

17-18 year-old Greek-Cypriot students'

understandings of differing historical accounts

**An exploratory study of how students engage with history
in the Republic of Cyprus**

Submitted for the degree of PhD
at the UCL Institute of Education

Maria K. Georgiou

2020

Declaration

I confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Name: Maria K. Georgiou

Signature:



Date: 14.07.2020

Word count (exclusive of appendixes and bibliography, but including endnotes,

figures and tables): 97.553words

Abstract

This study is an explorative study of 17-18 year-old Greek-Cypriot students' understanding about differing historical accounts. This study was envisioned in light of having a New History Curriculum implemented in the Republic of Cyprus, marking a shift from previous curricula. This study is (a) a continuation of history education research tradition (such as SHP and CHATA) concerns with disciplinary historical thinking and (b) an exploration of how students attribute value to historical accounts in personal terms. Purpose of this study is firstly to inform existing understandings on students' ideas about differing historical accounts, and secondly to raise wider implications.

This study reports on 96 students from 9 schools across the Republic of Cyprus. This study took a qualitative approach, that of exploration, although the scale of the sample also allowed some quantitative analysis. Students had to answer a series of questions on two pairs of differing accounts on the same historical event. Following, about one third of students participated in group interviews which aimed in triangulating data and yield more data. Data were analysed through inductive coding.

This Thesis concludes that students' ideas are multifaceted and complex, often in ways that do not allow them nuanced thinking such as everyday misconceptions, incomplete notions, every-day life ideas and ideas shaped by their context, which might not be relevant to the discipline of history. I therefore make the argument that policy-makers and educators need to be informed so as to enhance students' learning. At the same time, I take the stance that learning and understanding is a social practice, and hence that purist disciplinary approaches might be restrictive. I thereby propose re-thinking current history education paradigms in terms of theory, research and teaching practice.

Impact Statement

Following a series of political and social changes across the Cyprus divide, a New History Curriculum was envisioned in 2003 and its implementation began in 2011-12 in the Republic of Cyprus. With regard to history education, the new curriculum requires critical thinking, disciplinary understandings, and the ‘overcoming of the textbook’, marking a shift from previous curricula, conservative teaching, and ethnocentric third person narratives. Yet, in RoC, historical understanding in education, is still at a rudimentary stage of development (Makriyianni and Psaltis, 2007; Perikleous and Shemilt, 2011), reflecting the conservatism of the broader academic and public culture (Christodoulou, 2014). A large part of the reason why traditional norms, and especially history education, have not been challenged is due to the political situation in the island (Koutselini, 2007; Latif, 2017). Given this complex situation, how do Greek-Cypriot students understand historical accounts?

At the same time, students’ understandings of differing accounts matter around the globe, because different (hi)stories of the past are not solely typical of the divided island of Cyprus. They are neither an exclusive phenomenon of countries in conflict and/or post-conflict countries. Seeking to explore how young people engage in historical understanding in a world in which different (hi)stories claim authority, I raise implications for policy-making and practice. Further, I raise wider implications for history education and thereby offer a re-conceptualisation of history education.

Firstly, drawing on this study’s findings I put forward a series of specific proposals. These include, the disconnection of teaching from the textbook, and the grand narrative in general; the cultivation of historical inquiry; working closely with sources – both primary and secondary; paying attention to the language used in textbooks and teaching; and, the use rather than discard of other modes of relation to the past, such as eye-witnessing and collective

memory as learning tools. The proposed levels of advancement and description of students' understandings can be used by policy-makers and educators as a guiding scheme for enhancing student thinking. Secondly, these proposals can be valuable for teacher training, in that teachers need to know what students' ideas are if they aim in targeted teaching.

Thirdly, I highlight areas for further research. I do so by highlighting the loose-ends of my findings and addressing this study's limitations. Fourthly, this research contributes to the international research as it addresses the question: to what degree is the picture emerging from Cyprus similar and different to other contexts? Fifthly, by making evident the ways in which existing paradigms might be considered restrictive, this study makes a conceptual contribution to the field of history education and proposes re-thinking current paradigms. Sixthly, this study has the potential for community impact. Findings will be shared with participating schools and the Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Education, which is hoped to take on the findings of this research in a fruitful manner.

Table of Contents

Declaration	2
Abstract.....	3
Impact Statement	4
Table of Contents	6
List of Tables and Figures	9
Acknowledgements	10
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION	13
1.1. Research focus.....	13
1.2. Significance.....	15
1.3. Stimuli.....	18
1.4. Context.....	20
1.4.1. The educational context in the RoC	20
1.4.2. History as nation-construction	24
1.4.3. Contested histories	26
1.5. Positionality	27
1.6. Thesis structure.....	30
CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	32
2.1. A note of caution	32
2.2. Defining historical accounts	33
2.3. The writing of history as social practice	37
2.4. The methodological construction of historical accounts.....	39
CHAPTER 3. STUDENTS' IDEAS ABOUT DIFFERING HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE.....	43
3.1. Introduction.....	43
3.2. Research on students' ideas on differing historical accounts.....	43
3.3. Opening up the historical accounts paradigm.....	49
3.4. Historical accounts and personal relationships with the past.....	51
3.5. Literature discussion	53
CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND STRATEGY.....	59
4.1. Introduction.....	59
4.2. Epistemological Assumptions	60
4.2.1. Knowledge as constructed.....	60
4.2.2. Narrativity and language	62
4.3. Methodology	62
4.4. Research question(s) and foci	65
4.5. Instruments.....	70
4.5.1. Written tasks.....	70
4.5.2. Group interviews.....	73
4.6. Sample and procedures	74
4.6.1. Sample.....	74
4.6.2. Procedures	76
4.7. Data analysis strategy	79
4.7.1. Data handling	79
4.7.2. Grounded theory.....	80
4.7.3. Data analysis procedures.....	82
4.8. Credibility.....	87
4.9. Upgrade and pilot study refinements	89
4.10. Ethics.....	91
4.11. Reflexivity	93
4.11.1. The researcher's role	93
4.11.2. Meaning attribution and translation	95
4.11.3. The fluid nature of positionality.....	98
CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS	100
Introduction.....	100
5.1. How do we Acquire Knowledge of the Past According to Students?	101

5.1.2. Author Absence	104
5.1.3. Author Disposition	108
5.1.4. Author Manipulation	114
5.1.5. Author Investigation	118
5.1.6. Subjectivity	127
5.1.7. Author Construction	130
5.2. How do Students Judge the Validity of Accounts?.....	135
5.2.1. Introduction	135
5.2.2. History is Factual.....	136
5.2.3. History is Empirical.....	146
5.2.4. History is Always Distorted	149
5.2.5. History is Relative	152
5.2.6. History is an Epistemic Product	155
5.2.7. History is Construction.....	161
5.3. How do Students Attribute Authority to Accounts?	164
5.3.1. Introduction	164
5.3.2. Textual Authority	167
5.3.3. Narrative Authority	169
5.3.4. Relative Authority	174
5.3.5. Community Authority	176
5.3.6. Epistemic Authority.....	180
5.3.7. Modelling Authority	185
5.4. What Criteria do Students Employ so as to Assess Accounts' Usefulness?	190
5.4.1. Introduction	190
5.4.2. Textual Use.....	192
5.4.3. Narrative Use.....	195
5.4.4. Community Use.....	197
5.4.5. Blame Use	203
5.4.6. Epistemic Use.....	205
5.4.7.Theoretical Use.....	210
5.4.7. No Use.....	212
5.5. Data Analysis Conclusions.....	213
CHAPTER 6. WHAT ARE STUDENTS' EPISTEMOLOGICAL IDEAS?	217
6.1. Introduction	217
6.2. Conceptual Inconsistencies.....	218
6.2.1. Introduction	218
6.2.2. Petros' case.....	219
6.2.3. Meri's case.....	220
6.2.4. Default positions as barriers?	221
6.3. Student Ideas about the Nature of Historical Accounts.....	222
6.3.1. Introduction	222
6.3.2. Accounts Are Just There.....	225
6.3.3. Accounts Convey the True and Fixed Past.....	226
6.3.4. Accounts Are Just Different Opinions.....	228
6.3.5. Accounts Are Distorted Versions of the Past	229
6.3.6. Accounts Are Epistemic Products	231
6.3.7. Accounts Are Constructions	233
6.4. Incomplete Notions.....	234
6.4.1. Introduction	234
6.4.2. Incomplete notions under 'Accounts Are Just There'	235
6.4.3. Incomplete notions under 'Accounts Convey a True and Fixed Past'	237
6.4.4. Incomplete notions under 'Accounts are Just Different Opinions'	259
6.4.5. Incomplete notions under 'Accounts are Distorted Versions of the Past'	263
6.4.6. Incomplete notions under 'Accounts are Epistemic Products'	264
6.4.7. Challenges.....	267
6.5. Advanced Thinking.....	268
6.6. Socio-Cultural Obstacles?	270

6.7. Conclusion	271
CHAPTER 7. HOW DO STUDENTS UNDERSTAND HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS IN PERSONAL TERMS?	274
7.1. Introduction.....	274
7.2. Assimilation	275
7.3. Responsibility and blame	277
7.4. Didactic uses of the past	279
7.5. Constructing national identity	281
7.6. Teleological history	285
7.7. Conclusion	286
CHAPTER 8. HOW DO GREEK-CYPRriot STUDENTS' IDEAS COMPARE TO THOSE REPORTED IN THE EXISTING LITERATURE?	288
8.1. Introduction.....	288
8.2. Situating Greek-Cypriot students' ideas in the international literature.....	288
8.2.1. Similarities with literature	289
8.2.2. Differences from existing literature	295
8.3. Situating Greek-Cypriot Students' ideas in the Cyprus context	298
8.4. Comparative Overview.....	300
CHAPTER 9. LIMITATIONS, CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE, IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY-MAKING	304
9.1. Introduction.....	304
9.2. Conclusions.....	304
9.3. Limitations.....	306
9.3.1. Research design issues	306
9.3.2. Instrument issues	307
9.3.3. Data collection issues	308
9.3.4. Data analysis issues.....	309
9.3.5. Discussion issues.....	309
9.4. Contribution to knowledge.....	310
9.5. Implications for further research	311
9.6. Implications for policy-making.....	313
9.6.1. Restructure textbooks as 'know-how' tools	313
9.6.2. Language (and discourses) 'reality effect'	316
9.6.3. Teleology	317
9.6.4. Use of existing knowledge	318
9.6.5. Teach interpretation as stance – not opinion.....	319
9.6.6. Work in groups.....	320
9.6.7. Create meaningful curricula.....	321
9.6.8. Revise curricula and textbooks	322
9.6.9. Teacher training	322
CHAPTER 10. FINAL REFLECTIONS	324
REFERENCES.....	329
APPENDICES	355
APPENDIX 1. Paired Accounts on 'The Outbreak of WWI'	356
APPENDIX 2. Paired Accounts on 'The British Take-over of Cyprus'	362
APPENDIX 3. Paired Accounts on 'The Cyprus Events of 1974'	368
APPENDIX 4. Participating Students.....	374
APPENDIX 5. Interview Transcript Example	377
APPENDIX 6. Consent Form	387
ENDNOTES	390

List of Tables and Figures

List of Tables		Page
Table 1.	Research cycles for method testing.....	65
Table 2.	Instrumentation of research foci.....	69
Table 3.	Research procedures.....	77
Table 4.	Range of student ideas as to why there are differing accounts.....	103
Table 5.	How do we acquire knowledge of the past according to students?..	104
Table 6.	Range of student ideas on accounts' simultaneous truthfulness.....	137
Table 7.	How do students judge the validity of accounts?.....	139
Table 8.	Range of student ideas on account authority.....	165
Table 9.	How do students attribute authority to accounts?.....	166
Table 10.	Range of student ideas on account usefulness.....	191
Table 11.	What criteria do students employ so as to assess accounts' usefulness?.....	193
Table 12.	Students' ideas about the nature of historical accounts.....	223
Table 13.	Implications for policy-making.....	314

List of Figures		
Figure 1.	Jörn Rüsen's disciplinary matrix.....	35
Figure 2.	Formulating research questions.....	66
Figure 3.	The four analytical units of data analysis.....	82
Figure 4.	Use of analytical questions.....	84
Figure 5.	Data analysis procedures.....	85
Figure 6.	Incomplete student notions.....	236
Figure 7.	Seixas' history/memory matrix for history education.....	320

Acknowledgements

Upon this Thesis submission I realised that for the last four years of this PhD I have been in conversation with 96 young people, who just before entering their adult life allowed me a window into their thoughts. It is them that I would like to thank firstly. I hope that their contribution made a small but imperative difference in the world of (history) education (in Cyprus). I would like to extend my gratitude to all the Headteachers, teachers and Assistant-Heads who enabled me to do this research. I would also like to thank the Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Education and Culture for enabling this research.

The challenges faced during the completion of this Thesis were not few. I would therefore like to thank all who, in different ways and capacities, supported me during the research and writing process. Any shortcomings are mine and mine alone of course. First and foremost, I would like to extend my gratitude to my supervisor Dr Arthur Chapman, for all his support and faith in me. He had the patience to deal with my long sentences, metaphors and mumbling drafts. Despite his own inconveniences he dealt with my trainee researcher insecurities and for this I am deeply indebted to him. Both as a researcher and a mentor, he taught me more than I could ever give him credit here. I was truly honoured to complete this PhD with him as my supervisor. Within IOE I would also like to thank: my upgrade examiners, Tom Woodin and Andy Pearce, for their invaluable comments on the insinuations of this study; Jo Pearce and Jacek Brant who read the final draft of this Thesis; and, Stuart Foster, who introduced me to the world of history education. Last, yet not least, I would like to extend a hearty thank-you to my Viva examiners: Professor Gary McCulloch, who asserted that I should speak my voice louder, and Dr Dean Smart who not only read through the nuances of this study, he did so with meticulous attention and genuine interest.

On the other end of the Atlantic I received a valuable and generous reading of the final draft from Professor Peter Rutkoff of Ohio University whose check-in emails were a constant source of support. Within IOE, Dr Mark Freeman's encouragement and our discussions during the last stretch of this thesis were extremely valuable. Appreciation is due to Zoe Mercer-Golden, Kyriakos Georgiou and Loizos Kapsalis for taking on part of the proofreading. I am grateful to Ms Antonia Prodromou for her help in contacting the pilot schools' Headteachers, but most importantly for being a constant source of encouragement. Many thanks also go to Eleni Zanou for our long talks on teaching and learning history in Cyprus' classrooms.

My thanks go to my friends in Cyprus who, with their silly memes, text messages, and photos of their wonderful curly haired babies kept me going. I also have to thank them because, while I was back home, and when needed, they reminded me that hard work needs to be balanced with some fun times too (preferably over a chilled glass of zivania). I owe a warm-hearted thank you to Elektra and Aleka who were there for me at times of cross-roads. In London I would like to say a big big thank you to all the ladies in 545: they were my London family and safety net. Thank you all for being part of this journey, it was an honour and an invaluable gift to walk this journey with you. I also need to acknowledge Loizos' support and practical contribution. Every time I doubted this Thesis he reminded me of why this research is important. Throughout our discussions he gave me new perspectives on Cyprus and identity. And, despite working on his own PhD, he took on the responsibility for running our household when I was writing, teaching and marking. Last, yet not least, I would like to thank my parents – I couldn't have done this research if it wasn't for them. But most importantly, I need to thank them for their love and wholehearted support despite their anxiety and puzzlement for the difficult journey I chose to take. It is to them therefore that I dedicate this Thesis. Σας ευχαριστώ. Για όλα.

To Yiola and Kyriakos, Kyriakos and Yiola

CHAPTER 1. Introduction

1.1. Research Focus

This Thesis is an exploratory study of 17-18 year-old students' understandings in the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) about differing 'historical accounts', a British meta-concept which has been used around the globe in researching students' historical thinking, and one that connotes differing interpretations about the same historical event. This study was envisioned in light of having a New History Curriculum (NHC) implemented in the Republic of Cyprus, reflecting the broader political and social changes in the island. This study is (a) a continuation of a history education research traditions (for example, the SHP and CHATA, which I discuss in Chapter 3, Section 3.2) concerns with disciplinary thinking in history and (b) an exploration of how students understand historical accounts in personal terms. The purpose of this study is firstly to inform existing understandings on how students engage with differing historical accounts and consequently make a contribution to policy making, and secondly to raise wider implications for history education with regard to re-thinking historical accounts conceptualisation and consequently research.

Since I focus on the Republic of Cyprus, in this Thesis, I discuss Greek-Cypriot students' ideas (Chapter 4, Section 4.6.1). Explicitly, firstly, this study explores the kinds of epistemological ideas Greek-Cypriot students have about historical accounts; and, secondly, it addresses how students engage with accounts in non-disciplinary terms. Accordingly, the research question I ask is: **How do 17-18 year-old Greek-Cypriot students' understand differing historical accounts?** This study operates within the ongoing tradition of international research on history education (Afandi, 2012; Barca, 2005; Carvalho and Barca, 2012; Cercadillo, 2001; Chapman, 2009; Hsiao, 2008; Levstik, 2001; Shemilt, 1980; Lee et al., 1994) and historical accounts specifically, hence the questions I raise are not new. Yet,

although there is a growing volume of research on students' ideas about history, less work of this kind has been done in history than in science or mathematics (Epstein, 2012).

The main research question of this study arises not only from the relevant literature and research paradigms, such as School's History Project (SHP) and the Concepts of History and Teaching Approaches (CHATA) project which I discuss in Chapter 3, but also from my interest in the Cyprus context. This research question is important to the RoC specifically, in that history education is still at a rudimentary stage of development (Makriyianni and Psaltis, 2007; Perikleous and Shemilt, 2011), reflecting the broader academic and public culture of the island on the one hand (Christodoulou, 2014), and Cyprus' political situation on the other (Letif, 2017). Moreover, in RoC, research into history education has been limited, with researchers, hitherto, focusing mainly on textbooks and identity.¹ Additionally, history education research has so far focused on primary school education (Makriyianni, 2011; Perikleous, 2011). In so far as I have been able to ascertain, there is no empirical literature on young people's understandings of history before leaving school in the RoC. Hence, to use Shemilt's (1980, p.1) description of the SHP research on students' understandings in the late 1970s in UK, my study is a 'journeyman project', as it has been the first of its kind in the RoC as it is the first research project exploring students' understandings of differing accounts.

Given the study's context and rationale, I deemed it necessary to take a qualitative methodological approach. Specifically, I chose to take an exploratory approach which 'is necessary when very little is known about the topic being investigated, or about the context in which the research has to be conducted' (Blaikie, 2002, p. 73). In this study both the above apply. As I aimed to produce an overview of students' ideas rather than identifying individual responses, I developed an exploratory approach: my aim was to obtain a variety of responses and, consequently, offer a 'thick' description of (rather than explaining or evaluating)

students' ideas. In this study I discuss data from a total of 96 students, from nine high-schools.

I used two methods to answer my research question. Explicitly,

- i. Firstly, I used a series of written questions on three paired historical accounts. Students were asked to answer individually. Paired accounts focused on three historical issues: 'The WWI Breakout'; 'The British Take-over of Cyprus'; and, 'The Cyprus Events of 1974'.
- ii. Secondly, I used group interviews to facilitate triangulation of and explore deeper data generated from written tasks on the one hand, and on the other to generate more data on students' understandings of historical accounts as disciplinary constructs.

I analysed data by operating within the framework of grounded theory, following an analytic inductive coding data analysis strategy.

The primary aim of this study is to explore how high-school students think about differing historical accounts on the same event, and thereby offer findings that will be of direct relevance to others working in history education. This study also aims to highlight some of the wider implications of its findings, a) by identifying similarities and differences on how students think in different contexts, b) by exploring how student understandings are shaped by their socio-cultural context, and c) by indicating the importance of re-addressing existing theoretical and research paradigms.

1.2. Significance

Students' understandings of differing accounts about the same event matter around the globe, because variant histories of the past are not just typical of the divided island of Cyprus. Differing accounts are neither an exclusive phenomenon of societies and nor are they found in conflict and/or post-conflict societies.² Finding how students engage in historical understanding in a world in which different histories claim authority is not an unimportant

undertaking as ‘dubious representations of the past immanent within collective culture are significant impediments to the success of academically sound history education programmes in schools’ (Perikleous and Shemilt, 2011, p.13). Given the interplay between (disciplinary) history and other (cultural) representations of history that young people face all around the globe, and investigating how students understand different interpretations of the same event is an issue that the international community should not ignore.

Globally, students are confronted with differing accounts which they try to make sense of as, nowadays, historical interpretations are more available now than ever before. On the one hand, the domain of history has opened up with ‘public’ history (Tosh, 2006), making history available for public consumption and, on the other hand, ‘the quest for personal roots, the need for a perspective on present day cultural identities, securing a better purchase on the social past – all these and more shape the popular fascination with the past’ (ibid, p. xv). In the face of such interest in history,

students need guided opportunities to confront conflicting accounts, various meanings, and multiple interpretations of the past, because these are exactly what they will encounter outside of school, and they need to learn to deal with them (Seixas, 2002).

If stakeholders (equally educators and policy-makers) do not know what students’ existing ideas are, then they do not know how students will interpret new concepts. Students’ existing ideas may negatively impact new learning and cement misconceptions (Lee, 2005). Hence, what might be facilitated by fuller historical knowledge could be achieved through better and more targeted teaching.

Although historical accounts can indeed be quite difficult to work with (Lee, 2005), they are important because they can provide an understanding of the world, and how we as humans have come to exist within it as ‘historical beings’ (Wineburg, 2001). Additionally, history can ‘contribute to thinking about structural issues in society’ (Jordanova, 2006, p.9) as well as to thinking ‘critically about the diverse ways in which human groups and societies

make sense of time and change' (Chapman, 2011a, p.96). This is why historical thinking matters, and this is why it is crucial that stakeholders are informed and subsequently prepared to enhance students' historical thinking. Comparative findings have suggested that children and adolescents around the world operate with more or less sophisticated sets of assumptions about history (Barton, 2001, 2008; Cercadillo, 2001; Carvalho and Barca, 2012; Maggioni et al, 2006; Yeager et al, 2002), while international research has demonstrated that students are potentially able to explain why accounts might differ and that different accounts are the outcome of different questions (Chapman, 2009; Lee, 1998). Furthermore, research has demonstrated that students' thinking *can* be developed through teaching and learning interventions (Chapman, 2011b, 2012; Cooper, 1991, 2003; VanSledright and Afflerbach, 2005). I therefore argue that sustained instruction cannot take place unless educators and policy makers are 'being *prepared* to consider the present state of things other than to be censorious, for what is and what really can be' (Shemilt, 1980, emphasis added). Hence, as this study addresses the peculiarities of history and history teaching, it also addresses possible implications for conceptual change (Halldén, 1997; Limón, 2002).

Although history education in RoC has mainly focused on the legitimisation of conflicting narratives, this research is relevant, more widely, to countries in conflict and/or post-conflict countries (Cole, 2007). This is because exploring students' understandings of differing accounts in a divided island can provide valuable findings for similar contexts. Teaching and learning 'difficult histories' (Epstein and Peck, 2017), is of course not exclusive to countries in conflict and/or post-conflict. Nonetheless, the dynamics of learning with a conflicting other (Epstein and Peck, 2017; Psaltis et al., 2017) or about a conflicting narrative (Klerides, 2016), in particular with regard to countries in conflict or post conflict situations, are quite different: different positions become more debatable, multiple perspectives are even more restricted, and new teaching methods and materials are almost absent (Valentinovna-Korostelina et al., 2013).

This study could also be significant if set in the context of historical understanding in international studies – i.e. in the UK (Chapman; 2009, Lee and Ashby, 2000), Taiwan (Hsiao, 2008), Portugal (Barca, 2005; Gago, 2005) and Singapore (Afandi, 2012). Comparative results (Barton, 2001, 2008; Carvalho and Barca, 2012; Cercadillo, 2001; Yeager et al, 2002) have been vital in shedding light on the similarities and differences among different educational settings, suggesting at the same time that the variables that might be causing these similar and different patterns. Last but not least, this study aims to make a distinct contribution to the knowledge of history education by discussing critically concepts (such as historical accounts) and theoretical frameworks (such as historical understanding) that have often been taken for granted.

1.3. Stimuli

RoC's NHC (2011) overall philosophy marks a big change from the previous curricula, in that it makes disciplinary teaching and learning demands. There have been educators using sources in the classroom and facilitating a variety of means and methods besides the textbook of course. Yet, for the very first time, through the NHC, there is a shift at the official level. The NHC dictates changes both to its *content* and *ways* of teaching and learning and, within the proposed changes, the new curriculum emphasises the '*overcoming of the textbook content*' (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2011, emphasis added), that is, moving away from simply learning textbook content. The reorientation of the new National Curriculum, which addresses all core disciplinary subjects, demands flexible educational content and gives emphasis to active learning, through the establishment of new methods and techniques enabling the production of knowledge of a critical character for understanding subject disciplines. This study therefore is written in the light of a new RoC history curriculum and the new demands posed in it. The NHC, part of a holistic educational reform which was envisioned in 2003 and started being implemented in 2011-12, responds to and encapsulates the social and political changes taking place at the time. Interestingly, NHC reforms have

been limited in primary education and not been extended to secondary education. However, even in primary education, although steps have been taken to implement the NHC demands, it is safe to argue that changes to content and ways of teaching and learning and ‘overcoming of the textbook content’ (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2011) remain unactioned (Perikleous, 2015) and that there is often a gap between the theory and the practice of everyday school life (Makriyianni, 2004).

At the same time, the implications of the past and the political issue regarding the island’s history and its ownership, continue to be influential in history teaching and learning. In the specific case of Cyprus, due to past conflict and the de facto division of the island into two administrations, both communities tend to produce ‘othering’ accounts of their neighbouring community (Papadakis, 2002; Psaltis et al., 2011). As Papadakis (2002, p.xx) pointed out, ‘memory and forgetting are two sides of the same coin’ where ‘each provides the presupposition for the existence of the other’. The education systems on both sides of the divide reflect the ongoing ethnic conflict, while the history textbooks have been used to convey and legitimise official narratives and reinforce identities defined *vis-à-vis* the other (Latif, 2017). As students therefore still live in the ‘practical past’ (Oakeshott, 1933; White, 2005) – that is, the human experience of the past through which the past is accessed contextually through cultural material³ – they bring to the classroom their own ideas about how history works. Some of these ideas come from what is around them – that is, the island’s contested histories. A large problem of the problem of history teaching and learning therefore is the past itself. As I demonstrate more thoroughly in Section 1.4, the political situation of the island has an intrinsic effect on history teaching and learning.

Given therefore the prevalence of ‘practical past’ which is defined by the existence of contested histories, how do Greek-Cypriot students⁴ engage with differing accounts, in other words interpretations of past events? This study can be helpful in that it can indicate how

students think, not just in the island of Cyprus but also in similar contexts. If stakeholders do not know what students' (context related) ideas are, we cannot know what sense they make out of their lessons and, consequently, what obstacles they face. Moreover, in particular apropos Cyprus, it seems that debates have become so fixated on the question of 'Which history?' that we have forgotten a more basic question: 'Why study history at all?' (Wineburg, 2001, p.5). If the answer is that 'history holds the potential only partly realised, of humanising us in ways offered by few other areas in the school curriculum' (ibid),⁵ research is valuable in its own right. It is within this rationale that this study sets out to create a model of students' understandings of differing accounts in the RoC.

1.4. Context

1.4.1. The educational context in the RoC

In both communities across the divide, the teaching and learning of the history of Cyprus which may be summarised as follows: it propagates a narrative that focuses on the suffering of the nation and seeks to legitimate its political goals (Papadakis, 2008). Efforts for reform have taken place both in the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot community with different degrees of success. These, however, on both sides of the divide, have been stalled (Papadakis, 2008; Ioannou, 2019). That history education is difficult to challenge mainly because of the political situation in the island (Koutselini, 2007; Makriyianni and Psaltis, 2007; Latif, 2017) is not surprising, as the island of Cyprus has been de facto divided since 1974. The tensions between the two communities – that is, Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots – go back to the 50s, with the two communities being physically separated since 1967. In 2003, 'in a surprise move' (BBC, 2003; Morgan and de Quetteville, 2003, p.xx), the unexpected opening of the borders allowed the two sides to come in contact for the first time in 36 years. Thereafter, hundreds of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots have crossed the island's dividing line. Although, since the 1974 division, political negotiations have been

ongoing a solution to the segregation of the island is yet to be found, with history curricula and textbooks decision making affected by the political situation in the island.

Of course, the division of the education system in Cyprus did not start with the de facto division of the island in 1974. Education has been traditionally divided along ethno-religious lines where ‘the development of national consciousness among the two communities was deeply influenced by both Greece and Turkey, while the colonial policies of Britain manipulated this consciousness for its own national interests’ (Kadioglu, 2010, p.3). In Cyprus, the division of education along ethnic communities has been established with and because of the British rule (Kadioglu, 2010; Persianis, 1996)⁶ and, since then, ethnocentric textbooks and curricula have been de facto. Explicitly, both in the Greek-Cypriot (Makriyianni and Psaltis, 2007; Persianis, 1996), and the Turkish-Cypriot (Kadioglu, 2010; Latif, 2017) education systems, the modelling of schools has been based on those of the two ‘motherlands’, Greece and Turkey (Kadioglu, 2010; Persianis, 1996). As Papadakis (2008) illustrated, on the Greek Cypriot side, the history of Cyprus has been presented as an extension of the history of Greece, and on the Turkish Cypriot side as an extension of the history of Turkey (p.5), with this reflected not only in curricula and textbooks but also in the two communities’ hidden curriculum. In fact, until recently, the only textbooks used in the two respective sides of the Cyprus divide were sponsored by ‘motherlands’.

In recent years, books were also written within the two communities in Cyprus. Nonetheless, in both communities, these books have been commissioned by the two communities’ authorities with committee members being dictated by political parties (Perikleous, 2015). Simultaneously, it has been suggested that textbooks written in Cyprus promoted and maintained two parallel narratives: one Greek-centred and the other Cypriot-centred (Klerides, 2008). This ‘co-articulation of two interchangeable accounts’ has set issues of a ‘problematic ethnic identity formation’ (Klerides, 2008), while the philosophy of both

the history textbooks subsidized from Greece (Koulouri, 2002a, 2002b; Nakou and Apostolidou, 2010) as well as those written in Cyprus were defined by partisanship (Makriyianni, 2004; Papadakis, 2008).

Regarding the aims of school history therefore, it could be argued that these have been largely social aims, leaving little room for engagement with the discipline's 'know-how' (Lee and Ashby, 2000) – that is the tacit 'meta-knowledge' involved in the field, or what (Seixas, 2000) calls 'epistemological goals'. Explicitly, RoC's school goals have oriented around a) the 'liberation of the country', and b) subsequently, the responsibility not to forget the Turkish invasion and still withstanding occupation of the 37% island, goals encapsulated in 'Δεν Ξεχνώ', the 'I Do Not Forget' principle. This principle marked schools for years and been adopted as an educational goal of the year numerous times during the last 40 years (Zembylas, 2018). 'Δεν Ξεχνώ', the 'I Do Not Forget' cry, has defined both the social and private spheres of people so deeply (Christodoulou, 2014), that it is difficult – if not completely impossible – to engage with historical thinking. Teaching and learning history in Cyprus therefore has been dictated by what Seixas (2000) calls 'the collective memory' or 'best history' approach – that is a set and beautified version of the past,⁷ hence leaving little space for critical disciplinary thinking.

Moreover, not only social goals have been instrumental in driving curricula, textbooks and practices, they are ever present in the 'hidden curriculum' (Giroux, 1977) of schools. In reference to the Greek-Cypriot school for instance, the beginning of the Greek-Cypriot resistance against the British Rule in 1955 is celebrated as a national anniversary with school events and parades (Christou, 2006). The anniversary and subsequent celebrations (within and outside school) seek to instil the 'fighting spirit' and the 'struggle' in young people (ibid), who often bring from home the divisive and often conflicting legacies of EOKA, the 'National Organization of Cypriot Struggle', the Greek-Cypriot organisation that was formed with the

purpose of liberating Cyprus from the British and pursuing unification with Greece (Ireton and Kovras, 2012; Mavratsas, 1997).⁸

That is not to say that RoC's educational policy and curriculum have not been influenced by the different emerging trends and goals. However, this has not always resulted in significant and/or positive changes. As Christodoulou (2014, p.151) highlighted,

all these continuous changes, often followed by turmoil and disagreements, were confining educational and curricular efforts mostly at a policy level, diminishing effective and substantial discussions at the curriculum. While educational policy was a regular discourse topic at a political level, discussion on the curriculum – including the questions ‘what knowledge is most worth’ (Spencer, 1860) and why and who decides (Schubert, 1997) – were absent, since it was a given that curriculum should be ethically oriented.

Specifically to history education (Christodoulou, 2014), there has been little discussion around substantial issues in relation to the curriculum or Spencer's (1860) question ‘what knowledge is most worth’. The discussion has mainly focused around content – therefore, favouring the ‘what’ over the ‘how’ of history teaching and learning. In sum, ‘teaching methods predominantly used in Cyprus emphasize the teacher's authority to dictate knowledge and decide if the students' answers are ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, whilst failing to integrate diverse and alternative interpretations into narratives or to develop students' historical thinking’ (Psaltis et al, 2011, p.350-51).

Despite the recent educational reform efforts therefore, the Republic of Cyprus, until today, has an especially traditional educational system. For instance, some of its main features are that it is teacher-centred, has a single national curriculum, and a single textbook for each topic. Such monolithic features do not encourage critical historical thinking (Makriyianni and Psaltis, 2007) in the way this is described in the NHC (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2011). Another central feature of RoC's educational system is the issue of inadequate and non-obligatory teacher development (Karagiorgi and Symeou, 2007). Although, this study is not concerned with evaluating how students are taught, as teacher development is an

imperative factor influencing students' understandings, it would be an oversight not to highlight its importance.⁹ This is because good learning requires more informed, more nuanced and more targeted teaching.

All these practices have had several pedagogical implications for policy-making, teacher education, teaching and learning (Klerides, 2016; Makriyianni and Psaltis, 2007), with historical enquiry suffering and history education used to convey and legitimise official narratives and conflicting identities (Christodoulou, 2014; Klerides, 2016; Latif, 2017). More recently, other initiatives such as the Association of Historical Dialogue and Research NGO, have been instrumental in challenging ethnocentric narratives and training teachers. Yet these efforts are the exception. It is within this context that I set off to explore Greek-Cypriot students' understandings of differing historical accounts.

1.4.2. History as nation-construction

The tensions in RoC's NHC are not surprising of course. These tensions are, in essence, disputes on who 'we' are as a community – or, to be more exact, who *we want to be*. This is because history education continues to serve as a tool for the social (re)production of national identities. Education and schools have been traditionally used to re-create a sense of belonging¹ - and, therefore, establish a (new²) homogenised identity, with the printed word (Anderson, 1983) and mandatory and standardised education within the public-school system (Gellner, 1983) being the main technologies of this project. History education especially was vital in the homogenisation of different territories and populations as it imagined and, accordingly, constructed the nation's past by building up on 'shared memories' (Smith, 1986, quotes added). Therefore, when it comes to the state-formation project:

¹ The emergence and construction of a modern national required that loyalty is transferred from a kinship i.e. the king/sultan and/or the church to the nation.

² The degree to which national identities are completely new can be debated (Smith, 1986).

As frequently emphasised in conceptual discussions, two elements among these ideological apparatuses come to the fore: historiography and education. While social values that create a national identity have been constructed by historiography continuously from the past to the present, it aims at spreading such values through education. History education at the intersection of these two concepts has occupied a privileged place in the nation-building process.

What is more, education has been not only a factor contributing to nation/ state-building, it constitutes a function of it too (Green, 1990 cited in Kazamias, 2009, p.239). In other words, education does not simply create ethnic identity: it invokes and maintains it.

Textbooks have, of course, been instrumental in constructing the nation (Crawford and Foster, 2007; Roldan-Vera & Fuchs, 2018). History education might not be exclusive to textbooks, but textbook narratives constitute one of the main resources of history education. The use of textbooks is even more exaggerated in contexts like Cyprus, where education is state-controlled and teacher-centric. Moreover, the multiple conflicts and foreign interventions in the recent history of Cyprus provide the socio-political context within which textbooks are produced (Papadakis, 2008). However, textbook narratives do not simply reflect Cyprus' troubled past: they invoke the past for different uses and even create it (Grever, 2017).

In relation to Cyprus specifically, there has been a simultaneous construction of two opposing 'imagined communities'. On the one hand, in Cyprus, the past has been created by aligning with the motherlands. More specifically, 'on the Greek Cypriot side, the history of Cyprus has been presented as an extension of the history of Greece, and on the Turkish Cypriot side as an extension of the history of Turkey' (Papadakis, 2008, p.5). Accordingly, the adopted Hellenic and Turkish identities respectively were promulgated through history teaching, creating kinships that are either Greek or Turkish, but never Cypriot. On the other hand, the past has been created by othering the 'Other' community. The mechanism of othering is not exclusive to Cyprus, of course. On the contrary, the act of differing – in other words, positioning against an 'Other' – and self-identifying through historical narratives that

are based on the us-versus-them equation is usual. Yet, when it comes to the case of Cyprus, dualism in the form of inclusion and exclusion does not simply operate at the majority-versus-minority level. The construction and maintenance of othering operates simultaneously at the two communities' administrative level, generating *two* official histories. This, therefore, results not only to the narratives on each side of the island becoming mutually antagonistic (Papadakis, 2006), but also leads to a situation in which the two official histories cancel each other out.

Recently, in Cyprus, historical narratives have been contested from 'below', with NGOs 'touching on issues that the authorities might not dare to' (Zembylas and Harakasan, 2017, p.330). Specifically, the Association of Historical Dialogue and Research (AHDR) and POST Research Institute have created spaces in which to talk about history, provide teacher training and produce supplementary material for the classroom. They furthermore compared history textbooks across the divide demonstrating that history education revision in Cyprus is a deeply politicized process (ibid., p.330-332). Important openings were also made from the 'outside'. Specifically, Euroclio and the Council of Europe have suggested alternative ways of teaching history through multicultural teaching material and teacher training. Yet, in Cyprus, history narratives continue to be tightly controlled (Ioannou, 2019). As a result, they are extremely difficult to dispute, creating a dichotomy where only one of the two narratives can be true.

1.4.3. Contested histories

Curriculum disputes are not exclusive to Cyprus of course. Public and academic debates over history and ones that 'negotiate the nation' (Letourneau and Chapman, 2017) are common all around the world, with these subsequently making their way into the classroom – from Argentina to Japan, and Russia to Canada (Cannadine, Keating and Sheldon, 2011;

Cole, 2007; Nakou and Barca, 2010; Taylor and Guyver, 2012). ‘History wars’ - as the public debates over the interpretation of the history have been called (Taylor and Guyver, 2012) – ‘surround social imaginings and depictions of national, cultural, racial, ethnic, tribal and religious pasts’ (ibid., p. xii), and are an outcome of contestation between traditional/patriotic views of history teaching and reformed or 'new' history.

When it comes to contested histories, different categorisations have been suggested (Nakou and Barca, 2010; Taylor and Guyver, 2012; Cajani et al., 2019). Regardless of these different typologies, in all cases there are issues of political control of the curriculum and parallel issues of who writes it. However, the implications of history teaching are much more acute in post-conflict settings such as Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine and Bosnia-Herzegovina – that is, societies that have suffered from internal division (Psaltis et al., 2017) – as what has prevailed in these post-conflict societies is the preservation of the memory of one-sided victimization and an ethnocentric orientation to history teaching (ibid.). As a result, there are additional tensions which are deeply ingrained in post-conflict societies and, consequently, their schools. More explicitly, stereotyping thrives and conflict dominates *outside* the school, while personal suffering, guilt and forgiveness maintain the open question as to ‘when the time is ripe’, and when such an objectification can successfully be undertaken in school (Valentinovna-Korostelina et al., 2013, p.39-40). Hence, in these contexts, the question of how to ‘cope with the violent past’ is even more prominent (Davies, 2004, pp. 99-100 cited in Valentinovna-Korostelina et al., 2013, p.39).

1.5. Positionality

Vital in the designing of this research was my positionality – that is, my world-view – and, consequently, the position I have chosen to adopt in relation to a specific research task. My positionality was an outcome of being situated in two contexts. I consequently brought

together different perspectives. Explicitly, I conceptualised my research by drawing on the Cyprus context. Yet, I materialised my research design by drawing on theoretical and research paradigms, which mainly come from the UK and the English-speaking world. I have been also located within a specific English-speaking higher education institution, which enabled me to have access to certain aspects of knowledge and research which have been considered ‘global’ but were prescribed from a specific point of view (Chapter 9, Section 9.4). I moreover conducted my research in Cyprus, a context which has experienced an ‘overload of history’ (Papadakis, Peristianis and Welz, 2006), and one which has been ‘othered’ so as to establish colonial intervention and the dichotomy of the European notions of space: north–south, centre-periphery, identity-otherness (Philippou, 2005).

I also conducted this research by using two languages. At all stages of this study, meaning-making took place with all the complications that the use of different languages and translations involved (Chapter 4, Section 4.9.2). What is more, I report my findings within the limitations of what language can convey. Altogether, I consider meaning-making as tangible as I see knowledge as constructed, firstly, by my participants and, secondly, by myself (Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1). That is, I adhere to the premise that by reflecting on our experiences we construct our own understandings (Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2). Consequently, on the one hand, I consider data as constructions; and on the other, myself as reconstructing those data by providing an interpretation of their meanings. I therefore do not make claims of generalisation.

Having been inducted into a particular form of history knowledge, I consider history writing as a distinctive form of talking about the past, in that it constitutes an organized and evidence-based presentation of the processes and events that have occurred over a period of time. Yet, having growing up and been schooled in the island of Cyprus, I am sceptical on whether historical concepts and/or historical understanding as defined in the English literature

can be seen in the same way around the globe. In addition, I argue that history is a social practice and that, for this reason, it is part of the cultural and social world. I therefore see history as being part of ‘lebenspraxis’ – described by Seixas (2016) as the practical functions of life-orientation which draws on Megill’s (1994b) interpretation of Rüsen. I also see history as one of the many modes of engaging with the past. I do not argue that history writing can or should be replaced by other representations of the past. On the contrary, I take the stance that nuanced and informed engagement with the past requires disciplinary skills and higher-order thinking (Levesque, 2017). Given my positionality however, I do propose that a) the answer to ‘History Education for What?’ should be orientation as proposed by Lee (2004, 2011) – a ‘GPS’ in Lévesque’s (2017) words, in other words a navigation tool to help young people navigate their lives and worlds as I put forward in Chapter 9; and that b) consequently, theory should go beyond the normative schemes of history education theorisation, research, and teaching and learning, and find ways to develop students’ ideas by drawing from and being responsive to social and educational contexts (Chapters 7, 8 and 9).

Moreover, a distinctive element of this study is its specific exploration of other modes of understanding the past, namely what kinds of ideas students have besides the epistemic ones (Chapter 7). In other words, unlike previous studies on historical accounts, this study asks questions regarding students’ ideas about accounts and, at the same time, their possible relationships with other modes of engagement with the past. Including this theoretical perspective in a study of this nature is important because learning and thinking does not occur in vacuum: it is conditioned and shaped by culture, and context related factors. At the same time, I consider the findings reported here as contingent. This is because findings are located in a specific place and time. (I argue that the same applies for theorising knowledge. It is for this reason that, when referring to the literature, I locate it in the past: theorising the social world is always defined by its temporality and, hence, by default subjected to change).

Lastly, in order to embark in this exploratory study, I employed a methodological paradigm which adopts elements and aspects of quantitative research (Chapter 4, Section 4.3). This is because, for the purposes of this Thesis, I employed a methodology that would allow me to tackle the questions which I set out to answer (Chapter 4, Sections 4.3 and 4.4). On the whole, the questions I address, and how I attempt to answer them, have been framed by my world view, epistemological stance, personal experiences and how I constitute myself as a researcher (Chapter 4, Section 4.11). Consequently, articulating my identity as the researcher and author of this Thesis is sine-qua-non, as what I report in this Thesis is what I have found operating within specific paradigms, and being positioned in certain ways.

1.6. Thesis Structure

Taking into account the research questions I sought to address on the one hand, and the specificities of this research on the other, I organised the chapters of this Thesis in a way that would be most suitable to meet the needs of my research. In the Introduction, I discuss the stimuli, context, and significance of this research. Following, I proceed to Chapter 2, where I discuss the conceptual framework of this study. I theorise the concept of historical accounts, and by doing so, I aim to demonstrate what historical accounts are and *do*, as a disciplinary tool; and illustrate how the hitherto disciplinary theorising of historical accounts has been restricting. Next, I discuss this study's literature review, presented in Chapter 3 of this Thesis. The literature review has two purposes: firstly, to situate my research topic in relation to the findings of the broader research community; and, secondly, to identify issues of importance that need to be materialized and explored through the research instruments. Following, in Chapter 4, I address the methodological framework of this Thesis. In Chapter 4, I discuss this study's epistemological assumptions, its overall methodological strategy, research question and foci, population, sample and procedures, data analysis methods and decisions, credibility, reflexivity, pilot study and upgrade, and ethics.

In Chapter 5 on data analysis, I discuss students' answers with the purpose of modelling student thinking about historical accounts and, by doing so, proceed to offering suggestions for history teaching and learning. In this chapter I 'zoom in' to students' answers at a high level of specificity with the purpose of providing a thorough account of students' ideas in order to describe students' thinking. I continue the discussion of findings in Chapters 6 and 7, where I 'zoom out' and theorise findings in a broader way so as to highlight what these findings *mean*. In these two chapters, I respectively attempt to answer the questions 'What are students' epistemological ideas?' and 'How do students attribute value to accounts in personal terms?'.

Next, in Chapters 8 and 9, I show the significance of my findings. In Chapter 8 I raise the question 'How do Greek-Cypriot students' ideas compare to those reported in the existing literature?'. I contextualise my findings in two ways. Firstly, I situate my findings in relation to the existing international literature and, secondly, in the specific context of Cyprus. In Chapter 9, the final chapter of this study, I offer conclusions. I then highlight the limitations and contribution to knowledge of this study and, following, outline future research recommendations. Next, I raise implications for policy-making by proposing ways in which curriculum and textbook design, teacher training and classroom practice might be enhanced. I conclude this study with Chapter 10 and sharing my final reflections. I firstly, highlight why it is crucial to take into consideration the findings of this study – that is, the importance of historical understanding for students and their glocal¹⁰ lives and, secondly and subsequently, why stakeholders, researchers and theorists need to revisit the ways in which we think of and therefore research students' engagement with the past.

CHAPTER 2. Conceptual Framework

2.1. A note of caution

I begin this chapter by taking on the task of discussing ‘historical accounts’, a British meta-concept which has been used extensively in researching students’ historical thinking as I discuss in the next chapter. I start from the premise that, in essence, ‘historical accounts’ are historical interpretations (Chapman, 2016). However, as researchers in the field of history education have been using this specific term, ‘historical accounts’, I chose to follow suit, so as to place myself within the existing history education research tradition. In my attempt to approach the definitional question of what historical accounts are, what they do, and how they work, I chose to draw upon and discuss the work of Jörn Rüsen, and, in particular, Rüsen’s ‘disciplinary matrix’ (Rüsen, 2005) as taken on by the English literature (Chapman, 2009; Lee, 2004; Megill, 1994). Certainly, there are many ways to approach the specific question about historical accounts and, indeed, Rüsen’s matrix comes out of a particular conjuncture in German historiography. The reason I chose Rüsen’s matrix is that, on the one hand, it illustrates the disciplinary know-how of historical accounts, while on the other, it allows for an opening where disciplinary historical accounts maybe situated within broader scheme of human experience, or what Rüsen calls ‘lebenspraxis’.

Regardless of the theoretical schemes one uses to explain historical accounts, I argue that a) as interpretations are *constructions* and that b) despite their construction, historical accounts are bound to certain rules and defined with respect to their modes of *methodological*, *rational* and *critical enquiry* rather than the discipline they come from - for example, anthropology or sociology.¹¹ My aim here is to achieve sufficient clarity to specify the object of my research - nevertheless, I do not claim that I have all the answers to the questions raised. To use Jordanova’s (2006) words in introducing *History in Practice*, the following discussion

is designed to *provoke* the reader to *think* about the processes through which the kind of knowledge called ‘history’ is made and used. It leaves much unresolved because there are no simple resolutions to most of the questions I pose. The discipline is intriguing precisely for this reason. It is also a vast domain and I make no pretence to cover everything – that would be absurd (p. 10-11, emphases added).

Accordingly, (re)defining concepts is necessary not because it can resolve current debates, but because, particularly from a qualitative point of view, concepts have to be redefined in order to reflect upon and question the multiple ways of establishing truth. It is with this aim that I attempt to re-examine ‘historical accounts’.

2.2. Defining Historical Accounts

In defining ‘historical accounts’, it would be easier to start from the second part – accounts, in that ‘history’ itself can refer to almost anything related to the past. On the contrary, ‘accounts’ is much narrower - in that, the term ‘accounts’ indicates a record or representation of something past, such as past people, past events or past states of affairs, either in words or in images. Hence, accounts can be constructed in many media – in writing, in painting or in film, for example. Here, it should be pointed out that, for the purposes of this study and what I aim to research, a more focused definition would be either ‘written historical accounts’ or ‘disciplinary historical accounts’ as historical accounts traditionally have been in written form. One should also bear in mind that, often, the terms ‘accounts’, narratives and interpretations are used interchangeably. This is an additional reason that it is so important to redefine ‘historical accounts’.

However, to define ‘history’ is a more challenging task. The word history has a number of meanings, and a wide range of connotations: as Jordanova (2006) pointed out, ‘since one of the main meanings of history is simply “the past”, almost any association with past times to be transferred to “history” as discipline’ (p. 13). Hence, the first distinction to be made is that between the past - that is, the events that happened before a given time - and,

history as the discipline that enquires about the past. Accordingly, I would argue that historical accounts are, typically, produced within particular traditions of practice which are traditionally linked to academic institutions, and account for what happened in the *past*. Hence, due to their disciplinary nature, historical accounts can be recognised as a fundamental resource for and reference to understanding the past and the present via a specific methodology that is rational and critical and the result of a specific process.

At this point, two important clarifications must be made. Firstly, to describe historiography – that is, the body of historical work – in a universal and linear way would be incorrect (Jordanova, 2006). Secondly, considering the ‘historiographic turn’ in the ‘West’ (Sharpe, 1991) is important. There are two separate issues here. Firstly, history has moved beyond unifying the nation’s ‘memory’ to the ‘democratisation’ of memory (Nora, 1989). Secondly, as a result, within academia, paradigms have changed: e.g. we now talk about Black history, or about women’s and children’s lived experiences (such as of the war). Furthermore, history has opened-up to other institutions and media – e.g. we have a number of films and series dealing with historical events – so, it could be argued that we now have more public history.¹² This raises the following implication: to have a specific historical subject matter in any form is part of the human culture, and is part of engaging with the past.

Yet, are all historical subject forms *history*? Lee (2013, p. xi), drawing on the distinction between history and memory, highlighted that ‘the mistake here is not that people are wrong to tell their stories, or even to claim their special relationships with the past’:


the mistake is to think that such histories or claims all have to be treated as if they compete with historical histories stories within history as a public form of knowledge. Stories people own are not are not historical histories, because the metacognitive traditions that are built into history do not treat history in that way (ibid.).

Hence Lee (2013) pointed out, history might not be superior to memory but it is different in that there is no praise to be won in history for forgetting (ibid., pp. xi-xii). This raises a further

level of complexity and the question whether all academic practices or genres (equally) are valid in investigating the past. While I accept Jordanova's (2006) argument that 'there cannot and should not be rigid boundaries around the particular set of *academic* practices called "history"' (p.10, emphasis added), I personally argue that what is important is not setting strict boundaries which are an adjunct to evaluative connotations but considering whether genres are *consistent* in the specific historical methodology they use and in the question they claim to be addressing. It therefore seems crucial to me to illustrate what historical accounts do, rather where they come from. In exploring this, I use Rösen's (2005) matrix as shown in Figure 1 below and as discussed in the English literature (Chapman, 2009; Lee, 2004; Megill, 1994b) which does exactly that: it demonstrates how historical accounts *work*. That is, it shows how historical accounts are *theories* about the past.

According to Rösen's matrix, firstly, author *interests* are where all historical research begins. Interest in a particular phenomenon 'is best understood *narratively*' (Flyvbjerg, 2001,

Figure 1. Jörn Rösen's Disciplinary Matrix (Lee, 2004)



p. 137, emphasis added), with intentions determining the course and flow of the narration (Bruner, 2005, p. 31). Moreover, author interests are always located in time and space. Secondly, according to Rüsen's matrix, once historians have an interest they work from different *theoretical assumptions*, as different historians and/or theorists operate within different *genres* and, consequently, have different ways of going about history. It is, thus, impossible to have history without making certain assumptions, meaning that historical accounts are produced from *different standpoints*, and answer *different questions*.

The third stage of historical research, according to Rüsen's matrix, is methods. Different historians have different ways of researching history; they may differ, for example, in the kinds of sources they use, and how they interpret them.¹³ This brings to the fore the question of the role of interpretation - the act of explaining and assigning meanings to the world out there. As Carr (1961) famously pointed out,

When you read a work of history, always listen out for the buzzing. If you can detect none, either you are tone deaf or your historian is a dull dog. The facts are really not at all like fish on the fishmonger's slab [...] History means interpretation (p.23).

It is for this reason that it has been suggested that historical thinking is an 'unnatural act' (Wineburg, 2001).

Fourthly, having interrogated and interpreted the selected sources through the lens of a certain theory, Rüsen suggests that this specific interpretation needs to be presented in a certain *form*. Nevertheless, this raises two implications. Firstly, historical accounts are always subjected to the limitations of language.¹⁴ This argument has been used by post-modernists to point out the problem of epistemological *relativism* and consequently to argue that, in historical narrative, meaning is always fluid.¹⁵ Secondly, structure, means a sort of sequence - even the most empirical chronicler has to invent narrative structures to give shape to time and place: '*res gestae* may well be one damn thing after another' (Jenkins, 1991, p. 13), a fact that raises the question: 'What is gained and what is lost when human beings have recourse

to the narrative mode of construing meaning?’ (Bruner, 2005, p.23). Fifth, in Rösen’s matrix, come *functions*. Surveying the function of historical accounts, one notices a variety of opinions on what this means. The different perceived functions and uses of history are evident in the growing debate between the social, epistemological and post-modern functions of history (Gottlieb and Wineburg, 2012; Lowenthal, 1985; Seixas, 2000).¹⁶ Should we seek common ground on this debate, perhaps this could be found in Tosh’s stance. Tosh (2008) pleads for a better kind of history in which improved ways of thinking with the past can provide more nuanced ways of understanding our presents and, thus, articulates the function of history in its relevance to our ‘thens’ and ‘nows’, or in Lévesque’s (2017) words, as a ‘GPS’ that can help students navigate their past. Seixas (2016), re-thinking Rösen’s matrix, offered the possibility that history education can be located in the ‘purple’ bridge between the (blue) historical disciplinary practice of history and the (red) remaining narratives about the past. Yet, to suggest that the history functions debate is easy to resolve, would be rather simplistic.

Putting all the above together, Rösen’s matrix can be useful in the following ways. Firstly, it demonstrates the disciplinary properties of history writing and, secondly, how the latter connects to author positionality. Thirdly, by doing so, it demonstrates that, in essence, historical accounts are *author interpretations*. Fourthly, and in relation to the latter point, it demonstrates that as history writing is intrinsically linked to interests and functions, it inescapably linked to ‘lebenspraxis’. Yet, the crucial question remains: are there better and worse forms of historical writing? It is safe to argue that, as Rösen remains committed to methodological rationality, his answer would be yes. I myself take the same position. I therefore use the term ‘historical’ to denote a particular mode of understanding of the past (Chapman, 2009). At the same time, I see history as a *social practice*.

2.3. The writing of history as social practice

History might be a social practice – however there is a clear line between disciplinary history and ‘lebenspraxis’ (Megill, 1994b). As Rüsen (1994, p.5 cited in Carretero et al, 2017, p.75) pointed out, “‘history’ is something principally idiosyncratic: it is closely connected to almost all cultural functions and forms, but at the same time it can be defined as a special element within it’. In other words, history is not only connected to the cultural and social world, it is *part of it*. On the other hand, responding to this argument, Seixas (2016) brought attention to the fact that

both Rüsen and Megill wrote before ‘memory’ and memory studies had come into their full flowering. It is widely acknowledged that there is no such thing as ‘pure history’, with some arguing that, the division between memory and history can be somehow forced.

What is more, both history and memory pertain to the past, ‘and the past acquires its double sense of having been and no longer being only in relation to the future’ (Ricoeur, 2008, p. 9).

As a matter of fact, history and memory have historically been intrinsically connected. Would one examine the origins and development of historiography, history and memory connect, in the sense that national history was invented so as to inform people about their common ‘memory’ (Carretero, 2011, quotation marks added). Articulation between history and memory was fostered above all by the nation state, and early professional historians, from kings’ chroniclers to monarchic state officials, who were commissioned to *tailor* (Carretero, 2011, p. 94, emphasis added) and, subsequently, homogenise the nation’s memory. Through various institutions – such as university and school– history was invented to serve the state and to inform people of their common ancestry, culture, language and often religion (Anderson, 1983). Hence history took the ‘role to create unity, regularity and durability, where there is naturally divergence, controversy and discontinuity’ (Letourneau, 2017, p.228). In Nora’s (1989) words, through history, ‘the nation’s memory was to be powerfully unified’ (p.11). In other words, history was invented to serve the state, and inform people on their common ancestry, culture, language and often religion (ibid.).

The reason I flag up this process is because one of the ways nations' 'memory' unification (and thus homogenisation) was pursued was through schooling (Anderson, 1983; Smith, 1986, 1991). That is, history, as a school subject, has been used in transmitting the nation's collective 'memory', thus contributing to nation-construction through (re)imagining a collective past, in which points of controversy would be silenced, and points of glory would be glorified (Papadakis, 2002). This official narrative would evolve around a set of 'reference points' (Dumont, 1996 cited in Letourneau, 2017, p.227), which would be used to give to the nation trajectory and destiny (Berger, Eriksonas and Mycock, 2008; Berger and Lorenz, 2015 cited in Letourneau, 2017, p.227). In this way, through collective memory, past and *future* have been *connected* at the societal or collective level (Halbwachs, 1980), creating a non-reversible 'reality'. Historical accounts therefore are used as reference templates, establishing the nation's supremacy, continuity and thus its legitimacy (Anderson, 1983; Smith, 1991).

Furthermore, especially in the case of post-conflict countries like Cyprus, the line between history and memory writing can become more blurred. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that in places like Cyprus, history and memory become a complex knot that can be difficult to unravel. Yet, despite their complex relationship, memory and history are distinctive. That is because, although history and memory interact and impact on each other - and how people and society remember can be a historical source (Tumblety, 2013), they differ in that they are confronted with diverse theoretical, ethical and/or methodological challenges (Tumblety, 2013). Explicitly, history writing is a distinctive form of talking about the past in that it differs from personal and collective recollection, as it constitutes an organised and evidence-based presentation of the processes and events that have occurred over a period of time.

2.4. The methodological construction of historical accounts

Closing the discussion on historical accounts, with special emphasis on the analysis of Rösen's matrix, there are two issues that are worth flagging up. Firstly, accounts are interpretations and not representations. In Rösen's words 'indeed, because it is guided by theory, historical narrative is not just mimetic but also *constructive*, taking as its object not just what is given but what is intelligible' (Megill, 1994b, p.51, emphasis added). That accounts interpret the past rather than reviving it, is a vital clarification in that brings to light two further important issues in relation to the nature of historical accounts. On the one hand, history as a construction is about answering questions and, therefore, making sense of the past through different lenses. On the other, because historical accounts, as constructions, are defined by *presentism* – the act of viewing the past through the lens of the present (Lowenthal, 2000; Wineburg, 2001) – they are *bound* to differ. As Straub (2005) pointed out, historical 'realities are just ephemeral as other mental images, thoughts and words' (p.46). Therefore, historical realities as *temporal* constructs are time-based theories and not fixed answers to timeless questions. Hence, it is in the nature of historical accounts to differ, not only because they can be produced by authors of diverse types and standpoints, but also the differing questions they ask are further asked in different times.

The second conclusion which could be drawn from Rösen's matrix is that although historical accounts are constructions, they can be defined by their 'validity', which lies in the fact that they are products of methodological research. Despite the 'relevance' of interpretation, historical accounts are not 'relevant', as Lemon (1995) clarified:

There are rational parameters which render practicable the proper telling of 'a story'. Its coherence and accuracy depend upon the perception, judgement, impartiality, and veracity of the teller (and in the historian's, unlike the participant's, case its details have to be inferred from evidence) but it *is* there, to be told [...] 'it' is far from being merely a matter of 'interpretation', if this implies that (with some ill-defined, yet 'sensible' limits) all accounts of the same eventuality are necessarily subjective, albeit equally valid! What confusion! (p.124, emphasis in the original).

Historical accounts might be subjective; yet, they can be defined by the distinguishing feature that they are the product of particular practices of reading linked to the critical appraisal of

evidence and other forms of probative thinking (Wineburg et al., 2007) designed to produce warranted and testable claims about the past which meet interpersonal standards of objectivity (Megill, 2007; Seixas, 1993). Hence, despite all their constraints and despite the different uses they might have, historical accounts are important because their disciplinary use ‘increases the competency to find meaning’ (Lee and Howson, 2009, p.17). This is because, what defines and assures the ‘validity’ of historical accounts is not their objectivity, but the fact that although they are interpretative products of research, they are products of research which is based on a *consistent* and *rational* methodology.

At the same time, historical accounts cannot be cut-off from ‘lebenspraxis’, the practical aspects of life. Evoking C.P. Cavafy’s poem, ‘An Old Man’ (1897), Herman Paul (2015, p.11) highlighted that ‘not everybody is comfortable with the level of abstraction inherent in reflection on such questions as what history is and what people do when they describe a long-distant past on the basis of memories with a proven talent for juggling’. Yet, as Paul underscored (ibid),

historical theory is at home in the café, especially if the old man, encouraged by a second beer, begins to tell about the passions, joys and dreams of his youth. Historical theorists roll up their sleeves wherever life stories are told, past decisions are explained and lessons from the past are drawn. For historical theorists do not merely study academic history, as some erroneously think. They reflect on matters of historical interpretation, explanation, story-telling, remembering and forgetting wherever these occur.

In a nutshell, engaging with historical accounts is also socio-cultural (Carretero et al., 2017), as I illustrate in the next chapter (Sections 3.2 and 3.3), by drawing on Rösen’s matrix. Indeed, the existing literature findings on students’ understandings of historical accounts demonstrate that ‘lebenspraxis’ - the broader scheme of human experience - *is* one of the criteria evidencing how students engage with differing accounts, for instance through ‘epistemic switching’ and ‘appropriation’ as I discuss in the next chapter. As Epstein and Peck (2018, p.3) pointed out, narrative appropriation not only circulates ‘within national, ethnic or religious communities’ but also varies ‘not just among individuals, but also within individuals

over time, depending on the purposes for and contexts in which historical narratives are employed’.

I have used historical accounts as instruments drawing on the above theorisations on accounts. I thereby aim to explore how Greek-Cypriot students understand and appraise differing interpretations of the past a) as disciplinary constructs and b) in personal terms. In the next chapter, Chapter 3, I take on the discussion of findings relating to how students understand historical accounts in the international literature. How historical accounts were used as an instrument, and how they were complemented with group interviews, is addressed in Chapter 4, Methodology. In Chapter 4, I discuss how I devised my methodological strategy with the purpose of exploring students’ (a) understandings of historical accounts as constructions, and (b) students’ understandings of historical accounts in personal terms.

CHAPTER 3. Students' Ideas about Differing Historical Accounts in the International Literature

3.1. Introduction

Within this chapter on the literature around students' ideas about historical accounts I aim to a) present findings about the disciplinary ideas students of different countries and different ages have about differing historical accounts, b) discuss findings from the broader research community on how students engage with accounts in personal terms, c) contextualise these empirical findings by providing some background as to how research about students' historical thinking came about through 'New History', and d) identify issues of importance that I take on within this Thesis, and which are materialised and explored through the research instruments to be discussed in the methodology chapter. By assessing existing literature and findings I intend to make evident the ways in which existing research might be considered restrictive and, hence, establish why I am taking on an existing paradigm but in a new way.

3.2. Research on Students' Ideas on Differing Historical Accounts

I start this literature review discussion from the premise that it is questionable whether children, young people or even adults are aware of the disciplinary aspects of historical accounts, in other words what is above the 'lebenspraxis' line (Chapter 2, Section 2.2). For example, as Gottlieb and Wineburg (2012) highlighted, 'historians, we can say with reasonable assurance, approach documentary evidence in ways that differentiate them from

other intelligent, degreed adults' (p. 110). And yet, the point is not that we seek to turn students into little historians:

- i. 'the point is rather that students bring to school tacit ideas about what history is, and that we must address these ideas if we are to help them make progress in understanding what teachers and historians say about the past' (Lee, 2005, p. 32),
- ii. and, that 'for historical knowledge to be grounded in reason, adolescences must understand *something* of the subject's perspectives, logic and methods' (Shemilt, 1980, p.2, emphasis added).

Therefore, I discuss existing findings with the purpose of highlighting what we already know about how students think. Research into students' understandings is imperative since teaching without being prepared and informed about students' ideas 'is like firing blindly into the dark: we may get lucky and hit one of our targets, but we are much more likely to damage our own side' (Lee and Shemilt, 2004, p. 31). Explicitly, attention needs to be paid to students' ideas about the property of historical concepts (historical accounts, evidence, cause, explanation, empathy, etc.), as these might be part of students' prior knowledge, and in turn might be an obstacle to students' understanding of history and conceptual change.

Most of the research on students' historical understanding has taken place since the break with the Piagetian tradition¹⁷ in the 1970s and the rise of 'New History' – that is, the British movement calling for history to be taught as a *discipline* (Rogers, 1979).¹⁸ 'New History' has been decisive for history education in two ways. Firstly, 'New History' put forward the importance of *how* we do history, what Lee and Ashby (2000) named as history's 'know-how'. In this way 'New History' marked a shift from the 'know-that', the content, to 'know-how', history's methodology. Hence, New History was crucial in establishing history as more than a 'done-deal' (Lee and Ashby, 2000) in that history is neither set or fixed but is constantly under revision because of new evidence, questions and theorisations. Secondly and subsequently, 'New History' has established what we call 'second order' concepts – that is,

the skills or processes involved in doing historical enquiry (Byrom, 2014). These include change, continuity, causation, consequence, significance and historical accounts (Byrom, 2014).

Although historical accounts have been significantly under-researched compared with other concepts with respect to historical thinking (i.e. as a concept it is not present in US and Canadian models), there has been a series of projects investigating how students think historically. Project CHATA (Lee and Ashby, 2000) was the first big project to present students with different stories, namely contrasting stories about the Roman invasion and settlement of Britain, commencing a research tradition relating to students' understandings of accounts. Analysis of a sample of 320 7-14 year-old students yielded a progression model of how students understand differing accounts. Lee and Ashby (2000) generated the following progression model –a model describing students' ideas in terms of advancement – about students' ideas of accounts. The ideas that students had about accounts appeared to progress through the following positions: that,

- i. Accounts are just (given) stories.
- ii. Accounts fail to be copies of a past we cannot witness;
- iii. Accounts are accurate copies of the past, except for mistakes or gaps;
- iv. Accounts may be distorted for ulterior motives;
- v. Accounts are organised from a personal viewpoint, and
- vi. Accounts must answer questions and fit criteria (Lee and Shemilt, 2004, p.30).

Nonetheless, Lee and Shemilt (2003) cautioned that 'progress' has a wide range of meanings and an important distinction to bear in mind is that between 'progress' in general and '*progression*' in particular.

The relatively recent appearance of another word – 'progression' – hints that we sometimes want to talk about something rather different from a general notion of progress. 'Progression' was juxtaposed with 'aggregation' to emphasize that progress in history could be more than an increase in the amount of information

pupils could recall: learning history was not just learning ‘one damn thing after another’ (Lee and Shemilt, 2003, p. 13).

Some support for CHATA (Lee and Ashby, 2000) findings was evident in subsequent research (Gago, 2005), and other pieces of research gave similar results (Chapman, 2009; Hsiao, 2008). For this reason instead of presenting findings in a chronological order I discuss relevant findings in relation to CHATA (Lee and Ashby, 2000).

One of the most important findings of CHATA and the studies supporting its results was that students tend to see history as being something fixed (an unsurprising finding as this is how history has traditionally been taught), accounts as being ‘mirrors’ of this fixed past (Lee and Ashby, 2000), and histories as being pictures of the past rather than theories answering questions about the past. The notion that history is fixed relates to another important finding of CHATA: students tend to see history as ‘a single story’, with historians ‘making it up’ or guessing if they ‘weren’t there’. The ‘single story’ notion has been confirmed through a series of other studies. Foster and Yeager (1999) conducted research with fifty-one 12 year-old students who were presented with a series of accounts about the Boston massacre. History was seen as a ‘single factual story’ with the findings suggesting that students who have not had much exposure to historical enquiry had a very basic understanding of why there might be differing conflicting witness testimonies.

Influenced by project CHATA (Lee and Ashby, 2000), project CHIN (Children’s Ideas about Historical Narrative), undertaken in Taiwan between 1999 and 2001, produced some interesting results, allowing space for further research (Hsiao, 2008). Students aged 10-14 in Taiwan were presented with differing accounts relating to the ‘Romans and the Saxons’ and ‘The first Chinese Emperor’. The findings indicated (Lin, 2003, 2006 cited in Hsiao, 2008) that the majority of the students could not accept that there could be more than one valid story. The students argued that accounts differ because of, one, the use of different sources; two, transmission errors; and, three, because of author distortion. Lin (2003 cited in

Hsiao, 2008) concluded that students' perceptions of history were to a large extent due to the fact that history was seen as a 'single factual story', with these findings being quite similar to those of Foster and Yeager (1999), Lee and Ashby (2000), and Lee and Shemilt (2004). Additionally, CHIN findings (Lin, 2003, 2006 cited in Hsiao, 2008) indicated that the majority of the students could not accept that different sources can exist.

On the contrary, Hsiao's (2008) findings on Taiwanese students contrasted with the CHATA and CHIN findings. Hsiao investigated students' understandings in Taiwan by presenting them with three accounts on the 'Opium War'. These were a) a familiar textbook account, b) a non-textbook account and c) an unfamiliar textbook account. Students identified three main categories as to why accounts might differ: one,

- i. *lack of knowledge* (9%), which is due to not having direct access to sources or using different sources;
- ii. *author's position and selectiveness* (62%), having to do with intentional distortion or inevitable subjectivity; and
- iii. *different question focus* (29%), that resulted in differing accounts.

Here 62% is just what CHATA would have led one to expect in relation to author position (Lee and Ashby, 2000). However, what is remarkable, and this where Hsiao's findings differ from CHATA and CHIN, is that 29% of students attributed different accounts to different question focus – which shows quite a sophisticated understanding of history.

CHATA (Lee and Ashby, 2000) findings in relation to students' sophistication were also supported by Chapman (2009, 2011b, 2012) who gave a more holistic picture of how students' epistemologies affect their understanding. In Chapman's study (2009) twenty-four students from the UK, twelve in the first year of A-level, and twelve in the second year of A-level (that is, 16-17 year-old students), completed a series of three written tasks relating to three pairs of conflicting accounts - on the Ranters, the Peterloo Massacre and the Holocaust.

These tasks took place within one academic year. Each written task presented students with a set of conflicting accounts of the same event. Chapman (2009) identified five ‘explanatory types’ of historical thinking explaining accounts’ variation in student responses:

- i. *Authorial explanation*: the students explain differences in terms of author backgrounds or background beliefs;
- ii. *Archival explanation*: differences in accounts are due to the variable or limited nature of the archive available to account authors;
- iii. *Impositionist explanation*: accounts differ due to author activity or imposing preconceptions on representations of the past;
- iv. *Hermeneutic explanation*: account variation is because of author activity with respect to constructing the meaning of the past; and
- v. *Inquisitional explanation*: differences in accounts are explained in terms of variations in the author activity with respect to asking questions about the past.

This categorisation is not merely descriptive. Chapman (2009) highlighted that the first two of these categories focus on author *identity and resources* whereas the other three focus on author *activities*. Students who fit into the first category were likely to assume that historical accounts were simply either true or distorted, failing thus to grasp history as *interpretation* and accounts as *answers* to questions or theories.

Similarities with CHATA findings were also found by Martens (2015) and Afandi (2012). Martens (2015) too found that students’ understanding is differentiated in a progression-like model. His sample consisted of students aged 13-19. Marten’s (2015) findings concerning students’ epistemological knowledge were similar to the CHATA findings of Lee and Ashley (2000) who did research with 7-14 year-old students. Overlaps were also observed. For instance, levels 3 to 6 proposed by Lee and Ashby (2000) corresponded to those put forward by Martens (2015). Martens highlighted that, due to the age differences between the samples, the students reported on by him demonstrated a better

historical understanding than those interviewed by Lee and Ashley (2000). Afandi (2012) explored students' ideas about different accounts of the same historical event in Singapore.¹⁹ He found that students understood accounts and explained differences across three broad categories, namely, *knowledge deficits*, *multiple stories* and *constructional attributes*. A small minority of students (11%) thought of accounts as 'not different' if they are 'telling the same story in different words'. The rest of the answers indicated six patterns of ideas that students used to explain differences between accounts. These were:

- i. We look for the best copy.
- ii. We choose 'the preferred' version.
- iii. We try and find more stuff.
- iv. We count opinions or average views.
- v. We combine stories together, and
- vi. We consider all points of view (relativism).

Although the 'progression' models identified by Afandi (2012) were slightly different to that put forward by Lee and Ashby (2000) his findings appear to parallel those reported by CHATA (Lee and Ashby, 2000). In turn, Boix-Mansilla (2005) made a contribution to the literature by looking into students' training. Boix-Mansilla (2005) found a strong association between students' research background and their favoured epistemological orientation. Explicitly, when reasoning about the acceptability of historical accounts students trained in scientific research tended to favour an objectivist stance. In contrast those trained in historical research overwhelmingly favoured a view of historical accounts as organising the past for contemporary audiences (Boix-Mansilla, 2005).

3.3. Opening up the Historical Accounts Paradigm

Looking into what has been discussed above at a higher level of generalisation, data yielded from research on students' ideas about historical accounts have mostly been focused

on the disciplinary ideas students might have (Goldberg, 2017). Indeed, in history education there is work that takes a competencies approach – e.g. the German post-Rüsen approach. Körber (2015) for instance, highlighted that within the last 15 years a shift has taken place in German educational policy and academic thought, where schooling in general and almost all special subjects have been subjected to what has been labelled ‘orientation on competencies’ – that is, a focus on methodologies and assessing student achievement. On the other hand, Lee (2005) argued that the CHATA’s approach is explicitly opposed to thinking in terms of skills. Still, it can be argued that the CHATA history education paradigm has focused on the ‘know-how’ (Lee and Ashby, 2000) and/or skills of doing history²⁰ and, by doing so, has failed to encapsulate the complexity of how we relate to the past.

The existing paradigm of historical accounts therefore can be limiting in one more way; in being oriented (exclusively) towards reason, in that it focuses on students’ meta-knowledge (‘know-how’). Hence, this paradigm might be restrictive in that it does not encapsulate the complexity of historical understanding. For instance, cognition is not an individual construction, but is distributed across people as they participate in culturally relevant activities (Robbins, 2005). I do not take an anti-cognitive stance. What I argue is that by focusing exclusively on the disciplinary aspect of historical accounts and adhering to the cognitive psychology paradigm the existing history education research paradigms neglected the socio-cultural context aspect of learning, i.e. that of the ‘practical past’ – that is, the human experience of the past.

As discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3), it has been well established that history is *not* cut off from interests and functions. Although history education *must* go beyond the ‘practical past’ – that is engage with the disciplinary nature of history – we should not forget that the ways ‘we relate to and make sense of the past’ (Lee and Howson, 2009, p. 217) also exist within the practical past (Paul, 2015). Similarly, experience is cognitively mediated; yet

any kind of experience is affective too (Hyland, 2011). It is with this rationale in mind that I decided to use historical accounts, as these can generate helpful data and provide evidence in relation to students' epistemologies, and also in relation to how students attribute value to historical accounts in personal terms. Hence, historical accounts served as proxy for looking at students' historical thinking in broader terms.

3.4. Historical Accounts and Personal Relationships with the Past

A key piece of literature in relation to historical accounts which is mostly relevant to students' personal relationships with the past is what Gottlieb and Wineburg (2012) call 'epistemic switching'. The term 'epistemic switching' was actually coined by Gottlieb and Wineburg in 2012, however, related findings occur before this date: in 2005 there was a research finding by Barca (2005) which was not found in CHATA: students' inconsistency in relation to issues that matter to them. Barca's (2005) research in Portugal involved students from years seven, nine and eleven as a sample, asking them to decide on what grounds they would choose between conflicting interpretations. Students were presented with four accounts as to 'Why did the Portuguese manage to establish a maritime Empire in the Indian Ocean during the sixteenth century?' One of Barca's (2005) findings was that students dismissed an account just because of its provenance. It has been pointed out (Barca and Magalhães, 2005) that preference for the nationalistic version based on an 'emotional choice' was in some cases consciously justified in terms of practical concerns, which were overtly distinct from historical criteria. Barca and Magalhães (2005) argued that students' inconsistency when dealing with issues that matter to them might be indicative that perhaps there is a lot of work to be done in history education around this specific issue, which is part of a much bigger challenge: making explicit the relationships between what we think and what we do.

In turn, Gottlieb and Wineburg (2012) carried out research with adults in the USA, and have also reported findings on how ‘epistemic switching’ might occur. Gottlieb and Wineburg looked into how eight religious believers (historians and clergy) and eight sceptics (historians and scientists) read a series of documents on two topics – that is, the Biblical Exodus and the origins of the first (American) Thanksgiving – with the purpose of comparing their epistemologies. Religiously committed historians engaged with the reading differently from their non-religious peers. Religious historians were caught between the competing commitments of their faith communities on the one hand and their academic communities on the other, and engaged in epistemic switching – that is, the employment of *varying* epistemological criteria to align with the allegiances triggered by the given reading. This was a small sample study, such that it is difficult to make generalisations. Similarly, Levesque and Létourneau (2019) found that national identification among young French Canadians took place in relation to language.

Wertsch’s (1994) findings are also relevant to students’ ideas with respect to historical accounts. Wertsch’s (1994) findings demonstrate how people differentiate cognitive mastery from ‘appropriation’ – that is, the process of making ideas one’s own, or part of one’s identity. Wertsch (1994) examined how Estonians use differing historical representations of events in 1940 and the differences between their use of the official and unofficial histories of the 1940 events. Wertsch (1994) concluded that the unofficial historical representation can be understood as a set of counterclaims to the basic claims included in official history and that the unofficial history is generated through a kind of ‘hidden dialogicality’ with the official one. Narrative appropriation has also been reported by a series of other researchers (Apostolidou, 2006; Carretero, 2011; Carretero et al., 2012; Porat, 2006a, 2006b; Wertsch and Rozin, 1998). An other interesting finding on narrative appropriation comes from New Zealand. Sheehan and Davison (2017) report that young people are not passive in this process: Although they typically do not demonstrate a firm grasp of all the relevant historical details

about the First World War, when given the opportunity to do so they appear to be engaging critically with the production of cultural memory messages about war remembrance.

Privileging one narrative over another, code switching and appropriation have been also found in post-conflict contexts. For instance, Goldberg (2017), in his study on how 155 Jewish and Arab-Israeli teenagers related to the past, found that the participants made diverse references to the past – that is, from family history, via biblical allusions and collective memories, to formal, schooling-based historical documents. Individuals used these references to the past to negotiate the present and future of inter-group relations. In addition, they made strategic use of references to others' narratives. Similarly, Angier (2017), reporting on 27 South African university students' understanding of their national past, found that participants relate to historical narratives in terms of emphasis (the relative weight assigned to different periods and people) and of agency (who had done something to them).

What these findings show is that, as Bricker and Bell (2016) illustrated, young people's epistemologies might involve 'code switching' between various epistemologies and practices – that is, 'what criteria are used for judgement in what context and why; in any given context what are the epistemic virtues and vices at play' (*ibid.*, p. 205, *emphasis added*).

3.5. Literature Discussion

So how much do we know, on the basis of existing work, about students' understandings of history? As Terrie Epstein (2012) illustrated, a lot:

During the past 20 years, research on learning and teaching history has grown exponentially. In a 2007 review of the research on history education, Keith C. Barton found over 200 empirical studies on young people's historical understanding, ranging in topics from how young people make sense of primary and secondary history sources to how socio-cultural contexts and identities shape their interpretations of historical concepts and content.

However, despite the large volume of research on students' historical understanding, very little work has been done in relation to students' understandings of historical accounts: we therefore now need to know more about, for example how students engage with, interpret and evaluate historical accounts. The lack of research makes this research valuable in its own right. In addition, the dissimilarities between the different findings (Section 3.2) makes the need for further research even more evident: identifying similarities and differences between contexts can enable researchers to a) point to what might be working, as well as factors that might inhibit student learning, and b) pay more attention to the specificities of the context that is being researched.

Moving through the literature I presented on students' ideas there are three issues I identified and which I take on herein:

- i. Similar patterns of thinking have been reported in the literature across different contexts. Although student thinking is not solely related to age-levels (similarities have been found across students of different ages, as I showed in Section 3.2), up to a certain degree thinking is age-related (Lee and Ashby, 2000; Martens, 2015).²¹
- ii. The existing research findings' consistencies show that students bring potentially 'erroneous' in Lee and Shemilt's (2004) words, epistemologies to the classroom.
- iii. Existing literature also shows that there are inconsistencies in research findings, i.e. between CHATA (Lee and Ashby, 2000) and Hsiao (2008).
- iv. The literature does not support the notion that students ever think about historical accounts in exclusively cognitive terms. Thinking about historical accounts is messier than this, with students engaging for instance with 'epistemic switching' (Gottlieb and Wineburg, 2012) or 'narrative appropriation' (Werstch, 1994).

So, what do the findings show in relation to the above conclusions? Firstly, existing literature suggests that *there are* inter-cultural constants as to how students understand

history. For example, Gago's (2005) research in Portugal, conducted with fifty-two 10-13 year-old students to investigate why accounts differ through two pairs of accounts on 'The Romans in the Iberian peninsula' and 'The history of Port Wine', produced findings in line with those of CHATA (Lee and Ashby, 2000). Secondly, students bring with them flawed ideas about what we can know in relation to the world and how it works (Lee, 2005). 'Erroneous' epistemologies could be described as:

- i. *pre-scientific* ideas,
- ii. *preconceptions*, or
- iii. *alternative* ideas.

Although these ideas lead to dead-ends that make history 'impossible' (Lee and Shemilt, 2004) I refer to these notions as 'limited' or 'incomplete' rather than erroneous. This is because calling these ideas 'erroneous' would imply that they are entirely wrong, which they are not. This is because a number of these ideas might not fully encapsulate the nature of the properties of historical accounts – hence, not enabling students to give complete answers as to why accounts differ; however, these ideas *do* say something about how history works. For instance, as I demonstrate in Chapter 5, Sections 5.2.6 and 5.3.6, students' 'epistemic' criteria are flawed in that they are imprecise or inadequate in explaining how history works. Yet, these ideas do say something about how history works as 'episteme', as a discipline.

Students' 'limited' epistemologies have been well reported in the literature. Firstly, students see history as fixed, accounts as mirrors of a fixed past, histories as pictures of the past rather than theories answering questions about the past (Foster and Yeager, 1999; Lee et al., 1994; Lin, 2003 cited in Hsiao, 2008). Related to the above notion, research unveiled the 'alternative' preconceptions about how we know about history and how historians know: historians 'make it up' or 'guess' if they weren't there. Another misconception students have is that if history 'cannot be true' then it is distorted - deliberately or not (Lee and Shemilt, 2004). Moreover, and in relation to history's 'distortion', students' ambiguity about history

often depends upon how accounts relate to the concept of evidence and its interpretation: in students' minds evidence often seems to be talking for itself rather than being interpreted by the historian according to the question asked. Many students acknowledge sources as the backbone of history, but they operate with simplistic models of historical epistemology, such as 'scissors and paste thinking' (Collingwood, 1994; Lee and Shemilt, 2003). Looking at the bigger picture the most palpable example of thinking with respect to knowledge production is that students are likely to struggle to think of accounts as being answers to specific questions, e.g. 'Why did WWI start in 1914 rather than 1915?' and, therefore, imagine accounts to be 'mirrors of the past' (Lee and Ashby, 2000) rather than theories that provide a solution to a problem (Lee and Shemilt, 2004). The implication of such simplistic thinking is that these underdeveloped epistemological ideas can inhibit children's understandings of the full range of reasons – and in particular the methodological reasons – as to why historical accounts might legitimately vary.²² Thirdly, research findings show divergence with regard to degrees of sophistication in relation to different samples, i.e. between CHATA (Lee and Ashby, 2000) and Hsiao (2008).

Fourthly, literature demonstrates that thinking about the past is not limited to disciplinary thinking. As I demonstrated through my discussion of 'epistemic switching' and 'appropriation' students engage differently in relation to issues that matter to them. This could be identified as 'hot cognition' (Brand, 1985/86), the supposition that a person's thinking is influenced by their emotional state. In a simplistic way it could be argued that hot cognition is cognition coloured by emotion. Hot cognition contrasts with cold cognition, which implies cognitive processing of information that is independent of emotional involvement. Hence, hot cognition may arise, with varying degrees of strength, in politics, religion, and other socio-political contexts because of moral issues, which are inevitably tied to emotion (Brand, 1985/86). For instance, drawing on the highly selective use of South Africa's past by university students, Agnier (2017) highlighted the importance of socio-cultural factors in the

development of young people's historical consciousness, a conclusion that has implications for classroom pedagogy. For this reason hot cognition is defined by motivated reasoning - that is, the emotion-biased decision-making - which can result in attitude change and cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). As Goldberg, Schwarz and Porat (2011, p.186) highlighted, conceptual and attitudinal change is of longstanding interest in educational, cognitive, and social psychology. However, it could be argued that existing research has focused either on students' conceptual (SHP, CHATA) or attitudinal notions (Gottlieb and Wineburg, 2012; Werstch, 1994). This research could help in bridging this dichotomy. It is hoped that it will allow for the taking of some tentative steps towards constructing a picture of the ways students' not only think about but also *engage* with history.

Bringing the literature discussion to a close, firstly I locate myself within the tradition of CHATA. This is because I concede that historical thinking is sine qua non for young people as it 'increases the competency to find meaning' (Lee and Howson, 2009, p.17). As I argue that we can best take on the task of enhancing history teaching and learning by being informed on what students' ideas are, I identify with a series of specific questions:

- i. Can students conceptualise historical accounts as constructions?
- ii. And, can they understand that, as constructions, there can legitimately be differing historical accounts?

One answer is that they are likely to if they have developed notions about a) evidence, b) what historians do, c) the fluid nature of the historical past and d) an understanding that accounts are, to borrow Lee's (2005) phrase, more like theories than pictures. If, on the other hand, some or all of these elements are not present students tend to treat a plurality of accounts as a sign that something has gone wrong – i.e. someone has made a mistake or, worse, someone is lying because in principle the past happened in only one way and accounts are 'mirrors of the past' (Lee and Ashby, 2000) put together by cut and paste from witness testimony.

Secondly, I locate my research within an exploration of a broader set of issues – e.g. modes of relationship to the past conditioned by identity and other considerations. For instance, the findings on ‘epistemic switching’ and ‘narrative appropriation’ show that students (and adults) a) attribute value to accounts in different ways and b) consequently, employ *varying* epistemological criteria to align with the allegiances triggered by the given reading. I attempt to address these issues with respect to the research design and the designing of tools.

The existing findings and the questions I raise make for an interesting challenge: that is focusing upon the issue of how Cypriot students might respond to these. Work in Cyprus could help to explore this aspect. Hence, through this study I aspire to contribute to knowledge by exploring the setting of Cyprus and at the same time illuminating gaps which currently exist in the research. Although this is not a comparative research study further findings from Cyprus could provide a comparative analysis of students’ ideas both there and elsewhere. I identify and discuss the issues that have been identified in this chapter in Chapter 4, constituting this study’s methodological framework.

CHAPTER 4. Methodological Framework and Strategy

4.1. Introduction

In Chapter 2 (Section 2.2) I demonstrated that historical accounts can be recognised as a fundamental resource for understanding the past and the present (a) via a specific disciplinary methodology that is consistent, rational and critical and (b) hence as a process of construction. In the same chapter I also made the argument (Section 2.3) that historical accounts cannot be seen outside of their socio-cultural context. In Chapter 3, I discussed the literature on students' understandings of historical accounts. In my discussion I referred to how thinking about historical accounts in exclusively cognitive terms can be restrictive in that historical thinking can be more convoluted than this. This is because (student) thinking is 'messier'. Having identified this issue I considered it necessary to take on the task of discussing and, consequently, defining historical accounts – that is, a) a key concept used to understand history and b) what I will make use of in my instruments for the purposes of this doctoral research. Following on from the issues identified in these two chapters in relation to my research question (How do Greek-Cypriot students understand differing historical accounts?), in the present chapter, I demonstrate how I have taken on board these issues in order to design my research methodology, and also how I devised my methodological strategy with the purpose of, firstly, exploring students' understandings of historical accounts as disciplinary constructions on the one hand, and on the other, how they understand accounts in personal terms.

In using the term 'methodology' I refer to the research paradigm that I employed, that is the 'interpretation of what is worth knowing, how to collect the knowable, and then to interpret it, that is a core aspect of what becomes known as "truth" (notwithstanding that such readings will be interpreted differently in relation to truth(s))' (Scott and Morrison, 2006,

p.153). Consequently, my methodology has been my general orientation to what knowledge is and how to make knowledge. Accordingly, firstly, I traced the gaps in knowledge, then, I designed ways to understand it, explore it, and talk about it. Since methodology is all about *strategy* (Patton, 2002), in this chapter I present a description of the decisions I have taken whilst being fully aware that they were shaped by/influenced by my assumptions, the research tradition that I have been working within, and so on. In relation to reporting findings, I share Lee's (2005) theory that students do not think in the ways suggested by (his) models. Instead, I argue that suggested models describe the kinds of ideas *that it is probable* that students have. For this reason, I have adopted an abductive research strategy in which I a) describe a phenomenon (e.g. what students say about accounts) and then b) posit mechanisms (theories about their underlying ideas) that might explain the patterns observed (Blaikie, 2002). In order to describe my methodology and address how this came about through my research instruments, in this chapter I discuss the following: this study's epistemological assumptions, its overall methodological strategy, research question and foci, population, sample and procedures, data analysis methods and decisions, credibility, reflexivity, pilot study and upgrade, and ethics.

4.2. Epistemological Assumptions

4.2.1. Knowledge as Constructed

I begin my discussion of methodology by addressing the epistemological assumptions of this research before explaining the research design and how decisions were taken, as one cannot proceed to determine the study's strategy before dealing with some philosophical questions. (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Scott and Morrison, 2006). This study operates within the paradigm of constructivism. Constructivism is founded on the premise that by experiencing things and reflecting on those experiences (Lincoln and Guba, 1985),

individuals construct their own understanding and knowledge of the world. In a similar way to interpretivists, constructionists argue that meanings are created, negotiated, sustained and modified (Schwandt, 2003) through different processes, yet always within a shared reality. Hence, firstly, data represent how the world is *understood*, that is as meanings which are constructed through personal experience and through social interaction. A second level of the construction of the shared reality is my interpretation of data as ‘the researcher is more than a witness; (s)he actively constructs a particular understanding of the phenomenon under investigation’ (Charmaz, 1990, p.1165). In fact, it has even argued that the researcher *has to be* the primary data-gathering instrument (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, emphasis added). Accordingly, throughout the research and writing stages of the present study I sought to remain fully conscious of the effects of my assumptions, lived experiences and research tradition on my interpretation of the data. I sought to do this by taking a series of steps which I discuss in Section 4.9. I discuss the extent to which this was successful in Chapter 9 (Section 9.3).

Explicitly, I see construction as socially situated and knowledge as being constructed through interaction with others. When utilising constructivism, it is also necessary to address the role of language, as reality is always filtered through human language. Language links up knowledge (and the world in general) with fixed meanings, but these ‘fixed’, provinces of meaning are always contingent. Language affects not only how we report on the world, but also how we experience it: ‘the relation between subjective experience and language is a two-way process; language is used to express meaning, but the other way round, language influences how meaning is constructed’ (van Nes et al, 2010, p.314). Moreover, as language is shared, ‘meaning is shared, thereby constituting a taken-for-granted reality and, therefore, society is viewed as existing both as a subjective and an objective reality’ (Andrews, 2012), I take on students’ ideas as jointly constructed understandings of the world.

4.2.2. Narrativity and Language

Especially in the case of historical accounts, one cannot ignore that these are constructed through *narrativity* and hence the contingency of language which runs through historical narrative and the work of the historian. In other words, the historical narrative is represented *through* the conventions of language and text. Historical narratives are literary narratives, and as such they tell a story using different modes (Paul, 2015; White, 1984). Historians use a number of techniques to represent a meaningful past. For instance, representing a meaningful past requires *flow* (Lemon, 1995, p.44). In turn, flow is achieved through the process of selection and omission, which is no different from the recounting process of a novelist (1995). Another problem with respect to narration is that of sequence and consequence and how the first implies the second. As Lemon (*ibid.*, p.42-54) explained, a narrative or story is a report of connected events presented in a *sequence* of written or spoken words, while plot refers to the sequence of events inside a story. This sequence of events might affect other events through the principle of cause and effect. Hence, narrative as a form is structured in terms of ‘this *then* that’ (*ibid.*, p.43, emphasis in the original), creating epistemological implications that can be intractable (*ibid.*, p.42). Hence, historical narratives themselves are, in their essence, literary *constructs* of a past ‘reality’.

4.3. Methodology

This study constitutes an interpretative enquiry. The approach I took was carefully considered and informed by research methods, literature and empirical studies. Generated from personal and social concerns it was decided from the very beginning of this PhD project, that this research would follow a qualitative approach. As ‘qualitative research is intended to approach the world “out there” (not in a specialised research setting such as laboratories) and to understand, describe and sometimes explain social phenomena “from the inside” in a

number of different ways' (Flick, 2007, p.ix), I deemed that qualitative research was an indispensable methodological approach for this research. The qualitative nature of this study could give some valuable indications as to 'how' and 'when' students' constructions occur. From the early stages of this study, it was decided that this research project would closely follow qualitative traditions developed within the history education community (Section 4.4).

In order to embark in this exploratory study, I employed a methodological paradigm which adopts elements and aspects of quantitative research, for instance, by presenting students' ideas in a form of progress and as percentages. I chose to use this specific research paradigm for two reasons. Firstly, it is a paradigm that has been commonly used in history education research; and secondly, this paradigm allowed me to look for comparable findings across literature. Moreover, the qualitative/quantitative division can be argued to be a fallacy. For 'a quantitative *or* qualitative way of doing things hardly exists' (Åsberg, Hummerdal and Dekker, 2011, p.409), I suggest that research is about 'methodos' (from 'μετά', meaning after, and 'ὁδός', meaning path), the method taken, how to go about it, or an approach, as defined in the English language (ibid.).

I concluded that this research should remain within the basic research territory, as applied research is focus-oriented, aiming to change, evaluate or assess a direct, practical problem, and is usually carried by practitioners (Blaikie, 2002). Amongst the five research approaches of qualitative research - namely, to explore, to describe, to explain, to understand, and to predict (ibid.) - an exploratory aim approach was opted for as the most suitable as, at the present time, there is little research work on this topic in Cyprus. Moreover,

Exploratory research is necessary when very little is known about the topic being investigated, or about the context in which the research has to be conducted. Perhaps the topic has never been investigated before, or never in that particular context. [...] Essentially, exploratory research is used to get a better idea of what is going on and how it might be researched (ibid., p. 73).

Thus, within the present study I seek to offer a *provisional* and ‘thick’ description of students’ understandings. The purpose of this study is to thoroughly *describe*, rather than explain, the ways in which students understand differing accounts of the same issue. Notably, the importance of description should not be underrated: ‘without adequate description there might be nothing to explain’ (Blaikie, 2002, p.82).

Although under-researched, since CHATA and the 1970s scholarship in the history tradition has produced significant findings on students’ understandings of accounts (Chapter 3, Section 3.2). However, little research has taken place in traditional educational settings and in post-conflict zones. Research in post-conflict settings is in its infancy: Porat’s (2004, 2006b) work on how Jewish-Israeli and Arab-Israeli students understand conflicting accounts of the Israeli–Arab conflict is worth mentioning. Cyprus is both a post-conflict and traditional educational setting. Moreover, there is a lack of research projects in the history education literature focusing on Cypriot students’ understanding of accounts. I therefore decided that this study would take an exploratory approach. Given all the above the research question I set for the purposes of this research was: **‘How do 17-18 year-old Greek-Cypriot students’ understand differing historical accounts?’**.

The research design of this research was tested through pilot-testing. Accounts and instrument questions were tested through three cycles of pilot-study which took place to verify the suitability of data collection methods and tackle ambiguities. Paired accounts were simplified and shortened. Instrument questions were also simplified, and rephrased. I experimented with different instrument questions so as to enable findings on how students understand historical accounts in disciplinary terms on the one hand, and in personal terms on the other. I also pilot-tested my instruments. As I explain in Section 4.6.1, for the main study I utilized the first pair of accounts that was pilot-tested, ‘The British Take-over of Cyprus’, but decided not to use it for the main study. Instead, I used a different pair of accounts, ‘The

Cyprus Events of 1974’, which was selected based on its relevance to the second research focus of this study, how students understand accounts in non-disciplinary terms. A further reason why I opted for a different set of accounts in the main study is because of the Upgrade feedback on the specificities and nuances of this study and how these could be tackled with the given instruments (Section 4.10). Furthermore, it was decided that the second pair of accounts should be significantly shorter than the first one due to the restrictions of time. I show how paired accounts and instrument questions were refined in Table 1 below.

4.4. Research Question(s) and Foci

The main research question that I address with this study is the following: ‘**What are 17-18 year-old Greek-Cypriot students’ understandings of differing historical accounts?**’. The study’s research question is a ‘What’ (Blaikie, 2002) research question as it


Table 1. Research cycles for method testing

Cycle of Research	Participating Schools	Task-Testing	
		Paired Accounts	Instrument questions
Pilot study 1	School 1	Piloted ‘The Outbreak of WWI’ and ‘The British Take-over of Cyprus’: simplified accounts.	Piloted questions through written tasks and instruments: tested a) whether questions were suitable to answer the research foci, and b) whether they were comprehensible
Pilot study 2	School 2	Piloted ‘The Outbreak of WWI’ and ‘The British Take-over of Cyprus’: shortened and further simplified accounts.	Piloted questions through written tasks and instruments: tested a) a different set of questions, and b) simplified phrasing
Pilot study 3	School 3	It was decided that a) ‘The British Take-over of Cyprus’ would not be used in main study as it did not enable ‘epistemic switching’, b) the 2 nd accounts should be shorter than the 1st	Piloted questions through written tasks and instruments: finalized questions and refined phrasing
Main data	Schools 4-9	Used ‘The Break-out of WWI’ and changed ‘The British take-over of Cyprus’ to ‘The Cyprus Events of 1974’	Used set questions

signifies an exploratory study (Figure 2, cited in Blaikie, 2002, p 91). My means of addressing my research question has resulted from a long tradition in history education. My written tasks are similar to those of CHATA study and those of other researchers, in the sense that a number of studies sought to model student thinking by asking students to complete written tasks and interviews (Barca, 2005; Cercadillo, 2001; Chapman, 2009; Foster and Yaeger, 1999; Gago, 2005; Lee et al., 1994; Shemilt, 1980).²³

More specifically, I drew extensively on the work of Chapman (2009) and Afandi (2012) with whom I share an interest in accounts and the methods used to explore how students understand them, as well as in understanding of the *modus operandi* of history itself and, hence, the meaning and place of historical understanding in education. At the same time, my research paradigm differs. Discussing critically the existing research has given me the opportunity to identify gaps both in research and in theory and to enhance research around this area of knowledge. Setting the question ‘How can I best address the identified “gaps”?’, and given Cyprus’ specific context, I deemed it necessary that I would use existing methods

Figure 2. Formulating research questions



but in a more nuanced way. I therefore decided to take an *existing paradigm* (which seems to have proven quite fruitful in a number of contexts), *modify* it in a way that *addresses the gaps* I identified in terms of theory and subsequently research, and *extend* it to a *new context* in order to see if the approach was informative and enlightening in this new setting. Explicitly, as Peck (2018) argued, research on students' historical thinking should always include questions of identity and belonging (especially when it comes to post-conflict setting such as Cyprus): making sense out of history – perhaps especially national history – can never be a simple task.

Having identified the overarching research focus of this research, I broke it down to more specific foci. These are:

- i. Identification of differences.
- ii. Explanation of differences.
- iii. Judging validity.
- iv. Understanding historical processes.
- v. Choosing amongst accounts, and
- vi. 'Appropriating' accounts.

Accordingly, I aimed to answer how students do:

- i. Identify differences in accounts?
- ii. Explain differences in accounts?
- iii. Assess accounts in terms of truthfulness?
- iv. Understand historical processes?
- v. Choose amongst differing accounts?, and
- vi. 'Appropriate' accounts?

Regarding the sixth focus, I borrow the term 'appropriation' from Wertsch (2004) to indicate that I am looking into the process of making ideas one's own, or part of one's identity.

Research foci were ‘translated’ into instrument questions, which were addressed to the students through the two instruments I employed by this study – that is, written accounts and group interviews. Again, I designed my instrument questions with the purpose of answering the question ‘How can I best materialise my research foci into specific questions through the use of my instruments?’. Consequently, through my instruments, I attempted to (a) consider the kinds of epistemological understandings that students draw on, and having done that, to (b) to ‘bring the reader and the text together to examine’, in Wolfgang Iser’s (1979, p. 253 cited in Wertsch, 1994) terms, ‘the process by which the text is realized’ in non-disciplinary ways.

As I explain in Section 4.8, due to the large volume of data, for the purposes of this study, I decided to centred analysis on student answers in relation to the following research foci, namely:

- i. Explaining differences.
- ii. Assessing truthfulness, and
- iii. Choosing accounts.

The links between these research foci and my research instruments are presented schematically in Table 2 on the next page.

The first research focus addressed in this study is: ‘explaining differences’. This was addressed it through the instrument questions: a) 2.1. ‘Why do these two accounts differ while they refer to the same event?’ which was asked both in the written tasks and interviews; b) 2.2. ‘How is it possible for historians to give differing accounts of the same piece of history?’ and c) 2.3. ‘Why do accounts differ in general?’, which were asked in the group interviews. Questions 2.2 and 2.3 were used to further unfold students thinking. I devised questions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 with the purpose of following up on research findings (Lee and Ashby, 2000; Hsiao, 2008; Chapman, 2009; Afandi, 2012) which report that most students attribute differing

Table 2. Instruments and research foci discussed in this study

What are 17-18 year-old Greek-Cypriot students' understandings of differing historical accounts?				
Research foci		Instrument questions	Through the means of:	
			Written tasks	Group interviews
1.	How do students explain differences in accounts?	2.1. How is it possible that, while two historical accounts refer to the same issue, the same event, they are different?	X	X
		2.2. Why do accounts differ in general?		X
2.	How do students assess accounts' validity?	3.1. Can both historical accounts be true at the same time? 3.1.1. If they can, in what ways? 3.1.2. If they cannot, why not?	X	X
3.	How do students choose amongst differing accounts?	4.1. Which account amongst the two is best? Can you please justify?	X	X
		4.2. Is a more truthful account better as well?		X
		5.1. Which of the two accounts was more useful for you? Can you please justify?	X	X

accounts to either author opinion, author bias, or archive gaps.

The second research focus discussed in this study (truthfulness assessment), was addressed through the following instrument questions: a) 3.1. 'Can both historical accounts be true at the same time?'; b) 3.1.2. 'If they can, in what ways?' and c) 3.1.2: 'If they cannot, why not?'. The purpose of this instrument question was to further explore students' idea that historical accounts are a 'mirror' (Lee and Ashby, 2000) of the past, and subsequently, to explore to what degree students are aware of the construction of historical writing. These questions required the students to *assess the truth* of the accounts and to *adjudicate* between the accounts. These questions were closed for they ask students to decide on truthfulness. processes take place when considering differing accounts.

The third research focus addressed in this study examined the issue of how students choose between accounts. Question 4.1 was asked both in the written tasks and in group interviews. This question, that is 'Which account amongst the two is best in your opinion? Can you please justify?', was an open question as the purpose of this instrument question was

to see the range in which students would interpret the term ‘best’. This is a different issue from the previous instrument question (‘Can both historical accounts be true at the same time? If they can, in what ways? If they cannot, why not?’), where the question at hand was validity. Authority and validity might overlap, yet they are not necessarily the same. For instance, validity might be one aspect of authority, however account authority is not confined to validity or truthfulness. Question 4.2 was asked in group interviews: would one of the two accounts be ‘true’, is it necessarily better than the other? This question aimed to go deeper into how students choose between accounts and explore what kind of criteria they employ in doing so. Secondly, the focus on ‘choosing amongst accounts’ was addressed through the instrument question 5.1. ‘Which of the two accounts was more useful for you? Can you please justify?’. The purpose of this question was to explore how students assess differing accounts in personal terms. This question was asked both in the written tasks and group interviews. With this question I aimed to explore a) what kind of criteria students use in judging usefulness, and b) whether these answers would match with those given in relation to accounts authority.

4.5. Instruments

4.5.1. Written Tasks

The first instrument I used for this study’s data collection is written questions relating to two pairs of historical accounts. Project CHATA (Lee et al., 1994) was vital in establishing the importance of accounts in the history education as well as the actual term ‘accounts’ (Chapter 3, Section 3.2). In the present study, the differing paired accounts were selected on the same principles as those employed by Lee and Shemilt (2004).

We assume in what follows that historical accounts are not copies of the past, but are in some ways more like theories, and in others like extended metaphors. This does not mean that we think any account is as good as any other, or that accounts do not in any way refer to the past. We subscribe to a view of history in which we may test accounts against other, rival accounts, using criteria of congruence with facts, comprehensiveness and consistency (p.25-26).

I used accounts in order to encourage students to disclose their ideas about the discipline of the history on the one hand (explicitly, their epistemologies of history); and, on the other hand, to explore how they assess accounts in personal terms.

I opted for two pairs of accounts for two reasons. Firstly, the selection of two different events – one relating the history of Cyprus, sought to address Barca's (2005) finding on 'emotional choice' and how students engage with the past in personal terms. Secondly, as historical accounts differ in a number of ways, two pairs of accounts were expected to enable a number of responses. For example, accounts differ in terms of chronological display of events and thematic explanation. What is more, questions on two pairs of accounts rather than one were thought more likely to generate more reliable and 'valid' data. Incorporating topics which are included in students' curriculum was thought to be an extra incentive for the RoC Ministry of Education to grant permission for research, for Head-teachers to concede into allowing me into their schools, for humanities teachers facilitating the practicalities of the research, and students agreeing to participate. I therefore decided that both events would be events that are taught in year 12.

All accounts presented to students were closely based on found texts, which were adapted for the purposes of this study. This was for two reasons: firstly, in order to make possible responses on the epistemological aspect of accounts – that is, on whether the past can be taken at face value (in an objective way) and, secondly, so as to mirror differences in the epistemology of the accounts. These were based on Rösen's matrix: differences in interests, theory, methods, form and function. Ensuring that the texts differed in a number of ways was important because it enabled a number of responses. Nonetheless, some of the differences may or may not have been repeated in the second pair of accounts. The reason for that is that I was interested in how students understand differences, and not in specific patterns. Accounts were modified and simplified for readability purposes. For this purpose, I

used the Flesch Reading Ease scale, which indicates how easy a material is to read, as a monitoring tool (Flesch, 1948). Written tasks, which were a series of questions about differing accounts, drew on different foci as these were identified through the literature review and broken down into sub-foci.

I opted for an event from the modern history of Cyprus because I was interested in exploring the different ways in which students might attribute value to the past, i.e. through ‘epistemic switching’ or ‘appropriation’ (Chapter 3, Section 3.4). Having decided that the Cyprus event and first pair of accounts would be ‘The British take-over of Cyprus’, I decided to use WWI as the second event. This is because the two events can be seen as comparable in terms of the issues they discuss: both the WWI outbreak and the British takeover of Cyprus involve foreign powers. It was decided that the Cyprus event should be discussed second in order to avoid dissemination - that is, drawing information and/or skills from a source, and using them in following stages of the research. Following the pilot study and upgrade (Section 4.9), it was decided that the accounts of the British takeover of Cyprus would be replaced by a pair of differing accounts on ‘The Cyprus Events of 1974’. The second pair of accounts that has been used in the main data collection refers to events that led to the invasion of the Turkish Army in Cyprus on the 20th of July, following on from the Greek Junta-sponsored coup against President Makarios on the 15th of July. As the accounts refer both to the coup and the invasion, I titled them under ‘The Cyprus *Events* of 1974’. Consequently, in the pilot studies students were confronted with ‘The WWI Break-out’ (Appendix 1) and ‘The British Takeover of Cyprus’ (Appendix 2) whereas in the main study students were confronted with ‘The WWI Break-out’ and ‘The Events of 1974’ (Appendix 3). In this study I included students’ answers in relation to all three pairs of accounts (Appendix 4). One issue that this choice of data raises relates to what degree the data are comparable: the pilot study written tasks refer to ‘The British Takeover of Cyprus’, whereas the main study written tasks refer to ‘The Cyprus Events of 1974’. I decided to keep data from one of the pilot schools, as this provided useful

insights. I kept both sets of data not only because they yield interesting findings but also because they could shed light into how students attribute value to accounts in personal terms.

4.5.2. Group Interviews

Group interviews were the second method used in this research. I chose interviews as these can work as a means to contrast and compare the collected data, and thereby to verify and extend information emerging from these (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). I also used interviews to increase ‘validity’ (Section 4.9), by securing more in depth data in a context where the students were encouraged to express themselves more fully. Accordingly, I used instrument questions that would allow me to look into this. Group interviews were also used so as to further explore the fourth focus of this study, ‘understanding historical processes’ which is not discussed in this study. I decided that semi-structured interviews would be used in order to probe more deeply into the interviewees’ thoughts. While structured interviews granted me flexibility, they also created distinct problems – such as in terms of consistency – as it is often the case (Patton, 2002).

I opted for group interviews bearing in mind two dynamics. The first was that this study aimed to produce an overview on students’ constructions – rather than identifying individual responses. The second was that group interviews were preferred over individual interviews as, through peer interaction, they can provide a useful mechanism for encouraging students to express themselves in a more relaxed and informal way and exploring students’ afterthoughts. I designed interviews so as to further explore the foci addressed in through the written tasks (Table 1). I finalised interviews only after piloting. An interview example is cited in Appendix 7.

4.6. Sample and Research Procedures

4.6.1. Sample

The targeted population was high school students aged 17-18 (year-12) who were attending the last year of higher secondary school in RoC. The rationale for choosing this specific population, that is high-school students, was to explore how students master history during their last formal exposure to schooling before entering their adult life. Notably, I chose to focus on 17-18 year-old Greek-Cypriot students rather than Cypriot students across the divide. This is because a) I needed to narrow down my sample and b) conducting research on Turkish-Cypriot students' ideas would take place in English, creating a divergence in the sense that on the one hand, I as researcher and my Greek-participants would be using our native language and, on the other hand, I and my Turkish-Cypriot participants would use English – that is second language. It is possible that Greek-Cypriot students' ideas might be reflecting those of Turkish-Cypriot students. Indeed, there are many similarities regarding the two communities' educational context (Chapter 1, Section 1.4). Yet the Turkish-Cypriot setting can be argued to differ. In the Turkish-Cypriot community, one of the outcomes of the questioning of the old status-quo and the resulting change of regime in the Turkish-Cypriot community in 2004²⁴ was the initiative of writing new history textbooks. These textbooks were considered to be more 'progressive', and were grounded in the idea that 'Cyprus is the homeland of Cypriots', which was a departure from previous textbooks (p. 329). Although the ethnocentric government of 2009 withdrew the 2004 books, teacher associations do continue to have an activist role, especially when it comes to history education. Greek-Cypriot students' ideas therefore might or might not resemble those of their Turkish-Cypriot peers.

I chose to focus on Greek-Cypriot students who did not have humanities as a major. This is because I wanted to sample the majority of 17-18 year-old students, rather than the

minority. On the one hand, that humanities and non-humanities students would perform differently constitutes a *hypothesis*. On the other hand, there are reasons that might support this supposition.²⁵ Also, findings (Boix-Mansilla, 2005) indicated a strong association between students' research background and their favoured epistemological orientation (Chapter 3, Section 3.2). However, it should not be implied that all humanities students make up a homogenous body. For this reason, I decided to employ 'stratified random sampling' (Robson, 2011), according to which 'the division of the population into strata is based on one or more significant criteria' (Sarantakos, 2005, p.158-59). Three criteria were employed: firstly, the geographical coverage of the Republic of Cyprus; secondly, the representation of urban, semi-urban and rural areas; and, thirdly, the selection of a variety of schools in terms of performance. Following three cycles of pilot study, I opted to use six schools for my main study. As sample size is informed by 'fitness for purpose' (Cohen et al, 2011, p.161), and as this is an exploratory study, I decided it was important to have enough data to enable the formulation of a relevant hypothesis for more definite research.

Participating classes were chosen through 'convenience sampling' (Robson, 2011) – that is, because of their convenient accessibility. Specifically, classes were chosen either due to one of the humanities teachers' willingness to give up some of their teaching time for the conduct of the research or because accessing the specific classes would cause the least disruption to the normal school schedule, which was an ethical decision. Around a third of students from each class were interviewed in groups of three, four, or five, so as to give a thorough illustration of students' understandings. Students who would participate in the interview were chosen based on the criteria of, one, representing more or less one third of the classroom and, two, representing a variety of answers. Students who participated in the group interviews were chosen through 'purposive sampling' (Robson, 2011). The purpose of this selection was that I wanted to select participants representing the full spectrum of answers given in the written tasks. Hence, once I analysed the written tasks answers in a purposeful

way, I selected students who appeared to have different approaches to the accounts to participate in different group interviews.

4.6.2. Procedures

Procedures can be described in two phases: preparing the research, and conducting the research. These took place as described schematically in Table 3 on the next page. Firstly, I needed to follow a series of steps in order to actualise the conduct of the research. Having decided on the school sample an application was submitted to the Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Education and Culture via an on-line application. The application was quite detailed and asked for ethics permission from the university of the researcher. The application does not require that the researcher has previously gained permission from Head-teachers - however, this helps. On the other hand, the permission granted from the Ministry does not compel or even put pressure on Heads - either legally or practically - to give permission for any kind of research to take place within their school. In fact, many of the Heads approached were reluctant to grant me permission before seeing the RoC Ministry of Education approval.

Procedures took place as follows. As soon as I submitted to the RoC Ministry of Education and Culture the online application for the conduct of research, I approached Head-teachers to ask for tentative permission to conduct research in their school. The procedure I followed in terms of securing permission from Head-teachers was neither simple nor linear. As soon as I was granted permission from the Ministry, I phoned Head-teachers, who confirmed that they were ready to collaborate. Head-teachers put me in contact with the school's Assistant-Heads or one of the humanities teachers, so that appropriate plans for the conduct of the research could be made. Planning focused on:

- i. Selecting which class would participate in the research.
- ii. Identifying days and times for the written tasks (this time would be taken from humanities teaching time).
- iii. Identifying possible times for the conduct of group interviews, and
- iv. Deciding how consent forms would be disseminated and gathered.

Overall, procedures and changes needed to be planned in a way that my research would have the least possible impact upon the operation of the school timetable, and students' learning. Lastly, having agreed on the day(s) and time(s) for conducting the research, the person of contact needed to a) inform students about the research and ask for the consent and b) disseminate consent forms to students and to collect them after they were signed by their guardians. Students were informed about the length and topic of the research, as well as on anonymity and confidentiality. The dates of the research were finalised only when the person of contact had collected the consent forms from all students.

Table 3: Research procedures

	Steps followed	Stages
1.	Ethics permission acquired from IOE	Research preparation
2.	Approached school Heads tentatively <i>[Participants identified tentatively]</i>	
3.	Submitted online application for the conduct of research at the RoC Ministry of Education and Culture	
4.	Informed school Heads on Ministry's approval	
5.	Heads appointed person of contact: Deputy-Heads / humanity teachers	
6.	Researcher and person of contact identified participants	
7.	Researcher and person of contact set provisional date for research	
8.	Researcher provided person of contact with the consent form to be signed by students' guardians	
10.	Person of conduct informed students and distributed consent forms	
11.	Students returned signed forms y guardians to person of contact	
12.	Researcher and person of conduct finalised date of research	
13.	Conducted written task A	
14.	Conducted written task B	
15.	Conducted group interviews	
16.	Kept research notes	

Procedures in terms of conducting the research were as follows. On day one, I repeated to students that anonymity and confidentiality would be maintained and that every effort to prevent anyone outside of the project from connecting individual subjects with their responses. I also emphasised that students could withdraw from the research at any point of the research. In some of the schools the person of contact - that is the humanities' teacher or the Deputy-Head – stayed in the classroom, while in others not. Following, students performed written tasks on the first set of differing accounts. In some schools, students performed written tasks on the second pair of accounts in the following school period, or in a school period within the same day. In other schools, students performed written tasks on the second pair of accounts on a different day. Overall, students performed written tasks over two schooling periods. Next, having students' written answers at hand, I selected students who would participate in the group interviews. For most schools, I conducted interviews within the same week. The three/four day interval enabled me to go through the students' answers and highlight the key points that arose in order to select the students who would participate in the interviews. I selected students that would represent a variety of answers. Each group was interviewed over the course one teaching period. The exact data collection schedule largely depended on the permission given by the schools' Heads. Interviews were semi-structured, with an effort to conduct them in an informal manner so as to create a friendly atmosphere which would allow students to freely express their thoughts. Throughout the interviews I made sure that, firstly, I covered all foci; secondly, I clarified written task ambiguities or inconsistencies; and thirdly, whenever possible, I explored new ideas, if those were relevant as for instance in Interview III which is cited as an Appendix (Appendix 5). For this purpose, I used follow-up questions and prompts, as well as challenging comments or reflecting on what students said. In addition, I often used students' written task answers as reminders and further stimuli. Groups differed; however, students, for the most part, seemed to be interested. Students' answers were diverse, and their wording varied too: some students offered tentative

answers, others more determinative. Some students had a more precise way of thinking about history, whereas others responded in an open-ended or composite way.

4.7. Data Analysis Strategy

By data analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 2008), I mean the ‘the process of examining something in order to find out what it is and how it works’ (p.46) in relation to my research question(s). Accordingly, what I will be doing in the following sections is describing how data analysis decisions were taken, and how the methods were then implemented.

4.7.1. Data Handling

Having all data at hand, I proceeded to the data handling phase. Data handling took place in the following way. The first phase was an attentive sorting and filing of all written tasks. Following, interviews were fully transcribed in the original language, that is in the Greek-Cypriot dialect. After transcribing all recordings in Word, I uploaded the transcription documents to NVivo. I then printed them, and inserted them in a file similar to the ones I used for storing the written tasks. The third stage of data handling was typing up the written tasks, as I needed to have all documents in Microsoft Word so as to insert them in NVivo. As with the interviews, written tasks were transcribed in Greek-Cypriot. There was additional contextual material, namely the researcher’s field notes (Flick, 2007, p.143), and students’ ‘afterthoughts’ (Corbin and Strauss, 2008), that is students’ thoughts after the recorder was been switched off. Field notes and ‘afterthoughts’ were also inserted into NVivo. Having typed up all written tasks, I uploaded the Word documents to NVivo. I chose to use software data mediation (NVivo), for two reasons. Firstly, using NVivo allowed me to code students’ answers with rigour and consistency. Secondly, NVivo can operate as a platform where data

are brought together, themes are ‘pulled’ and, consequently, ‘meta-data’ can be created and stored in the form of memos and summaries.

4.7.2. Grounded Theory

For the purposes of data analysing I used grounded theory, that is allowing theory to emerge from data themselves (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2006). I used grounded theory as a method of discovery (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), in that I seek to generate new and/or open up existing theory. Accordingly, I encompass the three underlying aims of the theory as set in *The Discovery of Grounded Theory* (1967). That is,

- i. To discover new ways of understanding the social world;
- ii. To generate a new theory to understand the investigated phenomena. This is generated by empirical social research that engages in reality and works towards formulating a hypothesis and theory; and that
- iii. The emergent theory should be ‘grounded’ from the collected data and not be imposed from the researcher.

I chose to use grounded theory for two reasons. Firstly, I adhere to constructivism. As thoroughly presented in Section 4.2, I see knowledge as a nuanced construction of the world – both on behalf of the participants and the researcher herself. I therefore see ‘grand’ theories as fixed and generalised statements about the ‘universals’ which do not allow researchers to come up with new interpretations to explain local, specific phenomena. I find that these theories can be limiting, whereas interpretive frames such as grounded theory, might be more suitable for considering social realities. Secondly, as this is an exploratory research, I did not set to confirm a hypothesis but to carry an *enquiry* and, by doing so, to give an overview of students’ ideas which owes to be open and not a given view of the world.

For I take a constructivist approach to grounded theory, hence I do not adhere to the traditional positivist approach of Glaser and Strauss – that is, the notion that one should gather and analyse data with no preconceived hypotheses. Firstly, it is impossible to free oneself of preconceptions in the collection and analysis of data in the way that Glaser and Strauss (1967) argue is necessary. Secondly, as already highlighted throughout the literature review and conceptual framework, inductive coding cannot be expected to take place on a *tabula rasa* – we do have some indications as to what kind of information we want and where to look for it. Thirdly, there are always philosophical assumptions lurking in researchers’ research (Kuhn, 1962 cited in Gibson and Hartman, 2014, p.17). And, fourthly, ‘producing knowledge claims is a *social practice*’ (Scott and Usher, 2011, p. 12) – hence it does not happen in a vacuum. Fifth and drawing on the latter, as I align with the constructivist take-on on grounded theory (Charmaz, 2000a in Charmaz, 2014) which views knowing and learning as embedded in social life (Charmaz, 2014), I acknowledge my own subjectivity as a researcher. I therefore argue that openness in the way envisioned by Glaser and Strauss is impossible.

I sought openness by using grounded theory a) as a methodology (Bryant, 2017; Charmaz, 2006) which ‘consists of guidelines for collecting and analysing data to construct theories from the data themselves’ (Charmaz, 2014, p. 1) and b) as a methodological tool. I used grounded theory as a methodology in the following two ways. Firstly, by adopting the two principles of Glaser and Strauss (1967) – explicitly ‘theory understanding’ and ‘accepting the idea of process and rejecting strict determinism’:

The first principle pertains to change. Since phenomena are not conceived of as static but as continually changing in response to evolving conditions, an important component of the method is to build change, through process, into the method. The second principle pertains to a clear stand on the issue of ‘determinism.’ Strict determinism is rejected, as is non-determinism. Actors are seen as having, though not always utilizing, the means of controlling their destinies by their responses to conditions. They are able to make choices


according to their perceptions, which are often accurate, about the options they encounter (p.5).

Notably, these two principles do not mean that there isn't systematic analysis. While grounded theory gives to the researcher flexibility (Charmaz, 2014, p.3) it does pertain a rigorous methodology which 'begins with inductive data, invokes iterative strategies of going back and forth between data and analysis, uses comparative methods, and keeps you interacting and involved with your data and emerging analysis' (ibid., p.1). I furthermore used grounded theory as a *methodological tool*. Specifically, I used grounded theory as an analytic inductive coding data analysis strategy as originally developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). In doing so, grounded theory offered me a neat encapsulation of the essence of interpretative inquiry – in that it allows ideas (the 'theory') emerge rather than imposing them.

4.7.3. Data Analysis Process

Data analysis started before data were uploaded on NVivo. This is because I thought of my data and how these might sense during data collection, while I also wrote down relevant thoughts and reflections in my research diary. My data analysis strategy evolved around four analytical units as I show in Figure 3: low-inference codes, high-inference codes, clusters and categories. Of course, this is a schematic and simplified description of data analysis procedures: it depicts analysis as happening in a prescribed, standardized, linear fashion, which was not the case.


Figure 3: The four analytical units of data analysis



Firstly, through ‘open-coding’ – that is, the preliminary selection of data that helps the researcher to separate from hundreds of pages a manageable subset of data relevant to the questions - low-inference codes entailed capturing content line by line or sentence by sentence. Next, low-inference codes were summarised and recoded based both on language and context, resulting in high-inference codes. Subsequently, the latter were grouped into clusters - that is patterns of data. Clusters were analytical rather than descriptive. This is because instead of being summarised in order to answer the set foci, high-inference codes were categorised around an analytical question (Figure 4). Analytical questions were drawn from data and were formulated so as to give shape and direction to this study in ways that answer its research question. Next, clusters were grouped into categories. Categories served as thematic units, or model themes, which allowed a more general level of abstraction, with the purpose of leading to discussion.

Generating broad categories on students’ ideas did not aim in producing a ‘cage’ (Lee and Shemilt, 2003), that is a narrow description of categories. Instead, this description aims in showing *inferences* throughout the different stages rather than solely giving a strict classification and segregation like in the case of classical model where the main role of categories is to describe phenomena through classification (Dey, 1993). Clusters and categories were analytical rather than descriptive. This is because, instead of being summarised based on themes, these were the outcome of analytical questions. Having thematic categories at place I proceeded to the discussion of findings as shown in Figure 4. The purpose of data analysis was to lead to discussion, with the aim of a) providing suggestions and b) raising wider implications for history education policy and practice (Figure 5).

Figure 4. Use of Analytical Questions




Due to the large volume of data, I did not analyse data from all nine schools which participated in the main study. I analysed both sets of written tasks and group interviews from four schools. More specifically, three of the six main study schools, and one of the three pilot schools. I decided to keep data from one of the pilot schools as these provided useful insights. I also analysed interviews from the five remaining schools (Appendix 4) as I wanted to include a broad range of answers. There was also a second stage of reducing data. This happened after I finished open-coding and had high-inference codes for all data from the four selected schools. Despite my original intention to discuss all analysed data, I soon realised that I needed to further reduce data for analysis. Accordingly, I decided to centred analysis on student answers in relation to the following sub-research foci (Section 4.4): namely,

- i. Explaining differences.
- ii. Assessing truthfulness, and
- iii. Choosing accounts.

I decided to take on these specific foci with the following rationale: these foci were seen as encapsulating notions that also emerged from the other foci – just in more depth, and with more precision. I decided to break down the third focus and discuss it through employing two separate analytical questions: ‘**How do students attribute authority to accounts?**’ and ‘**What criteria do students employ so as to assess accounts’ usefulness?**’ Centring my

Figure 5: Data analysis procedures



discussion on these three foci (and therefore excluding others) could possibly affect what I am saying and/or what I can and cannot claim on the basis of data analysed – i.e. possible ‘correlations’ that might not have come to the surface in this Thesis, because of the exclusion of these data. For the purpose of discussing students’ answers, I mapped student ideas in ‘progression’-like models.

As I pointed out in Chapter 3, progression should be approached with caution. This is because, there is no such thing as automatic progression of psychological development (Lee and Shemilt, 2003). Moreover, as history is ‘counter-intuitive’ (Lee, 1999), and hence going ‘against the grain of how we ordinarily think’ (Wineburg, 2001, p.7), it does not come easily to students. Consequently, I do not make claims that ‘progression’ levels are exhaustive (Chapter 3). My proposed levels are *tentative*, and their purpose is to be used as a) as navigation models for teaching and learning and b) broader categories of discussion with regards to bigger implications in history education. Hence, students’ ideas about the nature of

accounts are presented as frameworks and considered to be ‘levels’ of ‘crude approximation’ (Lee, 2004; Lee and Ashby, 2000) which can serve as a guiding scheme of knowledge to inform stakeholders about students’ understanding regarding historical accounts. It is for the same reason that I present students’ ideas in percentages. Indeed, reducing the data to graphical configurations such as percentages ignores the whole point of qualitative research – i.e., the analysis of context and personal meaning. However, by ‘quantitising’ qualitative data, I was able to ‘facilitate pattern recognition or otherwise to extract meaning from qualitative data, account for all data, document analytic moves, and verify interpretations’ (Sandelowski, Voils and Knafl, 2009 p. 210 cited in Maxwell, 2010, p.476).

I looked into Greek-Cypriot students’ ideas as a whole for the same reason that I used percentages: in order to map students’ ideas at a broader level. I could have explored unlimited topics by using different analytic lenses in my analysis. However, this wasn’t the purpose of this Thesis. As this was an exploratory study aiming at ‘thick description’ (Section 4.3), I did not wish to break down the participants of this study in smaller ‘sample’ groups. For this reason, I did not employ analytic lenses such as gender and/or class. Furthermore, using these categorisations would require a) further theorising and b) addressing intersectionality. In addition, employing particular analytic lenses would result into fragmented descriptive accounts of the data and, consequently, to losing the big picture. Looking into the bigger picture of the data allowed me to be broad and open to unexpected findings and, moreover, to address the bigger implications of this study. Furthermore, breaking down data would hinder deeper description and, as a result, impede proceeding to some level of analysis. On the one hand, this study was not designed to provide an analysis of students’ ideas. On the other hand, the data obtained enabled me to draw inferences and to address questions such as: What do the recurrent patterns mean? (Chapter 6); What tensions are there? (Chapter 6, Section 6.2); How do different layers of ideas make a whole? (Chapter 6, Section 6.3); and, How do students’ ideas as systems of meanings reproduce culture? (Chapter 7).

I could also have proceeded into data analysis using school lenses. However, that would shift the attention from the students to the teachers. Indeed, one of the goals of this study was to alert educators on the implications of their teaching and enable them to make more targeted decisions by being informed on students' ideas, and categorising data in schools would allow shedding light on the importance in teacher instruction. However, although how students think could be traced back to teachers, the schools' culture, ethos, governance and socio-economic setting could be also 'variables'.

Data analysis was, at all times, a dynamic process. As shown in Sections 4.3 to 4.5, the methodological design of this research was not linear. Every pilot was crucial too, as it strengthened my understanding of the data and the questions I asked. Similarly, every cycle of the main data collection resulted to challenging existing perceptions and enhancing my understanding by comparing and evolving meanings. Moreover, the more I coded, the more I grew as a researcher. Yet, while the generative nature of this practice became clearer the more I coded, it became messier too. Writing notes and keeping memos on NVivo resulted to codes and ideas evolving and changing. I was in a constant dialogue both with myself and the data. The reflection ofn the methods and processes of analysis became even more systematic and rigorous. As the researcher does not exist outside the research, I believe that the constant challenges and susequent reflection on my findings were not a weakness, but enricied the research process and outcome (Palaganas et al., 2017, p. 427). Accordingly, I ensured the 'correctness' the findings I report in the next chapter, by pursuing to constantly develop my skills as a researcher but also my principles as an individual (ibid., p.430).

4.8. Credibility

As I see realities as constructions and since 'reliability' and validity are rooted in a positivist perspective, the latter two might seem inappropriate for using within qualitative

research paradigm. Instead, I adopt the stance that, in qualitative research, ‘validity’ and reliability lie within the specific case study in the form of *internal* dependability and confirmability (Guba and Lincoln, 1985). These two notions, show on the one hand that the findings are consistent and *could* be repeated and, on the other, that a study maintains *a degree of neutrality* (Scott and Morrison, 2005, p.208). Hence, although I do not consider the the present study a replica of phenomena, I do consider it to be ‘a coherent set of statements’ (Dowling and Brown, 2010, p.143), which needs to be established through contextual validity. Accordingly, while within positivist research could be made about generalisability, the present qualitative study, rather than making claims for generalisability, aims at ensuring the ‘roughly here’, in the sense of credibility.

In approaching credibility through the ‘roughly here’, several strategies for safeguarding dependability and confirmability have been followed. A first means of achieving credibility was through various triangulation techniques (Robson, 1998). These were as follows:

- i. I chose the two specific methods following qualitative traditions, that is written tasks and interviews, as these non-innovative methods increase the probability of producing valid and comparable findings.
- ii. As my sampling reflects a broad sample of students across Cyprus claims that the sample is indicative of how Greek-Cypriot students might think are possible.
- iii. So as to enhance the likelihood of success in ‘getting it right’ in terms of data collection, analysis and reporting, three cycles of pilot studies were conducted.
- iv. After each session of data collection, I reflected on my experiences, and if necessary I slightly modified part of the methodology for the next stages.
- v. Interview data highlighted issues which came up in written tasks and thus warrant further soundness with regard to data.

- vi. A considerable degree of warranted confirmability was built through contrasting and comparing data and accounting for clarity and consistency in reporting data, and
- vii. When considering the bigger picture in the study's conclusion (Chapter 9), limitations were explored.

Credibility has also been ensured through reflexivity – the awareness of how the researcher's involvement might have had an impact on the findings. Reflexivity was pursued through:

- viii. A thorough description of the procedures from the beginning to the end.
- ix. Reflecting on the social and educational setting within which data collection took place, and giving a detailed account.
- x. Taking into consideration language meanings and interpretation implications, and
- xi. Reflecting on the insider/outsider status, the impact, the subjects and the researcher/s had on each other.

Overall, I intend to use this study's findings to say *something* about history education and about how history educators *might* use these findings.

4.9. Upgrade and Pilot Study Refinements

The upgrade was an important milestone in reviewing this study's research design and conceptual framework. During the thesis upgrade, examiners pointed out the following two issues:

- i. My theorising of history, and history education was rather narrow, in that it put forward quite a fixed theorisation – that of disciplinary history – downplaying other dimensions of history and relating to history, such as public history and memory, with the latter being intrinsically linked to the context of Cyprus.

- ii. Similarly, instruments – specifically, the specific tool questions - did not seem to encapsulate the complexity of Cyprus’ specificities.

The examiners suggested that differences in historical accounts should not be examined in isolation from the Cyprus context. I decided that I wanted to take on these issues, and address the Cyprus particularity. I did so in four ways: a) I addressed the challenges that the Cyprus context might entail – that is, the ‘blur’ of history, caused by the historical understanding in Cyprus being at a rudimentary stage, as well as the persistence of the Cyprus problem (Chapter 1, Section 1.4); b) I took on the challenge of opening up how I theorise history education in the introduction, literature review, and conceptual framework; c) accordingly, I took into account the aforementioned dimensions, and included these in my sub-research foci; and d) consequently, designed my instruments in a way that they incorporate the above issues.

Following the upgrade, and in order to enhance my research design and ensure credibility, I conducted three pilot studies (Chapter 4, Section 4.10). These were ‘pre-studies’ to the main study. As a miniature version of the main research a pilot study can also enhance the likelihood of success in ‘getting it right’ in terms of data collection, analysis and reporting since one of its intentions is to assess the dependability of findings. Therefore, in order to follow sound research procedures in the main study, as well as to enhance the credibility of the research, it was imperative that I test the main research design. Specifically, piloting the study was necessary in order to:

- i. Detect any inefficiencies, obscurities and potential problems the instruments and procedures might have.
- ii. Give some preliminary findings so that I as a researcher could clarify or even reform the research question, and
- iii. Bearing in mind the above two points, to test whether the method of research and analysis proposed is indeed plausible for a larger set of data.

Indeed, the input of piloting in the main study design was valuable, as it offered some important observations in terms of the content and degree of difficulty of the accounts used in the written instruments. For example, do students see the accounts as ‘different’? Can they point out contradictions and other limitations that exist within a given source? Do students understand that different interpretations might represent and respond to different starting points or enquiry questions? And can they recognise the subjective nature of each of the accounts? Indeed, the first pilot study was instrumental in pointing out the need for further adjustments in the instruments. Through the three cycles of the pilot study I made improvements in relation to my instruments and thereby enhanced my research design.

4.10. Ethics

Ethics was an indispensable component of this research. The recruitment, recording and reporting of research participants was governed by the published Ethical Guidelines of BERA, the British Education Research Association (2011), while the research design was approved by the IOE Ethics Committee through the submission of the ethics form and by the Pedagogical Institute of Cyprus’ Ministry of Education through an electronic application. All the key principles identified by BERA (e.g. informed consent, the right to withdraw, the avoidance of detriment) were addressed in the design with the main ethical issues considered being consent, anonymity and confidentiality.

The participants in the research were students of year-12, aged 17-18. Consequently, their guardians permission was also required. Students were informed by the school about the research: their humanities teachers (Chapter 4, Section 4.6.2) informed them that a) participation was anonymous and not obligatory, b) they could withdraw participation or use of their answers at an time, and c) their guardian's participation was needed. As the participants were underage I provided a sheet for students’ guardians (Appendix 6). The top

half explained the aims of the research, my methods, the voluntary nature of the research, and so on. The bottom half of the sheet was the consent form: this should be torn apart, signed by the guardian, and returned by the student to the class' humanities teacher. This sheet was signed off by the Headteacher, photocopied and distributed to students by their humanities teacher. The purpose and rationale of the research was also described briefly upon the beginning of the research (that is before students started completing the written tasks). Participants took part in the research during school hours and within the school construction.

Sensitive data was collected under the definition of the Data Protection Act 1998. Steps were taken to ensure that what participants answered could not be traced back to them when the final report was produced, with pseudonyms used and the schools' location coded and changed in the process of writing. Nonetheless, students' names were asked at the beginning of the procedure, as some students might need to be traced later for further interviewing or participation in focus groups. The raw data will not be made accessible to third parties as they will be stored in a locked cabinet in a secure environment. Electronic data were also protected; this took place through encoding.

At the same time, one should bear in mind that *procedural* ethics cannot in itself provide all that is needed for the ethicality of/in research. Hence, a series of other ethical issues were also considered for the purposes of this research, and ethical reflection was employed throughout all stages. As with all research there is a potential for harm, stress and anxiety for research participants (Robson, 2011, p.194). An ethical risk might lie in the fact that students might have been exposed to narratives which do not ally with their personal beliefs and backgrounds. Some students might have also reacted adversely with regard to the task itself - a task opposite to traditional teaching in Cyprus. Both risks were seriously taken into consideration and were addressed through three means: firstly, eliminating deception (ibid., p. 205) in relation to the research and its purpose; secondly, assuring participants of

their right to withdraw (ibid., p.196), and thirdly, assuring students of anonymity and confidentiality (Robson, 2001, p.20).

4.11. Reflexivity

As I demonstrated in Section 4.8, one of the tools I employed to ensure internal credibility was reflexivity – that is, the awareness of how my involvement as a researcher might have had an impact on my findings. Not only is reflexivity at the core of qualitative approaches (Scott and Morrison, 2005), it is crucial when working with people, especially in educational research (Scott and Morrison, 2005). I embarked on this Thesis journey to explore students’ ideas about historical accounts having my own ideas, which I am fully aware of. As my position as a researcher by default contributed to and shape the research outcome, one way of shedding light on the non-transparent role of the researcher, is by illustrating the on-going dialogue between ‘what’ I know and ‘how’ (Hertz 1997 cited in Pillow 2003, p.178, cited in Couture et al, 2012, p. 89). In other words, it is crucial that I illustrate how my acquired knowledge, choices and beliefs came to be. A means of illustrating this dialogue has been by demonstrating thoroughly to the reader how meaning-making took place is the analysis discussion in Chapter 5.

4.11.1. The researcher’s role

As a researcher I was never neutral, impartial, or disinterested. Hammersley and Atkinson (2007)²⁶ highlighted that, when it comes to qualitative research, from very early on, observer roles are described, with placing roles on a scale from complete participant to completely observed. In the present study, I have sought to maintain a balance between the two perspectives described above. On the one hand, I took an insider perspective by turning my gaze on what is familiar (Merriam et al, 2001) and remaining conscious of the similarity

between my own characteristics and/or experiences with those of students participating in the study (Dwyer and Buckle 2009, cited in Couture et al, 2012, p. 89). On the other I have taken an outsider perspective because despite the similarities between myself and the participants, there were important differences (Couture et al, 2012, p. 90): they were young, I was older; they were students, I had a different status; some of them were male, I was female. Nevertheless, as Merriam et al (2001, p.405 cited in Couture et al, 2012, p. 90) argued, one is never one or the other: 'it is unreasonable to dichotomize insider/ outsider status and think of them as exclusive since they are based on our numerous intersecting identities, which are inherently complex'.

I have conducted this study as both an 'insider' and 'outsider', with all the implications involved. I was an insider as I had 'natural access' to the setting which I set out to explore, and was part of my participants' world (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). At the same time, I was an outsider in that I studied a group to which I was not a member. I have turned my gaze on what is familiar – yet I was never simply an insider: my status was at all times explicitly different to that of the students who participated in this study. Despite having shared experience and ethnicity with most of the participants, I held power over the process and content of the research.

That I was, to a large degree, an insider, unquestionably had its strengths. For instance, I belonged to the world of my participants (Couture et al, 2012) having the advantage of and understanding experiences that a researcher of a different race may not have the language or cultural knowledge to understand (Rhodes, 1994 cited in Couture et al, 2012, p. 90). Nonetheless, being familiar with much of what is seen could have been a drawback, in that over-familiarity might lead to overlooking critical data. It is also possible that familiarity resulted in partiality, as there is potential bias that can arise from too close an affiliation with research participants (Allen, 2004 cited in Couture et al, 2012). Nevertheless, researchers, just

like historians, cannot remove themselves from their practice, because they *are* part of the practice. Instead, the goal should be that the researcher engages with self-reflexivity at all stages of the research and being critical in the following ways: being able to explore her own practice, role, and relationship with the participants, their social status and framework of research, their interpretations, and personal experiences.

4.11.2. Meaning attribution and translation

In relation to reflexivity, it is also necessary to address that I, as a researcher, was involved in meaning attribution and translation. As already discussed in Section 4.2.3, realities are represented through language. For instance, what is coded, how it is coded, and why it is coded in this way, depends a great deal on language representation and interpretation, and the same applies to any attempt to find meaning. Of course, there is no such thing as neutral language. Nevertheless, even though the interpretation entailed in every hermeneutic study is deeply personal, it is possible for the researcher to ‘objectify’ data analysis to some degree, by adopting a reflective approach in relation to language meaning. This reflective approach in relation to language meaning will be discussed in relation to: firstly, students’ answers; secondly, language translation; thirdly, sharing meaning; and fourthly, the search for findings’ meaning.

The first issue which needs to be considered in relation to data and attribution of meaning is the coding of students’ answers. As language constructs language (Taylor, 2000), from the very beginning of open coding, I focused on and tried to be constantly aware of my own response to students’ language. I did so by keeping a diary where I took notes on codes – specifically, my thoughts and doubts about what they mean, and how I should name them. During all stages of data analysis, I kept revisiting this diary and reflecting on the decisions I took. At the same time, as interpretation was both linguistic and contextual, I paid attention

to the *context* of what was being said. Moreover, I relied on literature and existing research. This might have caused importing existing theory into the analysis, as was the case with my findings on students' ideas about a) truthfulness and b) nature of historical accounts.

However, comparing my data and codes with those of other researches proved extremely valuable in three ways: a) comparing my own inductive coding with that of other researchers helped me identify broad patterns and break down and categorise data; b) when, at times, differences between codes seemed to be a challenge, it helped in the final refinement of codes; and c), it was helpful in seeking out relationships between codes and data. Also, throughout the data analysis process I shared coding decisions and dilemmas with my supervisor. At the few instances when there was divergence of interpretation, this was mostly fruitful in that it enabled me to reconsider the data in a new light.

A second issue in relation to meaning attribution is that of translation which is also an interpretive act (van Nes et al, 2010). A consequence of this is that translation was subjected to double interpretation. In point of fact, one of the biggest challenges of this thesis was translating languages: I had to not only interpret the meanings of my data but also to enact interpretation of meaning while translating languages, which was the case throughout all processes. What I mean by this is the following. On the one hand, this research project was envisioned and written while in the UK. Therefore, the literature review, conceptual and methodological framework were conducted in English and were to a large degree influenced by UK traditions conveying meaning in English. However, the present study had as a stimulus the Cyprus context, where the fieldwork also took place. A third level of complexity was that in Cyprus the language in use is in fact a Greek dialect.²⁷ Consequently, although 'Κοινή' [Koine], the standardised official form of Greek, is the official language used in public services, documents, and school, in their everyday life in Cyprus people use the Greek-Cypriot

dialect. Another level of complexity in relation to translation issues was that students' answers were coded in the original – that is, in the Greek language – but were reported in English.

Translating data was often a challenge, and a number of translation issues have occurred. Translation dilemmas were numerous, and some translation choices were difficult to make - as with the concept 'στοιχεία' [elements]. Explicitly, in Greek, the word 'στοιχεία' can mean both information and evidence, with its original meaning being 'elements'. Although what the students meant was often made obvious from the context, this was not always the case. Moreover, as I show in Chapter 5 (Sections 5.1.5, 5.2.6 and 5.3.6), students did not seem to have a clear understanding of the concept of the 'evidence' – hence, the use of the word 'στοιχεία' [elements] at times became even more obscure. In every instance I translated the term paying attention to the sentence's meaning as well as its context.

A third issue that needs to be accounted for in relation to language meaning is *sharing* meaning when sharing meaning amongst a team (van Nes et al, 2010) – in the case of this thesis study, between myself and my supervisor. Meaning was negotiated on the basis of what is closest to the original, yet still makes sense in the English language. Last but not least, the search for meaning can be equally tangible in the reporting of data, as language meaning is being assigned up to the last stages of discussion (van Nes et al, 2010). This is because the complexities of meaning run throughout all researcher and reporting of data, not only when moving between languages, but also in the later stages of searching for meaning.

It has been argued that translation is 'not just a transfer of information between languages, but a transfer from one culture to another' (Hervey et al., 1995, p.20, emphases added). In the case of this thesis, findings were reported in English, with the subsequent discussion also taking place in English, which is not my native language. However, this is not necessarily restrictive, as one could raise the question 'Does it make a difference?' (Roth,

2013). I argue that what is important in translation is that words should ensure what *should* be conveyed rather than what could be conveyed (van Nes et al, 2010). Nonetheless, since translation is an interpretive act I am aware that meanings might have been lost in the translation and sharing process. I attempted to mitigate this by staying as close as possible to the original data for as long as possible (ibid.) and, at the same time, communicating findings in such a way that the reader understands, in so far as this is possible the meaning as it was expressed in the findings, originating from the data in the source language (ibid.).

4.11.3. The fluid nature of positionality

My engagement with this study was never static. Both my role as a researcher and the meaning I gave to my findings were fluid at all times. This Thesis lasted much more than the 6 years between my registration as a PhD candidate at the UCL IOE and the submission of my doctoral thesis. Meanings, therefore, were never fixed – what I know and how I know it kept changing and evolving over time. Similarly, my position as a researcher was always fluid. This is because the research journey shapes not only the research process and outputs, but also the researcher (Palaganas et al., 2017).

Moreover, although I held power over the process and content of this research, this took different forms. One of these instances was when I taught in one of Cyprus' higher education institutions while I was in the country for my data collection. I restructured the syllabus in a way that included theory, epistemology and pedagogical concerns, with special emphasis on history's 'know-how'. I presented to my teacher-students the difference between history's social and epistemological goals and, following on from that, the problems of the 'best narrative approach'. Next, I addressed how these problems could be mitigated through the use of history's know-how – more explicitly, through the use of a) secondary order concepts and b) enquiry questions. Some of my students seemed to realise the importance of

history's know-how while others seemed to have been ignorant of its importance. Overall, however, at the beginning, my students were largely reluctant to engage with this new form of knowledge. Gradually, one by one my teacher-students were convinced by why we address history in the classroom as more than content. At times, however, there was a feeling that the insights I gave them did not match with their concerns. Some of my students were still reluctant. 'All this was good' they acknowledged, 'but, how can we discuss Cyprus and the Congress of Berlin when our book says one thing and the sources another?'. Or, 'how can we teach EOKA in a critical manner when, at the same time, we are asked to organise triumphant school celebrations?'.

My students' concerns raised the issue of my positionality both as a researcher and as an educator: Why was I proposing to investigate students' ideas about differing historical accounts? My starting point was to accept that I saw history mainly as a methodology, excluding other modes of relating to the past such as memory which is very much prominent in Cyprus. This, of course, related to the fact that I was using knowledge and schemes from the British canon but also to the fact that I have been living outside Cyprus for more than 10 years. The changes brought about to myself as a result of the research process, as well as the personal challenges encountered, such as teaching teachers in Cyprus, made me realise that I was not simply seeking new knowledge. I realised that, through this journey, I acquired a further goal which was, in the long term, engaging with (history) education to contribute to social change. This has had an impact on a) how I formed my research question and b) how I analysed and attributed meaning to my data. The shift in my positionality was also vital in framing my data in a more wholistic way: Why do the findings of this study matter? (Chapter 10). How can they help teachers make more informed choices? (Chapters 6 and 7). And, how can they meet the needs of young people? (Chapter 9, Sections 9.6.7 and 9.6.8).

CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I described how I designed my methodological framework and how data was collected in order to answer the research question of this study: **‘What are 17-18 year-old Greek-Cypriot students’ understandings about differing historical accounts?’**. In this chapter, I discuss students’ answers with the purpose of a) mapping student thinking about historical accounts and, by doing so, proceeding to suggestions for history teaching and learning; and of b) raising wider implications about history education. By mapping I mean sketching students’ ideas in a way that would allow for the presenting of some of the students’ ideas: I do not claim universal applicability, nor generalisation to the population that I have sampled as ‘the best we can do is to arrive at a truth that makes a difference that opens up new possibilities for understanding’ (McLeod, 2001, p. 4). I intend to use data about the world to say *something* about history education and about how history educators *might* use these findings.

Here I report on 96 students from 9 schools who completed written tasks and participated in group interviews (Appendix 2). Pseudonyms were used and schools were anonymised. As I made a selection within my data (rather than reporting all of it), I am fully aware of all the implications this might entail. Yet, despite the fact that excluded data might shed new/different light on the findings reported here, I do not consider this to be a problem because the arguments put forward in this Thesis are made based on the data I discuss here and not all generated data. As the purpose of the data analysis was to provide a thorough description of student ideas, in this data analysis chapter I ‘zoomed in’ to students’ ideas at a high level of specificity (in a sense, I described the trees over the forest). Explicitly, zooming

into students' ideas at a high level of specificity allowed me to explore: a) the range of students' repertoire, b) which ideas are more advanced, c) whether some ideas are more prominent than others, d) what the barriers in more sophisticated thinking might be, and e) whether there is overlap between students' ideas.

For the purpose of discussing students' answers, I mapped student ideas in 'progression'-like models. My proposed levels are *tentative*, and their purpose is to be used as a) as navigation models for teaching and learning and b) broader categories of discussion with regards to bigger implications in history education. Hence, students' ideas about the nature of accounts are presented as frameworks and considered to be 'levels' of 'crude approximation' (Lee, 2004; Lee and Ashby, 2000). I arrived at the proposed levels by clustering student ideas in terms of simplicity: I started from the more simple/naive ideas and moved to more nuanced ideas and explanations in relation to a) how, according to students, we end up having differing accounts and b) thereafter, how (written) historical accounts are all together products of construction. For each code, I provide and discuss from one to three examples of student answers, depending on whether more examples need to be discussed in order to shed light to the nuances of the code.

5.1. How do we Acquire Knowledge of the Past According to Students?

5.1.1. Introduction

Ninety students provided 199 answers to the instrument questions a) **'How is it possible that, while two historical accounts refer to the same issue, the same event, they are different?'** and b) **'Why are there differing accounts in general?'**. I assembled these answers into 22 high-inference codes, as presented in Table 4, page 103. Students' answers

as to why accounts differ generated the largest number of low-inference codes amongst all data. For this reason, refining these into high-inference codes proved to be a challenging task. This was because open codes had to be clustered in a way that would enable me to represent the data more broadly, while at the same time avoiding eliminating the specific properties of the codes. As a result, some high-inference codes are an amalgam of sub-ideas (although the main notion is the same).

Students provided a variety of answers, which differed in terms of complexity and sophistication. Nonetheless, by and large, students utilised rather rudimentary thinking: most students whose answers are reported in this study faced difficulties answering the instrument question ‘Why do these two accounts differ?’ Their difficulties were of two kinds: a) identifying rather than explaining differences (in other words, students were providing descriptions when asked for explanations); and b) carrying limited epistemologies – in that these did not fully encapsulate the nature and properties of historical accounts. However, at the same time there was some evidence of more sophisticated thinking: for example, students referred to how accounts are constructed differently, or that differing accounts exist because of authors’ different standpoints. The four most populated codes representing students’ ideas on why there are differing accounts are:

1. *Author disposition*: numbering 40 answers.
2. *Account differences*: numbering 36 answers.
3. *Obscure agency*: numbering 17 answers, and
4. *Different opinion*: numbering 17 answers.

Five students did not answer the question or answered ‘I don’t know’ and five answers were coded as non-codable.

In order to group high-inference codes relating to why there are differing accounts into broader thematic categories I employed the analytical question ‘**How do we acquire**

Table 4: Range of student ideas as to why there are differing accounts

(N=199 student answers)

Code	Number of Answers
Author Position	40
Account Differences	36
Author Opinion	17
Obscure Agency	17
Author Distorts the Past	14
Author Adds Opinion	9
Different Standpoints	7
NA	5
Not Objective	5
Different Foci and Questions	5
Audience	5
Knowledge Gaps	5
Different Style	4
Partial Sources	4
Countries Act	4
Different Writing Style	2
Different thinking	2
Different Sources	3
Different construction	3
Inadequate information	2
Transmission errors	2
Information fades	2

knowledge of the past according to students?'. I employed this analytical question for two reasons. Firstly, in order to understand to what degree students were aware of the history writing process - that is, that there are several steps involved in the planning and execution of historical writing. Secondly, in order to ascertain whether students are conscious of the author behind the accounts. The six categories I devised were:

1. Author Absense.
2. Author Disposition.
3. Author Manipulation.
4. Author Investigation.

5. Authorship, and
6. Author Construction.

I show how codes were grouped into these categories in Table 5 below.

5.1.2. Author Absence

The first category I devised in order to make sense of students' explanations as to why accounts differ and to answer the analytical question '**How do we acquire knowledge of the past according to students?**' was 'Author Absence'. I labelled this category as such because in this category students answered in the following two ways: students either

Table 5: How do we acquire knowledge of the past according to students?

Category	Number of Answers	Codes	Number of answers
Author Absence	57	Account Differences	36
		Obscure Agency	17
		Countries Act	4
Author Disposition	57	Author Opinion	17
		Author Position	40
Author Manipulation	19	Author Distorts the Past	14
		Audience	5
Author Investigation	29	Transmission Errors	2
		Information Fades	2
		Partial Sources	3
		Knowledge Gaps	5
		Not Objective	6
		Author Adds Opinion	9
		Inadequate Information	2
Subjectivity	8	Different Writing	4
		Different Thinking	4
Author Construction	18	Different Sources	3
		Different Construction	3
		Different Standpoints	7
		Different Foci and Questions	5

answered *how* accounts differ or they answered as to *why* accounts differ, but through attributing account differences to countries rather than to authors. In both cases therefore, students did not acknowledge the existence of an author behind the accounts.

The ‘Author Absence’ category numbers 57 out of the 199 answers explaining differences in accounts, making up 28.64% of all answers in this group of data. This was the most populated category amongst the six broad categories explaining why accounts differ. I included three codes in this broad category – namely:

1. *Account Differences*
2. *Obscure Agency*, and
3. *Countries Act*.

The ideas represented in these codes vary in terms of sophistication. Specifically students’ answers in the first two codes refer to *how* instead of *why* accounts differ, while students’ answers in the third category refer to why accounts differ in a problematic way. The three ideas are similar in that in none of them was the author acknowledged. Differences were attributed to accounts just being different representations – hence they were included in the same category.

The first code I included in the ‘Author Absence’ category was: ‘Account differences’. Answers coded under ‘Account differences’ represent students simply *identifying* differences in accounts rather than explaining these. This code is made up of 36 answers.

[They differ] in that in the first account none of the European countries wanted a war while in the second [account] there was conflict.

(Nikolina, Written Task 1)

- 1) They have different historical facts.
- 2) In the second account it has more information.

(Marina, Written Task 2)

These students identified rather than explained the differences. Nikolina identified differences in terms of the accounts content. In turn, Marina combined these notions and identified differences in terms of both presentational manner and content. By focusing on the description rather than explanation of differences these students did not identify an author.

The second code I included in the ‘Author Absence’ category was ‘Obscure Agency’. Similar to the students above these students responded to *how* accounts differ rather than *why* they do. This code differs from the previous one (‘account differences’), in that students whose answers were coded under ‘obscure agency’ hinted at some kind of agency behind the accounts. However, it remains unclear from student answers whether agency comes from the author or from the accounts themselves. This code includes 17 student answers.

Because in the first account it is supported that Makarios himself caused the coup. And in the second [account] that Makarios does not constitute a cause of the coup.

(Amalia, Written Task 2)

One account differs from the other because in Account 1 it accuses Makarios to us and it focuses on him. And Account 2 talks to us in general in regard to the cause if the coup.

(Magda, Written Task 2)

In these answers, students referred to an abstract voice. As a result, it remains unstated whether an author is responsible for what is conveyed in the accounts; specifically, it is not made clear who ‘it’ is or who is behind ‘it’. For instance, Amalia used the third person to answer why the two accounts might differ: one thing is ‘supported’ in one account, and something else in the second. Hence, in this student’s answer it is not explicit who ‘tells us’ things. Of course, it could be argued that the expressions ‘one account [the first account] puts responsibilities’ or ‘tells us’ are commonly used in Greek-Cypriot language to imply agency. However, Magda’s stance was much more revealing of the obscure agency behind differing accounts. More explicitly, the student explained differences between accounts by making

reference to the way in which the account ‘talks *to us*’ about the coup, and ‘accuses’ Makarios *to us*. In doing so, much more to than in the other examples above, Magda clearly attributed agency to accounts. It could even be argued that as they are described as doing things accounts are being personified.

The next code I included in the ‘Author Absence’ category was ‘Countries Act’. This code conveys the idea that, according to students, differing accounts are the result of different countries’ actions. This code includes 4 references.

It is also in the interest of each country whether it will change the past.

(Dimitra, Written Task 1)

Each country records facts as she sees them. Things are written so as to accuse a country and the other to look innocent, for their own interests.

(Thalia, Written Task 1)

Looking further into these answers, students seem to explain account differences in terms of national involvement and interests. However, whereas answers included in the previous two codes were about *how* accounts differ, in this category answers in the final cluster were about *why* accounts differ. Despite this, here too students did not acknowledge the agency of an author. For instance, Dimitra pointed out that different countries have interests – hence we are presented with differing accounts. Thalia went a step further and argued that the reason behind different accounts is that countries want to make themselves look innocent. Stavros was more elaborate in relation to country agency: not only do countries want to express ‘their own words’, they make active use of whichever archive might be beneficial to them too. Answers grouped in the code ‘Countries Act’ tended to display greater sophistication than those grouped in the previous sections. This is because, unlike previous students, these students actually *did* answer the question of why accounts differ, which was the one they were confronted with. Yet, they still overlooked the agency of the author.

Overall, students’ answers in the ‘Author Absence’ category suggest that students have trouble understanding that there is author activity behind historical accounts. Students

whose answers were included in this category seem to perceive accounts as self- free-standing entities which represent or deploy the past, and not as outcomes of an author-generated procedure. It could therefore be argued that many students might never have thought about why it is that differing accounts have come to exist. For this reason they approached the question in two ways. Firstly, instead of answering why accounts differ – a question that was difficult for students, they answered *how* (in what ways) accounts differ. Secondly, those students who did attempt to answer the given question about why accounts differ were not equipped with the knowledge/skills to do so adequately and, as a result, they replaced the author with an entity which is familiar to them: that is, the country. What both approaches reveal is that student thinking on accounts lacks both the acknowledgement of an author, and the understanding of evidence as scrutinised and interpreted by an author, rather than being something abstract mirroring the past (Cercadillo et al., 2017).

5.1.3. Author Disposition

The second category I devised in order to represent students' ideas about why accounts differ was 'Author Disposition'. Answers coded in the 'Author Disposition' category displayed greater sophistication than those discussed in the previous section. This was because, in contrast to the answers within the previous 'Author Absence' category, these students recognised the role of the historian in writing an account of the past. Explicitly, with these answers, students suggested that account differences are a result of authors' disposition relate to: a) pre-existing opinions or b) different positions – including, but not limited to, the author's background. Accordingly, I included two codes in this category:

1. *Author opinion*, and
2. *Author position*.

This was one of the two most populated categories on students' ideas as to why accounts might differ, ranking equal first with 'Author Absence' category, and numbering 57 out of

199 student answers on why accounts differ. That is, 28.64% of answers show that students believe that account differences exist because authors take a stance which is based on their background or opinion – hence indicating that this is a very prevalent idea amongst students.

The first code I included in the ‘Author Disposition’ category was ‘Author Opinion’. This code represents students’ notion that accounts differ because authors can be predisposed to a certain position because of their divergent opinions. This code numbers 17 student answers. This was a homogeneous category of answers in that students attributed account differences solely to authors having different opinions about past events.

[Accounts differ] because each one [author] has their own opinion, he sits down and he writes it, so there are different historical accounts.

(Garifalos, Interview II, 1.39-40)

Because each person in their head understands things differently, or explains them in their own way. So do we, as receivers we perceive differently than others the fact. ‘When there is a truth, then there is no truth’.

(Persefoni, Written Task 1, quotations in original)

In this group of answers, the determining factor behind accounts was the authors’ opinion. Garifalos, for instance, indicated that authors just have their own opinions which they proceed to write down on paper. For him this process seemed natural as well as straightforward. Persefoni took to a more relativistic perspective of history: not only do different authors understand things differently, readers understand things differently too. Hence, as everything is a matter of opinion, we can never claim that there is one truth.

The second code I included in the ‘Author Disposition’ category was ‘Author Position’. Students whose answers were included in this code aligned with the idea that differing accounts can be explained by different author position, in terms of taking sides, having different ideologies, adhering to different politics, or having certain lived experience. This notion is more advanced than that of opinion imposition. This is because, unlike previous students who articulated that opinions are likely to shape how the author sees the

past, these students started recognising the *identity* of the author. Of course, they did so in a rather simplified and rudimentary way. Yet, the answers I included in this code show that students recognise that authors' identities have an impact on their work. Four ideas make up this code - specifically:

1. *Different sides.*
2. *Different ideologies.*
3. *Different politics,* and
4. *Different experiences.*

Altogether the 'Author Position' code numbers 40 out of 199 references as to why accounts might differ. This was the most populated code with regard to students' explanations of differing accounts.

The first student notion I included under the 'Author Position' code was 'different Sides'. That is, students put forward that differing accounts exist because authors are positioned differently, in that they belong to different countries or sides, or they are attached to different affiliations. According to students the author is positioned differently either because of their ethnic background or political affiliation. This underlines how they write the past – and results in the construction of differing accounts. The 'Different Sides' idea numbers 26 answers.

They are written by two different people, with two different opinions, since they belong to different camps. One author supports the position of Cyprus and the other that of Turkey.

(Evgenia, Written Task 2)

One [author] is German and he wrote to support his country and the other that he wasn't German and against her, against Germany and the rest that fought with Germany he wrote in opposition to the beliefs of the one that wrote the first text [account].

(Sofronis, Interview VI, 1.51-53)

In these quotes, students identified disposition in relation to the author's national background as the determining factor behind differing accounts. For these students belonging to, or

supporting, different countries or sides results in having different agendas – that is, defending one’s ‘own side’ or undermining ‘the other side’. For instance, Evgenia held the belief that authors’ backgrounds resulted in each supporting different sides. Evgenia did not clarify which camps the authors adhere to. Nonetheless, adhering to different sides seems to bring about supporting different sides. Sofronis followed the same line of thought: authors take sides. However, Sofronis’ answer was more elaborate in that he explained that the first author supports the Germans, where the second author is against them because he is against Germany. Again, Sofronis does not make it apparent what the second author’s background is.

In this category of answers, a causal relationship seems to emerge: because authors belong to different ‘camps’ they have different interests – hence we end up with differing accounts. Of course, it is difficult to establish this causal relationship based on the existing data. However, what seems to emerge from students’ answers is that different backgrounds or sides result in different interests. Although students did not use the specific word ‘interests’ they made it obvious that, for them, accounts differ because different backgrounds result in having different agendas – which explains the differing accounts we are confronted with.

The second student notion I included in the ‘Author Position’ code is ‘Different Ideologies’. In this group of answers students put forward that we end up with differing accounts, as the author’s background has an impact on their beliefs and ideologies. In other words, students explained differences in accounts in terms of authors writing within and/or employing a different spectrum of political ideas. The ‘Different Ideologies’ idea consists of 6 answers.

Because of the different political beliefs/opinions of the people that brought to the light these events.

(Margarita, Written Task 1)

Because each one person, influenced by his ethnicity and his political beliefs, he perceives and formulates an event/fact differently.

(Melanthi, Written Task 1)

...they might have been written...by two people that had different ideologies...

(Petros, Interview I, l.118-20)

In these answers students articulated that different accounts result from the authors' different political beliefs or 'ideologies'. For instance, Margarita explained that accounts differ as authors hold different 'political ideas'. Interestingly, in Margarita's answer, different political beliefs and opinion seem to go together. Melanthi expanded on this idea, explaining that according to the system of beliefs that authors hold they understand and formulate things in a different way. Lastly, Petros made overt use of the term 'ideologies'. Petros seemed to highlight not only a set of political beliefs, but a system of ethical ideas and/or doctrines.

The third notion I included under the 'Author Background' code is 'Different Politics'. The idea encapsulated by this code is different from the one discussed above. 'Different Politics' represents the notion that not only do authors come into history writing with different ideologies, but these ideologies are connected to different political parties. The idea here, according to students, is that by identifying the political parties that authors adhere to one can explain differences in accounts. Four answers make up this idea.

Maybe the two sources [accounts] are written from people of different political parties.

(Solonas, Written Task 2)

Obviously one source was written by a right-wing person.

(Nikiforos, Written Task 2)

With these answers, students argued that accounts differ as they are written by authors who adhere to different political factions. Examining the first answer, Solonas was rather indefinite in that he identified alignment with political parties as a *possible* explanation. On

the other hand, Nikiforos, not only seemed much more affirmative in the language he used ('obviously'), he pointed to the political affiliation of the authors too.

The fourth and last student notion I included in the 'Author Background' code is 'Different Experiences'. Students who expressed this idea answered that certain backgrounds and/or supporting different sides seemed to result in authors having different lived experiences and/or different perceptions of what happened in the past. Four answers make up this code.

...or let's say [according] to their experiences, they might have perceived it, the fact...

(Marita, Interview I, 1.24-5)

Well, it may be that some individuals have lived through these events, so they may see them from a subjective point of view, because when you have lived through something and experienced it and later described it you are not fully objective.

(Meri, Interview III, 1.28-31)

For these students, history comes down to lived experience which affects the author's writing – hence we end up with differing accounts. Marita mentioned the possibility that authors are likely to have views that connect to their lived experience which, in turn, might have influenced their perceptions and consequently the different writing of the accounts. Meri followed the same line of thought, but also elaborated further on this notion: she pointed out that we need to consider the fact that experiences may directly influence authors' interpretations of events, which might not be objective.

In summary, students whose answers were grouped under the 'Author Disposition' category approached the differing accounts by attributing these to authors' opinion or position, which might result to different sympathies and interests, alliances and/or politics, or experiences. Approximately one out of four students seemed to believe that account differences exist because the authors take stances in terms of their background or opinion,

such that this was a very prevalent idea amongst students. Yet, this notion can be problematic. Explicitly, the notion that partisanship can justify differences in accounts can be precarious in that: a) it reveals limited epistemologies, and b) it suggests a relative perception of the past, as I discuss in Chapter 6 (Sections 6.1 and 6.3).

5.1.4. Author Manipulation

The third category I developed to describe students' ideas about why accounts might differ and to answer the analytical question '**How do we acquire knowledge of the past?**' was 'Author Manipulation'. In this category of answers students explained that authors assimilate the past to become what they want it to be; in this way we end up with different versions of the past. This category differs from 'Author Disposition' in that student answers included in the 'Author Manipulation' category suggest that students see the author as *actively* changing the past (rather than the past passively coming into their writing because of their different disposition). Answers in the 'Author Manipulation' category suggest that students believe there are differing accounts because a) accounts passively mirror their authors' beliefs, or b) authors work actively towards manipulating the past and making the necessary interventions – that is, omissions, exaggerations or alterations. In this way historical accounts become biased reports which prevent the true story of the past from emerging.

The overall notion conveyed in the 'Author Manipulation' category is similar to that of the 'Author Disposition' category, as well as the notion carried in the code 'Countries act', which was included in the 'Author Absence' category. This is because all these notions convey students' idea that history writing is an outcome of different author positionality. Nonetheless, the idea that the author manipulates the past differs from the ideas included in the previous category, 'Author Disposition'. This is because in the 'Author Disposition'

category students pointed to authors' backgrounds, which might cause them to (passively) adhere to different sides and/or interests. However, in the 'Author Manipulation' category students put forward the idea that authors bring their interests in the archive and intervene in the past. Hence, this idea demonstrates greater sophistication in that it recognises the author's *active agency*. For this reason, this category of answers marks a shift from seeing the author in terms of identity to seeing them as an *active* entity. This category includes 19 student answers, making up 9.54% of all student answers about why accounts differ. This category includes different levels of sophistication, as I demonstrate below.

The first code I included in the 'Author Manipulation' category is 'Author Distorts the Past'. The student idea represented in this code is that authors readily put forward their politics and, accordingly, manipulate the past for their own or community purposes. This code consists of 14 student answers.

It is possible that at some point when someone attempts to write with the intention to serve political or economic interests and for this reason he goes to distort, to write differently a historical fact – that is one reason.

(Meri, Interview III, 1.46-48)

[Authors] violate history and change it for their own interests.

(Dimitra, Written Task 2)

In these quotes, Meri and Dimitra explained that history manipulation takes place because of vested interests. Meri avoided simplification and offered her answer as a possibility rather than an established generalisation: she explained that *one* possible explanation is that, at times, authors might have different interests, which leads them to distorting history - hence the differing historical accounts. However, Dimitra not only seemed to generalise and take the broad view that authors, in general, manipulate the past, she used much stronger vocabulary: authors 'violate history' and 'change it for their own interests'.

Interestingly, several students explained *how* exactly author distortion takes place: they did so by explicating the manipulation *processes*. These answers are more nuanced than the previous ones, in that students shed light on the *ways* in which the past is being manipulated by the author.

Both [accounts] use the same reference, the second [author] however *isolates* what he needs so as to prove his position.

(Nikiforos, Written Task 2, emphasis added)

Well because I know that one [author] that [has written] one account has his own opinion, he wants to blame Makarios; while the other [account] *had other details*, other sources, so as not to blame him.

(Markos, Interview IX, 1.76-77, emphasis added)

... [when authors] think that [accounts] they are not in your interest or that you don't like them...so therefore it is not objective and *you will not say everything* and *you will take a stance* – you won't just say the information you have and everything you have gathered, you will take, you will take a certain position, which however you should not take because it is your position, it is not the things that happened.

(Kiriakos, Interview VII, emphasis added)

Looking at these quotes, students identified the specific mechanisms that authors used to manipulate the past. For instance, Nikiforos pointed out that one of the authors isolates the information he needs so as to prove his point. In turn, Markos explained that the second author, as he does not want to place blame on Makarios, includes a different set of information and sources from the first author. Similarly to Markos, Kiriakos answered that accounts differ as one of the authors will keep aside specific information. However, Kiriakos built on this idea, he explains that the author, by hiding specific information and not being objective, takes a specific stance, which results in an account which 'is not the things that happened'. This notion resembles English students' idea that historians 'see what they want to see' (Chapman, 2011a).

The second idea I included in the 'Author Manipulation' category is included in the code 'Audience'. Students whose answers were coded under this code indicate more

sophisticated thinking than the ones whose answers were coded under ‘Author distorts the past’. The reason for this is because these students built upon the idea of vested interests, explaining how these are connected to *audience*: because of their political interests, authors want to influence or manipulate their audience – hence we end up with differing accounts. This is a more sophisticated idea in that students remark upon the *intentionality* of historical writing. This code is made of five student answers.

Each [author] has his own interests. Either to inform, or to accuse and justify.

(Melanthi, Written Task 2)

Undeniably, the first author, like the second one, have their own interests. Therefore, they want, in their own way, to support or accuse or blame a specific country, which in our case is Germany and then send subconscious messages to the readers.

(Arianthi, Written Task 1)

They aim to different readers, whom they want to manipulate and make them believe the things the strong [countries] want them to believe.

(Anaxagoras, Written Task 1).

In the first quote, Melanthi did not make explicit reference to an audience. However, by putting forward the notion that authors aim ‘either to *inform*, or to *accuse* and *justify*’, Melanthi implicitly gestured to an – intended or unintended – audience. Looking at the second and third answer above, both Arianthi and Anaxagoras made explicit reference to readers. Arianthi highlighted that, *undeniably*, both authors have their own interests; she then moved on to explain that authors aim to mislead audiences, and they do so by facilitating hidden messages about the past. With this statement Arianthi put forward that historians’ work is all about serving political interests, while historians are also assigned to the task of orienting readers in specific directions by ‘sending subconscious messages’. In turn, Anaxagoras was even more outspoken about influencing of the audience. This is because, whereas Arianthi made reference to ‘sending subconscious messages’, Anaxagoras articulated in a very explicit way that authors target different readers with the purpose of manipulating them, and ultimately *brainwashing* them. Hence, according to students,

accounts differ because authors write from the perspective of their different agendas with regards to their readers. This constitutes a powerful idea as it reveals that a) students understand that history is intended for an audience; and b) by doing so, they point to author *intentionality* – that not only do authors have agency, but they have specific objectives when they write.

In summary, in the ‘Author Manipulation’ category students performed in the following two ways. Firstly, students attributed differing accounts to author manipulation: that is, students put forward that authors intervene to the past by changing or manipulating sources and available information – hence we have different interpretations. And, secondly, a number of students recognised that interests are intrinsically related to targeting specific audiences. Overall, the underlying logic seems to be that authors know what they want the past to be – based upon their individual or community, ideological or vested interests – and they manipulate the archive in a way which will convince the relevant audience(s) accordingly. This idea is a weak one and one that should be highlighted as it reveals students’ understanding of history as unavoidably biased, leading to the ‘impossibility of history’ (Lee and Shemilt, 2004) – that is, to history being seen as a dead-end.

5.1.5. Author Investigation

The fourth category devised to group students’ responses relating to why accounts might differ and to answer the analytical question ‘**How do we acquire knowledge of the past?**’ was ‘Author Investigation’. Students whose answers were coded under this category appeared to suggest that authors acquire knowledge of the past by trying to uncover it in the fashion of archaeologists. Specifically, these students seemed to connote that history is a set of fixed facts which need to be discovered and reported. In other words, students saw history as an act of retrieval and differences in accounts as problems in acquiring facts, sources or

knowledge about the past. This was the third most populated category relating to why different accounts might come about, numbering 29 student answers and 14.57% of all answers on why accounts might differ. I included seven ideas in this category, which are expressed in the following codes:

1. *Misinformation.*
2. *Information fades.*
3. *Source limitations.*
4. *Knowledge gaps.*
5. *Not credible.*
6. *Author adds opinion, and*
7. *Inadequate information.*

These ideas make up a very rich category. Yet although the ideas conveyed in these codes were quite distinct and different in level of sophistication, they insinuate the same idea: that is, that history depends on the (full and accurate) discovery and displaying of facts. However, as I demonstrate below, ideas represented in these codes were not of equal sophistication. In general, in this category, students were able to recognise that authors look for different things, while they offered some ideas on what this investigation might look like.

The first code I included in the ‘Author Investigation’ category is represented in the code ‘Misinformation’. The student idea conveyed in this code is that, according to students, differing accounts came about because authors were given or had access to false information. This code includes 2 answers.

The differences between them are hardly any since minimum facts differ that maybe there is misinformation.

(Margarita, Written Task 2)

So as to see that, yes like Stelios said to compare, and whatever is similar it means they have happened, I simply don’t believe that, someone has been misinformed and he writes things –

(Marina, Interview VI, 1.23-24)

According to these two students, information might have been passed on in the wrong way. Both students used the same word, ‘misinformation’. Yet it did not become clear whether authors had been deceived or just misheard things. Margarita’s answer is typical of the history-as-a-mirror-of-the-past notion - history is set and fixed (Lee and Ashby, 2000) so that whatever information does not match must be a mistake. Marina seems to operate with the same notion– that is that the past is one and fixed. Hence, if accounts differ someone has been misinformed.

The second student idea I included in the ‘Author Investigation’ category, which represents students’ idea that history is an uncovering of the past, is conveyed through the code ‘Information Fades’. These students, unlike those whose answers were coded under ‘Misinformation’, not only suggested that different accounts might be the outcome of wrong information, they explained *why* we end up having misinformation: this happens because of the passing of time, which has resulted in information being differentiated. Two answers were included in this code.

...each author is certain about his sayings - [yet] as the facts are away from the present they are differentiated from hearing to hearing resulting to having different versions. This doesn’t mean that something is wrong but a bit twisted from what really happened.

(Eleftheria, Written Task I)

[each author] transmits it differently with, with different details, so those details can change big facts – let’s say one might say this information, the other might describe it differently, and in this way generation by generation some we change some things and it is completed...

(Markos, Interview IX, 1.17-20)

These students communicated the idea that accounts differ because information is lost in the passing of time. For instance, Eleftheria articulated that being ‘away from the present’ can result in things being passed on differently, leading to there being different stories about the same event. Interestingly, she added that having a different story does not necessarily mean we are considering an incorrect version of the past, but just ‘a bit twisted from what really

happened’. Hence Eleftheria seemed more negotiable with regard to the idea of an account being either true or false. Still, the use of the words ‘twisted’ and ‘really’ shows that Eleftheria thought of history as ‘a mirror of the past’ (Lee and Ashby, 2000). Markos also pointed out that some of these problems may include transmission errors. Markos seemed to believe that ‘details’ in accounts can change the ‘facts’ – hence he adheres to the idea of history as a picture of the past. That Markos saw history as a mirror of the past can also be seen in the vocabulary he is using; in suggesting that the past is being ‘transmitted’ to us, he seemed to be arguing that the past is carried to us intact.

The third code I included in the ‘Author Investigation’ category is ‘Partial Sources’. This code conveys students’ idea that accounts might differ as source limitations might impede the big picture from emerging. The idea conveyed in this code is that accounts might differ because using different sources can result in problems enquiring into the past; hence, these students explained accounts differences in terms of archival problems. The idea here is that sources can put across the big/complete picture of the past if considered as a whole. This category is made up of four student answers.

Their information is taken from other sources and at certain points from contradicting sources.

(Leda, Written Task 2)

These two accounts differ because they are based on different sources.

(Dina, Written Task 1)

Leda talked of ‘contradicting sources’. However, there are two issues that do not become explicit: firstly, what he meant by ‘contrary’ stayed implicit; and, secondly, it was not clear whether Leda referred to primary or secondary sources. What is more, with the use of verb ‘is taken’, she cued that information is taken out of sources. Leda therefore considered sources as mirrors of the past. Similarly, Dina seemed to be considering primary sources to be reflections of the past: the accounts are based on different sources – and not on different evidence or inferences (coming from the sources). That Dina too thought of history as a series

of facts, can be supported by the answer she gave on whether the two accounts can be simultaneously true: 'No because they are two completely opposite opinions'. In these codes, students put forward that archive limitations can be the reason behind differing accounts. The idea that accounts differ because there is lack of sources is not only an undeveloped one it is a hazardous one too, as it can impede students' historical thinking as I discuss in Chapter 6 (Section 6.4).

The fourth student idea I included in the 'Author Investigation' category is signified in the code 'Knowledge Gaps'. This code encapsulates the idea that, according to students, account differences are the result of authors failing to acquire certain requisite knowledge or factual information about the past. This idea is similar to that conveyed in the previous code – that is source limitations - in that students seem to focus upon procedural inefficiencies. However, here authors are limited in terms of knowledge rather than sources. This code includes five answers on why accounts might differ.

hm...maybe...maybe they [the authors] didn't, they didn't have a spherical picture of the situation that existed at the time, maybe they overlooked certain details...

(Petros, Interview I, 1.121-22)

Possibly, the reason they [the accounts] differ is because the author of the first account knows very few, summarily facts and situations about WWI, while the author of the second account knows specifically and analytically about what happened in WWI.

(Lenia, Written Task 1)

In these answers students seemed to consider differing accounts to be the result of certain gaps, either in terms of information or overall knowledge. Petros' answer was an interesting one in that he referred to the spherical picture of the past: because the author is missing certain knowledge/information about the past the resulting account is missing certain pieces of the past. The following two students not only made reference to an author who is limited in terms of knowledge, they made reference to one who lacks knowledge as opposed to a knowledgeable author. For instance, Lenia explained that accounts differ as one of the

authors has the summary version of the facts, in contrast to the second who knows WWI 'events specifically and analytically'.

The fifth student idea I included in the 'Author Investigation' category is represented in the code 'Not Credible'. I included more than one idea in this code. Students whose answers were included in this code indicated that accounts are not reliable, in that there is a) some kind of bias, b) procedural problems (lack of sources and/or opinion addition), and c) author credibility issues. This code includes six student answers.

Perhaps they did not extract information from primary sources or they have also included their own opinion in the account. There is also the possibility that there are interests behind each account.

(Aristos, Written Task 1)

First of all, when an account on the same topic is written by two different people it is certain that there will be differences. The two people because of diversity, difference of occupation, knowledges and way of thinking write some facts that are common, but they add or they don't mention some others which don't match to their personal opinion. Undeniably, these people add their opinion too, not to a large extent, but they still do so.

(Anastasia, Written Task 1)

Through these answers students gestured that we end up with differing accounts because (one of the two) accounts cannot be trusted. Confronted with the question of why the two accounts differ despite referring to the same event, Aristos offered two explanations: one, authors might not have 'extract[ed] information from primary sources'; two, they might have added their opinion; and, three, there could be interests underlying the accounts. There are two issues with regards to Aristos' answer. Firstly, for Aristos primary sources seem to operate as a kind of witnessing; and, secondly, altogether, the idea put forward by Aristos is that authors cannot be trusted. In essence, Aristos asserted that the author's *intentions* prevent the representation of reality.

In turn, Anastasia gave a more elaborate answer. She argued that accounts might have been written by different people who are positioned differently and who, because of

this, add their opinion. Nonetheless, *how* different positionality and thinking might give way to differing accounts was not explained. Through this answer Anastasia pointed to the contingency ('not to a big degree, but still'). Still, what came across in her answer was her scepticism with regards to the author, who intervenes in the past either by omitting things or by adding their opinion. Ultimately, these students discarded the credibility of either both accounts or one of them. Again, as I demonstrate in Section 6.4, this idea leads to the 'impossibility of history' (Lee and Shemilt, 2004) in that, according to students, we simply cannot trust accounts – or authors.

The sixth student idea I included in the 'Author Investigation' category is represented in the code 'Author Adds Opinion'. This idea differs from the previous one – namely 'Not-credible'. This is because for students whose answers were included in this code, accounts are not altogether failing to be objective, as students put forward in 'not-credible': these students seem to be suggesting that authors offered their opinion as an *additional* element. This idea also differs from another code discussed above – namely, author opinion - because students whose answers were thus coded stated that accounts are in their totality a matter of opinion. On the contrary, students whose answers are discussed here suggested that opinion constitutes an *addition* to the (true) facts. This code includes nine student answers.

...or [they] might have included their opinion *too* in the account.

(Leda, Written Task 1, emphasis added)

Because the first account, besides the historical facts, also mentions the authors' opinions while the second [account] does not.

(Eleana, Written Task 1)

Students who provided these answers as to why accounts might differ seemed to adhere to the notion that historians exercise their opinion with respect to the facts, such that we have differing accounts. Unlike those discussed above these students suggested that opinion imposition is deliberate, in that authors use it as an *added* element. For instance, Leda made reference to authors using their opinion 'too'. Eleana followed the same line of thought and

exemplified that accounts differ because one of the two authors provide their opinion besides the historical facts. Hence, according to these students, author opinion is an added belief to the (certain) facts of the past, obstructing the truth from emerging. This idea reveals students' broader notion of history as a positivistic practice, a notion I will discuss further in Chapter 6 (Section 6.4).

The seventh and final code I included in the 'Author Investigation' category is 'Inadequate Information'. Student answers grouped under this code demonstrate more sophisticated student thinking than those displayed in the previous codes of the author investigation category. This is because whereas students in the previous two clusters attributed inconsistencies between accounts to the authors' *failure* to acquire knowledge of the past, students in this category attribute differences to the *non-availability* of knowledge – in terms of evidence and sources. Basically, whereas previous students explained differences in accounts in relation to something missing, these students explained differences in terms of sources and/or evidence not existing. Two answers are included in this code.

Because the situations that prevailed at that time are not absolutely understandable. The position of Junta is not completely understandable, Turkey had not shown precisely her aims, that is it cannot be confirmed if it [the invasion] was for the protection of the [Cyprus'] Turks or because America wanted to enforce the invasion and the plans of Makarios.

(Sonia, Written Task 2)

...maybe for a historical finding there are many pieces of evidence and so we are not sure which piece of evidence – let's say the example of Amphipolis, hm, that we are not sure to whom the tomb belongs to because there are many pieces of findings that indicate different times, different, to, person, who belongs...

(Evaggelia, Interview VII, 1.40-44)

With their answers Evangelia and Sonia respectively gestured to how we cannot know things due to a lack of evidence or conflicting information. With the first quote Sonia suggested that the reason we have differing accounts of the same event is that there is not (at least for the time being?) enough light shed on the events - hence, incomplete explanations make for differing accounts. On the other hand, Evangelia illustrated that there might be multiple

evidence which *complicates* (rather than i.e. clarifies) the past. Through these answers, students made reference to the complexity of the past and, by doing so, saw missing information not as a problem of quantity but as a problem of insufficient evidence, - in that we cannot accurately extract conclusions because of inadequate information. This is a powerful idea in that it hints at how students can sense the intangibility of the past: it is as if these students have established that there is evidence of absence, in the sense that there is not existing information.

Looking into the answers grouped under the ‘Author Investigation’ category in relation to the analytical question ‘**How do we acquire knowledge of the past?**’ it seems that, in students’ heads, history is understood as a compilation of facts and/or sources which need to be retrieved by a historian. Hence, these students thought of history as an act of reassembling the past and, consequently, thought of historical knowledge in quasi-investigative terms. Students saw the account’s author as a kind of detective, who needs to exercise their knowledge and skills in a dexterous way in order to discover the past. This notion can relate to two other ideas. Firstly, students perceived the past as a factual reality. Accordingly, in students’ heads, when sources can be corroborated, we have safe results about the past - a notion that was very clear in the following answer: ‘Because each person takes information from different sources, so some coincide and some don’t’. Secondly, as students understood the past as a kind of puzzle that needs to be retrieved and put together, they consequently saw facts and sources in terms of (a necessary) quantity and not quality. In other words, students saw sources in terms of accumulating knowledge rather than constructed knowledge through evaluation and inferencing. At the same time a number of students did demonstrate some sophisticated thinking in that there was recognition of the density of the past. Still, the overall idea behind the ‘author investigation’ category is that account differences may be explained by the author being restricted as they do not have access to all the events – and, as a result, they fail to encapsulate the past fully. That,

according to students, history is grounded in sources and facts – with the historian being a collector and corroborator of the past - raises some interesting challenges for the learning and teaching of history. These are further discussed in Chapters 6 and 9.

5.1.6. Subjectivity

The fifth category I developed to represent students' answers on why accounts might differ is 'Subjectivity'. Students' answers in this category proposed that accounts differ because of authors' personal writing, thinking and construction of the accounts. For these students, accounts differ in the way they are written, thought through and put together because authors are individuals, and therefore have different ways of conveying the past. This category represents students' is an important indicator of sophistication as it marks a shift from the idea of the author as collector of information to the author as someone who has an impact on how the past is written through his/her subjectivity. Yet sophistication within this category varies, in that students attributed different accounts to authors just writing things in different ways because they are different people, to accounts differing because authors are *positioned* in a specific way – hence they write things differently due to their sources and/or school of thought, which affect their writing. This category consists of 8 student answers on '**How do we acquire knowledge of the past according to students?**', and makes 4.02% of answers on why accounts might differ. I included two ideas in this category, which varied in terms of sophistication:

1. *Different writing style*, and
2. *Different thinking*.

The first idea I included in the 'Subjectivity' category is represented by the code 'Different Writing Style'. This code represents the idea that, according to students, as authors are different individuals by default, they have different ways of writing about what has

happened in the past. Students therefore perceived authorship in terms of style and language used rather than craft. This code includes four answers.

Maybe one [author] wrote the events in a different way, and the other in another...

(Isidora, Interview I, 1.57-8)

Because most probably they were written by different people who have different ways to express what they want to say.

(Yiolanta, Written Task 1)

In these answers, students expressed the idea that accounts differ as authors have different ways of conveying what they have to say. Interestingly, all three students whose answers are discussed here seemed speculative in relation to the notion they conveyed ('maybe' and 'most probably'). With their answers ('mentions them in their own way', 'wrote the events in a different way' and 'have different ways to express what they want to say') all three students seem to consider authors to be passive conveyors of the past, with accounts being naturally different as different authors use different manners. Interestingly, all three students *speculated* as to why accounts might differ; that is, their answers constitute hypotheses and not affirmative statements. That these students provided hypotheses might indicate that these students did not have the opportunity to think about why we end up with differing accounts.

The second idea I included in the 'Subjectivity' category is represented in the code 'Different Thinking'. Here students seem to recognise that account differences might exist due to accounts being compiled differently because of different individual thinking- and not just because different information has been discovered. This code consists of four student answers.

Accounts are written by different people so each author according to the things he has studied he mentions facts in his own opinion.
(Evdokia, Written Task 2)

That is, the way *I* see it with my way of thinking and the pieces of knowledge I have etc, my, my logic says that he was a bad man. But some other person either [because of what he] thinks or because of experiences or because of the logic he

has, and says, OK Hitler might have done the things that he did, but he has correct ideas. Or he might even agree with the way he realised his ideas.

(Minas, Interview VIII, 1.68-72, emphasis in the original)

In the second quote, Evdokia referred to the fact that authors do not understand things in the same way, and also added that authors use different material. Although Evdokia did not refer to the author's 'thinking' in such an explicit manner as Danae, it is obvious that through her answer she was also making reference to the authors' different thinking processes or analytical practices, as she drew a connection between reading different things and mentioning them in their own opinion.

Similarly, Minas made reference to the authors' own way of thinking and the specific knowledge they might possess. Mina's response was more sophisticated than other students' responses. Minas acknowledged the authors' personal voices and identities when they write about history - not as a matter of disposition, but as part of the author's individuality. Thereby Minas acknowledged that authors who are positioned differently make different judgements. By employing the example of Hitler, he attempted to make a connection between causes and actions which establishes the cogency of the latter. It can be argued that Mina's thinking was quite sophisticated in that he referred to the author's *argument*. Yet, although he acknowledged that accounts can be more or less valid depending on how they are constructed, he did not recognise that arguments are linked to the quality of the construction. In other words, he did not recognise that arguments might be valid but not legitimised. This answer might have been a sophisticated one, still it falls within the overall notion of relativism: if an account is justified by the author's overall thinking it can be as good as any other; in essence, history according to Minas is a matter of logic, not methodology, as I discuss further in Chapter 6 (Section 6.4.6).

Overall both ideas included in the 'Subjectivity' category lacked sophistication. In this category, on the one hand, students explained different accounts as the result of different

writing styles; in other words, accounts differ as authors have their own individual writing manner. On the other hand, students recognised that authors have different thinking stances: they think differently, which may influence how they ‘understand things’, ‘mention them’, and build their argument. Indeed, the overall approach of students whose answers were coded in this category was more nuanced than those ideas offered in the previous categories. This is because these students acknowledged the *role* of the author with regard to differences between accounts. Yet these ideas seem partial as an explanation as to why accounts might differ, as they do not acknowledge how personal stances might result in different *selections* and/or *evaluations*. Nonetheless, the idea of authorship is a potent idea in that it can be the starting point for helping students to realise that different identities might result in different constructions and/or cause authors to focus on different things.

5.1.7. Author Construction

The sixth and final category I devised to represent students’ answers as to why accounts might differ is ‘Author Construction’. Answers coded in this category tended to display greater sophistication than those discussed in previous sections. That is, unlike students whose answers were discussed in previous codes, these students, although not always in an explicit manner, seem to move away from the notion of history as a mirror or digging of the past, and understanding history as constructed. This is because students whose answers were coded under the ‘Author Construction’ category pointed to the authors’ intervention, not in terms of background, agenda, uncovering of the past, or style of presentation, but in terms of *construction* accounts – to a greater or lesser extent. This category includes 18 out of the 199 answers relating to why accounts might differ, accounting for 9.04% of explanations of how we acquire knowledge of the past. Four codes were included in this category:

1. Different sources.

2. *Different construction.*
3. *Different standpoints, and*
4. *Different foci.*

The first idea I included in the ‘Author Construction’ category is represented in the code ‘Different Sources’. The idea conveyed in this code is that accounts differ as authors use different sources. This code differs from that of source limitations which was included in the ‘Author Investigation’ category. This is because students whose answers were coded under ‘Source limitations’ suggested that access to different or fewer sources can result in gaps or limitations in knowledge. On the contrary, these students saw different sources as an organic part of the authors’ construction of their arguments. This can be verified by referring to students’ answers to the instrument question ‘Can both historical accounts be true at the same time? If they can, in what ways? If they cannot, why not?’ Answering this question these students answered ‘yes [they can]’. By doing so, these students can be contrasted to students who answered that different accounts cannot be true at the same time because history is set and fixed (Section 5.2.2). Three answers were included in this code.

Because each person gets the information from different sources and, in this way, some coincide and some don’t.

(Paraskevas, Written Task 1)

It is logical that they [the accounts] differ since each historian e.t.c. takes the facts from different sources that differ.

(Eleftheria, Written Task 1)

With these answers, students acknowledged that authors build knowledge differently in that they use different sets of sources. Still, this was not a very powerful idea in that sources seemed to function to convey parts of the past rather than providing evidence through inferencing. For instance, Paraskevas explained that accounts differ because the author *gets* information, rather than simply ‘reading’ sources or hearing stories; and by doing so he points to the active agency of the author. In turn Eleftheria built on this idea and she

explained that it is natural for accounts to differ because different authors use different sources. Eleftheria's answer seemed more sophisticated than that offered by Paraskevas. This is because, by explaining that 'some coincide and some don't', Paraskevas seemed to adhere to the idea of a single and fixed account and to think of sources as verifying the factual past. On the other hand, for Eleftheria it seemed normal that different historians working with the same sources could end up with different explanations of the past.

The second idea I included in the 'Author Construction' category is represented in the code 'Different Construction'. Students whose answers were coded herein - to a lesser or greater degree of sophistication - put forward that accounts differ as authors construct them differently in terms of focusing on different aspects, using different analytical tools, using different sources and pieces of information, and extracting different conclusions. This quote contains different ideas. However, these ideas are similar in that they convey the students' notion that authors put accounts together in a range of manners. Three answers were included in this code.

Because the sources and the pieces of knowledge of each author are different and the way they understand the facts are not the same.

(Persa, Written Task 1)

...I also believe that there are different historical sources, well so...one author who studies history might adopt it from different sources and in this way to extract different conclusions.

(Amalia, Interview IX, l. 22-24)

Persa, explicated that not only do authors use different sources and pieces of knowledge, but they understand things differently. However, Persa was not explicit as to whether the two connect. Amalia too built on this idea: authors use different sources which results in them reaching different conclusions. Amalia's answer seemed more sophisticated than that given by Persa in that she connected different sources to different conclusions. Yet this idea is limited in that it did not become apparent whether it is the sources themselves or their *query* that results in different conclusions. In fact, Amalia's use of 'adopt' rather suggests that, for

Amalia, sources themselves can supply answers to the past. Noticeably, these students did not explicitly refer to author *intention*. Still, through their answers there was an implicit recognition of the author's intention in structuring things differently.

The third idea I included in the 'Author Construction' cluster is represented in the code 'Different Standpoints'. This code conveys the students' idea that as authors stand within a different time and geographical space, they account for the past differently – hence we have differing historical accounts as these were encapsulated and written in different contexts. This was the most sophisticated idea students demonstrated in relation to why accounts differ, with these students articulating that different chronological starting points might result in divergent views of the past. This code includes seven answers.

They differ because they were written in different times and by different people.

(Mariella, Written Task 1)

Basically what is different, hm..., it is because of the fact that they were written by two different perspectives, they might have been written at two different times.

(Petros, Interview I, 1.118-19)

Solonas: Also they might have been written in different time, they might have been written after certain facts came to the surface.

M.G.: Yes...?

Solonas: And [we] have [access to] new facts and new sources [accounts?].

(Interview III, Solonas, 1.56-60)

These answers mark a shift in students' thinking, as they seem to be suggesting that the combination of different personalities and different times might have resulted in authors grasping different aspects of the past. For instance, through their answers Mariella and Petros suggest that accounts constitute different studies of the past in that they were written in different times. While Mariella refers to accounts being written 'in different times and by different people', Petros summed up this answer using the specific word 'perspective' (to indicate how accounts are always situated in time?). Solonas offered an answer relating to the

same notion. Moreover, he added that due to the different times authors lived they might have had access to different facts and sources.

The fourth and final idea I included in the ‘Author Construction’ category is that, according to students, authors focus on different questions. Thus, they actively consider different topics of investigation relating to the same event. This idea was conveyed in the code ‘Different Foci and Questions’. This code consists of five answers.

Because there is a different perspective from the historians. The first [historian] saw the issue by looking into all the political moves of all countries while the second [historian] looked only the political moves of Germany.

(Giorgos, Written Task 1)

The source [account] might have a different purpose. One might aim to prove who is responsible, the other [might] aim to show the tragicality of the whole thing.

(Nikiforos, Interview VIII, 1.31-33)

These students explained that authors seek answers to different questions. Students therefore recognised that accounts differ in that they are different facets of the same event. For instance, Giorgos highlighted that the two accounts differ because the authors behind the two accounts focused on different aspects of the past. Giorgos used the word ‘perception’ – hence he suggested that authors write history through different lenses, rather through setting different questions. However, through his answer he was exactly right about the questions that the two authors set: the first author examined all countries as he was looking into the causes of the war, and the second looked exclusively into Germany’s political moves, for he was aiming to prove Germany’s responsibility. Similarly, Nikiforos speculated that accounts differ because they are a product of authors’ different areas of interest. Nikiforos’ answer was more nuanced than the one given by Giorgos in that he used the word ‘purposes’; by doing so Giorgos recognised that authors aspire to answer different questions in relation to the same event. In fact, Nikiforos provided an answer which was indeed very close to claiming that the two authors’ dissimilar motives resulting in the divergent foci of their

research projects. The author of the first account examined WWI with the intention of showing how the whole of Europe was gradually caught – through long-standing and more immediate causes – within a war which resulted in a tragic loss of lives. On the other hand, the author of the second account explored WWI with the purpose of demonstrating Germany's responsibility, by displaying the strategic and political moves she made starting from the end of the 19th century.

Moving up the student answers I included in the 'Author Construction' category to a higher level of generality, students understood history as a process of meaning-construction and as a process of revealing different aspects of the past and/or considering it in different ways. Specifically, students acknowledged that authors constructed meaning through differential interpretive mechanisms, such as setting different questions. This category of answers represents the highest level of sophistication regarding students' ideas with respect to explaining differences in accounts observed in my data. This is because these students' answers showed that the accounts are products of different constructions. This category of student answers as to why accounts might differ revealed some underdeveloped ideas, such as that they take information from sources at face-value. Arianthi's case, for example, demonstrates that a) many students, despite operating at a higher level of thinking, are still confined to limited and default ideas which constitute a barrier to more powerful thinking, and that b) for this reason students' thinking, to a large degree, is based on conceptual inconsistency rather than consistency. I discuss these two issues in Chapter 6, Sections 6.4 and 6.2 respectively.

5.2. How do Students Judge the Validity of Accounts?

5.2.1. Introduction

In this section, I discuss students' responses to the instrument questions: a) '**Can both historical accounts be true at the same time?**'; b) '**If they can, in what ways?**'; and c) '**If they cannot, why not?**'. Students provided a total of 180 answers in relation to these questions. Answers were grouped into 22 high-inference codes, as presented in Table 6 on page 137. The most populated codes relating to account validity are:

1. *Yes - if they don't contradict (or parts of them):* including 24 answers.
2. *Yes - but in their parts ('copy-paste'):* numbering 21 answers, and
3. *Yes - if they talk about the same thing:* numbering 20 answers.

Four students did not offer an answer to this instrument question. Two students answered that divergent accounts can be true at the same time but did not provide a justification why.

In order to group high-inferences codes on simultaneous truthfulness into categories I used the analytical question: '**How do students judge the validity of accounts?**'. In view of this question I banded together high-inference codes into the following six categories:

1. *History is Factual.*
2. *History is Experiential.*
3. *History is Biased.*
4. *History is Relative.*
5. *History is an Epistemic Product, and*
6. *History is (Theory) Construction.*

I show how codes were grouped into these categories in Table 7 in page 139.

5.2.2. History is Factual

Table 6: Range of student ideas on accounts' simultaneous truthfulness

(N= 180 student answers)

	Code Name	Number of Answers
1	Yes - If they don't contradict (or parts of them)	24
2	Yes - But in their parts ('copy-paste')	21
3	Yes, if they don't contradict	20
4	No - There can only be one true singular account	19
5	No or Partly Yes - History is always distorted	11
6	Accordingly - They need to be reasonable	10
7	Yes - Authors have different (political) opinions	9
8	Yes - Accounts are built differently	9
9	Yes - Things might just faded because of time	8
10	Yes - It depends on the reader	6
11	No - Only one side can be responsible	6
12	Yes - If there is objectivity	6
13	Yes – Even if it's difficult to find out	6
14	Yes - Just facts or sources might have been distorted or missing	5
15	Yes – Accounts involve meaning-making	5
16	No Answer	4
17	Yes - If they include citation	4
18	Yes - Stories could simply be distorted/exaggerated	3
19	No - We weren't there to know	3
20	Accordingly - We need to check against the evidence	3
21	Yes - No Answer	2
22	Possibly - We need further evidence	2

The first category I devised to represent students' ideas on accounts' simultaneous truthfulness and to depict answers to the analytical question **'How do students judge the validity of accounts?'** is 'History is Factual'. Students whose answers were included in this group seemed to hold the belief that historical accounts are the outcome of bringing together and re-assembling the facts; in other words, students see history as putting together the pieces to operate with the notion that there can only be one singular, true account of the past. Given this belief, students were predisposed to think about accounts in a binary fashion: accounts were either right or wrong, true or false, accurate or mistaken. The 'History is Factual'

category amalgamates 10 codes including 108 student answers, and making 60% of all account validity answers.

The first idea I included in the 'History is Factual' category is represented in the code 'Yes - If they don't contradict (or parts of them)'. This code is the most populated code in relation to truthfulness, including 24 answers. The idea here is that as long as historical accounts - or parts of them - don't clash, both accounts could be true at the same time.

The second account is opposite to the first account in some parts, therefore they cannot be both true.

(Leda, Written Task 1)

They can both apply up to a certain degree, because... the two of them do not clash in relation to the position of Germany.

(Aristos, Written Task 1)

I don't believe that both accounts are simultaneously true. Because one gets into the other – and how can I say it. One says one thing and the other comes to refute it, you can't say that they are both true when one cancels the other.

(Zinonas, Interview V, 1.98-100)

In this group of answers students articulated that variation in the overall accounts, or in parts of them, means that accounts cannot be simultaneously true. For instance, Leda exemplified how accounts can be conflicting in parts. Conversely, Aristos argued that since the accounts do not clash potentially they could be concurrently true. By answering so he indicated that consistent parts are essentially 'true facts' - hence if they match they are representative of a 'real' past. In turn, Zinonas highlighted that accounts refute each other as *overall* ideas, and cannot be true if they cancel one another out. Aristos followed Zinonas' rationale, by employing a reverse rationale: since the accounts don't clash they can both be true. This group of answers demonstrated students' notion that, in general, if accounts clash they cannot be true at the same time; if they do not clash they could be simultaneously true. Therefore, where accounts differ (to a large degree) one of the two is false.

Table 7: How do students judge the validity of accounts?

Category	Student Answers	Codes	Student answers
History is Factual	108	Yes - If they don't contradict (or parts of them)	24
		Yes - But in their parts ('copy-paste')	21
		Yes if they talk about the same thing	20
		No- There can only be one true singular account	19
		Yes - If they include citation	4
		Yes - Just facts or sources might have been distorted or missing	5
		Yes - Stories might have been distorted/exaggerated	3
		No - Only one side can be responsible	6
		Yes - Even if it's difficult to find out	6
History is Empirical	11	No - We weren't there to know	3
		Yes - Just things might have faded because of time	8
History is Biased	11	No or Partly Yes - History is always distorted	11
History is Relative	15	Yes - Authors have different (political) opinions	9
		Yes - It depends on the reader	6
History is an Epistemic product	21	Accordingly - We need to check against the evidence	3
		Yes - If there is objectivity	6
		Accordingly - They need to be reasonable	10
		Possibly - We need further evidence	2
History is a (Theory) Construction	14	Yes - Accounts are built differently	9
		Yes - Accounts involve meaning-making	5

The second idea I included in the 'History is Factual' category is expressed in code 'Yes - But in their parts ("copy-paste")'. The 'copy-paste' notion has been recorded by a number of researchers (Afandi, 2012; Chapman, 2009, 2011; Hsiao, 2008; Lee and Ashby, 2000). The idea behind this code is that history is grounded in the compilation of facts, citation or sources, through which the past is uncovered. Hence, according to these students the

truthfulness of the accounts can be retrieved by selecting and assembling their true elements. This code includes 21 answers. This was the second most populated code in relation to students' ideas on accounts' simultaneous validity.

Maybe some facts from the one [account] can be true, and from the other [account] that are different, to be still true.

(Efi, Interview III, 1.93-94)

Well at least in combination to other [accounts] we can extract a more correct result than the account he gave.

(Minas, Interview VIII, 1.136-37)

These students answered that accounts can be concurrently true *but* in their parts – in other words, accounts' truthfulness lies in their true parts. Consequently, students seemed to believe in the notion that we can decide whether a *story* is true by collecting and collating the true parts from various accounts. For instance, Efi's answer is very representative of the 'copy-paste' notion: this is because she explained that accounts can be simultaneously true in their parts in that one part can be true from the first account, and another part from the second. Hence, Efi clearly showed that she understood historians as *putting together* the archive and/or the past in a 'scissors and paste' fashion, and, in this way, creating historical accounts. Minas put forward a similar suggestion, in that he proposed that by combing the true parts of the two accounts we can fabricate a third account which is better than the ones the authors have given us. This idea is characteristic of the 'factual history' notion (Lee, 2003) – that is that history is a series of reported facts. Hence according to Minas, a compilation of accounts' true facts can result to a third account, which can be true(r) because it constitutes a composition of the past's factual truths.

The third idea I included in the 'History is Factual' category is represented in the code 'No - There can be only one true singular account (for the past is fixed and, hence, things happened in a specific way)'. The idea represented by this code is similar to that coded in 'Yes - But in their parts ("copy-paste")' in that these students too saw history as a set and

fixed past. However, unlike the previous students, these students expressed the idea that since there is a set and fixed past (story) things have happened in one specific way – hence it is impossible that two differing accounts are valid at the same time. If there is divergence between interpretations therefore one must be wrong because there can be only one correct representation of a singular reality (Lee and Shemilt, 2004). This idea includes 19 answers. This was the third most populated code amongst codes representing students’ ideas with regard to accounts’ simultaneous truthfulness.

Marina: No, they cannot both apply at the same time.

M.G.: Why not?

Marina: Because it’s not possible that the same things are happening and one to say this is what happened and the other [to say] differently. One of the two must have happened, let’s say apply.

(Marina, Interview VI, 1.60-64)

No, it is not possible, because here we talk about a person that is unique and it is not possible that simultaneously the same person to be in London and in New York as the first account tells us and in the other account to go to different places.

(Markos, Written Task 2)

In these codes, students elaborated that two accounts cannot be true at the same time as events either happened in a specific way or did not. Such was the written answer provided by Marina: ‘since only *one* thing must have happened, only one thing can be reported in the right way’. Interestingly, there was another connection between factual and experiential history: knowledge is ‘there’ to be found – however it may not be directly accessible, producing false or distorted stories. Following the same line of thought at the group interview, Marina rejected divergent accounts’ consistency emphatically: ‘surely only one of the two accounts must have happened’. Marina’s choice of words is interesting: it is not the past that ‘happened’, but the accounts! Therefore, it is the accounts that could have happened only in one way. The use of these words indicates how often in students’ heads the past is fixed and given; hence, this knowledge should be represented within a singular account. Markos too articulated that different accounts cannot be true at the same time, but was more illustrative than Marina. Markos explained why accounts cannot be simultaneously

true: a person cannot be in two different places - as it is argued in the accounts - at the same time.

The fifth idea I included in the 'History is Factual' category is represented in the code 'Yes if they don't contradict'. This code represents the idea that since the past is fixed and set: if accounts say the same thing, they are mirroring the correct past. Conversely, where accounts fluctuate one has failed to encapsulate the truthfulness of the past. This code includes 20 out of 190 answers on account validity, accounting for 10.52% of responses relating to accounts' simultaneous truthfulness.

Yes, just the first account has more details.

(Kalliopi, Written Task 1)

Yes, they just differ in the details and the meaning is the same and both accounts can be true.

(Markos, Written Task 1)

These students suggested that where accounts differ in more than details, they cannot be simultaneously true, since historical accounts constitute mirror images of a set and true past. For instance, Kalliopi and Markos pointed out that if historical accounts are made out of the same pieces of information they are true – hence if accounts say different things they cannot be consistent.

The sixth idea I included in the 'History is Factual' category is represented by the code 'Yes - If it includes citation'. This code represents the idea that because there are factual truths an account can only be true if it includes citation, or 'evidence'. Evidence operates as a corroboration of the past; therefore, if citation is included this means that events are real. This code includes four answers.

...the historical facts that the sources are mentioning are real, e.g. the UN conference, so both accounts can be true.

(Aristos, Written Task 2)

According to the elements that are given, the details that they give us and if they are the same - similar things, yes, why wouldn't they be true? ...We will lean towards the evidence.

(Stella, Interview VIII, 1.86-89)

In this group of answers students articulated that we need to check against the facts. For example, Aristos gestured that if the citation is correct then events are correct – hence accounts can be simultaneously true. In other words, it is as if providing a citation operates as recounting truths. Stella made a statement like Aristos ('the details that they give us and if they are the same, similar things, yes, why wouldn't they be true?'), but in addition she explained that she considered these 'details' to be *evidence*. Hence, what seems to be connoted by Stella is that dates capture the reality of the past, such that they operate as evidence. This idea of citation is similar to the copy paste idea, in that in students' heads citation, just like pieces of the past story, are fragmented mirrors of the past which, if put together, can reveal the full picture.

The next idea I included in the 'History is Factual' category conveys the notion that there is an existing singular and true past, which is however possibly distorted. This notion is found in two codes: namely, 'Yes - Just facts or sources might have been distorted-exaggerated-missing', with five answers, making up 2.63% of students' answers on simultaneous truthfulness; and 'yes - stories might be exaggerated', with three answers, accounting for 1.57% of all student answers on whether accounts can be true at the same time. Both codes carry the idea that things are bended, added, or omitted – either as a whole story or in parts of it; yet, behind this distortion there is the true past and that is why the two accounts can be simultaneously true.

Both accounts can be true on certain points. Both sides say some truths but also lies as they want to convince you by using exaggeration.

(Evgenia, Written Task 2)

Yes they can. When the information is from different sources it is possible that they differ as they can also be altered.

(Paraskevas, Written Task 2)

Through these quotes, students proposed that there is a set truth which can be retrieved, even though at times this truth is distorted. This idea builds on the ‘copy-paste’ notion, in that truth can be retrieved in pieces. However, in this category of answers, a new problem arises: these retrievable truths can be distorted. This was the idea expressed by Evgenia and Paraskevas, who respectively argued that different pieces of information can be true, but parts of them could be exaggerated or altered.

The ninth idea I included in the ‘History is Factual’ category, is carried in the code ‘Yes - Even if we don’t know which one’. The students whose ideas were expressed in this code argued that although it can be difficult to retrieve the past it is there to be found. Therefore, this idea extends the line of thought conveyed through the ‘history is factual’ category – that is, that there is a set and fixed past. This code includes six student answers.

Yes, they can, because we don't know accurately what has happened.

(Kristia, Written Task 2)

Yes, because none of us knows which of these facts are true or not, even if they have information and references, it is not certain that these are valid.

(Dimitra, Written Task 2)

In this group of answers students put forward that accounts can be true at the same time as the truth is somewhere out there and it is therefore potentially retrievable, even if we can’t find it. Yet recovering the truth can be difficult, not because things might have been exaggerated or altered, but because, not having enough information, we cannot be certain what has truly happened. For instance, Kristia, pointed out that since history is a matter of facts history should be known, but sometimes it happens that we do not know it. A similar approach was taken by Dimitra who argued in favour of the possibility of both accounts applying at the same time, despite the serious problems in uncovering the truth.

The tenth and final code I included in the ‘History is Factual’ category was ‘No - Only one party can be responsible’. Falling under the overall notion that history is fixed and set, and thereby constitutes a series of factual truths, students whose answers were included in this code held the belief that things could have happened in only one way because there can be *only one side* to blame. Hence, where accounts refer to multiple causes or culprits one of the two accounts must be wrong; it is as if, for these students, history is unilateral. This code numbers six answers on accounts’ simultaneous truthfulness.

No, absolutely not, because either Germany is responsible or not - we cannot measure responsibility and say a lot or little.

(Antonia, Written Task 1)

No because it says different possibilities. It is not possible on the one Makarios to be responsible for the coup and on the other hand EOKA B’.²⁸

(Maria, Written Task 2)

In these answers, students argued that there can be only one party to blame; hence if accounts carry the idea that responsibility lies with more than one country, party or people, one of the accounts must be false, and hence authors are lying. Such was the notion put forward by Antonia - Germany is either responsible or not: there cannot be multiple culprits, and it is not possible that Germany can have *part* of the blame. Maria, commenting on the Cyprus War, followed the same line of thought: she argued that there cannot be simultaneous responsibility as only one party could have caused the war. This idea is, in essence, about *causality*, the problematics of which I discuss in Chapter 6, Section 6.4.

Focusing upon those students whose answers were coded under the ‘History is Factual’ category at a higher level of inference, these students saw historical accounts as an assembly of singular factual statements (Lee, 2009). Since students reason that explanations are like singular factual statements the problem is relatively straightforward: as the past is fixed and things happened in a specific way there can be only one true account. The overall

idea of history's factuality can be evidenced in Katerina's answer, coming from one of the group interviews:

I don't believe that it is possible that both accounts are both simultaneously true because the truth is one; therefore, one of the two accounts will refer to the reality. Now: it is possible that the other [account] partly mentions some information which is correct but it is not possible that both are altogether true. One will present more facts that will respond to reality, and I will agree that it has to do with objectivity.

(Katerina, Interview V, 1.81-89)

Katerina's answer is very indicative of the fact that, according to students, history is made out of factual statements. Thus, when students are confronted with what appears to be a direct clash between two rival historical accounts what they make of it is that one of the accounts must be lying because there is a) deliberate distortion or b) some form of mistake. Therefore, the findings of this study support the literature finding that for many students, history is 'a compilation of information, thought of as pre-existent, waiting to be found and marshalled' (Lee, 2001). What is interesting, however, is that the students who took part in this project are older than those involved in similar studies. I discuss this further in Chapter 8 (Section 8.2), where I carry out a critical comparison of this thesis' findings with those of other researchers.

5.2.3. History is Empirical

The second category I devised to represent students' answers to the instrument questions that correspond to the analytical question '**How do students judge the validity of accounts?**' was 'History is Empirical'. This category conveys students' notion that if you were there and experienced events directly you could have known – what Barca (2002) referred to as the 'direct observation paradigm'. This notion follows on from the 'Factual history' (Lee, 2009) notion – that is that history is a series of factual truths. Yet the notion conveyed in the 'History is Empirical' category may be considered more advanced those included in the 'History is Factual' category - in that these students offer an explanation as

to *how* truth can be retrieved: that is, through personally witnessing or hearing it. Therefore, in this category of answers, students appeared to think of historical knowledge in quasi-empirical terms: historical knowledge is based on empirical reports – in other words, witnessing. This category consists of two codes:

1. *Yes - Just things might have faded because of time, and*
2. *No - We haven't witnessed it.*

In total the 'History is Empirical' category includes 11 answers, making up 6.11% of all answers on accounts' validity.

The first code I included in the 'History is Empirical' category is 'No – We weren't there to know'. These students articulated that as you can trust only what you can see and we haven't lived during the time of these events, it is difficult to judge whether all accounts can be true at once. This code consists of three answers.

I don't believe that they can be both true at the same time, but I cannot know because from the moment I haven't lived the facts, I cannot judge which is true, and which is not.

(Zinonas, Interview V, 1.89-91)

Undeniably the two accounts cannot be simultaneously 'true' since these people cannot write all history and I don't know the facts perfectly.

(Anastasia, Written Task 2, quotations in original)

Zinonas adhered to the 'direct observation paradigm' (Barca, 2002) – that is, that first-hand experience functions as evidence – in a very explicit manner: the only way we could have known is if we were there and, since Zinonas himself wasn't personally there, he cannot therefore know. Anastasia also made statements that are reminiscent of the 'direct observation paradigm' (Barca, 2002). She argued that historians can neither write everything (because they weren't there?) nor know the events in their totality. Hence it is doubly impossible to know what has truly happened. The notions that a) those who have experienced the past can present it truthfully, and b) consequently that, as none of us was alive in those

days, we can never know what is true, are not only erroneous, but make history ‘impossible’ – that is, a dead-end (Lee and Shemilt, 2004).

The second idea I included in the ‘History is Empirical’ category is represented in the code ‘Yes - Just things might have faded because of time’. This idea builds upon that of the previous code – namely ‘No - We haven’t witnessed it’, in that as history can only be represented if experienced directly, ‘faults’ in accounts might be due to flaws in the experiential evidence we have. The ‘Yes - Just things might have faded because of time’ code includes eight answers.

Hmm, yes. Because it is possible as we said before that someone has seen them [the events] but might have omitted something which he didn’t consider important. Hm, and maybe the differences they have are both valid, just someone might have not put some of them and included some other and that is why they differ. Hmm, yes. This thing.

(Isidora, Interview I, 1.273-76)

It is possible to have some degree of truth in both accounts. Each author, by writing an account is certain about his sayings [,] the events being away from the present are being altered from ear to ear resulting to having many versions. This doesn’t mean that something is wrong but a bit distorted from what has truly happened.

(Eleftheria, Written Task 1)

These students put forward that accounts can be (partly) true, if authors were there or relied on witness reports from those who had direct experience. However, there could be either first hand or second-hand mistakes. The first answer, given by Isidora, is very indicative of the students’ notion that authors know things only in light of their experiences, a incomplete notion as I demonstrate in Chapter 6, Section 6.4.3. Isidora followed this line of thought and suggested that knowledge of the past comes from personal experience. Nonetheless, according to Isidora authors might have included different parts of their experience. Isidora, further to the idea that authors must have been present at the scene of events, added another element: as authors were present, they could choose what to include and what to omit. Eleftheria expressed a similar notion: that is, that the past is handed on through word of

mouth. The notion here is still experiential, in that as the author was absent from the scene of the events he has to rely on word of mouth; hence, faults in accounts might be due to imprecision. In Eleftheria's words, when authors write things, they are certain about what they have in front of them. However, what is in front of them could be 'a bit distorted from what has truly happened', as it has been 'altered from ear to ear' by the time it got to the historians.

Overall, in the 'History is Empirical' category students not only pointed to the role of experience with regards to ascertaining the truthfulness of the past, but they considered it to be a necessary condition. According to these students lived experience can give us access to knowledge; in their view, acceptable historical knowledge can be established *exclusively* on the basis of either experience or observation. Since first-hand experience functions as evidence it is as if through experiential evidence we can re-experience the past and, consequently, verify what has truly happened. As I demonstrate in Chapter 6 (Section 6.4.4) this idea can be inherently dangerous in that it can reinforce the every-day life notion that the past can be accessed and (re)presented *only* if experienced directly.

5.2.4. History is Always Distorted

The third category I devised to represent students' ideas on accounts' simultaneous truthfulness and to answer the analytical question '**How do students judge the validity of accounts?**' is 'History is Always Distorted'. This category originates from the code 'No or partly yes: history is always manipulated', which I classified as a category as it signifies a unique and free-standing idea. Specifically, in this group of answers students seemed to be suggesting that accounts cannot be true, or they cannot be true in their totality, as authors align with different political stances and, consequently, present history in a way that

expresses their personal or collective identification. Hence, the overall notion of this category is that political views shape the way authors see and represent the past.

The answers included in this category were assessed as more advanced than those described in the previous category as in this category the author has an *active* relationship with the past; that is, rather than passively transmitting the things he has seen, experienced, or heard, he actively intervenes and changes past events and/or the archive. This category numbers 11 out of 180 answers relating to whether accounts can be true at the same time, making up 6.11% of all answers on simultaneous truthfulness. The ‘History is Always Distorted’ category consists of two ideas, which were grouped together as they communicate the same meaning.

The first idea included in the ‘History is Always Distorted’ category is that there are preconceived politics and opinions which populate authors’ accounts. Therefore, these distortions would misrepresent – to a greater or lesser degree – what has truly happened.

It is possible that they both have true information, it is possible however that none of the two [is true] because the person who wrote them might be supporting an opinion.

(Natasa, Written Task 1)

...it is true but not to a great degree – again for vested interests and such reasons.

(Solonas, Interview III, 1.82-85)

In these answers, students argue that it is impossible for accounts to be true in their totality, as bias and personal interests always come into play when it comes to writing history. For instance, discussing differing accounts’ consistency and simultaneous truthfulness, Natasa pointed out that accounts could be partially true, but one cannot exclude the possibility that authors might be supporting personal opinion. In turn, Solonas explained that ‘vested interests and these kinds of reasons’ make it difficult to believe that accounts can be altogether true.

The second idea comprising the ‘History is Always Distorted’ category is that not only do authors’ political views affect how they view the past but, what is more, they control and direct information and facts as they will, in order to manipulate the past. Therefore, whereas previous students suggested that authors’ political views affect the way that they see the past, these students suggested that authors *actively* distort the past.

It could be possible but up to a point. That is that some facts might have happened but from one point and onwards he [the author] brings it to his side as we also said before each one [author] had his interests, the...

(Renos, Interview VI, 1.80-82)

No, because all those who lived or did not live the war will use something that they saw, heard or happened, with the aim of convincing the others towards the direction they want. Therefore, we will ALWAYS and will never know the truth.

(Arianthi, Written Task 2, underlined and capitalised in the original)

Renos, in interview VI, illustrated how authors ‘bring’ the past to the point they want it to be at: would their interests be comprised, authors intervene to the past. That is, authors distort the archive; they know what they want the past to be, according to their ideological or vested interests, and they make the archive tell that story. The answer given by Arianthi is evocative of this notion and shows in a very elaborate way how, as we are left in a position where historians are, by default, prone to exercise bias, truthfulness is out of the question. Hence, again, author bias leads to the ‘impossibility of history’ (Lee and Shemilt, 2004) – that is, we can never know the truth.

There are three points worth discussing in relation to the overall notion expressed in the ‘History is Always Distorted’ category. Firstly, it is not erroneous to infer that the notion of *distortion* connects to the idea that accounts are *copies* of the past. Students seemed to be suggesting that the past has an objective and set meaning, and if people didn’t have political opinions, we could see it clearly for what it really was. The second issue that is worth discussing is that the word ‘interests’ prevailed and remained constant throughout students’ answers in this category. It is worth mentioning that in Greek the word ‘interests’ is a very

loaded term which connects strongly to politics and/or community or economic vested interests. Thirdly, it seems that, for students, opinions and politics merge. Amalia's answer on accounts' truthfulness allows us to make this hypothesis:

Hm, just simply the conclusion which is different as we saw in the two accounts, hm, might not apply neither the one or the other, maybe it is something in the middle that just due to interests each one [author] wrote what they believed.

(Amalia, Interview IX, 1.83-86)

Interestingly, in this answer it seems that interests and 'what authors believe', or opinions, merge. Although, whether and how this imposition takes place requires further investigation. I discuss this issue further in Chapter 6 (Sections 6.4.4 and 6.4.5).

5.2.5. History is Relative

The fourth category I devised to represent students' ideas about accounts' simultaneous consistency and to answer the analytical question '**How do students judge the validity of accounts?**' is 'History is Relative'. In this category students suggested that as history is a matter of opinion the simultaneous truthfulness of the accounts is author-relative and reader-relative. In other words, students signified that truth can be relative to the person writing or reading the accounts. Accordingly, this category is made out of the following two codes:

1. *Yes - Authors just have different opinions, and*
2. *Yes - It depends on the reader.*

In this group of answers students explicated account differences by orientating themselves to a past that is a matter of opinion – rather than construction, or interpretation – which explains why accounts can be simultaneously true. Altogether, the category includes 15 answers, making up 8.33% of students' answers on account validity.

The first idea I included in the ‘History is Relative’ category is represented in the code ‘Yes - Authors just have different opinions’. In this group of answers, author opinions seem to be perceived as natural – almost a kind of presupposition. This code includes nine answers.

Yes, they can because as I mentioned before each one writes in the way he thinks and perceives [things]. One understands them differently, and the other differently. There is never just one truth.

(Persefoni, Written Task 1)

Yes. There is never one truth! Each one [author] says what they believe.

(Persefoni, Written Task 2)

In the first quote, Persefoni pointed to the validity of differing accounts, and referred to authors carrying different opinions, thus pointing towards *perspective*. Persefoni’s reference to an author and their perspective makes it tempting to suggest that she might be referring to something more than opinion – for instance to an author’s positionality or theoretical stance. However, the next two components of the answer (‘one understands them differently, and the other differently’ and ‘there is never just one truth’) suggest that Persefoni operated within a relativistic notion. That Persefoni operated within a relativistic notion (that is, that accounts are simply a matter of opinion, for people say what they believe – hence there is not methodology or interpretation involved) becomes clear beyond any doubt from her emphatic answer: ‘Yes. There is never one truth! Each one says what they believe’. This can be argued to be the most extreme form of relativism: if different truths come from different beliefs this means that, according to the student, truth is equated with belief!

The second code I included in the ‘History is Relative’ category is represented in the code ‘Yes - It depends on the reader’. This code includes six answers, comprising 3.15% of all students’ answers relating to whether accounts could be simultaneously true. The idea conveyed in this code is similar to that enshrined in the previous code – namely ‘Yes - Authors just have different opinions’ - in that students accept the simultaneous consistency of accounts on relative terms. However, whereas previous students articulated that accounts

can be simultaneously true because of the author's relativity, these students argued that multiple accounts can be true at once because of relativity of perception. This code numbers six answers.

Well, ok, I have some different opinions on this topic. But, for me, personally, the second account is more valid. In this way, I agreed more with the second account in my written answers too. But if we consider that still in Cyprus even now that there are right-wing people and left-wing people, the two, gave different opinions. So, I believe that both are very correct according to what each believes.

(Constantina, Interview IV, l. 83-87)

I think that the facts and the evidence that each one has set were correct. The point is that the conclusion that comes out of each one, is necessarily subjective it cannot be objective. So, the conclusion depends on the reader too if he will accept the evidence as satisfactory or not, but the evidence is correct. I can say that mobile phone is big so it's not nice, and someone else [might] say it is of high technology so it's nice. The conclusion is different, the evidence however is right in both.

(Nikiforos, Interview VIII, l.100-05)

In these codes, students expressed the notion that accounts' simultaneous truthfulness depends on the reader's opinion - hence whether accounts are true or not, is up to the judgement of the reader. Constantina made two interesting statements. One, she explained why people might have different opinions: readers' politics affect the way they interpret the information and their views on the topic. Two, interestingly, Constantina drew on her own opinion ('for me, personally, the second account is more valid') to give an example of how truthfulness is reader relative. By referring to herself Constantina signalled that she is in the same position as the author in terms of judging the validity of accounts. It may be argued that this kind of answer might be pointing to the fact that students aren't exposed to the concept of being a historian by *profession* and, consequently, to the fact that historians work with a level of *expertise* which is different from opinion and from ordinary people's everyday judgements. This is a notion that could be related to the issue of trustworthiness, which I elaborate on in Chapter 6 (Section 6.6). Nikiforos' answer is much more sophisticated – yet he too operates within the relativistic notion: this is because Nikiforos seemed to be arguing that evidence for assessing the 'better' accounts is a matter of subjective, rather than

methodological, reasoning. That historical arguments are (exclusively) a matter of subjectivity, is a long-standing argument in the philosophy of history and one I discuss more thoroughly in Chapter 6.

Overall, students whose answers were included in the ‘History is Relative’ category articulated that divergent accounts can be simultaneously true as past representations are relative to authors’ and readers’ positionalities. The answers discussed above illustrate students’ notion that history rather than being a matter of criteria or methodology is a matter of opinion. The range of this notion can expand from perspective to relative validity and to an absolute relativism which accepts all accounts as valid. The relativist notion that history carries relative weight is significant as it demonstrates a) how students’ understandings *can* relate to the ontologies they bring with them, and b) their (consequent?) beliefs about the relativity of historical knowledge and their understanding of the relationship between objectivity and historicity. Furthermore, it seems that the relative notion of history c) is intertwined with students’ (lack of) standards about what constitutes (acceptable) historical knowledge - such as evidence being subjected to criteria and questions; and, in addition d) is reinforced by students’ pre-conceptions and everyday experiences (Lee, 2005). I touch on these issues in Sections 6.1 to 6.4.

5.2.6. History is an Epistemic Product

The fifth category of answers I devised to represent students’ answers with regard to the analytical question ‘**How do students judge the validity of accounts?**’ is ‘History is an Epistemic Product’. I labelled this category as such because students whose answers fall under this category seemed to recognise that accounts are products of an *episteme*, a discipline, in that they accepted or dismissed accounts’ simultaneous truthfulness by drawing on a series of disciplinary criteria such as neutrality and use of evidence. The notion of this

category connects to the notion conveyed in the ‘History is Factual’ category, in that there is a past that needs to and can be retrieved and represented accurately. Four codes were included in this category:

1. *Accordingly - We need to check against existing evidence.*
2. *Yes - If they are objective.*
3. *Yes - If they are credible, and*
4. *Possibly - We need further evidence.*

Altogether this category includes 21 out of the 180 answers on account validity, accounting making 11.66% of all answers in this group of data.

The first idea I included in the ‘History is an Epistemic Product’ category is that, according to students, we can decide on accounts’ simultaneous consistency by running them up against existing evidence. This idea is represented in the code ‘Accordingly - We need to check existing evidence’. This idea resembles that relating to citation, in the sense that ‘evidence’, just like citation, constitutes proof of a true past. Still, students whose opinions were included in the ‘Accordingly - We need to check existing evidence’ code seemed to hold more advanced understandings than those whose answers were included in the code ‘Yes - If they include citation’. This is because rather than referring to citation these students used a vocabulary which could be suggesting that they know what is entailed in the historical process. The code ‘Accordingly - We need to check existing evidence’ includes three answers.

From the moment that the first text [account] refers more in general but with more proof (including more chronological frames and names), we cannot consider both as simultaneously true.

(Arianthi, Written Task 1)

Certainly both accounts can be true at the same time, because no one has evidence and, if there is, no one can know for sure that this evidence is true, except through [conducting] scientific research and [having] the most evidence.

(Dimitra, Written Task 1)

Indeed, these students used vocabulary ('proof', 'scientific method', and 'historical evidence') which could indicate an attentiveness to the discipline of history. Nevertheless, these answers seem to be suggesting that they might not have a proper understanding of the discipline. Arianthi's answer, for example, is interesting as it reveals two differing - yet not irrelevant - ideas. Firstly, through her answer Arianthi emphasised that the *volume* of evidence is not only important, but it is the decisive criteria for deciding upon account truthfulness, a notion also put forward by Dimitra. Secondly, by making use of the word 'proof' Arianthi pointed to a positivistic conception of history where proof functions in an experiment test-like fashion: 'proof' can verify the reality of what is out there. On the other hand Dimitra employed the criteria of 'evidence' and 'scientific research' to assess the simultaneous truthfulness of the accounts. Unlike Arianthi, Dimitra did not conclude that the account providing less evidence must be false. However, for Dimitra too evidence seemed to operate on a cumulative basis: if more scientific research were to take place, we could assess accounts' truthfulness by seeing where *most* evidence lies. In general, in this group of answers, students articulated that triangulating accounts with other 'evidence' could help us decide whether these could be simultaneously true. In other words, for these students, (accumulation of) evidence is a prerequisite for true history. However, a) it remains implicit whether evidence for these students means something more than information, and b) it is the mere existence of this 'evidence', and not their interrogation of it, that matters. Hence, altogether it may be argued that these students don't seem to be knowledgeable about how evidence can be used in regard to legitimate and illegitimate representations of the past.

The second student idea I included in the 'History is an Epistemic Product' category is that one can decide whether both accounts can be true by testing their degree of neutrality. These students set a variety of criteria that makes an account objective - these are: author objectivity, not supporting a specific side, and including sources and information from all

perspectives. This idea was encapsulated in the code ‘Yes - If they are objective’, which includes four answers.

I would decide based on their objectivity, hm, with facts, I would go online and look what each source says if it has indeed happened but my first criterion would be objectivity because, both accounts on the second topic [Cyprus War] accused someone, one source [account] Makarios, the other source [account] did not accuse him but accused the Turks. This kind of thing... It is possible that he was responsible, however it accuses him, which is not objective for me.

(Phoeve, Interview V, 1.72-77)

No, because none of the historical accounts is completely true since they entailed the author’s subjectivity.

(Antonis, Written Task 1)

Phoeve’s ideas about objectivity are obviously quite weak, yet extremely interesting. Specifically: a) according to Phoeve, one can confirm an account’s objectivity through online corroboration; and b) in Phoeve’s assessment of objectivity there is absolute absence of the author: it is as if it is the accounts that make the accusations! On the other hand, even though Phoeve’s ideas are limited, she seemed to have explicit awareness of criteria, unlike most of the students who participated in this study. In turn, Antonis’ assessment of accounts’ simultaneous truthfulness was clearly author-based. According to Antonis, the author’s subjectivity is central in acquiring the truth of the past: were the author subjective by default the truth would be prevented from coming to the surface. Overall, in this group of answers students treated the question as a matter of fact: being objective facilitates the discovery of the truth.

The third code I included in the ‘History is an Epistemic Product’ category is ‘Yes - If they are reasonable’. This code carries a similar idea to that carried in the previous code – namely ‘Yes - If they are objective’– in that historical enquiry needs to provide us with valid interpretations of the past. The idea carried in this code is that what makes an account balanced is its trustworthiness; in other words, accounts need to make reasonable interpretations of the past. The code includes 10 answers. The idea here was that authors, in

their practice, need to resolve problems in a reasonable way.

No. You cannot support the Turks in any way.

(Kristia, Written Task 2)

No, they cannot because if Makarios wished for Turkey to intervene and save the Turkish-Cypriots[,] the Turks would not feel threatened by Makarios in relation to their position and consequently invade.

(Sonia, Written Task 2)

In these answers, students implied that the simultaneous truthfulness of the accounts depends on the soundness of what is put forward. Kristia was categorically affirmative of this notion: she uttered that one *cannot* possibly support Turkey, even though she did not explain why. Sonia was also affirmative: they cannot be true at the same time. However, Sonia, unlike Kristia, explained why accounts can be rejected on the basis of not being reasonable: that simultaneously, on the one hand, Makarios wished and tried to help Turkish-Cypriots and, on the other, the Turks felt threatened, constitutes a paradox. Hence, according to Kristia, it would be a fallacy to accept an account that conveys an irrational argument as true. Sonia also drew on the soundness of the argument in her interview answers, although she was not dismissive of the account's inconsistency like Kristia.

The fourth idea I included in the 'History is an Epistemic Product' category is that, according to students, in order to be able to decide on account validity we need *additional* information or evidence. More explicitly what is suggested here is that by having access to more information we could know best whether the stories are valid; and if they are, they can be true at the same time. This idea is represented in the code 'Possibly – We need further evidence'. This code includes two student answers.

In general, in this kind of accounts, further information might also exist.

(Anastasia, Written Task 1)

No. And, also, we cannot know that in absolute certainty since the Cyprus Dossier has not opened [to the public] yet. But these are opinions of the historians.

(Rena, Written Task 2)

Confronted with the question of whether multiple accounts can be true at the same time Anastasia pointed out that there is further information which we might not know about. Rena followed the same line of thought: we need *additional* information so as to be in a position to know. Assessing accounts' truthfulness with regards to the pairs of accounts on 'The Cyprus Events of 1974' Rena made reference to the Cyprus Dossier, an in-depth investigation into the Cyprus events in 1974, which has not been released to date. Interestingly, to the criterion of deciding whether multiple accounts can be true at once by consulting additional information, Rena added 'but these are opinions of the historians'. It is not clear what 'these' refers to; however, she could be referring to one of two things. On the one hand Rena could be suggesting that it is up to historians to decide whether (these specific) accounts can be true all at once, or she could be signifying that, were the Cyprus Dossier released, this further evidence should be assessed by the historians. Yet it is not that important which of the two propositions Rena posed. What is important here is the notion behind these propositions: both these propositions allude to the fact that, according to Rena, evidence assessment cannot be taken on by the ordinary wo/man: it needs to be carried out by those within the *profession*.²⁹ Although Rena referred to the author's 'opinion', and not judgement for example, this kind of thinking is much more advanced than the thinking we have seen so far, such as Melina's proposition that history simply comes down to opinion (Section 5.2.5).

Overall, in the 'History is an Epistemic Product' category students exemplified the notion that history can be recovered in scientific manner. It may be argued that in this group of answers students exemplified more sophisticated thinking than those previously discussed. For instance, a number of students suggested that we cannot reach safe conclusions about the past until we have access to the means that would allow us to further explore and construe it. Still, this notion might be a limited explanation in that the authors'

work involves giving a legitimate account using the evidence *at hand*. However, most of the answers in this category were flawed as they were underlined by a series of erroneous epistemologies. For instance, according to students, evidence has to do with quantity and not quality. This is an idea that started emerging in from the previous data set relating to why accounts differ, and one that I will discuss further in Sections 6.1 to 6.4. What is more, students' notion of the employment of 'evidence' goes back to students treating sources as a factual problem in reviving the past. Altogether, notions conveyed in this category are in line with the factuality of the past - that is, with the idea that if different truths (either pieces of the story or citation) can be collected by being assembled they can generate the full and true picture of the past.

5.2.7. History is Construction

The sixth and final category I devised to describe how students assess truthfulness and to answer the analytical question '**How do students judge the validity of accounts?**' is 'History is Construction'. In this category students appeared to employ ideas that show their understanding that historical accounts are methodological and/or theoretical constructions hence demonstrating that students *are* capable of sophisticated thinking. Deciding on account consistency, students treated historical accounts as constructions in two ways. Firstly, in that accounts are based on different sources and/hence different construction; and, secondly, in that accounts are different meaning-entities. Accordingly, the following two codes were included in this category:

1. *Yes - Accounts are built differently, and*
2. *Yes - Different meaning-making.*

Overall, the 'History is a Construction' category includes student 14 answers, making up 7.78% of answers on account validity.

The first idea I included in the ‘History is Construction’ category is represented in the code ‘Yes - Accounts are built differently’. Students whose answers were included in this code articulated that as accounts are based on different sources and/or development of the account they can be true at the same time. This code consists of nine answers.

I believe that yes, that they both can be true. On the other hand, because each historian sees each, he has his own look on things, he sees each historical fact differently. Well so, the way he will develop the historical account is different. I mean, well...

(Kiriakos, Interview VII, 1.61-63)

Yes, they can, since they were probably written by a different person and each writes the historical knowledge that he considers true and valid.

(Amalia, Written Task 1)

Kiriakos seemed to see accounts as being true because authors have their own ways of going about things (‘he has his own look on things’). However, Kiriakos went a step further and talked about how authors *develop* accounts differently, but he then ran out of ideas, suggesting that the explicit use of the verb ‘develop’ might not have been conscious. Yet Kiriakos’ answer clearly points to the construction of accounts. In turn, Amalia made a different statement with regards to account construction: different people evaluate historical ‘knowledge’ differently – hence they end up constructing their accounts by using pieces of knowledge that they evaluated as ‘true and valid’. Amalia’s answer is in fact a sophisticated one in that what historians do does not differ much from what she described. Altogether these answers are more sophisticated than those discussed above. On the other hand, interestingly, for these students, different construction seems to be a matter of perspective – and not methodology.

The second and final idea I included in the ‘History is Construction’ category is represented in the code ‘Different meaning-making’. These students appeared to suggest that accounts are a point of view that goes beyond the author’s personal prerogative. In this group of answers students articulated how two accounts might be true at the same time as the

authors behind them might have a) different foci, b) evaluated information differently thus leading to different conclusions, and c) have responded to different questions. The ‘different meaning-making’ code includes five student answers.

Basically, in the example...that in one [account] all countries are to blame and in the other [second account] Germany. So, in one [first account] Germany is also included. The second [author] what he does is to focus on a piece of the first [account] and presenting just this [and thus] creating wrong impressions to me that I am reading it. It doesn't mean that it is, that it is not true, simply he focuses somewhere specifically and creating me wrong impressions. While the first [author], describes what the second [author] described, so both are true, simply one hides some additional [aspects].

(Meri, Interview III, 1.101-109)

Partly yes, because the specific event might have happened but maybe it is not the reason why the War broke out.

(Theodora, Written Task 1)

Confronted with the question of whether the two accounts can be true at the same time Meri attempted to explain how both accounts can be true in that the authors might use and focus upon different facets of the same event; in other words, Meri very clearly pointed out that aspects of the past have been interpreted and represented. However, proceeding to explain further how both accounts can be true at once, her explanation collapsed: one of the authors has hidden certain aspects of the event. In turn, Theodora made the point that both accounts can be true narratives – in that they are truthful with regards to the events, but only one might be *valid* with regard to the question why WWI broke out. Theodora was in a position to tackle how historical accounts might be true – yet, at the same time they might not be valid if they do not respond to the question they claim to discuss.

On the whole, in the ‘History is Construction’ category, students appeared to employ ideas that show their understanding that historical accounts are methodological and/or theoretical constructions hence demonstrating that students *are* capable of sophisticated thinking. Obviously not all thinking demonstrated in this category is of equal sophistication; e.g. for students who referred to accounts’ different construction, different construction

seems to go back to *opinion*. Hence, this group of answers connotes relativism in that the construction of accounts seems to be a matter of personal perspective, where perspective is seen as an opinion and not as theory. At the same time, in this category students put forward that both accounts can be valid in that authors engage in different *meaning-making* practices. This has been the most advanced kind of thinking demonstrated with regard to the analytical question ‘**How do students judge the validity of accounts?**’. I come back to how students saw accounts as theorisations of the past in Chapter 6 (Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.6).

5.3. How do Students Attribute Authority to Accounts?

5.3.1. Introduction

The third group of data I chose to present for the purposes of this Thesis is students’ responses to instrument questions a) ‘**Which account amongst the two is best? Can you please justify?**’ and b) ‘**Is a more truthful account better as well?**’. Eighty one students provided 191 answers. These included a variety of ideas and were grouped in a total of 22 high-inference codes, which are presented in Table 8 on the next page. The three most populated codes were:

1. *More truthful*: numbering 28 answers.
2. *Most neutral*: numbering 21 answers, and
3. *More convincing*: numbering 20 answers.

One student identified one of the accounts as best, without providing an explanation. Ten students gave no answer.

In order to discuss student answers to the above instrument questions I employed the analytical question: ‘**How do students attribute authority to accounts?**’. Purpose of this analytical question was to explore what kind of criteria students employ in assessing differing

Table 8: Range of student ideas on account authority

(N=191 student answers)

Code Name	Number of Student Answers
More truthful	28
More neutral	21
More convincing	20
Assimilation	17
More clear-cut/comprehensive	14
Checking against (further) facts-evidence	12
NA	10
More analytical	9
More emphasis on Cyprus	8
Both need to be consulted-combined	7
None	5
Depends on the question	5
Theory construction	5
More concise	4
More inclusive	4
More didactic	3
Corroboration	3
More rational	2
None - It depends on the reader	3
Internal verification	3
Better sources	2
None - It depends on the author	1
Identification not explanation	1

historical accounts as representations of the past in general. In other words, this question aimed to yield data on how students attribute value to historical accounts. This analytical question had another use: I wanted to compare whether and to what degree the criteria students use to assess accounts' authority and usefulness overlap – that is, whether students use the same or similar criteria to weigh up an account's authority on the one hand, and an account's usefulness on the other. Unfortunately, due to word and time limitations, it was not possible

to follow up on this issue in this thesis report. Facilitating the analytical question: How do students attribute authority to accounts? I devised six categories:

1. *Textual Authority.*
2. *Narrative Authority.*
3. *Relative Authority.*
4. *Community Authority.*
5. *Epistemic Authority,* and
6. *Theory Construction Authority.*

High-inference codes were grouped into these six categories, as shown in Table 9 below.

Table 9: How do students attribute authority to accounts?

Category	Student Answers	Codes	Student answers
Textual Authority	27	More clear-cut/comprehensive	14
		More analytical	9
		More concise	4
Narrative Authority	59	More truthful	28
		More convincing	20
		More rational	2
		None	5
		More inclusive	4
Relative Authority	4	None - It depends on the author	1
		None - It depends on the reader	3
Community Authority	28	Assimilation	17
		More emphasis on Cyprus	8
		More didactic one	3
Epistemic Authority	42	More neutral	21
		Checking against (further) facts-evidence	12
		Both need to be consulted-combined	7
		Better sources	2
Modelling Authority	16	Internal verification	3
		It depends on the question	5
		Best corroborated	3
		Best modelling of the past	5

5.3.2. Textual Authority

The first category I devised to describe students' ideas in relation to the analytical question '**How do students attribute authority to accounts?**' was 'Textual Authority'. In this category, students judged accounts as text-based representations of the past. In view of this students chose as the best account the one that corresponded to the criteria of being analytic, clear-cut and concise. Students whose answers were included in this category saw historical accounts as textual artefacts and judged them as such. In other words, these students' choices were guided by accounts' *textuality*, or that which makes the past intelligible to the reader. Three codes were included in this category:

1. *More clear-cut/comprehensive.*
2. *More analytical, and*
3. *More concise.*

Overall, the 'Textual Authority' category consists of 27 answers, making 7.77% of student answers on account authority.

The first idea I included in the 'Textual Authority' category is that, according to students, the best account of the two is the one that is most explicable to read and understand. This idea is represented in the code 'More clear-cut/comprehensive'. This code consists of 14 answers.

The second account is best because it talks [about] specific things, clearly.

(Maria, Written Task 1)

The second [account], because it is easier to comprehend, and has more details.

(Alexandros, Written Task 1)

In this group of answers students assessed accounts based on their clarity. For example, Maria illustrated that the second account refers to specific things and in a straightforward way. Students also pointed to how comprehensiveness is enabled through lucid details; this

was the case of Alexandros, who argued that the more details an account has the easier it is to understand.

The second idea I included in the ‘Textual Authority’ category is represented in the code ‘More analytical’. This code represents the idea that analytical language has primacy when assessing accounts: in other words, students attributed authority to accounts by drawing on the criterion of whether language was used in a systematic way. This code consists of nine answers.

The first account because it talks with details and mentions facts.

(Ania, Written Task 1)

The first account because it tells us more details and guides us in a better way.

(Marina, Written Task 1)

In this group of answers students argued that accounts need to be analytically robust in order to be considered precise interpretations of the past. Answering with regards to WWI, Ania pointed to the detailed nature of the accounts and the reference to facts. Marina too pointed to the details being what makes for a good account. Moreover, Marina also offered an explanation as to why this is the case: specificities can guide us better.

The third idea I included in the ‘Textual Authority’ category is represented by the code ‘More detailed’. In this category of answers students chose the best account by identifying the account that was brief but comprehensive, whilst getting across a lot of information clearly at the same time. This code includes four answers.

The account which mentions the most important facts.

(Ariana, Written Task 2)

The best account is the first [account] because it includes just the important facts and in relation to Cyprus without much chatter.

(Panayiota, Written Task 2)

The first [account] I believe is the best because it refers more specifically to the facts that have happened and therefore it is better.

(Eleana, Written Task 2)

Within this group of answers students attributed authority to accounts based on whether these were concise or not. For instance, Ariana indicated that we can decide which the best account is by examining which account is more substantial in terms of the facts included. Commenting on the same pair of accounts Panayiota followed the same line of thought. She also highlighted that by referencing the important facts the story is free from ‘chatter’. Eleana employed the same criterion of assessment: she too chose the first account as the best one as it ‘refers more specifically to the facts that have happened’.

Overall, students whose answers were included in the ‘Textual Authority’ category judged accounts more in terms of language than content. For these students, language was held to have primacy in that it has priority in the attempt to understand the past. In other words, language was connoted as a tool that ‘guides us’ with regards to the past and, accordingly, is one that needs to be clear, comprehensible, analytical and substantial. This category of answers started to bring to light how the past cannot be regarded as separate from language, as ‘we are cocooned in a world of language, a world from which *we* cannot escape’ (Smith, 2006, p. 87).

5.3.3. Narrative Authority

The second category I devised to describe students’ ideas in relation to the analytical question ‘**How do students attribute authority to accounts?**’ is ‘Narrative Authority’. In this group of answers students assessed accounts as narrative-stories; in other words, students attributed authority to accounts as story-like entities. Accordingly, the five codes I included in the ‘Narrative Authority’ category are:

1. *More truthful.*
2. *More convincing.*
3. *More rational.*
4. *None, and*
5. *More inclusive.*

Altogether 59 student answers were included in the ‘Narrative Authority’ category, making up 33.52% of all student answers in this group of data.

The first code I included in the ‘Narrative Authority’ category was ‘More truthful’. The idea conveyed in this code is that a good account is an annotated account, since (as much as possible) citation makes an account truthful. Indeed, that accounts are preferred if they have more citation is not a new notion: citation as a criterion of truthfulness is an idea that has been repeated throughout all groups of data. This code includes 28 answers.

The one that gives more real historical facts.

(Antonis, Written Task 2, underlined in the original)

Andrew: According how much of the facts it contains. The facts are certain.

M.G.: You mean what?

Andrew: I mean let’s say the facts that are certain, the ones that we know that happened.

(Andrew, Interview III, 1.173-77)

In this group of answers students assessed accounts as truthful narratives where truthfulness of the past is proven through the citation of facts and ‘details’. Antonis referred not only to the citation of facts, but emphasised that accounts should cite the *real* facts. What seems to be emerging with Antonis’ answer is the ‘reality effect’ (Barthes, 1989): the real facts are representative of the true past. Andrew made a similar statement to Antonis: if the account includes the ‘certain’ facts – that is ‘the ones that we know that happened’ – then we know it is true. Andrew’s explanation was, of course, incomplete in that he did not explain how we could know that facts have happened, and therefore are ‘certain’.

The second code I included in the ‘Narrative Authority’ category is ‘More convincing’. This code conveys students’ assessment of accounts as narrative-stories which, according to students, need to recount the past in a believable and cogent way. For these students too (just like students whose answers were included in the code ‘the most truthful one’) citation was perceived to make an account a more truthful reconstruction of the past. However, these students not only preferred the truthful (annotated) account, they made it explicit that citation the power of transmitting the truth. Students whose answers were grouped under this code seemed to value the kind of narrative which can provide certainty and, accordingly, assessed accounts in terms of how convincing they are. This code includes 20 answers.

So, to be able to convince you that it’s right, it should give information, the things it says should stand, so it’s not whatever, and try to gain your interest so in the end to convince you that is right - that something like that happened.

(Garifalos, Interview II, 1.69-72)

...the dates show that – they make you believe more. Because they justify their position and the dates show that indeed it has happened that day. And it is truer I believe.

(Arianthi, Interview VI, 1.128-30)

The idea in this category of answers is that students considered that what makes a good account is claims or information being organised into convincing arguments which could establish warranted conclusions. Garifalos, for instance, referred to accounts’ validity as the criterion of judging a good interpretation of the past. For the English speaker the ‘things it says should stand’ expression might not make much sense; however, this is an expression which is very meaningful in the Greek language, connoting that if something ‘can stand’ it is credible. Thus, for Garifalos if an account can ‘stand’ it can ‘convince you’ ‘that something like that happened’ – hence, it is a good account. Arianthi seemed to agree with Garifalos’ notion of details making an account able to ‘stand’. Hence, by illustrating that we need to have citation as a proof of reality, Arianthi also followed the reality-effect notion with regards to historical accounts.

The third idea I included in the ‘Narrative Authority’ category is represented in the code ‘More rational’. This code is similar to the previous one in that it draws on the accounts’ rhetoric. However, these students, rather than referring to the accounts’ convincingness, referred to their rationality. In other words, students appraised accounts based on their reasoning. This code consists of 2 answers.

The best is the second account, it explains better Germany's motives, which are logical; thus, looking at her motives, Germany has been the cause for WWI.

(Antonia, Written Task 1)

I consider the second more valid, since no-one declares war without their consent.

(Anaxagoras, Written Task 1)

According to these students the rationality of the argument can be demonstrated through the display of a sequence of causes and effects which establish the facts in a clearer way, as Antonia articulated. On the other hand, Anaxagoras established rationality at the level of argumentation: one cannot provide an unreasoned explanation – such as stating that people declare war without consent, i.e. for the break-out of the war. Again, these students, like the previous students who appraised accounts drawing on their convincingness, seemed to be judging accounts based on their rhetoric: there are arguments that are rational and there are those that they are not. It is therefore relatively easy to decide which the best account is.

The fourth code I included in the ‘Narrative Authority’ category is ‘None’. This category of answers can be seen within students’ overall idea that there is a singular correct version of the past. In view of this, according to students if there are two accounts that are radically different one must be wrong – however which one is the wrong one? Or, reversing the question: which of the two is the correct one? Or is there a possibility that these accounts are both wrong? This seems to be confusing for students. The code consists of 5 answers.

I believe there are no criteria that we could [use to] define which the best is because they confuse us with the things they write.

(Kalliopi, Written Task 2)

Personally, I don't believe that there is a best one. Although it becomes clear in both accounts that Makarios is responsible for the invasion which would happen at some point anyway. Also, I would prefer A.1 [the first account] not to support Turkey that much and putting more blame on her.

(Anastasia, Written Task 1)

I personally know what I have been taught at school, without knowing whether it is correct. I believe we cannot know which of the two we can trust.

(Evgenia, Written Task 1)

Being faced with a pair of competing accounts was extremely confusing for Kalliopi, who, for this reason, became helpless when asked to suggest a way to decide on a better historical account, ending up rejecting both accounts. Anastasia was also caught between the two accounts. However, she approached the accounts' contradiction differently. Anastasia pointed out that both accounts agree in that Makarios bears some degree of responsibility – however the first account supports Turkey, a fact which was difficult for Anastasia to accept (does not match what we know from school and/or family?). Consequently, as none of these accounts conveys a narrative with which she could align, Anastasia found it difficult indicating which of the two is more valid. Evgenia also found it difficult to weight up different claims. Employing the criterion of trustworthiness, Evgenia also concluded that we cannot know which of the two is true because a) both seem difficult to trust, and b) even if could trust them, they don't match what we know from school – which indeed might not be trustworthy, but is the only measure of comparison we have.

The fifth and final idea I included in the 'Narrative Authority' category is 'More inclusive'. This code signifies students' notion that the best account is the one that is most broad, and at the same time comprehensive. Four answers were included in this answer.

The first account was best because it referred to all countries.

(Mariella, Written Task 1)

The first account because it gives us a more complete picture about the war and about the role that each country played.

(Stelios, Written Task 1)

These students assessed accounts based on their capacity to show the bigger picture with regard to the events they narrate. For instance, Mariella pointed to inclusiveness as a criterion of a good account, in terms of making reference to all the countries involved. Stelios's answer too clearly establishes inclusiveness as the criterion of assessment ('it gives us a more complete picture about the war and about the role that each country played').

5.3.4. Relative Authority

The third category I devised to represent students' answers as to what gives authority to accounts is 'Relative Authority'. In this category of answers students put forward the notion that authors and readers have different opinions about the past; hence, we cannot judge an account as being the best, as all accounts hold relative weight. Hence, according to students, for accounts which hold relative weight, none can be better than the others. I included two codes in this category:

1. *None – It depends on the Author*, and
2. *None – It depends on the Reader*.

Altogether four student answers were included in this category, making 2.27% of answers on what gives authority to accounts.

The first code I included in the 'Relative Authority' category is 'None - it depends on author'. This code conveys the idea that there is no better account, for accounts are merely different opinion stories. This code consists of one answer.

None, because it is clearly opinions of the historians.

(Rena, Written Task 2)

Unlike previous answers conveying students' notion that accounts can be valid all at once as they are the products of opinion – and different opinions are natural - for Rena, author opinion did not seem to be something that should be accepted. Rena could be arguing that as

authors have different matters of opinion both accounts can be equally good. However, for Rena, author opinion seems to be something unqualified, rather than something that would make both accounts valid.

Interestingly, relativity was also considered in terms of the reader. This idea is captured in the ‘None – it depends on the reader’ code, which is the second idea I included in the ‘Relative Authority’ category. These students too saw accounts as having relative authority. However, these students articulated that accounts’ authority is relative to how they are assessed by the reader, rather than how they are articulated by the author. One would have expected that these answers would come from the same students who put forward that ‘History is Relative’ because account authority depends on the *reader* (Section 5.2.5). Interestingly enough however, these answers come from different students, showing that reader relativity might be a broader notion. Three answers were included in this code.

Constantina: I will agree with Electra. Hm, it’s always based on the beliefs. That is, I won’t say which is the correct – I *cannot* do such a thing. In relation to my own [belief], but I believe different things from what are written inside – I will go with, with my interests, with what I read and *I* know is the right thing, irrelevantly that I can also see a different opinion.

M.G.: So none from the two can be good – even if we have a true one we cannot accept it as a good one?

Constantina: It depends...

M.G.: But [what happens] if everything is a matter of opinion?

Constantina: If I judge that that [account] matches to my own beliefs I will say that it is true.

(Constantina, Interview IV, 1.203-213, emphasis in the original)

We can determine that the second account is best, since it is also more logical but still this depends on the opinion of each person. Nothing is correct and nothing is wrong.

(Eleftheria, Written Task 2, underlined in the original)

In the first quote, Constantina pointed out that accounts are reader-relative narratives. Explicitly, she pointed out that whether a history consumer would agree with a specific account would be a matter of whether this matches her/his opinion, which is a relatively unsophisticated idea, as it resembles the idea that accounts are just opinions. Constantina

made reference to convictions, and by doing so she exemplified how relativity can be problematic, as it cancels history's authority. Eleftheria gave an even more relativistic answer. Although Eleftheria referred to rationality as a criterion of assessing a good account she clarified that determining the best account '*still*' depends on each reader. For Eleftheria accounts were clearly a matter of opinion, hence the relativistic judgement 'nothing is correct, and nothing is wrong'.

5.3.5. Community Authority

The fifth category I devised to signify how students attribute authority to accounts is 'Community Authority'. These students weighed up accounts against cultural frameworks, in other words they assessed accounts as cultural points of reference. They did so in the following three ways: firstly, by testing how accounts compare to official narratives; secondly, with regard to whether accounts give an insight into events in Cyprus; and, thirdly, by whether they can constitute a didactic narrative (for the future). That is, altogether the question of assessing accounts centred on what is relevant to the community and its citizens. Student answers which drew on these criteria were condensed in the following three codes, which comprise the 'Community Authority' category:

1. *Assimilation.*
2. *More emphasis on Cyprus, and*
3. *More didactic.*

Altogether, these codes include 28 student answers making 15.90% of all answers on account authority. Most of the answers in this category come from the two tasks on Cyprus' history.

The first idea I included in the 'Community Authority' category is that, according to students, accounts should be assessed against what we already know. This idea is represented by the code 'Assimilation'. I borrowed the name of the code from Piaget, who used the term to describe how awareness of the outside world is achieved.³⁰ Explicitly, Piaget argued that

assimilation of knowledge occurs when a learner encounters a new idea and must ‘fit’ that idea into what is already known. In simple terms we can think of this process as filling existing containers; accordingly, what the Greek-Cypriot students involved in this study did was to contextualise the past by using existing (prior) knowledge. This code consists of 17 answers.

Based on the knowledge we already have, because in combination to the historical account the conclusion will be more complete.

(Ermioni, Written Task 1)

The best [account] I think was the second [account] maybe because it is closer to what we learnt in school and also [was] more understandable in our heads.

(Margarita, Written Task 2)

Essentially, by suggesting that we should ‘combine the account with our existing knowledge’ what Ermioni argued is that the criterion for judging accounts is our own knowledge. In turn, Margarita made an interesting statement in that she made reference to existing knowledge obtained in school. That is, she highlighted that school history exposure can help us to weigh up the best interpretation of the past. With this argument Margarita proposed school history as the canon and the measurement criterion of a good historical account.

Within the group of answers that came under the code ‘Assimilation’ there was a group of students who seemed to be pointing out that assessing accounts should be a combination of considering existing knowledge and checking this against evidence. Yet these students’ answers seem to indicate that the two elements of the equation are not equal: sources and evidence do matter but only because they can verify our current knowledge.

I believe that the first account is better since it tells us the facts with more details, while also through my own historical knowledge, I know that the facts happened as the first accounts says they have happened.

(Solonas, Written Task 2)

In this quote Solonas declared his knowledge as an additional evaluation criterion (‘while also’). Yet, clearly, his ‘own historical knowledge’ is not an extra criterion but the benchmark

against which he tests accounts. Overall the notion here is that if ‘evidence’/facts/sources say so, and if these ‘agree’ with (that is, confirm) what we know, then our version of the past is the correct one, and thereby the best version of the two. In a nutshell these students chose the best account by employing *confirmation bias* (Nickerson, 1998 cited in Goldberg, Schwarz and Porat, 2000, p.187) - that is, they confirmed and strengthened their initial theories through the use of new information.

The second code I included in the ‘Community Authority’ category was ‘More emphasis on Cyprus’. In this code students rated more highly the account that placed emphasis on events referring to Cyprus’ history. This code consists of six answers.

The second account because it puts more emphasis on what has happened during the time that the Britain took over Cyprus from the Ottomans.

(Mariella, Written Task 2)

The second [account] because it has more detailed information for the events that happened so as to have the take-over of Cyprus.

(Sotiris, Written Task 2)

Mariella and Sotiris evaluated accounts in terms of organising the local past: if accounts engage more deeply or analytically with what has happened where we live these accounts are best.

The third and final code I included in the ‘Community Authority’ category is ‘More didactic’. Students whose answers were included in this code conveyed the idea that the best of two accounts is the one that can operate as an example for the future. Just like the idea represented in the previous code – namely, ‘emphasis on Cyprus aspects’ - this idea too has a community use. This is because the didactic aspect of history plays a role in how communities are shaped – present-wise, and future-wise. Three answers were included in this code.

At a 90% the true one is the more correct one, but on the other for educational and exemplary purposes maybe it is best if there is also a bit of lie inside. That

is, if we want to see it purely from a historical perspective, yes we will take the true one. But for other purposes maybe, it is what we said [before in the interview] that the goal justifies the means. That is if you want to give the example you want, I don't believe that it is wrong to change a bit a story.

(Minas, Interview VIII, 1.238-42)

...[Great Alexander] killed, he was a conqueror, maybe he has committed genocides where he went. But we can include that small lie inside and keep only the fact that he built cities, he did, he built constructions, he built temples, he was a leader example. That is we can, they can, all the leaders can take examples of Great Alexander let's say. From the way he encouraged his men, from the way he kept all those lands under his control with such a small army, because his army had very little [proportional] relation to the lands he conquered. So, you remove those that are not in your benefit and you keep that the Great Alexander had leadership skills from which we can take examples. It is what I said before. Historically it does not help us as Nicolas said. But from an educational perspective, this thing might help.

(Minas, Interview VIII, 1.269-79)

These two answers come from the same student, Minas. The idea conveyed in these answers is that a good account is one that makes an exemplary stance – that is it uses the past to give examples for the present and the future, even though other accounts might be more accurate. Explicitly, Minas explained that a true account can be limited in that it is good solely in historiographical terms, and offered a counter proposal by proposing that a didactic account has a positive role in that it can provide an 'example'. He offered a specific example drawing on Great Alexander, to whom Stella had made reference before him.³¹ Minas agreed with Stella that a different narrative might make a good account, and used Stella's argument to articulate his own with respect to what makes for a good account: Great Alexander's fierceness can be used as a lesson for the present in terms of good leadership.³²

All in all, students whose answers were included in the 'Community Authority' category assessed accounts as products of cultural use. For these students, history's value seemed to lie primarily in a) reinstating the existing histories – either these come from school or political attachments; b) bringing to light aspects of the communal past; and c) being didactic and bringing to the fore the culprits of the past. This is an issue that bares a series of

implications for the teaching and learning of history as I warn in Chapters 6 and 9 (Sections 6.5 and 9.6).

5.3.6. Epistemic Authority

The sixth category I devised to describe how students attribute authority to historical accounts is ‘Epistemic Authority’. Students whose answers were grouped under this category employed criteria which, according to them, relate to the methodology of history, such as providing evidence, or using more and/or appropriate sources. Again, although the way students used these criteria might be limited in that they do not fully encapsulate how history works, students who employed them gestured knowledge of the history practice and its epistemological nature. Specifically, students appraised the epistemic authority of accounts based on six criteria, which seem to concur with the scientific model of history – that is, that history is a kind of inquiry. Explicitly, students put forward that a good historical account can be assessed by: a) being neutral and objective; b) its content being tested against sources and/or evidence; c) both accounts having good parts which need to be consulted-combined; d) the sources used; e) its internal verification; and f) whether it can be corroborated by other historical accounts. Accordingly, the codes I included in the ‘Epistemic Authority’ category are as follows:

- 1. More neutral.*
- 2. Checking against evidence.*
- 3. Composition.*
- 4. Better sources.*
- 5. Internal verification, and*
- 6. Corroboration.*

This category includes 45 out of the 193 answers responding to the analytical question ‘How do students attribute authority to accounts?’, making up 25.57% of all answers in this group of data.

The first idea I included in the ‘Epistemic Criteria’ category is represented by the code ‘More neutral’. This is not a new notion: neutrality/objectivity as a criterion for evaluating accounts was also prominent in the previous groups of data (Sections 5.1.5, 5.2.4 and 5.2.6). Students whose answers were included in this code attributed authority to accounts that employed a more neutral argumentation. This is because subjectivity was thought to imply untruthfulness and bias. This code includes 21 answers. Students followed three lines of thought in relation to account neutrality. The first criterion indicating neutrality was authors not taking sides, as partisanship can result in bias.

A historical account, so as to be considered better, in my opinion, it should support the decision of the [Versailles] Treaty, and to question it at the same time. That is, to have a balanced opinion, supporting both sides.

(Nikos, Written Task 1)

A historical account would be considered best, if it supported partly Turkey and Makarios, without putting blame to both ‘sides’ completely.

(Nikos, Written Task 2)

The criteria is when it does not support or does not ‘separate’ the countries that is all the things they write not supporting one country and not saying what the specific country has done.

(Magda, Written Task 1)

Nikos stated that a good account should support both sides, rather than putting exclusive responsibility on them. Facilitating this criterion both with regards to Written Task 1 and Written Task 2, Nikos put forward that taking sides gives us a partial picture of the past. Similarly, Magda employed the criterion of impartiality: all countries should be discussed equally. Answering with regards to Written Task 1, Magda elaborated that ‘to see the topic from all the sides’ equals *objectivity*, which is what makes for a good account. What these

students have ultimately argued is that authors should not take a direct line of attributing blame – instead, they should be equally sympathetic to all sides.

Secondly, in order to assess accounts as objective students referred to how language is used in accounts.

Based on the phrasing style and the words which are used. That is, if there is use of sentimental phrases and absolute phrases, like the first account, it is possible that the author is subjective. Also, in the second account the author supports clearly that the war is responsibility of all countries, whereas in the first [account] this is not clear.

(Aristos, Written Task 1)

According to the intensity with which they present the actions and the beliefs of the people they present. If that happens, they support completely a person and it is possible that they are ‘biased’ and consequently not good.

(Aristos, Written Task 2)

Responding to Written Task 1, Aristos pointed to how subjective language might be biased; hence, more dispassionate language and detached writing results in a better account. The same student, answering with regards to Written Task 2, referred to ‘words’, but he also introduced the idea of *style*. It can be assumed that by style Aristos was referring to the ‘use of sentimental phrases and absolute phrases’. What Aristos seemed to be suggesting here is that the rhetoric stretch (that is, the art of using *language* so as to persuade or influence others) of the accounts disqualifies them.

The second code I included in the ‘Epistemic Authority’ category is ‘Checking against evidence’. The idea expressed in this code is that as the scientific method is a triangulation of facts and/or ‘evidence’ the best account of the two is the one that can be tested against the ‘evidence’ it cites. I included 12 answers in this code.

If we had more evidence on the Turkish invasion, then we would know better where to lean.

(Rena, Written Task 2)

Well, in my opinion, I believe it is the source [account] that has been studied for a long time like - yes, we will take the primary source, but we will also look into, like you said, the historians that take sources from other historians let's say. I believe the information will be more correct and more accurate and valid because they [the historians] will study and will know. But we need to take from primary sources too.

(Stavros, Interview IX, 1.67-72).

From existing proof, if I may call it that. That is, if it is recorded somewhere as a historical fact, the massacre, the genocide of a people, if we find huge burial sites with people buried in them, or something, something in these findings that proves that something like this may have happened, that opinion is more backed up by evidence; whereas if it just circulates as legend, as the words of someone, or some people, it is not so backed up by evidence.

(Meri, Interview III, 1.185-91)

Rena made reference to 'evidence', in that the existence of more of it would help us to know where things stand. Seemingly, Stavros could be referring to corroboration rather than testing against evidence: 'I believe it is the source [account] that has been studied for a long time [that it is the best one]' - however this seems a stretch. This is because Stavros did not suggest comparing accounts against what other historians have written, but against the *sources* historians have used. It would be tempting to suggest that Stavros refers to the historians' *use of* sources and not to the sources themselves; yet, in the last line of his answer Stavros returns to the employment of primary sources. In turn, Meri moved in a different direction, referring to evidence as physical materials – explicitly relics – surviving from the past, pointing hence to the *materiality* of evidence. It could be argued that Meri's answer also entails positivistic notions, in that, again, evidence seems to be taken at face value. Yet Meri's answer was more sophisticated than Rena's and Stavros'. This is because Meri gave an example of what evidence is, while the latter two failed to point to what counts as evidence.

In the 'Checking against evidence' category of ideas I also included student answers that indicated eye-witnessing as the criterion for attributing authority to accounts. This is

because students considered eye-witnessing to be evidence, as it could verify what really happened and, hence, indicate which account is the best.

If there were people that lived at the time, and saw the events with their own eyes and haven't heard it from some others.

(Solonas, Interview III, 1.196-97)

If we knew that one of the two historiographers possibly had personal experience either by himself or has learnt the facts from a reliable source, from which the words have not been changed for any reason, then this automatically, would make one of the two more valid, correct and therefore better.

(Kipros, Written Task 1)

Solonas drew on the authenticity of eye-witnessing: the fact that authors saw 'in their own' eyes mean they know what really happened. Kipros put forward a similar notion: we need to check authors' backgrounds and the accessibility they had in the events. It is as if through personal experience the past has the power to transcend the present. This idea is similar to the idea discussed above, in that knowledge of the past depends on 'evidence', although in this case evidence is thought to be experiential.

The third code I included in the 'Epistemic Authority' category is 'Composition'. This idea is similar to the previous one in that, just like the triangulation of 'evidence', the assemblage of the true pieces of differing accounts can uncover the true story of the past. This code includes 7 answers.

They are both [accounts] good because both are telling us for the same event but each one has some different information which gives us more knowledge.

(Yiolanda, Written Task 2)

There is not better source [account] because we cannot distinguish which is right and which is not. The triangulation of the two sources leads us to conclusions.

(Stratos, Written Task 2)

With these answers, students repeated the copy-paste notion, that is, that the true pieces of the two stories can lead us to the truth. Yiolanda indicated that both accounts have useful elements which need to be combined. In turn, Stratos used the exact word 'triangulation'.

The fourth code I included in the ‘Epistemic Authority’ category is ‘Sources’. The idea expressed in this code is that accounts can be assessed based on the sources which have been used in their construction. This code includes two answers.

Based on the sources of the historical account.

(Nikiforos, Written Task 1)

Based on their historical sources.

(Nikiforos, Written Task 2)

Both answers come from the same student. It is not made clear on what grounds Nikiforos referred to sources as a criterion of assessment: Are sources a mirror of the past – hence we can use them to triangulate the truthfulness of the accounts? Or are sources a source of ‘evidence’ - hence, if they provide citation, they make the account truthful? Or was Nikiforos referring to the selection and interpretation of sources?

Overall students’ ideas as discussed in the ‘Epistemic Authority’ category demonstrate a kind of paradox. On the one hand, students seem to be aware of the process that a historian goes through in putting together a historical account – such as assimilating factual evidence and being neutral. However, these ideas seem to exist at a rudimentary level. This could be explained by the fact that although students judged history as ‘episteme’ they did so by seeing episteme in a natural sciences way, where science can illustrate the truth. Hence, students seem to consider history as akin to chemistry or maths, which are based on a series of laws giving science authority and which need to be followed with no bias or personal intervention, as students very strongly showed through their answers. Accordingly, students considered that if one follows all the right steps we can have a valid result. I illustrate how this constitutes a conundrum in Chapter 6 (Section 6.4.7).

5.3.7. Modelling Authority

The sixth and final category I devised to describe students' ideas about the authority of historical accounts is 'Modelling Authority'. I named the category as such because students whose answers were included under this category evaluated accounts as narratives that *model* – in other words, conceptualise - the past in specific ways. These students, prioritised accounts which were more like 'picturing' rather than reproducing the past. I included four codes in this category.

1. Internal verification.

2. It depends on the question.

3. Best corroborated, and

4. Best modelling of the past.

The 'Modelling Authority' category includes 16 answers, making up 9.09% out of all answers on how students attribute authority to accounts.

The first idea I included in the 'Epistemic Criteria' category is carried in the code 'Internal verification'. This is quite a sophisticated notion, as students pointed to the accounts' course of thought and demanded for a basis of reasoning. This code includes three answers. These answers resemble previous ideas about accounts being constructed differently (Sections 5.1.7 and 5.2.7).

The second account because it justifies and reasons better the opinions and the facts which are mentioned.

(Renos, Written Task 1)

From the way it starts and ends, and how it evolves.

(Mirianthi, Written Task 1)

With these answers Renos referred to internal consistency, while Mirianthi alluded to the progression and unfolding of the argument: whereas before students saw history as a kind of equation, where we can have all the right elements, in this category of answers students seemed to be arguing that in order to assess an account as a good one there needs to be a demonstration of how the argument was constructed. It may be suggested that these answers

in fact refer to the ‘know-how’ (Lee and Ashby, 2000) of the accounts; or, in other words, to how historians do history.

The second idea I included in the ‘Modelling Authority’ category is represented in the code ‘Different reader questions’. This code conveys the notion that according to students, accounts are question-relative, hence they have a *utility* value. This code consists of five answers.

Both accounts because each reader might be interested in different information which he might find either in the first or the second account.

(Paraskevas, Written Task 2)

If you want to find out how Cyprus was passed from the Ottoman to the British, best is the first account. Whereas if you want to know the reaction of the Cypriots on this change best is the second [account].

(Andrew, Written Task 2)

Here students assessed accounts in terms of their relevance to the reader. As highlighted by Lemon (1995): ‘whereas one constructs a narrative answer to a question regarding the origins or ‘causes’ of a situation, there are many different stories to be told depending upon the exact question asked. Accordingly, Paraskevas pointed out that what is a good account has to do with what one is looking for (‘each reader might be interested in different information which he might find either in the first or the second account’). In turn Andrew explained that we should test how accounts correspond to *questions* we might have. It may be argued that through this answer Andrew indicated that accounts are understood as answers to the things we would like to know more about. Indeed, Andrew’s language might not be very sophisticated, but the notion conveyed is a powerful one in that it models history as forming a theory about the past. Andrew’s case is very indicative of how students’ thinking is based on conceptual inconstancies, an issue I discuss further in Chapter 6 (Section 6.2).³³

The third idea I included in the ‘Modelling Authority’ category is that a good account is one that can be triangulated. This idea is represented in the code ‘Best corroborated’. This

idea resembles students' factual notion that history is a series of facts: as students think that there is a right version of the past as a consequence, they also believe that the corroboration of different information can verify the (single) correct representation. However, this idea was classified as an epistemic criterion as students seemed to acknowledge that historical practice demands triangulation. The code consists of 2 answers.

[By] corroborating it with other sources, so as to also see other opinions.

(Anaxagoras, Written Task 1)

The best criterion is to compare the historical accounts with others and accordingly to decide which one is best.

(Giorgos, Written Task 1)

Anaxagoras explained that we could evaluate an account by looking into what has been articulated in other sources. By 'sources' Anaxagoras seems to mean secondary sources, and the idea here seems to be that since an account is essentially a theory about the past we can assess it by seeing how the past has been theorised in other accounts. Giorgos followed the same line of thought.

The fourth and final code I included in the category 'Modelling Authority' is 'Best modelling of the past'. These students prioritised accounts in terms of modelling the past in different ways; in other words, these students valued accounts' explanatory power. I included 5 answers in this code.

If there are references to the words of a personality or the decision of some of the two opposite powers, in this way I understand how we were led to some fact (that the account deals with).

(Ermioni, Written Task 1)

I believe that the best account is the first, as it gives us general criteria for the historical fact, in relation to the second account that says the criteria for each country, and the problems which were foreseen early about the economic crisis, the pain and everything they would lose at the war, in relation to the second [account] which simply describes the word 'feelings'.

(Danae, Written Task 1)

Even though implicitly, Ermioni pointed to the inferencing power of history: history is about bringing the threads together and, consequently, enabling new openings. In turn Danae explained that she chose the first account as this approached the topic more holistically. It could be argued that Danae referred to what historians call ‘grand narrative’ (Lyotard, 1979) – that is, the construction of a ‘What is the bigger picture?’ theory of the past – hence suggesting that history’s power lies in providing a totalising narrative schema which orders and explains knowledge and experience.

With regard to appraising accounts in relation to their modelling authority, two students evaluated accounts as theories in terms of historical empathy. That is, the process of (cognitive and affective) engagement with *people of the past* to better understand and contextualise their lived experiences, decisions or actions.

The best account I believe is the one that is not affected by sentiments that much, but mostly from the data and the recording of the facts to take of course in mind the mental conditions of the time but also considering the actions, without the author giving his opinion directly and putting emphasis on it. To give the facts and maybe at the end to give his own modest conclusion.

(Sonia, Written Task 1)

So, if, if, OK you might want and some subjectivity let’s say. Because you might, also want the element of feel – the psychological let’s say. Hm. It’s possible let’s say in the testimony that only the events of the people that lived the specifics facts that are included and has also some understanding of their psychological situation at the time and why they did specific things because of their emotional load. Whereas the other [account] that it is more objective does not have something in relation to the emotional and you cannot understand how people thought.

(Stavros, Interview IX, 1.198-205)

Sonia’s answer was an intriguing one. Sonia pointed out that accounts should not be affected by the sentiments of the authors who, in fact, should refrain from giving any kind of opinion besides *maybe* their modest conclusion. Yet she pointed out that ‘the recording of the facts’ should take into account the mentalities of the time and consider people’s actions. Sonia followed a different line of thought, suggesting that, in fact, it might be useful for the author to have some subjectivity. This is because that would allow us to engage with empathy and

therefore understand people's thoughts and feelings better, which could potentially explain their actions in a clearer way.

Overall, in the 'Modelling Authority' category of answers Greek-Cypriot students seemed to go beyond the position that accounts are just opinion narratives, as they employed a series of evaluative criteria. Modelling history in a positivistic way was also repeated in this group of data: explicitly, in this data set, students seemed to be thinking of history as a kind of equation, which, if we get right, leads to a 'good' account.

5.4. What Criteria do Students Employ so as to Assess Accounts' Usefulness?

5.4.1. Introduction

The fourth group of data I chose to discuss for the purpose of this thesis is students' responses to the instrument question '**Which of the two accounts was more useful for you? Can you please justify?**'. Eighty-seven students provided 203 answers which I assembled into 23 high-inference codes, as presented in Table 10 on the next page. The three most populated codes relating to account usefulness were as follows:

- 1. Validation:* numbering 27 answers.
- 2. Combination:* numbering 25 answers, and
- 3. Clarity:* numbering 18 answers.

Nine students identified one of the accounts as the most useful, without however providing an explanation for their choice. Eight students did not answer the question, or answered 'I don't know'. Two answers were coded as non-codable.

Table 10: Range of student ideas on account usefulness

(N= 203 student answers)

Code Name	Number of student answers
Validation	27
Both	25
Clarity	18
Substantial	12
Neutrality	11
Analytical	9
Answered but did not explain	9
Blame and Responsibility	9
Content	9
Inclusive	8
No answer	8
Argument	7
Cyprus-centric	7
New perspectives	7
Use of archive	7
Reasoning	5
Combination	4
Educational use	4
Historical empathy	3
Insightful	3
None	3
Educational Use	4
Non-codable	2

In order to group high-inference codes on account usefulness I used the analytical question **‘What criteria do students employ so as to assess accounts’ usefulness?.**

Accordingly, I devised seven categories:

- 1. Textual Use*
- 2. Narrative Use*
- 3. Community Use*
- 4. Blame Use*

5. *Epistemic Use*

6. *Theoretical Use*, and

7. *No Use*.

A total of 19 answers did not fall under any of these categories. Table 11 on page 193 provides an illustration of how codes were clustered into categories.

5.4.2. Textual Use

The first category I devised to describe students' ideas about accounts' usefulness and to answer the analytical question '**What criteria do students employ so as to assess accounts' usefulness?**' was 'Textual Use'. Students whose answers were included in this code assessed accounts based on *how* they communicate the past text-wise, and whether they are easy to use. In essence, students judged accounts according to their readability – hence usefulness was seen from the consumer's point of view. In this category of answers students prioritised the textual features of historical representation, and assessed texts in terms of reading comprehensiveness. Accordingly, the following codes were included in the 'Textual Use' category:

1. *Clarity*.

2. *Substantial*, and

3. *Content*.

Altogether 39 student answers were included in this category, making up 20.10% of all student answers on account usefulness.

The first student idea I included in the 'Textual Use' category is that an account is useful if it's clear and explicable. This idea is represented in the code 'Clarity'. The criterion of assessing usefulness based on clarity and comprehensiveness was one of the students' favoured ones, ranking third in students' preferences with regard to what makes a

Table 11: What criteria do students employ to assess account usefulness?

Category Name	Total Number of Answers	Codes included in the category	Number of References
Textual Use	39	Clarity	18
		Substantial	12
		Analytical	9
Narrative Use	20	Argument	7
		Reasoning	5
		I am not sure	8
Community Use	47	Validation	27
		Cyprus-centric	7
		Educational use	4
		Blame attribution	9
Blame Use	9	Blame and Responsibility	9
Epistemic Use	58	Content	9
		Both	25
		Combination	4
		Neutrality	11
		Use of archive	5
		Corroboration	4
Theoretical Use	18	Inclusive	8
		New perspective	7
		Historical empathy	3
No Use	3	None	3

good account. The code consists of 18 answers.

The second [account] because it's written in a tidier way.

(Ania, Written Task 2)

The second account. I didn't understand the first one, the thinking and writing style of the author confused me. On the contrary, I was fully satisfied by the second account.

(Persefoni, Written Task 1)

Ania's answer was short yet illuminating with regards to what makes an account useful: she attributed usefulness on the basis of the account being organised more clearly. Persefoni made a different argument with regard to assessing accounts' usefulness: she pointed out

what does *not* make an account useful, stating that there were problems with trying to understand a convoluted text.

The second idea I included in the ‘Textual Use’ category is conveyed in the code ‘Substantial’. This code signals the idea that the more useful of two accounts is the one that includes important facts and is to the point at the same time. The code consists of 12 answers.

The first account because it has less details.

(Melina, Written Task 2)

Mostly the second [account] because it is more substantial.

(Marina, Written Task 2)

Within the notion of assessing accounts’ usefulness in terms of textual qualities Melina pointed to a quality that eradicates usefulness from accounts – that is, being too elaborate. Marina explicated Melina’s thinking: what makes an account useful is condensing it.

The third and final code I included in the ‘Textual Use’ category is ‘Analytical’. This code represents the idea that accounts are mostly useful when they provide a more systematic analysis of the events and/or the facts. By raising demands for the text to be analytical these students seem to disagree with previous students who demanded that accounts are well-organised and break things down. This code consists of 9 answers.

The one that gives more information, that can analyse in a better way something that was not included in the other...that can analyse it in a better way.

(Marina, Interview VI, 1.367-69)

I found the second [account] more useful because...in the second [account] again it differentiates responsibilities, shows each one at what point was responsible, what he has done.

(Renos, Interview VI, 1.406-09)

Marina attributed usefulness at the level of analysis. Yet it does not become apparent whether Marina values more information or more in-depth analysis (it is possible that in her head the two overlap). In the same interview Renos followed the same line of thought as Marina:

accounts should enable the reader to understand the variability of the past.

In general students whose answers were included in the ‘Textual Use’ category drew on a series of textual features when it came to evaluating accounts in terms of usefulness. Specifically, students put forward that for an account to be useful the text used needs to be a) comprehensible, b) concise, and c) facilitating analytical language. In other words, these students appealed for a text that enables the unfolding of the story in a manner which is comprehensible to the reader.

5.4.3. Narrative Use

The second category I devised to discuss students’ ideas about usefulness and to answer the analytical question ‘**What criteria do students employ so as to assess accounts’ usefulness?**’ was ‘Narrative Use’. These students focused on the narrativity – that is the recounting of events - rather than on the textuality of the past – that is the use of words in written form. Students whose answers were included in this category evaluated accounts based on their narrative power – that is, transmitting the past in a conclusive way. Three codes were included in the ‘Narrative Use’ category:

- 1. Argument,*
- 2. Reasoning, and*
- 3. I am not sure.*

Altogether these codes include 45 answers, constituting 23.19% out of all answers as to what makes for a useful account.

The first code I included in the ‘Narrative Use’ category is ‘Argument’. This code encapsulates students’ idea that an account can be useful if it provides a convincing argument. Accounts were judged on their capacity to convey the past in a persuasive manner:

how is an account of any use if it cannot convince us that this is what (truly) happened? In other words, accounts were evaluated on the basis of their narrative power. This code includes 7 answers.

More useful I found the second account. It is more convincing.

(Kristia, Written Task 1)

The first account because it is convincing the way it writes things.

(Miria, Written Task 1)

Kristia's answer was straightforward, as she indicated her preferable account and attributed this choice in the convincingness of the argument. Interestingly, however, Kristia did not explain where the account's convincingness lies. Miria was equally specific on what makes an account useful: how convincing it is. However, while Kristia did not specify what makes an account convincing, Miria explained that the account is convincing due to how it is written. Although what is meant by this remains implicit Miria seems to be pointing to the narrative's manner – explicitly its style and rhetorical manner.

The second code I included in the 'Narrative Use' category is 'Reasoning'. This code also encapsulated students' notion that accounts can be useful if they have certain narrative capacities. However, whereas before students raised the demand for an account to provide a convincing argument, now students raised demands for *rational* arguments. This code consists of 5 answers.

The first account because it was more rational.

(Melanie, Written Task 1)

The second [account]. For me it describes things better. I find it more rational.

(Nikolina, Written Task 1)

Melanie judged accounts based on the argument's rationality, but without explaining what 'rational' means. Nikolina too attributed usefulness to rationality. Nikolina also pointed out that the account describes things in a better way, but it was not made explicit whether the

two elements are connected ('For me it describes things better' hence 'I find it more rational'?) or whether they are two separate features which make the account useful.

The third code I included in the 'Narrative Use' category is 'I am not sure'. The idea represented in this code is that as accounts are radically different it is difficult to say which is more valid. One answer was included in this code:

I don't know because it confuses me. Let's say one says Makarios sent that message and that was why the war started, while the other [account] rejects this possibility. I don't know which one would be more useful for me.

(Arianthi, Interview VI, 1.397-40)

For Arianthi the fact that accounts were so different, to the point of cancelling each other out, seemed to be not only confusing, but it led to a dead-end. It could be argued that what is causing the confusion for Arianthi is that accounts might be conflicting, yet they are so convincing in their argument that they both seem valid. Interestingly, Arianthi's answer seemed to resemble Persefoni's ('the thinking and writing style of the author confused me'), which was coded under 'clarity' and included in the 'textual use' category: if accounts are not comprehensible enough (either in terms of language or narration) they cease to be useful.

Overall, within the 'Narrative Use' category of answers students attributed usefulness to the story-telling capacity of the accounts. Accounts have the power to convey the past and students not only acknowledged that, but they argued that this is precisely what makes them useful. For these students the narrative competency of the accounts was important in that it can provide an organised view of the past – either in terms of convincingness or rationality. As a result, an account which does not meet these criteria has no utility.

5.4.4. Community Use

The third category I devised to represent students' answers as to which of two accounts is the most useful one and to answer the analytical question '**What criteria do students employ to assess accounts' usefulness?**' is 'Community Use'. As the reader might recall this is the second time that students evaluated accounts with regard to the community. This category of answers is different to the 'Community Authority' group of answers in that, these answers were responses to the instrument question '**Which of the two accounts was more useful for you? Can you please justify?**' which asked students to specifically identify how they attribute *usefulness* to accounts, rather than value in general as it was the case with responses to the instrument questions '**Which account amongst the two is best? Can you please justify?**' and '**Is a more truthful account better as well?**'. Specifically, in this category students drew on their past, present and future relationships with the community. As I explain below, students whose answers were coded as part of this category drew on or placed usefulness within their 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1983) and therefore aligned with the social goals of history. Three codes were included in this category:

1. *Validation.*
2. *Cyprus-centric,* and
3. *Educational use.*

In total 47 student answers were included in this category, constituting 24.22% of all student answers regarding how students attribute usefulness to accounts.

The first code I included in the 'Community Use' category is 'Validation'. Students whose answers were included in this code evaluated accounts based on whether they ascertained the past as they already knew it. This notion relates to that of 'Assimilation' (Chapter 5, Section 5.3.4), in that students made sense of new information – that is the historical accounts they were confronted with - and incorporated it into or compared it to their existing ideas and experiences. I have labelled this code differently so as to differentiate it from 'Assimilation', which was a code referring to how students attributed *authority* to

accounts. As this approach is community specific it is not surprising that all answers listed here relate to accounts of Cyprus. ‘Validation’ is the most populated code with regard to students’ answers about account usefulness. The code consists of 27 answers.

I believe that the second account is more useful as it is known to everyone the brutal behaviours of the Germans and also the methods which they use. Therefore, clearly the second account is true.

(Stavros, Written Task 1)

Personally, I prefer the second [account] because in my opinion it says truths and it doesn’t not present the English as something good.

(Alexandros, Written Task 2)

Stavros drew upon common knowledge to choose the most useful account: the behaviour of Germans ‘is known to everyone’. Stavros did not explain why common knowledge makes the account useful. However, the rationale here seems to be that if Germans’ behaviour is known to everyone then this is common knowledge; hence it must be true. Alexandros assessed usefulness by employing the same criterion – that is, whether accounts confirm what is already known. Alexandros also draws upon his own knowledge. Still, that the English are not ‘something good’ is known to Alexandros because the roles of ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly’ (Bryant and Papadakis, 2012) as I thoroughly illustrate in Chapter 7, (Section 7.6) are well known in the community to which he belongs.

Within this category of answers students have also indicated that the usefulness of accounts lays in confirming that ‘what we know’ is correct. Interestingly the notion of ‘Truthfulness’ was displayed with regards to the Cyprus events of 1974, but not to the British take-over of Cyprus or the First World War break-out.

I found the second account useful because it talks about the right facts.

(Sofronis, Written Task 2)

I believe the second account because I believe it is wrong that Makarios believed that Turkey would come and rescue the situation. Turkey was looking for an excuse, she found it and she invaded.

(Natasa, Written Task 2)

Because when it comes to facts that concern [your] country directly and you ‘ve heart true stories and experiences, so knowing more, you accept and you believe the account that it is closest to what you have learnt. Judging by logic, but also considering the repeating efforts of Turkey for invasion, but also those of Junta for extinguishing Makarios then you cannot accept the first account.

(Melanthi, Written Task 2)

In these answers, students did not draw upon ‘what we all know’. In contrast, they seemed to evaluate accounts based on personal preference, but this still seems to draw upon a known and established truth. For instance, despite the implicitness of his answer, Sofronis referred to the ‘right facts’. Natasa was more elaborate in her account evaluation, in that she exemplified that we should test accounts against the ‘correct’ version of the past, as we all know what the truth is. Melanthi too drew upon the validity of ‘what we all know’. She identified the second account as the most useful, drawing on existing knowledge. The idea here is that if an argument contrasts with existing knowledge it cannot be rational; hence, it cannot be useful. All four answers cited here show that students aligned themselves to the second account which, despite the fact that it points to Junta and does hint at a degree of responsibility lying with Makarios, is overall in line with the Greek-Cypriot official narrative: the invasion had been long planned, and Turkey had no excuses. Through their answers these students instantiated the power of institutional narrative dominance and control, an issue I address in Chapters 7, 8 and 9.

In order to assert past narratives students also drew on teleology (Chapter 7). That is, students drew analogies between the past and the present to evaluate the accounts. Whereas teleology starts from where history is going or intended, reverse teleology has a twist in that the force of history lies in the *beginning* which presses upon us the future course of things.

Personally, I believe that the second account was more useful and trustworthy, because it's known that Germans were always a little bit show-off and considered themselves superior.

(Kipros, Written Task 1)

I believe that the second source [account] that Germany was a victim, this is

impossible. Because so many lives were perished, there are videos that in fact show us how they turned them into soaps, they burn them...

(Katia, Interview IV, 1.530-33)

In this group of answers students suggested that repetition in history confirms the conclusiveness of the account. Interestingly repetition was accounted for in terms of human behaviour, and both students illustrated this point by drawing upon the example of Germany. Kipros, for example, referred to Germany's role in WWII. Intriguingly Kipros thought that the accounts referred to WWII and not WWI. What his answer shows, however, is that the past itself serves as a paradigm as it keeps repeating itself. For him it is apparent that the past itself is enough in providing historical evidence. In turn Katia emphasised that as things have *always* been the same the past serves as a paradigm for the present. In simple terms it must be true if it happened more than once; this is how things work.

The second code I included in the 'Community Use' category is 'Cyprus-centric'. Students whose answers were coded herein emphasised that the accounts they chose as useful were chosen because they have Cyprus as their focus. In other words, accounts are about *us*. This code consists of 7 answers.

I prefer the second account because it mentions only the facts of Cyprus and does not make reference to other countries like the first [account].

(Panayiota, Written Task 2)

More useful for me was the second account because it gives more information for the events of the time and for the reaction of the Cypriots.

(Mariella, Written Task 2)

Panayiota chose her preferable account on the basis that it centres on Cyprus. In turn Mariella approached usefulness a bit differently: accounts do not need to centre on Cyprus. Yet, should accounts focus *more* on Cyprus they can be considered more useful. Mariella was interested in a specific aspect of Cyprus' history, which was how the locals reacted upon the coming of the British. In a sense it is as if students call for accounts that relate to the 'practical past' (Oakeshott, 1933; White, 2005): why are these accounts useful to *us*?³⁴

The third code I included in the 'Community Use' category is 'Educational use'. This code encapsulated students' notion that one can draw lessons from the past – either these are positive examples or examples to refrain from. Again, this idea connects to one's existence as part of a community. Four answers were included in this code.

Certainly, though the first account gains my interest, since it supports that no European country desired the war, something which is quite pleasant.

(Amalia, Written Task 1)

More useful I found the second [account] because Makarios is not accused and certainly through it a message of peace is distributed which I consider that it is also one of the main goals of history.

(Amalia, Written Task 2)

These student answers encapsulated the idea that historical accounts are valuable if they reinforce positive messages. Confronted with Written Task 1, Amalia pointed to the first account as more useful, in that by removing responsibility from European countries it allows for a more positive version of the past to emerge. Amalia explicated the positive role of the past in a clearer manner when confronted with the Cyprus Events of 1974: according to Nikiforos not only should the past enable a better present, but this is one of the main goals of history.

In the 'Educational use' code I also included students' idea that a useful account is one that provides an example for the present and the future.

...taking of course in mind the problems...which are useful, as they exist today in our society, in our civilisation, in our moral, in our homes, in the people (economic crisis) and in this way by reading this account we should realise that we should not make the same mistakes as tomorrow's citizens.

(Danae, Written Task 1, parenthesis in the original)

None, as they are both defined from subjectivity and very little objectivity. So they don't present the facts correctly, therefore we cannot use them to develop historically and politically correct consciousnesses.

(Aristos, Written Task 2)

These students placed emphasis on the negative side of facts, which could serve as examples for ‘tomorrow’s citizens’. By pointing out how people should abstain from past mistakes, Danae emphasised the fact that history has the capacity to be used as a law for human behaviour. In turn, Aristos’ answer was an embedded one. With regard to accounts’ usefulness Aristos answered that none are useful as they are not objective. He then added that if the accounts were subjective, they could not provide examples for the future, hence they are proved to be of no value. Through these answers students suggested that accounts can be useful in that they can provide *moral codes* for the (future) community. They hence pointed to the purposeful use of history, which I discuss further in Chapter 7 (Section 7.5).

Overall, students whose ideas were included in the ‘Community Use’ category started turning their attention to the social uses of the past rather than focusing on the past’s factuality or narrativity. These students pointed to a history that serves ‘blame attribution’, ‘validation’, ‘didactic use’, and ‘educational use’. There are two issues worth mentioning about notions conveyed in this category. Firstly, it started becoming clear that students approach the past in their own ways, and that along with their ‘epistemic’ criteria they also employ a series of other criteria – such as attributing value to accounts based on the social uses of the past. Secondly, as with the previous group of data, students repeated how our perceptions of truth and blame are conditioned by the community to which we have access. These issues will be discussed further in Chapter 6, Section 6.5 and Chapter 7, Section 7.3 respectively. Thirdly, the repetition of data shows that there is an overlap between community authority (Section 5.3.5) and community usefulness (this section).

5.4.5. Blame Use

The fifth category I devised to describe this study’s students’ ideas on usefulness and to answer the analytical question ‘**What criteria do students employ to assess accounts**’

usefulness?’ is ‘Blame Use’. The idea represented in this category is that accounts can be useful if they can point to the culprits of the past. This category arose from a code, which I expanded as its properties did not allow me to cluster it with other codes. I therefore decided to expand this into a category. Students whose answers were included in this category focused on responsibility and blame. Although students’ answers do not make it explicit why blame and responsibility are (important) uses of the past some hypotheses could be raised. Students could be indicating a) the need to point out that the war was non-consensual; b) (consequently?) that responsible parties and countries should take responsibility and own their wrong-doings (affecting other people); and/or c) students’ eagerness to ascertain guilt with the purpose of refraining from repeating these actions in the future, and all of these can be argued to be community uses. This category consists of nine answers, constituting 4.43% of all answers within the group of data responding to the analytical question: ‘What criteria do students employ to assess accounts usefulness?’

The second [account] because it says clearly who is responsible for the [First World] war.

(Pamela, Written Task 1)

I found the second account more useful because I believe it mentions some people that played indeed important role to the invasion and for the fact that it mentions the Turkish-Cypriots without however putting responsibilities to Makarios or to Turks exclusively.

(Sonia, Written Task 2)

Pamela attributed usefulness to conclusiveness as to who is to blame. Sonia took a different direction with regards to blame attribution: rather than being conclusive with regards to blame, the account seems to be *inquiring* about blame. Sonia identified how the account puts blame into question: a) by avoiding placing blame on the usual suspects (Makarios and the Turks), b) mentioning other people who played role in the invasion (possibly Kissinger and Junta); and c) referring to the role of Turkish-Cypriots (who are not often accounted for in the official narrative).

5.4.6. Epistemic Use

The fifth category I devised to describe this study's students' ideas on usefulness and to answer the analytical question '**What criteria do students employ to assess accounts' usefulness?**' is 'Epistemic Use'. Similarly to students who provided answers with regard to accounts 'Epistemic Authority', in this category, students attributed usefulness to accounts 'epistemic' authority and, accordingly, chose accounts by employing 'epistemic' criteria such as multiperspectivity, objectiveness, use of citation and/or evidence, the combination of information sourcing from different accounts, and trustworthiness. How students employ 'epistemic' criteria to evaluate accounts has already been discussed in previous chapters. Five codes were included in this category:

1. *Content.*
2. *Combination.*
3. *Neutrality.*
4. *Use of archive, and*
5. *Both.*

In total the 'Epistemic Use' category numbers 58 student answers, making up 29.907% of all answers on accounts' usefulness.

The first code I included in the 'Epistemic Use' category is 'Content'. The idea behind this code is that, according to students, the more information accounts provide the more useful they are. Notably, students here refer to 'information', 'facts' and 'details' and not to evidence. These elements are considered important due to their capacity to accurately recount the past; hence, in this category of answers history is discussed as a matter of truthfulness. This code consists of 9 answers.

Most useful I found the second account because it presented to us more facts than the first [account] (regardless of these differ or not).

(Thalia, Written Task 1)

The first account because it has more details.

(Markos, Written Task 1)

In this group of answers students repeated notions exemplified in the previous group of data – that is, deciding which criteria give authority to accounts – in that, a) details, facts, information and references, in students’ heads, can enable historical actuality; and b) consequently, the more of it we have, the more actuality accounts have.

The second code I included in the ‘Epistemic Use’ category is ‘Both’. This code stands for the popular student idea that, when confronted with a pair of differing accounts both can be useful in that both possibly include valuable information, evidence and/or perspectives – hence they are both worth consulting this can allow the reader to reach their own conclusions. Reversely, it could be argued, that according to students, as both historical accounts have the same intrinsic value neither of the two can be prioritised as more useful. This code consists of 25 answers.

Both.

(Lenia, Written Task 2)

No account is more useful. Both have the same value.

(Rena, Written Task 1)

At large, students did not elaborate on the answers they provided. Nonetheless, for students the idea that all accounts are inherently useful (something that gives them ‘value’) does not seem to be connected to an understanding of accounts as theories, which would explain why all accounts are inherently valuable in their own right. Instead, these answers seem to be echoing notions of relativism as exemplified in previous data sets (Sections 5.2.5 and 5.3.4).

The third code I included in the ‘Epistemic Use’ category is ‘Combination’. In this group of answers students put forward that accounts’ usefulness rests in combining their true or different parts; therefore, in their parts or in relation to partial information, both accounts

are useful. This is a similar idea to the second idea of the cluster which put forward that the reader should consult both accounts to get a better idea of the past. Although the latter idea is obviously more sophisticated the two are similar in that they view the past as a triangulation of information. This code consists of 4 answers.

Both [accounts] as I took useful information from both, although I am not certain on the reliability of the authors.

(Gavriel, Written Task 2)

This category of answers brought forth a favoured student notion: that of ‘copy-paste’: ‘if you connect pieces a correct one comes’; ‘I took from both useful information’; ‘both mention important opinions and elements’. What is interesting here is that although ‘copy-paste’ was expected to be used as a criterion for assessing the authority of accounts I did not expect this to be used as a criterion for assessing accounts’ usefulness.

The fourth idea I included in the ‘Epistemic Use’ category was that historical accounts can be useful when written from a neutral perspective. This idea is represented in the code ‘Neutrality’. This code consists of 11 answers.

None [is useful], as they are both defined from subjectivity and very little objectivity.

(Aristos, Written Task 2)

...it writes [that] all the European countries have been responsible. Therefore, it doesn’t accuse someone specifically, it puts responsibility to all of them.

(Arianthi, Interview VI, 1.373-74)

In this group of answers students argued that the one-sided attribution of blame was a biased report of the past; hence, students seemed to carry the notion that when blame is attributed equally this is an indication of perspectiveless neutrality. For instance, Aristos emphasised that neither of the accounts was useful, in his opinion, as they were both reported in a biased way – although he did not clarify what this means: hence, as the lack of objectivity twisted the past, facts were presented incorrectly. Arianthi put forward that the fact that blame is attributed equally to all countries makes the account seem less positioned and biased. The

argument here is that accounts are copies of the past that can be, to a more or a lesser degree, distorted; hence, the less distorted they are the more objective they might be.

The fifth code I included in the ‘Epistemic Use’ category is ‘Use of archive’. Students whose answers were represented within this code connoted historians as *drawing* from an archive rather than just falling into sources – hence it is important to address the existence of the archive. This code was included in this category because in students’ heads this is how history works as episteme – that is, historians write accounts based on the sources they use. This code consists of 5 answers.

Personally, the second historical account includes stronger historical evidence compared to the first, therefore there is a more supported view. The fact that it mentions that there is proof in the German documents that Germany wanted to put big part of the blame to Russia is a very important element.

(Nikos, Written Task 1)

The second account because it mentions that the specific point that is being discussed comes from triangulated sources.

(Leda, Written Task 2)

These students pointed out how historians make claims based on the archive. By pointing out how the archive delimits questions that can be asked, Nikos seemed to have believed that historians reach conclusions by interrogating archives and drawing inferences. Aristos took a different approach and referred to the triangulation; specifically, Aristos ascribed accounts’ usefulness to their credibility, in that the claims made can be found in more than one source.

The sixth and final code I included in the ‘Epistemic Use’ category is ‘Corroboration’. This idea should not be confused with the ‘copy-paste’ idea – that is, that we should isolate parts/information from accounts and compile them together. ‘Corroboration’ stands for the student notion that (all?) accounts can be useful as they can be used for theoretical triangulation. This code numbers 25 student answers.

Both historical sources [accounts] are helpful since if the opinions they presented are corroborated we can end up to our own conclusions on what

happened during WWI.

(Stratos, Written Task 1)

Both accounts are useful. History is to make your own conclusions by using your judgement and reading different historical accounts.

(Giorgos, Written Task 2)

Both are useful, it is always good to see both sides of the topic from the opponents although I disagree with the first.

(Evgenia, Written Task 2)

Similarly, Stratos and Giorgos pointed out the importance of consulting both accounts, as these can illustrate the different sides to an event, and they articulated that their usefulness lies in the fact that it allows the reader to use their own judgement. Evgenia also construed epistemic usefulness in terms of consulting all opinions. However, interestingly, she teased out that she did not agree with the first perspective. The reason why this reference is important is because it seems to be restricting Evgenia from seeing value in accounts, in that the corroboration of different accounts can help us reach our own conclusions; that is, Evgenia already knows the conclusion, and it is not one that agrees with the first account.

Overall, in the 'Epistemic Use' category students judged accounts in similar ways to those included in the previous group of data; that is, they assessed accounts on the basis of factual quantity, 'copy-paste', consulting both as they are equally valid, neutrality and checking against evidence. However, this time they used these criteria to attribute usefulness rather than authority to accounts. At the same time two new student notions emerged in this category: a) the use of the archive and b) corroboration. Both notions can be argued to be sophisticated ideas, in that they indicate that students *can see* how history is about theory construction. There is another issue that should be flagged up. This is that there is some overlap between 'Epistemic Authority' and 'Epistemic Use', which raises an interesting challenge for history education: are the notions of epistemological and useable history disjointed or intersecting values?

5.4.7.Theoretical Use

The fifth category I devised to represent students' ideas about accounts' usefulness and to answer the analytical question '**What criteria do students employ to assess accounts' usefulness?**' is 'Theoretical Use'. Students whose answers were included in this category attributed usefulness to the account's capacity to model the past in various ways. In this category of answers students valued historical accounts' power to theorise the past a) in an inclusive way, b) by giving new perspectives and c) in engaging with past (and consequently present) peoples' actions and thoughts. Correspondingly, the following three codes were included in the category:

1. *Inclusive.*
2. *New perspective, and*
3. *Historical empathy.*

In total 18 student answers were included in this category, making up 9.28% of all student answers as to what makes accounts useful.

The first code I included in the 'Theoretical Use' category is 'Inclusive'. Students whose answers were grouped under this code identified usefulness based on the account's capacity to be all-compassing. Interestingly, students employed different criteria of inclusiveness. This code includes 8 answers.

The first historical account was more useful because it referred to all the countries.

(Mariella, Written Task 1)

I prefer the first [account]... because...I was informed on the whole process that led to the take-over of Cyprus.

(Meri, Written Task 2)

Mariella explicated that she chose the first account as it gave her a more holistic picture of the course of things. Similarly, Meri seemed to value a more inclusive narrative mode –

explicitly, one that explains the overall procedures (in relation to the take-over of Cyprus), rather than specific aspects of the past.

The second code I included in the ‘Theoretical Use’ category is ‘New perspective’. In this group of answers students illustrated that an account’s usefulness lies in its capacity to provide a new – in contrast to what we already know – perspective on past events. This code consists of 7 answers.

Most useful I found the first [account] because this side of the facts maybe it’s not many people that know it.

(Marilena, Written Task 1)

The first [account]. Because it helped me see the arguments of those adhering to Junta.

(Nikiforos, Written Task 2)

Marilena addressed usefulness in terms of the accounts providing a different side to the current, and commonly known, story. In turn, Nikiforos pointed out that accounts are more useful when they provide a new theoretical point of view – that is, a new way of framing the issue of responsibility, by respectively drawing on the case of the Germans and the Junta. In general, in this category of answers, accounts’ usefulness in their capacity to open a new window to the past was considered.

The third and final idea as to what might make an account useful in terms of ‘Theoretical Use’ is represented in the code ‘Historical empathy’. The idea behind this code is that a useful account can help us to understand different perspectives – explicitly with regards to how people think. This code consists of 3 answers.

Both [accounts] were useful. The first helped me to learn and understand all the facts and see them holistically. On the other however, because I conclude that the second [account] was written by a person who is against Germany and in favour of the theory that she is the main responsible, I managed to conclude how those who support Germany think, and on what arguments they depend on.

(Meri, Written Task 1)

I cannot know which [account] is the most correct one, but with the first one we can comprehend how some Germans think. Despite that, I think that the second [account] is more valid, since no-one declares war without their will.

(Anaxagoras, Written Task 1)

These students attributed usefulness to the taking of different perspectives; explicitly, students argued for the notion that these accounts are useful because by employing historical empathy one can appreciate different stances and how people think. Interestingly, looking into different perspectives was not employed as an ‘everything goes’ approach which validates all accounts (and their arguments?), resulting in ‘muddying the waters’ (Foster, 2001, p.171).

5.4.7. No Use

The sixth category of answers about what makes an account useful, ‘No Use’, consists of three answers. The three answers come from three students who stated that none of the accounts was useful for them.

None of the two.

(Antonis, Written Task 2)

I am not interested in neither of the accounts.

(Kristia, Written Task 2)

Electra: I read them, and I made notes.

M.G.: Which was more useful?

Electra: Well, I don’t know, I cannot be bothered.

M.G.: Which seemed more useful for you in terms of knowledge?

Electra: I don’t know, I cannot be bothered.

(Electra, Interview IV, 1.520-25)

Antonis dismissed the accounts’ usefulness altogether, while Kristia shared this belief. Electra’s answer in interview IV was really interesting. Although she read the accounts for the purposes of the written tasks and provided written answers, she expressed her indifference on the issue of account usefulness. At the time of the interview I did not ask

Electra to clarify why she ‘couldn’t be bothered’. Yet, there are a number of hypotheses that can be considered. Firstly, Electra was simply bored: she saw me for a third time within a short period and she just wanted the interview to finish. Secondly, it is possible that Electra’s ‘couldn’t bother’ relates to her notions of relativism (Section 5.3.5) and scepticism (Section 5.4.5): history does not matter anyway – we can never know the truth.

5.5.Data Analysis Conclusions

Bringing students ideas across the different data analysis sections together, these could be summarised as follows. Firstly, student thinking seemed to be based on rudimentary notions. Firstly, a minority of students seemed to be unaware of the author behind the accounts. Perhaps this could be because students had never had the opportunity to think about how these accounts came about. Secondly, most of students did recognised an author – hence they engaged with historical accounts in a more nuanced way, yet most of these student answers was also formed on the basis of limited epistemologies. For instance, a big number of students saw authors as ‘relatively passive story tellers, dispensing ready-made stories or compiling and collating information’ (Afandi, 2012, p.41), while others evaluated history on the basis of a positivistic model similar to that of the natural sciences, as I demonstrate in Chapter 6 (Section 6.4.7). Thirdly, throughout all groups of data a worth mentioning number of students demonstrated sophisticated thinking: respectively, 9.04% of student answers were on the authorship of accounts, 7.78% of answers indicated that students accept that accounts can be simultaneously valid as they are methodological constructions, and 9.09% of student answers showed that students understand that through accounts authors *model* – in other words, conceptualise - the past in different ways. These averages give an average of 8.64% of student answers demonstrating nuanced student thinking. Students who pointed out that historians *construct* the past differently seemed to be able to recognise, even implicitly, that accounts are: a) constructed differently, i.e. that different sources are being used, or that authors discuss

different aspects of the past; and b) the result of different meaning-attribution – that is, they depend on the author’s standpoint and the enquiry question set. The notion of meaning-making demonstrates a student shift beyond the simple one-way view of accounts as an investigation of the past, towards the idea that history is not only investigation but also *interpretation*.

Looking into these findings at a higher level of generality what do they mean?

Several conclusions can be drawn:

- i. Not all responses fell neatly into my categories. At the same time there was overlap across different groups of data. This establishes that students’ thinking is *complex* and thus cannot be put in ‘cages’ (Lee and Shemilt, 2003).
- ii. Students engaged with the different aspects of accounts and by employing a series of *repeated notions*. These included, for instance, that accounts are mirrors of the past, products of opinion or affected by bias imposition. It could be argued that the *narrow repertoire* students demonstrated was because they lack the breadth and depth of history’s ‘methodology which would allow them to explain and evaluate differing accounts.
- iii. Drawing on the ideas students have about accounts’ differences and the properties of these ideas it is apparent that many of the ideas Greek-Cypriot students employed were *limited* in that the latter did not enable students to produce complex and coherent explanations.
- iv. Even though most of Cypriot students seemed to operate with either rudimentary thinking (Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2) or on the basis of limited epistemologies, there were students who answered in a sophisticated way and who engaged with historical accounts in a much more nuanced ways than their peers.
- v. Some of the students engaged with accounts by drawing upon their everyday experiences. Such were for example the ideas that truth is ‘something in the middle’

(Section 5.2.4), and can be verified if people ‘saw the events with their own eyes and haven't heard it from some others’ (Section 5.3.6).

- vi. Certain (limited) ideas may be seen as coming from students’ *specific context* – that is, the context of Cyprus, an issue I will discuss further in the next chapter.
- vii. The fact that many students operate on the basis of a incomplete model results in student thinking being constituted by *inconsistencies*. Students did, by and large, exemplify certain patterns of thought which were mostly incompatible. In other words, the ideas that individual students displayed were not necessarily consistent across *all their answers*. As I demonstrate in the next section students who demonstrated sophisticated thinking were not an exception to this.
- viii. At the same time student notions about the nature of historical accounts point to the *conceptual frameworks* within which students operate. To claim that students’ ideas fit entirely within one of these modelling frameworks is quite simplistic. However, these frameworks can help educators navigate teaching and learning.
- ix. Students attributed value to historical accounts by employing a number of criteria beyond the epistemic ones. Explicitly, students drew on the community uses of the past and therefore aligned with the social goals of history as I discuss in Chapter 7. Hence students used historical accounts as ‘cultural tools’ (Bakhtin, 1981; Vygotsky, 1978; Wertsch, 2000) – that is, as cultural means of appropriating the world around them.

In conclusion, the data analysis overview of ways of thinking inherent in knowing and doing history has shown that students’ thinking is complex and multi-faceted. Students’ answers indicate that their ideas are neither simple nor easy to define. As the purpose of the data analysis chapters was to provide a thorough description of student ideas I ‘zoomed in’ on students’ ideas at a high level of specificity (in a sense, I described the trees over the forest). In the next chapters I attempt to ‘zoom out’ and theorise findings in a broader way to highlight

what these findings *mean*, why these findings matter, and what their implications are for history education. I theorise findings as discussed in the data analysis chapters over two chapters – that is, Chapters 6 and 7, in which I discuss a) students’ epistemologies and b) how students attribute value to historical accounts in personal terms. In Chapters 8 and 9 I discuss my findings’ significance. Firstly, in Chapter 8 I situate the findings reported on here by discussing how Greek-Cypriot students’ ideas compare to those reported in the existing literature. In Chapter 9, I draw the big picture in relation to the findings of this discussion: I go back go back to my research problem and stimuli and discuss why these findings matter.

CHAPTER 6. What are students' epistemological ideas?

6.1. Introduction

In the preceding chapter I presented the ideas that Greek-Cypriot students, who participated in this study, have about historical accounts. I used four analytical questions in order to group data and discuss students' engagement with history. These concerned the a) authorship, b) validity, c) authority and d) usefulness of accounts. By discussing student answers under the use of these analytical questions, I provided a systematic and thorough account of the range of ideas students have about historical accounts. In this chapter, rather than exhausting the findings, I contextualise the points raised in the previous chapter in a way that allows me to proceed in highlighting implications and suggestions for history education by responding to the issue of *relevance*. The themes that I am foregrounding reflect instructive features of respondents' answers from a policy making perspective and allow key issues, such as misconceptions to be addressed and considered. Specifically, in response to contributing to knowledge I discuss findings by demonstrating how these have implications for history education in terms of curricula, textbooks, classroom practice and pedagogy. Moreover, in this chapter, in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, I attempt to move from answer-level to student-level, and to give a more holistic picture of student cases and hence to illustrate individual student thinking.

The first analytical question I employed in order to theorise students' ideas is '**What are Greek-Cypriot students' epistemologies about historical accounts?**'. Firstly, in Section 6.2, I discuss students' conceptual inconsistencies, with the purpose of demonstrating how students' understanding of history is messy – and, therefore, often difficult to put in 'cages' as Lee and Shemilt (2003) emphasised. In Section 6.3 I present students' ideas about the nature of historical accounts, and thus, of history itself (Chapman, 2001, p.8). Thirdly, in Section 6.4 I discuss students' limited notions with the purpose of highlighting implications

for policy-making and classroom practice. Following up on students' incomplete ideas, in Section 6.5 I demonstrate how students' context *might* be reinforcing their limited epistemologies. In Section 6.6, I present powerful ideas demonstrated by students and, in Section 6.7, I offer conclusions with regard to students' epistemological ideas.

Conceptual Inconsistencies

6.2.1. Introduction

As the data analysis findings showed, student thinking is complex and multi-faceted. This led me into analysing a number of selected student cases as I wanted to investigate whether students' understandings result from broader conceptual understandings. I found that students' thinking was, most of the times, characterised by patterns of *inconsistency* rather than consistency, which is perhaps to be expected. Drawing on his data, Martens (2015, p. 226-7) reported that

students who were able to, for example understand history as a construct, still expressed and enacted positive ideas as well. In their dealing with and discussion about historical accounts, a synchronicity of differently sophisticated epistemological theories was observable in all groups of the data.

In order to illustrate students' conceptual inconsistencies, I selected to discuss two cases of students who demonstrated more advanced thinking than their peers in that they seemed to acknowledge that historical accounts are products of methodological and theoretical construction. The reason I selected these two students is because I wanted to point out that incomplete models of thinking can be found throughout all levels of progression. Addressing students' inconsistencies is crucial, as it has implications for history teaching and learning; namely, revealing that a) many students (even those who employ sophisticated thinking) operate on the basis of an incomplete model and that b) consequently, this flawed model, does not enable students to produce complex and coherent explanations.

6.2.2. Petros' case

Petros' case was revealing with regard to students' conceptual inconsistencies. Petros' answers in relation to different instrument questions were interesting, in that they exemplify how students often engage with conceptual dichotomies. For instance, Petros' written answer cited below talked explicitly about interpretation:

The influences that exist in each person that investigates the historical facts, that is, background, environment, etc., will certainly affect the way they will connect the knowledge he learns. Also, maybe his research focuses on specific periods or element so that they don't allow a wide knowledge of the facts, so the research and the conclusion are not 100% correct.

(Petros, Interview I)

In this extract Petros modeled the authors of accounts as active: they 'investigate', 'connect...knowledge' and make decisions about the focus of their 'research'. Moreover, Petros seemed to be aware of the historical enquiry methods in that he placed emphasis on a central issue of historical writing: *connecting* information. However, and despite this clear emphasis on author *activity*, this student also clearly modeled history writing as passive – that is, as acted-upon and influenced by their personal 'background, environment, etc.' which 'will certainly affect' how they conduct research and interpretation; hence, Petros' answer was *internally* inconsistent. By internal inconsistency I mean that there is some kind of logical divergence within the same answer. In addition, Petros explained account variation in terms of inadequacies in the historian's knowledge: historians may have a narrow focus or perspective that prevents them from representing their topic fully and adequately ('maybe his research focuses on specific periods or elements so that they don't allow a wide knowledge of the facts so the research and the conclusion are not 100% correct').

Petros' inconsistent answer as discussed above was not an exception, as he exemplified internal inconsistency more than once. In his interview answer Petros explained account variation in the following terms:

I think more it has to do with how, the one who, will approach a specific historical event, how he will approach it from which side – let's say he might focus more on the causes, or to, let's say to some countries. According to his environment let's say, where he was influenced from, where there are better, where let's say he can learn more things – let's say in one country he might learn more information than the other and so to them more holistically from the one side, but from the other he might not get the information he needs, and in the end to have different things from each [author].

(Petros, Interview I)

Here, again, Petros recognized that writing history is an active process of enquiry that involving a number of decisions (about which 'specific historical event' to 'approach' and about which, 'focus' to take – 'on... causes, or... countries'). However, as in his written answer, these perceptions are combined with a non-active 'impositionist' model (Chapman, 2009) of how historians work – that is, that historians' writings are shaped first by their backgrounds (their 'environment' and 'where' they were 'influenced from') and second by the fact that archives might just happen to be better supplied in one context than in another ('where there are better, where [...] he can learn more things [...] in one country he might learn more information than [in] the other and [...] from the other [side] he might not get the information he needs'). For him, then, it may be argued that history is perceived as an active process and the historian is understood as the interpreter. However, at the same time, he is also understood as shaped by processes he does not control –background influences on historians and contingent facts about the context in which they conduct their research.

6.2.3. Meri's case

Meri's was another interesting student case of conceptual inconsistency. Unlike Petros, Meri did not display internal dichotomies. However, she provided answers which were *externally* inconsistent. That is, answers in themselves were consistent; however, when compared to each other, there was logical divergence.

Well, maybe some people have lived these events, so they see them from a subjective perspective, because when you live something, and you experience it you are not completely objective.

(Meri, Interview III, 1.28-31)

Like now that they say something with the English that there is an archive which goes every year, it gives out information, but it goes back in time. So, until we reach the year that includes certain facts, then we might find information which we don't know right now.

(Meri, Interview III, 1.61-65)

In the first fragment from Meri's interview answers Meri modelled the author as passive: authors' experiences may (directly) influence their interpretations of events, which might not be objective; in other words, authors' lived experience operates as an imposition to how they approach history, resulting in the removal of objectivity from a potentially truthful account. In the second fragment, Meri can be argued to still be modelling authors as passive: authors passively fall onto sources that happen to be available. However, the second fragment may be argued to convey a more sophisticated notion of the author – he 'finds information'. Meri's perception of the author is also one that puts emphasis on the tools of the craft – that is the sources; therefore, her passive idea of the author co-exists with a more active one, in which authors actively look for information. It may be argued that Meri's second response is a (more) reflective one, with the first response being an incomplete explanation, clearly functioning as a default position.

6.2.4. Default positions as barriers?

Petros' and Meri's answers are of particular interest because they are typical of a number of student answers, which simultaneously made sophisticated advances, but were also held back by less powerful and less sophisticated ideas that inhibited their developing understanding of history, and which operated as their 'default positions' (Lee, 2004). The most likely cause of inconsistency can be argued to be students' prior and 'erroneous' ideas

about what history is and how it works. For instance, young people draw on a range of information to make sense of history, which can include myth, assumption and stereotype (Dickinson and Lee, 1978; Lee and Howson, 2009; Shemilt, 2009), while, students are also likely to draw upon their everyday experiences - such as that someone is either responsible or not - to construct historical meaning and understandings (Lee and Shemilt, 2004).

Addressing students' inconsistencies is crucial, as this has implications for history teaching and learning. To begin with, as students' thinking is complex and far from set, educators should be reminded that different and unequal ideas often co-exist. Moreover, stakeholders should be reminded that description and thinking models should not be taken at face value; models are useful as they operate as *mapping* schemes which can enable educators to help students make the necessary shifts and move towards more powerful explanations. Lastly, bringing inconsistencies to the forefront is a reminder that students do have the potential for sophisticated thinking, but often their prior (mis)conceptions impede the development of powerful historical understanding.

6.3. Student Ideas about the Nature of Historical Accounts

6.3.1. Introduction

Even though many students' thinking is defined by inconsistencies as shown in the previous section, at the same time, students' thinking suggests that, when it comes to the nature of historical accounts, there are conceptual frameworks within which students operate. These can be suggested to form progression levels in that, in each level, students' new ideas allow students to make better sense of history and of the world (Lee, 2005). I propose six conceptual levels as shown in Table 12 on the next page. By proposing these I do not put forward a

Table 12: Students' ideas about the nature of historical accounts

1.	Accounts are just there
	Accounts are copies of a fixed and consequently singular past. Accounts exist somewhere out there, waiting to be found.
2.	Accounts convey a true and fixed past
	Accounts are copies of a fixed and consequently singular past. This past is transferred through meticulous citation; for this reason, authors make sure that they have the right version of the past by citing as much information as possible. The past can also be transferred by eye-witnessing. Accordingly, accounts cannot be true if authors - or ourselves - haven't been there to verify what has happened.
3.	Accounts are just different opinions
	Authors have their own opinions, which they - passively or actively - impose on the past. Readers have their own opinions too, and it is up to them how to judge the past. The interpretation and evaluation of the past is a matter of personal judgment – hence all accounts can be equally valid, according to the author or the reader.
4.	Accounts are biased
	Accounts are the product of bias. Authors are, by default, disposed in a specific way; and, for this reason, they either passively or actively distort the past. History is also distorted at a collective level: sometimes countries – and not authors – ‘write’ the past (with a specific agenda).
5.	Accounts are ‘epistemic’ products
	Accounts stop being copies of the past (which simply exist, are ‘transferred’, or constitute opinions). Accounts are the result of a scientific procedure; therefore, differences in accounts exist because of gaps, procedural mistakes or failures. The past can be fully retrieved in a natural-sciences fashion; hence, historians should strive for the ultimate and untouched truth, and personal opinion should be removed.
6.	Accounts are constructions
	Accounts are the result of historians' different construction of the past. Hence accounts have relativistic weight, not because they carry different author opinions but because authors: use different sources and/or knowledge; they (accordingly?) employ different ways of thinking; centre their research on different aspects of the past; or, are interested in different questions. Therefore, accounts are (theory) constructions.

Piagetian model of student thinking – that is, I do not argue that students move through different stages of thinking and/or (intellectual) development. As I have demonstrated in the previous section students think, understand and evaluate historical accounts by operating within two or more conceptual frameworks. In a similar vein to other researchers, I offer these conceptual frameworks in the form of progression models. By using the term ‘advancement’ I mean a kind of betterment in relation to how students understand the nature of accounts and thus history writing in general. The frameworks I put forward relating to students’ ideas about the nature of history, to a large degree, resemble the six categories I devised to describe students’ ideas about whether differing accounts can be simultaneously true. The frameworks I propose also resemble progression models as proposed by other researchers (Suhaimi, 2012; Chapman, 2009; Hsiao, 2008; Lee and Ashby, 2000).

When considering this model, we should bear in mind that what indicates progression in students’ ideas and understandings about historical accounts is not the frameworks themselves, but the *leap* students need to take between them. Moreover, when considering this model – or any model for that matter, we need to think through issues such as ‘cultural translation’ - that is moving or carrying findings across from one place or position to another, in that it might involve a shift in norms, values, languages across cultural boundaries. I refer further to this issue in Chapter 8. Last but not least, we should be cautioned that we cannot expect students’ ideas to fit in entirely in the proposed frameworks: arguing that students are tied to the frameworks put forward in this model would be an empirical error. The reason I put forward these levels with regard to students’ understanding of the nature of historical accounts is because these can enable: a) policy-makers to design curricula and textbooks that aim at bettering student thinking; and b) educators to identify limited epistemologies, and c) consequently, help students advance their overall thinking and understanding.

6.3.2. Accounts Are Just There

The first level regarding students' ideas about the nature of historical accounts is 'Accounts Are Just There'. That is, according to students, accounts just exist - they are out there, waiting to be found by us. At this level, students do not clarify where the agency behind the accounts lies. Students do not name an author, and thereby they do not make it apparent how we acquire knowledge of the past: the past just exists - either in the book or in told stories - and it reprises the information from the past. As Lee (2009) explained, for some students 'the question "How do we know?" simply does not arise: there is only one story "because it says one way in the book".' In other words, it is as if the past is revealed to us via an unknown authority. For instance, drawing on the first analytical question I devised for the purposes of data analysis ('How do we acquire knowledge of the past according to students?'), students did not seem to be aware of *how* we end up with differing accounts. Students exemplified this notion by, a) describing rather than explaining differences (accounts just exist), b) referring to an obscure voice transferring the past, and c) pointing to countries as the actor behind accounts. For these students there is no author: the past is just out there, waiting to be found.

Magda was an indicative example with regards to how students did not seem to understand accounts as written by an author. Magda's answers in relation to different instrument questions were interesting, in that they exemplify how students often think of the past as a story that is just transferred to us - rather than a matter of interpretation (and one that happens to be transferred through the accounts themselves).

The criteria are when it does not support or does not 'separate' the countries that is all the things they write not supporting one country and not saying what the specific country has done.

(Magda, Written Task 1, Question 4.1)

One account differs from the other because in Account 1 it accuses Makarios to us and it focuses on him. And Account 2 talks to us in general in regard to the cause if the coup.

(Magda, Written Task 2, Question 2.1)

Confronted by the question ‘**Which account amongst the two is best in your opinion? Can you please justify?**’ in relation to Task 1, Magda did not make explicit reference to an author. This should does not necessarily mean that Magda is not aware of the author behind the accounts. However, not only Magda did not identify an author through her answers, when she responded to the question ‘How is it possible that, while two historical accounts refer to the same issue, the same event, they are different?’ in relation to Task 2, she modelled accounts as active: ‘Account 1 *accuses* Makarios to us’; ‘it focuses on him’; and, ‘Account 2 *talks to us*’.

6.3.3. Accounts Convey the True and Fixed Past

The second level regarding students’ ideas about the nature of accounts is that ‘Accounts Convey the True and Fixed Past’. In this second level, students operate within the notion that accounts constitute a ‘mirror’ of the past (Lee and Shemilt, 2004) – that is, historical accounts are treated as copies of a fixed past. In other words, students see historical accounts as accurate representations of what has happened in the past. This was a finding that prevailed throughout all the analytical questions. Taking as an instance students’ answers on the simultaneous truthfulness of two differing accounts more than half of student responses – 105 out of 188, representing 55.85% of all student answers on accounts’ simultaneous validity – indicated that students accepted or rejected accounts’ simultaneous truthfulness, based on whether the facts match or not. The assumption here is that as history is a series *of given* facts which need to be put together, an account is either true or not. This finding should not be considered surprising, as it is in line with other research findings. For instance, drawing on CHATA, Lee (2009) highlighted that

Few children had any strategy for testing an explanation except by checking that the statements in it were true; for most, a cause was epistemologically speaking on a level with a statement of fact, and was either something that happened or existed, or not.

In other words, for students, history is a representation of the past, and one that is grounded in citation.

The notion that a true past is out there, and that we can know this through citation, can be found in a series of sub-notions. The first way to recount the facts is through ‘copy-paste’ or ‘scissors and paste’ (Collingwood, 1994) - that is, compiling pieces/information from different stories. Secondly, students who operate in the ‘accounts “mirror” the past’ framework argue that truth can be triangulated by providing and/or checking against citation – that is the citation of dates, names, and cited references. Thirdly, according to these students, we can assess accounts via eye-witnessing: if authors were there they have transferred the true story of the past. Through these mechanisms we can assess whether historical accounts are altogether or partly true.

Zinonas’ answers were representative of how students think of accounts as mirrors of the past:

Yes [they can be both true in their parts], but I don’t believe that they can be both true in their totality. ...Because one gets into the other – and how can I say it. One says one thing and the other comes to refute it, you can’t say that they are both true when one cancels the other. Maybe if you put them together you can extract your own conclusion.

(Zinonas, Interview V, 1.94-101)

I don’t believe that they can be both true at the same time, but I cannot know because from the moment I haven’t lived the facts, I cannot judge which is true, and which is not.

(Zinonas, Interview V, 1.89-91)

Zinonas placed emphasis on the fact that there is only one correct version of the past. Hence, should the accounts clash, one of the two (or both?) is wrong. In addition, Zinonas also explained how we can gain knowledge of the factual and true past - that is by witnessing it. Hence, if we haven’t been there ourselves, it is impossible to judge which of the two versions of the past is the correct one. This level marks an advancement on level 1 in that students

who operated in level 1 saw accounts as entities about the past without any reference to *how* we know about the past. on the contrary, students who operate in this level appear to have some awareness that history involves dealing with (sometimes conflicting) information and referring to specific events.

6.3.4. Accounts Are Just Different Opinions

The third level regarding students' ideas about the nature of historical accounts is that accounts constitute different opinions. This idea marks a shift in students' thinking, in that by moving from history as factual (level 2) to that of history as opinion students place the emphasis on the author rather than the story. The latter way of thinking marks a progression in that students seem to start acknowledging the author behind the accounts. In other words, while students continue seeing history as a series of facts like in level 2, what is added in this level is that these historical facts become relative because of authors' (or readers') opinions. The idea that accounts are reflective of different opinions was prevalent in students' answers throughout all data groups. For instance, when analysing students' answers as to why accounts might differ, author opinion scored 30.34%.

At this level students appear to demonstrate a more or less relativistic approach in relating each account to different judgements and consequently considering all accounts as valid. The degree to which, according to students, accounts constitute opinions can vary. This is because students see accounts as being the products of opinion on different scales - that is, from the authors' perspective, to moderate relativism, and to an extreme form of relativism. Nonetheless, as a whole, despite the degree of relativism, judgement seems to be a matter of personal opinion. In students' heads, relativism comes in three forms. Firstly, opinion is just something authors do – in other words, opinion is natural. This notion seems to be common

amongst young people, as ‘some students will regard this situation as perfectly normal and somehow related to basic human nature’ (Hsiao, 2008, p. 54-55). Within this notion opinion is often linked to ethnic beliefs and/or affiliations, as it comes about because of the authors’ background. Secondly, accounts are relative because authors actively impose their opinion. The third notion regarding students’ idea of the nature of historical accounts as something relative is that opinion is relative to the reader – not just the author. Accounts, therefore, are reader-relative narratives.

A student that seemed to operate mostly within the ‘Accounts Are Just Different Opinions’ level was Persefoni. Persefoni clearly modelled historical accounts as matters of opinion – that is, as written and influenced by authors’ different way of thinking, affecting how they ‘think’ and ‘perceive’ things.

Yes, they can because as I mentioned before each one writes in the way he thinks and perceives [things]. One understands them differently, and the other differently. There is never just one truth.

(Persefoni, Task 1, Question 3.1).

Because each person in their head understands things differently or explains them in their own way. So do we; as receivers we perceive differently than others the fact. ‘When there is a truth, then there is no truth’.

(Persefoni, Task 1, Question 2.1, inverted commas in the original)

Thus, as there are different perceptions there are different truths.

6.3.5. Accounts Are Distorted Versions of the Past

The fourth level regarding students’ ideas about the nature of historical accounts is that accounts are inescapably biased: when it comes to history writing, it is impossible for accounts to be true in their totality as bias and interests always come into play. Specifically, according to students, accounts are distorted in three ways. Firstly, by default, accounts are distorted versions of the past as authors have different interests. Secondly, accounts are biased

in that not only do authors' (political) opinions affect how they view the past but, what is more, authors actively control and direct information and facts as they will, in order to manipulate the past. Thirdly, accounts are biased at a collective level: it is countries – not historians – who are exercising bias according to some students. Just like bias at the individual level, collective bias is both passive and active. As a result, because of these conscious or unconscious interventions, by default accounts *have* to be distorted. For most of these students who think that accounts are distorted versions of the past, it is impossible for accounts to be true in their totality. However, for a number of students, accounts although not being altogether biased, are still biased in parts. Regardless of accounts being partly or altogether partial, because bias and interests always come into play when it comes to history writing, we can never have a true version of the past. Despite the fact that these notions about the nature of historical accounts are still incomplete, they can be argued to mark an improvement as students not only recognise the author behind the accounts, they recognise his *active* role.

A student who largely gave answers by operating within the 'Accounts are Just Different Opinions' was Sofronis.

One [author] is German and he wrote to support his country and the other that he wasn't German and against her, against Germany and the rest that fought with Germany he wrote in opposition to the beliefs of the one that wrote the first text [account].

(Sofronis, Interview VI, 1.51-53)

...they can be both true, but they will be true up to a point, and at the point their side will be touched on they will take it, they will change that thing...

(Sofronis, Interview VI, 1.90-94)

I found the second account useful because it talks about the right facts.

(Sofronis, Written Task 2)

Answering the instrument question 'How is it possible that, while two historical accounts refer to the same issue, the same event, they are different?'. Sofronis pointed out that authors (naturally?) support different sides – hence accounts are distorted versions of the past. In

addition, through his answer Sofronis clarified that accounts could have been ‘true’; however, the moment authors identify something that does not agree with their version of the story they intervene and change the account so as not to touch upon side/country. That accounts could have been true in the first place is confirmed by Sofronis’ answer to the instrument question ‘Which account amongst the two is more useful?’: it is possible that one of the two accounts depicts ‘the right facts’

6.3.6. Accounts Are Epistemic Products

The fifth level regarding students’ ideas about the nature of historical accounts is that accounts are products of an episteme, a discipline. This is clearly an advancement when it comes to understanding the nature of historical accounts as students who operate in this conceptual level seem to recognise the *disciplinary nature* of history and hence the methodology behind it. However, a) their epistemological ideas were limited, as I will demonstrate in the next section, and b) (consequently) they seemed to think of history operating on positivist epistemic methods. This notion is in line with the factuality of the past: there is a truth, and it can be recovered. However, in contrast to the student notions attributed to the second framework – that is that the past can be transferred through use of citation and eye-witnessing, at this stage, ‘Accounts Are Epistemic Products’, students refer to sources and evidence. Students consider evidence as proof of the ‘truth’ - even though they do not seem to be (fully) aware of what is meant by ‘evidence’ and how this relates to accounts. Operating within a positivistic model of the past evidence is treated as face value information and, therefore, in students’ heads ‘evidence’ can be used to check against a factual past. The idea here, as Lee (2009) pointed out, is that

the past is treated as if it is the present; pupils treat potential evidence as if it offers direct access to the past. Questions about the basis of historical statements do not arise: children operate with a true/false distinction.

As Greek-Cypriot students put it, ‘if they are [both] true, why not?’. For students, ‘evidence’ creates a reality effect; in other words, it has the power of making accounts look truthful. The existence of evidence therefore indicates that accounts can be trusted.

As students see history in a positivistic manner, they fail to understand that history is not strictly a science, as it has epistemological limitations that prevent it from applying the scientific method. Boix-Mansilla (2005) described the students who adhere to this notion as ‘historical objectivists’, and explains that these ‘students view historical enquiry as a practice that operates within a constellation of norms, methods and validation criteria designed to capture the past accurately and completely’ (p.101). Accordingly, as history resembles natural sciences ideally it should be written from a position of absolute neutrality: opinions should be omitted, and historians should only write down the facts.

Rena was one of the students who modelled accounts as science-like products. That is, historical accounts are products of a specific discipline which is defined by a certain methodology.

No. And, also, we cannot know that [whether accounts are simultaneously true] in absolute certainty since the Cyprus Dossier has not opened [to the public] yet. But these are opinions of the historians.

(Rena, Task 2, Question 3.1)

This answer entails a number of beliefs that students hold as to how history works as a practice. Assessing accounts truthfulness with regards to Written Task 2, Rena emphasised that the evidence we currently have at hand we are not in a position to know whether accounts can all be valid at once. By placing emphasis on evidence, it is possible that Rena operated as a ‘historical objectivist’ (Boix-Mansilla, 2005) - that is, it seems that Rena in that it assumed that history could be fully and accurately captured if we have the right/adequate evidence.

6.3.7. Accounts Are Constructions

The sixth and final level in relation to the nature of accounts is that accounts are constructions. In this category, students acknowledge the constructed nature of history and, therefore, concede to the author's subjectivity – yet, in a positive way in contrast to students who operated within the 'Accounts are epistemic products category' and saw author subjectivity as limitation. Explicitly, in contrast to previous students' demands for a perspectiveless opinion (level 5), students acknowledge opinion as personal subjectivity: the author's personal point of view is utterly legitimate, and it might arise only through different interpretations but also different syntheses. Students who operate within this conceptual framework acknowledge history as inference in that the authors talk about the past with respect to deduction from facts and sources, and by reference to specific frames of thought.

In this level, students see accounts as (theory) constructions in that they can understand that historical knowledge, as a kind of theory, is connected to theorising the past with reference to a specific question or interest. An example of a student who operated within this framework was Theodora.

Partly yes, because the specific event might have happened but maybe it is not the reason why the War broke out.

(Written Task 1)

Theodora made the point that both accounts can be true narratives in that they are truthful in regard to the events, but only one might be *valid* with regards to the question. Theodora made the point that both accounts can be true narratives in that they are truthful about the events, however only one might be valid regarding the question on why WWI broke out. Theodora was in a position to tackle how deferring historical accounts might be simultaneously true, yet at the same time they might not be valid if they do not respond to the question they claim to discuss. Theodora's answer can be argued to constitute the most nuanced understanding of historical accounts as reported in this study. This is because 'students who operate within

this framework not only seem to understand that history represents and does not reconstruct the past, but they are also in a position to acknowledge that historical knowledge is an argument to a conclusion' (Collingwood, 1994).

Theodora made the point that both accounts can be true narratives in that they are truthful with regard to the events, however only one might be valid with regard to the question on why WWI broke out. Theodora was in a position to tackle how differing historical accounts might be simultaneously true, yet at the same time they might not be valid if they do not respond to the question they claim to discuss. Theodora's answer indicates the most nuanced understanding of historical accounts as reported in this study. Students who operate within this framework not only seem to understand that history represents and does not reconstruct the past, but they are also in a position to acknowledge that historical knowledge is an argument to a conclusion (Collingwood, 1994).

6.4. Incomplete Notions

6.4.1. Introduction

As I have demonstrated throughout this Thesis not only do students face a series of difficulties when dealing with historical accounts, but they also operate with limited ideas about historical accounts. The two are interrelated of course: students face difficulties with regards to the nature of historical accounts *because* they have incomplete disciplinary awareness. The findings of this study revealed that most, but not all, of the students participating in this study operated on the basis of incomplete notions. Some of these notions can be broken down in more specific limited ideas. As previously explained, I refer to students' ideas as 'limited' or 'incomplete' as they do not encapsulate the full complexity of history. As I present schematically in Figure 6 in page 236, incomplete notions be grouped


under the conceptual frameworks I proposed in Section 6.3. I discuss students' limited ideas so as to highlight how they constitute barriers to powerful thinking.

6.4.2. Incomplete notions under 'Accounts Are Just There'

i. Obscure Agency: 'Accounts explain things to us'

The first student incomplete notion revealed by the findings of this Thesis is: 'Obscure agency' (Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2). This notion falls within the 'accounts are just out there' conceptual framework. Students who exemplify this notion seem to think that a) simply there are different historical accounts out there, or b) accounts or countries convey the past differently (Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2). Specifically, in 33% of responses related to the differences between accounts, students made reference to accounts but not to an author. Moreover, with regard to the question of why accounts might differ 8.54% of all answers indicated that students identified an agency behind the accounts – however it did not become apparent whether agency came from the author, or the accounts, or somewhere else. For these students it seems as if accounts speak for the past rather than representing it. Of course, it could be argued that students refer to accounts as entities as they follow up on the question namely, 'Why do the two accounts differ?'. In other words, students' use of the language could reflect the language I have utilised in the instrument questions, but, on the other hand, language reflects thinking. This is because language is a window to the human mind and therefore to our(unconscious) representations of the world (van Nes et al, 2010). Therefore, students' answers are representative of their understanding or rather the lack of understanding that accounts are actively constructed and that perspectives are taken by the authors.

Figure 6: Students' Incomplete Notions



Moreover, according to students' accounts are not simply entities, they are entities *acting* (Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2). For instance, according to students, differing accounts can be the result of different countries' deeds, a notion conveyed in code 'Countries act'(ibid). According to this notion, students indicated that history was written by nations, not historians. What is interesting here is that national subjectivism (understanding things as each country 'sees them') morphs into explicit partisan action that aims to serve national self-interest by

Adapting history to fit instrumental purposes – that is, things are written to accuse one country and to deem the other innocent with respect to their own interests. Of course, nations *are* historical actors capable of purposeful and conscious action. However, it is doubtful whether students were in a position to decouple countries and authors.

6.4.3. Incomplete notions under ‘Accounts Convey a True and Fixed Past’

There are five limited notions falling under the ‘Accounts Convey a True and Fixed Past’ conceptual framework. These evolved around the idea that history means *representing* the true and factual past. On the one hand, according to students there are four ways in which the factual truth can be restored; that is, through: a) citation (which is often is classified as ‘evidence’), b) true vignettes of the past (which can be identified and compiled), c) sources, and d) being there. As Martens (2015, p. 226) highlighted, students who regard history as a picture of the past are not able ‘to appreciate the influence of the author, the character of historical enquiry, or at least of the constructivist nature of history’. A further limited notion within the ‘Accounts Convey a True and Fixed Past’ level is that history is ‘unilateral’ (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2).

ii. Citation: ‘It refers to the right dates’

The first limited idea within the ‘Accounts Convey a True and Fixed Past’ conceptual framework is: citation. Explicitly, according to students, the true factual past can be found in citation as this has the power of ‘mirroring’ the past. Not only that, as annotation can be taken as true, in students’ heads, annotation counts as evidence. Obviously, for students, providing citation operates as recounting truths. What is more, if students are inclined to think of facts and information as ‘evidence’, it makes sense that, the *more* of it we have the closer we are to the factual past. Consequently, history becomes a matter of *quantity* – a notion that is

problematic in that students see the historian's work in terms of accumulating knowledge rather than retrieving knowledge through evaluation and inferencing.

iii. 'Copy-paste': 'Both can be true in parts of them'

A second limited idea within the 'Accounts Convey a True and Fixed Past' was the 'copy-paste' or 'scissors and paste' (Collingwood, 1994) notion. According to this notion, the true past can be obtained by findings the fragmented 'mirrors' of the past, that is true account parts and/or information, which as soon as they are identified and thereafter isolated ('scissors') and put together ('paste'), can reveal the true picture of the past. The 'copy-paste' notion has been recorded in literature by a number of researchers (Shemilt, 1980; Lee and Ashby, 2000; Chapman, 2009) and draws on Collingwood's (1994) 'scissors and paste' idea. Collingwood (ibid), suggested that many historians simply constructed by excerpting and combining the testimonies of different authorities. That history can consist of true parts, was a popular notion amongst Greek-Cypriot students. For instance, 11.05% of answers on accounts validity showed that students reported on in this study aligned with the notion that we can decide whether a story is true by collecting and collating the true parts from different accounts. Given this belief, students are predisposed to thinking about accounts in a binary fashion: accounts are right or wrong, true or false, accurate or mistaken. As Lee pointed out 'many students, then, operate with sets of ideas that work well in everyday life, but between them render history impossible. Because there is a fixed past, only one true account may be given of it'(Lee, 2009). Consequent of the incomplete notion that history is fixed and set – are the following two limited ideas: a) if two different views contradict one another, then one of them must be true and the other false – hence we are led to absolutism; and b) the set and fixed past constitutes a series of factual truths, this means that the past is *singular*.

iv.Sources: 'Information is taken from different sources'

A third limited idea within the ‘Accounts Convey a True and Fixed Past’ is that sources operate as a jigsaw that can give the full and true picture of the past. This notion is limited too in that, just like in the case of citation and ‘copy-paste’, sources too operate as smaller/fragmented pieces of the factual past that, when put together, can give us the true account of what has happened. Moreover, according to students, for this reason, different sources can lead us to different conclusions. The notion that sources mirror the past is restricting because students take sources at face value – that is, students hold the belief that sources themselves have the answers. In other words, in students’ heads, the past seems to be taken straight from the source (authors ‘adopt’ history from different sources). That students saw sources at face value also became apparent due to the fact that students did not question the source provenance so as to reflect on the utility or reliability of that source. Indeed, there were a number of students who pointed out that accounts’ truthfulness and authority could be judged against trustworthiness – which nonetheless, is not one and the same thing as reflecting on source provenance, as trustworthiness could depend on whose side the author is on. Drawing on his own research, Wineburg (1991a) found that, in contrast to historians who would first read the source information at the bottom of the document before reading the document content, ‘students seemed to view texts as vehicles for conveying information in which attribution was the last thing to be read’ (p.83).

Students also seemed (almost completely) unaware that sources – that is their selection and interpretation, are intrinsically connected to and depended on history’s methods, forms and functions (Rüsen, 2005). What is more, students seemed completely unaware that sources are interrelated with the rest of the historical processes. In other words, that all ‘aspects should be investigated and demonstrated in their inner systematic coherence’ (Blanke, 2005, p.247) seemed alien to students. In other words, although historical elements are interconnected, decisions taken at one level, affect decisions taken in the next stages (Rüsen, 2005), students seemed to have completely missed this point. Moreover, students who employ the idea that more/better sources can convey the truth past, do not seem aware that, to start with, authors are actively looking for sources

– they neither look for all sources, nor do they fall passively into them (according to affiliation). That authors passively fall onto different sources raises different implications. For instance, do people hear the information, or read it somewhere? Also, are authors restricted only to their side of the story sources? The belief that authors either just find sources, or happen to hear – or witness things, can lead to: a) relativism - in that, different people have knowledge of different things just because this is what they had access to; or, b) to nihilism – in that, since authors are doomed to know only one side of the story we can never know the full truth. These notions can be problematic in that they make history impossible (Lee and Shemilt, 2004), as history is confined to sides.

A further limited idea in relation to sources is source restrictions. As students attribute sources to the role of chance and accident, they think of differences in accounts as a result of archive gaps. That is, in their minds, the historian just did not find enough appropriate sources – hence we end up with account deficiencies. This idea was represented in ‘Source limitations’ (Chapter 5, Section 5.1.5) conveying the idea that accounts might differ as source limitations might impede the big picture from emerging. Accordingly, instead of seeing sources as the raw materials that are used in the process of yielding evidence, students see sources as puzzle pieces, which in their combination can give a full picture of the past.

v. The experiential past: ‘You needed to be there’

The fourth limited idea within the ‘Accounts Convey the True and Fixed Past’ conceptual framework is that factual past can be recovered through contemporary experience. Explicitly, according to students, we can capture the factual past through immediate witnessing - in students’ own words, by ‘being there’. Interestingly, the ‘direct observation paradigm’ (Barca, 2002) was expressed in two sub-notions by students who participated in this Thesis study. Explicitly, as students held the belief that only those who had experienced the past could present it truthfully, they put forward that: a) only those authors who were present can know the truth; and b) that, alternatively/or

in addition we needed to have been there as well - however as none of us was alive in those days, we can never know what is true (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.3). On the other hand, this finding is not exclusive to Greek-Cypriot students. Barton (1997) illustrated that, when asked how the people who write books know what happened, students described them as little more than written versions of oral transmission; most thought books about the past were written by people in the past, who had witnessed events first hand, while nearly all students thought the information was handed down through word of mouth.

vi. 'Unilateral history': 'He couldn't have been in two places'

The fifth limited notion within the 'Accounts Convey a True and Fixed Past' conceptual framework is that of 'Unilateral history' (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2). According to students, that the past is factual means that, logically, the past is singular too. Therefore, if the past is singular, it is based on a series of *subsequent* facts – hence things could have happened in only one way. Therefore, as historical accounts are viewed as factual depictions of the past - that is, of events as they 'actually happened', students appear to be operating with the notion that there is a singular, true account of that past. That history has happened only in one way relates to students' notions that history is unilateral – that is, that responsibility is one-sided. This idea was displayed with regards to students' ideas on accounts simultaneous consistency, as one of the criteria that students used to decide between alternative explanations is the impossibility of simultaneous blame. Explicitly, students displayed the notion that it is *not* possible for two differing accounts to be true at the same time if responsibility is placed on more than one actor/side/country, since only one these can be responsible. This notion is characteristic of how students fail to grasp multi-causal explanations in history - in other words, of the failure to grasp that there *can* be simultaneous responsibility. There is a clear tendency towards a simplification of blame as, according to students, only one party could have caused the war. Accordingly, the actions of one single person or country seem sufficient to explain a specific event resulting in students not attempting to make any links between possible responsible parties.

A further reason policy-makers and educators should pay attention to the ‘Unilateral history’ notion is because this notion is revealing of students’ ideas about *causation*. Students’ difficulties in picturing more complex explanations in history are not only indicative of their misconceptions about causality, they are a result of it too. Students’ notion that in history there can be only one side to blame, means that multiple causes or culprits are out of the question. This conclusion can be problematic in that, whereas historians tend to favour impersonal, abstract structures as providing suitable explanations for historical events (Coffin, 2004), students would be keen to reject any multi-causal explanations/theorising, as many of them do not understand the idea that there are multiple reasons for why historical events occur.

6.4.4. Incomplete notions under ‘Accounts are Just Different Opinions’

Within the ‘Accounts are Just Different Opinions’ conceptual framework, students demonstrated the following limited notions:

- i. Firstly, students seemed to see accounts as contingent – that is, history is just a matter of opinion, where, more or less, anything goes.
- ii. Secondly, students appeared to think of accounts as a matter of ‘perspective’; yet, this notion too fell within relativism.
- iii. Thirdly, students seemed to assume that authors offer their opinion as an *additional* element, and
- iv. Fourthly, students put forward that accounts are contingent because of relativity of perception – that is, the latter is reader relative.

As I started discussing in Section 6.1, the notion that history comes (exclusively) down to opinion, not only constitutes an obstacle to powerful thinking, it might result to a dead-end.

vii. *Anything goes: ‘There is no right or wrong’*

The first limited idea within the ‘Accounts are Just Different Opinions’ conceptual framework is relativism. In students’ own words, in history ‘there is no right or wrong’. Students who exemplified this notion seemed to have the belief that either opinion can be justified by the fact that, at the end of the day, there is no way of knowing what is true - we cannot know anyway: ‘Yes, they can be both be true because no one can guarantee what happened at the time’ (Lenia, Written Task 2, Question 3.1). For these students it seems natural that people have their own opinion: authors have their own opinions which they sit down and put onto paper (Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3).

viii. ‘Perspective’: ‘As receivers we perceive things differently’

The second limited idea within the ‘Accounts are Just Different Opinions’ conceptual framework is that historical accounts are a matter of ‘perspective’. However, although a seemingly more sophisticated approach on evaluating accounts and explaining why accounts differ, this notion can enable relativism too. That is because ‘perspectives’, ‘perceptions’, and ‘points of view’ seemed to be thinly veiled words for opinion.

Because each person in their head understands things differently or explains them in their own way. So, do we, as receivers we perceive differently than others the fact.
‘When there is a truth, then there is no truth’

(Persefoni, Written Task 1, quotations in original)

This convolution needs to be addressed, as these terms do not signify the same thing. Consequently, students need to know: a) how a perspective can be factual while an opinion is always subjective; b) that different perspectives are based on different *evidence*; and, that as a result, c) there is a distinction between valid and *legitimate* accounts.

For instance, according to students, different accounts might be considered as equally valid as they can be the result of *positionality* as I demonstrated in Chapter 5 (Section 5.1.6).

That is, the way *I* see it with my way of thinking and the pieces of knowledge I have etc, my, my logic says that he was a bad man. But some other person either [because of what he] thinks or because of experiences or because of the logic he has, and says, OK

Hitler might have done the things that did, but he has correct ideas. Or he might even agree with the way he realised his ideas.

(Minas, Interview VIII, 1.68-72, emphasis in the original)

For instance, here Minas operated in a kind of relativism which is defined by subjectivism, a general preference of reason, and an acute sensitivity to the role of ideology (rather than methodology) in asserting and maintaining historical claims. It is for this reason that, despite being more sophisticated than a number of other answers, this answer too suggests a relative writing and judgement of the past. Teachers therefore not only owe it to the students to help them make the transition from opinion to perspective, they also need to be careful that they are not enabling a kind of ‘perspectivism’ that can lead to relativism.

The notion that different positionalities can be equally justified is problematic because if an author’s rationale can be as good as any other, history becomes a matter of logic – rather than methodology. This does not only invalidate the methods of history, it puts down the historian who *did* engage with the discipline’s methodology. As Dray (1989, p.65 cited in Park, 2008, p.24-25) stressed, the danger of drawing analogies between a sense perception and artistic representation with historical enquiry by arguing ‘What is more likely to be relativized is not truth itself, but the historian's claim to know it - this being done by interpreting... (emphasis added)’. For this reason, the notion that accounts are intrinsically and unavoidably linked to authors’ ‘perspectives’, can result not only in relativism but also in nihilism.

ix. Opinion Addition: ‘These people also add their opinion’

The third limited idea within the ‘Accounts are Just Different Opinions’ conceptual framework is that authors offer their opinion as an *additional* element. Of course, the idea that opinion constitutes an *addition* to the (true) facts closely relates to the idea that history is a mirror of the past. For opinion is an extra element added to the truth, it means that opinion as an added belief to the (certain) facts of the past, obstructs the truth from emerging. Essentially, by articulating that authors’

held preconceptions and beliefs determine account variation, existence, truthfulness, quality and utility, students consider opinion as *active* intervention. For most of the students that have this notion, there is only one account of that event that is correct, which then gets to be distorted, often resulting in rival accounts of an event that occurred in the past.

Other students suggested that opinion imposition takes place because, as historians are left in a position where they know little or not enough about the past, they employ their opinion. For instance, the notion that authors ‘might not derived information from primary sources or might have included their opinion too in the account’ does not make it clear whether according to students, historians do one or the other, or, if historians use their opinion when they are unable to gain ‘the truth’ about the past. This notion is different from opinion addition where authors just add their opinion on top of the (real) facts. Here, according to students, authors add opinion because of uncertainty – that is, authors seem to use opinion as a substitute. Again, this notion is not only erroneous, it may lead to a dead-end: if we can’t have reliable knowledge, what we are left with is opinion.

x. Reader Opinion: ‘It depends on my judgement’

The fourth limited idea within the ‘Accounts are Just Different Opinions’ conceptual framework is relativity of perception; in other word, students indicated that opinion is relative to the reader – not just the author. This notion was expressed by Lenia who pointed out that: ‘It depends on what each person believes and wants to know’ (Lenia, Written Task 2, Question 4.1). Melanthi also followed this line of thought and evaluated different accounts are reader-relative narratives:

Melanthi: I will agree with Electra. Hm, it’s always based on the beliefs. That is, I won’t say which is the correct – I *cannot* do such a thing. In relation to my own [belief], but I believe different things from what are written inside – I will go with, with my interests, with what I read, and *I* know is the right thing, irrelevantly that I can also see a different opinion.

M.G.: So, none from the two can be good – even if we have a true one we cannot accept it as a good one?

Melanthi: It depends...

M.G.: But if everything is a matter of opinion?

Melanthi: So, besides that, if I judge that that [account] matches to my own beliefs I will say that it is true.

(Melanathi, Interview IV, l. 203-213, emphasis in the original)

Again, according to students, in this extreme form of relativism, historical accounts are judged by the reader's assumptions, opinions, and political interests, removing any authority of critical disciplinary reading.

6.4.5. Incomplete notions under 'Accounts are Distorted Versions of the Past'

xi. Background Imposition: 'It depends on whose side they are'

A further limited student notion is that accounts are distorted versions of the past because of different kinds of author background impositions. Despite the fact that this idea too seems to relate to opinion, I grouped this incomplete idea under the 'Accounts are distorted versions of the past' conceptual framework. This is because this notion differs from the notion of opinion as something natural, to opinion being a result of the author's *background*, who is positioned differently depending on a) ethnic background, b) which side he supports, and c) on political affiliation. These factors underline how authors write the past and, consequently, the validity of the accounts. There were three ideas in this notion: firstly, authors, because of their background and beliefs, actively impose their opinion on the facts and, hence, distort the truthfulness of the past (Chapman, 2009); secondly, authors, not only bring their beliefs to the past, they *manipulate* it to serve political interests; and, thirdly, authors use their opinion as a substitute for missing facts and evidence. In any case, if people didn't have (political) opinions we could see it clearly for what it really was (see Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2), a notion also reported by Lee and Shemilt (2004).

Hand in hand with students' ideas about differing historical accounts being a result of authors' imposition, seems to be the notion that this imposition is all about partisanship. The notion of author

partisanship is an interesting one in that what students seem to be implying is that history writing is always subjected to author background – or *ideology*. Nonetheless, with the data I have at hand, it is difficult to support these claims with certainty. Instead, I propose three questions that need to be answered before proceeding to argue the validity of this claim. Explicitly: obviously, preconceived politics and opinions come through authors' accounts. However,

- i. To what degree do background beliefs and opinions connect?

What is more, political views shape the way authors see and represent the past. Yet,

- ii. Should according to students background beliefs and opinions connect, do they also merge?

And thirdly,

- iii. Should author background beliefs and opinions merge, is there a complete overlap?

In other words, if ideology is ubiquitous and hence transcending authors' methodologies, what is meant is that the act of history writing is by default subjected to author beliefs. Consequently, should students hold this belief, in their head, background ideology does not only devalue the status of history as an object of scholarship, it invalidates it too.

6.4.6. Incomplete notions under 'Accounts are Epistemic Products'

Students who operated within the 'Accounts are Epistemic Products' conceptual framework also demonstrated ideas that were limited. These ideas: a) are related to notions about history as a mirror of the past – in that students believe that there is a recoverable past, and b) they resemble history as natural science. However, positivist notions can be considered more advanced than notions about factual history: this is because, students who operated with positivistic notions about history moved on from the idea that history is a mirror of the past, and exemplified how accounts are connected to 'epistemic' criteria and processes. History is of course an evidence-based practice, and students seemed to be aware of that. However, the 'epistemic' ideas students displayed, constitute limited epistemologies in that they fail to encapsulate the complexity of what historians do. Katerina's declaration for instance, 'I identify truth with the good', indicates that for some students, history can

be very confusing as it resembles natural sciences.³⁵ According to students, history is a matter of validity as there is a reality that can be observed and reported. Hence a truthful history is a good history.

xii: A 100% Recoverable History: ‘If you look hard enough you can find the truth’

The first limited idea within the ‘Accounts are Epistemic Products’ conceptual framework is that history is fully recoverable. This notion is depicted in Phoeve’s answer on why accounts differ.

Phoeve: We look for it.

M.G.: So you are saying that if we look into it –

Phoeve: We can find it. I believe that you can find the truth if you look for it.

(Phoeve, Interview V, line 268-71)

According to this notion a) the truth is out there and b) hence, the historian is assigned with the task of recovering this truth in an archaeological way. Lee (2009), drawing from Arthur Danto (1965), pointed out that students see the historian as an ‘Ideal Chronicler’ – that is, a collector of (true) facts and evidence, which need to be triangulated.

Accordingly, students theorised history as a scientific-like knowledge, and as such, historical knowledge can only come from positive affirmation of theories or elements through strict scientific methods, such as discovering and triangulating. Evidently, there is some fallibility in the idea that if you look hard enough you can find the truth: of course, history involves ‘excavation’ – however it also requires the right kind of abduction that helps historians make valid claims. As pointed out (Lee and Ashby, 2000), although students implicitly recognise that historical claims bore some relationship with what the past has left behind, they see this as a direct connection, not as interpretation.

The belief that the truth is out-there can be dangerous in that what might be true for natural sciences, might be not for history. This is because, whereas other disciplines have a specific object of study, which can be observed through direct inspection and testing – i.e. physics, chemistry, biology,

which can give us empirical and repeatable results, in history we cannot verify the past in the same way - given that we cannot observe the past directly. Moreover, the idea of knowing the full 'reality' can be dangerous because, history a) in a sense is always 'partial' and b) is a matter of interpretation rather than representation. Yet, in students' minds, the past can be fully encapsulated. Although in students' minds missing facts or information might mean that the historian has failed, historians are very well aware that they will most probably never be in a position to know 100% of the past. Furthermore, notions on the completeness of history might be limiting for students as, in history, questions regarding the past concern not just the issue of 'what really happened', but also the issue of how historians can come to know 'what really happened'.

xiii. Wrong procedures: 'Someone has been misinformed'

The second limited idea within the 'Accounts are Epistemic Products' conceptual framework is that differences in accounts are the result of mistaken procedures. The notion that author investigation can be flawed comes across in two more specific student ideas – explicitly, i) misinformation and ii) knowledge gaps (Chapter 5, Section 5.1.5). This notion raises some interesting challenges with respect to the learning and teaching of history. The idea that limitations in accounts exist because authors did something wrong (the process has been flawed in that something went wrong in the discovering or reporting of the past), is a problematic one because it obstructs students from understanding that authors often face restrictions, such as accessing specific archives or finding additional evidence. Secondly, the idea that a historian is an archaeologist retrieving the past can be the default position for many of the students and this can be problematic, as this notion is incomplete and can inhibit the understanding of history as a process of meaning-construction and interpretation; for instance, when the author is faced with the complexities of the past, he just stops as it is impossible to retrieve the past, rather than proceeding to hypotheses or inferences. In other words, knowledge deficits - point towards a 'factual reality', with knowledge about the past being something that is fixed and/or given.

ivx. Perspectiveless Author: 'Maybe at the end to give his own modest conclusion'

The third limited idea within the within the framework of 'Accounts are Epistemic Products' is that, according to students, the past has a set meaning – and as such, can be reported objectively. This is because taking a stance is considered to be taking sides and hence an obstruction to objectivity. Students therefore demand someone who simply facilitates the exercise of looking into the past without being positioned in any way. In other words, although positionality 'explains part of the reality from a specific standpoint, and this is a genuine feature in history not a methodological weakness' (Dray cited in Barca, 2005, p. 69), in students' minds, historical standpoint comes across as distortion.

The notion of the 'independent' or the 'perspectiveless' author raises a series of implications for the teaching and learning of history. This notion is underlined by that of positivism, as authors' judgements are expected to be *value-free*. Consequently, interpretation in social sciences is seen as value *imposition*. The problem with the idea of history as similar to that of (natural) sciences is that a) in natural sciences, elements are there - whereas in history what exists is fragments of the past, and b) in history the elements of the past need to be interpreted and mediated by different methods and construction and, always, through the intangibility of language.

6.4.7. Challenges

Students' flawed ideas are important in themselves, for several reasons. Firstly, limited ideas could be signalling that students' approaches to making sense of historical accounts are connected to everyday experiences - such as, that someone is either responsible or not (Lee, 2009). Secondly, the difficulty of understanding the complexities of a multiple past, to a large extent, can be argued to be a result of students' undeveloped historical thinking. Thirdly, and in relation to students' limited disciplinary awareness, students' incomplete ideas are revealing of how their ideas seem to be

mirrored in their ideas about the nature and status of history, in a situation where epistemology and ontology raise the question of the chicken and the egg.

Hence, we are left with the question: how can we address these issues? Some proposed answers on how we can address students' (incomplete) thinking are the following. I take on these proposals at the last chapter and illustrate how they can be taken on for the teaching and learning of history.

- i. Students ideas are not erroneous altogether. Hence, instruction should start from students' existing ideas. In other words, educators should *use* this knowledge rather than dismissing it. Indeed, the epistemologies students have, to a large degree, differ from those employed within the discipline. Yet, they are a starting point. And,
- ii. Educators, as tools of learning, need to a) know about the language of the discipline; and the way of doing so is by b) engaging (further) with theoretical and historiographical issues.

6.5. Advanced Thinking

Although most of the Greek-Cypriot students reported on in this study seem to operate with rudimentary or incomplete ways of thinking, it would be excessive to suggest that there is a complete lack of advanced thinking. This is because there were students who engaged with historical accounts in much more nuanced ways than their peers. For instance, students a) pointed out that different accounts answer different questions, b) valued accounts' explanatory power, c) pointed to the *materiality* of evidence – that is, how physical materials such as relics or sources affect historical writing, d) explained that accounts are written at different times (and hence were aware that the meaning-making of accounts depends upon existing knowledge) and e) recognised that historians need to verify the validity of the evidence.

Moreover, a number of students seemed to be aware of the *theoretical* nature of accounts. This is because students: a) acknowledge that accounts are built on internal coherence and articulation; b) think of accounts as lines of argument; and c) address that the constructivist nature of accounts also poses limits to articulating a final theory answer as existing evidence does not allow for the drawing of definite conclusions. Students who had these kinds of ideas have more sophisticated understanding than their peers in that students recognised how authors make decisions based on information and source evaluation and that, consequently, historians build accounts based on the information and sources they considered valid.

There were also students who demonstrated nuanced thinking. These students saw accounts as theory constructions in that they can understand that, historical knowledge, as a kind of theory, is connected to theorising the past with reference to a specific question or interest. An example of a student who operated within this framework was Theodora:

Partly yes, because the specific event might have happened but maybe it is not the reason why the War broke out.

(Theodora, Written Task 1)

Theodora made the point that both accounts can be true narratives – in that they are truthful with regards to the events, but only one might be *valid* with regards to the question of why WWI broke out. Theodora appeared to be in a position to tackle how historical accounts might be true, but at the same time might not be valid if they do not respond to the question they claim to discuss. This can be considered the highest level of thinking, as students who operate within this framework not only seem to understand that history represents and does not reconstruct the past but some of them are also able to acknowledge that historical knowledge is an argument to a conclusion (Collingwood, 1994).

Nonetheless, not all student ideas about the construction of the past are not of equal sophistication. For instance, students recognised that authors use different sources, without it always being apparent to them why they end up using these sources. Sources were related to different

conclusions, although some students (seemingly with a hard sciences background?) were in a position to disconnect sources from the narrative outcome. Different construction also seems to be related to authors' different 'thinking' and differing access to knowledge and sources. However, these students seemed to employ relativistic notions: accounts differ because of subjectivity, not because of methodology. It could be argued that students' advanced ideas are difficult to get across as they lack the necessary vocabulary to say what they want to say. It has been suggested (Dilek and Cooper, 2004) that it is possible that adults cannot make sense of students' conclusions, because of the students' lack of vocabulary; for instance, in the case of this study, vocabulary depth and breadth in explaining what is 'valid', or what author 'thinking' means. Given this deadlock how can we a) address students' limited ideas and consequently b) help them to develop more nuanced thinking?

6.6. Socio-Cultural Obstacles?

As meaning-making is always social (Vygotsky, 1978), students' ideas cannot be understood without considering their reference context. For instance, it could be argued that the prevalence of the 'practical past' in the Cyprus context may have influenced students' ideas with regard to the experiential past: we know history through testimony – i.e. people who lived during the events of 1974 or EOKA. Similarly, history may be seen as a matter of opinion because different versions of the past are result of different beliefs: 'it has to do with the politics of each [person]'. Taking sides as a form of bias, exaggeration and dogmatism, which can twist the real facts, might come from students' everyday lives, where the past is often twisted due to vested political interests (Chapter 5, Sections 5.1.3 and 5.2.4). Similar notions are very common in other contexts too, i.e. in UK (Chapman, 2011) – yet, based on this study's findings, it seems that these ideas are more common in Cyprus (Chapter 8, Section 8.2).

A further notion that might be partly related to students' context is trustworthiness. As people always take political sides, we don't know whom to trust, hence 'we do not know if it's true

at the first place'. Trustworthiness does not constitute an epistemology. However, it was a notion underlying students' answers throughout the data and it was a prominent one. A student answer that encapsulated students' notions about trustworthiness was Electra's:

First of all, we don't know whether it's true.

(Electra, Interview IV, 1.199)

Electra's proposition was characteristic of student scepticism about history: 'How are we supposed to know if it's true?'

Still, Electra was not alone in her scepticism of history and historians. Greek-Cypriot students, through their answers, raised the big question:

- Can we trust history?

And if yes,

- How can we trust the author?
- How are we supposed to know if it's true?
- How do we know what we know about the past is true?
- Can history ever be accurate - or even objective?

Of course, the 'How reliable is history?' question is not a new one (White, 2005). The question of the nature, and even the possibility, of a sound historical method is raised in the philosophy of history as a question of epistemology and has long been debated. Of course, history can be open to scepticism – after all, we need to start with discerning fact from myths, rumours, and lies. And then, how are we supposed to know that 'evidence' has not been manipulated, or is partial? This leaves us with the question: if - given Cyprus' recent past and the subsequent 'overload of history', there is no possibility of reliability, are we doomed?

6.7. Conclusion

With regard to the analytical question **‘What are students’ epistemological ideas about historical accounts?’**, the findings I discussed in this chapter show that for most of the students the understanding discipline of history was either absent or incomplete. Students demonstrated conceptual inconsistencies, operated on the basis of incomplete models and drew on ideas coming from their socio-cultural context which however might not be relevant or applicable to history. Perhaps students’ limited epistemologies and inconsistencies could be attributed to the discrepant disciplinary knowledge students have at their disposal. In other words, students used their existing (epistemological and other) knowledge as ‘substitutes’ for a non-existing and/or fragmented ‘know-how’ (Lee and Ashby, 2000) knowledge.

There are five issues worth flagging up with regards to students’ limited understanding of historical accounts.

- i. A number of these limited ideas seem to come from students’ everyday lives. Research in a variety of settings has shown that student ideas about history and historical accounts, as others are very much influenced by out-of-classroom thinking (Barton, 2001; Seixas, 1997, 2000; VanSledright, 1998; Voss, 1998; Wineburg, 2001). Lee and Shemilt (2004) illustrated how students are likely to draw upon their everyday experiences to construct historical meaning and understandings – such as, what might constitute evidence (Section 6.5.3).
- ii. Limited epistemologies seem to come in pairs. As Barca (2005) emphasised, it is the case that some students use the direct observation paradigm, but at the same time they assume a subjective or sceptical attitude towards historical knowledge. Similarly, Lee and Shemilt (2004) illustrated how, in students’ heads, history ‘cannot be true’: on the one hand we were not there to see the past, and only with empirical witnessing can we really know what happened; on the other hand, the past is (always) deliberately distorted. Each of these ideas can be dangerous in itself – however, what is more, in combination, these two misconceptions result in the invalidation of history: should the historian have been there, it is very possible that s/he would be biased, as people always have agendas.

iii. Many students supported notions of positivism: it is obvious that history can be very confusing as it does not resemble other sciences, and relativism: historians are different people hence they write history differently. It is important that these issues are addressed because they do not allow students to see history as a matter of inference.

With regard to the discussion I set on to answer in this chapter, **‘What are students epistemological ideas about historical accounts?’**, I conclude that most of the students lacked knowledge of how history is about inferencing. This is because students failed to see how history is not just a guess but a *theoretical* guess with respect to what might have happened. Or, to rephrase so as to reflect students’ ideas, history is not just an opinion/different perspective – it is an *educated* opinion/different perspective. It may be argued that, the potential for history only becoming possible through inferencing – that is, an idea or conclusion that's drawn from evidence and reasoning – seems to be something that students never had the opportunity to think about. At the same time, concluding this chapter, it should be emphasised that there were students who showed more sophisticated thinking. Moreover, it could be argued that students could not fully demonstrate their thinking as they lacked relevant and appropriate vocabulary in relation to the discipline of history.

A further conclusion of this chapter is that thinking and learning is socially conditioned and therefore it could be argued that student ideas are, partly, shaped by their contexts. Although further research is needed on this issue, I will take on the challenge of tentatively putting forward this argument in Chapter 7. Moreover, students bring with them ideas about how the world or history works. These ideas are important to tackle as ideas dictate students’ knowledge of history, a discipline which operates very differently from everyday life (Wineburg, 2001). Therefore, unless teachers are ready to recognise and confront these ‘alternative’ ideas, they cannot assist their students to deal with the counterintuitive nature of history.

CHAPTER 7. How do Students Understand Historical Accounts in Personal Terms?

7.1. Introduction

In Chapter 6, I discussed students' ideas about the epistemology of history: students displayed a variety of ideas with regard to the disciplinary nature of history and engaged with accounts with varying degrees of sophistication. At the same time, students displayed a series of ideas that went beyond the disciplinary use and nature of historical accounts. In other words they attributed value to accounts by drawing in *non-epistemic* criteria. Explicitly students engaged with accounts in ways that allowed them to form personal relationships with the past. This finding yielded some interesting, yet not surprising results. As Paul (2015) emphasised (Chapter 2, Section 2.4), independently of the historian's work and the disciplinary nature of history, everyone has a personal connection to the past. In fact, even historians themselves are 'parts of history', as history is a social process (Carr, 1961; Chapter 3, Section 3.3). Accordingly, in this chapter I attempt to answer the analytical question: **'How do students understand historical accounts in personal terms?'**

In order to answer this question, I employed thematic analysis: that is, I pinpointed, examined, and recorded patterns (or 'themes') within data with regards to the analytical question I set. Firstly, in this chapter I discuss further the notion of assimilation (Chapter 5, Sections 5.3.5, 5.4.4 and 5.4.5) – that is the process of fitting new ideas into what we already know. Secondly, I theorise students' ideas about responsibility and blame and how these relate to moral judgement. Thirdly, I discuss the didactic uses of the past - in that history can provide lessons for both present and future behaviour. Fourth, I address how students, through their answers, demonstrated that they had internalised the nation-construction aims of the history curriculum. Fifth, I address how students employed reverse teleology, establishing an eternal and un-changing notion of time as well as matrix of relationships.

7.2. Assimilation

'He believes it is true'

The most dominant way in which students appraised historical accounts in non-epistemic terms was by employing assimilation. That is, students used existing knowledge as a means to process and assess new knowledge. For instance, with regards to assessing accounts' authority, 9.66% of answers showed that students assessed the accounts they were confronted with (in this case, historical accounts) against existing knowledge. Addressing the notion of assimilation is crucial, as it has important implications for history teaching and learning. Explicitly, assimilation brings to the fore how official narratives are created and maintained by institutions – such as school, conditioning not only community memories –but also individual teaching and learning. This is because humans do not know or 'remember' in isolation. Accordingly, the students involved in this study did not assimilate accounts to their personal schemas of knowledge but to the 'knowledge' schemas that a bigger group of people and/or their community had established as the truth, through public discourse and the official narratives.

Through their answers Greek-Cypriot students demonstrated that knowledge does not exist in a vacuum, but is created, negotiated and disseminated socially. As MacIntyre (1984, cited in Wertsch and Rozin, 1998, p.45) explained, knowledge comes from a 'stock of stories' that is available to us, against which we check new stories and information. Those stories are tools of the state establishment and means of state legitimisation. Institutions, as we know (Hobsbawm, 1962; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983) 'invent' traditions out of previously ordinary happenings and then endow them with privileged status. One way of 'inventing traditions' is through text, and specifically through an enormous suppression of description. This is because, as Gergen (1998) explains, the well-formed narrative places requirements over what events may be included in a proper story. Accordingly, these stories gradually acquire a standardised form, resulting in patterns of thinking or reasoning becoming so established that they essentially become the norm – they become *true*, and, in turn, 'narrative truth

becomes *cultural convention*' (Gergen, 1998, p.7, emphasis added). Greek-Cypriot students repeatedly referred to narratives as conveyances for truth and, accordingly, assigned usefulness to accounts by checking them against the conventional (cultural) 'truth'.

A characteristic example of students' belief in 'truth' in the form of existing knowledge can be seen in Sofronis' ideas. Following on from Marina, who pointed out that a true account might not necessarily be the best one,³⁶ Sofronis seemed to agree that the most comprehensible account is the best one (as long as it is not all lies?!).

Marina: ...you need to read the text and understand the things it writes – rather than not understanding anything.

MG: OK, good. Sofroni? Do you agree? Disagree?

Sofronis: I agree, you will, from what you will read to understand the content and, and when you will see the two texts to see which [account] refers more to what you know so as to understand it better and oh!

MG: Sofroni: if it refers to the things we know why is it best?

Sofronis: Because you comprehend it best.

MG: Anyone else wants to say something? I will repeat the question: if it agrees with what we know, to what degree is it best? The things I know are always true?

Sofronis: It could be lies? Maybe I could be misinformed.

Marina: Yes, but he can understand it better, and to, for him it's best to comprehend it and overlap and be true and understand it himself.

MG: I am not saying I disagree. My question is: what if what I know is not true?

Marina: *He* believes it is true.

(Sofronis and Maria, Interview VI, 1.219-235)

For Sofronis therefore, comprehensibility was understood in terms of alignment with official narratives. What seemed to be implied here is that the more an account diverges from the official narrative, the harder it is for students to understand it. This is a confounding vignette for any educator, in relation to dominant narratives and their place in schools: in a nutshell, as Marina concluded, these narratives are so powerful because they become the truth.

The reason why dominant narratives become the 'truth' is because they function as a navigation scheme; in other words, master narratives operate as *general interpretation patterns*. These interpretation patterns have the function of making sense of the past, present, and future of a cultural community (Heller, 2006 cited in Carretero and van Alphen, 2014, p.291, emphasis added) – for

instance, such is the biblical narrative of the Jewish people looking for freedom through the exodus from Egypt as a general model of liberation from oppression (ibid). These master narratives take on a normative function from which Greek-Cypriot students drew to evaluate accounts.

The best [account] I think was the second [account] maybe because it is closer to what we learnt in school and also [was] more understandable in our heads.

(Margarita, Written Task 2, Question 4.1)

I personally know what my school has taught me, without knowing whether it is correct. I believe we cannot know which of the two we can trust.

(Evgenia, Written Task 2, Question 4.1)

For these students, historical accounts are benchmarked against what they were taught at school. The issue however with this notion is that school history is validated as the best, without it being acknowledged that it serves specific uses for the community and that, for this reason, school history answers limited questions. The fact that students employed assimilation and, by doing so, they tested new knowledge against known set narratives, undermines a more critical understanding of history. Wertsch's work in Estonia shows that it is very possible for young people to master such official narratives but also to resist them and this is also the conclusion of Epstein's work in the states – that is, the out of school cultural background of pupils impacts the sense they make of official narrative). Yet, when it comes to school history, students are likely to be caught in a textbook and school narrative 'best history approach' (Seixas, 2000) that simplifies, beautifies, and thus mythologises the past. Assimilation of set and/or official narratives therefore can be problematic in that it can promote and maintain 'echo chambers' – that is, situations in which beliefs are amplified or reinforced by communication and repetition inside a closed system. By visiting an 'echo chamber', people can seek out information which reinforces their existing views. Subsequently, in the case of teaching and learning history, if students are not exposed to different narratives and taught how to be aware of different interpretations, they will keep recycling the same stories and rhetoric.

7.3.Responsibility and Blame

'It is clear who really bears more responsibility'

Another means of appraising accounts in non-academic terms was responsibility and blame. For students involved in this study, responsibility and blame, in relation to all three historical events that students were confronted with (that is, the WWI, the British take-over of Cyprus, and the 1974 War in Cyprus) was one of the most prevalent themes in students' answers, both in relation both to how and why accounts differ. Students also referred to blame and responsibility when they assessed accounts in terms of their usefulness. Markedly, as students of this study demonstrated through their answers, blame and moral judgement go hand to hand, as blame is about who is *morally blameworthy* or praiseworthy.

Through their answers, Greek-Cypriot students seemed to be reproducing the debate about whether moral judgement has a place in history.³⁷ A small number of students were in favour of non-conclusiveness with regards to blame; in specific, arguing that history should be *questioning* rather than concluding with blame.

I found the second [account] more useful because...in the second [account] again it differentiates responsibilities, shows each one at what point was responsible, what has he done.

(Renos, Interview VI, 1.406-09)

Students also stood against historians taking a position, and within this stance, they demanded a kind of history where sides are not taken.³⁸

On the other hand, other students were adamant about the importance of responsibility and how blame should be clearly attributed.

The second [is the best] because it has more facts and it is clearer in us understanding who *really* bears more responsibility for the outcome of the war.

(Efi, Written Task 1, Question 4.1, emphasis added)

No, not at all, because either Germany is responsible, or she is not responsible, we cannot measure responsibility and say a lot or little.

(Antonia, Written Task 1, Question 3.1)

In these answers, one can see the need for identifying responsibility. Notably, responsibility seems to be a purely descriptive notion (indeed, both ‘The WWI Breakout’ and ‘The Events of 1974’ accounts were (partly) about responsibility with regards to WWI), blame has *power* (Bousalis, 2017) and is not merely a perspective (Walzer, 2015 cited in Bousalis, 2017, p.8). As Bousalis (2017, p.8) warned citing Ryan (1986, p.228), blame seems to be focused more on ‘what was right and what was wrong’. Yet, moral standards are not exclusively individual. Moral standards are state standards, in that, now, it is states which are expected to behave in the ‘right’ way.

Moreover, if blame is about making moral judgement, subsequently, it means it is also about moral character. In view of this, blame is one of the main components of history as a school subject, facilitating identity construction by positioning the good Self against the bad ‘Other’ and, subsequently, steering sentiments towards notions of the victorious or suffering past. Hence, asserting moral judgement plays a role in defining communities of identification through identifying the enemy. As blame and responsibility are connected to the politics of memory (Papadakis, 2002), demonisation and historical injustice, addressing these in the classroom (rather than brushing them under the carpet) is hugely important for three reasons. Firstly, discussing the past, either in classroom or in the public sphere, makes it almost impossible to avoid making judgments. Secondly, these discussions become even more prominent when it comes to post-conflict and traumatic pasts (Epstein and Peck, 2017; Klerides, 2016; Psaltis et al., 2017; Valentinovna-Korostelina et al., 2013). Thirdly, in the post-truth era we live in, there is a great danger of falling into ‘moral relativism’, which is of course epistemically unsound. Moreover, it can also be unhelpful when it comes to achieving social outcomes from the study or the use of the past.³⁹ If a purpose of history is to identify responsibility, this must be done a) with some understanding of the settings in which choices were made by historical actors and b) in relation to the specific cause, effect and context.

7.4. Didactic Uses of the Past

‘We should not make the same mistakes’

The didactic uses of the past were also considered by the Greek-Cypriot students who participated in this study. For ‘historical narratives provide the foundation for knowing not only what is, but what ought to be’ (Wertsch, 2001, p.518), the students involved in this study, similarly to those reported on by Park (2008), promoted the idea of the purposeful use of history, echoing what Rüsen (2004, p.173) called ‘the exemplary type’. According to Rüsen (cited in Park, 2008, p.271), history is ‘viewed as a past recollected with a message or lesson for the present, as didactic’. In addition, as Chapman and Facey (2004, p.39) have highlighted, the past operates as an example of a moral compass where ‘the past is a storehouse of examples and precepts that should guide us in the present’.

History’s role in explicating for the present, and the future, has long been debated. ‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it’ argued Giorgos Santayana (1905/6). However, one can safely argue that even those who know and remember many historical facts still repeat the mistakes of that past. Yet the didactic role of history remains at the heart of (school) history.

...taking of course in mind the problems...which are useful, as they exist today in our society, in our civilisation, in our moral, in our homes, in the people (economic crisis) and in this way by reading this account we should realise that we should not make the same mistakes as tomorrow’s citizens.

(Danae, Written Task 1, Question 4.3, parentheses in the original)

That students pointed to the informative and thus instructional manner of history, should not come as a surprise. As Bruner (2005, p. 26) illustrated historical narratives seem to generate received wisdom – often in the form of maxims or morals (as in Aesop, for example) – such that they are able to have atemporal generality. This received wisdom, in turn, is applied to specific historical examples, feeding moral judgements as well as potentially reinforcing pre-existing stereotypes.

That the present and the future can learn from the past can be a problematic idea, mainly in that it implies that history repeats itself. Still, structures change, and the world is now a different place than it was 100 or 50 years ago. Certainly, understanding that nothing within the realm of history is as simple as it seems can seem uncomfortable; yet it is this uncertainty and complexity which can teach us the most. Studying the past can enable perspective-taking - i.e. the Germans and

Junta did what they did operating within a specific rationale; better decision-making (i.e. if England had intervened earlier or more convincingly, could WWI have been prevented?); and approaching the people of the past with humility (could Makarios have done something different, could the events of 1974 be prevented?).

7.5. Constructing National Identity

'You cannot accept the first account'

In the island of Cyprus, nationalism as an/ethnic cultural community was not formed on the basis of developing solidarity through common meanings, values, myths and symbols (Peristianis, 2006). This is because, in Cyprus, nationalism was formulated on the basis of two 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 1983). In other words, there wasn't Cypriot nationalism, but Cypriot nationalisms that considered people as members of two different 'mother-lands' – Greece and Turkey. As Papadakis illustrated (2008),

despite their different political goals, the two nationalisms that emerged in Cyprus shared the same form, namely, an ethnic nationalism stressing common history, descent, language, culture and religion with the people of the "motherlands" Turkey and Greece. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were only taught the history of Greece and the history of Turkey respectively, while the history of Cyprus was only relatively recently introduced and with considerably less time allotted. On the Greek Cypriot side, the history of Cyprus has been presented as an extension of the history of Greece, and on the Turkish Cypriot side as an extension of the history of Turkey (p.5).

The narratives in each side therefore became mutually antagonistic, with censorship restricting narrative interaction and contestation (Papadakis, 2006).

One of the ways in which Greek-Cypriot students who participated in this study evaluated accounts was by turning to their community narratives. In other words students drew on their 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 1983) as a criterion of evaluation. By doing so students reinstated the existing historical narratives of nation and community. At the same time they were actively

engaged in the process of ‘othering’ - that is, the process of casting a group or individual into the role of the ‘Other’, and establishing their own identity in opposition to it or them (Gabriel, 2012).

That the students of this study evaluated accounts with respect to point to the ‘Other’, is not surprising: as Billig (1995, p78) put it, if ‘nationalism is an ideology of the first person plural, which tells “us” who “we” are, then it is also an ideology of the third person. There can be no “us” without “them”’. In other words, one’s imagined community can be imagined *only* by imagining imagined communities of others. In his book *National Identity*, discussing whether the nation is ‘invented’, ‘imagined’ or ‘reconstructed’, Smith (1991) explained that the illusion of homogeneity is achieved through a differentiating nominator – the Other, which Greek-Cypriot students identified. Explicitly, Greek-Cypriot students engaged in the process of othering, through vilification of the ‘Other’ (Gabriel, 2012).

Turkey was looking for an excuse, she found it and she invaded.

(Natasa, Written Task 2, Question 4.3)

Judging by logic, but also considering the repeating efforts of Turkey for invasion, but also those of Junta for extinguishing Makarios then you cannot accept the first account.

(Melanthi, Written Task 2, Question 4.3)

The second [account] [is more useful] as the first attempts to justify mistakes in a ridiculous way, by justifying Turkey and Junta.

(Anaxagoras, Written Task 2, Question 4.3)

Hence the ‘Other’ and the legitimacy of the nation are intrinsically linked. That is, the ‘Other’ is crucial in the formation, maintenance and transformation of national identities (Smith 1998, p.13), as the appeal of the nation is strengthened in the reinforcement of feelings of threat (Smith, 1989/98, p.54-57) and lost territory (Smith, 1989/98, p.50-51). In other words, ethnicism is fundamentally defensive as Smith (1989/98) highlights. This is because the concept of the Self presupposes the existence of (at least one significant) Other for any national Self to exist, and that this ‘Other’ is usually threatening and negative (Smith (1989/98): ‘you cannot justify Turkey, and Junta’).

Yet, the Self is not exclusively realised through opposition to the Other, but also within the realm of relations. As Gergen (1998) pointed out, as one of the functions of historical narratives is establishing social relations historical accounts can become a powerful template for identifying and determining the past's specific actors, as either individuals or groups of people. Accordingly, students demonstrated more complex ideas. Explicitly, often, students through their answers brought into the equation not just the Bad 'Other' but also the Ugly 'Other'. 'The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly' (Papadakis, 2007)⁴⁰ equation is one where

The Good stands for the national Self, the Bad for the Historical enemy, and the Ugly for the 'West' or the Great Powers, who should have been at the side of the Good but they usually side with the Bad or at least allow the Bad to persist in his evil deeds (Bryant and Papadakis, 2012, p. 11).

Drawing on Papadakis (2007), Bryant and Papadakis (2012) illustrated that this scheme is an application of how historical narratives reproduce and establish the triad of the actors, a classic motif in the Balkans and the Middle East.

In the case of this study these actors were easily identified by the students. Through their own words, students modelled Papadakis' scheme, and exemplified not only the Bad but also the Ugly - that is, the bystander. Students identified the Ugly as the British:

Erm, yes, because it may be that the agreement that happened with the Archbishop was, it was not disseminated to the people, that is, it was secret between the Archbishop and the Englishman [the High-Commissioner] and have taken place in a closed circle.

(Solonas, Interview III, 1.121-25)

The second historical account seemed more useful to me personally, since it doesn't say all those things we knew for so many years but it presents English as bad as the Turks. (Solonas, Written Task 2, Question 5.1)

Personally, I prefer the second [account] because in my opinion it says truths and it does not present the British as something good.

(Alexandros, Written Task 2, Question 5.1)

Other students attributed roles to the Great Powers:

Personally, I believe that the second account was best as, once again, it's shown that Cyprus was a pawn at the hands of the strong countries. They decided for us and used it as trade.

(Chrisanthi, Written Task 2, Question 7.1)

Finally, the Junta was labelled as the Ugly.

Judging by logic, but also considering the repeating efforts of Turkey for invasion, but also those of Junta for extinguishing Makarios then you cannot accept the first account.

(Melanthi, Written Task 2, Question 4.3)

The position of Junta is not completely understandable, Turkey has not shown precisely her aims that is if it [the invasion] was for the protection of the [Cyprus'] Turks or because America wanted to enforce the invasion and the plans of Makarios cannot be confirmed.

(Sonia, Written Task 2, Question 2.1)

The first [account]. Because it helped me see the arguments of those adhering to Junta.

(Nikiforos, Written Task 2)

Moreover, as historical narratives have traditionally been state-sponsored and official (Wertsch and Rozin, 1998), they use different mechanisms so as to establish the nation's legitimacy and thereby rightful claims. Hence the nation is portrayed as the Good on the one hand (Bryant and Papadakis, 2012), and as a victim on the other (Papadakis, 2002). Accordingly, drawing on the hegemonic nationalist narrative, students identified the Greek-Cypriot as the Good,

I found more useful the second account, which mentions what Makarios did so as to help the Cypriot people, so as that everyone should reclaim their rights.

(Danae, Written Task 2, Question 4.3)

Greek-Cypriots were also identified as the victim.

Constantina: For me, I believe the second [account is the most useful] – why though. Clearly because of this – because we messed things up ourselves, in inverted commas we allowed them [the Turks] to take us, because we were fighting each other, with the coup, we clearly gave the opportunity to Turkey to come in, because she wanted to come in, she was looking for an excuse – [pretending] to save the Turkish-Cypriots, they didn't care about the Turkish-Cypriots.

M.G.: So why is this account useful?

Constantina: Because everything was predesigned.

(Constantina, Interview IV, 1.605-611)

The discourse exercised by Constantina is illustrative of how victimisation and legitimisation are intrinsically linked; in other words, how the victimisation and/or persecution card can provide an attractive means of legitimisation, thereby justifying current actions and causes.

Ultimately, it may be argued that by aligning with their community narratives, students used accounts for *self-identification*. This is because the construction of their self or ‘own’ identities cannot take place outside the ‘we’ (Billig, 1995). In view of this, through ethnic identification and the question ‘Who are we?’ students answered the question ‘Who am I?’, by referring to their community narratives and engaging with the process of othering. Through this notion, ‘students attempted to assimilate their knowledge of history to a view of the past that provided legitimisation for the contemporary society of which they considered themselves a part’ (Levstik and Barton, 2009, p.250).

7.6. Teleological History

‘Germans always considered themselves superior’

Another way of understanding historical accounts in non-epistemic terms, was teleology, but not in its traditional form. Explicitly, some of the students involved in this study employed reverse teleology – that is, the narrative explanation of the past that there is a force of history which lies in the *beginning* of things and determines their future course. Reverse teleology is a ‘twisted’ teleology; and, of course, as it has many functions, teleology is ‘tailor-made’ – meaning that it can be amended to the purpose at hand. The main line of teleology can be argued to be the narrative view of history as a progressive march in one direction towards an inevitable end point (Butterfield, 1931). In other words, there is a final cause in history and events progress accordingly. Another form of teleology, by focusing on nature, argues in favour of eternal forms (such as the human race) which become part of the grand narrative. The students who employed teleology as a criterion of account usefulness aligned with this second line of teleology, assessing accounts based on an eternal time, where certain features of the past have been, and are, ever present. In view of this, students constructed a narrative

view of history as deterministic: things just are this way, things have always been this way, and things will always follow the same course.

It is not surprising that students employed teleology; this is because the establishment of this simplicity has great value for society. Explicitly, teleology becomes a barrier against the danger of derailing, and establishes amongst other things, a stable set of relationships. Gergen (1998) pointed to the 'quotidian functions' of narratives, and explains in relation to the primitive narrative of stability:

Negotiating social life successfully requires that one is capable of making him/herself intelligible as an enduring, integral, or coherent identity. For example, in certain political arenas it is essential to demonstrate that in spite of extended absences, one is 'truly rooted' in the local culture and part of its future.... In close relationships people often wish to know that others 'are what they seem', that certain characteristics endure across time. A major means for rendering such assurance is the stability narrative.

Therefore, as identities and nation legitimacy are not just things of the past and as 'history is to the nation rather what memory is to the individual' (Schlesinger, 1992, p. 45-46 cited in Wertsch, 2001, p.518), it is not surprising that students who participated in this study employed teleology and, accordingly, connected to an eternal and unchanging Self and community on the one, and eternal and unchanging Others on the other.⁴¹

7.7. Conclusion

With regard to the analytical question '**How do Students Understand Historical Accounts in Personal Terms?**', the findings of this study showed that, at large, Greek-Cypriot students use accounts as social tools. Explicitly, students whose answers are reported in this study attributed value to accounts in ways that allowed them to form relationships with the past, their 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1983) and the 'Other'. Research has demonstrated the ways in which history has a social use for students (Levstik and Barton, 2009; von Borries, 2011), and the results of this study verify these results. On the one, Greek Cypriot students used historical narratives to construct a relationship between a people and a nation-state (Anderson, 1991). At the same time, historical accounts were

used by students so as to form different relationships with the past, such as its didactic uses and its potential to indicate the ‘Good’, the ‘Bad’ and the ‘Ugly’ actors of the past.

These findings demonstrate that students used accounts as cultural means of appropriating the world around them. In relation to this, there are four issues worth flagging up.

- i. Historical accounts are essentially *cultural tools* (Bakhtin, 1981; Vygotsky, 1978; Wertsch, 2000) - that is, as cultural means of appropriating the world around them.
- ii. As cultural tools, historical accounts are ‘appropriated’, that is used, in a number of ways.
- iii. Moreover, students used historical accounts not only to define the world around them but also to *relate* to it.
- iv. Consequently, we can have different sorts of relationships between cultural tools (past narratives) and agents (students).
- v. As accounts are in essence cultural artefacts, they are mediated by language, which enables us to master psychological functions like memory, perception, and attention in ways appropriate to our cultures (Vygotsky, 1978).

Concluding, due to the different uses of historical accounts and the different purposes of communicating the (with which we may or may not agree), it is crucial not to neglect the utility of the past when it comes to the teaching and learning of history. I therefore propose that theorists and researchers need to address historical accounts not only as disciplinary concepts but also from the perspective of ‘mediated action’ which takes on the perspective that narratives, as cultural tools, shape and transform human action, including mental functioning (Wertsch, 1994). It is for this reason that I refer to students’ understanding as *engagement*.

CHAPTER 8. How do Greek-Cypriot Students' Ideas Compare to those Reported in the Existing Literature?

8.1. Introduction

In Chapters 6 and 7 I attempted to theorise findings with regards to how these might be relevant to the social world and, with the purpose of beginning to consider the implications of my findings for history education. In this Chapter I attempt to situate my findings within a) the international research context and b) their specific context – that is, the island of Cyprus. The purpose of this contextualisation is threefold. Firstly, I aim to establish the ‘validity’ (Chapter 4, Section 4.8) of my own findings, as in qualitative research one way of assessing the findings’ accuracy is through considering whether claims are supported by further evidence. In other words my purpose is to provide the background which I need to establish that my claims are supported by enough evidence. Secondly, contextualisation helps establish novelty, and highlighting new contribution in this PhD research work. Thirdly, I aim to highlight similarities and differences with respect to other contexts and, consequently, by doing so, I will discuss how these differences might relate to Cyprus’ specific context.

8.2. Situating Greek-Cypriot students’ ideas in the international literature

Overall, the ideas students in Cyprus have about differing historical accounts can be described as similar to those held by students in other national contexts. At the same time, some of my findings are, to some extent, at odds with those of other researchers. I begin this section by illustrating how my findings are broadly in line with those of other researchers. Commonalities between my own

findings and those of similar studies conducted in the UK, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Taiwan and Singapore, support that, at large:

- i. Students see historical accounts as fixed; and, therefore, as singular.
- ii. Students see accounts as a compilation of factual truths and/or 'true' parts.
- iii. According to students true accounts or true parts of accounts can be verified through citation, sources and 'evidence'.
- iv. According to students evidence and sources are taken at face value.
- v. For students some of the decisive evaluation criteria are author background and bias, and archive gaps.
- vi. Students see history in positivistic terms.
- vii. Students' deficiencies and constraints result in a fragmented understanding of history.
- viii. Students evaluate accounts drawing on a set of criteria, including non-disciplinary ones.
- ix. Blame is a central goal of history.

At the same time, some of my findings seem to be more prevalent comparing to findings of existing research. In the case of my student sample, the notions below seem to be more widespread comparing to their peers:

- x. For some students historical accounts just exist out there.
- xi. Nuanced thinking is found to lesser degree in relation to their peers.
- xii. History and authors are thought to be untrustworthy.
- xiii. History is political, and
- xiv. Students employ assimilation.

8.2.1. Similarities with literature

i. Students see historical accounts as fixed and, therefore, singular.

One of the main findings of earlier work that connects closely to the findings of this study is that historical accounts (as well as sources and ‘evidence’) are a ‘mirror’ of the past. This notion indicates that students see history as fixed, and accounts as mirrors of a fixed past - therefore they see history as something that reflects one and only one fixed past. As students see the past as fixed they think that history is made out of factual statements which can be recounted. These elements are considered important due to their capacity to accurately recount the past. In this category of answers history is discussed as a matter of truthfulness. This finding is in line with other research findings as Lee (2009, p.12) points out drawing on CHATA:

Few children had any strategy for testing an explanation except by checking that the statements in it were true; for most, a cause was epistemologically speaking on a level with a statement of fact, and was either something that happened or existed, or not.

History as a single factual story has been reported by Lee et al (1994), Foster and Yeager (1999), Lee and Ashby (2000) reporting on CHATA, Lin (2003 cited in Hsiao, 2008), Boix-Mansilla (2005), and Hsiao (2008) reporting on project CHIN. Taiwanese students’ ideas seem to be close to those of Cypriot students: students, in both contexts, to a large extent, regard history as copies of a fixed past. Lee and Howson (2009) reported that students see changes in the form of an on off happening, which is a crucial factor in preventing them from creating and utilising big pictures of the past. Although the students participating in my research did not take on this task, what seems to be similar is that ‘there is little sense of themes relating to one another’ (p. 239). In relation to this Thesis, this finding can be seen in students’ notions of causality (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2). As students don’t see causes as (gradual) developments but as isolated events they fail to understand how different causes in history can be interrelated.

ii. Students see accounts as compilations of factual truths and/or ‘true’ account parts

The findings of this thesis support the literature finding that for many students, history is ‘a compilation of information, thought of as pre-existent, waiting to be found and marshalled. In other words, the only important questions for students - apart from asking whether it is true or false, it seem

to be a) whether it is available and b) where it can be found'(Lee, 2009). At large, the Greek-Cypriot students whose answers are discussed in this study seemed to be aligned with this idea, raising a series of implications for history teaching and learning. In a sense, the non-understanding of the difference between singular statements of fact and explanatory claims is understandable in that for these students, history is descriptive and not explanatory. For this reason, it is also to be expected that difficulties will arise, when students are confronted with conflicting explanatory claims or rival accounts. Yet, this notion can be problematic in that it prevents students from understanding how historians make claims by using questions, evaluations and inferencing.

iii. True parts or true account parts can be verified through citation, sources, and 'evidence'

A similar idea to the one that the past can be retrieved by selecting and assembling its true elements is the idea that the truthfulness of historical account can be proved through the citation of annotation, sources and 'evidence'. This finding is in line with the literature, as research has shown that students consider sources to be historical evidence (Barton, 1997). Von Borries (1998) for instance warned that although sources 'are not the first, but, if at all, the last instance of historical argumentation' [...] 'students are normally convinced that "sources" directly confirm historical texts' (p.363). In other words, as von Borries (1998) explained, students treated sources as if they offer direct access to the past: sources were seen as pieces of the story written at the time – hence, they must be true. The students reported in this study also saw 'evidence' as 'pictures of the past', which is the first level of understanding evidence, according to the CHATA results (Lee, 2009). The idea here, as Lee (ibid) points out, is that the past is treated as if it is the present; in other words, pupils treat potential evidence as if it offers direct access to the past.

iv. Evidence and sources are taken at face value

This Thesis' findings also agree with those of other researchers, who concluded that students have difficulty dealing with disciplinary understandings. Barton (1997) also supported students' lack of familiarity with the use and evaluation of historical evidence. Drawing on her research, Alcoe (2007, p. 70) pointed out that British students in year-12 failed to acknowledge that the reliability of accounts could depend on provenance or the question asked. Nonetheless, year-12 students were more perceptive and could be differentiated from their younger peers in that they acknowledged the importance of provenance and the question asked – although their answers were tentative rather than definite (ibid., p.71). Chapman (2009) also reported student explanations at face value; however, these seemed to be the exception when it came to his sample. This could be related to the fact that Chapman's sample was 17-19 year-old students who studied history as a major.

v. Some of the decisive evaluation criteria were author background and bias, and archive gaps.

Another finding from the literature which confirms the findings of this study is in relation to the question of how students understand differences in accounts with respect to archive gaps. Gago (2005), reporting on 52 Portuguese 10-13 year-old students' answers as to why accounts differ, illustrated how students think of differing historical accounts being a result of gaps in the archive. Similarly, Hsiao (2008) reported that Taiwanese students also attribute the reasons for different accounts to varying access to information. These findings relate to my own, which show that Greek-Cypriot students holding the belief that the author might know more or less, which, in students' heads, explains why accounts differ.

Another commonality between existing findings and the findings of this study in relation to why accounts differ, was the idea that author disposition is the reason behind differing accounts. Progressing to recognising that history is not a copy of the past Cypriot students pointed out that

accounts are influenced by the author's position. This student idea was also put forward by Taiwanese students (Hsiao, 2008) and British students (Chapman, 2009) students.

vi. Students see history in positivistic terms

Another finding – that of history being evaluated in the same way as natural sciences, has been also brought into light by Boix-Mansilla (2005), who conducted research with sixteen 14-17 year-old high school-students with outstanding research ability in history and science. Students were confronted with conflicting narratives about the Holocaust, and explained differences between the accounts by engaging with two different epistemologies: the first was reproducing the past as it really was, and the second was reproducing the past on strong empirical grounds - relying on multiple sources and interpretations, distinguishing facts from opinions. What is interesting here is that, although the reproduction of the past based on empirical grounds is of course more sophisticated than reproducing the past as it 'really' was, it is still based on a differing paradigm: that of the natural sciences (Chapter 5, Section 5.5 and Chapter 6, Section 6.2.5).

Boix-Mansilla (2005) described the students who adhere to this notion as 'historical objectivists', and explained that these students 'view historical enquiry as a practice that operates within a constellation of norms, methods and validation criteria designed to capture the past accurately and completely' (p.101). She explained (ibid.) that three core beliefs define this epistemological orientation:

- (a) A strong emphasis on accuracy in the sense of an exact presentation of the past as it really was;
- (b) a tendency to believe that, eventually and at least in principle, a complete account of the past could emerge from historians' ongoing collective enquiry and
- (c) a view of historians as striving for objectivity (e.g. distinct separation between past and present, fact and opinion, knowledge and value, subject and object).

Interestingly, the 'objectivists' were those students who studied science. Explicitly, science students tended to 'favour an objectivist stance' and history students favoured the view that

historians ‘make the past intelligible’ to those in the present. Standards of acceptability therefore are partly defined through disciplinary training.

vii. Overall, students’ deficiencies and constraints result to a fragmented understanding of history

Greek-Cypriot students, similarly to their peers, were found to operate on the basis of incomplete models and inconsistencies. For instance, Martens (2015, p. 226-7) reported that students who were able to, for instance, understand history as a construct, expressed and enacted positivist ideas at the same time. Lee and Shemilt (2004) illustrated how, students’ incomplete ideas can lead history into a dead-end: on the one hand we were not there to see the past, and only with empirical witnessing can we really know what happened; on the other, the past is (always) deliberately distorted.

viii. Students evaluate accounts drawing on a series of criteria, including non-disciplinary ones.

Previous research on students’ ideas about accounts’ authority and usefulness also bares commonalities to my own findings. Boix-Mansilla (2005), drawing on her research, concluded that students accepted historical accounts based on four criterial standards: empirical power, explanatory power, human understanding, and narrative strength. Similarly, Greek-Cypriot students evaluated accounts based on their capacity to a) provide evidence (Chapter 5, Sections 5.1.7 and 5.2.6), b) model the past (Chapter 5, Section 5.3.7), c) enhance different understandings and d) model human behaviour (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.7). Other researchers have demonstrated that students perceive accounts in terms of ‘epistemic switching’ (Barca and Magalhães, 2005; Gottlieb and Wineburg, 2012) or ‘narrative appropriation’ (Apostolidou, 2006; Werstch, 1994).

ix. Blame is a central goal of history

Bellino and Selman (2012) provide some really interesting findings that can shed light on Greek-Cypriot students' moral judgements about history. The authors conducted research in seven metropolitan USA locations, collecting responses from 621 grade 9 and 10 students, comprising a representative national sample. Bellino and Selman examined students' ethical and moral reflections on a historical case study titled 'Jasmina and Tanja's story' by asking students why Tanja 'did what she did'. Students' moral answers were: one, valenced (that is, explicitly positive or negative); two, neutral (descriptive); and, three, unresolved (implicit judgement or explicit acknowledgement of both negatives and positives). Students' ethical reflections did not necessarily exclude historical thinking; however, at the same time, nearly all students were unable to neutrally place Tanja's decisions in her socio-historical context. Students in my research operated in the same way: they blamed Germany without attempting to place her actions in the context of the time. Lee and Howson (2009) report similar findings with respect to blame.

8.2.2. Differences from existing literature

x. For some students historical accounts just exist out there

One of the findings of this Thesis relates to the absence of the author and the 'Obscure agency' finding (Chapter 5, Sections 5.1.2), with 28.64% of answers showing that students believe that accounts are just out there. For these students it wasn't made apparent how we acquire knowledge of the past: the past just exists – either in a book or in told stories, and it reprises the information of the past. As Lee (2009) illustrated, for some students 'the question "How do we know?" simply does not arise: there is only one story 'because it says one way in the book''. Yet, the absence of an author is not reported in other findings. In essence, it looks like the past is revealed to us from an unknown yet all-knowing authority. With regards to Greek-Cypriot students specifically the notion of history being

‘transferred’ by someone and not built by an author could relate to the conservatism of the broader academic and public culture (Christodoulou, 2013) and the (partly consequent) lack of historical enquiry in school (Section 7.5 and Chapter 1).

xi. Nuanced thinking is found to a lesser degree

The findings from the Greek-Cypriot student sample I used seem to indicate that, compared to their peers, nuanced thinking is found to a lesser degree. As I demonstrated in Chapter 5 (Section 5.5) a significant number of students did demonstrate advanced thinking. Specifically, 8.64% of student answers were classified as nuanced in that students modelled accounts as author and/or theory constructions. However, 8.64% here refers to number of student answers and not to number of students. Moreover, although students included in this study demonstrated advanced thinking, the properties and quality of this thinking seemed less advanced than those of their peers. For instance, Hsiao reported that 29% of the Taiwanese students she reported on identified ‘different question focus’ as the reason behind differing accounts. In turn, Martens (2015) reported that students in his study demonstrated notions such as: understanding that authors may or may not be contemporaries (Greek-Cypriot students raised the issue whether authors have been eye-witnesses, but not that of temporal positionality, apart from very few cases); it made a difference whether texts were sources or accounts (often Greek-Cypriot students used ‘texts’, ‘accounts’ and ‘sources’ interchangeably); and that historical enquiry is an *active* process of searching for sources (Greek-Cypriot students explained that accounts might differ because of authors’ different thinking and sources – however they did not clarify whether authors actively look for different sources because they think differently). On the other, we should be reminded that findings have shown that students are likely to struggle to think of accounts as being answers to specific questions, e.g. ‘Why did WWI start in 1914 rather than 1915?’ and, therefore, imagine accounts to be ‘mirrors of the past’ (Lee and Ashby, 2000).

xii. History is Political

CHATA findings showed that according to students' historical accounts are distorted - deliberately or not (Lee and Shemilt, 2004). Drawing on her own findings with regards to author imposition Hsiao (2008, p. 54-55) highlighted that 'some students will regard this situation as perfectly normal and somehow related to basic human nature. They think that people and states will see things from their own position and defend their points of view'. Similarly, Chapman's (2009) findings demonstrate that British students employ the 'impositionist' model too. Explicitly, students reported on by Chapman (2009) pointed out that historians 'try to profit and that isn't correct' (p. 89). Yet, for Greek-Cypriot students, political imposition makes history impossible. In the case of Greek-Cypriot students the idea that not only do authors impose their politics, but these politics are very specific as they emanate from political parties, can be dangerous in that it revokes the work of the historian.

xiii. Students employ assimilation

Greek-Cypriot students, to a large degree, drew on the official narratives of their community. Hsiao's (2008) results confirm that there is a connection between students' ideas about (textbook) historical accounts and their views on the value of history. Indeed, in my own research I haven't used textbook accounts nor enquired about textbooks. However, findings on textbooks are comparable with some of my own findings in two ways. Firstly, a number of student answers referred to school history so as to draw comparison with the accounts they were confronted with. And, secondly, a number of students explicitly referred to textbooks. Discussing her own findings, Hsiao (2008) described how most students trusted historical accounts in textbooks and did not appear ever to have questioned them. Although students hesitated when asked if they actually believe accounts in textbooks, some of them said that they had never thought about this matter and that the idea of challenging authority (in the form of a history textbook) made them feel uncomfortable. Interestingly, some students said they

would even feel betrayed and deceived if accounts in textbooks were not true. At the same time, Wertsch's (1998; 2002) work in Estonia shows that it is very possible for young people to master such official narratives but also to resist them (Chapter 3, Section 3.4) and this is also the conclusion of Epstein's work in the states (the out of school cultural background of pupils impacts the sense they make of official narrative). In other words, at the moment, we don't have strong empirical reasons to think that official narratives actually impacts students.

8.3. Situating Greek-Cypriot students' ideas in the Cyprus context

As I have demonstrated in the previous section, although my findings are generally compatible with those of other researchers, there are a number of aspects in which they differ. Therefore more research is needed so as to a) to confirm that the differences themselves exist and b) thereafter so as to answer the question of why these differences exist. That is, differences in students' ideas can be attributed to a variety of reasons, and a way to eliminate the different factors that have contributed to differences is by conducting further and more systematic research with regards to specific 'variables'.

As 'an individual's working intelligence is never "solo"' (Bruner, 1991, p.3), it could be argued that differences – or some of the differences – are a result of the specific setting in which data were collected. Therefore, I argue that research findings should always be interpreted in the local context within which they occurred – in the case of this thesis study this being the context of Cyprus. As I demonstrated in Chapter 1 (Section 1.4) what we have in the case of Cyprus, is a predominance of the 'practical past', or the lived past as we might call it, but not much 'history' to use Oakeshott's terms (Cambell-Corey, 2006; Oakeshott; 1933). As a result, the past involved is a practical, and not an historical past, and the educational system is such that it does not encourage the distinction between the two: the past is mythologised, fetishized and eternalised, and consequently reproduced as history (Papadakis et al., 2006) through curricula, textbooks and the 'hidden curriculum' (Chapter

1, Section 1.4). Hence, students' absence of historical thinking in school cannot be seen to be unrelated to the Cyprus' context. As Christodoulou (2014) highlighted, especially when it comes to history school, aims have been instrumental in driving curricula, textbooks and practices, and these aims have been at largely social aims. In fact, it could be safely argued that school goals have been oriented around the liberation of the country, and the responsibility not to forget 'Δεν Ξεχνώ', the 'I Do Not Forget' principle, marked both the inside and the outside curriculum for years. It was a phrase that carried so many messages for who we are and who we owe it to the country to be, while it was also important for the adults to speak and hear about this aspect of the past (Christodoulou, 2014, p.154).

The phrase 'I do not forget' became a slogan that was whispered or cried at demonstrations. It could be found everywhere, from schools and student notebooks to the streets and pictures of villages that were hanging on house walls; it represented an entire culture (ibid).

Hitherto, 'Den Xehno' has marked the school years of thousands of students and has been distantly symbolic: it is still being reproduced in school national celebrations and parades. Even at the time when a more Cyprus-centric curriculum was pushed forward alongside new educational objectives – such as the establishing of respects for the rights, civilisations and traditions of other communities in Cyprus – the nurturing of a fighting spirit was simultaneously a goal (Christodoulou, 2014, p.155).

Some of the findings of this study should not come as a surprise: this is because one of the roles of school history as a mechanism of identity construction - especially with regard to the construction of curricula in post-conflict societies is coping with the violent past. For instance, with regard to the case of Cyprus the division of the island has been eternalised and connected to personal experience ('Den Xehno'), while trauma and victimisation have been running through the hidden curriculum (Zembylas, 2018), which has evolved around attributing blame and establishing roles (Chapter 7, Section 7.3 and 7.4). School has traditionally been used as a nation-construction tool to install national trauma, becoming a crucial arena for asserting the (Good) Self against the (Bad and Ugly) 'Other' dichotomy (Chapter 7, Section 7.6). In view of this students' demand for naming the culprits should not come as a surprise, nor their understanding of history as a teleological narrative (Chapter 7, Section 7.7).

As a result, the intersection between the politics of memory and identity and education policy, make it impossible for traditional norms to be challenged. (As Perikleous (2015) pointed out, active learning might be accounted for in the new curriculum, but it is not enacted). At the same time students' ideas, to a greater or a lesser degree, depend on a variety of factors, with school being one of them. Considering the data at hand, it seems to be difficult to prove dependence or even a significant correlation between students' ideas and the teaching methods and culture. At the same time, there is research-based evidence of the dependence of students' historical ideas on schooling (von Borries, 1997, 1998). More research is therefore needed before making generalisations as to Greek-Cypriot students' ideas about historical accounts. This is because ideas which might be dominant in one school may not be so dominant in another.

8.4. Comparative Overview

Attempting a comparative overview at a higher level of inference, what do my findings mean? Three conclusions could be drawn. Firstly, it could be argued that Greek-Cypriot students ideas are, to a large degree, similar to those of their peers. Secondly, at the same time, some of the notions Greek-Cypriot students displayed do not fully align with those of their peers. Thirdly, Greek-Cypriot students' ideas seem to be most similar to those of students who are schooled in similar educational contexts, such as Twaiwan (Hsiao, 2008). Yet, the fact that commonalities were found does not mean that findings match in any absolute manner. For instance, the nature of accounts and sample used by Hsiao could have played a role in how students engaged with the tasks.

Firstly, attempting to sketch some rough comparisons, it could be argued that most of the notions Greek-Cypriot students had were similar to those of their peers – except that there is a crucial difference: the age factor. For example, Greek-Cypriot students explicitly ruled out the possibility of more than one reason, factors or person contributing to and/or resulting to a historical event, i.e. the breakout of WWI; and, as Lee (2009) pointed out, it appears likely that a 'common feature of younger

children's responses is that important people, rather than antecedent conditions, make things happen in history'. However, the Greek-Cypriot students who participated in this study were much older – that is, 17-18 year-olds. Lee (ibid) for instance, also reported on how CHATA students demonstrated notions such as:

- i. Relativistic notions: '[It's just a matter of opinion] because many historians have different opinions for when the Empire ended. Some historians may have interpreted it differently'.
- ii. The positivistic past: '[The differences in the stories matter] because they are supposed to be the truth. If you looked in one book you would like to know what you were reading is the complete truth'.
- iii. And, that the past is unreachable: 'It happened so long ago no-one really knows when it ended. [We could decide when it ended by] looking it up in a few books and take the time that most of the books say'.

Indeed, these CHATA student ideas echo Greek-Cypriot students' answers. However, the findings reported by Lee (2009), as well as by other researchers, refer to students (much) younger than to the Greek-Cypriot students - that is, 17-18 year-olds. Other researchers whose findings could be compared to mine, sampled younger students too: Bellino and Selman (2012) studied year 9 and 10 students; Gago (2005) 10-13 year-old students; Foster and Yeager (1999) focused on 12 year-old students, CHIN (Hsiao, 2008) on 10-14 year-olds students; and Hsiao's (2008) sample were 13-15 year-old students. Researchers who sampled older students - explicitly, Afandi (2012) with 14-15 and 17-18 year-old students, Boix-Mansilla (2005) discussing 14-17 old students, Chapman (2009) with 17-18 year-old students and Martens (2015) discussing 13-19 year-olds– have reported more sophisticated ideas.

Comparing Greek-Cypriot students to their peers it could be argued that there is an important common denominator: that is, that students operate on the basis of *deficiencies*, which results in a

fragmented understanding of history. For instance, a number of Greek-Cypriot students might have shown sophisticated approaches to history in relation to certain aspects of history. However, their fragmented understanding of history, leads them to a limited understanding of how history works, often resulting in history seeming to be a dead-end endeavour. Lee and Howson (2009) also accounted for the fragmented nature of students' understanding, describing how students participating in the *Usable Historical Pasts* (UHP) research, which generated data from ten groups of three 14-18 year-olds, resulted in 'fragmented and skeletal' stories.

Secondly, Greek-Cypriot students demonstrated a series of notions that seemed to differ or be more prominent in relation to those of their peers. As I demonstrated in the previous section, these diverges might be argued to relate to students' socio-cultural context (Chapter 1, Section 1.4). As Lee (2005) demonstrated, students' ideas are formed through different factors, such as culture, family and everyday experiences. The discrepancies with existing research need to be considered in future research, that a) is targeted on these specific issues, and b) in the form of comparative studies which can shed more light on (contextual) similarities and differences. Thirdly, comparing my findings to those of other researchers a more general claim or possible conclusion arising from the results (which may be proved or disproved in subsequent research), is that Greek-Cypriot students' ideas seem to be more similar to those of students who are schooled in similar educational contexts – for instance, the Taiwanese students reported on by Hsiao (2008). On the other hand, the literature suggests that there are also inconsistencies in relation to students' ideas about historical accounts. For instance, in the studies referenced British students seem to have performed better than their peers in other countries overall. A possible explanation for this might be that the UK education system places emphasis on the disciplinary aspect of history. In UK, as students are more attuned to historical inquiry, they are in a position to demonstrate more sophisticated thinking. Cercadillo (2001), in her own research with English and Spanish students, found that English students showed a greater understanding of significance, which could result from different pedagogical traditions; however, her findings demonstrated that the sophistication gap closes around the age of 16-17. Or, it could be assumed that

Hsiao's (2008) sample's cohorts were different in that they have been trained differently. Another implication here is that samples in the aforementioned research have been relatively small, an observation which raises caution in relation to sampling, how that relates to findings, and the ability to make generalisations. Task differences might also be a factor as to why study findings might differ between research projects.

At this juncture, a point of caution must be raised. That is, when considering findings and/or models, we need to think through issues such as 'cultural translation' (Carretero et al, 2017, p. 539) – that is, moving or carrying findings across from one place or position to another. Of course, data comparison can indeed be useful.⁴² Yet, when every time the task of comparison is undertaken, caution is needed; because a) comparison does not always work (this is because we often compare different contexts and/or systems), and b) comparisons raise the alarming question: What are we comparing for? (Schleicher, 1995). In other words: Are we comparing *with*? Or, are we comparing *to*? And if we are comparing with, *to what ends* are we comparing?

CHAPTER 9. LIMITATIONS, CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE, IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY-MAKING

9.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I offer conclusions and I address the implications of this Thesis in terms of its limitations, contribution to knowledge, implications for future research, and implications for policy making. I also share final reflections. Explicitly, I address the following questions:

- i. What are the conclusions of this Thesis?
- ii. What are the limitations of the Thesis?
- iii. What are its strengths?
- iv. How has it contributed to the field?
- v. What implications do the methodology and conceptual framework of the thesis have for future research?
- vi. What implications does this study raise for policy-making and how can these implications be addressed in terms of the recommendations identified?
- vii. And, why do the findings matter?

9.2. Conclusions

I designed this study with the purpose of exploring students' understandings about differing historical accounts. In line of this, I did two things. Firstly, I explored the kinds of epistemological ideas Greek-Cypriot students have about differing historical accounts. Secondly, I explored how students understand accounts in personal terms with the purpose of raising further implications. Despite the limitations of this exploratory study, and despite calling into question further issues to those I set to answer, some tentative conclusions can be drawn. That is, at large, the findings of this

study, to a more or a lesser degree, confirm those of other researchers on students' epistemological ideas about historical accounts. At the same time nonetheless, there are some divergences in that some of the findings of this study are at odds with the literature. In addition, the findings of this study showed that alongside students' understandings of accounts in disciplinary terms, as accounts are in essence cultural tools, students use accounts in a number of ways which constitute a multifaceted engagement with the past and the present.

More specifically, drawing on the findings of this Thesis the following tentative conclusions can be drawn. The first conclusion of this study is that Greek-Cypriot students' understanding is multifaceted and complex, in ways that often does not allow them nuanced thinking. With regard to my first aim, that is exploring students' epistemological understandings of historical accounts, the findings of this study revealed that most, but *not* all, of the students participating in this study employed understandings that were defined by deficiencies and constraints resulting to a fragmented understanding of history. My findings show that the participant Greek-Cypriot students' ideas are, to a large extent, similar to those of their peers as reported in the international literature (Chapter 8, Section 8.2). Similar to their peers in other contexts, students' ideas in the Republic of Cyprus were multifaceted, defined by inconsistencies, and sometimes based on incomplete deficit models. Yet, at the same time students' ideas were often nuanced and sophisticated. But, as illustrated in Chapter 8 (Section 8.4), Greek-Cypriot students seemed to have a more limited repertoire of epistemological notions than their peers in other countries and, hence, were limited in employing powerful historical thinking. At the same time, some of the ideas Greek-Cypriot students displayed did not fully align with those of their peers. Interestingly, Greek-Cypriot students' ideas seem to be most similar to those of students who are schooled in similar educational contexts, a finding that supports the argument that learning and thinking is socially conditioned.

Furthermore, my findings showed that student ideas go beyond cognitive ideas and epistemic criteria. I developed an argument that the disciplinary notions which current history education

paradigms foreground, are not likely to encapsulate the specificities of post-conflict contexts such as Cyprus. In other words as historical accounts are, in essence, cultural artefacts, I thereby argue that those researchers or educators who have taken-on historical accounts in exclusively disciplinary terms have missed out the centrality of identity and the socio-cultural nature of constructing meanings with regard to learning and thinking, and thus in relation to students' understanding of historical accounts, an argument that has been also put forward by other researchers (Barton, 2009). Hence, I propose that thinking about historical accounts in exclusively cognitive terms can be restrictive in that historical thinking can be more convoluted than this. Accordingly, I propose that policy-makers and researchers need to adopt approaches and research designs that are more socio-culturally sensitive and informed in order to give students the tools to seek more nuanced answers (within their contexts and for their own personal questions). These propositions are at the core of the implications I raise for research and for policy-making.

9.3. Limitations

In this section I recount the study's limitations to acknowledge that I have thought critically about the research problem; address problems with regard to errors, methods, and validity; discuss whether these 'problems' eventually matter and, if so, to what extent; and highlight future directions in terms of research and policy-making.

9.3.1. Research design issues

For the purposes of this study, I devised my methodology such that it would be suitable to meet the needs of my research, taking into account both the questions I wanted to address, and the specificities of the context. Accordingly, I used an existing methodological paradigm which however I modified in order to address my research question (Chapter 4, Section 4.4). This might have resulted in a certain level of complexity.⁴³ Explicitly, in this study, I used data generated from one pilot study

and three main data collection schools. An implication raised by this pragmatic choice of data relates to the degree of data comparability: the written tasks in the pilot study referred to the British Occupation of Cyprus, whereas the written tasks in the main study referred to the Cyprus War of 1974. More positively, it was argued that including both sets of accounts could be seen as a strength (Chapter 4, Section 4.6.1). Given that the research design of this thesis was exploratory rather than explanatory, the design had undeniable strengths. For instance, the data was rich, and a significant quantity of information was obtained. On the other hand, because of this what? Having a lot of rich data, it was difficult to establish causality between students' ideas; for instance, ascertaining the degree to which, according to students, opinion and belief overlap (Chapter 6, Section 6.4.6).

9.3.2. Instrument Issues

The instruments employed were part of the tradition within I operate. Of course, accumulating meanings could be acquired in other ways – for instance, through focus groups, thinking aloud tasks, or using pictures, all of which have been used by other researchers (Barton and McCully, 2005; Dilek and Cooper, 2004). I chose the particular instruments of written tasks on paired accounts and group interviews as they follow from a specific tradition (SHP, CHATA) and, subsequently, they enabled me not to start with a blank canvas. Nonetheless, the chosen instruments had their limitations. As I argued (Chapter 2, Sections 2.3 and 2.4; Chapter 3, Sections 3.3 and 3.4), although research into historical accounts might be a well-established research paradigm in countries such as the UK, this research paradigm does not necessarily make sense in the case of Cyprus.⁴⁴ My choice and adjustment of accounts should be also considered. I chose the specific accounts as these corresponded to how I conceptualize history – that is, adhering to Rösen's (2005) matrix (Chapter 3, Section 3.2); and I paired accounts in three sets based on my *own* assumptions of what constitutes differing accounts. Still, it was impossible for me to know how far students' ideas corresponded to these assumptions and ways of envisioning history writing. For instance, students showed awareness of these dimensions of

difference when explaining account variation; yet, they also focused on other dimensions, such as the blame dimension (Chapter 7, Section 7.3).

Limitations with regard to group interview design and execution should also be considered. As interviews were interactive, it was possible for the interviewer to press for complete, clear answers and to probe into emerging topics. Using semi-structured interviews was fruitful in that they allowed ‘depth to be achieved by providing the opportunity on the part of the interviewer to probe and expand the interviewee's responses’ (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p.88 cited in Alshenqeeti, 2014) while allowing all relevant areas to be covered, specifically, the research foci. On the other hand, there were pitfalls, and these should be taken into consideration. For instance, there is the issue of power relations, as an interview ‘is not a simple tool with which to mine information. It is [rather] a place where views may clash, deceive, seduce, enchant’ (Schostak, 2006, p.92 cited in Alshenqeeti, 2014, p.40). Moreover, as the interviewer’s attention is to ‘always seek the particular’ (Richards, 2003, p.53 cited in Alshenqeeti, 2014, p.41), there is ever the danger that what might emerge from the interview could be the ‘particular’ the researcher has been paying attention to rather than the whole, or aspect that the researcher has neglected.⁴⁵ Moreover, in the case of group interviews, although these had the benefit of allowing students to develop ideas collectively and scaffold without my intervention, it could be argued that students might not have been given the opportunity to freely and fully express their ideas, in that it was difficult for them to elaborate on their ideas in depth.

9.3.3. Data collection issues

This reserach depended on having access to students and schools. This meant that access was *granted*, whereas it could have been denied or limited in some way. Request for permission creates implications in that access is based on power relations (Chapter 4, Section 4.7.2). Moreover, researcher performance itself could could have resulted in inadequacies. Data collection, including the pilot study, took place over a period of nine months, on different days and at different times, and

entailing different kinds of practical complications. Hence, written task guidelines were at times phrased differently and/or at different levels of elaboration. Also, as group interviews were conducted by the myself, it is unavoidable that in this study, a certain degree of subjectivity can be found. For instance, while I might have motivated certain students, I might have discouraged others. This might have affected my data in that some students might have provided more and/or better answers than others.

9.3.4. Data analysis issues

Data analysis is a multistage process, which demands from the researcher both sensitivity and time to work out discover meanings and establish the findings which emerge from the data. This process might have resulted in coding in great detail without necessarily answering the research question.⁴⁶ Alternatively, the volume of data and/or the mundane exercise of processing data through NVivo, might have resulted in focusing on what I thought interesting and exciting. The challenge of meticulous record keeping, demonstrating a clear decision-making trail and ensuring interpretations of data are consistent, needs be addressed as well.

9.3.5. Discussion issues

As grounded theory is an inductive analytical methodology which also generates theory, the discussion of data in different chapters might, at instances, have led to repetition. Findings could have also been discussed in ways that might have shed light on particular ‘variables’: for instance, using schools as units of analysis would have allowed me as the researcher to point to the significance and influence of the classroom and socio-cultural settings on historical thinking. Findings could have also been discussed in through selected student cases. For instance, discussion could have also focused on students’ ideas in relation to the conceptual framework(s), and revealed patterns of consistency and inconsistency, which might have engendered a more complete portrait of students' notions, and

facilitated exploration of the relationship between students' ideas, which in turn could have shed more light on their approaches to historical thinking. A further issue with regard to discussion limitations is researcher bias. How I posed my research problem question, selected the data to be analysed and chose what data was omitted, the way I discussed data, how I elected to represent findings, and how I named and attributed properties to overall phenomena, could have been undertaken with a positive or negative connotation.

9.4. Contribution to knowledge

To the best of my knowledge literature suggests this is the first study of its kind that attempts to explore students' ideas about differing historical accounts of conflict in Cyprus. Hence, doctoral research has important contributions to make in terms of building knowledge about students' historical understandings, and, consequently, providing research information to inform the RoC history curriculum which is currently undergoing significant development. Another unique aspect of this thesis is its investigation of understanding students' accounts of historical thinking in a post-conflict context. Hence, this inquiry offers a substantive exploration of issues in an area that is of significant research interest and about which little research exists. The findings generated by this thesis emerged from a particular context and culture of historical instruction. My findings, therefore, revealed patterns of students' ideas comparable to those of research conducted in other similar national contexts (Chapter 8, Section 8.2). Findings from high-school students in Cyprus also reveal differences as well as similarities between research undertaken in other post-conflict contexts (Chapter 8, Section 8.3), indicating that more research is needed.

A distinctive element of this thesis is that the research design was created with the purpose of encapsulating both epistemological ideas of the past and uses of the past. The findings of this thesis also demonstrate that there are implications concerning the existing conceptual paradigms of history education. Most of the published research on students' ideas has focused on the cognitive demands of

history education, while work addressing a more holistic approach of students' ideas about history has been small/slight. A possible new paradigm for broadening the focus of research into dimensions of historical practice is that articulated in Rüsen's matrix (Megill, 1994) which is attended by the kinds of meta-historical questions required to put the matrix to work.

Last but not least, the research design I employed in this thesis, as well as the use of grounded theory, allowed me to navigate through data 'noise' and show the extent to which ideas are always contextually situated and culturally shaped. Explicitly, I have proposed that we who need new history education research paradigms that are contextually and culturally nuanced and responsive. Most of the research available on students' ideas about history comes from the 'West' – and specifically the UK.⁴⁷ Yet, as cogently argued by continental scholars and those from further afield, other research perspectives are needed in order to re-examine and widen the field of research into historical thinking so as to engender greater contextual specificity.

9.5. Implications for further research

By addressing the question, **'In what way(s) is the current state of knowledge about students understandings of historical accounts lacking/limited/in need of extending?'**, a number of conclusions can be drawn in relation to implications for further research. The findings of this thesis suggest that the current state of research knowledge lacks input by and about post-conflict countries. Hence, this study's findings call for re-assessment and expansion of the limits of existing theory; and accordingly, for the need of extending research paradigms.

There are also implications for comparative research. The findings of this thesis advocate that further research is needed into the ways that contexts have shaped how students think about the past, and how the former may affect the development of their whose? ideas across different age-groups, ethnic backgrounds, and religious affiliations. A cross-country comparative study with like-minded

researchers across the world would help clarify the impact that contexts may have on the ways students develop their pre-existing ideas about historical accounts. In addition, further research across national contexts on students' ideas about historical accounts could be carried out to build on the work already done (Chapter 2).

A number of specific student ideas were found to be worthy of further exploration. These include students' ideas about unilateral history (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2) and the degree to which this relates to students' ideas about sequence and consequence. A further focus of research interest might centre on student ideas before and after carefully designed instruction (i.e. in the form of interventions). Moreover, teacher ideas and their impact on student learning is a further issue for future research in historical thinking. Additional themes that could be considered for future research might include the issue of blame and responsibility (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.5 and Chapter 7, Section 7.3). It is difficult to argue, however, whether the detailed coding undertaken in this thesis can reveal something more, and perhaps work could be done to progress this opening. Nonetheless, the issue of blame seems especially ripe for future research. For instance, the issue of blame relates not only to power relations (Chapter 7, Section 7.3) but also connects to students' ideas about historical empathy, and morality. I hope to tackle these issues in future research.

A further issue that emerged from these findings, on which more research could shed light, is opinion and author positionality (Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3). To what degree, in students' minds, do background and opinions connect? While background positions and opinions are often apparent in authors' accounts, shaping the way authors view and represent the past, in students' minds, do opinions and author background also merge? And, if yes, to what degree is the overlap? (Chapter 6, Section 6.5.4). A connected issue on which further research could take place relates to politics and opinion (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.5). According to students, historical accounts are biased since authors' political and other opinions affect how they view the past. Authors were also held to actively control

and direct information and facts in order to prove their position (Chapter 6, Section 6.2.4). Again, to what degree is there overlap between politics and opinion?

9.6. Implications for policy-making

Sharing research findings and proposing recommendations that can help improve a situation, or highlighting best practice, is crucial as without an awareness of what students know and think, policy-making, curriculum and textbook designing, and classroom practices are ‘like firing blindly into the dark: we may get lucky and hit one of our targets, but we are much more likely to damage our own side’ in Lee’s and Shemilt’s (2004, p.31) words. By highlighting the implications arising from my findings – and in combination with other published research, I address the possibilities opened up for the teaching and learning of history. I present this in a summary table on the next page.

9.6.1. Restructure textbooks as ‘know-how’ tools

In RoC, both in primary and secondary education, a single age-appropriate history textbook is used, and most teachers use it as the only material in history classes. As the findings of this thesis show, students have an authoritative image of official narratives. If, as it has been suggested by others (Wertsch, 2000), in students’ heads textbooks are expected to represent history as an integrated whole, how can stakeholders then: a) change students’ (pre)conceptions about historical accounts in textbooks, and increase their critical view of narratives?, and b) help students refrain from relativism (Chapter 5, Sections 5.2.4 and 5.3.4)? I propose that, concerning policy-making, in deciding future changes to textbooks, what needs to be firstly addressed is the ‘*know-how*’ (Lee and Ashby, 2000) of history – rather than the content as has been the case so far. Policy-makers need to pay necessary attention to textbooks because, if students uncritically trust their textbooks, this could be a major obstacle to teaching both differing accounts and the know-how of history. Moreover, if all that students know is one story and a one story approach, how will they cope well with the almost infinite

Table 13: Implications for policy-making

1. Restructure textbooks as know-how tools
1.1. Author illumination
1.2. Problematising factuality and linearity
1.3. Alternative interpretations
2. Address the language ‘reality’ effect
3. Tackle teleology
4. Use students’ existing knowledge
4.1. Use of limited epistemologies
4.2. Use of the ‘practical past’
5. Teach interpretation as a stance – not opinion
6. Work in groups
7. Create meaningful history
8. Revise curricula and textbooks
9. Teacher training

number of narratives that they will encounter as adults? I propose therefore that textbooks need to be rewritten in a way that they: i) problematise factuality and linearity; ii) make the author visible; and, iii) engage students with different interpretations.

i. Problematising factuality and linearity

Historical accounts are, in essence, narratives. This Thesis’s findings have shown how narrativity can have an impact on students’ ideas (Chapter 5, Sections 5.3.3 and 5.4.3). To argue that ideas about students’ narrativity come exclusively from textbooks would be simplistic. Narrativity does not come exclusively through textbooks. It comes with any kind of narration, written or oral or visual (films/plays/pictures, e.g. Picasso’s *Guernica* and so on). Nonetheless, the narrative form of textbooks reinforces the linearity and singularity illusion, notions that were extensively demonstrated by the students who participated in this study, and might be attributed, partly at least, to the use of textbook narrative, and the use of narrative does come with implications for student learning.

Traditionally, the focus of history education has been on the content, with history learning focusing on narrating and memorizing important facts from the national past (van Drie and van Boxtel, 2008). Of course, it is not that schools generate this notion – rather, they *reinforce* it. This is a task that teachers need to adopt. A challenge therefore that needs to be address is how to break from the rigidity of textbook narrativity. Again, the emphasis on history’s know-how is sine qua non. Moreover, the positionality of the language used in textbooks and by classroom educators needs to be uncovered so that the bias/politicality/non-neutrality of the author’s and teacher’s voices can be interpreted.

ii. Make the author visible

The use of textbooks, emphasis on citation, and use of a (all-knowing) third person voice, and the subsequent ‘reality effect’ (Barthes, 1982) can be also argued as eliminating the author behind the construction of accounts. Hence, historical accounts can become extremely powerful ‘narrative templates’, as they often eliminate the author’s voice constituting the past as all-authoritative, thereby eliminating any meta-cognitive procedures (Wertsch, 2000). Students need to know that accounts are built differently because of the authors behind them. Authors can have different analytical *thinking* methods, such as the use of annotation.

iii. Engagement with alternative interpretations

That history is seen by students as something fixed and agreed (Chapter 2, Section 2.2), can also be partly attributed to the use of a single textbook. Cypriot students are not alone in having this notion. As Lee (2009) highlighted, when asked how we can know what happened, ‘many younger children talked of looking it up in a book, or more ambitiously, of finding out what most books said’. If students’ answer that ‘this is what the book says’, the only access students have to the past is those of master narratives. As a consequence of the emphasis on national master narratives, students have

limited access to other pools of knowledge; and, therefore, as a result, they use assimilation as a default mechanism for evaluating history. On the other hand, when it comes to the context of Cyprus, students *do* have alternative knowledge to that conveyed in official narratives. For this reason, students need to have access to different interpretations. At this point, it would be wise to raise a point of caution: students need to be exposed to more than two interpretations. This might otherwise result in students being caught in the bipolarity of historical accounts and, consequently, reaching a dead end. Students need a pool of stories, which will help them to move beyond the juxtaposition of conflicting interpretations.

9.6.2. Language (and Discourses) ‘Reality Effect’

Language reflects the way we think, but also shapes the way we think.⁴⁸ Consequently, realities create echo chambers, spaces where like-minded individuals reinforce their previously held beliefs. The findings of this study demonstrate that Greek-Cypriot students used their school history to evaluate the accounts they were confronted with. In other words, according to students, a truthful account is one in which there is common agreement: the greater the number of authors, textbooks, or people which know and support the same version of past events, then that is the right and true version of the past (Chapter 7, Section 7.2). The findings of this research have demonstrated how the language currently used in textbooks might impede students’ understanding, and the existence or reinforcement of notions such as factuality in history, and/or obscure agency. Language however is not found only in textbooks, it is also in the classroom. Classroom language plays an important role in teaching and learning history, and commonly used expressions such as ‘our book says’ or ‘what does your book say?’ are counter-productive. In order to maximise the impact of history’s know-how, teachers need to use a language that helps students to understand history as construction, one that gives visibility to the author behind the accounts, and one that enables students to understand that historical accounts are *interpretations* rather than representations of the past.

9.6.3. Teleology

Related to linearity (Section 9.6.1) and the dangers this entails is teleology. The dangers of employing teleology (Chapter 7, Section 7.6) as a form of engagement with the past are very real for the classroom. Teleology can become very powerful, especially when there is absence of knowledge of the past. This is because students use elements from the present to fill in gaps (Lee and Howson, 2009, p. 240). The first danger of employing teleology is that, whereas the chief duty of a historian is to approach the past on its own terms, teleology enables a simplified and deterministic approach to the past. Secondly, engaging with the past through the lenses of teleology can often lead to nihilism: since no one can escape history, we are doomed to repeating the same mistakes as our destiny is set and fixed. Thirdly, through teleology one risks the application of past or present moral judgements or prejudices, enabling the past becoming a self-fulfilling prophesy. Four, identities are not unchangeable. Not only are identities not unchangeable, ethnic and national identities are constantly transforming, and are continually being renewed, reinterpreted and renegotiated according to changing circumstances and, interests. 'Each age and society recreate its Others' (Said, 1995, p.332). Identity as such cannot be understood as a preconstituted structure, but only as a process in constant flux and teleology discourses not only flatten out identities but they establish them as resolute and unchanging.

However, as Ahonen (2018, p.19) highlighted, 'by including and mediating moral claims', socially constructed narratives 'tend to provide narratives with a contrast between good and bad actors'. Especially when it comes to (school) history, this kind of determinism not only glosses over the (causal) complexities of the past, 'it provides a presentist or anachronistic view on national history' (Carretero and van Alphen, 2014, p.293). Yet the idea of teleology in history can become ludicrous almost as soon as we start to interrogate it to any depth, dismiss practices such as (highly) selective use of evidence and the complete dismissal of countervailing viewpoints or interpretations,

and take-on the task of engaging with the past through the use of meta-historical concepts such as continuity and change and historical empathy.

9.6.4. Use of existing knowledge

The findings of this Thesis showed that students come with their own ideas of how history works. That is, students come into the classroom with alternative knowledge and limited epistemologies. Although a seemingly counterintuitive proposal, I argue that educators not only should, they *must* use this existing knowledge. Either if this knowledge comes in the form of limited epistemologies or alternative ideas about the practical past, teachers should use it rather than dismiss it and ‘dictate knowledge by simple deciding if the students’ answers are “right” or “wrong” (Psaltis et al., 2011, pp.350-51), as is currently the case in a number of countries, such as the RoC.

i. Use of limited epistemologies

Overall, the findings of this thesis suggest that the majority of students have not developed sophisticated responses in relation to historical accounts and history in general. Students who are not (fully) familiar with the genre of disciplinary history use their own conceptions and frameworks to interpret a question. Indeed, students’ notions about historical accounts may differ from those of teachers and historians. Yet, these ideas are a starting point. Moreover, these ideas must be brought to the surface and addressed so as to stop their being an obstacle to powerful historical learning. These ideas can be addressed by asking students *how* we know *history*. Most importantly, tackling the limited ideas which some students might have cannot be achieved unless educators are aware of them.

ii. Use of the ‘practical past’


One of the criteria used by the students who participated in this study to assess accounts was

(authors' or own) experience (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.3). This, to a degree, could be connected to Cyprus' context (Chapter 8, Section 8.3) and the prevalence of the 'practical past' (Oakeshott, 1933). Of course, it is natural that students draw on what is around them – that they know things through experience (Lee, 2005). Although the line between the 'practical past' and disciplinary history can be blurred, it is helpful to pose a distinction as the line *is* there, and it indicates a methodological *disciplinary* boundary, and one which history educators and stakeholders need to illuminate. This is because disciplinary history 'increases the competency to find meaning' (ibid.), by illustrating how 'history education must go above the line if students' historical consciousness is to be adequately developed' (ibid.). These ideas however need and must be addressed. Students in Cyprus, and all around the world, come into classrooms with unofficial material and memorial cultures (Carretero et al., 2017; Seixas, 2016). However, this culture might prove to be an 'affordance' for students to develop historical thinking skills. As shown in Figure 7, Seixas (2016) raised the possibility that history education is located in the 'purple' bridge between (the 'blue') historical practices and (the 'red') memorial beliefs. For history education to be positioned in the 'purple bridge', skilled teachers are needed who 'have considerable autonomy to address the memorial cultures of the students in their classes and where community memories – perhaps even divided memories – are subjected to and enlarged by critical, historical scrutiny, feeding back into public memory' (ibid.). History teachers therefore need a curriculum that uses memory as a historical tool.⁴⁹

9.6.5. Teach interpretation as stance – not opinion

One of the principal findings of this Thesis concerned authorship (Chapter 1, Section 5.1.6). Explicitly, students attributed differing accounts of authors' writing in different ways to the notion that they are different people – not because authors are positioned differently.⁵⁰ Students therefore need to be shown that interpretation is a *disciplinary judgement* so that the subsequent problem of a) subjectivity and b) fragmentation can be addressed (Chapman, 2009).⁵¹ Being confronted with the partiality of history is therefore important, as it can help students to move beyond limited

Figure 7. Seixas' History/Memory Matrix for History Education



epistemologies whereby they might argue that should authors lack information they are free to add opinion, or that as the past cannot be re-assessed experientially, historians exercise bias. And of course, students need to be aware that interpretation depends on the question asked.

9.6.6. Work in groups

It is known from research (Ashby and Lee, 1897 cited in Cooper and Dilek, 2004; Cooper and Chapman, 2009) that students can reach higher levels of understanding when discussing a historical event or problem amongst themselves, than they would achieve on their own. Drawing on their own research, Cooper and Dilek (2004) highlighted how group discussion unfolded students' thinking. Indeed, one of the findings of this thesis was that some of the more nuanced answers were given in group interviews. Examples of higher-order/more sophisticated thinking related to students addressing how readers might be interested in different things (Chapter 5, Section 5.2), understanding that accounts differ because of authors' different standpoints (Chapter 5, Section 5.1.7), and appreciating that authors evaluate evidence (Chapter 5, Section 5.3.6). Students need safe spaces to

unfold their thinking/understanding both in the classroom and in smaller groups, where, for example, they can engage in think-aloud tasks.⁵²

9.6.7. Create meaningful curricula

It is often assumed that local issues matter to young people, while remote events might leave them indifferent. Yet, the findings of this study demonstrated that students attributed value to historical accounts which provided new openings and alternative interpretations not only about the events of 1974 in Cyprus but in relation to WWI too. Historical enquiry therefore as a pedagogical tool needs to be responsive to student needs, their questions and glocal lives. Yet, when it comes to Cyprus specifically, history teaching is dictated by (conflicting) national interests, political priorities and colonial attachments (Chapter 1, Section 1.4). Historical accounts co-articulate two interchangeable versions, Greek-centred and Turkish Cypriot-centred (Klerides, 2008), setting issues of elusive ethnic identity formation. On the other hand, history narratives display identities that feel primordial, and powerful enough to be killed or kill for (Calhoun, 2017). Additionally, historical accounts establish and promote relationships where everyone knows who the ‘Bad’ and ‘Ugly’ guys are (Chapter 7, Section 7.6). Against such a background of unexamined historical thinking, how can educators make history meaningful for students? Ozbaran’s (1998, pp.67-68) warning of twenty years ago that,

the professional historians holding important seats should be bothered much more seriously with what history is and means for the teenagers. Moreover, the most are not yet experienced in combing the qualities of the historiographer and the educator

remains current in Cyprus and its effects are demonstrably played out in school curricula, textbooks and teaching practices. Alongside ‘modernising’ the teaching and learning of history and making history relevant to students’ lives, it is important that Cyprus’ setting and students’ context is taken into account (Section 9.6.4).

9.6.8. Revise curricula and textbooks

In order for all the above to take place, curricula and textbooks need to be revised. On the one hand, it is important that students are given the big picture, both of their own country and of the world. On the other hand, history's 'know-how' is equally important. Therefore, both curricula and textbooks, need to be revised in a way that they combine history's know-that and know-how in a balanced way. Moreover, they need to be designed in a way that allows in-depth learning. In order to achieve more in-depth learning, teachers need to be given freedom and flexibility. One way of doing so is by having less content. The curriculum's compulsory components can be stripped back, with some of the components being mandatory and others optional. In general, a broader and, at the same time, more in-depth history is needed, which teachers can adapt to the needs of their students. For this to happen, policy-makers need to have a clear rationale, and they need to answer with braveness and clarity the 'History for What?' question.

9.6.9. Teacher training

As highlighted from the very beginning of this Thesis, this study is not concerned with evaluating teachers. Nonetheless, concerns over textbooks and curricula should be accompanied by concerns with educators as *tools* of learning. Explicitly, as teachers are one of the most imperative factors influencing students' understandings, it would be an oversight not to highlight the importance of teacher training. It is not unsafe to argue that there many ways in which student learning may be influenced by teachers' conceptual frameworks. In order to improve learning, teaching needs to be improved, which can be addressed through an approach to teacher training that places emphasis not only on the methodology of history, but also on research and theory about students' ideas. Educators need to be equipped with practical and theoretical knowledge that will allow them to use what they have at their disposal in a meaningful way. Some questions that need to be addressed are:

- i. What do teachers need to know about the language of the discipline in order to communicate its knowledge and expectations?
- ii. How can teachers become more engaged with wider theoretical and learning issues, for example issues of historiography and interpretation?
- iii. How do authorities and schools engage teachers in the above?

CHAPTER 10. FINAL REFLECTIONS

Unless the historical understanding which students come to the classroom with is engaged with and realised through evidence-based historical enquiry, neither the disciplinary nor of the proposed curriculum changes can be realized. As Grever and Clark (2018) have pointed out, due to the ubiquity of the past in contemporary culture and society, history is fundamental to the way people perceive themselves. This raises several pedagogical questions, such as: are students able to engage with disciplinary historical thinking? It has repeatedly argued by researchers that disciplinary history can be counterintuitive to students' historical thinking (Wineburg, 2001), with Lowenthal (1985) famously pointing out that the past is a foreign country. However, even for Greek-Cypriot students who demonstrated mostly limited epistemologies, the past might be a foreign country but it is not a foreign planet. Despite their incomplete epistemologies, as the findings of this study showed, (Cypriot) students are more able than we think. What is more, in this Thesis, students themselves valued the epistemological nature of history (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.6). That is, 36.9% of participating students argued that historical accounts can be useful because of their epistemic value. Students attributed usefulness to accounts when based on the criteria of multiperspectivity, objectiveness, use of citation and/or evidence, the combination of information sourcing from the different accounts, and trustworthiness. These ideas might be limited, and indeed they might not fully encapsulate history's epistemological nature. However, they indicate that students do find epistemic value on historical accounts. Yet, educators and policy makers often deny students the opportunity to gain and thereafter use powerful knowledge.

Drawing on this study's findings I furthermore argue that students are also denied the opportunity to use history in a meaningful way. The findings of this Thesis show that no one can escape their relationship with the past (Chapter 7). This stance has been articulated by several thinkers (Paul, 2004; Seixas, 2016), and it is a stance I have taken myself. Within this thesis I have argued for a greater degree of openness than that provided by existing history education paradigms – and an even

greater level of openness than Rüsen's view seems to assume. As historical representation is always culturally mediated (Werstch, 1994), we need to re-think history education in a way that goes beyond skills. In addition, we need to be reminded that disciplinary history too ‘*can be also be abused*’ (Carretero et al., 2017, pp.1-2, emphasis added).

Why disciplinary history then? Although ‘pure history’ does not exist, nuanced and informed engagement with the past *does* require disciplinary skills and higher-order thinking. (Perhaps an alleged over-emphasis on skills has had the adverse effect of creating a disengagement from the core of the past in relation to history?). Students *need* good history because history can teach us who we are. It can teach us about who we are as a race and what we are capable of on both our dark and our noble sides. And it can teach us who we are as social animals and individuals. The study of the past can also help us to think about and understand the world around us, and address questions such as: ‘On what grounds do different authors attribute responsibility differently?’, or ‘Could have the First World War been avoided?’ History, moreover, can help us understand society and how we operate in it.

Good history can also help us reflect how we position ourselves in relation to ‘Other(s)’ and our own communities. This is because ‘any identity is shaped by the social heteroglossia of the historical world and is therefore made up of diverse semantic strands that often pull in different directions’ (Klerides, 2016, p.270). Put simply, identities are diverse, and they are fluid. It is for these reasons that students need good history that can help them explore the past, navigate the present, and prepare for the future. For this reason, as long as we are fixated on teaching history for maintaining and cultivating ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1983), we fail to address that who we are goes beyond the fixed and set identities imagined by and for the nation.⁵³ Any discussion of history education therefore needs to be one which is *informed*, it needs to be *nuanced*, and it needs to be *responsive* to young people whose lives, needs and questions go beyond the narrow confinements of ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1983).

Good history can also help young people make informed decisions in the present, and in their adult lives. This thesis was submitted at a time where fake news, notably in relation to Donald Trump and Cambridge Analytica, made the newspaper headlines every day. Worryingly, research has shown that students are ill-equipped to manage the emerging media landscape, by thinking, for example, that photos can be taken at face value (Schulten and Brown, 2017). This Thesis was also written at a time when Facebook management defended users' right to be wrong – even Holocaust deniers (Levin and Solon, 2018). In the UK, because of the rigorous teaching, we would expect students to be more reactive to post-truth. Yet research on British university students and the public showed that this is not the case (Esplen, 2018). Similarly, a Stanford University study found that most American students do not know when news is fake, concluding that 'young and otherwise digital-savvy students can easily be duped' (Brookes, 2016). Should not, therefore, stakeholders and educators allow students' the capacity to develop a more cautious or tentative approach when relating a narrative to a *valid* point of view or a *legitimate* perspective' (Afandi, 2012, p.162, emphases added)? Should not we equip young people with the necessary skills to read and manage information around them?

First and foremost, though, this thesis was written with Cyprus at heart. This thesis was undertaken while I taught student-teachers in Cyprus, student-teachers who like myself, throughout their primary and secondary education, learnt that history is memorizing and looking for the 'truth'. Seeing history learning through the eyes of my teacher-students was an awakening experience. Being a history educator who had to educate history educators, provided me with more reflexive lenses and more nuanced questions about the why, how and for what history is for. This Thesis was also written while I was running an 'Oral History' workshop in a bi-communal summer camp where Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot teenagers came together in a former mixed village, nowadays almost deserted, where Christians and Muslims had lived and worked side by side. These teenagers were confronted with new narratives about Cyprus' recent past – some of the being conflicting with the ones they were familiar with, asking why these had not been addressed by their school textbooks and teachers. At the same time, by the time that this thesis was submitted, young people in Cyprus had

gone from ‘Δεν Ξεχνώ’ to ‘Δεν Ξεχνώ το Δεν Ξεχνώ’ [‘I do not Forget the “I do not Forget”’] to singing ‘Despacito’ (Zembylas, 2018), the reggaeton Latin pop song that became viral and took over the international charts in 2017. This seems miles away from the time when young people, including myself, attended all-night demonstrations against the ‘Turkish Republic of North Cyprus’. Yet, as the findings of this Thesis have shown, to claim that nowadays (all) young people have moved beyond the official narratives of ‘Den Xehno’ would be misleading.⁵⁴

Today, Cyprus is at a crossroads. The RoC Ministry of Education and Culture is in the process of revising history education curriculum and producing new learning materials for the classroom. At the same time, other efforts, such as those promoted by the Association of Historical Dialogue and Research (AHDR) and the Pedagogical Institute of Cyprus, are trying respectively to model history teaching workshops for trainee teachers to improve their practice and design better curricula (Perikleous, 2015). But for these efforts to be meaningful, it is important that policy-makers enable educators to understand students’ ideas – that is, the conceptual tools which students have in their possession and conversely those they lack, which I have tried to show throughout this Thesis.

By being informed about students’ thinking, history educators will be able to, firstly, enable students engage with historical texts in a meaningful way - i.e., take into consideration and evaluate historical perspectives and, secondly, advance their thinking and address their misconceptions. Yet, as long as pedagogies, disciplinary reform efforts and history textbooks keep being entangled with politics of memory and issues of legitimacy, the former cannot be successful. This is because, either if we want to admit it or not, the political problems in the island *do have* repercussions for the education system (Latif, 2007). These political problems, to a large degree,

have led to the politicisation of its education systems as well. Political leaders use education for disseminating ideologies, preserving power and maintaining the status quo. Educational leadership is in the hands of politicians, who can use it for indoctrination and manipulation (ibid, p.2).

For the history education reform to be meaningful therefore, policy-makers urgently need to engage in an open and daring dialogue on how to take history education forward in a setting where history

education has been dictated by the politics of memory and political competition (Papadakis, 2002; Papadakis et al., 2006; Latif, 2007).

Specifically, in order to advance student thinking through history's know-how, policy-makers need to engage in the discomfiting discussion on 'history why'. Re-imagining history teaching and learning is, indeed, a difficult and challenging task. Yet, curriculum and textbook design, teacher education and classroom practices need to move beyond the 'best history approach' (Seixas, 2000) and take on the disciplinary paradigms of history education that the current Republic of Cyprus history education curriculum claims it demands. That is, making 'changes in both *content* and *ways* of teaching and learning', the 'overcoming of the textbook content', cultivating 'active learning', and establishing 'new methods and techniques through the production of knowledge of critical character for the 'understanding of the discipline' (Cyprus Ministry of Education and Culture, 2011, emphasis added).

As importantly, rethinking history education is urgent not just in relation to Cypriot students, but for young people all around the world, who are both cleverer than we think (Gago, 2005) and do care about the past (Letourneau, 2014). I therefore argue that the above principles should apply for all contexts. History educators need to give young people the tools to navigate their glocal contexts, and they also need to give them the tools to confront different interpretations and make distinctions between what is 'valid' and legitimate, and have the kind of knowledge that can take them beyond the narrow confinements of their textbook. Bringing this thesis to a close, I propose that re-thinking history education, and engaging in more carefully designed pedagogy, requires responding to the following questions:

History Education How? For What? And, For Whom?

REFERENCES

- Afandi, S. (2012). *Conceptions about the Nature of Accounts in History: An Exploratory Study of Students' Ideas and Teachers Assumptions about Students' Understandings in Singapore*. (Unpublished PhD Thesis). London: Institute of Education.
- Ahohen, S. (2018). Sustainable History Lessons for Post-Conflict Society. In: T. Epstein and C. Peck, eds., (2018). *Teaching and Learning Difficult Histories in International Contexts: A Critical Sociocultural Approach*. London and New York: Routledge. pp.41-62.
- Alcoe, A. (2007). *Being an Historian is about Telling the Truth: A Study of How Secondary Students Analyse Conflicting Historical Accounts*. (Unpublished MA Dissertation). London: Institute of Education.
- Allan, G. (2003). A Critique of Using Grounded Theory as a Research Method. *Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods* [online] 2(1), pp.37-46. Available at: <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.129.9102> [Accessed 25 Feb. 2018].
- Alshenqeeti, H. (2014). Interviewing as a Data Collection Method: A Critical Review. *English Linguistics Research*, 3(1), pp.38-45.
- Andrews, T. (2012). What is Social Constructionism? *The Grounded Theory Review*, 11(1), pp.39-46.
- Anderson, B. (1983). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Angier, K. (2017). In search of historical consciousness: An investigation into young South Africans' knowledge and understanding of 'their' national histories. *London Review of Education*, 15(2), pp.155-173.
- Ankersmit, F. R. (1983). *Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historian's Language*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Ankersmit, F. R. (2001). *Historical Representation*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Ankersmit, F. R. (2006). 'Presence' and Myth. *History and Theory*, 45(3), pp.328–336.

- Apostolidou, E. (2006). *The Historical Consciousness of 15 year-old Students in Greece*. (Unpublished PhD Thesis). Institute of Education: London.
- A°sberg, D., Hummerdal, D. and Dekker, S. (2011). There are no Qualitative Methods – nor Quantitative for that Matter: The Misleading Rhetoric of the Qualitative–Quantitative Argument. *Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science*, 12(5), pp.408–415.
- Association for Historical Dialogue and Research. Available at: <http://www.ahdr.info/home.php> [Accessed 8 Sep. 2018].
- Bakhtin, M. M. (1981). *The Dialogic Imagination*, trans. C. Emerson and M. Holquist, Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Barca, I. (2002). Direct Observation and History: The Ideas of Portuguese Students and Prospective Teachers. In: *Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association*. [online]. New Orleans. Available at: <http://www.cshc.ubc.ca/viewpaper.php?id=89> [Accessed 3 Mar. 2018].
- Barca, I. (2005). ‘Till New Facts are Discovered’: Students’ Ideas about Subjectivity in History. In: R. Ashby, P. Gordon and P. Lee, eds., *Understanding History: Recent Research in History Education* (International Review of History Education, 4). London, New York: RoutledgeFalmer, pp. 68-82.
- Barca, I. and Magalhães, O. (2005). A Bridge between the Past and the Present? The Perspectives of Portuguese Young People. Paper presented at the annual meeting of AERA in Montreal, Canada.
- Barthes, R. (1982). The Reality Effect. In: T. Todorov, ed., (trans. R. Carte), *French Literary Theory Today: A Reader*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 11-17.
- Barton, K. C. (1997). ‘I just kinda know’: Elementary Students' Ideas about Historical Evidence. *Theory and Research in Social Education*, 25(4), pp. 407-30.
- Barton, K. C. (2001). History Education and National Identity in Northern Ireland and the United States: Differing Priorities. *Theory into Practice*, 40(1), pp. 48-54.

- Barton, K. C. (2008). 'You'd be Wanting to Know about the Past': Social Contexts of Children's Historical Understanding in Northern Ireland and the U.S.A. In: L. S. Levstik and K. C. Barton, eds., *Researching History Education: Theory, Method and Context*. New York: Routledge, pp. 333-53.
- Barton, K. C. (2009). The Denial of Desire: How to make History Education Meaningless. In: L. Symcox and A. Wilschut, eds., *National History Standards: The Problem of the Canon and the Future of Teaching History*. Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, pp. 265-282.
- Barton, K. C. and Levstik, L. S. (1998). 'It Wasn't a Good Part of History': National Identity and Students' Explanations of Historical Significance. *Teachers College Record*, 99(3), pp. 478-513.
- Barton, K. and McCully, A. W. (2005). History, identity, and the school curriculum in Northern Ireland: an empirical study of secondary students' ideas and perspectives. *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 27(1), pp. 85-116.
- BBC (2003). *Emotion as Cyprus Border Opens*. [Online]. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2969089.stm> [Accessed 6 Sep. 2018].
- Bellino, M. J. and Selman, R. L. (2012). The Intersection of Historical Understanding and Ethical Reflection during Early Adolescence: A Place where Time is Squared. In: M. Carretero, M. Asensio, and M. Rodríguez-Moneo, eds., *History Education and the Construction of National Identities*. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, Inc., pp. 189-202.
- Berger P. L. and Luckmann T. (1966). *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. New York: AnchorBooks.
- Billig, M. (1995). *Banal Nationalism*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Blanke, H. W. (2005). Towards a New History of Historiography. In: P. Koslowski, ed., *The Discovery of Historicity in German Idealism and Historism*. Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer.
- Blaikie, N. (2002). *Designing Social Research*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Boix Mansilla, V. (2005). Assessing Student Work at Disciplinary Crossroads. *Change*, 37 (January/February), pp. 14-21.
- Bousalis, R. (2017). Establishing Sociological Imagination before Blame in Historical Events. *The Clearing House: A Journal of Educational Strategies*, 90, pp. 8-11.
- Brady, H. E. and David Collier, D., eds. (2004). *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Brand, A. G. (1985-1986). Hot Cognition: Emotions and Writing Behaviour. *Journal of Advanced Composition*, 6, pp. 5-15.
- Bricker, L. A. and Bell, P. (2016). Exploring Images of Epistemic Cognition across Contexts and over Time. In: J. A. Greene, W. A. Sandoval, and I. Bråten, eds., *Handbook of Epistemic Cognition*. New York and London: Routledge.
- British Educational Research Association (2012). *Ethical Guidelines for Educational Research*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bera.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/BERA-Ethical-Guidelines-2011.pdf?noredirect=1> [Accessed 3 Mar. 2015].
- Brooke, D. (2016). Stanford Researchers find Students have Trouble Judging the Credibility of Information Online. *Stanford, Graduate School of Education* [online]. Available at: <https://ed.stanford.edu/news/stanford-researchers-find-students-have-trouble-judging-credibility-information-online> [Accessed 6 Sep. 2018].
- Bruner, J. (1991). The Narrative Construction of Reality. *Critical Enquiry*, 18(1), pp. 1-21.
- Bruner, J. S. (2005). Past and Present as Narrative Constructions. In: J. Straub, ed., *Narration, Identity, and Historical Consciousness*. United States: Berghahn Books, pp. 23-43.
- Bryant, A. and Charmaz, K. (2007). *The SAGE Handbook of Grounded Theory*. Thousand Oaks, CA.: SAGE Publications.
- Bryant, R. and Papadakis, Y., eds. (2012). *Cyprus and the Politics of Memory: History, Community and Conflict*. London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.

- Burke, P. (2002). Western Historical Thinking in a Global Perspective – 10 Theses. In: J. Rüsen, ed., *Western Historical Thinking: An Intercultural Debate*. New York: Berghahn Books, pp.15-30.
- Butterfield, H. (1931). *The Whig Interpretation of History*. London: G. Bell.
- Byrom, J. (2014). *Progression in History under the 2014 National Curriculum. A Guide for Schools*. London: The Historical Association.
- Cajani, L. Lässig, S. and Repoussi, M. eds., (2019). *Palgrave Handbook of Conflict and History Education in the Post-Cold War Eras*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Calhoun, G. (2017). *Nation and Imagination: How Benedict Anderson Revolutionized Political Theory*. [online] Available at: <http://www.abc.net.au/religion/nation-and-imagination-how-benedict-anderson-revolutionized-poli/10095810> [Accessed 17 May 2018].
- Campbell-Corey, E. (2006). *Michael Oakeshott on Religion, Aesthetics, and Politics*. Missouri: University of Missouri Press.
- Carr, E. H. (1961). *What is History?* London: Penguin.
- Carretero, M. (2011). Constructing Patriotism: Teaching History and Memories in Global Worlds. *Advances in Cultural Psychology: Constructing Human Development*. Charlotte NC: Information Age Publishing, Inc.
- Carretero, M., Asensio, M. and Rodríguez-Moneo, M., eds. (2012). *History Education and the Construction of Identities*. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, Inc.
- Carretero, M., Berger, S. and Grever, M., eds. (2017). *Palgrave Handbook of Research in Historical Culture and Education*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Carretero, M. and van Alphen, F. (2014). Do Master Narratives Change among High School Students? A Characterization of How National History Is Represented. *Cognition and Instruction*, 32(3), pp.290-312.
- Carvalho, M. and Barca, I. (2012). Students' Use of Evidence in European Countries. *International Journal of History Teaching, Learning and Research*, 11(1), pp.24-39.

- Cercadillo, L. (2001). Significance in History: Students' Ideas in England and Spain. In: A. Dickinson, P. Gordon and P. Lee, eds., *International Review of History Education: Raising Standards in History Education* (3). London and Portland: Woburn Press, pp. 116-45.
- Cercadillo, L., Chapman, A. J., and Lee, P. (2017). Organizing the Past: Historical Accounts, Significance and Unknown Ontologies. In: Carretero, M., Berger, S. and Grever, M., eds., *Palgrave Handbook of Research in Historical Culture and Education*. London: Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 529-51.
- Chapman, A. (2009). *Towards an Interpretations Heuristic: A Case Study Exploration of 16-19 year-old Students' Ideas about Explaining Variations in Historical Accounts* (Unpublished EdD thesis). London: Institute of Education.
- Chapman, A. (2011a). Historical Interpretations. In: I. Davies, ed., *Debates in History Teaching*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 96-108.
- Chapman, A. (2011b). Understanding Historical Knowing: Evidence and Accounts. In: L. Perikleous and D. Shemilt, eds., *The Future of the Past: Why History Education Matters*. Nicosia: The Association for Historical Dialogue and Research / UNDP-ACT, pp. 169-214.
- Chapman, A. (2012). Beyond 'Bias' and Subjectivity? Developing 16-19 year-old Students' Understandings of Historical Interpretations through Online Inter-Institutional Discussion. In: R. Ghusayni, R. Karami and B. Akar, eds., *Learning and Teaching History: Lessons from and for Lebanon*. Beirut: Arab Cultural Center, pp. 53-84.
- Chapman, A. (2016). *Developing Students' Understanding of Historical Interpretation*. Oxford: Edexcel/Pearson.
- Chapman, A. and Facey, J. (2004). Placing History: Territory, Story, Identity, and Historical Consciousness. *Teaching History*, 116, pp. 36-41.
- Chapman, A. and Facey, J. (2009). Documentaries, Causal Linking and Hyper Linking for AS Students. In: H. Cooper and A. Chapman, eds., *Constructing History 11-19*. Thousand Oaks, CA.: SAGE Publications, pp. 88-119.

- Charmaz, K. (1990). 'Discovering' Chronic Illness: Using Grounded Theory. *Social Science and Medicine*, 30(11), pp. 1161-72.
- Charmaz, K. (2000). Constructivist and Objectivist Grounded Theory. In: N. K. Denzin and Y. Lincoln, eds., *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, pp. 509–35.
- Charmaz, K. (2006). *Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through Qualitative Analysis*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Christodoulou, N. (2014). Curriculum Studies in Cyprus: Intellectual History and Present Circumstances. In: Pinar, F. W., ed., *International Handbook of Curriculum Research*. New York and London: Routledge, pp. 151-60.
- Clark, A. and Maria Grever, M. (2018). Historical Consciousness: Conceptualizations and Educational Applications. In: S.A. Metzger and L. H. McArthur-Harris, eds., *International Handbook of History Teaching and Learning*. New York: Wiley-Blackwell Publishers. pp.177 -201.
- Coffin, C. (2004). Learning to Write History: The Role of Causality. *WRITTEN COMMUNICATION*, 21(3), pp. 261-289.
- Cohen, L., Manion, L. and Morrison, K. (2011). *Research Methods in Education*. 7th Ed. London and New York: Routledge.
- Cole, E. A., ed. (2007). *Teaching the Violent Past: History Education and Reconciliation*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Collingwood, R. G. (1994). *The Idea of History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cooper, H. (1991). *Young Children's Thinking in History* (Unpublished PhD Thesis). London: Institute of Education.
- Cooper, H. (2003). Historical Thinking and Cognitive Development in the Teaching of History. In: H. Bourdillon, ed., *Teaching History* (last ed.). London and New York: Routledge. pp.101-21.

- Cooper, H. and Dilek, D. (2004). Children's Thinking in History: Analysis of a History Lesson Taught to 11 year-olds at Ihsan Sungu School, Istanbul. *International Journal of Historical Learning Teaching and Research*, 4(2). Available at: http://insight.cumbria.ac.uk/id/eprint/93/2/Cooper_dielek.pdf [Accessed 18 May 2018].
- Corbin, J. and Strauss, A. (2008). *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory*. 3rd ed. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications.
- Couture, A. L., Zaidi, A. U. and Maticka-Tyndale, E. (2012). Reflexive Accounts: An Intersectional Approach to Exploring the Fluidity of Insider/Outsider Status and the Researcher's Impact on Culturally Sensitive Post-Positivist Qualitative Research. In: S. Kleinknecht, A. J. Puddephatt and C. B. Sanders, eds., *Contemporary Issues in Qualitative Research*, VIII(1), pp. 86-105.
- Creswell, J. W. (1998). *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Traditions*. London: Sage Publications.
- Darlington, Y. and Scott, D. (2002). *Qualitative Research in Practise: Stories from the Field*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Dey, I. (1993). *Qualitative Data Analysis: A User-friendly Guide for Social Scientists*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Dickinson, A. K. and Lee, P. J. (1978). Understanding and Research. In: A. K. Dickinson and P. J. Lee, eds., *History Teaching and Historical Understanding*. London: Heinemann Educations Books, pp. 94-120.
- Donnelly, K. (2014). Apples and Oranges: Comparing our Education System with other Countries doesn't Always Work. [Blog] *THE CONVERSATION*. Available at: <https://theconversation.com/apples-and-oranges-comparing-our-education-system-with-other-countries-doesnt-always-work-31174> [Accessed 27 Sep. 2018].
- Dowling, P. and Brown, A. (2010). *Re-Interrogating Education*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Drummond, A. H. (1929). *History in School: A Study of Some Of its Problems*. London, Harrap.

- Epstein, T. L. (2012). *Preparing History Teachers to Develop Young People's Historical Thinking*. Available at: <https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/may-2012/preparing-history-teachers-to-develop-young-peoples-historical-thinking> [Accessed 2 Sep. 2018].
- Epstein, T. and Peck, C. (2018). *Teaching and Learning Difficult Histories in International Contexts: A Critical Sociocultural Approach*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Esplen, B. (2018). Censorship on Campus? A New Poll Reveals what Students Really Think about Free Speech: Who is really more Offended – Students or the General Public?. [Online] *New Statesman*. Available at: <https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/education/2018/06/censorship-campus-new-poll-reveals-what-students-really-think-about-free> [Accessed 10 Sep. 2018].
- Festinger, L. (1957). *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*. California: Stanford University Press.
- Fink, B. (1997). *The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Flax, J. (1990). Postmodernism and Gender. In: L.Nicholson, ed., *Feminism/Postmodernism*. New York: Routledge.
- Flesch, R. F. (1948). A New Readability Yardstick. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 32, pp. 221-33.
- Flick, U. (2007). *Designing Qualitative Research, The SAGE Qualitative Research Kit*. Los Angeles: SAGE.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2001). *Making Social Science Matter. Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again* (TRANS. S. Sampson). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Foster, S. and Yeager, E. (1999). 'You've got to Put Together the Pieces': English 12-year-olds Encounter and Learn from Historical Evidence. *Journal of Curriculum and Supervision*, 14(4), pp. 286-317.
- Foster, S. J. (2001). Historical Empathy in Theory and Practice: Some Final Thoughts. In: O. L. Davis, Jr., E. A. Yeager and S. J. Foster, eds., *Historical Empathy and Perspective Taking in the Social Studies*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 167-81.

- Gabriel, Y. (2012). The Other and the Othering – A Short Introduction. [Blog] *Yiannis Gabriel: Stories, Music, Psychoanalysis, Politics, Reviews, the Odd Cooking Recipe*. Available at: <http://www.yiannisgabriel.com/2012/09/the-other-and-othering-short.html> [Accessed 10 Sep. 2017].
- Gago, M. (2005). Children's Understanding of Historical Narrative in Portugal. In: R. Ashby, P. Gordon and P.J. Lee, eds., *Understanding History: Recent Research in History Education* (International Review of History Education, 4). London and New York: Routledge Falmer, pp. 83-97.
- Gergen, K. (1998). Narrative, Moral Identity and Historical Consciousness: A Social Constructionist Account (Draft copy appearing as Erzählung, moralische Identität und historisches Bewusstsein. Eine sozialkonstruktivistische Darstellung). In: J. Straub, ed., *Identität und Historisches Bewusstsein*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Gillis, J. R. (1994). *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Giroux, H. A. (1977). The Politics of the Hidden Curriculum. *Independent School*, 37(1), pp. 42-3.
- Glaser, B. G. and Strauss A. L. (1967). *The Discovery of the Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Goldberg, T. (2017). The useful past in negotiation: Adolescents' use of history in negotiation of inter-group conflict. *London Review of Education*, 15(2), pp. 194-210.
- Goldberg, T., Schwarz, B. B. and Dan Porat, D. (2011). 'Could They Do It Differently?' Narrative and Argumentative Changes in Students' Writing Following Discussion of 'Hot' Historical Issues. *Cognition and Instruction*, 29(2), pp. 185-217.
- Gottlieb, E. and Wineburg, S. (2012). Between 'Veritas' and 'Communitas': Epistemic Switching in the Reading of Academic and Sacred History. *Journal of the Learning Sciences*, 21(1), pp. 84-129.
- Grbich, C. (2013). *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Introduction*. 2nd ed. London: Thousand Oaks, CA.: SAGE Publications.

- Halbwachs, M. (1980). *The Collective Memory*. New York: Harper & Row Colophon Books.
- Halldén, O. (1997). Conceptual Change and the Learning of History. *International Journal of Educational Research*, 27(3), pp. 201-10.
- Hammersley, M. and Atkinson, P. (2007). *Ethnography: Principles in Practice*. 3rd ed. London: Routledge.
- Hatch, A. J. (2002). *Doing Qualitative Research in Education Settings*. State University of New York: State University of New York Press.
- Hatzivassiliou, E. (2015). Book Review: Rappas, A. (2014). Cyprus in the 1930s: British Colonial Rule and the Roots of Cyprus. *Conflict, Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 26(1), pp. 188-189.
- Hauser, G. (1999). *Vernacular Voices: The Rhetoric of Publics and Public Spheres*. South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press.
- Hervey, S., Higgins, I. and Haywood, L. M. (1995). *Thinking Spanish Translation*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1962). *The Age of Revolution, Europe: 1780-1848*. UK: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. (1983). *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hsiao, Y. M. (2008). *Taiwanese Students' Ideas about Historical Accounts: With Special Reference to their Perceptions of History Textbooks* (Unpublished PhD Thesis). London: Institute of Education.
- Husbands, C., Kitson, A. and Pendry, A. (2003). *Understanding History Teaching: Teaching and Learning about the Past in Secondary Schools*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Hyland, T. (2011). *Mindfulness and Learning: Celebrating the Affective Dimension of Education*. Switzerland: Springer.
- Hyvarinen, M. (2017). Foreword: Life meets Narrative. In: B. Schiff, A. E. McKim and S. Patron, eds., *Life and Narrative: The Risks and Responsibilities of Storying Experience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Ireton, L. and Kovras, I. (2012). Non-Apologies and Prolonged Silences in Post-Conflict Settings: The Case of Post-Colonial Cyprus. *Time & Society*, 21(1), pp.71–88.
- Jenkins, K. (1991). *Re-thinking History*. London: Routledge.
- Jordanova, L. (2006). *History in Practice*. 2nd ed. London: Hodder Arnold Publications.
- Kadioglu, P. (2010). *The Rise of the Ethno-Nationalism in Cyprus under the British Rule: 1878-1960*. (Unpublished MA Dissertation). Ankara: Middle East Technical University.
- Karagiorgi, Y. and Symeou, L. (2007). Teachers' In-Service Training Needs in Cyprus. *European Journal of Teacher Education*, 30(2), pp.175-94.
- Karnieli-Miller, O., Strier, R. and Pessach, L. (2009). Power Relations in Qualitative Research. *Qualitative Health Research*, 19(2), pp.279-89.
- Kitson, A. and Husbands, C. (with Steward, C.) (2011). *Teaching and Learning History 11-18: Understanding the Past*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- Klerides, L. (2008). *The Discursive (Re)Construction of National Identity in Cyprus and England with Special Reference to History Textbooks: A Comparative Study* (Unpublished PhD Thesis). London: Institute of Education.
- Klerides, L. (2016). (Re)Reading National Identities in School Historiographies: Pedagogical Implications from the Case of Cyprus. *Pedagogy, Culture & Society*, 24(2), pp.269-83.
- Koulouri, C., ed. (2002a). *Teaching the History of Southeastern Europe*. Thessaloniki: Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe.
- Koulouri, C. (2002b). *Clio in the Balkans: The Politics of History Education*. Thessaloniki: Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe.
- Koutselini, M. (2007). History and Civic Education Teaching, Identities and Citizenship: A Case Study in Cyprus. In: *L.Cajani and A. Ross, eds., History Teaching, Identities and Citizenship*, Stoke on Trent: Trentham, pp.95-108.
- Kyle, K. (1984). Passionate Purposes. *London Review of Books*, 6(16), pp.15-16.
- Latif, D. (2017). A Challenging Educational Reform: Politics of History Textbook Revision in North Cyprus. *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education*. Available at:

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057925.2017.1369003?scroll=top&needAccess=true> [Accessed 2 Sep. 2018].

- Lee, P. J. (1998). 'A lot of Guess Work goes on': Children's Understanding of Historical Accounts. *Teaching History*, 92, pp.29-35.
- Lee, P. J. (2004). 'Walking Backwards into Tomorrow': Historical Consciousness and Understanding History. *International Journal of Historical Learning Teaching and Research*, 4(1), pp.34-67.
- Lee, P. J. (2005). Putting Principles into Practise: Understanding History. In: M. S. Donovan and J. D. Bransford, eds., *How Students Learn: History in the Classroom*. Washington D.C.: The National Academy Press, pp.31-77.
- Lee, P. J. (2009). History in an Information Culture. *International Journal of Historical Learning Teaching and Research*, 1(2). Available at:
<https://www.history.org.uk/publications/categories/304/resource/4852/the-international-journal-volume-1-number-> [Accessed 13 Nov. 2016].
- Lee, P. (2014). Fused Horizons? UK Research into Students' Second-Order Ideas in History – A Perspective from London. In: M. Koster, H. Thunemann and M. Zulsdorf-Kersting, eds., *Researching History Education: International perspectives and disciplinary traditions*. Schwalbach: Wochenschau Verlag, pp.170–94.
- Lee, P. and Ashby, R. (2000). Progression in Historical Understanding among Students Ages 7-14. In: P. Stearns, P. Seixas and S. Wineburg, eds., *Knowing, Teaching and Learning History: National and International Perspectives*. New York: New York University Press, pp.199-222.
- Lee, P., Dickinson, A. and Ashby, R. (1996). Progression in Children's Ideas about History. In: M. Hughes, ed., *Progression in Learning*. U.K., U.S., Australia: Multilingual Matters Ltd, pp.50-81.
- Lee, P., Donovan, M. S., Bransford, J. D. and Pellegrino, J. W. (1999). *How People Learn: Bridging Research and Practice*. Washington, DC, National Academy Press.

- Lee, P. and Howson, J. (2009). 'Two out of Five did not know that Henry VIII had Six Wives': History Education, Historical Literacy and Historical Consciousness. In: L. Symcox and A. Wilschut, eds., *National History Standards: The Problem of the Canon and the Future of Teaching History*. Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, pp.211-61.
- Lee, P. J. and Shemilt, D. (2003). 'A Scaffold not a Cage': Progression and Progression Models in History. *Teaching History*, 113, pp.13-23.
- Lee, P. J. and Shemilt, D. (2004). 'I just Wish we could go back in the Past and find out what really Happened': Progression in Understanding about Historical Accounts. *Teaching History*, 117, pp.25-31.
- Lee, P. J. and Shemilt, D. (2009). Is any Explanation better than None? Over-determined Narratives, Senseless Agencies and One-way Streets in Students' Learning about Cause and Consequence in History. *Teaching History*, 117, pp.42-9.
- Lee, P. J., Slater, J., Walsh, P. and White, J. (1992). *The Aims of School History: The National Curriculum and beyond*. London: Tufnell Press.
- Lemon, M. C. (1995). *The Discipline of History and the History of Thought*. New York: Routledge.
- Létourneau, J. (2014). Teaching History: Historical Consciousness and Quebec's Youth. *Active History: History Matters* [Online]. Available at: <http://activehistory.ca/2014/03/teaching-history-historical-consciousness-and-quebecs-youth/> [Accessed 12 Sep. 2019].
- Létourneau, J. (2017). Teaching National History to Young People Today. In: M. Carretero, S. Berger and M. Grever, eds., *Palgrave Handbook of Research in Historical Culture and Education*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- Levesque, S. (2017). History as a 'GPS': On the Uses of Historical Narrative for French Canadian Students' Life Orientation and Identity. *London Review of Education*, 15(20), pp.227-42.
- Levesque, S. and Letourneau, J. (2019). 'They fought for our language': Historical narratives and national identification among young French Canadians. In: A. Clark and C. L. Peck, eds. *Contemplating historical consciousness: notes from the field*. New York : Berghahn Books.

- Levin, S. and Solon, O. (2018). Zuckerberg Defends Facebook Users' Right to be Wrong – even Holocaust Deniers. *Guardian* [online]. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jul/18/zuckerberg-facebook-holocaust-deniers-censorship> [Accessed 6 Sep. 2018]
- Levstik, L. S. (2001). Crossing the Empty Spaces: Perspective Taking in New Zealand Adolescents' Understanding on National History. In: E. A. Yeager and S. J. Foster, eds., *Historical Empathy and Perspective Taking in the Social Studies*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, Inc., pp.69-96.
- Levstik, L. S. and Barton, K. C. (2001). *Doing History: Investigating with Children in Elementary and Middle Schools*. 2nd ed. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Levy, J. S. (2008). Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, pp.1-18.
- Levy, S. E. (1967). Taylor-made Teleology, *World Futures*, 6(1), pp.88-92.
- Limon, M. and Mason, L. (2002). *Reconsidering Conceptual Change: Issues in Theory and Practice*. Switzerland: Springer Nature.
- Lincoln, Y. S. and Guba, E. G. (1985). *Naturalistic Enquiry*. Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications.
- Lowenthal, D. (1985). *The Past is a Foreign Country*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lowenthal, D. (1998). Fabricating Heritage. *History & Memory*, 10(1), pp.5-24.
- Lowenthal, D. (2000). Dilemmas and Delights of Learning History. In: P. N. Stearns, P. Seixas and S. Wineburg, eds., *Knowing, Teaching, and Learning History: National and International Perspectives*. New York: New York University Press, pp.63-82.
- Maggioni, L., Riconscente, M. M., and Alexander, P. A. (2006). Perceptions of Knowledge and Beliefs among Undergraduate Students in Italy and in the United States. *Learning and Instruction*, 16, pp.467-91.
- Makriyianni, C. (2004). *What does it Mean to Think Historically? Approaches to Teaching and Learning History*. Nicosia: Association for Historical Dialogue and Research.

- Makriyianni, C. (2006). *History, Museums and National Identity in a Divided Country: Children's Experience of Museum Education in Cyprus* (Unpublished PhD Thesis). Cambridge: University of Cambridge.
- Makriyianni, C. (2011). Constructing an Epistemological Framework for the Study of National Identity in Post-Conflict Societies through History Teaching and Learning. In: L. Perikleous and D. Shemilt, eds., *The Future of the Past: Why History Education Matters*. Nicosia: AHDR, pp.454-85.
- Makriyianni, C. and Psaltis, C. (2007). History Teaching and Reconciliation. *Cyprus Review*, 19, pp.43-69.
- Martens, M. (2015). Understanding the Nature of History. In: A. Chapman and A. Wilschut, eds., *Joined-up History: New Directions in History Education*. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, INC., pp.211-30.
- Mavratsas, C.V. (1997). The Ideological Contest between Greek-Cypriot Nationalism and Cypriotism 1974–1995: Politics, Social Memory and Identity. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 20(4), pp.717-37.
- Maxwell, A. J. (2010). Using Numbers in Qualitative Research. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 16(6), pp. 475–482.
- McCulloch, G. (2004). *Documentary Research in Education, History and the Social Sciences*. London and New York: Routledge Falmer.
- Megill, A. (1994a). Introduction: Four Senses of Objectivity. In: A. Megill, ed., *Rethinking Objectivity*. Durham: Duke University Press, pp.1-20.
- Megill, A. (1994b). Jörn Rüsen's Theory of Historiography between Modernism and Rhetoric of Inquiry. *History and Theory*, 33(1), pp.39-60.
- Megill, A. (2007). *Historical Knowledge, Historical Error: A Contemporary Guide to Practice*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mignolo, W. D. (2007). Introduction: Coloniality of Power and De-colonial Thinking. *Cultural Studies*, 21(2-3), pp.155-67.

- Ministry of Education and Culture (2011). *History (New Curriculum) [Ιστορία (ΝέοΑναλυτικό)]*. Available at: http://www.moec.gov.cy/analytika_programmata/nea-analytika-programmata/istoria.pdf [Accessed 23 Feb. 2014].
- Morgan, T. and de Quetteville, H. (2003). Cyprus Border Opens for First Time in 30 Years. *The Telegraph*. [Online]. Available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/1428255/Cyprus-border-opens-for-first-time-in-30-years.html> [Accessed 6 Sep. 2018].
- Morse, J. M. (1994). Designing Funded Qualitative Research. In: N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, eds., *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, pp.220-35.
- Mruck, K. and Breuer, F. (2003). Subjectivity and Reflexivity in Qualitative Research-The FQs Issues. [Blog] *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*. Available at: <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/696/1504> [Accessed 3 Mar. 2018].
- Nakou, I. and Apostolidou, E. (2010). Debates in Greece: Textbooks as the Spinal Cord of History Education and the Passionate Maintenance of a Traditional Historical Culture. In: I. Nakou and I. Barca, eds., *Contemporary Public Debates Over History Education. International Review of History Education*, Charlotte, N.C.: Information Age Publishing, Inc., pp.115-132.
- Nora, P. (1989). Between Memory and History: 'Les Lieux de Mémoire'. In: G. Fabre and R. O'Meally, eds., *History and Memory in African-American Culture*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., pp.284-301.
- Oakeshott, M. (1933). *Experience and its Modes*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Oldfield, A. (1981). Moral Judgements in History. *History and Theory*, 40, pp.260-77.
- Ozbaran, S. (1998). Tuirkiye'de Tarih Egitimi ve Ders Kitaplari Ustuine Duisuinceler [Thoughts on Historical Education and History Books in Turkey]. *Sempozyum, Tarih Egitimi ve Tarihte 'Oteki' Sorunu*. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlari.
- Pachoulides, K. (2007). *Greek-Cypriot's National Identity: A Sociopsychological Genetic Approach* (Unpublished PhD Thesis). Athens: Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences.

- Panteli, S. (1984). *A New History of Cyprus: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day*. London and The Hague: East-West Publications.
- Papadakis, Y. (1993). *Perceptions of History and Collective Identity: A Study of Contemporary Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot Nationalism* (Unpublished PhD Thesis). Cambridge: University of Cambridge.
- Papadakis, Y. (2002). *The Politics of Memory and Forgetting*. Available at: <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/papadakis.diss.html> [Accessed 23 Feb. 2015]
- Papadakis, Y. (2006). Disclosure and Censorship in Divided Cyprus: Towards an Anthropology of Ethnic Autism. In: Y. Papadakis, N. Peristianis and G. Welz, eds., *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island in Conflict*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 66-83.
- Papadakis, Y. (2008). History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot Schoolbooks on the 'History of Cyprus', *PRIO Cyprus Centre Report*, 2. Nicosia: PRIO.
- Papadakis, Y., Peristianis, N. and Welz, G. (2006). *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island in Conflict*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Park, J. (2008). *Students' Ideas about Different Representations of the Past: South Korean Adolescents Interpret Historical Film* (Unpublished PhD Thesis). London: Institute of Education.
- Patton, M. Q. (2002). *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods*. Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
- Paul, H. (2015). *Key Issues in Historical Theory*. New York: Routledge.
- Peck, C. (2018). Intersections of Students' Ethnic Identifications and Understandings of History. In: T. Epstein and C. Peck, eds., (2018). *Teaching and Learning Difficult Histories in International Contexts: A Critical Sociocultural Approach*. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 231-46.

- Perikleous, L. (2011). Why Did they Treat their Children Like This?: A Case Study of 9-12 Year-Old Greek Cypriot Students' Ideas of Historical Empathy. In: L. Perikleous and D. Shemilt, eds., *The Future of the Past: Why History Education Matters*. Nicosia: AHDR, pp. 217-52.
- Perikleous, L. (2015). A brave new world: History Education Reform in the Greek-Cypriot Educational System. In: A. Chapman and A. Wilschut, eds., *Joined-up History: New Directions in History Education*. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, INC., pp.161-182.
- Perikleous, L. and Shemilt, D, eds. (2011). *The Future of the Past: Why History Education Matters*. Nicosia: UNDP-ACT.
- Peristianis, N. (2006). Cypriot Nationalism, Dual Identity, and Politics. In: Y. Papadakis, N. Peristianis and G. Welz, eds., *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island in Conflict*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 100-120.
- Perry, P. (2016). Does the Language we Speak Affect our Perception of Reality? [Blog] *Big Think*. Available at: <https://bigthink.com/philip-perry/does-the-language-we-speak-affect-our-perception-of-reality> [Accessed 5 Oct. 2018].
- Persianis, P. (1996). The British Colonial Education 'Lending' Policy in Cyprus (1878-1960): An Intriguing Example of an Elusive 'Adapted Education' Policy. *Comparative Education*, 32(1), pp. 45-68.
- Philippou, S. (2004). *How the Concept of 'Europe' could Shift Ethnocentric Discourses in History and Geography Curricula as well as in Children's Constructions of Identity and Citizenship* (Unpublished PhD Thesis). Cambridge: University of Cambridge.
- Philippou, S. (2005). Constructing National and European Identities: The Case of Greek-Cypriot Pupils. *Educational Studies*, 31(3), pp. 293-315.
- Polman, J. L. (2000). Identity Development through Participation in an Informal Setting. In: B. Fishman and S. O'Connor-Divelbiss, eds., *Fourth International Conference of the Learning Sciences*. Mahwah, NJ.: Erlbaum, pp. 340-41.

- Porat, D. (2006a). The Nation Revised: Teaching the Jewish Past to the Zionist Present. *Jewish Social Studies*, 13(1), pp.59-86.
- Porat, D. (2006b). 'Who Fired First?' Students' Construction of Meaning from One Textbook Account of the Israeli–Arab Conflict. *Curriculum Inquiry*, 36(3), pp. 251-71.
- Psaltis, C., Carretero, M., Cehajic-Clancy, S., eds. (2017). *History Education and Conflict Transformation: Social Psychological Theories, History Teaching and Reconciliation*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Psaltis, C., Lytras, E., Costache, S. and Fisher, C. (2011). Methodology, Epistemology and Ideology of History Educators across the Divide in Cyprus. In: L. Perikleous and D. Shemilt, eds., *The Future of the Past: Why History Education Matters*. Nicosia: AHDR, pp.343-86.
- Robson, C. (2011). *Real World Research: A Resource for Users of Social Research Methods in Applied Settings*. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Robbins, J. (2005). Collaboration, and Cultural Tools: A sociocultural perspective on researching children's thinking. *Contemporary Issues in Early Childhood*, 6(2), pp.140-49.
- Rogers, P. J. (1979). *New History: Theory into Practice*. UK: The Historical Association.
- Roth, W. M. (2013). Translation in Qualitative Social Research. [online] *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, 14(2). Available at: <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1986/3534> [Accessed 10 Sep. 2018].
- Rüsen, J. (2004). *Berättande och Förnuft: Historieteoretiska Texter*. Göteborg: Daidalos.
- Rüsen, J. (2005). *History: Narration, Interpretation, Orientation*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- Santayana, G. (1905/6). *Life of Reason*. New York: Scribner's.
- Santos, B. (2014). *Epistemologies of the South: Justice against Epistemicide*. Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers.
- Sarantakos, S. (2005). *Social Research*. 3rd ed. London: Macmillan Press.

- Sheehan, M. and Davison, M. (2017). 'We need to remember they died for us': How young people in New Zealand make meaning of war remembrance and commemoration of the First World War. *London Review of Education*, 15(2), pp. 259-271.
- Schleicher, A. (1995). Comparability Issues in International Educational Comparisons. In: W. Bos and R. H. Lehmann, eds., *Reflections in Educational Achievement: Papers in Honour of T. Neville Postlethwaite*. Münster, New York: Waxmann, pp.216-29. Available at: <https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=LmOyGxM1r-oC&pg=PA229&lpg=PA229&dq=Schleicher+A.+Comparability+Issues+in+International+Educational+Comparisons.+Paris:+OECD&source=bl&ots=RzPoDUk0Ih&sig=xAoTipzRoh2tSbwjNcPhFQMPV1M&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjQhZ6mlfzdAhXJzaQKHdXvDgcQ6AEwBHoECAYQAQ#v=onepage&q=Schleicher%20A.%20Comparability%20Issues%20in%20International%20Educational%20Comparisons.%20Paris%3A%20OECD&f=false> [Accessed 22 May 2018].
- Schulten, K. and Brown, A. C. (2017). Evaluating Sources in a 'Post-Truth' World: Ideas for Teaching and Learning about Fake News. *The New York Times* [online]. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/learning/lesson-plans/evaluating-sources-in-a-post-truth-world-ideas-for-teaching-and-learning-about-fake-news.html> [Accessed 24 July 2018].
- Scott, D. and Morrison, M. (2006). *Key Ideas in Educational Research*. London and New York: Continuum.
- Scott, D. and Usher, R. (2011). *Researching Education: Data Methods and Theory in Educational Inquiry*. 2nd ed. London: Continuum.
- Seixas, P. (1993). Historical Understanding among Adolescents in a Multicultural Setting. *Curriculum Inquiry*, 23(3), pp. 301–27.
- Seixas, P. (1997). Mapping the Terrain of Historical Significance. *Social Education*, 61, pp. 22-27.

- Seixas, P. (2000). 'Schweigen! Die Kinder!' Or, Does Postmodern History Have a Place in Schools? In: P. Stearns, P. Seixas and P. Wineburg, eds., *Knowing, Teaching and Learning History: National and International Perspectives*. New York: New York University Press, pp. 19-37.
- Seixas, P. (2002). The Purposes of Teaching Canadian History. *Canadian Social Studies*, 36(2). Available at: <http://historicalthinking.ca/sites/default/files/files/docs/The%20Purposes%20of%20Teaching%20Canadian%20History.pdf> [Accessed 9 Sep. 2018].
- Seixas, P. (2004). *Theorizing Historical Consciousness*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
- Seixas, P. (2016). A History/Memory Matrix for History Education. [Blog] *Public History Weekly: The International Blogjournal*. Available at: <https://public-history-weekly.degruyter.com/4-2016-6/a-historymemory-matrix-for-history-education/> [Accessed 21 May 2018].
- Seixas, P. (2018). History in School. In: B. Bevernage and N. Wouters, eds., *The Palgrave Handbook of State-Sponsored History after 1945*. pp. 273-88
- Sharpe, J. (1991). History from Below. In P. Burke, ed., *New Perspectives on Historical Writing*. Penn: University Park, pp. 24-41.
- Shemilt, D. (1980). *History 13-16 Evaluation Study*. Edinburgh: Holmes McDougall.
- Shemilt, D. (2009). Drinking an Ocean and Pissing a Cupful: How Adolescents make Sense of History. In: L. Symcox and A. Wilschut, eds., *National History Standards: The Problem of the Canon and the Future of Teaching History (International Review of History Education, 5)*. Charlotte, North Carolina: Information Age Publishing, Inc, pp.141-210.
- Silverman, D. (2000). *Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
- Slater, J. (1989). *The Politics of History Teaching: A Humanity Dehumanized?* London: Institute of Education.
- Smith, A. D. (1986). *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Smith, A. D. (1991). *National Identity*. London: Penguin.

- Smith, F. (2006). *Ourselves: Why we are who we are*. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers.
- Spyrou, S. (1999). *Small Ethnic Worlds: Identity, Ambiguity, and Imagination in Greek Cypriot Children's Lives* (Unpublished PhD Thesis). New York: State University of New York at Binghamton.
- Stearns, P. (1998). Why Study History?. [Blog] *American Historical Association*. Available at: [https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/historical-archives/why-study-history-\(1998\)](https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/historical-archives/why-study-history-(1998)) [Accessed 9 Sep. 2018].
- Straub, J. (2005). Telling Stories, Making History: Toward a Narrative Psychology of the Historical Construction of Meaning. In: J. Straub, ed., *Narration, Identity, and Historical Consciousness*. United States: Berghahn Books., pp. 44-98.
- Strauss, A., and Corbin, J. (1990). *Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques*. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications.
- Taylor, J. T. (2000). Language Constructing Language: The Implications of Reflexivity for Linguistic Theory. *Language Sciences*, 22, pp. 483-99.
- Tosh, J. (2008). *Why History Matters*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tuhiwai-Smith, L. (1999). *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples*. 2nd ed. London and New York: Zed Books.
- Tumblety, J., ed. (2013). *Memory and History: Understanding Memory as a Source and Subject*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Valentinovna-Korostelina, K. and Lässig, S. (with Ihrig, S.), eds. (2013). *History Education and Post-Conflict Reconciliation: Reconsidering Joint Textbook Projects*. London and New York: Routledge.
- van Drie, J. and van Boxtel, C. (2008). *Historical Reasoning: Towards a Framework for Analyzing Students' Reasoning about the Past*. *Educational Psychology Review*, 20(2), pp.87–110.
- van Nes, F., Abma, T., Jonsson, H. and Deeg, D. (2010). *Language Differences in Qualitative Research: Is Meaning Lost in Translation?* Available at:

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2995873/pdf/10433_2010_Article_168.pdf

f [Accessed 25 Feb. 2018].

- VanSledright, B. (2011). *The Challenge of Rethinking History Education: On Practices, Theories, and Policy*. New York: Routledge.
- VanSledright, B. A. and Afflerbach, P. (2005). Assessing the Status of Historical Sources: An Exploratory Study of Eight US Elementary Students Reading Documents. In: R. Ashby, P. Gordon and P. Lee, eds., *Understanding History: Recent Research in History Education, International Review of History Education*, 4. London, New York: Routledge Falmer, pp.1-20.
- Varnava, A. (2011). A History of Cyprus - A Classic Revisited. [Blog] *Reviews in History: Covering Books and Resources across all Fields of History*. Available at: <https://reviews.history.ac.uk/review/1051> [Accessed 18 Feb. 2018].
- von Borries, B. (1998). Representation and Understanding of History. In: J. F. Voss and M. Carretero, eds., *International Review of History Education 2: Learning and Reasoning in History*. Portland, OR: Woburn Press, pp.360-77.
- von Borries, B. (2011). Historical Consciousness and Historical Learning: Some Results of my own Empirical Research. In: L. Perikleous and D. Shemilt, eds., *The Future of the Past: Why History Education Matters*. Nicosia: UNDP-ACT, pp.283-320.
- Voss, J. and Carretero, M., eds. (1998). *Learning and Reasoning in History*. London: Routledge Falmer.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). *Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes*. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
- Wertsch, J. V. (1994). The Primacy of Mediated Action in Sociocultural Studies. *Mind, Culture, and Activity*, 1(4), pp.202-8.
- Wertsch, J. V. (1998). *Mind as Action*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Wertsch, J. V. (2000). Is It Possible to Teach Beliefs, as Well as Knowledge About History? In: P. Stearns, P. Seixas and S. Wineburg, eds., *Knowing, Teaching and Learning History: National and International Perspectives*. New York: New York University Press, pp.38-50.
- Wertsch, J. V. (2004). Specific Narratives and Schematic Narrative Templates. In: P. Seixas, ed., *Theorizing Historical Consciousness*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp.49-62.
- Wertsch, J. V. (2011). Beyond the Archival Model of Memory and the Affordances and Constraints of Narratives. *Cultural Psychology*, 17(1), pp.21-9.
- Wertsch, J. V. and Rozin, M. (1998). The Russian Revolution: Official and Unofficial Accounts. In: J. F. Voss and M. Carretero, eds., *Learning and Reasoning in History* (International Review of History Education, 2). London: Woburn Press, pp.39-60.
- White, H. (1966). The Burden of History, *History and Theory*, 5, pp.111-34.
- White, H. (2005). Introduction: Historical Fiction, Fictional History, and Historical Reality. *Rethinking History*, 9(2/3), pp.147-157
- White, H. (2014) *The Practical Past*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- White, H. (1973). *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*. United States: John Hopkins University.
- Whorf, B. L. (1956). *Language, Thought, and Reality; Selected Writings*. Cambridge: Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Wineburg, S. (2001). *Historical Thinking and other Unnatural Acts: Charting the Future of Teaching the Past*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Wineburg, S., Resiman, A. and Fogo, B. (2007). Historical Evidence and Evidence of Learning. *The International Journal of Social Education*, 22(1), pp.146-54.
- Xiaoqun, W. (2014). Do We Really Need a 'Global View of History?' *Chinese Studies in History*, 42(3), pp.45-50.
- Yeager, E., Foster, S., and Greer, J. (2002). How Eighth Graders in England and the United States View Historical Significance. *The Elementary School Journal*, 13(2), pp.199-219.

Zembylas, M. (2018). *Victimization and Villainification as Affective Technologies in the Cyprus Conflict: The Case of the 'I Don't Forget' Education Policy*. Nicosia: Comparative Education Society Europe Biannula Conference.

Zembylas, M. and Harakasan, H. (2017). Formal and Non-formal Reform Efforts of History Teaching in Cyprus: Openings and Closures for Dangerous Memories and Reconciliation Pedagogies. In: C. Psaltis, M. C. Carretero and S. Cehajic-Clancy, eds., *History Education and Conflict Transformation: Social Psychological Theories, History Teaching and Reconciliation*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 321-340.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. Paired Accounts on ‘The Outbreak of WWI’

Written Activity A: The WWI (World War I) breakout

This activity is part of a doctoral research, which looks into how students understand differing historical accounts of the same event.

This is the first out of the two activities you need to answer to.

Knowledge of the specific event is not necessary – quite the contrary.

Also, there are no right and wrong answers. Your participation is valuable for this exact reason: because this research looks into *your* understandings!

Please:

- (a) Fill in the box below with your personal details.**
- (b) Please read the introduction on ‘The WWI break-out’ carefully.**
- (c) Read the two accounts on ‘The WWI break-out’, and**
- (d) Answer the questions that follow in the boxes provided. Please give all of the questions equal attention.**

Name:

Gender:

School:

Class:

Major modules:

Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research!

I. Please read carefully the following introduction on The WWI break out.

WWI (World War I), also known as the (Great) War, broke out in July 1914 with the “July Crisis” when the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria was assassinated, and lasted until 1918. The War drew in all the world's Great Powers of the time, which were assembled in two opposing alliances: the *(Triple) Entente* also known as the *Allies* (United Kingdom, France and the Russian Empire with the United States joining later on), and the *Central Powers* of Germany and Austria-Hungary, with the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria also joining later, also known as the *Quadruple Alliance*. The War ended with the victory of the Allies.

As a result of the War, four Empires collapsed, numerous nations regained their former independence, and new ones were created. 9 million people lost their lives and equally many were injured. In 1919, the *Treaty of Versailles*, which was signed between the Allies and Germany, marked the end of the War. The Treaty – and in specific, the War Guilt Clause, forced Germany to pay reparations of billions to the Entente powers, disarm, and make substantial territorial and population concessions.

The main personalities that relate to the break out of WWI as mentioned in the following historical accounts are:

- Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg: Chancellor of the German Empire
- Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria: Heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne
- Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf: Chief of the General Staff
- Alexander Graf von Hoyos: Chief of Staff of the Foreign Ministry of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
- Emperor Franz Joseph: Emperor of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
- Leopold Graf Berchtold: Foreign Minister of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
- Helmuth von Moltke: Chief of the German General Staff
- Prince Lichnowsky: German Ambassador at Great Britain
- Sir Edward Grey: Foreign Secretary of Great Britain
- Jules-Martin Cambon: French ambassador to Germany
- Gottlieb von Jagow: Foreign Minister of Germany
- Count Istvan Tisza: Prime Minister of Hungary
- László Szógyény-Marich: Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin.
- Kaiser William II: German Emperor

II. Please read the two historical accounts carefully and answer the questions that follow.

The break-out of WWI –Historical Account 1	
<p>[1] None of the Powers wanted a European War. With very few exceptions, all their governing rulers and ministers predicted that it must be a frightful struggle, and that the loss of life, suffering, and economic consequences would be terrible.</p>	1
<p>[2] Germany did not plot a European War. She did not want one and she made genuine, though too late efforts, to prevent war. Germany was the victim of her alliance with Austria and of her own foolishness: Bethmann felt obliged to comply with Berchtold's request for support while he also hoped and expected to keep the Austro-Serbian conflict at a local level.</p>	5
<p>The motto of the Versailles Treaty was a motto exacted by victors because of the blindness, ignorance, hatred, and the propagandist misconceptions of the war. It was based on evidence which was incomplete and not always solid.</p>	10
<p>[3] But historians still disagree as to the relative part of this responsibility. But the present writer condemns such efforts to assess a very complicated question by a precise formula and some precise mathematical fashion. After all, this complicated question is more a matter of delicate shading than of definite white and black.</p>	15
<p>[4] Moreover, despite the immediate causes connected with the July crisis of 1914, there were the underlying causes, which for years had been building towards a dangerous situation. Explicitly, the development of a system of alliances, the increase of armaments, economic rivalry, nationalist ambitions and antagonisms, and newspaper incitement, were decisive in the break-out of the war.</p>	20
<p>[5] Austria was more responsible for the immediate origin of the war than any other Power. Yet from her own point of view she was acting against the decline of Greater Serbia and the unrest in the broader area of Balkans.</p>	25
<p>Russia was partly responsible for the conflict between Austria and Serbia because of the frequent encouragement which she had given at Serbia but also due to the preparatory military measures that she was making in secret. But it was primarily Russia's general mobilization which hurried the final catastrophe, causing Germany to mobilize and declare war. England also played an important role in the war. Sir Edward could probably have prevented war if he had warned France and Russia that England would remain neutral early in the crisis.</p>	30
<p>[6] Therefore, in view of the evidence now available, the verdict of the Versailles Treaty that Germany and her allies were responsible for the War is historically unsound. However, because of the popular negative feeling widespread in some of the Entente countries, it is doubtful whether a formal and legal revision by historical scholars, and through them of public opinion will take place.//</p>	35

The break-out of WWI – Historical Account 2	
[1] In spite of all the surface calm, the feeling or conviction that a great European conflict could not be postponed for long started prevailing.	1
[2] Germany's confidence in her military strength was deeply shaken by the increases in the French and Russian armies. Hence, already since the elections of 1912, the idea of a "preventive war" was acquiring an increasing appeal, especially in military and conservative circles, who started to regard war as a "tempering of the nation" and a way to strengthen the Prusso-German state.	5 10
[3] The news of the murder of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne evoked indignation and consternation throughout Europe, but there was no feeling that it must inevitably lead to a European crisis.	
[4] On July 4 the hesitation of Germany was converted by Kaiser, who famously uttered 'it's now or ever'. The same day the Austrian Foreign Ministry had been unofficially informed by the German embassy that "Germany would support the Monarchy through thick and thin, whatever action it decided to take against Serbia. The sooner Austria-Hungary struck, the better."	15 20
On July 7, at the meeting of the Ministerial Council, a shift in the Austro-Hungarian policy came too. All the participants except Tisza, agreed on the necessity of war against Serbia. Tisza, on July the 8, like Emperor Franz Joseph, had been convinced that "the Monarchy had to reach an energetic conclusion	25
[5] Despite all the appeals and warnings of Europe, Germany failed to put any pressure on Austria to avoid the local conflict. At 11 a.m. on July 28 Austria presented her declaration of war on Serbia. Berchtold rejected any intervention as too late.	30
The same day, Moltke sent a clear memorandum to the Chancellor explaining that mobilization must inevitably lead to world war. The Chancellor responded that the mobilisation need to start, and from this point on, the idea of making "Russia alone responsible for any extension of the conflict and disturbance of the European's peace" appears with increasing frequency in the German documents.	53
[6] There is no question that all European powers had some measure of responsibility – greater or smaller – for the outbreak of the war, in one respect or another. Even so, it is not the purpose of this work to enter into the known controversy over the question of war guilt. In this work, we are concerned solely with the German leaders' objectives and with the policy actually followed by them in the July crisis.	40
[7] Germany, being confident in her military superiority, willed and yearned for the Austro-Serbian war, and she consciously faced the risk of a conflict with Russia and France. Therefore, her leaders must hold a substantial share of the historical responsibility for the outbreak of general war in 1914.//	45

III. Please answer the following questions:

A.1.1. In what ways do the two historical accounts differ?

A.1.2. On a scale of 1-10, with 1 representing the minimum and 10 the maximum, how far do the two accounts differ?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
----------	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------	-----------

A.2.1. Why do these historical accounts differ while they refer to the same event?

A.3.1. Can both historical accounts be 'true' at the same time?

A.3.1.1. If they can, in what ways?

A.3.1.2. If they cannot, why not?

A.4.1. Which historical account amongst the two is the best? Can you please justify?

A.5.1. Which of the two historical accounts was more useful for you? Can you please justify?

APPENDIX 2. Paired Accounts on ‘The British Take-over of Cyprus’

Written Activity B: The British Take-over of Cyprus

This activity is part of a doctoral research, which looks into how students understand differing historical accounts of the same event.

This is the first out of the two activities you need to answer to.

Knowledge of the specific event is not necessary – quite the contrary.

Also, there are no right and wrong answers. Your participation is valuable for this exact reason: because this research looks into *your* understandings!

Please:

- (a) Fill in the box below with your personal details.**
- (b) Please read the introduction on ‘The British Take-over of Cyprus’ carefully.**
- (c) Read the two accounts on ‘The British Take-over of Cyprus’, and**
- (d) Answer the questions that follow in the boxes provided. Please give all of the questions equal attention.**

Name:

Gender:

School:

Class:

Major modules:

Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research!

I. Please read the following introduction on the British take-over of Cyprus.

In 1878, as a result of the *Cyprus Convention*, Great Britain took over Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire. In exchange, Britain would provide military support to the Ottoman Empire - the 'Sick man of Europe' as it was called at the time as the Empire was steadily declining - in the case that Russia attempted to take over territories held by the Ottomans in Asia. The Cyprus Convention was the result of the Congress of Berlin in which the other Great Powers of the time were involved as well.

The aim of the Congress of Berlin was to reorganize the countries of the Balkans, as well as to revisit the *San Stefano Treaty*, which took place earlier in Istanbul. The San Stefano Treaty was a treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Empire marking the end of the Russo-Turkish War, 1878; in reality, however, the Treaty served the interests of Russia and as result caused the change of power in Europe, causing thus the reaction of the other European Powers. The result of this reaction was the Congress of Berlin which – amongst a series of other changes it necessitated – decided that Cyprus would be taken over by the British.

The main personalities that relate to the Cyprus Convention and the Takeover of Cyprus from the British as mentioned in the following historical accounts are:

- Benjamin Disraeli: Prime Minister of Great Britain
- William Gladstone: Ex-Prime Minister of Great Britain, famous for his rivalry with Benjamin Disraeli
- Sir Henry Layard: Britain's Ambassador at Constantinople
- Abdul Hamid II: Sultan of the Ottoman Empire
- Lord Salisbury: Foreign Secretary of Great Britain
- Joseph Nasi: Jewish diplomat and influential figure in the Ottoman Empire
- Lord John Hay: British vice-Admiral, in July 1878 he was sent to take control of Cyprus and to occupy it according to the Congress of Berlin
- Georgios Kepiades: Greek-Cypriot historian, and prominent Greek-Cypriot scholar
- Bishop of Kition Kyprianos
- Sir Garnet Wolseley: He went as High-Commissioner to the newly acquired possession of Cyprus on 12 July 1878
- Sami Pasha: Confident of the Sultan and Great Vezir at the time (the equivalent of today's Prime-minister).
- Archbishop Sofronios: Archbishop Sofronios served as an Archbishop (which means the religious leader of Greek-Cypriots) when Cyprus went under the administration of the British (1878).

II. Please read the two historical accounts carefully and answer the following questions.

The British Take-over of Cyprus –Historical Account 1	
[1] This chapter tells the backstage story of how Britain conquered Cyprus. The possession of Cyprus happened because of a combination of reasons. The British purchase of the Suez Canal in 1875, the Russian move to the south of Europe and the desire of British industry to expand, meant that Disraeli had to act fast. Also as the San Stefano treaty revived the expansionist plans of Russia, the Russians started moving towards Europe, and therefore the British interests started to be in danger.	1 5
[2] Layard was instructed to present Sultan Abdul Hamid B' with the draft agreement for the transfer of Cyprus to British rule. The Sultan was happy to hear that only Cyprus was demanded, and accepted the agreement. Layard wrote that the Sultan had lots of guards around him because he heard that Layard wanted to kill him. By December 1877 the Sultan's defeat was complete. But his allies did not abandon him completely. Because of the San Stefano Treaty, Britain and Austria-Hungary needed Turkey. The outcome was the Congress of Berlin. In the Congress of Berlin, control of Cyprus was ceded to Britain. Austria took over Bosnia and Herzegovina and France took over Tunis in north Africa. Therefore, the treaty secured for Britain the "Diamond of the Mediterranean" – the key to the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa.	10 15
[3] On the other hand, not everyone in England was happy with the takeover of Cyprus. In a speech in Manchester, Lord Salisbury responded to the government: "The takeover of Cyprus just followed the set policy of the British Government which was established a long time ago".	20
[4] There was a strange coincidence in relation to the last two occupations of Cyprus: the island was conquered by Jews during both times, and both occupations were combinations of careful planning and no chance. The first time was by Nasi for the Ottomans, when Cyprus was under the Venetians. Nasi was serving the plans of Turkey. However, by taking over Cyprus, he also desired to take revenge on Venice that ill-treated his Jewish family. Nasi failed and died in 1579. The second time was in 1878, by Britain's first Jewish Prime Minister. The island was often referred to as the "Cyprus bribe," and was surely combined with personal ambition too. Such was the beauty and position of Cyprus that this tiny land was desired by many.	25 30
[5] On 4 July Lord John Hay, arrived at Larnaca. Hay gave a small speech and raised and saluted the British flag. After this ceremony, Hay formally announced to the people that her majesty Queen Victoria now ruled over Cyprus and the crowds applauded with enthusiasm. Next, George Kepiades expressed the joy of the Cypriots and their hopes for prosperity and full political liberty.	35
On 22 July 1878, Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived in Larnaca, and on the following day he read a public announcement – with it he assured Cypriot people that the Queen wished for wealth, the development of trade and agriculture, liberty, justice and security. Kyprianos the Bishop of Kition, is said to have welcomed Wolseley's honest promises.	40
[6]Actually, the transfer of Cyprus from a Muslim empire to a Christian one was seen as the golden bridge for the unification of Cyprus with Greece. The most important Greeks of the island, mainly professional and ecclesiastic, welcomed the British occupation because it brought a change in Cyprus' situation: with that change they aimed at self-government, autonomy, self-determination and finally union with Greece.//	45

The British Take-over of Cyprus–Historical Account 2	
[1] The Cyprus Convention was secretly agreed between Turkey and Britain on 4 June 1878. It might seem, like most of the events in the island’s history, as a secondary affair in the congress of Berlin. But it was not so for those statesmen who had interests in the Near East, the Middle East and India.	1
[2] It is true that some writers had doubts that Cyprus had naval advantages. On the other hand, Colonel Home pointed out that from Cyprus the British could check Mesopotamia or the Suez Canal. And Sir G.Elliot emphasized that all Famagusta wanted was what British ports would need if they had been neglected for that long.	5
However, the suggested cost was not enough. And there was another difficulty: the official report on the unhealthiness of Famagusta was terrifying. Additionally, there were many other places in the eastern Mediterranean which have been proposed as a possible harbour. After much uncertainty, the British agreed to take over Cyprus.	10
[3] On 24-25 May, Layard received instructions to propose the agreement to Sultan Abdul Hamid. The Sultan was in a state of nervous collapse because of a failed plan to kill him, and thought that Layard was going to assassinate him or carry him off to England. However, it was him who begged to go to England so as to be in safety from his enemies. Layard, because the Sultan was not in a dependable state of mind, drafted the Convention himself. The Cypriotes were not asked. In those days it was almost not necessary as long as their ruler, the Sultan, had agreed. But, it was necessary to take in mind the feelings of the powers – France, Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary, which eventually agreed.	15
[4] The occupation of Cyprus took place without any serious incident. The big exception was at Limassol, where the municipal council would not co-operate, and the people were less respectful to the newcomer British.	20
Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived at Larnaca on July 1878. On the next day he read a public statement in which he assured people that the Queen wishes for progress of the island. There were complains that the announcement did not say anything about England giving a constitution to the Cypriots. This silence left emptiness in the heart of the Cypriotes, if not hostility to their new rulers.	25
Either way, the announcement was greeted by the people with cheers, and the general feeling of both Greeks and Turks appeared to be one of welcome for the new change of rule and hope for the future. The Bishop of Kition, Kyprianos, read an address of welcome.	30
[5] Wolseley also went to Limassol, where a Greek deputation expressed the hope that England would follow the same policy as with the Ionian Islands which were given to Greece. In Nicosia, Wolseley received an address of welcome from Archbishop Sophronios. The feelings which it expressed were altogether correct; there was no suggestion of any desire for union with Greece. The address by Sophronios expressed the hope that all would have equal rights and equal duties before the law, and that the people would learn to walk in the right way of truth, duty and freedom.	53
[6] The Sultan officials Sami and Bessim remained in Nicosia until 23 August for clearing up the reports of the Ottoman administration: the Turks were working so to present a large balance in the treasury because the annual payment that English would pay to the Porte would to be based on the average excess of the last five years.	40
The removal of guns and other munitions of war were also pending. The old bronze cannon of the Venetians had to be blown up, being too heavy to be transported in one piece.//	45
	50

III. Please answer the following questions:

B.1.1. In what ways do the two historical accounts differ?

B.1.2. On a scale of 1-10, with 1 representing the minimum and 10 the maximum, how far do the two accounts differ?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
----------	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------	-----------

B.2.1. Why do these historical accounts differ?

B.4.1. Which of the two accounts could we say that it is better? Please justify your answer.

B.5.1. Who wrote each of these accounts in your opinion and why?

Please justify your answer.

B.7.1. Why is it important – if it's important at all – to have knowledge of these two accounts on WWI? Please justify your answer.

APPENDIX 3. Paired Accounts on ‘The Cyprus Events of 1974’

Written Activity B: The Cyprus Events of 1974

This activity is part of a doctoral research, which looks into how students understand differing historical accounts of the same event.

This is the second and final activity you need to answer to.

Knowledge of the specific event is not necessary – quite the contrary.

Also, there are no right and wrong answers. Your participation is valuable for this exact reason: because this research looks into *your* understandings and how *you* understand history!

Please:

- (a) Fill in the box below with your personal details.**
- (b) Please read the introduction on *The Cyprus Events of 1974* carefully.**
- (c) Read the two accounts on *The Cyprus Events of 1974*, and**
- (d) Answer the questions that follow in the boxes provided. Please give all of the questions equal attention.**

Name:

Gender:

School:

Class:

Major modules:

Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research!

I. Please read the following introduction on the war of 1974.

Following the EOKA struggle in the 1950s, Cyprus was declared Independent and therefore free from the British rule. According to the London and Zürich Agreements and specifically the Treaty of Guarantee, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom were to act as guarantor powers. According to the Treaty, Each of the three guarantor powers reserved the right to take action to re-establish the current state of affairs in Cyprus.

Cyprus' independence was followed by inter-communal violence between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the 60s, which led to the physical separation of the two communities. On 15 July 1974, a coup against Archbishop Makarios and the appointed government of the Republic of Cyprus was staged by Greek-Cypriots in collaboration with the Greek military Junta in an attempt at *Enosis*, the incorporation of Cyprus into Greece. Five days later, on 20 July 1974, in response to the coup, the Turkish army marched to the island based on Turkey's right to intervene according to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. This led to the capture of the present-day territory of northern Cyprus in the following month.

The main personalities and actors that relate to the Cyprus Events of 1974 as mentioned in the following historical accounts are:

- Makarios: Archbishop Makarios III served as the Archbishop of the Church of Cyprus (1950–1977) and as the first President of Cyprus (1960–1977).
- Junta: The Greek military junta of 1967–1974, was a series of military juntas that ruled Greece following the 1967 overthrow of Greece's elected government by a group of colonels. The Junta dictatorship ended on 24 July 1974 after the events in Cyprus.
- UN Security Council: The United Nations Security Council is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security.
- Nikos Sampson: Nikos Sampson was appointed as President of Cyprus by the Greek military leaders of the coup d'état against Makarios, on July 15 1974.
- Ioannides: Dimitris Ioannidis was a Greek military officer and one of the leading figures in the Greek military junta of 1967–1974. He was also one of the leading figures in the attempt to overthrow the government of Archbishop Makarios III.
- Etzevit: Bulent Ecevit was a Turkish politician. He served as the Prime Minister of Turkey four times between 1974 and 2002.
- Kissinger: Henry Kissinger was an American politician. He became National Security Advisor in 1969 and U.S. Secretary of State in 1973.

II. Please read the two historical accounts carefully and answer the following questions.

The Cyprus Events of 1974 – Historical Account 1	
<p>[1] On the 2nd of July 1974, Makarios sent a second letter to Junta, which was openly published. With it, he demanded the departure of all Greek officers from Cyprus by the 29th of July. In this way, that is with the publication of the letter, Makarios himself caused the coup.</p>	1
<p>[2] Many have argued that the Junta would have carried out the coup, at some subsequent date, in any event. But, on the other hand, it can be argued that, like Turkey's many intervention attempts between 1964 and 1967, the junta might never have gone so far as actually carrying out the coup, if it wasn't for Makarios. In fact, Makarios' letter was the last act before the coup and which made the coup unavoidable.</p>	5
<p>[3] Indeed, the coup took place on 15 July. Makarios escaped from the Greek officers who wished to kill him and went to London and from there to New York. There, at the UN Security Council, he accused the coup as 'invasion' and confirmed that the coup was 'invasion against the independence of Cyprus'. Next, he emphasized that the Turks of Cyprus were in great danger and called Turkey to intervene and stop Junta, which was a 'continuous source of anomaly in Cyprus'.</p>	10
<p>[4] Turkey showed remarkable restraint and patience in spite of immense internal pressures and humanitarian urge to act during the preceding eleven years. However, following the coup of 15 July 1974, and the placement of Nikos Sampson to the Presidency she had no alternative but to intervene, so as to save the Turkish-Cypriot community which was in the grave and in immediate danger to be eliminated by the Greek and Greek-Cypriot troops.</p>	15
<p>[5] The Turkish intervention which took place on 20 July 1974 was carried out in accordance with the rights and obligations of Turkey under the Treaty of Guarantee.//</p>	20
	25
	30

The Cyprus Events of 1974 – Historical Account 2	
[1] On the 2 nd of July 1974, Makarios, with a letter to Junta demanded the departure of all Greek officers from Cyprus by the 20 th of July of 1974. It has to be noted that, despite the demanding tone of the letter and its publication, which signalled an open confrontation with the Junta, the sources agree that Makarios himself did not constitute the cause of the coup.	1 5
[2] There is a plethora of cross-checked information from Greek, Cypriot and American sources that Ioannides and the Junta leadership started seriously considering Makarios' overthrow in early spring. The provocateur role of EOKA B' in Cyprus, is verified by archival evidence which provides evidence that that the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs controlled the illegal organization EOKA B' fully.	10
[3] The coup took place on the 15of July and Makarios barely escaped death. He escaped from the Presidential Palace and absconded to Paphos. From there, he went to New York. In the UN Security Council, Makarios denounced the coup, which 'violated the independence and sovereignty of the [Cyprus] Republic,' and accused the military Junta. Next, he called on the Council to 'to use all ways and means at its disposal so that constitutional order in Cyprus and the democratic rights of the people of Cyprus can be reinstated without delay'.	15
[4] Turkey and Ecevit acted logically and smartly. Despite the fact that from 1968 until the 20 th of July no conflict in Cyprus was noted between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, 5 hours after Makarios' plea to the UN Council, the Turkish invasion had started. The whole strategy of the Turkish government was to exhaust the procedures that would allow Turkey to present the military operation as a legal action on the basis of the international agreements.	20 25
[5] The Turkish invasion should not have been be prevented, due to Kissinger's long-term policy: in Cyprus, the position of Turkey and the power balance should be settled with the military presence of Turkey.//	

III. Please answer the following questions:

B.1.1. In what ways do the two historical accounts differ?

B.1.2. On a scale of 1-10, with 1 representing the minimum and 10 the maximum, how far do the two accounts differ?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
----------	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------	-----------

B.2.1. How is it possible that, while two historical accounts refer to the same issue, the same event, they are different?

B.3.1. Can both historical accounts be 'true' at the same time?

--

B.3.1.1. If they can, in what ways?

--

B.3.1.2. If they cannot, why not?

--

B.4.1. Which historical account amongst the two is the best? Can you please justify?

--

B.5.1. Which of the two historical accounts was more useful for you? Can you please justify?

--

B.7.1. On a scale of 1-10, with 1 representing the minimum and 10 the maximum, to what degree is it important that we have knowledge of these two accounts on 1974?

Acc.1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
-------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

Acc. 2	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
--------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

APPENDIX 4. Participating Students

N= Total of 79 students from 9 schools	Number of participating students			
	Task 1	Task 2	Interviews	Total
School 1 (N = Total of 4 students reported on in this study)			4	4
Why do these two accounts differ while they refer to the same event?			4	
Can both historical accounts be true at the same time? If they can, in what ways? If they cannot, why not?			4	
Which account amongst the two is best in your opinion? Can you please justify?			-	
Which of the two accounts was more useful for you? Can you please justify?			2	
School 2 (N = Total of 3 students reported on in this study)			3	3
Why do these two accounts differ while they refer to the same event?			3	
Can both historical accounts be true at the same time? If they can, in what ways? If they cannot, why not?			3	
Which account amongst the two is best in your opinion? Can you please justify?			3	
Which of the two accounts was more useful for you? Can you please justify?			3	
School 3 (N = Total of 23 students reported on in this study)	21	23	4	23
Why do these two accounts differ while they refer to the same event?	21	21	4	
Can both historical accounts be true at the same time? If they can, in what ways? If they cannot, why not?	0	0	4	
Which account amongst the two is best in your opinion? Can you please justify?	21	22	4	
Which of the two accounts was more useful for you? Can you please justify?	21	23	3	

N= Total of 78 students from 9 schools	Number of participating students			
	Task 1	Task 2	Interviews	Total
School 4 (N = Total of 5 students reported on in this study)			5	5
Why do these two accounts differ while they refer to the same event?			5	5
Can both historical accounts be true at the same time? If they can, in what ways? If they cannot, why not?			5	
Which account amongst the two is best in your opinion? Can you please justify?			5	
Which of the two accounts was more useful for you? Can you please justify?			5	
School 5 (N = Total of 17 students reported on in this study)	17	16	4	17
Why do these two accounts differ while they refer to the same event?	15	15	4	
Can both historical accounts be true at the same time? If they can, in what ways? If they cannot, why not?	15	16	4	
Which account amongst the two is best in your opinion? Can you please justify?	14	14	4	
Which of the two accounts was more useful for you? Can you please justify?	15	14	4	
School 6 (N = Total of 21 students reported on in this study)	21	19	4	21
Why do these two accounts differ while they refer to the same event?	21	19	4	
Can both historical accounts be true at the same time? If they can, in what ways? If they cannot, why not?	21	19	4	
Which account amongst the two is best in your opinion? Can you please justify?	21	18	4	
Which of the two accounts was more useful for you? Can you please justify?	21	19	4	

N= Total of 78 students from 9 schools	Number of participating students			
	Task 1	Task 2	Interviews	Total
School 7 (N = Total of 18 students reported on in this study)	18	13	4	18
Why do these two accounts differ while they refer to the same event?	14	11	4	
Can both historical accounts be true at the same time? If they can, in what ways? If they cannot, why not?	14	10	3	
Which account amongst the two is best in your opinion? Can you please justify?	13	8	4	
Which of the two accounts was more useful for you? Can you please justify?	13	10	1	
School 8 (N = Total of 4 students reported on in this study)				
Why do these two accounts differ while they refer to the same event?			4	4
Can both historical accounts be true at the same time? If they can, in what ways? If they cannot, why not?			4	
Which account amongst the two is best in your opinion? Can you please justify?			3	
Which of the two accounts was more useful for you? Can you please justify?			4	
School 9 (N = Total of 3 students reported on in this study)				
Why do these two accounts differ while they refer to the same event?			3	
Can both historical accounts be true at the same time? If they can, in what ways? If they cannot, why not?			3	
Which account amongst the two is best in your opinion? Can you please justify?			3	
Which of the two accounts was more useful for you? Can you please justify?			3	

APPENDIX 5. Interview Transcript Example

Interview III (Pilot Study 3)		
		School 3
		Transcribed on 12.12.16-17.12.16
Minute		Line
	MG: Lyceum 3, 3 March 2015. I am here with:	1
	Meri: Meri.	
	Efi: Efi.	
	Andrew: Andrew.	
	Solonas: Solonas.	5
	MG: Very well, you must speak loud so that I can hear you well. Erm, I will start with the following question. I gave you two pairs of differing historical accounts, along with a series of questions, referring to these. My first question to you is this: how is it possible that, while two historical accounts refer to the same issue, the same event, they are different.	10
	Solonas: It may be that some... One account be written by individuals with interests from one side, while the other be written by individuals from the other side - the opposite one - with other interests in mind.	
	MG: Andrew?	15
	Andrew: Well, it may be the case that in one they are just referring to facts, those that are certain, while on the other side they also talk about what is on their minds as well.	
	MG: Yes.	
	Efi: Erm.	20
	M.G.: Efi?	
	Efi: It may be that in one...	
	MG.: Louder, and do not fidget, because [the tape recorder] picks that up.	
	Efi: It may be that in one some people are voicing their opinions, while others are saying what they know happened?	25
	MG: Yeah? How do they know they happened?	
	Efi: Erm.	
	MG.: Meri?	
	Meri: Well, it may be that some individuals have lived through these events, so they may see them from a subjective point of view, because when you have lived through something and experienced it and later described it you are not fully objective, and others may have written years later, so used the sources and be more objective and more distanced.	30
		35
2.27.2	MG: Good, let me ask a similar question. Efi. Erm, in general, we have differing historical accounts - that it, different histories by various historians or other scholars, scientists, academics, for different events. Why do we have such a great variety of historical accounts? Is this something you have ever thought about? More generally - why is there such a variety of historical accounts. Solonas?	40
	Solonas: I don't know...	
	MG: Andrew?	
	Andrew: Well, there are many sides, let's say; they can't call it, let's say, for example, they may, it may be that it is described from one side, and from the other. Let's say...	45
	MG: Yes... Yes... Meri?	

5.07.0	<p>Meri: I'm going to agree with what Solonas said previously. Interests also play a part. It is possible that at some point when someone attempts to write with the intention to serve political or economic interests and for this reason he goes to distort, to write differently a historical fact – that is one reason. 50</p> <p>Another reason is this, another reason may be that, this: they may have read some other sources - but you might then say: how were these sources written. 55</p> <p>Or they may have heard stories which describe an event from one, from the side, and they don't know everything that happened behind the scenes, so they see it from a different point of view.</p> <p>MG: Good. You said 'a different point of view,' or they don't know someone from behind the scenes. 60</p> <p>Solonas: Also they might have been written in different time, they might have been written after certain facts came to the surface.</p> <p>MG: Yes...?</p> <p>Solonas: And [we] have [access to] new facts and new sources [accounts?]. 65</p> <p>Meri: It is like now that they are saying something referring to the British, that there is an archive that every year releases new information, but that it goes far back in time. Therefore, by the time we get to the year that includes certain specific events, then we may be able to find information that we are now do not know. 70</p> <p>MG: [sound of approval] Would someone like to add something? Please, if you'd like...</p> <p>Here's another question.</p> <p>I'll return to the accounts that you had [seen] the first one on the First World War, and the other one on how Cyprus transitioned from the Ottomans to the British - two differing accounts on each of these. 75</p> <p>How can - or rather, can they both be true at the same time?</p> <p>That is, you had - let me quickly remind you, in relation to the First World War, most of you responded that the first historical account says that all countries were responsible for the First World War, to a greater or lesser extent. 80</p> <p>Also, it seems that there were other reasons, like social, economic, while in the second, almost all of you said to me that, everyone, almost everyone said to me that the author ascribes blame exclusively on Germany - Therefore we have widely differing historical accounts. 85</p> <p>Can both be true at the same time? Who will start? Solonas?</p> <p>Solonas: Erm, they can both be true, but definitely one will be obscuring something that will... will obscuring something that is not true, it will, it will, ...it is true but not to a great degree – again for vested interests and such reasons. 90</p> <p>The other may be true and recount events as they happened.</p> <p>MG: Good. Let me hold on to that thought. Andrew?</p> <p>Andrew: Well, in some points both may be true but in other points they may also be false. 95</p> <p>MG. Yes... Efi?</p> <p>Can one account that says 'white' and the other 'black' be true at the same time?</p> <p>Efi: It may be that some events from one are true, and on the other, where they are different, they are also true. 100</p>	
--------	--	--

8.37.8	<p>MG: So you are saying that, if each describes different events, they may both be true at the same time.</p> <p>Efi: Or one part from one [account] is true and another -</p> <p>MG: One part, ok, good... Yes.</p> <p>Efi: Be true...</p> <p>MG: Yes Meri? You want to add something.</p> <p>Meri: Basically in the example...that in one [account] all countries are to blame and in the other [second account] Germany. So in one [first account] Germany is also included. The second [author] what he does is to focus on a piece of the first [account] and presenting just this [and thus] creating wrong impressions to me that I am reading it. It doesn't mean that it is, that it is not true, simply he focuses somewhere specifically and creating me wrong impressions. While the first [author], describes what the second [author] described, so both are true, simply one hides some additional [aspects].</p> <p>MG: So you are also saying what Solonas said?: it is obscuring. Also, if I understand correctly, the emphasis in one is elsewhere. Let me ask another thing - I want to use the other two historical accounts as an example.</p> <p>One [account] said that the Archbishop, when he welcomed the British, asked for Enosis. Some of you highlighted this as a difference. The other [account] says that there is no evidence to support the argument that the Archbishop spoke of Enosis - the desire for Enosis, but at the same time what he said was right, he said that now that England has arrived, which is a European power, that there will be democracy, equality etc.</p> <p>Therefore, here we clearly have one saying that things happened one way, and the other another way.</p> <p>At this point, can both accounts be true at the same time? What do you think?</p> <p>Solonas: Erm, yes, because it may be that the agreement that happened with the Archbishop was, it was not disseminated to the people, that is, it was secret between the Archbishop and the Englishman [the High-Commissioner] and have taken place in a closed circle.</p> <p>MG: Explain this a little for me. What do you mean?</p> <p>Solonas: The agreement that you referred to....</p> <p>MG: I said that when the British arrived, the Archbishop welcomed them with an address. One historian says that this address said that 'we demand Enosis, we demand that, the same way that Greece gave, that Britain gave back to Greece the Ionian Islands, it should also give Cyprus.' The other historian says that we have no evidence that the Archbishop spoke of Enosis.</p> <p>Solonas: Because the Archbishop may have spoken only, without an audience let's say, to the British about Enosis with Greece. It may have been in a closed circle let's say.</p> <p>MG: So can both accounts be true at the same time?</p> <p>Can both historians be telling the truth? This is the question. Andrew?</p> <p>Andrew: Well - no. Since one is saying one thing, the other one, another. It may be that one let's say described it, let's say, heard it somewhere, read about it from the facts, let's say, of Cyprus, and the other may have been some English man who read about it from the English side of things.</p>	<p>105</p> <p>110</p> <p>115</p> <p>120</p> <p>125</p> <p>130</p> <p>135</p> <p>140</p> <p>145</p> <p>150</p>
--------	---	---

11.11.4	<p>MG: Yes... Good... Efi? Efi: Eeerm. No. MG: No. Efi: Eeerm...</p>	155
	<p>MG: Someone is lying? Efi: ...</p>	160
	<p>MG: Good, let me move on. We talked about differing historical accounts which refer to the same historical event. You said to me - you all agreed, that in their parts they may both be true. I think that, if I understand correctly, you said to me that both may be true, both of them, and furthermore, besides the fact that both historical accounts may be telling the truth at the same time, we must look at their parts. I think we have reached an agreement on this.</p>	165
	<p>Now. Let's suppose that a historian has to choose one [account] of the two for his work.</p>	
	<p>Let's suppose that a second - a third historian writes about the Third World War. And wants to choose one of them.</p>	170
	<p>Which one would he choose, with which criteria would he choose the first one? Who should we start with? Efi?</p>	
	<p>Efi: Eerm...</p>	
	<p>MG: What makes an historical account be considered 'good'?</p>	175
	<p>Efi: It has more historical events, with, erm....</p>	
	<p>MG: Yes... Something else?</p>	
	<p>Efi: It may be referring specifically to something that took place...</p>	
	<p>MG: Yes...</p>	
	<p>Efi: [sound of having nothing further to say]</p>	180
	<p>MG: Solonas?</p>	
	<p>Solonas: Well, they must see who the source was written by, which side, whose side the person who wrote it was on, in order to see if they are telling the truth or if they were, they were taking someone's side - if they were serving some interests.</p>	185
	<p>MG: What other criteria may we set in order to say which is a good historical account? - In order to choose the best one? Andrew?</p>	
	<p>Andrew: According how much of the facts it contains. The facts are certain.</p>	
<p>M.G: You mean what?</p>	190	
<p>Andrew: I mean let's say the facts that are certain, the ones that we know that happened.</p>		
<p>MG: How do we know it for certain? How does a historian know it? You say 'we know for certain.' How do we know 'for certain?' Before we go to 'for certain' is there any other criterion that one may have, a</p>	195	
<p>historian, in order to select the best historical account, or to say what makes it good?</p>		
<p>[Think about] the stories you hear around you. For various things, for Cyprus, for the wars, for more contemporary events. For example,</p>		
<p>now we have [the conflict between] Russia and Ukraine... Yes Meri.</p>	200	
<p>Meri: From existing proof, if I may call it that.</p>		
<p>That is, if it is recorded somewhere as a historical fact, the massacre, the genocide of a people, if we find huge burial sites with people buried in them, or something, something in these findings that proves that something like this may have happened, that opinion is more backed up by evidence; whereas if it just circulates as legend, as the words of someone, or some people, it is not so backed up by evidence.</p>	205	

	<p>MG: So you are saying that one way - I want to return to 'for certain:' that a fact is certain? Solonas: We could see the dates. MG: To see the dates... Solonas: If there were people that lived at the time, and saw the events with their own eyes and haven't heard it from some others.</p>	<p>210 215</p>
15.29.5	<p>MG: Solonas? If someone witnessed the event, and has not heard it from someone else, are they more reliable than someone who has heard about it? Solonas: Definitely. MG: Why definitely? Solonas: Eeerm, if we don't know the interests again, they are more reliable. They were more at the moment, more reliable. MG: More reliable... Meri: This has two sides. MG: Someone else? Yes Meri? Meri: Well, because on the one hand, yes sure, when it is word of mouth they [historians?] may change, or add things from their imagination and add etc, on the other hand when you live through something - what we said in the very beginning - you are not so objective, you are subjective because perhaps the even you have experienced may have influenced you - but that is one side. When you were there and you saw it with your own eyes, it may be more true.</p>	<p>220 225 230</p>
	<p>MG: Does it exist? Efi what do you think? We have one person who has seen it with their own eyes and one person who has heard it from someone else. Or you may say to me, both are saying the truth, it is not necessarily black or white. Efi: Well, the person who experienced it... MG: [sound of approval] Efi: ...is going to say exactly what they experienced, whereas the other person may have heard something from the other person, thought about something else, added to it, and that will make it more false. MG: It may be false, yes? Andrew, do you have something to add? Andrew: No. MG: So. I will draw on this in order to take us a step further. We talked about events which are certain, we talked about evidence - for example to have something tangible such as burial sites. Erm, you also told me that historians will many times write from interests, in order to serve someone or some side.</p>	<p>235 240 245 250</p>
17.45.6	<p>So, what steps does one historian follow so that they may reach to a historical account? For example, the historical accounts that you have seen. About the First World War, about Cyprus. How did they end up on paper? What did the historian do, from the beginning so that they may reach that? Efi? What do you think? What steps are included in a historian's job in order for them to get to the point where they may give us something that says, 'this is what happened, this is history?' Efi: They must have asked some people who knew, some people who have heard. Erm... MG: What else? E: I don't know...</p>	<p>255 260</p>

20.36.4	<p>MG: Solonas? Yes? Solonas: They must interview some people, they must have written texts which they have gotten from others, again, which testify to what he is writing. This. Sources, sources, this.</p>	265
	<p>MG: Sources? For example? S. Eeerm. Basically some things that they have gotten from others, which have been written by some others.</p>	
	<p>MG. So, some other historians...</p>	270
	<p>Solonas: Or their personal...</p>	
	<p>MG: Or their personal experiences. Good. Andrew?</p>	
	<p>Andrew: As I said in the beginning, they must undertake research, meet [those who] may have experienced those events, or those who knew, who experienced, when the research is more contemporary, it may be for example, that the sources are video recordings, sound recordings, this.</p>	275
	<p>MG: Well, what if there are no contemporary [sources]? Let's say if they want to write about Choirokoitia, where all those who lived in Choirokoikia have died?</p>	280
	<p>Andrew: Well, he will refer to, to archaeologists.</p>	
	<p>MG: To archaeologists, yes...</p>	
	<p>Andrew: Let's say, they will speak to the archaeologists that they will meet, so that... this.</p>	
	<p>MG: Good... Meri?</p>	285
	<p>Meri: Again they will start from the findings, scientific findings that have been found may provide evidence to support their opinion, then they will go to - if they exist - to the testimonies of people who lived during this time, he will search in sources, if it is as, as Andrew said, from modern times, they will go to video recordings etc, in older times they may also look at newspapers, even in older, older times - I don't know, cave men drew what they experienced on the walls - even that is a finding on which someone may draw on in order to continue, and to develop, and to undertake in-depth research.</p>	290
	<p>MG: Good, very good, let me ask something related to this. Andrew used the word 'research' - they are undertaking 'research.' In order to start doing research, what do they do before that, what do they think about?</p>	295
	<p>Why, or how, does a historian embark on research?</p>	
	<p>Do they wake up in the morning and say, 'oh good, I am going to go tousle up the books in the library?'</p>	300
	<p>Solonas: There must have been an event which is influencing a lot of people, countries, the economy, I don't know - something like that.</p>	
<p>MG: Hmm, good... So you are saying that the motive is an important event, good.</p>	305	
<p>Solonas: This kind of thing, and it is the reason...</p>		
<p>MG: And it will become the reason for further research - very good. Another opinion? Meri?</p>		
<p>Meri: That'sit... I'm going to agree with, [the historian must] begin questioning... they may even notice something in the contemporary period, something now, for example a certain characteristic of the Greeks in this time and they may start questioning - why this?</p>	310	
<p>And it may be that the causes of these characteristics originate in ancient Greece and they may end up over there.</p>		
<p>But it will be something that draws their attention, will lead them to question and they will want to explore it.</p>	315	

	<p>MG: Yes?</p> <p>Solonas: It may also be a very old event, for which there is no evidence-based opinion on what happened, who were to blame, the causes, all of this, and they will try to undertake a, to compile these two things and to make a general...</p> <p>MG: Very good - so you are saying there must be a certain gap...</p> <p>Solonas: – yes, and they will try to investigate it.</p> <p>MG: Very good. Erm. Now.</p> <p>We have historical accounts that are the outcome of research, as you said, by various historians.</p>	320
22.56.1	<p>My next question to you is the following. To what extent in your opinion, can we expect historical accounts to give us a final answer regarding a historical event?</p> <p>I will start with Efi who hasn't spoken in some time.</p> <p>Let me reiterate the question. We have differing historical accounts - Solonas: [...]</p> <p>MG: There is no right and wrong answer.</p> <p>Solonas: Repeat the question?</p>	325
	<p>MG: We have differing historical accounts on events - can we expect from them to give us the final answer to something? For example regarding WWI. Or the conquest of Cyprus by the British. What do you think?</p> <p>Efi: Erm...</p>	330
	<p>MG: You may say, for example, 'this account is convincing for me, it gives a final, a concluding answer.' What do you think?</p> <p>E: I don't know.</p> <p>MG: It is something you haven't thought about before... Yes... Andrew?</p>	335
	<p>Andrew: In order to come to a conclusion we must read a score of accounts, and you must come to a conclusion by yourself, which will be for you, which you will consider to be right.</p> <p>MG: So you believe that a historical account cannot by itself give a final answer [to a historical event]?</p> <p>Andrew: Well, one no. You must read a whole series.</p>	340
	<p>MG: You must read a whole series - so you're saying, good, yes. Any other opinions? Solonas?</p> <p>Solonas: [...]</p> <p>MG: Can a historical account offer us the final answer for an event? Yes? Or no? And why?</p> <p>Solonas. No.</p> <p>MG. Why not?</p>	345
	<p>Solonas. Because you have to read, as Andrew also said, you have to read a good number of them in order to reach your own conclusions, to reach to something yours, to combine accounts - historical accounts and reach the right one.</p> <p>MG: Without suggesting that I disagree.</p> <p>Why can I not say that I have this account, I consider it complete and it could be a final answer?</p>	350
25.17.8	<p>Solonas: Because...</p> <p>Andrew: Because there are other accounts which say a different thing.</p> <p>MG: Yes?</p> <p>Solonas: Specifically it may have been someone's fault, someone who was inside the events, someone who, again, had interests...</p>	355
		360
		365
		370

27.18.8	<p>So you have to choose, to read different ones from both sides and reach your own conclusion.</p> <p>MG: Meri would you like to add something?</p> <p>Meri: I'm thinking... Eerm. I believe that you might be able to find, but there will always be inside of you the germ of doubt.</p> <p>But perhaps... Even if you have read quite a lot, you will come across an account which will describe for you - the person who wrote it, that is, has done such extensive research, and has read so many other accounts, and has reached a conclusion of their own, and is presenting it in such an exquisite way, and with such evidence and arguments, they may present an event to that point where they can convince you that this is how it happened.</p> <p>MG: Erm. You are saying they may be able to convince you. That they may be able to convince you means that it may be the final answer?</p> <p>Meri: I don't believe there is ever a real final answer. That is...</p> <p>MG: But why?</p> <p>Meri: The final answer for me, yes.</p> <p>MG: If you are saying that there is in-depth research that is backed-up by evidence, an extensive research, you have said to me they have engaged quite a lot, they have an argument that convinces you, why can it not be the final answer?</p> <p>Meri: Because it may be research and drawing on evidence that exists - there may be some events that are so difficult - even perhaps impossible - to discover and to be able to, that may be so important, they have such an significant impact on changing the events, or the causes of events or the consequences, but not even that man, or anyone, might be able to find them for some reason.</p> <p>MG: Good, because we don't have much time... - your answers are very nice, but because you have a short [lesson] period I must move quickly.</p> <p>Something relevant... We previously said that, you previously said that, from what I understand, you said that the perfect - final answer cannot exist.</p> <p>And that we must examine different [accounts].</p> <p>I will return to what you said that parts of them may be truthful.</p> <p>My question is as follows. Let me begin again with Efi.</p> <p>If we combine the truthful parts from the two historical accounts, we take differing historical accounts - we say, 'the truthful parts of one are these and of the other one are these.'</p> <p>Putting them together may give us a third historical account which may be truthful and final?</p> <p>There is truth [in the first account] and there is truth [in the second account]. And we bring these together. And they give us a more complete historical account.</p> <p>Efi: Yes, but it won't be final.</p> <p>MG: It won't be final...</p> <p>Efi: There may be some [parts?] which</p> <p>MG: Something may be missing...?</p> <p>Efi: Yes.</p> <p>MG: Can it be truthful however?</p> <p>We have truth, and truth. We have the truthful [parts] in one and the truthful [parts] from the other.</p>	<p>375</p> <p>380</p> <p>385</p> <p>390</p> <p>395</p> <p>400</p> <p>405</p> <p>410</p> <p>415</p> <p>420</p> <p>425</p>
---------	--	--

	<p>If we put them together can we have a third final account? A third truthful historical account?</p> <p>Efi: We don't know if some of what we added is truthful.</p> <p>MG: If we cross-check them and know that this, on the one hand, and this [on the other] is true? And put them together?</p> <p>Efi: Erm... Yes.</p> <p>MG: Yes, you say, if they are cross-checked. Any other opinions? Andrew?</p> <p>Andrew: Yes, it will be truthful, but it will be truthful for ourselves. Because the, let's say someone else... will be able to, be able to take the parts we have taken from one source, differently. Take different parts from each source and pick them out, and to combine these and they will be truthful for themselves.</p> <p>MG: [sound of approval]</p> <p>Andrew: And, and... And, in the end, the final will be different, mine and the other person's.</p> <p>MG: Any other opinions? Let me move on, let's speak louder than these people, however. Erm. Next question. How is the historians' task different from the rest of the historical accounts? How is the historian's task from the other accounts that refer to the past?</p> <p>M: How do you mean?</p> <p>Solonas: I didn't understand.</p> <p>MG: You have a book -</p> <p>Meri: A film may...</p> <p>MG: You have a history book. How is it different from another account that refers to the past? For example, a film, a documentary, a biography. Andrew?</p> <p>Andrew: Each documentary... Each account that isn't in the history book has the, has a bit of an interest let's say, wherever you are. It has a bit of an interest - someone while in the history book there is an attempt at presenting everything in a neutral side.</p> <p>MG: [sound of approval] Yes...</p> <p>Solonas: If we take '74 as an example, in the [sic] no one ever says that there was a coup, or, basically that Turkey was brought by Greece and, I don't know, the Junta. They always say that Turkey can without a reason and occupied us, the Turkish invasion. They don't say things as they are. They try to...</p> <p>MG: So you're saying that from this perspective also, the book is also lying?</p> <p>Solonas: Well, sometimes yes.</p> <p>Andrew: Well sometimes books -</p> <p>MG: May I occupy you for another 3 minutes?</p> <p>A. It's just that sometimes the book does not say some of the things for which it is not sure about.</p> <p>MG: Andrew you said that the historian has not interests - this point is valid. Solonas says that there are interests - but only in relation to some events.</p> <p>Andrew: Eerm...</p> <p>MG: Is it possible that there are events for which the historian is completely neutral?</p> <p>Andrew: Well, the historian tries to select those which, which are certain, which he considers certain, that happened and includes them in their book so not to influence the students to take a certain side.</p>	<p>430</p> <p>435</p> <p>440</p> <p>445</p> <p>450</p> <p>455</p> <p>460</p>
--	---	--

	<p>MG: Good. If there is no pressing issue that you'd like to tell me about, I have another question. Yes!</p> <p>Efi, why is it important, if it is at all important, to have in mind, for example the accounts on the two events which I have presented to you, WWI and the occupation of Cyprus by the British?</p> <p>Efi: So that we may know what happened in the past.</p> <p>MG: [sound of approval] Are there more specific reasons? Solonas?</p> <p>Solonas: Well, so that we may avoid repeating mistakes that happened in the past?</p> <p>MG: Yes?</p> <p>Solonas: Well, in this way we will try to develop ourselves [sic] he technology, the science, whereas when there are war [sic], different events, we will definitely remain where we were and go even further back.</p> <p>MG: Andrew?</p> <p>Andrew: What he said...</p> <p>Meri: I absolutely agree with Solonas, I want to add that when it is more contemporary events, perhaps it will be a relief for the individuals who... - for example the invasion. If we find out what really happened, and the real reasons, and what was to blame, etc, it will also offer complacency, at least the people who were affected by it will get some answers.</p> <p>That is, if I lost my father, my uncle etc., by finding out what really happened, perhaps something will change.</p> <p>But the main reason is this: from the past we gain lessons for the future.</p> <p>MG: Thank you very much. Your answers were very good. Thankyou. I wish you all good luck for your exams... //</p>	
--	--	--

APPENDIX 6. Consent Form

Guardian Consent Letter

[On behalf of the School]

[Date]

Dear Parent/Guardian,

Research: Students' understandings of historical accounts

With this letter, I would like to inform you that your child's classroom has been chosen to participate in a research which looks into how students understand history. Purpose of this letter is to provide you with information on the research and ask your permission for your child's participation. This research is part of a PhD empirical research, and aims to collect information on how students understand history, and therefore, to conclude to a series of suggestions on the teaching and learning of history, which aim to contribute to a better education for the youth of the 21st century.

The research has been approved by the Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Education and Culture.

Your child will be asked to answer a series of written questions. Some of the students will be chosen to participate in a group interview with other fellow students. This study will take place within school premises and school hours, and there will be [] more schools across Cyprus participating in this research. Your child's privacy and the confidentiality of his/her data will be protected by anonymising all data. Your child's and school's information will be protected and no child or school can be tracked down.

In addition to your permission, your child must agree to participate in the study. Your child's participation in this study is voluntary. Also, your child may withdraw from participation at any time. Withdrawal or refusing to participate will not affect their relationship with the school in anyway.

Our school participates in this research as we believe that its results will be valuable for our students. Thus, I would be grateful if you completed the section below and return it to [Teacher/Assistant-Head] as soon as possible.

Thanking you in advance,

Kind Regards,
[The Head-teacher]

Guardian Approval: Research: Students' understandings of historical accounts

I am making a decision to allow my child to participate in the specific research.

Student's name:..... School:

Guardian's signature:..... Date:

ENDNOTES

¹See, for example, Klerides (2008), Makriyianni (2006), Pachoulides (2007), Papadakis (1993),

Philippou (2004) and Spyrou (1999).

² See, for example, Greece (Nakou and Apostolidou, 2010), Turkey (Dilek and Dilek, 2010), the Balkans (Koulouri, 2001, 2002; Joke, 2012), Northern Ireland (Barton and McCully, 2005), Israel and Palestine (Podeh, 2002; Porat, 2006(a)), Lebanon (Ghusayni et al., 2012), and South Africa (Grunebaum-Ralph, 2001; Meldrum, 2005).

³ The term has been mainly taken on by Hayden White (1973, 2014). White borrowed the term from philosopher Michael Oakeshott, who used the term to describe the accessible material and literary-artistic artefacts that individuals and institutions draw on for guidance in quotidian affairs. White saw ‘professional history’ as falling prey to narrow specialization, and called upon historians to take seriously the practical past.

⁴ Not all students in the RoC are Greek-Cypriot. I use the term to make the distinction between the two communities in Cyprus, and signal that I am conducting research in the RoC (rather than in both sides of the divide).

⁵ This is because history can be used for the examination and an understanding of human values (Slater, 1989) while in Drummond’s (1929) words one of the purposes of history is that the student is ‘brought to realise the solidarity of mankind and to have a feeling of community, indifferent to class or nation or race.

⁶ Although different identity perceptions existed much earlier among the two communities of the island (Persianis, 1996; Kadioglu, 2010), the policies of the British administration enabled the emergence of a conducive environment for the politicization and manipulation of these diverse identity perceptions (Kadioglu, 2010; Hatzivassiliou, 2015). In this era, nationalisms gained strength, with the ethno-religious identity consciousnesses of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in the island turning into ethnonational ones, partly through education (Persianis, 1996).

⁷ Seixas (2000) offered suggestions for history educators using three specific approaches: a) the ‘collective memory approach’; b) the ‘disciplinary approach’; and c) the ‘postmodern approach’. The ‘collective memory approach’ is defined as ‘enhancing collective memory’. The ‘disciplinary approach’ encourages teachers to teach students to understand the past based on a variety of documents and learn how to use disciplinary criteria. Lastly, the ‘postmodern approach’ asks students to understand how the past is constructed by different groups rather than to arrive at the most appropriate historical narrative.

⁸ Cyprus emerged as an independent Republic in 1960 which ended the British Colonial Rule in the island. The 1960 Constitution recognized two main communities based on culture and religion: the Greek-Cypriots (82%) and Turkish-Cypriots (12%). The independence document was drafted by Britain, Greece and Turkey, who were to act as guarantor powers of the sovereignty of the new state, leaving Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities’ political aspirations – for union with Greece (the Greek-Cypriot aspiration) and partition of the island (the Turkish-Cypriot aspiration) – unfulfilled. Disagreements between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots resulted to intense interethnic violence which culminated in July 1974 with the Coup which was supported by Greek Junta and Turkey’s invasion (Zembylas, 2018).

⁹ For instance, one cannot neglect the issue of inadequate teacher development when it comes into discussing history education in Cyprus. As Karagiorgi and Symeou (2007) pointed out, the country’s history curriculum, both for primary and secondary school, encourages teachers to follow traditional teaching and norms. Many teachers therefore avoid involvement in new pedagogical processes or training. Moreover, for secondary school teachers, pre-service education by the appropriate university departments is limited to preparing future teacher graduates according to specialisation in classical studies, physics, mathematics or theology - teacher training and placement does not take place in these fields of graduate study. Additionally, secondary teachers are put on hold on a waiting list by the Ministry of Education.

¹⁰ By ‘glocal’ I mean reflecting or characterized by both local and global considerations.

¹¹ Such is the case of Bryant and Papadakis (2012) and Spyrou (1999) in Cyprus. On the other hand, to argue that historical accounts do not come from or are confined exclusively to the domain of historiography, raises the question of what makes an account about the past historical (rather than anthropological and so on).

¹² Of course, it could be argued that a number of films/series, have been meticulously researched with historians being commissioned as part of the writing team.

¹³ For instance, historians might be interested in hypothesis generation which involves the specification of causal mechanisms and the use of N variations, in contextual variables or comparative cases (Levy, 2008).

¹⁴ Lacan, for example, would have much to say on whether any subject can be fully captured through language (Fink, 1997). (And yet he managed to put forward such an elaborate thesis, which constitutes a paradox!).

¹⁵ For instance, see White (1966) and Jenkins (1991).

¹⁶ Lowenthal (1998), for example, adhering to history’s epistemological goals, has taken a positivist stance. In doing so he argued that history seeks to convince by truth. Lowenthal (1985) proposes that methods enable us to have a reasonably accurate interpretation or representation of the past through the

study of the remnants of the past such as documents (p. 214-219). Nonetheless, Lowenthal's stance does have strong opponents, such as Gottlieb and Wineburg (2012) who positioned themselves against a positivist history. They argue that people often employ 'epistemic switching' – that is, they behave differently in relation to history that matters to them as individuals and as participants in a community. In turn, Barton (2009) critiqued the notion of historical disciplinarity and its rigid boundaries as he raises the question of 'who owns history?'

¹⁷ Although Piaget did not study historical understanding, his focus on children's cognitive development created a tradition which prevailed until the 1970s (work of this kind was carried out by Hallam for instance). This tradition emphasised young children's inability to cope with complex and abstract concepts and, therefore, led to the conclusion that history was too difficult for most children to study.

¹⁸ 'New History' in education is a highly complex and differentiated tradition (Lee, 2014) of course.

¹⁹ Afandi (2012) also explored how teachers think about different historical accounts.

²⁰ Explicitly, until recently, most of the research has taken place within the broader knowledge of learning provided by the cognitive psychology paradigm which focuses on the human mind and its processes – or, simply put, on mental performance. For instance, 'the U.S. National Research Council's How People Learn project sought to distil very robust principles of learning from the vast body of cognitive research carried in the past 30 years' (Lee and Howson, 2009, p. 218-19). Moreover, the disciplinary paradigm can be argued to be connected to skills and the age of knowledge capitalism (Peters, 2003). For instance, 'the OECD report indicates that "*tacit knowledge* in the form of skills needed to handle codified knowledge is more important than ever in labour markets"' (p. 13, emphasis in original, cited in Peters, 2003, p.370).

²¹ Student understandings depend not only on age but also on other factors, such as gender and class. For instance, Martens (2015) reported that whereas students from schools with a lower and intermediate educational level mostly offered an understanding of history as a truthful account of the past students from schools with higher academic requirements demonstrated more reflective and tacit epistemologies.

²² In relation to this a worthy question is what are teachers' ideas about why accounts might legitimately vary, and how might this affect students' thinking?

²³ These methods have been used to model student thinking about a series of historical concepts: evidence, significance, different accounts and so on.

²⁴ This was a result of the dissatisfaction with the old regime that ruled for decades – namely, under Rauf – and the banking crisis (Zembylas and Harakasan, 2017).

²⁵ Students who major in humanities study history three times a week, whereas students engaged in other majors study history twice per week. The difference seems to be minor – however the two groups have very different 'relations' with the subject of history. Students who major in humanities will be tested in history to enter university. For these students therefore, the study of history requires hard work and dedication.

²⁶ Although Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) referred to ethnographic research, their description is useful in that it sheds light on the researcher's role boundaries.

²⁷ The Greek-Cypriot dialect displays the biggest dialect similarity (along with the lost Arcadian dialect), to the second-millennium Mycenaean dialect – that is, the dialect spoken at the time of the Trojan war and the consequent events, as described by Homer (Woodard, 1997, p.224). For this reason, the Cypriot dialect is distinct to the degree that it is unintelligible to speakers of Standard Modern Greek without adequate prior exposure (Arvaniti, 2006).

²⁸ See Chapter 1, Section 1.4.

²⁹ In contrast to this, see Melina's proposition as discussed on page 166. By referring to herself as a benchmark of evaluating the accounts, Melina signalled that she is in the same position as the author in terms of judging accounts' validity. It may be argued that this kind of answer might be pointing to the fact that students weren't exposed to the concept of being a historian by *profession* and, consequently, to the fact that historians work with a level of *expertise*, which is different from opinion and ordinary people's everyday judgements.

³⁰ Piaget settled on two fundamental response stimuli, as he was interested in how children organise new 'data' or, in other words, how they adapt new information to their existing knowledge. According to Piaget, assimilation is one of the two complementary processes of adaptation. The second process is accommodation – that is, the process of taking new information in one's environment and altering pre-existing schemas in order to fit in the new information.

³¹ Stella articulated that 'some people see Great Alexander very differently than we do'. She then went on to explain that this account might be a counter-narrative to what 'we know' as Greek-Cypriots; however, this account could be classified as an account which is better than other more accurate ones as it gives us a new perspective on the past.

³² While this answer can be seen to be descriptive of what is conveyed in the accounts, blame is also central to the functioning of school history as *community* history as I discuss in Chapter 7. It is interesting that two of the three students who referred to the didactic use of the past did so in relation to Great Alexander.

That Great Alexander prevailed in the conversation can be seen in the framework of assimilation: what we have learnt to believe to be true is very specific.

³³ As highlighted by Lemon (1995): 'whereas one constructs a narrative answer to a question regarding the origins or 'causes' of a situation, there are many different stories to be told depending upon the exact question asked. The more precise the question the easier to locate the implicit beginning of the required story. This is why general questions such as, 'what caused the 1917 Russian Revolution' or 'why have you come home like this?' are more difficult to answer through narrative. 'How far was the 1917 Russian Revolution a consequence of the failings of tsarism' or 'why have you come home in such a dishevelled state?' immediately narrow down the range of occurrences under consideration and point more clearly at the implicit beginning of the requisite story' (p.125).

³⁴ As Park (2008, p. 30) pointed out, citing Rosenzweig and Thelen (1998, p.90), taken together, a kind of sensitivity to the mediation between the past and present seems to be at work here, leading students 'to assess patterns of mediation between what they wanted to know about the past and why they wanted to know about it in the present'.

³⁵ Interestingly, students' positivistic ideas echoed the Enlightenment tradition and the belief in achieving a 'true' knowledge of the world (Bruner, 1991): the only authentic knowledge is scientific knowledge, which is the only *good* knowledge as science and facts oppose metaphysics and assumptions.

³⁶ Marina articulated this as follows: 'Let's say if a text has some true elements in it - we believe they are true, but we don't understand it well, I think that another historical account that it's written and we can understand it better, to take things from it, I think that is better than the true one. While you should read the text and understand what it writes, instead of understanding nothing'.

³⁷ Oldfield (1981) for instance, engaged with the debate as to whether there is a case for moral judgments in history by drawing on three historians. Knowles (Oldfield, 1981) referring to the Middle Ages, takes a different position and points out that 'The historian is not a judge, still less a hanging judge'. In turn, Carr (ibid.) asserted that 'history does not turn aside to pronounce moral judgements on the private lives of individuals who appear in his pages, [the historian] has other things to do'. Similarly, Collingwood (ibid.) warned that 'to pass moral judgements on the past, is to fall into the fallacy of imagining that somewhere, behind the veil, the past is still happening [...] as if [it is] now being enacted in the next room and we ought to break open the door and stop it. These things have been; they are over; there is nothing to be done about them'. Discussing the objections to the use of moral judgments in historical writing put forward by three historians, Oldfield, finds these objections to varying degrees unconvincing, and concludes that they do have an inescapable role, but one that is not usually accepted by historians. Concluding, Oldfield (ibid.), considering the nature of moral judgments, the criteria on which they are based, and their function, argued that moral judgement *does* have a place in history. These theorisations might go back in time, yet they are not outdated. This is because they demonstrate that there is no agreement on blame, and whether one should practice it remains a moot point, both in historiography, and history education.

³⁸ 'Personally [I prefer] the second, no one is to blame' (Nikolina, Task 2, Question 4.3); 'I consider as best the second account because in the first it pressures the reader to believe that the "X" country is responsible for WWI. The second account gives us facts and allows the reader to decide himself to what degree each country is responsible for this war' (Andrew, Task 1, Question 4.1, quotations in the original).

³⁹ Such is the case of South Africa for example. Following the end of apartheid, the *Truth and Reconciliation Commission* (TRC) was assembled as a court-like restorative justice body with the purpose of establishing reconciliation. Witnesses who were identified as victims of gross human rights violations were invited to give statements about their experiences, and some were selected for public hearings. Perpetrators of violence could also give testimony and request amnesty from both civil and criminal prosecution.

⁴⁰ Of course, the phrase was not invented by Papadakis (2007). As Wikipedia quotes 'The Good, the Bad and the Ugly' (Italian: 'Il buono, il brutto, il cattivo, The good, the ugly, the bad') is a 1966 Italian film directed by Sergio Leone and starring Clint Eastwood, Lee Van Cleef, and Eli Wallach in their respective title roles. The plot revolves around three gunslingers competing to find fortune in a buried cache of Confederate gold amid the violent chaos of the American Civil War (specifically the New Mexico Campaign 1862), while participating in many battles and duels along the way.

⁴¹ Moreover, these unchanging identities become moral templates. Explicitly, the value generating function in the case of self may be linked in particular to what might be called 'moral identity' – that is, one's definition as a worthy and acceptable individual according to the standards inherent in one's relationships. In 'western' culture, for example, to intelligibly narrate oneself as a stable and coherent individual (stability narrative), who is attempting to achieve a standard of excellence (progressive narrative), and is fighting against earlier setbacks or injuries (regressive narrative), is to approach a state of moral identity, of communal decency in its broadest sense. Heroes and villains are painted such by virtue of their narrative encasement. As MacIntyre (1984) also highlighted, we are accountable for these narrative portrayals: 'to be the subject of a narrative that runs from one's birth to one's death is [...] to be accountable for the actions and experiences which compose a narratable life' (p.202). To portray oneself as striving for

noble ends is to generate expectations, and to open oneself to reproach should the narrative not ‘ring true’ in terms of subsequent actions. By one’s narratives, then, one’s moral status is negotiated, and the result is one to which the person can subsequently be held responsible (Gergen, 1998).

⁴² For instance, the exercise of educational comparison can be useful in answering questions such as: i) Are there cause-effect correlations that work?; ii) Are things that don’t work in both/all countries, such as preconceptions?; and, iii) If yes, how can stakeholders and educators work around that?. On the other hand, comparison can also be problematic for a number of reasons. To start with, ‘the diversity of education systems and differences in the structure of the governance of education make international educational comparisons very difficult’ (Schleicher, 1995, p.xx). Also, procedures might vary – such as, participation and flow of research, decision making on methodology, instruments, and sample, according to context, access, and funding (ibid.).

⁴³ This is because, although ‘there are conventions, and, usually, the orientation of qualitative research is one that follows a specific structure’ (Merriam, 2009, p.8), ‘there is almost no consistency across writers in how [the philosophical] aspect of qualitative research is discussed’ (ibid.), and that ‘in true qualitative fashion, each writer makes sense of the field in a personal, socially constructed way’.

⁴⁴ In fact, it could be argued that, in Cyprus, research in the direction of students’ ideas on historical accounts might be unfruitful and contextually unfitting: not only do historical accounts not exist as a concept, different interpretations at school are also absent.

⁴⁵ In line with this, it could be argued that, as I used semi-structured interviews and came to the interview with set questions, it could be possible that the answers of the participants were shaped in terms of first how they were expressed, and then how they are reported. Explicitly, ‘what people say in an interview will indeed be shaped, to some degree, by the questions they are asked; the conventions about what can be spoken about;...[...]...by what time they think the interviewer wants; by what they believe he/she would approve or disapprove of’ (Hammersley and Gomm, 2008, p.100 cited in Alshenqeti, 2014, p.43).

⁴⁶ As a researcher can conceptually manage only relatively small amounts of data, codes are often mundane, obscure, irrelevant, or only tangentially related to the topic (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007, p.233), while data that included in analysis must be significant, pertinent, and informative.

⁴⁷ That most of the research we have on students’ ideas about history comes from the ‘West’ – and specifically UK - is partly expected: the modernity project meant that state relationships are defined by imperialism and colonialism.

⁴⁸ Whorf (1956) famously said ‘Language is not simply a reporting device for experience but a defining framework for it.’ Language in his view shapes the way we think, and determines what we think about. The idea that language shapes reality has henceforth been known as ‘Whorfianism.’

⁴⁹ In Seixas’ (2016) words: ‘history education is located in the “purple” bridge between historical practices and memorial beliefs, where skilled teachers have considerable autonomy to address the memorial cultures of the students in their classes and where community memories—perhaps even divided memories—are subjected to and enlarged by critical, historical scrutiny, feeding back into public memory’.

⁵⁰ For instance, when answering why historical accounts might differ, one of the participants, Persa, referred to the fact that authors do not understand things in the same way, further arguing that they use different materials: ‘Because the sources and the pieces of knowledge of each author are different and the way they understand the facts are not the same’. There are three ways to read this sentence. The first is that accounts differ because, on the one hand, authors have access to different knowledge and sources while, at the same time, it *happens* that they think differently. The second way of reading Persa’s explanation is that authors have access to different sources and knowledge; and *as a result*, the way they understand things is not the same. The third interpretation is that *because* authors think differently, the sources and knowledge they use is different. It is possible to assume that Persa meant the second. Yet, what is missing from their explanation is causality. Authors do B *because* of A. They do not do A and B. In other words, A and B are not irrelevant – they are intrinsically interrelated. Students therefore need to be exposed to the status of ‘because’ statements which are often about explanation and analysis, not just ‘opinion’.

⁵¹ As Dray (cited in Barca, 2005, p.69) argued ‘historical explanation is always tied to a value judgement and it is still objective because it is a partial reconstruction of a real past. It is partial in the sense that it explains part of the reality from a specific standpoint, and this is a genuine feature in history not a methodological weakness’.

⁵² Of course the benefits of group work are multiple. Working in groups can have further pedagogical benefits. That is, co-operative, small group learning is widely recognized as a pedagogical practice that promotes learning and socialization across a range of curriculum areas from primary school through to high school and college. When children work co-operatively together, they learn to give and take help, share their ideas and listen to other students’ perspectives, seek new ways of clarifying differences, resolving problems, and constructing new understandings and knowledge (Gillies, 2003).

⁵³ For this reason, we need to reframe disputes over the nature of national identities constituted in school historiographies (Klerides, 2016).

