augustine in his work. Augustine has associated his opinion on the subject as well as himself with these Church fathers. The phrase borrowed from Cicero will have been known by Julian and serves Augustine as unattributed authentication.

16. *CI* 1.4.13 (PL 44,648): qui omne praeteritum vitium, primi scilicet hominis, qui libero arbitrio **est in profunda demersus**, Christum dixit sui lavacro purgasse Baptismatis; qui denique parvulos definivit, nisi manducaverint carnem Filii hominis, vitam prorsus habere non posse.

This phrase is used one other time to denote a condition of great human misery (*Ep.* 181.7), but seems to be only rhetorical language rather than indication of an intertext.

17. *CI* 1.5.16 (PL 44, 651): Tunc enim dicetur novissimae inimicae morti, **Ubi est contentio tua? ubi est aculeus tuus?**

1 Cor. 15:55: Ubi est mors victoria tua? ubi est mors stimulus tuus?

The ungrammatical phrase is clearly alien in tone to its surroundings. Augustine introduces the phrase as if it is a well-known quote. Its function is unattributed authentication.

18. *CI* 3.3.9 (PL 44, 706): obsecro, **aperite qualescumque oculos**, et videte qua iustitia poena ista infligenda sit parvulo, quem clausis oculis originali obnoxium negatis esse peccato.

This phrase is an ungrammaticality in that the meaning of *qualescumque* is not explained by its context. It is found within Augustine's argument that unbaptised infants do not enter the kingdom of God. The identity of the intertext is probably scriptural, but not indicated in the text.

19. *CI* 3.7.16 (PL 44, 710): Et tamen dialecticorum quasi iaculis oneratus acutis, in certamen procedis, et **iactas plumbeos pugiones**, dicens...

The phrase is also an ungrammatical element at *CI* 1.4.12 (citation 15, above).

20. *CI* 3.17.32 (PL 44, 719): Poenus, inquam, disputator, non ego, sed Cyprianus Poenus, **te hoc vulnere Poenus immolat, et poenam scelerato ex dogmate sumit**.

Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas
immolat et poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit. (*Aen.* 12.946-7)

The ungrammatical element is the martial language unexplained by the context. The intertext is explained in Chapter Six.

21. *CI* 3.23.53 (PL 44, 729): Illud mirabile est, quod cum essent Apostoli bonus **odor Christi**, trahebatur inde bonum trahebatur et malum. Aliis enim **erant odor vitae in vitam, aliis odor mortis in mortem; cum odor ille non esset usus mali, sed boni**.

The odour image is an ungrammaticality in that it is not explained by its context. Its source is 2 Cor. 2:15-16: quia Christi bonus odor sumus Deo in iis qui salvi fiunt, et in his qui pereunt: aliis quidem odor mortis in mortem: aliis autem odor vitae in vitam. Et ad haec quis tam idoneus?

The reference is basically an explication of Paul's verse. Augustine argues that marriage is the good use of libido, which is an evil. He takes these verses from Paul as authority for the idea that evil can be used for good. He uses Paul for authentication even without identifying him, presumably because these verses would have been so well known by Augustine and Julian that they require no attribution.

22. *CI* 4.2.10 (PL 44, 741): Quia cum **sopitos deludunt somnia sensus**, nescio quomodo etiam castae animae in turpes labuntur assensus...

aut quae sopitos deludunt somnia sensus (*Aen.* 10.642)

The phrase is also an ungrammatical element at *CD* 10.11.30-3 (citation 7 above). The *Aeneid* context is Juno's mission to save Turnus from death in battle. She takes on Aeneas' form to deceive the Latins; her disguised appearance is likened to ghosts who delude sleepers in their dreams. A salient and ongoing controversy in *CI* is the argument over the nature of lust. Julian says it is good because it makes procreation possible; Augustine says it is an evil that leads people to sin and that its only good aspect is that in marriage it can be used for good. Augustine argues in this passage that lust is an evil even when good people assent to it in sleep. The intertext associates lustful cravings with Juno, both of which come with intent to deceive when we are most vulnerable.

23. *CI* 4.2.12 (PL 44, 742): Quia mali huius occulta sunt et **dira contagia**...

priusquam
dira per incautum serpant contagia uulgus. (*Georgics* 3.468-9).

The phrase introduces alien poetical language and is therefore ungrammatical. The intertext is discussed in Chapter Six.

24. *CJ* 4.3.19 (PL 44, 748): **nec aliud erit quam vera iustitia Catilinae, comprehendere multos amicitia, tueri obsequio, cum omnibus communicare quod habebat: et fortitudo vera erit eius, quod frigus, famem, sitim ferre poterat: et vera patientia, quod patiens erat inediae, aliorum vigiliae, supra quam cuiquam credibile est.**

Sallust *Bellum Catilinae* 5.3-4: corpus (sc. Catilinae) patiens inediae, aliorum, vigiliae supra quam cuiquam credibile est

Cicero *In Cat.* 3.17: re Catiline: frigus, sitim, famem ferre poterat

A knowledge of the story of Catiline and accounts of his treachery are assumed by Augustine and are therefore ungrammatical elements. Augustine's context is an argument that all seemingly virtuous actions are not evidence of true virtues. To support this, he offers examples of what appear to be virtues of Catiline, but are patently not virtues in this example. Although the repeated language makes the sources clear, the effect of this intertext is merely unattributed authentication.

25. *CJ* 4.3.21 (PL 44, 749): **Ex quo te tanta absurditas sequitur, ut veram cogaris appellare iustitiam, etiam cuius dominam reperis avaritiam.**

The phrase introduces an artificial element and could be either an indication of the presence of an intertext or simply rhetorical language. In any case, the intertext is not identified in the passage.

26. *CJ* 4.16.83 (PL 44, 782): **Homo es, a humani nihil abs te alienum puta;** et in iis quae non pateris, compaterere patientibus.

Homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto. (Terence, *Heaut.* I.i.77).

The phrase is presented in the text as an alien element, an ungrammaticality. The noble sounding sentiment in *Heauton Timorumenos* is merely the justification offered by a nosy neighbour. Augustine's context is the argument with Julian over the status of lust. Specifically, Augustine defends the position that the genitalia are *inhonesta*, a condition brought about by original sin, and that they are covered due to an appropriate sense of shame. The quote is followed by a list of temptations men must endure because of the body. The effect of the intertext is to challenge Julian to defend man's fallen state and accept the bodily temptations as good things, a clearly absurd position. There is no intertextual relationship beyond the appropriation of familiar words to further a point: a type of unattributed authentication.

27. *CJ* 5.6.24 (PL 44, 798-9): Vos enim **'augetis'** ista novitate eam quae in omnibus est haereticis, **'occidui temporis pravitatem.'** Vos **'estis ruina morum,'** qui ipsius fidei supra quam mores aedificandi sunt, molimini fundamenta subvertere. Vos **'pudoris interitus,'** quos laudare non pudet, contra quod pugnat et pudor.

These ungrammaticalities are obviously alien elements and probably refer to language from Julian's treatise. The intertext is otherwise not identified.

28. *CJ* 5.7.29 (PL 44, 802): Sed vir fortissimus, **nocturnorum et si non administrator, certe exhortator praedicatorque bellorum...**

Cicero *De Or.* 1.48.210: (imperator est) administrator quidam belli gerendi.

This ironic remark is ungrammatical and precedes a quote of Julian's work. Cicero uses a phrase that is similar. That may be the identification of the ungrammaticality. Otherwise the identity of the intertext is unknown.

29. *CI* 5.16.61 (PL 44, 817): Sed homines acutissimi ideo non modum non genus, sed excessum voluptatis arguitis et exprobandum censetis obscenis...

The ungrammaticality is the terminology, otherwise unexplained. It would seem to refer to the terminology Julian uses in his own treatise, taken from Aristotle's *Categories* and applied to the question of original sin.

30. *CI* 6.5.13 (PL 44, 829): ...quanto magis ut putas acriter, tanto magis infideliter pugnas. Sed

**verte omnes tete in facies, et contrahe quidquid
sive animis, sive arte vales...**

uerte omnis tete in facies et contrahe quidquid
siue animis siue arte vales...(*Aen.* 12.891-2).

The phrase is highly artificial and an obvious ungrammaticality. The *Aeneid* context is the beginning of the final battle between Aeneas and Turnus. Aeneas, confident of victory, tells Turnus he can run but not hide. Augustine frames his argument with Julian regarding original sin and the necessity of baptism in martial language then uses the Vergil quote. The effect of the intertext is to suggest that Augustine's next argument is fatal to Julian's position.

31. *CI* 6.7.21 (PL 44, 833): Relinquamus silvas oleastorum, et montes vel Africanos vel Italos olivarum; nec interrogemus agricolas, qui cum tibi aliud, mihi aliud forte responderit, neutros possumus celeri exploratione convincere, si ad hoc experimendum seminetur arbor seris factura nepotibus umbram.

iam quae seminibus iactis se sustulit arbos,
tarda uenit seris factura nepotibus umbram (*Georgics* 2.58-9).

32. *CI* 6.7.21 (PL 44, 833): **Habemus oleam, non Africanam, non Italam, sed Hebraeam; cui nos qui fuimus oleaster, insitos esse gaudemus. Illi oleae data est circumcisio, quae nobis solvit istam sine disceptatione quaestionem.**

The phrases listed as citations 31 and 32 are highly cryptic and unexplained in their context. The intertexts are related and discussed in Chapter Six.

33. *CI* 6.8.22 (PL 44, 836) "**Oblato,**" sicut loqueris, "**placuit componi foedere bellum.**"

oblato gaudens componi foedere bellum (*Aen.* 12.109).

The battle reference is highly artificial and ungrammatical. Vergil's context is Aeneas' joy that the agreement he had offered of single battle with Turnus would end the war. Augustine is responding to Julian's reference to a single combat between the two of them that would settle this dispute. Augustine denies the idea that if Julian defeats him in argument the Pelagian heresy would win acceptance. Julian's original context is gone, but it seems that the intertext with the *Aeneid* is simply to reinforce the idea of a single combat between him and Augustine to settle their dispute, as we might quote 'Lay on, MacDuff' in accepting an argumentative challenge.

34. *CI* 6.11.34 (PL 44, 841): ...in quibus et "auditoriales scholasticos" tangis, et dicis contra me clamatueros, "**O tempora, o mores...**nonne alia in te Tulliana vere convenientia verba convertent.

The phrase is artificial and, to a Roman audience, an obvious reference to Cicero; it is his chastisement of Catiline from *In Catilinam* 1.1.11. Julian's original context is lost, but on one level it is merely a clichéd phrase of condemnation. Augustine identifies the source as Cicero later in the section, seemingly to show Julian that the reference has not escaped him.

35. *CI* 6.12.39 (PL 44, 843): ...in has videlicet magnas manifestasque miserias, in quibus **homo vanitati similis factus est, ut dies eius sicut umbra praetereant, et sit universa vanitas omnis homo vivens**

Ps. 143.4: Homo vanitati similis factus est; Dies eius sicut umbra praetereunt.

Ps. 38 (39).6: Ecce mensurabiles posuisti dies meos, Et substantia mea tanquam nihilum ante te Verumtamen universa vanitas, omnis homo vivens.

These phrases are artificial and ungrammatical. Augustine describes the wretched state of fallen man while defending himself against Julian's attack that he had changed his mind on original sin. The context of the Psalm quotes is, in each case, a description of the insignificance of man and his dependence upon God for any relief from his condition. This is not so much an intertext as a case of unattributed authentication.

36. *CI* 6.18.56 (PL 44, 856): Porro si continuo fit bonus, et utique bona qualitate fit bonus, qui fornicationi vinolentiaeque renuntians ab huius modi operibus sese abstinet; nonne recte audi, **Ecce sanus factus es, iam noli peccare**; recteque appellatur castus et sobrius?

This phrase is an ungrammaticality in that its meaning is not explained in the context, although Julian would have recognised it immediately. It finds its intertext at John 5:14: *Postea invenit eum Jesus in templo, et dixit illi: Ecce sanus factus es; iam noli peccare, ne deterius tibi aliquid contingat.*

The quote in John is Christ's statement to a man whom he had cured of his sickness at a pool called Bethesda. Augustine's context is an extended metaphor of lust as a disease requiring a cure, as part of an argument against Julian who regards lust as a sensation. The intertext, then, is no more than the idea that a person who renounces sinful behaviour and does not commit it again should be regarded as healed; lust being analogous to the sickness suffered by the man at the Bethesda pool. The intertextual relationship, however, is weak. It seems more a case of unattributed authentication.

37. *CI* 6.21.67 (PL 44, 864): **Sed vobis tam malitosum venenum antiqui draconis irrepsit**, ut et Catholicos horrore Manichaei nominis infametis, et Manichaeos perversitate vestri dogmatis adiuvetis.

This ungrammatical phrase comes at the end of a section in which Augustine selects phrases and terms from Julian's treatise and uses them to argue against Julian. It is not clear that this phrase is Julian's, and it is not otherwise identified.

38. *DT* 13.7.10.45-50: Re: the seemingly admirable capacity of philosophers to endure suffering: Quamuis enim per fortitudinem sit paratus excipere et aequo ferre animo quidquid aduersitatis acciderit, mauult tamen ut non accidat et si possit facit; **atque ita paratus est in utrumque** ut quantum in ipso est alterum optet, alterum uitet, et si quod uitat incurrerit, ideo uolens ferat quia fieri, non potuit quod uolebat.

fidens animi atque in utrumque paratus

seu versare dolos seu certae occumbere morti. (*Aen.* 2.61-2)

The philosophers, whose beliefs allow them to endure suffering with bravery, still do not have happiness, i.e. willing what they want and having what they will. They accept misfortune even though they do not will it. This is admirable, but they cannot be said to be living as they want to live. By this intertext, they are compared to Sinon who volunteers to be found by the Trojans so that he can trick them into accepting the horse. He is prepared either to effect his deceit by eliciting the sympathy of the Trojans or to die at their hands. He prefers that his trick work but is prepared to endure the worst if necessary. So the philosophers are ready either to accept a life free of misery or to endure injuries if they must, although preferring not to have to endure. The intertext makes clear that while this willingness to endure suffering may appear to be an admirable thing, it is so only from a particular point of view, and is not an example of the happy life.

39. DT 15.7.13.118-22: Ex me quippe intellego quam sit mirabilis et incomprehensibilis scientia tua qua me fecisti quando nec me ipsum comprehendere ualeo quem fecisti, et tamen **in meditatione mea exardescit ignis ut quaeram faciem tuam semper.**

The language of these ungrammaticalities introduces concepts that are common to scripture but cannot be explained from the context of Augustine's text.

As it happens, the first ungrammaticality indicates an intertext with Ps. 38 (39).4: *Concaluit cor meum intra me;/ Et in meditatione mea exardescit ignis.* The context is praise for the virtue of keeping quiet, i.e. refraining from judgement, regarding the events of the world. Augustine's context is the difference between man's experience of time and God's; this difference in perception makes any genuine knowledge by man of the eternal impossible. Augustine's use of the verse from the Psalm in this context suggests that the best course for limited man is to remain silent, refraining from judgement regarding the workings of God since he can never have genuine knowledge of the eternal.

The second ungrammaticality finds its grammaticality in Ps. 104 (105).4: *Quaerite Dominum, et confirmamini;/ Quaerite faciem eius semper.* The Psalm begins with an admonition to praise and give thanks to God, then provides a catalogue of those who have had faith in times of adversity and ultimately been rewarded by God. Augustine's use of the Psalm as an intertext complements the idea of the previous intertext: in the face of a universe you cannot understand, refrain from judgement and have faith in God. The rhetorical effect of his passage is augmented by these intertexts, which make Augustine's point in terms familiar to his Christian audience.

40. DT 15.16.25.1-5: Quapropter ita dicitur illud dei uerbum ut dei cogitatio non dicatur ne aliquid esse quasi uolubile credatur in deo, quod nunc accipiat, nunc recipiat formam ut uerbum sit eamque possit amittere atque informiter quodam modo uolutari.

The ungrammaticality is in the word *uolubile*: the Word of God should not be considered a thought of God lest one believe that there is anything revolvable in God. There is precedent for this word being used to mean 'changable', (by Cicero in *Pro Milone* 26.69), but the normal use of it is 'turning around' or 'revolving'. It would have struck the reader as unusual and unexpected in this context, especially as Augustine so often uses 'immutabile' or a synonym in such a context.

The intertextual grammaticality that fills the gap in logic produced by *uolubile* is found in the next sentence:

Bene quippe noverat verba, et vim cogitationis inspexerat locutor egregius, qui dixit in carmine,

Secumque volutat
Eventus belli varios: id est cogitat.

hic magnus sedet Aeneas secumque uolutat
euentus belli uarios...(Aen. 10.159-60),

Attributed to *locutor egregius*, the line describes Aeneas' thoughts turning over in his mind as he returns to his camp with Lydian reinforcements. The intertext highlights the contrast of the workings of our mortal thoughts--different thoughts coming to the fore at various moments--and God's thoughts which are all present at all times.

Footnotes

1. *CD* 8.1.9-11: Porro si sapientia Deus est, per quem facta sunt omnia, **sicut divina** auctoritas ueritasque **monstrauit** uerus philosophus est amator Dei.

Et quaecumque sunt absconsa et improvisa didici:
Omnium enim artifex docuit me sapientia. *Wisdom* 7:21

Vapor est (sc. sapientia) enim virtutis Dei,
Et emanatio quaedam est claritatis omnipotentis Dei sincera... *Wis.* 7.25

There is no intertextual relationship here, only unattributed authentication.

2. *CD* 8.2.5-7: Italicum genus auctorem habuit Pythagoram Samium, a quo etiam **ferunt** ipsum philosophiae nomen exortum.

...cuius ingenium et eloquentiam cum admiratus esset Leon, quaesivisse ex eo qua maxime arte confideret; at illum (sc. Pythagoras) artem quidem se scire nullam, sed esse philosophum (*Tusculan Disputations* 5.3.8-9).

The reference is unattributed authentication and without any intertextual relationship.

3. *CD* 8.3.1-2: Socrates...**memoratur**...

Memoratur introduces a whole section on Socrates and his followers, which suggests, but does not identify, an outside source or sources.

4. *CD* 8.11.21-2: re: availability of a Greek translation of the book of Jeremiah: ...quod Ptolemaeus pro ingenti beneficio, qui a regia potestate etiam timeri poterat, meruisse **perhibetur**...

No intertextual source is identified.

5. *CD* 8.14.1-2: Omnium, **inquiunt**, animalium, in quibus est anima rationalis, tripertita diuisio est, in deos, homines, daemones.

The footnote indicates an outside source, probably Apuleius' *De Deo Socratis*, which is the subject of a lengthy discussion begun later in 8.14.

6. *CD* 8.19.3-10: Cur enim tam graviter ista plectuntur seueritate legum, si opera sunt numinum colendorum? An forte istas leges Christiani instituerunt, quibus artes magicae puniuntur? Secundum quem alium sensum, nisi quod haec maleficia generi humano perniciosa esse non dubium est, **ait poeta clarissimus**:

Testor, cara, deos, et te, germana, tuumque
Dulce caput magicas inuitam accingier artes?

testor, cara, deos et te, germana, tuumque

dulce caput, magicas inuitam accingier artis. (*Aen.* 4.492-3)

The citation is unattributed authentication. Vergil is recognisable as *poeta clarissimus*.

7. *CD* 8.19.11-15: Illud etiam, quod alio loco de his artibus dicit (sc. Vergil):

Atque satas alio uidi traducere messes,
eo quod hac pestifera scelerataque doctrina fructus alieni in alias terras transferri **perhibentur**...

atque satas alio uidi traducere messis. (*Eclogue* 8.98)

The footnote makes reference to a source, possibly folklore, to which the Vergil quote makes allusion.

8. *CD* 10.1.57-9: Within the context of a discussion of the etymology of *cultus* ...sicut **ait quidam Latini eloqui magnus auctor**:

Vrbs antiqua fuit, Tyrii tenuere coloni.

Vrbs antiqua fuit (Tyrii tenuere coloni) (*Aen.* 1.12)

This reference is a case of unattributed authentication. Vergil is recognisable as *Latini eloqui magnus auctor*.

9. *CD* 10.6.6-7: ...tamen sacrificium res diuina est, ita ut hoc quoque **uocabulo id Latini ueteres** appellauerint.

The identity of intertext is not made clear. It may be found in Varro, who has been a source for much of this section.

10. *CD* 10.10.38-41: ...sicut de Proteo **dictum est**,
formas se uertit in omnes,

hostiliter insequens, fallaciter subueniens, utrobique nocens.

sed quanto ille magis formas se uertet in omnis
tam tu, nate, magis contende tenacia uincla (*Georgics* 4.411-2).

The footnote introduces an unattributed quote of Vergil. The *Georgics* context is Cyrene's advice to her son Aristaeus on how to capture Proteus and get him to reveal the cause of the plague that hit Aristaeus' bees. Augustine's context is an argument against Porphyry's theurgy. Porphyry claims that people who undergo purification rites have beautiful visions of deities. Augustine claims these are sent by the Devil to deceive. It is the devil that is compared with Proteus. The effect of the intertext is to associate the Devil with Proteus' ability and inclination to deceive by changing his form.

11. *CD* 13.19.1-3: Nunc de corporibus primorum hominum quod instituimus explicemus; quoniam nec mors ista, **quae bona perhibetur bonis** nec tantum paucis intellegentibus siue credentibus...

This phrase, introduced by the classic footnote **perhibentur**, refers to an outside, probably Biblical, source but does not identify it in the text.

12. *CD* 19.12.39-40 There is an extended discussion of Cacus from *Aeneid* 8.190-305 introduced with a footnote: *Sed faciamus aliquem, qualem canit poetica et fabulosa narratio*. In the same discussion a quote of the *Aeneid* is introduced by another footnote (19.12.51-2): *ut describitur, semper recenti caede tepebat humus*. Then there is a final reference to the *Aeneid* story, communicated by a borrowed term and footnote (19.12.72): *nam et semiferus dictus est*.

semperque recenti
caede tepebat humus (*Aen.* 8.195-6)

uultum uillosaque saetis
pectora semiferi atque extinctos faucibus ignis. (*Aen.* 8.266-7).

The *Aeneid* context is Evander's telling of the Cacus story in order to honour Hercules. Augustine's context is an argument in which he claims everyone wants peace. The *semiferus* Cacus is cited as an extreme example of savage conduct, which is, in fact, in the pursuit of peace. There is no intertextual relationship beyond what is pointed out in Augustine's text. Vergil's Cacus is chosen because he is a familiar example and furthers Augustine's argument. The citation is unattributed authentication.

13. *CI* 3.11.22 (PL 44, 714): *Pro modo autem nunc temporis, quo longe brevior spatio vivunt homines, intra centum annos amborum coniugum generare posse dicuntur*.

The outside source is probably Roman law.

14. *CI* 4.3.19 (PL 44, 747): *Non enim absurde virtus definita est ab eis qui dixerunt, "virtus est animi habitus, naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus*.

Nam virtus est animi habitus naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus. (Cicero De Inventione 2.53.159)

Cicero's context is an explication of the nature of the three kinds of things that should be sought. Virtue is the name for things that should be sought for their own sake and further defined in the above quote. Augustine's context is an argument that pagans who act in a way that seems virtuous are not showing genuine virtue. He quotes Cicero in order to refine his definition in the light of Christian virtue. The effect of the intertext is merely unattributed authentication.

15. *CI* 5.9.38 (PL 44, 806-7): *Intuere honesto corde, si potes, quid de Catone poeta cecinerit:*

Urbi (inquit) pater est, ubique maritus;
Iustitiae cultor, rigidi servator honesti,
In commune bonus; nullosque Catonis in actus
Subrepsit partemque tulit sibi nata voluptas.

urbi pater est ubique maritus,
Iustitiae cultor, rigidi servator honesti,
In commune bonus; nullosque Catonis in actus
Subrepsit partemque tulit sibi nata voluptas. (Lucan 2.388-91)

The footnote indicates an intertext with Lucan, unmistakable because of the exact quote. Lucan's characterisation of Cato follows a description of his subdued marriage to his former wife Marcia. Augustine's context is the nature of lust within even the most honourable union, i.e. a necessary evil. Cato is chosen as an ideal man who is in control of his passions. He is being used as an exemplum of Roman *probus* (in the immediate context of the quote: *nec foedera prisci/ Sunt temptata tori; iusto quoque robur amore/ Restitit*, 2.378-80). His character and conduct are cited because they are consistent with Christian conduct. The effect of the intertext is primarily for

unattributed authentication. The most relevant lines in the immediate context are not included in the quote, however, making it a case in which one must be familiar with the Lucan passage beyond simply recognising the source of the lines to appreciate the intertext in full.

16. *CI* 5.10.43 (PL 44, 809): nec eis confert magnum beneficium, quod ei de quo **legitur**, Raptus est, ne malitia mutaret intellectum eius.

The footnote marks a reference to *Wisdom* 4.11: Raptus est, ne malitia mutaret intellectum eius, Aut ne fictio deciperet animam illius.

Augustine is arguing that some children are born to be condemned in eternal fires even though created by God with his foreknowledge of their fate. The benefit described in the quote is salvation. God creates those who are born not to receive it. The argument is designed to exonerate parents of any blame for their children's fate. The verse from *Wisdom* is not so much an intertext as authentication--unattributed authentication.

17. *CI* 5.11.45 (PL 44, 810): Nam et sacrificia eorum **legimus**, quibus utique sanguis ille figurabatur, qui solus tollit peccatum mundi.

The footnote marks a reference to Leviticus 12:6: Cumque expleti fuerint dies purificationis suae, pro filio, sive pro filia, deferet agnum anniculum in holocaustum, et pullum columbae sive turturem pro peccato ad ostium tabernaculi testimonii, et tradet sacerdoti. Cf. John 1:29: Altera die vidit Iohannes Iesum venientem ad se, et ait: Ecce agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccatum mundi.

Again, as is common with Augustine's references to the Bible, this citation is unattributed authentication

18. *CI* 5.12.46 (PL 44, 810): ne divortium fiat vel ab ea coniuge quae non potest parere, vel **sicut fecisse Cato perhibetur**...

The story is found in Plutarch's *Life of Cato the Younger* 25.4-5, and Lucan 2.329ff.

Augustine's context is a description of the necessary properties of marriage. Although one effect of this intertext is to make Cato, an icon of Roman propriety, suffer when his actions are evaluated against the background of Christian ethics, the principal effect of the outside sources is to provide unattributed authentication to Augustine's argument.

19. *CI* 5.14.51 (PL 44, 812): Sed **magnum aliquid te dialectica docuit**: 'Rem quae in subiecto est, sine illa re esse non posse, in qua subiecta est.'

The footnote introduces a sentence that seems too precise to be anything but a quote. The identity of the intertext is revealed later in the same passage as Aristotle's *Categories*: Non enim Aristoteles, cuius categorias insipienter sapis, sed Apostolus dicit...Augustine's explicit mention of the *Categories* seems only to indicate to Julian that he knows the reference. There is no intertextual relationship.

20. *CI* 5.16.60 (PL 44, 817): Nam et **de duobus hominibus scriptum est**: Filius eruditus sapiens erit, imprudente autem ministro utetur.

The footnote serves to mark a quote from Proverbs 10.4 (from the Septuagint): υἱὸς πεπαιδευμένος σοφὸς ἔσται, τῷ δὲ ἄφρονι διακόνῳ χρήσεται. Again, the Biblical passage requires no attribution other than *scriptum est* to provide authentication.

21. *CI* 6.6.16 (PL 44, 832): **Audiebamus a maioribus nostris**, qui se id nosse ac vidisse dicebant, Fundanium Carthaginis rhetorem, cum ipse accidenti vitio luscus esset, luscum filium procreasse.

The intertext is not identified, but could simply be folklore or a way of referring to Fundanius that affirms his condition which is salient to Augustine's point that, contrary to what Julian has asserted, parents do pass on qualities to their children that they themselves do not possess.

22. *CI* 6.13.40 (PL 44, 844): Quamvis et ipse exterior per lavacrum sanctificatus sit, et spem futurae incorruptionis acceperit, propter quod et templum Dei merito **dicitur**.

The footnote marks the presence of the phrase *templum Dei* from 1 Cor 3:16: *Nescitis quia templum Dei estis, et Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis?*

The phrase does not so much mark an intertext as unattributed authentication.

23. *CI* 6.14.41 (PL 44, 845): ...propter quam Calligonum Valentiniani iunioris eunuchum gladio **novimus** ultore punitum, meretricis confessione convictum.

The footnote indicates an outside source unidentified in the text.

24. *CI* 6.18.53 (PL 44, 854): **Dixerunt eam quidam philosophi** partem animi esse vitiosam: et utique pars animi substantia est, quia substantia est ipse animus.

The footnote refers to a very specific doctrine. There is, however, no specific intertext identified.

25. *DT* 13.8.1.40-3: **Deinde quomodo erit uera tam illa perspecta, tam examinata, tam eliquata, tam certa sententia**, beatos esse omnes homines uelle, si ipsi qui iam beati sunt beati esse nec nolunt nec uolunt?

This appears to indicate an outside source, either as a footnote or simply an ungrammaticality. It could merely be rhetorical language. It is included because it definitely indicates an outside source, although it is not identified in the text.

26. *DT* 13.9.12.1-7: Humanis quippe argumentationibus haec inuenire conantes uix pauci magno praediti ingenio abundantes otio doctrinisque subtilissimis eruditi ad indagandam solius animae immortalitatem peruenire poterunt. Cui tamen animae beatam uitam non inuenerunt stabilem, id est ueram. Ad miserias eam quippe uitae huius etiam post beatitudinem redire **dixerunt**.

This is a rather protracted footnote, but certainly indicates the necessity of an outside source. Reincarnation of the soul is discussed at *Republic* 619a-620d; *Phaedrus* 248c-249c; and *Timaeus* 42cd/ CT 12.45

27. *DT* 13.9.12.7-12: Et qui eorum de hac erubuerunt sententia et animam purgatam in sempiterna beatitudine sine corpore conlocandam **putarunt** talia de mundi retrorsus aeternitate sentiunt ut hanc de anima sententiam suam ipsi redarguant, quod hic longum est demonstrare sed in libro duodecimo de civitate dei satis a nobis est quantum arbitror explicatum.

Another protracted footnote, but pointing to an external source, which is this time named. The Platonist who is ashamed of the doctrine of reincarnation is Porphyry (cf. *CD* 12.21ff.)

28. *DT* 14.14.18.18-25: Similem morbum mutorum animalium cum poeta describeret:

Dii, inquit, meliora piis, erroremque hostibus illum!
Discissos nudis laniabant dentibus artus

Cum morbus ille corporis fuerit, cur dixit errorem nisi quia omne animal cum sibi natura conciliatum sit ut se custodiat quantum potest, talis ille erat morbus ut ea quorum salutem appetebant, sua membra laniarent?

...ipsique suos iam morte sub aegra
(di meliora piis errorem hostibus illum!)
discissos nudis laniabant dentibus artus. (*Georgics* 3.512-4)

This reference is unattributed authentication. Vergil is recognisable as *poeta*.

29. *DT* 15.1.1.5-9: Quo nomine (sc. mens) **nonnulli auctores linguae latinae** id quod excellit in homine et non est in pecore ab anima quae inest et pecori suo quodam loquendi more distinguunt.

The intertext indicated by this footnote must be guessed from the context, which describes a distinction between *mens* and *anima* by Latin writers.

30. *DT* 15.7.1.2-3: Homo est enim **sicut uerteres definierunt** animal rationale, mortale.

No intertext is identified in the text; it could be any number of Platonic writers or handbooks. The reference does not seem to be to a particular source, but to attribute the definition to pagan writers.

Attributed Vergil Citations

1. *CD* 9.4.103-4: Talem describit etiam Vergilius Aenean, ubi ait:

Mens inmota manet, lacrimae uoluuntur inanes.

Mens immota manet, lacrimae uoluuntur inanes. (*Aen.* 4.449)

Within the context of a discussion of the mind's ability to control emotions, Vergil is used as an authority; the line refers to Aeneas' mind being unmoved by Dido's sorrow. The Vergil text is attributed clearly and quoted.

2. *CD* 10.21.24-30: Sed rursus ei succumbit infelicter ceditque Vergilius, ut, cum apud eum illa dicat:

Vincor ab Aenea,

ipsum Aenean admoneat Helenus quasi consilio religioso et dicat:

Iunoni cane uota libens, dominamque potentem
Supplicibus superba donis.

uincor ab Aenea. (*Aen.* 7.310)

Iunoni cane uota libens dominamque potentem
supplicibus supera donis... (*Aen.* 3.438-9)

These two attributed quotes of Vergil are presented in the context of a discussion of the nature of Juno, for whom Heroes are named (supposedly via Hera); Augustine uses the *Aeneid* quotes rather

clumsily to illustrate the deference mistakenly shown to Juno by Vergil immediately after the statement: *(Iuno) quae non usquequaque inconuenienter a poetis inducitur inimica uirtutibus et caelum petentibus uiris fortibus inuida.*

3. *CD* 10.27.39-43: de quo etiam poeta nobilissimus poetice quidem, quia in alterius adumbrata persona, ueraciter tamen, si ad ipsum referas, dixit:

Te duce, si qua manet sceleris uestigia nostri,
Inrita perpetua soluent formidine terras.

Ea quippe dixit, quae etiam multum proficientium in uirtute iustitiae possunt propter huius uitae infirmitatem, etsi non scelera, scelerum tamen manere uestigia, quae non nisi ab illo saluatore sanantur, de quo iste uersus expressus est. Nam utique non hoc a se ipso se dixisse Vergilius in eclogae ipsius quarto ferme uersu indicat, ubi ait:

Vltima Cumaei uenit iam carminis aetas;

unde hoc a Cumaea Sibylla dictum esse incunctanter apparet.

te duce, si qua manent sceleris uestigia nostri,
inrita perpetua soluent formidine terras. (*Eclogue* 4.13-4)

Vltima Cumaei uenit iam carminis aetas; (*Ecl.* 4.4)

Both these quotations are attributed and serve to support Augustine's argument regarding Christ against Porphyry.

4. *CD* 10.30.30-36: falsum esse ostendit (sc. Porphyry), quod Platonice uidetur dixisse Vergilius, in campos Elysios purgatas animas missas (quo nomine tamquam per fabulam uidentur significari gaudia beatorum) ad fluuium Letheum euocari, hoc est ad obliuionem praeteritorum:

Scilicet inmemores supera ut conuexa reuisant
Rursus et incipiant in corpora uelle reuerti.

scilicet inmemores supera ut conuexa reuisant
rursus, et incipiant in corpora uelle reuerti. (*Aen.* 6.750-2)

Vergil is being cited again as a Platonist. The Platonic doctrine is found at *Republic* 621a. Courcelle (1984) points out that *CD* 10.30 contains much terminology from Vergil's description of the underworld in this passage and is, in fact, full of allusions to *Aen.* 6.744-51.

5. *CD* 13.19.21-3: Following a paraphrase of Plato's description of the fate of good souls in the afterlife (citations 25 and 39 on the list of citations from previous studies,

Scilicet inmemores supera ut conuexa reuisant
Rursus et incipiant in corpora uelle reuerti;

quod Vergilius ex Platonico dogmate dixisse laudatur...

Aen. 6.750-2 is quoted for a second time as evidence for Vergilian support of another (different) Platonist position. Cf *Republic* 619a, *Phaedrus* 249a.

6. *CD* 22.26.37-9: Sic enim non in eis erit illa dira cupiditas, quam posuit ex Platone Vergilius, ubi ait:

Rursus et incipiant in corpora uelle reuerti

The third time Augustine quotes this line (*Aen.* 6.751) as an example of Vergil supporting a Platonic conception of the afterlife.

7. *CI* 4.14.67 (PL 44, 771): Haec duo, id est, famem et edendi amorem etiam poeta discrevit, qui post maris iactationem, sociis Aeneae naufragis et peregrinis satis esse iudicans tantum sumere alimentorum, quantum refectionis indigentia postularet, ait,

Postquam exempta fames epulis, mensaeque remotae

Cum vero Aeneas ipse ab Evandro rege susceptus est hospes decentius arbitratus ampliores exhiberi epulas regias, quam necessitas posceret, non satis fuit ut diceret,

Postquam exempta fames;

sed addidit,

et amor compressus edendi.

postquam exempta fames epulis mensaeque remotae (*Aen.* 1.216)

Postquam exempta fames et amor compressus edendi (*Aen.* 8.184)

Although Vergil's name is not mentioned, *poeta* and *Aeneae* would be enough to make an unmistakable identification. Augustine uses Vergil for authentication in support of his point that a distinction is to be drawn between natural hunger and an unnatural desire for food.

8. *DT* 14.11.14.15-21: Sed qui dicit memoriam non esse praesentium attendat quaemadmodum dictum sit in ipsis saecularibus litteris ubi maioris curae fuit uerborum integritas quam ueritas rerum:

nec talia passus Vlixes,
Oblitusque sui est Ithacus discrimine tanto.

Vergilius enim cum sui non oblitum diceret Vlixem, quid aliud intellegi uoluit nisi quod meminere sui?

nec talia passus Ulixes
oblitusque sui est Ithacus discrimine tanto. (*Aen.* 3.628-9)

The authority of Vergil is used here to make a point about memory.

Attributed Plato Citations

Much of *CD* 8 is a review of the history of Greek philosophy, particularly the Platonists. The book suggests outside sources in much of its language. Only conspicuous or important examples for the current study are listed.

1. *CD* 8.3.12-20: quas primas atque summas non nisi in unius ac summi Dei voluntate esse credebat...intellegentiae puritate conspiceret.

This passage is part of a broad discussion of Socrates' beliefs on the cause of the universe and the necessity to purify one's intelligence to ascend to the level of the eternal. cf. *Phaedo* 67a-d, 82d.

2. *CD* 8.8.33-36: Nunc satis sit commemorare Platonem determinasse finem boni esse secundum uirtutem uiuere et ei soli euenire posse, qui notitiam Dei habeat et imitationem nec esse aliam ob causam beatum...

Cf. *Gorgias* 470d; 508b.

3. *CD* 8.11.48-9: ...ea quae mutabilia facta sunt non sint, uehementer hoc Plato tenuit et diligentissime commendauit.

Cf. e.g. *Timaeus* 27d-28a, CT 2.3: Quid est quod semper sit neque ullum habeat ortum, et quod gignatur nec umquam sit? quorum alterum intellegentia et ratione comprehenditur, quod unum atque idem semper est; alterum quod adfert (ad) opinionem sensus rationis expers, quod totum opinabile est, id gignitur et inerit nec umquam esse vere potest.

4. *CD* 8.12.29-30: ...et ipse Plato diis plurimis esse sacra facienda putauerunt.

Cf. *Laws* 716d-717b; 828ad

5. *CD* 8.13.17-20: Plato senserit, notus est, cum poetas ipsos, quod tam indigna deorum maiestate atque bonitate carmina compuosuerint, censet ciuitate pellendos.

Cf. *Republic* 398a, 568b, 605a, 607b

6. *CD* 8.13.27-31: iste (sc. Plato) autem illos (sc. deos) nec tam malos timendos putat, sed suae sententiae robur constantissime retinens omnes poetarum sacrilegas nugas, quibus illi immunditiae societate oblectantur, a populo bene instituto remouere non dubitat.

The citation ultimately comes from the same source as above.

7. *CD* 8.15.48-9: ...cum ipsas aequas terris praeponat Plato...

Cf. *Timaeus* 32b; CT 5.15

8. *CD* 10.29.15-20: Vteris etiam hoc uerbo apertius, ubi Platonis sententiam sequens nec ipse dubitas in hac uita hominem nullo modo ad perfectionem sapientiae peruenire, secundum intellectum tamen uiuentibus omne quod deest prouidentia Dei et gratia post hanc uitam posse compleri.

Cf. *Phaedo* 66d-67b

9. *CD* 13.16.15-19: Sed cum apertissime Plato deos a summo Deo factos habere immortalia corpora praedicet eisque ipsum Deum, a quo facti sunt, inducat pro magno beneficio pollicentem, quod in aeternum cum suis corporibus permanebunt nec ab eis ulla morta soluentur...

Cf. *Timaeus* 41ab, CT 11.40

10. *CD* 13.16.44-48: Et hoc quidem utrum Plato uerum de sideribus dicat, alia quaestio est. neque enim ei continuo doncedendum est globos istos luminum siue orbiculos luce corporea super terras seu die seu nocte fulgentes suis quibusdam propriis animis uiuere eisque intellectualibus et beatiss...

Cf. Tim. 41d-42a, CT 12.43: toto igitur omni constituto sideribus parem numerum distribuit animorum et signulos adiunxit ad singula...

11. CD 13.16.48-50: ...quod etiam de ipso uniuerso mundo, tamquam uno animali maximo, quo cuncta cetera containerentur animalia, instanter adfirmat.

Cf. *Timaeus* 30d, CT 4.12

12. CD 13.17.1-4: Contendunt etiam isti (the Platonists) terrestria corpora sempiterna esse non posse, cum ipsam uniuersam terram dei sui, non quidem summi, sed tamen magni, id est totius huius mundi, membrum in medio positum et sempiternum esse non dubitent. (footnote)

Cf. *Timaeus* 34ab, CT 6.20-1: Haec deus is qui erat de aliquando futuro deo cogitans leuem illum effecit et undique aequabilem et a medio ad summum parem et perfectum atque absolutum ex absolutis atque perfectis. animum autem ut in eo medio conlocavit ita per totum tetendit; deinde eum circumdedit corpore et vestivit extrinsecus caeloque solivago volubili et in orbem incitato complexus est, quod secum ipsum propter virtutem facile esse posset nec desideraret alterum, satis sibi ipsum notum et familiare. sic deus ille aeternus hunc perfecte beatum deum procreavit.

13. CD 13.17.9-12: ...ipsiusque corporeis tamquam membra locis suis posita atque digesta quattuor constituerit elementa, quorum iuncturam, ne umquam deus eorum tam magnus moriatur, insolubilem ac sempiternam uelint...

Cf. *Timaeus* 32c, CT 5.15-6: itaque et ob eam causam et ex is rebus numero quattuor mundi est corpus effectum, ea constrictum conparatione qua dixi; ex quo ipse se concordi quadam amicitia et caritate complectitur atque ita apte cohaeret ut dissolvi nullo modo queat nisi ab eodem a quo est conligatus.

14. CD 13.17.43-46:...sed omne corpus esse fugiendum, et deos rursus dicentes habere beatissimas animas et tamen aeternis corporibus inligatas, caelestes quidem igneis...

Cf. *Timaeus* 40a, CT 10.35: Divinae animationis maxime speciem faciebat ex igne, ut et spendissimus esset et aspectu pulcherrimus.

15. CD 13.19.24-27: ita quippe animas mortalium nec in suis corporibus semper esse posse existimat (sc. Plato), sed mortis necessitate dissolui, nec sine corporibus durare perpetuo, sed alternantibus uicibus indesinenter uiuos ex mortuis et ex uiuis mortuos fieri putat

Cf. *Phaedo* 64c and 70e-72e.

16. CD 19.1.35-6: Within the context of an explication of the doctrine of quattuor quaedam...quae homines...naturaliter appetunt, explicitly in libro de philosophia by Varro, a parenthetical remark makes reference to a doctrine found in Plato: arte uiuendi, quae uirtus dicitur et procul dubio discitur.

The idea is debated beginning at *Meno* 86d.

17. CD 19.21.14-19: Non enim iura dicenda sunt uel putanda iniqua hominum constitua, cum illud etiam ipsi ius esse dicant quod de iustitiae fonte manauerit, falsum esse, quod a quibusdam non recte sententibus dici solet id esse ius, quod ei, quo plus potest, utile est.

Cf. *Republic* 338c; of course *Somnium Scipionis* is the more likely source, explicitly mentioned in the larger context.

18. *CD* 22.11.37: Nam et Aristoteles quintum corpus eam (sc. natura animae) dixit esse et Plato nullum.

Plato describes the soul as possessing the opposite qualities to body at *Phaedo* 79b-80d. The statement about Aristotle, however, would appear to come from *Academica* 1.26.

19. *CD* 22.12.57-60: In reply to those who ask about the nature of bodily resurrection as it applies to a cannibal: ad hoc percontantur, ut fidem resurrectionis inludant ac sic animae humanae aut alternantes, sicut Plato, ueras infelicitates falsasque promittant beatitudines...

Cf. *Republic* 619d; *Phaedrus* 249a

20. *CD* 22.27.3-5: Plato dixit sine corporibus animas in aeternum esse non posse. Ideo enim dixit etiam sapientum animas post quamlibet longum tempus, tamen ad corpora redituras.

Cf. *Republic* 619a-620d; *Phaedrus* 248c-249c; *Timaeus* 42cd, CT 12.45

21. *CD* 22.27.167: Quoniam secundum Platonem etiam sanctae animae ad humana corpora redibunt

This is from the same discussion as the reference above and involves the same group of sources.

22. *CI* 2.7.19 (PL 44, 686): Audi ergo quid dicat in libro de Philosophia contra Platonem philosophum, qui hominum animas revolvi in bestias asseverat, et animarum tantummodo Deum opinatur auctorem, corpora autem diis minoribus facienda decernit.

That men's souls return in the bodies of animals is found at *Timaeus* 42c/ CT 12.45, *Phaedo* 81e ff., *Phaedrus* 249b and *Republic* 620a-d; that lesser Gods created human souls is from *Timaeus* 41c/ CT 11.41.

23. *CI* 2.7.19 (PL 44, 686): cum in Timaeo eam (sc. anima) Dei opus esse memoraverit, inter immortalia a Deo factam; corpus autem non videri opus summi Dei asserit, quia natura carnis humanae nihil a natura corporis bestialis differt.

Timaeus 41cd/ CT 11.41: quorum vobis initium satusque tradetur a me, vos autem ad id quod erit inmortale partem adtextote mortalem...

24. *CI* 4.3.17 (PL 44, 745): Verum tu in hac causa etsi ad scholam Pythagorae provices vel Platonis, ubi eruditissimi atque doctissimi viri...veras virtutes non esse dicebant, nisi quae menti quodam modo imprimuntur a forma illius aeternae immutabilisque substantiae, quod est Deus.

Possibly *Meno* 100a-c; but that does not seem sufficient as source for Augustine's statement.

25. *CI* 4.14.72 (PL 44, 774): "An vero," inquit, "voluptates corporis expetendae, quae vere et graviter a Platone dictae sunt illecebrae esse atque escae malorum?"

The line begins a lengthy quote from the *Hortensius*. A reference to the same doctrine appears at *CI* 4.15.76 (PL 44, 778).

Other Citations

1. *CD* 9.9.33, Courcelle²⁴⁰: (re: daemons) *Nulla morte, sicut animalium terrestrium, animi eorum soluuntur a corpore: nec sic existamandum est eorum corpus tamquam honoratorum aeternum vehiculum, sed aeternum uinculum damnatorum.*

'hunc ego Diti
sacrum iussa fero teque isto corpore soluo': (*Aen.* 4.702-3).

Courcelle identifies this as an example of the idea of death as the soul being removed from the body found originally in the *Phaedo*. Aside from the fact that both Vergil and Augustine seem to be assuming Plato's definition of death, there is no substantive relationship between the passages; there is no interpretable intertextual relationship.

2. *CI* 4.15.78, Courcelle: Cicero in extremis partibus Hortensii dialogi...commemorat...quod est apud Aristotelem simili nos affectos esse supplicio atque eos qui quondam, cum in praedonum Etruscorum manus incidissent, crudelitate excogitata **necabantur**, quorum **corpora uiua** cum **mortuis**, aduersa aduersis accommodata, quam artissime colligabantur; sic nostros animos cum corporibus copulatos ut uiuos cum mortuis esse coniunctos.

mortua quin etiam iungabat corpora uiuis
componens manibusque manus atque oribus ora,
tormenti genos, et sanie taboque fluentis
complexu in misero longa sic morte necabat (*Aen.* 8.485-88).

Augustine cites Cicero's *Hortensius* as his source, which he says, in turn, follows Aristotle. Courcelle believes, however, that Augustine was thinking instead of the *Aeneid*. He points out that Augustine alludes to this passage from book eight on two other occasions in similar contexts. Courcelle is convinced of the allusion because of the clearly-shared language in the two passages. Vergil's context is Evander's story of how all Etruria is united against the Rutulians due to Turnus' defence of the Lydian tyrant Mezentius who engaged in the torture Augustine mentions. Augustine quotes Cicero against Julian on the subject of suffering in this life for crimes committed previously. There is no interpretable intertextual relationship.

3. *CI* 6.1.1 (PL 44, 821), Courcelle, Hagendahl: **quos certe si ab ubere raptos abstulerit ultimus dies**, miror si audes dicere habitaturos cum sapientia praeter regnum Dei...

continuo auditae uoces uagitus et ingens
infantumque animae flentes, in limine primo
quos dulcis uitae exsortis et ab ubere raptos
abstulit atra dies et funere mersit acerbo (*Aen.* 6. 426-9).

The *Aeneid* context is Aeneas' trip to the underworld: he hears the cries of the souls of infants when he gets past Cerberus. Augustine's context is an argument against Julian's idea that unbaptised infants go to heaven. Quoting *Wisdom* 7.28, which he notes as a reference for Julian when arguing from the opposite side, Augustine reminds Julian that "*Neminem diligit Deus, nisi eum qui cum sapientia habitat.*" Children clearly do not live in wisdom, so how can Julian argue that they inherit the kingdom of God? The quote substitutes *ultimus dies* for Vergil's *atra dies*--and presumably means the final day of life for the infant (it may be that Augustine simply did not recall the line accurately). The effect of the intertext is as a reminder of the scene in which Aeneas hears the crying children, i.e. amid the horrors and despair of the underworld. That setting answers the suggestion made immediately following the quote: that children somehow live in wisdom outside the kingdom of God. The answer is that outside the kingdom of God there is only horror and despair.

²⁴⁰ Citations attributed to Courcelle in this section refer to Courcelle (1984).

CHAPTER SIX

Analysis

The purpose of this study is to collect evidence pertaining to the question of Augustine's knowledge of Plato's dialogues. The method employed in its execution called for the identification of markers that indicated intertexts. Internal markers included shared language and the presence of ungrammaticalities; footnotes were the external markers sought. When the presence of intertextual elements was determined, an attempt was made to identify the intertext itself. Finally, the new context of the passage was compared with its context in the original text in order to interpret the resulting intertextual relationship. If such relationships could be identified, an argument can be made *a fortiori* that Augustine read the original passage, if not as a part of a complete reading of the original text, then at least in the passage's original context. If a Platonic intertext could be identified, it could be concluded that Augustine had read at least a portion of a dialogue.

The study examined only late works by Augustine, i.e. those composed after 415, because it was determined that the bishop would have had the best chance of being acquainted with Plato in this period. Previous scholarship suggests that only after this date (if at all) would Augustine have known Greek sufficiently well to read Plato in the original. By the end of his life, Augustine would also have collected whatever translations of Plato he was ever to possess.

An analysis of the passages cited in previous scholarship supports the methodological critique of *Quellenforschung* advanced in Chapter Four. There, it was argued that such studies often lacked specific methodology regarding the identification of parallel passages, and that they failed to interpret satisfactorily those parallel passages they identify. Passages identified as citations in these studies were selected exclusively on the basis of doctrinal similarities usually in combination either with Plato's name or some clear reference to him as a marker. Of the 51 citations put forward in the scholarship, 41 explicitly name Plato. Of the ten that do not, five contain footnotes that clearly refer to Plato or the Platonists (*eorundem philosophorum ceteris excellentiores nobilioresque senserunt* at no. 1; *Contendunt...isti* at no. 13; *Dixit quidam et illorum qui quondam apud Graecos sapientes habiti sunt* at no. 31; *inquiunt* at no. 41; and *philosophi...ponunt* at no. 44) and another refers explicitly to Socrates (no. 37). All of the citations

associate a Platonic doctrine with the named or unnamed sources; each of these citations appear within discussions in which it is clear that Augustine is identifying Plato or the Platonists.

Of the four remaining citations, two suggested by Courcelle are extremely vague doctrinal similarities to Cicero's *Timaeus* 11.40. These citations are so vague that no specific lines are offered as the source of the references (citations 11 and 12). This passage from the *Timaeus* is quoted or referred to 18 times in the citations on this list. Appearing so frequently, the passage becomes a marker in itself of doctrinal parallels.

The last two citations that do not include a clear reference to Plato's name turn out not to be citations at all. Courcelle's contention that *CD* 12.26 refers to Cicero's *Timaeus* 11.40 (no. 14) is an error; the passage to which he claims Augustine refers here is actually the subject of a citation at *CD* 12.27.23-36 (put forward by Hagendahl and discussed as citation no. 17). The reference to Cleombrotus committing suicide after having read the *Phaedo* (citation no. 36, *CD* 1.22.13-17, and there called Theombrotus) clearly cannot be *in* the *Phaedo*, and is not a reference to Plato.

For all the emphasis placed on linguistic analysis, no citations are posited on the basis of a verbal, grammatical or syntactical similarity. The verbal similarities that are present are not used as the primary means of identifying passages, but serve instead as evidence of citation in passages already identified by the presence of Plato's name and a doctrine attributed to him.

The criticism that source studies make no effort to explain the significance of citations would also appear to be valid in the light of analysis of identified passages. None of the studies makes any effort to interpret Augustine's use of Platonic citations. A premise to source study is offered by O'Donnell: 'the history of what a subject reads and hears is potentially as useful to the reconstruction of the development of a lifetime's thought as the history of what the subject wrote, said and did.'²⁴¹ The studies under question seem to have taken for granted that the identification of citations is tantamount to the identification of sources, and ultimately to influence on the development of Augustine's thought. This conclusion is not necessarily a valid one, and no theoretical justification for it is offered.

The nature of the citations identified in previous studies makes them unsuitable for interpretation using the methodology of the current study. The heart of an intertextual relationship is the presence of an element of an older text in a new text. The difference between what meaning

the textual element possessed in its original context as opposed to the new creates a tension that is resolved only by comparison of the new and old texts. Nuances can be conveyed and themes appropriated from an old text by means of this intertextual relationship. The citations identified in the studies under question take the form of a quote or paraphrase usually explicitly attributed to Plato. Augustine's 'open acknowledgement' of his use of Plato means there is no tension created by the intertext. Rather, the new text 'simply inserts the old text statically within itself'; there is no 'interpenetration' between the texts, and no interpretable intertextual relationship.²⁴² The function of these open appropriations of Plato is what Conte calls 'authentication', i.e., an appeal to the evidence provided by the old text.²⁴³ Usually, Augustine brings Plato into his discussions merely for use as evidence to further his own arguments. There is no rhetorical function beyond this authentication. It was necessary for the present study to generate its own citations to make use of its interpretive methodology.

It should be noted, however, that five of the citations under analysis are marked by the presence of footnotes. The methodology of the current study uses the identification of footnotes as potential markers of intertexts. This is their function in Augustan poetry; it appears that Augustine sometimes uses this feature to mark his own use of outside sources. The fact that footnotes are present in Augustine's works and perform the same function as they did in poetic texts of four centuries before vindicates the methodology of the current study, suggesting that the presence of footnotes will, indeed, mark intertexts.

The application of the method to the studied texts encountered several difficulties. First, Augustine often uses very colourful and highly rhetorical language. The presence of this language complicates the identification of ungrammaticalities and footnotes, those alien textual elements. One source of this difficulty is the heavy presence of Biblical references and Biblically derived language in Augustine's texts. Intertextual markers were collected irrespective of their source, so references to the Bible that fit the criteria are included among the study's identified citations. However, Augustine is often so heavily reliant on a particular passage of scripture that the language of that passage becomes a trope for him. An example is found at *CD* 10.24.33-5: *Non ergo caro per se ipsa mundat, sed per Verbum a quo suscepta est, cum Verbum caro factum est et habitavit*

²⁴¹ O'Donnell (1980), 144.

²⁴² Conte, 59-60 discusses the lack of interpretable meaning in openly acknowledged intertexts.

in nobis. The reference is to John 1:3: *Omnia per ipsum (sc. Verbum) facta sunt: Et sine ipso factum est nihil, quod factum est*. Ordinarily, the passage from *CD* might be regarded as an ungrammaticality. However, Augustine uses the language of John 1:1-14 so often that the language of the *Verbum* becomes a trope. It is so instantly recognisable in Augustine's prose that it ceases to be an alien element. Such examples contain no intertextual relationship, but instead are examples of authentication. While there are examples of markers of intertexts that indicate only authentication among the citations listed, when language was identifiable as a trope, it was not listed as a citation.

Another difficulty in applying the method was finding linguistic elements shared between the Augustine and Plato texts. With the exception of the passages from Cicero's translation of the *Timaeus*, elements must be identified in Latin texts that are shared with Greek texts. The translation into Latin of Plato's Greek had to be guessed at since even in those cases where Augustine may have had a translation available to him, none of those translations are available to us except the *Timaeus*. In practice, the search for shared language had to focus on either easily recognisable elements of Plato or the use of subject matter as a marker. In fact, no such shared elements were found.

To test the precept that intertextualist relationships indicate relationships of genre is also difficult for this study. The works of Augustine used in the study have no analogue of genre in pagan Latin literature. Such relationships are supposed to provide some insight into the author's conception of his works and of their place in literary history. The uniqueness of Augustine's works, at least so far as pagan literature is concerned, means that the conclusions of this study will not benefit from such insight.

Finally, the identification of intertextual markers was influenced by the presence of reference notes in the various texts used. It was intended that ungrammaticalities and footnotes would be identified exclusively by close readings, which would reveal such features in the text. These features would then reveal the presence of intertexts. Each of the texts I used, however, (CCL for *CD* and *DT*, PL for *CI*) contains notes that point out references to other texts. These were impossible to ignore, and altered the application of the method. In cases where such a note was offered, an attempt was made to identify intertextual markers in the immediate context of the

²⁴³ Conte, 59.

reference to determine if some element of the text would have indicated the presence of an intertext. This was pursued in all honesty, but it was impossible to will oneself to be unaware of the reference notes.

This study found no evidence to suggest that Augustine ever read any dialogue of Plato except for that portion of the *Timaeus* translated by Cicero. The ungrammaticalities and footnotes identified did not in any case indicate an intertext with Plato. There was also no significant language or linguistic feature found that was shared between the works of Augustine and those of Plato that were a part of this study.

Markers that indicated a doctrinal similarity between Augustine and Plato were collected; these citations reinforced the conclusions of earlier studies. The current study found 25 passages of the type identified in previous scholarship that indicated doctrinal similarities. These ranged from explicit references to the *Timaeus* to clear references to specific doctrines to vague references to Platonic doctrines that are evidenced throughout Plato's corpus. The great majority of these doctrinal references cited *Timaeus*. Clear references to the subject matter of the *Phaedo*, *Meno* and *Republic* were also found. As was argued in the Introduction and demonstrated in chapters 1-3, however, these kinds of doctrinal similarities are not sufficient to conclude that Augustine read any particular work. Platonic ideas could have come from any number of sources including philosophical commentaries, handbooks and even an oral tradition. There was nothing in any of these citations that suggested a more thorough familiarity with the text of a dialogue, again excepting the translated portion of the *Timaeus*.

The study's findings also militate against the idea that Augustine was especially familiar even with the *Timaeus*. While numerous doctrinal references were found that pointed to that dialogue, and several quotes of it were identified in previous scholarship, the *Timaeus* does not seem to have been a text with which Augustine spent great time and energy. Of the 34 citations found in previous scholarship and 13 more uncovered in the present study, nearly half (19) were quotes of or references to Plato's description of lesser gods being created by the supreme God at *Timaeus* 41a-d (CT 11.40-1). In all, only nine different passages in the dialogue are referenced and four of these only once.

Further, in spite of the fact that Augustine most certainly did read the *Timaeus*, there was no intertextual relationship marked between that dialogue and any of the Augustinian works under

study. A tenet of literary critical work on allusion and intertext is that intertextual relationships indicate the significant familiarity on the part of an author with an antecedent text. A writer is understood to create a work of the raw material of other works in the genre that he has already digested.²⁴⁴ Even within the *Quellenforschung* tradition, Fr. O'Connell notes the need for a research method capable of perceiving great subtleties because, 'the more thoroughly a source is assimilated, the more profound its effective influence, and the more freely the influenced author can manipulate, recombine and express the materials which he has made his own.'²⁴⁵ If manipulated elements of previous texts are signs of familiarity, we can only conclude that Augustine had no significant familiarity with nor had thoroughly assimilated the *Timaeus*.

A final theoretical premise of the current study is the intertextualist principle associating intertextual relationships and genre: a text is built on textual elements derived from the relevant literary tradition. Intertextual relationships are said to signal the link between a specific literary work and its genre.²⁴⁶ That the Cassiciacum works stand in the same genre with the philosophical dialogues of Plato and Cicero, for example, is evidenced by intertextual relationships within them to previous examples of the genre.²⁴⁷ No such link is indicated by the intertextual relationships in *De Civitate Dei*, *Contra Iulianum* or *De Trinitate*. This may be yet another difficulty in applying the method of this study to the works of Augustine, so many of which either lie outside any discernable literary genre, or belong to a genre for which there is no analogue in secular literature. Perhaps it will not be possible to utilise intertextualist theory in determining a genre relationship between Augustine's and earlier secular literature. However, any relationships that are discovered may provide insight into those works that have defied genre classification such as *Confessions* or *De Civitate Dei*.

In summary, the current study ratifies the scholarly consensus, and Courcelle's 'final word', that Augustine knew Plato only through Cicero's partial translation of the *Timaeus*. No evidence was found to support the suggestion that Augustine possessed any another *Timaeus* translation,

²⁴⁴ See p. 149.

²⁴⁵ O'Connell (1963), 4.

²⁴⁶ See p. 149.

²⁴⁷ The relationship between one Cassiciacum dialogue, *Contra Academicos*, and its Ciceronian antecedent is discussed in O'Meara (1956). While this is not an intertextualist critical work, it describes the relationship between Augustine's work and Cicero's *Academica* in sufficient terms to allow the reader to infer a relationship of genre between the works based upon references in the later work to the earlier.

namely that of Calcidius. This contention was based upon citations putatively attributed to sections outside those translated by Cicero (27e-47d). This study found no citations outside that section, and could attribute no doctrines to any other section that could not also be accounted for within Cicero's translation. With respect to Augustine's knowledge of the *Phaedo*, while three citations were identified that indicated familiarity with the subject matter of that dialogue, no evidence was found to suggest that Augustine actually knew the text. Finally, this study concludes that Augustine was not especially familiar with the *Timaeus* in spite of the evidence that he had certainly read the dialogue. Including all the citations of it in this study and all previous ones, nearly half are to a single passage. No intertexts found link any of the Augustinian works under study with the dialogue. Augustine had apparently not internalised the text sufficiently to generate intertextual relationships with it, nor did he perceive any debt to the genre of the *Timaeus* in the studied works.

While this study did not find evidence to link the works of Augustine and Plato, the method devised for it proved successful. No internal or external marker pointed to Plato, but these markers were present in the text. Footnotes and ungrammaticalities were present and did indeed indicate the presence of intertexts. Identified intertexts included a variety of both scriptural and pagan literary works with which Augustine was demonstrably familiar. The method revealed often-complex relationships with these earlier texts. Often, significant meaning was bestowed upon Augustine's text by virtue of these intertextual relationships, many of which revealed their meaning not in the referenced passage, but by a comparison of the context of the referenced passage with Augustine's new context. All these findings were predicted by the method and by the literary allusion and intertextual critical theory that generated it.

An examination of the intertexts and intertextual relationships found that Biblical texts were the most important to Augustine. Most Biblical citations were not included in the study results because they were attributed or because they were communicated by language that made their identification obvious.²⁴⁸ Even with those removed, there was still nearly the same number of citations of the Bible as of pagan works in the study.

While there were intertextual relationships among these, the function of the majority of Biblical citations was authentication. This is normally the function of attributed citations. However, Augustine's references often have the effect of authentication even though they are not

attributed. An example is at *CJ* 1.15.16 (ungrammaticality no. 17), which contains a reference to 1 Corinthians 15:55: *Ubi est contentio tua? ubi est aculeus tuus?* Augustine's context is a clarification of Julian's misconception of St. Basil's statement regarding the necessity of God's grace to remove evil from human will. A discussion of this act of grace precedes the quoted portion. Paul's context is the resurrection of the dead, when what is mortal will be made immortal. The effect of the reference is to give Augustine's argument the strength of Biblical authority. The Corinthians passage is so well known to Augustine that it is not necessary for him to attribute the quote in order to derive authentication from it. There are ten such instances of unattributed authentication among cited Biblical passages. The majority of these, as might be expected, are found in *Contra Julianum*, a work written for a fellow-bishop whose scriptural knowledge would allow him to perceive the references without any need for attribution.

There are fewer examples of actual intertextual relationships between Augustine's works and the Biblical passages to which he makes reference. One is found at *CD* 8.23.67-70 (ungrammaticality no. 4),

Citius enim fit, ut homo in honore positus pecoribus non intellegens comparetur, quam ut operi Dei ad eius imaginem facto, id est ipsi homini, opus hominis praeferatur,

which is a reference to Ps. 48 (49): 13:

Et homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit. Comparatus est iumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est illis.

Within the context of a discussion of Hermes Trismegistus' statement concerning those gods that were made by men is a treatment of the psalm, which warns against placing too high a value on one's property in this world. The effect of the intertext is to urge the reader to understand those gods created by men as property acquired in life: something that is not worthy of worship. In effect, Augustine says that anyone who does place so high a value on man-made gods so as to worship them, is not elevating these gods, but reducing his own status.

Another intertextual relationship is found at *CD* 8.23.96-8:

...sicut religio loquitur, quae nec fallit nec fallitur, non sicut iste quasi omni uento doctrinae hinc atque inde perflatus et falsis uera permiscens dolet quasi perituram religionem, quem postea confitetur errorem...

where this ungrammaticality indicates an intertext with Ephesians 4.14:

²⁴⁸ See p. 195.

ut iam non simus parvuli fluctuantes, et circumferamur omni vento doctrinae in nequitia hominum, in astutia ad circumventionem erroris.

Augustine's context is still a discussion of Hermes Trismegistus' views on the gods. The context of Paul's statement is to portray the confusion that is the result of mortal reasoning. The effect of the intertext is to suggest that Hermes' errors are examples of such confusion. The intertextual relationship, as in the previous example, is not profound, but does convey new meaning, at least some rhetorical slant, that is unrecognised without perceiving the intertext.

The number of scriptural intertexts found was considerable, although the number of significant intertextual relationships identified was surprisingly small. However, the sheer quantity of Biblical references, the Biblical language that permeates these three works, and particularly, the number of unattributed citations of the Bible that have the effect of authenticating points of view in Augustine's texts, confirm his profound familiarity with scripture. The method found a relationship between Augustine and scripture that we knew to be there. Its confirmation of Augustine's familiarity with and heavy use of scripture is a confirmation of the method: evidence was present, the method found it and even offered some insight into Augustine's use of scripture that had not been suggested before.

The study also found references to pagan literature. There were 26 citations of Vergil including nine that were attributed references. Also among Latin pagan authors cited were Cicero (4 citations), Lucan (2 citations), and Terence (1 citation). Aristotle, Porphyry and Plutarch were each represented by one citation, although the Plutarch reference can be attributed to Lucan and is, therefore, questionable.

The effect of the references to these authors was nearly always authentication. Five of the 18 unattributed citations, as well as all eight of the attributed references to Vergil were simply content citations that used the poet's authority to lend weight to Augustine's position. All four Cicero citations found, both Lucan citations and the only Terence citation fell into this category of unattributed authentication: each was used to add authority to Augustinian statements. The lines that were referenced authenticate their new context but do not indicate any significant intertextual relationship. The fact that these pagan authors can be used unattributed for authentication means that Augustine is still very familiar with the specific lines referenced and expects that his audience would be also. The lack of intertextual relationships suggests that Augustine's familiarity with the

works cited is probably limited to the specific lines and not the context of the lines or the work from which the lines are drawn. This finding is especially surprising in the cases of Cicero and Terence, and is worthy of further study.

Augustine's use of Vergil, however, suggests that his relationship with Rome's greatest poet is altogether different. In addition to the 13 attributed and unattributed citations used for authentication only, there are also a handful of citations found that indicate complex intertextual relationships. These include an ungrammaticality (no. 7) at *CD* 10.11.30-3:

...quae de hoc genere fallacium malignorumque spirituum, qui extrinsecus in animam ueniunt humanosque **sensus sopitos uigilantesue deludunt**...

that points to an intertext with *Aen.* 10.641-2:

morte obita qualis fama est uolitare figuras
aut quae sopitos deludunt somnia sensus.

The context of the *Aeneid* quote is a description of Juno having come to earth disguised--she takes Aeneas' shape and dress, and walks like him in order to fool Turnus so as to save him from death on the battlefield. Her appearance is likened to those ghosts who fool sleeping men in dreams. Augustine's context is an explication of Porphyry's condemnation of *daemones*. The line borrowed from Vergil refers to deceitful spirits who appear to listen to men's commands and grant favours, but who are actually evil and use their powers to lead men into evil.

The effect of the intertext is that the passage attributes the qualities of Juno in this particular context to those malignant spirits who appear good but are actually evil. The comparison is appropriate in many respects: Juno is a deity inferior to the supreme God, Jupiter, and obliged to obey him. She is, nevertheless, opposed to his will with respect to the Trojan/Latin conflict and seeks to do whatever she can to delay its execution. Jupiter allows Juno to use her powers to save Turnus in one particular battle. It is clear that this action will only delay the inevitable (*sin altior istis/ sub precibus uenia ulla latet totumque moneri/ mutariue putas bellum, spes pascis inanis.* 10.625-7). Her hatred of the Trojans moves her to delay fate. Her mission on earth is one of deceit. While Turnus is rescued from imminent death, his fate is sealed. She appears to grant him a favour, but her actions are for her own benefit. The delay she causes serves only to continue a bloody conflict and put off an eventual resolution.

Daemones, for Augustine, are supernatural beings more powerful than men but under the power of God. As this passage says, they were evil, only appearing good to maximise their ability to deceive. They could work evil in the world, but were powerless to stop the will of God. The intertext offers Juno as a familiar example of such deceitful daemonic activity that neither benefits those men who appear to gain favour nor thwarts the inevitable will of the supreme God. An additional richness of meaning is supplied to Augustine's text by the intertext. In order to be effective, the intertext must not only be recognised, but its context must be compared with Augustine's new context.

Another intertextual relationship is marked by the footnote (no. 10) at *CD* 10.10.38-41, *...sicut de Proteo dictum est, formas se uertit in omnes, hostiliter insequens, fallaciter subueniens, utrobique nocens.*

The referenced passage is

sed quanto ille magis formas se uertet in omnis
tam tu, nate, magis contende tenacia uincla (*Georgics* 4.411-2).

The footnote introduces an unattributed quote of Vergil. The *Georgics* context is Cyrene's advice to her son Aristaeus as to how he might capture Proteus and get him to reveal the cause of the plague that devastated Aristaeus' bees.

Augustine's context is an argument against Porphyry's theurgy. Porphyry claims that people who undergo purification rites have beautiful visions of deities. Augustine claims these are sent by the devil to deceive. It is the devil that is compared with Proteus. The effect of the intertext is to associate the devil with Proteus' ability and inclination to deceive by changing his form. That the devil can change form as Proteus is said to be able to do is discernible without recognising the intertext. The association of deception with this ability to change is carried by the intertext, and then only by comparing the Vergilian context with the new context in which Augustine places the reference.

Similarly, at *CI* 3.17.32, *Poenus, inquam, disputator, non ego, sed Cyprianus Poenus, te hoc vulnere Poenus immolat, et poenam scelerato ex dogmate sumit*, there is a reference to *Aen.* 12.946-7 (ungrammaticality no. 20):

Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas
immolat et poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit.

The source for this ungrammaticality is the death of Turnus passage from *Aeneid* 12. As Aeneas debates what to do over the helpless form of his enemy, he sees the sword belt taken by Turnus at the time when he had killed Pallas. He kills Turnus in vengeful anger, telling his opponent precisely why he is being killed - that it is a penalty for the earlier killing of Aeneas' friend. Augustine's context is an argument concerning baptism. Julian had apparently referred to Augustine as Punic in order to insult him and had insulted the African Church generally. Augustine's argument against Julian is offered in the name of Cyprian, 3rd century bishop of Carthage, who had apparently been a particular target of Julian's insults. The effect of the intertext primarily is to assert that Augustine's argument is fatal to Julian's position. Further, this dialectical deathblow is delivered in the name of a martyred fellow African. This connection is enhanced further by Augustine's play on *Poenus* and *poenam*. Augustine assumes Aeneas' righteous anger and his heroic posture in avenging--in his case the slander of--a dead compatriot.

Two citations found at *CI* 4.2 use intertextual relationships with Vergil to advance Augustine's argument concerning the nature of lust. At *CI* 4.2.10, *Quia cum sopitos deludent somnia sensus, nescio quomodo etiam castae animae in turpes labuntur assensus*, the ungrammaticality (no. 22) points to another intertext at *Aen.* 10.642: *aut quae sopitos deludent somnia sensus*. The *Aeneid* context, again, is Juno's mission to save Turnus from death in battle. She takes on Aeneas' form to deceive the Latins; her disguised appearance is likened to ghosts who delude sleepers in their dreams. A large and ongoing controversy in *CI* is the argument over the nature of lust. Julian says it is good because it makes procreation possible; Augustine says it is an evil that leads people to sin and that its only advantage is that in marriage it can be used for good. Augustine, in this passage argues that lust is evil even when good people assent to it in sleep. The intertext associates lustful cravings with Juno, both of which come with intent to deceive us when we are most vulnerable.

Later, at *CI* 4.2.12, *Quia mali huius occulta sunt et dira contagia*, the ungrammaticality (no. 23) indicates an intertext found at *Georgics* 3.468-9: *priusquam/ dira per incautum serpant contagia uulgus*. Vergil's context is a warning to shepherds of the symptoms of plague and of the desolation a plague brings. The advice is to kill an infected animal before its contagion is allowed to pass into the herd. Augustine's context is a further discussion of the evil nature of *concupiscentia*, which Julian has defended as good since it is necessary for procreation. The effect

of the intertext is to suggest that lust and the plague are similar afflictions. The consequences of lust are suggested by the association with plague and its consequences in the *Georgics*. Further, Vergil's advice that an animal having plague must immediately be killed is contrasted by Augustine's prescription for those infected with *concupiscentia*: *etiam si quidam ab eiusdem mali noxa regeneratione soluti sunt, sicut solvendi sunt qui inde nascuntur*. Vergil's plague-stricken animals must be killed while people afflicted with lust can be saved and regenerated.

A further point of interest in this intertext is that *Georgics* 3.464-566 describes the plague as causing violent ruin similar to Vergil's description of the consequences of lust earlier in the same book (*Georgics* 3.209-283). Augustine's association of lust with plague in *CI* is a mirror image of the association of plague with lust in *Georgics* 3. The intertext does not simply paint *concupiscentia* with the associations of *contagia* by repeating Vergil's diction, it borrows a major theme of the *Georgics* for application in a new context. These two intertexts, especially the last, are examples of complex relationships between Augustine's discussion of lust and the two Vergil texts. In each case, language that comes as an ungrammaticality in the new text, but is attributable to the antecedent texts clearly marks the intertext. Also in each case, the Vergilian verses add significant meaning to Augustine's text, but only by comparison of the original and new context.

Perhaps the most significant and complex intertextual relationship discovered in the study is found at *CI* 6.7.21:

Relinquamus silvas oleastorum, et montes vel Africanos vel Italos olivarum; nec interrogemus agricolas, qui cum tibi aliud, mihi aliud forte responderit, neutros possumus celeri exploratione convincere, si ad hoc experimendum seminetur arbor seris factura nepotibus umbram. Habemus oleam, non Africanam, non Italam, sed Hebraeam; cui nos qui fuimus oleaster, insitos esse gaudemus. Illi oleae data est circumcisio, quae nobis solvit istam sine disceptatione quaestionem.

The ungrammaticality beginning with *nec interrogemus agricolas* and extending to *nepotibus umbram* (no. 31) indicates an extremely complex intertext with *Georgics* 2.58-9

iam quae seminibus iactis se sustulit arbos,
tarda uenit seris factura nepotibus umbram

This in turn is related to the ungrammaticality to follow (*Habemus oleam...disceptatione quaestionem*, no 32) which finds its intertext at Rom. 11.16-24.

Vergil's context is a discussion of uncultivated plants (*Sponte sua quae se tollunt*, 2.47).

While such trees and vines may grow strong and tall, they are unfruitful, often kill their offspring

and offer nothing but shade and even that not to the farmer, but to his grandchildren. Augustine's context is an argument over the question of original sin, specifically Julian's contention,

Per rerum naturam fieri non posse, ut illud probentur tradere parentes, quo caruisse creduntur. Quod si tradunt...non amiserunt (*CI* 6.7.18, PL 44, 833).

Augustine claims this is false and offers as a counter-example that sons of circumcised fathers are themselves born with a foreskin.

Augustine has mentioned many times already that circumcision was commanded of Abraham by God as a sign of God's covenant with the Hebrews (cf. Gen. 17.11-14). He also points out that circumcision, in scripture, stands for baptism (Col. 2.10-12). He then mixes circumcision with a new metaphor. He admits to Julian that the foreskin is good because God made it *sicut de oleastro copiosissime disputasti*. Julian's argument is lost, but must have referred to Paul's metaphor for the salvation of the Gentiles at Rom. 11.16-24. Salvation is accomplished by baptism that makes Gentiles a part of the covenant of God with the Hebrews just as shoots of wild olive trees that have been grafted onto a cultivated olive tree gain new life as if they were a natural part of the original. The foreskin, like the wild olive, Augustine says, is inherently good because God made it, but it stands in scripture as a symbol for what is evil.

While the intertext with Vergil is obvious due to the exactly repeated phrase *seris factura nepotibus umbram*, it is made unclear by Augustine's alteration of Vergil's language. His *agricola* gives a different answer to anyone who asks and no easy answer to anyone. There is no analogous language in Vergil. Further, Augustine's question is whether a tree will produce shade for one's grandchildren if it is planted *ad hoc experimendum*, i.e. a tree grown for the purpose of some experiment. Vergil's description, however, is of a tree that grows unplanted and uncultivated (*seminibus iactis se sustulit*) and provides such shade. As the intertext follows an urging to leave behind such matters as wild olives then a warning that the farmer is not likely to have any useful knowledge, its effect would appear to be an expression that we should not get bogged down in academic discussions and tree metaphors because they will not yield anything.

There is, however, a further intertextual relationship with the general context of Vergil's lines. While uncultivated plants are useless to the farmer, he says that their nature can be changed through grafting or transplanting:

tamen haec quoque, si quis
inserat aut scrobibus mandet mutata subactis,

exuerint siluestrem animum, (2.49-51).

In fact, they will adjust eagerly to whatever new role the farmer wants: *cultuque frequenti/ in quascumque uoles artis haud tarda sequentur* (2.51-2). Vergil then begins a lengthy discussion of the practice of grafting the branches of one plant onto another with the advice that it is necessary for all uncultivated plants:

scilicet omnibus est labor impendendus, et omnes
cogendae in sulcum ac multa mercede domandae. (2.61-2).

With this context in mind, Augustine moves immediately after the *Georgics* quote to his comparison of Gentiles as wild olive shoots rejoicing to be grafted onto a Hebrew olive tree. This introduces the second intertext, one with Paul's letter to the Romans likening Gentiles to grafted wild olives.

The context in which we read the intertext with Vergil includes Augustine's argument against Julian that something which is not possessed by a parent can be transferred to the child, the grafting of the wild olive as Paul's metaphor for baptism which offers salvation to Gentiles, the connection of baptism with circumcision, and the consequent analogue of the foreskin's place in circumcision with the wild olive's in grafting (and baptism). The language of the ungrammaticality does not match Vergil's with respect to the farmer's knowledge and nature of the shade tree as a marker for the source text. The immediate *Georgics* context is thus de-emphasised. The grammaticality provided by the *Georgics* intertext is understood only if we include the wider context, not explicitly stated in the Augustine text, of Vergil's statements about grafting: the nature of the wild plant is changed by the graft. Something useless to the farmer is made into something useful. Within Paul's metaphor, something that is in fact inherently good, the wild olive, stands for evil; Augustine takes great pains to explain this distinction. The process, then, takes something evil--the wild olive--and makes something good of it through the process of grafting. Vergil's description of an actual arboricultural practice accomplishes the same thing as Paul's metaphorical arboricultural practice and fortifies that metaphor. That metaphor originally stood for baptism; this connection is fortified in the same way by association, as is the circumcision metaphor. Furthermore, the tree that is grafted produces seeds that are not of a hybrid, but of the original

ungrafted plant; an example, returning to the original point Augustine was arguing against Julian, of a changed parent not passing that change on to its offspring.

The intertextual relationships presented above are complex, highly significant and communicated through both the recognition of referenced texts and by comparison of the context of the Vergilian verses with Augustine's new context. Scholarship on the question, however, has concluded that Augustine's use of Vergil, especially late in his career, was trivial. Hagendahl reckons that Augustine's quotations of Vergil reflect nothing more than an interest in the content of the older work for use as evidence in argument, i.e. authentication.²⁴⁹ O'Donnell finds that Vergil's works as well as all other classical Latin literature were used by Augustine as adornments only.²⁵⁰ MacCormack determines that Augustine quotes Vergil either as evidence for a line of reasoning (again, in the terms of this study, authentication), or that lines of Vergil appear informally as part of Augustine's 'mental furniture'.²⁵¹ Courcelle offers no interpretation of the nature of Augustine's use of Vergil. In his list of citations, however, he notes references and gives a brief explanation but ignores their significance.²⁵²

An example of the approach adopted by these scholars is the interpretation each places on the reference at *CD* 8.18.13-15:

Amant quippe illi scaenicas turpitudines, quas non amat pudicitia; amant in maleficiis
magorum **mille nocendi artes**, quas non amat innocentia.

to *Aen.* 7.335-8:

tu potes unanimos armare in proelia fratres
atque odiis uersare domos, tu uerbera tectis
funereasque inferre faces, tibi nomina mille,
mille nocendi artes.

This ungrammaticality, *mille nocendi artes* (no. 2), comes in the midst of a sustained attack against Apuleius' position that *daemones* are sometimes good. The reference is to Vergil's description of the underworld divinity Allecto who is so terrible an entity that *odit et ipse pater Pluton, odere sorores/ Tartareae monstrum* (7.327-8). She is hated because *cui tristia bella/ iraeque insidiaeque et crimina noxia cordi* (7.325-6). The effect of this intertext is that all *daemones* become

²⁴⁹ Hagendahl, 388-9.

²⁵⁰ O'Donnell, 171.

²⁵¹ MacCormack, xviii.

²⁵² Courcelle (1984).

associated with Allecto's malignity and irrationality, advancing Augustine's case that they are always evil and always harmful.

Hagendahl, Courcelle and MacCormack all note that the reference is to Vergil's description of the demon Allecto, but they do not interpret its effect or recognise the importance of its complexity. Hagendahl does tell us that 'Vergil's words about the fury of Allecto come in well.'²⁵³ But the reference to Allecto is not explicit. While she is brought into comparison with *daemones*, one must know the *Aeneid* passage by heart or look it up to see that *mille nocendi artes* refers to her. Further, in order to understand what meaning is gained for Augustine's text by this intertext, one must find out from the context of the referenced lines that Allecto is hated by her family because of her love of sorrow, treachery and harm. This is a powerful intertextual relationship that depends upon recognition of the Vergilian context to convey its meaning.

Augustine makes comparatively few references to Vergil, but many represent intricate intertextual relationships that convey salient meaning to their new context. It was argued earlier that if a significant intertextual relationship could be identified among Augustine's references to earlier works, it must be concluded that the bishop had read the earlier work in its original context. With Vergil, of course, it was already known that Augustine had read his entire corpus and had probably memorised a good deal of it while a young man. However, the findings of this study show that even at this late stage in Augustine's career, he is intimately knowledgeable and closely involved in Vergil's texts. Even if we grant his mastery of Vergil's works as a young man, this does not account for the subtle way he is able to manipulate the texts some 30-40 years later. Augustine's use of Vergil after 415 is not simply for the purpose of authority or ornament.

The method of the current study could be used in a comprehensive examination and analysis of Augustine's use of Latin literature, particularly of Vergil. Greek sources could also come under examination. However, the utter lack of intertexts identified with Greek literature in the current study which included works selected because they were most likely to yield Greek references strongly supports previous claims that Augustine's culture was almost entirely Latin. A study of the intertextual relationships with Latin sources could yield insight into the nature of Augustine's classical readings, his changing attitudes toward secular culture, the extent of his involvement with secular literature at various stages of his career, and the nature of Augustine's

manipulation of antecedent texts. It would be of particular interest to examine the *Confessions* for intertextual relationships with the *Aeneid* to test the intertextualist principle that links intertextual relationships with genre. We might gain insight into the genre of the *Confessions* by examining its relationship to Vergil's epic at the intertextual level. It is clear that the enormous amount of scholarship that has addressed his sources has correctly discerned the slight nature of Augustine's knowledge of Plato. However, there is still much to be understood concerning the complex nature of Augustine's knowledge of and involvement with Vergil. This study has provided a new critical tool for scholars interested in this question.

²⁵³ Hagendahl, 399.

Excursus on Literary Allusion and Roman Education

It may be argued that Augustine would be unlikely to engage in a literary practice that is most often found in Roman literature among poets of the first century BC. There are two reasons we might expect to find allusion in Augustine's writings. First, while the Augustan poets did engage extensively in allusiveness, a practice they took from the Alexandrian scholar-poets, the practice was not confined either to them or to poetry. Roman literature is filled with writers using imitative techniques to allude to earlier works. Beyond the Augustans, allusion is found in many others including Statius in the first century,²⁵⁴ Aulus Gellius in the second,²⁵⁵ and Ausonius in the fourth.²⁵⁶ Commentators from the elder Seneca (e.g. *Suasoriae* 3.7) to Macrobius (*Sat.* 5) noted and examined complex allusive techniques in Roman literature. Cicero filled his oratorical works with allusions to Greek literature.²⁵⁷ Even historians like Livy²⁵⁸ and Tacitus²⁵⁹ made allusions to earlier works--poetry and prose.

Another reason to expect allusive activity in Augustine's works is the nature of Roman education. That system was based upon an Alexandrian model introduced to Rome in the second century BC. Its emphasis was almost entirely literary. In explaining why Roman writers imported the literary allusion from the Alexandrians, Thomas attributes the Roman attraction to the technique to 'similar intellect and temperamental affinity between the Augustans and Alexandrians'.²⁶⁰ While this may be so, the tendency of Roman writers to allude to previous texts is likely due more to the Roman boy's education, which, from beginning to end, emphasised memorisation, and especially memorisation of literary passages. From the age of seven, Roman children in primary education memorised passages of works in a literary canon for oral recitation.²⁶¹ Later, under the direction of a *grammaticus*, students moved from passages to full

²⁵⁴ Hinds, 125-6.

²⁵⁵ Hinds, 63-4; 71-4.

²⁵⁶ Kenney, Vol. 2, 704.

²⁵⁷ Jocelyn, 61-111.

²⁵⁸ Lyne (1994), 193.

²⁵⁹ Woodman, in West & Woodman, 148-9.

²⁶⁰ Thomas (1986), 172.

²⁶¹ Bonner, 177.

texts which were read aloud by the master to be memorised and recited before the class.²⁶² The highest level of school, devoted to rhetorical training, emphasised declamatory speech making. These were, again, learned by heart and recited before the public.²⁶³ Content was mastered through exercises such as *progumnasmata* in which the master read aloud a passage from a poetic work. The student was to retell the story, sometimes in prose, starting at various points in the narrative and paraphrase the story from that point and then provide the background of events that led to his starting point.²⁶⁴ Exercises such as this demanded a detailed command of the plot structure of all works studied.

Beyond the learning of literary works by heart, students were also drilled in every nuance of poetical and rhetorical style. The *grammaticus* taught literature line by line and word by word, engaging in a long and meticulous explication of the text.²⁶⁵ Students were guided systematically through texts, while having to parse each word until huge numbers of verses were committed to memory and 'perused for the purpose of eliciting and imitating stylistic features.'²⁶⁶ Schoolmasters demanded that students read and re-read the literary canon and compare works; they made a special point in their explications of works to discuss all allusions to myths or to the literary tradition.²⁶⁷ By the time students finished an education such as this, they possessed an encyclopaedic knowledge of classical literature, both Greek and Latin, as well as mastery of rhetorical and poetical devices. This education would produce the ideal audience for literary allusive poetic manipulation. The educated Roman could easily identify allusive language, discern markers and recognise imitated model texts.

Roman education observed a rigid and sustained literary canon, the centrepiece of which was Vergil.²⁶⁸ The *Aeneid*, in particular, became a 'school text *par excellence* and remained so through the centuries.'²⁶⁹ A large number of examples of allusion in Chapter Four are taken from Vergil. This is because he was a master of the technique, utilising it often and to great effect. His allusive tendency was well known in the ancient world. 'From the first century AD, assessment of

²⁶² Bonner, 212.

²⁶³ Marrou (1956), 286.

²⁶⁴ Gwynn, 200.

²⁶⁵ Gwynn, 279.

²⁶⁶ Bonner, 212.

²⁶⁷ Gwynn, 220; Bonner, 331.

²⁶⁸ Marrou (1956), 278.

²⁶⁹ Bonner, 213.

the degree of Vergil's success in borrowing or echoing lines and passages from Homer, the Greek tragedians, and earlier Latin poets, such as Ennius and Lucretius, was a favourite occupation of the *grammatici* and was still a major interest of the *savants* whose discussions Macrobius reports in the fifth century.²⁷⁰ Vergil's texts, his poetical style, his allusiveness would have been mastered by any product of the Roman education system from the time of the poet's death virtually until the end of empire.

Augustine, growing up in Africa in the fourth century, was a product of this same Roman education system, the precepts of which went unchanged throughout this period.²⁷¹ His account of his education, first in Thagaste, later in Madauros and Carthage illustrate Augustine's classical Roman training. Even in provincial Africa, he received instruction in Greek (*Conf.* 1.13.20). He studied Latin with a *grammaticus* (1.13.20), which included proper pronunciation and grammar (1.17.28), and he memorised poetical passages--from the *Aeneid* (1.13.20) and from Terence (1.16.26). He even describes an oral recitation exercise in which he is to recite a prose rendition of Juno's speech from *Aen.* 1.38-49 (1.17.27). While his Greek instruction was nowhere near the level described by Cicero in his own time, Augustine clearly participated in a traditional Roman education and can be assumed to have mastered the canon and the stylistic features of the authors that were a part of it. Allusion would have been a fundamental part of the most important works that all Romans knew, and they knew them by heart. For Augustine and every other educated Roman, recognising allusion and utilising allusive technique in composition would have been second nature.

If it is reasonable to assume the potential presence of literary allusions in Augustine's works, the question is then: to what would he have alluded? Certainly, we might expect references to those works in the canon that were so profound a part of Augustine's literary vocabulary. Intertextualists would also have us look to the literary tradition of which he was a part as a source of any allusions he might make. Augustine was completely candid about the significant role Platonic philosophy played both in his conversion and throughout his career in the development of his own philosophy. He joins Origen in claiming for Christians the right to despoil the Egyptians, that is, to take from the Platonists doctrines that are true and consistent with Christianity for the

²⁷⁰ Bonner, 213-4.

²⁷¹ Marrou (1938), 1-7.

purposes of advancing the faith (e.g. *De Doctrina Christiana* 2.144). It would be an effective means of accomplishing this despoiling to allude to philosophical literature, i.e. passages from the Platonists, and use the borrowed meaning for his own Christian purposes.

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Ambrose

<i>BM</i>	<i>De Bono Morte (Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 32, 1)</i>
<i>DI</i>	<i>De Isaac (CSEL 32, 1)</i>
<i>DF</i>	<i>De Fide (CSEL 78)</i>
<i>DO</i>	<i>De Officiis (Patrologia Latina 16)</i>
<i>Hex.</i>	<i>Hexameron (CSEL 32, 1)</i>
<i>SS</i>	<i>De Spiritu Sancto (CSEL 79)</i> <i>De Excessu Fratris Satyri (CSEL 73)</i>

Aristotle

<i>Cat.</i>	<i>Categories</i>
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Augustine

<i>BV</i>	<i>De Beata Vita (Corpus Christianorum Latinorum 29)</i>
<i>CA</i>	<i>Contra Academicos (CCL 29)</i>
<i>CD</i>	<i>De Civitate Dei (CCL 47-8)</i>
<i>CE</i>	<i>De Consensu Evangelistarum (CSEL 43)</i>
<i>CI</i>	<i>Contra Iulianum (PL 44)</i>
<i>Conf.</i>	<i>Confessiones (O'Donnell, 1992. See below for bibliographical entry.)</i>
<i>DC</i>	<i>De Doctrina Christiana (CCL 32)</i>
<i>DT</i>	<i>De Trinitate (CCL 50-50A)</i>
<i>Ep.</i>	<i>Epistulae (CSEL 34)</i>
<i>IA</i>	<i>De Immortalitate Animae (CSEL 89)</i>
<i>LA</i>	<i>De Libero Arbitrio (CCL 29)</i>
<i>QA</i>	<i>De Quantitate Animae (CSEL 89)</i>
<i>Retr.</i>	<i>Retractationes (CCL 57)</i>
<i>Serm.</i>	<i>Sermones (CCL 41)</i>
<i>Sol.</i>	<i>Soliloquia (CSEL 89)</i>
<i>UC</i>	<i>De Utilitate Credendi (CSEL 25, 1)</i>
<i>VR</i>	<i>De Vera Religione (CCL 32)</i> <i>De Genesi Ad Litteram (CSEL 28, 1)</i> <i>De Diversis Quaestionibus Octaginta Tribus (CCL 44A)</i>

Cicero

<i>Ac.</i>	<i>Academica (Loeb Classical Library 268)</i>
<i>CT</i>	<i>Timaeus (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teuberiana, fasc. 46)</i>
<i>ND</i>	<i>De Natura Deorum (LCL 268)</i>
<i>RP</i>	<i>De Re Publica (BSGRT, fasc. 39)</i>
<i>TD</i>	<i>Tusculan Disputations (LCL 141)</i> <i>De Divinatione (BSGRT, fasc. 46)</i> <i>De Fato (BSGRT, fasc. 46)</i>

Clement

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<i>Protr.</i>	<i>Protreptikos (PG 8)</i>
<i>Strom.</i>	<i>Stromateis (PG 8)</i>

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