The long-term outcomes of refugees: tracking the progress of the East African Asians

Abstract

Refugees are often perceived as an economic "burden", as the current debate on the European refugee crisis illustrates. But there is little quantitative evidence on the medium-term outcomes of refugees in the UK. We fill this gap by looking at the case of "East African Asians" who arrived as refugees in the late 1960s and early 1970s. We discuss from a theoretical and empirical perspective the possible factors that might influence – positively and negatively – their long term economic outcomes, and use data from the UK Census to describe those outcomes forty years later. We show that their outcomes are at least as good as the population average, with the younger cohort performing better. At least for this group, refugee status, as distinct from ethnicity or immigrant status, appears to have been positively associated with their economic outcomes.

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1 Introduction

In 2017, about 700,000 people sought asylum in the member states of the European Union. Given the current state of international relations, continuing substantial flows can be expected over the medium term. Furthermore, given the nature of the situations that the refugees are fleeing, most are unlikely to return home in the foreseeable future. The UK too has seen a significant recent increase in the number of refugees arriving by irregular means and claiming asylum. In addition to the problems faced by the refugees themselves, it is often asserted that refugees are likely to be a significant economic drain on the receiving country. While this seems to be a common view (despite evidence from the historical record), there is surprisingly little quantitative evidence on the medium-term outcomes of refugees to the UK.

We start to fill this gap by tracking the fortunes of one group of refugees, fleeing to the UK almost fifty years ago, having been summarily evicted from their homes and expelled from their country at very short notice. We use UK Census data to identify them in recent data (2011) and compare their situation to the rest of UK residents. The group we study are East African Asians, more commonly described as "Ugandan Asians": refugees of Indian ethnicity who were expelled from East African countries (primarily Uganda and Kenya) in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. There is certainly a folk wisdom about this group,[1] that they have done well and are a success story, both for themselves and for the UK as receiving country. However, there is very little quantitative analysis, none of it recent, to substantiate this; much discussion is purely anecdotal, based on individual "success stories". In this paper, we aim to establish the facts and set this aspect of the debate about refugees on a firmer footing.

We use bespoke extracts from the UK Census of Population in 2011.[2] We identify our primary group of interest as those born in East Africa,[3] identifying with ethnicity Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi. We also define a number of comparator groups against which to measure their success. Having established the overall pattern, we define other narrow groups to explore the possible sources: ethnicity, immigrant status given ethnicity, and refugee status given ethnicity and immigration status.

We show that East African Asians have indeed done well. In summary, the distributions of occupation, education and employment status for this group appear to be better or at least no worse than for the rest of the population, particularly for the younger cohort. Similar proportions have ended up in high occupational status jobs as UK-born individuals. By 2011, East African Asians were significantly overrepresented among professional and managerial occupations. This is quite remarkable, given the many disadvantages with which the group arrived. The more detailed analysis of possible sources of this overall difference shows that the biggest positive factor is refugee status within immigrants of this ethnicity. Our framework for understanding this is based on human, social and financial capital. Since refugees arrive with very little in the way of financial or social capital, and their human capital may often not be immediately recognised, it seems that one important potential plus for them may be higher levels of non-cognitive skills such as resilience and determination. Given that we now know that such traits are valued in the labour market (Brunello and Schlotter, 2011; Caliendo et al., 2014; Rauch and Frese, 2007), this may be one part of their route to success.

This analysis informs the UK policy debate on refugees by providing quantitative evidence of the medium- to long-term socio-economic outcomes of a distinct refugee group, who arrived in sizeable numbers over a short period of time, much like the current refugee flows from Syria. By providing a quantitative analysis of the longer-term outcomes of this group, we hope to provide some perspective on the key factors which might underly refugee success–or otherwise. We return to the external validity of this study for current refugees below. We obviously should be cautious about using these results to forecast the future economic and social trajectory of refugees arriving in the UK now, but the experiences of past groups at least provide a starting point.

The paper proceeds as follows. We discuss the background to the migration of "East African Asians" and its significance in Section 2; we also use this to set up our research questions. We introduce the data used and the

[1] For example, in 2012, in the House of Lords, Baroness Warsi said: "As today's debate will show, minority communities have so much to offer - even when they start with very little. So let's, all of us, be inspired by the people who turned dispossession into prosperity and setback into success: our British Ugandan Asians" (Warsi, 2012).

[2] We also conducted our analysis in data from the 2001 Census, which is reported in Appendix B.

[3] Unfortunately the 1981 and 1991 Censuses did not have the key country/region of birth questions.

groups we define for our analyses in Section 3. We then explore the differences between these groups in order to test our hypotheses in Section 4. Finally, we offer some broader conclusions in Section 5.

2 Background

2.1 Historical background

2.1.1 Asians in East Africa

Trade links between the east coast of Africa and the west coast of India, in particularly Gujarat, date back millennia. However, the establishment of settled communities of Indians in East Africa began at the end of the 19th century, driven by a number of factors. First, the incorporation of the territories of East Africa, formerly under the control of the Imperial British East Africa Company, to the Crown, meaning that people moving from India to East Africa could do so simply as subject of the Crown; second, the construction of the Ugandan Railway, which was largely built by Indian indentured labourers (mostly from the Punjab), some of whom remained after it was completed; and finally, a severe famine in Gujurat in 1899-1900, which made emigration more attractive for those who could afford it (see Mattausch, 1998).

By the time of decolonisation and independence, the Asian communities in Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi numbered several hundred thousand. The policies, explicit and implicit, of the colonial administration ensured that on average they occupied a relatively privileged position economically, with a dominant position in finance and trade (although by no means all were particularly rich: many were small shopkeepers and artisans). At the same time, they were almost entirely segregated, residentially and culturally, from the African majority. Unsurprisingly, this was a recipe for economic and racial tension. The newly independent states pursued policies of "Africanisation", and Asian communities were both an obvious target for such policies and obvious scapegoats when the policies failed to deliver quick results.

While the expulsion of Ugandan Asians was by far the most dramatic single event leading to large refugee flows from East Africa to the UK, it was neither the beginning nor the end of the process. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act had stated that all British passport holders living in independent Commonwealth countries would have the right of entry to the UK. When the Kenyan government offered Asians (and whites) Kenyan passports if they renounced their British ones, few accepted. A steady exodus began, which culminated in a mass outflow in 1967-68, in response to discriminatory legislation. The UK government–which had originally anticipated that the provisions of the Act would benefit mostly white Britons and their children–passed a further Act that was designed to exclude Asians from Kenya and elsewhere in Africa (Cable, 1969).

However, when President Amin, in August 1972, announced the wholesale expulsion of all Asians from Uganda, the UK reversed its policy, and allowed entry, despite considerable domestic opposition. The then Prime Minister, Ted Heath, said:

> [The British people] have refused to be scared into supporting the attitude of meanness and bad faith towards the [Ugandan Asian] refugees. They have responded in accordance with our traditions of honouring our obligations and holding out a friendly hand to people in danger and distress. (The Times, 11 Oct. 1972)

The majority of Ugandan Asians moved to the UK. A further, smaller influx followed from Malawi in 1976 as a result of the actions of the Banda government.

2.1.2 Arrival and reception in the UK

Estimates vary, but it seems likely that over the period from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s at least 150,000-200,000 East African Asians moved to the UK. Although we do not have precise dates of arrival, there are approximately 120,000 people born in East Africa of Asian ethnicity in our data, which, because of the cohorts we focus on in this this research, does not include those who were over the age of 30 in 1970, or those who died between arrival and 2011. This would be reasonably consistent with estimates that the Gujurati community in the UK now numbers 600,000, of which perhaps half trace their ancestry via East Africa (National Congress of Gujarati

Organisation, 2018). Although many spent some time in government-organised reception centres, there was little attempt on the part of the government to proactively (or coercively) "disperse" the new arrivals, in contrast to policies subsequently adopted by some Scandinavian countries. As a result, most of the new arrivals settled in areas where there were already existing Gujurati communities, in particular Leicester and parts of North-West London – despite, in the case of Leicester, efforts to dissuade them which went as far as advertising in the Uganda Argus.

The arrival of the East African Asians in the UK coincided with perhaps the most bitter domestic debate on race and immigration in the UK in the post-war period. As noted above, the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act was designed explicitly to exclude the East African Asians on racial grounds. 1968 also saw both the passing of the Race Relations Act and, in reaction to the provisions of the Act which forbade racial discrimination in housing and employment, Enoch Powell's "Rivers of Blood" speech (Hansen, 2000). The political atmosphere was similarly fraught in 1972, and there was considerable pressure on the government to reject any responsibility for the Ugandan Asians. Enoch Powell, still an influential voice in the debate, said that "their so-called British passports do not entitle them to enter Britain", and public opinion was very much divided. Some media coverage was openly racist (Hundal, 2016). Even in 1976, when a further, relatively small, group arrived from Malawi, tensions remained high. At the time the National Front, an openly racist political party, had a significant popular following; again, there was considerable, and very hostile, media coverage, with headlines ranging from "Scandal of Day-Tripper Immigrants" in the Mirror to "Invasion of Asians" in the Telegraph (Morrison, 2004).

2.2 Analytical framework and existing evidence

2.2.1 Factors influencing migrant and refugee outcomes

There is a voluminous literature on the long-term economic outcomes of immigrants (e.g. Drinkwater et al., 2009). The analytic framework for such studies is usually one of "assimilation" (Chiswick, 1978); that is, immigrants start out in a different labour market position (generally inferior) to that of natives, and converge over time; the key empirical questions of interest are therefore what factors (characteristics of the immigrants themselves, in terms of skills, qualifications, etc.; and conditions in the host country) determine the pace of assimilation.

Recent studies, in both the US and Europe, suggest that immigrants begin with a large wage gap, which is driven by lower skills and qualifications (for some immigrants); by lower returns to qualifications (which may reflect a number of factors: lack of recognition of professional qualifications, discrimination, occupational segregation, etc.); and lack of language proficiency. These gaps diminish over time, but not to zero. See Kerr and Kerr (2011) for a recent review. An example in the UK context is Lemos (2011), who finds (in contrast to the US literature) that immigrants from more recent cohorts have done rather better than in earlier cohorts. She also finds very considerable heterogeneity, with migrants from Europe performing much better than those from Asia and Africa. More recent work by Forte (2016) finds similar results.

However, there is much less empirical work relating specifically to refugees. A simple economic framework for thinking about the medium term-outcomes for refugees is based on human, social and financial capital. Human capital comprises cognitive and non-cognitive skills, the former at least typically measured by education. By social capital we mean human networks, useful contacts for employment, business opportunities and so on. Financial capital is necessary for starting up businesses, particularly if access to borrowing is very difficult in the absence of a relevant credit history or social networks. We can assess the expected outcomes for our group of interest in terms of these characteristics. Furthermore, we can consider key factors linked with labour market success within the migration literature, which are often interlinked with capital of these kinds.

There are a number of reasons why refugee assimilation is likely to differ significantly to that of immigrants more generally. Most obviously, most immigrants who enter the labour market are likely to have migrated wholly or partially precisely because they want to work in the host country–this is certainly true of the US and Northern Europe, the subject of most empirical studies–while refugees, by definition, are migrating for non-economic reasons, and may have little or no choice about their destination. However, there are several other reasons why refugee outcomes may differ: refugees (and host governments) are likely, on arrival, to be preoccupied with issues relating to housing and access to health and education more than employment; and they may, in some cases, have

had traumatic experiences that have lasting impacts. On the other hand, refugees may also feel a particularly strong sense of commitment and gratitude to the host country. Furthermore, return migration, often a possibility for economic migrants, may not be an option, which may increase their incentive to acquire country-specific human capital (Cortes, 2004); this factor appears particularly relevant in the context of a forced expulsion as experienced by the East African Asians. On the other hand, the particular circumstances of this group may make them more like economic migrants in the sense of being a selected population within their country of origin (as discussed above), meaning there are some similarities to the self-selection (Borjas, 1987) at play in the case of immigrants more generally. Ruiz & Vargas-Silva (2013) also note the potential for self-selection within the context of forced migration, for example through the role of selection into assistance programmes or of destination, although this seems less relevant for our case.

Direct evidence on the long-term economic outcomes of refugees is mixed, but generally shows refugees perform considerably better in North America and Canada than Europe (Legrain, 2016). In the US, refugee employment rates are relatively high, although convergence in incomes and other variables is much slower. There is also considerable heterogeneity–the two largest refugee groups, Cubans and Vietnamese, have very sharply different trajectories. Interestingly, this is not primarily driven by different levels of human capital on arrival (Capps et al., 2015). Vietnamese refugees also had positive outcomes in Canada (Beiser, 1999).

By contrast, in Europe, employment rates for refugees are often very low: in 2010, only 25% of Somali refugees aged 25-64 in Sweden were employed, compared to 57% of those in the US. Poor labour market outcomes in Europe are often related to policies that focus on housing and services rather than employment, or that exclude or discourage refugees and asylum-seekers from work entirely (Legrain, 2016). Similarly, Fasani et al. (2018) find that lower refugee recognition rates (which are presumably associated with less refugee-friendly and pro-integration policies more generally) and compulsory dispersal policies (which frequently result in refugees being accommodated in areas with less buoyant labour markets) lead to worse outcomes.

There is relatively little direct evidence for the UK that provides quantitative data, but what there is suggests generally poor outcomes for recent refugees; again, this is often related to policies that either do not focus on employment or, in the case of asylum-seekers, positively exclude new arrivals from the labour market. For example, Bloch (2004) uses data from a survey of 400 refugees with access to the labour market carried out for the UK Department of Work and Pensions to find that despite often being relatively skilled and well qualified, recent refugee arrivals to the UK had very low employment rates and were typically working in low-skilled and low-paid jobs. This is confirmed by more recent Labour Force Survey data, which shows that those who originally arrived as refugees or asylum seekers have much lower employment rates and wages than other migrants (or the native population) (Vargas-Silva, 2016). Similarly, Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2018) find lower rates of employment among refugees compared to natives and other migrants, noting the potential role of differences in health status in explaining these gaps.

These generally poor short-run outcomes for recent refugees to the UK make the case of the East African Asians, forty years on, when we have more medium-run evidence, even more relevant to contemporary policy debates. Moreover, long-run evidence on the effects of forced migration tends to find more positive effects for the migrants, specifically when migrating to a developed country (Ruiz and Vargas Silva, 2013). There are also key differences for this group compared to other refugees relevant to the evidence above, such as the lower probability of difference in health status (cf. Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2018). Furthermore, Bloch's (2000) findings imply that social and economic settlement of refugees importantly depends upon labour market access, in turn depending on their citizenship rights which, as discussed above, were already held by East Afrian Asians as a colonial legacy.

The one quantitative analysis we have identified that bears directly on the East African Asians that are the subject of our paper is much more positive, and is broadly consistent with our results. It comes from a large-scale survey of ethnic minorities in the UK conducted in 1994 which, unlike almost all other such analyses, did separately identify people of Indian origin who had some family connect to Africa (Modood et al., 1997). Although limited by sample size and other factors, it suggests that the labour market outcomes of East African Asians had by the early 1990s largely converged with those of the white population: "African Asian men have moved from the bottom to the top of the distribution. Two decades ago they were averaging less than the Pakistanis, a decade ago they were equalling Indians, and now they seem to have caught up with the whites... After the period of being political refugees and rebuilding their livelihoods and establishing themselves in Britain, they seem to have made considerable progress in re-creating their prosperity."

2.2.2 The circumstances of the East African Asians

The older refugees arriving in the UK would have completed their education in Africa. Given their community's relatively affluent position in those countries, their distribution of achievement was probably above average in their country of origin, although difficult to compare to that of UK-educated individuals. In this sense, this group would therefore have been positively "selected" for education (as in, for example, Borjas, 1985), relative to the general population in the African countries from which they came. However, the selection at work here was the result of this specific group being singled out for persecution as opposed to either self-selection or skill-biased immigration systems acting at the individual level, which are the usual processes relevant to the selection of economic migrants. Furthermore, it seems likely that the African qualifications would often have been disregarded in hiring in the UK, although as skills became apparent on the job, this may have led to promotion. For the younger cohort, most of their education would have happened in the UK, and so we would expect a not very dissimilar distribution of outcomes to other UK-educated pupils. Although Burgess (2014) has shown that in our current educational system "children of immigrants" tend to do much better than natives, the reverse was true in the 1980s, at least for non-white immigrants (see e.g. Swann, 1985). One key advantage that many will have had with respect to some other migrant groups is reasonably fluent English, which is known to be helpful for migrant outcomes (Dustmann, 1994), although we do not have any data on this. Furthermore, the circumstances of this group's migration, specifically forced expulsion limiting the potential for return migration, increase the probability of this group investing in developing their country-specific human capital over time as per the model proposed by Cortes (2006), while their pre-existing British citizenship may have eased initial access to the labour market relative to other refugees (Bloch, 2000) mitigating human capital deterioration that is usually expected during absence from the labour market.

In terms of non-cognitive characteristics, the interesting question is the extent to which these can be moulded by experience. It is unclear whether experiences such as the mass expropriation of property and forced displacement from home and country would enhance psychological traits such as 'drive', 'grit', 'resilience', internal locus of control, and determination to succeed. These are likely to be valuable traits in employment and in setting up a business (Brunello and Schlotter, 2011; Caliendo et al., 2014; Rauch and Frese, 2007). Voors et al. (2012) show that personality traits such as patience and risk-taking can be affected by exposure to very strong exogenous shocks (for example, conflict or natural disasters). Conversely, it is also possible that their desire to succeed would be undermined by this experience.

The East African Asians largely settled in areas where there were already existing Gujurati communities, in particular Leicester and parts of North-West London. There is considerable evidence that the long-term outcomes of migrants, in particular refugees, are influenced by labour market conditions in the localities in which they first settle (or resettle) – for example, Godoy (2017) shows that outcomes for refugees in Norway (who were assigned quasi-randomly to specific geographical areas) were influenced by the strength or weakness of local labour markets. In the UK, given relatively low levels of geographical mobility, this is likely to be relevant, and indeed the East African Asian community remains very numerous in the areas of initial settlement. While Leicester remains deprived on a number of measures, both North-West London and Leicester are centrally located and generally well connected, so isolation from economic opportunity may have been less of an issue than for some other immigrant groups (in particular those of Pakistani origin, many of whom migrated to relatively deprived areas in the North of England).

Social capital within the displaced group may well have been strong, since the group was a relatively insular minority in their African countries of origin,; on top of that, they had to cope with the same experience of forced migration, including for many a temporary period in reception centres in the UK pending resettlement. Links were also formed quickly with the existing, albeit much smaller, Gujarati community living in Britain. Beaman, (2012) finds that social networks within refugee communities are correlated with better employment outcomes. More broadly, however, we posit that social links to the majority white population were likely to be weak initially, particularly for the older cohort.

The financial capital of arriving refugees would likely have consisted of what they could bring with them; those coming from Uganda were only permitted to take £55 in cash, and while those from Kenya may have fared slightly better, most arrived with relatively little in capital, and were therefore obliged to take menial or manual jobs at first, even if, as in many cases, they had previously been owners or managers of small businesses (Harris, 2002). Women of East African Asian origin, employed as factory workers, played a central role in the Grunwick dispute, a key episode in post-war UK industrial relations (Anitha and Pearson, 2012).

In summary, for the older cohort, in employment, we expect their educational qualifications to be generally ignored but their underlying cognitive skills may be recognised once hired, reinforced by a strong incentive to invest in developing their country-specific human capital. Their positive non-cognitive traits may have been enhanced by their experience, or weakened. Both social and financial capital were initially low. For the young cohort, their human capital would be more akin to that of non-refugees, and they would be able to establish social networks of their own. Any financial capital they had access to would largely be from capital accumulated by their parents or relatives. Of course, on top of all these factors sit two more very substantial obstacles– discrimination and, where relevant for some, the language barrier. Overall, the major positive factors for our group of interest would be potential underlying human capital and incentive to invest in this, pre-existing British citizenship helping to reduce gaps in labour market experience, and potentially their non-cognitive traits–if their drive and determination to succeed in a new country were enhanced by their experiences. Otherwise, many factors were against them. The prediction is therefore that the older cohort would do worse than their non-refugee counterparts. The younger cohort may improve on that, but again there is little reason to expect a more positive outcome than their native counterparts.

3 Data

Our question is a longitudinal one–comparing the current outcomes for people in an identified group over 40 years ago–but the UK has no longitudinal data of that length of time with sufficient sample to answer this question.[4] We therefore use the UK Census of Population and construct pseudo-cohorts for our groups of interest and their matched counterparts. The Census released cell means for a multi-dimensional set of groups,[5] defined below, to us. However, we do not have the underlying individual data.

The data come from the 2011 Census.[6] Overall, we have data based on the 20.66m individuals within our cohorts of focus (see next paragraph) who took part in the 2011 Census. The groups are defined by age, and the intersection of ethnicity and place of birth. This intersection has been constructed post-hoc based on two distinct variables in the census: first, self-identification of ethnicity; second, reported place of birth. As such assignment to these groups is not based on self-identification to the group as a whole (e.g. 'East African Asian' in the case of our focus group) but rather ethnic self-identification (i.e. as ethnically 'Bangladeshi', 'Pakistani' or 'Indian' for the focus group) and place of birth (i.e. in Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania or Malawi for the focus group).

In terms of age, we focus on two cohorts. First, we consider those who are 56-70 at the 2011 census date (referred to as the older cohort). This cohort have an average age of 24 in the key date of 1972, suggesting that this cohort of our group of interest joined the UK labour market directly without receiving local schooling. Second, we consider those who are 41-56 in 2011 (referred to as the younger cohort), giving them an average age of under 10 in 1972, and therefore likely to have received significant schooling in England. Our data therefore measure these the outcomes for these people some 40 years after the traumatic events that brought them to Britain.

Within each cohort, the groups are defined by ethnicity and place of birth as follows (note that they are deliberately not all mutually exclusive):

[4] The NCDS sample were born in 1958 but that was too early and, by design, only includes those born in the UK.

[5] To further safeguard confidential data, with some small cell sizes, the data were subject to small cell adjustment. For further details refer to ONS (2011).

[6] The 1981 and 1991 Censuses lack a key identifying question on country of birth. We also carried out our analyses on the 2001 Census, reporting the findings in Appendix B.

- BPI born in EA: this group contains everyone who reports that their ethnicity is Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Indian *and* that they were born in Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania or Malawi (East Africa - EA); this is our focus group, denoted EA-BPI;
- Everyone except EA-BPI: this group contains everyone except those who identify as ethnically Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Indian (BPI) *and* who were born in Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania or Malawi;
- UK-born: this group contains everyone who reports they were born in the UK regardless of their ethnicity;
- Non-UK-born BPI: this group contains everyone who reports being Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Indian *and* that they were not born in the UK;
- Non-UK-born except BPI: this group contains everyone who reports that they were not born in the UK *except* those who report being BPI;
- UK-born BPI: strictly speaking, this group would be most accurately described as "BPI not born in BPI or EA" since it contains everyone who reports that their ethnicity is Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Indian *but* that they were not born in Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania or Malawi; however, this group will be predominantly UK-born BPI so we use this name for ease of interpretation;
- BPI born in BPI: this group contains everyone who reports that their ethnicity is Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Indian *and* that they were born in Bangladesh, Pakistan, or India.

The sizes of the groups are reported in Table 1, separately for each age cohort. Reassuringly, these groups remain broadly the same size between 2001[7] and 2011, suggesting minimal onward or return migration, at least between these two time points.

The Census does not collect income data, but in fact the outcomes we use are perhaps better measures of long-run outcome: occupational status, educational qualifications achieved, and economic status. The standard categories we use are set out in Table 2. Occupational status is captured using the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC), designed to capture social class differences between occupational types (Rose & Pevalin, 2001) – we also report how these are correlated with average levels and variation in wages using analysis of the UK Labour Force Survey; educational qualifications reported using a six category classification ranging from no qualifications to bachelor's degree (or equivalent) or higher; employment status categorised as wage employed, self-employed, unemployed or economically inactive.

Our data consist of cell means for each of these outcomes for each of our ethnicity-birthplace groups for each aged-defined cohort for each Census year. We report a full set of these outcomes by group in Tables 3-8. In terms of general demographics, these data show rising educational outcomes between the old and young cohorts. It is also clear that part of the older cohort have started to move into retirement (inactivity) by the time of the 2011 Census.

4 Results

We first quantify the overall outcome: the overall differences between BPI-EA and everyone else, and the differences between BPI-EA and UK-born individuals. This is the key question: did the individuals in this group, as widely predicted at the time, fail in the labour market and become a 'drain' on the public finances? Second, we compare outcomes between specific, narrow comparison groups to explore the possible sources of the overall effect we see. Our analysis is primarily graphical,[8] presenting the distributions of occupation, education and employment status for two groups; full details of the distributions across all groups considered are provided for the older cohort in Table 3 (educational qualifications), Table 4 (occupational status), and Table 5 (employment status) and for the

[7] See Appendix B for replication of our analyses using the 2001 census.
[8] We plot the fraction of each group in each category.

younger cohort in Table 6 (educational qualifications), Table 7 (occupational status), and Table 8 (employment status). We do not conduct statistical inference testing, since these are population data and so are not subject to sampling error.

4.1 Overall comparisons

We first quantify the overall differences in outcomes between EA-born BPI individuals and comparator groups. For the latter we take the inverse set, that is, everyone else in the population apart from EA-BPI; secondly, we take the UK-born population. In practice, these are highly similar, given that UK-born individuals make up the vast majority of the rest of the population; as such, the graphs for the UK-born individuals are placed in Appendix **Error! Reference source not found.** and the comparison with only UK-born individuals is only mentioned in the text if different.

We begin by comparing occupational status outcomes (Figure **Error! Reference source not found.**). Looking at the older cohort (aged 56-70 in 2011) of EA-BPI, 10.2% of this cohort report being in top category NS-SEC jobs. This is slightly higher than in the rest of the population, although only by a small margin of 0.4%pts. in 2011.

Among the younger cohort (age 41-56), 12.3% of individuals report being in the top NS-SEC category. The proportion of EA-BPI individuals reporting being in this group was considerably higher at 16.5%. They are correspondingly less likely to be in the lowest two NS-SEC groups (6 and 7) with 12.9% in these two groups, compared to 16.1% of the rest of the population. These differences are quite large: put another way, the probability of someone in the EA-BPI group having a top NS-SEC job in 2011 was a third higher than the population average. It is also interesting to note an over-representation of our focus group in NS-SEC category 3 including small business owners and the self-employed.

Moving on to economic status (Figure **Error! Reference source not found.**), EA-born BPI individuals are slightly less likely to be employed than the rest of the population; however, this is more than made up for by higher rates of self-employment, consistent with the higher proportion in NS-SEC category 3, as noted above. East African Asians are also marginally more likely to be unemployed, but less likely to be economically inactive. Overall activity rates are, therefore, broadly similar.

Finally, we consider education levels (Figure **Error! Reference source not found.**). The older cohort arrived with educational qualifications broadly similar to the rest of the population, although, as noted above, the comparability of these qualifications may not have been obvious, particularly to potential UK employers. The proportion of EA-BPI individuals in the older cohort (who arrived in the UK and probably went straight into the labour market) reporting having a degree (23.3%) is slightly below that of the rest of the population, which stands at 24.4%.[9] The EA-BPI group have a lower propensity to report having no qualifications (28.8% vs. 34.6%).

The EA-BPI group in the younger cohort, whose qualifications will have been mostly obtained in the UK, have significantly better outcomes in terms of education compared to both the population at large and the UK-born population, with 34.6% holding a degree or higher, compared with 30.4% for the rest of the population.

In summary, the distributions of occupation, education and employment status for our focus group EA-BPI appear to be better or at least no worse than for the rest of the population. Similar proportions have ended up in high occupational status jobs as UK-born individuals–somewhat more for the younger cohort, who overall appear to outperform the rest of the population. There is some evidence of over-representation of EA-BPI individuals in NS-SEC category 3, which includes small business owners and self-employed individuals, which may reflect exclusion or discrimination against this group, mitigated by selecting into self-employment.

4.2 Understanding the overall effects

It seems reasonable to argue that the overall comparisons reported above are contrary to popular belief, or at least would have seemed so in the early 1970s, when the refugees arrived. We might have expected a group of refugees to take longer than less than a generation to be doing better than the native population. How can we understand this? Most of the factors highlighted in our analytical framework cannot be directly measured–cognitive and non-

[9] It is worth noting that the picture was the other way around in 2001, with an increase in the proportion of the rest of the population in the subsequent 10 years driving this change.

cognitive skills, social networks and financial capital. Instead, we attempt to isolate the key factors in their success through a series of group-mean comparisons, differing in only one dimension at a time. The dimensions are immigrant status, ethnicity, and refugee status.

First, we test whether there is something specific about immigrants by comparing the outcomes of non-UK-born individuals with UK-born individuals within the same ethnicity. We compare non-UK-born individuals of Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Indian (BPI) ethnicity with UK-born BPI individuals.

In Figure **Error! Reference source not found.**, we consider the distribution of occupations. Across both cohorts, UK-born BPI individuals are more likely to report being in high-status occupations and less likely to report being in low-status occupations. For example, among the younger cohort UK-born BPI individuals are around 4%pts. more likely to report being in a top NS-SEC occupation. In labour market outcomes, a greater proportion of UK-born BPI individuals are classified as employed than among the analogous cohorts of non-UK born BPI individuals (Figure **Error! Reference source not found.**). This is, to some extent, offset by higher rates of self-employment, meaning that the differences in unemployment rates are very small. Nevertheless, economic inactivity is also higher among those who are BPI/EA-born than those who are UK-born. Finally, non-UK-born individuals are more likely to have no qualifications than their UK-born BPI peers (Figure **Error! Reference source not found.**), while being less likely to have any level of qualification that is higher than this. The differences are notably more stark among the younger cohort, reflecting significantly higher levels of education among the younger UK-born cohort, which may reflect wider trends towards higher levels of education in the UK.

Overall, we summarise this picture as slightly worse outcomes among this group of immigrants compared to UK-born individuals of the same ethnicity. This is consistent with the picture for immigrants found in previous studies in the literature, described above.

Second, we examine whether there is something specific about this ethnicity, compared to other immigrants of different ethnicities. We do this by comparing the outcomes of non-UK-born BPI individuals with all other non-UK-born individuals. Figure **Error! Reference source not found.** demonstrates higher rates of reporting being in high-status occupations (NS-SEC 1 and 2) among non-BPI migrants than among BPI migrants. This pattern is evident across years and across cohorts with, for example, 22.2% of non-BPI migrants in the older cohort reporting having an NS-SEC 2 job (such as social workers, nurses and journalists), compared to 9.7% of BPI migrants. The picture in Figure **Error! Reference source not found.** is slightly different to other comparisons of economic status, in that there are only small differences in rates of self-employment; differences in unemployment rates are also small, which is in line with the other comparisons we have drawn. Nevertheless, there are large differences in employment rates, balanced by differences in rates of economic inactivity, with non-BPI individuals having higher rates of the former and lower rates of the latter across both cohorts and years. The differences are much larger in the older cohort; this adds to the plausibility of this being explained by gender differences between these cohorts, although we are not able to test this directly with our data. Finally, in Figure **Error! Reference source not found.** we see that, among this group of non-UK born individuals, those of BPI ethnicity are more likely to have no or very low levels of formal qualifications and less likely to have all levels of education above this than their non-BPI peers.

Overall, we summarise this picture as somewhat worse performance, on average, among BPI migrants compared to immigrants of other ethnicities. Again, this is consistent with other data (see Migration Observatory, 2017, for a summary). Note, however, that there is, as would be expected, considerable heterogeneity among BPI migrants overall to the UK: this is not surprising since they will have arrived via a variety of (non-refugee) routes, and those who migrated for economic reasons may have done so for high- or low-skilled jobs.

Third, we test whether there is something specific about refugees, compared to other immigrants of the same ethnicity. We do this by comparing the outcomes of BPI born in EA individuals, whose migration we assume is likely to have been forced, with BPI born in BPI individuals, most of whose migration was in a similar timeframe (approximately 70% of BPI-born immigrants recorded in the 2001 census aged 50-64 arrived before 1981; relatively few arrived recently, suggesting comparisons are not significantly distorted because of different arrival times) but is unlikely to have been forced.

In Figure **Error! Reference source not found.**, we show that those from the refugee group (i.e. EA-BPI) are more likely to report being in higher status occupations and less likely to report being in low status occupations

than the group of other migrants from the same ethnic group (BPI-born BPI individuals). For example, 11.5% of BPI individuals not born in East Africa are in a top NS-SEC job, which is approximately in line with the figure for UK born individuals (11.7%) compared to the higher figure noted for EA-BPI individuals. The differences are notably starker in younger cohort than is the case in the older cohort. Normally, we would expect to see substantial occupational downgrading (i.e. immigrants working in jobs below their skill levels)–this has been true of UK immigration historically and is particularly true of Eastern Europeans now (Campbell, 2013). We do see some evidence of this, but it is not striking: the overrepresentation among small business owners/own account workers is perhaps the most marked feature. The economic status differences are in the same direction as those in the occupational status differences. There is a similar pattern in education levels as well (Table **Error! Reference source not found.**). In terms of educational attainment, the younger group, who are likely to have received significant education in UK, look much more like BPI-ethnicity people born in UK than those born in BPI; in other words "assimilation" to the UK norm–for ethnic minorities–of relatively high participation in further and higher education was relatively quick. Considering the differences discussed above, it is notable that although educational attainment among EA-BPI individuals was similar to UK-born BPI individuals, their labour market outcomes appear to be better.

Overall, we summarise this picture as showing considerably better outcomes for this refugee group (EA-born BPI) than for non-refugee migrants of the same ethnicity. We do note, however, that there will be more variation in the UK arrival times of the non-refugee migrants than of our EA-BPI group and discuss other relevant differences and caveats to this comparison below.

In summary, from the comparisons we have drawn, we find: (a) evidence of slightly worse labour market outcomes among immigrants in general relative to natives; (b) worse outcomes among migrants of BPI ethnicity than migrants of other ethnicities; and (c) better outcomes among this group of refugee immigrants of BPI ethnicity than for non-refugee immigrants of that ethnicity. In fact, as the previous section showed, this final point is enough to more than make up for the other two factors, particularly for the younger cohort.

One interpretation of these differences is that they are attributable, at least in part, to the East African Asian migrants' status as refugees, rather than regular migrants. Given that the regular (non-refugee) migration system for those coming from outside the EU was, and is, based in large part on labour needs and, hence, should, in principle, select for those more likely to succeed in economic terms, this is worth of note. We consider the plausibility of this explanation and discuss potential causal channels below. However, we accept that our evidence for this is certainly not conclusive, since there are alternative explanations that cannot be ruled out. It could be that the Asian population of East Africa were as a whole better educated than Asians who migrated directly into UK from Asia, or had other unobservable advantages, perhaps connected with the initial selection effects linked to the migration to East Africa; as noted above, Asian migrants to the UK, other than the group focused on here, are very heterogeneous and may well not be directly comparable to East African Asians. In particular, although both groups trace their origins back to "British" India, the East African Asians are disproportionately from Gujarat, with relatively few from Bangladesh or Pakistan; and although both groups contain significant proportions of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, the East African Asians are considerably more likely to be Hindu, and less likely to be Muslim or Sikh, than other Asian migrants to the UK. These differences could be associated either with different initial levels of human capital at the time of migration to the UK, or to different experiences after migration (for example, experiences of labour market discrimination, or different locational decisions).

5 Conclusions

This paper contributes to the quantitative literature on migration and refugees. We study a group of around 150,000 to 200,000 people who were summarily ejected from their countries of residence, taking little or nothing with them (Harris, 2002), albeit that they were a relatively advantaged group within those countries, having previous positive selection for entrepreneurial traits and background. They arrived in the UK at a time of racial tension, when there was considerable racial prejudice among the broader population; and were not widely welcomed. We use bespoke extracts from the UK Census of population to identify them forty years later and describe their socio-economic status. It might have been expected that being from a minority ethnic group, being an immigrant and being a refugee would be a triple disadvantage. This has not proved to be the case. We show that the occupational distribution of

this group was at least as good as that of the remainder of the population, with a higher fraction in professional or managerial jobs. In terms of occupational structure, employment status and educational outcomes, the EA-BPI group do as well as or better than the rest of the population.

We also explore the potential sources of this performance, albeit with group-level data rather than with individual-level data. The ethnicity of this group does not seem to explain their strong outcomes: people of their ethnicity tended to do worse than other ethnicities in this cohort. Likewise, being an immigrant was not associated with an advantage: foreign-born people of their ethnicity did worse than UK-born people of their ethnicity over the same time horizon. The positive difference, more than offsetting those two disadvantages, is associated with being an immigrant of that ethnicity from East Africa rather than from the Indian sub-continent. We posit multiple potential interpretations for this pattern, including some related directly to the potential longer-term labour market advantages of refugee migrants compared to labour migrants. These include the possibility that the experience of being refugees strengthened positive non-cognitive skills and psychological traits, and that investment in country-specific human capital was boosted by the fact that return migration was unlikely or impossible (Cortes, 2006; Becker et al., 2020). Alternatively, there could be a role for selection effects (Borjas, 1985): the Asian population of East Africa was as a whole better educated than the Asian population who migrated into the UK from Asia, with this human capital difference mattering more than their likely disadvantage in other forms of capital (Waldinger, 2016). Either way, we believe that the likelihood is that the East African Asians did so well after their flight to the UK because of their cognitive and/or non-cognitive skills, rather than other forms of capital. Identifying the source of the advantage can only be suggestive in this data, but for groups who were refugees so long ago, this data may be all that is available.

For policymakers, the results offer a rare piece of large-scale quantitative evidence on medium-run outcomes for refugees into the UK. Of course, the external validity of this study for current refugees is for discussion and we have outlined the limitations of our analysis above. However, while obviously each refugee group is unique in its source countries, its experiences and any assets (tangible and intangible) it brings, there are commonalities too. All have left necessarily left their home country under duress, all have self-evidently made it through to a place of safety, and all have experienced (at the least) very difficult transitions. We should clearly be cautious in predicting similar futures for current refugees, but nevertheless, it may be that the commonalities are more important than the differences. As one of the present authors wrote at the height of the Syrian refugee crisis: "Integrating refugees into our society and labour market will be, as it has been in the past, challenging. But we have done it before – with enormous benefits, both economic and social, to the UK – and there is absolutely no reason we cannot do it again." (Portes, 2017, quoted in Guyoncourt, 2016).

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Table 1: Individuals in each group in each cohort

Group / Cohort	**Older**	**Younger**	**Total**
Everyone except EA-BPI	12,202,201	8,339,941	3,7240,928
UK born	10,549,082	7,518,990	2,5319,525
Non UK-born BPI	385,663	199,044	584,707
Non UK-born except BPI	1,339,826	663,864	2,003,690
UK-born BPI	103,922	16,744	120,666
BPI born in BPI	313,293	157,087	470,380
BPI born in EA	72,370	41,957	114,327
Total	12,274,571	8,381,898	20,656,469

Table 2: Outcome measures definitions

Occupation	
NS-SEC 1	Higher managerial, administrative and professional occupations, such as lawyers, architects, and doctors. Younger cohort median wages = £44,980, SD = £22,405. Older cohort median wage = £44,980, SD = £23,125.
NS-SEC 2	Lower managerial, administrative and professional occupations, such as social workers, nurses and journalists. Younger cohort median wages = £30,004, SD = £17,618. Older cohort median wage = £27,612, SD = £17,355.
NS-SEC 3	Intermediate occupations, such as paramedics, bank staff and armed forces (up to sergeant). Younger cohort median wages = £17,992, SD = £11,814. Older cohort median wage = £17,420, SD = £10,821.
NS-SEC 4	Small employers and own account workers, such as farmers, shopkeepers and driving instructors. Younger cohort median wages = £7,176, SD = £12,460. Older cohort median wage = £8,398, SD = £14,332.
NS-SEC 5	Lower supervisory and technical occupations, such as mechanics, train drivers and electricians. Younger cohort median wages = £23,920, SD = £13,431. Older cohort median wage = £22,984, SD = £13,506.
NS-SEC 6	Semi-routine occupations, such as traffic wardens, receptionists and care workers. Younger cohort median wages = £13,988, SD = £9,059. Older cohort median wage = £13,000, SD = £8,202.
NS-SEC 7	Routine occupations, such as bar staff, cleaners and bus drivers. Younger cohort median wages = £16,796, SD = £10,304. Older cohort median wage = £15,600, SD = £9,887.
NW	Never worked and long-term unemployed.
NC	Not classifiable (including full-time students).
Education	
Level 0	No academic, vocational or professional qualifications
Level 1	1+ 'O' levels/CSE/GCSE (any grade), NVQ level 1, Foundation GNVQ
Level 2	5+ 'O' levels, 5+ CSEs (grade 1), 5+ GCSEs (grade A - C), School Certificate, 1+ 'A' levels/'AS' levels, NVQ level 2, Intermediate GNVQ or equivalents
Level 3	2+ 'A' levels, 4+ 'AS' levels, Higher School Certificate, NVQ level 3, Advanced GNVQ or equivalents
Level 4+	First degree, Higher Degree, NVQ levels 4 - 5, HNC, HND, Qualified Teacher Status, Qualified Medical Doctor, Qualified Dentist, Qualified Nurse, Midwife, Health Visitor or equivalents
NC	Other qualifications/level unknown: Other qualifications (e.g. City and Guilds, RSA/OCR, BTEC/Edexcel), Other Professional Qualifications
Employment	
	Employed
	Self-employed
	Unemployed
	Economically inactive

Notes: Indicative medians and standard deviations of wage distribution for each NS-SEC category based on separate analysis of UK Labour Force Survey for 2014 with sample restricted to appropriate age ranges.

Table 3: Qualifications among older cohort in 2011 by group

	No Quals	**Level 1**	**Level 2**	**Level 3**	**Level 4+**	**Other**	**Total**
	Row %	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*
Everyone except EA-BPI	34.6	10.3	10.9	7.3	24.2	12.8	100.0
UK born	35.0	10.6	11.2	7.4	23.6	12.2	100.0
Non UK-born BPI	42.8	7.5	5.3	3.1	19.9	21.3	100.0
Non UK-born except BPI	27.2	7.5	8.7	6.6	32.1	17.8	100.0
UK-born BPI	32.4	9.2	7.4	4.8	28.6	17.6	100.0
BPI born in BPI	46.6	6.0	3.8	2.6	19.0	22.0	100.0
BPI born in EA	28.8	13.1	10.9	5.1	23.3	18.7	100.0
Total	34.6	10.3	10.9	7.2	24.2	12.8	100.0

Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. *N*=8,381,898. EA = East-African born; BPI = Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Indian ethnicity; full group definitions reported in Section 3.

Table 4: NS-SEC among older cohort in 2011 by group

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Unemp**	**Not class**	**Total**
	Row %	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*
Everyone except EA-BPI	9.8	20.8	14.0	12.5	7.6	16.8	14.7	3.6	0.2	100.0
UK born	9.8	20.9	14.4	12.4	7.8	17.0	14.8	2.7	0.2	100.0
Non UK-born BPI	8.2	9.7	7.6	14.8	5.5	14.4	16.4	23.1	0.3	100.0
Non UK-born except BPI	10.3	22.7	11.5	13.0	6.3	15.1	12.8	7.9	0.4	100.0
UK-born BPI	8.2	19.1	10.2	12.6	5.7	15.5	12.4	15.0	1.2	100.0
BPI born in BPI	7.6	8.7	5.8	14.4	5.3	13.7	17.2	26.9	0.3	100.0
BPI born in EA	10.2	13.5	14.6	16.5	5.9	17.1	13.0	9.0	0.2	100.0
Total	9.8	20.8	14.0	12.5	7.6	16.8	14.7	3.6	0.2	100.0

Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. *N*=8,381,898. 'Unemp' = Unemployed; 'Not class' = Not classified (including full time students). EA = East-African born; BPI = Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Indian ethnicity; full group definitions reported in Section 3.

Table 5: Employment status among older cohort in 2011 by group

	Emp	**Self-emp**	**Unemp**	**Inact**	**Total**
	Row %	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*
Everyone except EA-BPI	32.1	10.0	1.7	56.2	100.0
UK born	32.1	9.9	1.6	56.4	100.0
Non UK-born BPI	24.4	11.2	2.5	61.9	100.0
Non UK-born except BPI	34.0	11.2	2.6	52.1	100.0
UK-born BPI	32.7	10.3	2.8	54.1	100.0
BPI born in BPI	21.3	10.6	2.3	65.7	100.0
BPI born in EA	35.8	13.6	2.9	47.7	100.0
Total	32.1	10.0	1.7	56.2	100.0

Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. *N*=8,381,898. 'Self-emp' = Self-employed; 'Unemp' = Unemployed. EA = East-African born; BPI = Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Indian ethnicity; full group definitions reported in Section 3.

Table 6: NS-SEC among younger cohort in 2011 by group

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Unemp**	**Not class**	**Total**
	Row %	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*
Everyone except EA-BPI	12.3	24.0	13.4	12.0	7.2	14.1	11.1	5.0	0.9	100.0
UK born	12.2	24.6	14.1	11.8	7.4	14.2	11.0	4.0	0.7	100.0
Non UK-born BPI	10.3	12.7	8.6	16.5	6.0	13.4	12.2	19.3	1.0	100.0
Non UK-born except BPI	13.6	22.4	9.9	12.2	6.2	13.4	11.2	8.8	2.3	100.0
UK-born BPI	14.9	21.3	14.1	13.3	4.6	12.0	7.8	10.2	1.8	100.0
BPI born in BPI	8.9	11.0	6.5	17.0	6.3	13.4	13.2	22.6	1.1	100.0
BPI born in EA	16.5	20.2	17.7	13.9	4.8	13.3	7.8	5.1	0.6	100.0
Total	12.3	24.0	13.5	12.0	7.2	14.1	11.1	5.0	0.9	100.0

Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. *N*=12,274,571. 'Unemp' = Unemployed; 'Not class' = Not classified (including full time students). EA = East-African born; BPI = Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Indian ethnicity; full group definitions reported in Section 3.

Table 7: Employment status among younger cohort in 2011 by group

	Emp	**Self-emp**	**Unemp**	**Inact**	**Total**
	Row %	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*
Everyone except EA-BPI	66.4	14.1	4.2	15.3	100.0
UK born	67.7	13.8	3.9	14.5	100.0
Non UK-born BPI	48.6	17.5	5.2	28.7	100.0
Non UK-born except BPI	60.9	15.3	6.0	17.8	100.0
UK-born BPI	58.8	16.7	5.3	19.2	100.0
BPI born in BPI	45.2	17.4	5.4	32.0	100.0
BPI born in EA	63.1	18.2	4.3	14.5	100.0
Total	66.4	14.1	4.2	15.3	100.0

Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. *N*=12,274,571. 'Self-emp' = Self-employed; 'Unemp' = Unemployed. EA = East-African born; BPI = Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Indian ethnicity; full group definitions reported in Section 3.

Table 8: Qualifications among younger cohort in 2011 by group

	No Quals	**Level 1**	**Level 2**	**Level 3**	**Level 4+**	**Other**	**Total**
	Row %	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*
Everyone except EA-BPI	16.0	17.6	16.0	11.3	30.4	8.7	100.0
UK born	15.7	18.9	17.1	11.8	29.5	6.9	100.0
Non UK-born BPI	30.7	11.9	7.9	5.1	25.3	19.1	100.0
Non UK-born except BPI	14.0	9.3	10.0	8.5	38.5	19.7	100.0
UK-born BPI	15.8	18.8	13.6	9.6	35.0	7.3	100.0
BPI born in BPI	34.6	10.5	6.4	4.1	23.1	21.3	100.0
BPI born in EA	13.7	18.1	14.7	9.6	34.6	9.4	100.0
Total	16.0	17.6	16.0	11.3	30.4	8.7	100.0

Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. *N*=12,274,571. EA = East-African born; BPI = Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Indian ethnicity; full group definitions reported in Section 3.

Figure 1: NS-SEC by group between BPI-EA and everyone else



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Un.' = Unemployed; 'N/C' = Not classified (including full time students).

Figure 2: Economic status by group BPI-EA and everyone else



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Emp.' = Employed; 'Self-emp' = Self-employed; 'Unemp.' = Unemployed.

Figure 3: Education level by group BPI-EA and everyone else



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3.

Figure 4: NS-SEC by group to test immigration research question



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Un.' = Unemployed; 'N/C' = Not classified (including full time students).

Figure 5: Economic status by group to test immigration research question



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Emp.' = Employed; 'Self-emp' = Self-employed; 'Unemp.' = Unemployed.

Figure 6: Education level by group to test immigration research question



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3.

Figure 7: NS-SEC by group to test ethnicity research question



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Un.' = Unemployed; 'N/C' = Not classified (including full time students).

Figure 8: Economic status by group to test ethnicity research question



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Emp.' = Employed; 'Self-emp' = Self-employed; 'Unemp.' = Unemployed.

Figure 9: Education level by group to test ethnicity research question



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3.

Figure 10: NS-SEC by group to test refugee research question



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Un.' = Unemployed; 'N/C' = Not classified (including full time students).

Figure 11: Economic status by group to test refugee research question



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Emp.' = Employed; 'Self-emp' = Self-employed; 'Unemp.' = Unemployed.

Figure 12: Education level by group to test refugee research question



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. Education level measured using NVQ

Appendix A: Comparison with UK Born

Figure 13: NS-SEC by group between BPI-EA and UK-born



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Un.' = Unemployed; 'N/C' = Not classified (including full time students).

Figure 14: Economic status by group BPI-EA and UK-born



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Emp.' = Employed; 'Self-emp' = Self-employed; 'Unemp.' = Unemployed.

Figure 15: Education level by group BPI-EA and UK-born



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3.

Appendix B: Analysis of 2001 Census

Table 9: Individuals in each group in each cohort - 2001

Group / Cohort	Older	Younger	Total
Everyone except EA-BPI	12204687	8973601	37227190
UK born	10852676	8146830	27230609
Non UK-born BPI	355169	204891	560060
Non UK-born except BPI	1070015	664397	1734412
UK-born BPI	111614	19881	131495
BPI born in BPI	281996	162374	444370
BPI born in EA	73173	42517	115690
Total	12277860	9016118	21293978

Table 10: NS-SEC among older cohort in 2001 by group

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Unemp**	**Not class**	**Total**
	Row %	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*
Every one except EA-BPI	9.3	21.6	9.8	10.7	8.0	13.4	10.7	3.2	13.3	100.0
UK born	9.2	21.7	10.0	10.7	8.2	13.5	10.8	2.5	13.3	100.0
Non UK-born BPI	8.2	10.0	5.4	12.8	4.9	12.0	11.4	21.5	13.8	100.0
Non UK-born except BPI	10.8	23.2	8.5	10.8	6.1	12.3	8.7	6.5	13.1	100.0
UK-born BPI	7.9	17.5	7.6	11.0	5.5	12.5	10.0	12.3	15.7	100.0
BPI born in BPI	7.8	8.5	4.0	11.9	4.5	11.6	12.0	25.2	14.5	100.0
BPI born in EA	9.6	15.8	10.6	15.9	6.5	13.7	9.2	7.4	11.4	100.0
Total	9.3	21.5	9.8	10.7	8.0	13.4	10.7	3.3	13.3	100.0

Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. *N*=9,016,118. 'Unemp' = Unemployed; 'Not class' = Not classified (including full time students). EA = East-African born; BPI = Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Indian ethnicity; full group definitions reported in Section 3.

Table 11: NS-SEC among younger cohort in 2001 by group

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**Unemp**	**Not class**	**Total**
	Row %	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*
Everyone except EA-BPI	12.1	24.7	10.9	8.8	8.7	13.2	9.8	4.2	7.6	100.0
UK born	11.7	25.0	11.2	8.8	9.1	13.4	10.0	3.3	7.4	100.0
Non UK-born BPI	11.5	12.5	6.8	12.2	5.4	13.4	11.4	20.1	6.7	100.0
Non UK-born except BPI	17.0	24.8	9.2	8.3	5.8	10.6	6.6	8.2	9.5	100.0
UK-born BPI	15.5	21.7	11.8	9.5	5.4	11.7	6.7	9.5	8.2	100.0
BPI born in BPI	9.9	9.9	4.9	12.1	5.4	13.8	12.8	24.3	6.9	100.0
BPI born in EA	17.5	22.4	14.1	12.4	5.7	11.7	6.4	4.0	5.8	100.0
Total	12.1	24.7	10.9	8.9	8.7	13.2	9.8	4.2	7.6	100.0

Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. *N*=12,277,860. 'Unemp' = Unemployed; 'Not class' = Not classified (including full time students). EA = East-African born; BPI = Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Indian ethnicity; full group definitions reported in Section 3.

Table 12: Qualifications among older cohort in 2001 by group

	No Quals	**Level 1**	**Level 2**	**Level 3**	**Level 4+**	**Other**	**Total**
	Row %	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*
Everyone except EA-BPI	37.9	12.7	13.4	4.7	18.7	12.5	100.0
UK born	38.1	13.2	13.6	4.5	17.6	13.0	100.0
Non UK-born BPI	51.9	8.0	9.0	3.9	22.1	5.0	100.0
Non UK-born except BPI	31.3	8.3	12.4	7.8	31.6	8.6	100.0
UK-born BPI	38.2	10.6	11.9	5.2	27.9	6.2	100.0
BPI born in BPI	56.6	6.5	6.4	3.3	22.3	4.9	100.0
BPI born in EA	33.8	14.0	19.1	6.0	21.5	5.6	100.0
Total	37.9	12.8	13.4	4.7	18.7	12.5	100.0

Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. *N*=9,016,118. EA = East-African born; BPI = Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Indian ethnicity; full group definitions reported in Section 3.

Table 13: Qualifications among younger cohort in 2001 by group

	No Quals	**Level 1**	**Level 2**	**Level 3**	**Level 4+**	**Other**	**Total**
	Row %	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*
Everyone except EA-BPI	18.3	24.4	21.6	7.0	23.8	5.0	100.0
UK born	17.8	26.0	22.6	6.8	21.9	4.9	100.0
Non UK-born BPI	41.3	12.1	11.1	4.7	26.0	4.7	100.0
Non UK-born except BPI	15.7	11.1	14.6	10.1	42.7	5.9	100.0
UK-born BPI	17.9	20.1	18.9	7.3	32.1	3.7	100.0
BPI born in BPI	47.8	10.5	8.4	3.8	24.8	4.8	100.0
BPI born in EA	16.5	18.4	21.7	8.2	30.9	4.3	100.0
Total	18.3	24.3	21.6	7.0	23.8	5.0	100.0

Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. *N*=12,277,860. EA = East-African born; BPI = Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Indian ethnicity; full group definitions reported in Section 3.

Table 14: Employment status among older cohort in 2001 by group

	Emp	**Self-emp**	**Unemp**	**Inact**	**Total**
	Row %	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*
Everyone except EA-BPI	57.9	12.6	2.8	26.8	100.0
UK born	58.7	12.5	2.7	26.2	100.0
Non UK-born BPI	37.8	14.3	4.4	43.5	100.0
Non UK-born except BPI	53.5	13.6	4.2	28.7	100.0
UK-born BPI	46.5	12.9	4.7	35.9	100.0
BPI born in BPI	34.1	13.3	4.5	48.0	100.0
BPI born in EA	51.7	18.3	3.9	26.2	100.0
Total	57.8	12.6	2.8	26.8	100.0

Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. *N*=9,016,118. 'Self-emp' = Self-employed; 'Unemp' = Unemployed. EA = East-African born; BPI = Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Indian ethnicity; full group definitions reported in Section 3.

Table 15: Employment status among younger cohort in 2001 by group

	Emp	**Self-emp**	**Unemp**	**Inact**	**Total**
	Row %	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*	*Row %*
Everyone except EA-BPI	67.9	10.8	3.7	17.5	100.0
UK born	69.4	10.7	3.5	16.5	100.0
Non UK-born BPI	48.7	13.9	5.3	32.0	100.0
Non UK-born except BPI	59.9	11.3	5.5	23.4	100.0
UK-born BPI	59.3	12.3	5.3	23.2	100.0
BPI born in BPI	44.6	13.0	5.8	36.6	100.0
BPI born in EA	64.8	17.5	3.4	14.3	100.0
Total	67.9	10.9	3.7	17.5	100.0

Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. *N*=12,277,860. 'Self-emp' = Self-employed; 'Unemp' = Unemployed. EA = East-African born; BPI = Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Indian ethnicity; full group definitions reported in Section 3.

Figure 16: NS-SEC by group between BPI-EA and everyone else - 2001



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Un.' = Unemployed; 'N/C' = Not classified (including full time students).

Figure 17: Economic status by group BPI-EA and everyone else - 2001



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Emp.' = Employed; 'Self-emp' = Self-employed; 'Unemp.' = Unemployed.

Figure 18: Education level by group BPI-EA and everyone else - 2001



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3.

Figure 19: NS-SEC by group to test immigration research question - 2001



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Un.' = Unemployed; 'N/C' = Not classified (including full time students).

Figure 20: Economic status by group to test immigration research question - 2001



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Emp.' = Employed; 'Self-emp' = Self-employed; 'Unemp.' = Unemployed.

Figure 21: Education level by group to test immigration research question - 2001



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3.

Figure 22: NS-SEC by group to test ethnicity research question - 2001



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Un.' = Unemployed; 'N/C' = Not classified (including full time students).

Figure 23: Economic status by group to test ethnicity research question - 2001



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Emp.' = Employed; 'Self-emp' = Self-employed; 'Unemp.' = Unemployed.

Figure 24: Education level by group to test ethnicity research question - 2001



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3.

Figure 25: NS-SEC by group to test refugee research question - 2001



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Un.' = Unemployed; 'N/C' = Not classified (including full time students).

Figure 26: Economic status by group to test refugee research question - 2001



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Emp.' = Employed; 'Self-emp' = Self-employed; 'Unemp.' = Unemployed.

Figure 27: Education level by group to test refugee research question - 2001



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. Education level measured using NVQ

Figure 28: NS-SEC by group between BPI-EA and UK-born - 2001



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Un.' = Unemployed; 'N/C' = Not classified (including full time students).

Figure 29: Economic status by group BPI-EA and UK-born - 2001



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3. 'Emp.' = Employed; 'Self-emp' = Self-employed; 'Unemp.' = Unemployed.

Figure 30: Education level by group BPI-EA and UK-born - 2001



Notes: Source: Aggregate data from UK Census provided by Office for National Statistics ©Crown Copyright 2015. Full group definitions and sample sizes reported in Section 3.