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Rhetorical Structure and Function in
The Anatomy of Melancholy

Abstract: In writing *The Anatomy of Melancholy* Robert Burton was working within the system of classical rhetoric as revived in the Renaissance, specifically the epideictic *genus*. A juxtaposition of the topics, arguments, and tripartite form employed by Burton with the treatment of epideictic in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, as well as with aspects of the Roman and Hellenistic rhetorical traditions, shows how Burton has playfully adapted Renaissance conceptions of epideictic rhetoric for encyclopaedic, satirical, and self-expressive purposes. The function of rhetoric in the *Anatomy* is both to 'dissect' the *corpus* of knowledge about melancholy and to 'show forth' the author's own melancholic condition.

he whose eloquence is like to some great torrent that rolls down rocks and 'disdains a bridge' and carves out its own banks for itself, will sweep the judge from his feet, struggle as he may, and force him to go whither he bears him. This is the orator that will call the dead to life.
<div align="right">Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, 12.10.61</div>

'tis not my study or intent to compose neatly, which an Orator requires, but to expresse my selfe readily & plainely as it happens. So that as a River runnes sometimes precipitate and swift, then dull and slow; now direct, then *per ambages*; now deepe, then shallow; now muddy, then cleare; now broad, then narrow; doth my stile flow: now serious, then light; now Comicall, then Satyricall; now more elaborate, then remisse, as the present subject required, or as at that time I was affected.
"Democritus Junior to the Reader", *Anatomy of Melancholy*, 1.18.6–12.[1]

T o modern readers, the labyrinthine structure and densely woven prose of *The Anatomy of Melancholy* tend at first glance to create the impression that this text pays scant regard to the theory of rhetoric. Given this initial impression, it should probably follow either that Robert Burton was a rather poor student of rhetoric, or else that he deliberately adopted a writing style in opposition to classical, "Ciceronian" eloquence as it was revived by the Renaissance. Critics have usually taken him to be implementing a loose "Senecan" style,[2] so that the question of the role of classical rhetoric in the *Anatomy* has generally been dismissed before it has even been posed. Such an interpretation, however, rests precariously upon isolated remarks made by Burton's *persona*, Democritus Junior, on the nature of his style.[3] As the juxtaposition of Quintilian's portrait of the good orator and Democritus Junior's characterization of the style of the *Anatomy* suggests, the relationship is not quite as simple as it seems. The composition is, apparently, not "that which an

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Anatomy of Melancholy, ed. T. Faulkner, N. Kiessling, and R. Blair, with a commentary by J. Bamborough and M. Dodsworth, 3 vols, (Oxford, 1989–2000; vol. III of commentary forthcoming). References to the *Anatomy* include line references when appropriate.

[2]G. Williamson, "Senecan Style in the Seventeenth Century", *Philological Quarterly* 15 (1936) pp. 337–38 and idem, *The Senecan Amble: A Study in Prose Form from Bacon to Collier* (London, 1951) pp. 198–200; J. M. Patrick and R. O Evans eds, *Style, Rhetoric, and Rhythm: Essays by Morris W. Croll* (Princeton, 1966) pp. 10, 20, 81–82, 161–62, 199, 209–12. Amongst the critics who have accepted this argument (and followed its implicit foreclosure of rhetorical analysis) are B. G. Lyons, *Voices of Melancholy: Studies in Literary Treatments of Melancholy in Renaissance England* (London, 1971) pp. 138–39, and J. Sawday, "Shapeless Elegance: Robert Burton's Anatomy of Knowledge", in N. Rhodes ed., *English Renaissance Prose: History, Language, and Politics* (Tempe, 1997) p. 183. A recent exception to the general paucity of sustained rhetorical approaches to Burton is M. M. Schmelzer, *'Tis All One:* The Anatomy of Melancholy *as Belated Copious Discourse* (New York, 1999) pp. 33–85, though the context of this discussion is confined to the Erasmian theory of *copia* as read by T. Cave, *The Cornucopian Text* (Oxford, 1979)—as opposed to the context of classical or Renaissance rhetoric in general.

[3]His claims to a plain style ("I call a spade a spade", (1.17.23)) are blatantly contradicted by the habitual use of tropes and figures throughout the *Anatomy*. See K. J. Höltgen, "Robert Burtons *Anatomy of Melancholy*: Struktur und Gattungsproblematik im Licht der Ramistischen Logik", *Anglia* 94 (1976) pp. 388–403, esp. pp. 401–02, where Burton's scientific and anti-rhetorical plain style is measured against his use of metaphorical language for communicative purposes. The plain style is, however, itself a part of the system of rhetoric—a "simple, frugal, and less polished" style is said by Menander Rhetor to be characteristic of the epideictic informal talk (*lalia*). See *Menandri acutissimi ac sapientiss. Rhetoris de genere Demonstrativo libri duo . . .* (Venice, 1558), 2.4, fol. 44ᵛ. As we shall see, Burton appears to follow Menander's rhetorical guidelines for *lalia* in several of his stylistic and compositional choices. See also K. J. E. Graham, *The Performance of Conviction: Plainness and Rhetoric in the Early English Renaissance* (Ithaca, 1994) esp. pp. 1–24.

Orator requires", but the figure of style as a river has its source in Quintilian (the "Orator", perhaps, whom Democritus Junior is supposedly defying). Burton's style indeed "carves out its own banks for itself" in Quintilian's formulation, and, in his own subtle placing of references to the classical notions of *decorum* ("as the present subject required") and Aristotelian *ethos* ("as at that time I was affected"),[4] indicates that his work will pursue the humanist enterprise of *serio ludere* with the resources of classical rhetoric: the activity of writing is rhetorical gameplay, or, as he says, a "playing labor" (1.7.4). In fact, it is my contention that the structural composition and prose style of the *Anatomy* is far better understood in the context of the Renaissance revival of classical rhetoric, in particular of theories about demonstrative or epideictic rhetoric current in England and Europe in the later sixteenth century, than has previously been recognized; and, further, that it is in this context that Burton's subversive writerly abilities are most clearly revealed.

The ornamental literary qualities of the *Anatomy* have long been recognized, and it is indeed a work shot through with rhetorical figures and tropes, but Burton's well-documented compositional self-consciousness indicates that his use of rhetoric may be for more than simply communicative, or even eloquently persuasive, ends.[5] If the *Anatomy* was written with such rhetorically conventional goals in mind, then it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that Burton was simply not given to eloquence in any classical or Renaissance sense of the ideal, such is the apparent difficulty of grasping the message of extensive sections of the text. Indeed, if the *Anatomy* seems at times the model of lengthy obscurity, as some critics have found,[6] then this very characteristic might be seen as a deliberate

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[4]Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, trans. H. E. Butler, 4 vols (Cambridge MA, 1920–22) 6.2.26. The "present subject" indeed has "affected" Burton, and *decorum* is in alliance with *ethos*, but as we shall see this makes Burton's *ethos* no less melancholic than his subject matter.

[5]For valuable studies exploring Burton's self-consciousness see J. Webber, *The Eloquent 'I': Style and Self in Seventeenth-Century Prose* (Madison, 1967) pp. 80–114 and Lyons, *Voices of Melancholy*, pp. 113–48.

[6]S. Fish, *Self-Consuming Artifacts*(London, 1972) pp. 303–52; M. Heusser, *The Gilded Pill: A Study of the Reader-Writer Relationship in Robert Burton's* Anatomy of Melancholy (Tübingen, 1987); since these critical studies are based on a highly subjective reader-response methodology, it is unclear to what extent their conclusions are a function of modern unfamiliarity with Renaissance rhetoric. For the most recent exponent of this tradition of criticism see J. Miller, "Plotting a Cure: The Reader in Robert Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*", *Prose Studies* 20 (1997) pp. 42–71, but compare Stanley Jackson, "Robert Burton and Psychological Healing", *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied*

pursuit of *copia* with the intent to subvert the classical dictates of *claritas* and *brevitas*,[7] essential qualities for a speech to be properly *ornatus* and hence effectively persuasive.[8] However, Burton's attitude towards rhetoric is not simply instrumental; rather, the nature of rhetoric is one of his book's many subjects. As the means by which a melancholic author discourses about melancholy, in many respects his rhetoric itself seems to be melancholic: intentionally "affected" by the passions of his condition, 'corrupt', disordered, and perhaps even dysfunctional.[9] As a consequence, rhetoric becomes inextricably intertwined with the object of his analysis, simultaneously a symptom and object of the discourse on melancholy. In fact, this is a simple rhetorical propriety, Burton's "melancholic" style being at once an expression of his emotions, character, and

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Sciences 44 (1989) pp. 160–78 to supply the historical context that could partially substantiate Miller's argument (first made by Heusser) that the text cures the reader. Although I am in agreement with many of Miller's specific points, I cannot accept his basic premise that reading the *Anatomy* is intended to be a continuous linear experience: as an encyclopedic work it is explicitly designed for reference purposes and intermittent reading in the manner of Montaigne's *Essais* (see below at note 89).

[7]In classical rhetoric *copia verborum* is not incompatible with *claritas* and *brevitas*, but most who have read the *Anatomy* in its entirety have experienced much of the former at the expense of the latter two qualities. It is often correctly noted that Burton piles up the opinions of learned authorities to such an extent that the question under discussion becomes obscured rather than clarified (see Miller, "Plotting a Cure", pp. 48–49.). The rhetorical dimension to this technique will be explored below, but although occasionally it may seem that Burton does not have *brevitas* on his mind when writing, he is nevertheless self-conscious about his method in this respect: "Many delightsome questions are moved by Philosophers ... which for brevity I omit" (1.152.4).

[8]At the outset of his enormously influential *De copia*, Erasmus had warned against this very possibility, interestingly using the image of the river taken from Quintilian. See *Copia*, in Craig R. Thompson ed., *Collected Works of Erasmus*,24 (Toronto, 1978) 1.1–16 . For the classic statements of these ideals of *elocutio* see *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, 4.12.17; Cicero, *De oratore*, 3.13.49–50, 3.42.167; and Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 8.2.22.

[9]The direct association between the author's writing and his melancholic passions is made not only in the passage quoted above ("as at that time I was affected"), but also when he offers a disingenuous apology for the faults of his style: "I confesse all ('tis partly affected)" (1.12.15); compare the important metaphorical coincidence when he later describes the passions of melancholy—which, "as a torrent (*torrens velut aggere rupto*) beares down all before, and overflowes his bankes ... they overwhelme reason, judgement, and pervert the temperature of the body" (1.248.11–13). We should take Democritus Junior's description of the book as an "evacuation" of his melancholy humours (1.7.19) as an important hermeneutic injunction. The figure of the river as passionate speech is also employed by Thomas Wright in his description of the force of affections in man (*The Passions of the Minde in Generall*, facsimile of the 1604 edition, with an introduction by Thomas O. Sloan (Urbana, 1971) p. 79).

subject matter.[10] In order to explore the "melancholic rhetoric" of the *Anatomy* in this article, I shall first investigate classical and Renaissance treatments of demonstrative rhetoric in general, and then Aristotle's theory in particular. This discussion will provide the background for a rhetorical analysis of, in turn, the *exordium* of the *Anatomy*, constituted by its introductory sections; its *narratio*, divided into the synopses, topics, and arguments of the main treatise; and, finally, its *peroratio* ("The Conclusion of the Author *to the Reader*").

Like its deliberative counterpart,[11] epideictic rhetoric was rehabilitated in the Renaissance but in an expanded form, reappearing in different genres from sermons and dialogues to epic and lyric poetry.[12] As a *genus* specifically structured to demonstrate virtue (or vice), it was, in fact, particularly suited to communicate the humanist message of *dignitas hominis*.[13] Moreover, it had the distinct advantage of compositional flexibility since its treatment by the classical authors left it without a strict set of formal rules. Aristotle, who gave epideictic the most sophisticated treatment, had expanded it to the domain in which the internal decisions of the audience are influenced, and noted that it was particularly suited to written compositions.[14] Cicero, Quintilian, and the author of th*e Ad Heren-*

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[10]Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 3.7.1. Miller, "Plotting a Cure", p. 43 argues suggestively that melancholy is "the condition of the text, insinuating itself into any perspective from which it might be regarded". It seems to me that the historically legitimate context in which to investigate such a claim is that of Renaissance rhetoric.

[11]For the Renaissance application of deliberative rhetoric to politics and civil science, see J. Tinkler, "Praise and Advice: Rhetorical Approaches in More's *Utopia* and Machiavelli's *The Prince*", *Sixteenth Century Journal* 19 (1988) pp. 187–207; Q. Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (Cambridge, 1996).

[12]For the definitive history in the classical world, see T. Burgess, "Epideictic Literature", *Studies in Classical Philology* 3 (1902) pp. 89–248. For Renaissance epideictic, see J. O'Malley, *Praise and Blame in Renaissance Rome: Rhetoric, Doctrine, and Reform in the Sacred Orators of the Papal Court, c. 1450–1521* (Durham NC, 1979); O. B. Hardison, *The Enduring Monument: A Study of the Idea of Praise and Blame in Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice* (Chapel Hill, 1962); B. Lewalski, *Donne's Anniversaries and the Poetry of Praise: The Creation of a Symbolic Mode* (Princeton, 1973); A. L. DeNeef, *This poetick liturgie: Robert Herrick's Ceremonial Mode* (Durham NC, 1974); B. Vickers, "Epideictic and Epic in the Renaissance", *New Literary History* 14 (1982) pp. 497–537 and idem, "Epideictic Rhetoric in Galileo's *Dialogo*", *Annali dell'Istituto e Museo di Storia della Scienza di Firenze* 8 (1983) pp. 69–102.

[13]J. O'Malley, "Content and Rhetorical Forms in Sixteenth-Century Treatises on Preaching", in J. Murphy ed., *Renaissance Eloquence* (Berkeley, 1983) p. 240; see below, at note 98, for Burton's inversion of this theme.

[14]Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 3.12.5–6; compare Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 3.8.63.

nium gave epideictic a more perfunctory analysis, leaving its objects much less clearly defined than those of the other two types of rhetoric; furthermore, the Roman theorists note that sometimes it is for display, or only for entertainment, but at other times it may serve an important ethical function for the individual and the state.[15] Since neither the purpose nor the object of epideictic was tightly delineated, the compositional guidelines that applied to judicial rhetoric (the five- or six-part oration) did not translate into epideictic: so that, for example, in its later manifestation in Renaissance sermons, all that was required was the tripartite *exordium, narratio,* and *peroratio.*[16]

What, then, can be said of the structural components and persuasive ends of Renaissance epideictic? Since it was not an overtly contentious *genus*, it had been not so much defined as 'sketched out' by classical rhetorical theory, and its persuasive ends remained strangely obscure. It is nevertheless useful to recall Cicero's basic distinction between *contentio* (formal, combative oratory) and *sermo* (informal, conversational speech). Epideictic forms were intrinsically non-combative, and if religious sermons and panegyrics were composed for formal, institutional contexts, the majority of humanist epideictic creations (dialogues, epic and lyric poetry, essays) fall clearly on the side of the *sermo.*[17] Cicero had noted that "Guidance about oratory [*contentio*] is available, provided by the rhetoricians, but none about conversation [*sermo*]",[18] and so in the case of epideictic texts that did not have clearly stated persuasive

[15]Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 3.7.6; *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, 3.6–8 and Cicero, *De inventione*, 1.5.7, 2.52.155–61; B. Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric* (Oxford, 1988) pp. 57–58. The broad scope of Renaissance epideictic can be seen in Richard Rainolde's English translation / adaptation of Aphthonius, *A Booke called the Foundacion of Rhetorike* (London, 1563), fol. 37ʳ. Compare Menander, *De genere Demonstrativo* 2.4, fol. 43ʳ, as well as Reinhard Lorich's commentary to the treatment of *Laus* in Aphthonius, *Progymnasmata* (London, 1575) fol. 114ᵛ. This edition of the *Progymnasmata* (with Agricola's translation and the commentary by Lorichius) was extremely popular in English grammar schools: see F. Johnson, "Two Renaissance Textbooks of Rhetoric: Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* and Rainolde's *A booke called the Foundacion of Rhetorike*", *Huntingdon Library Quarterly* 6 (1943) pp. 436–38.

[16]O'Malley, *Praise and Blame*, pp. 41, 58–60.

[17]J. Tinkler, "Renaissance Humanism and the *genera eloquentiae*", *Rhetorica* 5 (1987) pp. 279–309; see also G. Remer, *Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration* (University Park PA, 1996) esp. pp. 26–41, and below, note 139 for the associations of the *sermo* with scepticism.

[18]Cicero, *De officiis*, 1.132; however, in his own written *sermo* on friendship Cicero also says that "discourses of this kind seem in some way to acquire greater dignity when founded on the influence of men of ancient times, especially such as are

aims beyond the purpose of entertainment or display, something of a *carte blanche* had been given to the humanists to exercise rhetorical licence.[19] The loosely sermocinal dimension of this branch of rhetoric was given further weight by the treatment of epideictic *lalia* or "informal talk" in Menander Rhetor, whose survey of the demonstrative genres was being read from the sixteenth century onwards.[20]

At this point in our survey there is a danger of echoing the later rhetorical theorists of antiquity and losing any sense of the specificity of epideictic; expanding the category, in the manner of Hermogenes, to such an extent that it encompasses all literature that is not explicitly deliberative or judicial, would entail a dilution (if not erasure) of the content of this rhetorical *genus*. Rather, the flexibility of epideictic should be stressed because it was thus accommodated to the humanist preference for "conversational" literary creation.[21] Nevertheless a number of basic components remain: first, it is ostensive or demonstrative—it is, literally, a "showing forth", a display (though precisely what is displayed is a matter of some ambiguity);[22] second, it is in the main applied temporally to the present; and third, it is intrinsically concerned with the domain of ethics, notions of the good and / or the bad. To go beyond these basic components, however, it will be necessary to turn to a text whose rediscovery in the Renaissance, in the words of one recent commentator, generated a

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renowned" (Cicero, *De amicitia*, 1.4). Burton follows this principle when he assumes the identity of Democritus *redivivus*.

   [19]Tinkler, "Renaissance Humanism", p. 285.

   [20]For *lalia*, see Menander, *De genere Demonstrativo*, 2.4, fols. 41^v-45^r. The Greek edition of the *Peri Epideiktikon* was included in the Aldine edition of *Rhetores Graeci* (Venice, 1508) pp. 594–641,but its first appearance in the Latin tradition seems to be in the middle of the century with the 1558 Latin translation also issued in Venice. It also appears to have been used by J. C. Scaliger in his enormously influential *Poetices libri septem* (1561): see F. Cairns, "The *Poetices Libri Septem* of Julius Caesar Scaliger: An Unexplored Source", *Res Publica Litterarum* 9 (1986) pp. 49–57. For the Greek text and English translation, see D. Russell and N. Wilson, *Menander Rhetor* (Oxford, 1981).

   [21]In his discussion of sermocinal letter-writing Erasmus stresses the virtue of flexibility against those who say that letters should be without the "impassioned utterance" proper to contentious oratory (*De conscribendis epistolis*, trans. C. Fantazzi, in *Collected Works of Erasmus*, 25 (Toronto, 1985) p. 12).

   [22]As we shall see below; when the speech is designed purely for entertainment, as Cicero and Quintilian admit it may be, then it is the orator himself that is on display. It is at this point, where *epideixis* becomes *autodeixis*, that the humanist exploration of epideictic is at its most sophisticated. This is the rhetorical position adopted by Montaigne and exploited by Burton.

fascination which "goes beyond simple excitement".[23] This was, of
course, Aristotle's *Art of Rhetoric*. For it is not just that in composing
the *Anatomy* Burton was working with and actively adapting classical
models of epideictic rhetoric; above all it was an Aristotelian theory of
this *genus* that provided Burton with a theory of persuasive argumen-
tation, and which accordingly permeates his entire writing project.

Aristotle's definition of the *techne* of rhetoric is as "the faculty
of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any
subject whatever".[24] As such, its domain is not the discovery or state-
ment of truth—which pertains only to science arrived at by logical
demonstration—but the manufacture of probability through dialec-
tical discussion (specifically, by means of the rhetorical syllogism or
enthymeme) and of plausibility through the assent of the audience.[25]
The three principal means by which persuasion by assent is to be
achieved are *ethos* (the moral character of the speaker), *pathos* (putting
the audience into a certain frame of mind), and *logos* or *lexis* (the
speech / writing itself, as it proves or appears to prove). This triangu-
lar relationship is fundamental to Aristotle's conception of rhetoric
and its effects. Correspondingly, in order to achieve his goals the
orator "must be capable of logical reasoning, of studying characters
and the virtues, and thirdly the emotions—the manner and character
of each, its origin, and the manner in which it is produced".[26] It is

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[23]L. Green, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Renaissance Views of the Emotions", in
P. Mack ed., *Renaissance Rhetoric* (London, 1994) p. 1; Green, "Introduction" to *John
Rainolds's Oxford Lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Check Place, 1986).

[24]Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1.2.1.

[25]According to Aristotle, dialectic (logical discussion by way of question and
answer) and rhetoric are both opposed to scientific proof, and are closely related
(*Rhetoric*, 1.1.1 ff.). In practice, however, dialectic is conducted by two speakers in front
of a small audience and is concerned with logical processes; it is aimed at defeating
an opponent in debate by forcing him into contradiction, and applies syllogistic or
inductive reasoning to probable premises. Rhetoric, by contrast, is addressed to a large
audience and so cannot use properly logical or scientific reasoning; instead it uses an
imperfect syllogism (the enthymeme) and example, and employs emotional rather
than logical methods of persuasion. Whilst a knowledge of rhetoric is not necessary
for the dialectician, dialectic is nevertheless useful for the rhetorician (E. L. Hunter,
"Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians", in R. F. Howes ed., *Historical Stud-
ies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians* (Ithaca, 1961) pp. 66–67). Compare also J. Brunschwig,
"Aristotle's Rhetoric as a 'Counterpart' to Dialectic", in A. O. Rorty ed., *Essays on Aris-
totle's Rhetoric* (Berkeley, 1996) pp. 34–35 and, for approaches to this relationship in the
Renaissance, J. D. Moss, "Antistrophic Rhetoric: Aristotelian Rhetoric in Renaissance
Rome and Padua", in C. Blackwell and S. Kusukawa eds, *Philosophy in the Sixteenth
and Seventeenth Centuries: Conversations with Aristotle* (Aldershot, 1999) pp. 86–106.

[26]Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1.2.7.

specifically the task of Book 3 of the *Rhetoric* to explore the emotions and the psychological means by which they are aroused, and, importantly, it was this dimension of the text (pertaining to plausible rhetorical argument aimed at eliciting emotional assent rather than to the dialectical enthymeme dealing with probable logic) that received most attention in the later Renaissance—in all likelihood because of the dominant Ciceronian conception of the ends of rhetoric as *movere, docere, et delectare*.[27] When he turns to the epideictic kind of rhetoric in the first book, Aristotle states that it is used for the purposes of praise or blame, and that it its temporal frame is "most appropriately the present, for it is the existing condition of things that all those praise or blame have in view", although the past or future may also be used. Its *telos* is the honourable or the disgraceful, and hence requires a knowledge of ethics.[28]

All this is conventional enough, but it is in the next step of his argument concerning plausible demonstrative rhetoric that Aristotle shows some of the reasons for the Renaissance fascination with the *Rhetoric*. Since epideictic deals with virtue or vice, it is necessary for the *ethos* of the orator that he appears virtuous (that is, not necessarily that he should *be* virtuous, rather that he cultivate the *appearance* of virtue).[29] Furthermore, from the point of view of *pathos*, the orator should consider *in whose presence* the praise or blame is delivered, and his notions of virtue or vice should be adjusted accordingly.[30] The inclusion of the audience in the rhetorical triangle entails their inclusion in the subject of the discourse itself:

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[27]L. Green, "The Reception of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in the Renaissance", in W. Fortenbaugh and D. Mirhady eds, *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle* (New Brunswick, 1994) esp. pp. 328, 333–35, 347; Green, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric*", as in n. 23, esp. pp. 4, 7–9, 12; compare also the view of Ludovico Carbone (Moss, "Antistrophic Rhetoric", p. 98). One of the exponents of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in England was John Rainolds, the Greek Reader at Corpus Christi College in Oxford in the 1570s. Rainolds lectured on the *Rhetoric* as an elective topic, and the surviving lecture notes show that he concentrated most of his attention on its emotional and psychological aspects (Green, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric*", pp. 12–13; *Rainolds's Lectures*, as in n. 23, pp. 68–76); as Green notes, Rainolds follows Agricola's reformulation of the relationship between the two domains in assigning the logical aspects of rhetoric to dialectic, but goes well beyond him in his probabilistic view of knowledge about the world; he thus "dismisses scientific reasoning as a mere chimera" (*Rainolds's Lectures*, p. 73). As we shall see below, Rainolds's adaptation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is largely followed by Burton.

[28]Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1.3.4.

[29]Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1.9.1–15.

[30]This Aristotelian aspect of rhetoric is emphasized in the diverse approaches of George of Trebizond, Cardinal Bessarion, and Juan Luis Vives (Green, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric*", p. 6, "Reception", pp. 325–26).

> In epideictic exordia, one must make the hearer believe that he shares
> the praise, either himself, or his family, or his pursuits, or at any rate
> in some way or other. For Socrates says truly in his Funeral Oration that
> "it is easy to praise Athenians in the presence of Athenians, but not in
> the presence of Lacedaemonians."[31]

This procedure has no necessary requirement that what the epideictic
discourse represents be truthful: it operates purely in the realm
of *techne*, where epistemological questions of truth or falsehood
are instrumental, but by definition incidental.[32] Epideictic rhetoric
becomes a form of discourse in which the values of the audience (as
they are conceived by the orator) are reproduced and shown to be
in conformity with the object of praise or blame, as well as present
in the character of the orator himself.[33] This circular process means
that in effect the orator must manipulate the realm of ethics to his
advantage, so that, just as ethics should use rhetoric for ethical ends,
rhetoric can also use ethics for rhetorical ends.[34]

Where Aristotle demonstrates distinctiveness from his sophist
predecessors and the later Roman tradition is in his insistence that
ethos is a quality that resides purely in discourse, rather than in the
character of the speaker.[35] Epideictic discourse, then, must include
a process of self-fashioning (another direct point of contact with
characteristically Renaissance concerns),[36] simultaneously and coin-
cidentally with the figuration of the audience as an ethical subject.
The inclusion of both orator / author and audience / reader in epide-
ictic should ideally take place in the realm of metadiscourse, since
it is a basic principle that rhetoric should conceal its presence.[37] There
is an element of deception here, but in fact deception aimed at the

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[31] Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 3.14.11.

[32] That is not to say that Aristotle does not envisage rhetoric as a potentially ethical
instrument, but rather that its status is technically instrumental: like strength or wealth
it can (and should) be used for ethical purposes, but this is the domain of ethics and
not of rhetoric.

[33] This point is strongly brought out and put to good use in R. Lockwood, *The
Reader's Figure: Epideictic Rhetoric in Plato, Aristotle, Bossuet, Racine, and Pascal* (Geneva,
1996) pp. 35–169. My discussion of Aristotle is greatly indebted to this exposition.

[34] Lockwood, *Reader's Figure*, pp. 45–46.

[35] H. North, *From Myth to Icon: Reflections of Greek Ethical Doctrine in Literature and
Art* (Ithaca, 1979) pp. 152 ff.

[36] S. Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning from More to Shakespeare* (Chicago,
1980).

[37] Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 3.2.4; compare Longinus, *On the Sublime*, 164 and Quintilian,
Institutio oratoria, 4.2.126.

audience can take place at every level in the epideictic.[38] The creation of *ethos*, the construction of argument in praise or blame of the object (*logos* or *lexis*), and the arousal of the audience's emotions (*pathos*) are interconnected functions of a certain way of 'figuring' the audience in accordance with the ends of plausible and probable rhetoric, to achieve assent and persuade in matters of uncertainty.[39]

It is in his treatment of the means of *pathos* in Book 3 that Aristotle's concept of epideictic comes to its fruition. In the first book he has stated the general principle that "it is ... the hearer, that determines the speech's end and object",[40] and of course each part of rhetorical persuasion (*ethos*, *pathos*, *logos/lexis*) is expressly aimed at the audience. Moreover *ethos* and *pathos* have an intrinsic connection insofar as they both establish an identificatory connection between the speaker and the listener—that is, *ethos* is the precondition for effective *pathos*; the listener must be able to identify himself with the orator before the latter can elicit emotion and attain assent. In cases of uncertainty, the audience's assent is achieved by means of an "appropriate style", which establishes *ethos* and *pathos* in harmony, so that its rhetorical affect

> makes the fact appear credible; for the mind of the hearer is imposed upon under the impression that the speaker is speaking the truth, because, in such circumstance, his feelings are the same, so that he thinks (even if it is not the case as the speaker puts it) that things are as he represents them.[41]

This is the structure of plausible rhetoric: since "his feelings are the same", the listener's identification with the speaker gives absolute power to the discourse by means of its emotional expression. The triangle is completed by the listener's identification of himself with the object explicitly being praised: "we must make the hearer feel that the eulogy includes either himself or his family or his way of life or something or other of the kind".[42] The identification of speaker, listener, and object has been carried so far that, in effect, the question of *what* or *who* exactly is being praised (or blamed) in the discourse

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[38]Aristotle is quite explicit on this point: the means of creating *ethos* as well as the content of *logos* can be deceptive, for example by "calling 'rashness' 'courage'" (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1.9.28–29).

[39]For the notion of 'figuring' the audience in epideictic rhetoric, see Lockwood, *Reader's Figure*, passim.

[40]Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1.3.1.

[41]Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 3.7.4.

[42]Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 3.14.11.

becomes highly ambiguous, let alone the question of what now constitutes the persuasive *telos*. If we recall, however, that epideictic may be serving the simple purpose of a display of oratorical skill purely for entertainment,[43] then it becomes possible that for all its pretensions to be working on, or even flattering the audience, the ultimate object of praise will be the skill of the orator himself. As Aristotle had stated earlier, "We may say, without qualification, anyone is your judge whom you have to persuade",[44] so as pure display the speech is judged by its audience as successful or unsuccessful if they undergo the processes of identification involved and feel the same emotions that are expressed by the discourse.[45]

Demonstrative rhetoric was not always about pure entertainment, however, and as a kind of rhetoric it was necessarily tied to persuasion. Hence it is that epideictic may well be deliberative in disguise, "as when we scold a man for his conduct or try to change his views";[46] in such a context the ethical use of persuasion seems clear, and finds its Renaissance application in the form of epideictic sermons.[47] Closer examination, however, has revealed that the theoretical grounding of such persuasion is far more complex than it initially appears. What is on display is, apparently, the objects or qualities that are being praised or blamed; but, according to Aristotle's circular formula, the ethical characteristics of these objects or qualities must first of all be in some sense shared or valued by the audience. If this is indeed the case, then it is hard to see in what sense the audience may be "persuaded" by the praise or blame of an object or quality that they already value or despise, except in the case of a listener who has acted in contradiction to his or her own ethical code. More loosely, the "persuasion" may be seen to be a spur to emulation (and this is surely its intended function in Renaissance sermons), but it is equally possible that the persuasive nature of Aristotelian epideictic may be formulated as an apparently tautological injunction to the audience to "be more like themselves".[48] In this complex

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[43]Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric*, pp. 57–58; O'Malley, *Praise and Blame*, p. 40.

[44]Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.18.1.

[45]Lockwood, *Reader's Figure*, pp. 73–4.

[46]Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.18.1; it is possible to speak in two *genera* simultaneously. Cf. the role of deliberative advice in *lalia* in Menander, *De genere Demonstrativo*, 2.4, fol. 42ᵛ.

[47]O'Malley, *Praise and Blame, passim*.

[48]This may be related to what J. Briggs, *Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature* (Cambridge MA, 1989) identifies as the "Timaeic" idea, widespread in the Renaissance, of a rhetoric that perfects its subject matter.

circularity, the process of persuasion is seen to be a "success" when the audience exhibits assent in the form of the appropriate emotional response (pleasure, excitement, wonder), a response which simultaneously confirms the persuasive power of the discourse, the skill of the orator, and the values of the audience. A paradox, then: the persuasion consists in the audience's recognition of its own persuaded condition.

Aristotle thus left the persuasive ends of epideictic in a state that was tightly defined theoretically, but open-ended in practice.[49] There is no *agon* in which the orator is engaged, he merely demonstrates (literally, he "shows it forth"), and so the audience is not persuaded to back one side of an argument; as we have seen, precisely what is shown is also highly ambiguous; and further, the speech is not constructed in order to produce an *act*, although it is designed to arouse the audience's emotions and thereby control their judgement over a matter that was previously uncertain. In fact, what epideictic produces in Aristotle's formulation is a judgement on the part of the audience, a judgement, that is, of the effectiveness (or otherwise) of the discourse at establishing that the object of praise or blame truly is worthy of that response. At every stage of its construction, the epideictic argument elides the figures of orator / author, listener / reader, and the object of the discourse in order to produce a favourable judgement on its own content. What, then, is "shown forth"? Essentially it is the working of the discourse itself, striving for its own culmination in the simultaneous emotive response and approval of its audience: *epideixis*, at its core, operates through *autodeixis*.

EXORDIUM

Returning to *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, there are a number of strong indications in its immediate presentation that it has been constructed within the epideictic framework for plausible rhetoric as the classical world, and specifically Aristotle, had conceived it.[50] To begin our

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[49] As Harry Caplan notes in *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1954) it seems that whereas in judicial and deliberative causes the speaker tries to move his listeners to a decision or specific course of action, in epideictic he tries simply "to impress his ideas upon them, without action as a goal" (p. 173).

[50] At Oxford Burton would have been trained in Aristotelian rhetoric: for the prominent role of Aristotle, and specifically of his *Rhetoric*, in the arts curriculum at Oxford in Burton's era, see J. McConica, 'The Collegiate Society', in McConica ed., *The History of the University of Oxford*, III, *The Collegiate University* (Oxford, 1986) pp. 707–12

analysis with Burton's *exordium*,[51] it is worth looking at the title of
the work as it appeared on the illustrated Frontispiece of the third
edition (1628):

> THE ANATOMY OF MELANCHOLY. *What it is, With all the kinds causes,
> symptomes, prognosticks & severall cures of it.* In three Partitions, with their
> severall Sections, members & subsections. *Philosophically, Medicinally,
> Historically, opened & cut up* By Democritus Junior. *With a Satyricall
> Preface, Conducing to the Following Discourse . . . Omne tulit punctum qui
> miscuit utile dulci.* (1.lxiii)[52]

At its most basic level, then, it is a demonstration of melancholy—
a showing forth of *What it is.* Burton's choice of title is indeed
naturally suited to the *genus demonstrativum*, an anatomy being a
method of analysis which begins with an opening and proceeds
by cutting up ("opened & cut up") a whole into its parts with an
explicitly ostensive purpose.[53] At the same time, the Horatian dictum
indicates a distinctively Ciceronian slant to the book's rhetorical
aims.[54] Moreover the illustrated frontispiece which contains this title

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and McConica, "Humanism and Aristotle in Tudor Oxford", *English Historical Review*
94 (1979) pp. 291–317. For the place of rhetoric in Renaissance education generally, see
the summary in Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric*, pp. 256–65. For information regarding
Burton's career as a student at Oxford, see R. Nochimson, "Studies in the Life of Robert
Burton", *Yearbook of English Studies* 4 (1974) pp. 85–111 (pp. 89–92).

    [51] The following analysis is based on the ordering of prefatory material found in
the last edition corrected by Burton (1651): (i) the title-page and its "Argument"; (ii)
"Democritus Junior ad Librum suum"; (iii) the "Authors Abstract"; (iv) "Democritus
Junior to the Reader"; (v) "Lectori malè feriato"; (vi) "Heraclite fleas . . ."; (vii) the
Synopsis. I have indicated in footnotes when this order is varied throughout the
different editions.

    [52] This is mostly identical to the title of the first two editions, but the engraved
frontispiece appeared for the first time in 1628 along with the Horatian dictum.

    [53] In rhetorical terms, "opening" signifies a visual display of an object previously
hidden from sight. See Henry Peacham's description of "Diæresis" as an ostensive
procedure of division leading to the perception and knowledge of the parts of an
object (H. Peacham, *The Garden of Eloquence* (1593; facsimile repr. Gainesville, Fl., 1954),
123–24). Peacham warns against "reckning up too many" and including instances "of
another kind" in one's discussion, so that "it falleth in an obvious confusion", but
by drawing attention to the "confused" and "divers" kinds of melancholy in his
account (1.168.13–14) Burton conspicuously transgresses Peacham's guidelines. The
association of epideictic rhetoric with anatomical dissection is not Burton's innovation:
see H. von Staden, "Anatomy as Rhetoric: Galen on Dissection and Persuasion", *Journal
of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 50 (1995) pp. 47–66 for a most important
and authoritative precedent.

    [54] Although it does not have an explicitly emotional dimension, the dictum is
Ciceronian in a loose sense since it incorporates persuasion, teaching and pleasure.

at its centre not only adds a strong visual dimension to augment
the demonstrative force, but simultaneously points to itself as an
ostensive articulation. From the fourth edition of 1632 onwards, the
frontispiece is supplied with an explanatory poem ("The Argument
of the Frontispiece") whose introductory lines refer to the reader's
act of seeing this demonstration: "Ten distinct Squares heere seene
apart, / Are joyn'd in one by Cutters art" (1.lxii). The coincidence
of *epideixis* and *autodeixis* has occurred at the very beginning: the
book is explicitly drawing attention to its own ostensive function
(the "Squares heere seene") and its establishment of the rhetorical
triad of author, reader, and text. This is not, however, a conventional
treatment, and ambiguity has already crept in. "Ten distinct Squares"
are indeed "seene" by the reader, but who is the "Cutter" whose
"art" has made them "joyn'd in one"? The initial impression is that
the "Cutter" must be the engraver of the illustrations, but then again
the anatomist is also a cutter, whose art has dissected melancholy
and reconstituted it in his book.[55]

In fact, the author appears only to disappear. Most obviously
he is hiding behind the pseudonym of Democritus Junior, but his
portrait and coat of arms—which draw attention to the frustrated
question of authorial identity and hint at his autodeictic intention to
show himself showing—nevertheless sit below the title. In the final
stanza of "The Argument of the Frontispiece", which corresponds
to the portrait, the author, reader, and text are placed in a complex
reformulation of the Aristotelian rhetorical triangle:

Menander describes *lalia* as a "genus ad delectandos auditores" and emphasizes its
pleasure-giving capacity throughout (*De genere Demonstrativo*, 2.4, fos. 41^v and 41^v-
45^r). In Burton's first edition, the Delphic maxim and Renaissance commonplace of
"Nosce teipsum" is found in its place: see below, esp. at notes 162–70, for the *Anatomy*
as an exploration of self-knowledge.

[55] R. Fox, *The Tangled Chain: The Structure of Disorder in "The Anatomy of Melancholy"*
(Berkeley, 1976), pp. 34–36 notes this ambiguity; Fox suggests that the title page
"presents a conflation of the synoptic tables and the index: ordered but not balanced,...
a *manifestatio* of logical order modified by the not quite logical associations of the
emblems". This argument, which coincides with her overall view of the *Anatomy*
as a scholastic *manifestatio* of "disordered order" is ultimately unsatisfactory. Most
importantly, there is no direct evidence in the text that Burton is using the scholastic
principle of *manifestatio* in order to achieve an "artificial unity": this is anachronistic—
he is rather using the tools of classical rhetoric throughout. For a more sober view of
the Frontispiece and its "Argument", see M. Corbett and R. Lightbown, *The Comely
Frontispiece: The Emblematic Title-page in England, 1550–1660* (London, 1979) pp. 190–
200; see also W. Mueller, "Robert Burton's Frontispiece", *Publications of the Modern
Language Association of America* 64 (1949) pp. 1074–88.

> Now last of all to fill a place,
> Presented is the Authors face;
> And in that habit which he weares,
> His Image to the world appeares.
> His minde no art can well expresse,
> That by his writings you may guesse.
> It was not pride nor vaineglory,
> (Though others doe it commonly)
> Made him doe this: if you must know,
> The Printer would needs haue it so.
> Then doe not frowne or scoffe at it,
> Deride not, or detract a whit.
> For surely as thou dost by him,
> He will doe the same againe.
> Then looke upon't, behold and see,
> As thou likest it, so it likes thee.
>
> And I for it will stand in view,
> Thine to commande, Reader Adew.

In Aristotelian terms, the author being presented by the text is *ethos* being created by *logos*, but the relationship between author and text is not fully functional: "His minde no art can well expresse, / That by his writings you may guesse". Although rhetoric was never considered to be an exact science of language, one of its more reliable functions was thought to be self-expression;[56] Burton is suggesting, however, not only that his own melancholy mind will never be "well" expressed by his writing—neither effectively, reliably, nor, perhaps, for conventionally 'good' ends— but also that this should be evident to the reader.[57] Burton's *logos* will be placed in an untrustworthy, rhetor-

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[56] According to Thomas Wright, for example, "Words represent most exactly the image of the minde and soule" and "we write to declare our minds" (Wright, *Passions of the Minde*, pp. 106, 141); compare also Longinus, *On the Sublime*, 22.1, where rhetoric appears to be a direct representation of the speaker's psychology, and in general B. Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric*, rev. edn (Oxford, 1989) pp. 294–339. However, insofar as an orator's *ethos* is always geared towards persuasion it should not be taken as a transparent expression of his mind. In the text Burton sets up a tension between these two approaches to *ethos* by assuming a *persona*: the first as a variable self-image adapting when appropriate to persuasion (seen in the preface's argument that all the world is melancholy), and the second as a fixed locus of authorial identity (which is behind the author's claim that he has "writ with as small deliberation as I doe ordinarily speake" (3.471.16 and 1.17.17)).

[57] B. Vickers, "The Power of Persuasion: Images of the Orator, Elyot to Shakespeare", in J. Murphy ed., *Renaissance Eloquence* (Berkeley, 1983) p. 417 notes that one of the fundamental functions of rhetoric in the Renaissance was to express thought or

ically 'corrupt' relationship with his *ethos*, as a direct function of his ultimately unknowable melancholic condition—as he says later, "you may as well make the *Moone* a new coat, as a true character of a melancholy man; as soone finde the motion of a bird in the aire, as the heart of a man, a melancholy man" (1.407.28–30).

This is the first step in a series of rhetorical inversions: *ethos* as, paradoxically, the establishing of a self-consciously *un*trustworthy persona.[58] Given the corruption of *ethos* by *logos*, it is unsurprising to find that *pathos* can follow the same route. The reader is warned not to "detract" from the author, or else he will get similar treatment in return ("He will doe the same againe"); the reader is placed in a potentially abusive relationship with the author (he is already showing forth melancholic paranoia), who then turns from blackmail to bribery for approval: "As thou likest it, so it likes thee." So much for the author gaining the trust of the reader (*ethos*) and the reader being put in a receptive frame of mind (*pathos*). Moreover, who is speaking this poem? It is not, apparently, the author, since he is the third person. Rather, it is "The Argument of the Frontispiece", and the "I" is the text personified.[59] The book speaks, "doe not frowne or scoffe at it [i.e., the "Authors *face*"] . . . As thou likest it, so it likest thee ", and places itself *between* the reader and the author: "And I for it will stand in view".[60]

As if to reinforce the distinction (and at the same time the potential disjunction) between author and text, what follows is a valedictory address from the author to his book: "Democritus Junior ad

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reveal the mind: the fact that this cannot occur satisfactorily for Burton suggests that his malfunctioning rhetoric is directly linked to his melancholy. Compare his labelling of his speech as sometimes "muddy" (1.18.10): this seems to refer to a self-conscious and deliberate cultivation of obscurity—as opposed to perspicuity—which is named by Aristotle as one of the faults of style (*Rhetoric*, 3.5.6–7) and by Thomas Wright as a sign either of confusion or pride (*Passions of the Minde*, p. 141).

[58] As he is constructed in the "Satyricall Preface", Democritus Junior is a *prosopopoeia* of this notion. In Aristotelian terms, this *persona* consistently violates two of the components of *ethos* (*phronesis*, the quality of careful deliberation, and *eunoia*, the avoidance of provocation or shocking of the audience) in favour of an excess of the third (*arete*, the showing of a virtuous frankness that does not fear the consequences of expressing itself). See Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.1.5.

[59] Compare J. Webber, *The Eloquent "I"*, pp. 80–114.

[60] There is a telling ambiguity in the phrase "stand in view": it suggests both that the book will be the author's representative in the discourse to the reader (it will be in view for the reader to see), *and* that it will stand in the view of the reader, i.e. that it will obscure the reader's view of the real author. Thus in the Aristotelian schema, *logos* plays a duplicitous role in constructing the image of the author and eliciting the trust of the reader (*ethos*).

Librum suum",[61] conducted in Latin,[62] and preparing it for its task
and reception in the outside world:

> VAde Liber, *qualis*, non ausim dicere, *fœlix*,
> Te nisi fœlicem fecerit Alma dies.
> Vade tamen quocunque lubet, quascunque per oras,
> Et *Genium* Domini fac imitere tui. (1.lxvi)[63]

In a further modulation of enunciative relationships, the author then
proceeds to another poem: "The Authors Abstract of Melancholy
Διαλογικῶς". Strictly speaking, it is not a dialogue but a dialogical
poem, in which the positive and negative aspects of melancholy are
juxtaposed—a playful exercise of epideictic *laus et vituperatio*, but
unusually mingling the praise with the blame,[64] and so a poetic argu-
ment *in utramque partem* designed to create the impression of oscillat-
ing uncertainty.[65] Whereas "The Argument of the Frontispiece" and
"Democritus Junior ad Librum suum" had expressly been directed
at the reader and the book respectively, the "Authors Abstract" is not
apparently addressed to anyone. It is rather a solitary, internal medi-

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[61]This was added in the third edition (1628) along with the "Authors Abstract";
both were originally located after "Democritus Junior to the Reader", but from the
1632 edition onwards they were placed before the preface.

[62]According to Democritus Junior, Latin is his preferred language, so in this
Burton is following the classical rhetorical precept of *decorum personae*.

[63]The rest of the poem prepares the book for the different types of reader it is
likely to encounter, with the instruction that when it faces criticism it should reply,
in loose translation, "Good Sir, throughout, the context see" (R. Burton, *The Anatomy of
Melancholy*, ed. and trans. F. Dell and P. Jordan-Smith (New York, 1948) p. 6). This is
a useful hermeneutic injunction for the critic.

[64]The combination of praise and blame (*amphidoxa*) is categorized by Menander
as a subgenre of the epideictic encomium (*De genere Demonstrativo*, 1.10, fol. 15ᵛ).

[65]For the reversibility of epideictic topics to effect a transition from *laus* to *vituper-
atio*, see Aphthonius, *Progymnasmata*, fols 118ʳ-121ᵛ, 156ʳ, and esp. Lorich's scholium
at fol. 158ᵛ. See also Rainolde, *Foundacion of Rhetorike*, fol. 43ᵛ and Aristotle, *Rhetoric*
1.1.12; since it deals with probabilities, the proving of opposites is also appropriate
to Aristotelian dialectic. In the main treatise the most explicit and self-conscious argu-
ment *in utramque partem* is found at 3.266–268, where Burton playfully quotes twelve
points ("succinctly, pithily, pathetically, perspicuously, and elegantly delivered") for
and against marriage (he is in deliberative mode) as "a briefe abstract of all that which
I have said" on the subject. As he concludes, "'tis all in the proofe" (1.268.27). The
subject of marriage is frequently used as an exercise in rhetoric manuals—see, for
example, Rainolde, *Foundacion of Rhetorike*, fols 54ᵛ-59ʳ. For the prominent role of this
type of argument in the Renaissance, see T. Sloane, "Rhetorical Education and the
Two-Sided Argument", in H. Plett ed., *Renaissance-Rhetorik* (Berlin, 1993) pp. 163–78;
see also Q. Skinner, "Moral Ambiguity and the Renaissance Art of Eloquence", *Essays
in Criticism* 44 (1994) pp. 267–92.

tation ("When I goe musing all alone . . . When I lie waking all alone" (1.lxix)) conducted by the author about the dialogical nature of his melancholic condition ("None so divine as Melancholy . . . Naught so damn'd as Melancholy" (1.lxxi)), and hence, rhetorically, addressed to himself.[66] The final stage of this particular rhetorical game is, somewhat unsurprisingly, "Democritus Junior *to the Reader.*" (1.1.1–2)[67]

Framing devices such as introductory poems and illustrated title pages were nothing unusual in themselves,[68] but it is difficult to ignore the self-conscious manner in which Burton has manipulated and inverted the norms of rhetoric in the first pages of his work. His project here is the simultaneous implementation and distortion of the conventional relationships between author, text and reader, an epideictic demonstration of the disorderly "badness" of his own melancholic rhetoric. This is a process that will be recapitulated at greater length in the preface and, indeed, in the whole of the book. The opening of the *Anatomy*, in true epideictic fashion, shows itself showing, and directs the reader to contemplate the enunciative relationships that will structure the following discourse. Moreover, the fact that the progression from title-page to preface is delineated by this rhetorical gameplay with enunciation indicates that each of these stages should be categorized as parts of the *exordium* to the *Anatomy*. In other words, although it is tempting to see the "Democritus Junior *to the Reader*" preface as standing apart from the title page and the initial poems because of its length, it is, compositionally, the development of a rhetorical process already begun. That process, of course, is the domain of the classical *exordium*: to prepare the reader for what lies ahead.

In the preface Democritus Junior presents a bravura rhetorical performance to persuade the reader of the melancholy and madness of the world—as he says, "I could produce such arguments till darke

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[66] Burton's "Abstract" is clearly in the tradition of pre-Cartesian ideas about self-knowledge explored by I. Maclean, "Language in the Mind: Reflexive Thinking in the Late Renaissance", in C. Blackwell, *Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, cit. in n. 25 above, pp. 320–21 (see also note 179 below).

[67] This play with the system of classical rhetoric should not be considered unusual. Compare R. Barthes, "The Old Rhetoric: An Aide-Mémoire", in *The Semiotic Challenge*, trans. R. Howard (Oxford, 1988) p. 16.

[68] See, for example, their appearance in the beginning of Helkiah Crooke's Μιχροχοσμογραφια :*A Description of the Body of Man* . . . (2nd edn, London, 1631), a compilation of the anatomical works of Andreas Laurentius and Gasper Bauhinus. Compare also the letters, map, verses, and utopian alphabet printed in the early editions of More's *Utopia* (ed. G. Logan and R. Adams (Cambridge, 1989) pp. 112–132).

night" (1.66.10).[69] Leaving aside the complex particularities of the satire,[70] it should be noted that even when "Democritus Junior *to the reader*" has been completed, another two preparatory components of the *exordium* remain.[71] The first, present in the 1621 edition onwards, makes explicit the Rabelaisian strategy of the author threatening the potentially "idle and mischievous reader" ("Lectori malè feriato") and joins it with the preface's primary theme:

> Iterum moneo, ne quid cavillere, ne dum *Democritum Juniorem* conviciis infames, aut ignominiose vituperes, de te non male sentientem, tu idem audias ab amico cordato, quod olim vulgus *Abderiteanum* ab *Hyppocrate*, convicem bene meritum & popularem suum *Democritum*, pro insano habens. *Ne tu Democrite sapis, stulti autem & insani Abderitæ.*
>
> *Abderitanæ pectora plebis habes.*
>
> Hæc te paucis admonitum volo (male feriate Lector) abi. (1.114.11–18)

And, as if all this were not enough, another poem repeats the claim made in the preface that mankind needs a thousand Heraclituses and Democrituses to show them its madness (1.115.7–8).[72] These two additions seem little more than rather gratuitous exercises, since they merely restate themes that have already been put forward in concentrated form, but their inclusion conspicuously reinforces Burton's requirement of his readership that the following treatise should be interpreted within the rhetorical framework which he has con-

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[69] For the display of rhetorical skill in *exordia* see Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.14.1. Compare Democritus Junior's closing retractions and apologies (1.112.10ff.) with the protective self-rebuke advised in *Rhetoric*, 3.7.9; and consider his self-accusation of madness (1.112.14) as an inversion of the technique of "turning upon the opponent what has been said against ourselves" (*Rhetoric*, 2.23.7).

[70] For a selection of readings of the preface, see B. Danner, "Inversorum Silenorum: Inversions of the Silenus in Robert Burton's 'Democritus Junior to the Reader' ", *English Literary Renaissance* 27 (1997) pp. 233–257; Fish, *Self-Consuming Artifacts*, pp. 303–52; R. Friedrich, "Training His Melancholy Spaniel: Persona and Structure in Robert Burton's 'Democritus Junior to the Reader'", *Philological Quarterly* 55 (1976) pp. 195–210; P. Holland, *Robert Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy and Menippean Satire, Humanist and English* (unpublished Ph. D. diss., University of London, 1979) esp. pp. 163–318; J. Starobinski, "La Mélancolie de L'Anatomiste", *Tel Quel* 10 (1962) pp. 21–9 and idem, "Démocrite parle: L'Utopie mélancolique de Robert Burton", *Le Débat* 29 (1984) pp. 49–72; J. Tillman, "The Satirist Satirized: Burton's Democritus Junior", *Studies in the Literary Imagination* 10 (1977) pp. 89–96.

[71] In the 1628 edition, as we have seen in note 61 above, "Democritus Junior ad Librum suum" and the "Authors Abstract" were also placed between "Democritus Junior to the Reader" and the main treatise.

[72] Added in the 1632 edition.

structed in the prefatory sections. In fact, both "Democritus Junior *to the Reader*" and "Lectori malè feriato" are explicitly marked as hermeneutic directions. But whereas the "Satyricall Preface" relates to the main treatise, the following sections, in restating the preface's reflexive theme, act as a bridging device between preface and treatise and make sure that the reader will not now dispose of the opening as "just for laughs".[73] This *exordium* has so far consisted of six separate but thematically linked parts.[74] Before the First Partition begins, however, the final, overarching piece remains to be put in place: the synopsis, which lays out the skeleton[75] of the discourse to follow. It is therefore a convenient point at which to begin consideration of the rhetorical structure of the *Anatomy* as a whole.

NARRATIO

(i) Synopsis

"The Synopsis of the First Partition" performs a double function: as it is placed at the end of the *exordium*, but before the text of the first Partition—the beginning of the *narratio* proper—it is technically a device to prepare the reader for the structure of the discourse; at the same time, however, its visual dimension draws attention to the author's process of *dispositio*, manifested primarily in his systematic implementation of the device of *partitio*. Several recent critics have suggested that the complexity of the four-page-long synopsis does not so much clarify the reader's notion of the structure of the following discourse as obscure it.[76] It is important to note, however, that both of its functions remain fully operative. First, it is an

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[73]In the first edition of 1621, Burton underlined the importance of the preface to the understanding of his work: "As for the end and use of this precedent Discourse, I referre you to that which hath beene formerly said", with the accompanying reference "*Prefat. Democ.*" (3.472.20–21; note q).

[74]Or seven, if the Frontispiece and its "Argument" are taken separately.

[75]Although the use of bodily metaphors to describe the structure of the Anatomy is now a critical commonplace (for example Fox, *Tangled Chain*, p. 8), as we shall see the origin of such terminology is found in the reflexive criticism which the book offers of itself.

[76]This point is made and explored in J. R. Simon, *Robert Burton et l'Anatomie de la mélancolie* (Paris, 1964) p. 422; Fox, *Tangled Chain*, pp. 22–7; D. Renaker, "Robert Burton and Ramist Method", *Renaissance Quarterly* 24 (1971) pp. 210–20. These views appear to be, to a greater or lesser extent, a product of modern unfamiliarity with Renaissance presentational techniques.

accurate map of the Partition, in all its intricacy, and thus prepares the
reader for the challenge of comprehending the complex and varied
nature of the subject matter; and second, its length and baroque
elaboration make it stand independently as a semi-visual discourse.[77]
It is, therefore, a reflexive epideictic act, a showing itself showing,
as well as a pointing to the process of *dispositio* that underlies the
creation of its discourse. The book opens itself up and performs its
own dissection: the anatomy of the *Anatomy*.[78]

The case has been stated that the systematic division and sub-
division of the *Anatomy* seen in its synoptic charts—one is placed
immediately before the beginning of each of the three Partitions
of the main treatise[79] —are an implementation of Ramist 'method',
with its penchant for dichotomies and diagrammatic concepts and
its emphasis on *dispositio* rather than *iudicium*.[80] In particular, it has
been argued that the charts "signal a late and somewhat decayed
Ramism", in that they incorporate not just dichotomies, but also nu-
merous subclasses, and actually end up frustrating the pedagogical
ends for which the 'method' was expressly designed.[81] The charts do

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
[77]Renaker, "Robert Burton", p. 213

[78]Cf. Richard Whitlock's instructions to his readership: "take therefore this
Anatomy of the *Anatomy*, (the Book it self) by way of a *Preface*" (*Zootomia, or, Ob-
servations on the Present Manners of the English* (London, 1654) p. 3). In his "Morall
Anatomy" Whitlock borrows extensively from Burton: see C. Bentley, "*The Anatomy of
Melancholy* and Richard Whitlock's *Zootomia*", *Renaissance and Modern Studies* 13 (1969)
pp. 88–105. The metaphorical connection between the *Anatomy* as a book and Burton's
own melancholic anatomy is explored below. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.14.8, makes a similar
connection when he speaks of the *exordium* as the "head" of a discourse, and the *narra-
tio* as its "body". The most important Renaissance precedent is probably Vesalius's
tabular representation of the human body, but compare also Montaigne's description
of his book as "a [s]*Keletos*" (*The Essayes*, trans. J. Florio (London, 1603) 2.6, p. 220). See
Maclean, "Language in the Mind", cit. in n. 66, p. 310, but also D. Hodges, *Renaissance
Fictions of Anatomy* (Amherst, 1985) esp. pp. 107–123. W. Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the
Decay of Dialogue* (Cambridge MA, 1958) p. 315 notes the Renaissance medical uses
of spatial presentations of "bodies" of knowledge, and their later manifestations in
the literary anatomies and dissections of Lyly, Nashe, and Burton.

[79]In the 1638 edition the "Synopsis of the first Partition" appears after the
"Authors Abstract" and before "Democritus Junior to the Reader", but this seems
to me to be a printing error.

[80]The argument for the Ramism of the charts is found in Renaker, "Robert Burton",
Höltgen, "Robert Burtons *Anatomy of Melancholy*", cit. in n. 3 above, pp. 398–401.
Sawday, "Shapeless Elegance", cit. in n. 2, pp. 199, 202 pursues the same line. For
Ramist *dispositio*, see W. Ong, *Ramus*, pp. 8–9.

[81]Renaker, "Robert Burton", pp. 212–13; Renaker notes that there were precedents
for the appearances of subclasses in Ramist texts, but argues that Burton carries it to
extreme lengths, and that confusion is the result.

Bread, course and blacke, &c.

Drinke; thicke, thinne, sowre, &c.

Water vncleane, milke, oyle, vineger, wine, spices, &c.

Diet offending in *Sub.* 3 — Substance

Flesh { Parts; heads, feet, entrals, fat, bacon, blood, &c.
Kinds { Beefe, Porke, Venison, Hares, Goates, Pigeons, Peacocks, Fensoule, &c.

Hearbs, Of fish; all shell fish, hard and slymie fish, &c.

Fish, Of hearbs; pulse, cabage, mellons, garlick, onyons, &c.

&c. All roots, raw fruits, hard and windy meats.

Quality as in { Preparing, dressing, sharpe sauces, salt meates, indurate, sowced, fryed, broyld, all made dishes, &c.

Quantity { Disorder in eating, inmoderate eating, or at vnseasonable times, &c. *Subs.2.*
Custome, delight, appetite altered, &c. *Subs.3.*

Retention & Evacuation. *Sub.4* { Costiuenesse, hot bathes, sweating, issues stopped, Venus in excesse, or in defect phlebotomy, purging, &c.

Ayre; hot, cold, tempestuous, darke, thick, foggy, moorish, &c. *Subs.5.*

Exercise { Vnseasonable, excessiue, or defectiue of body or minde, solitarinesse, idlenesse, a life out of action &c.
Subs.6.

Sleepe and waking, vnseasonable, inordinate, ouermuch, ouerlittle &c. *Subs.7.*

8 Necessary causes as those six non-natural things which are *Sect. 2. Mem.2.*

Mem.3, Sect.2. Passions & perturbatiós of the minde. *Subs.2.* With a digression of the force of Imagination *Sub.2.* & diuision of passions into *Sub.3.*

Irascible { Sorrow cause and symptome. *Sub.4.* Feare cause and symptome. *Sub.5.* Shame, repulse, disgrace, &c. *Sub.6.* Envy and malice. *Sub.7.* Emulation, hatred, faction, desire of reuenge. *Sub.8.* Anger a cause. *Subs.9.* Discontents, cares, miseries, &c. *Sub.10.*

or concupiscible { Vehement desires, ambition. *Sub.11.* Couetousnesse, φιλαργυρία. *Sub.12.* Loue of pleasures, gaming in excesse, &c. *Sub.13.* Desire of praise, pride, vainglory &c. *Snb.14.* Loue of learning, study in excesse, with a digression of the misery of Schollers, and why the Muses are Melancholy. *Sub.15.*

B. Symptomes of melancholy are either. *Sect.5.*

Generall as of *Memb.1.*

or

Body, as ill digestió, crudity, wind, dry braines, hard belly, thick blood, much waking, heauines & palpitation of heart, leaping in many places &c. *Snb.1*

cómon to all or most { Feare and sorrow without a iust cause, suspition, jealousie, discontent, solitarinesse, irksomnesse, continuall cogitations, restlesse thoughts, vaine imaginations &c. *Sub.2.*

or minde

Celestiall influences, as of ♄. ♃. ♂. &c. parts of the body, heart, braine, liuer, spleene, stomack, &c.

or Humours { Sanguine are merry still, laughing, pleasant, meditating on playes, women, musicke, &c.
Phlegmaticke, slothfull, dull, heauy, &c.
Cholericke, furious, impatient, subiect to heare and see strange apparitions &c.
Black, solitary, sad, they think they are bewitched, dead &c Or mixt of these 4 humors adust or not adust, infinitely varied.

Particular to priuate persons, according to *Sn. 3. & 4.*

Their seuerall customs, conditions, inclinatiós, discipline, &c. { Ambitious thinkes himselfe a king, a lord, couetous runnes on his money; lasciuious on his mistris, Religious hath reuelations, visions, is a Prophet, or troubled in minde. A Scholler on his booke, &c.

Continuance of time, as the humor is intended or remitted, &c { Pleasant at first, hardly discerned, afterwards harsh, and intollerable, if inueterate.
Hence some make three degrees { 1. *Falsa cogitatio.* 2. *Cogitata loqui.* 3. *Exequi loqnuta.*
By fits or continuat, as the object varies, pleasing, or displeasing.

Simple, or as it is mixt with other diseases, Apoplexies, gout, *Caninus appetitus*, &c. so the symptoms are various.

A 3 *See* ᵹᵹ *Mem.2.Par.*

indeed appear to answer Ramus's dictate that "the principles of the arts are definitions and divisions; outside these, nothing",[82] but the relationship between the supposedly Ramist synopses and the actual discourse of the *Anatomy* needs closer scrutiny. It is perhaps true that Burton's digressive, contradictory prose style and fondness for *copia verborum* stand in opposition to the organization of the synopses, but the question of the role of Ramism in the overarching structure of the *Anatomy* remains to be answered.[83]

If the charts have a Ramistic appearance, this should be counterpoised with the fact that they are the only identifiable evidence of any apparent Ramism in the whole of the *Anatomy*.[84] Most clearly,

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[82]Ramus, *Aristotelicae animadversiones* (Paris, 1543) fol. 58, quoted in Ong, *Ramus*, p. 188

[83]Höltgen argues plausibly that Burton uses the "useful" organizational elements of Ramist method "in moderation" in order to construct a clear scientific structure, but retains an essayistic prose style within this structure (Höltgen, "Robert Burtons *Anatomy of Melancholy*", pp. 396, 402–03). Renaker, however, equivocates between an interpretation of Burton as simply incapable of implementing a Ramist method ("Robert Burton", p. 217), and a view of Burton as taking a "curious revenge" on Ramus: that is, by his use of examples to prove a point either way depending on the context of the discussion, he was implementing the place-logic of Ramism to the exclusion of the other aspects of the method (pp. 219–20). In my view Burton's use of examples to prove a point either way is far more likely to be a parody of the rhetorical argument *in utramque partem* and has no direct relation to Ramist method. Hodges, *Renaissance Fictions*, pp. 114–15 is one of many critics to argue for a meaningful tension between Burton's disorderly prose style and his scholarly, analytic framework; it seems to me, as we shall see below, that a more significant tension is between the framework of the book and the kinds of argument found within it.

[84]Indeed, Ramus is one of the few intellectual figures of the era who is not mentioned at all in the whole of the book. Of course this does not in itself prove that Ramus has not influenced Burton, either directly or indirectly, but his absence seems conspicuous. Given his prominent role in scholarly controversy in the era (one of Burton's favourite subjects), the fact that he features neither in the pages of the *Anatomy* nor in Burton's extensive personal library may well reflect a degree of scholarly contempt. For the contents of his library, see N. Kiessling, *The Library of Robert Burton* (Oxford, 1988). For the vexed question of the influence of Ramus in Oxford, see M. Feingold, "The Humanities", in N. Tyacke ed., *The History of the University of Oxford*, IV, *Seventeenth-Century Oxford* (Oxford, 1997) pp. 289–92, 246–56; McConica, "Collegiate Society", p. 713, and idem, 'Humanism and Aristotle', pp. 301–02, 314; P. Sharratt, "Recent Work on Peter Ramus", *Rhetorica* 5 (1987) p. 58. Oxford booklists soon to be published in R. J. Fehrenbach and E. S. Leedham-Green eds, *Private Libraries in Renaissance England: A Collection and Catalogue of Tudor and Early Stuart book-lists* (Binghamton, 1992-) will supply much-needed evidence either to substantiate or complicate these largely negative views. Peter Mack has detected currents of Ramism in Oxford through these book-lists for the period leading up to the end of the sixteenth century (P. Mack, *Permeations of Renaissance Dialectic into*

however, Burton places his own rhetorical method in direct opposi-
tion to Ramus and his followers by drawing attention to the personal
iudicium which is intertwined with his *dispositio*, and revealed by the
selection, order, and use of commonplaces in his *cento* ("the composi-
tion and method is ours onely, and shewes a Schollar" (1.11.25–26)).[85]
Further, the description of melancholy throughout the main treatise
is deeply imbued with moralistic language and subject matter—since
vices and sinfulness play a prominent role in his description of the
disease[86] —but the Ramist approach tended towards a separation of
ethics from rhetoric.[87] As we shall see, moreover, Burton's probabilis-
tic rhetorical treatment of his subject matter is in direct conflict with
Ramus's views on human knowledge.[88]

In fact, the charts do not indicate Burton's allegiance to or in-
terest in Ramism but place the work inside a more general tradition
of encyclopaedism.[89] Similar examples can be found throughout the

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English Discourse c. 1580-c.1620 (M.Phil. diss., Warburg Institute, University of London,
1978), and it seems undeniable that Ramism stimulated significant controversies in
the university in the 1570s and 1580s, but since Burton matriculated at Brasenose
College in 1593 it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about the direct influence of
Ramism on his university education and subsequent career. What antagonism there
was towards Ramus in Oxford appears to derive from his hostility towards Aristotle,
who remained the dominant intellectual influence there well into the seventeenth
century: see, for an invaluable case-study, C. Schmitt, *John Case and Aristotelianism in
Renaissance England* (Kingston and Montreal, 1983). For Ramus's influence in England
and Europe generally, see G. Oldrini, "Sul rapporto al quotidiano in Ramo e nel
Ramismo", in *Scienze, credenze occulte, livelli di cultura* (Florence, 1982) pp. 65–85
and his "Le particolarità del ramismo inglese", *Rinascimento* 25 (1985) pp. 19–80;
G. Mohrmann, "Oratorical Delivery and other Problems in Current Scholarship on
English Renaissance Rhetoric", in J. Murphy ed., *Renaissance Eloquence* (Berkeley, 1983)
p. 58. For a useful survey of the varieties of Ramism implemented in the later sixteenth
century, see A. Grafton and L. Jardine, *From Humanism to the Humanities* (London, 1986)
pp. 161–200.

[85]See below at notes 162–67.

[86]Most obviously throughout the third Partition on "Love Melancholy" and "Re-
ligious Melancholy", but also in his treatment of the passions of envy, malice, hatred,
jealousy, and anger (1.263–270) as well as covetousness (1.283–288), "immoderate"
pleasures (1.288–293), and pride and self-love (1.293–301), all as causes.

[87]Grafton and Jardine, *From Humanism to the Humanities*, pp. 189, 192.

[88]Green, *Rainolds's Lectures*, p. 75, makes the distinction between the views of
Rainolds (drawn from Vives) and those of Ramus.

[89]Thus although I am in agreement with aspects of Höltgen's approach to the
Anatomy, in particular with his emphasis on the encyclopaedic and essayistic aspects
of the work ("Robert Burtons *Anatomy of Melancholy*", p. 396), the direct association
of the synoptic charts and the structure of the book with Ramism seems to me to
be misconceived. He concludes that Burton's "Ramist method" substantiates Bur-
ton's alleged claim (*Anspruch*) that the book should be taken as a "scientific-medical

variety of humanist encyclopaedias of the sixteenth century: synoptic charts had been used in early humanist *florilegia* such as Domenico Mirabelli's *Polyanthea* (1503), as well as in encyclopaedic common-place books such as Conrad Gesner's *Pandectae* (1548) and Theodor Zwinger's *Theatrum humanae vitae* (1565). They would also be used extensively by Alsted in his *Encyclopaedia* (1630).[90] Other indications that the *Anatomy* should be viewed in this context are Burton's tripar-tite method ("Philosophically, Medicinally, Historically"(1.lxiii)),[91] his use of an index at the end of the work (a device typical of the

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work" (p. 403), but this entails an unwarranted narrowing of the book's intended encyclopaedic scope as well as leaving the apparent tension between its form and content unresolved; further, although he shows the connection between Ramism and certain medical works in the later decades of the sixteenth century as well as between Ramism and encyclopaedism (pp. 398–99), this suggests that any Ramist influence on Burton is at best diffuse and indirect. Interestingly, the *Anatomy* appears to have been used as an encyclopaedic *florilegium* by Whitlock to aid the composition of his *Zootomia* (Bentley, "*The Anatomy of Melancholy*", pp. 94–5).

[90]For the argument that synoptic charts were commonplace to a wide variety of late humanist works and cannot be taken as indications of Ramist allegiance, see A. Blair, *The Theater of Nature: Jean Bodin and Renaissance Science* (Princeton, 1997) pp. 33–37, 84–85; compare also C. Schmitt, *Aristotle and the Renaissance* (Cambridge MA, 1983) pp. 56–59. For brief surveys of the works cited in the text, see A. Moss, *Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought* (Oxford, 1996) pp. 93–7, 191–2, 195–7, 228–32. The fact that Zwinger had a Ramist education shows the significant overlap between Ramism and late-sixteenth-century encyclopaedism, but it seems to me that it is the latter, broader tradition that has influenced Burton—though it is possible to talk of an indirect Ramist influence on Burton *through* this tradition. Either way, to talk of Burton's explicitly Ramist method seems misleading. W. Ong, "Commonplace Rhapsody: Ravisius Textor, Zwinger and Shakespeare", in R. R. Bolgar ed., *Classical Influences on European Culture A.D. 1500–1700* (Cambridge, 1976) p. 115, rightly places both Zwinger and Burton in an encyclopaedic tradition of 'omnibus dissectionists' dealing with commonplaces.

[91]This is often overlooked by critics arguing that Burton's intentions were pre-dominantly medical or scientific. His account may be "philosophical" insofar as it discusses questions of natural and moral philosophy as they relate to melancholy, though possibly the term refers more simply to a general *amor sapientiae*. It is "histor-ical" in its use of examples and case studies drawn from the written record—compare Bacon's notion of "literary" history in *The Advancement of Learning* (1605; London, 1906), 2.1.2, p. 82—though once again a generalized sense of *historia sapientiae* is possi-ble. When put together the three methods amount to an encyclopaedic approach to melancholy. See D. Kelley, "History and the Encyclopaedia", in D. Kelley and R. Pop-kin eds, *The Shapes of Knowledge from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment* (Dordrecht, 1991) pp. 9–11. Mordechai Feingold has noted that at the turn of the century in Oxford the Aristotelian, encyclopaedic image of knowledge as an essential unity was still dominant (M. Feingold, "The Mathematical Sciences and New Philosophies", in N. Tyacke ed., *History of the University of Oxford*, vol. IV, cit. in n. 84, p. 361; moreover the encyclopaedist Cardano is one of Burton's most frequently cited sources—see J. Bam-

humanist encyclopaedists),[92] and his compositional approach based on commonplaces.[93] Synoptic charts were also commonly used in medical works, such as the *De Crisibus* of Andreas Laurentius,[94] and can be found in this genre before Ramus.[95] It seems that, as for the encyclopaedists and medical authors, for Burton they are perform-ing a purely pedagogical, illustrative function, and have no Ramist significance in themselves; if there was any element of parody in the charts, it must have been supplied by the reader.[96] Insofar as they appear to announce a "sober" textbook and a certain scientific dis-course, a promise first made by the untrustworthy Democritus Junior (1.112.20), however, they are setting the reader up for a fall.

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borough, "Burton and Cardan", in J. Carey ed., *English Renaissance Studies Presented to Dame Helen Gardner* (Oxford, 1980), pp. 180–193.

[92] The tables were added in the second edition of 1624. Ruth Fox suggests that the index has "wholly illogical" elements (*Tangled Chain*, p. 31), but this is only the case from a modern perspective accustomed to more systematic editorial techniques. Hieremias Drexelias testified to the fact that such devices were an emerging but not yet fully effective reference tool when he pointed out in his encyclopaedic *Aurifodina artium et scientiarum omnium* (1638) that indices were rarely compiled by the author, and for the most part were unreliable and unhelpful (cited in Moss, *Printed Commonplace-Books*, p. 235). The reason that Burton's index creates the impression that "to study melancholy" is "to study man and the universe" (Fox, *Tangled Chain*, p. 31) is simply the consequence of the *Anatomy*'s encyclopaedic scope (Höltgen, "Robert Burtons *Anatomy of Melancholy*", p. 396).

[93] In the discussion of his "method" Burton employs the metaphor of the bee gathering nectar from flowers for the production of honey (1.11.6–8, 17), often used to typify the compositional method of encyclopaedic commonplace books: see Moss, *Printed Commonplace-Books*, pp. 13–15 for the history of this *topos*.

[94] A. Laurentius, *Opera omnia* (Paris, 1628) 1.4, p. 7; Laurentius is one of Burton's major medical sources.

[95] K. J. Höltgen, "Synoptische Tabellen in der medizinischen Literatur und die Logik Agricolas und Ramus", *Sudhoffs Archiv* 49 (1965) pp. 371–90 (371–72).

[96] It seems possible that some more attentive readers may have enjoyed an in-joke stemming from the tension between discursivity and visual illustration in the synopses—as Renaker has argued, the text in the charts is indisputably Burtonian (i.e. copious)—but it is impossible to demonstrate that they are intentionally parodical in themselves, rather than a simple reflection of the text which they accurately map. In my view they were intended by Burton to be taken simply as a sign of an encyclopaedic textbook, and the real location of satire and parody is in the other parts of the work.

(ii) Topics and Arguments

As the *narratio* of the book, the main treatise of the *Anatomy* is the place in which the "facts" about melancholy are presented and where the speaker seeks—as the author of the *Ad Herennium* puts it—to "turn every detail" to his advantage "so as to win the victory".[97] In general terms the main treatise is a sustained epideictic 'pointing' to what is bad—i.e., melancholic—about human nature and behaviour, an elaboration of the preface's paradoxically humanistic theme of *indignitas hominis*.[98] In fact, insofar as the *narratio* presents a systematic justification of the playful argument presented in the *exordium* "that all the world is mad, that it is melancholy, dotes" (1.24.24), Burton is simply following the conventional procedure of first stating the subject to be discussed in a skilful and pleasing manner,[99] and then presenting all the arguments that pertain to it.

The main treatise bears all the signs of being constructed through the system of rhetorical or dialectical 'topics'. In Aristotle *topoi* have a diversity of associations,[100] but in the *Rhetoric* they are defined as the source for the construction of dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms, and they can be applied to a variety of subjects. As such, the topics are a series of logically grounded points of view from which an uncertain question may be approached, with a view to the discovery of plausible and probable arguments as well as, on occasion, the first principles of a science.[101] This view is simplified by Cicero in his *Topica*, where they become a source of positive arguments, or the 'common places' (*loci communes*) where such arguments are found. The Ciceronian approach, which broadly speaking is adopted in the Renaissance,[102] amounts to the production of an argument through

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[97]*Rhetorica ad Herennium*, 1.8.12; it is therefore far from being a objective presentation of facts: see Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 4.2.111–124 for the use of emotional appeals in the *narratio*.

[98]For this idea in reference to Alberti's *Momus o del principe*, see R. Klein, "La Thème du fou et l'ironie humaniste", in *La Forme et l'intelligible* (Paris, 1969) pp. 433–50; as a subject for *vituperatio*, the theme of *indignitas hominis* in Burton's preface is wholly appropriate to the epideictic *genus* of the work.

[99]Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 3.19.4.

[100]For a convenient summary, see J. M. van Ophuijsen, "Where Have the Topics Gone?", in W. Fortenbaugh, *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle*, cit. in n. 27, pp. 134–35.

[101]Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.2.21; when the principles of a science have been discovered by such means, however, "it will no longer be Dialectic or Rhetoric" since the discourse is now in the domain of certainty.

[102]For the suitably chequered history of commonplaces in the Renaissance see Sister J. M. Lechner, *Renaissance Concepts of the Commonplaces* (New York, 1962); W.

the application of a certain topical heading (such as species or genus) to the present subject matter.

A brief survey of the structure of the *Anatomy* confirms that Burton has generated his arguments following a selection of the topics described by Aristotle and Cicero,[103] and it comes as no surprise that his favourite topics involve a procedure of division and thus show the anatomist at work. Throughout the main treatise arguments concerning diseases in general and the different kinds of melancholy are generated through the topic of definition by enumeration or division (*partitio*), which is frequently announced in 'member'[104] headings.[105] Division is also involved in the closely related topic of definition by analysis into species and genus, and species and genus are themselves both topics;[106] these are all found throughout the *Anatomy*.[107]

Ong, "Commonplace Rhapsody"; B. Beugnot, "Florilèges et Polyantheae: Diffusion et statut du lieu commun à lépoque classique", *Etudes francaises* 13 (1977) pp. 119–41; F. Goyet, *Le Sublime du lieu commun: L'Invention rhétorique dans l'Antiquité et à la Renaissance* (Paris, 1986); and Moss, *Printed Commonplace-Books*. For Renaissance approaches to the topics in relation to dialectic and rhetoric see P. Mack, *Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic* (Leiden, 1993) pp. 130–67 and Moss, "Antistrophic Rhetoric".

[103]Cicero, *Topica*, 21.79; Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 5.10.122.

[104]There is a corporeal reference in Burton's use of "members" (demonstrated by Democritus Junior's reference to writing his work as the task of journeying "through all the Members of this our *Microcosmus*" (1.23.26)), although *membrum* was present in the vocabulary of classical rhetoric and had been a common term of rhetorical usage in the middle ages—see, for example T. Charland, *Artes Praedicandi: Contribution à l'histoire de la rhétorique au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1936) and J. Murphy, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine to the Renaissance* (Berkeley, 1974). For Burton's double application of the "book as body" metaphor, see below at notes 162–67.

[105]"The Definition, Number, Division of Diseases" and "Division of the Diseases of the Head" (1.129–31); "Loves Beginning, Object, Definition, Division" (3.8–16); "Jealousie, its . . . Definition, . . . severall Kindes" (3. 273); "Despaires . . . Definitions" (3.408–10). See Cicero, *Topica*, 5.28 as well as Aristotle, *Topica*, 1.5 (101b38–102a18) and *Posterior Analytics*, 2.13 (96b15–97b7).

[106]Cicero, *Topica*, 5.28; compare Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 5.10.63–70: whereas *partitio* is simply a dissection of a whole into its parts whose territory is uncertain, *divisio* is concerned with certain knowledge of *genus* and *species*—but, as we shall see below (note 135), Burton dissolves this distinction. See also Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 2.13 (97b27). For species and genus as topics, see Cicero, *Topica*, 3.13–14 and 9.39–40; Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 5.10.56–57; Aristotle, *Topica*, 1.5 (102a32–102b2) and 1.7 (103a6–103a23).

[107]"*Dotage;* Fatuity, or Folly, is a common name to all the following Species" (1.132–36); "Of the Species or Kindes of Melancholy" (1.168–71); "Love or Heroicall Melancholy, His definition" (3.48–58); and the "subdivision" of the genus of melancholy yielding the species "Religious Melancholy" (3.330). The topic of definition, in

These topics of definition are routinely employed by Burton as headings to mark the starting point for a particular medically orientated discussion, and in this he is implementing the Galenic method in which definition and logical division lead to knowledge of a disease and provide the basis for diagnosis, prognosis and therapy.[108] The topics of causes, effects, and consequents,[109] are presented in their equivalent medical terminology—causes, symptoms, and prognostics—and these headings, along with the final category of cures obviously required by a therapeutic method, structure the remainder of each discussion.[110] In each case, however, Burton re-employs the anatomist's topic of *partitio*, which logically enumerates the different types of cause, symptom, prognostic or cure at the same time as, rhetorically, lifting the tedium of a prolonged *narratio*.[111] His frequent recourse to digressions serves the same purpose.[112] Other

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the general sense of "the knowledge of what the thing is in itself" is also mentioned in Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.23.8; see also 2.23.10 for division (*diairesis*).

[108] A useful summary is found in J. Barnes, "Galen on Logic and Therapy", in F. Kudlien and R. Durling eds., *Galen's Method of Healing: Proceedings of the 1982 Galen Symposium* (Leiden, 1991) pp. 50–112. For division in particular, see pp. 66–67, 95–96; for definition, see pp. 72–76. See also N. Gilbert, *Renaissance Concepts of Method* (New York, 1960) pp. 13–24.

[109] For the topics of causes, effects, and consequents see Cicero *Topica* 13.58–17.66, 18.67, and 12.53 respectively. See also Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 5.10.80–86, 5.10.74–79.

[110] In the first Partition, the treatment of the subject of melancholy in general proceeds from definition to causes, symptoms and prognostics; the second Partition discusses the cures of melancholy in general. The Third Partition recapitulates this progression for the species of Love Melancholy and then of Religious Melancholy. I cannot agree with Fox, *Tangled Chain*, in seeing in these methods of division and subdivision a reference to the scholastic *summa*: although the term *member/membrum* gives common ground, the text of the *Anatomy* is not divided into *partes* but "Partitions"; *quaestiones* occur only in the synoptic charts for the second and third Partitions and refer to the Renaissance medical tradition of *quaestiones* or *disputationes* in texts and training; *articuli* are nowhere to be found. Burton's terms, rather, refer to the dissective activities of the medical anatomist: partition, section, member, subsection. In the preface Burton cites Antonio Zara's encyclopaedic *Anatomia Ingeniorum* (1615) as a "President" for his method (1.6); we might compare Burton's preoccupation with his own *ingenium* (see below at notes 162–67).

[111] Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 4.2.49; Cicero, *De inventione*, 22–23, esp. 22.31, and Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.23.10.

[112] His playful and apparently excessive use of digressions in different parts of the work was, similarly, a technique sanctioned by classical rhetoric (*diatribe, egressio* or *digressio*). In Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, 3.17.10, *diatribe* is the opportunity for dwelling on a subject (*commoratio*) or the occasion for digression. I cannot agree with those critics who see Burton's digressions as explicit markers of Menippean satire—for instance, B. Korkowski, "Genre and Satiric Strategy in Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*", *Genre*

topics appropriate to a medical subject matter are those of property and accident,[113] as well as etymology, conjugation ("words etymologically related"),[114] and *differentia*;[115] the latter three are used by Burton in the discussion of the *Name* and *Differences* of melancholy which accompany his discussion of its definition (1.162–63) and in its surrounding *Æquivocations* (1.136–39; also 3.273–80, 3.408–10).

If the structure of the *Anatomy* reflects a choice of topics that shows its author to be broadly following the conventions of contemporary medical literature,[116] a rather different picture is presented by the subject matter and kinds of argument upon which that structure is imposed. Since the origin of diseases in general and melancholy in particular is the Fall of Man (1.121–28), at its most straightforward level the *narratio* is an exposition of the vices (and occasionally the virtues) of body and mind. Whilst this ethical or religious starting point is nothing unusual in a medical account of pathology,[117] Burton's strong emphasis on the moral dimensions of melancholy— seen most clearly in the third Partition on "Love Melancholy" and "Religious Melancholy", but spread throughout the work—confirms the implication of the title-page that medicine is not his over-riding

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8 (1975) p. 82 and S. Blanchard, *Scholars' Bedlam: Menippean Satire in the Renaissance* (London, 1995) p. 138; this seems to me to be a case of unconsciously reading the *Anatomy* through Sterne's playful appropriations of it in *Tristram Shandy*. The intended function of Burton's digressions *qua* digressions seems to be simply to refresh and exercise both author and reader (1.249.34–50.3; 2.33.7–14), in what is elsewhere felt to be "a long and tedious discourse" (2.208.4), and this is in accordance with the classical conception of the technique.

[113]The basic Aristotelian topics of property and accident are employed at 1.166– 168 in the discussion of the colour and heat of the "matter" of melancholy (compare Aristotle, *Topica*, 102a18–31, 102b4–26; Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 5.10.58–62).

[114]Cicero, *Topica*, 9.38; Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 5.10.85; Aristotle, *Topica*, 1.15, esp. 107b613, and 1.18, 108a18–37 on equivocation. See also Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.23.9.

[115]For the topics of etymology and *differentia*, see Cicero, *Topica*, 8.35 and, in the context of rhetoric, Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.23.29. For property and *differentia*, see Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 5.10.58–62.

[116]Broadly similar structures are found, for example, in Bright's *Treatise of Melancholie* and in the works of Andreas Laurentius. Neither of these authors slavishly follows the Galenic structure of definition, symptoms, kinds, causes, and cures; see, for example, Laurentius's *De morbis melancholicis*, which begins with definition, but proceeds to mix up kinds, symptoms, and cures without strict regard to the Galenic progression (printed in Laurentius, *Opera omnia*). Bright also includes a digressive "consolation unto the afflicted conscience" in his work (*Treatise of Melancholie*, pp. 207–42).

[117]It is found in Laurentius's *De morbis melancholicis* (in *Opera omnia*, vol. II, cap. 2), or translated in A. Laurentius, *A Discourse of the Preservation of Sight*, trans. R. Surphlet (London, 1599) pp. 80–81.

concern.[118] In fact, whilst the structure of the *Anatomy* is broadly medical, the treatment of its subject matter is dictated by specific epideictic topics established in the rhetorical tradition, namely "the excellencies of the minde" and "Of the bodie", and conversely their vices or defects.[119] Indeed, when he discusses the question of the curability of melancholy in the second Partition, Burton devotes almost as much time discussing non-medical cures based on the moral and psychological corrections of the ancient *consolatio* tradition as he does medical ones based on physiology,[120] and in the third Partition medicine is almost nowhere to be found.[121] Moreover the exhortation to the bodily and mental or spiritual virtue that consti-

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[118]J. Gardiner, "Elizabethan Psychology and Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 38 (1977) pp. 373–88, rightly emphasizes the moralistic distinctiveness of Burton's "humanistic psychology".

[119]Rainolde, *Foundacion of Rhetorike*, fols. 40^r, 43^v; Cicero, *Topica*, 23.89; Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 5.10.26–36. For a comprehensive treatment of epideictic topics, see Aphthonius, *Progymnasmata*, fols 110^v-121^v; for the topic of bodily virtue, see fol. 116^v, and see fol. 159^r for the vituperative topics of bodily and mental vices and fol. 167^r for an example.

[120]For a survey of "psychological" cures (i.e. cures which revolve around the manipulation of the passions of the soul) in the *Anatomy* see Jackson, "Robert Burton and Psychological Healing", and idem, "The Use of the Passions in Psychological Healing", *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 45 (1990) pp. 150–75 to supply useful medical and philosophical background. For one view of Burton's curative intentions, see Miller, "Plotting a Cure", cit. in n. 6. The strong influence of the *consolatio* genre on Burton's project and its relation to his rhetoric has yet to be discussed in adequate detail in this important context, but see J. Lievsay, "Robert Burton's *De Consolatione*", *South Atlantic Quarterly* 55 (1956) pp. 329–36 for an analysis laying the groundwork for such an approach. The mode of consolation is of course epideictic (Menander, *De genere Demonstrativo*, 2.8 and 2.4, fol. 44^v), as is the epithalamium (2.6)—a playful example of which Burton offers at 3.270.7–72.12.

[121]Although the division between medical and non-medical cures is not strictly adhered to by Burton, at a rough calculation he devotes 132 pages to the former (which includes measures such as diet, exercise and simples), and 108 to the latter. If we include the non-medical cures of love melancholy and religious melancholy, then this total rises to 215. To make this calculation I have included the following pages as medical discussions of cures: 2.11–33, 2.67–99, 2.208–66, 2.201–17; and the following as non-medical ones: 2.99–207, 3.217–40, 3.242–72, 3.306–29, 3.392–95, 3.424–46. Obviously the main reason for the overall imbalance in favour of the non-medical discussion of cures is Burton's decision to consider non-medical types of melancholy in the third Partition. Compare Laurentius, *Discourse on the Preservation of Sight*, p. 122, on the curative function of "fair words and cunning speeches" and Bright, *Treatise of Melancholie*, pp. 182–242. For this tradition of "spiritual physick", see Jackson, "The Use of Passions", pp. 161–62; D. Harley, "Spiritual Physic, Providence and English Medicine, 1560–1640", in O. Grell and A. Cunningham eds, *Medicine and the Reformation* (London, 1993) pp. 101–17.

tutes for Burton a 'cure' of love melancholy and religious melan-
choly is, as we have seen,[122] a characteristically epideictic rhetorical
procedure.

Whilst the skeleton of the *Anatomy* as seen in its synoptic charts
and headings is broadly medical or 'scientific', its body is resolutely
rhetorical.[123] For it is not that Burton presents rhetorical arguments
where they are conventionally required—in the intrinsically uncer-
tain moral and spiritual domains pertaining to melancholy—but pro-
duces scientific or logically certain arguments when discussing its
medical or physiological aspects. In fact, through a series of intercon-
nected rhetorical techniques Burton makes both medical knowledge
and treatment of melancholy, as well as important aspects of the natu-
ral philosophy upon which it draws, subject to an uncertainty which
undermines its scientific status.[124] The basis of his critical procedure
is derived from the topic of argument from *testimonia*, or citation of
authority in order to produce conviction,[125] and its repeated appli-
cation results in what is in literary terms a *cento* (1.11.9).[126] In the
terms of rhetoric the production of a *cento* relies, as Burton acknowl-
edges, upon a skilful *dispositio* ("I doe *conquoquere quod hausi*, dispose
of what I take" (1.11.21–22)). In many parts of the *Anatomy* this in-
volves the juxtaposition of contradictory authorities as a means of
making the conflicts between them clear to the audience, a tech-
nique which is, according to Aristotle, most effective in rhetorical

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[122]See n. 46 above and Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 3.14.4.

[123]The rhetorical treatment of scientific matters in relation to the writings of Aris-
totle is found well before Burton. In his commentary on Aristotle's *Topica*, Alexander
of Aphrodisias claims that the orator may discuss medical or philosophical matters,
though he emphasizes the difference between the methods of rhetoric and dialectic
and argues for the special applicability of rhetoric to civil science. Antonio Riccobono,
a translator of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, develops Alexander's approach and broadens the
reach of rhetoric into all fields of knowledge (Moss, "Antistrophic Rhetoric", p. 102).

[124]Since melancholy may be caused by human vices, in offering a probabilistic
analysis Burton may be following Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1.2.14, where non-necessary
"human actions" are said to be the domain of rhetorical or dialectical deliberation.

[125]Cicero, *Topica*, 19.73; Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 5.10.36–44; compare Aristo-
tle, *Rhetoric*, 3.17.3.

[126]See A. Moss, "The *Politica* of Justus Lipsius and the Commonplace-Book",
Journal of the History of Ideas 59 (1998) pp. 421–36; J. Waszink, "*Inventio* in the *Polit-
ica*: Commonplace Books and the Shape of Political Theory", in K. Enenkel and C.
Heesakkers eds, *Lipsius in Leiden* (Voorthuizen, 1997) pp. 141–62. For the *cento* in antiq-
uity, see J. Delpierre, *Tableau de la littérature du centon*, 2 vols (London, 1874); for the
close relationship between the *cento* and parody, see F. Lelièvre, "The Basis of Ancient
Parody", *Greece & Rome* n.s. 1 (1954) pp. 75–76.

refutation.[127] Just as "The Authors Abstract" has indicated, authori-
ties on both sides of the argument about the 'facts' of melancholy
are repeatedly offered to the reader, a technique that makes the
uncertainty involved in the human discourse on melancholy quite
explicit.[128]

Admittedly authorities frequently agree or complement one an-
other in Burton's *cento*, but at crucial stages in his analysis—usually
when questions of scientific certainty and human rationality are at
stake—conflict breaks out and the truth of the matter in hand is
shown to be obscure.[129] In "Of the Rationall Soule", for example,
he lists at length "many erroneous opinions" in a passage that de-
generates into Lucianic ridicule (1.155.8–156.4), and although he ap-
pears to end with a definition that is heuristically satisfactory, it
relies upon the authority of suspiciously unnamed "Philosophers"
whose credibility has been the main target of the subsection.[130]
Again, the subsection devoted to the "Definition of melancholy,
Name, Difference"—as we have seen, a crucial step in a Galenic
analysis—discusses not the definition itself, but rather the question
of the definition as it arises in scholarly dispute. Despite his an-
nounced intention "perspicuously to define what this *Melancholy*

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[127] Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.23.20, 2.23.23 and 3.17.13. Technically refutation is a proce-
dure belonging to judicial rhetoric, but as we have seen epideictic, especially in the
Renaissance, can borrow from other *genera*.

[128] D. Renaker, "Robert Burton's Palinodes", *Studies in Philology* 76 (1979) pp. 162–
81 counts eighteen explicit retractions, though there are many more less noticeable
instances of self-contradiction throughout the book. Renaker sees this as a form
of satirical self-protection, though it seems to me to be a more subversive form of
rhetorical argumentation aimed against the scientific claims of medicine and human
knowledge in general. For Aristotle, of course, scientific certainty achieved through
strict demonstration (*apodeixis*) necessarily precludes the possibility of a two-sided
argument (*Rhetoric*, 1.1.12).

[129] The demonstration of obscurity or uncertainty is another topic appropriate to
refutation (*restructio* or *destructio*): see Aphthonius, *Progymnasmata*, fols 64^v, 67^r and
Rainolde, *Foundacion of Rhetorike*, fol. 24^v.

[130] "This *Reasonable Soule*, which *Austin* calls a spirituall substance, moving it
selfe, is defined by Philosophers to bee *the first substantiall Act of a Naturall, Humane,
Organicall Body, by which a man lives, perceives, and understands, freely doing things, and
with election*" (1.157.24–27). Bamborough and Dodsworth note in their commentary
that this definition is translated from Velcurio (4.192), but Burton's rather surreptitious
failure to reference the quotation suggests that he wants to create the impression
of doubt even here by ironically relying on those "Philosophers" who have just
been discredited. This subsection is part of the largely straightforward "Digression
of Anatomy", where authorities tend to agree, but given the central importance of
the rational part of the soul to explanations of melancholy the sudden lapse into
contentiousness is most telling.

is, shew his *Name*, and *Differences*" (1.162.5–6) what Burton pro-
ceeds to do is show confusion and obscurity.[131] Though etymol-
ogy should not pose any problems ("imposed from the matter ...
Μελανξολια, *quasi* Μελαινα χολη, from black Choler"), he notes that
there is no agreement on "whether [the name] be a cause or an ef-
fect, a Disease, or Symptome", and decides to let others decide. He
then lists "severall Descriptions, Notations, and Definitions", and
although he finally agrees that fear and sorrow are the "true Char-
acters" of melancholy, the possibility of an essential definition—
albeit one that is rather vague—is held out only to be taken away
in an addition made in the second edition of 1624: both passions
are "inseparable companions of most *Melancholy*," but "not all, as
Her. de Saxonia, Tract. posthumo de Melancholia, cap. 2 well excepts,
for to some it is most pleasant, as to such as laugh most part;
some are bold againe, and free from all manner of fear and griefe"
(1.163.15–17).[132]

   This scheme of encyclopaedic dissection is played out through-
out the first Partition: scholarly contention and doubt is exposed in
the same way over the part affected by melancholy,[133] the matter,[134]
and the species and kinds.[135] When Burton proceeds to the causes,

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   [131]Compare Aristotle, *Topica*, 7.5 (155a3–4ff.) and Montaigne's treatment of legal
knowledge in *Essayes*, 3.13, p. 635.
   [132]In this case, if we follow the distinction made in Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.25.11,
Burton is not refuting outright the definition he has offered, but simply showing it
to be probable rather than certain.
   [133]"Some difference I finde amongst Writers about the principall part affected in
this disease" (1.163.21); "As many doubts almost arise about the *Affection*" (1.164.20).
   [134]"Of the Matter of *Melancholy*, there is much question" (1.166.9), "Some differ-
ence I finde, whether this *Melancholy* matter may be ingendred of all foure humours,
about the colour and temper of it" (1.167.8–9).
   [135]For an example of Burton's approach to scientific topics, consider the following
example: while Quintilian uses the example of the number of forms of government
("democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy") to illustrate the certainty of the analytic topic
of *divisio*, at 1.170.31–171.3 Burton uses the analogy between the body politic and
the human body to suggest the "obscurity" and confused "variety" of species of
melancholy. Although sometimes Burton says that the reason for the confusion is
in the diversity and complexity of the subject matter, more often than not this is in
order to emphasize its result, i.e. the human inability to make clear distinctions (e.g.
at 1.168.12ff.). It is important to note, however, that Burton has medical authority
on his side when he cites the infinite diversity and confusion that accompanies his
subject matter: see, for example, Philothei Eliam Montalto Lusitanii, *Archipathologia in
Quainternarum capitis affectionum essentia, causæ, signa, præsagia, & curatio accuratissima
indagine edisseruntur* (Paris, 1614), 4.21 (pp. 295–6). Burton cites Montaltus as one of
his principal medical sources at 1.131.20, and, as Bamborough and Dodsworth note
in their commentary (4.296), quotes from *Archipathologia* 4.21 at 1.256.9, note z.

despite a promise that he will attempt to "extricate my selfe out of
a Labyrinth of doubts and errors" (1.171.10–11) the same structure
is reproduced,[136] and in a devious aside he hints at the satirical nature
of his rhetorical enterprise:

> It is a most difficult thing (I confesse) to be able to discerne these causes
> whence they are, and in such variety to say what the beginning was.
> He is happy that can performe it aright. I will adventure to guesse as
> neere as I can, and rippe them all up, from the first to the last, *Generall*
> and *particular* to every *Species*, that so they may the better be descried.
> (1.171.25–72.3)

Given the preceding and subsequent emphasis on the misery of
mankind after the Fall, it seems likely that he has the preface's para-
doxical *exemplum* of sanity "*Nicholas nemo*, or Mounsieur *no-body*"
(1.107.10) in mind when he says that "He is happy that can per-
forme it aright".[137] Burton moreover places his own words at three—
perhaps four?—removes from the truth ("I will *adventure* to *guesse* as
neere as I *can*") before indicating that his anatomizing will be a satiri-
cal 'ripping up' of everything scientific written about melancholy,[138]
"from the first to the last", so that it may be "descried"—discovered
from the obscurity of human knowledge—for the uncertainty it
really is.

As an encyclopaedic *cento*, then, the *Anatomy* combines argu-
ment from authority with its sceptical mirror-image: argument from
lack of real authority, or, more accurately, from the proliferation of
uncertain authorities.[139] In other words, the humanist enterprise of

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[136]For example, on a grand scale in the "Digression of Spirits": see 1.174.17–26,
175.13–23, 176.33–177.1, 179.32–3, and so on throughout.

[137]This is a paraphrase of Virgil, *Georgics* 2.490, which Burton inserts in a foot-
note attached: "Fælix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas" ("He is happy who can
understand the causes of things") (4.202). For the history of the paradoxical image of
'Nobody', which Burton has adapted from Ulrich von Hutten, see G. Calmann, "The
Picture of Nobody: An Iconographical Study", *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld
Institutes* 23 (1960) pp. 60–104.

[138]Bamborough and Dodsworth note the satirical connotations of this phrase
(4.202), which is repeated at 1.372.6, although Bamborough has elsewhere argued that
"the bulk" of the *Anatomy* "is straight-forward and factual" (1.xxxiii).

[139]This type of rhetorical argumentation from conflicting authority is not Burton's
invention: it is found, most notably, in Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola's *Examen
vanitate doctrinae gentium et veritatis Christianae disciplinae* (1520) and in Cornelius
Agrippa's *De vanitate et incertitudine scientiarum invectiva* (1526). For Pico, as for Burton,
"it is more important and useful to render uncertain rather than reconcile the dogmas
of philosophers" (trans. from G. Pico Della Mirandola, *Opera omnia*, (repr. Hildesheim,
1969) vol. II, 738), and the point of writing is to show the vanity and contentiousness of

medical philology—which aims at the furthering of contemporary knowledge through elimination of errors— is both pursued and parodied.[140] Alongside this combination, Burton also employs what Aristotle calls "fallacies of diction" as deliberate rhetorical strategies to increase the impression of uncertainty:[141] "combining what is divided",[142] confusing particular and absolute arguments,[143] and employing metaphorical language in order to produce obscurity[144] are all involved in Burton's repeated oscillation between on the one hand using the term "melancholy" to denote a distinct disease properly divided into its different kinds (1.136–39, 1.168–71), and on the other confusing the distinction between melancholy "in habit" and "in disposition" (1.138.15–19), and applying a generalized sense of the term that coincides with madness—at one point even in the midst

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human reasoning; and for Agrippa, "al Sciences are nothing els, but the ordinaunces and opinions of men, . . . doubtful and full of errour and contention" (H. C. Agrippa, *Of the Vanitie and Uncertaintie of Artes and Sciences*, trans. James Sanford, (London, 1575), fol. 5ʳ). Agrippa's *De vanitate* seems to be a strong influence on Burton, and there are very close similarities between their treatments of philosophy: both list a torrent of conflicting philosophers' opinions to show their readership "howe muche they disagree among themselves" (fol. 66ᵛ) and that "although Philosophie disputeth and iudgeth of all thinges, yet shee is certain of nothing" (fol. 64ʳ). The same is true of both authors' approach to medicine (fols 140ʳ-154ʳ). For these predecessors of Burton, see C. Nauert Jr, *Agrippa and the Crisis of Renaissance Thought* (Urbana, 1965) pp. 292–321, and C. Schmitt, *Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1469–1533) and His Critique of Aristotle* (The Hague, 1967). However, in his argumentative strategies and probabilistic approach Burton appears to have a more explicit relation than either Agrippa or Pico to the version of Academic scepticism related by Cicero in his *Academica*, particularly in his periodic employment of *epoche* in the face of irreconcilable opinions on matters in which religious fundamentals are not at stake; see Remer, *Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration*, cit. in n. 17, pp. 22–26 on the associations of the *sermo* with this brand of scepticism.

[140]For various aspects of Renaissance medical philology—which is found in the works of those such as Joannes Manardi, John Caius, Julius Caesar Scaliger, and Hieronymus Mercurialis—see V. Nutton, "John Caius and the Linacre Tradition", *Medical History* 23 (1979) pp. 373–91; "The Seeds of Disease: An Explanation of Contagion and Infection from the Greeks to the Renaissance", *Medical History* 27 (1983) pp. 1–34, (p. 23); "John Caius and the Eton Galen: Medical Philology in the Renaissance", *Medizinhistorisches Journal* 20 (1985) pp. 227–53, (pp. 243–51); "The Anatomy of the Soul in Early Renaissance Medicine" in G. R. Dunstan ed., *The Human Embryo: Aristotle and the Arabic and European Traditions* (Exeter, 1990) pp. 136–57.

[141]Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.24.2ff. These are topics involved in the construction of "apparent" rather than "real" enthymemes.

[142]Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.24.3.

[143]Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.24.10.

[144]Aristotle, *Topica*, 4.3 (123a33–38) and 6.2 (139b19–140a2) and *Rhetoric*, 3.5.4.

of the discussion of the distinction between the two ("The last kinde
of madnesse or melancholy" (1.135.32)).[145]

If the negative or destructive dimension of Burton's rhetori-
cal strategy is geared towards showing the uncertainty of human
knowledge about melancholy in the realms of natural philosophy
and medicine, its more positive counterpart, manifested in plausi-
ble arguments concerned with ethics and psychology, is designed
to evoke emotional assent. Like many Renaissance readers of Aris-
totle's *Rhetoric*, most significantly the Oxford lecturer John Rain-
olds, Burton appears to have adapted its concerns to fit a broadly
Roman rhetorical agenda of *movere, docere, delectare*—in employ-
ing techniques of psychological and emotional persuasion—and to
have overlooked the logical dimension of rhetorical argument rep-
resented by the enthymeme.[146] Syllogistic proofs are never explicitly
employed in the *Anatomy*, but although much of his *Rhetoric* is con-

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[145]This passage was mischievously added in the third edition of 1628; compare
Wright, *Passions of the Minde*, p. 143: "Good distinctions breed perspicuity, but a
multitude engendreth obscurity"—it is in this context that Burton's discourse seems to
be, as he says, "muddy" rather than "cleare". The reader is prepared for the frequent
confusion of melancholy and madness in the main treatise (e.g. at 1.268.21–270.16
and 1.299.2–300.8) by Democritus Junior in the preface (1.25.31–34). Some of these
confusions are noted in Holland, *Robert Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy*, pp. 325, 330,
though they are here seen to be literary-satirical rather than specifically rhetorical
techniques.

[146]Green, *Rainolds's Lectures*, pp. 75–76; following John Rainolds's downgrad-
ing of dialectical reasoning and prioritizing of plausible argument through example
in his Oxford lectures on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Burton's account accumulates emotive
historical examples to illustrate his argument and persuade his readership of their
general applicability. The *Anatomy*'s rhetorical composition thus appears to correlate
closely to Rainolds's exposition of the *Rhetoric*: in Aristotle's terms, it is geared more
towards persuasion or assent by plausible argument and the arousal or manipulation
of the audience's emotions. See also the broadly Ciceronian approaches to the *Rhetoric*
of George of Trebizond and Daniele Barbaro (Green, "The Reception of Aristotle's
Rhetoric", cit. in n. 27 above, p. 325, and his "Aristotle's *Rhetoric*", pp. 7–11) as well
as the combination of Ciceronian and Aristotelian rhetoric in the writings of Ludovico
Carbone (Moss, "Antistrophic Rhetoric", pp. 93–100). Green argues that many Renais-
sance commentators had difficulty in comprehending the idea of the enthymeme, and
that in general they followed Cicero's idea that Aristotle was speaking figuratively
about its importance (Green, "The Reception of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*", pp. 343–44). Bur-
ton's avoidance of logical arguments possibly stems from a general dislike of the
"needlesse Sophismes" of "Logicke" (1.364.22–3), although he is admittedly writing
in a satirical mode at this point, and Anthony à Wood interestingly claims that Burton
had "made considerable progress in logic and philosophy" when he was at Brasenose
(*Athenae Oxonienses* (London, 1815), 2.652). There are important similarities between
Burton's rhetorical treatment of human knowledge and Rainolds's scepticism (see
Green, *Rainolds's Lectures*, pp. 73–75).

cerned with enthymemes, it should perhaps be remembered that
Aristotle says that they are inappropriate to ethical and emotional
discourse.[147] However, just as Rainolds has urged in his Oxford lec-
tures on the *Rhetoric*, instead of enthymemes Burton uses examples
(a form of rhetorical induction deemed by Aristotle to be no less
persuasive),[148] both real and fictional.[149] The provision of real *exem-
pla* scattered throughout the *Anatomy* (for "examples are infinite"
(1.378.5)) constitute the 'historical' method announced on the title-
page,[150] but his inclusion of fictitious examples, as well as proverbs
and maxims,[151] makes clear his intention to bring all the available
resources of persuasion to bear on his subject matter. This can be
seen most clearly in his self-consciously rhetorical treatment of "Dis-
contents, Cares, Miseries" as causes of melancholy: beginning with
a reference to "*Aristotle* in his *Rhetoricke*" (1.270.22), he proceeds to
cite the opinions of "Poets" and examples from "tales" (1.270.29–
71.19), proverbial wisdom from both pagan and Christian authors
(1.271.25–73.22), examples of miserable Greeks and Romans both
real and fictitious (1.275.2–76.21), and, adding that if all this "bee
not a sufficient proofe" of humanity's misery, he moves to con-
clude with a depressing survey of "every condition and calling"
(1.277.26–79.26).

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[147] Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 3.17.8, 12; but also Menander, *De genere Demonstrativo*, 2.4
fol. 42^v.

[148] Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1.2.10. At 1.9.40 examples are characterized as most suited
to deliberative rhetoric, and at 2.20.9 they are said to produce conviction (*pistis*) in
the absence of enthymemes.

[149] See Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.20.2–8 for the division between "historical" examples
and "fables"; and Cicero, *Topica* 10.44–45: both real and fictitious examples derive from
the topic of similarity. See also Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 5.11.1–16, 17–21.

[150] Burton's general approach to history is encapsulated by the following remark:
"Looke into our histories, and you shall almost meet with no other subject, but what
a company of hare-braines have done in their rage." (1.270.11–13). In the context of
medical discussions in the *Anatomy*, however, the use of examples corresponds to
the conventional practice of citing case-histories in the tradition of Hippocrates and
Galen; compare Lemnius's "historyes of Melancholike persons" (Levinus Lemnius,
The Touchstone of Complexions, trans. Thomas Newton (London, 1576), fols 150^v-52^r),
Laurentius's similar use of "histories" (Laurentius, *Discourse of the Preservation of
Sight*, 100–04 and 121–2), and N. Siraisi, *The Clock and the Mirror: Girolamo Cardano
and Renaissance Medicine* (Princeton, 1997) pp. 195–213 on Cardano's extensive use of
medical *historia*.

[151] For maxims and proverbs as types of proof suitable to ethical discourse ad-
dressed to a popular audience, see Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.21.1–16; see also Menander,
De genere Demonstrativo, 2.4, fol. 44^r. Compare Höltgen, "Robert Burtons *Anatomy of
Melancholy*", p. 395, for parallels with Montaigne.

Besides the wide variety of materials appropriate to probable argument, Burton frequently employs figures designed to elicit emotion. Most prominent are the characteristically epideictic figures of amplification (*auxesis*), or rhetorical intensification,[152] and its more specific form of exaggeration (*deinosis*) or, as Quintilian puts it, "language giving additional force to things unjust, cruel, or hateful", and often used in order to stir up hatred or anger.[153] In this denunciation of the impious, Burton's *deinosis* is drawn from the topic of the comparison of contraries and framed in the epideictic terms of virtue and vice:[154]

> A company of *Cyclopes* or Giants, that warre with the Gods, as the Poets fained, Antipodes to Christians, that scoffe at all religion, at God himselfe, deny him and all his attributes, his wisdome, power, providence, his mercy and judgement .... Let them contend, pray, tremble, trouble themselves that will for their parts, they feare neither God nor divell; but with that *Cyclops* in Euripides,
>
> > *Haud ulla numina expavescunt cælitum,*
> > *Sed victimas uni deorum maximo,*
> > *Ventri offerunt, deos ignorant cæteros.*
>
> They fear no God but one,

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[152] Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1.9.39

[153] Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 6.2.24; Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.21.10. We might compare Burton's employment of the figure of the river to describe his style with Longinus's similar description of Cicero's speech when heightened by *auxesis* (*On the Sublime*, 12.4–5). Cicero himself associates amplification with *indignatio*, or the arousal of hatred at an attribute of a person or thing (*De inventione*, 1.53.100; compare Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.2.27, 2.9.1–16); in the *Anatomy* this figure is employed by Democritus Junior in his Juvenalian satirical mode, in the form of prolonged *saeva indignatio*, but its appearance in the main treatise is forewarned at the close of the preface (1.113.8–13) and is found throughout the book—for example in the invective against patrons in the "Digression on the Misery of Schollers" (1.316.8–24.25). The inclusion of satire in epideictic *lalia* is sanctioned by Menander on the condition that it is done impersonally (*De genere Demonstrativo*, 2.4, fol. 43ʳ); this convention is followed by Burton throughout the main treatise (though not in the preface), and is mentioned at 1.340.34–38 to exempt those who "generally taxe vice" from reprimand.

[154] Cicero, *Topica*, 28.69; Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 8.4.9–14; Aristotle, *Topica*, 3.1 (116b38–117a1–4), 3.2 (117b3–8) and *Rhetoric*, 2.23.1 and 2.2.12. Green, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric*", p. 15, states that much of Francisco Benci's interest in the *Rhetoric* concentrated on the persuasive potential of the topics of contraries. The topic of comparison by contraries is closely related to that of comparison from corruption (Aristotle, *Topica*, 3.2 (117b3–5)), which is found throughout the *Anatomy*, probably because of its clear applicability to postlapsarian humanity: for examples, see 1.153.24–27 and 1.255.27–256.13.

> They sacrifice to none,
> But belly and him adore,
> For Gods they knowe no more.

Their God is their belly, as *Paul* saith, *Sancta mater saturitas;*
—— *quibus in solo vivendi causa palato est.*
The Idoll which they worship and adore, is their Mistris, with him in *Plautus, mallem hæc mulier me amet quàm dii,* they rather have her favour then the Gods. *Satan* is their guide, the flesh is their instructor, Hypocrisie their Counsellor, Vanity their fellow-soldier, their will the law, Ambition their Captaine, Custome their rule; temerity, boldnesse, impudence, their Arts, toyes their trading, damnation their end. (3.395.30–96.33)[155]

Here Burton appears to be treading the thin line between seriously moralistic vituperation and playful satire, but in unequivocally lighter moods he employs amplification humorously to ridicule those afflicted with melancholy. His language, for instance, in describing the symptoms of the jealous man and his behaviour towards his beloved is well calculated to arouse amused contempt:

> He will sometimes sigh, weepe, sob for anger . . . sweare and belye, slander any man, curse, threaten, bawle, scold, fight; & sometimes againe flatter, and speake faire, aske forgivenesse, kisse, & coll, condemne his rashnesse and folly, vow, protest and sweare, he will never doe so againe; and then eftsoones, impatient as he is, rave, roare, and lay about him like a mad man, thumpe her sides, drag her about perchance, drive her out of dores, send her home, he will be divorced forthwith, she is a whore, &c. by and by with all submisse complement, intreat her faire, and bring her in againe, he loves her dearely, she is his sweet, most kinde and loving wife . . . so he continues off & on, as the toy takes him, the object moves him, but most part brawling fretting, unquiet hee is. (3.298.5–18)

But if here Burton is amplifying his point in order to evoke non-benevolent emotions in his audience, in the opposite extreme he uses amplification to arouse a mixture of shame and pity[156] in his repeated

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[155]In this final passage Burton employs *prosopopoeia* in attributing human roles to vices, alongside extended *zeugma* for persuasive effect. See Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 9.3.35, 81 for the distinction between grammatical and rhetorical figures of speech.

[156]Since Augustinian theology makes the misery fully deserved, in Aristotle's scheme Burton's readership should properly feel shame, not pity: see Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.6.1–27, esp. 2.6.25 on the disgrace of ancestors, and 2.8.1–16 on pity as the response to undeserved misfortune. However, Burton strikes a posture which equivocates between a view of the universal misery of fallen man as just punishment for original sin (1.123.25–24.6) and a more sympathetic approach that denounces

lamentations of the miserable state of fallen man.[157] When the main
treatise opens, the tragedy of the Fall is amplified through the devices
of *peripateia* and *ecphronesis*:[158]

> MAN, the most excellent, and noble creature of the World, *the principall
> and mighty worke of God, wonder of Nature*, as *Zoroastes* calls him; *audacis
> naturæ miraculum, the marvaile of marvailes*, as *Plato; the Abridgment and
> Epitome of the World*, as *Pliny; Microcosmus*, a little world, a modell of
> the World, Soveraigne Lord of the Earth, Viceroy of the World, sole
> Commander and Gouvernour of all the creatures in it: to whose Empire
> they are subject in particular, and yeeld obedience, farre surpassing all
> the rest, not in body only, but in soule; *Imaginis Imago*, created to Gods
> owne *Image*, to that immortall and incorporeall substance, with all the
> faculties and powers belonging unto it; was at first pure, divine, perfect,
> happy, *Created after God in true holinesse and righteousnesse; Deo congruens*,
> free from all manner of infirmities, and put in Paradise, to knowe God,
> to praise and glorifie him, to doe his will,
>
> <div style="text-align:center">
>
> *Ut diis consimiles parturiat deos;*
>
> </div>
>
> (as an old Poet saith) to propagate the Church. But this most noble
> Creature, *Heu tristis, & lachrymosa commutatio* (one exclaimes) O pittifull
> change![159] is fallen from that he was, and forfeited his estate, become
> *miserabilis homuncio*, a cast-away, a catiffe, one of the most miserable
> creatures of the World . . . an unregenerate man . . . he is inferiour to a
> beast.

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the agency of the extreme expression of this view in producing despair (3.413.26–33,
3.426.16–21), although admittedly his primary concern here is with the related doctrine
of predestination.

    [157]Lamentation is of course an epideictic mode: see Menander, *De genere Demon-
strativo*, 2.8 and 2.14. Burton laments most eloquently, perhaps, in a passage that is
a composite of additions made in 1624, 1628 and 1632 to "Discontents, Cares, Miseries,
&c. Causes" (1.273.23–74.9). The majority of the additions made by Burton throughout
his lifetime in the course of the six increasingly large editions are such cases of rhetorical
amplificatio of points already made, rather than new concepts or arguments—which is
a good indication of the author's pre-eminently rhetorical conception of his enterprise.

    [158]The expression of extreme emotion (*ecphronesis* or *exclamatio*) is seen through-
out the work, most obviously in the subsection on "Discontents, Cares, Miseries,
&c." (1.270–79). *Peripateia*, the sudden change or reversal of fortune often associated
with tragedy is mentioned in Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1.11.24. Burton is well aware of the
rhetorical devices peculiar to tragedy, satire and comedy: see 3.8.20–24, and com-
pare Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 6.2.35; compare also Bright's description of how, in
melancholy, comic laughter becomes tragic despair (*Treatise of Melancholie*, p. 164).

    [159]Burton seems to be showing his characteristic rhetorical self-consciousness here
in labelling his quotation and subsequent translation as *exclamatio* ("one exclaimes").

And with a swift rhetorical manoeuvre, man as an object of pity undergoes a transformation into one of satirical contempt, as Burton now ridicules him as "a monster by a stupend Metamorphosis, a fox, a dogge, a hogge, what not?" (1.121.8–22.12).

Shame, pity, and contempt at the state of fallen man are three of the emotions Burton most frequently attempts to arouse throughout the *Anatomy*, a rhetorical strategy designed to inculcate in the reader the oscillation between Democritean laughter and Heraclitean tears, first introduced in the prefatory *parerga*, which characterizes the passionate extremes of melancholy.[160] It is above all in his rhetorical figures, then, that Burton is 'opening up' his own melancholic passions (the "method" shows forth the "scholler") at the same time as attempting to induce them in his readership: a move that makes the rhetorical coincidence of *ethos* and *pathos*—in effecting the epideictic elision of author, reader, and discourse—truly melancholic.[161]

For "so is a mans *Genius* descried by his workes" (1.13.5): if the materials of his *cento* are "most part" others', its rhetorical "composition and method" are a showing forth of his melancholic *ingenium*, or wit ("my *malus Genius*" (1.7.21–22)), the manifestation of both his intellectual ability and his character. On the one hand—*ingenium* as ability—the *Anatomy* as an encyclopaedia opens up the *corpus* of knowledge about melancholy,[162] which as it is presented

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[160]Compare Burton's use, at 3.364.9–13, of the figure of *adynaton*, or stating the impossibility of expressing oneself adequately to the subject, derived from the argumentative topic of the possible or impossible (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 2.19.1–16). *Adynaton* is also brought to bear against the possibility of achieving certain knowledge of melancholy through the repeated insistence on the "obscurity", "confused", and "divers" nature of melancholy, and on fallen man's inability to master this "confused subject" in its infinite particularity: e.g. 1.168.12–21, 1.280.21–23, 1.370.19, and 1.407.20–31. Compare Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1.122 for the impossibility of certain knowledge of particulars.

[161]In relation to the theory of emotional persuasion through imaginative *visiones* and *enargeia* delineated in Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 6.2.20–36, it could be said that since Burton claims to be a genuine melancholic he has no need to imagine the passions he wishes to arouse in his audience; however, it is clear that he is nevertheless working within this theory, since he obviously wishes to exercise a degree of control over which passions are to be aroused and at what point in his discourse.

[162]Cardano is one of Burton's most frequently cited sources: see J. Bamborough, "Burton and Cardan", in J. Carey ed., *English Renaissance Studies Presented to Dame Helen Gardner* (Oxford, 1980) pp. 180–93. In his *Annotationes in Pandectas*, Guillaume Budé—another prominent encyclopaedist in the *Anatomy*—talks of the classical heritage as an encyclopaedic 'corpus' of knowledge (quoted in F. Simone, "La Notion d'Encyclopédie: Elément caractéristique de la Renaissance Française", in P. Sharratt ed., *French Renaissance Studies, 1540–1570: Humanism and the Encyclopaedia* (Edinburgh 1976), p. 246).

is 'ripped up' by the author's scholarly *iudicium* and dispositional method,[163] and thereby diagnosed as melancholy.[164] On the other—*ingenium* as character—his rhetorical composition, in implementing passionate figures and a self-consciously "affected" writing style, exhibits his character as a self-confessed melancholic just as it shows itself to its readers as such (1.7.20–8.10).[165] What is on display, then, is a metaphorical body that is curiously doubled: an encyclopedic body of learning that is also an authorial body afflicted by melancholy. The presence of the author in his *narratio*, inherent in epideictic theory,[166] is made manifest through a melancholic rhetoric which at the same time shows itself working on its audience; Burton himself is both the primary means of persuasion of his argument about the knowledge of melancholy and the very object of rhetorical dissection. The *cento* turns out to become, as Montaigne says (through Florio), a "most ingenious and wittie" literary form.[167]

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[163]Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 5.11.44 and Cicero, *Orator*, 47–49.

[164]In this respect the most famous (or infamous) predecessor of the *Anatomy* is the negative encyclopaedia of Agrippa; following him, Burton, as Democritus Junior, proclaims all the world and its learning melancholy. Compare the image of the encyclopaedia of human learning as a "diseased" body in need of treatment portrayed by James Sanford in his apologetic introduction to the *De vanitate* (*Of the vanitie and uncertaintie*, fol. 3^{r-v}). There is also an uncanny similarity between Burton's claim that his work is "now serious, then light; now Comicall, then Satyricall" (1.18.11) and Agrippa's *Apologia* for his *De vanitate* as a *declamatio* in which "some things are said as jokes, others seriously, some falsely, others sternly" (however see Nauert, *Agrippa*, p. 196 for the context of this disclaimer). As with the *Anatomy*, we should not make the mistake of presuming an incompatibility between moral seriousness and rhetorical playfulness—see the views collected in N. Siraisi, "Medicine, Physiology and Anatomy in Early Sixteenth-Century Critiques of the Arts and Sciences", in J. Henry and S. Hutton eds, *New Perspectives on Renaissance Thought: Essays in the History of Science, Education, and Philosophy in Memory of Charles B. Schmitt* (London, 1990), p. 215, note 5.

[165]Compare *Hamlet*, 1.5.103: "Within the book and volume of my brain".

[166]This is made explicit by Menander, *De genere Demonstrativo* 2.4, fols 41^v, 44^{r-v} on *lalia*. Compare Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 3.16.5 and Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 4.2.50.

[167]Montaigne, *Essayes*, 1.25, p. 68. With typical acuity, Montaigne introduces this brief discussion of the *cento* with the remark, "I never spake of others, but that I may the more speake of my selfe". There is a close similarity between Burton's intention to show himself and his erudition through a commonplace method and that of Montaigne: see F. Goyet, "A propos de 'Ces pastissages de lieux communs' (Le rôle des notes de lecture dans la genèse des *Essais*)", parts 1 and 2, *Bulletin de la Société des Amis de Montaigne* 5–6 (1986), pp. 11–26 and 7–8 (1987) pp. 9–30.

Peroratio

The first edition of the *Anatomy* published in 1621 ended with "The Conclusion of the Author *to the Reader*".[168] It is marked by Burton as a return to the theme of the preface and its culmination:

> The last Section shall be mine, to cut the strings of *Democritus* visor, to unmaske and shew him as he is.
>
> —— *Amphora cœpit*
> *Institui, currente rota cur urceus exit?*
>
> *Democritus* began as a Prologue in this Trage-comedie, but why doth the Author end, and act the Epilogue in his owne name? (3.469.3–8)

Having asked the question, he seems to avoid the answer, admitting that he "intended at first to have concealed my selfe", but "for some [unspecified] reasons I have altered mine intent".[169] Nevertheless the answer does come, and in a most important passage:

> *Me me adsum qui feci, in me convertite ocellos*
> *Lectores, meus hic labor est.——*
>
> If ought be otherwise then it should be, since I have now put my selfe upon the stage, I must undergoe and abide the censure of it. . . . It is most true, *stylus virum arguit*, our style bewrayes us, and as hunters find their game by the trace, so is a man descried by his writings. I have laid my selfe open (I know it) in this Treatise. . . . (3.469.11–17)

Whereas in the preface Democritus Junior had begun by asserting that "Thou thy selfe art the subject of my Discourse" (1.1.32), Burton now confesses that the *Anatomy*—in its encyclopedic display of knowledge and its performance of literary brilliance—has been a deliberate self-dissection ("I have laid my selfe open (I know it) in this Treatise") that has ended, appropriately enough, in the *peroratio*.

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[168] The fact that this *peroratio* was subsequently omitted from further editions does not technically invalidate the tripartite epideictic classification of the *Anatomy* into *exordium, narratio* and *peroratio*, since from the compositional point of view this was the structure consciously used by the author. His subsequent emendation of this structure is testimony to the perceived flexibility of the epideictic genus, as well as to Burton's intention to adapt rhetorical conventions to his subject matter—much of it is found in the preface of later editions.

[169] The quotation announcing his change of mind ("Amphora coepit . . .") is from Horace, *Ars poetica* 21–22, thereby underlining Burton's compositional self-consciousness at this point. Compare Aristotle's contrary advice about *perorationes* in *Rhetoric*, 3.19.5.

The symmetry is striking: the former remark appears in the *exordium* (and is thus a hermeneutic guide for the reader which turns out to be untrustworthy), but its inversionary restatement in the *peroratio*, the part of a discourse classically reserved for summing up, underscores this theme's importance to what the author conceives to be the whole work's proper reception by the audience. Why, then, has he revealed who is behind the mask? It has been the purpose of the entire discourse: "I have anatomized mine own folly." (1.112.14)[170]

This summing up fulfils the primary task of the *peroratio*, but it is also combined with a second, namely, an appeal to pity (*commiseratio*). In judicial oratory this appeal would be made to the audience, and the pity would be directed at either the defendant or the victim of the alleged criminal.[171] In epideictic rhetoric, as we have seen, there is no immediately obvious principal subject of the discourse. Having just admitted that he has been writing about himself, however, Burton now turns to his readers for clemency,[172] characteristically twisting the appeal into defiance in another rhetorical inversion:

> I feare good mens censures, *& linguas mancipiorum contemno*, as the barking of a dogge, I securely contemne the malitious and scurrile obloquies, flouts, calumnies of those railers and detracters, I scorne the rest.... I am none of the best of you, I am none of the meanest. (3.469.22–26)

Whilst it might be objected that the third element of the classical *peroratio*, *amplificatio*, is not properly present in Burton's 'Conclusion', there are indications nevertheless that he is toying with the rhetoricians here. It is at this point that Burton turns towards his own work,

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[170]The telling phrase "I have laid my self open" was subsequently incorporated into the preface, thus reinforcing the implication of "I have anatomized mine own folly". It seems to me that there is a very good reason for this: if the preface is to be an effective guide to reading the treatise that follows, then it probably needs a series of pointers to make this self-revelatory function explicit. I suspect that Burton had hoped that his readers would be able to decode the inverted allusion to Montaigne ("Thou thy selfe art the subject of my discourse") and realize that the melancholy author was anatomizing his own condition, but in subsequent editions decided that more explicit hints were needed. For more allusions to Montaigne in the *Anatomy*, see F. Dieckow, *John Florios englische Übersetzung der Essais Montaignes und Lord Bacons, Ben Jonsons und Robert Burtons Verhältnis zu Montaigne*, Inaugural-Dissertation, (Strassburg, 1903) pp. 92–115.

[171]See, for example, *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, 2.30.67

[172]Menander says that in *lalia* the speaker may ask his audience's pardon as a means of gaining its favour (*De genere Demonstrativo*, fol. 43ʳ).

so that the book closes with a highly ironic meditation on its own form:

> I should have perused, corrected and amended this Tract, but I had not that happy leasure,[173] no *amanuenses*, assistants; and was enforced as a Beare doth her whelpes, to bring forth this confused lumpe,[174] and had not space to lick it into forme, as she doth her young ones; but even so to publish it, as it was written at first, once for all, in an extemporanean stile, *quicquid in buccam venit*, as I doe commonly all other exercises, *stans pede in uno*, as hee made verses, out of a confused company of notes; *effudi quicquid dictavit Genius meus*,[175] and writ with as small deliberation, as I doe ordinarily speake. So that as a river runs precipitate & swift. . . . (3.471.8–17)

The final metaphor, as we have seen, comes from Quintilian, and the claim that he "writ with as small deliberation as I doe ordinarily speake"—being tantamount to saying 'I am not an orator'—is the *topos* of rhetoric attempting to cover its tracks. At the same time, however, we should note that "alleging that one's work is extemporized" is said by Menander to be an appropriate means of winning the reader's favour in epideictic *lalia*,[176] and that contrived "disorder" is an essential part of this strategy.[177] Moreover the *imago* of speech as a river is entirely appropriate to the *peroratio*. According to Quintilian, the *peroratio* is the place where "it becomes appropriate to open up every possible fountain of eloquence", so that 'mental pictures' (*fan-*

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[173]Compare Democritus Junior's claims to have been leading "a solitary life, and mine owne domesticke discontents" (1.5.20–21).

[174]Critics have made much of Democritus Junior's remark that his work is a "confused lumpe" (3.471.11): in the sense that Burton has imported a medical progression of definitions, causes, symptoms, prognostics, cures into an epideictic framework of *exordium, narratio, peroratio* the form of the *Anatomy* is indeed 'confused'. By placing this remark the *peroratio*, then, Burton was drawing attention to his implementation of the conventional forms of rhetoric and medicine (and, indeed, it appears just before his adaptation of the Quintilian reference quoted at the beginning of this essay). When this section was transplanted into the preface, and the *peroratio* removed, this double interpretation of the term "confused" became less apparent. See also note 177 below.

[175]It is, of course, melancholy that is his "*malus Genius*" (1.7.21–22).

[176]Russell and Wilson, *Menander Rhetor*, 2.391.14–15; in the 1558 Latin edition there is a lacuna at this point, but the "extemporized" style is suggested elsewhere, e.g. at 2.4, fol. 43^v.

[177]Menander, *De genere Demonstrativo*, fol. 43^{r-v}. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 3.16.1, makes mention of the epideictic *narratio* as "disjointed". Compare Ausonius's similar self-deprecation when describing his writing of the *Cento nuptialis* (*Ausonius*, trans. H. E. White (London, 1968) p. 375).

tasias or *visiones*) appear to the listener.[178] The image of the author's writing is indeed conjured up by means of the river figure, but it is difficult to ignore the reflexivity of this situation: as it closes, the book turns inwards and considers its own form and content; author and reader, accordingly, perform the same task, and the subject of the *Anatomy* is revealed to be Burton's own anatomy.[179] Figuratively 'absent' throughout the three Partitions,[180] the opened *imago* of Burton's self-dissected anatomy returns to the discourse, to be closed in the final expression of his melancholic torrent of eloquence.

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[178]Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 6.1.52.

[179]The *Anatomy* is one of the many Renaissance texts exploring psychological reflexivity in the philosophical and psychological context delineated in Maclean, "Language in the Mind", cit. in n. 66. In specific terms, it enacts the quest for self-knowledge to be gained indirectly through the knowledge of externals—this is one of the purposes of the "Digression of the Ayre": to "freely expatiate (i.e. roam, but also to dilate at length, or 'open up') and exercise my selfe, for my recreation" (2.33.12)—as well as through a process of self-scrutiny in which the mind turns itself into its own object of analysis. See Maclean, "Language in the Mind", pp. 303–04 for the Aristotelian basis of these ideas, and pp. 315–18 for parallels with Keckermann, Zabarella and J. C. Scaliger.

[180]The "absence" of the author is only figurative throughout the main body of the treatise because the enunciative relations between author and reader are not technically manifested in the frame of the discourse: that is, as an ostensibly scientific (but in reality, as we have seen, rhetorical) discourse, it is not explicitly presented as an address from author to reader, unlike the *exordium* and the *peroratio*. Within the *narratio*, however, the rhetorical presence of the author and his appeals to the reader are constant and repetitive.