# The Emergence of Collaborative Environmental Governance in Taiwan: A Changing Landscape of Environmental Politics

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‘I, Yi-Jen Shie, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.'

# ABSTRACT

This thesis is inspired by the newly emergent phenomenon of participatory environmental management that has mushroomed in the post-authoritarian political climate in Taiwan. The phenomenon challenges the existing literature on the systems of government in East Asia, in which the state largely monopolises the policy process, even suggesting that the western experience of a shift from government to governance can be seen to be occurring, at least in the environmental sphere. To examine these issues, the thesis reviews three case studies of collaborative environmental governance in the Kaoping River basin seeking to assess whether they have resulted in a meaningful and sustained move towards local environmental democratisation.

Both intensive and extensive methods have been used to collect empirical evidence. The former employed in-depth interviews with fifty-three key actors and the latter an extensive examination of reports in local newspapers. More than 2000 news-cuttings, dating from the 1960s to 2010, were examined. The three selected case studies were differentiated according to whom initiated a collaborative approach to environmental governance. Two were endogenous programmes (initiated by citizens) and one an exogenous project (initiated by government officials). The three studies reveal quite different political and managerial processes, levels and kinds of available resources, and sustainability over the long term. The key element in successful collaborative governance is provided by the spontaneous and continuous commitment of local citizens. But whilst the most disadvantaged groups of citizens are able to play active roles in preventing environmental degradation, the state-society partnership is rarely one of equal and mutual benefit, not least because of the reliance of environmental groups on government resources for the expansion and maintenance of their governance activities. More specifically, local political competition between factions can be fatal to collaborative activities, revealing the crucial importance of community consensus before launching such initiatives.

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# Chapter 1 Introduction

This thesis assesses the effectiveness of collaborative governance in resolving environmental issues and improving stakeholders' participation in contemporary Taiwan. It examines how disadvantaged groups and civil society more generally can initiate successfully (or otherwise) collaborative governance within an historic context of state hegemony and how this may influence the quality of governance in the interests of the environment. It is an attempt to assess the relevance of ideas developed in western democracies regarding collaborative governance in the quite different political economy and culture of Taiwan, a country that is often seen as 'typical' of the East Asian 'tiger' economies. The thesis concludes that environmental collaborative governance is growing rapidly in Taiwan, initiated from both an endogenous and exogenous approach. It has rapidly changed the political landscape and the outcomes of environmental governance. However, without the spontaneity of civil actors, its continued success will be problematic. Also its capacity to transform state-society relations is constrained due to its reliance on government support, which makes it prone to be manipulated and disabled when it chooses to confront the state regarding controversial issues.

This introduction is organised into six sections. The first introduces the context that frames the research, whilst the second builds on this description to offer a research rationale. The third part of the chapter sets out the research questions, and the fourth explicates the research arguments. The fifth introduces the research methods and finally the chapter concludes with a description of the thesis structure.

## 1.1 Research context

During the last three decades, various forms of collaborative governance have emerged as a means of reforming governmental processes in western democracies. This new form of governance brings multiple stakeholders together to find the resolution for public issues, in which social participants regain the ownership and greater acceptance of public policies. The key purpose has been to search for forms

of governance that are more reflexive, deliberative, participatory, hetero-archic and consensus-based. They are designed to facilitate the steering and enabling capacity of the state. It is widely recognised that the state in western democracies no longer 'controls' but 'steers' (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Peters, 1997; Pierre and Peters, 2000). The new forms of governance being proposed are not seen so much as a substitute for the state and market, but as complementary to them (Gray, 1989; Ansell and Gash, 2006).

Collaborative governance has been applied to policy decision-making studies, governance theory, urban planning, the study of development, network theory and environmental management. It has been of particular interest in the environmental and developmental domains in the last two decades (Wondolleck et al., 1996; Coenen et al., 1998b; Bloomfield et al., 2001; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Berkhout et al., 2003; Munton, 2003; Holden, 2011). Collaborative governance presumes an active and mutually beneficial engagement between the state and civil society. However, it should not simply be viewed in instrumental terms as providing, for example, environmental infrastructure and services, but also as a method to fulfil environmental values and political accountability. By allowing a greater level of public participation in environmental issues, collaboration becomes an important new form of local environmental governance and makes partnerships more relevant by leading to a better satisfaction regarding local environmental needs (Edge and McAllister, 2009).

Whatever their success in the West, the transfer of these ideas and practices to societies and states where the historical political culture is less deliberative and inclusive, cannot simply be assumed to be beneficial. This is especially the case as much research in the West has tended to assume, rather than to demonstrate, that collaborative governance will lead to an improvement in the quality of policy-making (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Rauschmayer et al., 2009; Murray et al., 2010; Holden, 2011). The better the co-ordination of the interests of civil society and government does not guarantee a more effective policy. Moreover, civil societies in countries with long democratic traditions, as in Western Europe and in the United States, where most empirical work on collaborative governance has been conducted, are comparatively well-developed economically and socially quite homogeneous in global terms. Outside the West, the implications of collaboration

are frequently different in the absence of processes of deliberative democracy.

Given its authoritarian history, the search for a sincere process of collaborative governance in the East Asian context, in which state and society stand on an equal footing, may seem to be an unrealistic goal. In post WWII East Asia, authoritarian states have frequently ignored civil society and dominated the development of both economy and society, leading to a state-centred initiation of hierarchical governance. The non-state sector became largely absorbed into a corporatist order, in which social associations had to be legitimised and arranged by the ruling power, operating in coordination with the objectives of the state (Cumings, 1984; Evans, 1989; Wade, 1990; Unger and Chan, 1995; Evans, 1997; Brødsgaard and Young, 2000). However, some of those East Asian countries that were authoritarian in nature are now experiencing a transition in governance because of moves towards various forms of democratisation. More specifically, democratisation liberates social pressures that seek a positive state response to bottom-up demands, including public participation in governance (Yamamoto, 1999; Yamamoto and Ashizawa, 2001; Warren and McCarthy, 2009; Kim, 2010), and these are especially evident in the 'environmental' arena (Hsiao, 1995, 1999; Lee and So, 1999). The central question here is how genuine collaborative governance can emerge in particular localities where corporatist politics and an overwhelmingly dominant state remain influential legacies.

This broad process of change in patterns of governance has some immediate resonance with my research into the activities of environmental groups in the Kaoping River basin, Taiwan, over the last 20 years. In particular, I have observed a process in which many environmental groups and grassroots organisations, which originally were involved in direct protest politics against the state, have moved towards launching collaborative actions with local governments. This shift in approach has not only led to some changes in environmental policies and practices but has, to some extent, led to a revitalisation of the environmental movement, a movement that was otherwise declining in its impact on local politics and local environmental protection. As this thesis will show, calls for state-society cooperation that look similar on the surface prove to be different in character and in their effects across geographical space.

## 1.2 Potential contribution

The value of this research is three-fold. One is that by examining the effect of a series of endogenous initiatives in innovative environmental management in Taiwan, taken from the Kaoping River basin, this thesis enriches the literature on collaborative governance. This is done by investigating the application of collaborative governance theory and practice in a social, political and environmental domain (southern Taiwan) that has been previously unexamined. Existing literature on collaborative environmental governance largely draws upon experience in advanced western democratic societies. It mainly focuses on the factors that affect collaboration, the risks and opportunities of collaborative governance in enhancing outcomes and the various institutional designs of such governance forms. This thesis by contrast, contributes to this field by examining how a different mode of public participation has emerged in an 'Eastern' context and provides a comparative perspective on the 'hidden' contextual conditions of collaborative governance in the West. This research thus seeks to develop an analytical framework to explain the dynamics of collaborative environmental governance in new political contexts, whilst providing a wider understanding of the formulation, opportunity and risks of practising collaborative governance in diverse political and cultural backgrounds.

The second reason the study is valuable is that it contributes to the literature on East Asian governance set in a political context of an authoritarian state apparatus that created the condition for the East Asian economic miracle. This literature (see, for example, Cumings, 1984; Skocpol, 1985; Evans, 1989; Wade, 1990; Evans, 1995; Unger and Chan, 1995; Unger, 1996; Evans, 1997) assumes that a robust and dominant bureaucracy was of strategic importance to post-war economic growth that led to rapid national prosperity. Even with the emergence of democratisation, a 'soft' authoritarian regime in Taiwan retained a corporatist order and repressed those social forces opposed to the external costs of industrialisation, including environmental degradation. This thesis also questions the traditional view of state dominance in the initiation of collaborative governance practices in contemporary East Asia (Cumings, 1984; Skocpol, 1985; Wade, 1990; Unger and Chan, 1995; Brødsgaard and Young, 2000). It argues that the dialectical relation of state-society

collaboration over the last two decades has, to a certain extent, altered the long-lasting antithetical relationship between state and society, at least in the environmental domain (see also Marsh, 2006). This is due to the fact that environmental issues have released considerable social energy in favour of pursuing endogenous governance innovation. The vitality and diversity of bottom-up demands for participation have revealed a more equal and closer state-society synergy than is evident elsewhere in East Asia (see, for example, Evans, 1997), a synergy that requires both a strong state and a strong society to cooperate in an equal and productive manner (Yamamoto and Ashizawa, 2001).

Thirdly, in addition to contributing to the academic literature, this research also endeavours to contribute to our understanding of the development of environmental policy in Taiwan. The research results have some value for both policy makers and practitioners who have been attempting to break the gridlock between state and society, yet who remain sceptical of the possibility of genuine and effective collaboration over the longer term.

## 1.3 Research aims

The phenomenon of collaboration is central to the evolution of the state-society relationship in Taiwan in the post-war period corporatist order led by a strong state apparatus. This leads to a series of questions. It is crucial to address how collaborative governance can emerge from this particular power relationship and become institutionalised as part of environmental policy; and whether the adoption of collaborative governance as a political and management strategy can possibly transform this unequal state-society relationship, or does it just represent the existing power structure in another way? This is of interest to both academics and practitioners.

It is within the environmental domain that ideas of collaborative governance are of special interest, not least because environmental issues are highly uncertain temporally and locality-based. The key concern is whether these circumstances can bring forward new opportunities for environmental activism, and whether these

opportunities can lead to more effective environmental management. Thus, I set up five major research questions within the context of Taiwan. First, what have been the reasons that have motivated the emergence of environmental collaborative governance? Second, have different approaches to initiating environmental collaborative governance led to different processes and results? Third, does the emergence of environmental collaborative governance promise a new pattern for its long-term development through its institutionalisation within the policy structure generally? Fourth, what are the levels of transformability and constraints of collaborative governance in the context of Taiwan? Fifth, does the current practice of collaborative governance in Taiwan result in a true transition of the state-society relationship or just a disguised form of corporatist strategy?

More specifically, by examining state-society collaboration in the environmental restoration of the Kaoping River, the thesis explores how various forms of civic participation increase the effectiveness of river governance. It seeks to identify how socially and economically disadvantaged people mobilise to acquire the opportunities to participate in the policy process, the role the local state plays, and what principles should be incorporated into collaborative policy design in order to enhance the sustainability of public–private partnerships.

## 1.4 Research arguments

I would argue that there are three major weaknesses in the existing literature. First, most authors adopt a normative stance rather than an analytical approach. The former focusses on providing a set of static principles of collaborative governance to encourage governmental agencies to initiate actions with non-state actors. The latter explores how collaborative governance emerges, develops, diverges and reinforces itself. Second, the western literature tends to focus on a bureaucracy-led approach to collaborative governance and at the same time values it as a policy tool for government officials. Seemingly, that literature pays less attention to the potentiality of initiating collaborative governance from the bottom up. Third, the literature has neglected more recent East Asian patterns of governance and the need

for a different analytical framework to reflect their different underlying political mechanisms, economic circumstance and social structures.

The thesis argues that democratisation in the 1990s in East Asia released the social energy to pursue ownership of, and participation in, the policy process (Yamamoto and Ashizawa, 2001; Marsh, 2006; Adams, 2010). Even where the state apparatus traditionally owned a monopoly over the policy process, it gradually faced bottom-up challenges based upon requests for public participation. However, while the rise of collaborative governance may be said to change the state-society relationship from one of authoritarian rule to one of corporatism and then possibly to a more equal partnership, the means and forms of collaborative governance to emerge remain embedded in their context and shaped by it.

In addition to examining normative principles of collaborative governance, the research concerns the reasons for, and timing of, its emergence and the factors affecting its long-term development as a way of governing. This places particular emphasis on its transformability and embeddedness in the political arena. The research argues that there are four factors that shape the emergence of collaborative governance, namely motivation to collaborate, the nature of the specific environmental issue, geographical specificity, and 'attention-focussing' events (see Figures 5.2, 6.2, 7.2). In addition it is argued that leadership is integral to meaningful collaborative governance. The leadership may come from government officials or from civil society. It plays a role in interpreting environmental problems and conditions, making initiatives and mobilising available resources.

In the Taiwanese context, collaborative governance may be initiated endogenously by members of local civil society or exogenously by government officials. It is argued that the process differs considerably depending on who initiates the process. Each approach faces different barriers with no guarantee of success. An endogenous approach is built on social consensus, available resources and spatial heterogeneity leading to place-based solutions, able to tackle the environmental problems the community faces more effectively than the government alone. An exogenous approach builds upon existing administrative arrangements and routines that lack the social spontaneity and flexibility to tackle troublesome environmental issues.

These two approaches, to some extent, determine both the processes and results. However, in the end, successful collaboration relies on the capabilities and resources of the civil organisations involved, what they can input into the process of collaboration, and the sincerity and flexibility of government agencies in adapting to a particular collaborative process.

For collaborative governance to succeed, both parties have to treat the experiment as a learning process. The development of collaborative governance is non-linear. Both the mechanisms of institutionalising collaboration and a successful outcome produce a feedback function to reinforce the participants' commitment to collaborative governance. Equally, the processes of institutionalisation can also limit the innovative aspects of participation, especially when the state fails to continue to respect demands from local civil society.

## 1.5 Research methods

I develop these arguments through three case studies. They consist of three recent environmental movements and civil actions situated in a river catchment in southern Taiwan. In order to understand the emergence of various forms of collaborative governance in the environmental arena over the last 15 years, this thesis adopts a multi-method approach of qualitative research, utilising both intensive and extensive materials, along with a multi-site approach to the case studies. This choice of research methods is underpinned by a critical realist perspective that seeks to explore the underlying mechanisms, causality and basic conditions of a social phenomenon. Three major methods were used to collect data. First, 53 in-depth interviews were conducted with key governmental officials, core members in relevant communities, environmental organisations and stakeholders. This was so as to explore the respondents' perceptions of the emergence and development of collaborative governance in the Kaoping River basin. Secondly, data was also gathered from observations in 33 relevant activities to clarify some contradictions between the perceptions of the interviewees and the researcher. This observational method also helped the researcher to identify key actors in the new forms of river governance within the basin. Finally, one secondary source of data was employed,

derived from an analysis of related press-cuttings (6080 pieces) in one major national news-archive in Taiwan, to acquire an overall picture of the evolution of the river governance.

## 1.6 Brief thesis outline

The structure of the thesis is as follows. The first part of Chapter Two situates the research in the theoretical context of collaborative governance. In the second part, it examines the literature of East Asian governance. In the third part, it develops a potential model for analysing collaborative governance in Taiwan. Chapter Three discusses the epistemology of the research, its methodological implications and introduces the case studies, the data collection process and analytical methods. In this chapter, I also discuss my positionality in this research: as an academic, as a local and as an activist. Chapter Four explains the general background to the case studies, which is Taiwan's political and economic context since the 1960s. Chapters Five to Seven are devoted to the empirical analysis of the three case studies. Chapter Eight explores the results of the empirical analysis, relates them to the theoretical the argument and the model in Chapter Two, and discusses the contribution of the research findings to the previous literature on collaborative governance.

# Chapter 2 Literature Review

## 2.1 Introduction

In order to situate this review within a wider conceptual context, and establish the limits of existing knowledge about collaborative governance outside western contexts, this chapter reviews three strands of literature. The first examines current western notions of collaborative governance and the circumstances that have encouraged their emergence. The second part enquires into why collaborative governance is particularly relevant to environmental issues, and the third the current discourse of collaboration in an East Asian context. Finally, based on this review, this research develops an analytical framework relevant to Taiwan in order to apply it to the conduct of empirical studies in Taiwan.

## 2.2 Western Notions of Collaborative Governance

### 2.2.1 The Emergence of Collaborative Governance

Collaborative governance, a political strategy [1] often interchangeable with participatory governance, has aroused academia's and politicians' interest across many disciplines and countries over the last two decades (see Gray, 1989). Interest is to be found in the planning literature (Gray, 1989; Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998; Hibbard and Lurie, 2000; Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones, 2002), the development literature (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Hickey and Mohan, 2004), research into natural resource management (Goodwin, 1998a, b; Goodwin, 1999; Wondolleck and Ryan, 1999), and political science and political philosophy literature (Dryzek, 1997; Sanderson, 1999; O'Neill, 2000). The current literature is mainly preoccupied with the initiatives in collaborative governance led by public agencies (Ansell, 2003; Ansell and Gash, 2006), which are designed to increase the

[1] Strategy refers to, usually, temporary methods for mobilising resources and networks to achieve specific goals, Sometimes it is characterised as those methods that cannot be legislated or institutionalised, but can be part of policies written or unwritten.

legitimacy of policy-making and enhance state capacity (Jessop, 2002). In general terms, they aim to bring multiple stakeholders together, into the process of policy decision-making and implementation, to reach a greater degree of consensus and to improve the quality of the policy outcomes over established policy-making practices.

The prevalence of such a novel approach to governance is a response to both market and government failure (Rucht, 2005) or, more specifically, to the accountability failure of the so-called 'Public Management', which focused heavily on the actions of the state (Ansell and Gash, 2006). Governance, as opposed to government, usually refers to processes that engage multiple institutions that include, but are not exclusive to, both parts of government and civil society to describe a wide range of organisations that act in partnership in order to develop and deliver public policies and services, thereby enlarging (and changing) the domain of government. Governance suggests that more than just public agencies are involved in the formulation and implementation of policy. It is indicative of a 'declining relationship between jurisdiction and public management'. This means that governance is no longer about who takes the office and whose jurisdiction it belongs to, but who is included in the policy negotiation and implementation (Frederickson and Johnston, 1999: 702). Indeed, in western countries today, it is quite difficult to find situations where environmental decision-making, for example, occurs without public consultation or some other form of public involvement in the process (Rucht, 2005; Haveri et al., 2009). However, whether the nature of that involvement is 'satisfactory' is another matter altogether (Munton, 2003). In addition, this emergent managerial phenomenon leads to an increasing number of relationships between public and non-public organisations - an increasingly complex mix of public and private activities (Campbell and Peters, 1988; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003).

Although not without criticism (McCloskey, 1996a, b)[2], such transition from government to governance has prevailed in much of Western Europe and the U.S. over the last two decades. But what is governance and how is it different from 'government'? For early researchers, the terms are sometimes used interchangeably

[2] McCloskey, a former chairman of Sierra Club, expressed his doubts that Clinton Administration's policy of forest management, which intended to integrate local communities and stakeholders, might exclude environmentalists' chances to voice.

(for example Wilson, 1976), but more recently ‘governance’ has been used quite deliberately to distinguish it from government. Although governance is generally taken to include the institutions of government and civil organisations, it is essentially about processes rather than institutional structures (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). In Table 2.1 below, Leach and Percy-Smith identify the basic differences between old government and new governance.

Table 2.1: From Government to Governance: The Shifting Focus

| *Old government* | *New governance* |
|---|---|
| The state | The state and civil society |
| The public sector | Public, private and voluntary (or ‘third’) sectors |
| Institutions | Processes |
| Organisational structures | Policies, outputs, outcomes |
| ‘Rowing’, providing | ‘Steering’, enabling |
| Commanding, controlling, directing | Leading, facilitating, collaborating, bargaining |
| Hierarchy and authority | Networks and partnerships |

Source: Leach and Percy-Smith (2001:5)

Osborne and Gaebler (1992: 24) proclaim that ‘Governance is the process by which we collectively solve our problems and meet our society’s needs. Government is the instrument we use.’ The decision making process is perceived as inclusive rather than confined to office holders. Whilst government is widely seen as ‘them’, governance includes ‘us’. Government implies politicians and public officials governing, doing things, delivering services, with the rest of ‘us’ as passive recipients. Governance blurs the distinction between those governing and those governed and the divide between the public and the private (Tendler, 1995; Rhodes, 1999; Kooiman, 2003). We are all part of the process of governance.

In addition, the term ‘collaborative’ has now frequently been used in association with governance. The notion of ‘collaborative’ was derived from Gray (1989), Freeman (1997), Agranoff and McGuire (2003), Ansell and Gash (2008), Kallis et al., (2009) and Kim (2010). Freeman stressed its meaning of co-labour to achieve a common goal, often working across boundaries and in multisector and multiactor relationships. Collaboration is based on the value of reciprocity. Gray (1989) referred to this notion as a process of joint decision-making among key stakeholders

of a problem domain as regards the future of that domain. Innes and Booher (2010) emphasised the notion of 'collaborative rationality', an idea developed from Habermas's (1981) communicative theory, in which all the affected interests jointly engage in face-to-face dialogue to deliberate on the problems they face together. In the process, participants must be well-informed and are mutually respectful to each others' perspective whether they are powerful or not. The legitimacy, comprehensibility, sincerity, and accuracy of what is said by participants must be ensured. Seeking consensus is core to the process. This requires a transition in governing methods from a narrow technical and procedural focus towards a communicative and collaborative model for achieving common purposes in the shared spaces of our fragmented societies (Healey, 1997).

In many ways, the role of government is socially constructed. Politicians, government agents and citizens cast government in particular and differing ways to communities. Within this broad process, the role of government itself is changing. Modern government increasingly involves 'steering' rather than 'rowing', to adopt the terminology of Osborne and Gaebler (1992: 25-48). Or, to use a concept which has become familiar in the British context, it is about 'enabling' rather than 'providing' (Clarke and Stewart, 1988; Brooke, 1989). Government should not attempt to do everything itself, to meet every need through direct government provision. It should facilitate and co-ordinate rather than direct and control (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). Today, the central perception is one of government not as a 'provider' but as an 'enabler' of a vibrant society. In that regard, collaborative governance may well enhance the role and authority of government rather than challenge it (Cavaye, 2004).
Rather than adopting Rhodes' (1999) assumption of a 'hollowing out' of the state, implying the dominance of the market[3] and civil society, Kooiman (2002) retains

[3] The market has been considered a strong force driving the rise of democratisation and new forms of governance in parallel with civil society (Kooiman, 2003). It is especially true when market activities catalyse the emergence of the middle class (Hsiao, 1999), which was seen as the major population class behind many political reforms. But the political influence of the market mostly focusses on the liberation of economic activities and deregulation rather than directly striving for political freedom and social equity. In addition, the state often promotes economic benefits, especially in developing countries, in pursuing both national wealth and proliferation of political power. In the case of East Asia, the market activities have accompanied a rapid growth in industry and have been seen as being managed or governed by a developmental state (Wade, 1990). This relationship of state and market has reflected many aspects of the allocation of natural resources, as

the importance of the state. He suggests that the essence of governance lies in the interactive arrangements in which public and private actors participate, often at the initiation of the state. In doing so, actors attend to the institutions within which these governing activities take place. More practically, Schmitter (2002) suggests that governance is a method or mechanism for dealing with a broad range of problems and conflicts. In governance, actors regularly arrive at a set of mutually satisfactory and binding decisions by negotiating with each other and then cooperating in the implementation of the decisions. His definition treats governance as a fact, rather than a normative principle (Smismans, 2008; Klinke, 2009). Decision-making takes place both because of societal interaction as well as debate within governmental institutions. In short, governance refers neither to a specific mix of institutions, nor to a positive or negative judgement of political arrangements, in ethical terms. Neither is it to be seen as a better or worse mechanism than traditional hierarchy to achieve specific societal targets (Gbikpi and Grote, 2002).

The participation of civil society is directed to the core activities of governing, rather than acting passively and indirectly through the electoral process, as in traditional conceptions of liberal democracy. Ackerman (2004), for example, uses the term ‘co-governance’ to describe such cooperation between state and society, aiming to tap into the energy of society and improve the accountability of the state. This leads Jessop (2002) to suggest that the growing importance of governance should be seen as part of an on-going social transformation. Governance is to be viewed as a third type of societal coordination, beside the anarchy of the market and the hierarchy of the state, characterised by reflexive self-organisation of negotiated consent to resolve complex problems.

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well as of river governance in Taiwan. In discussion, new forms of governance, market, state and civil society are given equal attention. However, in this thesis, market is less of a focus as it aims principally to explore how the role of civil society and the state deal with dilemmas that emerge in collaborative governance.

#### *2.2.1.1 Basic Approaches to Collaborative Governance: Exogenous and Endogenous*

There are two contrasting, but not mutually exclusive, views on how to involve non-state actors in the public realm: top-down and bottom-up. The former can also be seen as part of a state-centred tradition (Mohan and Stokke, 2000; Pierre and Peters, 2000; Akkerman et al., 2004; Adger and Jordan, 2009) in which the state plays a leading role, making priorities and defining objectives (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 12). It conceives of non-state actors as objects of state attention to be consulted or manipulated by state agencies. This approach leads to modest adjustments of institutional arrangements, in order to tolerate the voices of non-state actors, and through this means to legitimise state dominance and remedy its democratic deficit (Piewitt, 2010). Public agencies and officials openly and inclusively engage with various stakeholders in a process of dialogue and mutual adjustment regarding problems of common concern. But stakeholders are generally seen as having different, even antithetical, interests. However, the idea remains that through dialogue, stakeholders may identify unanticipated opportunities for positive cooperation, or at least ways to mitigate the costs of adversarial relations (Ansell, 2003). The focus on encouraging the relevant actors to articulate their interests and to deliberate about their common purpose is seen as 'part of the solution', not 'part of the problem', for achieving sustainable public policies (Gbikpi and Grote, 2002).

The latter, bottom-up, approach can be called a society-centred approach (Mohan and Stokke, 2000; Dobson and Bell, 2006; Adger and Jordan, 2009; Dobson, 2009). It sees non-state actors as purposive agents involved in governance in their own right. It emphasises bottom-up and spontaneous challenges to current orthodoxy and allows a local initiation of developmental programmes. These challenges can then be assessed in terms of their strength, consensus, preferences within society and the specific geographic features of the locality.

However, in order to avoid ambiguity in the definitions of the approaches to collaborative governance, this research decided to use the terms 'endogenous' and 'exogenous' to replace the usage of bottom-up and top-down. An endogenous approach of collaborative governance means it is initiated and developed within a

local civil society. In contrast, exogenous is derived externally to it. The advantage of adjusting the terminology is its wider implication to more than the initiation of collaborative governance, but also to its institutional design and informal rules as well.

Table 2.2 below recognises that there is a wide a spectrum of public participation. The first five methods from the base upwards, namely casting a vote, passive participation, participation by consultation, functional participation and interactive participation, are top-down forms of engagement designed, if not manipulated, by the state apparatus. The public is seen as a passive, invited participant. Only the last method, self-mobilisation, represents genuine community spontaneity in which the 'public', or 'part of the public', owns the initiative.

Table 2.2: Spectrum of government interaction with communities and forms of participation

| Behaviour of governance | Type of participation | Agency | Democracy pattern |
|---|---|---|---|
| Facilitation of community-led development | Self-mobilisation | Community action | Participative democracy |
| Community partnership | Interactive participation | ↑ | ↑ |
| Structured community involvement | Functional participation | | |
| Consultation | Participation by consultation | | |
| Informing of decisions | Passive participation | | |
| Intuitive representation | Casting a vote | Government action | Representative democracy |

Source: Cavaye (2004: 87), adapted from Cavaye (1999), Pretty (1995), Arnstein (1969)

Also in Table 2.2 above, we see that Cavaye has integrated typologies developed elsewhere, including those of Cavaye (1999), Pretty (1995) and Arnstein (1969), to indicate a range of relations between the state and elements of civil society. From

this spectrum, it is suggested that spontaneous grassroots activity will possess more autonomy than where the state takes the lead, though whether activity initiated by civil society is more likely to succeed remains a question to be researched. 'Casting a vote' forms the most basic form of citizen participation and in some countries is treated as a compulsory obligation. Voting is regarded as representing individual interest rather than a collective interest or community consensus, if there is any. Citizens participate passively in a one-way relationship with government that informs citizens of decisions and disseminates information. Citizens have little chance of expressing their opinions, or even rejecting a policy that has been made.

Consultation involves a two-way communication between government and citizens. However, the consulted often possess no veto and only act so as to provide information to help decision-making. This type of participation is often linked to a specific issue or proposal, the outcome of which has been pre-determined by a government agency. Better than being a passive voter, 'structured' community involvement entails advisory committees or representative panels that mediate citizens' input. People may join with government on specific projects, or in other types of formal involvement, and sometimes may be motivated to do so by personal material gain or even incentives funded by the government. Participation, up to this level, is still viewed as a tokenistic strategy (Arnstein, 1969; MacLeavy, 2009) of the government to ease public dissatisfaction to policies.

Interactive participation shares both leadership and common goals. People participate equally and fully in a joint learning process, but often on a pre-determined state terrain. Finally, self-mobilisation and citizen initiation manifest the most spontaneous type of participation. Citizens can suggest orientation and control outcomes, resources and actions. In this case, even if a government takes the necessary actions, those actions have been initiated by the organised citizens and not selected by that government agency.

Collaboration clearly has the potential, under the right circumstances, to bring citizens and their interests to the attention of government (Wondolleck et al., 1996). However, civil participants must make a strategic decision on whether to participate, how to participate, how to remain in effective communication with their constituents

and whether or not to be involved in ensuring that any agreement is implemented (Pearce, 1997a). Thus while full participation brings the community into the inner workings of government, the benefits cannot be blindly received - the difficulties must also be confronted. It is a challenge that then begets new challenges. According to Table 2.2, authentic collaborative governance should reach the level of self-mobilisation or, at least, interactive participation. However, the position of civil actors in the process of participation is often teetering according to political circumstances that are in constant change. In order to stay on the top of the participation ladder (Arnstein, 1969), Wondolleck and his colleagues (1996) emphasise that it is crucial that citizens have some of the requisite skills, such as political savvy, negotiation and communication skills, and the energy and resources to devote to the process of successful participation.

#### *2.2.1.2 Civil Actors in Collaborative Governance*

Civil society has emerged as a critical arena for contemporary social change and social theory. The nature and extent of public involvement in the public realm is an important indicator of the condition of late modernity (McIlwaine, 1998). More generally, the concept of civil society seeks to give space to social elements that lie beyond the scope and control of the state on the one hand, and the market on the other. There are civic social organisations that operate at national and international scales (such as major charities), but civil society is usually associated with local, grassroots organisations (Chin, 2009). These spring up either to improve the local well-being of citizens or to represent them against the unwelcome consequences of state or market actions. In this sense, a spatial scale difference is often constructed between civil society and the state (Marston, 1995; Kelly, 1997), but it is equally possible to find situations where civil society and the state both operate at the local scale (Adams, 2010).

In modern western societies, the state intrudes across numerous areas of welfare in a broad programme of decision-making that is not always effectively integrated. Civil society actions are often also specific to particular policy concerns, for example environmental pollution, reflecting differences in their social and spatial concerns. This leads some authors to view civil society as ‘a space which reflects the social

divisions of society as a whole' (Pearce, 1997a: 72), a 'space for multiple groups to compete for access to decision-makers' (Brinkerhoff and Kulibaba, 1996: 13), or 'a potential location of power outside the state' (Von Doepp, 1996: 27). Civil society is thus a form of self-organisation (Hall, 1998) among members of a society. The levels of self-organisation can vary significantly from informal collective actions, voluntarily entered into by small groups of individuals with potential interests in common, to formal organisations with large numbers of members and requiring sophisticated management, as is the case with major environmental NGOs. This spirit of civil society derives from notions of trust, cooperation and individualism, which form the basis of a 'negative resisting power' and finally lead to a spirit of tolerance of difference and diversity. In a democratic political context, Hall (1998) sees these organisations as providing the basis for negotiation and cooperation with the state whilst still enabling individualism, i.e. individuals who are free to belong (or not) to such organisations. Thus it is that some writers define civil society as comprising of various types of organised groups (Blair, 1997; Pearce, 1997b), with a tendency to view NGOs as the primary 'vehicles' or 'agents' of civil society (Clark, 1997: 44-45). Especially in developing countries, civil society is treated as 'an agent of change to cure a range of social and economic ills left by failure in government or the market place, i.e. it often acts as an institution for development (Escobar, 1994; Ndegwa, 1996; Van Rooy, 2002: 489; Potter et al., 2008). Citizenship, as the major component of civil society, is seen as a tool for changing societal attitudes and behaviours (Dobson, 2009).

However, others give greater recognition to individualism and informal activity as constitutive parts of civil society, making the concept of civil society difficult to define. They accept the heterogeneity of groups and the individuals that constitute them and the fact that many groups in civil society are often in conflict or in competition with each other (Bryant and Wilson, 1998); and this in turn contributes to two contrasting approaches to our understanding of the concept of civil society.

Two contrasting views operate in parallel with each other in the discourse of civil society. In very broad terms, neo-liberal conceptions of civil society, deriving from the writings of de Tocqueville, consider civil society an autonomous sphere of freedom and liberty (see also Putnam et al., 1993). Strengthening vibrant civic

associations can therefore consolidate democratisation, and civil institutions can be vehicles for participation that empowers[4] target groups in development programmes (Mohan and Stokke, 2000). But this liberal approach, which tends to separate state from society, has aroused criticism from Marxists who emphasise the intricate relationship between state and society, not least because it is often highly context-determined (McIlwaine, 1998). Drawing on the works of Marx, Hegel and Gramsci, Marxists see civil society sometimes to be a site of oppression and power inequalities, penetrated by a state determined to reinforce class conflict (Nzimande and Sikhosana, 1995; Foley, 1996; MacDonald, 1997: 19-21; McIlwaine, 1998; Edwards and Gaventa, 2001:1; Potter et al., 2008). Marx ists focus upon the potential conflicts between the institutions of civil society, seeing the state as deliberatively fostering these to maintain the *status quo*. To them, empowerment is a matter of the collective mobilisation of marginalised groups against the disempowering activities both of the state and the market, as well as powerful, established elites within civil society (Mohan and Stokke, 2000). The cleavages surrounding the politics internal to civil society are, they suggest, understated in much of the literature.

To lessen the danger of imposing a western notion of civil society on the South, where the search for consensus through democratic processes has a much shorter history, McIlwaine (1998) urges a re-conceptualisation of the concept of civil society. This argument emphasises that civil society must emerge from below, and not from a civil elite. But how will this occur? Some argue that civil society can be encouraged by the efforts of outside support and internally by the promotion of social capital (Abers, 1998; Leach, 2006). Social capital is a concept closely linked to civil society because of its implication in voluntary association and civic organisation outside the market and state (Putnam, 1995; Alessandrini, 2002). Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1995) and others discuss social capital in terms of participation in networks, reciprocity, trust, social norms, the commons and spontaneous social organisations. According to Putnam's notion of social capital,

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[4] By the term empower, I mean to enable or facilitate disadvantaged people to voice and take actions to pursue their own benefits, which coincide with public goods, especially in those situations where dominant power-holders have repressed the weak for centuries. This can be achieved both by legal/formal and informal/unconventional means. The discussion of empowerment has always accompanied the discussion of collaborative governance (Gray, 1989).

social capital generates robust trust and network relations, which facilitate cooperation and mutual support in collaborative governance. Researchers constantly ask ‘how important is social capital to the production of civil society?’ (Onyx and Bullen, 2000; Lyons, 2001) and while both may reinforce each other, their contribution to democratic involvement should not be treated as a panacea (Fine, 2001; Harriss, 2001). This is because of its potentially negative consequences in enhancing the exclusion of outsiders and restrictions on individual freedoms (Portes, 1998).

#### *2.2.1.3 The State Actor in Collaborative Governance*

The rhetoric and experiment of participatory governance represent part of an ongoing evolution in the role of the state. Kenny (1994), for example, has conceptualised several evolving models of government. An integrated model of the evolving role of the state, based on the conceptualisation framework of Kenny (1994), Botsman and Latham (2001) and Cavaye (2004), is as follows (see Figure 2.1 below).

Figure 2.1: A General progression in government forms

| Age | Model of the state | Central concern |
|---|---|---|
| 1960s -70s | Independent state | Representativeness |
| | Instrumental state | Policy production |
| | Interlocking state | Policy integration |
| 1980s | Contractual state | Economic rationale |
| 2000s~ | Enabling state | Public participation |

Source: Adapted from Kenny (1994), Botsman and Latham (2001), Cavaye (2004).

The current focus on participation is contributing to the notion of an ‘enabling state’ (Botsman and Latham, 2001). Government is attempting to build a facilitation and partnership role with communities that better ‘enables’ social capacity (Sirianni, 2009), adding value to community outcomes. This view of the state emphasises the participation of civil society, but does not suggest discarding the state. The state retains a central role in producing a framework within which non-state actors can

engage in governance (Bryant and Wilson, 1998; Akkerman et al., 2004). More specifically, participatory governance enriches a hierarchical form of governance, rather than replaces it. However, the state remains critical, especially in terms of its regulatory capacity (Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002).

In contrast to the argument of a 'hollowing out of the state', in the Third World even the state is often criticised for delivering little of value and conducting 'business as usual' in its relations with ordinary citizens, and it is impractical and unrealistic to dismantle the functions of the state (Evans, 1995). The state lies at the heart of solutions to the problem of social and economic order. The appropriate question is not 'how much' state involvement but 'what kind', and more particularly what role the state plays in the process of collaboration between itself, the market and civil society (Koontz, 2004). The most successful collaborative governance requires agency officials to blend three roles- leader, partner and stakeholder, rather than act as an impartial facilitator (Wondolleck and Ryan, 1999).

### 2.2.2 Conducting Collaborative Governance

The opportunities and risks of collaborative governance are directly related to the prospects of success and failure of the new forms of governance. Although Getimis and Kafkalas (2002) remain concerned about the improbability of success, we should think of the possible benefits that stem from the better mobilisation of underused or isolated individuals and institutional resources (Ansell and Gash, 2006).

Table 2.3: The Risks and Opportunities of Collaborative Governance

| *Risks* | *Opportunities* |
|---|---|
| Non-transparency | Legitimacy |
| Compartmentalisation | Effectiveness |
| Instrumentalisation | Knowledge |
| Loss of direction | Consensus |
| Power imbalance enhancement | Innovation |
| Non-authentic forum | Accountability |
| Rent seeking | Flexibility |
| Apathy | Participation |
| Exhaustion and disillusion | Equity |

Source: based upon Getimis and Kafkalas (2002), Cavaye (2004), Freeman (1997), Gray (1989), Adgar et al., (2003), Fung and Wright (2001), Adgar et al., (2003), Innes and Booher (2010), Irvin and Stansbury (2004)

#### *2.2.2.1 Benefits and Opportunities of Collaborative Governance*

Given the growing crisis of a democratic deficit at all levels of political representation, it is crucial to widen the forms of representation (Paddison et al., 2008; Klinke, 2009). New forms of governance have been proposed, based on dialogue and bargaining, with a broader legitimacy and involvement of new types of actors through new forms of interest intermediation (Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002). Instead of authorising outsiders to make the decision, local stakeholders and relevant parties can retain ownership of the solution (Bryan, 2004). Thus parties most familiar with the problem, and not their agents, can create the solutions (Gray, 1989).

Broadening participation can add an independent democratic value (Freeman, 1997; Fung and Wright, 2001; Adams, 2010), and therefore enhance the acceptance of solutions and a willingness to implement them (Gray, 1989; Fung and Wright, 2001). These conditions will facilitate effective problem-solving, especially on regulation issues (Nie, 2008), which require information sharing and deliberation among parties (Freeman, 1997; Fung and Wright, 2001). In addition, such governance

arrangements provide for empowerment and access to stakeholders, and hence may lead to effective policy outcomes. The new cooperative partnerships may go beyond legal rights, supporting cooperation and widening forms of participation (Fung and Wright, 2001; Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002).

Collaboration emphasises continuous learning (Muro and Jeffrey, 2008; Painter and Memon, 2008) and improvement as well as an on-going engagement (Freeman, 1997). Different actors test their knowledge, arguments and power and learn from each other (Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002). Broad, comprehensive and reflexive analyses of the problem domain improve the quality of solutions, not least because responsive capability is more diversified (Gray, 1989; Fung and Wright, 2001). As the process proceeds participants build a capacity for self-management within communities, improve policy knowledge and create innovative strategies tailor-made to the unique conditions of each particular situation (Innes and Booher, 2010).

Collaborative governance emerges as a means of early conflict resolution to avoid a later conflict resolution by the courts (Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002; Baccaro and Papadakis, 2009). Moreover, under some circumstances, collaboration is also useful for re-opening deadlocked negotiations, so reducing the risk of an impasse and improving the relations between stakeholders. The process ensures that each stakeholder's interests are considered in reaching any agreement (Gray, 1989; Bloomfield et al., 2001). Thus it may provide a means for parties to reach a provisional solution (Freeman, 1997) which all agree could be subject to revision.

Collaborative governance can trigger organisational restructuring and enhance the potential for innovative solutions. This role becomes even more important whenever it is coupled with broader societal objectives, such as the pursuit of sustainability (Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002). During the process of reconstructing public institutions for collaboration, the mechanisms for coordinating future actions and arbitrating disputes among the stakeholders could be established as well (Gray, 1989). Parties are mutually dependent but accountable to each other. New arrangements may replace or supplement traditional oversight mechanisms, including self-monitoring and disclosure, community oversight, and third party certification (Freeman, 1997). Participation is both a-means-to-an-end and

an-end-in-itself. This implies that participation has both instrumental and transformative values (Munton, 2003; Gardner, 2005). Collaboration usually serves to deliver effective outcomes for a disadvantaged population who cannot voice its position in traditional hierarchical governments.

#### *2.2.2.2 Risks of Collaborative Governance*

Given the multiple benefits of collaborative governance, it is not without complexity, contradiction, limitation or dark sides (Haveri et al., 2009; Huitema et al., 2009; Kallis et al., 2009; Mwangi, 2009). In some cases, collaborative governance can cause diffusion, and probably a dilution, of responsibilities. This dilution of responsibility makes the partnerships increasingly non-accountable to participating parties (Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002; Acar et al., 2008; Paddison et al., 2008). In addition, policy partnerships with unequal power relations can lead to the uneven distribution of costs and benefits of a given policy. The new collaborative governance arrangements are sometimes developed without a set of understood and agreed rules as to how they are to work, but then implemented in different sectors and at different territorial scales, where they maybe interpreted selectively by dominant players (Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002; Antunes et al., 2009; Kroon et al., 2009).

Collaborative governance can be seen as a means to solve a policy crisis. As a result, it can lead to an over-emphasis on problem solving and policy outcomes, encouraging a technocratic, rationalistic perspective with reduced participation (Pierre and Peters, 2000; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004) while at the same time undermining political legitimacy and social justice (Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002; Cavaye, 2004). Increasing participation does not always fulfil its expected goals due to a lack of intention or commitment by the agency who initiated it (Gardner, 2005; Kim, 2010). This effect allows the new governance structure to become an instrument of shifting responsibilities at best, and a loss of orientation at worst (Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002). The efforts that state actors put into providing infrastructure and services should be equivalent to the investments in relationships and leadership (Cavaye, 2004).

Empowering civil groups or building community capacity often undervalues the existing informal capacity of societies to interact and can politically reinforce paternalistic approaches to societies. Capacity building of civil organisations needs to be reframed into capacity appreciation or extension, or to helping citizens build their organisational capacity (Cavaye, 2004). This can possibly avoid a facade of 'trust' and a rhetoric of 'collaboration' being employed to promote vested interests or reproduce existing power structure (Clegg and Hardy, 1996: 679; Aguera-Cabo, 2006; Baiocchi et al., 2008; Agger and Larsen, 2009; Baccaro and Papadakis, 2009; MacLeavy, 2009; Larson and Lach, 2010). In the participatory process, those situated outside the collaborative bodies may not recognise the authority of insiders and resist their decisions (Fung and Wright, 2001). In addition, the forum of collaborative governance needs to retain its recognition as an exclusive place for policy making, otherwise it might lead to a reluctance to accept the collaborative outcomes (Ansell and Gash, 2006).

Though most collaborative processes aim to enhance the public good, it is also possible that the processes may be manipulated to advance private or factional interests (Nikolic and Koontz, 2008). Some institutions deliberatively incorporate check mechanisms to prevent the new form of governance being absorbed into the old clientelist system. However, the extent to which the mechanism can effectively check this tendency is usually problematic (Fung and Wright, 2001; Irvin and Stansbury, 2004; Ansell and Gash, 2006; Agger and Larsen, 2009). Most citizens are overwhelmingly consumed by daily life and are too busy to give the time, energy, and commitment that collaborative efforts require and this can also lead to the temptation for some to free ride on the efforts of others (Fung and Wright, 2001). Usually collaborative action begins with mass enthusiasm and good will. However, over time those feelings may reduce because participants find the process to be increasingly time-consuming, or the results not sufficiently rewarding (Fung and Wright, 2001; Irvin and Stansbury, 2004; Holman, 2008). It is a fact that unmitigated success remains rare and the search for a definite, best practice of collaborative governance may end in disappointment (Rauschmayer et al., 2009; Murray et al., 2010; Holden, 2011).

To conclude, collaborative governance, as a general concept, has no agreed form

and is highly context-determined. Having gone through market failure and state failure in the history of modern states, there is the potential for governance failure (Jessop, 1998). This is because it is possible that governance fails to respond to the diversity and complexity of contemporary societies (Jessop, 1998; Bovens et al., 2001). Similarly, initiating collaborative governance under disadvantageous circumstances might lead to increased governance impotence as Ansell and Gash (2008) have suggested. This leads us to discuss some of the major factors that lie behind successful collaborative governance in the next section.

*2.2.2.3 Ansell and Gash's Model of Collaborative Governance*

Ansell and Gash (2008) conduct a meta-analytical study of the existing literature on collaborative governance and aim to establish a new model of collaborative governance (see Figure 2.2). Based on a review of 137 empirical cases[5] of collaborative governance across a range of policy domains, they identify a set of critical factors in the model, which will influence/produce successful collaboration. The critical factors that could possibly influence successful collaboration include (1) prior history of conflict or cooperation, (2) power and resource imbalance, (3) collaborative process, (4) leadership, and (5) institutional design. Crucial elements in the process of collaboration are also emphasised, which include face-to-face dialogue, trust building, and the development of commitment and shared understanding. They suggest that practitioners focus on producing 'small wins' that can create a virtuous cycle of collaboration which deepens trust, commitment, and shared understanding. A more surprising finding in their research is that, even under conditions of bitter social conflict, collaborative governance can still lead stakeholders to identify mutual gains[6]. Face-to-face dialogue is especially emphasised as being at the core of breaking down stereotypes and other barriers to communication.

[5] Ansell and Gash focussed on cases largely taken from the U.S. Later in Ansell's book, published in 2011, he defined collaborative governance as a pragmatist approach for achieving problem-solving democracy. Collaborative governance is thus regarded as a concrete strategy for fostering deliberation and learning about our mutual interdependency.

[6] For example, here he uses the case of Desert Tortoise protection in Las Vegas in 1989 (Ansell, 2011).

I have taken Ansell and Gash's model as a departure point developing its heuristic purpose as a conceptual framework in order to help in the analysis of Taiwan's attempts at environmental collaborative governance. Collaborative governance is a dynamic and complicated process and, as a result, is presented in various forms in different parts of the world. Nonetheless, their process-oriented model provides a clear conceptual framework and has helped me to distinguish relevant factors and elements in the empirical chapters.

Figure 2.2: Ansell and Gash's model of collaborative governance

(Source: Ansell and Gash, 2008:8)

At the outset of their model, Ansell and Gash argue that significant power/resource imbalances between stakeholders reduce the incentives of stakeholders to join collaborative actions. Powerful stakeholders often try to manipulate collaborative forums and reduce the possibility of meaningful participation for disadvantaged stakeholders. Similarly, unproductive and unpleasant previous experiences of interaction between the parties often has the same result. Both conditions can be responsible for reducing the incentives for stakeholders to participate.

In addition, they argue that any collaborative forum should be designed as a formal institution which is entitled to act as an exclusive venue for authoritative decision-making. It should aim to produce 'authentic dialogue' as Lovan, Murray and Shaffer (2004) put it, which gains legitimacy and political authorisation and produces sincere communication and constructive conclusions that take into account the perspectives of both sides. Otherwise, it will have little chance of attracting stakeholders to participate or to achieve consent with its outcomes. To create a forum, with the agreement of all parties to participate in it, the initiator must, in advance, acquire the respect of alternative forums (courts, legislators, executives) for the process.

However, Ansell and Gash emphasise that the above mentioned obstacles can be overcome if there is proper leadership (also see Hou and Chen, 2009), whom they refer to as commonly accepted outside mediators. Where conflict is high and trust is low, but the power distribution is relatively equal, stakeholders have an incentive to participate and can successfully proceed by relying on the services of an honest broker that they trust. In adverse circumstances, like those of an asymmetric power distribution or weak incentives to participate, there is still the possibility for successful collaborative governance if there is a strong 'organic' leader who commands the respect and trust of the various stakeholders at the outset of the process.

The model shows that a series of elements are identified as influential during the process of collaboration, including face-to-face dialogues, trust-building, and the development of commitment and shared understanding. Moreover, whether the process can produce 'small wins', as an intermediate reciprocal outcome, is crucial

because they deepen trust, commitment and shared understanding. They also bring about positive incremental changes, which can, in time, overcome many limitations (Abers and Keck, 2006). If these cannot be anticipated then stakeholders probably should not embark on a collaborative path (Ansell and Gash, 2006; Holman, 2008). Ansell and Gash also argue that even if the prior history is highly antagonistic, it is sometimes feasible to embark upon collaboration if the policymakers or stakeholders budget sufficient time for effective engagement and are fully devoted to trust-building and a strong commitment to cooperate. In addition, a strategy, that provides 'small wins' for each participant, is crucial to maintain the process of collaboration.

To conclude, even under circumstances of low trust and limited mutual dependence between participants, they remain optimistic that collaboration is possible under three conditions. These are (a) the forum is an exclusive place for consensus building, (b) an experienced and accepted facilitator is provided and (c) the process continues to provide 'small wins'.

Although Ansell and Gash's meta-analysis and model contribute significantly to governance study, there remain a number of problems regarding its adoption as the basis for analysis of environmental cases in Taiwan. First of all, they stress that they define collaborative governance as operating in formal forums, which are usually initiated by public government agencies and pursue institutionalised settings. This definition distinguishes itself from the traditional focus on the more informal interaction between government agencies and interest groups. It also clarifies its differences from ideas relating to corporatism, policy networks and public-private partnerships[7]. Hence, the process of institutionalising collaborative governance becomes a crucial element in the model and it neglects the possibility of endogenous initiatives from civil groups (Singh, 2008), which I am more interested in examining in the context of an East Asian model of collaborative governance.

Secondly, the emphasis on the institutionalisation of collaborative governance is

[7] Ansell and Gash include these three types of collaboration as some of the methods of conducting collaborative governance, but doubts as to their relevance remain in this thesis as they often imply different kinds of state-society relations in policy domains.

problematic as it downplays the possibility of innovation in governance and the role of civil partners. Since this research aims to explore how civil actors can practise real and effective participation beyond tokenism, it demands a definition governance in a broader social sense while examining the process and results of institutionalisation. Thirdly, while Ansell and Gash mention that their model is largely based on environmental experience, they fail to discuss how environmental collaborative governance is different from other domains. Fourthly, the model is primarily developed on experience described in the English literature, which is mostly produced in the U.S., and lacks empirical support from experience recorded in other languages.

Finally, in Ansell and Gash's model, an imbalance in power is an obstacle to collaborative governance, but in Asia such an imbalance of power between the state and social actors is common. How empowerment, as Ansell and Gash suggested, solves some of the dilemmas for implementing collaborative governance should be carefully examined within an East Asian context. Similar attention is emphasized in Roberts and Jones's research (2009), which enquires whether it is possible to use partnership to empower local communities while the state remains in overall control.

Despite these weaknesses, my adoption of Ansell and Gash's model serves as a departure point for the purpose of establishing an original model for analysing Taiwan's experience of collaborative governance. I constantly adjust the model in the following sections as the literature review proceeds. Throughout the rest of this chapter, the model is adjusted at the end of each review section according to the conclusion of the section, until it becomes a more appropriate model for analysing collaborative environmental governance in Taiwan (as shown in Figure 2.3).

### 2.2.3 Practising Collaborative Governance over Environmental Issues

Although collaborative processes have been adopted across many policy sectors and disciplines, they are found most frequently related to problems in the environmental domain because of two of its key features (Lafferty and Meadowcroft, 1996; Wondolleck and Ryan, 1999; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000; van den Hove, 2000; Berkhout et al., 2003; Munton, 2003; Gardner, 2005; Holden, 2011). First, environmental issues are characterised as 'ill-defined, tightly coupled with other sectors and questions, and reliant upon elusive and transitory political agreement for their resolution' (Coenen et al., 1998a: 2), and thus are often termed 'wicked' (Rittel and Webber, 1973; Carley, 1990; Clarke and Stewart, 1997; Darbas, 2008) or 'multifaceted'. They usually affect society as a whole and have no absolute solution. Hierarchical governments often fail to respond effectively to these sorts of issue due to their inflexibility and ineffectiveness. This is because environmental problems do not normally lead to simple solutions and do not fit easily into traditional governmental structures (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). Environmental issues thus require a high level of consensus, engagement and commitment from interested social actors. More inclusive deliberation and collaborative action allows different sources of knowledge to be integrated.

The second feature of environmental issues is their geographic-specificity. Geographic-specificity means that an environmental issue appears differently in different localities and requires responsive actions that recognise spatial heterogeneity. Broader relations between localities, local politics, social relations and the physical environment need to be taken into account. Local social actors are seen as more capable in their response to geographic-specificity.

Reviews of environmental management policy contain abundant criticism of the state's capacity to reconcile environmental exploitation and conservation (Sachs, 1993; Redclift, 1994; Johnston, 1996; Bryant and Wilson, 1998). Environmental governance implies governing spaces that comprise different power relations and interests, and therefore needs to recognise an inherent spatial heterogeneity. A

bureaucratic style of policy process is often found to be unsympathetic to the heterogeneous needs and interests of 'grassroots' actors (Bryant and Wilson, 1998). Most officials are physically distant from the localities in which environmental policies are implemented. Their understanding of the results of their policy-making often lacks local knowledge and may cohere with the notion of 'remoteness', as Plumwood (1998) put it, with decisions being made by distant political elites. Such elites often create governing systems which reinforce their 'remote' preferences (Hurrell, 1994). This is especially true in environmental issues because their geographic specificity is often related to more local stakeholders and plural interests than other policy domains.

Comprehension of the environment by state and non-state actors potentially diverges. The former often adhere to techno-centric attitudes deriving from western positivist science, which results in a problem-solving approach that tends to separate the social and economic context from human-environmental relations (Redclift, 1994; Burgess, 2000). The understanding of non-state actors may possess 'non-scientific' attributes, and therefore be under-valued despite the fact that they have a detailed knowledge of local ecological conditions. There is often a perceived gap between established scientific and local knowledge (Burgess, 2000; Painter and Memon, 2008; Kroon et al., 2009). Although such a disjuncture between the attitudes of state and non-state actors may be too simplistic, it is clear that state officials may approach environmental problems differently from local non-state actors, a picture complicated by the heterogeneity of local actors and their interests (Bryant and Wilson, 1998).

Researchers and practitioners have searched for inclusive, deliberative and integrative forms of environmental governance in order to combat these differences in outlook, and the emergence of sustainable development as the dominant narrative of environmental policy also helps to account for the increasingly frequent use of participatory processes. Its requirement that environmental concerns are integrated with economic and social issues emphasises the value of an inclusive participatory process, while at the same time the contested nature of sustainability demands a deliberative process (Owen and Cowell, 2002). Similarly, the Agenda 21 programme has encouraged many countries to attempt integrative solutions, which require both community participation in policy-making and implementation while

solving social, economic and environmental issues at the same time (Macnaghten and Jacobs, 1997; Burgess et al., 1998; Coenen et al., 1998a).

The participation of non-state actors is central to environmental governance because it helps to achieve sustainability and innovative policies on several grounds (Heinelt, 2002). Environmental issues being geographically specific, complex and uncertain suggest that they need to include a wide range of heterogeneous stakeholders distributed in various locations without the likelihood of absolute solutions. Thus it is highly desirable that those affected by environmental policy participate in the process of policy-making, not only because traditional democratic theory refers to it as a natural right, but also to provide a chance for mutual persuasion for the common good. In addition, the participation of a wider range of stakeholders extends the scope of relevant knowledge (Lindblom, 1959), improves the social acceptability and legitimacy of innovative environmental policies, and in general increases support for the implementation of policy decisions. In short, sustainable policies are based on the core values of dialogue, negotiation, active citizenship, partnership and subsidiarity (Heinelt, 2002).

Empirically, however, this relation between collaboration and environmental management leads to contrasting positions among researchers. Some praise the efforts of collaborative governance as providing a pragmatic and efficient vehicle for resource managers and stakeholders to address common concerns and promote environment, economy and community all at the same time (Kenney, 1999; Weber, 1999; Leach, 2006)[8]. Others argue that civil participation can be costly and ineffective. For example, where there is public reluctance to participate, geographic difficulties in organising face-to-face meetings, and competing factions among stakeholders (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004), the effective application of collaboration can prove difficult (Margerum and Whitall, 2004). Indeed, it would be inadvisable to assess the value of participation whilst neglecting the underlying power structure (Adger and Jordan, 2009). Moreover, governance structures for sustainable development must enable individual and social learning processes (Petschow et al., 2005).

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[8] Kenney and Leach's works both based on 1990s watershed management reform and Weber based on grassroots ecosystem management in the U.S.

While the theory of collaborative governance was developed from a series of problem-solving measures based on deliberative and cooperative actions, Elinor Ostrom has established a strand of literature on environmental governance, responding to Hardin's argument of 'the tragedy of commons', which seemed to describe irrational collective behaviours that exhausted natural resources. Focussing on governing 'common-pool resources' (CPR), Ostrom and her colleagues have demonstrated that social capital and informal institutions, for example norms, trust, network and reciprocity, can lead to sustainable environmental management. Her theory was developed from investigations of traditional agricultural and fishing societies, which have practised for centuries as self-organised governance systems. These societies have developed a variety of institutional arrangements for managing CRP which have avoided ecosystem collapse even when they are under pressure. She concludes that human use of cosystems does not necessarily lead to 'the tragedy of the common', but, with certain commonly accepted rules and norms, it is possible to maintain long-term sustainable resource yields (Basurto and Ostrom, 2009). However, due to the multifaceted nature of human - ecosystem interaction today, no singular institutional form can be treated as a panacea (Ostrom, 2007)[9].

Ostrom’s theory of co-management employing robust conditions of social capital and a dense network of links between actors is one important form of collaborative governance and explains why many collaborative actions, as recorded, in the empirical cases in this study, can be possible. It is very important to emphasise the significance of the broad political context within which detailed local studies are based. This is especially so in Taiwan where major national transitions in the nature

[9] Thus, a combination of conditions for institutional design should be paid attention to. Ostrom identifies eight ‘design principles’ for stable local common-pool resource management systems (Ostrom, 1990, see also Poteete et al., 2010 for additional variables):
1) Clearly defined boundaries (effective exclusion of external un-entitled parties);
2) Rules regarding the appropriation and provision of common resources that are adapted to local conditions;
3) Collective-choice arrangements that allow most resource appropriators to participate in the decision-making process;
4) Effective monitoring by monitors who are part of or accountable to the appropriators;
5) A scale of graduated sanctions for resource appropriators who violate community rules;
6) Mechanisms of conflict resolution that are cheap and of easy access;
7) Self-determination of the community recognised by higher-level authorities;
8) In the case of larger common-pool resources, organisation in the form of multiple layers of nested enterprises, with small local CPRs at the base level.

of government have taken place in recent decades. Thus a major concern for this study is to explore the social implications of national power transitions which lie behind the development of collaborative governance in Taiwan. These demand further understanding of the particular context of Taiwan's environmental politics in order to understand the evolution of collaborative governance, and these larger political forces are, it is suggested, not gain sufficient weight in the collaborative governance literature. The Taiwanese context is one of considerable change and adjustment, quite separate from the detailed self-management of local ecosystems.

## 2.3 Collaborative Governance in East Asia

In the West, the notion of collaborative governance was developed from several western political phenomena, including the 'hollowing-out' of the nation state, the emergence of multi-level governance (Rhodes, 1997; Pierre and Peters, 2000), and the need to renew democracy and trust between those governing and those governed (Rackham and Mitchell, 2000). In the East, the meaning of collaborative governance is ambiguous and lacks careful examination, but it normally implies that the state retains a key role (Yamamoto, 1999).

This part of the review will combine three strands of literature. The first strand draws on cases of environmental collaboration beyond the West, in order to discuss its nature, institution and method. The second strand examines various discourses of the state-society relationship in East Asian countries in recent decades in relation to corporatism, paternalism and the combined effort between the state and society on economic development projects. On one level corporatism seems similar to collaborative governance in terms of its stress on stakeholders' participation. But in fact, they are widely divergent. The third strand explores how the newly emerging civil society in East Asia relates to collaborative governance, especially the legacy of corporatist politics within East Asia.

### 2.3.1 Examples of Environmental Collaboration in Developing Countries

Outside the West, the rubric of collaborative governance is rare, even if discussions about participation are common and detailed in Africa, South America and South Asia (for example Evans, 1997; Hickey and Mohan, 2004; Mahanty et al., 2009; Gaynor, 2010; Peris et al., 2011). Researchers argue that the distribution of economic benefits for policy decisions is often found to be very unequal and the potential to improve the governance deficit arising from these outcomes is considerable (Mahanty et al., 2009; Maharjan et al., 2009). Some examples of how matters can be improved can be seen from the research of Ostrom (1997) who demonstrated how the involvement of citizens in the planning and implementation

of water and sanitation projects in urban Brazil has greatly improved their effectiveness and reduced corruption; from Lam (1997) who showed how community participation in irrigation programmes in Taiwan made water service delivery much more efficient and effective; from Tendler (1995) who demonstrated the salutary effects of the co-production of healthcare service delivery by street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1969) and a range of societal actors in Brazil. She emphasises the potential benefits of networks that span the divide between the state and civil society, while Ostrom (1997) and Lam (1997) argue that synergistic conditions can become truly enduring, as well as easily reproduced, when they are given strong institutional foundations.

Elsewhere, Pretty (1998) has demonstrated the importance of adapting policies to meet local circumstances by integrating local knowledge. He focused on agriculture in Africa where a top-down approach to introducing new methods to increase crop yields has often turned out to be a disaster, not least in environmental terms, when introduced without due regard to local circumstances and local knowledge through the participation of the local population. He found that evidence of success of participation occurred mostly at the most local of levels. It was in local environmental politics where significant transformations occurred, gradually affecting the higher levels of bureaucracies. It remains to be seen whether governments see this as an opportunity or threat to their power and authority.

Collaboration creates multiple benefits, including consolidating community support, creating robust social capital and facilitating mutual learning. According to Lemos (1998), who examined a pollution control project implemented by Cetesb (a state environmental protection agency) that controls air, water and soil industrial pollution in the city of Cubatão, Sao Paulo, one of the most polluted regions in the world, that by responding to community demands and seeking to encourage public participation, policy makers favoured a style of policy design and implementation fundamentally different from 'business as usual' in Brazil. Through community support, Cetesb was able not only to increase its leverage vis-à-vis the polluting industries, but the ability of popular movements to forge collective identities and frame pollution as a social issue expanded their basis of support and promoted the creation of social capital. Finally, during the implementation of the pollution control

project, the interaction between technical personnel and social scientists provided both groups with a new understanding and appreciation of each other's expertise, creating an opportunity to re-evaluate their professional roles in policy-making.

Participation can improve the performance of environmental policies better than traditional policy strategies, but has not always been found to be effective when environmental issues become particularly complex and controversial. Collaboration alone produces limited effects, although Hofman (1998) has shown, in Southeast Asia, that citizen confrontation can play an important role in the enforcement process. Public participation often takes place at the end of a decision-making process when citizens can only accept a decision imposed upon them or protest against it as outsiders (Rodan, 1996). In addition to the limited democratic traditions and the presence of authoritarian regimes, Hofman assumes that this kind of situation might also result from the overall social background, like a low level of industrialisation, poor citizen education and low per capita income, all of which constrain the public from taking action for the common good. Similarly, in post-apartheid South Africa, environmental activists have been confronted by the limitations of inclusion in a deliberative forum and have, therefore, strategically adopted a more adversarial position (Barnett and Scott, 2007).

### 2.3.2 State-Society Relationships in East Asia

The purpose of discussing existing political arrangements and culture in East Asia is to examine how they may respond to the demands of civil society for participation, as this challenges traditional state-society relationships that are based upon paternalism and various forms of corporatism. In the literature, there are four types of discourse over the state-society relationship. These are: bureaucratic oriented politics, state-society synergy, soft authoritarianism and East Asian corporatism.

Many East Asian studies treat the state as an essential player, rather than one to be manipulated and fragmented by political elites and plural social interests (Skocpol, 1985). In Chalmers Johnson's research on Japan, one typical example is the experience known as 'Japan, Inc.', in which major industrial conglomerates and

their dependent workforces were consciously manipulated by Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), so as to make the most of post-war economic growth (Johnson, 1982, 1995). This particular bureaucratic-orientation had an overwhelming influence over private industries. Elsewhere, Amsden (1985) has emphasised the ability of the state apparatus to transfer the general target of the authoritarian state from regaining control of Mainland China to developing Taiwan's economy. He claims that Taiwan's 'economic miracle' was largely led by the state via a wide range of reforms. But within this process of re-orientation it was the bureaucracy rather than the political elites who led the shift in goal from 'Re-conquer the Mainland' to investing in the economic boom. Elsewhere, Evans (1995) has used the notion of 'embedded autonomy' to describe how the state presides over economic development by enhancing its collaboration and networking with private economic sectors, while at the same time retaining its partial autonomy.

In their challenge to the notions of the 'withering away' and 'hollowing out' of the state, some researchers have shown that networking between the state and society can reinforce the role and interests of each. Evans (1995), for example, drew upon a series of empirical observations of the industrial transformation in the hi-tech sector in Korea, Brazil and India. Korea is particularly successful as a developmental state. It has a highly selective meritocratic recruitment history leading to long-term career rewards, which have in turn created commitment and a sense of corporate cohesion within the state bureaucracy. 'Corporate cohesion' in the state apparatus of the Korean government created a robust internal structure driven by the state which the other two counterparts, Brazil and India, did not have. In other words, the strong state apparatus, in combination with embeddedness into a dense social network, allows the state to perform the leading role in development. It is the contradictory combination of 'corporate cohesion' and connectedness to the social network, which Evans called 'embedded autonomy', that gives power to the state to solve problems of 'collective action'. In this light, state and society are more than just linked together, each helping to constitute the other and reinforce each other's role. Evans (1997) later proposed a notion of 'state-society synergy', based on an interweaving relationship between state and society in the East. This synergy can be viewed as a development strategy, combining the function of the state apparatus and organised community actions to provide economic productivity and efficient service delivery

via robust networks in society (Ostrom, 1996). It usually consists of a combination of complementarity and embeddedness through incorporating the trust and informal networks inherent in civil society into the economic development programme. Instead of relying on state- or society-centred explanations, Evans (1997) persuades us to look for an alternative that puts the collaborative relationship between the two at the heart of our thinking.

Although some scholars emphasise that social order has its own value, its purpose in consolidating an existing political regime is much larger than just doing public good. Etzioni (2004) analysed how East Asian countries under 'soft' authoritarianism and traditional Confucianism legacies have, over the last decades, formulated a communitarianism, a view that prioritises community need over individuals and sometimes implies individuals should sacrifice their own advantages for collective benefits. That depicts a different picture of the state-society relation. This prioritises social order and trust over individualism and freedom, and therefore promotes a different imagery of community. It also allows for the possibility of 'governance without government', resting on the social base of communal solidarity.

Fukuyama (1992) examined a number of East Asian nations. While they may on the surface appear to share the West's system of constitutional democracy, their societies are, it is argued, ordered according to unequal group hierarchies that emphasise conformity to group interests over individual rights. In Asia, it is argued, capitalism has become far more universal than democracy, and countries there have found a way to reconcile the market economy with a kind of paternalistic authoritarianism which persuades rather than coerces. This alternative, in the view of proponents such as Singapore's former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (1992), comes more naturally to Asian societies than western liberal democracy since it builds on Asia's shared Confucian traditions. Although it is a tremendous oversimplification to speak of a single 'Asian alternative' or a uniform Confucian legacy affecting all states in the region, both Etzioni and Fukuyama mention the relation between soft authoritarianism and the Confucian legacy. This legacy also contributed to the birth of East Asian corporatism[10].

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[10] Similar to the paternalistic view of the state-society relationship in East Asia, a significant amount

The so-called East Asian Miracle (the post-war economic success of East Asian New Industrialised Countries, NICs) in post-war Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, in particular, has been seen as managed or governed by the corporatist strategy of the developmental state (Wade, 1990), which relied upon the vertical cohesion of authority, both inside the bureaucracy and among state and society actors. As a result, the cohesion provided the state with the leverage to direct the allocation of industrial resources. Policy authority resided in a powerful modern state apparatus, staffed by economic technocrats loyal to the ruling regime. Horizontal cooperation between the line ministries was essentially directed from the top down (Wade, 1990; Evans, 1995; Noble, 1998). However, whilst these regimes provided strong leadership in economic growth they performed poorly in responding to social demands such as the social demand for housing, environmental degradation, land speculation and rising house prices (Chen, 2005b). The introduction of democracy in Asia has further removed many of the authoritarian mechanisms that had earlier contributed to the capacity of a state to 'govern the market' for rapid economic growth (Wade, 1990). Democratisation has challenged the developmental state by undermining the political foundations of past practices in economic policy-making and public administration (Chen, 2005a; Wong, 2005).

At one level, corporatism has aspects similar to collaborative governance in terms of its emphasis on stakeholder participation (Ansell and Gash, 2006), and, at another, where environmental activists are often manipulated by the state (see McEachern, 1993: 180-1; adopted in Doyle and McEachern, 1998)[11] or agents pursuing their own benefits under the cover of public interests (Hickey and Mohan, 2004).

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of literature emphasises a so-called 'East Asian model' of corporatism. Unger and Chan (1995) argued that it prevailed in the capitalist states of East Asia. Japan, Taiwan and South Korea erected strongly authoritarian corporatist structures during periods of intensive development and amidst perceived threats from abroad. It seems quite plausible to assume there is a correlation between Confucianism and East Asian corporatism, however whether Confucianism's emphasis on social compliance fosters future social order remains to be seen. In the West, corporatism has been theoretically applied to a wide range of polities which are organised around a mechanism mediating different interests. Corporatism has been referred to as a 'balance between labour and capital' or as a 'mode of policy formation and implementation that entails regular negotiations…between state agencies and interest groups' (Wallerstein, 1989). In contrast, corporatism in the East Asian context usually refers to processes primarily working in the opposite direction, or ways by which the state uses such relations to achieve social control and economic development.

[11] McEachern's argument was developed based of a study on environmental policy in Australia 1981-91.

McEachern identifies three different ingredients that make up this corporatist process: incorporation, assimilation and adaptation. In his analysis, environmental activists and the business community are brought together inside a process of political negotiation defined by the state. While the arena creates a sense of consensus around environmental concerns, participants are not allowed to raise a dissident view as that would be seen as against an emerging, shared and politically acceptable position (*incorporation*). In addition, environmental discourses are turned into legitimate, acceptable, non-threatening practices and discussions, for example, around the idea of 'sustainable development' within an economic frame of analysis and evaluation (*assimilation*). As a result, although environmental concern is incorporated into policy considerations, the 'solution' reached in corporatist policy-making employs policies that would allow maximum economic growth whilst minimising environmental damage (*adaptation*). This argument clarifies how corporatist policy can be differentiated from a collaborative one. While the former focusses on the interests of a consolidated ruling power, the latter focusses on those of the public.

To help achieve its ends, the state, in this East Asian model, uses officially-recognised civil organisations (not only industrial enterprises) as a means of restricting and controlling public participation in the political process and limiting the power of civil society. It is a so-called "pre-emptive" strategy to exclude spontaneous associations becoming active and legitimised. Those officially recognised organisations even get channelled into the policy-making processes in order to assist the state in implementing policy on the government's behalf. By establishing itself as the arbitrator of legitimacy, and often assigning responsibility for a particular constituency to one organisation, the state limits the number of players with whom it must negotiate and co-opts their leaders into policing their own members (Unger and Chan, 1995).

East Asian governments have a common advantage in adopting state-corporatist solutions: each of them already possess well-organised bureaucracies with established traditions. Moreover, traditionally they were authoritarian states largely autonomous from interest-group pressures, acting through patron-client social and political systems. Although most of these countries now enjoy greater freedom of

association and speech, with freer and fairer elections than in the immediate post-war era, the model of corporatism still has a long-lasting influence in the social and political sphere.

To conclude, these four discourses over the post-war East Asian states-society relationship point to a common phenomenon, that of raising their prosperity. Although it focused mainly on an economic perspective, it was intensively intertwined with corporatist rule and a robust bureaucratic system where traditional Confucian culture provided the breeding ground. Under the states' corporatist strategies, traditional social active actors and organisations were primarily state authorised and had a highly praised social harmony, instead of being absolutely spontaneous. Whilst, nowadays, East Asian states are in rapid political and social change toward democracy and minimisation of social control, they are still in the shadow of the past, with its overwhelming corporatist order and policy system that was strongly bureaucratically-oriented.

### 2.3.3 The Emergence of Social Mobilisation and Civil Society

Despite the legacy of authoritarianism and corporatism, a series of research projects have shown that civil society in East Asia, as a new social force, can today influence the provision and allocation of public goods (Hiroka, 1999; Yamamoto, 1999; Yamamoto and Ashizawa, 2001; Adams, 2010; Kim, 2010). Numerous studies emphasise how Eastern civil societies differ from their western counterparts (Cumings, 2002), especially in terms of their emergence, which lacked a context of democratisation (Downie and Kingsbury, 2001; Verma, 2002). Instead, it is often argued that their origins are closely related to traditional Confucian values (Rodan, 1997; Armstrong, 2002). Their influence is three-fold. First of all, Confucian education encourages intellectuals to pursue the promotion of common benefits of communities and societies as a whole, and this is one source of Asian citizenship and activism. Second, public servants enjoy high prestige in Confucian society, and this phenomenon resulted in the inclination of intellectuals to cooperate with, rather than confront, the state in terms of seeking greater public welfare. Third, the Confucian ethical order, which honours heaven, earth, rulers, parents and teachers encourages civil actors to lobby and cooperate with the state (Chiu, 2005).

According to Confucian philosophy, intellectuals should speak for the public interest but in a way that respects existing governance ethics, which implies at least a partial submission to the regime.

There are numerous reasons why civil society has become the new key player in East Asian governance. One major reason is the appearance of a 'crisis of effectiveness' in traditional government. Yamamoto (1999b) argues that during the period of post-war economic growth, East Asian countries relied on an authoritarian and interventionist state, which led in turn to the passivity of their citizens in both the social and political arenas. As these developmental states transformed themselves into industrial states, this growth model based on 'Asian values' has been called into question, particularly in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis that struck in 1997, when these countries' governance systems appeared ineffectual at best and even culpable of tolerating nepotism, corruption, and the income inequalities that these systems fostered. In a search for more effective and just systems of governance, civil society stepped in to fill the vacuum, including demands for democratic systems of government.

On the one hand, democratisation itself resulted in a multiplication of demands on the state for scarce resources, whilst releasing the social energy that gave social actors the enthusiasm to engage in public affairs (Yamamoto and Ashizawa, 2001; Marsh, 2006). Democratisation often followed the emergence of social movements, most notably environmental movements, in the 1990s, with environmental movements often being used as a cover by activists more concerned with promoting democracy and encouraging the general emergence of civil society (Lee and So, 1999). In South Korea and Taiwan, environmentalists' protests against pollution were among the few forms of popular mobilisation tolerated by their military regimes. Environmental campaigns also enjoyed widespread popular support and so have been less easily suppressed than those calling for democratic and social reform. Repertoires of legitimate collective action created a public sphere within which political dissidents could act, and within which environmental and democratic movements were often partners (Hsiao, 1996; Yamamoto, 1996; Lee and So, 1999; Armstrong, 2002; Schak and Hudson, 2003). On the other hand, along with dramatic reforms and power shifts in the Asian state, the political spaces opened up

to local actors and NGOs have expanded significantly in the last decade. New political configurations and alliances have emerged and alternative conceptions of common interest and identity have been articulated (Warren and McCarthy, 2009; Kim, 2010).

The contribution of the voluntary sector is often treated as a substitute for a public welfare service that the governments of developing countries often lack the capacity to provide. This condition has also occurred in Asia. For example, the successful management of specific environmental projects can be attributed to joint participation of both the government and NGOs (Gupta and Asher, 1998). Alternatively, in certain instances, NGOs are firmly entrenched in opposition to governmental development projects and little dialogue takes place, but overall NGOs have become important actors on the environmental scene (Gupta and Asher, 1998) with the effect of making the state provide environmental goods. This trend has become common in Asian society, with different civil society groups responding positively to the greater freedoms afforded by new regimes (Warren and McCarthy, 2009).

These developments have led several scholars to re-examine the theoretical claims and empirical foundation of the Asian developmental state (Boyd and Ngo, 2005; Underhill and Zhang, 2005). For example, Ngo (2005) has re-examined the role of the state in Taiwan. Taiwan has been the privileged site of a whole series of well-known stylised facts about the state’s exercise of 'governing the market'. Ngo has revisited these on the basis of recently declassified materials. His findings are dramatic and challenging. The stereotypical account of the Taiwanese case speaks of a state that possesses a high degree of unity that can focus the actions of numerous agencies. Ngo paints a very different picture, one of institutional fragmentation, imperfection, and even unstructured hierarchy. Contrary to what is described in the ‘governing the market’ literature, the state is in fact kidnapped by the struggle between ambiguous authorities, factional competition and different government departments. Even within the state, there are constant conflicts and incompatibilities between the unwitting practices of individual officials and their organisations. The Taiwanese state, in his view, is better described as an ensemble of ephemeral institutions whose jurisdictions and functions are extremely mutable. He argues that

the state departments, in pursuing developmental projects, were episodic rather than constant. State departments are often dependent upon particular combinations of circumstances. This phenomenon enables specific power-holders to disguise their own parochial agendas in national state projects. Hence, the state is thus personal and episodic. It relies on the congruence of developmental projects to maintain its regime.

Similar situations have been described in South Korea. For example, Koo (2005) concludes that the state's role in its labour relations was marked by contradiction, inconsistency, and myopia and was driven by political considerations rather than economic logic. Moon and Prasad (1994) conclude that the statist perspective neglects, or understates, the importance of intra-state dynamics. For example, the government apparatus in different departments formulates various types of network with outside actors, who are often competing on the basis of their own interests and agendas. This perspective suggests that concepts from policy network theory reveal a richer description of state-society interaction (Ferreyra et al., 2008). Concepts of political interactions, institutions and leadership choice, which are mutually influential, are more persuasive in analysing Asian states than the traditional statist view (see also Haggard, 2005).

It is inappropriate to view East Asian society as a homogeneous entity and by now tension between civil society and the state has arisen in most national contexts. Previously, there has not been a great deal of room for civil society to play a significant role in governance because of the state's vast resources and the clear consensus on national goals. Hence the bureaucracy has been seen as the exclusive arbiter of public interest. Because of such an historical background, the relationship between the newly emerging civil society and the government in these countries can be characterised as volatile and constantly shifting between cooperation and conflict. Under these circumstances, civil societies have struggled between being co-opted by the state and becoming irrelevant if they remained outside of the policy process (Yamamoto, 1996; Mouer and Sugimoto, 2003; Schak and Hudson, 2003).

The three strands of existing literature on East Asia's governance all point to one thing- the role of a bureaucratic system in deciding policy orientation with or

without a collaborative effort from their civic counterparts. This means that collaborative governance becomes complex when it is intertwined with established corporatist political arrangements and a bureaucracy that supports these. Even so, it would be inappropriate to neglect the potential of endogenous approaches in initiating collaborative governance in an East Asian context. This context of a Confucian culture, corporatist politics and rapid democratisation might both facilitate and constrain the emergence and development of collaborative governance at the same time. The rise of civil society in Asia is deeply rooted in Confucianism, the same culture which bred the soft-authoritarian regimes. Eastern intellectuals have been encouraged to engage in activism since Asian societies began a process of democratisation in the 1980s and 1990s. This exposes the contradictory relationship between social citizenship and the state in Asian countries. At the same time, this contradictory relationship also led to democratisation in the 1990s, opening up political opportunities for the emergence of collaborative governance. But given that economic prosperity is major source of legitimisation for Asian authorities and social development, this implies that economic pressures of differing kinds will also continue to play an important role in either hindering or helping the extent of democratic reforms that collaborative governance can bring forward.

## 2.4 Conclusion: An Analytical Framework of Environmental Collaborative Governance in Taiwan

While this study is situated within the broad framework of collaborative governance, its context in Taiwan inevitably invites some amendments to the scope of research examples quoted by Ansell and Gash and, to some extent, the approach to collaborative governance arising from studying what has happened on the ground. The following section thus reflect anew on Ansell and Gash's model in terms of its value as a heuristic framework for organising the empirical material that follows in Chapters Five to Seven.

Ansell and Gash (2008) established a process-oriented model of collaborative governance emphasising the major factors that affect the process and outcome. Their model did not attempt to examine the political structure by which

collaboration is effected or where it is situated. To apply this framework to an East Asian context demands more attention be paid to broader social-politics. In East Asia, the definition of collaborative governance can easily be confused with existing corporatism, traditional Confucian political culture and soft authoritarianism, all of which prioritise collective interests above personal ones. Therefore a new analytical model to examine collaborative governance in East Asia should add these contextual factors which may affect its practice. Also, a more dynamic perspective must be employed to examine how the emergence of environmental collaborative governance subsequently facilitates the evolution of new power relations and shapes the effectiveness of governing.

In the following section, this thesis tries to generate a conceptual framework which can more appropriately reflect an East Asian pattern of environmental collaborative governance, as shown in Figure 2.3, which is itself an adaptation of Ansell and Gash's model that pays additional attention to the features of environmental management and the political establishment in East Asia. This provisional framework serves as a conceptual device to help organise the later empirical material in Chapters Five to Seven and also provides the foundation for establishing a coding system for analysing press-clippings (see Chapter Three). Ten adjustments are made to Ansell and Gash's original model and are numbered following Figure 2.3..

Figure 2.3: An analytical framework of environmental collaborative governance in Taiwan



The most important viewpoint in the new framework is its emphasis on the need to treat collaborative processes as dynamic, context-based and recursive. On the very left side of Figure 2.3, I assume, based on the literature, that the emergence of collaborative governance begins with a series of motivators and enablers (Marschke and Sinclair, 2009) and specific geographical circumstances. These are comprised of (1) motivation to collaborate, (2) the particular nature of environmental issues, and (3) geographic specificity. Based on the review in Section 2.2.3., environmental issues are identified as scientifically uncertain and locality-based (Edge and McAllister, 2009), and these features influence the formulation of environmental governance from the very beginning. Very often (4) a civil mobilisation (Patsias and Patsias, 2009) arises to express the social resentment to existing environmental problems. Various kinds of emotion and dissatisfaction with the existing condition of the environment demand political responses and relevant policy actions. Most contemporary environmental collaborative governance starts with issues which cannot be solved by the traditional form of governing, are the issues are shaped by their relation to geographical specificity.

This mobilisation is then channelled by (5) the strategy-making process of a transformative government apparatus or facilitative leaders of communities (see also Freeman, 1997; Wondolleck and Ryan, 1999) to solve a common environmental issue. (6) The initiator of collaborative governance can be the state apparatus, elected officials, economic associations, or members of civil society or community groups. (7) Their choice of approach to collaboration is based on their interpretation of how these contextual factors will influence their specific engagement with the state, and will naturally produce contrasting processes and results.

In the process of initiating collaborative governance, transformative leadership is a crucial factor (Shaw, 2008; Hou and Chen, 2009). As Wondolleck and his colleagues (1996) argue, whether the leaders of participating groups possess the requisite capacity- such as political savvy, negotiation, and communication skills- will shape the process of collaboration. They interpret the starting conditions, determine whether to take collaborative action, and create innovate solutions based on available resources. Indeed, without transformative officials or civilian leadership (Abers, 2007) to mobilise and sustain local resources, failure is a real possibility. By

leadership, I signify a different interpretation from Ansell and Gash's model. They emphasise the role of a neutral third party, which is an interchangeable term with honest broker, outside mediator and facilitative leadership. My adoption of leadership means leaders in either the state apparatus or within communities, who can break through institutional constraints, re-orient public attention and mobilise resources for pursuing the common good.

The decision to undertake collaborative governance is embedded in, and shaped by, broader contexts of societal-politics and economic concerns. These contextual factors are often neglected in the western literature. Similarly, (8) resource availability and especially its mobilisation (including human, financial and material) is decisive for embarking on collaborative governance (Newman et al., 2004). It is suggested that the greater the mutual resource dependency between the state and society, the more likely it is that they will be able to establish collaborative action (Abers and Keck, 2009). Mutual dependence is key to bringing related actors together for configuring potential solutions for common problems they face. It covers a wide range of possible dependent relations. For example, the social actors might need administrative support and political recognition from the state, while the state might need social attention to create public pressure and mobilise the political will of the state to engage in collaborative governance.

On the right side of Figure 2.3, it is indicated that the development of collaborative governance can be divided into three parts: initiation approach, process and outcome. As previously explained, there are two types of approach- (9) endogenous and exogenous- where the development of collaborative governance diverges. An endogenous approach, initiated by local groups based on their capabilities, preferences and local circumstances, will produce a set of locally-agreed rules and methods to tackle local environmental issues. It will try to ensure a governance process in-line with local concerns and needs. In contrast, an exogenous counterpart initiated by outside experts or bureaucrats is often based upon generalised collaboration principles and actions with less consideration given to local circumstances. It often orients the process to fit in with the operations and purposes of bureaucratic routines, rather than the implications for those affected by the policy in local communities. Although the latter approach often possesses more suitable

financial resources to ensure the continuity of policy, it can fail to mobilise local resources and commitment. In examples of both of endogenous and exogenous approaches, it is crucial to clarify the contextual power relationship (between the state and society as well as within society) and the influence of the underlying corporatist arrangements.

The process of collaborative governance, as Ansell and Gash describe, should include the following: genuine deliberation, mutual learning, production of new public goods, an increase in the participants' sense of ownership of the process, and the creation of trust and commitment. However, I deliberately keep these boxes of process blank at this stage due to a lack of clear evidence from literature on what the process is like in East Asia and I expect to fill in more conceptual content based on empirical information from the case studies.

Regarding the outcome of collaborative governance, Ansell and Gash mention that most research does not answer the basic question of how effective collaborative governance is in comparison to traditional hierarchical methods and regulations. Researchers tend to focus more on the circumstances under which stakeholders will resort to collaborative governance. In addition, most literature is devoted to process outcome, rather than policy or management outcome, and most cases commenced when traditional methods or market-based ones failed to respond to a governance deficit. The last, but not the least, of the major differences between this model and that of Ansell and Gash concerns the role of (10) feedback. The bottom right hand side of Figure 2.3, which leads back to the actors involved, indicates the importance of effective feed-back if collaborative governance is to be sustained in the long term. Each process of collaborative governance might reinforce or undermine the other. It might also lead to an institutionalisation of the collaborative strategy.

# Chapter 3 Methodology

## 3.1. Methodological challenge: Exploring the underlying mechanism of the emergence of environmental collaborative governance in Taiwan

Chapter Three introduces the methodology this research adopted to respond to the research questions and assumption developed in Chapters One and Two. In Chapter Two, an analytical framework to explore the emergence of environmental collaborative governance in Taiwan was developed. The model assumes that the strategic thinking of human actors and social structures, which form the wider context of governance, and the geographic specificities which constrains the key actors' motivation and the form of governance, have contributed to the rise of collaborative governance.

The framework takes into account both micro and macro conditions. On the one hand, the framework draws attention to the decisions of civil organisations, communities and tribal groups to engage in a collaborative relationship with the state. While, on the other hand, it pays attention to how broader contexts shape their process of developing collaboration. The human actors' decisions influence the social world, but they are also constrained by social structure. This recursive structure-agent relationship is central to the complex ontology and epistemology of critical realism. This perspective underpins this research and reflects what this research aims to untangle. Critical realism argues that the value of scientific research lies in the exploration of underlying mechanisms which make social change possible (Sayer, 2000: 15). It suggests a methodology that provides insights into the motives and thinking of key actors in the decision making process, without losing the consideration of a broader context which constrains the actors' perception and behaviour.

Chapter Three explains the underlying philosophy of this research, critical realism,

in terms of its ontology and epistemology, and the suggestion of research methods. In Section 3.1, the design of the research and why it uses a critical realist approach is introduced. In Section 3.2, the ontology, epistemology and methodological implications of critical realism are laid out. Critical realism argues that social research should investigate the generative mechanisms of social phenomena that exist in an observable domain of the world by conducting a 'retroduction' approach and by combining both extensive and intensive research methods. Critical realism justifies the decision to adopt a multi-method and multi-site case study approach. Section 3.3 provides a justification of the selection of field sites. Following this is a brief introduction to the research site, the Kaoping River basin, introduced in Section 3.4. An acknowledgement of my positionality is in Section 3.5, and Section 3.6 gives details of the research process, including the strategies and decisions of data collection, processing and analysis, and the format of data reporting.

## 3.2. Critical realism: The philosophy underpinning this research

From the early 1980s, critical realism gained increasing attention in the geographical literature, in particular its methodological application to geographic research (Lawson and Staeheli, 1990; Chappell, 1991; Lawson and Staeheli, 1991). It has been widely applied in social studies which include economic geography (Sayer and Morgan, 1985), economics (Lawson, 1997; Fleetwood, 1999), entrepreneurship (Blundel, 2007), and organisational studies (Fleetwood and Ackroyd, 2004). Critical realism is a potential vehicle for conducting human geographic research. It is particularly effective for exploring generative mechanisms and contextual contingency in examining governance issues (Sarre, 1987; Morgan and Sayer, 1988; Allen and McDowell, 1989; Henderson, 1989; Massey et al., 1992; Sayer and Walker, 1992; Watts and Bohle, 1993; Pratt, 1995; Yeung, 1997).

Critical realism, founded by the work of two philosophers, Harré (1972) and Bhaskar (1975), has gained prominence over the last three decades. It provides a 'middle way' for social science research which needs to avoid both reductionism and relativism. The former took little consideration of interpretive understandings, whilst the latter was criticised as having an issue of incommensurability (Sayer,

2000: 67-80). The origin of critical realism related to direct experience in the field. For example, Sayer (2000: 5) found it impossible to reconcile the richness and complexity of the social world with law-like abstraction which aimed to be 'all-embracing, all explaining' as reductionism suggested. However, he also reminded social researchers that the crucial task of social research is to investigate underlying mechanisms which drive real social change rather than just to describe the surface expressions of social phenomena which, in turn, leads to a limited ability to explain social changes.

### 3.2.1. The ontology of critical realism: structure, mechanism and causal power

Bhaskar stratified the social world into three domains: actual, empirical and real. The actual domain means concrete social events which occur irrespective of human observation, while the empirical domain is the world of human experience and knowledge[12]. The real domain comprises underlying structures, tendencies and associated mechanisms beneath observable events. The first two domains, the actual and empirical, are transitive and temporal. The last, the real domain, is intransitive and permanent. It is transcendental but makes social events possible. In other words, it comprises the underlying mechanisms which drive the changes in the social world. The real domain is the key domain upon which scientific research should focus (Bhaskar, 1975). The level of critical realism's ontology is summarised in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: The ontology of critical realism

| | Real domain | Actual domain | Empirical domain |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mechanism | v | | |
| Event | v | v | |
| Experience | v | v | v |

Source: Bhaskar (ibid:13)

Furthermore, the real domain contains 'social structure', 'causal power' and 'mechanism', which are core areas of social scientific research (Sayer, 2000).

[12] 'Experience', meaning human conception of social events, is usually subjective and seldom equal to reality.

‘Social structure’ refers to how social objects in a society are constituted and relate to each other. A social object has certain ‘causal powers’, which are the things that potentially enable it to act or to facilitate various activities and developments (Lawson, 1997: 21). ‘Mechanisms’ refer to the way causal power of an object is exercised and give rise to concrete social phenomena. They therefore appear to be a ‘generative mechanism’ (Blundel, 2007). While a particular mechanism can produce entirely different social events in different settings, inversely, the same event can result from entirely different causes (Sayer, 2000). Critical realism aims to explain the relationship between mechanisms in causality (see Figure 3.1 below). For example the poverty of mountain indigenous people (event) is often caused by the exclusion of their ownership of, and free access to, natural resources (mechanism). However, what makes the exclusion possible is the imbalanced distribution of political power and overwhelming economic benefits (underlying structure and other mechanisms). See Figure 3.1 for an illustration of the relationship between events, mechanisms and structures.

Figure 3.1: A critical realist view of causation

(Source: Sayer, 2000:15)

In addition, realist ontology indicates a unique structure-agent relationship. Realism sees the world as comprising concrete events, mechanisms and structures in an open system where there are complex interactions between the structure and agency (Cloke et al., 1991: 146). Realism does not deny agency, although it does emphasise that behaviour is constrained by structure and processes (Johnston, 1991). Individuals make decisions within an infrastructure that they are not aware of. The infrastructure is both constraining and enabling to human thoughts and behaviours (Johnston, 1991; Lawson, 1997).

### 3.2.2. The epistemology of critical realism

The distinct ontology of critical realism has several implications for epistemology. First, as Unwin (1992) noted, the aim of critical realism includes both the need to identify how a phenomenon happens (causal mechanism) and how extensive it is (empirical regularity). But the central interest of critical realism focuses on explaining causality: what produces change, what makes things happen, and what allows or forces change (Sayer, 1985: 163). Second, critical realism concerns the underlying mechanism as well as the structure of social relations (Kitchin and Tate, 1999), without rejecting subjective experience (Layder, 1994). Third, though realists conduct their research at the level of subjective experience, they prefer to see the interpretation of actors as merely the starting-point to pursue a deeper causal explanation. Therefore an actor's account of experience only provides a provisional starting point for an explanation (Bhaskar, 1979; Whittington, 1989; Blundel, 2007). This suggests that realist enquiry in a single level of the social world (for example, the empirical domain) is presumed to be unsatisfactory (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; Low and MacMillan, 1988). To conclude, its epistemology suggests a methodological 'triangulation' designed to produce knowledge based on multiple methods, and is likely to include both extensive and intensive (see Section 3.2.3 for more explanation) ones (Sayer, 1985; Yeung, 1997).

This philosophy responds to the purpose and challenge of this research. The analytical model established in Chapter Two takes into account different social structures. This includes actors' decision making, geographic specificity and the influence of wider social factors in searching for the fundamental mechanisms and contextual conditions of the emergence of collaborative governance.

### 3.2.3. Retroduction and its methodological implications

'Retroduction', a unique form of scientific inference that critical realism adopts, involves explaining social events by seeking to discern the structures and mechanisms that are potentially able to produce them (Sayer, 1992: 107). It operates

quite differently from inductive and deductive approaches. The inductive approach might move from a series of observations to an empirical generalisation. Deductive ones form a set of premises, such as the existence of certain variables, to reach a conclusion about their implications for a social phenomenon. But, retroductive inference moves from the description and abstract analysis of particular social phenomena to a reconstruction of the basic conditions, i.e. the structure, causal powers and mechanism that make it possible (Bhaskar, 1986; Blundel, 2007). This approach argues that social research should move from pure description of social phenomena to abstract possible causes (Yeung, 1997). Following the example of the poverty of mountain indigenous people (social phenomenon) in Section 3.2.1, we can trace that the origin of their poverty issue is deeply rooted in the history of colonisation (retroduction). The population was forced to change their traditional hunting and agriculture activities and provide labour for logging precious wood for export and their territory was transformed into timber farms (description and analysis). Their economy was, therefore, marginalised in the world system due to the operation of capitalism (abstract causes).

Retroduction seems to lack of the preciseness of its methodological counterparts, but it requires a creative insight into the nature of social events (Lawson, 1997) in order to probe directly into the core generative mechanisms. This position also leads to its view on the generalisability of knowledge. Critical realism does not agree that knowledge can be absolutely generalisable, but is imperfect (ibid). Although retroduction searches for the basic conditions which cause social events to occur, it also involves a type of generalisation about fundamental mechanisms and structure whose causal powers act across different social events. These results of generalisation are not law-like principles as empiricists or positivists would argue, which are only possible in a closed system, but rather, they tend, *prima facie*, to be demi-regularities (or partial regularities) that arise in a society which is usually an open system rather than a conditional controlled environment. To Lawson (ibid: 204-7), the purpose of scientific research is to differentiate social demi-regularities from one another generated by different social structures.

To summarise, there are three implications of the retroductive approach for the working practices of social research (Blundel, 2007), and they correspond with the

needs of the model produced in Chapter Two. The implications for research methods are:

- multi-method data collection;
- a case study approach to explore the underlying mechanisms and context contingency;
- actors' accounts as a starting point for investigations.

Firstly, in order to reflect the complexity of concrete social phenomena, realist research prefers to draw on multiple sources of data which contain various types of intensive (usually qualitative) evidence as well as extensive (quantitative) evidence (Brewer and Hunter, 1989; Brannen, 1992; Easton, 2001: 241). The combination of extensive and intensive research methods serves the purpose of the research to investigate different strata of a social phenomenon, explaining both the causations without neglecting its regularities and generalisations. Sayer (1985) has suggested that realist research can be undertaken at the local scale by using intensive research, which aims at producing a causal explanation, while on a regional scale extensive research is aimed at examining descriptive generalisation. Intensive research focuses on determining the processes and conditions both necessary and contingent[13], while extensive research focuses on determining the regularities and generality of particular characteristics and processes in relation to a wider population by using quantitative methodologies. In spite of their differences in methodologies and the types of questions they ask, they share the same purpose of explaining phenomena in terms of their underlying mechanisms and structures which reveal their patterns and forms (Kitchin and Tate, 1999). This approach to data collection, sometimes described as 'triangulation', is a kind of call for a multi-method in social scientific research (Webb et al., 1966; Denzin, 1970). Triangulation improves the validity and reliability of research findings.

Secondly, in order to explore and clarify the necessary and contingent relationship between structures, realist researchers have often adopted a case-based research approach (Danermark et al., 2002). In this approach, extreme and 'pathological' cases are selected to highlight the structure and mechanism that give rise to certain

[13] By contingent I mean uncertain and possible, in contrast to necessary, which means essential.

social phenomena (Bhaskar, 1979: 48; Collier, 1994: 165). Moreover, the spatial and temporal boundaries of the cases are taken into account in the study in order to ensure that wider structural conditions are addressed (Whittington, 1989: 85). Thirdly, realist researchers pay particular attention to the accounts of human actors, not just 'in their own terms', but also in seeking the 'rules' that constitute these accounts (Tsoukas, 1989: 555). Thus the actors' accounts can be seen as starting points for a retroductive investigation of the structural constraints of these perceptions.

### 3.2.4. Case study approach: multi-method and multi-site

As critical realism suggests, a multi-method case study can explore both the causal relationships and the regularities of a social phenomenon. Moreover, a multi-site case study increases the transferability of the causal relations found in a case study. Rather than using samples, and following a rigid protocol to examine a limited number of variables, the case study method examines a phenomenon within its natural setting in depth, rather than breadth, to provide a 'thick description' (Geertz, 1973), which aims to produce a holistic and exhaustive examination of the context and situation of a social event. However, the case study approach is often criticised for its lack of generalisability (Bolgar, 1965; Shaughnessy and Zechmeister, 1985; Ball, 1996) because of its traditional focus on single unit analysis, and leads to variations in the case study approach to avoid 'radical particularism' (Ball, 1996). For example, one of the variations, the multi-method case study, combines qualitative and quantitative methods to determine both regularity and causality of a social phenomenon, while the other type of variation, the multi-site case study research, aims to analyse certain issues across a number of settings. The former tries to reinforce the validity of research and the latter to increase its transferability. Both of the variations proposed are designed to reassure oneself that the events and processes in the case study approach are not unique (Miles and Huberman, 1984). This implies that generalisability of a social phenomenon in a case study approach is established on the number and heterogeneity of research sites (Firestone and Herriot, 1984).

A multi-site case study approach also provides the possibility of multi-site

comparative analysis. This helps to unveil the social structure and processes that occur across many cases or sites and to understand how such processes are bent by specific local contextual variations (Miles and Huberman, 1984). A multi-site approach thus produces a result that can achieve a greater possibility of generalisation.

## 3.3. Justifying the selection of field site

This thesis chooses three examples of local collaborative governance in the Kaoping River basin as cases for study in order to examine the validity of the model established in Chapter Two for the Taiwanese context. These examples are (1) Water Defence, initiated by local environmental coalitions, (2) Riverfront Adoption promoted by local officials, and (3) River Enclosure initiated by Taiwanese indigenes.

The case studies in this study were chosen based on several principles. Firstly they were, to some extent, representative of the current trend of environmental collaborative governance in Taiwan. They cover a spectrum of collaborative management from spontaneous social-centred initiation to genuine citizens' responses to government actions that have arisen in the last decade (more clearly, from the consolidation of democracy since the late 1990s). The participants in these cases aimed to get involved and get their hands dirty, rather than stay in the role of whistle-blower or stay at the phrase of deliberative communication. Secondly, these cases were situated in the theoretical framework of collaborative governance, but with a slightly different outlook from their Western counterparts due to their background of rapid growth in numbers after the loosening-up of corporatist control in the late-1980s, which had repressed civil society for half a century. This background had limited the variety of types of collaborative governance in Taiwan. These cases focussed on compensating the democratic deficits in environmental governance and fulfilling the enthusiasm of the public to engage management reforms. Thirdly, in order to investigate the particular process of transition 'from corporatist to collaboration', the examples here focussed on illustrating a variety of participatory forms of civil society, some of them developed from earlier conflicts,

and the different processes of political change behind the notion of 'from government to governance'.

There were five major reasons for selecting the Kaoping River region as the field site. The first reason is that the Kaoping River basin is, physically, a typical river basin in Taiwan. Environmental actions in the basin emerged from the same regional background of rapid industrialisation that has caused enormous environmental externalities and which gave birth to East Asian corporatism. However, they present a variety of environmental concerns, composition of membership and geographic features, thus leading to different courses of action that have provided an opportunity to make a comparison between them (for further details see Chapter Four).

The second reason is that because of the fast-changing social-political development evident in Taiwan during the last two decades, the cases of collaborative governance in this study have emerged within the last ten years and have grown quickly. This has provided the researcher with an opportunity to examine the major factors that have affected their approach to and development of environmental collaborative governance more closely and holistically. The third reason was based on the argument that collaborative governance in localities is more visible and suited to examining the structure and underlying mechanisms (Marston, 1995; Kelly, 1997; Getimis and Kafkalas, 2002; Munton, 2003). Also, in governance theory, local governance has been considered the best level to demonstrate collaboration as discussed in 2.2.1 and the best location to realise the 'communicative rationality'[14] that Habermas has suggested (Marston, 1995; Kelly, 1997; Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). The necessity of including the stakeholders most directly affected by public actions, and the requirement of face-to-face deliberation entailed by the notion of 'communicative rationality', are seen as best promoted through decentralized planning and policy decisions (Barber, 1984; Williams and Matheny, 1995). This led to my decision to conduct empirical research at a local level.

[14] The theory of communicative rationality is core to the practice of deliberative democracy. It suggests that human rationality and reason can develop from successful communication. With a clarification of the necessary norms and procedures, non-coerced mutual understandings and agreements can be reached and is therefore a view of reason. In other words, the potential for reasons is inherent in communication itself (Habermas, 1992; Chilvers, 2009).

The fourth was a pragmatic decision in terms of the budget and time constraints of this research. The Kaoping River region is the author's home region, but in order to increase the heterogeneity of cases in this study, I chose three different types of collaborative governance (a total of 14 examples in three categories) which have taken place in the river basin in recent years. This was in order to highlight the inside changes of political relationships in governance reform and the mechanisms that gave rise to these changes. The final reason is that the variety and spectrum of environmental collaborative governance in this basin satisfy the demand for stratification in each category of cases. By this method, the research increases the generalisability of the mechanism which gives birth to social events in different contextual conditions.

## 3.4. The Kaoping River case

Taiwan has supported rapid economic growth since the 1960s during which time state policy has strongly supported industrialisation in a repressive manner often at the expense of social freedom and environmental quality. This pattern of development and the tensions it created are well demonstrated in the study area selected. This consists of the river basin of the Kaoping River. The Kaoping River is the longest river in southern Taiwan with a length of 171 km (see also Chapter 4.3). Its basin covers a total area of 3,257 $km^2$ which occupies 9% of the total area of the island. It is a typical Taiwanese river, short with a fast flow and polluted due to insufficient investment in a domestic sewage system. Domestic and industrial waste water have been discharged into the river without cleansing, which has resulted in high levels of contamination. In addition, the river basin was degraded when it was treated as a landfill site.

The basin has a rapidly growing population of 1.5 million, based around the city of Kaohsiung. It has achieved high rates of economic growth (GDP Growth Rates of 7.9% in the 1980s and 6.3% in the 1990s)[15], focusing on heavy industries, particularly in the fields of petrochemicals and steel production. These

[15] Department of Investment Service, Ministry of Economic Affairs, http://investintaiwan.nat.gov.tw/zh-tw/env/stats/gdp_growth.html, 30 April 2008

developments led to a rapid increase in demand for resources, as well as conflicts between conservation and industrial needs, especially regarding water resources for both domestic and industrial uses. Assuming there are no new water development projects, there will be a daily shortage of 0.6 million $m^3$ of water by 2021 in the metropolitan Kaohsiung area. This potential shortage has led to a series of environmental conflicts between industrial development and river conservation since the 1980's.

Due to the history of authoritarian rule, river governance has been dominated by the state. Traditional jurisdiction of the river is divided into three departments: (1) The River Bureau (mainly in charge of the midstream and downstream area), (2) The Water and Soil Conservation Bureau (upstream area) and (3) The Water Resource Bureau (water resource management). As a response to environmental activism in the river basin, the bureaus have slowly incorporated civil actors into river governance. There were six examples of collaborative action found in the Kaoping River basin during a preliminary study of relevant news-clippings in 2006. This research has selected three of the more recent and contrasting cases to study. This is because critical realism suggests that extreme cases may best illustrate generative mechanisms and causal relationships. The three chosen examples of collaborative governance are (i) River Enclosure by indigenous tribes, (ii) Riverfront Adoption by rural communities, and (iii) Water Defence by environmental organisations.

River Enclosure is an environmental movement which started from spontaneous action among the indigenous communities to protect their rivers from overfishing. These actions were initially illegal because they prevented people from fishing in the river, but they were later legalised and spread island-wide. Seven examples have been selected to illustrate how this movement has emerged and ultimately developed cooperation between the state and the most disadvantaged population in Taiwan.

Water Defence is a two-wave environmental movement aiming to protect the water resources of the Kaoping River from industrial exploitation. It has become a process for state actors and environmentalists to negotiate a means of water and wetland preservation. It represents a dynamic process between conflict and reconciliation

and, in this case, four environmental organisations were selected as study objects. Riverfront Adoption is a collaborative action initiated by local governmental officials who wanted to clean up the banks of the river, which were once treated as a dumping site, and encouraged local communities to adopt their nearby riverfront green space. This action has become popular in the whole river basin. In this case, three examples of collaborative governance have been selected as study objects.

Each of the three areas of collaborative governance contains three to seven examples, drawn from a news-archive review (see Section 3.6.1) which recognised the significant exposure and coverage these examples had received. The selection of examples is also stratified based on their environmental and social characteristics as summarised in Table 3.2. Geographic features include their location in different administration areas and take the case studies across different local politics and contexts, and their relative openness or closeness to the outside world. Close access to natural resources is argued to be one of the key elements of common management (Ostrom, 1990) and collaborative governance, where clear boundaries of the environment increase the local population's sense of ownership, as in the cases of River Enclosure and Riverfront Adoption.

Differing levels of social capital are also thought to be crucial to effective collaborative governance. Social capital refers to those characteristics of social relations, such as existing 'norm, trust and network', that facilitate collaborative action (Coleman, 1990; Putnam et al., 1993). Social capital is central to governing the 'Commons' in terms of supplying institutions, making credible commitments and mutual monitoring (Ostrom, 1990; Kooiman, 2003), and some scholars argue that social capital can be promoted by governmental action leading to the design of new institutions (Abers, 1998; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001; Adger, 2003). In the case examples studied here, most mountain villages in the River Enclosure initiative and rural communities in the Riverfront Adoption scheme have strong bonds and social norms inside their communities[16]. Therefore these communities are thought to possess higher social capital than urban environmental organisations in Water Defence.

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[16] This judgement was made according to interviews and observations.

The notion of group competence is derived from the resource mobilisation theory. It is argued that the capacity of an organisation to mobilise resources, materials or symbolic meanings, will determine the success or failure of their civil action (Olson, 1965; Oberschall, 1973; Tilly et al., 1975). Similarly, the capacity of an organisation will be one of the key factors affecting the effort of civil actors in participating in new governance arrangements. The resources needed to manage the environment will vary according to their local contexts. For example, while urban environmental organisations in Water Defence exhibit higher skills in adaptability in administration work and in mobilising professional aid and financial support from both the state and civil sectors, their rural counterparts, the communities in River Enclosure and Riverfront Adoption, show a lack of professional skills and resources but strong villager solidarity. It also matters whether a collaboration is launched endogenously or exogenously (Sabatier, 1986; Johnson, 1992) because this may influence whether it is compatible with local conditions and relevant to local organisations.

Table 3. 2: Three categories of local collaborative governance in the Kaoping River basin

| Collaborative Actions | Central notion | Social composition | Social capital | Group competence | Pattern of initiative | Spatiality | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Water Defence (WD) | Protecting water resource and environment from industrial exploitation | Urban environmental organisations | Low | High | Endogenous | Open place | Downstream area (urban) |
| Riverfront Adoption (RA) | Taking charge of communal riverfront green space creation and maintenance | Rural communities | High | Low | Exogenous | Open place | Midstream area (rural) |
| River Enclosure (RE) | Blockading river access from fish pirates and developing eco-tourism | Tribal villages | High | Low | From endogenous to exogenous | Closed place | Upstream area (remote mountain region) |

Figure 3.2: Research field




Source: http://www.theinterpretersfriend.com/indj/dcoew/taiwan.html

## 3.5. Acknowledging my positionality: as a local and an activist

The purpose of this section is to state my relation to the examples in this study. Having emphasised that researchers' insights of particular social phenomena are of particular importance in a retroductive approach, each researcher's subjectivity and reflexivity should be taken into account because potential bias is plausible under these circumstances. Moreover, there is increasing attention in the literature to the issue of a researcher's positionality and biography in doing geographic research (McDowell, 1992). This is because 'where we are located in the social structure as a whole and which institutions we are in … have effects on how we understand the world' (Hartsock, 1987: 188). Every researcher's positionality influences his or her point of view on the research question and the nature of the investigation, it shapes fieldwork relations, and eventually the information produced (Hastrup, 1992; McDowell, 1992; England, 1994; Katz, 1994; Kobayashi, 1994; Cloke et al., 2000). Thus higher reflexivity is demanded over the issue of the 'researcher's effect' (Malterud, 2001). The perspective of the observer is always limited and determines what can be seen. Knowledge is partial and situated according to the producer's positionality (Haraway, 1991). Examination of one's positionality is of particular importance during the fieldwork process when there is an unequal power relationship involved between the investigator and those being investigated (Gilbert, 1994). Attention should be paid to the structures of power that privilege certain (typically white, male, middle class) voices, sanctioning some points of view, whilst silencing others (typically people of colour, female, working-class) (Jackson, 2000c).

Clarifying one's positionality is of particular importance when examining how disadvantaged groups obtain positions in collaborative governance. This has led to two issues in this research: one is about the selection of interviewees, and the other is the reflexivity of myself as researcher. Firstly, it is crucial for the marginalised to speak for themselves, without distortion by researchers or being represented by the so-called 'key informants' (Hartsock, 1987: 189; Spivak, 1988). Secondly, the positionality of myself as the researcher and my subjects, and the power relations between us, need to be recognised (McDowell, 1992). In addition, the fieldwork process should also be seen as a dialogical process between the researcher and the

researched (ibid) rather than a clear dichotomy between an 'insider' and 'outsider' (Herod, 1999). My positionality in the chosen fieldwork site is threefold: first as an academic, second as a local and lastly as an environmental activist. My association with some of the research sites helped me to perceive local politics and social changes more concisely. I had insight into local knowledge and a personal network related to the research sites. The following section is an effort to position myself in relation to the case studies.

### 3.5.1. As a local

Positionality refers to a person's physical and social characteristics in relation to the research. In this regard, I am a mature female, middle class, native of southern Taiwan. I have spent half of my life in Kaohsiung city, the biggest city in southern Taiwan, located in the Kaoping River area. Being a local definitely influenced my exploration of environmental collaboration between the state and society in the Kaoping River basin. Both advantages and disadvantages coexist in the case of conducting research in a home environment. One of the benefits of 'home advantage' (Crow and Allan, 1994; Herod, 1999) is that it allows greater access to information and enables the researcher to more easily develop trust and understanding with his or her subjects. This mirrors my relationship with interviewees and both the type and depth of communication between us. My sensitivity and distinct insight, derived from me being a local, as Lawson (1997) suggested, is an important element in conducting realist research. It helps me to appreciate my respondents' narratives and to be aware of their position over local governance issues and their transition. Such insight is more difficult for a non-local to obtain, but it risks the research being designed in ways that reinforce the views that were held of the situation before the research commenced.

There are also drawbacks to being a local insider. Sometimes, research participants may omit information due to a presumption that I could already be familiar with it. In some circumstances, they may presume that I will take a position about certain local controversial issues and avoid revealing their true thoughts. These two issues rely on my sensitivity to judge the depth of dialogue, and also my confidence to

encourage them to deliver more intimate details. Aware of these potential issues, I undertook a strategy called 'the participating observer's sidetrack' to create an appropriate distance from a study setting that I was personally involved in. This was to avoid direct intervention with the social events I was studying. Instead of making myself part of the research object, i.e. being a research instrument in the study setting, as some cultural scholars might suggest (Kitchin and Tate, 1999), I reserved a position as an observer and avoided directly engaging with the research events and the leading participants' thoughts and behaviour.

### 3.5.2. As an activist

Since 1995 I have been a local environmentalist in Kaohsiung City alongside developing my career as a journalist. Being a journalist provided me with the privilege of engaging and intervening in public policy. This further aroused my interest in influencing the policy process for the public good, which was rooted in my involvement in student movements in the early 1990s. I was employed by two news publications during my nine-year journalism career. I spent the first half of the nine years in the capital, Taipei, working for the a magazine called News Weekly and the second half in Kaohsiung City working for the Taiwan Daily. The latter supported my intention to use news coverage as a vehicle to influence policies on several environmental and cultural conservation projects in Kaohsiung city. That coverage and subsequent lobbying led to successful campaigns and made me something of a household name in local activist and political circles. In relation to this research, my experience in local environmental campaigns and journalism provided me with access to key decision makers and key actors. Approximately one third of the interviewees in the research were my acquaintances or were introduced by acquaintances. Because of my pre-existing relations with, and knowledge about, the river basin, the interviewees may have found it easier to develop an in-depth dialogue with me and provide me with controversial or confidential information. Other researchers might not have been able to achieve the same level of mutual understanding or acquire the same depth of information as I could.

The experience of being an activist led me to aspire to join a dissenting tradition

(Blaut, 1979) of ‘people’s geography’ (Bunge, 1971, 1977; Peet, 1977; Blaut, 1979) in which geographers should (i) prioritise the study of crucial social, economic and environmental issues with (ii) an aim to devise feasible solutions in (iii) a way that includes ordinary people who are subject to those problems and solutions (Castree, 2000). While points (i) and (ii) correspond with the purpose of this research, point (iii) was not adopted. This is because although some researchers advocate the need to bridge the chasm between geographical ‘activism and academy’ (Blomley, 1994), and seek to do away with the academic/activist divide (Tickell, 1995; Routledge, 1996; Lees, 1999; Ruddick, 2001; Chatterton, 2006), for others, being both an activist and academic is a ‘killing opposition’ for both parties (Routledge, 1996) because the two states can be regarded as mutually exclusive (Halfacree, 2004). As a preliminary study of East Asian environmental collaborative governance, this research had no intention of adopting an action-oriented stance (Kitchin and Tate, 1999). Instead I situated myself in the position of seeking to gain ‘something’ more through the activism experience, rather than personally involving myself with the people and communities studied or intervening in the ‘real world’ (Castree, 2000). Also, I am aware that my activist background may draw questions on my position over my research perspective. One of the possibilities is to overpraise the actions of local activists. This awareness led me to be as circumspect as possible, though not necessarily as ‘neutral’, to both sides, i.e. the state and social actors, in their collaborative efforts.

## 3.6. Research process: data collection, data processing, analysis, and reporting

Based on the principles of methodology that critical realism suggests, the value of scientific research lies at probing beneath the surface of social events to discover the underlying generative mechanisms that make social phenomena and changes possible. That is to say, the research must start from analysing both the narrative and description of concrete social phenomena, and then proceed through iterative abstraction and mediation between theory and empirical material. By continuously abstracting the major mechanism and contextual contingencies of social events from the empirical material, this effort gradually theorises them. However, the theory

should be proven to be valid and transferable only when it explains empirical cases. A proposed procedure of realist research is illustrated in Figure 3.2. A review of the literature on governance theory and East Asian governance produced a set of assumptions regarding the emergence of collaborative governance in Taiwan, which led to the analytical model in Chapter Two. This research then sought to validate the assumptions empirically by the use of a retroductive approach, which moves from a descriptive account of a social phenomenon to its causal mechanisms and context contingency. The result is a mediation between theoretical conceptualisation and empirical validation. Thus the three core activities, namely data collection, data processing and analysis, and reporting, are not proceeded in a linear sequence, but rather in a circular and iterative one (Sarantakos, 1993; Miles and Huberman, 1994).

Figure 3.3: Research flowchart




Details of each phase are summarised in Table 3.3. Most empirical work in the field took place between January 2006 and March 2007. After the field work, I started to process and analyse the empirical material which lasted until the end of 2008. The process of data processing and analysis is never linear, but moves between concrete social phenomena and theoretical abstraction. The report form will be the production of the thesis, mainly accomplished between April 2007 and Dec 2011.

Table 3. 3: Three research processes

| Phase | Activities | Time frames |
|---|---|---|
| Data collection | Press-cutting survey | Jan 2006 – June 2006 |
| | Participant observation | Jan 2006 – Aug 2008 |
| | In-depth interviews | Aug 2006 – April 2007 |
| | Official documents and other data sources | Jan 2006 – March 2007 |
| Data processing and analysis | Survey summary | April 2006 – Dec 2006 |
| | Interview transcription | Aug 2006 – April 2007 |
| | Analysis of extensive data | Jan 2008 – Dec 2008 |
| | Intensive data coding | Jan 2008 – Dec 2008 |
| Reporting | Thesis writing | April 2007 – Dec 2011 |

### 3.6.1. Data collection

As critical realism suggests, research data are best produced from multiple sources, most feasibly from both intensive and extensive methods. Due to the lack of statistical materials on the research subjects, the relevant organisations, and the new environmental policies of collaborative governance, the extensive approach adopted a systematic analysis of press-cuttings. This produced an overall picture of the trends and regularities of collaborative governance in river management of the Kaoping River. The intensive methods adopted here consist of in-depth interviews and participant observation to explore the causal mechanisms of the emergence and development of collaboration.

The research began with a survey of press-clippings to capture the overall contours of the study, specifically quantitative information around the topic of state-society collaboration in the Kaoping River basin, and key actors in specific events related to the topic. At the same time the researcher participated in major relevant events to conduct participant observation to explore information that was absent from, or contradicted, the respondents' narratives. In the second half of 2006, the researcher asked key actors, identified from the news-archive analysis and participant observation, about their willingness to be interviewees in an in-depth interview. All consented. The first two data collection methods also benefitted the research by

allowing me to amend interview topics and to make my questions more specific. Between August 2006 and April 2007, I conducted the third data collection process-interviewing key actors (in related communities, organisations and government departments) using an interview guide approach. Secondary data sources also included a few documents from government statistics and an environmental internet newsletter released by environmental NGOs[17].

Table 3. 4: Focus of three methods of data collection

| Method of data collection | Focus questions |
|---|---|
| News-archive survey | The trends and regularities of the emergence and development of collaborative governance in the Kaoping River basin |
| Observation | The transition of state-society relationship in collaborative governance in the Kaoping River basin |
| In-depth interview | The motivation and decision-making of interviewees to undertake collaborative governance in the Kaoping River basin and their perception about whether collaboration improves environmental governance |

#### *3.6.1.1 News-archive survey*

Press-clippings obtained from an electronic news-archive were the main method used to understand the background to the case studies. The research analysed a large number of media reports covering a relatively long period of time (from 1961 to 2006) and a large geographic scope (the four administrative areas in southern Taiwan). This activity facilitated the research chronologically and allowed investigation of the trend towards, and regularities of, collaborative governance in the river basin. Usually this method is referred to as content analysis and involves analyses of messages conveyed by the media. Its major benefit is cost-efficiency because the information is relatively complete and therefore can lead to sound statements regarding the social world (Jackson, 1995). This approach also identified many of the key civil actors and governmental officials involved in the case studies and organised major events as an ‘event history’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994). But

[17] For example, one newsletter is from Taiwan Environmental Information Centre http://e-info.org.tw/.

it is not without its limitations. Certain newspapers have their political and/or social stance which dictates their press coverage. Also, as noted by some researchers, the result of news sampling was inevitably affected by factors external to the data itself, including the availability of resources, the object of the research and the capacity of the researchers (Weber, 1985: 42-3; Mason, 1994: 91-2; Bryman, 2001: 182-5). The samples examined can influence the results obtained (Flick, 2002). This led to the decision to acquire news-clippings as comprehensively as possible.

Apart from the above two points, the search found one more major limitation which was that the necessary information is often unavailable or incomplete. The UDN news-archive[18] used in this research is a privately-run electronic national press archive in Taiwan, which translated five mainstream paper-version newspapers, namely the UDN, Ming Sen Daily (MSD), Economic Daily News (EDN), United Evening News (UEN), and Star Daily (SD), into electronic data. All of these newspapers are distributed island-wide. The UDN archive was selected because its collection of electronic resources is comparatively comprehensive, dating back to 1961, whereas other sources covered a shorter period. However, its political stance tends to be conservative. The UDN is a Kuomintang (KMT)[19] supporter, but no obvious bias was found in its environmental coverage. For example, when the KMT was in power, a demonstration against water development projects took place in August 1998 in the capital, Taipei. The news-archive presented a more impartial report than another seemingly reform-oriented newspaper, the China Times, which faced the threat from one of the corporations involved to withdraw its advertisements. Also, the effect of its political preference was mitigated because of

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[18] In the initial stage of selecting news-archives to be my main extensive resource, I considered three sources, the United Daily News (UDN), the China Times and the Central News Agency. Eventually only one of them, the UDN, was chosen because the data of the other two were found to be fragmented and incomplete.

[19] Kuomintang, also called Chinese Nationalist Party by its word meaning, is the founding and ruling political party of the Republic of China (ROC). Established in Mainland China in 1894, the party's major purpose was to overthrow the Chin dynasty and democratise the nation. However, it was defeated by the communist party and then retreated to Taiwan in 1949. Its rule of Taiwan was known as an authoritarian regime between 1949 to 1987 when it pronounced the lift of martial law due to rising social demands and its crisis of legitimacy. A slow progress towards a more transparent and localised party has taken place inside the party during the post-authoritarian regime. Today, most of its supporters still uphold the value of eventual unification with the mainland. The rule of the KMT over Taiwan has lasted until now, except for the period between 2000 and 2008 when the DPP took power. In comparison the DPP, called Democratic Progressive Party, was established in Taiwan in 1986 when social movements mushroomed. It has upheld the value of Taiwan's independence and a variety of social reforms and pronounced itself as a partner of the social movements.

Taiwan's democratic transition. The country had gone through two transfers of political power in the previous two decades, and had arrived at a position of democratic consolidation (Hsiao, 1987). The authenticity, credibility and representativeness (Scott, 1990) of the archive is derived from its position as the earliest, most complete and prestigious archive available from the 1950s onwards. Access to the press archive was not free. Access was restricted, based on subscription charges[20].

Press-clippings were sampled based on key words, including 'the Kaoping River', 'River Enclosure', 'Water Defence', and 'Riverfront Adoption'. A total of 6,080 clippings, ranging from 1961 to 2006, were found. They were systematically reviewed and major events relating to collaborative river governance were extracted. The news-archive data acquired were summarised, explicated and structured as suggested by the method of content analysis (Mayring, 1983; cited in Flick, 2002: 190-194).

First, they were roughly categorised based on theme-related codes. These were:

- pollution and prevention
- clean action
- ecological and environmental conservation
- development of reclaimed land
- management of sand and gravel
- soil erosion
- abusive use of the river bed
- flooding and prevention
- water resource and management
- civil action
- governance reform

In order to probe the emergence of collaboration between the state and society, when an event related both to the categories of civil action and governance reform it meant that it was more likely to be related to the object of this research, and so was

[20] The researcher got access to the archive as an alumna of San Yet-sen University in Kaohsiung which subscribes to the archive.

given more attention. Second, the volume of news-clippings was further managed to retain only those related to Water Defence, Riverfront Adoption, and River Enclosure. From this, the researcher acquired background knowledge of the emergence of collaborative action for the management of the river basin and produced an overall contour of it (see Chapter Four). This research also roughly identified the key actors in these events who then became interviewees. Last but not least, the data was further interpreted in terms of collaborative governance, and the internal structure of social events in the news-clippings was investigated whether it fitted (or not) into the analytical model developed in Chapter Two. This re-organisation and interpretation of data facilitates further comparison between the three major cases.

The data derived from news-archive was analysed and examined based on a coding schema developed from the provisional analytical model (Figure 2.3) in a structured way and tried to be exhaustive in providing available codes for all possible relevant behaviours related to collaborative governance. By applying this coding schema, it was easier to distinguish and identify collaborative cases from the vast amount of news-clippings. Then I could further explore the process and political implications of collaborative governance in the detailed case studies in Chapters Five to Seven. The coding schema is comprised of six determined categories of codes:

- Starting point (motivation, environmental problems/concerns, geographic issues, conflicts, dissension, resentment)
- Initiation (leadership, strategy, solution, decision-making)
- Factors (local politics, power changes, organisational capacity)
- Process/development (public reaction, governments' responses, available resources, policy ownerships, reciprocity, mutual respect, public participation, collaboration, volunteering, state-society cooperation, dialogues, negotiation, bargaining, persuasion)
- Outcomes
- Feedbacks (reflections, institutionalisations, policy reforms, adaptations, co-options)

#### *3.6.1.2 In-depth interviews*

In-depth interviews permit researchers to explore subjective meanings and motives revealed from respondents' narratives because they allow the subjects to speak for themselves (Jackson, 2000a). In addition, this research adopted an interview-guide approach, which is less structured than a standardised open-ended interview approach (Patton, 1990). With the interview guide approach the topics and issues to be covered are specified in advance in outline form (see Table 3.7 for the relation between research questions and interview questions). However, during the interviews the wording and sequence of questions can be varied. This is so that the interviewer has greater freedom to explore emergent topics of interest, while providing the interviewee with a conversational and informal context in which to express what they find important to convey (ibid). Free-form interviews are often adopted when people of high-status are involved. It is thought that such people do not respond well to a situation where a questionnaire is read to them (Jackson, 1995), and this applied to many cases in this research. 53 in-depth interviews of key actors were conducted (see Table 3.5 for the categories of interviewees and Table 3.8 for the full list of them)[21]. The interviewees were mainly divided into three types: (1) key actors from civil society (i.e. major actors in collaborative action, usually senior members in environmental organisations, community associations, and village representatives), (2) government officials (most of them practitioners of collaborative governance in the case studies), and (3) a number of other important stakeholders (i.e. scholars, fundamentalist environmental groups[22] and business organisations in the river basin). The majority of interviewees were selected from the news-archive reviews and participant observation activities, where the researcher discovered who the key actors were. Very few of the interviewees were found through the snow-ball method, i.e. introduced by another interviewee. The researcher was also cautious about stratifying interviewees based on their age, sex, organisational occupation or social position. This was especially important in the case of Water Defence in which a variety of respondents (i.e. key actors) could be

[21] Five of the interviewees played a role in more than one of the categories of collaborative action in this study.
[22] By fundamentalist environmental groups I mean those groups which hold eco-centered belief and refuse to compromise with political or economic conditions. In this study, they refer to groups such as Taiwan Citizens of the Earth and Taiwan Environmental Protection Union.

found. In contrast, in the cases of Riverfront Adoption and River Enclosure, it is unavoidable that most respondents were middle-aged males due to the nature of traditional leadership in Taiwanese rural society.

The duration of the interviews ranged from two to three hours. This free-form interview required the interviewer to keep the conversation concentrated around a specific topic without digression. My experience as a journalist provided me with the ability to manoeuvre the interview process smoothly without the risk of letting the conversation wander too widely. Most interviews went well with productive dialogue and information. However, some of the respondents were more defensive than others, especially governmental officials and others who had factional interests in relation to a water-development project that generated severe conflicts in 2006, when I conducted the interviews. My strategy with defensive respondents was to show my knowledge of the events that they had experienced and display sympathy for his or her position, which usually encouraged them to reveal more intimate and detailed information.

Some asymmetry occurred in the total number of interviews in the three types of collaborative governance categories. The number of interviews about Water Defence was significantly higher than the others. This was because Water Defence was a more complicated case than that of Riverfront Adoption or River Enclosure. The Water Defence interviewees were highly heterogeneous, and therefore required more interviewees than those in the other two categories.

Table 3. 5: The Categories of In-depth Interviewees

| Action type | Interview number | Categories of interviewee |
|---|---|---|
| Water Defence | 31 | Civil actors x 23 |
| | | Governmental officials x 7 |
| | | Other stakeholders x 1 |
| Riverfront Adoption | 10 | Civil actors x 4 |
| | | Governmental officials x 5 |
| | | Other stakeholders x 1 |
| River Enclosure | 16 | Civil actors x 11 |
| | | Governmental officials x 5 |
| | | Other stakeholders x 0 |

#### *3.6.1.3 Observation*

Observation was considered as being developed from a traditional scientific methodology, which implies that the researcher is an objective scientist seeing social phenomena from a neutral perspective. It assumed that the observer had no particular purposes or pre-existing assumptions when observing a social phenomenon (Kitchin and Tate, 1999). My way of conducting observations diverges from this model and is influenced by an ethnographic method called 'participant observation'. Participant observation, originating in anthropological research on traditional societies in their natural settings, aims to produce first-hand data by entering a research site for prolonged and intensive observation in the field (Burgess, 1984; Jackson, 2000b). Participant observation typically requires the researcher to gain entry into a group or an institution, and involves recording detailed interaction between members of the group. This can be done by taking part in the activities and sometimes by sharing in their life experiences or even becoming part of the action agency itself (Jackson, 1995). Whilst my method of conduction did not intend to follow strict participant observation, I amended the traditional 'neutral and objective' approach to a more participatory way. This means that I did not avoid personal interactions with my subjects and sometimes took part in the activities myself. This benefitted me as I was able to obtain more confidential information, especially regarding the practice of power relationships.

During the observation process, social events unfold in their natural social settings (Marshall and Rossman, 1995:79), but it relies on the observer's ability to interpret what is happening in a systemic way, and what are the mechanisms that lie behind it and the meanings of social events and peoples' behaviour patterns. Observation, in this research, was conducted through a lens of collaborative governance theory reviewed in Chapter Two, which implied that the researcher observe social phenomena with a clear conscience in searching for a diversity of governance behaviours and forms.

I conducted observation at 33 major events (see Table 3.9 for a full list of observed events and Table 3.6 for a brief categorisation of them). The purpose was to analyse

the political implications of the interactions between key civil actors and governmental officials in relation to collaborative governance by observing relevant events. In the research, while key actor interviews aimed to explore how interviewees perceive certain topics, observation was more about how the researcher perceived them when witnessing the dynamic interaction between key actors. This was also a process whereby the researcher could establish trust with those researched, so that they subsequently felt more at ease to articulate how they conceived certain events and issues (Herod, 1999; Jackson, 2000b).

Nevertheless, in this research, observation is of minor importance in terms of producing data for analysis, but it plays an important contextual role for the researcher. It helped capture an overview of the processes of local collaboration and identified a potential list of interviewees in the early stages of the research (alongside the press-clippings). Unfortunately, the physical difficulty and time restrictions made the researcher unable to engage as thoroughly as wanted in local activities in all communities and villages, especially in the categories of Riverfront Adoption and River Enclosure, and this weakened the contribution of observation to the research. In contrast, Water Defence and related national/regional environmental events were more accessible and vibrant during the period of observation. This resulted in an asymmetry in the number of observations in different cases. However, observation remains an effective and productive way to highlight some of the contradictions between actors' accounts and what the researcher witnessed. Moreover, observation in a few major national events also helped the researcher to identify key actors in local governance to interview at a later time. My impressions and reflections about the observations were recorded during the settings, sometimes immediately after the observed events. The notes of observation were analysed along with the interview transcriptions to highlight the contradictions between the respondents' narratives and the researcher's perception.

Table 3. 6: The Categories of Observation

| Collaborative action categories | Number of participant observations |
| --- | --- |
| National/regional environmental events | 9 |
| Water Defence | 18 |
| Riverfront Adoption | 3 |
| River Enclosure | 3 |

### 3.6.2. Data processing and analysis

The enormous amount of narrative material from interviews was transcribed and coded using a thematic coding system (Miles and Huberman, 1984), in which codes were based on in the conceptual framework established in Chapter Two derived from the governance literature, yet remaining open to the re-education that comes from the discovery of unexplored or unexpected outcomes (ibid).

Both news-archive reviews and interview records invite the utilisation of content analysis. Traditional content analysis seeks to quantify content in terms of pre-determined categories in a systematic and replicable manner (Bryman, 2001; Flick, 2002) to minimise any possible bias (Reason and Garcia, 2007). The 'quantitative description' (Berelson, 1952) that content analysis aims to generate indicates one of its limitations - that it focuses on counting text rather than analysing content (Philo, 1988) - and thus neglects the essential elements in a text (Ahuvia, 2001). This leads to its inability to capture hidden meanings and the wider implications of the material (Reason and Garcia, 2007). However, a purely qualitative approach brings its own difficulties, not least that such data are mostly voluminous, unstructured and unwieldy (Bryman and Burgess, 1994: 216). It thus makes it difficult to increase the generalisability of the research findings, as well as making comparisons across several cases. Instead of producing a quantitative account from the clippings in the newspaper archive, this research aims to produce a more interpretative account of the evolution of governance in the Kaoping River basin.

Case study findings are reported in Chapters Five to Seven of this thesis. Given the

nature of the writing process, the thesis is a story built from selected pieces of information. It is a narrative of state-society collaborative action in the river basin. It can be seen as 'my story of their story', while the complete stories are far more intricate and beyond that which can be shown in the thesis. In order to encourage information providers to discuss controversial issues, the researcher ensured their anonymity (French, 1993). Therefore interviewees and observation subjects are referred to by number in this Chapter and in Chapters Five to Seven. The thesis uses direct quotations from interview transcripts wherever possible in order to preserve the language of the research participants (Winchester, 1999).

## 3.7. Ethical dimensions

Some of the ethical dimensions of this research are commented upon earlier in this chapter. This brief section makes it clear that this study has been conducted within the guidelines laid down by the Graduate School at UCL[23] although these were not as detailed as they are today when the field research was conducted. The guidelines require that all research involving human subjects should ensure that it is carried out safely and with the agreed consent of the interviewees, respecting their autonomy and privacy, and reflects concern for the power relationship between the researcher and the researched. In this study, the researched, especially those less educated and less powerful in economic and social terms, were encouraged to speak in support of their rights and interests. Before each interview started, it was explained that the contents of the interview were to be kept confidential and in their presentation later in the thesis, great care is taken in the quoted parts of narratives to avoid including information that would identify the interviewee. This practice supports the policy of data protection and interviewee privacy. All interviewees were to remain anonymous and it was agreed that the transcription of the full narratives would not be revealed to any other party. All interviewees could decline to answer any of my questions.

[23] Please find UCL related policy at http://ethics.grad.ucl.ac.uk/ and http://www.ucl.ac.uk/research/images/research-ethics-framework retrieved at 2012-06-15.

## 3.8. Conclusion

This chapter explains that the underlying methodological decisions made in this research arise from the philosophy of critical realism, which responds to the world view of the theoretical framework developed in Chapter Two. The research adopts a multi-method research approach that combines in-depth interviews, participant observation and a newspaper archive survey in the form of a case study of the Kaoping River, Taiwan. This approach establishes a complementary relation between extensive and intensive methods to explore both the regularity of collaborative environmental governance and its causal mechanisms. For instance, if the examples of collaborative governance appear repeatedly and significantly to a level that we would call a general phenomenon rather than a handful of unique cases that occur only in a particular context and circumstance, then we can define the phenomenon as having certain regularity.

This approach investigates the decisions and strategy of organised social actors (i.e. individual organisations/communities/tribal villages) in initiating collaboration with the state, without losing sight of the broader contextual influence (i.e. local political structure and global economic competition). It therefore represents a commitment to the combination of micro- and macro-level study of the implications of collaborative behaviour in state-society relations.

Collaborative environmental governance in the Kaoping River basin was chosen as the case study setting because of its history of unbalanced power relations between state and society. By examining the development of collaboration, the case study explores how the state-society relation has been transformed and how and whether environmental governance has been improved. This research selected three categories of environmental action and each of them contains three to seven stratified examples based on their location and social composition. Interviewees were stratified based on their age, sex, organisational occupation, and social position. This strategy of stratification aims to increase the generalisability of the research findings. Following the strategy of critical realism, the research applies a three-step procedure of qualitative content analysis to reduce the amount of contextual

material and to find a common structure within the material. Then it adopts a retroductive method and iterative abstraction to analyse the material for the exploration of the causal mechanisms and context contingency. These actions enable a comparative study between, and within, the categories.

Table 3. 7: The Relation between Research Questions and Major Interview Questions

| Research questions / Interview questions | What have been the reasons that have motivated the emergence of environmental collaborative governance? | Have different approaches to initiating environmental collaborative governance led to different processes and results? | Does the emergence of environmental collaborative governance promise a new pattern for its long-term development through its institutionalisation within the policy structure generally? | What are the levels of transformability and constraints of collaborative governance in the context of Taiwan? | Does the current practice of collaborative governance in Taiwan result in a true transition of the state-society relationship or is it just a disguised form of corporatist strategy? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Please explain how your organisation is engaged in river governance and river protection. | ✓ | ✓ | | | |
| Please explain the reasons why you initiate/take part in the collaborative governance over the Kaoping River protection and the changing practice of the organisation. | ✓ | ✓ | | | |
| Please compare and contrast the major activities of your organisation and its interaction with the state and non-state actors in the 1990s and 2000s. | | | | | ✓ |

| *Extended questions:* Please explain if the institutionalisation of collaborative environmental governance affects the effectiveness of collaborative practice. | | | ✓ | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Extended questions:* Please explain if collaborative governance changes traditional corporatist politics. | | | | ✓ | ✓ |
| Please evaluate the current collaborative practice in river governance. | | | | ✓ | |
| Please predict if the future practice of your organisation in five years time will be consistent with the current collaborative practice. | | | ✓ | | |
| *Extended questions:* Please predict, if current collaborative practice in governance is unsatisfactory, how your organisation will change its course of | | | | ✓ | ✓ |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| action and interaction with the state and non-state actors? | | | | | |

Table 3. 8: Full list of interviewees

| Environmentalists | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number | Age & Sex | Position | Affiliation | Interview date | Engagement |
| 001 | 60~70, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | Takao Green Association for Ecology and Humane Studies (TGA) | 2006-12-30 | WD |
| 002 | 50~60, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | | 2006-10-21 | WD |
| 003 | 40~50, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | Wetlands Taiwan | 2006-5-22 | WD |
| 004 | 50~60, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | | 2007-02-06 | WD |
| 005 | 50~60, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | | 2006-11-19 | WD |
| 006 | 40~50, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | | 2006-11-18 | WD |
| 007 | 40~50, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | Kaohsiung Wild Bird Society | 2006-11-17 | WD |
| 008 | 50~60, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | | 2006-12-6 | WD |
| 009 | 30~40, male | Paid Staff | | 2006-10-12 | WD |
| 010 | 40~50, female | Paid Staff | Blue Donggang Creek Conservation Association | 2006-10-17 | WD |
| 011 | 50~60, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | | 2007-01-31 | WD |
| 012 | 20~30, female | Paid Staff | | 2006-12-7 | WD |
| 013 | 30~40, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | | 2007-3-8 | WD |
| 014 | 30~40, male | Paid Staff | Meinung People’s Association | 2006-5-19 | WD |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 015 | 30~40, male | Paid Staff | | 2006-11-13 | WD |
| 016 | 60~70, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | | 2006-04-02 | WD |
| 017 | 20~30, female | Paid Staff | | 2006-8-2 | WD |
| 018 | 30~40, female | Non-Paid Senior Members | | 2006-8-2 | WD |
| Government officials | | | | | |
| 019 | 50~60, male | Paid Staff | Public Works Bureau of Kaohsiung City | 2007-2-12 | WD |
| 020 | 40~50, male | Paid Staff | Water Resource Bureau of Kaohsiung County | 2007-01-18 | WD, RA |
| 021 | 50~60, male | Paid Staff | Planning Office, Kaohsiung County | 2006-6-29 | WD |
| 022 | 50~60, male | Paid Staff | Ecological Conservation Section in Agriculture Bureau of Kaohsiung County Government | 2006-11-9 | RE |
| 023 | 50~60, male | Paid Staff | Kaoping River Watershed Administration Committee | 2006-12-15 | WD, RA |
| 024 | 50~60, male | Paid Staff | Seventh River Management Office | 2006-12-15, 2006-12-26 | WD, RA |
| 025 | 40~50, male | Paid Staff | | 2006-12-7 | WD, RA |
| 026 | 50~60, male | Paid Staff | Dashu Township Office | 2007-01-15 | RA |
| 027 | 50~60, male | Paid Staff | Kaohsiung Aborigine Bureau, Kaohsiung Government | 2007-01-15 | RE |
| 028 | 50~60, male | Paid Staff | Water Resource Bureau, Pingtung Government | 2007-02-07 | WD |
| 029 | 40~50, male | Paid Staff | Pingtung Aborigine Bureau, Pingtung Government | 2007-02-06 | RE |
| 030 | 50~60, male | Paid Staff | Sandimen Township Office | 2007-02-09 | RE |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 031 | 50~60, male | Paid Staff | Management Office of Maolin National Scenic Area | 2007-01-25 | RE |
| Grassroots groups | | | | | |
| 032 | 40~50, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | Old Iron Bridge Association | 2006-11-11 | RA |
| 033 | 50~60, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | Minchiuan Community Development Association | 2006-12-02 | RE |
| 034 | 50~60, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | Sanmin Township Love Homeland Alliance (and Mintzu Community Development Association) | 2006-12-03 | RE |
| 035 | 40~50, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | Gaujung Community Development Association | 2006-12-4 | RE |
| 036 | 50~60, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | Tauyuan Township Love Homeland Alliance (and Meilan Community Development Association) | 2006-12-4 | RE |
| 037 | 50~60, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | Tauyuan Township Love Homeland Alliance | 2006-12-4 | RE |
| 038 | 40~50, female | Paid Staff | Fushing Community Development Association | 2006-12-5 | RE |
| 039 | 60~70, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | Association of Jhuokou River Protection | 2006-12-5 | RE |
| 040 | 50~60, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | A-Ligang Cultural Association | 2006-12-29 | RA |
| 041 | 50~60, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | | 2006-12-29 | RA |
| 042 | 50~60, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | Dashe Community Development Association | 2007-01-02 | RE |
| 043 | 20~30, female | Paid Staff | Dashe Community Development Association | 2007-01-02 | RE |
| 044 | 40~50, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | Koushe Community Development Association | 2007-01-14 | RE |
| 045 | 40~50, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | Local cultural development leader | 2007-01-14 | RE |
| 046 | 50~60, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | Association of Mangrove Protection | 2007-02-13 | RA |

| Fundamentalist groups | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 047 | 40~50, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | Ecology Education Centre of Kaohsiung City Teachers' Association | 2006-04-8 | WD |
| 048 | 40~50, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | Taiwan Environmental Protection Union (TEPU) Pingtung Branch | 2006-10-23 | WD |
| 049 | 30~40, male | Non-Paid Senior Members | Ecology Education Centre of Pingtung County Teachers' Association | 2006-12-26 | WD |
| Scholars | | | | | |
| 050 | 40~50, male | Paid Staff | National Kaohsiung First University of Science and Technology | 2006-12-29 | WD |
| 051 | 50~60, male | Paid Staff | Water Resources Education and Studies in National Pingtung University of Science and Technology | 2007-01-12 | WD |
| Economic groups | | | | | |
| 052 | 50~60, male | Paid Staff | Pingtung Sand and Stone Association | 2007-02-01 | RA |
| 053 | 50~60, male | Paid Staff | Farm Irrigation Association of Kaohsiung | 2007-02-08 | WD |

Table 3. 9: Full list of observations

| Events | Case study | Date |
|---|---|---|
| National Conference on Environmental Action Plan Towards Sustainability- Environmental NGOs' Regional Forum (Northern Taiwan Section) | National environmental event | 2006-1-13 |
| National Conference on Environmental Action Plan Towards Sustainability- Environmental NGOs' Regional Forum (Southern Taiwan Section) | National environmental event | 2006-1-15 |
| National Conference on Environmental Action Plan Towards Sustainability- Regional Forum (Southern Taiwan Section) | National environmental event | 2006-3-21 |
| National Conference on Environmental Action Plan Towards Sustainability- National Forum | National environmental event | 2006-4-21/22 |
| 2006 National NGOs Conference on Rivers | National environmental event related to river governance | 2006-3-11 |
| Wetlands Taiwan advocates for reserve establishments and rehabilitation in 3700 hectares returned from salt pans due to the privatisation of the state-owned Taiwan Salt Company (TAIYEN). | WD | 2006-3-14 |
| The advocacy and construction of wetland eco-corridor in urban Kaohsiung. Wetlands reconstruction has been advocated since 1995, but mostly concentrated after 2000. | WD | 2006-3-21 |
| Blue Donggang Creek Conservation Association's activities as a project host to establish Life-Long Learning Mechanism in Pingtung area by empowering and training grassroots organisations to provide learning resources | WD | 2006-3-28 |
| Tenth anniversary of Wetlands Taiwan in 2006: publication, festival activities, film making, reviews | WD | 2006-2-1 |
| Discussions of the problems on organizational practices in Wetlands Taiwan | WD | 2006-5-1 |
| Forum towards Sustainability in Kao-Kao-Ping Area (including Kaohsiung city, Kaohsiung county, and Pingtung county) | Regional environmental event | 2006-3-25 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Symposium of Trans-basin diversion between Laonong River and Tsengwen Reservoir, an open dialogue between the officials from Water Resource Agency, Ministry of Economic Affairs, and indigenous activists, villagers and environmental organisations | WD | 2006-4-4 |
| Activities of Anti-Hushan dam projects and protest against destruction of the habitat of the Pitta (a kind of eight-coloured bird, also called Ching Ming Fairy because they migrate to Taiwan during Ching Ming Festival at the beginning of April) | WD | 2006-4-8 |
| National Forum on River Enclosure and Fish Conservancy organised by the Forestry Bureau, Council of Agriculture, and invited main village practitioners, officials, and stakeholders to discuss the mechanism, funding, and practices of the conservation movement | RE | 2006-6-25/24 |
| Anti-transbasin diversion construction press conference and pledge by villagers from Sanmin and Tauyuan Townships and officers from Kaohsiung County Government | WD | 2006-6-29 |
| Private communication and consensus meeting between urban environmental activists and officials from the Water Resource Agency, Ministry of Economic Affairs, including the Director General himself | WD | 2006-7-5 |
| 2006 Kaoping River Basin Water Resources Development and Management Conference organised by the Kaoping River Watershed Administration Committee | Governance of Kaoping River | 2006-7-6 |
| Conference on Trans-basin Diversion Construction between Laonong River and Tsengwen Reservoir organised by the Kaohsiung County Government | WD | 2006-7-12 |
| Revival of Kao-Kao-Ping Water Protection Coalition | WD | 2006-7-16 |
| White Paper on Kaohsiung Environmental Policy- civil version | Regional environmental event | 2006-7-20 |
| Private policy seminar on the mergence of Kaohsiung County and Kaohsiung City and environmental issues | Regional environmental event | 2006-8-20 |
| Preparation discussion on the mergence of Kaohsiung County and City organised by Kaohsiung City Architects Association | Regional environmental event | 2006-10-4 |
| Regular Meeting of Kaoping Watershed Administration Committee to discuss about incorporating the management of Tsau-Gung Canal of Kaohsiung Irrigation Association | Governance of Kaoping River | 2006-10-6 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Meinung dam alternative- Planning of wetlands reconstruction for flood prevention and water environment restoration | WD | 2006-10-13 |
| Private communication and consensus meeting between urban environmental activists and officials from the Water Resource Agency, Ministry of Economic Affairs, including the Deputy Director | WD | 2006-11-11 |
| Second meeting of the Kao-Kao-Ping Water Protection Coalition | WD | 2006-11-12 |
| Seminar on the improvement plan on the wetland park of the Kaoping River on the Pingtung side. | RA | 2007-1-11 |
| Report on the improvement plan to restore the local Wannian River in Pingtung County | WD | 2007-1-11 |
| The Governor of Pingtung county reported his policies on river and water resources to Kaohsiung environmental activists and sought the support of these groups and suggestions from them | WD | 2007-8-12 |
| Fundamentalist groups invited governmental agencies and other environmentalists to a site meeting about the current situation of mid-stream Kaoping River | RA | 2007-8-17 |

# Chapter 4 Context

## 4.1 The soft authoritarian state in transition

In Chapter Two, this research commented on the preoccupation of the literature in the 1970s and 1980s on the nature of state-capacity in East Asian governance in terms of economic development (Amsden, 1994; Unger and Chan, 1995; Dauvergne, 1998). It neglected a burgeoning civil society which played an essential role in governance reforms in the East in the 1990s (Yamamoto, 1996; Yamamoto and Ashizawa, 2001; Lee, 2004; Chiu, 2005). Civil society acted as a catalyst of changes by alerting existing institutions to problems of governance, by monitoring the performance of institutions and even by playing a role in the implementation of government programmes (McBeath and Leng, 2005). These actions explain why this research chose three types of environmental collaboration, in a particular river basin, to study how civil society has played a role in environmental collaborative governance from the 1990s onwards.

This chapter first introduces the three phases of Taiwan's environmental governance and its relation to the development of its country's political economy in Section 4.2. It then lays out how the Kaoping River example mirrors the broader river governance in Taiwan in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 this chapter introduces the three case studies by explaining the background and origin of the three types of collaborative action in the Kaoping River basin.

## 4.2 Three phases of Taiwan's environmental governance

### 4.2.1 Phase one: Authoritarian rule, economic boom and environmental deterioration

Taiwan is well-known for its rapid economic growth during the post-World War II

era[24], which was achieved, among other things, at the expense of environmental degradation (Edmonds, 1996; McBeath and Leng, 2005). This growth was closely associated with authoritarian rule under Martial Law between the 1950s and 1980s. This period of authoritarian rule led to a strong bureaucracy which monopolised the policy process and maintained a social corporatist order (Unger and Chan, 1995). This form of bureaucratic politics dominated the policy process and its implementation (McBeath and Leng, 2005). At the same time, its support of a meritocratic system aimed to establish a bureaucratic elite system which had the authority and expertise to decide and implement policies independent of pluralist interests and the control of local political factions. Most policies were decided by technocrats in central government.

In the early stages of the rise of environmental consciousness, the government adopted a 'command-and-control' style of environmental management and suppressed social discontent arising from the external costs of industrialisation (Kirkpatrick, 1992; Arrigo, 1994). Although Taiwan's environmental protection agency dates from the 1970s, its administrative position and influence in government was low and it lacked authority and resources. Although the first National Environmental Policy guidelines were introduced in 1979 as a common basis for the establishment of environmental programmes, central government continued with a 'grow first, clean up later' strategy by, for example, continuing to provide grants and give preferential treatment in its allocation of resources to heavily polluting industries, including the petrochemical and steel production industries.

### 4.2.2 Phase two: The upsurge of civil environmental protests in Taiwan

By the late 1980s, environmental problems had reached crisis levels, with some industrial complexes threatening the life and health of neighbourhood residents. Loose enforcement of regulations led to frequent environmental pollution around industrial complexes and several large-scale pollution events fuelled public anger.

[24] Average GDP Growth Rates of 7.9% in the 1980s and 6.3% in the 1990s.

For example, the outrageous air/water pollution caused by the Ling Yuan petrochemical complex (in 1983) and the Lee Chang Rong petrochemical factory (in 1986) led to an outburst of environmental protest catalysing environmental management bodies and civic groups. These serious pollution incidents coincided with the emergence of civil society more generally. Large-scale rallies, sit-ins, and even the direct blockage of polluting enterprises were organised, often led by local opposition politicians (McBeath and Leng, 2005). In the example of Lee Chang Rong, hundreds of residents blocked the factory for 425 days and finally forced the factory to close. At this stage, environmental protests often reflected 'NIMBY'ism in their complaints and were often easily quelled by monetary compensation (ibid). For example, in the Ling Yuan case, several pollutant spill-over events were resolved by compensating local fishermen with USD $10 million.

The lifting of Martial Law in 1987 further released social action and legalised street protests. It resulted in an increased number of, and the violence (Kirkpatrick, 1992) of, environmental protests against polluting industries (Hsiao, 1990). At this time the state saw environmental protests as a threat to social order and a disruption to the polluting industries that the state supported (McBeath and Leng, 2005). In response, in the same year, 1987, the state launched the bureaucratisation of environmental governance. The Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) was upgraded from its low political status to enforce environmental regulation, even if the purpose of the upgrade and related legislation was designed mainly to accommodate economic growth (Ho, 2005a) rather than to respond to social demands (Kirkpatrick, 1992). The EPA itself often became the target of environmental protests. Street protests reached their climax in 1991 with more than two hundred protests. Environmental activists remained highly active between 1992 and 1999 (see Figure 4.1).

Yet civic environmental actions gradually transformed into organised campaigns for environmental improvement during the mid-1990s (Ho, 2001). A large number of environmental organisations announced their establishment and registered as legal civil associations (otherwise these organisations would have been criticised as underground illegal associations). Many of them became more organised, expanded coalitions with environmental experts and established professional staff teams.

There were two major reasons behind this change. The first was the establishment of an institutionalised, deliberative system by the EPA which encouraged citizens' participation in an institutional policy process. For example, Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) were introduced for assessing large scale development projects, a process that could be easily manipulated by those technocrats who prioritised development, but it also had the effect of encouraging environmental pressure groups to act within the bureaucratically-dominated institutional structure (Hsiao, 1999).

The second reason was the democratisation of the polity, transforming it from party-military rule to a soft authoritarian regime, and therefore it adopted a more accommodating stance towards social pressures (Hsiao, 1990). This transformation of the state encouraged environmental pressure groups to change their positions from destructive violent protests to a more organised civil society (ibid). For example, the state's transformation encouraged some bureaucrats to collaborate with environmental, non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) in order to compete with development-first interests within policy institutions (McBeath and Leng, 2005). This transformation of Taiwan's ENGOs also led them to master more complex skills in addressing governmental issues and when engaging with the bureaucracy (Hsiao, 1990). Mass demonstrations were less raucous and ENGOs developed a greater expertise in monitoring governmental policies.

Figure 4.1: The Distribution of Environmental Street Protests in Taiwan
(1980-1999)

Source: Ho (2001)

### 4.2.3 Phase three: From confrontation to cooperation

Since the second half of the 1990s, growing commitment to cooperation between the state and society in environmental affairs has increased (Hsiao, 1995; Hsiao, 1999; Chi, 2006). This cooperation has produced effective environmental improvements through organised public participation. It also reinforced the influence of social movements over environmental governance (Chang and Cheng, 2003; Huang, 2004). As the official attitude toward ENGOs switched from confrontation to accommodation, the ENGOs also gained recognition at the policy-making level of governmental agencies. One type of recognition was that central ministries and agencies invited ENGOs and scholars to participate in advisory committees, such as the Wildlife Protection Advisory Committee, the EIA Review Committee, and the Sustainable Development Committee, all at cabinet level (McBeath and Leng, 2005). Another type of recognition was the delegation of governmental programmes, e.g. environmental monitoring, ecological investigation and promotion of environmental consciousness, to ENGOs by central or local governments [25]. This quasi-outsourcing of the work of government agencies improved the resource and standing of Taiwan's ENGOs, the majority of which were small scale, and it also enhanced state policy performance. They acquired more complex expertise and confidential information through bargaining over policy (Hsiao, 1999). On the other hand, the experience of implementing government programmes incorporated ENGOs into state policy processes. This process led researchers to reach quite different conclusions. One argued that this type of cooperation remained marginal in its effects and largely helped enhancing the legitimacy of state policy and its processes (McBeath and Leng, 2005), while others called for greater and more effective cooperation along these lines (Hsiao, 1999).

What catalysed the reform movement in Taiwan was a conjuncture of several factors. The 2000 presidential election was a milestone in Taiwan's democratisation and environmental governance. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate

[25] This practice was different from the traditional corporatist strategy which had usually delegated government programmes to local officials or the organisations established/authorised by the state, i.e. GONGO (government-operated NGOs).

Chen Shui-bian won, the Kuomintang (KMT) lost, and Taiwan accomplished the first democratic power transition in its history. Once the DPP became the ruling party in 2000, observers expected it to enact its longstanding policy of environmental protection. However, these hopes were only partially realised. As the DPP altered from a protest party to a parliamentary party, vote-maximising became its prime concern. It converted the DPP's radical pro-environmental position into a moderate one. The DPP's performance in protecting the environment from industrial development was, seemingly, more aggressive than its KMT counterpart (McBeath and Leng, 2005), but in reality it was not. There are two well-known examples. Its failure to halt the building of a fourth nuclear power plant was one example, and the continuous development of water resources in southern Taiwan to meet industrial demands was another. The latter stimulated enormous protests.

That said, the transfer of power did lead to a growing amount of state-society collaboration. Several ENGOs developed productive relationships with governmental agencies, operating as quasi-GONGOs (government organised non-governmental organisations), effectively promoting environmental protection. Nevertheless, despite the political democratisation in Taiwan, the state remained relatively strong and able to determine environmental policies (ibid). This explains why many have been sceptical about the rapid transition of the relationship between the soft-authoritarian regime and ENGOs from confrontation to cooperation. Without further consolidation of democratisation, this cooperation would have generated doubt about its effectiveness for environmental improvement and the sustainability of cooperation in the long-term. After 2000 environmentalists gained legitimacy and were appointed to government positions. This process was described as incorporation. Incorporation brought about a new way of raising environmentalist claims but the environmentalists' role in the DPP government was never friction-free. Environmentalists increasingly became 'polity members' who enjoyed routinised and low-cost access to governmental resources.

Taiwan's history of rapid political transition and economic development has created a complex state-society relationship (Hsiao, 1999; Chi, 2006). State hegemony has dominated the policy process and resources. However, its effectiveness in policy performance has increasingly relied on public participation. Although public

participation can be said to affect policy delivery in a positive way, it also often lacks the necessary social resources to sustain itself, often relying on government grants (Hsiao, 1999), raising the issue of civil groups being over-reliant on government resources.

## 4.3 The Kaoping River basin and its governance

### 4.3.1 Governing body

Rivers in Taiwan are divided into two groups, namely primary and secondary. The former are controlled by central government and the latter by local government. River governance of primary rivers, like the Kaoping River, is linked to twelve government departments, but only three of them are the main governing bodies. They are the River Bureau, the Water and Soil Conservation Bureau and the Water Resource Bureau. There is an exceptional and additional administrative department for the Kaoping River- the Kaoping River Watershed Administration Committee- established to tackle river pollution.

Early in the post-war era, jurisdiction over primary rivers belonged very largely to local governments. This situation led to several problems due to a lack of sufficient resources and personnel. In the case of the Kaoping River, local politicians abused the natural resources of the river. They turned a blind eye to the excessive extraction of sand and gravel that was severely damaging the riverbed and its surroundings. Part of the riverbank was treated as a free landfill site by unlawful businesses and, even, local township offices. Discharge of pollutants was ignored. This chaos led the central government to take over the jurisdiction of the primary rivers in 1999. Today, some central government agencies may delegate some of their management tasks to local governments with appropriate oversight and subsidies, or even deliver policy through collaboration with local community development associations and environmental organisations.

### 4.3.2 Geographic features

The Kaoping River is 171 km in length and its basin covers an area of 3,257 $km^2$. It occupies 9% of the total area of the island and is the largest river basin in Taiwan. The river runs through frigid, temperate, subtropical and tropical climate zones with plentiful biological resources along its course (See map in Chapter Three). The river has four upstream tributaries, namely the Laonong, Cishan, Ailiao and Jhuokou rivers, mostly located in the hills and mountain regions, which are also the locations of minority ethnic groups.

The basin is also known as the Kao-Kao-Ping area because it covers two administrative areas, Kaohsiung and Pingtung counties. It makes a major contribution to the water supply of Kaohsiung City. The city is the major industrial conglomeration in Taiwan and in the 1990s was the world's fourth largest logistic port. The river basin has a rapidly growing population of three million based around the city of Kaohsiung. The city grew rapidly during the post-World War II era as a site for heavy industries, which focused in particular on steel refineries, petrochemicals, shipbuilding and machinery manufacture. Most of these were state-run enterprises[26] and allowed to consume large quantities of water, constantly placing greater and greater demands on water development. Since the early 1990s, the demands have caused a series of conflicts between economic development, river restoration and community conservation.

The conflict over water resources is exacerbated because the river basin has high and low water level periods due to seasonal rainfall fluctuations. With a total annual water flow of 8.67 billion $m^3$, 89.5% of the annual rainfall is concentrated in summer and autumn and only 10.5% in winter. In addition, recent climate change has caused a growing number of heavy storms in the summer and autumn months (Chen et al., 2004). As a result, growing difficulties in river and water management have emerged and are a source of regional tension. From 1992 onward, five water development projects were initiated, including two dam projects, two trans-basin diversion projects and one artificial lake project as a lowland reservoir (Huang,

[26] But most of them were privatised in the 1990s.

1995; Jhong, 1996; Tseng, 1996). Most of the development projects are located in the river's upstream area where minority ethnic groups reside.

Twelve percent of the water from the Kaoping River is used domestically by 2.7 million people. It supplies water for industry, farming (including agricultural farmlands, animal husbandries and fish farms), and domestic use in the Kao-Kao-Ping area (The Seventh River Bureau, 2006). It has been predicted that there will be a daily water shortage of 0.6 million $m^3$ in the region by 2021 (The Bureau of Water Resource, 1996). However, extracting more water from the river in the mountain areas will have a severe impact on the river's fragile ecological system and the livelihood of minority groups in upstream areas (Gu, 1994; Taiban, 1994; Wong, 1996).

During the 1990s, the Kaoping River experienced abusive use, including gravel mining, agricultural development and illegal dumping. Even local township offices used high tidal flats as landfill sites due to a lack of incinerators and legal landfill sites. With a total of four billion tons of sediment per year[27], the Kaoping River is among those with the highest yield of sediment, and its gravel is considered to be of the highest quality for construction purposes. Excessive gravel extraction is the main cause of the riverbed degradation and is also a threat to bridge piers (Chen, 1994a; Kondolf, 1997). The deterioration of the riverbed was so severe that two major bridges collapsed in the year 2000. Its riverbank and ecosystem were further damaged due to widespread landfill, illegal dumping, fish farms, and cultivation on the riverbank (Chen, 1994b, 1995a). In 1996, more than a thousand barrels of toxic waste were found buried in the riverbed of the upstream area of the Kaoping River.

Another serious cause of deterioration of the river environment is water contamination. The pollution sources include waste water from industry, livestock farms and households. In addition, excessive development in the upstream area (a mountainous region) has led to severe soil erosion (Chen, 1995a; Tseng, 1995a, b). In the 1990s, the river was severely contaminated by domestic waste water (7.7%), industrial waste (30.6%) and agricultural effluence (57.3%). Every day, in that

[27] http://eec.kta.kh.edu.tw/kpbridge_html/a-kpbridge12.htm

decade, 30 tons of waste water was discharged into the water without cleansing (Chen, 1995a; Wu, 1995: 100). The multiple sources of contamination and lack of enforcement led the river to be the most polluted river in Taiwan. The poor quality of river water has affected people's livelihoods (Tseng, 1995a, b). In Kaohsiung City, the quality of tap water was so bad that most citizens bought bottled water for drinking purposes in the 1990s (Wen, 1994). The worst problem occurred in 2000 when the river was polluted by chemical waste leading to the greater Kaohsiung area being without clean water for a week. According to the EPA report[28], the pollution condition of the river was worst between 1992 and 2000 (see Figure 4.2 for details).

[28] http://wqshow.epa.gov.tw/

Figure 4. 2: River pollution index of the Kaoping River




Source: Adapted from the Environmental Protection Administration database[29]

[29] http://www.epa.gov.tw/wqm

The collective grievances of local dwellers were so strong that they compelled politicians to undertake restoration action in the river basin. In the mid-1990s, a preliminary action, joined by the local governor of Kaohsiung County and social elites, included the cleaning up of duck farms in the downstream area[30] and replanting of mangroves (Hong, 1996). The second wave of river restoration action did not occur until 2001. It was undertaken by the central government, following a collective appeal by local governors, to remove the pig farms from the midstream area of the Kaoping River (also within the Water Resource Protection Area). At the same time, a million tons of garbage that had been dumped on the riverbank was cleaned up. The action of removing pig farms significantly extended the unpolluted section of the river[31] (see Figure 4.2). Up until 2008, improvement to the urban sewage system in the river basin remained the key policy to be accomplished (Li, 2006b)

## 4.4 Three collaborative actions in the Kaoping River basin: Water Defence, Riverfront Adoption and River Enclosure

From the newspaper archives, the research identified three waves of collaborative river protection between the state and social groups which emerged between the late 1990s and the early 2000's. These three collaborative actions were 'River Enclosure' led by indigenous tribes[32], 'Riverfront Adoption' by rural communities[33],

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[30] United Daily News (UDN), 27 April 1993, Hundreds of police mobilised to alleviate the effects of duck farming on river quality. Thousands of ducks are removed, p.07.
UDN, 24 March 1994, Governor of Kaohsiung county, the leading water company, environmental bureaucrats and environmentalists enforce ban on duck farming on the river, p.15.
This action was based on the Law of Water Resource Protection.

[31] However, the river remained highly polluted after 2003 due to two reasons. One was the increase of suspended solids in the water body, resulting from a huge earthquake in 2000, and soil erosion in the upstream area of the river (The Seventh River Bureau, 2006). The other was that some pig farms, which were expelled from Water Resource Protection Area, moved to downstream areas and continued to pollute the river even more intensively than before.

[32] UDN, 22 Aug 2000, River enclosure in the Namasia reaches successful conservation, open for fishing next month, p.18.
UDN, 30 Nov 2001, Jhuokou creek in Maolin to be enclosed for two years, p.18.
UDN, 26 Dec 2001, Laonung creek to be enclosed for one year, p.19.
UDN, 19 Oct 2002, Lagus creek to be enclosed for one year, p.18.
UDN, 29 April 2003, Ailiao southern and northern creek extended enclosure for one and a half years, p. B2

and 'Water Defence' by environmental organisations[34]. These cases had some similarities. First, they showed high civic spontaneity from the bottom-up in managing the environment. Second, the civilian groups in these cases were 'de facto governing bodies'. Third, a large number of organised citizens got involved in these governing actions and produced significant results (see Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3).

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UDN, 16 July 2003, River enclosure of Nasadulu creek in Sanmin township preserve an ecology refugee, p. B2
UDN, 19 July 2003, Six creeks in Sandimen township will be enclosed, p.B2
[33] UDN, 28 Aug 1995, 500 citizens replant mangroves in the wetland of the Kaoping River
UDN, 10 April 1999, Old Iron Bridge area beside the Kaoping River is listed as highly dangerous site, p. 08
MSD, 21 July 2000, Huge amount of toxic dumping found in one water origin of the Kaoping river - Douggang riverbed, p.A1
MSD, 16 Dec 2000, Public participation in purifying the riverfront in Pingtung has become a fine example for the nation, p. CR2
UDN, 16 Dec 2000, Hundred River Bureau staff witness the result of Riverfront Adoption, achievement attributed to community volunteers, p.18
UDN, 1 Nov 2001, A-Ligang builds the image of Country of Stone on the riverbank park, p. 19
MSD, 18 March 2002, Greening the Kaoping River- Hundreds of citizens plant thousands of trees in A-Ligang, p. C7
MSD, 24 Nov 2002, The Seventh River Bureau purifies the riverfront of the Kaoping River, creates ten tourism spots, p. A3
MSD, 29, Dec 2003, A riverside landfill site transformed to a garden in Lionhead (Shitou) community, Pingtung, p.CR1
MSD, 30 Jan 2005, The Chief of the Seventh River Bureau urges collaboration across departments to achieve New River Movement, p. CR2
[34] EDN, 9 April 1994, Ministry of Economic Affairs makes a ten-year plan of water resource development project, p. 10
UEN, 18 April 1994 Meinung people refuse dam construction. Hundreds of civilians present a petition to Legislators, p. 06
MSD, 08 Oct 1995, International scholars urge the restoration of 'the fountain of lives'- the Kaoping River- in the south, p.18
MSD, 02 May 1997, Go fish watching in the Donggang Creek, p.28
MSD, 14 June 1997, Niao Song wetland embodies the dream of conservationism, p.41
MSD, 17 Nov 1998, Conservationists try canoeing in the Donggang Creek and watch rich ecology, p.17
UDN, 16 April 2000, Building Hundred-miles wetland to alternate dam projects for water resources, p.19
MSD, 29 May 2000, Meinung urges to preserve the landscape of the County of Tobacco, p. 3
UDN, 08 Dec 2000, West wetland beside the Donggang Creek resides rich ecology and is being designed as an education park, p.18
UDN, 13 Aug 2002, the Kaoping River increases one ecological park in Kaohsiung County, p. 18
MSD, 24 Dec 2002, Wetlands Taiwan regenerates Chou-chai wetland, the first wetland in Kaohsiung City, to create an ecologic paradise, p.CR2
MSD, 08 Feb 2004, Tobacco Making Tower in Meinung transformed into education center, p. CR1
UDN, 26 March 2004, Eight hundred school teachers and students move classrooms and cycle to the wetland part beside the Kaoping River, p.B1
MSD, 15 July 2004, Festival of Yellow Butterfly in Meinung opens, p. CR2
MSD, 24 April 2005, Flood detention pond in Kaohsiung City transformed to ecologic paradise, p.CR1

### 4.4.1 Water Defence

Water Defence was a series of water environment restoration campaigns initiated by environmental organisations. Traditionally, Taiwan's policy of water resource development had been monopolised by technocrats in central government (Chang, 2001). There were few citizens' voices in the development of policy until civil society mobilised against the exploitation of water sources from the Kaoping River. The mobilisation was a response to the water crisis which had emerged in the 1980s. A series of water development projects were set up to tackle a shortage of water to supply the expansion of the petrochemical industry (Tseng, 1995d). The water resource development projects had two phases and each initiated different waves of protests. The first phase, from 1992 to 2000, aimed to build two dams called Meinung and Majia. The second phase, from 2002 to 2007, included a twenty-mile trans-basin diversion plan and a seventy-hectare reservoir construction project (Huang, 1995). Both phases were located in areas inhabited by minority groups and indigenous tribes.

The Meinung and Majia dam projects were to be sited in the upstream areas of the Kaoping River where the Hakka and Lukai minority groups have resided for generations and this proposal raised questions of fair access to environmental justice. An advocacy coalition formed by environmental NGOs and ethnic groups started the first wave of protest against the dam projects. Instead of the dam supplying more water, the coalition suggested river restoration to preserve water resources. This included removing livestock farms, cleaning river flats, regenerating wetlands and regulating industrial and domestic pollution. This water protection campaign formed the largest coalition in Taiwan's environmental movement. Its members continuously mobilised to resist pressure from above, while at the same time they allied with local government officials to produce proposals for alternative development projects to improve water quality and its natural resources. The end of the first phase of the water protection campaign arrived eight years later, in 2000, when the opposition party (DPP) won the presidential election. They promised to abolish both the water resource development projects and the plan to expand the

petrochemical industry. The new administration also accepted the conservation suggestion of a ‘Hundred-Mile Wetland’ advocated by civil campaigners (Tseng, 2000).

Around that same year, the central government accepted alternative plans, including a three-mile Chi-San trans-basin diversion to an under-utilised dam located in another river basin, and moved the drinking-water pumping site to an upstream clean water source area. Civil campaigners pragmatically agreed to these alternatives which temporarily eased the tension that had arisen from the urban population’s demand for better water quality and more reliable supplies (Peng, 2006). The temporary cessation of water tension led to a transformation in the nature of the protests among environmental organisations. Those organisations, in the first wave of Water Defence, turned to community involvement and away from confrontational actions. Activists returned to their communities to promote several wildlife habitat reconstruction projects and community environmental improvement campaigns. Several wetlands were regenerated, as a response to the call for a ‘Hundred-Mile Wetland’ (Tseng, 1995c; Tseng, 1996). Two hundred and fifty hectares of wetland were regenerated via intense collaboration between environmental organisations and frontline officials. In doing so, environmental groups bridged government and local networks, negotiating public funding to aid local initiatives. These environmental organisations empowered local communities to take action on local environmental restoration. The empowerment included assisting local communal actors to build consensus over conservation plans and to re-direct government funding for local actions relating to landscape and water environment preservation linked to local culture (Huang, 2006a).

In contrast to the achievements of the first wave of Water Defence, the second wave barely made any progress despite its extensive coalition. The second phase of water resource development projects stimulated a new wave of environmental protests led by a group of fundamentalist environmentalists who allied themselves with indigenous tribes threatened by the projects (Li, 2006a). The environmentalists from the first phase also supported them. Three governors of southern counties all stood by them and declared their opposition to the development projects. Even though the authority (i.e. Democratic Progressive Party) at that time was pro-environment

(Participant observation: 2006-7-12), the second phase water development project survived domestic opposition. Very often, international economic pressure was used as an excuse by the government to promote development projects. Nevertheless, the alternatives advocated by environmental organisations were also incorporated into water resource policy (Huang, 2006b; Ting, 2006).

This research has examined in detail the collaborative actions undertaken between environmental organisations and the government in the two phases of Water Defence. Three major action groups of this campaign were selected as examples, namely Wetlands Taiwan, Blue Donggang Creek Conservation Association, and Meinung People's Association.

Table 4. 1: Examples of Water Defence

| Organisation | Location | Action | Result |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Wetlands Taiwan | Kaohsiung City | Wetland restoration | Restored more than 200 hectares of wetland and created a series of urban wetland corridors |
| Blue Donggang Creek Conservation Association | Pingtung County | Community environmental improvements | Established a network which consisting of more than 100 grassroots groups to conduct local environmental improvements |
| Meinung People's Association | Kaohsiung County | Minority ethnic community culture and environmental preservation | Conducted projects of local ethnic culture, landscape and water environment preservation |

### 4.4.2 Riverfront Adoption

Riverfront Adoption was a collaborative action initiated by the local bureaucrats in the Seventh River Bureau, a local branch of the central river administration[35], to encourage citizens to participate in the regeneration and maintenance of neighbourhood riverside green spaces. The first example was established in 1997. This action programme aimed to tackle the problem of riverbank deterioration. Local county governments were originally the authorities that owned the jurisdiction of river management, but they failed to manage the riverbank well due to a shortage of river patrol crews. The Seventh River Bureau withdrew the legal responsibility from the local authorities and launched a series of clean-up actions[36]. Among these actions, illegal gravel mining was banned and more than a million tons of garbage and contaminated waste were removed from the riverbank. The Bureau improved the aesthetics of the riverfront after each clean-up action[37] and launched a strategy called 'Riverfront Adoption', by which to encourage local participation in the maintenance of riverfront greenery. The Bureau authorised villagers to use publicly-owned riverfront places to create green spaces, for example by planting trees, and keeping the amenity of the green spaces intact. The aims were to meet the needs of local communities, to reduce the cost of riverfront maintenance and to prevent riverbank deterioration from occurring again.

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[35] UDN, 16 Aug 2000, Seventh River Bureau expands the action of transforming river bank, p. 18

[36] UDN, 10 Feb 1999, Large amount of mercury contaminated soil found in Kaoping River bank, p. 01
UDN, 10 April 1999, Old Iron Bridge area listed Highly Contaminated Area, p. 8
MSB, 5 Oct 1999, Seventh River Bureau aims to clean up contaminated area in the Kaoping River banks and investigate the whole river basin, p. 39
UDN, 19 April 2000, Six thousands barrels of contaminated waste in the riverfront of Old Iron Bridge area were cleaned up, p. 18
UDN, 9 June 2000, Thirty six duck farms were expelled from the riversides of the Kaoping River, p. 18
UDN, 1 Aug 2000, Seventeen contaminated sites found in the Kaoping River banks, p. 19

[37] UND, 21 Jan 2001, Seventh River Bureau and Kaohsiung county government cooperate to transform Old Iron Bridge area into water accessible park, p. 17
UND, 2 Jan 2002, Kaohsiung county government aims to wholly convert the high tidal flats of the Kaoping River, p. 17
UDN, 11 July 2002, Two landfill sites in the Kaoping River bank begins to convert into riverfront parks, p.18
UDN, 11 Jan 2003, The first riverside wetland park in Pingtung county was born, p.17
UDN, 25 Sep 2005, 112.5 hectares of riverside wetland park in Kaohsiung county was born, p. C1

The government actions transformed the riverbank from a no-go area to a pleasant water environment[38] and encouraged villagers to engage in the management of the local environment[39]. One commercial association even adopted one section of the riverfront[40]. The Bureau officials supported villagers in their attempts to organise themselves and gradually, this strategy attracted dozens of community associations[41]. Adopters were required to beautify the riverfront by planting trees, mowing grass, cleaning up garbage and constructing rest areas[42]. The riverside green space became a major recreation area for rural villagers. Enjoying a walk along the riverbank and watching the sunset became popular daily activities for local residents[43]. The policy won unprecedented popularity because Taiwan's rural areas usually lacked green spaces for recreation. Some of the groups mobilised approximately one hundred villager volunteers monthly to maintain the riverfront. The Riverfront Adoption catalysed community-building and made local residents proud of their own communities. This pattern of cooperation between the bureau and communities gradually expanded to the whole river basin[44].

About twenty community associations have adopted their nearby riverfronts (Huang, 2006a). Among them, the most well-known with the most information available on their activities are A-Ligang[45], Old Iron Bridge[46], Chung-yun community

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[38] The transformed river section was 41.6 kilometre long.
See UDN, 31 July 2003, River bank transformed into green space range from A-Ligang to Sandimen, p. B1;
UDN, 30 Nov 2002, Two hundred staff of River Bureau witness and learn the new river bank culture- River Adoption- in A Ligang, p. 18

[39] UDN, 10 March 2006, Hundred members of A-Ligang Environmental Greenery Association adopt and beautify neighbourhood river bank, p. C1
UDN, 30 Nov 2002, Two hundred staff of River Bureau witness and learn the new river bank culture- River Adoption- in A Ligang, p. 18

[40] UDN, 16 Feb 2004, Sand and Stone Association adopts riverfront, and no-go area becomes public park, p. B1
UDN, 4 Jan 2003, Gravel businessman adopt riverfront and create 12-hectored park, p. 17
UDN, 16 March 2000, Pingtung Sand and Stone Association adopts a riverbank section near gravel production area, p. 18

[41] UDN, 7 Sep 2001, A hundred people from Wandan township witness and learn River Adoption in A-Ligang for community building, p. 18

[42] UDN, 22 Nov 2005, Villagers in A-Ligang put effort and resource into riverfront transformation, p. C4
UDN, 28 Nov 2008, Volunteers in Old Iron Bridge patrol the riverfront twice a day to keep the green and water environment pleasant, p. C1

[43] UDN, 15 Oct 2000, Kaoping riverfront green – a popular recreation area, p.18
UDN, 24 Feb 2000, Kaoping River bank sides – the best location for flying kites, p.20

[44] UDN, 16 Dec 2000, River Bureau chief attributes the transformation of river bank to local adoptive actions, p. 18
UDN, 7 April 2000, Twenty Riverfront greens competing for the best riverfront area, p. 18

[45] UDN, 16 Dec 2000, River Bureau chief attributes the transformation of river bank to local adoptive actions, p. 18

associations[47], and Pingtung Sand and Stone Association[48], and they were selected as examples to study.

Table 4. 2: Examples of Riverfront Adoption

| Community | Location | Action | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Old Iron Bridge community | Kaohsiung County | Adopting Kaoping riverfront green space | 32.5 hectares of riverfront green space was well maintained by a local community association and became popular among the regional population |
| A-Ligang community | Pingtung County | Adopting Kaoping riverfront green space | 10 hectares of riverfront green space was created and maintained by a local community association |
| Chung-yun community | Kaohsiung County | Adopting Kaoping riverfront mangrove forest | 4.5 hectares of mangrove were planted and continuously taken care of by local school teachers and students |
| Pingtung Sand and Stone Association | Pingtung County | Adopting Kaoping riverfront green space | 12 hectares of riverfront green space was created and maintained by a commercial union |

UDN, 22 Nov 2005, Villagers in A-Ligang put effort and resource into riverfront transformation, p. C4

[46] UDN, 1 Sep, 2006, Old Iron Bridge Association established to adopt the neighbourhood riverfront, p. C1
UDN, 13 Oct 2007, Volunteers of Old Iron Bridge Association sell coffee to get money for maintaining riverfront green, p. C1
UDN, 28 Nov 2008, Volunteers in Old Iron Bridge patrol the riverfront twice a day to keep the green and water environment pleasant, p. C1

[47] UDN, 13 March 2000, Families replant mangroves in the mouth of the Kaoping River
UDN, 5 Dec 2001, Kaohsiung county governor witnesses the conservation result of mangrove in the mouth of the Kaoping River, C1
UDN, 23 Oct 2002, Chung-yun community school use mangrove ecology as teaching materials, p. 19
UDN, 21 Jan 2003, Chung-yun community successful conserve 5 hectares of various mangroves and establish Ecological Conservation Area, p. 18
UDN, 8 Dec 2005, Chung-yun community pupils interpret the ecology of river mangroves to visitors, p. C2
UDN, 30 Nov 2006, Two thousand school pupils join Mangrove Day hold by Chung-yun Mangrove Conservation Association, p. C2

[48] UDN, 16 Feb 2004, Sand and Stone Association adopts riverfront, and no-go area becomes public park, p. B1
UDN, 4 Jan 2003, Gravel businessman adopt riverfront and create 12-hectored park, p. 17
UDN, 16 March 2000, Pingtung Sand and Stone Association adopts a riverbank section near gravel production area, p. 18

### 4.4.3 River Enclosure

River Enclosure was a spontaneous action against exploitative fishing. It was initiated by the most disadvantaged ethnic groups in Taiwan- the indigene[49]. Riverside indigene traditionally owned their nearby rivers and the right to manage them based on a clan system[50] (Tang and Lu, 2002; Yen and Kuan, 2004) in which voluntary labour was mobilised by the call of village heads. Most River Enclosure actions are located near to the river source where tributaries are less polluted and ecologically rich (Chen and Fang, 1994). The River Enclosure movement was a reaction to the issue of exploitative fishing (though not illegal behaviour), especially by external fish poachers, in most tributaries of the river (Lu, 2001, 2004). The enclosure initiative aimed to 'conserve fish ecology by totally prohibiting fishing by both outsiders and locals' (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02).

The major issue for the indigenes was the elimination of their rights to manage the river by the government and an insufficient number of government patrollers to prevent abusive use of the river. Since the late nineteenth century, the hunting and farming territories of indigenous people were taken over by the colonial government of Japan, and this continued under the Kuomintang (KMT) regime, which retreated from China in 1947. Most of the indigenes' traditional territories were under the supervision and management of the state apparatus. Only part of the land was designated as a reserve to support their livelihoods based on agriculture and fishing. This policy ruined their traditional clan-based mechanisms of common management of natural resources and their traditional lifestyle (Wang, 1999). As a consequence, indigenous people became passive about their ownership and stewardship of the environment. This passive attitude and the inability of state bureaucrats to manage the vast natural resources of these areas resulted in the degradation of river quality

[49] There are twelve indigenous tribal groups in Taiwan with a population of 0.43 million, about 1.9% of the national population. Their lifestyle and cultures are discernibly different from the vast majority of the Han population originating from China, and are comparatively disadvantaged economically, socially as well as politically. In the Kaoping River basin, four tribes of indigenes (including the Bunun, Tsou, Paiwan and Lukai ethnic groups) live in the remote mountain areas.

[50] UDN, 2002-10-16, Villagers' voluntary labour mobilised to rebuild the river environment and fish-watch path in Koushe village, P. 18
UDN, 2003-11-18, Laiyi village applies for River Enclosure and forms patrol team to stop fish exploitation, but traditional rules of river ownership becomes a barrier, p. B2

and over fishing[51]. For several decades, abusive fishing, including electrifying, poisoning and explosives, prevailed in the upstream area to satisfy tourist consumption[52] (Lu, 2001; Tang and Lu, 2002; Lu, 2004; Liang, 2005, 2006).

Today, the indigenes' livelihoods do not wholly rely on income from river fishing, but the general degradation of the environment has increased the indigenes' grievances against outsiders and the dominant political regime. For more than a century, the modern state apparatus had precluded the indigenous population from managing their traditional territory. At least the policy of River Enclosure represents, though not exactly in return for their land rights, recognition of the need to incorporate local knowledge and local involvement in the river management.

The first example of River Enclosure, named Dannayiku, in San-mei Village, central-Taiwan, was successfully established in 1990[53] and legalised in 1995. The action was initially illegal[54] because it challenged the jurisdiction of the central government, but it was later legalised based on Fishery Law because of its significant results in river restoration (Lu, 2001, 2004; Liang, 2005, 2006)[55].

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[51] http://www.e-tribe.org.tw/tanayigu/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabId=181 captured at 03 January 2008

[52] UDN, 2002-02-26, Jhuokou Creek applies River Enclosure for two years and township office form a patrol team to stop fish exploitation, p. 18

UDN, 2004-02-21, Having practiced River Enclosure for two years, fish exploitation is still prevalent in Jhuokou Creek, p. B1

UDN, 2004-07-14, Koushe villagers protect Sagaran creek from fish depredation, typhoon and deforestation, P. B2

UDN, 2004-07-14, Poisoning fish event aroused River Enclosure, Koushe villagers protect Sagaran Creek, p. B2

UDN, 2006-07-05, River Enclosure and patrolling for a year in Sanhe Creek, Liugui Township, Kaohsiung County, have successfully recovered fish ecology, p. C1

UDN, 2000-08-22, River enclosure in the Namasia reaches successful conservation, open for fishing next month, p.18

[53] UDN, 2003-10-22, Dannayiku experience of fish conservation becomes a legend among the indigenous society, p. A11

[54] In Taiwan, jurisdiction over the rivers belonged to the government, and therefore River Enclosure was illegal when it was first initiated. It was later legalised because of its significant results in river restoration.

[55] There were two methods to legalise the River Enclosure. The first was to assign the River Enclosure sections as Wildlife Protection Areas (WPAs) based on Wildlife Protection Law; the second was to prove River Enclosure actions based on Fishery Law. Both required the political support of the local township offices and county governments in order to announce the scope and duration of River Enclosure (Lu, 2001, 2004). There was only one case of River Enclosure in Taiwan which applied the first method because under this law the income from issuing fishing licenses was only allowed to be used for conservation purposes, while the second method was more widely applied because of its flexibility in terms of land use and arrangement of income from issuing fishing licenses, e.g. public welfare, infrastructures, annual festivals and so on (Lu, 2001,2004). Fishery Law was a law initially established in 1929 to protect marine fishery resources, but it was ignored due to a

Around the year 2000, River Enclosure became a widespread reaction by indigenous villagers to prohibit fishing in their river sections and to conserve the ecology [56]. In order to start practising River Enclosure, which demanded mobilisation of every household, a consensus had to be passed in a village meeting, usually with all political leaders agreeing to the plan. With the River Enclosure, tribal villagers blockaded access to the tributaries and set up twenty-four hour patrols and prohibited any fishing behaviour during the set period of River Enclosure[57]. Every household was obliged to send one representative to join the patrol team. All fishing methods were strictly forbidden during the approved periods of River Enclosure, which ranged from one to five years[58].

River Enclosure won public praise and state recognition because of its unprecedented success in improving fish ecology and promoting of community consolidation (Lu, 2001, 2004; Tang and Lu, 2002; Liang, 2005, 2006). The government incorporated River Enclosure into its river management policy in 2003 and promoted it elsewhere[59], even though it conflicted with the jurisdiction of the

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lack of enforcement. This law was later applied to river fishery resources in 1995 and gained weight because of the rise of the movement of River Enclosure.

[56] UDN, 22 Aug 2000, River enclosure in the Namasia reaches successful conservation, open for fishing next month, p.18.
UDN, 30 Nov 2001, Jhuokou creek in Maolin to be enclosed for two years, p.18.
UDN, 26 Dec 2001, Laonung creek to be enclosed for one year, p.19.
UDN, 19 Oct 2002, Lagus creek to be enclosed for one year, p.18.
UDN, 4 April 2003, Ailiao southern and northern creek extended enclosure for one and a half years, p. B2
UDN, 16 July 2003, River enclosure of Nasadulu creek in Sanmin township preserve an ecology refugee, p. B2
UDN, 19 July 2003, Six creeks in Sandimen township will be enclosed, p.B2

[57] UDN, 2002-10-19, Fish conservation in Lagus Creek kicks off, thirty villagers form patrol team, p. 18
UDN, 2003-07-16, Volunteers watch over Nasadulu creek and made it an Eden garden, p. B2
UDN, 2003-11-18, Laiyi village applies for River Enclosure and forms patrol team to stop fish exploitation, but traditional rules of river ownership becomes a barrier, p. B2
UDN, 2006-07-05, River Enclosure and patrolling for a year in Sanhe Creek, Liugui Township, Kaohsiung County, have successfully recovered fish ecology, p. C1
UDN, 2002-10-16, Villagers' voluntary labour mobilised to rebuild the river environment and fish-watch path in Koushe village, P. 18

[58] The time length of the River Enclosure depended on how long the local township offices approved it, some even announced indefinite duration of the River Enclosure, e.g. Mintzu village. No one, outsiders or locals, were allowed to fish in the enclosed rivers. Violators risked arrest by police and/or a fine between US $1,000-5,000. Usually, within six months of enclosure, the river ecology could be successfully restored.

[59] UDN, 2001-12-26, Laonong creek will be closured based on Namasia model, P. 19
UDN, 2002-01-01, Laonong Creek applies River Enclosure and Jhuokou will follow, p.20
UDN, 2002-04-20, Successful river protection in Wutai faces difficulty to continue due to the end of paid patroller employment, P.18
UDN, 2002-11-19, Mudan Township office promotes River Enclosure, p. 18
UDN, 2003-04-29, Yila and Dawu continues the River Enclosure and preserves river wildlife, P. B2

Forest Bureau, and the legalisation of River Enclosure has still continued to arouse debate from time to time (Tang and Lu, 2002)[60]. In 2005 and 2006, the government funded environmental NGOs to hold two forums over the agenda of River Enclosure and Fish Protection to deliberate on how to improve related policies[61].

The importance of conservation and the benefit of economic rewards enabled the River Enclosure movement to spread to many indigenous communities throughout Taiwan. Local township offices approved most applications for River Enclosure. The central governmental agencies also provided various forms of financial support to encourage more indigenous villagers to make the initial move towards River Enclosure[62]. By 2006 there were 86 rivers practising River Enclosure in Taiwan, with most of them joining this movement between 2000 and 2006[63]. Eleven rivers

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UDN, 2003-04-04, River Enclosure presents prominent results, Ailiao southern and northern creek extended, P. B2
UDN, 2003-07-19, Six rivers in Sandimen township will be closured. All fishing methods will be forbidden, P. B2
UDN, 2003-11-04, Wanan community practices River Enclosure without applying government permission, anglers complained to township office, p. B2
UDN, 2003-11-18, Laiyi village applies for River Enclosure and forms patrol team to stop fish exploitation, but traditional rules of river ownership becomes a barrier, p. B2
UDN, 2003-11-22, Wutai tourism package presents the result of the River Enclosure in Yila village, p. B3
UDN, 2004-01-06, Six Creeks in Mudan Township, Pingtung County, practice River Enclosure, p. B2
UDN, 2004-02-26, Laiyi and Taiwu Township offices apply River Enclosure in their jurisdictions, p. B2
UDN, 2005-07-14, Four creeks in Chunri Township, Pingtung County, apply River Enclosure and river patrol for a year to recover fish ecology, p. C2
UDN, 2003-04-29, Ailiao southern and northern creek extended enclosure for one and a half years, p. B2

[60] See also interview: 033, 2006-12-02; participant observation: 24-25 June 2006.

[61] This first government-funded conference gave recognition to the results of the movement of River Enclosure and raised several issues which needed to be addressed for the future development of the movement. The first was to define the purpose of the River Enclosure, ecologic conservation or economic development. The second was to delimit the right of recreational fishing. The third was to clarify the ambiguous part of Fishery Law which related to River Enclosure (Participant observation: 24-25 June 2006).

[62] The government funding sources included Demonstrative Tribe Project in Council of Indigenous Peoples, Executive Yuan, Autonomic Tribe Project Council of Indigenous Peoples, Executive Yuan, River Protection Project in Council of Indigenous Peoples, Executive Yuan, Multiple Employment Project in Council of Labour Affairs, Executive Yuan, Community Forestry Project in Forestry Bureau, Council of Agriculture, Community Building Project in Construction and Planning Agency, Ministry of the Interior. The financial support, included funding for paid river patrollers, environmental improvement projects, and community development projects, aimed to help poor tribal communities to continue practising River Enclosure and Fish Protection, and hopefully develop local eco-tourism industries.

[63] http://e-info.org.tw/node/9803 and Forest Bureau, Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan (2006). The Current State of River Conservation and Promotion. Forum of River Enclosure and Fish Conservation, 24-25/6/2006, Taipei, Society of Streams Taiwan, ROC.p.8-11. This related to the new

in the Kaoping River basin were among them. In order to study the process of developing a collaborative relationship with the state, this research selected the seven most well-known cases, successes or failures, in the Kaoping River basin as examples, namely Gaujung[64], Koushe[65], Dashe, Mintzu[66], Fushing[67], Maolin[68], and Minchiuan[69] Villages. These cases were also chosen because of their difference in locations and social composition (see Section 5.1 in Chapter Five for details), which provides a basis for comparative study between them.

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regime started in 2000 which gave recognition to indigene's right over traditional territory (Chao, 2005).

[64] UDN, 2004-2-18, Promoting eco-tourism in Lagus and Tataparu Creeks should limit total tourist numbers for sustainability, p. B1
UDN, 2004-3-23, Gaujung community has protected Tataparu Creek for a year and is now promoting eco-tourism, p. B2

[65] UDN, 2002-08-29, Deforestation prevails in the upstream area of Koushe village and causes landslides, P. 17
UDN, 2002-09-04, Protecting Sagaran for nine months, Koushe village recovers river ecology, p.17
UDN, 2004-07-14, Koushe villagers protect Sagaran creek from fish depredation, typhoon and deforestation, P. B2
UDN, 2004-07-14, Poisoning fish event aroused River Enclosure, Koushe villagers protect Sagaran Creek, p. B2
UDN, 2002-10-16, Villagers' voluntary labour mobilised to rebuild the river environment and fish-watch path in Koushe village, P. 18
UDN, 2005-10-07, Koushe encounters typhoons destroying tourist facilities, P. C3

[66] UDN, 2003-07-16, Volunteers watch over Nasadulu creek and make it an Eden garden, p. B2

[67] UDN, 2004-2-18, Promoting eco-tourism in Lagus and Tataparu Creeks should limit total tourists number for sustainability, p. B1
UDN, 2002-10-19, Lagus creek to be enclosed for one year, p.18

[68] UDN, 2002-01-10, Jhuokou creek in Maolin will be closured for two years, P. 18
UDN, 2002-01-13, Kaohsiung County governor listens to a briefing of how Maolin Scenic Area will develop eco-tourism, P. 18
UDN, 2002-01-31, Wang, an non-indigenous, guarding Jhuokou creek conservation in indigenous village, P. 20
UDN, 2002-02-26, Jhuokou Creek applies River Enclosure for two years and township office form a patrol team to stop fish exploitation, p. 18
UDN, 2004-02-21, Having practiced River Enclosure for two years, fish exploitation is still prevalent in Jhuokou Creek, p. B1
UDN, 2001-11-30, Jhuokou creek in Maolin to be enclosed for two years, p.18.

[69] UDN, 2000-08-22, Namasia successfully restores river fish and will open application for fishing license, P. 18
UDN, 2003-04-29, Namasia will hold River Festival to celebrate successful river conservation, P. B2
UDN, 2003-08-13, Minchiuan holds an river festival to celebrate successful conservation, P. B1
UDN, 2000-08-22, River enclosure in the Namasia reaches successful conservation, open for fishing next month, p.18.

Table 4. 3: Examples of River Enclosure

| Village | Location | Action | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Koushe Village | Pingtung County | Protecting a tributary of the Kaoping River-Sagaran | Protecting an 8-kilometre long river section after a fish-pirating event in 2001<br><br>Consolidated villagers' collective action against outside fish poachers and won different kinds of support from central government, NGOs and scholars who helped them develop eco-tourism |
| Dashe Village | Pingtung County | Protecting a tributary of the Kaoping River-Davalan | Protecting a 20-kilometre long river section and combining river enclosure with an ethnic culture movement since 1994<br><br>Insufficient resources and outside support to sustain protection action due to remote location, unreliable telecommunications and inaccessibility |
| Gaujung Village | Kaohsiung County | Protecting a tributary of the Kaoping River-Tataparu | Protecting a 10-kilometre long river section since 2002<br><br>Considered one of the most successful examples of River Enclosure and won government grants to improve the environment for eco-tourism |
| Mintzu Village | Kaohsiung County | Protecting a tributary of the Kaoping River-Nasadulu | Protecting a 10-kilometre long river section since 1998<br><br>Issuing fishing licences and brought economic rewards to the village; however the prosperity did not last long due to a lack of outside support from the local government office |
| Minchiuan Village | Kaohsiung County | Protecting a tributary of the Kaoping River-Namasia | Protecting a 20-kilometre long river section since 1990<br><br>The earliest example of River Enclosure because it is within a designated Wildlife Protection Area; but this also led to a lack of villagers' spontaneity to participate in River Enclosure actions |
| Maolin | Kaohsiung | Protecting a tributary of the | Protecting a 20-kilometre long |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Village | County | Kaoping River-Jhuokou | river section since 1995<br>The only case not launched by indigenous people and refused government subsidy, thus remaining a small scale action |
| Fushing Village | Kaohsiung County | Protecting a tributary of the Kaoping River-Lagus | Protecting a 20 kilometre long river section since 1995<br>A case that failed to develop the River Enclosure movement and eco-tourism because landslides struck the river section they were protecting in 2004 and 2005 |

## 4.5 Conclusion

This chapter explained the empirical context to the case studies, including the political-economic context of Taiwan since World War II, the institutionalisation and development of Taiwan's environmental governance, the origin of state-society cooperation and the institution of river governance. There are three reasons why this research emphasises the importance of contextualising the study of collaborative river governance. The first is that the existing literature has neglected the context of the emergence of collaborative governance. The second is that critical realism emphasises the empirical spatial and temporal scale of particular social events, in which the researcher must explore the underlying mechanism and contextual contingencies. The third is that an aim of this research is to explore how collaborative governance in the East Asian context differs from that of the West.

This chapter highlighted how collaborative governance emerged from the transition of Taiwan's political economy from an authoritarian rule, giving priority to economic development, to a political climate which is more democratic and sympathetic to environmental concerns. Under pressure from political protests, the state opened up the space for public participation in the processes of policymaking and implementation. The social actors themselves also transformed their strategy from one of confrontation to one of collaboration as a pragmatic choice to increase the effectiveness of environmental management.

Regarding the three case studies, this chapter only provides a preliminary introduction which is linked to their wider backgrounds. More detailed information is provided in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, which focus on each one of the case studies.

# Chapter 5 Case Studies: River Enclosure

## 5.1 Introduction

During the last two decades, the management of the Kaoping River basin has been reshaped by various forms of collaborative governance. Initiators in these alternative governance forms have ranged from indigenes, lay villagers, non-governmental organisations, and local-based government agencies. This chapter focuses on one of them, the indigene, to see how they launched a bottom-up River Enclosure movement (see Section 4.4.3 for an introduction), which was a strategic collective action to recover river ecology that had deteriorated due to over-fishing. In the end, River Enclosure became an innovative form of governance capable of tackling environmental issues. The types of action they took spread to the whole island and led to government recognition of the role of lay villagers in governing rivers.

In this chapter, Section 5.2 introduces the selected examples of River Enclosure and their differentiation. Section 5.3 lays out seven preliminary findings of this case study. Section 5.4 concludes this chapter with reflections on how its findings rewrite the original model of environmental collaborative governance.

## 5.2 Examples of River Enclosure

This research has selected seven examples of locations that have practised River Enclosure, namely Gaujung, Koushe, Dashe, Mintzu, Minchiuan, Maolin, and Fushing villages (See Figure 5.1 for their sites). Each one sheds a different light on the process (see Table 5.1). The following is a brief introduction to the selected villages.

Table 5. 1 Examples of River Enclosure and their characteristics*

| Village | Starting year/ length | Motivation | Accessibility** | Leadership/ institution | Faction politics*** | Social capital/ resources/ capacity **** | Initiation approach | Process summary | Outcomes ***** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gaujung | 2002 | Protecting environment and developing eco-tourism | Easy | Church priest | Not obvious | High social capital as well as capacity | Endogenous | Spontaneous RE actions were considered one of the best examples, but government intervention with good intention turned out to reduce the spontaneity | Good |
| Koushe | 2001 | Halting abusive fishing and developing eco-tourism | Easy | Political faction leader | Obvious | High social capital, resources and capacity | Endogenous | Spontaneous RE actions were considered one of the best examples and thus acquired significant resources from both the state and society for developing eco-tourism, but was divided by faction politics | Good |
| Dashe | 1994 | Protecting neighbouring environment and developing eco-tourism | Difficult | Ethnic movement and Political leader | Not obvious | High social capital but low capacity and resources | Endogenous | Spontaneous RE actions in combination with ethnic movement, but acquired few outside resources due to geographic remoteness | Medium |
| Mintzu | 1998 | Protecting neighbouring environment and developing eco-tourism | Easy | Clan leader | Obvious | High social capital | Endogenous | Spontaneous RE actions with an interest in the economic rewards which turned out to be less than expected, and thus caused the reduction of RE | Medium |
| Minchiuan | 1990 | Being designated as Wildlife Protection Area (WPA) which | Easy | Political faction leader | Obvious | Low social capital | Exogenous | RE action as an response to the designation of WPA led to government-oriented action rather than citizen-oriented | Medium |

| | | prohibited fishing and developing eco-tourism | | | | | | spontaneous action, but major actors are good at acquiring government grants | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Maolin | 1997 | Being designated as Scenic Area and Protecting neighbouring environment | Easy | Environmental activist | Not obvious | Lower social capital | Endogenous | Spontaneous action organised by outsider activists rather than local indigenes, and led to community indifference and limited action | Medium |
| Fushing | 2001 | Protecting neighbouring environment and developing eco-tourism | Easy | Social leader | Not obvious | High social capital | Endogenous | Spontaneous RE action mainly for developing eco-tourism, once successful, but stricken by landslides which led to the end of the action | Poor |

* The evaluation part of this table is produced based on interview content. More details are revealed in the following section.
** Accessibility refers to the geographic accessibility of the village. Although most of the River Enclosure villages are located in mountain areas, some of them are more accessible than others. This factor has had a significant influence in their receipt of outside support and resources.
*** Faction politics refers to local political competition which often reduced the collective effort of River Enclosure to one faction against another in local environmental affairs.
****Social capital/resource/capacity these three items altogether refer to the resources that a village leader can mobilise. When a society's social capital is identified that means that the society retains networks, norms, and meditative mechanisms which facilitate the practice of the River Enclosure. Resources refer to labour and materials that are essential to the practice of River Enclosure. Capacity means, in particular, an organisation's administrative working skill or its adaptability to bureaucratic routines that relate to the long-term development of River Enclosure.
***** If the outcome of River Enclosure is identified as good that means that the collective enclosure action successfully recovered the fish ecology.

*Gaujung Village*

Gaujung village, with three tributaries of the Kaoping River passing through it, only chose one of them, Tataparu, in which to practice River Enclosure because of limited available labour. In 2002, the villagers reached a collective consensus to practice River Enclosure and initiated the action to conduct 24-hour river patrols[70]. 'Within a year the surrounding ecology recovered' (Interview: 035, 2006-12-4). The positive result of the local River Enclosure became a model for the local county governments, and a regional governors' summit took place there to learn about their conservation experience (Interview: 022, 2006-11-9)[71]. Every weekend several tourist coaches arrived either to appreciate the natural beauty or to learn about the experience.

At the beginning, a local Christian priest initiated the River Enclosure and then handed the leadership over to a local community development association (CDA). Because one of the core members in the association worked in the local township office and took charge of conservation affairs, this increased the local capacity in relation to River Enclosure administrative work, especially regarding government support (Interview: 035, 2006-12-4). The support consisted of a group of paid patrollers funded by the government for six to twelve months. However, this input reduced the spontaneity of the villagers in their support. 'Some villagers complained about why they had to patrol voluntarily while others got paid' (Interview: 035, 2006-12-4). In addition, the income from the eco-tour guides became mostly concentrated in the hands of the followers of the Director of the local CDA, and this also caused participants' discontent (Interview: 037, 2006-12-4).

*Koushe Village*

Koushe village is located beside one of the tributaries of the Kaoping River, Sagaran,

[70] http://www.nownews.com/2005/03/17/11060-1765945.htm,
http://www.ettoday.com/2004/03/27/738-1607338.htm,
http://www.wingfly.com.tw/tauyuan/main04.htm, http://www.wingfly.com.tw/tauyuan/main04.htm and
http://www.tncsec.gov.tw/b_native/index_view.php?act=home&c03=36&a01=0203&c04=2&num=1341 captured at 06 August 2006.

[71] http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/6/2/17/n1227505.htm captured at 06 August 2006.

which is eight kilometres long. Koushe villagers started the River Enclosure because of an outrageous event in 2001. The event took place when an annual Harvest Festival commenced and the villagers found the river fish had been taken by outside fishermen. The villagers were furious and responded to the call of the village chief to launch the River Enclosure[72]. During the first two years the villagers voluntarily embarked upon river patrols without any outside support or assistance. They patrolled twenty-four hours a day, and called for the mobilisation of obligatory labour to build wooden paths along the river in order to facilitate patrolling. Their action on river conservation gradually attracted the attention of outsiders (Interview: 010, 2006-10-17; 023, 2006-12-15).

In 2003, a group of urban environmentalists and scholars 'found' the spontaneous nature of the River Enclosure action of the villagers and the rich fish population the action had brought back. They were deeply impressed and volunteered to seek resources for the villagers. They helped Koushe to obtain the largest government grant among River Enclosure villages, US $340,000, for a three-year project to develop sustainable local tourism (Interview: 043, 2 Jan 2007). The grant was used to construct more facilities for both river patrolling and the development of tourism, including constructing more wooden paths, stone walls and river flats, and traditional raised cottages[73]. School students, tourists and local governmental officers came to witness their performance. Despite this, an internal struggle in the village followed the government's intervention. 'Non-paid volunteers withdrew from the collective effort and handed over the work of River Enclosure and tourism development to paid staff' (Interview: 042, 2007-1-2; 043, 2007-1-2). In other words, the River Enclosure gradually became 'institutionalised and professionalised and lay villagers became less involved and indifferent' (Interview: 043, 2 Jan 2007).

*Dashe Village*

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[72] UDN, 13 Aug 2003, Six rivers in Sandimen township conduct the River Enclosure, P. B2 http://www.ettoday.com/2003/07/08/738-1480417.htm and http://www.outgoing.idv.tw/travel_view/2004/09/20040926Korser/20040926KS.htm captured 06 Aug 2006.

[73] At the beginning, the outside funding consisted of small grants to develop river protection; later, the funding increased to US $ 340,000 for a three year project. With only 700 villagers, the grant was considered excessive in comparison to the average income of the local villagers. The head of the local CDA, who was the village chief at the same time, worked with his team to decide how to allocate the grant.

Dashe is situated along one of the tributaries of the Kaoping River, Davalan, which is approximately twelve kilometres long[74]. Possessing rich artistic culture, ethnic development awareness and renowned indigenous movement activists, Dashe villagers raised their 'awareness of river protection as a mechanism for tribal revival early in 1994' (Interview: 045, 2007-1-14). Dashe village has a strong community. For example, villagers exercised twenty-four hour patrols. When the government started to provide funding for River Enclosure patrollers, but with only a few day-time vacancies, Dashe villagers adapted well to the new policy design. Core members in Dashe coordinated wages and labour among paid and non-paid patrollers. This strategy avoided the negative impact of paid patrollers and staff which might discourage voluntary action as it had elsewhere. In addition, the village leadership (including the village chief, the director of the CDA and church leaders) cooperated in mobilising their constituents. The village issued recreational fishing licenses to outside anglers which brought several thousand US dollars annual income and generated greater vitality in the village. This encouraged the younger generation to return home from urban areas to volunteer, work and for recreation. The licensed income also financed public activities, e.g. the annual Harvest Festival. However, when the local township office transferred these paid patrollers to other villages, Dashe found it difficult to acquire alternative government resources partly because of their 'lack of modern abilities of administrative work, for example writing proposals to apply for governmental grants' (Interview: 044, 2007-1-14).

*Mintzu Village*

The River Enclosure movement in Mintzu aimed to protect a tributary of the Kaoping River called Nasadulu in order to develop eco-tourism for the future[75]. Mintzu is a comparatively small village and it was quite easy to build a consensus among the villagers. The local CDA coordinated local fishermen to join the action and earn their income from fish protection rather than the exploitation of the fish resources (Interview: 034, 2006-12-3). The former fishermen formed a patrol team

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[74] http://www.ettoday.com/2003/07/08/738-1480417.htm captured at 06 Aug 2006.
[75] UDN, 2003-07-16, Volunteers watch over Nasadulu creek and made it an Eden garden, p. B2 http://aborigine.kscg.gov.tw/tourism2_k.asp captured at Tuesday, 06 Aug 2006.

to conduct twenty-four hour monitoring of fishing activities. Before they could start issuing recreational fishing licenses, they charged a US $ 1 swimming fee per person. However, this income was not enough to satisfy the patrollers' needs for daily life and therefore several patrollers withdrew from the team (Interview: 033, 2006-12-2). Also, because the leader of this local CDA belonged to a different (political) faction from the upper level of the Sanmin township office, the village appeared to 'be more isolated from government resources' (Interview: 034, 2006-12-3). However, even though its scope on developing conservation and eco-tourism was small, the outcome influenced its neighbouring village, Minsan, to launch a river enclosure plan to protect its local creek.

*Minchiuan Village*

Minchiuan's history of practising River Enclosure dates back to 1990 and was the earliest example in the Kaoping River basin. Minchiuan Village protected one tributary of the river, Namasia, which is more than 20 kilometres long. Namasia was designated a Wildlife Protection Area which authorised the prohibition of fishing from the river, only opening for fishing in the non-breeding season[76]. But that was exclusively for regulated recreational fishing.

River Enclosure was called for by the local township office, i.e. from top-down, making it the first example of River Enclosure led by local government in the Kaoping River basin. The local township office provided the village chiefs in its jurisdiction US $3,000 a year to conduct river protection from abusive fishing. Within a year, the river ecology had fully recovered making it possible to open for recreational fishing on the condition of buying a fishing license. The fishing license system only lasted for two years due to the aftermath of typhoons, and the change of town mayor in 1998 led to the cessation of this policy. Nevertheless, 'the license issuing income reached US $ 84,000 and was spent on conservation expenses and still had some surplus in 2006' (Interview: 033, 2006-12-2). Unfortunately, people's

[76] UDN, 2000-8-22, Namasia successfully restores river fish, and will open application for fishing license, P. 18
UDN, 2001-12-26, Laonong creek will be closured based on Namasia model, P. 19
UDN, 2003-04-29, Namasia will hold River Festival to celebrate successful river conservation, P. B2
http://www.seewa.org.tw/kaoshung/spec.html, http://076701001.travel-web.com.tw/ and http://www.trongman.com.tw/abook/a070.HTM captured at 06 August 2006.

enthusiasm was depleted by local government intervention. The original team in the township office formed Minchiuan CDA and restarted the River Enclosure in 2004. This time they practised River Enclosure in one much smaller tributary of the Kaoping River, Natzilan, which is only three kilometres long. Although Natzilan was on a much smaller scale than the Namasia, there were two main reasons why the team moved there. One was that after the typhoons in 2004 and 2005, fish were only available in small creeks. The other was that it was much easier to build consensus and to practice twenty-four hour patrols in smaller villages.

*Maolin Village*

Maolin was the only case initiated by non-indigene in an indigenous village[77] that is also in a National Scenic Area. They protected one tributary of the Kaoping River, Jhuokou Creek. Although the regulation related to scenic areas they authorised the action of River Enclosure[78]. Two difficulties arose in the village. One was that the local villagers seemed indifferent to fish protection. The other was that the patrollers enlisted by environmental activists received little support from the management office of the National Scenic Area, partly because they were non-indigenous people (Interview: 039, 2006-12-5). Nevertheless, by 2006, Maolin Village had practised River Enclosure for more than a decade. One reason for this was that the head of this group of environmental activists was originally a local frontline government official who took charge of conservation, and even continued this work on a voluntary basis after his retirement. He called for collaboration between non-indigenous and indigenous people and by practising twenty-four hour patrolling, and slowly transferred the organisation to local indigenous people. However, due to their 'concerns over the constraint of government grants, they refused to accept subsidies from the government, preferring to raise funds from society' (Interview: 039, 2006-12-5). This meant that their scale of action remained small and mainly focused on education programmes.

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[77] UDN, 2002-1-31, Wang, an non-indigenous, guarding Jhuokou creek conservation in indigenous village, P. 20
UDN, 2002-1-13, Maolin Scenic Area will develop eco-tourism, P. 18
UDN, 2002-1-10, Jhuokou creek in Maolin will be closured for two years, P. 18

[78] http://www.maolin-nsa.gov.tw/maolin/ captured at 06 Aug 2006.

*Fushing Village*

Among the villages which practised River Enclosure, Fushing was the only one that did not apply for government subsidies and also the one stricken most seriously by landslides in 2004 and 2005, which resulted in the collapse of the patrol team. Most core members went back to agriculture or left for urban employment. Since 2001, Fushing Village has protected Lagus Creek, one tributary of the Kaoping River, seven kilometres long, via twenty-four hour patrols. They developed a tourist programme of creek tracing which was once popular[79]. Every week there were nearly a hundred visitors who brought in economic rewards for the villagers. The villagers formed a corporation consisting of twenty members. Each of them contributed US $30 per month as a membership fee to keep their qualification of being tour guides and to hire three paid patrollers (Interview: 038:2006-12-5). Their purpose for River Enclosure was mainly to develop tourism. However, after a year, the villagers found that they 'had difficulty paying the membership fee continuously, especially in the aftermath of strong typhoons in 2004 and 2005, which ruined the excitement and amenity of the river landscape' (Interview: 038:2006-12-5). Since then, tourists have stopped coming and the River Enclosure has been halted.

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79 http://www.tncsec.gov.tw/b_native/index_view.php?act=home&c03=36&a01=0203&c04=2&num=1341, http://www.wingfly.com.tw/tauyuan/main04.htm and http://traffic.kscg.gov.tw/CmsShow.aspx?Parm=20074214340890,2007327153636718,5 captured at 06 August 2006.




Figue 5. 1: The locations of the villages practising River Enclosure

## 5.3 Findings

In Chapter One, this thesis raised five research questions about collaborative environmental governance in Taiwan: (1) What have been the reasons that have motivated the emergence of environmental collaborative governance? (2) Have different approaches to initiating environmental collaborative governance led to different processes and results? (3) Does the emergence of environmental collaborative governance promise a new pattern for its long-term development through its institutionalisation within the policy structure generally? (4) What are the levels of transformability and constraints of collaborative governance in the context of Taiwan? (5) Does the current practice of collaborative governance in Taiwan result in a true transition of the state-society relationship or just a disguised form of corporatist strategy? In order to answer these research questions, each of the following sections, from Section 5.3.1 to 5.3.5, are devoted to them.

### 5.3.1. The reason motivating the emergence of environmental collaborative governance

There were mainly four reasons why, in the Kaoping River basin, indigenous people initiated River Enclosure. First, the degradation of the river environment and ecology triggered their collective grievance and provoked them to 'take action against abusive fishing behaviour, mainly by poachers' (Interviews: 033, 2006-12-02; 034, 2006-12-03; 035, 2006-12-04; 038, 2006-12-05; 042, 2007-01-02). Minchiuan[80] and Koushe[81] had similar dramatic experiences. A community leader in Minchiuan said:

> *'About a dozen years ago, our river fish were depredated and we were left with none. When I went fishing, what I could find was only garbage in the river.'* (Interview: 033, 2006-12-02)

[80] UDN 13 August 2003, Minchiuan holds an river festival to celebrate successful conservation, P. B1

[81] UDN 14 July 2004, Koushe villagers protect Sagaran creek from fish depredation, typhoon and deforestation, P. B2
UDN 19 July 2003, Six rivers in Sandimen township will be closured. All fishing methods will be forbidden, P. B2

A community leader in Koushe village described a similar situation:

*'On the day of our annual Harvest Festival in 2001, we found all river fish in our river had been harvested by poachers. All villagers were furious. At that moment I decided to launch River Enclosure and request my fellow villagers to volunteer for patrolling.'* (Interview: 042, 2007-01-02)

Another community leader in Mintzu village said:

*'In the old times, there were so many fish in our river that people did not dare to step in it. However, in the 1990s, fish started to disappear from the river and the wildlife in the surrounding environment had all been captured for sale. Therefore I made the decision to enact River Enclosure in order to recover the river ecology.'* (Interview: 034, 2006-12-03)

The second reason related to the geographic remoteness of the state as an environmental manager. The state took away the ownership and the rights of management of the indigene's traditional territories. However, the state apparatus did not function effectively because it was too far remote from the site and the environment kept deteriorating. Along with the democratisation of Taiwan's politics, the control over society loosened, making it possible for the indigenous people to seek a higher level of autonomy and regain the ownership of their surroundings. An indigenous township mayor described the effect of the state taking their traditional territory:

*'The Japanese and KMT colonial regimes had ruined our traditional system. Indigenous tribes had a system of managing traditional territory. We knew who each river section belonged to, and who it was managed by. However the government did not respect the indigenous system and allocated the jurisdiction of rivers to different bureaus...When river management was removed from indigenous institutions, numerous destructive events occurred. Even though the government established a lot of regulations, no one respected or followed the law…if the government can devolve some authority to the tribes, let tribal people protect and manage the environment, they will consolidate and discipline themselves… the result will be better for the environment as well as for the indigene.'* (Interview: 030, 2007-02-09)

A core member of the River Enclosure in Koushe Village explained how indigenous villages were invaded:

*'Since the government took over the jurisdiction of river management, the river valley was like an anarchic area. No one really cared about it.'* (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02)

*'The River Enclosure was closely linked to a resentment of outsiders who invaded indigene land. The outsiders behaved so brutally to the environment like no one lives here. Sometimes it was the government systematically exploiting our environmental resources like river dredging in order to acquire gravel for construction purposes. None of the locals were informed about these exploitative actions.'* (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02)

To some extent, the launch of River Enclosure was only possible in the late 1990s, because this generation still remembered their legacy of tribal norms and the lost beauty of nature. Community leaders in Dashe and Koushe said that:

*'The current generation still have the memory of rich river ecology that we used to have in the river. This is also the reason why they are full of longing to recover it and volunteer.'* (Interview: 044, 2007-01-14)

*'Tribal rules still exist in river management, but are not observed. For example only fish for what you need and no fishing in breeding season…the existence of a mechanism for voluntary labour for the common good was also key to the emergence of River Enclosure. People are still mindful that everyone is obliged to do voluntary service for the public if the leader requests it. River Enclosure is one of the products of traditional voluntary service.'* (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02)

Thirdly, because the first example of River Enclosure, Dannayiku, in central Taiwan, successfully developed eco-tourism which brought a fortune to the village, since then, the villagers who launched River Enclosure had the goal of improving the community economy, as at least one important objective. A core member in Fushing village said:

*'We heard the story of Dannayiku and how they successfully developed tourism by protecting fish, therefore we wanted to try, too. Our location*

*was as good as theirs.'* (Interviews: 038, 2006-12-05)

A community leader in Dashe Village described how the economic rewards of River Enclosure improved the village economy:

> *'After River Enclosure, we opened for fishing applications which brought job opportunities and cash to the village. The money went into public welfare and expenses. For example senior people did not have to pay for Harvest Festival anymore. They were very happy. The younger generation could get jobs in the village and did not have to leave home for the city. Families no longer had to be torn apart.'* (Interview: 044, 2007-01-14).

River Enclosure brought significant economic benefits[82] to Dashe village because of the development of community-run eco-tourism. Many other indigenous villages followed spontaneously and together they became an environmental movement (Liang, 2006)[83]. River Enclosure brought three types of economic reward. First, when the villagers successfully restored the river ecology, most of them expected to issue fishing licenses[84] because the income from them could significantly improve village finances (Participant observation: 2006-6-24/25). Secondly, by improving the aesthetic landscape of nearby rivers and its wildlife resources, the villages were able to attract tourists. Thirdly, when the government recognised the positive outcome of River Enclosure, they incorporated it into river policy and provided subsidies and government funded job opportunities to villages for developing eco-tourism.

The final reason builds upon the last. The government subsidy for practising River Enclosure motivated some of the villagers. A senior officer in Pingtung County government said that:

> *'Most River Enclosure in my county was not spontaneous action, just a few were, like Dashe and Koushe. We hired local unemployed to be paid patrollers and sent them to several township offices which applied for River Enclosure… The results depended on the executive ability of local*

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[82] In the first example of River Enclosure, the annual income of eco-tourism reached US $ 383,000 in 1999 and US $ 1m in 2003 (Liang, 2005:128; Tang and Lu, 2002).

[83] Many commentators considered River Enclosure as an action against state hegemony and a capitalistic economy (e.g. Yen and Kuan, 2004; Liang, 2006).

[84] These fishing licenses were not for commercial fishing, but only for recreational fishing using a fishing rod.

*villages and political consolidation. While some villages failed to respond to this policy, some other villages did well and thereafter built their own tourist resources.'* (Interview: 029, 2007-02-06)

River Enclosure was initiated by indigenous people, the most disadvantaged ethnic group in Taiwan. The fishing crisis was obvious to them but the state lacked the capacity to respond and so civil society stepped in to fill the vacuum. The bureaucracy was not the key initiator, even though it provided some assistance later. River Enclosure is a good example of an endogenous approach to environmental management achieved on the basis of local indigenous capacities, resources, and politics.

### 5.3.2. The endogenous approach of initiating environmental collaborative governance and its results

The initiation of the River Enclosure movement in the Kaoping River basin reflected a dynamic that shifted from an endogenous to an exogenous approach. It later developed a hybrid model when the government decided to incorporate this practice into policy and sponsor related activities. At the beginning, the movement rose internally and was called together by internal political or religious leadership. It would shape an endogenous approach to River Enclosure. For example, in Dashe, Koushe, Gaujung, Fushing and Mintzu Villages (Interviews: 044, 2007-01-14; 042, 2007-01-02; 043, 2007-01-02; 035, 2006-12-04; 037, 2006-12-04; 038, 2006-12-05; 034, 2006-12-03), the proposal of River Enclosure was advocated from within. As a core member of River Enclosure in Koushe said:

*'It was actually the village chief's idea to call for the River Enclosure rather than all villagers'* (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02).

Other interviews showed a similar situation of how local leaders launched this action:

*'It was when I became the mayor of this township that I started the action of River Enclosure.'* (Interview: 033, 2007-12-02)

*'I launched the River Enclosure to teach my church followers the concept of river conservation. A fish's life is more meaningful and valuable if it is in the river rather than in someone's belly. '* (Interview: 037, 2006-12-04)

However, the movement gradually became an exogenous initiative for many villages because of the intervention of the government. After the emergence of River Enclosure, the government realised that this initiative could go beyond fish conservation to tribal community-building and eco-tourism. Thus, seeing River Enclosure as a multi-functional development strategy, central government incorporated it into river policy and hired the unemployed to patrol the river banks (Interview: 029, 2007-02-06). The more insightful government officials also realised that 'this action would possibly reduce the spontaneity of local villagers' (Interview: 029, 2007-02-06), therefore they worked continuously on improving the policy design to ensure the involvement of local people. Therefore, for some villages, government agencies became the main body that promoted the policy of River Enclosure and formulated an exogenous approach to advocate it, such as with the situation in Minchiuan and Maolin Villages (Interviews: 033, 2006-12-02; 039, 2006-12-05; 029, 2007-02-06). Moving from an endogenous to an exogenous approach, requires street-level officials working closely with the locals and empowering villages that lack modern administrative capabilities to practise River Enclosure, like in the cases of Gaujung, Koushe, Yila and Wutai Villages (Interviews: 035, 2006-12-04; 042, 2007-01-02; 029, 2007-02-06).

Endogenous collaborative governance was initiated within the communities by non-state participants. Internal leadership mobilised the constituency to launch a participatory pattern of governance and share the process of consensus building collectively. The initiators suggested a mechanism which suited the village's domestic politics[85] and social conditions, so that they could tackle the issue they faced collectively. The most important element is that the mechanism was designed

[85] Tribal politics usually has multiple institutions of political leadership, including traditional clans, churches, modern elections and CDAs. The last two were of particular importance. If the leader from these two institutions was the same person, it was easier for a village to reach a consensus on collective action; if not, the political competition would be more complicated. There are also exceptional cases where multiple leaders in a village can reconcile or coordinate their actions for the public good.

based on the social resources the village could mobilise, and the terms the community members could agree to. In other words, it could work sustainably and mobilise resources. The process of building consensus among their constituents, mediating social interests, and organising villagers, were key to its success. One of the major elements facilitating internal mediation was social capital, i.e. the trust, norm and network a community possessed, which helped the community members to place common benefits above personal interests. Social capital was also a key element in helping the community to overcome obstacles.

An endogenous pattern of collaborative governance derived from autonomic actions on small scale experiments of environmental improvement tended to lead to small scale results. However these were often very effective as they built on villagers' consensus achieved in village meetings[86]. The weakness lay in the fact that environmental issues can be complex, multifaceted and large scale, demanding a greater level of financial support than was available locally. If the bureaucratic system had no related measures, it was more difficult for the social pioneers of collaborative governance to continue alone. On the other hand, more sustainable solutions were often raised by local society than the government because it often held greater knowledge and a comprehensive perspective on local environmental issues as most examples in this case study showed. Using this knowledge. In Gaujung, Dashe, Koushe, Fushing, Mintzu and Maolin villages, the villagers mobilised different resources, including voluntary labour, natural materials from the mountain and equipment for patrolling, persisted in their self-determined goals, even when faced with obstacles, and maintained their individual development logic (Interviews: 034, 2006-12-03; 035, 2006-12-04; 037, 2006-12-04; 042, 2007-01-02; 043-2007-01-02; 044, 2007-01-14; 045, 2007-01-14). Under these circumstances, their arguments and methods acquired greater esteem from outsiders, including the state participants (Interviews: 010, 2006-10-17; 022, 2006-11-09; 023, 2006-12-15; 029, 2007-02-06; 030, 2007-02-09). But to what degree the lessons from these local initiatives could be promoted regionally or nationwide is another matter.

[86] There were two reasons why River Enclosure needed consensus in village meetings in order to be put into practice. First, in an indigenous society, each river section belongs to a certain clan, therefore it is necessary to acquire agreement from each clan. Second, to conduct River Enclosure it needs each family to send one person to patrol the river and therefore whether each family can agree on this action is essential.

The Taiwanese state learnt how the practice of public participation could effectively resolve environmental issues and therefore it incorporated River Enclosure into policy/legislation, providing legitimisation and a budget, and promoted it to broader society (Interview: 027, 2007-01-15; 029, 2007-02-06; 031, 2007-01-25). This incorporation transformed the local spontaneous conservationism into formal government policy, and led to an exogenous pattern of collaborative governance. The exogenous pattern was initiated from outside by state agencies to promote public participation in environmental management, assuming it was possible to generalise local success but this approach to policy design did not necessarily match the range of conditions of the localities where River Enclosure was applied. For example, the policy of hiring unemployed outsiders to patrol rivers was an attempt to solve the problems of unemployment and environmental issues together, but its result on river protection was not as effective as sending locals to patrol because the former did not have the sense of stewardship of the latter (Interviews: 035, 2006-12-04; 042, 2007-01-02). The outcome was the reappearance of fish poaching. Another difficulty arose because government funding needed to be spent within the fiscal year rather than allowing the villages to use the funding more cautiously and effectively (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02).

Under this circumstance, the success of an exogenous pattern of collaborative governance relies very much on the villagers' capacity for adaptability. For example, several members of Minchiuan and Koushe Villages possessed good administrative skills, writing proposals and project reports, demonstrating River Enclosure outcomes in writing, and operating in conjunction with the government fiscal system and thereby acquiring government resources to construct tourism facilities (Interviews: 043, 2007-01-02; 033, 2006-12-02). Other members in other villages did not have such skills.

Furthermore, for some villages, these exogenously initiated policies 'reoriented the development logic and spontaneity of tribal villages' (Interviews: 039, 2006-12-05; 035, 2006-12-04; 043, 2007-01-02). This might have been an unanticipated consequence of the well-intentioned policy-makers. For example,

in Koushe and Gaujung Villages the initial river patrol was carried out by voluntary village mobilisation. After three or four years of mobilisation, most villagers were fatigued and this coincided with the government's decision to pay river patrollers. Thus the River Enclosure and related development efforts shifted from a community-centred to a state-centred activity almost by default. Again, the local patrolling and environmental improvement efforts were performed by paid staff, but the results were less accomplished than those achieved by voluntary villagers because of the loss of commitment and spontaneity. Some poaching behaviour reappeared. More than that, some volunteers withdrew after the paid staff joined the team because they thought to 'leave the labour to people who received payment' (Interviews: 035, 2006-12-04; 043, 2007-01-02; 029, 2007-02-06).

The exogenous pattern of collaborative governance in the Kaoping River basin encouraged community participation through sponsorship and facilitation. The essence of an exogenous pattern is that an indifferent and immobilised public could be both encouraged and enabled to participate in public affairs through a policy mechanism (Interview: 029, 2007-02-06). Government agencies, both the high-ranking bureaucrats and street-level officials, needed to appreciate that collaboration would not just occur spontaneously and that the chance of success would be increased if governmental officials were willing to promote public participation, including informing community groups of the policy opportunity and training new groups of volunteers in processes of participation. A difference can be observed between Kaohsiung and Pingtung Counties. While officials in the latter county went into mountain villages themselves in order to encourage and assist the locals, both to acquire government resources to develop community building and eco-tourism (Interview: 029, 2007-02-06), those in the former county stayed in the office revealing a lesser commitment towards the livelihoods of local people (Interview: 027, 2007-01-15).

A former chief in the local River Bureau explained his concern that outside help might bring undesirable results:

> *'When I saw local villagers in Koushe had spontaneously conducted River Enclosure for three years without asking for any government funding, I was*

*deeply moved. I immediately approved an NT $1m[87] subsidy to the village. The next day, our staff in the River Bureau went to discuss with the villagers about how to use the money well in order to create desirable results rather than cause destruction.'* (Interview: 023, 2006-12-15)

Another official in the County Government explained how an exogenous initiation of River Enclosure might not function as well as an endogenous approach:

> *'Designating a Wildlife Protection Area in Minchiuan Village ended up with only the public sector promoting river conservation. The result was less effective and only looked at the number of fish. In contrast, in Gaujung Village, the mobilisation of the whole village in river protection also induced the development of eco-tourism which made the village prosperous.'* (Interview: 022, 2006-11-09)

The social capital of the community involved was as decisive as the attitude of the government agency. Collaboration was more likely to succeed in those communities which possessed higher social capital. This is because the communities themselves retained norms, networks and trust on which to initiate public mobilisation, solve disputes and adjust policy design to suit local conditions. For example, in Dashe, when villagers agreed to launch River Enclosure ten years ago, village leaders asked them to hand in the equipment used for exploitative fishing, such as battery boxes, used to electrify fish, and every household was assigned an area to watch over (Interview: 044, 2007-01-14). This collective consensus and strict execution was based on the village's strong solidarity and boundedness (Interview: 043, 2007-1-2; 044, 2007-01-14; 045, 2007-1-14), which may be seen as a sort of social capital. Therefore when the government promised to provide funding for paid patrollers to the village, villagers mediated the salary among paid and non-paid patrollers, so that most patrollers could get some subsidy and therefore maximise the effect of government funding (Interview: 044, 2007-01-14).

For those communities which lacked solidarity, the mechanism for encouraging

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[87] About US $ 33,000。

participation might only be utilised by a few members (usually those local political faction heads or opinion leaders). For example, in Minchiuan Village, the decision in favour of River Enclosure was initiated from top-down, by government officials, and the vast majority of villagers played no role other than passively obeying the River Enclosure no-fishing rule. The result was that most government funding was allocated by a few political leaders (Interview: 033, 2006-12-02).

Outside support for River Enclosure was thus a two-edged sword. It became so popular among government agencies and urban environmental activists (including NGOs and academia) that many of them were keen to 'help' River Enclosure villagers in terms of assistance in writing project proposals for funding and sharing professional environmental knowledge. But outside support sometimes reduced local spontaneity and manipulated the villagers to pursue developmental goals (Fang, 2006)[88] favoured by state agencies, professionals or activists, which may have been incompatible with their internal objectives or their preferred timing. For example, a core member of River Enclosure in Koushe complained that the suggestion of developing eco-tourism made by outsiders was too early for their village:

> *'At the beginning what we did was simply protect the fish, but soon outsiders came to advise us on how to develop tourism…The whole process of moving from river protection to tourism development was encouraged by outsiders and government projects before the villagers themselves had determined their own initiatives.'* (interview 043: 2006-01-02)

Whether River Enclosure villages can adapt themselves to outside resources (and the conditions that follow) is a major issue. In fact, most villages found themselves faced with the dilemma of institutionalising the River Enclosure in order to acquire government grants. In some cases the villagers gave up applying for them and in others only a few core members could follow the conditions of government grants and this often led to internal disputes. In Koushe the split between villagers was obvious:

> *'Community building became one government project after another rather*

[88] See also interview: 043, 2007-01-02

*than spontaneous actions. When some villagers got paid and the rest did not, the split between them became obvious. In village meetings, those who did not get paid became interrogators and those who got paid interrogated. This was not fair for those doing a lot.'* (interview 043: 2006-01-02)

More generally, the role of the state in relation to River Enclosure was internally inconsistent. On the one hand the state was the traditional dominant ruler over its jurisdiction of forest and river resources. On the other, it was a good-willed supporter and enthusiastic in its attempts to 'nurture' tribal spontaneity and participation in governing natural resources. River Enclosure, symbolising how indigenes could reclaim their autonomy as well as ownership of traditional territories, challenged the compatibility between the existing polity and alternative governance.

Both the endogenous and exogenous approaches of River Enclosure had their challenges. The former faced the fact that villagers became weary of long-term voluntary patrolling thus making spontaneous action difficult to maintain. The latter faced a problematic institutionalisation of River Enclosure that reduced the spontaneity of villagers. In some examples, the combination of endogenous and exogenous approaches seemed to overcome individual problems, but it required strong social capital and organisational capacity to mediate internal interests and the ability to adapt to administrative work.

### 5.3.3. The long-term development of environmental collaborative governance and its institutionalisation

The long-term development of collaborative governance faces the dilemma of institutionalising the River Enclosure movement. Is it necessary to institutionalise the process? Institutionalisation aims to sustain the collaboration by incorporating it into government policy. However, institutionalisation often leads to less flexibility, more professionalism and bureaucracy, as well as more administrative labour, which tends to undermine the original value of collaboration and cause

the collapse of the civic teams that originally joined the collaboration spontaneously.

The institutionalisation of an environmental movement requires several different processes, including routinisation, professionalisation and bureaucratisation, even the end of movement politics, but also the standardisation of behaviour based on new normative processes and goals. It also suggests the establishment of new organisational forms of civil society. The purpose of institutionalisation aims to place the environmental conflicts within rather than outside of the polity (Brand, 1999: P35-36). From the perspective of resource mobilisation theory (Zald and McCarthy, 1979) or political theory (Tilly, 1978), the opportunity to access the polity relates to the levels of professionalisation and bureaucratisation of social movement organisations in contemporary liberal society (Lo, 1992). However, this situation faces many challenges, not least that the opportunity to enter the polity does not promise success.

In this research, the institutionalisation of collaborative governance means an innovative type of governance gradually accepted by the state and incorporated into the policy process. The government arranges a budget for the innovative governance and provides related assistance through administration work. The non-state actors may develop organisations and professionalism in order to engage effectively with the administrative system. The dilemma collaborative governance faces is that institutionalisation can undermine the resilience of collaborative governance and the spontaneity of civic society. As a result, collaborative governance can find it difficult to adapt to the complexity, diversity and dynamics of society (Kooiman, 2003). But from the perspective of social resource mobilisation, how environmental protection action can be sustained when local enthusiasm in volunteering decays due to individual or organisational fatigue, as in the case of River Enclosure, which demands intensive labour and resources, and with villagers who are often too poor to continue volunteering after a couple of years.

Inappropriate government incentives can cause irreversible consequences. In the case of River Enclosure, one of the government's measures, namely

government-selected paid patrollers, easily leads to bureaucratic habits and a lack of enthusiasm. Most of the empirical cases showed that 'paid patrollers cannot reach the same degree of effectiveness in fish protection that voluntary villagers can' (Interviews: 035, 2006-12-04; 029, 2007-02-06; 043, 2007-01-02). It can also undermine cohesion at the grassroots level. While 'some of the villagers might become paid patrollers and receive monetary rewards for patrolling, the rest did not' (Interviews: 035, 2006-12-04; 043, 2007-01-02). This often caused disharmony and reduced commitment towards River Enclosure. Also, because having paid patrollers is often only a short term arrangement (usually 6-12 months), once the governmental support stopped so did the patrolling. Another government measure, which directed the core members of the River Enclosure towards community production or eco-tourism, required the preparation of a three-year development schedule. All recipients of government grants were expected to present a proposal of how to reach self-sustainment by local communities in their development projects. This goal was 'more easily said than done' and:

> *'Most core members found themselves chasing the written goals and left their villagers behind and turned some villages from devotees of river protection into calculating business units'* (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02).

Many River Enclosure villages complied with government requirements following grant approval, but at the same time they also tended to neglect the value of consensus building among villagers over development orientation and its pace. The original simple River Enclosure had become a stepping-stone towards eco-tourism rather than eco-tourism acting as a supporting element of river protection. This change in the nature of River Enclosure often did not achieve collective village recognition and turned into 'a struggle between the core members and lay villagers' (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02). Even some core members argued that 'democratic discussion was a neck breaking-process and consumed too much energy without producing an efficient and effective outcome' (Interview: 035, 2006-12-04).

For example, Koushe Village, which received the largest government grant, started a series of projects to prepare for eco-tourism, including restoring

traditional buildings, constructing tourism infrastructure and setting up information and service centres. These tasks attracted a huge amount of administration work which was labour intensive and concentrated efforts on the paid staff of the community organisation. The organisation became more and more professional but gradually 'distanced the lay villagers' who were once the focus of the River Enclosure (Interviews: 043, 2007-01-02; 042, 2007-01-02).

Gaujung Village faced the same issue. On one hand, voluntary villagers concluded that the heavy work of patrolling could be left to paid patrollers. On the other, paid patrollers refused to work in the evenings or through the night, just when the fish poachers were active. 'Paid patrollers were usually passive and arrogant, saw the government as their real boss and disregarded the directions of villagers.' This phenomenon resulted in the reappearance of abusive fishing (Interview: 035, 2006-12-04).

Minchiuan had enjoyed plenty of government financial support since 1990 because it was situated in a Wildlife Conservation Area. Assessing the attraction of government grants, a Minchiuan interviewee revealed the contradictions when he argued that:

> *'The autonomy of the tribe was the most important element in practising collaborative governance and it was not absolutely necessary to apply for government support. But it is undeniable that without government grants, we might not have been able to produce an effective outcome.'* (Interview: 033, 2006-12-02)

More generally, the interviewees agreed that 'villagers' enthusiasm in voluntary service would inevitably face exhaustion, and that it is difficult to continue mobilising whole villages to practise River Enclosure, especially when the economic incentive is low (Interviews: 022, 2006-11-09; 043, 2007-01-02; 035, 2006-12-04). Usually, the voluntary service of River Enclosure could mobilise the greatest number of participants when collective grievances and anger were at their peak. The effort to follow government requirements gradually put the environmental actions at risk- distancing the movement from the real goals of collective action. One core member of River Enclosure in Koushe Village said

that:

> *'In order to close up the government project on time and efficiently, we have to sacrifice all the real goals…the targets of government grants are usually different from what we really need and expect. We have to adapt to the administration's requirements and procedures. The public sector cannot catch what our true social demands are. A burdensome administration system is influencing and orienting the development of our organisation…it is so burdensome that it caused us to lose our visions and goals.'* (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02)

Their village, with a population of only seven hundred, received several government contracts and one of them was for more than US $300,000 for a three-year project. With such a large project and budget there was not sufficient time for the core members of the village to think about their common expectations, and the project turned out to be disabling rather than empowering.

> *'The village became a channel for the government to outsource their policy business. Dozens of projects flowed into the village that the government agencies considered capable of producing a satisfactory performance. The community building became simply numerous government projects, rather than spontaneous plans instigated by the villagers'.* (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02)

The effort that communities had to put into the administrative formalities reduced local incentives especially as they focused on the details and not the overall picture. Although the government policy had good intentions, the implementation mechanisms were problematic and generated a lack of trust. Administrative red tape prevented the River Enclosure communities from having real autonomy, and the programme became oriented towards projects and tangible outcomes rather than process-oriented public association, deliberation and collaboration. This form of 'target-orientation strangled the networking, innovation and spontaneity of public spirit' in civil society (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02). Thus although institutionalisation was one of the means used to help collaborative governance to be sustainable, it was never thought through. Hindsight reveals that it was essential to 'adjust the policy incentive slowly to what society needed' (Interview:

029, 2007-02-06). The process of institutionalising collaborative governance demands a change in bureaucratic culture. Mutual learning needs to lead to an equal collaboration between state and society, rather than social actors having to adapt to the notions of a bureaucratic system, and it also requires collaborating organisations to advance their capacities in response to administrative procedures.

As a result, the major factor which can possibly guarantee successful collaborative governance is spontaneous social mobilisation. It has been the major force behind the initiation of collaborative governance in the Kaoping River basin. Civil participation in policy reform and environmental governance seeks to connect different resources and networks while encouraging partnerships which will overcome the bureaucratic culture of being 'confined to established rules'. An official in county government explained the importance of autonomic association at the local level:

> *'Koushe had strong autonomy and thus could overcome difficulties. For example, last year a typhoon destroyed a lot of the tourist infrastructure they had built, but they soon re-mobilised to rebuild it. The village had strong commitment and execution ability. Yila and Wutai Villages also encountered a typhoon that caused destruction of public infrastructure, like wooden paths, but soon recovered because they had consensus on goals among villagers. It is this kind of case that the government likes to provide funding for to help them develop.'* (Interview: 029, 2007-02-06)

Many interviewees emphasised that government support was a short-term solution. Recipients should not expect to come to rely on it permanently. Instead, 'spontaneity of the tribal village is the fundamental element to successful collaboration' (Interviews: 033, 2006-12-02; 030, 2007-02-09). Only then should the government assess what they can provide and what communities need in ways that they can retain their autonomy. The importance of the autonomy does not constrain or reduce the wish to 'establish a more equal and productive state-society relationship' as it also helps the community to build up an 'internal mechanism of independent sustainable development' and understand 'what support they really need from the outside world' (Interviews: 030, 2007-02-09; 029, 2007-02-06; 022, 2006-11-09).

Of course, collaboration in river governance needed both the input of a budget and social efforts, but it was social efforts that really mattered. Government input should correspond to what the civic actors need to empower them to participate in governance. To make River Enclosure work, we must let the civic actors make the first move, otherwise it is impossible to know what the goals and key points of civic actors are and what kind of support is needed. 'If the government initiates the movement, then it will not be what the community really needs' (Interview: 022, 2006-11-09). Only an endogenous initiative can identify and highlight what civic actors or community members are concerned about and suggest an effective resolution. A local frontline official in a township office, who was also a core member of the local CDA, explained that:

> *'Government resources are limited and, thus, cannot supply whatever the social actors demand. Therefore the spontaneity of communities is important in a way to clarify in what direction the community wants to develop, how to allocate available labour and resources, and how to distribute economic rewards. Only the local people can envision their future in a diverse and sustainable way'*. (Interview: 035, 2006-12-04)

Another official in county government agreed that:

> *'If the community raises its own projects, it will be easier to produce an outcome which benefits both the community and the government. In contrast, if the government actively provides assistance without prior negotiation with the community to establish the common willingness, it will often achieve only half the result with twice the effort. The consensus building and coordination between itself and the local leadership is the key to success.'* (Interview: 029, 2007-02-06)

### 5.3.4. The transformative capability and constraints of environmental collaborative governance in Taiwan

The ability of River Enclosure to motivate public-minded citizenship and to ensure long-term social commitment to untangle environmental issues is often

limited. Could it catalyse a new form of governance? The limitation is two-fold. One is that grassroots participation in the Kaoping River basin is often constrained to the final part of the policy process, i.e. policy implementation, rather than being involved from the decision-making stage. At best, locals were consulted to provide their views on established policies for environmental management and planning. In such situations, the grassroots can only decide whether to adopt new practices in their area, or how to conduct their River Enclosure strategy, rather than to determine policies towards their environmental affairs on their territories. But, so saying, some public participation has the capacity to reform policies, politics and institutions and this kind of transformative capacity should not be overlooked.

For example, River Enclosure often encouraged the villagers' latent commitment to environmental stewardship, a stewardship rooted in the 'traditional culture of tribal environmental management', which was often regarded as more sustainable than modern bureaucratic approaches to management (Interviews: 043, 2007-01-02; 030, 2007-02-09). Indigenes in the Kaoping River basin traditionally managed nearby river sections on a clan system. In other words, the ownership of and rights to rivers belonged to the heads of the tribal groups. Traditionally, the head of a clan took charge of river management and could call for a collective effort towards its achievement. In contrast, contemporary River Enclosure was more democratic as in all the cases the procedure began by reaching a collective decision on whether or not to commence it in formal village meetings. Then the village chief or head of local Community Development Associations (CDAs) would mobilise the whole village to river patrol against abusive fishing.

> *'The River Enclosure action revived the environmental- and community-minded awareness of the indigenous population. Villagers who had left the community to work in the cities came back to work for their people and environment as well as the elders who stayed.'* (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02).

Without a strong commitment to environmentalism and home protection, it was impossible for the villagers to persistently engage in River Enclosure because River Enclosure was labour-intensive and sometimes life threatening. This

became more so when some villages experienced two landslide disasters in 2004 and 2005, which were so tremendous that the local river environments were seriously damaged. Some of the village teams collapsed, but some were revived. For example, the action of River Enclosure in Koushe and Dashe survived the destruction of typhoons (Interviews: 044, 2007-01-14; 042, 2007-01-02), but in Fushing it did not and their team broke down (Interview: 038, 2006-12-05).

The transformative capacities of the River Enclosure groups improved the solidarity and environmental consciousness of their own communities, built community connections, solved collective environmental issues, raised their awareness of the environment, enhanced public participation and regained the sense of ownership of their traditional territory and related management policies. Some of them obtained economic rewards from the eco-tourism they developed based on river protection. Community participation, like the River Enclosure actions, usually aimed to recover the local environment rather than delivering on broader policies or political change. But in a few cases local actions led to a policy response, changed social values and sought to get the approach institutionalised. For example, when River Enclosure in Koushe and Dashe became so successful in Pingtung County, the spirit of public participation in communal environmental affairs spilled over into neighbouring villages (Interview: 029, 2007-02-06). Small scale community actions could inspire other communities into adopting the same action pattern (Interview: 034, 2006-12-03). The county government decided to promote River Enclosure to the whole county, including more than eighty rivers[89]. In so doing the River Enclosure movement obtained broader recognition and was able to compete with powerful recreational fishing associations for management solutions (Participant observation: The Forum of River Enclosure and Fish Protection, 2006-6-25, 24) [90].

But it is doubtful that these limited actions could gain enough political leverage to compete with economic development. River Enclosure seemed 'powerless to oppose large scale development projects' (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02). For

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[89] http://www.ettoday.com/2003/07/08/738-1480417.htm

[90] Conflicts between river protectors and anglers occurred from time to time. Anglers, mostly urban residents, organised an association to promote their legal right to river fishing and blamed River Enclosure for introducing charges for fishing. They raised several petitions to legislators. See http://fishing-right.org.tw/shownews.asp?newsid=778

example, Koushe Village obtained a good reputation for its River Enclosure, but could not 'battle with deforestation run by the underworld' (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02) in their upstream area which was under the jurisdiction of the Forest Bureau in central government[91]. In the worst case, the River Enclosure in Fushing Village was forced to suspend its operation due to the landslides caused by upstream deforestation that totally destroyed the river. Other villages, like Mintzu, Minchiuan and Tauyuan, are facing the threat of a transbasin water diversion which could well undermine the river environment that they spent resources protecting. They failed to stop the project even though they had numerous social and political supporters who joined their protests (Participant observation: 2006-4-4; 2006-6-29; 2006-7-5; 2006-11-11; 2006-11-12).

The other limitation of the River Enclosure movement was its deep embeddedness in the context of local politics, including both tribal politics and modern political competition- democratic elections. Tribal politics are not as simple as people might assume. Internally, they are multi-layered and highly antagonist, i.e. political competition exists among traditional hereditary Tou-Mu[92], the elected heads, informal political leaders from CDAs and even church leaders in a village. The colonial regime of the KMT had manipulated tribal politics with a corporatist strategy by allocating resources between different political institutions in villages (Chen, 2003).

In a village, even if a political leader successfully led his constituents to recover river ecology and brought new opportunities to the village, he might still face external resistance from other leaders. The village political leader also had to compete with other villages for government resources for environmental governance. Most government resources are distributed through a township office to local villages, and therefore the relationship between the village and township office determined, to a large degree, where the resources went. This explains the contrast between Minchiuan and Mintzu Villages in terms of the government

[91] UDN 6 Oct 2004, Landslides occur in the upstream area of the Kaoping River, P. B2
UDN 29 August 2002, Deforestation prevails in the upstream area in Koushe Village and causes landslides, P. 17

[92] Tou-Mu is an appellation of traditional tribal leaders in indigenous communities which also refers to the head of each indigenous clan.

resources they obtained. The political leaders in the former belonged to the same faction as the mayor in their upper level- Sanmin Township, and therefore Minchiuan obtained greater resources than Mintzu, whose leader belonged to another faction (Interviews: 033, 2006-12-02; 034, 2006-12-03).

A paid member of staff in a CDA explained that the competition of political factions hindered the efforts of River Enclosure:

> *'River Enclosure has its roots in traditional indigenous culture in that every indigenous household was obliged to work for public infrastructure in response to the call of the Tou-Mu. The success of River Enclosure relied on its combination of village political leadership and the tradition of voluntary service. However, the present political competition might offset the efforts of river protection. Many villagers see river protection as one faction competing against the other, with only a few villagers recognising it as being for the common good.'* (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02)

Traditionally, a river belonged to the local Tou-Mu and so did the right of river management, but over the last century the indigenes have been deprived of river ownership and the right of management by the state. River Enclosure aimed to devolve management back from the hands of the state to community groups, which were not the same as the Tou-Mu. This led to a backlash from the traditional elites, including both the state and the Tou-Mu. For example, in Koushe, Dashe, Mintzu and Gaujung, the 'traditional Tou-Mu of the clan resisted both the allocation of river stewardship to the state and the collective consensus over devolution to the community' (Interviews: 042, 2007-01-02; 043, 2007-01-02; 044, 2007-01-14; 034, 2006-12-03; 035, 2006-12-04). However, if the village meeting generated a consensus over River Enclosure and the result turned out to be good, River Enclosure legitimised the devolution of power from the state more than the process of democratisation did in the village meeting. This was particularly obvious when fish conservation in a River Enclosure village was good enough to issue fishing licenses[93], thus financially rewarding villagers. In this way it informally legitimised devolution and overcame the resistance of the Tou-Mu.

[93] The right of issuing fishing licenses also triggered disputes. Whether the village, the CDA or their supervisors in the township office had this right was not defined by the Fishery Law or Wildlife Protection Law. In practice, they all played a role in issuing fishing licenses.

The competition between modern local political leaders, e.g. the heads of villages and the heads of local CDAs, affected the solidarity of villages. There was often a conflict of political interest between village chiefs and the directors of local CDAs. The declining traditional Tou-Mu were replaced by a system of elected village chiefs imposed by the colonial state in the post-war era. The system of CDAs, started in 1994, was a pre-emptive corporatist arrangement introduced by the state to out-source government projects related to community building. It was also designed to instigate political competition in the localities so that the state could dominate local politics via manipulation of resource allocation (Fang, 2006; Tsai et al., 2007). CDAs were a type of semi-NGO, often viewed as a rival competitor to a village chief (ibid). If the village chief and the head of the CDA were the same person, then it would be much easier for the community to reach a consensus.

This is an aftermath of traditional Taiwanese corporatist politics. In the earlier authoritarian phase, the regime sought to repress autonomic associations and introduced the CDA system in the 1980s as a formal recognised community organisation in order to limit independent local political activity. However, the influence of a CDA depended on how much governmental resource was released exclusively to them. In the mid-1990s, political control over community associations was relaxed and the state encouraged the trend of community building. This encouraged the development of the CDA system throughout Taiwan[94]. Every community established at least one CDA either through the village chief or his or her political rival. The budget of the CDA came from central government for the purpose of community-building activities, although this process often turned out to serve political purposes as well. In addition, the budget needed for the CDA sometimes was more than the village office could acquire, usually from local governments. This, therefore, often led to conflict between the village chief and the director of the CDA. Today, many environmental activists ally with 'CDAs as an interface to engage with local environmental affairs and hence bring progressive concepts into the community mechanism' and push for self-reform (Interview: 043,

[94] Until 2007, there were 6,402 CDAs, containing 20 million members in Taiwan based on the Annual Statistic Report of the Administration of Domestic Affairs in 2007.

2007-01-02) in order to 'advance the performance of contracted government projects' (Interview: 010, 2006-10-17).

In Koushe Village, the director of the CDA and the elected village chief was the same person at the start of River Enclosure. Political leadership was concentrated in one person and this made it possible to produce a consensus over River Enclosure. However, later on, the village chief lost his re-election bid and thus the local leadership was split. The 'environmental restoration slowly disconnected with the rest of the village and was promoted by the CDA alone' (Interviews: 010, 2006-10-17; 042, 2007-01-02; 043, 2007-01-02). River Enclosure in Koushe later became only relevant to a small group of villagers (Interviews: 042, 2007-01-02; 043, 2007-01-02), an example of what community building must avoid at all costs. In Koushe, one community core member said that:

> *'The conflict between the Tou-Mu, head of CDA and the elected village chief was embedded into the traditional social structure'* (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02).

Therefore a River Enclosure leader said:

> *'Whenever River Enclosure encountered frustration, the Tou-Mu always argued to withdraw their right of river management. The conflict existed in the election of the village chief too. The new leaders disrupted the action of River Enclosure and left the work to be done by me [the former village chief] and my faction on behalf of the CDA.'* (Interview: 042, 2007-01-02)

A senior officer in Pingtung County government explained how local political competition offset the effort in community development:

> *'Government intervention will unavoidably bring a non-indigenous system into villages. I go to a local village to help them build a tourism institution based on river protection. But the village chief and the leader of the CDA belong to different factions. They have different opinions and both want to hold government grants. Neither of them is willing to reconcile their differences. I do not know how to allocate the resources if their struggle continues.'* (Interview: 029, 2007-02-06)

Local political competition, as a leftover of traditional corporatist politics, often

still overrode the new emerging participatory democracy. Sometimes faction politics divided the communities and set back collaborative governance, and the work of environmental improvement was left to a few of the villagers. Both endogenous and exogenous approaches find it difficult and time-consuming to overcome such political cleavages in a community.

### 5.3.5. State-society relationship in transition

The River Enclosure Movement demonstrates how the relationship between an indigenous society and the state can change from one dominating the other to a comparatively mutually-respecting partnership. During the post-war era, the state established an authoritarian regime which gradually weakened Taiwanese indigenes culturally, economically, and socially. Its corporatist strategy manipulated tribal politics. Altogether, the regime led to 'the indigene's reliance upon the state' (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02). The River Enclosure movement symbolised an alteration to the state-society relationship, as revealed by the state's concession to River Enclosure which represented a demand for self-government from bottom-up, and in its provision of resources to encourage more indigenous communities to act to improve their environment.

State hegemony overwhelmingly excluded indigenes from their traditional territory in the post-war period, while manipulating political leadership in tribal villages by introducing a mainstream election system and by selectively allocating government resources (Chen, 2003). The spontaneous River Enclosure by indigenous people was a combination of their reactions to environmental degradation, exploitation of river fish, anti-outsider sentiment, and the loss of local sovereignty. The successful outcome of River Enclosure legitimised the action itself and forced the state to give the indigenes recognition and gradually introduced a state and society partnership in environmental management. For example, this case study has found that civil actors can be equally contributive in initiating an innovative form of river governance. One reason is, as a county government official explained,

*'It is impossible for the government to manage everything everywhere. It*

*is better devolving the right of management to locals, especially voluntary locals. Because the locals will have their own perspective and priority on how environmental issues should be solved, the government decision and policy does not always correspond to their views…It is better if the locals take the initiative and the government follows and assists.'* (Interview: 022, 2006-11-09)

Nevertheless, this kind of state-society partnership is still fragile in Taiwan. The indigenous people are still developing their identity and prospects which have been repressed for a long time. The sudden input of assistance from a strong state can disorientate them. Once the state has intervened, it has often directed the development of the local community rather than allowing the community to make its own decisions. As a result, a new clientele relationship was formed between the reformist state apparatus and the autonomic civil society. This kind of relationship was, perhaps, unavoidable at this time, as a leader and a paid member of staff in Koushe said:

*'I felt bad when I did not help much in the governor's re-election. He [a local politician] has provided us with a lot of assistance. But our villagers did not know how to give feedback to the politician who helped us. It was because the township mayor and village chief belonged to another political party.'* (Interview: 042, 2007-01-02)

*'The River Enclosure received resources from one politician and then we needed to help him when the election year arrived. Sometimes we were asked to publicise our support for his re-election and win a certain amount of votes for him... This clientelist relationship became very obvious at particular moments, [for example during the election campaign,] and it actually ruined our efforts in community building.'* (Interview: 043, 2007-01-02)

But, at least, this process of learning how to develop collaborative governance provided the state agencies with a lesson that environmental governance is less plausible when exercised by the state actors alone. The River Enclosure movement integrated the capacity and knowledge of government agencies and

civil actors to work together on solving particular environmental problems. The collaborative effort reinforces the legitimacy, resources, opportunity, and legality of both the state actors and non-state actors in governance reforms. Moreover, through the process of collaborative governance, the communities or civil actors retain/regain their ownership, recognition and participation in the solution, which enhances the result of policy implementation. However, the state remains a powerful dominator leading to a new clientelist relationship with the civic actors through the processes of resource allocation and the institutionalisation of collaborative governance.

## 5.4 Conclusion: Re-thinking the model of environmental collaborative governance

With reference to the provisional model described in Chapter 2, this case study draws particular attention to some aspects of the model. Firstly, the nature of the environmental action was not designed only to achieve environmental recovery but also for its potential economic rewards, for example tourist income and job opportunities combined with river protection revealing key incentives to collaborate which developed beyond the scope of the environment. Secondly, River Enclosure was closely linked to the geographic features of indigenous society. The current working and older generations in indigenous villages retain the memory of their traditional territory and the definition of a good environment, which has been undermined by the modern state and the commercialisation of natural resources. At the same time they retained the legacy of tribal norms and a voluntary system. Even though it had not been practised for a long time, tribal leaders' call for River Enclosure aroused villagers' awareness as indigenes with long held environmental concerns and traditions. In other words, the emergence of River Enclosure was exclusive to the time and the place.

Thirdly, the change in political climate increased the incentive for the indigene to collaborate. A more liberal political climate after the year 2000, when the new administration gave recognition to the indigenous right of self-governing as a 'New Partnership' (Wang, 1999; Chao, 2005), further motivated the villagers to

participate in managing the environment. In addition, the environmental issue was more than simply a case of addressing environmental degradation, it also represented a response to the deprivation of their ownership of natural resources. These three reasons instigated a collective emotion among the indigene towards intrusion from outside the local community, especially the depredation of their fish resources. Their leaders converted this sentiment into a positive action, namely River Enclosure, to promote their right of river management.

As the model suggests, the success of River Enclosure action also depended on how many resources the leaders could mobilise, employing local social capital, traditional norms, networks, and the mechanism of mediating profits. Other resources like voluntary labour, and the administrative capacity to deal with government programmes, were also vital in defining the success of River Enclosure. But also, as the model suggests, the environmental action was embedded in a particular social-political context where the internal competition of political leadership in an indigenous village often undermined the attempt to make River Enclosure a success.

This case study also brings some new elements to the model (see Figure 5.2). The first is the focussing event, as Kingdon (1995) suggests, which draws peoples' attention to create necessary change. Attention-attracting problems function as focussing events to drive agenda change and to attract the attention of bureaucrats, elected officials and the general public to the issues involved (Birkland, 1997). In this case study, dramatic depredation of river fish led to an outburst of villagers' anger and grievance and a demand for a change in river governance. Despite the general decline in river fish and wildlife resources since the 1980s, worried villagers did not make a move until fish predation events by outsiders provoked them into protecting the river resource themselves, rather than waiting for the government to solve the issue for them.

The second discovery is the complication of the feedback mechanism between the outcome/process of collaborative governance and the continuity of it. The conduct of collaborative governance altered organisational behaviour encouraging continued participation, despite participants' complaints of

bureaucracy. This is because the process of collaborative governance required the major organisations in River Enclosure to engage with government procedures and learn administrative skills. This, in turn, reinforced the wish and capacity of most of the organisations to continue to collaborate.




Figure 5. 2: A revised model of the emergence and development of environmental collaborative governance

# Chapter 6 Case Studies: Water Defence

## 6.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates (a) how non-governmental organisations (NGOs) launched a bottom-up Water Defence movement (see Section 4.4.1 for an introduction), which was initially a reaction to the industrial exploitation of river water and later became a forum for innovative water conservation strategies for Southern Taiwan. This chapter is devoted to unveiling (b) how the Water Defence actions successfully persuaded the government to undertake a more sustainable method to manage river water resources and led its member organisations to the further development of environmental activism. By uniting NGOs across the divide of urban and rural areas, it became the biggest social mobilisation in Taiwan during the 1990s. Many key social actors of that movement became key members of decision making on river policy.

The three NGOs in this case study participated in confrontational protests to defend the water resources of the Kaoping River in the 1990s. As their issues were gradually taken into policy and their protests paused, they entered the policy community more generally. Coincidentally, they all chose to adopt a collaborative approach to governance for environmental conservation, their suggestions for alternative water resources were put into practice, and they raised new environmental initiatives. For example, Wetlands Taiwan restored the ecology and water resources by regenerating wetlands along the river high flat known as the ‘Hundred-Mile Wetland’. Blue Donggang Creek Conservation Association empowered community groups to resolve their environment problems by introducing debates over groundwater utilisation and recharging. Meinung People’s Association devoted itself to community conservation programmes which combined multidimensional actions including landscape, culture and industrial preservation.

In this chapter, Section 6.2 introduces the selected case studies of Water Defence.

Section 6.3 lays out the findings, while Section 6.4 reflects on how the findings adjust the original model of environmental collaborative governance.

## 6.2 Example organisations of Water Defence

This research examines the activities of Wetlands Taiwan, Blue Donggang Creek Conservation Association (BDCCA), and Meinung People's Association (MPA). All were key organisations in the Water Defence movement (see Figure 6.1 for their major active areas), and each sheds a different light on the process of collaborative governance (See Table 6.1). There follows a brief introduction to the selected organisations.

Table 6.1 Examples of Water Defence and their Characteristics

| Organisation | Starting year | Motivation | Accessibility | Leadership/ institution | Faction politics | Social capital/ resources/ capacity | Initiation approach | Process summary |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wetlands Taiwan | 1994 | Protecting wildlife habitat against industrial development | Easy | Urban professionals | Not obvious | High organisational capacity with limited resources from the government, but low social capital | Endogenous | Spontaneous social organisation which strived to decrease industrial exploitation of water and later became a de facto governing body of several wetland parks |
| Blue Donggang Creek Conservation Association | 1997 | Protecting rural water resources and the environment | Easy | Rural intellectuals | Not obvious | High social capital, organisational capacity, and resources from the government | Endogenous | Spontaneous social organisation worked on protecting natural resource and culture. It later devoted resources to empower more than a hundred local small communities to improve the local environment. |
| Meinung People's Association | 1994 | Conserving minority culture and landscape, and engaging the community against dam construction project | Easy | Rural intellectuals | Not obvious | High social capital, organisational capacity and resources from the government | Endogenous | Spontaneous minority communal organisation which opposed water development project near the community, and later became an initiator of local landscape and cultural conservation programmes |

*Wetlands Taiwan*

Wetlands Taiwan is located in Kaohsiung city. Most members of Wetlands Taiwan are professional people, including environment professors, journalists, medical doctors, ecologists and young activists. Since 1994, Wetlands Taiwan has successfully campaigned for designating wildlife protected areas against industrial development projects, including Shi-cao Wildlife Protection Area, Anti-Binnan Industrial Complex Development Project, Kaoping River protection action, and wetland restoration[95]. It later engaged in the management of wetland parks, which they lobbied central and local governments to establish.

In 1997, Wetlands Taiwan joined the protest against the development of two dam construction projects, using river water of the Kaoping River, which aimed to provide a water source for the Binnan Industrial Complex Development Project. These projects threatened the Kaoping River in terms of river water, landscape and ecology. The organisation proposed that the government should change river policy from developing water resources to restoring groundwater by constructing wetlands along the riverside. This proposal became a policy called the 'Hundred-Mile Wetland'.

Eventually, the two dam projects and the industrial development project were abandoned. Restoring and constructing the 'Hundred-Mile Wetland' became the new focus of the organisation. In 2007, local governments entrusted the organisation to regenerate and/or manage seven wetland parks, partly because these wetland parks were established under their advocacy, and partly because the government did not possess the capacity and personnel to manage wetlands. Four of them are located in the Kaoping area. The role of the organisation has transformed from whistle-blower to a government-partnership in the policy process. Some researchers called it a 'de facto governing body' (McBeath and Leng, 2005) which signified a new form of governance in managing natural resources. Most of the environmental issues they campaigned for successfully became part of the government's river policy, but the organisation then found that

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[95] The wetland network they created in the Kaohsiung area is called 'the Kaohsiung eco-corridor' (observation: 2006-3-4).

it had lost organisational focus and public attention. By managing wetland parks (some of them were award-winning), the organisation acquired a new objective.

*Blue Donggang Creek Conservation Association (BDCCA)*

The BDCCA is located in Pingtung County. The majority of its members are school teachers, elected officials and young activists. Starting as a local group of rural intellectuals against highway construction projects, the association soon achieved its anti-road goal and sought a new focus for further environmental action. The organisation thus joined the Kaoping River Protection Movement, not only because the development project of water resources was geographically related to the organisation, but also because they discovered that the abundant underground water of this area could be a solution to the water supply for the Kao-Kao-Ping area without sacrificing water conservation.

When the water crisis of the Kaoping River was resolved, the organisation devoted itself to local environmental restoration in the basin. However, they found that without local residents' awareness and consensus, it was difficult to make the restoration action sustainable. The organisation thus decided to dedicate itself to community building to raise local awareness of environmental deterioration.
Up until 2007, the organisation had established a network of more than a hundred community groups, which have experienced the benefit of generating an environment combining both the interests of nature and the social demands of local people. In addition to increasing local awareness of environmental protection, this network often became an ideal channel for the government to devolve the management of social development programmes.

*Meinung People's Association (MPA)*

The MPA is located in Kaohsiung County. Its membership is comprised of local intellectuals, artists, successful business people, elected officials, and young activists. Established to campaign against a dam development project at nearby Meinung Town, which was a threat to the existence of the local ethnic minority

Hakka, the MPA extended its care beyond environmental issues. It drew up a multi-dimensional strategy to revive the Hakka community, including ecological, cultural, architectural, landscape, and agricultural conservation and development. It prepared an integrated Meinung Master Plan[96] since the end of the 1990s in order to avoid community decline, which might in turn lead to the threat of the area being designated as a dam site.

In 2000, when the dam project was renounced by the newly elected Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) regime, the organisation sought to convince central and local governments that they should put into practice its multi-dimensional community conservation programme. This has developed into a series of innovative actions and gradually made the little town of Meinung an exceptionally successful case of community conservation that included organic agriculture development, Hakka cultural preservation and tourist development. These endogenous innovation programmes attracted local youths to return from urban areas to volunteer or work. It not only helped a once declining town to regain its vitality, but it also recruited talented people to participate in local development and Hakka culture promotion. The organisation was seen as an embodiment of local leadership transcending the local township office.

[96] Its major theme was to assign Meinung as a 'water source and landscape protected area' which would be supported by compensation from urban water tax/revenues.




Figure 6.1: The Locations of the Organisations Practising Water Defence

## 6.3 Findings

In Chapter One, this thesis raised five research questions about the collaborative environmental governance in Taiwan: (1) What have been the reasons that have motivated the emergence of environmental collaborative governance? (2) Have different approaches to initiating environmental collaborative governance led to different processes and results? (3) Does the emergence of environmental collaborative governance promise a new pattern for its long-term development through its institutionalisation within the policy structure generally? (4) What are the levels of transformability and constraints of collaborative governance in the context of Taiwan? (5) Does the current practice of collaborative governance in Taiwan result in a true transition of the state-society relationship or just a disguised form of corporatist strategy? In order to answer these research questions, each section from 6.3.1 to 6.3.5 examines each one in turn. Section 6.3.6 discusses a unique phenomenon that emerged in this case study.

### 6.3.1 The reason motivating the emergence of environmental collaborative governance

First of all, this example shows that several groups of environmentalists, although located in different areas (including rural and urban), could initiate a new form of collaborative governance spontaneously from the bottom up. The main reason for their actions was to break through three types of bottleneck they had encountered in the post-social movement phase.

The first bottleneck was the need to create new agendas and renewed mobilisation. When most of the controversial water resource issues, like dam projects and industrial water demands, were temporarily put into abeyance in the late 1990s, the organisations experienced a loss of public attention and support. Part of the reason was that the organisations were incorporated into the policy mediation process and this process isolated them from the public and led to a lack of public exposure. These organisations needed to develop new agendas for social mobilisation and public visibility if they were to continue to demonstrate their

local value (Interviewees: 013, 2007-03-08; 003, 2006-05-22).

Core members of Wetlands Taiwan suggested:

> *'Some groups among [the Kaoping River Protection Alliance] kept growing and transformed from single issue groups to multiple functional groups…If a group only cares about one thing, they lose the will to fight when the target disappears. If a group wants to continue its growth, it needs to introduce new agendas and new memberships.'* (Interviewee: 004, 2007-02-06)
>
> *'Participating in the policy meeting was very routine and regular mediation. Often in the process we were isolated from the public [and the media] and gradually lost public attention and support. It also affected our opportunity to recruit new members and made us become an organisation of a few elites.'* (Interviewee: 003, 2006-05-22)

For Wetlands Taiwan, when the water resource controversy was alleviated, they were able to return to their fundamental aim- environmental conservation. Their two director generals said:

> *'After we defeated the dam construction projects and related industrial development projects, the water use of the Kaoping River then returned to normal. So we returned our organisational task to basic ecological conservation.'* (Interviewee: 004, 2007-02-06)

Two chief executives in the BDCCA mentioned how the organisation started to conduct community empowerment projects in 1999 in order to promote environmentalism in each community and thus acquire support from the grassroots:

> *'We started to conduct community building because we had experience of setbacks. We constructed one artificial wetland on a tidal flat of a tributary of Donggang Creek. Local residents did not appreciate it; on the contrary, they accused us of occupying the tidal flat. In another case we suggested that the local government recover the streamlined nature of Donggang Creek after it had been straightened to make it more ecologically friendly. However the local residents preferred concrete dikes, which they felt safer than the ecological method of dike building due to concern about flood control.'*

(Interviewee: 010, 2006-10-17)

*'Our old method was to improve the environment directly by ourselves. But we found that if the local community did not recognise the work as being in the local interest it would be much more difficult to do the job. Now we work with the communities. We care about the primary need of the locals, thus making the job much more diverse. Usually it will combine with social demands.'* (Interviewee: 012, 2006-12-07)

A former director general explained how community building extended their movement repertoire:

*'The anti-dam campaign in Meinung played the role of catalyst to provoke different kinds of social activities. A lot of creativity was embodied. Many young people joined the activism. Different networks were established. Even after the mobilisation for anti-dam, MPA must continue to do things that are meaningful for our hometown. When we were not in the battlefield of anti-dam action, we were in the field of cultural rebuilding. This extended anti-dam activism to ecological and cultural dimensions.'* (Interviewee: 016, 2006-4-2)

*'Environmental activism always emphasises that a movement must be rooted in communities, but during the policy defence it was difficult to work in communities…It was not until political pressure and conflict was much relieved, that we had the opportunity to turn to communities and try to realise the idealism of a social movement. It gave us a chance to really face the public and gain their support.'* (Interviewee: 015, 2006-11-13)

The second bottleneck was how to solve those unsolved environmental issues that demanded cooperative actions. The solution lay in these NGOs teaming up with various government agencies (Interviewees: 019, 2007-2-12; 020, 2007-1-18; 023, 2006-12-15; 024, 2006-12-26).

Two director generals of Wetlands Taiwan explained how they cooperated with different government bodies on restoring wetlands after the controversial issues were resolved:

*'When the appeals of protecting the Kaoping River were accepted by the*

*government and an integrative institution, the Kaoping River Watershed Administration Committee, was established to integrate related authorities, our organisation returned to our basic aims and worked with the Seventh River Bureau on wetland regeneration on the high tidal flat of the river.' (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22)*

*'The personnel in both the Seventh Bureau and the Kaohsiung Municipal Government did not have the necessary expertise of wetland design and ecology conservation, so they consulted us on these topics and invited our participation.' (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22)*

The head of the Seventh River Bureau and the Kaoping River Watershed Administration Committee illustrated how they have come to count on NGOs and outside experts for support:

*"There was no emnity between government officials and environmental groups. We could sit down and talk. I think the dialogue process could change the perspectives of officials. It was very a positive interaction. We could even become friends[97]...Urban environmental groups usually raised intelligent suggestions and at the same time put effort into helping us to improve the environment."* (023, 2006-12-15)

*"Their basic ecological investigations were more complete than official ones, so was their knowledge of river ecology. What they suggested was what we never thought of and desperately needed. When we first contacted them, we strongly felt the inadequacy of our river management. We made a sudden U-turn to ecological-oriented river governance. We listened to the suggestions of environmental groups and tried to fulfil them with our empirical experience. It demanded both sides of expertise to achieve environmental protection."* (024, 2006-12-26)

One head of the government Water Work Bureau emphasized how participatory policy-making stimulates public servants' thinking and work:

*'After we entered public office, our thinking increasingly narrowed. The opinions of outside experts and environmentalists stimulated our thinking...*

[97] Several core members in the three organisations in this study truly developed friendships with these two officials (observation: 2006-7-5, 2006-7-6, 2006-7-12, 2006-10-6, 2006-10-13, and 2006-11-11).

*public officials often need outside pressure to force us to face the problems and this will also drive us to present better work.'* (Interviewee: 028, 2007-2-7)

One chief executive of the DBCCA said that the local government had a budget for environmental protection and community building but had no concrete plan, and therefore needed an NGO to draw up a plan and implement it:

*'At the beginning the [county government] had this budget but did not know how to use it. Therefore our former chief executive suggested that the DBCCA could help by putting a community building project into practice. Even without this budget, our daily work was exactly the same . Other organisations had shown their appreciation for our work of community networking.'* (Interviewee: 012, 2006-12-07)

The third bottleneck was the need of NGOs for organisational growth, including new expertise and membership, and a change of activities in the post-movement phase. In the case of Wetlands Taiwan, wetland regeneration and ecology restoration became the mechanism for the organisation to advance its expertise and recruit new members. Their two director generals said:

'*Our approach has gradually moved towards wetland adoption and management to demonstrate best practice to government and to train others in our expertise of wetland planning and management*.' (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22)

*'The growth of Wetlands Taiwan originated from our will to adopt the work of regenerating habitat for the Jacana*[98]*. Wetlands Taiwan accepted from various government agencies their trust in managing habitat regeneration. We have been reborn since then. The new approach implies that what we can do is more than just protest. We learned new methods, acquired new strengths and introduced new, talented people.'* (Interviewee: 004, 2007-02-06)

Nevertheless, the timing of the emergence of collaborative governance on restoring the Kaoping River coincided with the establishment of the new DPP

[98] Here it refers to pheasant-tailed Jacana, a wildfowl which was endangered. Wetlands Taiwan and bird societies suggested that the government should regenerate habitat for the endangered species and accept its entrustment of the habitat management.

regime. This inevitably provokes the debate as to what extent the new regime facilitated this new environmental movement. Although some interviewees think the emergence of collaborative governance does not necessarily relate to the new regime because there was cooperation between the two parties during the old KMT regime (004, 2007-02-06), most interviewees value how the new DPP regime has actively improved environmental policies, released resources to environmental groups and sought opportunities to collaborate with them. This has led to the emergence of collaborative governance (Interviewees: 013, 2007-03-08; 003, 2006-05-22; 002, 2006-10-21; 015, 2006-11-13). As a leader of Wetlands Taiwan said:

> *'The transformation of Wetlands Taiwan was closely related to the fact that the DPP came to power. The former ruling KMT party was hostile to environmental issues, therefore environmental groups had to ally with the former oppositional party DDP for environmental campaigns. This is why most leading politicians in the government are our former allies. We now have access to, and trust with, the current political leaders. After the DPP came to power, seventy percent the environmental activist elites were recruited into the government, most environmental issues were incorporated into policy, and therefore many groups lost their focus…Nevertheless, environmental groups can now obtain more government resources and gain the recognition of society. Our struggle skills have advanced and our organisation employs more formal staff.'* (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22)

But core members of these NGOs also thought the opportunity of committing to collaborative governance was not only provided by a friendly regime, but also produced by the past efforts of the Water Defence movement:

> *'The power transition was a crucial turning point. The idealism that environmental groups campaigned for suddenly jumped to official tables when the DPP came to power. It was not caused simply by the DPP's contribution, but also the energy the environmental groups had accumulated to fulfil their idealism.'* (Interviewee: 015, 2006-11-13)
>
> *'Many people attribute our fulfillment of community building to the presidential power transition, but it should not be seen this way. This neglects the effort that the environmental and social movements have put in.'*

(Interviewee: 015, 2006-11-13)

Some core members of environmental groups considered the support of politicians as just complementary, not decisive. They might still be able to achieve environmental targets through the bureaucracy even without a power transfer.

*'The success of environmental organisations has nothing to do with politicians. We had similar cooperative experience with the former KMT regime too…During the ecological campaign, we needed all sorts of support from every party and faction…We sought to utilise every possible resource. The Green government can make our progress quicker, but it does not mean that the Blues did nothing. I did not get any advantage because of the Greens coming to power. They know that we will support them even without releasing resources to us. Therefore, I stand for neither Green nor Blue. I acted based on laws and any method I could utilise.'* (Interviewee: 004, 2007-02-06)

*'Politicians are not absolutely critical, but they make our progress quicker, shorten the administrative process and provide opportunities…Nevertheless, even if a politician makes promises, the following detailed collaborative process needs to deal with technocrats. Privately, the Green government still needs the support of technocrats, especially in terms of managing habitats, which demands much more elaborate administrative resources and networks.'* (Interviewee: 004, 2007-02-06)

This perspective of avoiding overestimating the political support of the Green regime is similar to what the leader of the Green Association said:

*'The Green regime*[99] *is only a transition on the surface. The bureaucracy is a leftover of the old regime. Not only the personnel but also their ideology stayed. The old policy will affect the new party in power. It becomes a new synergy which is more difficult to deal with than the traditional KMT regime.'* (Interviewee: 001, 2006-12-30)'

This situation of how political support made the environmental collaboration

[99] The DPP is often called the Green, while its opposite party is called the Blue, which does not necessary imply that it is environmentally friendly.

grow faster and bigger was also happening at the local level. The founder of the BDCCA, Tsao Chi-hung (originally a high school teacher), has pursued a political career by joining elections on behalf of the DPP and later became the governor of Pingtung county. His political position has brought plentiful resources to his affiliated environmental organisations and related environmental reforms. This highlights that political connections are vital for acquiring significant government resources in Taiwan. However, his involvement in election politics has raised doubts about the relations between community groups and himself.
A former chief executive of the BDCCA defended the governor saying that:

> *'The BDCCA has taken advantage of Mr. Tsao's political position to acquire information, resources and funding…the BDCCA has acquired many resources from the public sector because of Mr. Tsao's help'* (Interviewee: 010, 2006-10-17)

To conclude, the main reasons that led the three environmental NGOs to develop collaborative governance are linked to the three bottlenecks- the need to mobilise public attention, recognition that the unresolved environmental issues required public and private cooperation, and the need of NGOs to continue developing their organisations. But the sudden rise of political support in both local and central government is also a major reason for the emergence of collaborative governance. In this situation, collaborative governance served as a strategy to explore new territory for the NGOs while at the same time extending their influence in order to stay relevant.

### 6.3.2 The endogenous approach of initiating environmental collaborative governance and its results

This section explores what form the collaborative governance took and how different types of environmental collaborative governance led to different processes and results. NGO thinking and concerns extended beyond 'NIMBYism' in order to promote wider environmental reform.
A former director general of Wetlands Taiwan made a similar analysis:

> *'During the confrontational phase, the linked groups in the Kaoping River Protection Movement were very similar and grew together as the movement*

*developed. However, afterwards, they introduced different elements leading to different development patterns. For example, the MPA introduced local culture, and the BDCCA did likewise, while Wetlands Taiwan introduced habitat restoration. Each group introduced new elements and this led to differentiation in organisational development. The development route they chose was often related to key people. For example, Wetlands Taiwan chose to promote habitat restoration because we had key individuals with the right expertise and financial support.'* (Interviewee: 004, 2007-2-6)

Wetlands Taiwan decided to develop the best model of wetland regeneration and management they could and to collaborate with government as necessary. For example,

*'The Kaoping River Protection Movement suggested the use of high tidal flats as a "Hundred-Mile Wetland", which could provide both the functions of waste water remediation and wildlife conservation. This proposal halted the original Kaohsiung County government's plan to develop high tidal flats as sports parks and residential areas.'* (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22)

Core members of the MPA sought to lead local development through several conservation programmes, including Hakka culture preservation, ecology protection[100], traditional architecture conservation[101], organic agriculture, water landscape preservation and ecological flood retention ponds.

*'The MPA, as the think tank of Meinung's development, argued for an integrated development plan more broadly than the dam project. The practice of water resource conservation was related to the surrounding culture and land use. Simply put, we seek to establish Meinung as an underground reservoir. The water stored underneath the earth can resolve the water resource issue in the Kaoping area on the premise of seeking a balance between recharge and extraction of groundwater.'* (Interviewee: 015, 2006-11-13)

The BDCCA has become the major force behind local community group empowerment. It encouraged local groups to participate in public affairs and

[100] This especially relates to the ecology of Yellow Butterfly Valley.
[101] Local famous architecture is also known as the Tobacco-Making Tower.

through these actions to promote their vision:

> *'In recent years, we have devoted all efforts to empowering locals to acquire their own resources and have avoided most resources becoming concentrated in our own organisation. We helped the locals to realise the future of their own communities, training them to be self-dependent for community management and then, finally, to network them so that they could help and learn from each other…Under the best circumstances we hope to enable local groups to play the role of regional platforms[102] able to empower other grassroots organisations either existing or newly established.'* (Interviewee: 012, 2006-12-07)
>
> *'We teach them how to acquire government resources to do what they want. Not force them to do what the BDCCA wants, but to lead them to explore what they want to do...'* (Interviewee: 010, 2006-10-17)

On the one hand, environmental NGOs obviously had a stronger capacity than community groups to acquire and integrate support and funding from multiple government departments in order to initiate endogenous collaborative governance. For example, Wetlands Taiwan has cooperated with several county and city governments on wetland regeneration and management, including Kaohsiung city and county governments, Tainan county government, the Environmental Protection Agency, and Construction and Planning Agency. Annually nearly US $ 1M from the government was spent on wetland regeneration based on Wetlands Taiwan's suggestions (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22). The BDCCA raised approximately US $ 400,000 for community empowerment each year (Interviewee: 012, 2006-12-7) from both central and local governments. The MPA also acquired multi-source funding for community building in every aspect (Interviewee: 014, 2006-5-19). On the other hand, the reliance on government funding both enabled and restrained the activities of these NGOs. Government budget oriented NGOs' activities kept them occupied with local environmental affairs rather than extending their focus to wider environmental issues (Interviewee: 013, 2007-3-8), for example new development projects of industrial complexes and water supply projects.

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[102] There were ten intermediate groups in this environmental network.

But in terms of local development, the influence collaborative governance brought was beyond what local administrations could do. For example the MPA had become the essential planner of local diverse development (Observation: 2006-10-13). A core member of the MPA said:

> *'The local township office has withdrawn to a pure administrative unit. It has no capacity to govern and only maintains a basic social function. It cannot envision the community's future. The major mechanism of local development is from the collective decision-making and public deliberation of local associations.'* (Interviewee: 015, 2006-11-13)

> *'The target of the MPA's work now is to enforce the foundation of Meinung's culture, including natural environment, landscape, industry and ethnic culture. This unique Meinung culture has dwindled no matter from which perspective, space, education, or heritage conservation. Our current project, Meinung integrative planning, aims to produce an essential strategy to tackle this problem.'* (Interviewee: 014, 2006-5-19)

A chief executive of the Green Association, which led the Kaoping River Protection Movement, revealed how early activism tended to be elite oriented:

> *'The southern green movement dates back to 1992. In the initial stage of the movement, Dr. Tseng Kuei-hai*[103] *saw that the embankment of the Kaoping River was piled up with all sorts of waste. He was very shocked. All press coverage related to the River was negative. He then called out to save the Kaoping River. Because he was highly renowned, many environmental and culture groups responded to his call and formed the Kaoping River Protection Movement. Most members at that time were lawyers, architects, physicians, writers and journalists.'* (Interviewee: 002, 2006-10-21)

As the nature of these organisations' work has changed, their membership has expanded fast. For example the BDCCA has networked more than a hundred associated community groups (Interviewee: 012, 2006-12-7); Wetlands Taiwan has approximately two hundred volunteers helping habitat regeneration (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22); and the MPA has around a hundred volunteers

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[103] A prestigious medical doctor, who led the early urban green movement during the 1990s, is a government consultant today. He won the title 'Southern Environmental Godfather'.

from community residents, local administration, schools and local groups (Interviewee: 014, 2006-5-19).

One director general of a department in Kaohsiung municipal government explained his observations of these NGOs' transition from elitism to participatory:

> '*Chouchai wetland*[104] *was originally advocated by environmental elites of Wetlands Taiwan but gradually opened to local people to participate in its management. This was an internal transition of the environmental organisation. Again and again the organisation experienced local generations taking over the wetland from the original elites. The municipal government has also learnt to tolerate and embrace the interaction with the civil society.'* (019, 2007-2-12)

The core members of these environmental NGOs held several memberships of all sorts of governmental committees in both central and local governments. They have won direct access to policy-making. But while the consultative mechanism of government committees did not guarantee membership and influence, conducting collaborative governance has reinforced their skills and expertise. This experience has consolidated their position in the policy process.

A chief executive of the Green Association explained how the repertoire of engagement among environmental organisations has changed:

> '*Initially, the ways NGOs promoted their idealism were by calling for press conferences, conducting policy lobbies, and pushing the government to reinforce implementation and public authority. In the future NGOs should be part of the decision making. In the Kaoping River Watershed Administration Committee, NGOs have several seats and participate in the policy process.'* (002, 2006-10-21)

The Kaoping River Watershed Administration Committee, established in 2001, was designed to integrate the dispersed authority of river management. It made available several seats for environmental groups. Not only did the Kaoping River

[104] One of the wetlands that Wetlands Taiwan regenerated and managed.

Watershed Administration Committee adopt a more participatory form, other water resource related committees also arranged seats for environmental NGOs (002, 2006-10-21). But this arrangement is subject to political manipulation. The chief-executive of the Green Association, who was one of the committee members, explained:

*'When the DPP came to power in 2000, it promised to establish an integrated river management organisation. This promise was fulfilled at the end of 2001 and the organisation allocated three seats for environmental groups*[105]*. We thought our goal was going to come true. In the first four years, both the MPA and the BDCCA were committee members..., so the influence of civil society was very strong. But now most civil seats are not occupied by real local environmental groups in either Kaohsiung city, county or Pingtung county...This is a political phenomenon directed by Frank Hsieh*[106]*.'* (002, 2006-10-21)

A more nuanced view is spelled out by a core member of Wetlands Taiwan:

*'When we attend the meetings of the government committee, our opinions are not necessarily incorporated into policy; but when we do wetland regeneration, we increasingly train new specialists and accumulate real knowledge. The results of wetland regeneration are very good too, and numerous wetlands follow our examples. Although our organisation is an NGO, we mobilise every resource we can get in time for the wetlands. It is impossible for the government to achieve this because governmental works have to go through a bidding process and bureaucracy often lacks spontaneity.'* (Interviewee: 005, 2006-11-19)

A further point made by another interviewee observes that:

*'Habitat management is a more concrete target and approach [in comparison to an issue campaign]. It demands much more labour, expertise and finance as well as closer relations with the government and sponsors. Without the support of volunteers, sponsors and governments, it is impossible to do this task well.'* (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22)

[105] Every administration area has been allocated a seat for environmental groups.
[106] A former mayor of Kaohsiung city who once was in conflict with the Green Association

These comments reveal that the form of collaborative governance initiated by the environmental NGOs adopted an approach which prioritised the demands and conditions of these organisations. As a matter of fact, these forms of collaborative governance were more like strategies to meet the organisational survival of the bodies concerned. The environmental problems they were dealing with were shaped in part according to the internal composition of the organisation and in part by geographic conditions. This suggests that it may be inappropriate to replicate the model of collaborative governance in other areas that lack the same conditions and spontaneity of civil society. (These were also the key reasons behind their decision of whether to continue collaborative governance which is discussed in Section 6.3.4.)

These endogenous governance actions mobilised government resources (political and administrative commitment and funding), supporters and networks to develop new solutions for environmental issues. As a result it performed a highly mobilised and integrated governance action on improving the environment while at the same time strengthening the position of these environmental NGOs in the policy process. It has benefitted both their development and the environment to an extent which cannot be achieved by either a government-oriented policy or a consultative form of participation within governmental institutions. But it later faced a dilemma on how to combat the newly emergent water crisis raised by their collaborative partner- the state (see Section 6.3.5).

### 6.3.3 The long-term development and institutionalisation of environmental collaborative governance

Collaborative governance has contributed to environmental improvement and the growth of associated organisations in this study, but these organisations do not think they will all necessarily follow the same direction. Major reasons include the instability of local politics and policies, and that the financial and labour requirements of collaborative governance are extensive. In addition, collaboration per se is an end-in-itself for the society as a whole in terms of its democratic value, but it is also a temporary strategy for the organisations.

For Wetlands Taiwan, the resource demand for wetland management is huge and has led to resource reliance on government and enterprise funding. Their core members have different opinions about this and one senior board member has even left the organisation because of a difference of opinion (Observation: 2006-2-1, 2006-5-1). Donations from society are never sufficient enough to cope with the expenses and they are not sure if they will continue with collaborative governance. There is still debate about the route of their organisation (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22; 005, 2006-11-19). Two director generals and one core member said that:

> *'[Since we started to collaborate with the government on managing the wetlands], our work on the policy campaign has decreased, and we have also encountered internal cultural conflicts and competition for resources. The thinking and focus of policy campaigns are different from those of managing wetlands. Habitat managers have a deep commitment to the wetlands but are indifferent to public policies. Focussing attention on both sides of the work is difficult for us in terms of finance and personnel and easily causes conflict.'* (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22)
>
> *'In the confrontation phase, Wetlands Taiwan only had to raise questions but not solutions; now doing habitat conservation is the opposite. Our role has become a bit awkward. It is exhausting to be in a managerial role because it needs all sorts of resources in comparison with being a critic. The government provides only limited resources but we have to achieve the results by any means…I believe this route is right for us, but it needs society as a whole to change values and input resources…What will happen in the future is not something we can decide alone. Habitat regeneration needs society and the government to get involved.'* (Interviewee: 005, 2006-11-19)

A director general in a department of the Kaohsiung municipal government expressed his opinion that cooperation between NGOs and the government cannot be guaranteed to last forever, and it is also very difficult to institutionalise this kind of cooperation. However, in his opinion, there are good reasons for various forms of future cooperation:

> *'It is difficult to judge to what extent we should institutionalise our*

*cooperation and how flexible it should be. At least the policy attitude toward Chouchai wetland and the goodwill of the NGO will continue even if all the responsible officials change. Nevertheless, it is possible that the cooperation will eventually face a weakening point when, for example, bureaucrats cannot cooperate... Nowadays, it has become common sense that governance is not a monopoly of the government but an incorporation of civil society in the policy process. For the government its new role is to play a catalyst of the forum of regional and cross-boundary governance and to motivate the participation of civil society.'* (Interviewee: 019, 2007-2-12)

Another source of tension between NGOs and government is the higher expectation placed on NGOs by government now that they receive support from government.

One director general of the BDCCA said that:

*'Sometimes I feel our organisation has been kidnapped by the government. The government insists on us helping in implementing some community related policies so that they can have peace of mind. It results in us having to release many talented people to do things irrelevant to the environment. Our work is gradually distanced from our early goal of conservation...We need a further transformation, but everyone has an opinion about where to start and to what extent we should transform. Personally I hope that we can look at environmental issues that relate to the wider Kao-Kao-Ping area, but there is another question about how we can financially afford to do this.'* (Interviewee: 011, 2007-1-31)

A further source of dispute arises from the dissatisfaction among some core members who feel working with government has shifted the organisations' original goal, not least a greater focus on community development rather than ecological restoration. Furthermore, the MPA, which has been devoted to community conservation and development, now faces a shift in the central belief of newly recruited paid staff and core members. The potential threat of political change implies that the Meinung dam project might be raised again, which might be difficult for their new generation of cadres to tackle. One chief executive said that:

*'It is highly possible that we will be forced to change direction because the DDP have not yet drawn up a long term perspective for the Kaoping River. The Water Resource Agency still insists there is shortage of water supply. But it has not put an equivalent effort into water saving and constraining water demand as what it has put into water development. The water issue still needs these NGOs' attention, but most of our cadres are now unfamiliar with the issue. As a chief executive, this makes me very anxious.'* (Interviewee: 104, 2006-05-19)

*'Our current employees never participated in the anti-dam movement; their central concern is to maintain the organisation rather than the mission. It might make the organisation practice bureaucratic and routine.'* (Interviewee: 015, 2006-11-13)

This last point is taken further by a director general of a department in Kaohsiung municipal government. He suggests:

> *'Cooperation with Wetlands Taiwan is now regular and taken for granted. The related funding is also budgeted...But the institution is rigid; it will hurt both the NGOs and government officials and cause conflict. There are too many side issues, grey zones, and inefficiency in institutionalisation. We need a new mechanism which can ensure the position of the NGOs in collaborative governance but with highly flexible procedures. But the problem is that we cannot simplify cooperation with the NGOs as this is laid down in law.* (Interviewee: 019, 2007-02-12)

To conclude, although the results of the endogenous approach of collaborative governance initiated by environmental NGOs is inspiring in many ways, its long-term development often seems problematic. The first difficulty is the tremendous resource demands of collaborative governance which have resulted in the NGOs' reliance on government funding which in turn is influenced by political shifts. The second is the dilemma the NGOs face when they are expected to devote their energy into emerging critical environmental issues, e.g. new water development projects, since most resources have been invested in other collaborative governance programmes. The third difficulty lies in the institutionalisation of collaborative governance because any form of institutionalisation reduces the flexibility of operation. Finally, the emergence of

new generations of supporters will inevitably lead to changes in organisational focus and purpose.

### 6.3.4 The transformative capability and constraints of environmental collaborative governance in Taiwan

The NGOs in this study have changed from confrontation-oriented to collaboration-oriented organisations, but their capacity is limited when it comes to preventing and combating the second wave of water resource conflicts which arose in 2006 (Observations: 2006-1-15, 2006-3-21, 2006-4-21/22, 2006-3-11, 2006-3-25, 2006-4-4, 2006-4-08). These organisations and other water defence groups tried to re-establish the Kaoping River Protection Alliance after ten years since it was first established in 1997, but failed to mobilise it effectively (Observations: 2006-7-16, 2006-11-12). This was because:

> *'Every group which survived from the first wave of mobilisation in the 1990s has committed to new issues and are unavailable to focus on the new crisis and can only provide a limited contribution.'* (Interviewee: 010, 2006-10-17)

Although the DPP was a more environmentally friendly party, its rule of the nation still produced many controversies in river and water resource management. The environmental NGOs were preoccupied by the affairs of collaborative governance, hence were unavailable to tackle newly-emerging issues (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22). This is also because of their allocation of resources to local conservation programmes and their gradual loss of political savoir-faire at a national level (Interviewees: 015, 2006-11-13; 012, 2006-12-07). Whilst senior members worry about the overall political situation of the environment, their new members and staff, attracted by collaborative programmes, did not approve of confrontational strategies, but preferred mild action methods such as advocacy and promotion (Interviewee: 014, 2006-5-19). In addition, their close relations with local governments also attracted criticism, by a new group of fundamentalist activists, in which they were accused of 'silent consent' to new water development projects (Interviewee: 048, 2006-10-23). These dilemmas highlight the limitations that the achievement of collaborative governance can make. While collaborative governance was developing rapidly, the Kaoping River

still experienced tremendous changes over the last eight years. A thousand hectares of river tidal flat was illegally used as farmland and seven hundred hectares as aqua farms, close to the tap water extraction location, and these polluted the water source. The problematic aquaculture was not resolvable and degrated the river (Interviewee: 048, 2006-10-23). The fundamentalist activists argued that the problem of water shortage was a false alarm and the government's deliberate misinformation due to the fact that most industries had migrated to China. It is believed that the Water Resource Agency overestimates the water demand (Interviewee: 048, 2006-10-23).

But, this might not be fair criticism. Being unavailable to confront the state does not necessarily reduce the contribution of the organisations in this study. Through their deliberation, they raised an alternative to traditional water resource development from the bottom-up and formulated a holistic vision of national water policy (Observations: 2006-3-11; 2006-7-12; 2006-7-16; 2006-10-13; 2006-11-11).

An active scholar explained that the contribution of collaborators to the initiative of new methods of water resource management was subtle and took a long time to provide results:

> *'Activists and academia have cooperated to raise the idea of underground reservoirs to replace traditional dam projects and trans-basin diversion. A relevant experiment has now started. It is very possible to become a leading practice of water resource. This campaign process has lasted ten years. Unlike the early policy making process from the top-down, this solution is raised from bottom-up by the Water Defence movement and deliberated collectively by activists, scholars, politicians and bureaucrats.'* (Interviewee: 051, 2007-1-12)
>
> *'The government now listens to the environmental issues that the locals and NGOs campaign for. Many issues have gradually become the pursuit of sustainable development and formulate a holistic national environmental vision'* (Interviewee: 051, 2007-1-12)

The first wave environmental groups, including the BDCCA, MPA and the Green

Association, have worked with scholars continuously in seeking solutions for water resources by utilising groundwater, recharging and extracting in specific locations where the geology is compatible. Their advocacy of an alternative option to water development was described by one chief executive of the Green Association as follows:

> *'Environmental groups have called for two international conferences to help introduce the technique of utilising groundwater to replace the current method of extracting surface river water, which often severely affects the river ecology and neighbourhood villages. The ideal we have advocated is to construct an underground weir just under the surface of the river bed to extract underground water. If we made a 1,500 meters long weir under the river bed where the width is 2,000 meters, we could acquire 1,000,000 tons of water. This quantity can make up for the shortage of water supply we face in the future in the Kao-Kao-Ping area.'* (Interviewee: 002, 2006-10-21)

Nonetheless, this alternative was not accepted by the fundamentalist activists. Moreover, when the new water resource policy triggered new disputes and confrontations, the environmental groups the government resorted to were the organisations in the first wave of Water Defence rather than the fundamentalist organisations in the second wave (Observations: 2006-7-5, 2006-11-11). This does not only highlight the political capital the first wave organisations had accumulated, but also the contradictions between the two waves of Water Defence.

One director of the BDCCA commented that the major difference, between the first wave of Kaoping River protection groups and the second, was in their intentions and strategies of persuading the government:

> *'The Water Resource Agency did not negotiate with the fundamentalist groups but with the first wave environmental groups. The first wave groups have the energy to become a counter to the government. They keep the network for communication with the government, but fundamentalist groups have difficulty in doing the same.'* (Interviewee: 013, 2007-3-8)
>
> *'The chance to negotiate exists because there is a network between the first wave groups and the government. Even in committing to a confrontational*

> *approach, the government and the environmental groups eventually need to sit down and talk. Sometimes the project is non-negotiable if the ideologies of the two sides are too different, like the Meinung dam project. This time the trans-basin diversion project is a smaller construction project so that is negotiable. There is no absolute success of negotiation because there is usually only one small issue in each negotiation. We do not ask for triumphant successes. Small losses can be a success too. At least we obtain vital information each time.'* (Interviewee: 013, 2007-3-8)

Collaborative governance per se successfully improved some environmental concerns at the community level (Observations: 2006-3-25, 2006-3-14, 2006-3-21 and 2006-3-28), which the collaborative groups evaluated as the most important successes of the phase and, as a whole, these allowed them to widen the scope of the environmental action repertoire. Nonetheless, it did not achieve radical changes on critical environmental issues in either a national or local sense (Observations: 2006-1-13, 2006-1-15, 2006-3-21, 2006-4-21, 2006-3-11, 2007-8-17, 2006-7-6 and 2006-7-12) and unavoidably roused criticism.

The influence of collaborative governance is also constrained by local politics, which is overwhelmed by the concerns of political election. As one leader of the BDCCA said:

> *'Our work has helped the communities in Pingtung to improve their life quality. People's ways of thinking is changing too. However local communities are still fragile and subject to political influence. During the election, people cannot resist faction and voting broker politics…Those who are enthusiastic in elections will eventually return to the traditional voting broker system.'* (Interviewee: 010, 2006-10-17)
>
> *'Some of our members have questioned why we help people inclined to the Blue, but we want to fulfil the value of community empowerment and let people see everyone is equal to us.* (Interviewee: 012, 2006-12-07)

Despite debate over their achievements, the continuous spontaneous mobilisation of these collaborative groups is the key to the success of the Water Defence movement. It is as a scholar who has been working with the environmental NGOs

said:

> *'The Water Defence movement and the dialogue between the government and NGOs have to be continued in the future; otherwise each agenda might take a long time to realise.'* (Interviewee: 051, 2007-1-12)

This endogenous approach of collaborative governance initiated by environmental NGOs achieved environmental restoration, which was highly valued by the public[107], and proposed feasible water resolutions in ways which could not be done by government alone nor by their previous interruptive strategies. To put the resolutions into practice it demanded a long term campaign, good communication, an extensive network of contacts among all actors and even continuous adjustment of position during the implementation process.

However, this approach to collaborative governance is also shown not to be without its limits, especially 1) policy compromises, which these NGOs confessed were unavoidable and 2) constraints on their action repertoire to respond to controversial environmental issues. For example, when encountering the new water crisis, they failed to make a radical change in water development policies and thus were criticised as being hijacked by the government. But whether this is fair criticism remains doubtful. Environmentalism can/should be embodied in multiple ways and a revolutionary result usually needs various conditions to make it come true, sometimes even catastrophes to consolidate the public and political will to achieve radical changes in policies. The disruptive strategy of environmental NGOs alone cannot achieve radical changes, neither can the cooperative ones. These two methods need to complement each other when putting public pressure on the government.

### 6.3.5 State-society relationship in transition

First, looking at the growing complex and inconsistent relations between the NGOs and the state from the point of view of the bureaucracy, two heads of the Seventh River Bureau and the Kaoping River Watershed Administration

[107] This statement is based on the coverage of mass media, the comments of the government officials and the large number of public visits shown by these three groups.

Committee described their dealing with environmental NGOs:

*'At the beginning the ideal of restoration was very strange to us. We received a lot of opinions from experts and NGOs and then finally had a clearer idea of how to modify our way of doing things…I have been working in the Water Work sector for twenty one years. In the initial stage, NGOs used radical methods to achieve their purpose. Both sides could not understand each other. We thought they were radical and extreme; they thought we were inactive and ineffective. Environmental NGOs thought government officials should do everything and the government officials thought NGOs had nothing to do but to criticise. There was a lack of trust and understanding between the NGOs and the government. But once we sat down and talked, we finally started to understand each other and discussed what we could and could not do.'* (Interviewee: 024, 2006-12-26)

Another member of the bureaucracy argued that:

*'Many in the Water Resource Agency have ended their prejudices against environmental activists. I told the director that there is no confrontation between the government and the NGOs in the south. We all work together in the planning process. The reason why NGOs conflict with the government is mainly because some bureaucrats engaged private companies to conduct Environmental Impact Assessments of big construction projects without consulting environmental groups.'* (Interviewee: 023, 2006-12-15)

A director in the Kaohsiung municipal government said that:

*'As time goes by, my personal interaction with NGOs is maturing. This is because the political transition*[108] *has revealed the public's views, the capacity of the NGOs has increased and the attitude of government officials has matured. When local government recognises NGOs as policy initiators, their attitude will be much improved in comparison to ten years ago when both sides were hostile and despised each other. At the outset, only enthusiastic officials in the government would talk to NGOs, nowadays it seems quite natural to interact with them.'* (Interviewee: 019, 2007-2-12)

[108] This refers to both the political power transfer in the central (in 2000) and local governments (in 1999).

Second, the timing of the Kaoping River protection coincided with the establishment of the new DPP regime. Although some interviewees think the emergence of collaborative governance does not necessarily relate to the new regime because there was cooperation between the two parties during the old KMT regime (004, 2007-02-06), most interviewees value how the new DPP regime has actively improved environmental policies, released resources to environmental groups and sought opportunities to collaborate with them. This has led to the emergence of collaborative governance (Interviewees: 013, 2007-03-08; 003, 2006-05-22; 002, 2006-10-21; 015, 2006-11-13).

> *'The transformation of Wetlands Taiwan was closely related to the fact that the DPP came to power. The former ruling KMT party was hostile to environmental issues, therefore environmental groups had to ally with the former oppositional party DDP for environmental campaigns. This is why most leading politicians in the government are our former allies. We now have access to, and trust with, the current political leaders. After the DPP came to power, seventy percent of environmental elites were recruited into the government, most environmental issues were incorporated into policy, and therefore many groups lost their focus…Nevertheless, environmental groups can now obtain more government resources and gain the recognition of society. Our struggle skills have advanced and our organisation employs more formal staff.'* (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22)

But core members of these NGOs also thought the opportunity of committing to collaborative governance was not only provided by a friendly regime, but also produced by the past efforts of the Water Defence movement:

> *'The power transition was a crucial turning point. The idealism that environmental groups campaigned for suddenly jumped to official tables when the DPP came to power. It was not caused simply by the DPP's contribution, but also the energy the environmental groups had accumulated to fulfil their idealism.'* (Interviewee: 015, 2006-11-13)
>
> *'Many people attribute our fulfillment of community building to the presidential power transition, but it should not be seen this way. This neglects the effort that the environmental and social movements have put in.'*

(Interviewee: 015, 2006-11-13)

However, the environmental NGOs' reliance on government resources, due to the limited social resources available, has become an issue among them. A core member of Wetlands Taiwan said that:

*'Our past relationship with the government was like confronting the tough with toughness. Our only reliable partner was the mass media, which had much more sympathy with environmental issues than they do today. Now our political network is much improved. We can achieve our goals simply by lobbying. Our relationship is more like a partnership…but after several years of DPP rule, we have found that the DPP now has problems to keep their environmental promises…In contrast to environmental NGOs' idealism, politicians need to consider all sorts of interests. Eventually we have to be self-reliant.'* (Interviewee: 003, 2006-5-22)

A core member of the MPA said:

*'We have been asked if the MPA are financially independent enough to prepare for the possibility of combating the state…if we can be self-reliant if the government resource is withdrawn...Actually, during the anti-dam campaign, many government departments provided us with funding and we only rejected money from the Water Resource Agency. It is not impossible that government funding might be cut off, therefore, we have to prepare for it.'* (Interviewee: 014, 2006-05-19)

*'We now have too many resources…when there is a new government project, the state always assigns part of the project funding to the MPA because it has higher capacity to make the policy succeed.'* (Interviewee: 014, 2006-05-19)

One director general of the BDCCA said:

*'The membership cannot sufficiently support the work of the BDCCA, but the government funding can. We do not strive for government project funding. The government begs us to accept the project funding. Of course we feel it is our mission to accomplish the policy we suggested.'* (Interviewee: 011, 2007-1-31)

*'Because the NGOs cannot get sufficient donations and membership, many things they aim to do rely on the government budget as a major financial source. Part of the reason that the MPA and the BDCCA have concentrated on community building is because the government has budgeted abundant funds in various departments.'* (Interviewee: 013, 2007-03-08)

There is an internal contradiction in the attitude of some environmental core members toward the issue of whether NGOs should receive sponsorship from the government. Some think that being a real NGOs means financial independence from the government.

A chief executive of the Green Association said that:

*'A real NGO should receive no subsidy from the government. We strive for authority, not funding. Funding should be acquired in a more social movement approach. It is a harder way, but we should develop the capacity to raise funds from society.'* (Interviewee: 002, 2006-10-21)

However, he also thought NGOs should be involved in policy implementation in order to closely supervise the quality of results:

*'We agree with other organisations we need to implement government projects in order to guarantee that the result of the projects corresponds with our expectations. The Green Association can play a more "detached" role, others can play a professional role to implement government projects and take good care of tax payers' money.'* (Interviewee: 002, 2006-10-21)

However, the fact that these NGOs receive government sponsorship does not automatically result in a biased position toward government policies. Some of their core members emphasised that they still raise oppositional opinion from time to time during collaborative governance.

A former chief executive of the BDCCA said:

*'The government money subsidises the financial demand of environmental maintenance at best. The money goes into no one's pocket. It would not affect our position on other government policies.'* (Interviewee: 010,

2006-10-17)

A core member of Wetlands Taiwan said that:

*'Government funding only compensates part of Wetlands Taiwan's expenses. We did not make a profit from it. We are still short of money and the subsidy is nothing in comparison to the huge volunteer effort we put in. If other local groups want to take over these wetlands, we are OK with that. The problem is no one can afford to take it over.'* (Interviewee: 005, 2006-11-19)

Nevertheless, the government is highly selective when choosing their civil partners. A director general of the BDCCA pointed out that:

*'The government is canny in terms of releasing resources. It only subsidises those communities that have made a previous effort. This is so that it could harvest a major outcome with only a little investment.'* (Interviewee: 011, 2007-1-31)

The selective choice of civil partners suggests the uneven distribution of government resources. A director of the Kaohsiung municipal government said that:

*'I admit that there is a geographical differentiation of government resources distributed to civil society…The result of nurturing certain NGOs might result in an unevenness of resource distribution, but it does not relate to the issue of legitimacy. Those with a higher capacity certainly extract more government resources. This will lead to a potential crisis of resource shrinking. Some NGOs' expansion is beyond that which local government can assist. The capacity of urban civil society to respond to resources is different from rural areas.'* (Interviewee: 019, 2007-2-12)

Fundamentalist groups, which have devoted themselves to the second wave of Water Defence, criticised some of those first wave Water Defence organisations who were absent in the current water crisis.

A chief executive of a fundamentalist group argued that:

*'Wetlands Taiwan and [other organisations] have developed a route called*

*habitat management and thus cannot devote effort to environmental campaigns. This route demands a lot of financial and labour resources, and establishes a collaborative relationship with the government. It easily becomes government propaganda and sometimes exaggerates the results and function of this route. It is window-dressing the government's ecological conservation work. These groups should be aware of this fact instead of intoxicating themselves.'* (Interviewee: 047, 2006-04-08)

He goes on to say:

*'Most of the first wave Water Defence organisations have withdrawn. The BDCCA focuses on community work and has changed its perspective. We only see their members in conferences; having said that, there is still some experience sharing. It would be shameful if past experience is disregarded. In addition to direct experience sharing, the BDCCA still supports us with their network and resources too.'* (Interviewee: 047, 2006-04-08)

*'When the state acts arbitrarily [to implement a controversial environmental policy], those groups which transferred their attention to local affairs have difficulties to counterbalance it. The first reason is because of their lack of a strategic coalition and a sense of mission between environmental organisations. Second, a broader understanding of regional environmental problems is not there in their daily activities.'* (Interviewee: 001, 2006-12-30)

The close relationship between the first wave Water Defence organisations and the Green government also roused criticism. A director general of a fundamentalist group made these fierce comments:

*'I am very disappointed with the Green government. It has been in office for four years. I have gone from high expectation, to sceptical observation to total disillusionment. My experience of contacting other environmental groups is equally disappointing because they have now merged with the ruling party. They have lost the persistence of being a part of civil society, not to mention they take money from the government.'* (Interviewee: 048, 2006-10-23)

*'The BDCCA needs more reflection on their relationship with the local*

*county governor. It worries me that no one can monitor the artificial lake project. There is no environmental impact assessment at all*[109]*, but the construction will start next year…even the major planner said there were many factors under the table that he could not decide on.'* (Interviewee: 048, 2006-10-23)

*'We want to participate in the policy making process, but there is no transparency. When we were invited to speak out, the policies had already been decided. …The experience of recent years has been very negative…I deeply hope that there will be a more participatory decision making process.'* (Interviewee: 048, 2006-10-23)

*'During the last few years, we have been in a very embarrassing position when facing the Green government. In 2004, I completely broke up with a few friends in environmental groups*[110]*… NGOs should insist on their initial purposes but not be incorporated into government. My reflection of the current situation is very pessimistic. The decision-making process is full of all sorts of disguised interests, but not a true deliberative process…'* (Interviewee: 048, 2006-10-23)

One director general of the BDCCA responded to this fact:

*'Some members think our current work has digressed from our original goals. As a leader I agree to this point of view, we took over too many government projects and roused criticism from outside the BDCCA. I think our focus should return to issues related to water resources and land use.'* (Interviewee: 011, 2007-1-31)

He also emphasised that the organisation will make a clear division with politicians:

*'I cannot deny that we have received a lot of help from Mr. Tsao. Even though he no longer sponsors us, there is still partnership between us. However, we will remain neutral even though he is the governor…We will*

[109] The artificial lake was planned to be dug fifteen metres deep, which was unnecessary according the opinion of the fundamentalist groups. It was located on top of an alluvial fan where the geology featured high-speed water infiltration. Flooding of a metre in depth would be enough to increase the speed of infiltration. It was said the purpose of digging this depth was to provide sand and stone for construction purposes, which the county government denied, and guaranteed that the soil dug out would be kept under surveillance (observation: 2007-8-12)

[110] This refers to the BDCCA.

*also avoid the participation of politicians…the governor will detach himself from us too.'* (Interviewee: 011, 2007-1-31)

Many environmentalists have been recruited to the Green government, which implies an effort to devote to reform within the institution. However, the result is not without criticism.

A leading environmentalist said that:

> *'Bureaucracy remains across regimes. Their ideology goes on even when political transition occurs. NGOs' relationships with the government are dialectic. For the environmental movement, sometimes to enter the institution is good in order to stop bad policies in advance, but sometimes it is bad because it reinforces the institution. In the case of anti-transbasin diversion, being in the institution does not help because there are many political forces struggling. We have made a huge effort and spoken strong words in the institution but still cannot change the policy. It is better to stay outside when facing the government cooperating with enterprise for development projects.'* (Interviewee: 001, 2006-12-30)

A leader of a fundamentalist group, having been designated a committee member of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in government, argued the limitation of the deliberation systems in governments and the necessity of '*undertaking confrontation strategies outside the government institutions'* because '*our state machine, enterprise and mass media still exercise violence towards the environmental movement*' (Lee, 2009). However, efforts inside the institution and confrontation outside are not mutually exclusive but often complementary. Even those groups, which have initiated collaborative governance, sometimes would undertake a confrontational strategy to resist policy threats[111] (The Liberty Times, 2009-7-16).

The fact that environmental groups played the role of mediating resources between the state and grassroots groups[112] led to a more controversial debate- whether this closer state-society relationship implies clientelism or corporatism. One community

[111] Wetlands Taiwan protest against mountain development project.
[112] This perspective was specially emphasised on BDCCA's case.

chief executive explained that the clientelist relationship became obvious during election seasons:

> *'The clientelist relationship I mentioned does not refer to traditional political rewards but a knowledge asymmetry. Communities rely on the BDCCA to train workers and volunteers or to write proposals to strive for government resources. The BDCCA does not ask these communities for political feedback. However, something makes people associate with clientelism…For example during elections, community heads will be asked to help and obtain a certain amount of votes. If the voting result is bad, we will feel pressure…'* (Interviewee: 043, 2007-1-2)

Despite the fact that they are aware of these criticisms, the leader of the three environmental organisations valued that what they offered were different action repertoires and resources. One former chief executive said that:

> *'In the new Water Defence, although the MPA is not the major initiator, privately we supplied a lot of support. The most important thing is the spiritual support and encouragement to help key actors feel self-confident and legitimate…but overall, we cannot shift our energy from anti-dam movement to other issues.'* (Interviewee: 014, 2006-5-19)

One director general of the BDCCA explained their consideration before undertaking interruptive action:

> *'[Before we protest development projects][113], we have to go to the site, meet the locals, and find some resources for alternative development approaches for them. The way the BDCCA does things is very unlike other groups who speak empty words without negotiating the future with the locals beforehand. We have to demonstrate to the locals that we have thought a lot about them and will work out the problem with them.'* (Interviewee: 011, 2007-1-31)

This case suggests that the relationship between the parties of collaborative governance might form a new system of clientelism outside the traditional corporatist relationship. Although this evidence does not necessarily imply manipulation by political leaders, the reliance on resources controlled by

[113] This relates to a highway construction project.

government officials/politicians often indicates that the NGOs are either being submissive to political wills or are vulnerable to policy threats.

But the implication of the subtle interaction is inconclusive regarding whether the new clientelist relation between the state and civil society is a new form of corporatism. The traditional form of corporatism was based on private interests of both parties, rather than of the public. Its social control was much more extensive and most social associations were compulsorily subordinate to the state. In comparison, the new rising clientelist relationship between the state and the NGOs has been less controlling and mutually dependent without neglecting the public interest. On the one hand, the Green government did provide more opportunities which stimulated the growth of certain environmental organisations while at the same time attracted the scepticism and criticism from those both inside the partnership and certain radical environmental groups. On the other, the state is highly selective when choosing its NGO partners which need to be highly capable and able to negotiate.

What it also suggests is that the attitude of the state is crucial to the enabling and development of collaborative governance. Nonetheless, the state itself is multilayered, comprising central government, local government, the local office of the central government and the communal administrative office. Environmental organisations thus need to interact with all the different layers of government and this may lead to complex, but inconsistent, relations with politicians, local governors and bureaucrats, which can then be exploited. But at least, a very positive sign is that the right of initiating a new policy is no longer the sole privilege of the government. The collaborative governance that NGOs initiated can become the breeding ground of new policies. The society-initiated approach is feasible even without the investment of government resources, though its scale would be much smaller and progress slower because of the limited scale of resources environmental NGOs can mobilise in Taiwan's society.

### 6.3.6 Return to the local[114]

This section looks at a phenomenon, emerging outside the core research questions defined in Chapter Two, which are shared by all three environmental NGOs in this case study. During the Water Defence protest, the focus of the three NGOs' struggle was with central government or its local offices. Since the water issue was improved, their focus on environmental actions has tended to return back to the local area and communities. This tendency can be explored in three dimensions- (1) the transition of their issue focus from national to local, (2) the exertion of their ability to materialise environmental appeals at local level and (3) their alliance with community groups.

First, they turned their attention from the policies of the central government to local issues and changed their pattern of behaviour toward the governments, mainly the local. This shift can be understood as a part of their survival strategy and an effort to promote their environmental visions at a local level. A leader of the Green Association interpreted the concept of 'return to the local' as:

> *'After the Water Defence, every group has returned to its own local origin, back to their "habitat" where they began their environmental activism and to deepen their roots in the local environment... They have developed different sorts of new tasks because of the difference of each "habitat" and their leaders' ideas'* (Interviewee: 001, 2006-12-30)

One former director general interpreted the phenomenon of returning to the local is because of power devolution:

> *'[The major reason of returning to local] is because we still chase the political power flow. In the past, political power was concentrated in the central government where critical decisions were made. This made it the focus of environmental protest. Nowadays, because the promotion of local administration autonomy, many political powers have been devolved to the local governments. That is why we have to interact with the locals either to cooperate with or to confront them.'* (Interviewee: 004, 2007-2-6)

[114] Throughout this paper 'return to the local' refers to groups refocussing their attention/activism to local areas and local politics.

In addition to encouraging environmentalism in communities, another reason for returning to the local was the provision of government funding for community building.

> *'The government has encouraged every department to make community building related to policies and budget. This provides an abundant source of funding for NGOs to apply for from different departments. This explains why the MPA and the BDCCA have concentrated their efforts on community building.'* (Interviewee: 013, 2007-3-8)

However, returning to local campaigning for environmental reasons is not necessarily easy. Two core members of the MPA and BDCCA said that:

> *Community per se is not a panacea; on the contrary, it might make the problem worse…because community is chaotic. In a post-modern community, people's identity is fragmented and diverse. The central issue is who your allies are in the community. They need to be found and form an organisation, even a combat force, which has its own identity. '* (Interviewee: 015, 2006-11-13)

Second, in order to widen their influence at the local level, it is necessary to enhance their ability to materialise their appeals, so that they can gain the recognition of the public and local government. *'Environmental groups in the local areas are different from those in the capital. Capital-based groups, campaigning in the political and economic centre, can rely on mass media; however, in the south, we need to build a grassroots connection for activism. We cannot rely on campaign slogans. We have to let people appreciate the benefit of environmentalism from their daily affairs.'* (Interviewee: 010, 2006-10-17)

It is crucial for environmental NGOs to prove their ability to deliver their appeals at the grassroots level, where fewer NGOs can use media effect to influence the politics. This materialisation of their appeals is more persuasive to the non-urban public than slogans.

Third, for the BDCCA and the MPA located in rural areas, which cover a wide

geographical scope, the key to success was linked to their connection with community associations, so that they could pay more detailed attention to each corner of their rural areas. A core member of the MPA elaborated the thoughts on community connection. In the early river protection movement, the MPA's relation with community associations was a strategy for combatting the state. Its major purpose was to mobilise the community population for the anti-dam campaign. In the post-movement phase, entering communities was aimed at building foundations for localising activism. Its focus was to deepen the MPA's roots in communities and pursue organisational transformations. This change in focus also forced the MPA into a dialogue with the existing community political powers and to mediate faction interests (Interviewee: 015, 2006-11-13).

Even though located in urban areas, Wetlands Taiwan also had the tendency to work in local areas and acquire the assistance of local governments and associations which are crucial to their achievements. One core member of Wetlands Taiwan said:

> *'In Chouchai Wetland[115], we have Blue Cross Environmental Volunteers, Community University and many other local groups helping out our habitat generation and tour guide work. We provide the space for their need for ecology learning. These groups' efforts are indispensable to the success of wetlands.'* (Interviewee: 005, 2006-11-19)
>
> *'Access to communities is not open; it requires a network relationship and the will of the community association to do good... [Doing community building] cannot just talk and exchange opinions; it needs to leave a good basic infrastructure to the communities.'* (Interviewee: 010, 2006-10-17)

To conclude, geographic features affected the collaborative governance they initiated. In this section, the interviewees expressed their passion to embody their idealism via collaborative governance at a local level. This was not only because its scale was more appropriate for practising collaborative governance but also because the environmental organisations can interact more easily and effectively with recognised stake-holders and power-holders without neglecting environmental solutions based on local geographical differentiation. Close local

[115] One of the wetlands that Wetlands Taiwan manages.

networks between the three parties were established to ensure a consensus about collaborative governance and the resources needed to be mobilised. Without valid local networks, collaborative governance would not materialise. However, 'return to the local' was not a panacea that can cure all environmental problems.

## 6.4 Conclusion: Re-thinking the model of environmental collaborative governance

With reference to the provisional model established in Chapter 2, this case study shed light on how collaborative action emerges based on multiple reasons. There were three reasons that gave rise to this collaborative governance, including 1) the need of environmental NGOs to campaign for new issues, 2) the water restoration issues which demanded private-public cooperation, and 3) the need for new thinking and the development of expertise among environmental organisations. The first and the third can be seen as 'motivation to collaborate' in the model. The second reason can be seen as attributed to 'the nature of environmental issues'.

The emergence of collaborative governance is closely associated with its 'geographic specificities' as emphasized in the model. Those environmental groups which are based in rural areas cannot rely on the mass media and policy lobby to campaign for their issues. They have to demonstrate their value to grassroots interests and therefore contribute to the phenomenon of 'returning to the local'. While Wetlands Taiwan has regenerated several wetlands in order to show local governments the benefit of nature preservation, the MPA and BDCCA have become deeply rooted in local communities in order to promote environmentalism, emphasising the significance of the 'geographic factor'.

The menace of the potential dam construction in Meinung village brought the villagers together, enabling them to stand and fight against the state apparatus. Many urban intellectuals and professionals established environmental NGOs in order to join this environmental campaign, which has lasted eighteen years, and eventually transformed itself into a movement beyond 'Not In My Back Yard' but

extended into the wider ecology and culture in general.
The importance of the ‘strategy-making of leaders’ is particularly highlighted in this case. These NGOs were highly homogeneous during the 1990s Water Defence. However, as the Water Defence protest faded, these groups faced the need to alter their approach which was determined by the characteristics of their leaders and the resources available. Two similarities in their development were 1) they both ‘returned to the local’ and 2) they shifted from elitist to participatory organisations.

Similar to one finding in the case of River Enclosure, two examples in this case study show how specific events consolidate the determination of the organisation’s members to engage with collaborative governance. For instance, the local opposition against the suggestion of an ecological dike by the BDCCA and Wetlands Taiwan’s decision to engage with the regeneration of habitat for a particular endangered bird species, Jacana, whose population dropped to only fifty. Both of these two events acted as catalysts to change the focus of these organisations.
The outcome of this case study, using an endogenous approach of collaborative governance, has been prominent and renowned, but not without its limitation especially in the context of political reliance. Water Defence changed its approach from early mass mobilisation to institutional defence and eventually established a collaborative relationship with the government. This endogenous approach to initiating collaborative governance was complicated and expertise demanding. This highly mobilised social resources, including funding and volunteers, and talented activists integrated resources from different government departments and produced an outstanding outcome. This outcome was impossible for the government to achieve alone. Its complex network and integrative capacity resolved the problems of departmentalisation and fragmentation of Kaoping river management. From Pingtung and Meinung’s case, a new solution to water resource management was developed based on local knowledge (Observation: 2006-10-13, 2006-7-12).

However, the sustainability of this kind of collaborative governance remains problematic. First, this is because the threat of water resource supply problems

and other environmental issues still remains. Second, because this collaborative governance is highly reliant on individual-based political support, and thus progress remains vulnerable to political change. It did not become institutionalised in the workings of government. These concerns illustrate the fact that although collaborative governance has won public applause, it is not without limitation. Its transformability of management arrangements is mostly temporal and regional and means that key actors will constantly review the need for different arrangements even to the point of questioning whether they should continue to collaborate. This finding underlines how the feedback mechanism functions to affect the leaders' strategy-making in different phases and enforcement of collaborative behaviour. Choosing to leave the collaborative effort is a possible option for participants if (a) they find the collaborative process is not authentic, (b) is incompatible with their purposes or (c) is incapable of producing a positive reciprocal outcome for both parties.
In the example of the BDCCA, an environmentalist was elected as a representative and eventually a governor. His political position helped to acquire many resources for environmental projects and organisations, underlining how government resources follow political networks and, possibly, contributes to a new corporatist order. Though traditional corporatism politics is not obvious here, this confirms the importance of the 'embedded social-political context' to the shaping of the contours of collaborative governance.

The Water Defence organisations formed the first generation of local environmentalism, but they developed a controversial transitional relationship with the state within a decade. The fast transition from confrontation to collaboration implies a wish among both parties to establish more equal, reciprocal and respectful relations. There are two reasons which led to this transition. First, the political power transfer in both local governments and the central government indicated a different approach to governance and the need for policy networks. Second, the tolerance of bureaucratic leaders eventually led them to become willing collaborators with their civil counterparts. This finding fills in our lack of knowledge regarding the Asian process of collaborative governance in the model.




Figure 6. 2: A revised model of the emergence and development of environmental collaborative governance

# Chapter 7 Case Study: Riverfront Adoption

## 7.1 Introduction

Unlike the previous two case studies which have shown how tribal villages and environmental NGOs initiated an endogenous form of collaborative governance from inside communities or originations, this chapter illustrates how rural community groups respond to an exogenous approach to collaborative governance. The riverfront park of the Kaoping River is a total of ten kilometres long. Those participating in riverfront maintenance include both communities and contractors. There are more than sixty sections in the riverfront and thirty four communities have adopted their nearby section.

## 7.2 Examples

*Old Iron Bridge Association*

The Old Iron Bridge Association is comprised of ordinary villagers, successful local businesspeople and local political leaders. Their action to maintain a green riverfront started in 2001 after the River Bureau cleaned up and rebuilt the river high tidal flat. The hundred-hectare riverfront green area, as was the case with many others, was originally treated as a landfill and thousands of tons of household garbage and industrial waste were dumped there illegally. Even local township offices dumped the garbage they collected until the Seventh River Bureau took action under pressure from environmental groups. After the cleanup, the Bureau called for the adoption of the riverfront as a strategy to prevent it from being ruined again. The participation of community groups in creating a riverfront park has not only made the park a regional tourist spot but also made the group an example of community building.

*A-Ligang Community*

The main organisation behind the A-Ligang community programme was the A-Ligang Culture Association, which is comprised of villagers, teachers and local intellectuals. Their action to adopt a green riverfront started in 1996 in response to the call of the local political leader, Mr. Chi-hong Tzao[116], for local participation in maintaining the river environment. Before that, the riverfront space was used as landfill. Even local township offices dumped garbage there until 1995 when the Seventh River Bureau cleaned up and beautified the space. Mr. Tzao helped to find funds and resources for the locals to take over the job of maintaining the green space. This case also set an example for both riverfront renovation and community participation. Several scholars used it as a case study and other communities came to witness their achievement in transforming the riverfront.

*Chung-yun Community*

Chun-yun community is renowned for its success in mangrove restoration. The programme was originally promoted by the local government and Chun-yun community successfully responded to this call. With political support and a high level of commitment, they have restored thousands of mangroves. They are one of the earliest groups which was devoted to ecology conservation. The group originally consisted of a numbers of elementary school teachers who dedicated themselves to mangrove conservation and education in the riverfront. It extended its membership to community residents and the broader public. However, they found themselves impotent to combat the nearby petrochemical complex and, as time went by, they found that public attention and political support decreased as did funding from the government.

[116] This refers to the current governor of Pingtung County, Mr. Chi-hong Tzao, a politician who was a junior high school teacher and started his political career from very bottom level.

Table 7. 1: Examples of Riverfront Adoption and their characteristics

| Organisation | Starting year | Motivation | Accessibility | Leadership/ institution | Faction politics | Social capital/ resources/ capacity | Initiation approach | Process summary |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Old Iron Bridge community | 2001 | Providing a pleasant green environment for public recreation and tourism | Easy | Rural intellectuals and local politicians | Obvious | High social consolidation and organisational mobility | Exogenous | Local villagers organised small scale environmental maintenance as a response to the call of a local politician. This action was integrated into the Riverfront Adoption policy of the River Bureau and its scale enlarged to cover 120 hectares of riverfront, including 13 ponds. The community group behind this action comprised approximately 80 volunteers. |
| A-Ligang community | 1996 | Providing a pleasant green environment for public recreation and tourism | Easy | Rural intellectuals | Obvious | High social consolidation and organisational mobility | Exogenous | Local community group meditated by environmentalists and a politician to cooperate with the river bureau on riverfront maintenance, which covered more than 10 hectares of riverfront. The community group behind this action comprised more than 100 volunteers. |
| Chung-yun community | 1994 | Preserving mangrove ecology | Easy | Rural intellectuals | Not obvious | High social consolidation and | Exogenous | Mangrove preservation action as a response to the call of |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | and providing public nature education | | | | organisational mobility | | environmentalists and the local municipal government and developed as a part of the programme of Riverfront Adoption. This action covered 4.5 hectares and, as a result, more than a thousand mangrove trees were preserved. The community group behind this action comprised more than 80 volunteers. |




Figure 7.1: The locations of the villages practising Riverfront Adoption

## 7.3 Findings

In Chapter One, this thesis raised five research questions about collaborative environmental governance in Taiwan: (1) What have been the reasons that have motivated the emergence of environmental collaborative governance? (2) Have different approaches to initiating environmental collaborative governance led to different processes and results? (3) Does the emergence of environmental collaborative governance promise a new pattern for its long-term development through its institutionalisation within the policy structure generally? (4) What are the levels of transformability and constraints of collaborative governance in the context of Taiwan? (5) Does the current practice of collaborative governance in Taiwan result in a true transition of the state-society relationship or just a disguised form of corporatist strategy? In order to answer these research questions, each of the following sections, from 7.3.1 to 7.3.5, seeks to answering one of them.

### 7.3.1 The reason motivating the emergence of environmental collaborative governance

A director general of the Old Iron Bridge Association explained that the reason they decided to adopt the riverfront was inspired by government actions:

> *'We saw the Seventh River Bureau start to restore the tidal flats and several million tons of garbage were cleaned up. We felt very envious that the opposite side of the riverbank was being made into a riverfront park; therefore we raised a request that we wanted our side done too. But at that time Taiwan's economy was declining, and the local government responded that it might be easy to build but difficult to maintain. Our director general decided that we should, at first, show our capability to maintain a community green area.'* (Interview: 032, 2006-11-11)
>
> *'Therefore, we started from a spot under the iron bridge. At that time we had limited resources and very few members. We worked with school teachers, principals and local entrepreneurs etc, even the village chief was a member. Community elites participated in our work without any expectation of*

*financial rewards. We did whatever we could with or without money. What was beyond our expectation was that the River Bureau decided to entrust the riverfront park to us when they had finished constructing it.'* (Interview: 032, 2006-11-11)

A founder of Chun-yun community described their adoption of a mangrove forest on the riverfront as a protest against the pollution from their neighbouring industrial park:

*'The industrial park had been polluting our environment for thirty years and once provoked a violent protest by our village fellows. Some of them even blockaded the factories. I sought to find an alternative method to protest- replanting mangroves in the river mouth of the Kaoping River.'* (Interview: 046, 2007-02-12)

*'I live in this place. I am a teacher, so my position was not appropriate to join in street protests. But, as a member of the community, I wanted to express how I felt about the pollution too. Intellectuals should not keep silent. Therefore we started to plant mangroves. Environmental groups gave their recognition to our actions and the New Hope Foundation[117] joined our action for a couple of years, too.'* (Interview: 046, 2007-02-12)

A former director general of A-Ligang community made clear that the government's reform and the suggestion of a local political leader had inspired their decision to adopt their riverfront park:

*'The riverfront was treated as a landfill site by the local township offices as with many other similar places. Our actions were motivated by the actions of the Seventh River Bureau that took on cleaning up the riverfront and removing most agriculture and farming on the tidal flats. The water quality of the tributaries of the Kaoping River was all improved too. Our villagers were very happy to see the river environment recover its beauty as they had seen it in their childhood. Therefore we submitted our request to adopt the Kaoping River bank in 1996 based on Mr. Tzao's suggestion. Until now, our villagers are still passionate about volunteering to maintain the riverfront.'*

[117] The New Hope Foundation belonged to the County Governor at the time- Cheng-chian Yu.

(Interview: 040, 2006-12-29)

The chief director of the Seventh River Bureau explained the major reason that led them to clean up the riverfront and open it up for adoption was the advocacy and inspiration of the local leader, Mr. Tzao.

*'The reason we developed the River Adoption policy was because the governor Mr. Tzao invited me (when I had not yet been promoted to chief director) to see how chaotic the riverfront was and asked me to do something. He suggested that we transform the riverfront to somewhere we could provide local recreation and he would find resources to enable government action and public participation. I responded to his idea that we, as engineers, could take the preliminary action of purifying the riverfront and let the community take over the following actions on landscaping and managing by gathering resources and volunteering by themselves. In the following years, we truly embraced that idea we came up with.' (Interview: 024, 2006-12-26)*

*'Lin-bian[118] became the first location to put this idea into practice and entrusted the locals to maintain the riverfront. The locals thought the purification effort made by our engineers did not satisfy their needs and gradually modified the riverfront into somewhere more humanistic and practical... This gradually evolved into the River Adoption policy as a mechanism to make riverfront restoration and local participation possible.' (Interview: 024, 2006-12-26)*

*'The combination of government agencies, politicians and community groups working together has became a model that can be applied to other localities too. River Adoption became the best mechanism to promote natural river landscaping. 'Do it yourself' worked better than any written words. Volunteers had a very high commitment to natural rivers. We have devoted ourselves to promoting this policy.'* (Interview: 024, 2006-12-26)

The officials in the River Bureau found that the results of greening and public acceptance were both improved through the policy of Riverfront Adoption. As a

[118] It is located in Pingtung County.

result they promoted this model of river management to other areas. A former chief director of the River Bureau emphasised the same point.

> *'Before Mr. Tzao became a politician, he had come to me to discuss with me about how to transform the riverfront. We agreed to find a place to experiment and the place was A-Ligang. It took us two years to finalise the model of riverfront transformation. The final result attracted public curiosity and interest and therefore we decided to continue promoting this model and…entrust the riverfront parks to the locals. Although each section of the riverfront became a little bit different, it did not matter just as long as the locals cared and thus were willing to maintain it.'* (Interview: 023, 2006-12-15)

Their action on improving the riverfront had attracted the public's interest in participating and they recognized that local communities should be empowered to build their own versions of riverfront. The Director General emphasized how the assistance of Mr. Tzao and his affiliated association made their work possible:

> *'Mr. Tzao helped a lot by acquiring us a NT$500,000*[119] *funding from the Tourism Bureau, which was used to plant flora on the riverfront, and other funding used in research and planning, and so on. Prof. Lin*[120] *helped us plan community building and volunteer management. She also introduced other communities to learn from our experience. The BDCCA*[121] *provided advanced concepts and helped us to integrate with other community work in the broader Pingtung county area.'* (Interview: 040, 2006-12-29)

A former chief director of the Seventh River Bureau also stressed the importance of political leadership:

> *'The major reason we successfully promoted River Adoption was because both the governors of Pingtung and Kaohsiung counties supported [river management reforms]. The new governors were actually the advocates of the movement.'* (Interview: 023, 2006-12-15)

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[119] Approximately US$15,000.

[120] This refers to Prof. Hui-may Lin who has devoted her efforts to empowering grassroots groups to community building.

[121] This refers to the non-governmental organisation Blue Donggang Creek Conservation Association, which has aimed to help locals to develop environmentalism.

To conclude, the above narratives reveal that the government's actions with appropriate leadership and mediation can inspire the public from the top. The leadership can range from a high level political leadership to local community leadership. With stable but limited government funding, the local participants in the exogenous approach of collaborative governance have stayed enthusiastically in the programmes and this approach can seen to be as effective as the endogenous approach.

### 7.3.2 The exogenous approach of initiating environmental collaborative governance and its results

The Director General of the Old Iron Bridge community said their motivation was simply to clean up their own environment. They did not foresee that their actions would expand to community care and cultural education. Although they were not provided with abundant resources, they had a lot of participants.

> *'At that time, few people thought of having a recreation area here. They thought that it would be deserted even if it was made into a park.'* (Interview: 032, 2006-11-11)
>
> *'At the beginning, we simply wanted to clean up and purify our hometown, and therefore we focussed on environmental work in the community. Gradually, our membership increased and consolidated and they pushed us to take over the maintenance of the whole riverfront park and expanded our work to environmental and cultural education, even to the integration of the tourist spots of the whole township.' (Interview: 032, 2006-11-11)*
>
> *'We have more than a hundred volunteers. Around eighty volunteers attended voluntary work regularly and were involved in tour guiding. This place has been transformed from a garbage dump to a popular tourist site. Because of the lack of a sufficient government subsidy, we rent out bicycles to earn some income to support organisational functions.'* (Interview: 032, 2006-11-11)

The Director General of the Old Iron Bridge community also pointed out the importance of local leadership. Local leaders from every domain have joined

their actions and this has attracted local participants.

> *'Our major cadre are elites and professionals who humbled themselves. They did not mind getting their hands dirty and did everything themselves. That did provoke villagers to work for the public good…this has surprised many visitors that so many locals were willing to maintain such a big park...this kind of atmosphere also affected the attitude of nearby communities toward public space.'* (Interview: 032, 2006-11-11)

Though it grew rapidly, the organisation does not lack the vision of their future development:

> *'At the beginning we just wanted to help clean up the environment and never thought about the long term goal of our work. But now we have developed various kinds of community work, like environmental volunteers, cultural education, water protection and community health promotion.'* (Interview: 032, 2006-11-11)

A director general of Chun-yun community pointed out that, since they cooperated with the county government, their conservation work kept expanding and became a well-known example of ecological education:

> *'Our preliminary experiment of transplanting mangrove trees was a triumph, and then we had several major transplanting events with the county government and other groups. We also did ecological monitoring and investigations which covered birds, fish, crabs, butterflies and their accompanying species. Overall, conservation was combined with education.'* (Interview: 046, 2007-02-12)

A-Ligang's Riverfront Adoption has lasted for more than a decade and has become a well-known example that others are learning from. Therefore whenever the Seventh River Bureau launches a new case of community participation, they usually ask the first time participants to learn from A-Ligang.

> *'When we successfully presented our result of Riverfront Adoption, many other communities and groups came to learn from our experience*[122]*. Almost*

[122] For example Lin-bian, Shin-Pi and San-di-men had come to learn from them.

*every community was interested in improving their riverfront and imitated our model. The whole riverfront section (from A-Ligang to Li-ling) has followed our method…It has been eleven years now and the whole riverfront has been transformed into a bicycle path by the Seventh River Bureau and Mr. Tzao has found funding and resources to help these communities consolidate and mobilise to engage in riverfront maintenance.'* (Interview: 040, 2006-12-29)

The Director General of the Old Iron Bridge clarified that their volunteers had operated so well that they did not need any help from the government's temporary employees. In other words, they preferred less government intervention.

*'The labour we use on riverfront maintenance is mostly volunteers. There are about fifty of us working regularly. We use the subsidy from the River Bureau to hire two persons to operate weeders. There are no government temporary employees working here. We do not need them because they do not work as hard as volunteers.'* (Interview: 040, 2006-12-29)

He also emphasised that two things they did better than other community groups was are spending money really carefully and promoting new issues to motivate their members (Interview: 040, 2006-12-29). This is the key reason why, when the same leadership transferred from Chun-yun to another community, Lin-yuan, he found it difficult to motivate local participation.

*'When I was transferred to a new position in Lin-yuan, I tried to instigate local teachers in mangrove conservation, but I found it difficult. It was because I did not get government project funding here to embark on something from scratch.'* (Interview: 046, 2007-02-12)

Although this approach to collaborative governance is exogenous, there are significant signs of local autonomy and spontaneity. Without grassroots actively responding to the government's call for public participation, the exogenous collaborative governance would not succeed. However, the locals' perspectives are diverse and so are their needs. Instead of pursuing homogeneity, the government had to tolerate a heterogeneous pattern of collaborative governance to avoid a 'one pattern fits all' notion of riverfront management. As the former

director general underlined, the most important thing in creating a public green space is to bring forth participants' own local perspectives in order to create something they really enjoy (Interview: 040, 2006-12-29).

In conclusion, although the exogenous approach of collaborative governance is a top-down approach, it has great potential to expand very fast if it obtains an autonomous response from the grassroots. It also needs appropriate local leadership helping to put policy into practice and to manage carefully the necessary resources. Even simple environmental maintenance can be a catalyst to local development and tourism.

### 7.3.3 The long-term development and institutionalisation of environmental collaborative governance

The Director General of A-Ligang community association suggested that although their volunteers were still very passionate about their adoption work, they faced difficulty in attracting new members.

> *'The passion of our volunteers is not decreasing at all because we have a subgroup working on organising and motivating volunteers. It has continued for eleven years. Every one of us who is available comes out to volunteer as a tour guide….However, the younger generation participate very little in cultural and environmental activities. It is a little bit difficult to attract them to do volunteer work due to their common indifference to public affairs. The best volunteers are usually retired teachers. They can motivate local residents. '* (Interview: 040, 2006-12-29)

The Director General of Chun-yun community stressed the importance of authority and funding provision from the government which gave them opportunities to grow.

> *'The Seventh River Bureau is the major government agency in Riverfront Adoption. Its ecological awareness has been raised and the approach of river management has become environmentally friendly. Therefore the group has made wood paths on mangrove habitats to avoid harming the wildlife and given us the opportunity and subsidy to adopt the habitat...these actions*

*have made it easier for us to achieve conservation.'* (Interview: 046, 2007-02-12)

Although this approach is initiated by the government, it cannot guarantee that government resources will be stable. The participation of local communities would lead to government resources, but if the locals started to rely on them, it might result in a lack of spontaneous social mobilisation and lose public and government attention.

The Director General of Chun-yun community complained how they started to lose government attention:

> *'Although the county government cares about our riverfront, they are unable to pay attention to it because of insufficient employees and budget. They used to provide us with funding as well as the River Bureau, the Agriculture Bureau and the factories in the industrial park…The money was well-spent on mangrove re-planting, ecology monitoring, public education, wood and bicycle paths. The result was good, but they no longer sponsor our work due to the fact that their attention diversified to other cases.'* (Interview: 046, 2007-02-12)

In comparison, the mid-stream area of the Kaoping River receives more attention than the river mouth area. The Chun-yun community, for example, which has been subjected to much more pollution due to the neighbouring industrial park, has received little compensation for environmental conservation.

> *'This is really unfair. The fact is that we deserve more attention and funding for environmental conservation since we have received so much industrial pollution which has effectively given birth to the economic boom. But the truth is that the funding is insufficient and the government effort is too little.'* (Interview: 046, 2007-02-12)

It is possible that the government does not want to fund anything that would instigate a big reduction in pollution which would, in turn, inhibit economic growth. Nevertheless, government policy usually requires the adoption groups to become self-sustaining at the end of their restoration programmes and therefore reduces its subsidy step-by-step. This situation was endorsed by the chief of the

conservation section in the local county government. He said that the community group should find their own financial resources and be self-sustaining to ensure their own long-term development.

> *'Financial independence is crucial to community groups. Government funding is a sort of encouragement rather than a long term commitment. For example, sometimes it does not fit with what the community wants to do and misappropriates it…Sometimes there is political interference which causes conflicts in competing for government funding. We should create a community mechanism which can take a proportion of everyone's income to be a funding source for public infrastructure.'* (Interview: 2006-11-9)

The office in charge of the Riverfront Adoption admitted the fact that there were some abuses of an exogenous approach to collaborative governance:

> *'Better examples include A-Ligang and Lun-ding communities. They are more spontaneous. Some communities join this action through the intervention of local political representatives. This kind of community adoption usually does the job superficially without continuous care and monitoring. Having said that, if the River Bureau makes a firm request, they will do it better.'* (Interview: 163, 2006-12-7)

The former chief director of the River Bureau noted the importance of environmental organisations and local leadership empowering grassroots groups to avoid the Riverfront Adoption becoming the interest of faction politics.

> *'We have to seek the help of the BDCCA to introduce and encourage local teachers and leaders to commit to the adoption. We found those communities introduced by the BDCCA worked better than others. Some communities engaged with this job only for the subsidy…some township offices even requested us to give them the right to authorise an adoption unit. According to our experience, this usually results in faction competition. We are more willing to give the authorisation directly to community groups.'* (Interview: 023, 2006-12-15)

The exogenous approach to Riverfront Adoption can only operate under two conditions - that it leads to spontaneous action from the grassroots and to

continuous support of government officials. For example, a problem appeared when the key official promoting the scheme left and there was a lack of local environmental consciousness to fill the gap. The former chief director of the River Bureau said:

> *'After I got promoted and left the position [of chief director of the River Bureau]…I still came back a lot to see the subsequent results of my former work and found much had been deserted. I suggested that the River Bureau do some improvements, but my suggestions were neglected too…The policy of Riverfront Adoption has been disregarded by the Bureau. Fortunately some community adoption still functions and lots of local representatives and grassroots people still consider it a mechanism and expect the government to work better in this regard.'* (Interview: 023, 2006-12-15)
>
> *'If we contract out the work of riverfront maintenance, the contractor usually only does it before official inspection. In contrast, if a local group adopts the riverfront, they usually do the work every day and even report to us about offences. Actually the latter costs less than the former in terms of government budget.'* (Interview: 023, 2006-12-15)

Though Riverfront Adoption is an exogenous approach, its result does not only rely on particular government officials to promote it, but also on the quality of communities. The chief-director of the River Bureau gave attention to this point:

> *'Communities are not all the same. Some of the groups used a limited government subsidy well and mobilised their own resources to provide public goods, but some of them misappropriated the subsidy and contracted out the work instead of utilising local villagers. We have to distinguish which group is good enough for us to authorise the adoption work.'* (Interview: 024, 2006-12-26)

In conclusion, even though the government promoted the policy of Riverfront Adoption with funding investment, the community groups that responded to this policy have found it difficult to attract new resources and recruit volunteers from the younger generation when the older ones retired.

### 7.3.4 The transformative capability and limitations of environmental collaborative governance in Taiwan

This kind of collaborative governance has a very limited influence on policy making. As the Director General of Chun-yun community described:

> *'We are not able to take part in the policy making process. Everything depends on the interest of the major political leaders. If they are interested, we would be authorised and empowered to participate. If they are not, we could not achieve anything even if we tried our best to strive for it.'* (Interview: 046, 2007-02-12)

The impact local initiative can make is limited when it comes to improving wider environmental problems. It needs to be noted there was a serious problem of pollution caused by mining companies and an industrial park that the communities strongly disliked. For example, the Director General of Chun-yun community expressed his concern about the extent that riverfront conservation can influence the nearby pollution from the petrochemical industrial park. All they can do is to somehow make the industrial park more environmentally friendly and provide a wildlife shelter rather than an ideal mangrove habitat.

> *'At the beginning, we wanted to make a contrast between the petrochemical industrial park and mangrove habitat. But recently our mindset has changed slightly. There is no way that we can make the industrial park leave. The government is still promoting petrochemistry. What we can do is to suggest that the industrial park take some environmentally friendly measures which can help create a positive image for the factories.' (Interview: 046, 2007-02-12)*
>
> *'Our next goal is to bring environmentalism into the industrial park and bring feedback from them regarding the mangrove conservation area when combining resources and industrial culture.'* (Interview: 046, 2007-02-12)
>
> *'This year the Industrial Bureau provided the industrial park with a NT$ 3M [123] budget to improve its environment and a little bit of the money will be spent on the conservation area based on our suggestion. We advised them to*

[123] About US$100,000.

*consider how to combine the industrial park and the mangrove conservation area. The industrial park should compensate for the impact it has caused on residents' health.'* (Interview: 046, 2007-02-12)

The influence of Riverfront Adoption on policy making is constrained to the riverfront the locals adopt. It has difficulty in extending its influence to wider areas and policies, and cannot guarantee the stability of government investment.

Both the Old Iron Bridge and the A-Ligang communities once considered splitting into two due to internal conflicts. This is due to their situation in the existing social-political context and, in some cases, it has fuelled local political competition. One leader of the Old Iron Bridge community criticised another saying:

*'[The former leader Mr. Zheng[124] ] had a different view from others; therefore we formed another group…he lacked the enthusiasm to achieve anything but political ambition. He wanted to get elected as a village representative; therefore what he did was only around the village periphery. That was why we left and established another group because we care about our wider environment. Since our new group was established, he has lost most of his volunteers and his public work has been abandoned…Our first director general was elected as Township Chief six months after we established.'* (Interview: 032, 2006-11-11)

On the contrary, other groups criticised the current leader of the Old Iron Bridge as being too aggressive and competitive.

*'[The former leader Mr. Zheng] was a gentle person who did not haggle over details, but the current director general did and kept attacking the former leader. The Old Iron Bridge community association have taken a lot of money from the government. It got a subsidy of NT$ 800,000 per year[125] for maintaining the riverfront alone. They even have problems with the township chief[126]. They have accused the township chief of not being supportive enough and take advantage of the association to pursue personal*

[124] This refers to Mr. Rong-hua Zheng a leader who established the former body of the Old Iron Bridge.
[125] About US$ 22,000.
[126] He is one of their former director generals.

*interests.'* (Interview: 003, 2006-5-22)

A director general of the Old Iron Bridge community association rejected this criticism:

> *'Many grassroots have internal conflicts between director generals and chief executives. They have factionalism. In our association, we emphasise openness, fairness and transparency, especially about finances, which can easily come under suspicion. We would rather be poor than be treated with suspicion. Usually rich groups collapse more easily than poor ones.'* (Interview: 032, 2006-11-11)

In A-Ligang community, internal conflict led to a split.

> *'When we first adopted the riverfront, the early directors had different ideals from us. Later, they were not elected as directors. Then they decided to form another group and claimed our early achievements were accomplished by them. It does not matter. I think most villagers and officials are very aware of who has accomplished what. It is good that some people leave to explore new domains of public affairs, but please do not smear the image others'.'* (Interview: 040, 2006-12-29)

The chief director of the River Bureau explained how they responded to the factionalism caused by the Riverfront Adoption policy.

> *'The policy of Riverfront Adoption has become so popular that every community wants to adopt a riverfront section. Even those political groups desire to share the monetary subsidy. If they do not acquire a subsidy, they will mobilise their political influence and cause a dispute either inside or outside the local communities. Riverfront Adoption has become the target of factional competition. Everyone knows that it can consolidate the public, gather resources and even win votes. That is why the local township wants to get involved and take advantage of the subsidy.'* (Interview: 024, 2006-12-26)

The former chief director of the River Bureau went as far as to say, in order to avoid the dispute of factionalism, he '*preferred to entrust the riverfront directly to civil groups rather than by way of township offices which are always affected by*

*factionalism.*' (interview: 023, 2006-12-15) With regards to this kind of internal conflict within community groups, the chief director of the River Bureau emphasised that they must be fair to every group.

> *'When there are community groups competing, we have to be really fair about the adoption procedure and subsidy allocation, otherwise there might be dispute, making those groups dysfunctional.' (Interview: 024, 2006-12-26)*
>
> *'It is quite important to keep harmony between groups. No one should over-insist on their own opinion. Toleration of others' opinions is crucial for reaching the real targets. For example A-Ligang was a really consolidated group. But because they had different opinions about which targets should be prioritised, they split up. It was really a shame. We had to divide the riverfront into two sections to allow both groups to adopt and the local atmosphere became bad too...'* (Interview: 024, 2006-12-26)

To conclude, in the case of Riverfront Adoption, there are several examples of internal competition for interests. These kinds of interests are not necessarily related to money, but more to political advantage and leadership. In Taiwan, almost every public affair will be related to politics and thus it is difficult to promote public participation. In the community, almost everything will be politicised and lead to factionalism while not necessarily in the form of conventional corporatism. Even the officials in the township offices claimed the subsidy of Riverfront Adoption should be assigned by them.

The distribution of government resources, instead of being based on traditional political patronage, is more related to a pragmatic cost-effective evaluation of the government apparatus, at least in this case study. The influence of corporatist control, which was overwhelmingly manipulated from the centre of the ruling party, is seen to be reduced to a minimum level. However, local political competition seems to overshadow environmental activism, which should aim to pursue public interests rather than personal political benefits. The funding of public affairs has become one of the resources that political factions compete for.

### 7.3.5 State-society relationship in transition

This section discusses how the state and society interact in this exogenous approach to collaborative governance. Did it ultimately alter the relationship between the state and society or just disguise the existing power structure in another way? If there is genuine collaborative governance, does the state continue to dominate the nature and practice of collaborative governance?

The Director General of the Old Iron Bridge community pointed out how the trust between the grassroots and the government was built, alongside recognition of the results of Riverfront Adoption, and thus brought them abundant government resources.

> *'Our interaction with the government has developed. In the early stages of our organisation, it was very difficult for us to acquire funding from the government. Every application was rejected. But after we had done a good job on the first project, the government found our organisation worth investing in and therefore has actively reminded us to apply for various sources of governmental project money.'* (Interview: 032, 2006-11-11)

But he emphasised that they did not abuse government funding. They only applied for an appropriate amount of project money to coordinate volunteers' participation and growth in activity.

> *'If we accept project funding which is beyond our capacity and end up doing a bad job, it will give the government a negative impression and attract criticism. Therefore we evaluate our ability and volunteers' willingness before we accept any project entrusted to us.'* (Interview: 032, 2006-11-11)

The Riverfront Adoption was a typical case of how modern governments can empower and nurture social associations, without jeopardising their autonomy to manage their own environmental affairs. With a small amount of subsidy and administrative assistance[127], the government can stimulate the growth of rural community associations, enabling them to participate in managing the

[127] For example, every $10m^2$ subsidy of US$ 1, and sometimes can also provide temporary government-employed staff.

environment. Although most community examples in this study can mobilise plenty of volunteers from their villages, they are financially dependent on government funding.

In addition, the distribution of government resources was targeted. The Old Iron Bridge community showed how the government repeated their investment in the same communities that had performed successfully while some other communities gradually lost public attention, for example Chun-yun community. Similarly, A-li-gang faced a future of its subsidy reducing slowly but surely, which meant, in order to be self-sustaining, the community had to create income from eco-tourism or fund-raising.

In general terms, the state-society relationship became progressively more equal and reciprocal regarding cooperation over environmental management. But this kind of cooperation was highly selective. From the perspective of government officials, investing in communities that had a higher probability to succeed helped their internal grading, and also explains why they were reluctant to approve grant applications from communities that had no track record of successful outcomes.

## 7.4 Conclusion: Re-thinking the model of environmental collaborative governance in Taiwan

In contrast to the previous two chapters, this chapter examines the exogenous approach to initiating collaborative governance, with regards to Riverfront Adoption, to see how it has worked differently from the endogenous approach.
This case study reveals two major mechanisms that gave rise to Riverfront Adoption. First of all, several riverfront sections had been treated as landfill sites for approximately two decades. Villagers were not able to access the river and their resentment had built up. The discovery that the riverfront had a large amount of toxic industrial waste buried underneath it further fuelled public discontent in 1999. This discovery acted as a focussing event which motivated both the local communities and the government.

The River Bureau finally started to take action by cleaning up the riverfront and initiating water restoration, which eased the anger of local people somewhat. A transformative government official and local political leader played a crucial role during the process. They developed the strategy of Riverfront Adoption together and translated social resentment over environmental deterioration into positive conservation actions. The local political leader negotiated with the River Bureau to cooperate with local residents to transform the riverfront. This strategy had two purposes: the first was to prevent waste landfill happening again, and the second was to provide a recreation place for local people. What the River Bureau had to offer was a very small amount of funding to assist with everyday riverfront maintenance, and respect for what the locals decided to do.

In this case, the extent to which environmental action became politicised was more obvious than with the other two case studies. It exhibited very clearly how collaborative governance initiated externally and soon became embedded in the existing local political context. Political factions made the neutralisation of environmental actions impossible, and activists were unable to avoid being categorised as belonging to one side or the other of competing factions. In two examples, community groups encountered internal struggles and eventually split-up. Part of the reason was a dispute over the government funding, and part as to who benefitted from the leadership and reputation associated with the scheme. Extra political capital would help in elections. These tensions pointed out the importance of consensus building before any exogenous approach to collaborative governance could be undertaken. A prestigious leader or a good-intentioned government official could function as an arbitrator, who could search for a suitable local leader, find resources and even deal with administrative routines and government grant processes.

Apart from the issue of it being deeply rooted in the existing political context, the exogenous approach was often largely configured on the operations of the bureaucratic system in place at the time and limited the degree of reform. The capability to improve the environment of Riverfront Adoption was much lower than in the previous two case studies. This is because most actions pertaining to Riverfront Adoption were government-oriented and their scope was limited to the

neighbourhood riverfront only and never extended to other controversial issues regarding the river, such as industrial pollution and gravel mining. Villagers were to be content to improve their own neighbourhood, but unable to deal with, and be emotionally disconnected from, other larger issues regarding the river.

This approach to collaborative action could only result in limited reform, not only because the scope of Riverfront Adoption was restricted to very local issues but also because, in practice, the majority of villager participants were persuaded to adopt collaborative and institutional methods rather than disruptive ones. Institutionalisation, as a feedback mechanism, obviously led to a reinforcement of participants' adaptation towards collaboration- oriented actions and away from disruptive confrontations. Its final institutionalisation meant that collaborative governance continued to function as a commonly-accepted way of governing.




Figure 7. 2: A revised model of the emergence and development of environmental collaborative governance

# Chapter 8 Discussion

In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I examined how local environmental groups with different cultural backgrounds and resources struggled to obtain greater autonomy over the management of their environment. The purpose of Chapter 8 is twofold. First, it reviews the findings of all these case studies, identifying areas of similarity and difference between them. It attempts to synthesise the results in the search for general conclusions and to see how those conclusions relate to the questions raised by the literature review, but it does not presume that all the case studies should have similar outcomes. Second, it discusses how these empirical studies can contribute to the theory of governance, and especially how they relate to the model outlined in Chapter 2. The case studies analysed in Chapters 5-7 reflect different approaches towards collaborative governance. The case of River Enclosure represents a grassroots autonomous initiative, whilst Water Defence was initiated by environmental NGOs and Riverfront Adoption was promoted by a government agency. These examples of the Taiwanese experience of conducting collaborative governance are used to examine the series of questions raised in Chapter 1. The questions are:
First, what have been the reasons that have motivated the emergence of environmental collaborative governance? Second, have different approaches to initiating environmental collaborative governance led to different processes and results? Third, does the emergence of environmental collaborative governance promise a new pattern for its long-term development through its institutionalisation within the policy structure generally? Fourth, what are the levels of transformability and constraint of collaborative governance in the context of Taiwan? Fifth, does the current practice of collaborative governance in Taiwan result in a true transition of the state-society relationship or just a disguised form of corporatist strategy?

The following sections discuss these questions in sequence. Section 8.1 restates the argument and the theoretical model that lies behind this research. Section 8.2 discusses the mechanisms behind the rise of collaborative governance in Taiwan. Section 8.3 examines the different approaches to initiating collaborative

governance and how these are critical to its success. Section 8.4 lays out the reasons affecting the long-term development of collaborative governance and its possibility of institutionalisation. Section 8.5 assesses whether the deliberative process as a form of democratisation has a positive association with environmental improvement, while Section 8.6 reviews how Taiwanese state and society are transforming their interaction and roles in the area of environmental governance. Section 8.7 addresses how an additional factor – the context – is important to each case. Finally, Section 8.8 discusses how the findings of this research modify the theoretical model of collaborative governance developed in Chapter 2.

## 8.1 Governance in theory

This study of collaborative governance in Taiwan aims to contribute to three important contemporary debates. The first is the issue of sustainable development; the second contributes to questions of local governance, including the relationships between central and local government and between citizens and the state, when managing the environment; and the third to debates surrounding the changing role of civil society in local governance in Taiwan. More specifically, this research addresses the general observation that governance theory needs to move beyond grand theorising and typologies, and undertake more detailed empirical studies to survey to what extent the world is actually shifting from government to governance (Kooiman, 2003: 4-5; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004: 165; Adger and Jordan, 2009).

Second, to avoid the notion of governance becoming a static phenomenon, mode or instrument, the governance of sustainability needs to be seen in terms of both processes and outcomes. It needs to be analysed in a more dynamic and interactive way in order to make clear what forms of governing could possibly lead to expected outcomes (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 22; Adger and Jordan, 2009), without neglecting the underlying power structure (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004: 166; Adger and Jordan, 2009).

Finally, much of the existing literature on collaborative governance lacks sufficient examples of in-depth Eastern studies. To date, most empirical data in

support of governance theory is taken from western experiences. This study has tried to compensate for this deficit in the literature by starting from an East Asian perspective. Although there is a growing amount of research assessing the signs of a vibrant civil society participating in governance in East Asia, only a small proportion has been examined using the framework of governance theory. Therefore this thesis aims to contribute to filling this gap in the governance literature and in so doing assist the development of the theory relating to collaborative governance. Moreover, contestations over the nature of different governance models in East Asia mostly focus on economic performance and democratisation, they seldom engage with the environmental domain. In particular, there is little research into the transformation of environmental governance in Taiwan.

The role of the state in East Asian development has always been a controversial topic. The processes of policy making in Asia were traditionally monopolised by the state. The state was the principal and dominant, if not dictatorial, decision maker in the policy making and implementation process. Strict control over economic activity, concentration of political power, and close regulation of cultural life were typical in the region (White et al., 1985). However, recent research has sought to modify this conception of the Asian state, seeing it instead as fragmented, imperfect and even disorganised (Boyd and Ngo, 2005), especially after the financial crisis of the late 1990s. These conclusions have rekindled the debate over the appropriate roles of the state (Drysdale, 2000). In particular, the traditional statist perspective on the East Asian political economy was considered inadequate in explaining economic performance, was neglectful of intra-state dynamics, and was limited in its depictions of state-society relations. In order to remedy these shortcomings, some researchers have turned to concepts taken from the network theory as they are seen to provide a conceptually richer description of state-society interaction. More emphasis is placed upon the significance of partnerships, collaboration and level of delegation (Moon and Prasad, 1994). For example, Drysdale and contributors in the book *Reform and Recovery in East Asia* offer a different view of the state after examining how Asian states reacted to the financial crisis of the 1990s (Drysdale, 2000). With extensive reform programmes underway in almost every Asian economy, they argue that

governance rather than government can play a key role in facilitating future economic performances and preventing future catastrophes.

Similarly, findings from Japan (Yamamoto, 1999), and many other developing countries (Boyd and Ngo, 2005; Haggard, 2005; Koo, 2005; Underhill and Zhang, 2005; Warren and McCarthy, 2009), suggest that the process of environmental policy in Taiwan was associated with a major transition from government towards forms of governance alongside the rise of civil society. Other examples in both African and Asian countries also show how cooperation in policy/programme implementation between the state and non-governmental actors can sometimes solve intractable development problems (Brown and Ashman, 1996).

In line with this argument, this research has assumed that the emerging civil society in Taiwan was the major engine behind newly appearing reforms of river governance, acting as the architect of new policy design and promoting public participation. At the same time, the emergence of collaborative governance would not leave the forms and functions of the state unchanged. This thesis explores what changes have taken place in this regard in the context of local environmental initiatives in Taiwan.

## 8.2 Underlying mechanisms in the rise of collaborative governance

The theory of governance elaborates on the value and potential ways of conducting collaborative action between state and society. However, it lacks evidence on how collaborative governance emerges, what its original purposes were and how it was initiated. These questions are worthy of investigation because they are where the success of collaborative governance lies. This section discusses how collaborative environmental governance emerged in Taiwan, who initiated it and what the reasons motivating the emergence of collaborative governance have been. The empirical data reveals that there are several reasons leading civil society to give rise to new patterns of environmental governance.

In the case of Water Defence, the rapid growth of industrialisation in the last thirty years, especially regarding the development of heavy industries, has degraded the river environment and water resources. This external cost of the industrial boom stirred up environmental protestation and led environmental activists to organise and to put up proposals for river restoration. More than just protesting, proposing and lobbying, they engaged in direct action themselves, without waiting for government action, using their own social and human resources. In the case of River Enclosure, the river environment had deteriorated, in part at least, because the modern state rule had disrupted traditional customary custodianship of tribal river management, without putting sufficient resources in place to manage the use of river resources. Especially for those river tributaries which are located in remote mountain areas, this inadequate rule resulted in the degradation of the river environment. Indigenous villagers often felt river resources were exploited. There was a state of anarchy without proper management, especially by comparison with customary means of doing so. This caused collective resentment among the villagers towards government inaction and eventually led to their spontaneous decision to undertake River Enclosure in order to regain the ownership and ecology of the river. In contrast to the previous two cases, Riverfront Adoption was initiated from outside. It was government officials and local politicians who drew up this policy intended to tap into social vitality in order to transform the riverfront from landfill sites. Helpful bureaucrats and local political leaders encouraged and empowered local villagers to participate, successfully catalysing public commitment.

While in the cases of Water Defence and River Enclosure, environmental activism created new means for public participation in environmental governance, in the case of Riverfront Adoption it operated the other way round. Here it was the local state that created a policy instrument which inspired the local growth of civil society. It is similar to a Japanese case where a policy mechanism was used to facilitate activism which in turn reformed the use of public space. Civil society surely needs both political and physical spaces in which to meet and flourish (Sorensen and Funck, 2007; Daniere and Douglass, 2008). In other words, the former two cases represented a kind of self-help designed to cope with the lack of government action, whilst the latter tended to complement government action and

policies as local collaboration was grafted on to an existing initiative, even if the initiative was designed to incorporate a local partnership once it had been set in motion. Although both approaches emerged from different mechanisms, they led to a similar result in terms of river restoration: the river became accessible, the river ecology recovered and citizens were catalysed.

Prior to these initiatives, Taiwanese society existed under dictatorial rule which precluded any chance of public participation except by corporatist organisations established by the government. Despite this history, the case studies do reveal that, with appropriate empowerment and leadership, the public can be encouraged and inspired to engage in public resource management. Alongside this positive conclusion, a more negative motivation for engagement arose out of government inaction which led in turn to attempts to reclaim the local right to manage the river, even to the point of returning to traditional environmental institutions. Nonetheless, the changing relationship between the state and civil society at this time 'allowed' such local action to take place without state interference.

The ineffectiveness and inaction of the state has led to a series of surges of social mobilisation, but so too has the active engagement of the government. While the former dismisses the reliance of the public on the governing actions of the state, the latter makes use of the enthusiasm of the public for environmental improvement and their willingness to engage in any restoration action. One crucial element is the availability of local leadership capable of promoting the opportunity and developing public involvement. Local leadership often bridges the state and social actors regarding resource inputs and political legitimatisation, but at the same time the state can also be highly selective in terms of with whom it prefers to cooperate. In some cases, state assistance is linked to the successful performance of particular commitments and their leaders, and in others more explicit political patronage is evident. More generally, it is the proliferation of local civil society in Taiwan which has developed beyond the protest politics of the 1980s and 1990s (see Ho, 2009) that has been fundamental to the emergence of collaborative governance (see also Yamamoto, 1999).

## 8.3 Examining the initiation and outcomes of collaborative governance: exogenous vs. endogenous approach

This section distinguishes between the two approaches to initiating collaborative governance: endogenous and exogenous. There is even a third approach, a hybrid approach, which merges the two approaches at different stages. The difference leads to different processes and, potentially, outcomes.

In the case of Water Defence, those environmental organisations which undertook direct action, did so on their evaluation of their available resources, strength and interests. And this varied from activities directed towards wetland regeneration, or the promotion of organic farming, but in all cases community participation became the focus of their ways of operating. This was a more constructive rather than disruptive strategy of civil engagement than the forms of protest employed in the 1990s. Their goals and actions were more reformist and altruistic and less confrontational. For example, the leading environmental activists put forward a series of proposals to restore the river environment, including wetland regeneration, landscape conservation, water restoration and so on, rather than confront state organisations directly. Instead, though some of their proposals were put into practice without the consent of the state, they capitalised on the hesitancy of the state to act and promoted new strategies of conservation, partly in the belief that demonstrating their value on the ground would lead the state to incorporate them into formal policies on a region-wide basis. In practice, the case studies suggest that this is an attainable idea only where autonomous social mobilisation was combined with high organisational competence.

In the case of River Enclosure, tribal leaders initiated a local approach to governance based on the community resources available to them. One of the vital elements in the successful employment of this approach is the conventional institution called *Gaja*, which means the obligation of every household to share community work and welfare under the direction of traditional leaders. This institution supported the emergence of River Enclosure, which was amended

through a modern form of consensus building via village meetings. The consensus was achieved through a more democratic process than the traditional paternalistic social order. The outcome is that every household shares the responsibility of environmental management through a form of consensus rather than written rules. It was based upon a strong commitment to conduct River Enclosure since the management of the scheme required 24-hour patrolling, which was not just harsh but also dangerous. Nonetheless, these inconveniences and threats were thought to be worthwhile if only to regain a sense of environmental ownership, even if this was not a legal form of ownership backed by the authority of the state.

Reclaiming the right of customary community control remains a major incentive for action in many indigenous areas. As Acciaioli (2009) exhibited in Indonesia, indigenous people have strived for an accommodation of customary custodianship in modern environmental governance, through partnership with state agencies, and returned with stronger environmental commitments.

In the early stages, River Enclosure was a community collective action against the state's jurisdiction over river management. However, because the result of River Enclosure was seen to be so effective among local communities, government agencies chose to circumvent their bureaucratic procedures and to accept this form of behaviour thus helping the spontaneous growth of social action. In other words, for River Enclosure to continue to succeed, it was important that local government officials became committed to the scheme, so assisting a new mode of governance to develop. In so doing, it further nurtured the development of local civil society.

It formulated a hybrid approach combining both endogenous and exogenous practices. While the villagers spontaneously initiated River Enclosure, it later became a social action which relied on government support to continue. However, when the government converted this kind of endogenous collaborative governance into policy of its own and committed government resources to it, it proved to be much less successful. At a very practical level, for example, the government only employed day-time patrollers, which was the opposite to fish

poachers who often only operated at night, and these government employees, most of them from outside the villages, were often unwilling to cooperate with locals or follow the instructions of local leaders. As a result, government investment had very little effect, and, even worse, it reduced the willingness of local villagers to volunteer.

In contrast, exogenous collaborative governance, like Riverfront Adoption, was planned by a government agency which made provision for it in its budget and developed the means of engagement. The participant communities followed the government-made rules and directions. Not surprisingly, by comparison with River Enclosure, Riverfront Adoption was more easily extended to other areas and provides a comparable example to the widespread Japanese civil actions on community reform that were elicited by government policy (Sorensen and Funck, 2007).

However this did not mean all issues of riverbank management were solved. Reform actions mostly focussed on narrow local interest, constrained in the riverbank areas and were less easy to expand to other sites. This was due to the limitations of capability and resource availability of local activists, while, at the same time, the concern of most of villagers is for their own community benefit rather than the environment as a whole. Nevertheless, if these sorts of social actions can be spread nation-wide, a revolution in policy design can be catalysed.

Through the policy of introducing riverfront adoption, the riverbank environment was significantly improved. The policy catalysed public participation by providing a public good. This increased the collective consensus in the community, and mobilised social resources. The environment, as a kind of civil space, provides the physical sites for civil society to function autonomously. The liberation of public space has attracted significant civic actions in many societies (Friedmann, 1988; Lefebvre, 1991; Massey, 1994; Daniere and Douglass, 2008).

Not every example of collaborative governance can be said to be wholly endogenous or exogenous in its initiation or in its appropriateness. One method that was suitable to one community might not apply to others because of

differences in societal-political contexts and geographical characteristics. It can be argued that an exogenous approach can be more easily adopted and operated by communities and organisations for environmental improvement at ground level where it lies within the aims of government agencies, but endogenous initiatives may encourage greater local social cohesion as they evolve from the central concerns of local social actors. However, the success and ingenuity of locally initiated collaborative governance relies on the commitment of the local population to their common choice.
One of the limitations of the exogenous approach of collaborative governance is that it is usually restricted to certain policy areas and processes, whose primary aim is to assist bureaucrats and politicians in conducting an environmental measure of their choosing. It might be just a placating gesture to diffuse public irritation for poor environmental management results, but it is least likely to be effective in resolving a controversial issue or in respecting local autonomy in local environmental affairs.

The empirical materials showed that both approaches have their limitations and strengths. It might be of theoretical interest to explore the possibility of successfully merging these two approaches. In reality, the merged model of collaborative governance, which might fit in with the bureaucratic system and its interests without opposing the needs of relevant communities and the environment, demands a very particular set of circumstances to make it possible, with no guarantee of success. On top of these conditions, the merged model needs to be able to be institutionalised for its long-term development.

Appropriate government investment and facilitation can elicit a significant citizen response. As Dobson suggests, citizenship is unlikely to emerge spontaneously. On the contrary, it requires new educational systems and democratic spaces in which to thrive, and he argues that government should invest in raising the public's ecological citizenship to ensure commitment among the public towards environmentally friendly behaviour (Dobson, 2003; Dobson and Bell, 2006; Dobson, 2009). In the case of Riverfront Adoption, it was only fifteen years ago that the residents who lived beside the river were bereft of any hope of a clean and ecologically vibrant river. Current government actions on cleaning up

pollutants in and along the river have regained the residents' trust of the government's determination to be involved in environmental management. This implies that an exogenous approach towards collaborative governance can, in some cases, equally catalyse the enthusiasm of the public in participating in environmental affairs and the growth of civil society. Similar examples can be found in some Brazilian cases of participatory budgeting projects that overcame traditional clientelism in order to enable cooperative governance to thrive (Abers, 1998; Souza, 2001).

Based on the ladder of participation (see Table 2. 2), the degree of power and delegation gained by the participants of the three case studies are significantly beyond 'tokenism' in Arnstein's terms (i.e. informing, consultation, and placation). In fact, the examples of Dashe, Koushe, Gaujung (River Enclosure), Wetlands Taiwan, BDCC and MPA (Water Defence), have presented a high level of community autonomy in the early stages of their social mobilisation for conservation action and protests against environmental degradation. The development projects were led by communities, rather than by the government. They remained so until the government stepped in at a later phase, which resulted in their reliance on government resources. Even so, their participation in governing remained interactive and functional according to the spectrum.

After all, there is no such thing as a 'one-size fits all' approach that can be applied to policy domains. The success of collaborative actions is contingent on local circumstances, geographic specificities, appropriate leadership and participants' commitment. However, as a suggestion to policy makers and practitioners, an appropriate hybrid model, especially with regards to institutionalising collaborative governance, should establish a set of rules and mechanisms, which is flexible enough to accommodate local demands and needs, and, most important of all, encourage local commitment and autonomy. This observation is also relevant to the practice of multi-level governance (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; Bulkeley and Moser, 2007), in which authority is not only redistributed to supra-national or sub-national institutions, but is also dispersed from different levels of governments to social voluntary sectors and networks (Peters and Pierre, 2001). Instead of becoming a dilution of responsibility and increased ambiguity

of accountability, the dispersion of authority should be carefully designed based on the nature of the environmental issues in quesion and which tiers of government or social sectors have the greatest capacity and relevance to address them. It follows that, sometimes, cooperation across borders is necessary in order to overcome the limitations of resources and operational capability (Bulkeley and Kern, 2006).

## 8.4 Mechanisms for the long-term development of collaborative governance and its institutionalisation

This section examines the significant determinants and difficulties of the long-term development of collaborative governance and how the actors involved strived to sustain this new form of governance. It is crucial, of course, for the organisations involved to increase their capability to acquire continuous financial support and political commitment from state organisations to input the long-term support for collaborative actions. But the financial input is not the only element important in the long-term development of collaborative governance. Without spontaneous mobilisation of social participants, both endogenous and exogenous approaches of collaborative governance cannot be sustained or transferred to other areas of policy. There must be commitment from local leaders and government officials if the local community is to be genuinely empowered and its members given the means to adapt themselves to new rules and practices.

Whilst governance theory foresees that genuine collaborative governance can improve the quality of environmental management, it is simply too optimistic to assume that collaborative practice between active citizens and responsive government officials can develop and be maintained without problems along the way. The process of initiating and practising collaborative governance can be time-consuming, expensive and frustrating with no guarantee of a consensual result.

In the case of Riverfront Adoption, government subsidy was stable and sufficient

enough for local communities to establish regular practices on limited government funding. Local communities did not have to worry about the availability of resources for future development or that continuous participation would constantly require sufficient political recognition to be effective. On the other hand, Water Defence, which was not a government project, had to rely on social mobilisation to obtain resources from both the public and private sectors. It also required constant attention be paid to the integration of their preferred activities into the government's project budget. The problem is that the evidence suggests that spontaneous social mobilisation can often acquire government resources, but not necessarily for the long term. Therefore, the groups in Water Defence needed to consistently propose new programmes, which could then obtain new sponsorship from either the government or society as a whole. Nevertheless, these projects were then not easy to institutionalise due to their traits of being place-based and temporary strategic measures.

While River Enclosure began as a spontaneous social action, it was gradually accepted as part of government policies and largely promoted to other river basins with the purpose of improving river ecology. However, the results were not always positive. Many communities conducted river enclosure as a response to government sponsorship, but without deliberative discussion or volunteer mobilisation within their own communities. Consequently, these communities became dependent on government funds and human resources although government funding was not planned as a regular and stable money supply for the locals with the result that some local initiatives had to be abandoned when the assumed resources were diverted to other areas and policies. Only a few River Enclosure initiatives are still in operation, and then only because of the voluntary river patrolling action of the locals.

These three cases reveal that two elements, spontaneous social mobilisation and stable funding, are the keys to long-term development. Although an exogenous approach can obtain government recognition and long-term subsidy, its failure is unavoidable without the spontaneous participation and capability of the grassroots. Equally, an endogenous approach, which responds to local circumstances, has similar difficulties if it is unable to access long-term resources

from both government and society more generally.

In addition, collaborative governance needs to be 'institutionalised' in order to guarantee its long-term development. It needs to become part of established practice, not forever remaining on the outside. But this is a difficult transition to make, politically and culturally, and most of the case studies demonstrate this. Water Defence is almost impossible to be institutionalised (Hou and Chen, 2009) because it relies on social actors' efforts to propose a flexible, situation-based solution and at the same time to integrate government resources to realise the solution. In the case of River Enclosure, attempts to institutionalise the practice of river patrol led to the withdrawal of volunteer villagers and the collapse of the patrol system. It would seem that in these case studies written rules seldom apply to successful collaborative governance. Progress relies more on government officials' genuine devolution of power and willingness to act, in addition to the countless informal acts of coordination among the social actors in their work cooperating with the government. These efforts are indispensable and need to be consistently applied to the phases of policy-making, strategic action, and implementation.

## 8.5 The limits of collaborative actions

This section considers the extent to which the new forms of collaborative governance can achieve effective reform of environmental management. Interest groups are often established to influence the policies and practices of others, state or non-state. This often reflects their natural expertise and concerns, but when they get involved in delivering environmental services can suffer a loss of vitality, professionalism, or even separation from the movement from which they emerged (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). Some who have agreed to deliver services in association with local governments have suffered problems of co-option and distraction from their original goals (Hickey and Mohan, 2004). The heavy engagement of Machizukuri groups in Japan with local governments in processes often created or supported by local governments, means that Machizukuri today often has more in common with 'public participation' processes than with social

movements (Sorensen and Funck, 2007). The distinction between public participation and social movement matters because whereas the former is intended to improve local environments, the latter is intended to make (r)evolutionary changes over the political-economic system, the policy priorities and the environmental consciousness of the public.

In this thesis the case studies have shed different lights on their capacities to reform environmental governance. An endogenous approach to collaborative governance can appear to be more profound than an exogenous one, probably due to the fact that most such cases emerge out of contentious politics towards existing governing institutions. Thus they tend to demand greater policy changes than those government-initiated programmes. Another reason is that grassroots movements reflect a greater willingness and persistence on the part of their actors to mobilise every bit of their social resources in order to realise or restore their favoured condition of the environment.

In the case of Water Defence, environmental campaigners kept challenging the state's boundary by seeing how far established policies could be altered. The movement started as an anti-dam construction campaign and was opposed to any large scale water resource development. In the event it not only halted the water development programme, but also transformed itself into more than a hundred local forms of collaborative conservation, located in various parts of southern Taiwan, based on the expertise and interests of each campaigning group. These proposals created a new 'action repertoire' (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 181-2) within the environmental movement and convinced a number of different government departments [128] to collaborate on these experimental projects. Although taking a different course of action from their original anti-dam purpose, they successfully changed the perception of government officials and the public towards environmentalism, leading to numerous local environmental improvements. This achievement contributed to their capacity to present feasible environmental restoration proposals, which integrated different sources of government funding and established a strong network of supporters within

[128] For example, they have worked with the Forest Bureau, Seventh River Bureau, Council of Cultural Affairs, Council for Hakka Affairs (in central government) and Agriculture Bureau, and the Water Resources Department (in local county government).

government who were inclined to support their action plans. However, some forms of public participation can conflict with regular policy making, such as budget planning for a long-term project, and therefore there needs to be some flexibility in the collaborative process if it is to be successful.

In contrast, actions associated with Riverfront Adoption spread widely with a minimum amount of change in the local landscape and on the basis of volunteering. Similarly, River Enclosure, although starting as a spontaneous action within a couple of tribal villages, was quickly incorporated into government policy in 2006 and spread island-wide. Nevertheless, its actions were often restricted to local tributaries and in some government-promoted cases there were no volunteers or paid patrollers available to monitor poaching behaviour. In the worst case, local power-holders counteracted the efforts of civil action. This happened mostly in rural areas. These two case studies have shown that the influence of an exogenous approach of collaborative governance was often constrained and led to a limited level of reform. Also, even with government sponsorship, it can be seen that it does not necessarily last longer than an endogenous approach.

Environmental protection emphasises the importance of ecological restoration; public participation aims to improve the democratic process of decision making. The latter does not always correlate with the former, but the evidence in this thesis suggests that most of the time enhancing public involvement leads to a greater public commitment to environmental values and a better developed sense of ownership of the environment. Sometimes the greatest achievement of collaborative governance is an improved policy process rather than environmental improvement. Especially in the post-authoritarian phase in Taiwan's history, between 1990s and early 2000s, the democratic value of collaborative governance seemed to attract more attention (Hsiao, 1987, 1995; Ho, 2003; Huang, 2004; Yen and Kuan, 2004; Ho, 2005b; Fan, 2006), than its environmental outcomes.

The sign of emerging collaborative governance implies a deeper democratic political system and a society more involved in governance, but it is often constrained at different levels of reform in particular policy domains. For

example, the local level is the most suitable to practice deliberative democracy and collaborative governance. Gaventa and Valderrama (1999) have emphasised that linking citizen participation to the state at this local or grassroots level raises fundamental and normative questions about the nature of democracy, plus the skills and strategies for achieving it. They have tried to explore the dynamics and methods of strengthening community-based participation in the context of programmes for democratic decentralisation. Even though public participation has prospered at the local level, the case studies show a concern as to the limited extent these actions can influence policy-making in central government. For example, although the Water Defence movement restored the water environment in many locations and extended its coalition to an unprecedented scale, ultimately the coalition has not yet been able to overturn the new water resource development projects[129] planned by central government. Even worse, in the case of River Enclosure, although many tribal villages have enjoyed fruitful results from the ecological restoration of the river and the resulting profits attained from eco-tourism, the issue of soil erosion caused by deforestation has continued to threaten the safety of these villages and the river basin. In addition, in the case of Riverfront Adoption, hundreds of hectares of riverfront green were created, but beside these riverfront parks mining companies were located that treated the river as a source of gravel for construction purposes, which has led to a deterioration of the water quality and surrounding natural habitats. In addition, from the water quality date, shown in Figure 4.2, it can be seen that there was no sign that the heavily polluted area was decreasing in size, probably due to the fact that pig farming was still degrading the river basin[130].

The core concern of governance is to diffuse or redistribute authority in order to incorporate social actors into the policy process and implementation in order to reach a structural change for governing sustainability (Petschow et al., 2005). Unfortunately, the conduct and results of collaboration in Taiwan have been limited to domains that seldom impact on major policies, especially regarding the

[129] Although the Water Defence coalition successfully overturned two dam projects, they have faced difficulties confronting the new water development projects, including a transbasin diversion, an artificial lake etc.

[130] Although pig farming has been expelled from the drinking water protected area since 2002, it moved to a down stream area where it was not regulated.

need for natural resources by industrial enterprises. However, at least in these case studies, while citizens have the potential to make big changes, very few of them are 'tolerated' at the higher level of policy process. The case studies were actually street-level reforms authorised by frontline government officials, especially in the case of River Enclosure and Riverfront Adoption. Although there were higher ranking government officials participating in the negotiation of Water Defence, very few concrete results were achieved in regards to shifting the paradigm of water development projects. Social actors have also urged the government to reconstruct its departmental organisations into a more integrated structure for governing the river[131], not to mention demanding a river policy that prioritised sustainable development and ecological conservation instead of water resource development, gravel mining and flood prevention. However, the results of the campaign are limited.

## 8.6 Taiwanese state-society relationship in transition

This section asks whether environmental collaborative governance ultimately alters the relationship between the state and society, or whether it just re-presented the existing power structure in another guise. Traditionally, the state monopolised the whole governance process, which led to a very low level of public participation. The Taiwanese government was generally considered as manifesting a benign form of authoritarianism (Chen, 1995b; Liao, 1997; Ting, 1999; Edmonds and Goldstein, 2001; Ho, 2009), which has often tried to incorporate local factions into the ruling system. Some (Ho, 2009) argue that the political situation in Taiwan has been so unstable and severely competitive that this alone undermines the value and purpose of public participation, especially when the increase in public participation is largely associated with the DPP regime. Many respondents worried that future changes in political party might have a negative impact on collaborative governance.

This section analyses how the Taiwanese state and society have changed their

[131] For example, as mentioned in Chapter 4, rivers in Taiwan are governed by twelve different departments that lack horizontal coordination.

roles and relationship along with the emergence of environmental collaborative governance. The three case studies in this research unveil the fact that the state no longer monopolises the initiation and implementation of policies. Potter et al. (2008) and Edwards (2001:3) would agree with this argument. The involvement of civic society leads to a policy that better fits the needs of the population as well as, in these cases, the imperative of environmental restoration.
With regard to the debate as to whether traditional corporatism has remained and overshadowed the effectiveness of collaborative governance, this thesis has a more optimistic finding. Because of the high level of social autonomous energy, civil society has been able to defend itself from traditional corporatist control. But the cooperation of the two parties has not entirely circumvented local political factionism. In the case of Water Defence, the state-society relationship moved from confrontation to cooperation, but the transition was uneven. The state is a complex entity and whilst some government agencies actively contacted social actors, in order to coordinate environmental solutions, other departments, such as the economic related ministries, totally excluded civil society members from their policy processes. In the last decade, environmental groups and government agencies have been trying to find common ground for restoration action for the Kaoping River. In some cases cooperation has produced discernible results, not least in strategies for water restoration and wetland regeneration. Nevertheless, some NGO members have categorised these results as window-dressing rather than a fundamental shift in power and relations. Moreover, water developments are often intractable, not only because of the problems in controlling water pollution but also because the benefits have been unjustly distributed, not least because many of the water development projects have aimed to satisfy the demands of heavy industry first and the needs of the general public second. This meant that the state's collaborative relationship with environmental NGOs has remained in tension because the demands of industry kept re-surfacing. Whilst there was difficulty in finding common ground for action over water resource restoration, these controversial issues have challenged the possibility of trust building between the state and society.

Most environmental activists have been included in one type of consultative institution or another (see also Ho, 2009), especially after 2000. Indeed,

environmentalists gained legitimacy and were appointed to government positions but cynicism, among NGOs, researchers and observers, remained about the lack of change in some of the controversial policies, revealing the continuing authority of the state over major policy domains. In the case of River Enclosure, the state was often absent from or negligent towards river management in the mountainous areas leaving laws and regulations with insufficient human resources to implement and monitor them. Government actions regarding river governance ran counter to local expectations, leading to deterioration in river ecology. This led the indigenous mountain people to undertake self-help action, filling the gap in public authority, although these actions were against the law. In due course, the state sought reconciliation with the indigene accepting the positive outcomes of their actions and their popularity. River Enclosure has led government agencies (such as the Forestry Bureau and county governments) to recognise the feasibility of entering into a partnership with the indigenous people.

Customary community control over river management has been reasserted through River Enclosure practices, but with a slight difference between traditional methods and modern practices, which implies change in the state-society relationship. Traditional ways of practising River Enclosure are conducted by autonomous clans. The position of customary custodianship was usually decided by the traditional clan leaders. However, its position in the resurgence of River Enclosure is under the recognition and support of the state, therefore modern skills of conducting government projects and negotiating community participation are required. However, this slight difference of who can legitimately authorise the policy of River Enclosure has significant implications for the relationship between the state and society. The state's right to approve the applications for River Enclosure, though there is seldom a case being rejected, implies River Enclosure no longer belongs to the domain of tribal autonomy.

In the case of Riverfront Adoption, the government agency (River Bureau) became the institution that empowered local communities to participate in public policy. The Bureau also accepted that public participation was a valuable concept in promoting democracy and that it could be used as a policy tool to resolve the problem of the democratic deficit. However, the opening-up of community

participation in environmental management also provided a new opportunity for local factions to engage with the policy processes or even compete for government resources. This undermined local communities who often lacked the ability to integrate different opinions and thus resolve political factional competition.

The pursuit of collaboration requires a willingness to experiment with non-traditional sources of accountability in order to address the problem of legitimacy (Freeman, 1997). In addition, the commitment of government officials, as well as the dedication of social actors, is an important variable when considering the value of public participation. For example in the case of Riverfront Adoption, the chief director of the Seventh River Bureau was fully in favour of this policy and gained a rewarding response from local villagers in the river basin. The cases of adoption grew rapidly. Similarly, in the case of Water Defence, with the commitment of a chief in the city government, Wetlands Taiwan swiftly expanded the scale of regenerated wetland and the scope of the adopted wetland park in Kaohsiung city. But both cases faced the return of conservative, bureaucratic attitudes once these two chief officials left their positions. The bureaucratic attitude of government officials in Taiwan towards public participation is sometimes a means, or a cover, to prevent accusations of providing benefit to particular civil groups.

The decrease of authoritarian control and the upsurge of social demand for better governance explains part of the reason why, in the last decade, collaborative examples grew rapidly, as similar to the case of Indonesia (Warren and McCarthy, 2009). Nevertheless, there is a dilemma attached to this rapid growth of collaborative governance, rooted in a history of an unequal state-society relationship, that it tended to be fragile and prone to manipulation (Hickey and Mohan, 2004) due to its reliance on government resources and officials' support. What Agrawal and Gupta (2005) worried about is the likelihood of the level of participation being much greater for those economically and socially better-off. This phenomenon sometimes occurred in rural areas, such as River Enclosure and Riverfront Adoption, where only those who were able to deal with bureaucratic routines and gain the recognition of local authorities could successfully apply for

government projects and funding. But, this was not without exception. In cases like Dashe, poor villagers relied on their own to conduct River Enclosure without outside aids, simply because of strong tribal norms, social capital and undivided leadership.

The traditional shadow of corporatism and cohesive social control by the state was not obvious in this research. The worst case was the counteraction of local factionist politics, which was afraid of the rise of citizenship becoming a sort of political power to compete with the current power holders. Therefore, those cases of collaborative governance in this research, especially as illustrated in the case of BDCCA and MPA (in Water Defence), emphasised the management of local relationships and were expected to combine the benefits and concerns of the locals with environmentalism.

The state-society relationship is becoming more equal and reciprocal. As Ho (2009) also noticed, the role of activists has transited from being 'viewed as disruptive protestors by officials to reliable partners in environmental governance'. Most of the government officials emphasised that they not only learnt from the endogenous approach of collaborative governance to shift policy direction, but also saw community participation as an end-in-itself.

The emergence of this collaborative approach to environmental activism was from the grassroots level and was unlike those capital-based environmental activisms based in Taipei and established under the assistance of international NGOs and the influence of western thought (Weller and Hsiao, 1998). The examples of collaborative governance in this research were little influenced by discussions taken in Taipei or by foreign organisations. They stand in contrast to those described by Huang and Ho who emphasised how the capital-based groups were incorporated into the state apparatus (Huang, 2004; Ho, 2009). Huang also argued that the incorporated NGO elites were able to reconstitute the state by working within the state institutions and thus promote new legislations. However, this study remains sceptical as to what extent this argument can be applied to locations away from the capital. Here the influence of environmental and grassroots groups in collaborative governance remained partial and complementary.

To conclude, the state-society relationship in Taiwan has been altered rapidly since the late 1990s along with the party political shift and the emergence of civil society. Evidence in this research, at least from the perspective of environmental governance, does not support the suggestion that the newly emerging partnership between the state and society is a new form of corporatism (Huang, 2004). However, it is without doubt, that the Asian state continues to dominate, and seeks to manipulate its partnership with society.

## 8.7 Contextualising collaborative governance

One significant additional finding is the influence of embedded contextual differences (Robins et al., 2008). Each case of collaborative governance has shed a different light. Local factionist politics, geographical differences, availability of social capital and organisational capacity, all generate intricate differences in the mode of collaborative governance and the way social actors and government officials commit to it. The geographical differences between rural and urban areas alone explain many of the diversified forms of collaborative governance. Those cases which were located in rural areas, such as Riverfront Adoption and River Enclosure, tended to get less government resources and were less regulated by the government, thus needed to be self-reliant. These two studies have demonstrated the consistent mobilisation of villagers in rural areas in delivering an environmental service, in contrast to the success of Water Defence which has tended to rely on the expertise and political savvy of social elites and professionals.

The political impacts of local factionalism also differed according to geographic differences. In some of the case studies, particularly those allocated in rural areas, for example, A-li-gang, Old Iron Bridge (Riverfront Adoption), Minchuan, Minzu and Koushe (River Enclosure), the research found that emerging forms of citizenship in these areas encountered the resistance of existing local political factions. In some cases, leaders of environmental activism, despite having obtained successful outcomes to their environmental campaigns, failed to be re-elected as village heads and this led to conservation actions being halted. Some

of them faced a split in their organisations due to the competition for local leadership and disputes regarding the location of resources. These political cleavages were often found to be fatal to the emergence of collaborative governance. This is why those cases of Water Defence insisted on being politically neutral or vigilant in their selection of political coalitions. In Taiwan in general, no matter whom initiates the new pattern of governance, the more rural the location the higher the risk of factionalism and the greater the need for reliance on self-help.

Even within rural communities, there might be differences in their level of social capital, which is an important element for building consensus and commitment. For example, Dashe had a stronger sense of community consolidation, which enabled villagers to reconcile their differences even though it was the village that received the fewest subsidies from the government. In contrast, Minchiuan and Gaujung encountered internal struggles over the issue of financial feedback from tourist income.

Different social groups embrace different environmental norms which translated into different forms and underlying ideology of conservation actions in the river basin. In Taiwanese society, 'nature' combines many different meanings. Generally speaking, Chinese society, which has been largely influenced by Buddhist thought, believes that humankind should live in harmony with nature. However, it actually translates very differently to different groups in this society. Indigenous Taiwanese society embraces nature as a way of living, which is traditionally complemented with a lot of rules and taboos, but for rural villagers it has a more utilitarian meaning, such as referring to agricultural production. For the ordinary layman, its definition can vary ranging from pastoral nostalgia, to resource supplies for daily needs to biodiversity. For example, while Water Defence was mainly organised by middle-class urban activists for eco-centred purposes, whose values tended to be in forms of conservation as an end in itself, River Enclosure and Riverfront Adoption were promoted by lower income rural leaders and villagers who mostly considered the river a part of their livelihoods. This was revealed from some of the examples seen in the case of River Enclosure, in which conservation action failed to continue due to the dispute over the income

distribution of tourism and fishing licenses. Another example was the factional struggle, in the case of Riverfront Adoption, over the issue of who was legitimate enough to acquire a government subsidy. Similarly, local civil groups are structured differently from one another and they therefore also produce diverse types of governance. For example, in the case of Water Defence, the diverse forms of Water Defence action often derived from differences among the environmental groups, such as organisational expertise, ideology of conservation and political networks. The varying combination of these factors, produced different forms of collaborative governance. For example, BDCCA have used their political connections to help hundreds of community groups acquire government grants to initiate projects for environmental improvement. The reason its members chose to facilitate community groups was geographical. BDCCA was located in rural areas with only a handful of members, thus only when community groups in the river basin supported their ideas, was river restoration be possible. In contrast, Wetlands Taiwan chose to act alone, using their own expertise in wetland regeneration and species protection combined with sponsorship both from the government and society. These circumstances allowed it to work alone. In another case, the social actors of River Enclosure took a similar form of action because of the homogeneity of the local indigenous villages involved, most being economically disadvantaged, yet socially consolidated and culturally connected.

The success of the new form of governance relies on the availability of facilitative officials, local leadership, social capital and organisational capability, which altogether describe the level of social autonomy and yet the configuration of a new form of collaborative governance often depends also on its context. As Potter (2000: 381) has concluded, there is no single model of 'good governance', but it may have different properties 'depending on the particular institutional context concerned'. While social capital provided a basic source for the initiation of River Enclosure, the local leadership and facilitation of government officials has made Riverfront Adoption prosper region-wide, and the organisational capability and political network has guaranteed the transformative ability of Water Defence. 'Whilst there are considerable opportunities that can be and are being realised through an increased role of civic society in development, civil society is no 'magic bullet' for the future. There is a need to consider what

particular combinations of public, private and civic institutions are most effective in specific contexts' (Potter et al., 2008: 326).

## 8.8 Conclusion: collaborative governance model for Taiwan's circumstances

This final section modifies the model of environmental collaborative governance in Taiwan established in Chapters 2 based on the findings in Chapters 5-7. The purpose of doing this modification is to discover to what degree the model fits Taiwan's case and how Taiwan's case can enrich the theory of collaborative governance. Particular attention has been paid to the mechanism of the emergence of collaborative governance and the factors including leadership, local factionism, organisational capacity, geographical heterogeneity and government actions.

### *8.8.1 The role of civil society*

The results of the empirical research are largely consistent with my assumption that civil society can play a more active role in solving the managerial deficit of river environment and resources. Social spontaneity is a major stimulus in initiating collaborative governance, in response to long-lasting environmental issues, some of which are linked to longstanding grievances such as indigenous land rights. Social spontaneity is crucial to the processes of environmental governance, continuously attracting public attention, mobilising social resources and putting public pressure on the state. It is critical to incorporate civic society in the process of initiating and sustaining collaborative governance, while at the same time empowering the members of civic society to reclaim the right to participate in the processes of public policy. It is possible that civil society functions, such as mobilising resources within the state through advocacy and lobbying, can provide a novel approach for the public to participate in the process, which, in turn, can lead to a more effective way to restore the environment. We can no longer assume that the state still controls the process of collaborative governance because the most crucial determinant of its success would be the continuous engagement of civil society in the process of policy development and

its implementation.

These findings lend support to the assumption that civil society has the potential to be both the initiator and implementer of environmental management, but the key to its success or failure is often held in the hands of government recognition and financial support. In addition, we can conclude with certainty that effective collaboration between state and society is not achievable without time and effort; neither is it possible to follow a fixed set of rules. The case studies have shown that collaborative governance cannot be promoted by the actions of civil society alone. Equally, it is highly unlikely that effective, long term river management can be achieved on the basis of local participation alone; the state cannot be totally withdrawn from the process. Collaboration depends on the whole-hearted participation of both the state and society.

In Taiwan, civil environmental projects have tapped into the public's pent-up demand for effective, hands-on community-building strategies. They continue to provide unique opportunities for people from different communities and walks of life to work together toward the basic goals of a healthy environment, quality employment, and a sense of place and community (see Shutkin, 2000; Hickey and Mohan, 2004). An increasing number of communities are transforming their environmental problems into opportunities to address underlying social and economic problems. Social networks can empower civil actions. As Ostrom (1997) and Shutkin (2000) both argue, personal relationships and networks, neighbourhoods and livelihoods can fuel civil environmental projects (Ostrom, 1990; Shutkin, 2000).

This suggests that the role of civil society in sustainable development will continue to gain greater weight. As Potter et al. (2008) have pointed out, NGOs have a number of characteristics that make them peculiarly suitable to the needs of sustainable development. These include (1) their ability to innovate and adapt, (2) their 'relative smallness' (Chambers, 1993); (3) their social approximity (Malena, 2000); (4) their tradition of working with the poorest groups and the grassroots (Craig and Mayo, 1995) ; and (5) their calibre, commitment and continuity of staff (Conroy and Litvinoff, 1988). There is increasing evidence that

NGOs act as initiators and executive bodies in a multitude of environmental projects (Rucht, 2005). There is a growing realignment of environmental protection strategies away from a purely law-based, law-driven and professional model to one in which diverse groups of citizens, environmentalists, government officials, and business people collectively become the experts in both planning and implementation (Shutkin, 2000).

In this study, although civil society has often been coupled with the absence of a strong financial base and has depended on the state to provide an enabling environment and resources (Yamamoto, 1996; Mouer and Sugimoto, 2003; Schak and Hudson, 2003). NGOs may run parallel activities, they may play oppositional roles, or they may represent weaker members of society, organising them in ways that allow them to become more influential in decision making and resource allocation. This 'civil society' function entails moving from a 'supply side' approach, concentrating on project delivery, to a 'demand side' emphasis, helping communities to articulate their concerns and participate in development processes. Similar to Brown and Ashman's (1996) findings, this study suggests that the most feasible, successful patterns for development projects are either through the mediation of non-government organisations (NGOs) or by grassroots-centred cooperation. The availability of different forms of social capital is vital to their success.

### *8.8.2 The role of Asian states*

There is also a need to modify the concept of 'stateness' in Asian states (Petschow et al., 2005) in order to achieve 'governance', which has no standard definition except the principle of a diffusion or redistribution of authority away from the state. I found in my case studies that the role of the state was twofold. On the one hand, it played the role of empowering much grassroots participation and could be as equally important as civil society in terms of supporting a diversified and non-standardised process of policy participation, as well as providing financial aid. On the other hand, the state can stifle the vitality and creativity of civil society if it over interfered in the process of collaborative governance. Thus the state can be as much part of the problem as it is the solution to societal problems

(Pierre and Peters, 2000: 2). The state plays a leading role, making priorities and defining objectives (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 12). The state facilitating the growth of civil society associations by empowering NGOs and self-help groups to deliver social services and promote social changes is different from traditional corporatism which aimed at controlling society. Today, the central perception of government is not as a 'provider' but as an 'enabler' of a vibrant society (Kooiman, 2003).

However, the constant circumstance of power imbalance between the state and society, as a residue of past authoritarian rule, inevitably results in the tendency for social actors to over-rely on government resources in order to expand and maintain their programmes. This constant imbalance has not reduced the motivation of civil society actors to collaborate. Instead, collaboration has also been used as a growth strategy for action and as a means of developing their skills in seeking the realisation of environmental policies of their choice.

The transition of the state-society relationship arises from the process of collaborative governance. It requires the relationship to evolve from one party dominating the other (in Taiwan's recent history it has usually been the state overwhelmingly controlling social order and repressing any autonomic action), to one of greater mutual respect and reciprocity and a desire for a successful and genuine collaboration. In addition, the state *per se* is not a homogenous entity. Whilst some government agencies might work hand-in-hand with their civil partners, others continued to monopolise the policy process and produce environmentally unfriendly decisions. Thus the state plays both roles of empowering and disabling civil society. While its cooperation with civil-society actors helps the latter to expand in size, actions and confidence, its over-intervention can equally suffocate the vitality of society.

Collaborative governance does not simply refer to the devolution of the right of managing the environment from the state to civil society. While some may be concerned about the allocation of responsibility to, and accountability of, NGOs following their participation in policy implementation, in fact it also requires considerable capacity-building from both sides to develop effective

collaboration– and this takes time.

Politics is the core of the process of these collaborative governance cases. It covers a range of political factors, including the political support (either from central or local government), along with the capacity of the state to respond to public demands and to steer collaborative actions. The emergence of collaborative governance can also be seen as a coincidence when the DPP became a new regime in 2000, but it was a minority in the national congress. It was forced to seek support from, and cooperation with, its social partners in order to achieve its goals under the stress of boycott from oppositional legislators. A similar situation happened when Ro Mu Hyun came to presidential power in South Korea in 2002. He emphasised establishing citizen partnership in order to cope with the fact that his party was a minority in parliament (Kim, 2010).

However, this does not imply that civil society actors cannot initiate/achieve collaborative governance without the support of a friendly regime (here referring to the DPP), but when this is the case the process is slower and with more barriers to overcome. The success of collaborative governance was deep-rooted in a decade long of preparation and campaign by social activists in Taiwanese society. Even after 2008, since the DPP has no longer been in power in the central government, activists have strived to continue collaborative projects with local governments where the DPP is still in power but with fewer resources from the government sectors. In other words, the success of collaborative governance requires both strong social spontaneity and state capacity.

Nevertheless, another contrasting example is in the Philippines in that when the nation has a very strong civil society, which acquires an enormous amount of resources from international donors and sponsorships from UN-related organisations, it continues to have difficulties in practising collaborative governance with its own government (with or without outside aid). This leads to the problem that the state capacity will never be enhanced if it stays as an outsider in these projects of governance reforms.

To conclude, collaboration does not refer to simply devolving power and

responsibility to the social sector, instead, it requires higher and newer types of state capacity to make it successful. Political regimes, in order to make collaborative governance successful, need to be 1) ready to listen and learn the public's ideals about environmental reforms and related strategies/actions, 2) ready for a prolonged, interactive, dynamic, constant evolving situation when communicating with the public, and finally 3) ready to be persuaded and encourage participants to reach a consensus on which common ground can be the starting point for action-taking.

### *8.8.3 Return to the local*

Growing evidence shows how local environmental governance is becoming the central concern of environmental groups and leading to their decision to 'return to the local'. Many activities of social movements worldwide have been promoted by the loss of local control over the environment, natural resources and indigenous land rights (see New Internationalist, 2001). It has become evident that much presumed 'lack of care' regarding the environment at a local level arises because 'people do not feel in charge of or, indeed, do not have the power to act' (Pye-Smith and Feyerarbend, 1995:303). Environmental campaigns in Asia tend to have a local focus and react to very concrete problems in the immediate neighbourhood. This pattern is in marked contrast to the profile of the most successful western movements for whom the focus is above all on perceived problems in distant parts of the world (Kalland and Persoon, 1998). Even mainstream environmental organisations in the West are retooling themselves, shedding their centralised structure and returning to a locally based organisational model.

Evidence in this research shows that the most plausible location for launching collaborative governance is at the local level, where the cost of collaborative governance and deliberative process is reduced and a clear boundary between stakeholders can be more easily defined. Most important of all, the locals are devoted to the land where they feel they have ownership and rewards, while at the

same time the street-level government officials, who are located close to the residents, feel more obligated to work with them.

Government at a local level should be especially responsive to citizens' desires and more effective in the service delivery. In addition to the fact that the local level is the place where most collaborative actions are made possible, collaborative governance should also be contextualised based on local conditions. Whilst there are considerable opportunities that can be and are being realised through an increased role of civic society in development, civic society is no 'magic bullet' for the future. There is a need to consider what particular combinations of public, private and civic institutions are most effective in specific contexts, and in a democratic process.

### *8.8.4 Governance and sustainability*

The crisis of unsustainability is, above all else, *a crisis of governance*, according to Adger and Jordan (2009). The transition to a more sustainable world will inevitably require radical changes in the actions of all governments, such as reforms of government structure and policy priorities. In addition, it also requires significant changes to the lifestyles of individuals everywhere. They examine these necessary processes and consequences across a range of sectors, regions and other important areas of concern. It reveals that the governance of sustainable development is *politically contested*, and that it will continue to *test existing governance systems* to their limits. When government policies fail to solve problems, the typical reaction is to try to fix the policy or to tinker at the edge of the system. Very seldom do leaders or the public question the institutions that have failed, nor do they often ask whether alternative practices and structures could be more effective (Innes and Booher, 2010).

Similarly, Petschow emphasises sustainable development as closely connected to governance structures and requires the investigation of new forms of social co-operation and confrontation. In this, we must take into consideration different levels (global to local), players (state, company and civil society), control

structures (hierarchy, market and hierarchy-market joint) and also the fields of action. Governance structures for sustainable development must especially enable individuals and social learning processes, and create options for design. This applies particularly against the background of the intra- and inter-generational justice precepts of the sustainability concept (Petschow et al., 2005; Adger and Jordan, 2009).

### *8.8.5 The limits of collaborative governance*

Whilst today most government agencies and citizens in Taiwan embrace the idea of public participation, its methods and meanings remain vague and difficult to realise. The current public consulting processes have often been exaggerated as a kind of deliberative policy-making, and have also often been used as a tokenistic method to ease public discontent. In practice, the consulting processes are often manipulated by powerful stakeholders and government officials. In addition, much of environmental behaviour by the public, for example recycling, is done for pragmatic reasons rather than out of environmental awareness. Both the public and industry are still trying to find loopholes in the law and regulations if there is no effective inspection and scrutiny. This delays the progress of the nation to being green.

Despite the fact that there has been progress in Asia, including public participation in local environmental governance, there is still too much optimism about the extent that local people can influence policy choices. In addition, the participatory process is still prone to being manipulated by powerful actors (Forsyth, 2006)[132]. Therefore, these difficulties of embodying the true value of public participation, in addition to the delay in environmental improvement, have motivated both environmental organisations and grassroots groups to embrace the continuing need for direct action. The case studies in this research show that the actions they chose to undertake tended to produce visible outcomes, even though those outcomes might be limited in terms of reforming environmental policies. Collaborative actions were mostly focussed in the areas of beautifying the river

[132] As Forsyth (2006) found out in the case of the Philippines and India.

environment, rebuilding wildlife habitats and conserving rural landscapes. Although these issues are important they are not vitally critical issues inextricably linked to larger economic, social and political forces.

During the previous two decades, public pressure for protecting the river has increased to an unprecedented level. The influence of environmental activism has penetrated into government institutions, and outside social pressure against industrial expansion has grown larger, but the expansion of heavy industry has remained virtually unshakable because of government support. Some environmental activists remain sceptical as to the achievement of collaborative actions. This is due to the fact that they cannot confront the major threats to the river environment such as the expansion of high energy and water consuming industries planned by both the public sector and private enterprises, and the mining of river sand and stone. As a whole, the impact of collaborative governance in the Kaoping River basin has been limited to certain non-controversial domains.

### *8.8.6. River as a controversial issue*

The issue positionality of water and river is especially relevant to the form of collaborative governance. Rivers, given their fluidity, cross borders and meet multiple functions, and so influence the population and ecology across boundaries. The management of rivers can range from irrigation, water supply, biodiversity, flood prevention, industrial demands, fisheries to recreation facilities. Different demands regularly cause conflict between stakeholders in the same part of the river, as well as between those operating upstream and those downstream, and between different government departments and regulatory agencies. For example, in Taiwan, river jurisdiction is divided between twelve government sectors and none of them, for example, is solely responsible for deterioration in the river. The call for watershed management, widely supported in many areas of society, has been evident for more than a decade but has not been fulfilled, not least because public participation has played a minor role in river governance and the allocation

of the river's water has retained a highly politicised nature.

In comparison, although forestry resources tend to be associated with particular territories, their management can also lead to trans-boundary issues. Deforestation can, for example, lead to a semi-permanent haze over large areas as a result of slashing and burning. Timber has increasingly become a very sensitive and highly priced commodity as the trade has been integrated into global capitalism. In recent decades this has been especially true in a third world context where thousand year forests have been treated as economic resources and felled on a grand scale for agriculture, industrial development or short term economic gain.

More generally, the applicability of collaborative governance to other environmental resources, ranging from fisheries to hunting grounds to common land management, is clearly evident. That said progress on the ground depends on political context, social conditions and the nature of environmental issues and these vary from place to place ensuring that no single approach to collaborative governance fits all situations. Methods and forms have to respect local societies' own initiatives and, especially, indigenous knowledge and autonomy if they are to be effective.

### *8.8.7 Potential research agenda*

A few suggestions for future inquiry are identified based on the findings in this study. Firstly, the research demonstrates that the emergence of collaborative governance, both endogenous and exogenous, reflects changes to the macro-political situation, social awareness and the local capacity to mobilise over environmental issues whose resolution demands collaboration between state and non-state actors. It also argues that collaborative governance is a very general concept and varies in its forms and results dependent significantly on how it is initiated. The three case studies demonstrate that whilst collaborative governance has justifiably emerged as an instrumental tool for incorporating social vitality as a means of addressing environmental problems that cannot be solved through

conventional methods, a collaborative form of river governance does not guarantee success. In particular, one key issue identified is how it can retain its effectiveness over time whilst at the same time continuing to provide concrete benefits for democratic transformation in a post-authoritarian society. As societies evolve democratically, then the optimal means of collaborative governance have to do so as well. Research is thus required that develops a clear method for identifying and evaluating these changes based upon comprehensible and publicly acceptable criteria.

Secondly, political support acts as a catalyst to encourage various forms of collaborative governance but exactly which form will emerge depends upon particular mixes of political opportunities and social conditions. For example, if there is a lack of social spontaneity, political support on its own will not ensure success. Moreover, up until now, the reformative benefits of most cases of collaborative action in Taiwan have been limited to a minority of the population and to specific policy domains. Institutionalisation should promote collaborative governance over the longer term but as this research concludes, institutionalisation has to be flexible enough to accommodate local conditions and needs. Any drift towards uniform measures and regulations, often reflecting state control and bureaucratic convenience, have to be resisted and further research is required into how this can be achieved in different social and political contexts.

Thirdly, where local political support for collaborative governance declines over time because of the broader consequences of political transition or decreasing resources, the legitimacy of grassroots engagement and the standing of NGOs in governing common resources depends increasingly on public consensus. This, in turn, leads to another concern – how to ensure that the operating framework of NGOs and other grassroots groups remains consensual and collaborative and, in the case of Taiwan, does not retreat back to confrontational strategies. This is a key concern where the state retains its dominant role in deciding policies and resource distribution, and where states empower or facilitate particular actors to collaborate because this can reinforce existing power imbalances within societies. In practice, the state may do better if it steps back and allows locals or NGOs to

explore what they need and how they are going to achieve it. Then the administrative recognition, facilitation and financial support that the state provides can be utilised in more appropriate ways. This situation requires a study of how a system of bureaucracy can be open-minded enough to pursue environmental policies through a participant approach allowing the most disadvantaged groups in society to voice their concerns and be part of the action using their local knowledge.

Fourthly, collaborative governance discourages traditional corporatist politics because of its high demands on social spontaneity, public consensus, transparent democratic process and concrete governance results. More detailed research is needed to examine how the political processes of collaborative governance depress the activities of traditional corporatism. This research has identified the phenomenon of the dialectical relationship between collaborate governance and local political factions which could set each other back. But whether this kind of political rivalry relates to the once overwhelming corporatist practice of social control requires further in-depth examination. It needs to look into the possibility of whether, and the method of how, collaborative governance can transform or resist this form of rule.

While the experience of this study suggests that new forms of collaborative governance in Taiwan are at least partially successful, it is not a practice that is easy to transpose to other developing countries. The key is definitely not related to economic success as the case of indigenous River Enclosure explained. The Taiwanese approach to collaborative governance has been dependent upon a particular degree of democratisation and social autonomy since the 1990s. These conditions are absent in many developing countries. This is not to underestimate the strength of civil societies in developing countries but to note the importance of reforming initiatives being initiated in local societies rather than being dependent upon outside support. The key need is to reinforce local consensus and solidarity to act, which in turn engages with the development of democracy. Whilst collaborative governance, in principle, can be applied generally to solve conflicts over natural resources, it is not an easier approach to effect than traditional hierarchical ruling. It can be time consuming and

exhausting, and sometimes participants lose their initial enthusiasm as time goes by. Moreover, as this study reveals, water controversies and local differentiation encourage different forms of collaboration; no single solution is a good form of solution. Collaboration has to reflect local circumstances and develop respect for indigenous autonomy and knowledge.

# POSTSCRIPT

The writing of this thesis has lasted five years. During this time, I have continued as a volunteer engaging in various environmental projects in the Kaoping River basin. This has allowed me to continue observing the progress of collaborative environmental governance in Taiwan and to reflect on my own thesis findings.

*Presidential power transfer in 2008*

The thesis has emphasised the importance of the attitude and role of the government in influencing the growth of collaborative governance. The DPP (Democratic Progressive Party), after coming into office in 2000, has assisted the emergence of collaborative governance as part of a more robust civil society. However, in 20 May 2008, Taiwan experienced a presidential power transfer. The KMT (Kuomintang), which had ruled Taiwan for a half century prior to 2000, regained power after eight years of DPP rule. This power transfer has affected the fortunes of some endogenous cases of governance reform that were launched because of the close cooperation between the DPP and autonomous NGOs. The KMT regime has a history of taking unfriendly environmental positions, triggering a new outburst of local environmental action against water resource development, highway construction and industrial development on the wetlands, putting back the goals of long-term sustainable development and ecological conservation. That said, the presidential power transfer has not totally eliminated the process of collaborative governance in some of the cases in this study. This is due to the fact that the field sites, located in southern local counties and cities, remained under the political control of the DPP and locally rooted social power has continued to exert authority.

*Continuous follow-up*

After formal data collection was completed in 2007, I have continued my involvement in the environmental movement in southern Taiwan. These actions have included attending deliberative meetings of several river restoration projects

and helping to alleviate the aftermath of Typhoon Morakot. The latter included assisting disaster victims and mountain village rebuilding. Additionally, I have been participating in a government sponsored project writing an environmental history of Pingtung County, which is part of my field work site. During the work, I met several important interviewees (both social actors and decision makers) in the thesis research and have included some of their continuing ideas about the development of collaborative governance in the final version of the thesis.

*Typhoon Morakot and community rebuilding*

On August 8th, 2009, Taiwan encountered a severe disaster- Typhoon Morakot. The area mainly affected was the Kaoping River basin. Landslides brought by the typhoon resulted in 700 people being buried alive and thousands of villagers losing their homes. Almost every case in this study, no matter whether it is Water Defence, Riverfront Adoption or River Enclosure, was more or less affected by the influence of Typhoon Morakot. The landslides tremendously changed the landscape of the river. For example, the deepest sediment in the river increased by 42 metres. The river water became so muddy that it caused the water supply for Kaohsiung City to stop for one week. In fact, the level of turbidity of the river water reached a historical high. Many indigenous villages in the mountain area were completely demolished so they needed to opt for relocation, if they were not forced to leave. This aroused a tremendous dispute over several controversial issues of environmental justice, including whether the government had the power to force mountain villagers to leave and how the indigenous could survive culturally, economically and socially once uprooted from their home villages. Another controversial issue of relocating indigenous villagers was that most of the decision-making was monopolised by government officials, under the KMT regime, rather than through a deliberative and participatory process.

Among the devastated tribal villages, Dashe and Koushe, which were both case examples of River Enclosure, illustrated very different processes when dealing with the typhoon aftermath. Koushe totally halted its River Enclosure practice and tourists stopped coming and they were pessimistic about their ability to do anything to reverse the damage caused by the landslides. On the other hand,

Dashe villagers successfully saved everyone in the village, which was more severely stricken, and reached a prompt consensus, making a clear plea for relocation collectively in order to start their new life and continue their culture on government owned farmland. In comparison, another relocation case, Houcha, which was also one village in the anti-dam campaign but not included in this research, lasted two years without making a clear decision from either the village itself and the government until Typhoon Morakot made other options impossible other than relocation. The key differences between these villages, which had different responses to the aftermath of a natural disaster, might be the level of villagers' consolidation and the building of social capital during the processes of environmental and community actions.

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