
The Marshall Plan:

Filling in Some of the Blanks

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- Dominique Barjot, Rémi Baudouï and Danièle Voldman, eds., *Les Reconstructions en Europe (1945–1949)* (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1997), 342 pp., FF175, ISBN 2-870-27693-1.
- Matthias Kipping and Ove Bjarnar, eds., *The Americanisation of European Business: The Marshall Plan and the Transfer of US Management Models* (London: Routledge, 1998), 235 pp., £50.00, ISBN 0-415-17191-1.
- Jeffry M. Diefendorf, Axel Frohn and Hermann-Josef Rupieper, eds., *American Policy and the Reconstruction of Western Germany, 1945–1955* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and the German Historical Institute, Washington, DC, 1993), 537 pp., £45.00, ISBN 0-521-43120-4.
- Hans-Herbert Holzamer and Marc Hoch, eds., *Der Marshall-Plan: Geschichte und Zukunft* (Landsberg/Lech: Olzog, 1997), 214 pp., ISBN 3-789-29349-0.
- Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, *50 Jahre Marshall-Plan* (Berlin: Argon Verlag, Berlin, 1997), 140 pp., ISBN 3-870-24387-2.
- Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka and Dieter Stiefel, eds., *The Marshall Plan in Austria* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 588 pp., ISBN 0-765-80679-7.
- Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly, eds., *Irish Foreign Policy 1919–1966: From Independence to Internationalism* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2000), 352 pp., £39.50, ISBN 1-851-82404-9.
- Bernadette Whelan, *Ireland and the Marshall Plan 1947–1957* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2000), 426 pp., £39.50, ISBN 1-851-82517-7.
- Charles Silva, *Keep Them Strong, Keep them Friendly: Swedish–American Relations and the Pax Americana, 1948–1952* (Stockholm: Akademitryck AB, 1999), 376 pp., Kl.10.00, ISBN 9-171-53974-3.
- Chiarello Esposito, *America's Feeble Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948–1950* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994), 226 pp., £49.50, ISBN 0-313-29340-6.
- Fernando Guirao, *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–57* (London: Macmillan, 1998), 240 pp., ISBN 0-312-21291-7.
- Martin A. Schain, *Marshall Plan Fifty Years After* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), £30.00, ISBN 0-333-92983-7 was published after this article went to press.

The Marshall Plan, or European Recovery Program (to give it its formal title), was the episode during which the United States granted or loaned some \$13 billion over

four years to sixteen European and quasi-European countries to enable them to re-ignite their economies. The United States required a strong and integrated European economy to which American goods, both industrial and agricultural, could be exported; American strategic policy required a strong and united Western Europe to provide a barrier against further Soviet expansion westward; America needed other liberal, capitalist democracies to exist lest the United States cease to be one herself; and the altruistic strain in American political culture encouraged the desire to help the European countries get back on their feet. The Marshall Plan, therefore, was a defining episode in the Cold War, during which the Continent was split along the geopolitical line which remained in place until 1989; it was a defining episode in the early history of European integration; it was an important example of the overt use of economic power in foreign policy; and it was the first concerted attempt by the United States to transplant its culture abroad.

Even while the European Recovery Program was in full swing, articles began to tumble out, many of them written by those involved in the negotiations for or implementation of the plan. The first substantial work which covered the period as a whole was the semi-official book by Harry Price, *The Marshall Plan and its Meaning*. This was based as much on interviews of the participants as on documents, and those interviewed had the opportunity to comment on the manuscript before publication.¹ The subsequent thirty years saw hundreds of books and articles published, the most influential of which was probably John Gimbel's *The Origins of the Marshall Plan*,² which placed Germany firmly in the spotlight. During those years, and thereafter, a substantial amount of work has certainly been done on, pre-eminently, the United States, but also on three of the larger countries, Britain,³ Germany and France: all of them have one or more books devoted to the subject, as well as a number of articles. On the other hand, for many of the smaller countries, much less is easily available: there are at this point only substantial articles on Belgium, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands, for example, while a book on Portugal, containing material of considerable interest, is available only to those who can read Portuguese.⁴ There is even less published on Greece, Turkey, Iceland and Switzerland,⁵ all of which have attracted only short dedicated pieces, although the Marshall Plan naturally makes an appearance in books devoted to wider topics of their foreign or domestic policies. In many of the books, the earlier ones in

¹ Harry Bayard Price, *The Marshall Plan and its Meaning* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955). I was given a copy of the pre-publication manuscript.

² John Gimbel, *The Origins of the Marshall Plan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).

³ Henry Pelling, *Britain and the Marshall Plan* (London: Macmillan, 1988). See also my essay for beginners, 'Britain and the Marshall Plan', in Chris Wrigley, ed., *Warfare, Diplomacy and Politics* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986), 210–30. For Germany, see below, n. 17 and for France, n. 30.

⁴ Maria Fernanda Rollo, *Portugal e o Plano Marshall* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1994). The author has provided a summary of her argument in Hans H. J. Labohm, ed., *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Marshall Plan in Retrospect and in Prospect* (The Hague: The Clingendael Institute of International Relations, 1997), 48–50. This is a very useful publication, giving information not easily available elsewhere, e.g. on Iceland and the Marshall Plan. For citations for articles on Belgium, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, see below, nn. 31–33.

⁵ See below, n. 4 for a source of information on all of them.

particular, the American historiography dominates, not least because many of the books were written by American-based historians, and in any case all must work in American archives.

Since the 1980s, two books have dominated perceptions of the Marshall Plan, Michael Hogan's *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952*, and Alan Milward's *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–51*.⁶ Hogan, using only American and some British primary sources, not only tries to answer the question why – why was there such a plan, what was it trying to accomplish? – but also looks at the working-out of the plan, attempting a complete history. He considers that, by and large, it was successful in accomplishing what its progenitors wanted it to accomplish. The book is, however, relentlessly political and wholly underplays the economic aspects. Indeed – curiously for a book which is fundamentally about economic aid – it contains not one table of statistics. Were you trying to find out something as simple as how much aid went to each recipient country, you would not be able to do so from Hogan's book. Furthermore, Hogan concentrates on the central core of countries, without explaining why, for example, he ignores Greece, Turkey, Iceland and Switzerland, or why Norway has only three entries in the index. Finally – and for me of overarching importance – Hogan's whole approach to the history of American foreign policy grounds it in the interactions among the American executive branch, including the president and the State Department, elements within and outside Congress and domestic interest groups: the sense of a world external to Washington often fades away. Therefore, he sees the Marshall Plan ultimately as an American foreign policy conceived in Washington – fair enough – and implemented in the field by American officials, but which is only intermittently subject to the influences of the other countries, thereby underplaying the concept of international relations as an interactive process. I think that this is misconceived.

Alan Milward's book, on the other hand, is notable for the breadth of its research in European archives: indeed, it is the only monograph published which both covers a number of countries and takes their point of view rather than the American. It is primarily a book of economic history and as such will be for some time irreplaceable. Certainly Milward himself believes that there remain few unanswered questions about the Marshall Plan, and his stature is such that his opinion must be treated with respect. I do, however, believe that he is mistaken. First of all, only two chapters of his book are devoted to the Marshall Plan, and the coverage is therefore anything but comprehensive; furthermore, since the book was published nearly twenty years ago, many more sources have emerged. Participants have died and their private papers have become available. More substantially, after fifty years some of the member governments are beginning to allow access to their relevant files. Of equal importance, however, is the fact that because Milward's focus is on economic

⁶ Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) and Alan Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–1951* (London: Methuen, 1984). See also Milward's review of Hogan's book, 'Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?', *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 13, no. 2 (Spring 1989), 231–53.

developments, the questions which he asks and answers naturally tend to be economic: consequently he necessarily underplays the psychological, political and diplomatic aspects, and constraints, of the European Recovery Program. His concentration, contrary to that of Hogan, is on the implementation of the ERP. His main argument is that the Marshall Plan was actually necessary for only two countries, France and the Netherlands; as for the rest, they could have gotten along without it. Possibly in economic terms they could have done so, but for Britain, to take one example, it would have meant going back to rationing at a level worse than that during the war. More fundamentally, for the countries concerned it provided not only an economic but a psychological safety-net: the United States was not going to abandon them to their fate. This was very important for West Germany, for example. Finally, because Milward's book focuses on Western Europe, it spends very little time on those countries not deemed to be part of Western Europe, in particular Turkey and Greece.

There is no lack of published work on the Marshall Plan: there are probably at least a thousand books and articles available. With the exception of Milward's book, virtually all other work has tended to fall into one of two categories. There are those which treat the Marshall Plan primarily as part of American foreign policy, written almost solely from the American or even Washington perspective and based largely on American documents. Or, secondly, there are those which focus on individual countries. There is no lack of work written by Europe-based historians, but much of the literature has been fragmented, country-specific to the point of being insular, written, naturally, in the home languages, not all of which are widely read by non-natives, and published in journals which are not always widely available. There is nothing necessarily wrong with country-specific history, but the advantage of much of this newer work has been its wider gaze, its documentary support based on relevant and sometimes newly available European archives, and its easier access. This is very welcome, since the new work is bound, in due course, to change the overall assessment of the nature and the accomplishments of the ERP.

The following states participated in the ERP: Britain, Ireland, France, Italy, Trizone (and then the Federal Republic of) Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, and Switzerland. Spain, because of Franco, was explicitly excluded, while the Soviet Union forced Finland to decline the invitation – indeed, it announced this from Moscow, before the Finnish government had finally reached, let alone announced, its decision.⁷ One question which could be asked is, how could such a disparate group of countries have constituted a *collective* object of a *common* policy on the part of the United States? One answer which could be given is, only with difficulty, since it would have required the kind of policy coherence and co-ordination of which the United States seemed only intermittently to be capable. But if one looks

⁷ Mikko Majander, 'The Limits of Sovereignty: Finland and the Marshall Plan in 1947', *Scandinavian Journal of History*, Vol. 19, no. 4 (1994), 309–26. The Americans of course realised that this was not the Finnish government's own decision, and treated it relatively kindly.

at the main policy goals of the Marshall Plan individually, it is possible, very loosely, to slot countries into various analytical categories.

First of all, Marshall aid was intended to foster the reconstruction of the economies of individual states, although it was to be done in a co-operative manner: states were not to beggar their neighbours, but to build trading links; certainly the economy of one state was not to be strengthened at the cost of another. Marshall Plan policymakers had two main concerns here. First of all, broken economies might foster the growth of communism much like mulch fosters mushrooms, a fear particularly prevalent with regard to France, Italy, Greece and Trizone Germany. The French government in May 1947 contained four Communist Party ministers, while Italy had the largest and most powerful Communist Party in Western Europe,⁸ which, in conjunction with the socialists, threatened to take power via the ballot box in the general election in April 1948.⁹ Greece was in the middle of a civil war between the Communist Party and the right-wing government forces, while Trizone Germany had the Soviet zone as an alternative example of political economy. And secondly, the United States needed working economies as export markets for American goods – the great postwar fear in the United States was that it would fall into recession or depression if it could not export the output of its farmers and workers.¹⁰ In this context the major industrial economies were important, particularly those of the trizone, France, the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries. There is an important subset relating to this general point: France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal and the United Kingdom all had overseas territories which the United States wished to prise open for its businessmen.

A second major goal of American policy was to contain the Soviet Union, which was perceived as having embarked on active expansion and as being irremediably hostile to the United States. A swift glance at a map makes it clear why Turkey, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden were included: Turkey and Greece would guard the eastern Mediterranean, Ireland would guard the approaches to the British Isles and the western Mediterranean, Norway and Iceland were strategically placed athwart the routes across the north Atlantic and Sweden lay across the Baltic Sea from the Soviet Union, its entire south-eastern coast effectively ringed with Soviet military forces.¹¹ Britain, however, was also included within this category of

⁸ Although the largest Communist Party per capita was that of Luxembourg.

⁹ The American Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, let it be known that if the Italians elected the Communist Party to power, there would be no Marshall aid for Italy. See, e.g., James Edward Miller, *The United States and Italy, 1940–1950* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986); John Harper, *America and the Reconstruction of Italy, 1945–1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Rosaria Quarataro, 'L'Italia e il Piano Marshall (1947–52)', *Storia Contemporanea*, Vol. 15, no. 4 (1984), 647–722; Pier Paolo D'Attore, 'Il Piano Marshall: Politica, Economica, Relazioni Internazionali Nella Ricostruzione Italiana', *Passato e Presente*, no. 7 (1985), 31–63; David Ellwood, 'La Propaganda del Piano Marshall in Italia', *Passato e Presente*, no. 9 (1985), 153–71; and Elena Aga Rossi, ed., *Il Piano Marshall e l'Europa* (Rome, 1983).

¹⁰ Certainly this was the Soviet expectation. See Scott D. Parrish, *New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947*, International History of the Cold War Working Paper No. 9 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1994).

¹¹ Silva (see below, p. 5) argues that Sweden's strategic value to the United States was limited:

containment. This was not so much for what it could do in Europe – although it would within two years begin its future career as an American aircraft carrier – but for the Empire: if Britain withdrew from these territories, which it might have to do if it could not afford their continued occupation and administration, the United States would have to fill the resultant vacuum. Therefore the health of the British economy, and its ability to support an American-approved foreign policy, were perceived as direct American strategic interests.

The need to contain the Soviet Union, plus the desire to rebuild the European economy, came together in the third goal, which was the drive for European integration. An integrated Europe working together politically as well as economically would constitute the strongest possible barrier to Soviet expansion, and certainly the United States maintained constant pressure on the participants in the Marshall Plan to move towards this goal. For this project the United States added Switzerland – which neither required nor received financial aid from the United States – Portugal, and Denmark to those countries already mentioned.

And finally – and incorporating all of the policy goals already mentioned – there was the overarching American desire to maximise the extent of the liberal, democratic, capitalist world: if America were the only liberal democracy left, the need to militarise its society to protect itself from its ideological enemies might ensure that it would no longer be one.

The United States believed that its economic power would enable it to achieve these goals. But not all of them were supported by various of the European countries, and finance as a weapon in foreign policy has its limitations. Recipient countries can always refuse aid if the price is too high. Norway and Portugal, for example, nearly refused to participate: Norway distrusted American economic policy and feared interference with its own Keynesian approach, while Portugal feared that the United States had its eyes on Portuguese territories in Africa. Weakness can be a strength if the stronger country fears what exacerbated weakness might lead to. France, for example, was able to fend off almost all the American attempts at intervention because the United States was so fearful of the latent as well as active strength of the far left that after one or two attempts it backed off. Recipient countries might work together against the donor over specific points: Britain, Norway and Switzerland stood together against the American pressure for integration as opposed to co-operation.¹² There are other examples of all of these

rather, he emphasises Washington's desire to keep the neutral states on board rather than alienating them.

¹² One glaring lacuna in the bibliography of works on the Marshall Plan is a focus on the small states, which in certain contexts had an importance which outweighed their size – Belgium is only one example. There has been some work done on this subject, which was presented at a conference, *The Marshall Plan and the Small States*, held at the University of Oslo in November 1997; publication of the proceedings is apparently expected in due course. In particular, to what extent did the small states band together, beyond the already connected Benelux states? Did any of them see this as a way of safeguarding themselves against too-insistent American, or other large-state, pressure? Geiger in his article (see below) briefly mentions this with regard to Ireland, but scholars could tease out a fundamental web of interconnected relationships.

responses during the period 1947–52. Indeed, it is worth emphasising that in general terms a country's weakness did not necessarily make it easier for the United States to impose its own policy prerogatives on it: the United States wanted to win the hearts and minds, as well as the governmental support, of the Europeans, and too obvious an attempt to throw its weight around would lead to charges of an American invasion of sovereignty. Certainly the American proposals for economic and political integration divided Europe and encouraged informal alliances for and against these proposals – Italy, France, Benelux and Germany for, Britain, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries against. Indeed, one almost begins to feel sorry for the Americans, trying as they were – often fruitlessly – to impose, argue for, foster or plead for the acceptance by an incoherent group of countries of an (ideally) organised and coherent programme.¹³

Only four of the books under review were written by single authors; the remainder are books of essays, which are always problematic to review. Of these seven, five are based on a single country, while the remaining two take a wider ambit. Of these two, the book edited by Barjot, Baudouin and Voldman, *Les Reconstructions en Europe (1945–1949)*, is not strictly about the Marshall Plan at all. Rather, it covers the wider political and especially the economic reconstruction of Europe, and the cultural representations of this reconstruction, with paragraphs rather than chapters being devoted to the ERP. Based on a colloquium which took place in France in Caen in spring 1997, the book is more successful than many in its attempt to be comparative, with an emphasis on pan-European themes (although single-country history still forces its way in). The authors, a combination of senior and junior historians, work in France, Germany, the United States and the USSR. The book's prologue is written by the distinguished French professor René Girault and its conclusion by the distinguished American professor Charles S. Maier. Franco-American relations are not always so amicable.

The other volume of essays with a European-wide ambit is *The Americanisation of European Business*. Like the previous volume, it is the result of a conference, in this case one held in the United Kingdom at the University of Reading in late 1996; in addition to the essays arising from the conference, the book includes several specially commissioned essays. Unlike the previous volume, however, its theme, on the face of it, is specifically the Marshall Plan. However, the ERP as such is not specifically the focus of the book; rather, it is a case study for analysing in some depth the success or otherwise of the transfer of managerial models across national frontiers. Nevertheless, it is a real contribution to the field, given that a frequently unremembered goal of the ERP was to improve European industrial productivity through such a transfer of American technology and managerial know-how.¹⁴

¹³ The big book which needs to be written is one which looks at Europe as a whole from the viewpoint of the Continent and the British Isles: how did it react to American carrots and sticks, and to what extent, and how, did temporary alliances form and reform in response to American policy initiatives? I plan to attempt such a book, but there is plenty of room for others as well.

¹⁴ For Britain, a standard work for some time has been Andrew Carew, *Labour and the Marshall Plan:*

The book looks at the men, institutions and channels involved in this transfer, and at the results in different industries and countries; it ends with three case studies. Between 1948 and 1958, several thousand missions visited the United States to tour factories and talk to businessmen, labour leaders, economists and government officials; their primary goal was to try and discover the reasons why the American economy performed so well. The American intention was that these missions would be made up of businessmen, government officials and labour leaders, but in certain countries, such as France, membership was also a perquisite given to sons of businessmen and officials to enable them to take a bit of a holiday. One assumes, however, that most of the visitors took the whole enterprise a bit more seriously.

At the same time, American experts visited factories in Europe in order to identify the causes of and suggest solutions for the huge productivity gap between the United States and Europe. In 1953 the European Productivity Agency was established to co-ordinate these efforts. In the end, Europeans failed to accept the whole Americanisation model: rather, they picked and chose specific techniques. Furthermore, the nature and scope of the responses in any particular country depended on that of individual enterprises rather than on governmental or even trade association decisions. It is also no surprise to discover that social and individual networks were the most important element in this acceptance or rejection.

The book begins, naturally enough, with an essay by the two editors setting out the introductory framework. This is followed by 'From Business Reform to Production Drive: the Transformation of US Technical Assistance' by Jacqueline McGlade, the main argument of which is that the nature and form of US technical assistance, and indeed of foreign economic policy, was the outcome of conflict between two different groups of American business enterprises, those who emphasised the export of the American model, defined as economic growth and democratic reform, and those who focused on national security, anti-communism and trade protection. In the end they both prevailed, but at different periods: the ERP began as a business reform programme and turned into a military production drive. Within the context of the book, this is a perfectly logical conclusion; the only drawback is that Professor McGlade does not always move as confidently in the political and international context as she does in the core of her subject, as shown by her sometimes shaky chronology.¹⁵ Nevertheless, her chapter is a useful counter-balance to those accounts which focus on the State Department and Congress.

The next four essays look at transfer mechanisms and channels. Bent Boel asks whether the European Productivity Agency (EPA), a semi-autonomous organisation within the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC),¹⁶ was a

The Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management Science (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), while for France there is R. Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemmas of Modernisation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

¹⁵ See also W. Sanford, *The American Business Community and the European Recovery Program, 1947–52* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987).

¹⁶ Consisting of representatives from all of the recipient countries, this was established on American insistence to co-ordinate the European requests for aid before submitting a single unified request to the

faithful prophet of the American model, frequently, but inadequately, defined by others as mass production techniques. Contrary to the accepted wisdom that the EPA was an agency of American influence, Boel argues that it developed into a framework within which OEEC countries looked for European solutions to European problems. Matthias Kipping considers the extent to which 'Operation Impact' converted European employers to the American creed. (Operation Impact refers to the episode in autumn 1951 when American politicians and company executives invited a large group of European business leaders from seventeen European countries on a tour of factories and cities, ending with a 'conference of manufacturers' in New York.) Kipping's conclusion is, not very much. John Dunning looks at the British case of the transfer of managerial techniques from American multinational-owned British affiliates to local industries. His conclusion is that UK industrial productivity was indeed advanced by the implementation of American managerial philosophy and practices, both by the UK affiliates of American firms and by their impact on the strategies and policies of their UK competitors. At the same time, UK management styles and procedures, not surprisingly, took on a distinctive style of their own. Rolv Petter Amdam and Ove Bjarnar analyse the regional dissemination of American productivity models in Norway, which largely took place in the period after the ERP. The key event was the establishment of the Norwegian Productivity Institute in 1953, the success and influence of which undermined the claims that 'American productivity models were transferred from the US and imposed on passive receivers in an "imperialistic" way'. Rather, the 'process of Americanisation and its outcome did not only depend upon the strength of American efforts' – national institutional forces in the receiving countries were an important influence in how, and whether, models were transmitted (p. 91).

The following three essays look at the transfer process itself in Great Britain, Sweden and Italy. Jim Tomlinson and Nick Tiratsoo argue that the Americans were not looking to supply a self-contained model, and particularly not a model of mass production (as opposed to flexible specialisation). British industry failed to adapt in the years after 1945, but this was for a variety of reasons arising from a variety of contexts, and a single model of any type will not suffice. Henrik Glimstedt considers the positing of Americanisation versus the 'Swedish model' of industrial relations with regard to Volvo. This essay, while interesting in itself, has little to do with the Marshall Plan; rather it deals with the opposing forces of a time-management system and a drive for quality: quality won out. For Italy, David W. Ellwood looks at the fate of Americanisation in Emilia-Romagna and the emergence of an alternative model: his work confirms the conclusion drawn by increasing numbers of economic historians, that the influence of the Marshall Plan was restricted. The 'take-off' of the region only began three years after the ERP had ended and bore no relation to the 'modernising recipes handed out from Washington' (p. 149).

US agency which administered the ERP, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). See Richard T. Griffiths, ed., *Explorations in OEEC History* (Paris: Organisation for European Development, 1997).

The final part of the book looks at translation and transformation, and contains three case studies: on the very great American influence in the Vereinigte Glanzstoff Fabriken AG of Germany, a new perlon factory, by Christian Kleinschmidt; on the relations of Pechiney, an aluminium and chemicals producer, with the United States since the nineteenth century by Ludovic Cailluet, who emphasises, not surprisingly, 'the crucial role of individuals as conveyors and "translators" of American management methods into the French context' (p. 191); and on Italy's public sector steel industry by Ruggero Ranieri. His example, the state-owned company Finsider, was the beneficiary of ERP funds which facilitated the transfer of technology. But beyond that, and here the company was more unusual, Finsider mastered and copied American methods in management culture, industrial relations, business strategy and organisation; furthermore, it was not alone in Italy, many companies being inspired by a neo-capitalist ideology which was particularly influential during the early 1960s.

The book, in short, is of a somewhat specialist nature, and one which many of those interested in the Marshall Plan will be tempted to ignore. There is no doubt that the fact that the Marshall Plan was the context for part of the period with which these essays deal is of minimal importance to some of their writers. Nevertheless, the question of European productivity and how to improve it was, for many of those involved in Washington, central to the whole enterprise. As such, scholars ought not to neglect it. This book provides a useful entrée into some of the continuing debates.

The next three books all deal with Germany,¹⁷ although only two of them deal specifically with the Marshall Plan. The book edited by Diefendorf, Frohn and Rupieper takes a wider ambit; in this book the period, and the topic, of the ERP take their proper place as part of a wider picture. This book, based on a conference held at the German Historical Institute in Washington, DC, is a meaty production. The second book, edited by Holzamer and Hoch, had a newspaper supplement as its foundation. The third book, apparently editorless, is the record of a conference commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the speech by Secretary of State George C. Marshall which began the whole thing. The three books do have one thing in common, however: each contains an essay by Christoph Buchheim, clearly the man to ask about dollars and the currency reform.

The book edited by Diefendorf, Frohn and Rupieper, *American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945–1955*, numbers among its twenty-three essays

¹⁷ This is hardly a topic which has been ignored. See, *inter alia*, John Gimbel, *The Origins of the Marshall Plan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976); Charles S. Maier and Gunter Bischof, eds., *The Marshall Plan and Germany* (Oxford: Berg, 1991); Gerd Hardach, *Der Marshall-Plan: Auslandshilfe und Wiederaufbau in Westdeutschland 1848–1952* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1994); Gerd Hardach, 'The Marshall Plan in Germany, 1948–1952', *Journal of European Economic History*, Vol. 16, no. 3 (1987), 433–85; Thomas Alan Schwarz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); Hans-Jürgen Schröder, 'The Economic Reconstruction of West Germany in the Context of International Relations 1945–1949', in J. Becker and F. Knipping, eds., *Power in Europe? Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a Postwar World, 1945–1950* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1986); and H. Berger and A. Ritschl, 'Germany and the Political Economy of the Marshall Plan, 1947–52: A Re-revisionist View', in B. Eichengreen, ed., *Europe's Postwar Recovery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 199–245, along with dozens of other articles and books in several languages.

three dealing with the ERP. The first is Buchheim's 'Marshall Plan and Currency Reform'. Buchheim openly takes issue with the argument of Werner Abelshauser that the direct contribution of the Marshall Plan to economic development in West Germany was relatively insignificant.¹⁸ He agrees with Abelshauser's thesis that it was the currency reform of 1948 which was the engine of reconstruction but emphasises it in a different way: he argues that it was the currency and economic reform which enabled the Marshall Plan to achieve its ultimate aim. A proper currency plus the elimination of price controls encouraged the manufacturing of goods which could be profitably exported to the rest of Western Europe, thereby reducing West Germany's dependence on American supplies and narrowing the dollar gap. The essay by John Gillingham, 'From Morgenthau Plan to Schuman Plan: America and the Organisation of Europe', does not really present a new interpretation, but it is useful to have the outline of events in a short compass. Finally, the essay by Ulrich Kluge, 'West German Agriculture and the European Recovery Program, 1948–1952', usefully provides the results of specialist research for the benefit of political and international historians. His conclusion is that 'without doubt, as far as agriculture was concerned, the Marshall Plan achieved the goal highest in the minds of its proponents and beneficiaries, namely "obtaining the highest degree of reconstruction" and of "developing production on a healthy economical foundation"'. Furthermore, and not unconnected, 'financial resources brought action rather quickly, often in contravention of complex bureaucratic procedures' (p. 170).

The second book on Germany, *Der Marshall-Plan: Geschichte und Zukunft*, is a slightly curious production. Beginning life as a supplement of the newspaper, the *Süddeutschen Zeitung* of Munich, it is combination of essays by historians and journalists, recollections of those involved, interviews of various politicians, a chronology and a bibliography. It is primarily a history of the political, economic and cultural aspects of the ERP, but attention is also paid to the possibilities of such a plan for eastern Europe, the bits that missed out on the first one. The editors see it as a book of reference, so this is not the venue for wild new interpretations.

The book opens with the text of a speech on the Marshall Plan given by Roman Herzog, the Bundespräsident, at a dinner with newspaper editors in March 1997. This is followed by a set of essays – not unlike newspaper leaders/editorials – on, for example, the birth of a myth, and the love affair of the Germans with the Marshall Plan. The next set of essays concentrates on foreign policy aspects: Josef

¹⁸ Werner Abelshauser, *Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945–1948: Rekonstruktion und Wachstumsbedingungen in der amerikanischen und britischen Zone* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1975); *idem*, 'Wiederaufbau vor dem Marshall-Plan: Westeuropas Wachstumschancen und die Wirtschaftsordnungspolitik in der zweiten Hälfte der vierziger Jahre', *Vierteljahrsschrift für Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 29 (1981), 567–9; and *idem*, 'Hilfe und Selbsthilfe: Zur Funktion des Marshallplans beim westdeutschen Wiederaufbau', *Vierteljahrsschrift für Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 37 (1989), 85–113. His arguments are summarised in English in an essay in Maier and Bischof, *The Marshall Plan and Germany: 'American Aid and West German Economic Recovery: a Macroeconomic Perspective'*, pp. 367–409. Conventional wisdom has always maintained that the ERP was an important condition for the success of the 1948 currency reform, itself the starting point for German economic growth.

Joffe, 'Eine wunderbare Freundschaft'; Wolfgang Krieger, 'Die Knute Moskaus als Überzeugungswaffe'; Ludolf Herbst, "'Ihre Teilnahme ist ein Bruch in der Front'"; and Manfred Knapp, 'Geburtsstunde für die Bonner Aussenpolitik'. Part III concentrates on economic history, and this section showcases some well-known names: Werner Abelshauer on 'Die Stabilisierung Westeuropas', Christoph Buchheim on 'Die Pistolenkraft der Marshall-Dollars', Uwe Prell on 'Carepakete für den "Vorposten Freiheit"', and Gerd Hardach on the 'Scharnier zum Wirtschaftswunder'. Part IV concentrates on cultural aspects: Hermann Glaser, 'Schöne, neue Waren-Welt'; Volker Wehdeking, 'Losgekommen von der Welt der Trümmer'; and an interesting piece by Rudolf Reiser, "'Europas Kalifornien'". This part of the book ends with essays on the contemporary resonance of the ERP and its possible application to eastern Europe.

There then follows a section made up of interviews with, or statements by, a selection of politicians: Bill Clinton, Günter Rexrodt, Richard von Weizsäcker, Volker Rühe, Joachim Lesser, and a group of experts, unnamed in the table of contents, which includes Helmut Schmidt. A German language version of Marshall's June 1947 speech is included, as are historical speeches by George F. Kennan and Toby E. Rodes, the last-named taken from the book below. The book ends with the aforementioned chronology and a bibliography. A few photographs and cartoons are sprinkled throughout.

The third book on Germany, *50 Jahre Marshall-Plan*, is equally a commemorative product. The record of a symposium held on the fiftieth anniversary of Marshall's speech, it combines historians giving the benefit of their researches and participants giving the benefit of their memories. The volume begins with talks on lessons for the future and on the German Marshall Fund. This is followed by the academic talks (*Wissenschaftliche Vorträge*), which are of a somewhat general nature: Curt Tarnoff on 'Die USA und das Europäische Wiederaufbauprogramm', Christoph Buchheim – for the third time – on 'Deutschland und der Marshall-Plan', Alan Milward on 'Die Auswirkungen des Marshall-Plans', and Barry Eichengreen on 'Der Marshall-Plan heute'. After a discussion, Günter Rexrodt celebrates the 'Start in eine neue Epoche europäischer und transatlantischer Kooperation'. Then comes the second half: memories of the men Who Were There. These include Charles Kindleberger,¹⁹ Hermann Jannsen, William Diebold,²⁰ Toby Rodes, Fritz Stern and Peter von Zahn. The book ends with the discussion of these *Zeitzeugenberichte*.

The last two books are usefully directed towards the German general public, for which those responsible are to be congratulated, conveying as the books do some of the major research findings of the academic community to the interested non-specialist. Furthermore, they will recall events for those who lived through them, and will carry forward the historical memory to the next generation. The books were never intended for those who already know more than the basics about the

¹⁹ Charles Kindleberger, *Marshall Plan Days* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987).

²⁰ William Diebold, *Trade and Payments in Western Europe: A Study in European Economic Cooperation 1947–1951* (New York: Harper & Bros [for the Council on Foreign Relations], 1952).

ERP, although historians may well find some of the reminiscences useful and even entertaining.

The next book of essays is very welcome, providing, as it does, one of the few wide-ranging English-language assessments of the ERP in Austria.²¹ The result of a conference held in 1998, *The Marshall Plan in Austria* is divided into three sections: Part I looks at economic legacies, Part II covers politics, identity and propaganda, and Part III is devoted to macro- and microeconomic impacts. The first essay is the text of the keynote address by Ferdinand Lacina, long-serving Austrian finance minister, who usefully sets out an economic context. In the first year of the ERP (1948/49), aid money contributed 14 per cent to the national income. Over the whole period it employed a recovery strategy which comprised three stages: in the first year the Marshall Plan offered direct aid, almost half of the deliveries consisting of food, while a quarter was raw materials; in the second stage, from 1950 to 1951, aid was devoted to the reconstruction and adaptation of basic industries; and in the final stage, aid went to the manufactures of finished and export goods, and to the tourism industry. This speech is nicely complemented by the essay by Hans Fussenegger and Kurt Löffler, 'The Activities of the ERP Fund from 1962 to 1998'. In 1962 the ERP counterpart funds²² were transferred to the Austrian government, which created the *ERP-Fonds*. The agreement stipulated that the funds were to be managed as a legally independent, extra-budgetary fund, and were to continue to be used to support economic development in Austria. In their essay the authors set out the provisions of the agreement and their modifications over the years, the policies to determine the uses made of the money, an analysis of the sectors which benefited and the extent to which they did so, the changes which have followed since Austria joined the European Union in 1994, and charts of statistics. The sector which enjoyed aid in Austria but not elsewhere to any significant extent was the tourism industry. For example, after 1989 money was provided to ensure that hotels and restaurants reached at least a three-star standard, whilst Lacina in his contribution points out that there is not a skiing resort in Austria which has not benefited from Marshall aid to build ski lifts or an hotel.

The first essay in Part II is that by Ingrid Fraberger and Dieter Stiefel: "'Enemy Images': the Meaning of 'Anti-communism' and its importance for the political and economic reconstruction in Austria after 1945'. This is a long, intricate and very interesting essay in which the authors tease out the sources of the hostile image of

²¹ See also Fritz Weber, 'Austria: A Special Case in European Economic Integration?', in Griffiths, *Explorations in OEEC History*, 49–60. There are, of course, a number of German-language works, including Wilfried Mähr, *Der Marshallplan in Österreich* (Graz: Styria, 1989) and Günter Bischof, 'Der Marshallplan und Österreich', *Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 17 (1990), 463–74.

²² Marshall aid was not naked money: rather, goods to an agreed financial limit were sold to the recipient government, which paid for them in their own currency. Of these payments 5 per cent were retained in the recipient country: these funds covered the costs of the ECA country mission, but they were also intended to provide investment funding for the country. The country mission, as the name implies, was made up of American officials (including trade unionists whose task was to establish contact with local labour leaders) who administered the ERP in the respective country. Each recipient country had its own country mission.

the Soviet Union held by most Austrians and its utility in reintegrating a society made up of pro- and anti-Nazis. These are the primary sources of anti-communist images: the traditional, that is, prewar, anti-communist feelings which contributed to the growth of pro-Nazi support; the rape and pillage indulged in by the Soviet occupying troops – watches were especially desirable – as well as their primitive habits of hygiene; and the evidence of the debilitating effect on their occupation zone of Soviet economic policies, including the stripping of the industrial sector – the Soviets took as reparations twice the amount in financial terms that the United States poured into the western zones. The revulsion felt by Austrians of all political stripes helped to bond them together as a country. These negative images continue to exist.

The essay by Andrea Komlosy, ‘The Marshall Plan and the Making of the “Iron Curtain” in Austria’, looks at the local and regional effects of the dropping of the Iron Curtain on the Austrian–Czechoslovak border regions whose social and economic lives had traditionally crossed borders for centuries, even before Bohemia’s absorption into the Habsburg Empire. She points out that for the United States, Eastern Europe was not part of the European economy whose recovery would strengthen it, so that given that the amount of aid was limited, Eastern Europe had very little priority (access to cheap Polish coal was one of the few exceptions). There was also the obvious reason that the United States did not wish to strengthen any part of the Soviet empire. However, at the end of the war the Czechoslovakian economy was in much better shape than that of Austria, so that there were economic arguments for a close relationship. However, the United States insisted on an embargo on most economic exchanges between the two blocs. Both sides suffered. Although describing in riveting detail the technical barriers between the borders, she nevertheless points out that separation was a process rather than a sudden split – in the early period farmers cultivated land on both sides, families visited each other and lovers met. But the reality had to be accepted, and the peripheral regions developed into crisis zones. People migrated, and the Austrian border regions became depopulated, a no-man’s-land.

Jill Lewis continues the theme of East–West relations in her essay ‘Dancing on a Tightrope: the beginning of the Marshall Plan and the Cold War in Austria’. She argues that along with economics and international politics, the Marshall Plan must also be considered in the domestic political context; in this essay she concentrates on food, wages and prices in 1947 and 1948. She argues that during this period of negotiation over the terms of Marshall aid, the political situation in Austria was extremely dangerous: the popularity of the Marshall Plan was not particularly obvious, and the need felt by the government to maintain political consensus and alleviate demands for higher living standards – in particular for food – went against Marshall Plan criteria. The backdrop was the ever-present threat of Soviet expansionism, a threat which tended to be exaggerated, or at least exploited, by Austrian politicians: was there really an attempted putsch in 1947? The action taken by the Austrian government in August 1947 was the drawing up of the Wages and Prices Agreement. It did not solve the immediate crisis, but the fact that it was

drawn up by the combined Chambers of Trade, Labour and Agriculture and then submitted to the government, which approved it, foresaw the production of an elite consensus which was to become the basis of postwar stability and economic recovery.

In “‘Caught Between *Iwan* and the *Weinachtsmann*’”:²³ Occupation, the Marshall Plan, and Austrian Identity’, Matthew Paul Berg considers ways in which the experiences of Soviet and American – not Western – occupation might have contributed to the sense of ‘Austrianness’ between 1945 and 1955. It comes as no surprise, particularly in the context of the essay by Fraberger and Stiefel, that ‘US aid and the generally positive Austrian response to the behaviour of Western troops, as compared to that of Soviet troops, reinforced for Austrians the long-standing conviction that Austria was a bulwark of Western culture and values set against the twentieth century threat from the east, Soviet-style socialism’ (p. 157). Circumstances required Austrians to embrace democracy, and given that the choice lay only between democratic centralism or liberal–capitalist democracy, the experience of Soviet occupation versus Marshall aid made the choice an easy one.

In ‘The CIA in Austria in the Marshall Plan Era, 1947–1953’, Siegfried Beer is as concerned to set out the whole organisation of intelligence, in Washington and in Austria, as he is to reveal what is actually known about the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and other organisations in Austria. This is partly because most scholars who are not a part of the intelligence study community will have little knowledge of the area. But it is also because what is actually known about the topic of the essay is limited, largely because of the paucity of the documentation which has been released. What he can say with confidence is (i) that the ERP certainly contained operatives – the counterpart funds were open to be used by the American intelligence organisation there;²⁴ and (ii) that the main activities of such organisations were intelligence gathering and analysis, rather than covert operations. As Beer points out, much remains to be discovered – in fact, almost everything, as far as one can tell.

It is a small step from spying to propaganda, and in his essay, ‘Marshall Plan Propaganda in Austria and Western Germany’, Hans-Jürgen Schröder demonstrates how very important the United States believed propaganda to be in getting the message across to recipient countries about the amount of largesse Americans were providing for them. He makes the important point that for both Austria and West Germany it was a joint effort by the United States and the recipient government. (He seems to imply that this was generally the case, although one wonders whether this should apply to France.) He also argues that this favourable propaganda continues to this day – although if the rosy view is generally accepted, as he says it is, it is problematic whether its transmission can still be strictly defined as

²³ Father Christmas.

²⁴ As revealed by Sallie Pisani in *The CIA and the Marshall Plan* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991).

propaganda. In any case, what Schröder also does in this essay is to begin to reconstruct the historical memory of the Marshall Plan in Austria.

The final section, Part III, concentrates on the economic history of the Marshall Plan. The first essay, Hans Seidel's 'Austria's Economic Policy and the Marshall Plan', looks at macroeconomic policy. Seidel is a former State Secretary for Finance, and writes with the authority, as well as with the detail, to be expected of one in his position. But he also engages with much of the relevant literature, and gives a very useful overview of Austria's economic policies and what influenced their adoption.

The following three essays take the microeconomic approach, and each concentrates on a sector. In 'The Marshall Plan and the Reconstruction of the Austrian Steel Industry 1945–1953', Kurt Tweraser argues that 'the investments in the heavy industry sectors, partly financed by the Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA), created a strong nationalised part of the Austrian economy which strengthened the power of the organisations of labour' (p. 314). Strengthening the organisations of labour was not, it must be said, a high priority on the part of the American government – rather, the intent was to contain Soviet expansionism. Another outcome was to fit a large enterprise into an economic structure dominated by small and medium-sized firms. In this context, Tweraser suggests that a basic premise of the ERP was that big is beautiful, thereby complementing Charles Maier's point that for those Americans involved in the ERP, mass production plus integrated markets promised prosperity.²⁵

Georg Rigele looks at another industry in his essay, 'The Marshall Plan and Austria's Hydroelectric Industry: Kaprun'. Rigele compares the impact of Kaprun with that of the American Tennessee Valley Authority complex, the intention of both being to generate a high output of electric power in economically underdeveloped regions, and to give citizens faith in the economic future of their respective countries. Rigele claims that this was the single most important project financed by ERP aid; about two-thirds of the money invested in Kaprun came from ERP counterpart funds.

The final industrial essay, as it were, is that by Günter Bischof, "'Conquering the Foreigner": the Marshall Plan and the Revival of Postwar Austrian Tourism'. His thesis is straightforward: 'the *take-off* towards broad-based Austrian prosperity after the Second World War – in which tourism played a major role – would not have occurred to the same degree or with such rapid speed were it not for the Marshall Plan' (p. 358). Other industries have received a great deal of attention, but the recovery of postwar tourism has been wholly neglected since the 1950s – surprising, given that tourism is Austria's most important industry. ERP aid financed both investments in the rebuilding and modernisation of hotels, spas, cable cars and ski lifts, and in streets and transportation facilities between 1950 and 1955, whilst as

²⁵ See, e.g., 'The Politics of Productivity: Foundation of American International Economic Policy of the Second World War', *International Organisation*, Vol. 31, no. 4 (1977), 607–33; *idem*, 'The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth Century Western Europe', *American Historical Review*, Vol. 86 (1981), 327–52; and *idem*, *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

noted above, the ERP-Fonds spread this modernisation among hotels and ski lifts in more rural areas. (It is probable that every hotel in Austria ought to sport an ERP plaque.) These investments in the tourist industry had a single goal for the Americans, although not necessarily for the Austrians: to attract foreign guests and thereby to produce sufficient foreign currency to help correct the negative Austrian balance of payments. Macroeconomically, his conclusion is, sadly, that 'the Marshall planners' success in reforming the Austrian political economy was modest at best' (p. 379).

Because tourism was so widely distributed, it stimulated a whole range of arguments. What priority did tourism have compared with hydroelectric projects? How were the funds to be distributed among the provinces? Who was to control this distribution, the local authorities or Vienna? Bischof only touches on these controversies, considering that they form an agenda for future research. He is more interested in the big picture, and in his conclusion he restates his main themes, while adding the interesting points that the return of German tourists was crucial for the revival of Austrian tourism, that the Western (Austrian) states which complained the most about being denied their full share of funds got the most in the end, and that the environmental concerns which were later to prove so important were ignored by Marshall planners and Austrian tourism officials alike.

The final essay is comparative. This is 'Fifty Years later: a New Marshall Plan For Eastern Europe?' by Wilhelm Kohler. In this he compares the conditions in the postwar period with the those obtaining in the eastern (or east central) European countries after the fall of the communist governments in the 1990s. First of all, there was immediate take-off after the war, dominated by reconstruction, while in comparison these countries in the 1990s experienced enormous contraction – only at the end of this period did they enter the reconstruction phase. The Marshall Plan era saw essentially closed economies, while in the 1990s commodity and capital markets were global; this was a mixed blessing, since it made the transition all the more painful, but offered more opportunities for gains through international exchanges of ideas, goods and finance. He dismisses the analogy, but suggests that an extension of aid by the European Union might prove even more beneficial to these countries than a Marshall Plan.

From Austria to Ireland is a geographical jump of some magnitude, but they were both, in American eyes, of strategic importance. Aid to Austria had not been in question because of its geographical position next to the Soviet bloc. Strategic requirements also helped Ireland, sitting, as it does, 'athwart the chief seaways and airways to and from western Europe' (p. 204 of Whelan, 'Integration' – see below). But the aid for Ireland was grudging: Ireland had been neutral during the war, a lapse in judgement that many American officials, and public opinion, found it difficult to forgive. It had to be included, however, not least because all West European countries – barring Spain – were to be included. Marshall planners saw Ireland's role as supplying food to Great Britain and continental Europe. For their part, however, a significant number of Irish politicians and officials failed to see why Ireland should participate at all.

Ireland, also like Austria, has lacked substantial publications on the Marshall Plan – and then, like a bus, three come along at once. The first is that edited by Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly, *Irish Foreign Policy 1919–1966: From Independence to Internationalism*, which includes two essays: Bernadette Whelan, ‘Integration or Isolation? Ireland and the Invitation to Join the Marshall Plan’, and Till Geiger, ‘The Enthusiastic Response of a Reluctant Supporter: Ireland and the Committee for European Economic Co-operation in the Summer of 1947’. The second is Whelan’s book, *Ireland and the Marshall Plan 1947–1957*. The third, another book of essays, was not yet available to the reviewer at the time of writing.²⁶ In any case, Whelan’s book by itself is a very substantial contribution to what might be called Marshall Plan studies.

The paragraph above in which the state of play in early summer 1947 is summarised is based on Whelan’s essay, which is particularly interesting in its interweaving of British, American and Irish responses. The increasing tension between the superpowers by 1947 meant that ‘any wish to isolate Ireland in retaliation for its wartime neutrality was counter-balanced by the security need to incorporate the country into some kind of American-sponsored organisation’ (p. 205). Britain supported this policy for security reasons, but for other reasons as well; for fear that if Ireland were excluded, the American anti-Irish-partition lobby would be outraged and could delay congressional approval of the ERP; because of economic considerations, particularly the need for Irish food exports; and because Irish inclusion might help to normalise Anglo-Irish relations.

In Ireland, the reaction was mixed. The Department of External Affairs was inclined towards international initiatives, especially multilateral ones: this might repair the damage to its reputation based on its wartime neutrality, President de Valera’s visit to the German legation on the occasion of the death of Hitler, the burning of the British and American flags on VE day and its omission from the United Nations in 1946. The Department of Finance was less keen, regarding the proposals as threatening its special relationship with the British Treasury, which was based on the intertwining of their economies and on personal ties and friendships – it was loath to accept that Ireland’s economic future might lie in a European context. More immediately, it did not want to increase Ireland’s already heavy borrowing, it hated the ‘indignity of accepting US aid’ (p. 216) and it feared that participation would encourage the government to spend without regard to the economic consequences – the timeless fear of finance departments. Other departments, such as Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, also participated in the internal discussions. Yet: ‘regardless of the consequences for neutrality and sovereignty, the state of the economy in the summer of 1947 was the most influential of all the factors – and realism prevailed’ (p. 217). The Cabinet decided to accept the invitation on the same day on which it was delivered.

Till Geiger then takes up the tale. In his essay he compares the Irish response to the Marshall initiative during the summer of 1947 with that of other European

²⁶ Mary Browne, Till Geiger and Michael Kennedy, eds., *Ireland, Europe and the Marshall Plan*.

governments, although his primary sources are largely Irish. His concentration is on the Irish government's position on the three key issues that dominated the proceedings of the Committee for European Economic Co-operation in July 1947: German recovery, European economic integration and 'the problem of American power' (p. 226). It is interesting to learn with which countries Ireland felt the most affinity and why. The observation of the secretary of the Department of External Affairs was that while the Scandinavian and the Benelux countries, as well as Greece and Turkey, acted in unison, Ireland seemed outside any such grouping. The Department then wrote to its embassies in Berne, Lisbon, Rome and Stockholm, requesting information about these governments' likely policies. Geiger comments that the selection of these four embassies 'is revealing about External Affairs' mental picture of Ireland as part of a group of small, neutral countries (that is, Sweden and Switzerland), but also of Ireland belonging to the circle of underdeveloped Catholic societies (that is, Italy and Portugal)' (p. 230). Little useful information was gained from this enquiry.

The Irish and American views on European economic integration were diametrically opposed: Ireland needed to retain protective tariffs to protect its young industries (although it needed close relations with Britain in order to maintain access to the British market). However, External Affairs agreed with the United States that German economic recovery was vital for European recovery. However, with regard to the attempts by the United States to exercise its economic power to remake Europe the American way – which some Irish officials saw as bullying – there was much ambivalence among policymakers as to the desirability of Marshall aid under these circumstances. In the end, according to Geiger, Ireland accepted Marshall aid for two major reasons. First, as for Italy (even more than Ireland a pariah power), participation allowed Ireland to rejoin the community of Western states. And secondly, Ireland needed dollars. It was as simple as that.

In her monograph, *Ireland and the Marshall Plan 1947–1957*, Whelan takes the story beyond the strict cut-off point of ERP funding, to the agreement signed in 1957 by the United States and Ireland governing the use of ERP monies. It is a deeply researched and thoughtfully written book – although I hope that she, and other historians, will eschew computer-speak: 'Dublin could use irregular channels to access the heart of the US administration' (p. 29) is an abomination.²⁷

Her first three chapters (out of nine) take the story to the signing of the bilateral treaty. In her first chapter, she covers the same ground as her essay in Kennedy and Morrison Skelly. In her second chapter she looks at the CEEC from June 1947 to the Irish general election in February 1948, in this case covering some of the same ground as Geiger. Neutrality was the overarching principle of Irish foreign policy, although proving flexible when economic advances were at stake. By the beginning of 1948 the possibility of Marshall aid had assumed a more urgent position within

²⁷ What is wrong with 'gain access to'? Almost as bad is Silva's use of managerial English (below, p. 81): 'Recent scholarship has tended to downsize both the extent of economic crisis in postwar Europe and the impact of American aid on that crisis.'

governmental thinking: the economy was deteriorating, and there was increasing reliance on the dollar area for imports and on the sterling pool for dollars. The latter did not please the British, and they curtailed Dublin's automatic access to the pool, forcing Ireland to look elsewhere. Dollars would now have to come from Marshall aid, for which it would be in competition with London. However, going almost unnoticed during the general election was the announcement that Ireland, along with Iceland, Portugal, Switzerland and Turkey, were expected to ask for loans, not grants – for Ireland a punishment for her wartime, and continuing, neutrality in a world increasingly dominated by the Cold War. In addition, many Washington policymakers had little idea of the true state of Ireland and its economy: the dominant idea was that it had not suffered during the war as had other countries and therefore could not expect the same help. The decision to mobilise the Irish-American lobby was a misjudgement, given the hostility of the State Department and the White House towards partisan political lobbying. It certainly did nothing to change American policy.

Chapter 4 is a stand-alone chapter, looking at Ireland and European integration. Whelan's conclusion is that Irish economic nationalism determined that the perceived dangers of free trade predominated in any discussion of the matter, as well as overshadowing any possible benefits which might flow from ending protectionism. The following three chapters are all broadly economic, covering the dollar import programme, and the Loan and Grant Counterpart Funds during the whole period. My favourite fact is that because tobacco was seen as essential rather than as a luxury, almost 25 per cent of all of Irish ERP funds went on tobacco. More seriously, the chapter on dollar imports demonstrates just how badly the agriculture sector performed; conversely, the predominant trend in industrial production was one of growth and expansion. What ERP funds did allow was the fulfilling of the public's wish to buy consumer goods. In short, ERP-funded raw materials, supplies and dollars allowed a higher standard of living than would have otherwise been the case and 'economic recovery was not [thereby] disabled' (p. 236). With regard to the use of counterpart funds, intended by the US government to be used for investment (and for the use of the CIA), the major conflict in Ireland was internal: should public investment be used predominantly for economic or social purposes? The final economic chapter looks at the push by the ECA for improvements in production and productivity, which would, they believed, be best achieved by adopting American approaches. This focuses on the Technical Assistance Program, and is usefully read in conjunction with the appropriate chapters in *The Americanisation of European Business*. The results were not very encouraging, given that Irish productivity, measured by gross domestic product (GDP) per worker, remained until the 1980s well below that of most other OEEC countries. The fact of the matter was that the American emphasis on efficiency and productivity, trade liberalisation and export promotion, could seem at odds with the Irish government's emphasis on a rural Ireland, self-sufficient and inward-facing.

The final chapter considers the publicity and propaganda inseparable from the Marshall Plan and its planners. They needed to sell American ideas of freedom and

capitalism, of a higher standard of living for all. The concepts of growth and prosperity entered the language of politics and economics through the Marshall Plan publicity campaign, and not only in Ireland. Counteracting communist propaganda was not problematic (unlike in Italy, with its large Communist Party). Furthermore, by the end of the second year, the ECA country mission had endeared itself to the Irish government by its zeal in attempting to help Ireland to prosper. One might have expected the result to have been otherwise. It is a somewhat surprising conclusion to a substantial book.

From Ireland we move to another neutral state, Sweden. In *Keep Them Strong, Keep Them Friendly: Swedish–American Relations and the Pax Americana, 1948–1952*, Charles Silva examines the Swedish–American relationship within the context of the Cold War, looking at American policies for stabilisation, productivity and the Marshall Plan, for European integration, and for rearmament and security, and at Swedish responses to these policies. This review will limit itself to the first two topics. His main thesis is that ‘Sweden’s position in the postwar system was determined by the interplay between domestic consensus-building and the emergence of core American objectives in W. Europe’ (p. 15).

Although the end of the war found Sweden in very good economic shape, this had entirely changed by 1947. Heavy imports of capital and consumer goods from the United States had resulted in a run on central bank reserves. Internationally, the country suffered from the lack of free-running European trade channels (as did other smaller states) and from shortages of raw materials and capital goods from non-dollar suppliers. The government also made a number of economic misjudgements, including over-extending foreign credits and buying and keeping sterling. Their policies stimulated domestic inflation, which the government tried to combat by imposing a tight regime of controls. By 1948, ‘Sweden, like the Swiss, queued up for foreign aid’ (p. 41). This opened it up to American scrutiny, and thereafter ‘Washington would progressively seek ways to incorporate Sweden into [its] larger political-economic strategy in W. Europe’ (p. 44).

In his long chapter 2, ‘Stabilisation and Productivity, 1948–1952: the US and Swedish National Economic Planning’, Silva demonstrates that these two problems brought Sweden into extensive contact and consequently great conflict with the United States. Marshall planners dismissed Swedish economic plans as unrealistic, threatening to withhold dollar aid unless fundamental reforms were made. These criticisms were made more pointed by the fact that they were substantially supported by domestic opponents of governmental policies, such as the opposition parties, parts of the business community and sections of the press. This encouraged the Swedish government to perceive American proposals as an interference in internal affairs and thus a potential violation of national sovereignty. By 1952, the situation was reversed: economic, financial and monetary health had been restored, and the domestic consensus now supported the government’s economic policies; at the same time relations with the United States had improved. The key within Sweden was the development and implementation of a strong stabilisation programme, which included a wage freeze sustained until 1950; this produced the yearned-for domestic

consensus based on co-operation between government, business and labour. The key for the United States was this stability and consensus, the financial rigour demonstrated by the government and the exclusion of the far left from political and economic influence. As Silva points out, 'with these components firmly in place, the American leadership had no trouble in seeing Sweden as a model W. European country' (p. 147).

In his even longer chapter 3, 'Liberalisation and Integration, 1948–1952: Sweden, the US and European Unity', Silva focuses on the breakdown of the European trading system in the postwar period, characterised by barter arrangements, discrimination against other countries' exports and the non-convertibility of currencies. Sweden responded to these constraints by proclaiming its support for multilateral free trade while the political and economic problems already set out encouraged a vacillating trade policy driven by short-term financial expediency. The result was participation in the European commercial imbroglio, while rejecting the American solution to this crisis. The Americans insisted that the Marshall Plan countries exchange their bartering arrangements for a multilateral trading regime, underpinned by the European Payments Union: the methodology was essentially that of a clearing bank, in that rather than two countries trading only to the point where there was a balance of trade between them, they could trade with any of the OEEC countries, throw the bills into a general pot supported by American funds, and use their respective shares of payments for goods they had exported for repayments in any currency for their imports. Sweden had to be coerced to join, but in this was not alone.²⁸

Nevertheless, her acceptance of this arrangement, along with her acceptance of American plans for the restoration and revival of Germany, amounted to tacit acceptance of the American determination to use commercial policy as a prod to encourage the formation of a West European economic and political bloc. The United States had in fact wondered whether or not to include Sweden in their plans for such a bloc: did Sweden really suffer from the trade crisis and should it receive dollar aid? This was problematic because, Silva argues, the initial focus for the Truman administration was the recovery of the major economies of Western Europe – and Sweden could hardly be described as one of these. In the end, what convinced the Americans to include Sweden was its traditional place in the 'trade and payments circuit, whose re-establishment was deemed vital to western Germany's revival and re-integration', demonstrating that 'political goals were embedded in economic integration' (p. 239).

This is a substantial work. In one sense it reveals its status as a doctoral thesis by the repeated restating of its main points, often in different words (or, in the classic

²⁸ See Jacob J. Kaplan and Günther Schleiminger, *The European Payments Union: Financial Diplomacy in the 1950s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) and Monika Dickhaus, "'It is Only the Provisional Which Lasts': The European Payments Union", Griffiths, ed., *Explorations in OEEC History*, 183–200. Michael af Malmberg, 'From Bridge Building to West European Economic Integration: Sweden in the OEEC', *Ibid.*, 169–182.

English formulation, by means of a type of elegant variation).²⁹ But the complicated and even involved arguments are set out clearly, although the lack of an index is a serious obstacle to the full use of the book (another mark of a doctoral thesis). But we should be grateful for this work in any form, since for the first time an extended treatment of the Marshall Plan in Sweden is presented in a language other than Swedish (is another mark of a smaller state the relative lack of non-native speakers of its language?).

In Chiarella Esposito's *America's Feeble Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948–1950*, we return to two of the larger states. In this very interesting work of comparative history, she asks the question; how effective was American conditional aid in achieving shifts in French and Italian economic policy between 1948 and 1950? Was American policy actually driven by economic and ideological concerns, or by the perceived needs of national security? Since it was obviously all of the above, the question then becomes; in what proportions? She limits herself to Marshall Plan operations which related directly to the two countries' domestic, not international, economic policies, showing how the Americans adapted their policies to the two countries' strikingly different economic situations. Their principal weapon of persuasion was the threat to withhold counterpart funds, the use of which had to be approved by the American country missions and ultimately by the ECA in Washington. Consequently, Esposito's concentration is on the country missions and on the technical implementation of policies.

She begins in her first chapter with descriptions of the political and economic situations in both countries in the postwar period before the Marshall Plan. The American intention was to defuse the class conflicts in both countries – they both had large, active Communist parties – by importing into Europe the American dream of increased prosperity for all. Distribution battles would decline if all parties experienced much higher standards of living. This is followed by three chapters on France. Chapter 2 covers France in 1948, at the end of which the Marshall Plan had been successfully launched in France. Despite the political and social turmoil – strikes, for example, and never-ending hostile parliamentary debates – the counterpart fund programme had been successfully inaugurated. This was not because the Americans had been effective in swaying French opinion: in this they were remarkably ineffective. What was key was the determination of certain French politicians and the existence of the funds themselves, which were utilised to support the passage and implementation of economic policies of which the country mission approved. (Esposito anticipates a later chapter by pointing out that at the end of

²⁹ See the ur-description and judgement of the use of elegant variation in the eponymous entry in H. W. Fowler's *Modern English Usage* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 1965), pp. 148–51. It famously begins, 'It is the second-rate writers, those intent rather on expressing themselves prettily than on conveying their meaning clearly, and still more those whose notions of style are based on a few misleading rules of thumb, that are chiefly open to the allurements of elegant variation . . . the real victims, first terrorized by a misunderstood taboo, next fascinated by a newly discovered ingenuity, and finally addicted to an incurable vice, are the minor novelists and the reporters' – but not, I hasten to add, Dr Silva, whose prose is usually straightforward and clear.

1948, by contrast, Italian counterpart funds remained blocked.) Not for the last time, France's strength depended on her weakness, since the alternative if the funds were not released did not bear thinking about.

During 1949, the subject of chapter 3, France continued with its modernisation plans, universally known as the Monnet Plan. These were in large part financed by counterpart funds: France refused to cut back on the Monnet Plan, and refused to increase the tax burden, both of which policies were urged upon the French government by the Americans. France's only alternative was to increase the national debt by borrowing from the Banque de France, a course which would vastly increase inflation and which was viewed by the Americans with extreme disapprobation. But faced with this alternative – caught between a rock and a hard place – the Americans released the funds.

In 1950, Esposito shows in chapter 4, the economy improved so much that financial stabilisation was in sight, and the Americans turned their attention to another worry: the attractiveness of communism to entirely too many French men and women. The country mission tried to convince the government to launch a propaganda campaign to make the population aware of how much they owed to the ERP. The idea was to convert French leftists to a pro-American stance. As part of this campaign they strongly urged the French government to spend some of the counterpart funds on building low-cost housing for the workers. The government refused, since its priority was still rebuilding and modernising productive capacity; the Marshall Plan required economic self-sufficiency by 1952. Only by increasing industrial capacity, government planners believed, could living standards be raised, and the government held to the level of housing expenditure for which they had already planned. (Only 3.1 per cent of all ERP counterpart funds were spent on new housing construction (p. 116).) It also refused to support a propaganda campaign, preferring not to advertise just how much France depended on the ERP and by extension on the United States.

In France the counterpart funds proved to be a pathetically weak weapon. They had been instrumental in French economic recovery, but in ways which frustrated the Americans. The French used them to cover public expenditures which otherwise would have required higher taxes or increased borrowing from the central bank, either of which threatened political instability. The French, in short, took the money while maintaining their independence.

Esposito's final three chapters cover the same periods for Italy. If the French were too adventurous for the Americans, the Italians were too cautious. The Christian Democrat government, dominated by the right, was determined in 1949 to pursue financial stabilisation as the priority, and the left were too weak to moderate this stance. The government's plan was to begin substantial investment in the economy only in 1951 at the earliest. In any case, the government considered the 'lire fund' a political instrument to be used for political purposes, such as employment relief projects or the maintenance of price subsidies. As in France, the country mission was unable to force the Italian government to change its policy. Its efforts were not helped by the split in American policy requirements. The Truman administration

wanted to stabilise the political situation and prevent the communists from exercising political influence: the concern was to maintain influence in, if not control over, Italy, because of its control of the Mediterranean basin. To do this they had to gain the support of the centrists, who supported more investment.

A situation developed wherein the ECA and its European control base, the Office of the Special Representative in Paris, were so concerned about a resumption of inflation that they threatened to slow down or block the release of counterpart funds if financial and monetary stability was given a lower priority. The country mission, conversely, believed that pressure should be put on the Italians to adopt a more aggressive investment policy, the only way, it thought, to encourage recovery and growth. These diametrically opposed policies resulted in the virtual blockage of the counterpart funds until spring 1949. During the same period, however, the Italian cabinet reached a compromise on policy: the government would encourage private investment and invest large sums itself, while emphasising the need to maintain financial stability.

Over the succeeding year the situation improved very little from the point of view of the country mission. The Americans misunderstood the beliefs and policies of certain significant politicians: for example, they considered Catholic moderate leftists to be demagogues rather than democrats and failed to try to gain their support. Within the cabinet, the politicians spent much time and effort attempting to gain political control of various aspects of the administration of US aid, and this jockeying for power contributed to the significant organisational chaos. The context was the struggle between the various factions for control of the Christian Democrat Party itself. One result was that well into 1950 the Italian government had still not set up a centralised planning body, a move long urged by the ECA.

During the late spring of 1950, however, a new government was formed, and it substantially changed the extant economic policy, at least in part to satisfy the demands for heavy investment voiced by opposition groups and the ECA (encouraged, perhaps, by the peasant uprisings which took place in the south in autumn 1949). However, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 arrested these changes: the growth of worldwide inflation led to the resumption of power by those who advocated the maintenance of financial stability over investment. As a consequence, no Italian agency or political party prepared a comprehensive economic plan. In short, the use of counterpart funds to direct or at least to influence Italian economic policy had proved a failure. As Esposito points out, 'American domination in the West did not result in effective control over the domestic policies of even a weak country such as Italy, a recently defeated former enemy' (p. 198).

She concludes that by the end of 1950, when aid from the United States shifted from an economic to a military focus, it had become clear that the use of counterpart funds as a weapon of influence in France and Italy was a failure. The United States felt that it had to support the consolidation of centrist political groups against both the extreme right and the extreme left, and this cost them leverage against their chosen politicians. Thus, America was unable to re-make either France

or Italy in its image. On the other hand, counterpart funds were instrumental in consolidating moderate pro-American forces and containing the communists. Other insights emerge: the Americans found collaboration with the French easier than with the Italians; perhaps this was not unconnected to the fact that American officials themselves treated the French and the Italians differently, being generally more subtle and conciliatory with the French, for whom they had greater respect. As for the 'counterpart fund experience' with regard to postwar reconstruction in France and Italy themselves: it seems clear that 'high productive investment rates remained a paramount French goal throughout the period, despite occasional successes of French conservative forces to contain the modernisation drive', while in Italy 'the Christian Democratic economic policy emphasised financial stabilisation' over investment (pp. 205–6). In short, the use of counterpart funds depended not on American policies, but on domestic political factors in the recipient country and on the willingness of its government to co-operate.³⁰

The final book is of a very different sort: rather than describe and analyse the effects on a country of Marshall aid, Fernando Guirao's *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–57* reveals what happens to and in the one country which desperately wanted Marshall aid but failed to receive it. As Guirao writes, 'the bloody origins and the undemocratic nature of the Franco regime caused Spain's exclusion from all of the initiatives at international cooperation after World War II' (p. 189). The countries which attended the initial meeting in Paris refused point-blank to have Spain associated with them. The Marshall Plan and subsequent initiatives fostered economic growth, social consensus and democratic political stability, all of which were lacking in Spain; as well, its population endured a lower standard of living than that which existed in the other West European states.

The Franco regime survived partly because it was not in other countries' interests to provoke political instability there; furthermore, the country provided a source of supplies which did not have to be paid for with dollars. Indeed, in spite of its own economic weakness, Spain provided credits to the major European powers so that they could buy from Spain immediately after the war. Guirao's conclusion is that 'once the Franco regime survived the immediate postwar period, it was there to stay' (p. 191). Sanctions might have been applied, but that would have required a united front among the Allies and other suppliers, and this was never feasible – Argentina, Portugal and Great Britain decided on a policy of non-discrimination.

Spain took the initiative in finding other ways to tap American aid. Fully aware of the importance of Marshall aid or its equivalent to its economy, but also aware

³⁰ See also Gérard Bossuat, *La France, l'aide américaine et la construction européenne 1944–54*, 2 vols. (Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière, Ministère des Finances, 1993) and *L'Europe occidentale à l'heure américaine: Le Plan Marshall et l'unité européenne 1945–1952* (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1992); Irwin M. Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France 1945–1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and the articles on France in Animation de la recherche, *Le Plan Marshall et le relèvement économique de l'Europe* (Paris: Comité pour l'histoire et financière, Ministère des Finances, 1993).

that its membership of the programme would set off strong political turbulence, it offered to Washington the opportunity to trade foreign aid outside the structure of the ERP in exchange for greater concessions on economic policy and trade liberalisation than its inclusion in the ERP would have required. However, this was not acceptable to Washington. Marshall aid was intended to provide stability to the weak democratic coalitions that formed most of the governments on the Continent: it would not be provided to an authoritarian regime opposed to the liberal political consensus which the Americans hoped would form the basis of a new European order. Only in 1951 did Washington open bilateral negotiations with the Spanish government, trading financial assistance for military facilities.

The price the Western powers paid for the ostracism of Spain was a loss of possible leverage over policy trends within the country. Spain itself paid a high economic price: necessary economic reforms were not implemented, while the lack of foreign exchange retarded recovery and led to unstable economic growth. ‘The actual balance of payments position kept economic authorities on the verge of a permanent breakdown’ (p. 194). However, the maintenance of trade relations with Western Europe allowed Spain to improve its productivity, and this may help to explain the rate of growth which it achieved in the 1950s. In short, Spain provides a counter-argument to the thesis that without Marshall aid Europe would have descended into chaos: as far as Spain was concerned the result was retarded recovery and unstable growth.

Guirao’s book is interesting in itself, providing as it does a history of the political economy of Spain during this period, but it is equally fascinating because it supplies the economic underpinning to the political history of Franco and the Spanish state. It deserves to be widely read, and not only by historians of Spain.

It is clear that all of these books are worth reading. It is exciting, in a quiet sort of way, to see and to read the results of a half-decade or more of new research. What we need now are books, not just articles – regardless of their quality – on the other OEEC states. A book on Belgium and the Marshall Plan is absolutely vital: after all, today’s Europe could quite plausibly be called Belgium’s Europe.³¹ The Netherlands also needs its history;³² and perhaps historians could collaborate on a history of the

³¹ See for now the articles by Ginette Kurgan-van Hentenryk: ‘La Belgique et le Plan Marshall: les négociations belgo-américaine (juin 1947–juillet 1948)’, *Animation de la Recherche, Le Plan Marshall*, 69–86; ‘La Belgique et le relèvement économique de l’Allemagne 1945–1948’, *Relations Internationales*, Vol. 51 (1987), 343–63; ‘Le Plan Marshall et le développement économique de la Belgique’, in E. Aerts et al., eds., *Studia Historica Oeconomica. Liber Amicorum Herman Van der Wee* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1993), 157–72; and ‘La Belgique et le Plan Marshall ou les paradoxes des relations belgo-américaines’, *Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire. Fasc. 2: Histoire Médiévale, Moderne et Contemporaine*, Vol. 71 (1993), 290–353. See also Isabelle Cassiers, ‘“Belgian Miracle” to Slow Growth: the Impact of the Marshall Plan and the European Payments Union’, in Barry Eichengreen, ed., *Europe’s Postwar Recovery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 271–91.

³² See Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, ‘“Big Stick” Diplomacy: the Netherlands Between Decolonisation and Alignment, 1945–1949’, *International History Review*, Vol. 14 (1992), 45–70 and E. H. van der Beugel, ‘An Act Without Peer: The Marshall Plan in American–Dutch Relations’, *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* (1982), 456–69.

Benelux union and the ERP.³³ What about Norway? Given that the Anglo-Norwegian alliance was virtually unbreakable, historians of either or both of those countries should produce a volume.³⁴ Denmark,³⁵ Greece, Turkey, Luxembourg, Iceland and Switzerland³⁶ all deserve a book. It is quite possible that work on all of these countries is *en train*. I hope so – and I look forward to reading the results.

³³ See Thierry Grosbois, 'Le Benelux et le Plan Marshall, une union douanière face au roi dollar', *Relations Internationales*, Vol. 51 (1987), 515–28; Cees Wiebe and Bert Zeeman, 'Benelux', in David Reynolds *et al.*, eds., *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives* (London: Yale University Press, 1994), 167–93; and Erik Bloemen, 'A Creditor's Dreams and Nightmares: Benelux and the Foundation of the European Payments Union', in Griffiths, *Explorations in OEEC History*, 201–8.

³⁴ See thus far H. Ø. Pharo, 'Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction: Norway Faces the Marshall Plan', *Scandinavian Journal of History*, Vol. 1, no. 1 (1977); *idem*, 'The Marshall Plan and the Modernisation of the Norwegian Economy', *Animation de la recherche, Le Plan Marshall*, 591–605, and E. Brofoss, 'The Marshall Plan and Norway's Hesitation', *Scandinavian Journal of History*, Vol. 1, no. 2 (1977).

³⁵ See V. Sorensen, 'The Politics of Closed Markets: Denmark, the Marshall Plan, and European Integration, 1945–1963', *International History Review*, Vol. 15 (1993), 23–45; N. Petersen, 'The Cold War and Denmark', *Scandinavian Journal of History*, Vol. 10 (1985), 191–209; and Leon Dalgas Jensen, 'Denmark and the Marshall Plan, 1947–8: The Decision to Participate', *Scandinavian Journal of History*, Vol. 14, no. 1 (1989), 57–83.

³⁶ See Gerd Wehner, 'Die Schweiz und der Marshallplan', *Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgechichte*, Vol. 79, no. 3 (1992), 341–56.