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Channeling diverse innovation pressures to support European sustainability transitions

Elena Verdolini, Benjamin K. Sovacool and Paul Drummond

Keywords: low-carbon transitions; innovation systems; innovation policy; decarbonisation policy.

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1. Introduction

In light of pressing climate mitigation needs and commitments, swift and strategic action is required to reorient and accelerate technological transitions towards an economy compatible with the goals of the Paris Agreement. More generally, a consensus is emerging that innovation patterns and processes must be commensurate to our growing sustainability challenges.¹ In this Perspective, we show how technological innovation systems are being harnessed to address key decarbonization challenges in Europe. Specifically, we illustrate five recurring lessons on how technology costs and configurations, as well as actors, values and countervailing pressures, influence the development and diffusion of the most promising technologies for the decarbonization of agriculture, buildings, electricity, information and communication technologies (ICT), industry and transport.


These lessons emerged from comparative case studies in Germany, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom (Figure 1 top panel).² These countries were selected to represent a diverse mix of national contexts, geographic locations, and energy regimes and to span a range of innovation system configurations and dynamics, each facing unique set of specific challenges and strengths, but across which common themes may be recognized. The comparative case studies were carried out using a common, consistent analytical framework informed by different innovation system approaches and concepts, such as national innovation systems: sectoral innovation systems, the functions of technology innovation systems, and the literature on sustainability transitions (see Figure 1). More details about our analytical framework are offered in the Supplementary Material “Annex I: Framework for Case Studies of National and EU Innovation Systems.”

The strength of this overarching summary and illustration lies in the fact that, while it is easy to argue that innovation must play an essential role in the transition towards

Channeling diverse innovation pressures 2

sustainability, it is much more challenging to provide useful models for how policy may help in mobilizing innovation for this purpose.³ Real-life lessons learned can (and should) be key inputs into national and EU policy making to ensure that all the key elements of the low-carbon innovation system are successfully mobilized. More details of our case studies and the underlying data for this Perspective are offered in the Supplementary Material “Annex II: Further case study data in support of our analysis.”

Figure 1: Technological, geographical, and analytical case study selection for the Innopaths Project



Source: Authors

2. Lesson 1: Varied technological configurations can respond to local needs but also hinder diffusion

Technology solutions must respond to local conditions and contexts.⁴ Indeed, in most sectors, several technological configurations for decarbonization at different levels of maturity are available. For instance, some configurations of renewable power technologies are extremely novel, such as deep-water or floating offshore wind farms, or bifacial or heterojunction solar cells. Similarly, several different smart meters are available, as are varied designs of high-efficiency building envelopes, which have been demonstrated and applied for several years; mitigation strategies regarding livestock feeding range from ensuring forage quality and precision feeding, which are considered a best practice, to the use of essential oils

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3 and tannins as additives to forage, which has been demonstrated but is not yet widely promoted
4 or diffused.
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6 Yet, the availability of different technological configurations plays a dual role in low-
7 carbon innovation systems. On the one hand, alternative configurations allow technology to be
8 applied within different geographical, social, economic, and institutional environments.
9 Indeed, certain approaches and technologies for livestock management that are deployed in
10 countries like Australia are not directly relevant for European countries, in which the majority
11 of livestock does not graze in large and dispersed pastures. Similarly, energy efficient building
12 envelopes need to adapt to local climates.
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19 On the other hand, the continuing presence of competing technological configurations,
20 a common characteristic of early-stage diffusion into niche markets before the emergence of a
21 dominant design, may represent a barrier to successfully promoting more widespread diffusion
22 of certain low-carbon technologies. As illustrated in Annex II, section 2 of the SI, this
23 characterized the roll-out of smart meters in Poland. There, smart meter installations has so
24 far been driven by voluntary initiatives by distribution system operators (DSOs). The lack of a
25 single or commonly-agreed model or technological characteristics led to difficulties with
26 interoperability. Similarly, in the UK, more than fifty energy suppliers utilize dozens of
27 different smart meter models.⁵ In Germany, a lack of clarity around standards and certification
28 of the smart meter “gateway,” which enables communication between smart meters and local
29 devices, and with third parties (e.g. grid operators and utilities), was a key factor preventing
30 widespread diffusion (see Annex II, section 2 of the SI for more details).
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40 3. Lesson 2: competitive technology costs are a necessary but insufficient enabler

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42 Alongside technology costs,⁶ other major factors affect the diffusion of (low-carbon)
43 technology. One of such factors is, for instance, the presence of tailored and flexible
44 environmental policies.⁷ For instance, in the diffusion of wind technologies, policy learning
45 played a crucial role alongside material costs and learning-by-doing. The increasing use of
46 competitive auctions to provide subsidy support was accompanied by a substantial reduction
47 in (revealed) costs for new onshore and offshore wind installations in a number of European
48 countries, including the UK. Properly designed auctions for more mature technologies provide
49 both stable revenue streams for developers and investors and better value to the public purse,
50 promoting further deployment.^{8,9}
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Channeling diverse innovation pressures 4

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3 Along similar lines, cost-effectiveness did not lead to fast and widespread diffusion of
4 smart meters and high efficiency building envelopes in most instances. Smart meters, along
5 with the surrounding infrastructure (data transmission and processing, communication
6 technologies etc.), have reached a stabilization phase. As illustrated in Annex II, section 2 of
7 the SI, the large-scale roll-out started in Italy in 2001; at the end of 2017, smart meters had
8 reached more than 50% of households in nine Member States, with five Member States having
9 no large-scale installation program. While the technology is fully commercialized and the
10 European market is growing, traditional metering solutions still account for a substantial
11 proportion of national markets. As discussed below, in many countries the diffusion of smart
12 meters is still fragmented, for reasons which include the interoperability between different
13 configurations/operators, lack of stringent national requirements, and/or the lack of clear
14 standards for the management and operation of the IT infrastructure associated with smart
15 meters.
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27 Another important factor affecting the diffusion of cost-competitive low-carbon
28 technologies is the cost of supporting infrastructure, as illustrated by renewable electricity
29 generation technologies. The key role of transmission infrastructure when renewable resources
30 are geographically clustered and far from centers of demand is widely recognized. As discussed
31 in Annex II, section 2 of the SI, this is the case, for instance, for offshore wind in the UK:
32 challenges could soon arise if substantial offshore generation capacity connects with the
33 onshore transmission network at a small number of specific points. Yet, building transmission
34 infrastructure (either national or in coordination with other countries) to fully exploit offshore
35 wind potential is expensive, increasing the total cost of delivering electricity from offshore
36 wind to the market.
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4. Lesson 3: A diversity of actors shapes technological transitions

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47 A successful technology transition requires the concerted action of a diversity of
48 actors—state and non-state—at multiple scales—local, national, and supranational—to shape
49 innovation and transition dynamics. Elinor Ostrom termed this “polycentrism” as it blends
50 action across spatial levels but also involves a multiplicity of organizations and actors.¹⁰
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54 The key role of polycentrism in promoting technology innovation and diffusion
55 emerged from all the INNOPATHS case studies. For instance, it is clearly visible, in low-
56 emission livestock management technologies and approaches in the UK and Germany. Both
57 countries invested heavily in fostering research (in part through international collaborations) to
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3 study feed type and feed management as a promising way to reduce GHG emissions from
4 agriculture. Agronomists and engineers undertaking academic research on biochar collaborated
5 with entrepreneurs, generating fruitful synergies. National and regional biochar associations,
6 the most well-known of which is the International Biochar Initiative, were central in bringing
7 together different stakeholders, acting as knowledge hubs and, in developing and administering
8 voluntary certification schemes helping facilitate diffusion.
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14 The comparatively more successful deployment of high-efficiency envelopes for new
15 residential buildings in Germany as opposed to other EU countries also reflects synergistic
16 interactions between diverse actors and scales of governance. The Federal and regional
17 (Länder) governments both played important (and potentially decisive) roles in a variety of
18 ways, alongside other public bodies, such as the KfW (and more local iterations, the
19 Länderbanks) and public research institutions. A collaboration between what became the
20 independent Passive House Institute and the Hessian Ministry for Economics and Technology
21 first developed and demonstrated the Passive House concept in the early 1990s. The KfW, a
22 national public interest bank, has been crucial in encouraging the diffusion of high-efficiency
23 envelopes for new buildings, through the long-time provision of various well-designed (and
24 well-used) subsidies. All the main German associations representing stakeholders in the
25 construction and housing sector, including landlords, all support stringent energy-efficiency
26 requirements for new buildings, and actively promote and develop high- construction
27 technologies, techniques and skills, often in collaboration with publicly-funded institutions.
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39 Yet, innovation is an international process. For instance, the dynamics unveiled in the
40 electric vehicle (EV) case studies clearly go beyond national and European borders. Success in
41 the diffusion of BMW and FIAT battery EVs can be ascribed to a supportive policy and
42 institutional environment in California shaping strategic decisions made by European
43 automotive manufacturers, as well as the availability of technologies such as carbon-fiber-
44 reinforced-plastic availability from a strategic venture with SGL and battery assembly and
45 manufacturing opportunities in China, Japan, and South Korea.¹¹ The role of international
46 actors is also very apparent in the case of efficient livestock feeding: the most extensive
47 experimentation is being carried out outside the EU, and particularly in Australia
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54 Several case studies also showed how, when polycentrism is weak, or worse, lacking,
55 low-carbon technologies do not develop and deploy successfully, therefore hampering
56 sustainability transitions are hampered. This is the case for light rail transport in Poland, which
57 lacks any real support beyond a single pilot project,¹² for the deployment of high-efficiency
58 envelopes for new residential buildings in Italy, Poland and the UK, which largely failed due
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Channeling diverse innovation pressures 6

to the centrality of power and the inability or unwillingness of many actors to engage in low-carbon innovation and technology diffusion (see Annex II, section 3 of the SI).

5. Lesson 4: A plurality of values shapes the EU innovation system

Value systems play a key role in shaping the way innovation objectives and priorities are framed.¹³ Several examples of the diverse range of values and rationales underlying innovation dynamics emerged from the INNOPATHS case studies, including how values support successful innovation and diffusion of low carbon technologies.

For instance, commitment by several actors and local bodies to accessible but low-impact mobility (underpinned by values of affordability and sustainability) was one of the key success factors in the DLR case study as well as in the successful diffusion of EV cars.^{11,12} This is even more apparent in the case of high building envelopes in Germany, as illustrated in Annex II, section 4 of the SI. Awareness of climate and energy-related issues (values of sustainability), the vision and expectations for the Energy Concept, and their implications for the buildings sector – including the need for high-efficiency envelopes for new buildings (values of efficiency) – were strong and shared by all key actors. These include the three principal German trade associations for the construction industry, the Federal Chamber of Architects and trade associations for skilled building crafts and social and professional landlords, and representatives for tenants, are also publicly in favor of high-efficiency buildings. Similarly, around 800 Solar Photovoltaic Energy Cooperatives in Germany played an important role in supporting PV from the community level. The values here appear to be a mix of sustainability, community cohesion and self-sufficiency.

On the contrary, the public perception of certain practices and feeding strategies relating to livestock management, such as additives, or vaccination, is far from being consistently positive (in part due to health concerns from the consumption of treated animals or their products), and may indeed prove to be a particularly hard-to-overcome barrier, as it would require widespread education and information campaigns to overcome perceptions. Thus, even if technologies are available, cheap (or subsidized) and ready-to-deploy, the relevant actors may still refuse to accept and adopt them.

6. Lesson 5: Countervailing pressures often slow and block innovation

Entrenched interests and lobbies can threaten the development and deployment of alternative, low-carbon technologies and innovation systems; in this context, European-level

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3 actors, policies and institutions play a crucial role in providing an impulse for the low-carbon
4 transition.
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6 For instance, industry lobbies play a key role in slowing the diffusion of renewable
7 electricity. In Poland, the high level of state ownership in coal mining and electricity generation
8 give this fuel and technology a particular political strength that is difficult to displace. Even in
9 Germany, where support for renewables is widespread, the coal sector has considerable
10 influence due to the high level of employment it supports.
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15 Large energy companies with vested interests remain responsible for the vast majority
16 of electricity generation in all countries. Yet, in Germany the share of the largest four
17 companies dropped from 95% of total electricity generation in 2004 to 76% in 2015 due to the
18 strong growth of renewables and distributed generation with 47% of energy-intensive firms
19 producing their own electricity^{14,15}. In Poland, five companies (PGE, TAURON, EDF, ENEA
20 and PAK) provide about three quarters of generation; the biggest three of which (PGE,
21 TAURON and ENEA) account for more than half of electricity generation, and are state-
22 owned. Furthermore, four out of five mining companies are fully or partially state-owned.
23 Through this ownership, the state has a financial stake in the survival of coal power plants¹⁶.
24 In contrast, wind accounts for less than 7% of electricity production; wind farms are small, and
25 only 19% of wind generation capacity belongs to state-owned utilities.¹⁷ Campaigning groups
26 have a role, including those that campaign against wind turbines. Such groups have had
27 substantial impacts on diffusion and related policies in both UK and Poland. In the UK the
28 focus of objections has been typically on the aesthetic impacts on the landscape, whilst in
29 Poland turbines have sometimes been associated with moneymaking schemes of corrupt
30 landowners,¹⁸ or with non-national elements, as argued above.¹⁹
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43 Governing parties and coalitions hostile to the decarbonization process can inhibit the
44 effective operation of innovation systems regarding low-carbon technologies. A largely hostile
45 Italian government led by the Five Star Movement and the Lega Lombarda in Italy in 2018
46 failed to effectively implement and monitor an otherwise comparatively advanced national
47 regulation regarding energy efficiency with respect to other countries. Few Italian regional
48 governments implement more stringent minimum energy performance requirements for new
49 residential building envelopes than the central government requires, and some had no minimum
50 requirements prior to 2005, when the initial EU Energy Performance of Buildings Directive
51 came into force in Italy. No subsidies for energy-efficient new construction have been available
52 at the national level (except briefly in 2010), and few from regional governments.
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Channeling diverse innovation pressures 8

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3 The Polish institutional, policy and political environment (from national to local level) is
4 generally hostile to ambitious climate and energy policy, with similar consequences. Private
5 car and other road-based passenger mobility are encouraged at the expense of alternative
6 modes, such as light rail transport¹⁶; and support for the deployment and high-efficiency
7 envelopes for new residential buildings is weak. Housing policy in Poland is governed by the
8 Ministry of Investment and Development, with energy efficiency policy largely the remit of
9 the Ministry of Energy. Although local authorities are responsible for granting construction
10 permits and ensuring compliance with building regulations, they are not permitted to set
11 standards that exceed national requirements (except with regard to heating technology, as they
12 pertain to local air quality). Poland has a national public interest fund (NFOSiGW), with an
13 explicit focus on environmental protection, however no funds are currently allocated to the
14 construction of high-efficiency envelopes for new residential buildings.
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7. Conclusion

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26 This Perspective illustrates specific examples, drawn from comparative case study
27 research, of how technology costs and configurations, as well as actors, values and
28 countervailing pressures, influence the development and diffusion of the most promising
29 technologies for the decarbonization of agriculture, buildings, electricity, information and
30 communication technologies (ICT), industry, and transport. Such lessons are important to
31 inform policy making on ways to effectively harness and promote innovation for the low
32 carbon transition.
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39 An important first insight emerging from our cross-country, cross-sector case study
40 approach is that a given country may have successfully supported the diffusion of a given
41 technology (e.g., a smart meter), but may be lagging behind with respect to another technology
42 (e.g., more efficient agriculture or lower carbon mobility). In other words, no country emerged
43 which was successful at promoting all technologies analyzed. Crucially, the decisions to switch
44 to low-carbon technologies are often made with multiple objectives, and a strategy that is
45 optimal in one context may not be in another. This highlights the complexity of supporting the
46 transition towards a climate-neutral economy.
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52 A second major insight is that, in this context, EU institutions and policies provide an
53 important framework fostering the transition towards low-carbon economies. Institutions and
54 policies play a key role in supporting polycentrism and the convergence of technologies, actors
55 and policies in support of the various low-carbon transitions explored. In those sectors where
56 a European framework and targets are in place (as for example in the case of renewable energy),
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3 the impact of countervailing pressures, including those of vested interests, are significantly
4 reduced. Thanks to the presence of European level commitments towards the low-carbon
5 economy, opposing actors in a given country or sector can only (significantly) slow the process,
6 but rarely can they completely kill it.
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10 Conversely, when such a EU-framework or targets are missing, as in the case of biochar
11 technologies or smart meters, it is comparatively harder for technological configurations to
12 emerge, and opposing interest may halt the development and diffusion of specific low-carbon
13 technology options. This suggests the importance of promoting EU level concerted action,
14 targets and legislations for all those (low-carbon technologies) which can support the energy
15 transition.
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20 A third important insight relates to the role of stakeholders. Getting the support from a
21 broad base of stakeholders can accelerate decarbonization efforts significantly. For this
22 reasons, polycentrism should be fostered through approaches promoting the engagement of
23 citizens, workers, businesses and industries also at the national and sub-national levels. This
24 sheds light on the importance of the stakeholder engagement process which has been pursued
25 at the European level to increase the acceptability of the low-carbon transition. This is an
26 important avenue to ensure the diffusion of low-carbon technologies.
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32 Taken together, our analysis underscores how multi-criteria policymaking, strong
33 institutional frameworks, and polycentric forms of governance can shape innovation pressures
34 compellingly towards—or against—decarbonization.
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