

1 Title Page (with Author Details)

2 Title: Insights into Blockchain Implementation in Construction: Models for 3 Supply Chain Management

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28 **Insights into Blockchain Implementation in Construction: Models for Supply** 29 **Chain Management**

30 **Abstract**

31 The interest in the implementation of distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) is on the rise in the
32 construction sector. One specific type of DLT that has recently attracted much attention is blockchain.
33 Blockchain has been mostly discussed conceptually for construction to date. This study presents some
34 empirical discussions on supply chain management (SCM) applications of blockchain for construction
35 by collecting feedback for three blockchain-based models for Project Bank Accounts (PBAs) for
36 payments, Reverse Auction-based Tendering for bidding and Asset Tokenization for project financing.
37 The feedback was collected from three focus groups and a workshop. The working prototypes for the
38 models were developed on Ethereum. The implementation of blockchain in payment arrangements
39 was found more straightforward than in tendering and project tokenization workflows. However,
40 blockchainization of those workflows may have large-scale impacts on the sector in the future. A broad
41 set of general and model specific benefits/opportunities and requirements/challenges was also
42 identified for blockchain in construction. Some of these include streamlined, transparent transactions
43 and rational trust-building, and the need for challenging the sector culture, upscaling legacy IT systems
44 and compliance with the regulatory structures.

45 **Keywords:** blockchain; construction; supply chain management; models; Ethereum

46 47 **Introduction**

48 There is a surge in the interest in distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) in the construction sector
49 (Elghaish et al., 2020; Li et al., 2019; Nawari and Ravindran, 2019; Wang et al., 2020). DLT is a digital
50 system for recording the transaction of assets in which the transactions and their details are recorded
51 in multiple places at the same time on a network of computers (Kuo et al., 2017). One specific type of
52 DLT that has recently gained prominence is blockchain, a peer-to-peer, distributed data storage
53 (ledger) structure that allows transactional data to be recorded chronologically in a chain of data
54 blocks using cryptographic hash codes. It is the underpinning technology of the world's first
55 cryptocurrency, *Bitcoin* (Nakamoto, 2008). When a transaction is executed over blockchain, the

56 transaction is packed with other transactions in a block. The validator nodes (miners) – computers
57 connected by a specific blockchain network - analyze the transaction and validate the block by a
58 predefined consensus protocol. Each identified block is then recorded with a unique crypto-identifying
59 hash code and linked with the preceding chain of blocks on the network. The key aspects of blockchain
60 are (Turk and Klinc, 2017): (i) decentralization, functioning across a peer-to-peer (P2P) network built
61 up of computers as nodes; (ii) immutability, once blocks are chained; (iii) reliability, provided all nodes
62 have the same copy of the blockchain that is checked through an algorithm; and (iv) a proof-of-work
63 procedure that is applied to authenticate the transactions and uses a mathematical and deterministic
64 currency issuance process to reward its miners. Blockchain's core innovation lies in its ability to
65 publicly validate, record and distribute transactions in immutable ledgers (Swan, 2015). Therefore,
66 many regard blockchain as a disruptive technology and believe that it will have profound effects on
67 various sectors by allowing individuals, organizations and machines to transact with each other over
68 the internet without having to trust each other or use a third-party verification (Wang et al., 2019).

69 Construction is deemed to be a low-productivity/low-innovation sector (Ozorhon et al., 2014)
70 with one the lowest research and development activity (Oesterreich and Teuteberg, 2016). McKinsey
71 Global Institute reports a global productivity gap of \$1.6 trillion USD can be tackled by improving the
72 performance of construction (Barbosa et al., 2017). For blockchain to gain a foothold in the sector, it
73 needs to address some of the construction's key challenges such as structural fragmentation,
74 adversarial pricing models and financial fragility (Hall et al., 2018), dysfunctional funding and delivery
75 models, lack of trust and transparency (Li et al., 2019), the inability to secure funding for projects
76 (Woodhead et al., 2018), corruption and unethical behavior (Barbosa et al., 2017), and deficient
77 payment practices leading to disputes and business failures (Wang et al., 2017).

78 As of January 2020, a blockchain keyword search yields approximately 8700 publications on the
79 *Scopus* database; only a very few of which are within the construction and built environment (BE)
80 domains, despite the recent interest in blockchain research and application (start-ups) (Lam and Fu,
81 2019; Li et al., 2019). Moreover, most of the existing blockchain discussions in construction are

82 conceptual (Hunhevicz and Hall, 2020; Li et al., 2019). Lack of empirical discussions, working
83 prototypes and actual **implementation** cases are conspicuous (Hunhevicz and Hall, 2020). Collecting
84 empirical evidence and insights for blockchain in construction is therefore necessary (Das et al., 2020;
85 Shemov et al., 2020). This paper presents some empirical discussions as research outcomes on the
86 **implementation** of blockchain **in SCM** in construction. Hence, the aim of the study is to explore
87 whether blockchain can help the construction sector overcome some of its key challenges by
88 developing and collecting feedback for three blockchain-based SCM models (working prototypes) for
89 empirical research.

90 **Research background**

91 Blockchain deployment outside finance has been experimental with testing efforts by large
92 organizations like Hyundai, Walmart, Tata Steel, **BP** and Royal Dutch Shell (Kshetri, 2018; Wang et al.,
93 2019). SCM is a strong fit for blockchain and will be affected by it (Kshetri, 2018; O'Leary, 2017;
94 Treiblmaier, 2018; Wang et al., 2019), where blockchain may facilitate the main SCM targets of
95 regulatory cost reduction (O'Leary, 2017), speed (Perera et al., 2020), dependability, risk reduction,
96 sustainability (Kshetri, 2018), flexibility (Kim and Laskowski, 2018), transparency (Francisco and
97 Swanson, 2018), sense-making, trust-building and reduction of complexities (Wang et al., 2019).

98 The technology will affect the structure and governance of supply chains as well as relationship
99 configurations and information sharing between supply chain actors (Wang et al., 2019). It is therefore
100 important to experiment with new SCM models for blockchain to better understand its implications
101 (Queiroz and Wamba, 2019; Treiblmaier, 2018). There are also serious challenges before blockchain
102 implementations in SCM (Kshetri, 2018; Sulkowski, 2019): **complex, multi-party global supply chain**
103 **environment operating on diverse laws and regulation, integration challenges relating to bringing all**
104 **the relevant parties together, and controlling the boundary between the physical and virtual world for**
105 **fraudulent activities.** Wang et al. (2019) group these challenges under five main categories: (i) cost,
106 privacy, legal and security issues; (ii) technological and network interoperability issues; (iii) data input

107 and information sharing issues; (iv) cultural, procedural, governance and collaboration issues; and (v)
108 confidence and related necessity issues.

109 Blockchain research in the BE is progressing over seven strands (Li et al., 2019): (i) smart energy;
110 (ii) smart cities and the sharing economy; (iii) smart government; (iv) smart homes; (v) intelligent
111 transport; (vi) **Building Information Modeling (BIM)** and construction management; and (vii) business
112 models and organizational structures. Despite blockchain's potential, various general challenges and
113 requirements for blockchain have been identified for the construction sector such as identifying high-
114 value application areas (Wang et al., 2017), developing practical implementation strategies and plans,
115 ensuring resource, process and workforce readiness (Li et al., 2018), compliance with regulations and
116 laws (Li et al., 2019), upscaling legacy IT systems, and capturing and documenting benefits and issues
117 in practice (Tezel et al., 2020). **The potential blockchain benefits and challenges outlined for**
118 **construction supply chains are in line with the blockchain discussions in the general SCM literature**
119 (Heiskanen, 2017; Perera et al., 2020). Procurement (Barima, 2017; Heiskanen, 2017), payments
120 (Barima, 2017), financing of projects (Elghaish et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2017), and real and digital
121 product/component tracking (Turk and Klinc, 2017; Wang et al., 2020) come to the fore as potential
122 blockchain application areas for construction supply chains.

123 A key area of interest in this domain is the application of smart contracts with blockchain
124 **(Ahmadisheykhsarmast and Sonmez, 2020)**. A smart contract is a self-executing contract with the
125 terms of the agreement between buyer and seller being directly written into lines of code. The code
126 and the agreements contained therein exist across a DLT (Mason, 2017). Smart-contracts are created
127 by accounts (addresses) and can only be updated by their owners. There exists among practitioners a
128 fear of the unknown and the doubt that a full contract automation and reduction in contractual
129 disputes are possible when value (money) transaction is involved in particular, with an
130 acknowledgement that smart contracts and blockchain could be beneficial for simple supply-type
131 contracts and for reducing the amount of paperwork involved in contract administration (Cardeira,
132 2015; Mason, 2017; Mason and Escott, 2018). Although their outputs are not directly observable, **Badi**

133 et al. (2020) suggest that smart-contracts can be applied to construction in a bilateral fashion between
134 supply chain actors.

135 The fragmentation of construction requires a higher integration and trust in supply chains for
136 better sector performance (Koolwijk et al., 2018). From a wider perspective, trust-building in
137 construction supply chains has been mostly narrated through a relational view focusing on the actors
138 and their interrelations to improve trust and information flows across supply chains (Maciel, 2020).
139 Blockchain shows potential in transforming the trust in construction supply chains from relational to
140 technological (Qian and Papadonikolaki, 2020). In short, blockchain applications can contribute to
141 building system-and cognition-based trust in construction supply chains reducing the need for setting
142 up relation-based trust (Qian and Papadonikolaki, 2020).

143 The research project of which this paper is one of the outcomes is concerned with developing
144 blockchain-based SCM models for the construction sector. They are very few discussions available in
145 the literature on models or working prototypes in this respect (Wang et al., 2020; Woodhead et al.,
146 2018). Furthermore, it is recommended that researchers and practitioners validate first whether a
147 blockchain-based solution would be suitable for their needs using one of the DLT decision-making
148 frameworks (Li et al., 2019; Mulligan et al., 2018). Following that validation process, Li et al. (2019)
149 previously identified the suitability of Project Bank Accounts (PBAs) for blockchain; however, the
150 authors did not present any model or working prototype for PBAs. Building on these scarce discussions
151 in the field, the authors of this paper initially ran a two-day scoping workshop in Northern England in
152 early spring 2019 with two experienced construction project managers with interest in and knowledge
153 of DLTs, and two experienced DLT developers. After reviewing and exploring some available
154 candidates from the literature and practice in terms of technical feasibility, value and validity, three
155 blockchain-based prototypes for Project Bank Accounts (PBAs) for supply chain payments, Reverse
156 Auction-based Tendering for procurement and bidding, and Asset Tokenization for project financing
157 (crowdfunding) were developed for blockchain integration. There is an optional link between the PBA
158 and Reverse-Auction based Tendering model as explained in the subsequent sections (see Figure 8).

159 The Asset Tokenization model was envisioned on the premise that funders or donators are part of a
160 project supply chain. Similarly, the models were developed targeting mainly
161 clients/owners/developers as the main users. The models are grouped under the general name of
162 SCM as the main domain, as payment, procurement and project financing practices can be categorized
163 under SCM in construction (Briscoe and Dainty, 2005).

164 For the blockchain infrastructure of the prototypes, the public and permissionless Ethereum
165 blockchain was adopted for its scalability, relatively fast processing times and transaction affordability
166 (Yang et al., 2020). As of October 2019, the Ethereum blockchain could process about 50 transactions
167 per second with an average time of 20 to 60 seconds for a transaction (Etherscan, 2019). The situation
168 of a transaction can be easily tracked online (e.g. <https://etherscan.io/>) using crypto addresses or
169 transaction hash codes. As of October 2019, the average and median fees for an Ethereum transaction
170 were \$0.119 USD and \$0.066 USD respectively (BitInfoCharts.com, 2019). As explained in the research
171 method section, the models were coded with Ethereum integration, deployed online as prototypes
172 and tested/reviewed with practitioners and academics for feedback after this initial scoping workshop.

173 **Project Bank Accounts**

174 Delayed or retained payments represent one of the major problems for the construction sector
175 (Mason and Escott, 2018; Wang et al., 2017; Yap et al., 2019). A PBA is a ring-fenced bank account
176 from which payments are made directly and simultaneously to the members of a hierarchical
177 contracting supply chain with the aim of completing payments in five days or less from the due date
178 (Cabinet Office, 2012). This eases cash flow through the system and supports closer working within
179 the supply chain. According to Griffiths et al. (2017:325):

180 *“Under a PBA arrangement, the main contractor submits its progress payment to the client under the*
181 *main contract showing a breakdown of payments to each of the suppliers. Once approved, the client*
182 *pays the total amount of the progress payment into the PBA, and payment is then made out of the PBA*
183 *to each of the suppliers with the dual agreement of the client and main contractor. Direct payment to*
184 *the suppliers from a PBA enables the traditional lengthy contractual payment credit terms, which*

185 *typically exist in subcontracts within the construction industry, to be bypassed ensuring a much quicker*
186 *flow of funds down through the supply chain. “*

187 According to a study commissioned by the Office of Government Commerce of the UK, public
188 sector projects could expect to save up to 2.5% with PBAs through reduction for cash collection, cash
189 flow risk certainty and Trade Indemnity Insurance (Office of Government Commerce, 2007). However,
190 there have been doubts expressed questioning whether such a saving is realistic (Griffiths et al., 2017).
191 Additionally, the Cabinet Office of the UK underlines some knock-on benefits such as greater
192 productivity and reduction in construction disputes, and supply chain failures (Cabinet Office, 2012).
193 In 2012, it was announced that Government Construction Board in the UK had committed to deliver
194 £4 billion worth of construction projects using PBAs by 2018 (Cabinet Office, 2012). In 2014, it was
195 announced that £5.2 billion worth public construction projects were being paid through PBAs in the
196 UK (Morby, 2014). In 2016, the Scottish government announced that PBAs would be used on all of its
197 building projects valued more than £4 million. In 2017, the Welsh government announced that PBAs
198 would be used on all public building projects over £2 million.

199 **Reverse Auctions**

200 In the procurement of goods and services, different types of auctions (e.g. English auctions
201 (ascending), Dutch auctions (descending), sealed first price auctions, sealed second price auctions,
202 and candle auctions) are being used. In recent years, electronic auctions have been popular due to
203 their convenience and efficiency (Chen et al., 2018). Strategic valuation, communication, winner and
204 payment determination are critical issues while executing open-bid auctions (Chandrashekar et al.,
205 2007). Electronic reverse auctions as a form of auction for supply chain procurement have been
206 adopted widely in many sectors with price benefits of the order of 20% through price competition
207 (Wamuziri, 2009). Reverse auctions are essentially Dutch auctions where the auctioneer starts by
208 setting a relatively high price that is then successively lowered until a bidder is prepared to accept the
209 offer (Shalev and Asbjornsen, 2010). A reverse auction involves an auctioneer setting the starting bid
210 and inviting bidders, who are generally pre-qualified suppliers, to compete in successive rounds of

211 downward bidding. The auction will close when no new bids are received and the closing time has
212 expired (Wamuziri, 2009).

213 The process is relatively simple, straightforward, reasonably quick, iterative as competitors are
214 able to submit more than one bid, and provides price competition (Hatipkarasulu and Gill Jr, 2004;
215 Wamuziri and Abu-Shaaban, 2005). However, service providers, suppliers and contractors in particular
216 are concerned with the structure of electronic auction systems that is prone to unethical behavior like
217 bid shopping (i.e., disclosure of the lowest bid received to pressure other bidders to submit even lower
218 bid) and shill bidding (i.e., when someone bids on a product or service to artificially increase or
219 decrease its price) (Majadi et al., 2017; Wamuziri, 2009). Therefore, reverse auctions are deemed
220 better suited to perishable items such as hand tools and consumables, in other words, for items and
221 services for which many suppliers of similar utility or quality features are available in the market (Pham
222 et al., 2015). To help resolve the trust problem and to eliminate the third-party intermediary costs for
223 the auction validation, it is suggested that blockchain can be **adopted** for public and sealed bids (Chen
224 et al., 2018; Galal and Youssef, 2018).

225 ***Asset Tokenization (Crowdfunding)***

226 Crowdfunding is a financing method which allows entrepreneurs, small businesses or projects,
227 through a crowdfunding platform, to collect funds from a large number of contributors in the form of
228 investment or donation. In comparison to the conventional funding collected from a small group of
229 high-level investors, each individual funder normally needs to invest only a small amount. Therefore,
230 a crowdfunding platform obviates the need for conventional intermediaries such as banks which are
231 often an obstacle to access financing, especially for small and innovative enterprises (Belleflamme et
232 al., 2014; Dorfleitner et al., 2017). Furthermore, the costs of crowdfunding platforms are lower than
233 finance institutions' (Lam and Law, 2016). There are four distinct crowdfunding forms. These are
234 donation-based crowdfunding, reward-based crowdfunding, crowdlending, and equity crowdfunding
235 (Dorfleitner et al., 2017). Asset tokenization involves turning a tangible or intangible asset into a digital
236 token for crowdfunding where the associated ownership and transactions are recorded on blockchain

237 for immutability and security. Tokenizing assets can help simplify fundraising, especially for start-ups,
238 small businesses, or non-traditional, innovative enterprises. In theory, companies and individuals can
239 sell tokens as if they are stock interests by-passing the onerous rules and regulations of the finance
240 sector.

241

242 **Research Methodology**

243 This study follows the **Design Science Research (DSR)** methodology. The methodology differs to other
244 explanatory approaches, and tends to focus on describing, explaining and predicting the current
245 natural or social world, by not only understanding problems, but also designing solutions to improve
246 human performance (Van Aken, 2005). It involves a rigorous process to design artefacts to solve
247 observed problems, to make research contributions, to evaluate the designs, and to communicate the
248 results to appropriate audiences (Hevner and Chatterjee, 2010). The DSR process commonly involves
249 the problem identification and motivation, design and development, demonstration, evaluation and
250 communication elements (Peppers et al., 2007). Due to its applied character, DSR is **adopted** for
251 problem solving in real world through innovation and creation of solutions. Such solutions could be
252 artefacts, theoretical models, algorithms, process models that can contribute to creating new theories
253 (Peppers et al., 2007). Three blockchain-based working prototypes (i.e., Project Bank Accounts, Reverse
254 Auction-based Tendering and Asset Tokenization) were developed for this study as DSR artefacts.

255 To ensure relevance to the real world, this study has adopted an iterative research process with
256 feedback loops from application to development (Holmström et al., 2009). To this end, the research
257 process was divided into the following stages and steps, considering the DSR elements:

- 258 • ***Stage 1: problem setting/understanding - for problem identification and motivation, and***
259 ***initial artefact design and development***
 - 260 ○ *Step 1: Literature review*
 - 261 ○ *Step 2: Scoping workshop*
 - 262 ○ *Step 3: Initial model development*

- 263 • **Stage 2: artefact development -for detailed artefact design and development**
- 264 ○ *Step 4: Detailed model development and coding for Ethereum*
- 265 • **Stage 3: analysis and testing – for demonstration, evaluation and communication**
- 266 ○ *Step 5: Three focus groups for model validation and feedback collection*
- 267 ○ *Step6: One workshop for model validation and feedback collection*

268 Stage 1 starts with problem identification and motivation. At this stage, there is a need to carry
269 out primary research to investigate and determine the nature and prevalence of the problem. The
270 research could involve self-interpretation through reflection or an initial literature review (Hevner and
271 Chatterjee, 2010). Diagnosing the problem was achieved through the existing knowledge base by
272 reviewing the literature (Step 1) (scientific articles, industry reports, and code snippets).
273 Consequently, no substantial exemplary use cases or working prototypes for blockchain-based SCM
274 models for construction were identified. March and Smith (1995) suggest that DSR artefacts need to
275 be evaluated against the criteria of value or utility, which are adopted in this study. To guarantee the
276 utility of the artefacts, the theoretical input was combined with input from practice, first through the
277 initial scoping workshop (Step 2) later in Stage 1, and then through the analysis and testing of the
278 artefacts in Stage 3. The initial scoping workshop helped define the scope, focus and objective of the
279 solution(s), which is to enhance the identified SCM practices in the construction sector through
280 blockchain.

281 In Stage 2, considering the aforementioned objective, the artefacts were developed in terms of
282 their frontend/backend coding, online deployment and testing (Step 4). Creating a technological
283 solution in DSR requires that the process can be automated and the solution facilitates a
284 change/improvement in current work practices (Hevner et al., 2004).

285 In Stage 3, the artefacts were analyzed through three focus groups and a workshop with 28
286 participants for feedback collection following a protocol as suggested in construction management
287 and automation research (Hamid et al., 2018; Osman, 2012; Tetik et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2014). The
288 utility of DSR artefacts must be demonstrated via evaluation methods (Hevner et al., 2004). The focus

289 group and workshop participants were asked of the potential of the artefacts (working prototype
290 models) in enhancing and improving the current SCM applications in question as well as the
291 applicability of the artefacts in practice. See **Table 1** and **Table 2** for details of the focus group and
292 workshop participants respectively.

293 Interaction and collaboration are key aspects of this type of evaluation where the participants
294 and the evaluator can both ask questions while testing the artefacts, and the evaluator can guide the
295 participant in the right direction while using the prototypes. The focus group participants were given
296 the opportunity to directly interact with the prototypes after a demonstration. The prototypes were
297 demonstrated to the workshop participants on a large screen, and although they could not control the
298 prototypes directly, each element of the prototypes was gone through with the participants answering
299 their questions for each step. The research process can be seen in **Figure 1** with each step involved in
300 the three main stages and their objectives in brackets. The first feedback for the prototypes was
301 collected from the scoping workshop participants after finalizing the model development process
302 (Step 4). They recommended some model usability and interface related changes, which were
303 incorporated in the prototypes. Feedback was also collected from the analysis and testing stage (Stage
304 3), which is summarized in the model feedback and evaluation section. However, most of the
305 requirements/feedback from this stage is strategic, long-term focused and comprehensive in nature
306 requiring a full participation of supply chain stakeholders for future efforts.

307 **(Please insert Figure 1 around here)**

308

309 **(Please insert Table 1 around here)**

310

311 **(Please insert Figure 2 around here)**

312

313 **(Please insert Table 2 around here)**

314

315

(Please insert Figure 3 around here)

316

317 **Models Requirement and Development**

318 Model development details including the demand and justification for each model, the architectures

319 for the working prototypes, and their integration with Ethereum are explained in this section. The

320 development process took place over Stage 1 and Stage 2 in the research process (see **Figure 1**).

321 ***Project Bank Accounts (PBA) Model***

322 ***Demand for a PBA model and problem setting***

323 Smart contracts can embed funds into a contract which will protect contractors, subcontractors and

324 other supply chain members from insolvency (Wang et al., 2017). They could automate the -currently

325 manually administered- principles of payment under a PBA increasing efficiency, decreasing pay-out

326 time, and minimizing risk of fraud, back-office costs and operational risks (Nowiński and Kozma, 2017).

327 The appropriateness of the PBA arrangement for blockchain has recently been identified in the

328 literature (Li et al., 2019). However, no real model or working prototype has been identified to validate

329 such an arrangement. Therefore, the purpose of the proposed PBA model on blockchain is to

330 automate and streamline the payment process through a construction supply chain, and to render it

331 more secure, traceable and transparent.

332 ***Development of the PBA model***

333 The modelling requirements are that this payment model will be adopted mainly by public and large

334 client organizations as envisioned previously (Li et al., 2019), where upon the creation and approval

335 of a payment for a work package by the client, the payment is executed instantly over cryptocurrency

336 through the supply chain members. Therefore, a blockchain-based payment model mimicking PBAs

337 was developed as shown in **Figure 4**. The model was coded ([https://github.com/huddersfield-uni-](https://github.com/huddersfield-uni-smart-contracts/contract.eth)

338 [smart-contracts/contract.eth](https://github.com/huddersfield-uni-smart-contracts/contract.eth)) to integrate with Ethereum and deployed online ([https://contract-](https://contract-eth.herokuapp.com/)

339 [eth.herokuapp.com/](https://contract-eth.herokuapp.com/)) for demonstration and feedback collection purposes. The escrow arrangement

340 was adopted in the model, which is a financial arrangement where a party holds and regulates

341 payment of the funds required for two parties involved in a given transaction. It helps render

342 transactions more secure by keeping the payment in an escrow account which is only released when
343 all of the terms of an agreement are met as overseen by the escrow company (O'Neil, 1986).

344

345 **(Please insert Figure 4 around here)**

346

347 In **Figure 4**, the client (owner of the contract and the transaction executor) creates the initial
348 escrow smart-contract, which will detail the requirements needed to fulfil the contract. After being
349 approved by a validator, the client will build the second smart-contract for payments. The payments
350 smart-contract details the rules for payments to be executed for the supply chain members. The
351 accounts on the system are created and validated using each party's unique crypto-wallet code, a
352 unique code that allows cryptocurrency users to store and retrieve their digital assets, which is also
353 used for the value transaction. A validator is an account which approves/rejects transactions from the
354 client into the escrow. The validator could be a senior contract manager at the client organization or
355 a Tier 1 contractor responsible for supervising the task executions in the supply chain. The payment
356 smart-contract is responsible for holding the information about the payment variables. Payments can
357 be withheld for different reasons such as the work package not being completed to required standards
358 or problems arising. The task of the validator is to step in when there are disagreements, but
359 otherwise, the monetary flow should be left untouched. See **Figure 5** and **Figure 6** for the smart
360 contact creation and approval respectively.

361

362 **(Please insert Figure 5 around here)**

363

364 **(Please insert Figure 6 around here)**

365 Smart-contracts will authenticate and validate transactions on the blockchain network real-time
366 with full traceability of who does what and when. In addition to reducing contract execution related
367 disputes, which is very common in construction (Cheung and Pang, 2013), this system would also
368 reduce costs associated with administration of procurement. They instantly generate electronic
369 documents in contrast to the traditional process, which necessitates the use of hard copies of
370 documentation and authentication by a third party (Wang et al., 2019). The transactions of creating,
371 approving or rejecting the contracts, creating the second contract and making the payment to the
372 supply chain take approximately 80 -240 seconds by the prototype on Ethereum. For reference, bank

373 payments need between three to five working days for the payments to be fully processed and settled.
374 Comparisons between cryptocurrencies and credit/debit cards should be excluded, given the later are
375 payment processors, not payment settlers, a function executed only by banks.

376 ***Reverse Auction Model***

377 ***Demand for an Auction Model and Problem Setting***

378 Unlike PBAs, no comprehensive discussion on the suitability of electronic reverse auctions for
379 blockchain was identified from the literature. To check that suitability, the decision-making framework
380 developed by the **World Economic Forum (WEF)** (Mulligan et al., 2018) to support businesses in
381 assessing whether a blockchain or DLT-based solution would be suitable for their needs was used at
382 the initial scoping workshop. The decision-making framework was gone through with the scoping
383 workshop participants to validate the **implementation** of blockchain by answering the *yes-no*
384 questions shown in **Figure 7**. The green arrows on **Figure 7** represent the answers for each decision-
385 making point. Depending on the required level of transaction control and transparency, a strong case
386 for both public and semi-public/private blockchain was found for transaction recording.

387 **(Please insert Figure 7 around here)**

388

389 ***Development of the Auction Model***

390 After this initial validation, a blockchain-based reverse auction model was developed
391 (<https://github.com/huddersfield-uni-smart-contracts/auction.eth>) as shown in **Figure 8** to integrate
392 with Ethereum and deployed online (<https://auction-eth.herokuapp.com/>). As shown by Galal and
393 Youssef (2018) to apply smart contracts to the auction process, bidders submit homomorphic
394 commitments to their sealed bids on the contract. Subsequently, they reveal their commitments
395 secretly to the auctioneer via a public key encryption scheme. Then, according to the auction rules,
396 the auctioneer determines and announces the winner of the auction. After the winner is confirmed
397 by the validating party, and the workflow comes to an end, the escrow smart-contract as explained in
398 the PBA model could **optionally** manage the payment workflows to mimic PBAs. Both smart contracts

399 could be linked so that after the bidding process is completed, the winner can enjoy the continuous
400 advantages of having payments going through a linked smart contract.

401 In **Figure**, the purpose is to allow clients to deploy Auction smart-contracts so that approved
402 companies in the ListBid smart-contract can bid in work packages (quantities, milestones, payments
403 conditions) represented by the WorkPackage smart-contract. When a bid is accepted by the client,
404 that information is automatically recorded in a Procurement smart-contract that is only accessible by
405 the client and validators. The client creates a ClientCompany smart-contract with all information
406 regarding the transaction, which contains the work package information, auction results and can be
407 verified by anyone. The nodes represent the agents interacting in the smart-contracts. The agents can
408 be: (i) owners, as in the addresses (clients) responsible for creating the smart-contracts; or (ii)
409 companies, as in the agents that participate in the auction bidding. The company nodes represent
410 companies that are bidding for the work package. The client is able to short-list a few bidders and
411 invite them for further negotiation if need be. The transactions of creating the contracts, contract
412 bidding, accepting the winning and rejecting the losing bids, and contract finalization take
413 approximately 120 – 360 seconds on Ethereum, considering only the party with the most steps
414 (contract creator and finalizer) in the prototype.

415 **(Please insert Figure 8 around here)**

416

417 ***Asset Tokenization (crowdsale/crowdfunding) Model***

418 ***Demand for an Asset Tokenization Model and Problem Setting***

419 Transparent crowd-sale, commonly known in the crypto-sphere as a **Decentralized**
420 **Autonomous Initial Coin Offering (DAICO)**, is a decentralized way of raising funds within a
421 specific blockchain protocol – usually Ethereum – in order to develop a project, idea or
422 company (Adhami et al., 2018). The DAICO contract starts in a “contribution mode”, specifying
423 a mechanism by which anyone can contribute to the contract and receive tokens in exchange.
424 This could be a capped sale, an uncapped sale, a Dutch auction, an interactive coin offering

425 with dynamic per-person caps, or some other mechanism the team chooses. Once the
426 contribution period ends, the ability to contribute stops and the initial token balances are set.
427 From there on the tokens can become tradeable (Butterin, 2018). By creating a public sale,
428 communities could raise auditable funds for construction projects and allocate them
429 transparently to companies, developers and client organizations looking to take-on such
430 projects (crowdfunding) (Wang et al., 2017). This is also the purpose of the developed model.
431 Blockchain is well-suited for the financial and management needs of that kind of a token-
432 based asset transaction (Chen et al., 2018; Mason, 2017; Wang et al., 2017).

433 ***Development of the Asset Tokenization Model***

434 A blockchain-based project crowd-sale/crowdfunding model was developed as shown in
435 **Figure 9**. The model is considered to be used for either donation or investment purposes,
436 where upon the creation of the tokens for a project or its parts, the funds are collected and
437 tracked over crypto-tokens. The model was coded ([https://github.com/huddersfield-uni-smart-](https://github.com/huddersfield-uni-smart-contracts/tokenit.eth)
438 [contracts/tokenit.eth](https://github.com/huddersfield-uni-smart-contracts/tokenit.eth)) to integrate with Ethereum and deployed online ([https://token-](https://token-eth.herokuapp.com/)
439 [eth.herokuapp.com/](https://token-eth.herokuapp.com/)).

440

441 **(Please insert Figure 9 around here)**

442

443 In the proposed model (**Figure 9**), the party seeking investment (owner address) creates
444 a Token smart-contract which functions as “shares” or “representations of the money given
445 to complete a milestone”. After the approvals are put in place, a Whitelist smart-contract is
446 created to allow for previously approved addresses to participate in the crowd sale. This
447 means that the funders or donators might be able to participate in different stages of the
448 funding, depending on the investment seeking party’s needs. When the tokens are issued,
449 they can be destroyed or given utility depending on the purpose of the crowd sale. For

450 example, the tokens may enable companies to vote on how the money to be used or can be
451 traded for money in the future, much like regular shares. Depending on the purpose and goals
452 of each investment seeking party and milestone, the token-utility can be adjusted. In **Figure**
453 **9** for instance, after the Token and the Whitelist and Crowdsale contracts (Milestone 1 and
454 Milestone 2) are created, Company A participates in the initial milestone funding while
455 Company B participates in the second milestone funding. In **Figure 9**, the nodes represent the
456 agents interacting with the smart-contracts. Agents can be: (i) investment seeking parties, as
457 in the addresses (clients) responsible for creating the smart-contracts; or (ii) companies, as in
458 the agents that participate in the crowd sale. In this example, the client uses two different
459 owner accounts to manage the smart-contracts. This could be a security measure to avoid
460 one account owning all the decision-making power. The company nodes represent the
461 entities willing to fund the project.

462

463 **(Please insert Figure10 around here)**

464

465 The tokenization smart-contract will enable individuals and organizations to fund projects by
466 milestones, and track the funds transparently. If aligned with automated payments (escrows), it is
467 possible to enable a new way of distributing value among all the network participants. Crowdfunding
468 on blockchain may help projects by streamlining and democratizing their funding needs with full
469 traceability.

470 ***Model Implementation and Integration with Ethereum***

471 Implementation of the proposed models requires building and storing an Ethereum architecture, as in
472 a private Ethereum node, to verify the transactions and to store the blockchain data. The Ethereum
473 node holds the private-public key-pair that signs the transactions by sending Ether (Ethereum's digital
474 asset bearer - like a bond or other security) (Atzei et al., 2017) to another agent or to a smart-contract.
475 Any application will be able to connect to the private node by submitting transactions or by querying

476 the node for information. The communication between an application and the node is through a JSON
477 **remote procedure call (RPC)** interface as represented in **Figure 11**.

478

479 **(Please insert Figure11 around here)**

480

481 The private Ethereum node is responsible for broadcasting the transactions to the entire
482 Ethereum blockchain. To an outside source, this will seem like a regular transaction, even though there
483 will be instructions encoded in the transaction bytecode that can only be accessed by the smart-
484 contract operators achieving a certain degree of privacy even in a public distributed ledger. Older
485 applications such as traditional Web 2.0 applications can easily communicate with the newer Web 3.0
486 applications through the **application programing interfaces (APIs)** connecting to distributed Ethereum
487 servers (e.g., Infura).

488 Although one can use cloud-based services to store the apps information (server-side) in a
489 private manner and can still **adopt** a public-blockchain ledger to store the transaction data, it is
490 assumed that private-blockchains may be preferred in practice by subscribers of the cloud services
491 offered by some of the largest technology conglomerates (e.g., IBM, Microsoft, Google, Amazon). In
492 essence, if an organization chooses to opt for **blockchain-as-a-service (BaaS)**, they will not be running
493 their Ethereum private node, meaning they are not verifying transactions and trusting a third-party
494 machine to do so, which defies some of the purposes of blockchain implementation-cases. A
495 representation of the architecture for such an arrangement, which was also envisioned for the
496 prototypes, can be seen in **Figure 12**. The architecture mimics a public chain executed on a cloud-
497 server computer. By using cloud-services, private-chains that use tokens to exchange value can be
498 deployed quickly instead of needing to use the Ethereum-public chain.

499

500 **(Please insert Figure12 around here)**

501

502 **Model Feedback and Evaluation**

503 The feedback collected for the blockchain-based SCM models/working prototypes, and blockchain
504 implementation in the construction sector in general from the focus group studies and workshop is
505 summarized in this section by each model, which was realized in Stage 3 in the research process (see
506 **Figure 1**).

507 ***Focus Groups for Model Evaluation and Feedback***

508 ***PBA Model***

509 The focus group participants found the PBA model applicable in a shorter-term particularly in
510 open-book or partnering/alliancing type procurement arrangements, where through the model, as
511 stated by one of the participants, one can achieve “a true open-book arrangement”. The system was
512 noted as a potential first step or gateway to the DLT and blockchain world for construction
513 organizations. According to the participants, the model could be of immediate interest to the clients
514 dealing with a large group of suppliers such as public client organizations, housing associations and
515 councils in the UK. The participants found the model’s application relatively straightforward provided
516 regulatory and contractual bases for the model are in place. Another potential benefit of the model
517 was found in achieving traceable and correct taxation through payments for governments. The
518 transparent payments discussion was presented as a “double-edge sword”, where although
519 automation and streamlining of the payment approval process would be beneficial to the sector, the
520 participants questioned whether clients were ready to transparently automate payments to such
521 degree. They underlined clients’ need to control value transfer and the culture of using payment
522 control as a source of power in the sector. Also, it was noted that most of the delays and issues
523 associated with payments to supply chains are due to clients’ and Tier 1 contractors’ slow internal
524 processes, which should also be streamlined alongside the model. There is also politics involved,
525 where gatekeepers use the payment process as a bargaining tool for projecting power to their supply
526 chains. Another concern highlighted by the participants is data resilience for the correct data to be
527 used for automated payments on the immutable blockchain, which will be demanded by clients. A link
528 between the PBA model and the existing accounting systems was requested by the participants. The
529 payment mechanisms in the standard form of contracts (e.g. NEC and JCT) should be incorporated in

530 future blockchain-based payment systems. Beyond payments and the procurement process, the focus
531 group participants also underlined the relevance of recording near critical data from site operations,
532 such as wind speed and ambient temperature, for blockchain.

533 **Reverse Auction Model**

534 A high value potential was attributed to the reverse auction model by the participants,
535 particularly for inducing transparency, record-keeping, audit trailer and data security in obtaining best
536 price in e-reverse auctions or in public/government procurement. The participants also found the
537 system potentially inclusive for smaller service providers, which large clients want to support in the
538 sector as there is not much investment required from those smaller organizations other than having
539 a crypto-wallet address to participate in the proposed decentralized system. However, the
540 participants noted the implementation of the reverse auction model would be more complex. The
541 issue with legacy IT systems in the construction sector that need to be aligned with a blockchain-based
542 environment was highlighted as a general barrier. Moreover, to render the system fully transparent
543 and trustworthy, it was found necessary to link the system with the emerging digital organizational
544 **identification document (ID)** and passport initiatives on blockchain as a future improvement
545 suggestion. This will also support awarding the best value service or product provider beyond just the
546 price parameter, where a client will be able to see the past performance of different bidders in a
547 trustworthy fashion. The participants highlighted that insurers for the sector would be highly
548 interested in the digital passport idea for tendering arrangements. Due to the required scale of
549 implementation and the need for incorporating the existing auction-based procurement and
550 tendering regulations, the reverse auction model was found harder to implement than the PBA model
551 with a higher potential value to the sector nevertheless. **To render the prototype more scalable, it was**
552 **suggested that some auction limitation options such as time or price limit could have been added. This**
553 **was incorporated in the prototype.** Who should bear the cost of recording the transactions was also a
554 subject of discussion among the focus group participants. Some participants believe if the cost of
555 transactions on blockchain is transferred to the bidders, that may encourage them to consider their

556 bid more carefully before submitting it. This led to discussions on the cost uncertainty and volatility of
557 cryptocurrencies, which in some form are necessary to record transactions on a public blockchain
558 consequently rendering cost forecasts for the procurement and tendering processes harder for both
559 clients and service providers.

560 **Asset Tokenization (crowdfunding) Model**

561 The crowdfunding application of the asset tokenization model for donation purposes was found
562 easy to implement with a high potential in rapidly and transparently raising donations for construction
563 projects, which may be of immediate interest to communities, councils and aid organizations.
564 However, for investment purposes, the participants noted that implementing the model would be
565 complicated as the value of tokens is subject to serious fluctuations at the moment. This will
566 potentially put investors off without any return guarantee on the tokens. Additionally, in the
567 cryptocurrency space, most of the utility tokens cannot distribute dividends. A potential remedy for
568 this, until a significant portion of the commerce/business in the future is executed on smart contracts
569 and crypto tokens, can be having specific investment tokens issued by governments, big
570 conglomerates (e.g. Facebook's crypto coin Libra) or super-national organizations like the EU. This may
571 lead to a stock-exchange market like establishment in the sector for asset tokens. The participants
572 agreed that one other way of overcoming the investment barrier through tokens on blockchain for
573 project development is having an *oracle*, an intermediary identity between the conventional and
574 crypto asset worlds. The *oracle* regulates the amount of dividend or benefit the investors of a project
575 will receive based on their token quantities in hand as project shares. However, the *oracle* could still
576 be manipulated through different methods like corruption, bribery, misinformation etc. According to
577 the participants, another complication or question relating to the investment through tokens is
578 whether or not the token holders will have or demand voting rights for project management and
579 governance. This will introduce further complications to the asset tokenization issue. There was a
580 general agreement on that the potential integration of the models with digital passports on blockchain
581 for identity trust would enhance the models' value and adoption in the future. The participants

582 underlined the relevancy of blockchain for legal project documents beyond contracts like planning and
583 development permissions. The participants think the asset tokenization model for investment will be
584 of interest to investors and asset developers in particular. A summary of the findings from each focus
585 group can be seen in **Table 3**.

586 **(Please insert Table 3 around here)**

587
588 ***Blockchain Workshop***

589 The attendees mostly attributed a very high or high value to the PBA model (see **Figure 13**). The
590 applicability of the PBA model was also found relatively easier than the other models. The need for
591 streamlining internal payment processes with the system was highlighted by the workshop attendees
592 as well. Also, some attendees mentioned the need for convincing client organizations and main
593 contractors for faster/direct payments, which may make them feel unsecure in terms of controlling
594 their projects and supply chains. Some discussions about changing the culture in the sector for more
595 openness and collaboration were conducted.

596 The attendees mostly attributed a high or moderate value to the reverse auction model. The
597 applicability of the model was found easy or moderate. The attendees argued that although the
598 system has potential in increasing trust and transparency in auction-based tendering arrangements,
599 suppliers and service providers are generally hesitant in participating in reverse auction tenders. The
600 potential integration of the model with digital passports may further increase trust in those systems
601 among both client and supplier organizations. This may possibly change the attitudes of service
602 providers and suppliers.

603 The attendees generally saw a high potential in the asset tokenization model for both
604 investment and donation purposes. However, the applicability of the model, particularly for
605 commercial investment purposes, was found moderate or hard. Similar to the focus groups, the
606 attendees indicated a mechanism to stabilize the value of investment tokens is necessary to render
607 the system attractive for investors. The results of the questions regarding the applicability and value

608 of the models that were obtained from the workshops participants through an online audience
609 interaction system can be seen in **Figure 13**.

610 **(Please insert Figure 13 around here)**

611

612 **Discussion and Conclusion**

613 Blockchain is an emerging technology with potential to disrupt the SCM practices in many sectors
614 including construction. However, the technology is still immature and its requirements, consequences,
615 and value have not been well-understood yet. The lack of empirical research beyond conceptual
616 discussions is more evident in construction. To some, blockchain is a hyped buzzword that will fade in
617 time or fall short in living up to its hype, and to some it offers a revolution in value transactions
618 (Hunhevicz and Hall, 2020). In this context, three blockchain-based models for SCM as working
619 prototypes for the construction sector were presented in this paper with their feedbacks from
620 academics and practitioners. The findings in general confirm blockchain's potential in solving the
621 sector's problems associated with streamlined and transparent payments and tendering processes
622 (Kinnaird and Geipel, 2017; Li et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2017) as well as easier access to project finances
623 (Elghaish et al., 2020). However, they also highlight the sector's expectations for the technology's
624 maturity for its day-to-day use (Li et al., 2018) calling for a wider view to blockchain with its potential
625 implications beyond its benefits. The rest of this section elaborates on these points. A summary of the
626 highlights of the models alongside their benefits **against the traditional workflows** can be seen in **Table**
627 **4**

628 **(Please insert Table 4 around here)**

629 **Blockchain Benefits and Opportunities**

630 The identified benefits of blockchain for construction SCM is a combination of the proposed
631 models' features, Ethereum characteristics and blockchain capabilities in general;

- 632 • Of the three prototypes, the PBA prototype could be implemented first with its more
633 straightforward requirements acting as a gateway for further DLT applications (see
634 **Figure 13**).

- 635
- Despite their more complicated requirements and needs, the auction and tokenization
636 prototypes could lead to large-scale impacts in longer terms (see **Figure 13** and **Table**
637 **4**).
 - Streamlined transaction times when compared to conventional methods as
638 demonstrated through the PBA prototype (approximately 80 -240 seconds on Ethereum
639 versus bank payments needing between three to five working days). Similar assertions
640 can be made for the conventional project financing and tendering arrangements with
641 lengthy regulatory durations (Ashuri and Mostaan, 2015), which take on average 120-
642 360 seconds on the reverse auction prototype.
 - Increased transparency induced by the prototypes as the transactions can be easily
643 tracked online (e.g. <https://etherscan.io/>) by the stakeholders in terms of where in the
644 business process any transaction is sitting, which is a key concern in conventional SCM
645 practices(Meng et al., 2011) and in establishing cooperative partnerships (Gunduz and
646 Abdi, 2020).
 - All stakeholders can participate and input information at any time, and that data is
647 available to all relevant parties for augmented interoperability.
 - Presenting a decisive advantage over the traditional relational databases, where the
648 traditional workflows sit, in terms of providing a robust, fault-tolerant way to store
649 critical data on Ethereum (Galal and Youssef, 2018), which most of the SCM data
650 (commercial) can be categorized as.
 - Affordable Ethereum transaction fees at the moment (\$0.066 USD median cost per
651 transaction) against expensive database investment and maintenance costs.
 - Integration of the tendering and payment processes into a single collection of
652 information that will create the basis for an integrated approval and value transaction
653 system (Das et al., 2020; Dujak and Sajter, 2019).
- 654
- 655
- 656
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- 659

- 660 • Open-source and flexible development as consortia on Ethereum are not locked into
661 the IT environment of a single vendor
- 662 • Facilitating relational contracting practices by helping achieve a true open-book
663 arrangement and transparent transactions for payments.
- 664 • Helping change the trust-building in construction from relational (soft) to rational
665 (technological) (Qian and Papadonikolaki, 2020) so that entities can trust the
666 information but not necessarily each other (Lumineau et al., 2020).
- 667 • Potentially overcoming unethical practices such as shill-bidding in procurement (Ahsan
668 and Paul, 2018).
- 669 • Increased accessibility to commission-free project financing for investment or donation
670 over DLT tokens without having to include large third-party organizations in the
671 traditional way.
- 672 • Further democratization opportunities for project governance through issued project
673 tokens, if voting rights are given to the token owners.
- 674 • Easy access for smaller service providers/suppliers to tenders, payments and project
675 financing instruments, helping large clients with supporting smaller organizations for
676 inclusivity and social sustainability (Kuitert et al., 2019; Montalbán-Domingo et al.,
677 2019).
- 678 • With support from super-national organizations like the EU, mass use of blockchain
679 systems by the public, leading to a live token-exchange market for construction
680 investments and public web services for construction tendering.

681 **Blockchain Requirements and Challenges**

682 The empirical findings from the model development process confirm the general requirements
683 for blockchain in the construction sector, some of which have been conceptually outlined in the
684 literature;

- 685 • Upscaling legacy IT systems in the sector for blockchain (Tezel et al., 2020),

- 686 • Blockchain's complying with the existing accounting systems, regulations/frameworks,
687 standard contracts and laws (Li et al., 2019),
- 688 • Challenging the prevalent business culture (power dynamics) in construction supply
689 chains (Wang et al., 2017),
- 690 • The need for validating the real-life data to be blockchained (data resilience) (Kshetri,
691 2018; Sulkowski, 2019),
- 692 • Legislative reforms to confirm the immutability of data stored on blockchain along with
693 the elucidated rights and primacies related to funds arranged in smart contracts,
- 694 • Blockchain system mechanisms allowing to modify the immutable data (e.g. payment
695 amounts in case of any payment changes, change orders or penalties) (Das et al., 2020),
- 696 • Streamlining internal/organizational processes for blockchain through enabling
697 technologies such as digital passports, remote sensing or the IoT (Li et al., 2018).
- 698 • Further maturity in the technology to fully execute multi-party SCM arrangements (e.g.
699 reverse tendering and project tokenization) with shared value (Blockchain 2.0) and
700 digital identity (Blockchain 3.0) capacities respectively (Swan, 2015).
- 701 • Wider implications of blockchain in terms of project governance, value sharing and
702 amount of employment to be created or lost.
- 703 • Fluctuating and volatile token values and transaction costs.

704

705 Beyond those generic requirements and challenges, future blockchain based models should be
706 analyzed for their specific requirements and challenges as identified from the asset tokenization
707 (crowdfunding) model for investment, for instance, where the issues of dividend payments, project
708 governance rights and the requirement for a prevailing crypto-token by national or super-national
709 legislative bodies came to the fore. Furthermore, questions relating to the practical application of the
710 models such as who (client, service providers or both) will bear the transaction costs on a DLT and
711 perhaps more importantly, who owns/operates (i.e., joint or single ownership of an actor(s))

712 blockchain-based solutions for SCM arrangements in the sector may lead to interesting discussions
713 and findings. Blockchain protocol-wise, it is suggested that organizations fully understand the trade-
714 offs and compromises across the different protocols and not consider the private and permissioned
715 protocols only due to some reservations relating to “losing the control” (Wang et al., 2019). Large and
716 public clients in particular are in the “wait-and-see state” and looking for guidance from policy -makers
717 (e.g. frameworks) to position the technology in their day-to-day workflows at the moment. Summary
718 of the general and model specific findings can be seen in **Figure 14**, where the opportunities and
719 benefits are grouped on the left, and the challenges and needs are grouped on the right.

720 **(Please insert Figure 14 around here)**

721 ***Conclusion and Future Directions***

722 The real-life implementation of the prototypes could not be realized within this study, which is
723 a research limitation. The authors intend to test the models empirically in real-life construction
724 projects as a follow up of this study. As for future steps for the models, linking the models with digital
725 passports (ID) on blockchain is deemed to be an important milestone. Alongside the development and
726 investigation of actual implementation cases, identification of key project or asset
727 information/document types to be blockchained over the project life-cycle presents another
728 prospective research opportunity. In this regard, systematically analyzing SCM workflows in the sector
729 for blockchain-suitability by following a decision-making framework as demonstrated in the reverse
730 auction model’s development presents a research opportunity. Some of the SCM workflows that could
731 be considered for this analysis are product and service provider authentication (e.g. responsible
732 sourcing, licensing), logistics management and tracking (e.g. off-site/prefabricated components),
733 property/project/shareholder portfolio data management on a DLT, life-cycle data management on a
734 DLT for plant, materials and components, legal documentation and approvals (e.g. planning/building
735 permissions, land registry records), due diligence workflows, contractually binding documentation
736 (e.g. change orders), tendering decisions over different stages (e.g. two-stage tendering or

737 negotiation), project sponsors' or core-groups' meeting records in relational contracts and data
738 transactions for handover/facilities management .

739 Additionally, developing a blockchain benefit realisation model with quantifiable benefit
740 parameters, understanding the change requirements for blockchain in the current procurement
741 systems/structures, how DLTs can positively or negatively affect digitalization, and their implications
742 on data management and flow in construction supply chains will be useful. Investigations into the
743 interaction between blockchain and other popular technologies such as remote sensing, the IoT, data
744 analytics and BIM will increasingly continue. The definition and role of data resilience in the DLT era,
745 reviewing the standard payment mechanism, contracts, procurement and commercial laws and
746 regulations for DLT, analyzing the implications of important decisions on SCM practices such as what
747 blockchain protocols to be adopted or who should own and govern the DLT arrangements, and
748 investigations into steps toward establishing blockchain process standards for the construction sector
749 remain as important topics of future research in this domain.

750 **Data Availability Statement**

751 Some or all data, models, or code that support the findings of this study are available from the
752 corresponding author upon reasonable request.

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Table 1. Focus group studies

Focus Group	Supply Chain Role	Participants	Years in Industry
1	Contractor	Operations Director	20-25
		Finance Manager	20-25
		IT Systems Manager	15-20
		IT Systems Developer	15-20
		Non-Executive Director	25-30
2	Academia/ DLT Application Development	Professor of Construction Project Management	25-30
		Professor of Supply Chain Management	20-25
		DLT Developer	10-15
		DLT Developer	10-15
3	Client	Procurement Manager	15-20
		Senior Quantity Surveyor	15-20
		Contract Manager	20-25
		Commercial Manager	20-25
		IT Systems Manager	15-20
		Project Director	25-30

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Table 2. Workshop participants

Workshop Attendees' Background	Number of Attendees
Academia	10
Contractor	4
Client	4
Consultant	3
Designer	3
IT Professional	2
Maintenance/Facilities Management	1
Public Servant/Government	1
Total	28

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Table 3. Summary of the focus group studies

<i>Model Name</i>		<i>Focus Groups</i>					
		<i>Contractors (Focus Group 1)</i>		<i>Blockchain Developers and Academics (Focus Group 2)</i>		<i>Clients (Focus Group 3)</i>	
		<i>Application</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Application</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Application</i>	<i>Value</i>
<i>Project Bank Accounts (Escrow Payments)</i>		Easy	High	Easy	High	Easy	Moderate
<i>Reverse Auction based Tendering</i>		Doable	Very High	Doable	Very High	Doable	High
<i>Asset Tokenisation</i>	<i>Crowdfunding (Donation)</i>	Easy	High	Easy	High	Easy	High
	<i>Investment</i>	Not so Easy	Very High	Not so Easy	Very High	Not so Easy	Very High

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Table 4. Highlights from the developed models

Developed Models	Requirement	Process	Advantages over Traditional Workflows	Overall/Long-term Benefits	Issues
Project Bank Accounts (PBA) model	<p>Automating payments to the supply chain members to be a substitute for the conventional PBA</p> <p>Protecting contractors, subcontractors and other supply chain members from insolvency</p>	<p>Overcoming gatekeepers for interrupted value flow through (almost) immediate and transparent payments</p> <p>Creating, validating, authenticating and auditing contracts and agreements in real-time, across borders</p>	<p>Quicker payments (approximately 80 -240 seconds) for minimal transactional costs (\$0.066 USD median cost/transaction)</p> <p>Transparent tracking and execution of payment transactions and secondary liabilities such as taxes at all times.</p>	<p>Ensuring a much quicker flow of funds down through the supply chain</p> <p>Reducing contract execution related disputes, reducing costs associated with administration of procurement</p>	<p>Sector culture related issues that may not favor automated payments,</p> <p>Need for integrating the model with clients' accounting systems</p>
Transparent reverse auction model	<p>Allowing transparency and facilitating the identification of best-value bids in reverse auctions</p> <p>Allowing clients to deploy Auction smart-contracts so that approved companies can bid in work packages. The payment mechanism</p>	<p>Relatively simple, straightforward, reasonably quick, and iterative</p> <p>Transactions of creating the contracts, contract bidding, accepting the winning and rejecting the losing bids, and contract finalization</p>	<p>Allowing competitors to submit more than one bid, and providing price competition with less regulatory processing-automation of regulatory tendering tasks.</p> <p>Helping overcome the transparency and bid ethics related concerns surrounding reverse auctions at reasonable transaction costs (\$0.066</p>	<p>Paving the way for the creation of a web-based project tendering system on blockchain for the public.</p>	<p>Need for integrating the model with digital IDs, accounting systems and the existing contracts and frameworks</p>


	is linked with the PBA model.		USD median cost/transaction) and transaction speeds (120-360 seconds) with increased inclusivity for smaller organizations.		
Asset tokenization (crowdfunding) model	Creating tokens for a project or its parts, collecting funds and tracking over crypto-tokens	Holding the information about the token being created, the approved companies' information, and each crowd sale milestone	<p>Quick access to project financing sources for both small and large organizations (crowdfunding) without third party costs, lengthy regulatory procedures and financial liabilities</p> <p>Enabling individuals and companies to easily fund projects by milestones (project progress) for investment or donation purposes, and track/audit their funds transparently</p>	Paving the way for the creation of a token-exchange market similar to the stock-exchange market for project financing, investment and governance	Issues with fluctuating token values, dividend payments over tokens and governance-rights of projects over tokens

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
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- . . . -> Feedback implemented in the study
- . . . -> Long term/comprehensive feedback for future efforts

Figure 1– Research process over the stages with the main feedback loops

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Figure 2– Focus group study with participants from client organizations.



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Figure 3– Workshop study of the models.




Figure 4 – The PBA model

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The screenshot shows the 'Create Contract' page in the Contr.eth application. On the left is a sidebar with navigation options: 'Home Page', 'Create Contract', and 'Contracts'. The main content area features a grid of form fields for contract creation. The fields are arranged as follows:

- Row 1: 'PBA Name' (text input), 'WorkPackage Name' (text input), and 'Select the Periodicity' (dropdown menu).
- Row 2: 'Contract Name' (text input), 'Payment Amount' (text input), and 'Validator Fee' (text input with '\$0' pre-filled).
- Row 3: 'Choose the Company Name' (dropdown menu), 'Choose the Validator Name' (dropdown menu), and 'Choose the Client Name' (dropdown menu).
- Row 4: 'Start Date' (calendar icon, text input 'dd/mm/yyyy'), 'End Date' (calendar icon, text input 'dd/mm/yyyy'), and 'Pay Date' (calendar icon, text input 'dd/mm/yyyy').

A teal 'CREATE CONTRACT' button is positioned at the bottom center of the form grid. The top of the page includes the Contr.eth logo, a location indicator 'Ox..Ox', a 'client' profile icon, and a share icon.

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Figure 5 – Smart-contract creation screen. Each party uses the system with their unique crypto-wallet code.

Id ↑	Name	WorkPackage	Contract address	Already Paid	Amount	State	Company Name
0	Soil Works PBA	Soil Works	0x411f...e9	0 €	1,600,000 €	Waiting For Approval	Daniel
1	Materials PBA	Materials	0xb0e4...16	0 €	2,000,000 €	Waiting For Approval	Daniel

Figure 6 – Contract validation and approval screen

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



Figure 7 – Blockchain validation for reverse auction systems on WEF’s (Mulligan et al., 2018) decision making framework. The green arrows represent the answers for the suitability of reverse auctions for blockchain

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Figure 8 – The reverse auction model. There is an optional link between the PBA prototype for supply chain payments when the tendering is set




Figure 9 – The asset tokenization model

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Welcome to the Crowdsale smart-contract! Here you'll be able to create decentralised fund-raising events, where tokens are issued and can represent any virtual asset, like shares, bonds or any sort of entitlements. With the Crowdsale smart-contract, raising funds for public projects can be more efficient, transparent and auditable by any of the involved parties.

Start by choosing a login for the Investor, Validator and Company, by clicking on each icon respectively. Afterwards, you can click on the Client agent to define the initial conditions for the crowdsale smart-contracts.

To use the Crowdsale smart-contract, please make sure all agents have a valid Ethereum address.

Remember: amendments can be made to some variables such as date, time or names, but not to amounts.



Investor

The agent responsible for defining the crowdsale rules and for making the payments



Validator

The agent responsible to handle disputes between the Company and the Client



Company

The agent responsible to execute the work defined in the smart-crowdsale and receive the payments

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Figure 10 – The asset tokenization (crowdfunding) model's main screen.




Figure 11 – The models' Ethereum integration

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


Figure 12– Private Blockchain infrastructure

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


Figure 13– Workshop participants’ evaluation of the models by their value and applicability

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


Figure 14– Summary of the general and model specific findings associated with blockchain in SCM

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