A Non-Intellectualist Account of Epicurean Emotions

Margaret Róisín Hampson

UCL

MPhil Stud

I, Margaret Róisín Hampson confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Abstract

This thesis argues against the orthodox, intellectualist interpretation of Epicurean emotions, in favour of what I call an *Appearances View*. The intellectualist interpretation takes the Epicurean fragments to suggest that emotions are essentially based in beliefs or judgements and that it is sufficient to alter an emotion by altering the relevant belief(s). I argue, however, that this interpretation is not decisive and at best only weakly supported by the texts. Further, I believe that the reading faces conceptual and textual problems that it cannot adequately respond to, and we thus have reason to seek an alternative.

To develop an alternative interpretation, I consider Aristotle's discussion of habituation and virtue in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, for insight into how Epicurus might understand the notion of 'accustoming' and what model of emotion must be assumed if we think that emotional dispositions can be altered through a process of habituation. I argue that the *Rhetoric* and the *Ethics* strongly suggest an *Appearances View* of emotion, in which emotion is constituted by a feeling of pleasure or pain, caused by an appearance (*phantasia*) of its intentional object. On this view, emotion is cognitive and intentional but not intellectual.

I then explore how this model might be applied to the Epicurean fragments, drawing on Epicurus' own account of *phantasia* to develop an *Epicurean Appearances View*. I show that both Epicurus' physics and ethical writings can support this reading, and that the account can deal with those cases presented against the intellectualist account, thus giving us reason to prefer it. Finally, I consider how this account might be applied to the case of our fear of death, and suggest that changing the appearance of death and thus removing our fear requires that we *live* a good, Epicurean life and in this way achieve *ataraxia*.

Contents

List of Abbreviations

DA	Aristotle, *De Anima*
DL	Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*
DRN	Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*
Ep. Hed.	Epicurus, *Letter to Herodotus*
Ep. Men.	Epicurus, *Letter to Menoceus*
Ep. Pyth.	Epicurus, *Letter to Pythocles*
KD	Epicurus, *Kyrai Doxai*
LS	AA.Long & D.N Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol.1*
M	Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians*
NE	Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*
Rhet.	Aristotle, *Rhetoric*
VS	Epicurus, *Vatican Sayings*

Introduction
Ataraxia and Emotion

0.1.   The Epicurean *Telos*

Like many Hellenistic philosophers, Epicurus saw the practice of Philosophy not as an intellectual exercise, but as an art of living. Ethics, in particular, is characterised not as a search for moral truths, but as "about things worth choosing and avoiding and about ways of life and about the goal of life" (*DL* X.30); it is a deeply practical exercise, through which the philosopher aims to lead a good or *eudaimon* life. As Sextus Empiricus recounts: "Philosophy is an activity which by arguments and discussions brings about the happy life" (*M* 11.169) and Epicurus believed that if the principles formulated in his ethical writings were observed, then his followers could live a divine life on earth.[1]

What distinguishes the Epicureans from other Hellenistic schools, however, is their conception of the state of happiness towards which we aim. Epicurus equates happiness with pleasure, asserting that:

"pleasure is the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognise pleasure as the good which is primary and congenital; from it we begin every choice and avoidance, and we come back to it, using the feeling as the yardstick for judging every good thing" (*Ep. Men.* 128).

But in claiming that pleasure is the goal of human life he does not mean the 'pleasures of the profligate' or the 'pleasures of consumption', but rather "the lack of pain in the body and disturbance in the soul" (*Ep. Men.* 131). Epicurus' conception of happiness as pleasure is portrayed not as a life of conventional hedonism[2], but as a state of psychological and physical well-being, described negatively as the absence of mental disturbance (*ataraxia*) and physical pain (*aponia*). On Epicurus' view, there is no middle state between pleasure and pain, and accordingly absence of pain is the highest pleasure, and the goal of human life.

Given his combined conception of (i) philosophy as the art of living, (ii) the good life as the life of pleasure, and (iii) pleasure as absence of pain, Epicurus' ethical writings

---

[1] Cf. *Ep. Men.* 135.
[2] Understood as indulgence, profligacy and self-gratification.

are deeply concerned with the alleviation of suffering, as a means of aiding his students to lead a *eudaimon* life. "Empty are the words of that philosopher", writes Epicurus, "who offers therapy for no human suffering. For just as there is no use in medical expertise if it does not give therapy for bodily diseases, so too there is no use in philosophy if it does not expel the suffering of the soul" (*LS* 25C). Much of Epicurus' writing, then, is directed towards the removal of obstacles to the states of *ataraxia* and *aponia*, identifying the major sources of mental disturbance and physical pain and attempting to remedy these.

0.2.   Achieving *Ataraxia*

To achieve *aponia*, Epicurus recommends that we cultivate desires for a simple and inexpensive diet, which will be easily satiable, and prevent us from experiencing unnecessary bodily pain[3] but it is the task of achieving *ataraxia* that receives the most attention, for the greatest pains are in fact those deriving from mental disturbance.[4] The principal obstacle to achieving *ataraxia* is anxiety. And the two principal sources of anxiety are our fears of the gods and of death:

 "…the greatest anxiety of the human mind arises through the belief that the heavenly bodies are blessed and indestructible, and that at the same time they have volitions and actions and causality inconsistent with this belief; and through expecting or apprehending some everlasting evil, either because of the myths, or because we are in dread of the mere insensibility of death." (*Ep. Hed.* 81).

As such, the eradication of these fears is central to Epicurus' ethical project, and feeling the right way about death and the gods is essential to living a good life.

The crucial point is that our fears of death and the gods are groundless, for neither present the harm that may be said to warrant a fearful response. Epicurus offers a battery of arguments to show that a supposition of harm is incorrect, focusing in particular on our fear of death[5] which he recognises as the more deep-seated and

---

[3] cf. *KD* 29.

[4] Cicero, *De Fin.* 1.55. Indeed, even when discussing bodily pains, Epicurus claims that "what is insatiable is not the stomach… but the false opinion concerning its unlimited pain" (*VS* 59).

[5] I will speak throughout of 'the fear of death', for the purpose of space. As Warren (2004), p.3.-4, rightly points out, however, this is at best a simplification, for we can distinguish at least four different fears (namely: The fear of being dead; The fear that one will die or that one's life is going to end; The fear of premature death; The fear of the process of dying).

difficult to remove.[6] A brief articulation of one of these arguments can be found at *KD* 2 where Epicurus claims that "Death is nothing to us; for what is dispersed does not perceive, and what does not perceive is nothing to us". A fuller explanation is offered at *Ep. Men.* 124-5, in which Epicurus begins by explaining that "all good and evil lie in sensation", and that death is the "absence of sensation". That death is the absence of sensation is an upshot of the Epicurean conception of the soul, and their conclusion that the soul cannot survive the body's death.[7] From these premises, Epicurus infers that there can be nothing good or bad for one who is dead, and thus the state of being dead cannot be bad either. In terms of our fear, if something is not bad when it is present, then fear of its future presence has no rational ground. We have no rational ground for fearing our future state of being dead.

Epicurus' arguments in *KD* and *Ep. Men.* are supplemented by Lucretius in *DRN III,* with an argument based on the assumed symmetry between the past and future, in which he seeks to show that just as we felt no pain at events prior to our birth, nor will we feel pain after our death (832-42). Appended to this are two statements which bolster the view that in death, since we cease to exist, there can be no subject of harm. The first statement (843-6) reinforces the notion that a subject is the *unity* of body and soul, and thus maintains that even if the soul *were* to have sensation after being torn from the body, this would be nothing to us "who are constituted by the *conjunction* of body and spirit". The second (847-51) emphasises further that it will not be *us* that are affected once the continuity of memory has been interrupted by the dispersal of our matter.[8] In summary: we must exist in order to experience pain, and since death deprives us of existence, there can be no experience of pain; a dead person feels no more pain than one who was never born. Further arguments appear at *DRN* III.966 and 1087, showing firstly that the horrific images of hell that can be a basis of our fear are in fact a projection of terrors of this life, and secondly that we should not wish to live longer on the assumption that we would be dead for a shorter period of time, since the period of non-existence will in fact always remain the same.

---

[6] Cf. Philodemus, *De Dis,* I.XXIV.20-34.
[7] Cf. *LS* 14F-H. As Long and Sedley explain: "Sensation is the soul's sphere of responsibility, but it is the body that …provides a suitable locus for the activity. And once this has happened… sensation becomes a joint activity of soul and body", pp. 71-72.
[8] Cf. Furley (1986), p77.

Much scholarship has been devoted to assessing these arguments, seeking to determine whether the Epicureans do show our fear of death to be groundless. But the merit of Epicurus' philosophy cannot be determined by the soundness of his arguments alone. Given Epicurus' own conception of his philosophy as directed towards the alleviation of human suffering, the ultimate success of his philosophy should be judged by its ability to *remove* our anxiety and fears, and with that our mental disturbance. An important question, then, is how Epicurus intends his philosophy to achieve this and further scholarship has been devoted to understanding the nature of Epicurean emotional therapy[9]. But just as a doctor determining a course of treatment for a patient must understand the nature of the disease, so too must we understand the nature of fear to know how best to treat it. We need an account of the nature of the *pathē,* to understand how they may be suitably addressed and thus how we can achieve *ataraxia*.[10]

Given the nature of the Epicurean *telos* then, it is incumbent upon the school to provide an account of what an emotion is. The difficulty is that they do not – or such an account does not remain in the fragments[11]; unlike the surviving Stoic works, the Epicurean texts contain no theory of emotion.[12] Philodemus' *On Anger* remains the only substantial treatise by an Epicurean about an emotion, but this concerns just one emotion and does not offer the level of conceptual analysis that is found in the likes of Chrysippus. To claim, however, that Epicurus either did not have a theory or that it has been lost does not circumvent our need for one. So the puzzle that faces contemporary readers of Epicurus is: given the centrality of an account of emotion to the understanding and achievement of the Epicurean *telos* and the lack of such an account in the extant works, what kind of view can we plausibly attribute to him?

0.3.   Some Points on Methodology

The account of emotion most commonly attributed to the Epicureans is intellectualist, and in Chapter One I argue against this as an interpretation of the

---

[9] By 'emotional therapy' I mean the means by which one seeks to alter an emotional state or disposition. See in particular Nussbaum (1994), Tsouna (2007), (2009).

[10] Indeed, it is not only fear, but other emotions such as anger, grief and envy that prevent us attaining tranquillity. These not only pose a threat to achieving *ataraxia*, but their bodily aspects or accompaniments may also inhibit *aponia*.

[11] See Mansfield (2005), p5 and Hutchinson (1994), p.xiii-xiv on the state of the primary sources.

[12] Cf. Annas (1989).

fragments. The extant writings are underdetermined and the intellectualist interpretation is at best only weakly supported by the texts and therefore not decisive. Further to that, however, I argue that the account also faces conceptual and interpretive problems which give us reason to consider an alternative. My aim is not to *refute* the intellectualist interpretation, but I hope to show that there are textual reasons to think that the interpretation is problematic, and that the responses the intellectualist may offer are either unlikely or burden them with further explanatory tasks. In the following chapters I consider what alternative account of emotion and its therapy may be compatible with Epicurus' remarks on achieving *ataraxia*, and argue that since this view can be supported by the texts and does not face those problems encountered by the intellectualist, we have reason to prefer it.

Some points on method. Firstly, whilst I wish to challenge one and propose an alternative interpretation of Epicurus' understanding of emotion, this thesis will focus almost entirely on Epicurus' remarks on fear or more specifically, the fear of death. There are a number of reasons for this restriction: space is one, as is the limited reference to other emotions in the Epicurean corpus – though this does not preclude us from making reference to remarks on other emotions where they do appear. But there is a further principled reason for prioritising the fear of death in our study, and that is its relation to achieving the *telos* as described above. The fear of death is our greatest obstacle to achieving *ataraxia* and removing this fear is thus a priority for any Epicurean teacher or student. Now it might be argued that we cannot infer a general theory of emotion by considering only one particular emotion; what holds for the fear of death may not hold for all other emotions. Perhaps. But for the purposes of this thesis I shall assume our findings generalise; it is a further project to *prove* that this is indeed the case (or equally, to show why it is not).

Secondly, whilst our analysis will focus largely on Epicurus' own remarks in his letters or reported sayings, I will look also to later Epicureans such as Lucretius or Philodemus (and the reports of Epicurean philosophy in Diogenes Laertius or Diogenes of Oenoanda) for insight or elaboration. Given the limited resources we have, heavily restricting our sources might be to our detriment. But my interest is also with the philosophy and teachings of the Epicurean school, rather than the strict

views of a single philosopher. And I will assume that the later Epicureans offer a faithful interpretation of this philosophy.[13]

Finally, in developing an Epicurean account of emotion, I wish to consider what is conceptually plausible but also plausible within the history of ideas. There is a temptation to look to contemporary theories of emotion, and upon discovering a possible model, to apply this to the Epicurean works. But whilst reference to contemporary theories or distinctions can of course be useful, there is also a danger in being too anachronistic. In attempting to discover an alternative model of emotion and its therapy I will restrict my search to accounts of emotion in Ancient thought; thus seeking not only a conceptual *model* for the Epicurean theory, but an account that Epicurus (and his followers) may have been aware of, and possibly from which their conception may have grown. In proceeding this way, we might pave the way to develop a fuller theory of Epicurean emotion, accounting not only for its nature on a conceptual level, but for the genesis of the Epicurean conception and the context in which it arose. This further task goes beyond the remit of this thesis, but is a direction in which the thought may be developed. My concern in the following chapters is to present an account of emotion and its therapy which could plausibly be attributed to Epicurus, and is at least worthy of consideration alongside the intellectualist orthodoxy.

The explicit aim of this thesis, then, is to present an account of emotion compatible with Epicurus' remarks on fear, but also an account of how we can alter our emotional states and thereby achieve the state of *ataraxia* that is the aim of Epicurean philosophy. But I hope there will be a further consequence of the thesis, and that is for how we regard the nature of Epicurean philosophy as a whole. Most commentators rightly stress its practical orientation and aspiration to relieve human suffering. But practical as the aim is, it is nevertheless supposed to proceed by intellectual means. Epicurus proposes certain doctrines, the student comprehends these and *ataraxia* is enabled through a process of ratiocination. On the view I will suggest, however, I believe Epicurean philosophy will come out as even more deeply practical. I will suggest not simply that Epicurus will be involved in the therapeutic process (that, he will), but that Epicurean philosophy must be embodied and its aims are achieved by *living* the Epicurean life.

---

[13] For stylistic purposes, however, I may simply refer to 'Epicurus' rather than the 'Epicurean school', but this should not necessarily be taken as attributing explicit claims to the historical figure.

Chapter 1
Against an Intellectualist Interpretation

1.1.   Introduction

The importance of emotion in Epicurean ethics is recognised by most commentators, but reference to the Epicurean view of emotion typically surfaces in the context of other discussions – of desire, therapeutic strategies or mortality, say – and is rarely subjected to individual or critical treatment. The orthodox, intellectualist reading is more often than not simply assumed, but explicit reference to the interpretation *is* made for example by Warren (2004, 2009), whose exposition of the thesis thus serves as a useful starting point for presenting the view.[14]

In this chapter I present this intellectualist reading of Epicurean emotions and begin §1.2 by setting out the interpretation, using Warren's remarks as a point of reference. I will then proceed to explain why we should resist interpreting the Epicureans in this way. In the first instance, the texts are underdetermined and there is at least room to consider an alternative reading. More so, however, I believe the view faces both conceptual and textual difficulties which give us reason for seeking such an alternative. In §1.3 I will present a recent position that appears to move away from the orthodox reading, but I will argue that despite some promising suggestions, it nevertheless reduces to the intellectualist orthodoxy.

This negative discussion, however, does have positive results as it sets us some conditions that an alternative account will need to satisfy and points us towards the kind of alternative we might want to investigate: a non-intellectualist interpretation of Epicurean emotion. Indeed, I will argue that if this interpretation can satisfy those conditions that the intellectualist account fails to meet, then we have reason to prefer this alternative to the orthodox reading. .

---

[14] Of course, Warren's remarks also arise in the context of another discussion, namely Epicurus' views on death, and are not intended as a fully developed 'theory' of the Epicurean view of emotion; but they can serve as a guide. For other advocates of the intellectualist interpretation see for example: Konstan (2009), p.202; Nussbaum (1994), esp. p.113-4; Sanders (2008), p.265-6, (2011), p.213. Sorabji (2000), p.26-7. Tsouna (2007), p. 40-3.

1.2.   An Intellectualist Interpretation

Epicurus' frequent repetition of arguments for the irrationality of fearing death, combined with his claim that "philosophy is an activity which *by arguments and discussions brings about the happy life*" (*M* 11.169) has led most commentators to suggest that Epicurus' arguments themselves are intended directly to remove our fear of death. Epicurus seeks by means of argumentation to remove the false beliefs which, it is supposed, are the source of our fears and in doing so, the very fears that are the cause of our mental disturbance. "The enterprise of moral inquiry and improvement is an intellectual one"[15], claims Warren, who explains the Epicurean conviction that rational argument and persuasion will remove our fear of death as a consequence of their "intellectualist stance on the emotions, which they tend to analyse as based in value judgements"[16]. On this view, emotions have as their content beliefs or judgements about the world, and are analysed in terms of these judgements, which are *in some important way* the basis of emotion. Since emotions have as their basis particular beliefs or judgements, it is sufficient, claims the intellectualist, to alter an emotion by altering the relevant belief.

In support of this interpretation, certain commentators look to *Ep. Hed.* 81, where Epicurus explains that the greatest anxiety:

"arises through the belief that the heavenly bodies are blessed and indestructible, and that at the same time they have volitions and actions and causality inconsistent with this belief; and though expecting or apprehending some everlasting evil, either because of the myths or because we are in dread of the mere insensibility of death, as if it had to do with us; and through being reduced to this state not by conviction but by a certain irrational perversity, so that, if men do not set bounds to their terror, they endure as much or even more intense anxiety than the man whose views on these matters are quite vague"[17].

Our fear of death arises from the belief that some everlasting evil awaits us when we die, be that some mythical punishment or simply the evil of insensibility. Of course, as Warren points out "when we speak of *the* fear of death, …we are at best guilty of a

---

[15] Warren (2004), p7.

[16] Ibid., p220.

[17] "Ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ὅλως ἅπασιν ἐκεῖνο δεῖ κατανοεῖν, ὅτι τάραχος ὁ κυριώτατος ταῖς ἀνθρωπίναις ψυχαῖς γίνεται ἐν τῷ ταὐτά τε μακάρια δοξάζειν <εἶναι> καὶ ἄφθαρτα, καὶ ὑπεναντίας ἔχειν τούτῳ βουλήσεις ἅμα καὶ πράξεις καὶ αἰτίας, καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰώνιόν τι δεινὸν ἀεὶ προσδοκᾶν ἢ ὑποπτεύειν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους εἴ τε καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀναισθησίαν τὴν ἐν τῷ τεθνάναι φοβουμένους ὥσπερ οὖσαν κατ᾽ αὐτούς, καὶ ἐν τῷ μὴ δόξαις ταῦτα πάσχειν ἀλλ᾽ ἀλόγῳ γέ τινι παραστάσει, ὅθεν μὴ ὁρίζοντας τὸ δεινὸν τὴν ἴσην ἢ καὶ ἐπιτεταμένην ταραχὴν λαμβάνειν τῷ εἰκαίως δοξάζοντι ταῦτα."

simplification or of shorthand"[18], for there are in fact a number of fears associated with death individuated, on his view, by their underlying beliefs as to the way in which death is a harm. This, then, is one feature of the intellectualist view: emotions are individuated not by some experiential quality, but rather by the beliefs that are their basis; it is the belief that one has been slighted that distinguishes anger from fear say, rather than a specific *feeling* of anger.

In what way might beliefs or judgments be the *basis* of emotion? Warren, for example, claims that for Epicurus "value judgements are at least *necessary conditions* of emotions", but states also that "fears of death are *caused by* various judgments of the form: 'it is bad that X'"[19], implying that beliefs are causal factors. Other proponents of an intellectualist reading simply stress that belief is an *essential element* of emotion.[20] We should note at the outset the difference between this view and that of the Stoic Chrysippus, for the Stoic claim is stronger. For Chrysippus, emotions *are* value judgements, and "every instance of emotion i*s in its very essence* a judgement concerning some present or potential state of affairs"[21]. Our fear of death, on the Stoic view, not only *implies* a certain judgement about death (that it is a bad thing, say) but *is* a judgement that death is a bad thing. Intellectualist readings of the Epicureans do not make this identity claim, and most allow that for Epicurus emotions also have affective or non-cognitive aspects. [22] These, however, are dependent on the judgements involved in the emotion, and in the case of the irrational fear of death, result from "a cognitive fault of either ignorance or misapprehension"[23].

How committed any intellectualist interpretation is to defending a claim as to the *precise* role of belief a constituent, condition or causal factor is open to question; the important point for this reading is that, whatever its role, belief is at least necessary for an emotion, and furthermore, altering the relevant belief is sufficient to alter one's emotional state. "The intellectualist assumption is crucial", writes Warren, "because it justifies the Epicurean conviction that the fear of death, since it is based on false value judgements, can be exposed and eradicated by means of rational

---

[18] Warren (2004), p.4.
[19] Ibid. p.220.
[20] Cf. Sanders (2011), p.213. Sanders (2008) describes judgements as "both constituents and causes of emotions", p.365.
[21] Graver (2007), p.4.
[22] Cf. Gill (2010), p.155; Tsouna (2009), p.251-2; Warren (2009). p.235.
[23] Warren (2009), p.235.

argument"[24]. Of course, this then places enormous pressure on the strength of the various arguments levelled against the fear of death, for if they turn out to be weak or fallacious, then Epicurus' ethical project looks set to fail.[25] The crucial assumption however, is that argumentation is *the right sort of thing* to affect and eradicate our fears, and Epicurus must simply persuade us of his conclusion.

1.2.1. *The Intellectualist Interpretation is Not Decisive*

The question I am concerned with is whether this is the account of emotion and emotional therapy that we should be attributing to the Epicureans. The Epicurean texts, being fragmentary, are underdetermined and I contend that there is room to develop an alternative account. Note, first, that the 'intellectualist assumption' that Warren speaks of is indeed an *assumption*. Epicurus makes no *explicit* claim as to the nature of emotion, and aside from the passage from *Ep. Hed.* quoted above, little other mention is made of the role of belief in emotion. Indeed, whilst that passage does acknowledge that certain (false) beliefs may be associated with the fears there described – in particular, our fear of the Gods – the disjunction "though expecting (προσδοκαν) *or* apprehending (ὑποπτεύειν)" in the second clause suggests that whilst a doxastic state *may* be the source of the emotion, the preceding mental state might instead be a state of *upopteuein* (translated by Bailey as 'imagining'). Further, the insistence that we are "reduced to this state not by conviction" suggests that we are misplacing the stress in emphasising the role of belief in the passage.

Secondly, as Warren and others acknowledge, the texts contain equal reference to the affective or physiological elements importantly associated with emotion - such as Philodemus' description of anger as "a kindling, swelling, irritation and indignation" (*On Anger,* VIII.20) – and an interpretation that takes *these* fragments as its starting point might claim they suggest something closer to a non-cognitive or 'feeling' theory of emotion[26], rather than that emotions are essentially intellectual.

---

[24] Warren (2004), p.7-8.
[25] Cf. Warren (2004), p.7.
[26] On this view, emotions are simply a class of feelings, individuated not by the content of some cognition but by their experiential qualities. A prominent advocate of this view is James (1884), according to whom emotions are feelings that record physiological changes resulting from a stimulus. I believe that such an interpretation of the Epicureans, however, would be difficult to construct, and I do not make any such attempt in this thesis.

Many interpreters would acknowledge of course that *explicit* evidence for an account of emotion is certainly lacking, but argue instead that the Epicurean conception of emotion can be derived from the nature of the emotional therapy they offer (by considering what account of emotion must be assumed for that therapy to be *required* and *effective*). Since Epicurus offers *intellectual* therapy in the form of argumentation, the intellectualist might contend, his target must also be intellectual in nature. But this still goes too quickly. To argue *decisively* for their view, the intellectualist would need to show that for Epicurus argumentation is *sufficient* to alter an emotional state, since the target of argumentation is surely belief, and this would then suggest that a change in belief is indeed sufficient for a change in emotion. But even proponents of the intellectualist reading acknowledge there is evidence that implies *argumentation alone* cannot achieve the desired results, and we might therefore question what reason there is for assuming an intellectualist interpretation, given that it is not strongly supported by the texts. Further, since Epicurus does not make any explicit claims as to the nature of the therapy he offers, we might also question the intellectualist assumption that Epicurean therapy is intellectual at all. Epicurus does, of course, present arguments that demonstrate the irrationality of our fear, but these may not necessarily be aimed at directly altering our emotional states, and in fact perform some alternative function.[27]

The above points indicate that the intellectualist reading is not as well supported by the texts as is thought, but in the following sections I hope to make a stronger claim and will argue that there is reason, both conceptual and textual, to think that altering the relevant belief (or beliefs) is not sufficient to alter the emotional state and that the intellectualist interpretation is mistaken.

1.2.2. *Infant, Animal and Recalcitrant Emotions*

There are at least two *prima facie* problems for any intellectualist theory of the emotion, and they lie in accounting for cases of 'recalcitrant' emotions and the emotions of infants and animals. The difficulties in each case are related and concern how to explain the presence of an emotion in the absence of the allegedly requisite judgement. Let us begin with infant and animal emotions which, it is argued, resist being understood as consisting in the judgements or beliefs that the intellectualist

---

[27] I shall give an alternative explanation of the role of Epicurus' arguments in Chapter Three.

view identifies as essential for emotion. In contemporary philosophy of emotion the problem is typically put as follows: judgements or beliefs are states of mind that imply the acceptance of propositions. As such, to be capable of experiencing emotion requires that one is capable in general of grasping and affirming propositions – but beasts never acquire this ability and infants have yet to do so. An ancient Greek version of the objection would appeal rather to the necessity of a rational faculty for judgement or belief, and point to its absence in animals and its underdevelopment in infants.[28] In either case, an intellectualist theory of emotion appears unable to account for their emotional states.

A response open to intellectualist theorists is to deny that animals and infants ever experience emotion, and this indeed was the tactic employed by the Stoics. But this course was not pursued by the Epicureans, and cannot be pursued either by defenders of the intellectualist interpretation. For in *DNR* III Lucretius explicitly describes the emotions experienced by various animals, such as lions who "growl and roar until they burst their bellies, since they are unable to repress their tempestuous rage" (III.298-9). At various points in the poem Lucretius also refers to the emotions of children (e.g. II.55-8), who it is acknowledged possess a "feeble intellect" (III.447-51) and Epicurus maintains live "naturally and without reason" (*Ep Men.* 137). The intellectualist must either attribute an inconsistency to Epicurus or find some explanation of how such passages are compatible with the reading they offer.

Consideration of our 'pre-rational' emotions in fact draws our attention to a further textual obstacle encountered by the intellectualist, which gives us reason to consider what alternative theory might be compatible; that is the Epicurean doctrine of 'original constitution'. In *On Nature* 25, Epicurus considers three causal factors that are involved in our behaviour, namely (i) our original constitution, (ii) the environment and (iii) us ourselves. By our 'original constitution' Epicurus means the package of soul atoms we are born with, which differ from person to person. All minds are equal at birth, insofar as we all pursue pleasure and avoid pain, but differ in that we have different dispositions for experiencing certain emotions and for behaving accordingly. Lucretius explains from *DRN* III.279 how the various atomic constitutions give rise to various emotions:

---

[28] See for example Aristotle, *DA* III.3 428a.

"The mind contains as well the element of heat, which it displays when it seethes with anger and fire flashes fiercely from the eyes. It also contains an abundance of that chill breath, the attendant of fear, which provokes shuddering in the limbs and makes the frame tremble. It contains too that still, calm air, which is in evidence when the breast is tranquil and the countenance unclouded."

The passage seems to suggest that it is our original constitution that is the crucial determining factor in the genesis of our emotions, and certainly does not describe these emotions in any intellectual terms.[29] The presence of this explanation both under-motivates and undermines the intellectualist reading.

The second *prima facie* problem for an intellectualist account is posed by cases of 'recalcitrant' emotions. Such emotions are those which persist despite being in recognised conflict with the subject's better beliefs, such as a fear of spiders, despite the knowledge that spiders are not harmful. The case that an intellectualist theory has to answer is: if a particular belief is essential for an emotion, why, when that belief is not present, does the emotion nonetheless persist? The problem of recalcitrant emotions is typically pressed against the Stoic theory, which in claiming an identity relation between emotions and judgements implies that either we can simultaneously make contradictory judgements or that cases of recalcitrant emotions are in fact impossible. A fear of spiders on the Stoic view involves – or rather *is* – the judgement that 'spiders are harmful'; but we also know that 'spiders are not harmful', and yet for many the fear still persists. In identifying an emotion as a judgement, the contradiction in judgements (in this case, that X is harmful and to be feared, and that X is not harmful, and not to be feared) is immediately apparent. If one has the emotion of fear, then one has *at that very moment* the judgement that X is harmful.

But is this only a problem for the Stoic view, where an identity relation between emotions and beliefs is claimed? Whilst intellectualist interpretations of Epicurus do not claim the *identity* of judgements and emotions, it still remains that if it is sufficient to alter an emotion by altering the relevant belief, then once one's original judgement has been succeeded by a new contradictory judgement, the emotion should no longer persist. The difficulty of recalcitrant emotions for an intellectualist account is

---

[29] Those who nevertheless stress the belief basis of emotions, explain that our original constitution produces different *dispositions* for experiencing certain emotions, but not those emotions themselves (Cf. Bobzein (2006), p.214.) Yet the passage continues to describe how these emotions are *displayed* in animals, indicating that an atomic constitution produces not simply a disposition towards emotion, but the emotion itself (and for a lion this cannot be based on belief).

recognised by Warren, who notes that the story of Axiochus[30] would be a counter-example to the view that if one has heard the relevant arguments designed to remove the belief that X is bad, that the related fears will also be removed. Axiochus, having heard all the relevant arguments, is fearless of death - but when 'up against the fearful thing', is terrified. "Perhaps therefore", Warren reflects, "the fear of death is not so amenable to rational introspection and criticism"[31].

On the principle of charity, it is desirable that we develop a reading of Epicurean emotions that is not faced with such an obvious difficulty, or at least has the resources to easily explain recalcitrant emotions. It is a difficulty that the Stoics must face head on, but since the Epicurean texts are underdetermined, we have room to consider an alternative to the intellectualist account, and reason for preferring one. A stronger case against the intellectualist picture, however, would be to show that the Epicureans themselves recognised such cases of recalcitrant emotions, and could thus be thought to have incorporated such considerations in the formulation of their account. I believe there is textual evidence that they recognised the recalcitrant nature of certain emotions and, as I indicated in §1.2.1, that they saw the limitations of philosophical argument as a means of fully vanquishing these.

1.2.3. *Accustoming Ourselves*

There is certainly evidence that the Epicureans recognised the *difficulty* involved in removing certain emotions, in particular, our fear of death. Philodemus claims that our fear of death is harder to cure than our fear of the gods:

"because fully ridding oneself of a latent, hidden, source of anxiety is difficult and it is not possible to throw off such weighty foolishness. Indeed even wise words are unable to take away these people's wounds." (*De Dis*, I.XXIV.20-34).

Even having heard *wise words*, our fear of death remains. In this case, it may be pointed out that our beliefs are 'latent and unarticulated' and have to be identified and brought to attention before any process of removal can take place.[32] Similarly, Lucretius describes his search for verses which will "enable [him] to light the way

---

[30] Of the pseudo-Platonic dialogue the *Axiochus*. See Furley (1986) for a discussion of the similarities between the *Axiochus* and Lucretius.
[31] Warren (2004), p220.
[32] Warren (2009), p.237.

brightly for your mind and thus help you to see right to the heart of hidden things" (*DRN* I.144) indicating that he also recognised the initial need to illuminate our veiled beliefs. Warren believes, of the Philodemus passage, that once our beliefs have been identified, the Epicurean arguments will be effective. But Philodemus' claim that "even wise words are unable to take away these people's wounds" does indicate a certain doubt as to the full healing power of philosophical argumentation.

A further acknowledgement of the recalcitrant nature of our fear of death can be found in Lucretius *DRN* III 870-9, where he alludes to the persistence of our fear of death, even when the continuation of feeling after death has been denied. Lucretius notes that like Axiochus - who had heard all the relevant arguments, professed not to fear death, but was nonetheless fearful as his end drew near - there are those who claim not to believe in a torturous afterlife, but who are nonetheless pricked by fear. We should notice, however, that Lucretius is denying that such people do in fact "grant the conclusion they profess to grant, [and] the premise from which it is derived", suggesting that these new beliefs have not in fact been adopted.[33] The passage then does appear to recognise the recalcitrance of fear, but is still compatible with an intellectualist reading of the emotions. Removing fear may be difficult, but this difficulty lies in fully convincing people of the truths Epicurus and Lucretius profess. The problem is still intellectual. There is a further piece of evidence, however, suggesting a stronger Epicurean doubt about the sufficiency of argumentation as a means of altering our emotions, and I believe this does have force against the intellectualist view.

At *Ep. Men.* 124 Epicurus instructs: "*accustom* yourself to hold that death is nothing to us"[34] and it is this phrase that I suggest casts doubt on a purely intellectualist reading. The implication of an intellectualist account is that if we have followed and assented to the arguments that target our (false) beliefs, then these should be altered and the emotion immediately vanquished. If this were the case, then we should surely ask why Epicurus believes we need to 'accustom' ourselves. The phrase suggests that argumentation alone is not sufficient to vanquish our fear of death, and more is required to alter our emotions than assent to the conclusion of an argument. Indeed, the term 'accustom' (συνέθιζε) connotes not 'assent' but *habituation*, and typically

---

[33] And in essence, denying that two contrary beliefs are actually held.

[34] "Συνέθιζε δὲ ἐν τῷ νομίζειν μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι τὸν θάνατον". I have chosen to translate *nomizein* as 'to hold' rather than 'to believe', for reasons I explain.

involves some form of practice or experience, implying that the Epicureans made room for non-intellectual therapy, as well as philosophical argument, in their project of removing our fear of death.

It might be pointed out that this tells us only that the Epicureans propose some non-intellectual forms of *therapy*, rather than establishing anything about the nature of the emotions.[35] It might be the case, the intellectualist could concede, that argumentation must be supplemented by a process of accustoming, but the target is nevertheless our beliefs. Indeed, it may also be argued by the intellectualist that the line at *Ep. Men.* 124 should be translated as "accustom yourself *to believe...*", thus supporting their claim. The line is of course open to being translated this way, indeed it typically is; but *nomizein* may also be translated less strongly as simply 'to hold' and even 'to hold customarily'. If translated this way, the line is once again compatible, and in fact supportive of, a non-intellectual reading of Epicurus, for it suggests that we can assume an attitude towards death where it is 'nothing to us' (i.e. we can be fearless of death), but this is reached through a process of habituation. The line is at least open to being translated either way. What I wish to stress, however, is what the 'accustoming' consideration does show us: namely, that the intellectualist lacks the support that would champion their interpretation over another (the thought that argumentation was sufficient to alter our emotions).

Not only does the accustoming consideration show the intellectualist reading lacks decisive support, it forces the intellectualist to explain why we should accept their interpretation and not an alternative account. If the forms of therapy employed by the Epicureans act as a guide as to their conception of emotion (as the intellectualist suggests when they claim that Epicurus' offering of intellectual therapy implies that he has an intellectualist stance on the emotions[36]) then the idea that emotional therapy involves accustoming casts doubt on the assumed intellectual nature of emotion. If we have to accustom ourselves not to fear death, this suggests that the removal of false beliefs / assent to true beliefs, achieved through argumentation, is not sufficient for the change of an emotion; why then should belief, and not some other form of cognition or affect be thought to be an essential component or

---

[35] See Gill (2010), p.156 (n.42).

[36] For example, Sanders (2008), p365: "That [Epicurus] and his followers regard this fear as essentially cognitive is clear from the means by which they seek to cure it. The Epicureans employ for this purpose a form of cognitive therapy; that is they seek to disabuse people of their false belief regarding the fear of death".

condition of emotion? If it were the case that the nature of the emotions is intellectual, then the intellectualist must explain (i) why non-intellectual therapies are required to work on our beliefs and (ii) why these therapies should not instead be understood as aimed at the non-intellectual or affective components of emotion. Regarding (ii) in particular, I believe the burden of proof is on the intellectualist, since habituation is typically understood as targeting these phenomena.

1.2.4. *Internalising Beliefs*

Having acknowledged the problem that recalcitrant emotions pose for an intellectualist account, Warren goes on to claim that there is a route out of these difficulties; an intellectualist *can* account for cases of recalcitrant emotions, and indeed, the Epicurean instruction to 'accustom' ourselves. Referring to the *Axiochus* case, Warren notes an obvious reply an Epicurean can make:

"Perhaps like the person whom Lucretius describes, who still feels anxiety at the thought of what will happen to his corpse although he claims not to believe that he will survive death, there is some difficulty in *fully integrating* the correct opinions drawn from the Epicurean arguments with other potentially conflicting opinions he also holds"[37].

Warren explains that in the case of our fear of death, Epicurus acknowledges that there may be "difficulties in fully understanding and coming to terms with the revisionary view he is offering", and that the belief that death is nothing to us is "not something that can simply and immediately be integrated into our beliefs, since it requires reconsideration of many other attitudes"[38]. The thought is that whilst we may have followed the arguments, and assented to the new belief, this belief has not yet been *internalised* – it has not yet been fully integrated with our wider beliefs and is not yet exhibited in our behaviour. Until this occurs, the emotion will persist, but once the belief is fully integrated with our other beliefs, then the emotion will disappear.

This is not the claim that the subject has not really followed the arguments, nor that she has not in fact assented to the new belief; Warren holds that the subject *does* follow the Epicurean arguments and *does* assent to the belief. It is just that this belief has not been internalised. As such, he claims that Epicurus' instruction to 'accustom'

---

[37] Warren (2004), p.220.
[38] Ibid..

ourselves should be understood as "thinking over and internalising the Epicurean point of view, integrating it with one's other relevant beliefs" [39]. On this understanding, Epicurus' suggestion that we 'accustom ourselves' does not imply that emotions are non-intellectual or heterogeneous by nature, but rather points to the complexity of the beliefs involved in our fear of death and the complexity of the task required for our emotional education.

Should we consider this a satisfactory explanation of the Epicurean dictate to 'accustom' ourselves? We may, firstly, want to resist the intellectual explanation of 'accustoming' and state as above that this is not how we naturally understand the term; that we understand it to be something closer to habituation than 'thinking over'. I agree, and think that this can be supported with reference to Epicurus' usage of *sunethizein* at *Ep. Men.* 131, but will defer discussion of this until Chapter Two. For now I wish to press this explanation of 'accustoming', and consider the model of belief acquisition that it requires us to attribute to the Epicureans.

The concept of an 'internalised' belief is central to Warren's argument, and we should begin by considering what he means by this. Warren explains that internalising involves gaining consistency with one's wider set of beliefs and on his view a belief is not said to be internalised at the moment of assent. Certainly, he implies, one might have *agreed* with the conclusion of an argument, and may indeed be said to *hold* the new belief, but this does not mean it has been internalised. What this implies is a two-step view of belief acquisition and adoption in which one first assents to a belief (having been convinced by Epicurus' arguments, in this case) and by some further process, integrates or makes this consistent with one's other beliefs.

Yet if one agrees with the conclusion of an argument, and has assented to a new belief, then why should there be any difficulty in gaining consistency with this, and one's other beliefs? Why is some further process required to integrate this belief? We may have prior beliefs which conflict with our new belief, but the acceptance of this new belief surely marks it out as the winner, and our previous beliefs should immediately make way for it.

On the one hand, Warren could claim that he is working with a very thin notion of assent, which merely consists in apprehending the conclusion, but lacks any further

---

[39] Warren (2009), p.237.

conviction; our newly held belief thus lacks the force to surmount our other, contradictory beliefs. It is difficult, firstly to see how one would accept the relevant premises, follow the reasoning of an argument, but not feel bound by the conclusion. Or indeed to see how one may be said to be in 'agreement' with a conclusion without this also involving some form of conviction or endorsement; it is not clear that we would describe such a person (who follows an argument, but has no conviction with regards to its conclusion) as 'believing' the conclusion at all. But Warren does claim that the recalcitrant student *believes* the conclusion of the Epicurean argument, so his explanation cannot appeal to a thin notion of assent.

So, for us to count as believing the conclusion of the Epicurean arguments, the notion of assent that must be advocated should involve at least conviction and endorsement – but we are once again required to explain why this is still not enough for the belief to be made consistent with one's other beliefs. If we take this thicker notion of assent, which does carry conviction and acceptance, then it is difficult to see what further process is required for the belief to be integrated (since as stated above it should surely surmount any old conflicting beliefs) or what else could be meant by 'internalised'. Whatever further explanation the intellectualist may try to offer is problematic for their position. If the point is that *assenting* to a belief (with full conviction or endorsement) is not sufficient to bring about the change in an emotional state, then that conflicts with the intellectualist claim that changing a belief *is* sufficient to change an emotional state. Or if the claim is that altering a belief *is* sufficient to change an emotional state, but something further is required in addition to even the thick notion of assent (involving full conviction) for us to count as 'holding' that belief, then the intellectualist needs to explain what that is and what textual evidence there is to support attributing such a picture of belief to Epicurus.

It is not clear what evidence the intellectualist could cite to support this as the Epicurean view of 'belief'. One suggestion of how we might understand the idea of 'internalising', however, (if this is intended to mean something more than making that belief consistent with one's existing set of beliefs) is in relation to how we 'see' or 'imagine' that object. We might endorse a new belief about an object, we may have integrated this into our set of beliefs, ridding ourselves of any conflicting beliefs, but the object of that belief might not yet *appear* to us under this new aspect. 'Believing' that an object is not a source of harm and coming to also then 'see' it in this way

might be a process that takes time and what is meant by 'internalising'. To anticipate future chapters of this thesis, I will in fact offer something like this explanation in my alternative interpretation to the intellectualist, and I believe that such an explanation *can* be supported by the Epicurean texts. But this is *not* an account of belief, but how we see or imagine an object; and if the intellectualist were to offer this as an explanation of 'internalising' (which in turn was intended to explain what Epicurus meant by 'accustoming'), then they renege on their view that belief (a conviction that something is the case or commitment to the veracity of a proposition) is essential to emotion, and that changing this (changing those propositions we endorse or assent to) is sufficient to bring about a change in emotional state.

So when developed, Warren's explanation of 'accustoming' seems to present the intellectualist with further challenges that it is not clear that they can deal with (at least without denying the defining claims of their position). The intellectualist account seemed to offer a ready explanation of Epicurus' frequent employment of arguments when guiding his students towards *ataraxia*; but the account faces serious conceptual and textual problems, and any attempt to deal with these makes the intellectualist interpretation a much more complicated and problematic explanation than first appeared. The underdetermined nature of the texts allows and invites an alternative account and I believe we have now good reason for preferring one. Indeed, the textual evidence that was problematic for an intellectualist may be employed positively in favour of an alternative account, and how this may proceed I will subsequently consider.

1.3.   Alternative Therapy?

In the previous section I described the orthodox interpretation of Epicureanism, which takes Epicurus to be promoting a form of intellectual therapy, aimed at altering the false beliefs which, on this view, are the basis of our emotions. Against this, I argued that the intellectualist interpretation is not immediately compelling and claimed we have both reason and room to develop an alternative account of emotion and its therapy.

In fact, progress towards such an alternative appears to have already been made, namely by Tsouna (2009) who, in contrast to those interpretations which take Epicurean therapy to be essentially intellectual, draws our attention to the 'extra-

cognitive' nature of Epicurean therapeutic strategies. In her opening discussion, Tsouna explains that a variety of therapeutic techniques are employed by the Epicureans because (i) psychic diseases can be complex and hard to cure, and by way of explanation goes on to claim that (ii) the Epicureans strongly suggest that the emotions consist of cognitive and non-cognitive elements. The position looks like a candidate for the alternative reading of Epicureanism I am seeking to establish and proceeds by noting the 'extra-cognitive' features of emotional therapy and inferring from these a non-intellectual account of the nature of emotion. But on a closer examination, it is not entirely clear that Tsouna manages to establish the relation between (i) and (ii) that I wish to develop.[40] Indeed, it is not clear that her first claim does not in fact reduce to the intellectualist position I am setting myself against. Nonetheless, I believe the paper may equip us with some useful resources, notably in its recognition of the non-intellectual features of Epicurean therapy. Further, in determining where Tsouna's position is vulnerable or in need of development we are offered insight into how an alternative, positive account should proceed.

1.3.1. *Reconstructing Tsouna's Argument*

Since the purpose of Tsouna's paper is to offer a review of therapeutic techniques rather than an analysis of emotion, locating a precise argument for her claim about the emotions is not a simple task. Indeed, in considering the claims she makes regarding the nature of Epicurean therapy and the nature of the emotions, it is not immediately clear which form the premises of her argument and which the conclusion. Nonetheless, I believe it is possible to construct from Tsouna's paper an argument from the nature of Epicurean therapy to the nature of Epicurean emotions, and will attempt to do so in this section.

Before proceeding to her discussion of Epicurean therapeutic strategies, Tsouna offers some remarks on the nature of the *pathē*; stressing in particular that "the Epicureans strongly suggest that the emotions consist of cognitive and non-cognitive elements"[41]. The cognitive elements consist of desires and beliefs, of which there are both descriptive and evaluative components, whilst the extra-cognitive features

---

[40] That is, that the complexity of psychic diseases lies in their heterogeneous nature and the relation between the cognitive and non-cognitive elements. It is the nature of both features that makes the cure of psychic diseases especially difficult.

[41] Tsouna (2009), p.251.

include feelings and imaginings, and also "account for the particular experiential quality that each emotion has"[42]. It may surprise us that Tsouna opens with such a substantial claim, but on consideration, the statement is not as strong as might first appear. Tsouna tells us only loosely of the elements involved in emotion and not of the relation between these or the structure of the emotions. The intellectualist does not deny that, say, there may be feelings associated with emotions, but their claim that it is sufficient to alter an emotion by simply altering the relevant belief suggests that these do not need to be attended to in the process of removal. Tsouna tells us only that "these extra-cognitive features are distinct, if not independent from beliefs"[43], but it is otherwise not clear how they are related.

Let us proceed to Tsouna's second observation, that Epicurean therapy has both cognitive and extra-cognitive[44] aspects. Those aspects she describes as "cognitive *in the narrow sense*" [45] consist of arguments, and involve reading, studying and understanding. These intellectual methods are aimed at removing ignorance or the false beliefs that lie at the source of our anxiety and disturbance. But Tsouna claims that argumentation is insufficient to treat the extra-cognitive aspects of our emotions, and these need to be supplemented by other methods. The salient forms of extra-cognitive therapy identified by Tsouna are *repetition* and *memorisation*.[46]

Developing the thought in §1.3, I believe we can use Tsouna's second claim in support of a stronger reading of the first; telling us not simply of the associated elements, but the *nature* of the *pathē*. As the Epicureans deny the sufficiency of argumentation to affect our feelings, and employ other non-intellectual techniques in the process of emotion removal, this implies that the Epicureans saw emotion alteration as involving more than the alteration of belief, but as requiring work on our feelings as well. This does tell us something of the structure of the emotions, because it suggests - contra the intellectualist - that feelings are necessary constituents of emotion, and not dependent on beliefs (for if they were dependent on beliefs, it should suffice to target these beliefs directly and through their alteration, alter our feelings). In short, the use of extra-cognitive methods is evidence for a non-intellectualist view of the emotions.

---

[42] Tsouna (2009), pp.251-2.
[43] Ibid., p.251.
[44] Tsouna uses the terms 'non-cognitive' and 'extra-cognitive' in her paper and I follow her usage here.
[45] Tsouna (2009), p.254.
[46] Ibid., pp.254-5.

1.3.2. *An Intellectualist Response*

It is not clear, however, that Tsouna has managed to show this. We can grant Tsouna the two claims that (a) the Epicureans recognise that there are feelings and imaginings at least associated with emotion, and (b) that argumentation is not sufficient to treat feelings directly. But the intellectualist might claim that this does not show that argumentation is insufficient to treat *emotion* if, of course, we grant the intellectualist assumption that beliefs are sufficient causes of our feelings, (that argumentation is sufficient to alter beliefs, and thus in altering our beliefs we alter our feelings). Of course, it is precisely this question that is under discussion, and since no texts tell us explicitly about the structure of the emotions, we must attempt to discover this from what the texts *do* tell us. So the thought is that by looking at the nature of therapeutic techniques, we can infer something about what the Epicureans thought the structure of the emotions was. And the further thought is, if the Epicureans do propose non-cognitive techniques to treat the emotions, then they cannot have thought that altering a belief is sufficient to alter an emotion (because as above, if that were the case, then we should only need to treat our beliefs, and working on any associated feelings would be superfluous).

So is this not what Tsouna has done – pointed towards the non-cognitive techniques employed by the Epicureans and in doing so shown that they cannot have held an intellectualist view of the emotions? The difficulty is that Tsouna's presentation of the non-cognitive techniques employed by the Epicureans seems to stress the manner in which they work on belief, rather than the emotion as a whole (or its specifically 'non-cognitive' components), and her position is thus vulnerable to collapse into the intellectualist's.

The main techniques that Tsouna draws our attention to are repetition and memorisation. Of repetition, Tsouna points out that "Epicurus' insistence on repetition and practice indicates that the relevant trains of thought become increasingly faster to the point of being quasi automatic moral reflexes"[47]. And of memorisation, she notes Epicurus' suggestion that what we commit to memory tends to get associated with a number of thoughts, and the more we remember the key

---

[47] Tsouna (2009), p.255.

Epicurean principles, the quicker we associate these with particular situations, moving from one true belief to another, and eventually make the right choice. [48]

Now, there is a clear sense in which repetition and memorisation are not intellectual in the way that, say, arguments are and need not employ propositions (we can repeat actions; remember images, etc.). But there is another sense in which repetition and memorisation are not so independent of arguments or propositions, in that they may also be are *things we do with* them. We can repeat and memorise arguments, statements or propositions. And note that it looks like such instances of repetition and memorisation that are cited by Tsouna: that we should repeat and commit to memory the principles of Epicurean doctrine.

It now looks as though the methods of repetition and memorisation, taking as their objects the principles of Epicurean doctrine, are aimed at working on our beliefs, rather than our feelings. One could easily state that repetition and memorisation help us to keep hold of our new beliefs (arrived at through argumentation), making sure we don't forget them, or the reasons that lead to their acceptance, and revert back to believing, for example, that death is a harm. If this is the case though, Tsouna has only shown that the Epicurean arguments need to be supplemented by repetition and memorisation if we are to certainly alter our beliefs; she hasn't shown that altering our emotions requires more than altering these. So the intellectualist can claim that altering belief is still sufficient for altering an emotion. Tsouna might have shown the insufficiency of argumentation *alone* to alter our beliefs, but she hasn't shown the insufficiency of altering our beliefs for altering our emotions.

Returning to claims (i) and (ii) at the beginning of Tsouna's paper, the intellectualist can certainly agree with Tsouna about her first claim, but state that the complexity of psychic diseases is *intellectual*. Our (web of) beliefs about death are complicated, inter-related and unarticulated, and a lot of cognitive work must be done to unravel, alter or eradicate these. Following the Epicurean arguments, we may need to repeat to ourselves the principles of Epicurean doctrine, in order to commit them to memory, but ultimately the nature of psychological disease and its cure is intellectual.

Does the collapse of Tsouna's position into an intellectualist account mean we should have recourse to the intellectualist orthodoxy? I do not think so. For one, the

---

[48] Tsouna (2009), p.255.

textual and conceptual difficulties with the intellectualist interpretation presented in §1.2 remain and we still have reason to seek an account that is not so obviously problematic or is at least equally compatible with the Epicurean fragments. Secondly, the collapse of Tsouna's own position does not defeat an approach which appeals to the non-intellectual forms of therapy as evidence for a non-intellectual view of the emotions; rather it points to the work that needs to be done if we are to cite the nature of Epicurean therapy as evidence for an alternative account. The variety of strategies that Tsouna draws our attention to are important; in terms of our negative argument they help *undermine* the orthodox assumption that emotional therapy proceeds by intellectual means, and in terms of a positive argument, offer a more complex view of Epicurean therapy which may be incorporated into an alternative account of Epicurean moral psychology and development. But in appealing simply to *individual* therapeutic techniques (such as repetition or memorisation), without further explanation or a framework in mind, Tsouna does not offer an alternative account of Epicurean emotions.

1.4.   Towards a Non-Intellectualist Account

If we are to develop a positive alternative to the intellectualist account, and are to draw on the nature of Epicurean therapy as evidence for the underlying theory of emotion, I believe we need to consider precisely the overall nature of that therapy, rather than starting from individual techniques. Once we have a framework within which to work, and can consider what model of emotion might plausibly be assumed for this mode of therapy, we can consider how the individual techniques rightly noted by Tsouna might work within this suggested treatment. This framework within which we can consider the nature of Epicurean therapy and their underlying theory of emotion is, I believe, indicated in Epicurus' instruction that we *accustom ourselves* to no longer fear death. In the following chapter I wish to consider how we might take this instruction, what *accustoming* might involve in the context of our emotions, and what model of emotion would be most compatible with such an account. Having developed such a model, I will return to the Epicurean fragments in the third chapter, to consider what textual support there may be for attributing such a model to Epicurus and how Epicurus' therapeutic techniques can help us to achieve *ataraxia* on this reading.

A requirement is placed on our account, however, by the various intellectualist readings we have discussed so far – and that is to account for the role of Epicurus' arguments and what part, if any, they play in our emotional therapy. For whilst I maintain that the assumption of intellectual therapy is indeed an assumption, the intellectualist reading *does* provide a neat account of the role of Epicurus' arguments (particularly in light of the self-professed practical aim of Epicurean philosophy). Our account must not, then, leave the presence of these various arguments unexplained and must pay due respect to Epicurus' claim that a philosopher's words are empty if they offer therapy "for no human suffering".

Chapter 2
Aristotle, Habituation and Emotion

2.1.   Introduction

The previous chapter presented my negative thesis against the orthodox reading of Epicurus on the emotions. The aim of this chapter is to develop an alternative model to the intellectualist account, which in the third chapter we shall apply to the Epicurean writings. The first question that arises is: 'How do we go about doing this?' For the difficulty we have already established is that no explicit account is offered by the Epicureans and, owing to the fragmentary nature of the extant writings, there are limited materials from which we can construct one. Of course, as Tsouna demonstrated, there is plenty of information that can be gleaned from the texts regarding Epicurean therapeutic strategies; and we might use these to gain insight into the Epicurean view of emotions by considering what account must be assumed that these be *required* and *effective*.[49] But as we also saw in Chapter One, the nature and target of Epicurean therapy is itself open to interpretation. The variety of strategies appealed to by Tsouna, for example, are in fact compatible with a number of theories of emotion and do not (on their own or without further explanation) establish an alternative view. This is not to claim that consideration of the therapeutic techniques employed may not be used to support, explain or add credibility to an account once developed, but that a survey of individual techniques, without some interpretive framework in place, may not get us very far.

At the end of the last chapter I proposed that such an interpretive framework might be provided by consideration of Epicurus' dictate that we should "*accustom* [ourselves] to hold that death is nothing to us" (*Ep. Men.* 124). It is, after all, a clear instruction as to the *general means* by which we should become unaffected by the thought of death; so by considering how Epicurus may have intended this term and what is

---

[49] I believe that this is the means by which most (though not all) commentators have arrived at an intellectualist account: by interpreting Epicurus' arguments as a mode of intellectual therapy, and inferring from this an intellectualist picture of emotion. Thus Konstan (2009), p202: "it is essential to fear that it pertain to the rational part of the soul, for if it did not, there would be no possibility of eliminating it by the therapy of philosophy". See also Sanders (2008), quoted above at n.36.

involved in the process of accustoming, we might be better positioned to consider what idea of emotion this is most plausibly directed towards. And following that, we can consider how the individual therapeutic strategies, identified by Tsouna and others, are connected with the practice of accustoming.

Unfortunately, Epicurus himself does not elaborate on his claim, and offers no explanation as to the nature of accustoming, what it involves or how it works. Of course, we have our modern understanding of the term – *to become used to something, to become familiar with something, to habituate or develop the habit of doing something* – but we must consider how the term would be understood by a Hellenistic philosopher. It turns out, however, that the connotations which spring to the contemporary mind may not be far off, for the term Epicurus uses – *sunethize* – may similarly be translated as 'habituate'. Indeed, the term appears again only a few passages later, when Epicurus insists that "to habituate (*sunethizein*) one's self, therefore, to simple and inexpensive diet supplies all that is needful for health" (*Ep. Men.* 131). The use of the term in this context, I believe, warrants our taking *sunethize* at *Ep. Men.* 124 to command that we *habituate* ourselves and to indicate that some *process of habituation* is required to remove our fear of death. Now, how one might habituate oneself to a diet is readily understood: it involves frequently and consistently eating a foodstuff, and we might thus think that Epicurus understands *accustoming* as typically involving some form of learning-by-doing, experience of practice rather than the integration of some belief. But what role might this have played in the removal of our fear of death? The question, when considered in the light of our development towards a state of *ataraxia*, calls us to consider more generally the role of habituation in moral development and education. And for insight into this our best source is Aristotle.

2.2.   Insight from Aristotle

We should be cautious in our use of the Aristotelian material for various reasons. Firstly, we cannot assume that Epicurus' position will be the same as Aristotle's. We do have good reason for thinking that Epicurus was aware of Aristotle' teaching[50] and recognising certain affinities in their philosophy can reasonably take Aristotle as

---

[50] Aristotle's school was well established when Epicurus arrived in Athens, by which time Aristotle is thought to have composed many of his works. Further, there are clear instances in which Epicurus' work is a response to Aristotle, such as his re-appropriation of Democritean atomism in light of Aristotle's attack on the original theory.

a guide for what Epicurus may have thought about the nature of accustoming – but we cannot assume his thought is identical.[51] In particular, we should note the different contexts in which these discussions arise. We are looking for insight into the role of habituation in removing our fear of death, but Aristotle's discussion arises in the context of how one may become a virtuous agent and we cannot isolate his remarks on habituation from this.

A remark by Burnyeat on the relation between moral development and virtue, however, points to an interesting analogy between this and our project. In reaction to Socrates' claim that we cannot know whether virtue can be acquired until we know what virtue is, Burnyeat states that he "wants to reverse the order, asking how, according to Aristotle, virtue is acquired, so as to bring to light certain features in his conception of what virtue is"[52]. And it is the same methodology that I have proposed we use in the search for an Epicurean theory of emotion; that we consider how, according to Epicurus, emotions can be altered, in order to bring to light his conception of the nature of emotion. Further, Aristotle's discussion of virtue and moral development is presented by Burnyeat as a reaction to Socratic *intellectualism* and the chief philosophical benefit of an inquiry into Aristotle's thought is, he claims, to be found in the recognition that a range of desires and feelings shape patterns of motivation and response long before we come to a reasoned outlook. It is thus Aristotle's emphasis on the importance of "*the gradual development of good habits of feeling*"[53] that will be of particular interest to us whilst we, similarly, seek an alternative to an intellectualist account of emotion and its therapy.

A word more needs to be said to bring the relevance of Aristotle's discussion of habituation in moral development to light. It might be useful, as a contrast, to begin by considering why one might *not* think the Aristotelian discussion will be of use; this is not the same as the reason for caution above, but based on a naïve view of Aristotle on which habituation or repeated practice is necessary simply for the *performance of virtuous actions*. On such a view, Aristotle's concern is with virtuous *activity* – donating to charity, standing up for one's friends, fighting in battles – and habituation is required for the acquisition of this *skill* or *habit*. Considered as a skill,

---

[51] Indeed, there are some notable differences in their view of moral education. E.g. Epicurus claims that one can achieve *ataraxia* at any age, whilst the implication of Aristotle's discussion is that without a good upbringing in habits one cannot attain virtue.
[52] Burnyeat (1980), p.69.
[53] Ibid, p.70.

virtue is like riding a bicycle: skills can't be acquired without practice, and what is important about habituation is simply that it is a form of learning-by-doing. Considered as a habit, virtue is a settled disposition to do certain kinds of things or to perform certain actions regularly; achieved again through repeated practice. In either case, the emphasis is placed on the *action* or *activities* involved in virtue, and habituation – as a mode of learning-by-doing and repetitive practice – is the means of learning and perfecting these.

If this were the view we held, it is less than obvious how Aristotle's account of habituation and virtue acquisition could inform the account of *sentimental* education and analysis of emotion we are trying to develop for Epicurus. But this is a naïve account of the role habituation plays for Aristotle (as I will show shortly), and one that few scholars would hold. Of course, there is *some* truth to this interpretation: it is plausible that the actual *performance of virtuous actions*, considered as a skill or habit, should be learned and improved through a process of habituation. But the *Nicomachean Ethics* quickly reveals that Aristotle had a far more complex view of virtue than the performance of certain kinds of action, and accordingly, that the role of habituation in our moral development is far more sophisticated than the above sketch would have it appear.

Aristotle's claim that virtues of character are acquired through habituation is found at the beginning of Book II, where this mode of acquisition is contrasted with teaching (of an intellectual kind) and what we possess by nature (i.e. what we are born with). Aristotle notes at 1103a that the Greek term for 'character' (*ēthos*) is derived from the word for habit (*ethos*) and the result of successful habituation, we find, is that one becomes accustomed to acting in the right way, acquiring *a firm and settled disposition* to do so. It is only when an agent chooses to act well, in the knowledge that they are doing so and from this settled state that they are said to be virtuous. This firm and settled disposition is not something simply exhibited in the predictable actions of the agent, but involves the agent experiencing the appropriate accompanying *pathē* and taking appropriate pleasure in their virtuous actions (hence the emphasis on *character*). As Aristotle explains at 1104b:

"we must take as an indication of a person's states the pleasure or pain consequent on what he does, because the person who abstains from bodily pleasures and finds his enjoyment in doing just this is temperate, while the person who finds doing it oppressive is intemperate,

and the person who enjoys facing up to danger, or at least does not find it painful is courageous, while he who does find it painful is a coward."

A passage earlier, at 1103b, Aristotle explained that "by becoming habituated to feeling fear or confidence, some of us become courageous, others cowardly" and we thus discover that habituation is the process through which we do not simply learn to act the right way but, importantly, learn to *feel* the right way. The relevance of Aristotle's account for our own project now becomes clear: by considering Aristotle's account of habituation, how he thinks we develop the appropriate *pathē* of virtuous agents and what theory of emotion underlies this, we might discover a picture of emotion and emotional education which might plausibly have been held by Epicurus.

2.2.1. *Aristotle on Habituation*

What, then, is Aristotle's account of habituation and how does this enable us to achieve the desired state of virtue; a state which importantly involves certain developed emotional dispositions? Some general marks can be found at *NE* II, and also the *Eudemian Ethics* and *Rhetoric*. Aristotle tells us firstly that we "become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts" (1103b1), suggesting that habituation involves performing certain action and thus some form of learning-by-doing. Elsewhere it is added that the formation of habit involves "frequent movement of a particular kind" (1220b2) and that "habitual events [happen] often" (1370b8), indicating that habituation not only requires practice, but practice that is *frequent* and *repeated*. The question is how Aristotle believes the frequent repetition of certain actions can create the settled disposition of character towards such action that is required for virtue.

Before we consider the further details of Aristotle's account, it might first be helpful to distinguish two ways in which we might understand the result of successful 'habituation'. On one understanding, habituation is simply where, through a process of repetition over time, you find that you continue to perform a particular action; you repeat the action 100 times and continue to perform it on the 101st. We might call this 'un-motivated' habituation, because our habit replaces the motive for performing the action. On another understanding, however, habituation involves altering our *motivations* over time and, importantly, these motivations are not limited to beliefs.

I hope that the preliminary remarks that I have made regarding Aristotle's complex conception of virtue and the importance of acting from a *settled state of character* will already have intimated that Aristotle's notion of habituation involves more than the replacement of motive by habit; the virtuous agent will not simply find that they perform virtuous actions, but rather choose these actions from a firm character. More specifically, we find that habituation involves the development of an associated pleasure with those actions we repeatedly practice, which provides the motivation for future actions. Evidence for this may be found at 2.3, where Aristotle writes:

"virtue of character is concerned with pleasures and pains: it is because of pleasure that we do bad actions, and pain that we abstain from noble ones. It is for this reason that we need to be brought up in a particular way from our early days, as Plato says, so we might find enjoyment or pain in the right things; for the right education is just this" (1104b 10-14).

Our moral education, which takes the form of habituation, must involve us finding enjoyment in the right things, thereby establishing a firm and stable disposition of character towards such things. Importantly, the passage points us to the motivational role of pleasure and pain and the importance of good upbringing, on which Aristotle expands in Book 10. There, Aristotle emphasises that virtue cannot be achieved simply by following arguments and that whilst these may encourage an already well-bred youth, they will be ineffective on 'the many'. Why? Because the many live by passion, pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain, and passion yields not to argument but only force[54]. The first motivation for youth is the pursuit of pleasure or the avoidance of pain (as indicated at 1.3 and again at 8.3) and the ill-bred we are told, "pursue the pleasures appropriate to their character" (1179b12), pleasures of the body, say, or of indulgence. Argumentation will be ineffective in encouraging the many to virtuous action, since they are driven by their profligate pleasures and Aristotle recognises that "argument cannot remove the traits that have so long been incorporated in the character" (1179b17). Only the threat of punishment (a pain) can dissuade them from their desired pursuits.

The well-bred character, however, in being habituated to virtuous action, has already had the opportunity to take pleasure in it, and therefore a motive to continue in such action. Why should this occur? Because virtuous action is *by nature* and *in itself pleasant*:

---

[54] "He who lives as passion directs will not hear argument that dissuades him, nor understand it" (1179b26-7).

"Lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are pleasant for such men as well in their own nature" (1099a13-15).

Virtuous action is pleasant not as a means, but in the actual performing of the action, for its own sake. And by performing virtuous actions the student of virtue is able to discover for themselves the pleasure of those actions. In discovering this pleasure, such actions will (begin to) appear to him pleasant when he is presented with an occasion to act in the future. The many on the other hand, in never having acted virtuously (certainly not regularly, consistently and with reinforcement) have never discovered the pleasure of virtuous action and are thus only motivated to pursue the pleasures of the body, the only things which appear to them pleasant. The difference between the well-brought up agent and the many then, is that the former has had the opportunity to develop appropriate pleasures in appropriate objects (i.e. virtuous action), and represent those objects in this light, whereas the many have not. Hence the importance of being guided in virtuous action from an early age (1103b20-5). As Burnyeat writes: "the underlying idea is that the child's sense of pleasure, which to begin with is his only motive, should be hooked up with just and noble things so that his unreasoned evaluative responses may develop in connection with the right objects"[55].

In talking of 'unreasoned responses' he does not mean that such responses have involve no thought; they are indeed grounded in an evaluation of their object, just as appetite is oriented to a conception of its object as something pleasant. Rather, he is pointing us to the Platonic insight that our evaluative responses develop before reason does, and "need not invariably or immediately give way or lose efficacy to contrary considerations. There are, as it were, pockets of thought in us which can remain relatively unaffected by our overall view of things"[56]. Moral education requires that our motivating evaluative responses are directed onto the right objects, and since these responses are unreasoned, other forms of training must be employed for this. To argue that something is good or should be an object of pleasure will be ineffective; rather we need guided practice and habituation in virtuous actions so that we might develop the right evaluative responses to such actions. Moral development must be a less than fully rational process.

---

[55] Burnyeat (1980), p.80.
[56] Ibid., p.79.

The nature of the 'thought' involved, referred to above, is not pursued by Burnyeat, but is crucially important for our own question, regarding the model of emotion that underlies Aristotle's account of habituation in our development towards virtue. In the following section I will outline the picture of emotion that I believe is most compatible with Aristotle's account of moral development and education given so far; a picture presented by Aristotle himself, just not (explicitly) in the *Ethics*. Having outlined the account, found in the *Rhetoric*, I will explain the connection between it and the *Nicomachean Ethics* discussion so far presented. The clue to the connection is in the attention Burnyeat draws to the importance of beginnings and a child's moral development, for the account of emotion supposed by Aristotle must fit the psychology of the child and not just a fully developed agent.

2.2.2. *Aristotle on Emotion: the Appearances View*

What model of emotion can be found in Aristotle's ethical and rhetorical works is a matter of debate, as is the question of whether any fully-fledged theory can be gleaned from his writings. Some (e.g. Dow, 2010) have argued that Aristotle's remarks *do* amount to a theory of emotion (a theory restricted simply by the requirements of a treatise on rhetoric), whilst others (e.g. Cooper, 1996) have denied that Aristotle's ethical writings offer any "general, analytical account"[57]. Nevertheless, even such views conclude that from the detailed account of individual emotions that we find in the *Rhetoric*, we can "see certain patterns emerging that… could be made the basis for a comprehensive general theory"[58]. And for our purposes, this level of commitment will suffice – from a conceptual perspective, we require a model of emotion compatible with habituation as a means of cultivating emotional dispositions, and one that is at least plausibly attributable to Aristotle.

Aristotle's discussion of individual emotions in *Rhetoric* II makes it clear that Aristotle sees a strong connection between emotion and (i) the pleasures and pains, (ii) the desires and (iii) the cognitive states of the agent experiencing the emotion. Before proceeding to his analysis of the individual emotions, at 1378a Aristotle offers a general definition of emotion as:

---

[57] Cooper (1996), p.238.
[58] Ibid., p.239.

"those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure. Such are anger, pity, fear and the like, with their opposites"[59].

The nature of the 'accompaniment' of emotion by pleasure or pain is subject to interpretation, but I follow Dow, Leighton, Nieuwenburg *et al*, in taking Aristotle to be making a conceptual claim, namely that emotions are (in part) *constituted* by a feeling of pleasure or pain. On this interpretation, the relation Aristotle has in mind when he uses the verb *hepesthai* is not one of mere concurrence, but one of constitution, and to experience emotion is, in some way, to feel pleasure or pain.[60] Our concern at present, however, is not with the nature of the pleasure, pain or desire involved in emotion, but the cognition that apparently precedes it. Regarding this, two main interpretations have emerged, which disagree on the cognitive content of the agent experiencing the emotion, and these we will call the *Beliefs View* and the *Appearances View*.

Similar to the intellectualist reading of Epicurus discussed in Chapter One, the *Beliefs View* takes Aristotle to posit beliefs or judgments as at least necessary conditions of emotion. Since we have already outlined something like this view in presenting the orthodox reading of Epicurean emotion, I shall proceed here in outlining the *Appearances View* in the anticipation that this model might provide a plausible alternative for interpreting Epicurus. In doing so I do not claim that this view is conclusively that held by Aristotle, and I acknowledge that certain arguments have been presented to challenge this view.[61] For the issue at present is not whether this account was truly advocated by Aristotle, but rather that this is an account that can quite plausibly be derived from his works, and thus an account that Epicurus may likewise have taken from him. Nevertheless, my own preference *is* with the *Appearances* reading of Aristotle and I believe that if I can show that Aristotle's remarks on habituation and the development of emotional dispositions are most compatible with an *Appearances View*, then this should also offer further reason (outside the context of the *Rhetoric*) for taking Aristotle to hold that position.

---

[59] "Ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη, δι' ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸσ τὰς κρίσεις, οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἷον ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἔναντι. δεῖ δὲ διαιεῖν τὰ περὶ ἕκαστον εἰς τρία."
[60] See Dow (2010) pp.49-50 for a discussion of Aristotle's usage of *hepesthai* in support of this reading.
[61] See in particular Dow (2009).

On the *Appearances View*, then, the cognitive content of emotion is not a belief, but a form of 'appearance' - or using Aristotle's terminology, *phantasia*. Emotion involves a feeling of pleasure or pain, but this arises not because we take the object of our emotion *to be* certain way, but because it *appears* to us a certain way. Take Aristotle's definitions of fear in *Rhetoric* II: fear is "a certain kind of pain and disturbance out of the appearance (*phantasia*) of an impending destructive or painful bad thing" (1382a21-3). Reference to *appearance* or *appearing* is repeated throughout the chapter: regarding fear it is added that the object must *appear* to be close (1382a24) and must *appear* to have a great power to cause harms (1382a28); regarding experiences of anger, Aristotle explains that a feeling of pleasure accompanies the *appearance* of gaining revenge on those who have apparently slighted us (1378a8).

That pleasure or pain may accompany appearances has already been anticipated in Book I where Aristotle notes that:

"pleasure is the consciousness through the senses of a certain kind of emotion; but imagination is a feeble sort of sensation, and there will always be in the mind of a man who remembers or expects something the imagination of what he remembers or expects. If this is so, it is clear that memory and expectation also, being accompanied by sensation, may be accompanied by pleasure. It follows that anything pleasant is either present and perceived, past and remembered or future and expected, since we perceive present things, recall past ones, and expect future ones" (1370a27-b1). [62]

The passage emphasises the intimate relationship between imagination and pleasure (or pain), but also anticipates the forward or backward looking nature of our imaginative faculty employed in emotion. Fear is a pain at the anticipation of proximate harm to oneself; grief a pain at the memory of loss. The appearance is in the present, but its content may be future or past directed: when we dwell on the *prospect* of revenge, for example, Aristotle explains that "the appearance, which is then present creates pleasure, as happens in dreams" (1378a8). Accordingly, we may describe certain emotions as forward or backward looking; though we shall find that emotion (and its development or treatment) involves a complex relation between memory and anticipation (and their accompanying pleasures and pains), the importance of which we will come to in the following section. For the present, let us

---

[62] Aristotle adds that: "in general all the things that delight us when they are present also do so, for the most part, when we merely remember or expect them" (1370b9-10).

proceed by considering the nature of the attitude Aristotle has in mind when he claims that *phantasia*, in part, constitutes emotion.

Those holding a *Beliefs View* of Aristotelian emotion make attempts to explain away the references to *phantasia* or *phantasthai*, or claim that the term is judgemental – another in Aristotle's lexicon of belief-terms. Dow, for example, takes the terms to signal how things stand *to the subject*, rather than how things actually *are*, and that Aristotle is thus alive to a crucial fact about emotions, namely that they are related to the subject's perspective. Those holding the *Appearances View*, however, generally hold that:

"it seems likely that Aristotle is using *phantasia* here to indicate the sort of non-epistemic appearance to which he draws our attention once in *De Anima* III.3 according to which something may appear to be or strike one in a certain way (say as being insulting or belittling) even if one knows there is no good reason to take it so"[63].

The exact nature of *phantasia* as presented in *De Anima* is highly debated, but the attitude is importantly contrasted with belief (*doxa*), as shown by Aristotle in the famous sun example. At 428b Aristotle describes how the sun appears a foot wide to an agent, although it is believed to be larger than the inhabited world, illustrating how an object may appear a certain way to an agent, despite knowledge to the contrary. In the case of emotion, the thought is that Aristotle's use of *phantasia* acknowledges that we may experience emotion on the basis of how things appear, despite what one knows or believes to be the case.

Consideration of the sun example and the difference between *phantasia* and *doxa* allows us to reflect on what features may characterise *phantasia* as an attitude. Some have described *phantasmata* as images and might thus distinguish the attitudes by appeal to the 'propositional' nature of *doxa* on the one hand and the 'imagistic' nature of *phantasia* on the other. This view is not universally held, however, and it might be argued in turn that since the appearance of the sun as a foot wide involves predicating the sun of a property (i.e. being, or appearing, a foot wide), *phantasia* would appear to have propositional content and thus that the difference between *phantasia* and *doxa* cannot be that one is propositional and the other not. Rather, it seems that the difference lies in a commitment to veracity: the belief that the sun is

---

[63] Cooper (1996), p.247.

larger than the world involves a commitment to the truth of that proposition, whereas the appearance that it is a foot wide involves no claim or commitment to the truth of the appearance.[64] Aristotle makes the point himself at 428a when he claims that:

"But opinion implies belief (for one cannot hold opinions in which one does not believe); and no animal has belief, but many have imagination. Again, every opinion is accompanied by belief, belief by conviction, and conviction by rational discourse; but although some creatures have imagination, they have no reasoning power" [65] (428a20-24).

The natural question that arises when we consider this characteristic in the context of emotion (rather than perceptual illusion, as in the sun example) is how, if the agent has no commitment to the veracity of the appearance before them, the appearance has the power to produce the pleasurable or painful response that partly constitutes emotion for Aristotle? This question, I believe, is one that drives many commentators to adopt the *Beliefs View* in place of the *Appearances* interpretation, since it appears more understandable how an agent's *believing* there to be a painful or destructive harm present, say, would produce a negative affect such as in fear. Of course, we saw at 1370a that Aristotle thinks that appearances *do* have the power to produce feelings of pleasure and pain, but this does not explain why those appearances that in part constitute emotion have the power to produce such strong responses, whilst others apparently do not.

If we return to the *Rhetoric*, however, we see that it is not *any* appearance that produces a positive or negative response for Aristotle, for when we consider Aristotle's definition of fear, for example, we see that the imagined "destructive or painful evil in the future" (1382a23) must appear "not remote but so near as to be imminent" (1382a24-25). We do not fear those things that are a long way off, but only those that are close by, and likewise we are comforted by or confident in the "imaginative expectation of the nearness of what keeps us safe and the absence or remoteness of what is terrible" (1383a16-17). The appearance that is productive of a

---

[64] See Schofield (1978), p.251.
[65] "ἀλλὰ δόξῃ μὲν ἕπεται πίστις (οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δοξάζοντα οἷς δοκεῖ μὴ πιστεύειν), τῶν δὲ θηρίων οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει πίστις, φαντασία δὲ πολλοῖς. ἔτι πάσῃ μὲν δόξῃ ἀκολουθεῖ πίστις, πίστει δὲ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι πειθοῖ δὲ λόγος. τῶν δὲ θηρίων ἐνίοις φαντασία μὲν ὑπάρχει λόγος δ' οὔ."

strong pleasurable or painful response is not any old appearance, but must involve the object of the emotion as appearing close by (either physically or temporally).[66]

2.2.3.   *Habituation and the Appearances View*

In the previous section I outlined the *Appearances View* of emotion that I believe can be plausibly derived from Aristotle's remarks on emotion in *Rhetoric* II; I now wish to return to the initial claim that I made, namely that this view must also be supposed if we are to understand Aristotle's account in the *Nicomachean Ethics* of how we may cultivate the emotional dispositions appropriate to virtue through a process of habituation. Whilst the claim is not made explicitly by Aristotle, or in Burnyeat's reconstruction, I believe a strong clue is nevertheless given in the focus that is placed on the importance of a *child's development of good habits of feeling*. I shall now try to draw out the connection.

We saw that for Aristotle virtue requires that the agent experiences the appropriate *pathē* when performing virtuous actions and importantly takes pleasure in those actions that they perform. This is especially important for the student of virtue, who in being motivated by pleasure, will not be persuaded through argument to pursue virtuous action if they do not recognise it as pleasurable. If a child has already been guided in performing virtuous actions, then they will luckily have had exposure to the pleasurable quality of those actions; but the crucial feature of learning to be good and developing the right emotional dispositions is not simply that one take pleasure in those actions *when they are performed* (you enjoy sharing with your brother *when* you do so, as you enjoy a roller-coaster *when* you are on the ride) but that you must be able to recognise *future* cases of virtuous action as pleasurable, thus giving you motivation to perform them (you must be able to envisage sharing with your brother *tomorrow* as pleasurable, as you see a new ride and think 'that's *going to be* fun!').

The point is that this re-*cognition* need not involve beliefs – or rather, for the child it *cannot* involve beliefs. The child does not yet have a developed rational faculty[67], and does not *believe* that sharing with her brother is noble and thus pleasurable. But they do possess *phantasia*. They are able to remember sharing yesterday, remember that is was 'nice', and when it is suggested they share their toys again, they are able to

---

[66] Nieuwenburgh labels this the 'nearness condition'.
[67] See for example *Pol.* 1260a, *NE* 1174a.

envisage this as 'nice' also. So the point of the child engaging in virtuous action is that they experience the pleasure of those actions, are equipped with a memory of that pleasure and are able to expect such pleasure from similar actions in the future. This is the complex relation between memory and expectation that I indicated is crucial in the previous section, and we saw explicitly linked to *phantasia* by Aristotle at 1370a-b.

The child is not yet virtuous, of course. They may be performing virtuous action, taking pleasure in those actions and some pleasure in their anticipation. But this takes time and practice to develop. Having shared on one occasion, the child has a memory of the pleasure of sharing, but this one memory may not yet be enough to create a *strong impression* of pleasure in the future (particularly if that one occasion of sharing recedes further into the past). Perhaps they even have competing impressions of the pleasure of sharing on the one hand and the pleasure they also derived from hitting their brother on the other. But if the child continues to share and continues to experience its intrinsic pleasure, they may form a stronger and stronger impression of this, which informs their future expectations. As the child matures, they will begin to develop beliefs and knowledge about their actions

The process of habituation not only enables the child to experience the pleasure of particular acts of virtue, but to begin to *see* the world in the right way. By performing the virtuous act, the child experiences the pleasure of that act (pleasure importantly taken in the right object), and will thus be equipped with a memory – an impression – of that pleasure. The content of that *phantasia* is backwards-looking, but it may inform the impression we have of such actions looking to the future. When we anticipate that act of virtue or are faced with a choice of whether to perform that action or not, we are able to envisage it as pleasurable (and thus, for the infant, choiceworthy). By repeating the action we form a firmer and firmer impression of that pleasure (or the pleasing features of the action), until we finally come to envisage virtuous action always under that aspect. But I suggest that for Aristotle our practice of the action must be frequent and regular for this impression to be firm. Later we will come to make virtuous choices from the knowledge of their goodness, rather than the pursuit of pleasure, but by then we will experience no conflict in such choice, for our knowledge and *pathē* will be correctly aligned with the same objects.

In considering the emotional development of the child and the cognitive faculties with which the child is equipped, we can see that the cognition that precedes the feeling of pleasure or pain in emotion must be *phantasia,* and how an *Appearances View* of emotion can make sense of an account of development which insists on the need for experience and repeated practice, which the *Beliefs View* cannot. "*For a long time moral development must be a less than fully rational process",* wrote Burnyeat, and in light of the account we have just developed we might then understand the rest of his claim, that: "what is less often acknowledged, [is] that *a mature morality must in large part continue to be <u>what it originally was, a matter of responses deriving from sources other than reflective reason</u>*"[68]. Mature morality, like the child's, involves us not only taking pleasure in the right objects, but *seeing* those objects in that light as well; as adults we must *see* the world in the right way, not simply believe the right things about it.

2.2.4. *Response to Dow*

I mentioned in §2.2.2 that I do not want to engage in the debate of whether the *Beliefs View* or *Appearances View* presents the most *accurate* interpretation of Aristotle's own view of emotion, but I do want to respond to one aspect of Dow's paper in defence of the *Beliefs View* which might seem to undermine my argument for suggesting that Aristotle's account of habituation assumes an *Appearances View.* For whilst I have claimed that only the *Appearances View* can explain how a child develops the right emotional dispositions that are the necessary starting points for virtue, it has been argued by Dow that in fact it is the *Beliefs View* of emotion which alone can explain Aristotle's remarks on virtue. Dow notes that the kind of virtuous action, involving the proper emotional affect, is "a matter of making the best response to the best information available to the agent":

"Accordingly, making the best emotional response, of the kind involved in virtue, cannot merely be a matter of responding to appearances only, it must be a response that is sensitive to the balance of relevant information available. Since, frequently, this will be a matter of making an emotional response to the balance of relevant information available despite appearances to the contrary, its distinctive outlook cannot be a matter of how appearances stand to the subject"[69].

---

[68] Burnyeat (1980), p.80.
[69] Dow (2009), p.148.

Since our response must be made to the relevant information available despite what else might appear to be the case, Dow believes that the cause of our response cannot be an appearance. But I believe this argument goes too quickly and ignores a crucial fact about appearances; a fact we saw when considering the developmental stages of the child. And that is that we can have conflicting appearances. Dow's argument seems to be that since we might have a false appearance, and a virtuous agent will react appropriately in spite of such an appearance (i.e. will act contrary to how one might be expected to react given such an appearance), that the cause of their reaction thus cannot be an appearance (and must, on his view, be a belief). But the fact that one does not react in accordance with a *particular* appearance does not entail that the cause of your reaction cannot be an appearance: it might rather be an alternative appearance. An appearance of an object may have some fearful features, but it also has sufficient other features that a fearful response is not produced. I may act bravely and an object does not (on balance) appear to me frightening, despite certain appearances to the contrary. As I learn not to fear public speaking, say, I may be confident as a result of the positive image I have developed through practicing to a friendly audience, despite a lingering appearance I still have for some time of myself faltering (an appearance which, having been impressed upon me for so long before, has yet to completely disappear). This is partly why it takes time – to build up a strong appearance and come to see things in only one light.

2.3.   Remembering Aristotle, Anticipating Epicurus

I hope we may now have a sufficient understanding of Aristotle's notion of habituation, his model of emotion and relation between the two that we may proceed to our interpretation of Epicurus in the next chapter. I wish to conclude this chapter by considering a particular feature of Aristotle's account and how it should relate to our interpretive project. This is the relation, for Aristotle, between the forward and backward looking aspects of *phantasia*.

From the account we have given, one might think there is a pertinent dis-analogy between Aristotle's discussion and what concerns Epicurus. This is not the claim that the one aims at virtue and the other *ataraxia* (for in certain respects these are not so different if we consider that they are both settled states of character, and require that we are disposed to feel the appropriate way). Rather, the objection concerns the fact

that throughout I have stressed the *motivating* role of pleasure (and de-motivating role of pain) - or more to the point, the role of pleasure in *motivating us towards particular acts*. And this is why the relation between the forward/backward looking aspects of *phantasia* was so important in Aristotle, because he could show that if we remember a pleasing feature of an action and see it in that light in the future, we will be motivated to pursue it in the future. But for the Epicureans, in terms of removing anxiety there is not a particular *action* we are aiming at; does the focus on memory and anticipation derived from Aristotle's account then become irrelevant? I do not think so.

The forward/backwards looking relation is in fact of central importance in applying our Aristotelian findings to our Epicurean account – but not because of any concern with action. Rather, it is a crucial feature of the fear of death that it is forward looking, and thus if we are not to be fearful of death, our future directed imagining of it must not represent it as painful or a harm, ensuring that we are not pained in our contemplation. We have to come to *see* death in the right way, in order to feel the right way.

Chapter 3
An *Epicurean Appearances View*

3.1.   Introduction

In this Chapter I present my alternative reading of Epicurean emotions, conceived in response to the intellectual orthodoxy and in light of Aristotle's account of habituation and possible view of emotion. The alternative reading I suggest presents Epicurus as advocating an *Appearances View* of emotion, according to which an emotional response is composed of a feeling of pleasure or pain, produced by the particular appearance of its intentional object. On this view, then, emotion is intentional and cognitive; but that cognition does not involve belief but rather a form of appearance. In Aristotle, the position can be explained with reference to his account of *phantasia,* distinguished from *doxa* in terms of its unresponsiveness to reason, indifference to veracity and being possessed by children and animals.[70] Through an appreciation of these and other features of *phantasia*, we were then able to show the compatibility of this account of emotion with Aristotle's claim that a process of habituation is required for the cultivation of proper emotional dispositions (as needed for virtue).[71] I believe that an *Appearances View* of emotion may likewise make sense of Epicurus' instruction that we should accustom ourselves to fearlessness in the anticipation of death, but further work is now required to develop this as an interpretation of Epicurean emotion.

Successfully applying this model of emotion to the Epicurean fragments involves at least two tasks. Firstly, since the previous chapter suggested only a *model* for a theory of emotion on the one hand and on the other explained certain features of that model using the particular resources of Aristotle's philosophy, our interpretation must offer an *Epicurean* account of the *Appearances View* of emotion, explaining and filling out the model on the basis of Epicurean philosophy (in particular, Epicurus' atomism and philosophy of mind). Secondly, whilst the previous chapter presented

---

[70] Cf. *DA* 428a.

[71] In particular, the unresponsiveness of *phantasia* to reason can explain why an intellectual process such as argumentation is ineffective in cultivating emotional responses, whilst the possession of *phantasia* by children makes it possible for Aristotle to stipulate that the process of habituation must start in childhood, if virtue in adulthood is to be attained.

the *Appearances View* of emotion as a conceptually and historically plausible alternative to the intellectualist (by way of reference to Aristotle), we must now show what further positive support there may be for attributing this view to Epicurus and why it is a good interpretation of the fragments.

I will begin with the first task, offering a more specifically 'Epicurean' *Appearances View* of emotion, focusing on the more controversial aspect of that view (namely the nature and power of the cognitive state involved) and examining Epicurus' own account of *phantasia*. In doing so I will show that Epicurus has the conceptual resources from which an *Appearances View* of emotion could be constructed. In fact, in fulfilling this first task, we will already begin to make progress in the second, for I believe that once the *Epicurean Appearances View* is developed, it offers a view of emotion very much in keeping with the central tenets of Epicurean thought, integrating with or incorporating fragments of Epicurus' physics, psychology and even epistemology. In §3.3 I will support the attribution of this view to Epicurus by highlighting textual support for the principal features of the *Appearances View* of emotion, namely that emotion is constituted by (i) a feeling of pleasure or pain, (ii) an appearance of the intentional object and (iii) that the appearance causes the feeling of pleasure or pain. I will note also that the view is consistent with certain features of, or testimonies from, Epicurus' ethics, which is of particular significance since it was in this context that our interest in the Epicurean account of emotion first arose. Most importantly, however, I will show that the textual difficulties I presented against the intellectualist interpretation are not problematic for the *Epicurean Appearances View*, thus giving us reason to prefer this interpretation. Having completed these tasks, I will then present and respond to an objection that may be raised against this account of Epicurean emotion: that it leaves no room for Epicurean philosophy in the process of emotional therapy and leaves unexplained the presence of Epicurus' arguments. I will claim, however, that Epicurean philosophy still plays a role in the process of achieving *ataraxia* and will suggest in particular that the therapeutic techniques described by Tsouna and mentioned briefly in Chapter One, can be easily understood as directed towards the alteration of appearances.

3.2. The *Epicurean Appearances View*

The aim of this section is to develop a fuller explanation, on the basis of the Epicurean fragments, of the model of emotion derived from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and implied, I believe, by his *Ethics*. On this model, emotion is constituted by a feeling of pleasure or pain, caused by an 'appearance' of a particular sort, by which the emotion is individuated. Take a fear of public speaking, in which the subject is painfully anxious in the anticipation of such events.[72] On an intellectualist picture, this fear is either reducible to or has as a necessary and sufficient cause, beliefs about the matter: that they will dry up, that their audience will be hostile, that they will be humiliated, say. And an explanation needs to be offered of why, when a fearful speaker claims not to believe these things (when they are confident in their work and know their audience is sympathetic, say) their fear remains. On the *Appearances View*, however, the explanation is that regardless of their beliefs about the matter, when they *imagine* a future occasion of public speaking they imagine it as in some sense harmful or humiliating; perhaps they imagine themselves before an intimidating audience or have an impression of themself stuttering as they speak.[73] Either way, what has resulted is a 'negative' impression of public speaking, and since this appearance is non-rational, it cannot be altered by argumentation.

Our task now is to look in more detail at how this model of emotion, distinguished from others by the mode of non-intellectual cognition involved, would be explained within Epicurean philosophy, particularly given Epicurus' atomistic account of mental functioning. On the account derived from Aristotle, the appearance or *phantasia* of the future event was explained with reference to his faculty of the same name, but how might 'appearances' be understood in Epicurean philosophy of mind? We need to show that Epicurean philosophy has the resources to account for the following features of an *Appearances View*:

(i)   that we can have *phantasia* of objects and that this cognition is distinct from belief;

---

[72] Whilst our specific concern in developing an account of Epicurean emotion and emotional therapy was with our *fear of death* (being the main obstacle to achieving *ataraxia*), in this chapter my examples will focus largely on more prosaic cases, since these are less problematic than the fear of death. This chapter seeks to develop a *general* view of the nature of emotion and its therapy for the Epicureans, before we come to think about the content of specific cases.

[73] One question we might ask is 'why', and various answers will be offered in the following discussion.

(ii)   that *appearances* can both correctly and incorrectly represent their object[74];

(iii)   that *appearances* have the power to produce the feelings of pleasure or pain that also constitute emotion.

To answer these questions, we must now turn Epicurus' account of mental functioning, and in doing so, begin to develop a more specifically *Epicurean* account of the *Appearances View*.

3.2.1. *Phantasia in Epicurus*

Diogenes Laertius tells us that Epicurus wrote a work entirely on the topic of *Phantasia* (*DL* X.28) but that this text (much to our disadvantage) is lost. Nevertheless, references to *phantasia* still appear in various other Epicurean texts, most notably in Epicurus' account of sensation in the *Letter to Herodutus*. Having introduced his atomistic physics in the early sections of the work, according to which everything in the world is composed from atoms or separated by void (*Ep. Hed.* 40-45), Epicurus then proceeds to offer an account of sensation, beginning with an account of sight and how we form impressions of external objects. In doing so, he makes appeal to 'images' (*eidola*) – fine films of atoms which fly from solid objects (at 'unsurpassed speed'), as a result of the vibration of the atoms deep in the solid body. "The unity and continuity [of these flying atoms] then results in an 'impression' (*phantasia*) and preserves their co-affection all the way from the object because of their uniform bombardment from it" (*LS* 15A8). In other words, the *eidola* impress themselves on our soul, which "is itself delicate and extraordinarily mobile" (*LS* 15D4).

Annas describes the impression of atoms on the soul as follows:

"A continual barrage of images makes an imprint in the souls by building up a new pattern of atomic movement in the soul. Perception is, on the physical level a change in the perceiver that consists in having some of her atomic movements changed. A single

---

[74] Epicurean appearances must be capable of correctly representing an object since some emotions are justified and will involve seeing the object the right way. They must also be capable of incorrectly representing an object since the *Appearances View* holds that appearances can conflict with our true beliefs about an object.

perception will do this fleetingly; it takes continued perception to build up something more permanent in the perceiver's soul"[75].

Annas' latter remark on the need for continued perception in building new impressions will be of particular importance when we come to consider the role of repeated experience in the formation and alteration of appearances. A word or two more might first be needed, though, to clarify the relevance of this account of visual perception to our inquiry. Of course, the account provides us not simply with an explanation of the mechanism by which we *see* objects, but rather how we come to (literally) form an impression of an object; it is an atomistic account of how an object *appears* to us. Several questions arise, however.

In the first place, we might naturally wonder how we explain the formation of mental images in *dreams* or the *imagination*, on an account of *phantasia* which appeals to a stream of atoms emitted by an external object? This is, after all, the kind of impression we surely have when we *imagine* our death. The account in *Ep. Hed.* informs us that the mind in fact obtains impressions in the same manner as sight; but as Lucretius explains, those images which enter the mind are "much more delicate-textured than the ones which fill the eyes and stimulate vision". Such images, being extremely delicate, form together easily when they meet – or even spontaneously in mid-air – thus enabling us to form images of non-existent creatures:

"For certainly the image of a Centaur does not arise from a living one – there never was such a species of animal – but when the image of a horse and a man have accidentally met they easily and immediately stick together… owing to their fine nature and delicate texture" (*LS* 15D3)

Phantasia of dreams or the imagination thus have an atomic cause, like our visual impressions, but the images which impress themselves on the mind are not (necessarily) emitted by an external body. Whether as a result of visual perception or the functioning of the imagination, the appearance of an object is simply the resulting impression of *eidola* on the soul. But questions still remain, for the Epicurean account of *phantasia* is not unproblematic and those problems the account apparently faces appear magnified when considered in the context of emotion.

---

[75] Annas (1992), p.161.

3.2.2. *The 'truth' of phantasia*

In considering the formation of mental images and the causal story the Epicureans offer, we may be puzzled as to how this squares with a central, but controversial, tenet of Epicurean epistemology: the famous claim that 'all impressions are true'. The claim is troubling from an epistemological perspective, because we naturally want to resist the claim that a perception of a Centaur or hallucination is 'true', and the status of the doctrine in Epicurus' epistemology is therefore widely debated. As our investigation of 'appearances' is concerned more with the physiology and psychology of *phantasia* rather than their epistemological significance we should be wary of being drawn too far into that debate. But since one feature of the *Appearances View* that we needed to account for was the idea that we can both correctly and incorrectly represent objects, a few comments on the issue are clearly necessary. In fact, we will find that they are illuminating for in considering some respects in which the claim is puzzling and the responses that may be offered, we discover certain features of *phantasia* that are central to our investigation.

Many commentators, noting the intuitive implausibility of Epicurus's claim that 'all impressions are true', quickly explain that the Greek word for 'true' can also mean 'real' and that Epicurus' claim may thus be taken to mean 'all impressions are real'. But as Long and Sedley point out, we surely want this to mean more than 'all sensations are real events' if the claim is to be anything other than trivially true. Sextus' record of the Epicurean doctrine does indeed suggest a stronger meaning, for he attributes Epicurus' claim to his belief that "every impression is the product of something existent and like the thing which moves the sense" (*LS*16 F1). The position may seem once again puzzling, for surely Epicurus recognises that the objects of our perceptions do not always exist and/or that our perceptions do not always accurately represent their object. To respond to this objection, however, Epicurus need only refer back to the above account of the formation of impressions: the existent thing that is the cause of the impression is not, of course, the perceived external object, but the image that impresses itself on the mind. And the impression is true, not of the external object it purportedly represents, but "because it accurately

reports the state of the images entering the eye"[76]. So even an alleged misperception, such as a hallucination, is true; the error lies in then judging that the hallucinated object exists. We go wrong by adding belief to our impressions.

In terms of our understanding of Epicurean *phantasia,* one interesting feature of this account of truth and falsity that emerges from the 'all impressions are true' thesis is that it points to a clear distinction between beliefs and the impressions of our imagination. While an impression of an object may often be a good reason for judging that that object exists or that it is a certain way, Epicurus like Aristotle also allows that we might have an impression (which is true of the *images* which cause it), and yet need not judge that this appearance is true of a particular external object. Thus it is perfectly possible that Epicurus would allow us to have a mental impression, in contemplating death perhaps, without insisting that in having this impression we are thereby committed to some kind of belief about the matter.[77]

A second interesting aspect of the 'all impressions are true' thesis is Epicurus' purpose in asserting the claim. The thesis is typically interpreted within an anti-sceptical context, as an assertion of the validity of perceptual knowledge in the face of sceptical challenges.[78] I do not wish to refute this interpretation in any way, but only suggest that Epicurus' insistence on the truth or reality of impressions may also be taken as trying to show why non-veridical appearances – or more to the point, *appearances in general* – can have such power to move. In outlining Aristotle's account of emotion we asked how appearances can be so powerful when we do not take them to be the case, and the answer we are provided with here is 'because impressions are real'. This may also provide a way of reading the following claim by Diogenes Laertius that "the objects presented to madmen and to people in dreams are true, for they produce effects – i.e. movements in the mind – which that which is unreal never does" (DL X.32). The impressions of madmen are real, not only because they are caused by real things (images), but also because the impressions

---

[76] *LS*, p.85. Long and Sedley use the metaphor of a photograph to elucidate this sense of the truth of impressions "A photograph is properly regarded as a photograph of an external object, not of light waves, yet it is 'true' not in so far as it accurately depicts the shape and colour of the object itself – it may well not do so, e.g. because of perspective, and the use of black and white film, - but in so far as it accurately reports the pattern of light waves arriving at the lens, and thus provides bona fide evidence about the external object reflecting the light."

[77] Further, contextual support for this distinction in Hellenistic thought can be derived from the testimony of the Sceptics, who claim to suspend judgement about everything, but nonetheless live by appearances. Cf. *PH* 1.13.

[78] See Striker (1996) pp.77-91 for discussion.

themselves have the power to move the mind (i.e. produce sensation). This latter explanation then resembles Aristotle's account of the power of *phantasia* to produce sensations of pleasure and pain, and accords with our claim that the pleasures or pains that are constitutive of emotion may be caused by an appearance of something being a certain way.[79]

3.2.3. *Variance in phantasia*

So far we have a physical account of the cause of *phantasia* and an insight into certain features of Epicurean *phantasia* derived from Epicurus' psychology and epistemology. As stated above, the epistemological puzzles surrounding Epicurus' thesis that 'all impressions are true' are not the subject of this thesis, but there is one last question we should let surface, for it will again be illuminating for our discussion.

The question arises in response to the above explanation that all impressions are true in so far as they are caused by images and accurately represent those images as they enter a given sense organ. For one might respond that what we are really interested in is the accurate representation *of the object* – and in certain cases doesn't this representation seem to be obviously false? We might accept that the notion of 'falsity' only enters when belief is added to the picture and the impression is judged to be true of that external object; yet the question remains as to how it is possible to 'misrepresent' an object, when the images that produce that representation are supposedly emitted from the object and supposedly resemble that object? How can we represent a stick as bent when that impression is caused by images emitted from a straight stick? Long and Sedley suggest that such an illusion can be accounted for, because what is represented is not a stick *simpliciter* but a stick *as-it-appears-in-water-in-a-glass*.[80] We might reframe the challenge, however, and ask how Epicurus would explain conflicting appearances between multiple viewers in similar conditions. The general question that these challenges raise is: how, on this causal, atomistic account, do we explain variance in perceptions?

Various explanations are offered in the literature, many appealing to a disturbance in the stream of images that are emitted from the object. The explanation that is most

---

[79] Diogenes of Oenoanda makes reference to the emotional effects of images (in the context of Epicurus' account of perception) adding further support to our interpretation. *New Fr.*12 5-14; Smith (1971), p.377.
[80] *LS,* p.86.

fruitful for our account, however, is that offered by Asmis. Asmis points out that "a derangement in the sensory organ may alter the perception" and by way of explanation goes on to say:

"Basically a sense organ takes in precisely what is commensurate with it. Its condition therefore determines what parts of the perceptual stream it encounters. As a result perceptions vary from one type of animal to another, from one individual to another, and from one perception to another"[81].

Asmis recalls Lucretius' example of honey which, when the organ of taste is healthy will taste sweet, but when the organ is defective in some way will taste bitter. She explains that "in the former case, atoms productive of sweet taste interact with the sense organ; in the latter, atoms that produce a bitter taste are admitted instead"[82]. So a defective organ admits different images to those admitted by a healthy organ.

I draw this explanation to our attention for a number of reasons. Firstly, because it highlights a feature of appearances (and in particular, appearances in emotion) that we want to explain, namely how 'appearances' can go wrong, how an appearance can misrepresent an object in the first place (*prior* to the addition of any judgement about that appearance). Because the point, in the case of an irrational or recalcitrant emotion, is that we are moved by a 'false' appearance (whilst judging that what appears is not actually the case). An answer, then, that appeals to the *state of the receiving organ or agent* provides an interesting means of explaining variance in appearances (between the object represented and one or multiple perceiving subjects). But I do not believe that we need to appeal always to a *defect* in the perceiver or sense organ to explain its receptivity to certain sorts of impressions – rather we might make an appeal to the atomic constitution of that subject.

Remember the Epicurean claim, noted in Chapter One, that we are born with an original atomic constitution, made up of a particular arrangement of basic atoms; and Lucretius' explanation that this constitution determines the emotional dispositions of humans and animals. Recall too my argument that an account of emotion which appeals to beliefs as the basis of emotion will have difficulty reconciling itself with this claim. Now a question which faces our *Appearances View* would be: how do we square this interpretation and the causal role it assigns to *appearances* in generating

[81] Asmis (1999) p. 271
[82] Ibid.

emotion, with Lucretius' claim about our original constitutions? And the answer is that our original constitution plays a role in determining the images which strike us. So those with a more wind-based constitution may be more receptive to those wind-like images, whilst those with a fiery constitution may be more prone to receive fire-like images. Our different constitutions, being more receptive to certain atoms, may be more likely to form certain impressions (seeing an object under a fearful aspect, say) and thus more likely to have certain emotional responses.

Returning to the example we used to illustrate the *Appearances View* at the beginning of this section, we can now explain how the subject may have formed a negative impression of public speaking: whether formed from previous experiences of public speaking or simply through the combination of atoms, their constitution is such that they are more receptive to images productive of 'fearful' impressions, and thus an impression of harm or humiliation is formed.

We should now be familiar with the key features of *phantasia* for Epicurus, and thus how the non-intellectual cognition required for the *Appearances View* of emotion might be understood on the basis of Epicurean atomistic philosophy. Considering the account alongside Epicurus' claim about the 'truth of all impressions', we are able to show how Epicurus distinguished *appearances* from beliefs and how *appearances*, for Epicurus, have the power to move us. Despite the seeming contradiction between the 'truth of all impressions' claim and the requirement of an *Appearances View* that it be possible to misrepresent an object, I suggested that Epicurus does not claim that impressions must be true *of the represented object* and that Epicurus' atomism in fact provides an explanation of how we might come to have an inaccurate appearance of an object (via interference in the stream of atoms or our atomic constitution). Epicurus thus has the conceptual resources to construct an *Appearances View* of emotion, but the question we must now answer is: does this provide a good interpretation of the fragments?

3.3.   In Support of the *Epicurean Appearances View*

As we acknowledged at the beginning of this thesis, owing to the lack of an explicit theory of emotion and state of the extant Epicurean writings, any interpretation of Epicurean emotion will be somewhat speculative. But the strength of an interpretation may nevertheless be judged on its consistency with the fragments and

ability to accommodate certain claims within the extant writings. In what follows I will show that the principle features of the *Appearances View* do find textual support in the fragments and are consistent with a key testimony of Epicurus' ethical writing. I will then return to those textual features presented in Chapter One, which I argued were difficult to accommodate on an intellectualist interpretation and will show that they can be accounted for on the *Epicurean Appearances View.*

3.3.1. *The Appearances View and Epicurean Ethics*

The least controversial aspect of the *Appearances View* I believe is the claim that emotions are, in part, constituted by feelings of pleasure or pain. I believe the attribution of this thesis to the Epicureans is uncontroversial for a number of reasons, not least that it is explicitly stated in the fragments: at *Ep. Men.* 125 Epicurus remarks that we experience (groundless*) "pain in the expectation"* of our death and continues to mention the 'pain' of anticipation throughout the passage. Furthermore, the thesis coheres well with the historical context in which Epicurus was writing. The association of pleasure and pain with emotion had already been made by Epicurus' predecessors; Aristotle's account of the accompaniment of emotion by pleasure or pain we have already discussed, but many other instances of such an association occur Greek thought, a notable example being the *Philebus* where Plato presents a view of the emotions *as* mixed pleasures and pains.

Whilst Epicurus was often keen to deny the influence of his philosophical ancestors, the compatibility of this thesis with his own hedonist views would have made it ripe for appropriation into his account of emotion. Epicurus' psychological hedonism – the view that pleasure and pain are the criteria by which we judge all things good or bad and from which we make every choice or avoidance – is often taken to be the central feature of Epicurean ethics. From Epicurus' discussion of fear alone it is clear that he sees emotions as likewise positively or negatively valenced, and a natural explanation of this phenomenon in Epicurean terms is that they are constituted either by a feeling of pleasure or a feeling of pain.

Surprisingly, given its coherence with Epicurean ethics and history of ideas, this feature of Epicurus' view of emotion has received little contemporary attention in comparison to the focus on the supposedly intellectual features of emotion; but it is nonetheless a thesis that the orthodox reading could endorse. Indeed, Tsouna

acknowledged that our emotions involve certain non-cognitive components, with which the claim that emotions involve feelings of pleasure or pain is consistent. But it is important that we distinguish this view from the position found in Tsouna's paper, for we saw that her discussion implied that even these non-cognitive affects were causally dependent on our beliefs, suggesting that they could also be removed by the alteration of the beliefs from which they arise. On the *Appearances View*, however, our feeling of pain is crucially *not* caused by the *belief* that death is a harm, but by an appearance. Note indeed that Epicurus says that the "*expectation* of death causes pain" – the negative evaluative response arises in the anticipation of death and is not necessarily mediated by any beliefs about it. We shall return to this fragment in just a moment, but first we shall consider one further piece of textual evidence that supports this feature of the *Appearances View* (i.e. that an appearance can cause a feeling of pleasure or pain).

I suggested in the previous chapter that doubt over the power of 'mere' appearances to produce sensation is perhaps a factor that drives interpreters to dismiss *Appearances Views* of emotion, so finding support for this thesis is an important matter. In *Ep. Hed.* we saw that impressions have the power to produce feelings of pleasure and pain, and the thesis is further supported by Diogenes of Oenoanda who writes:

"If they (i.e. visions) have the form of such things as are congenial to our nature, they make the mind exceedingly glad; if, on the other hand, they have the form of such things as are repugnant to our nature, they often fill the whole man with perturbation and fear and set his heart pounding" (*New Fr.* 12 5-14).

But I believe we also find in Epicurus' ethics strong contextual evidence for the thesis, in the emphasis placed by the Epicureans on the power of *memory and anticipation* to produce feelings of pleasure or counterbalance feelings of pain. Take the famous testimony of Epicurus on his deathbed, for instance:

"Strangury and dysentery had set in, with all the extreme intensity of which they are capable. But the joy in my soul at the memory of our past discussions was enough to counterbalance all this" (*DL* X.22)

The remembrance of conversations with his friends was able to produce a feeling of pleasure in the present; a feeling strong enough that it was sufficient to counterbalance the excruciating pain of gallstones. As with the status afforded to

pleasure and pain as motivational forces and criteria of good and bad, the thesis that the imaginings of memory or anticipation have the power to produce a sensational response is central to Epicurean ethics. For the testimony of Epicurus on his deathbed is not simply an anecdote for the enjoyment of Epicurean followers but a recommendation that positive memories (of an appropriate sort) will be enough to produce pleasure even in the face of unavoidable bodily pain, and ensure that we are secure in achieving and maintaining a state of *ataraxia*. Given the centrality of the claim in Epicurean ethics, particularly with regard to achieving *ataraxia*, it is all the more plausible that this thesis would be incorporated into his account of emotion.

3.3.2. *Accustoming: Infant, Animal and Recalcitrant Emotions (revisited)*

i. Accustoming

In Chapter One I argued that the intellectualist interpretation sat uncomfortably with the claim at *Ep. Men.* 124 that we must 'accustom ourselves' to hold that death is nothing to us, and in Chapter Two sought a model of emotion compatible with the claim that emotional states can be altered via a process of accustoming or habituation. We are already aware following our discussion of Aristotle that an *Appearances View* of emotion is consistent with the 'accustoming' thesis, but in developing the specifically *Epicurean Appearances View* we are provided with a fuller explanation of how the practice or repeated experience involved in habituation can alter the impressions we have of objects and therefore our emotional states.

In discussing Aristotle we suggested that through experience of an object or state of affairs we gain access to certain features of that object, and over time develop an impression of the object with those features as its salient content. In Epicurus, however, we are offered a full, causal account of how that occurs, and why indeed *repeated* practice and *time* are needed to form that impression. Let us return to our public speaking example. Now imagine that our phobic delivers the lecture they were anxiously anticipating and it went as follows: their audience were engaged, they didn't shake, they didn't stutter; it wasn't unpleasant or harmful. Through this experience, through the images emitted, our subject forms an impression of these features. Perhaps they had to concentrate on those positive features, for as Lucretius explains, certain images are so delicate that "the mind [could] only see sharply those of them which it strain[ed] to see" (LS 15D8). But once received, their mind was *impressed* by

the images nonetheless. The next week, when they come to present again, they have this memory to draw on. They can picture themself in front of an audience, and whilst the scene still includes some intimidating features (that impression hasn't entirely faded yet) this time it also includes a confident presenter and lively discussion. And their response to this scene is not so painful anymore. The 'positive' impression will only be feint at first, but through *repeated* experience and frequent practice of public speaking, they build up a firmer impression of its positive feature and eventually come only to imagine it in this light, with the result that they no longer feel pain at the expectation of speaking.[83]

ii. *Recalcitrant and 'Irrational' emotions*

From this and our previous discussions, it should now be clear how the *Appearances View* explains the recalcitrant nature of certain emotions. We described recalcitrant emotions in Chapter One as those which persists despite being in conflict with the subject's better beliefs (such as, indeed, a fear of public speaking despite professed confidence in one's ability) and argued that an intellectualist interpretation also has difficulty in accounting for such cases, since they seem to involve simultaneously judging *p* and its negation. On the *Appearances View* however, an emotion will persist so long as the object of the emotion *appears* to the subject a certain way, regardless of their beliefs; we need not therefore ascribe to them contradictory beliefs (or attempt to explain the problem with reference to latent or 'un-internalised' beliefs).

Dow argues that the *Appearances View* fails to account, however, for the 'irrational' nature of such emotions, for there is no irrationality he claims "in having a perceptual appearance as of things being different from how the subject knows them to be"[84]. On the one hand, we might bite the bullet and agree that phobias or recalcitrant emotions should not be described as 'irrational'; but we might also use 'irrational' in a less strict sense to refer to the conflict between the content of the appearance and that of the better belief. When we describe an emotional response as 'irrational' we can simply mean that the subject has an incorrect impression of the intentional object and their reaction to that object is unwarranted by any proper

---

[83] An obvious difficulty with this account, however, lies in applying it to our fear of death. For whilst Epicurus' account of impression formation allows us to alter our impression of objects through repeated experience of them, it is difficult to see what experience we might have that could alter our impression of death. I shall address this problem in the next chapter

[84] Dow (2009), p.146.

features of that object. The *Appearances View* does not make these cases difficult or impossible, but nor is it unable to account what is 'incorrect' (what we typically call irrational) about such responses.

iii. *Infant Emotions*

The final textual difficulty encountered by the intellectualist interpretation was in accounting for the emotions of infants and animals, and we discovered in Chapter Two that the *Appearances View* can accommodate these cases. Whilst animals do not have the capacity to form judgements and in infants that capacity is undeveloped, both can form impressions of objects; so where Lucretius' recognition of infant and animal emotions as evidence *against* the intellectualist reading in Chapter One, it may now be referred to in *support* of the *Appearances View*.

Indeed, whilst the nature of the fragments means our development of the *Appearances* interpretation is somewhat speculative, Lucretius' description of infant emotions in fact provides us with some of the strongest *textual* evidence in favour of this reading. Lucretius writes of "the *imaginary* dangers that cause children to quake in the dark" (*DRN* III.90) which resonates with the claim of the *Appearances View* that imaginings (consisting of *phantasia*) and not beliefs are the cause of emotional responses.

We may now return to the claim at *Ep. Men.* 125 noted above where Epicurus explains that we experience pain in the "expectation of death". I stated that the remark is consistent with the *Appearances View* in positing 'pain' as the affective component of fear (rather than a particular 'feeling' of fear) and noted that rather than citing specific beliefs as the cause of this pain, the passage simply states that it is felt in the expectation or anticipation of death. On an intellectualist reading, these states would be characterised as somehow belief involving, and whilst I do not deny that such attempt at characterisation may be pursued by the intellectualist, I believe that Lucretius' explicit reference to the *imaginings* that cause fear give us reason for characterising these states as involving rather the imagination and thus *phantasia*. The anticipation of harm involved in fear on this reading consists of a future directed *phantasia*, whilst the memory of a slight involved in anger, say, consists of a past-directed *phantasia*. Indeed, memory is characterised precisely in this way by Lucretius, who explains of memory that some *images* affect us as to make us think repeatedly of their object (*DRN* IV.962).

In having developed the *Epicurean Appearances View,* presented textual and contextual support for the essential features of the view in Epicurus' ethics and importantly, shown the capacity of the view to accommodate those textual features that were problematic for the intellectualist interpretation, I hope to have shown that we have reason to think this offers a good interpretation of the Epicurean fragments, and a preferable one to the orthodox reading. I foresee, however, an objection to this interpretation, and this I will address in the following section.

3.4.   An Objection and Response

On the interpretation I have proposed, emotion involves the intentional object of the emotion *appearing* a certain way to the agent, rather than their holding a particular belief about it, and thus the alteration of emotional states requires not a change in beliefs, but in appearances. Drawing on the atomistic account of Epicurean *phantasia* I explained how a process of habituation, involving repeated experience of the intentional object enables us to form new impressions, thereby altering how we imagine that object in the future. Yet there is an issue that this interpretation leaves in need of explanation: the role that Epicurean philosophy should play in this process.

In the Introduction, we noted the Epicurean claim that a philosopher's words are 'empty' if they do not help alleviate suffering, and accordingly placed as a constraint on any account of Epicurean therapy that it must cohere with this tenet of Epicureanism and demonstrate the role that Epicurean philosophy plays in the therapeutic process. On the intellectualist reading, the explanation was clear. Epicurus offers intellectual therapy: by means of argument towards a particular conclusion, Epicurus seeks to alter our beliefs about the object of our emotion, removing the false beliefs which are the source of our emotion and replacing them with true beliefs which will enable us to achieve our desired state. Epicurean philosophy, on this view, is not intended for disinterested scholarship, but as a practical aid – *the* practical aid, in fact – for achieving mental tranquillity. On the reading I have proposed, however, argumentation appears redundant in the therapeutic process, on the grounds that our non-rational cognitions and responses are impervious to reason, and a process of habituation is instead required to achieve tranquillity. And we are thus presented with two explanatory tasks. If, firstly,

Epicurus did recognise the inadequacy or inappropriateness of intellectual therapy, then we must explain why so many arguments – specifically, for the irrationality of fearing death – appear in his ethical works. And secondly, if the suggestion is that we alter our emotional states through a process of habituation or learning-by-doing, what if any practical role can Epicurean philosophy have in helping us achieve *ataraxia*?

3.4.1. *The Role of Epicurus' Arguments*

We will begin with the role of Epicurus' arguments[85], for whilst my reading does not endorse the notion of *intellectual therapy*, I believe we can nevertheless explain the presence of argumentation in Epicurus' ethical works and its function in the wider therapeutic process. One explanation for the presence of Epicurus' arguments may be derived from our analogy with Aristotle, for a similar issue arose for Burnyeat in his interpretation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The issue there was to explain the role of the apparent teachings on virtue in the *NE*, given that (a) intellectual teaching will be inconsequential to the ill-bred, while (b) the well-bred should *already* have good habits in and correct beliefs about virtue. Burnyeat's explanation was that Aristotle's teaching gives us 'the *because*'; "he is giving a course in practical thinking to enable someone who already wants to be virtuous to understand better what he should do *and why*"[86]. Likewise, then, we might claim that Epicurus' arguments demonstrate the irrationality of our fear *as a means of enhancing our understanding.*

It may be through a process of accustoming that we come to "hold that death is nothing to us", but understanding *why* it is not a proper object of fear requires that we understand Epicurus' philosophy. On the basis of his atomism and view of the soul Epicurus is able to show why anxiety about death is indeed ungrounded, supporting his ethical outlook with his metaphysics. On this interpretation, Epicurus' philosophy looks fairly academic – of intellectual interest rather than practical use – for it appears simply to offer explanation of an attitude we should already have taken. The difficulty is how we then square such an interpretation with Epicurus' own claim that "there is no use in philosophy if it does not expel the suffering of the soul".

---

[85] Although I am postponing discussion of the fear of death until the next chapter, this section will concentrate on Epicurus' arguments towards the conclusion that 'death is nothing to us', since these are the most prominent in Epicurean writings.

[86] Burnyeat (1980), p.81.

Now, in one sense, this interpretation *does* cast Epicurus' arguments in a more academic light, showing he is interested in imparting understanding, rather than *simply* curing his students. But it is not the case that neither his arguments nor philosophy have a practical role as well.

Firstly, whilst Epicurus' arguments will be ineffective in directly altering our emotional states, they may nonetheless *create a space* in which the Epicurean student can begin to engage in emotional therapy: explaining the irrationality of our fear will not immediately vanquish it, but it may spur the student to *begin* the process of habituation that Epicurus is recommending. Secondly, showing the *groundlessness* of that fear also pre-empts any response to Epicurus' account of the *benefits* of removing fear (viz. achieving *ataraxia*) where one might argue that fear is also beneficial in that it protects us from particular harms.[87] By demonstrating that death is not a harm Epicurus can show that our fear is indeed unnecessary and does not carry any natural benefit which may outweigh the benefit of achieving *ataraxia*.

Through the philosophical understanding he tries to impart, Epicurus assumes the role of a teacher, but this does not preclude him from playing a role in our psychological therapy as well. Not only does Epicurus diagnose the cause of our psychic disease, but he also prescribes the form of treatment that is necessary to cure our illness (viz. habituation), through imperatives such as "accustom yourself" (*Ep. Men.* 124), "practice these things" (*Ep. Men.* 135) and the suggestion that we "completely rid ourselves of our *bad habits* as if they were evil men who have done us long and grievous harm" (*VS* 46).

I believe, however, that there is a further practical role that is played by Epicurus' philosophy, in which it can be interpreted not only as instructing us to engage in a process that will enable us to alter our impressions of objects, but as aiding that process itself. We may now return to the 'therapeutic strategies' reported by Tsouna, for many of these can be seen as directed to the correction of appearances, generating images and reinforcing impressions as is necessary for the alteration of an emotional state. Indeed, considered in light of our non-intellectual interpretation, I will argue that Tsouna's strategies can be shown not only to be compatible with our

---

[87] The thought of being calmly unaffected in the face of a lion may be desirable as far as achieving tranquillity is concerned, but a natural fear in the face of predators ensures that we also avoid dangerous situations.

account, but are in fact better suited to a theory of emotion which has an 'appearance' as the cognitive component of the emotion.

3.4.2. *Therapy for appearances*

Earlier, we noted Tsouna's recognition of the various modes of therapy and many extra-cognitive techniques employed by the Epicureans. "Therapeutic exercises", she explained "are intended to engage one's whole being and, therefore, they involve many factors: intellectual as well as moral, self-reflective as well as instinctual, dispositional and also behavioural, drawing on reason and sensibility, memory, imagination and sensitivity"[88]. Her treatment of Epicurean therapy appeared to make progress towards developing an alternative to the intellectualist account of Epicurean emotion, but Tsouna insisted that those non-intellectual therapies were nevertheless directed towards adjusting and integrating the set of beliefs that form the basis of our emotional responses. Might these strategies have a different function, however, if we instead assume an *Appearances* reading of Epicurean emotion?

There is one therapeutic strategy which surfaces throughout Tsouna's discussion, yet only ever seems to enjoy an ancillary role in the process of moral correction. This is the technique of *setting-before-the-eyes*[89], which "works by inducing the creation of pictures or images in the patient's mind and engages some form of imagination which has mental pictures and related items as its proper medium." [90] Tsouna describes this technique as intended to draw the patient's attention to sufferings and dangers of a particular passion, emphasising how great they are and thus prompting the patient to *seek therapy*. Working on an intellectualist understanding of emotion, she cannot see that this process might itself serve to bring about instances of the desired emotional state by engendering the formation of particular impressions within the student's mind (as an act of imagination). This more parsimonious explanation for that strategy is open if we grant the power of impressions to produce affective responses.

---

[88] Tsouna (2009), p.252.
[89] This technique is required, says Philodemus, because "reasoning alone does not suffice to achieve the desired result". This claim coheres with much of what I have claimed about the insufficiency of argumentation.
[90] Tsouna (2007), p.205.

The technique of *setting-before-the-eyes* unites many of the strategies discussed by Tsouna, even those which she claims "cannot be readily classified under some general heading"[91]. Take the technique of Moral Portraiture, which likewise involves setting a picture before-the-eye. A particular virtue or vice (or rather virtuous or vicious agent) is described in vivid detail, compelling us "to imagine what it is like to be superstitious, arrogant, irascible etc. and also what it is like to be the opposite."[92] The intention is that we feel aversion to those negative emotions or character traits so represented (and attracted to those *ataraxia*-enabling qualities of the Epicurean sage), and on Tsouna's understanding are thereby prompted to eschew or adopt like qualities. Tsouna acknowledges the 'effectiveness' of such imaginings, but claims that the success of the techniques depends on the literary qualities of the representation. Her explanation of this requirement for success is that "we must be induced to assume that a single person can believe and do everything that the portrait represents"[93], suggesting that the essential qualities of that representation are those which make it believable.

Yet the effectiveness of moral portraiture on my interpretation need not lie in its credibility but rather the vividness of the portrait painted. Indeed, I align the technique more with that of 're-describing familiar things in an unfamiliar light', my explanation of which also differs from Tsouna's. On this strategy, the object of one's lust, say, is described not as beautiful but skinny and thick-lipped, with the aim of subduing any lustful affection. Tsouna explains that such re-description is intended to change the way in which we *think* of a person, object or state of affairs, seeing them for what they really are. Again, stress is placed on our acknowledging the veracity of that representation, and a successful representation is a convincing one.

But 'changing the way we think about' the object of an emotion need not mean changing our beliefs about it, but rather changing how it appears to us, the way we see or imagine it. If we wish to no longer be infatuated with a person we need not believe that the person is 'too skinny to live', but only imagine them in this light. Tsouna is right to claim that we must 'revise our previous characterisations', but on my reading this operates at the level of appearance, rather than the level of belief. On this understanding, the necessity of certain literary qualities lies not in their power to

---

[91] Tsouna (2009), p.262.
[92] Tsouna (2007), p.87.
[93] Ibid.

convince, but in making vivid those descriptions which are intended to call certain images to mind. And in this way I believe we can explain the function of the many literary or poetical devices so skilfully employed by Lucretius and other writers (and indeed, acknowledged by Tsouna). A vivid description calls to mind a particular image, and in focusing on these we can build up or reinforce those impressions which will produce the appropriate affective responses for a tranquil life.

It is in this light that I believe we can also understand the importance of repetition and memorisation, those techniques which received most attention in Tsouna (2009). On Tsouna's account, the importance of repetition and memorisation lay largely in enabling the retention and reinforcement of those new beliefs we have adopted as a result of Epicurus' arguments, and Tsouna took as a paradigm of these strategies the instruction that we repeat and commit to memory the tenets of Epicurean philosophy. By remembering the cornerstones of Epicurean thought, we are better able to associate them with particular situations, and repetition and practice enable these trains of thought to become 'quasi-automatic moral reflexes'. But whilst Tsouna focuses largely on the instruction that we repeat to ourselves the tenets of Epicurean philosophy, we should keep in mind that the tactics appear not only as direct instructions, but indirectly through the repetitive nature of Epicurean aphorisms and verse. And further, that this need not be understood as simply reinforcing Epicurean doctrine. Lucretius, for example, encourages his reader to re-read his poem, which serves not only to remind them of the conclusions contained within, but repeats the vivid descriptions which influence our imaginings.

The thrust of my point is that on the *Appearances View* reading we can make better sense of why these processes are required and effective. Having outlined the Epicurean account of impression formation (and thus altering appearances), it should be clear how repetition and memorisation enable, and are perhaps essential to, the achievement of this. A single image will not be enough to form a strong impression, a weak impression may be superseded by another firmer impression, an impression may simply fade; and so repetition[94] is necessary to create a firm impression under which aspect we will imagine an event in the future. And likewise, remembering both those positive features of an object and calling to mind a positive impression ensures that we keep that appearance in mind and going over it, *re-impress* it in on our minds.

---

[94] Whether of actions, exposure to objects, or those vivid descriptions which create mental pictures.

The exercise and targeting of the imagination features in almost all of the therapeutic strategies described by Tsouna, and is indeed often acknowledged by her. But by assuming an intellectualist view of emotion, Tsouna cannot see this process as directly enabling the alteration of emotional states, but must explain it as somehow necessary for the reinforcement of beliefs or as spurring the Epicurean student to engage in those processes which will directly enable *ataraxia*. If we grant, however, the power of appearances to produce affective responses, the presence and functions of many of these therapeutic strategies becomes much more readily explainable. And yet, there is a remark by Tsouna, which I believe betrays an implicit support for the interpretation I am proposing. Of the practice of relabeling, Tsouna notes that it is:

"often driven by theory however in other cases it is simply done for psychological effect. For instance, Philodemus uses it as a kind of shock tactic in connection with the vivid description of events"[95].

It is the ideas of 'psychological effect' and 'shock tactic' that I find most interesting here. For the implication is that by vividly describing something in a certain light, the image thereby formed in the mind (or 'brought before-the-eyes') has a power to shock or produce some other psychological effect. Or in other words, it produces an affective response. And thus Tsouna offers implicit support for the claim that appearances may be productive of emotional responses, which is exactly the position that I am advancing. If Tsouna desires a parsimonious explanation of those therapeutic strategies she rightly identifies, I believe she would do well to embrace an *Appearances View* of Epicurean emotion.

---

[95] Tsouna (2007), p.82.

Chapter 4
The Fear of Death and the Epicurean Life

4.1.   Introduction

In the previous chapter I offered an interpretation of the Epicurean fragments according to which they suggest an account of emotion similar in basic structure to that found in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. On this view, emotion is constituted by a feeling of pleasure or pain, produced by a particular impression of its intentional object; and thus whilst cognitive, emotion is not intellectual as the orthodox reading of Epicurus holds. Drawing on Epicurus' atomistic theory of mental functioning in *Ep. Hed.* we developed an *Epicurean* account of the Aristotelian model of emotion, describing the formation of impressions as a result of experience or the operation of the imagination and thereby indicating how we might alter an emotional state. Repeated experience or frequent practice of the relevant object or event allows us to gain access to images which generate a new impression of that object.

The interpretation in the last chapter offered an account of emotion *in general* and the means by which we can alter our emotional states, rather than discussing the content of a particular emotion or the specific strategies that might be employed in treating it. The aim, in part, was to set out the theory of emotion I wish to attribute to the Epicureans, and how the treatment of emotion works in the *unproblematic* cases. Now we must turn to the specific case of our fear of death, the most significant example of emotion for the Epicureans and that which prompted our investigation in the first place. As I hinted in the previous chapter, this is a more problematic case than those more prosaic examples discussed previously; most notably for emotional therapy.

4.2.   The Fear of Death and Problem of Experience

What we must explain in particular is how the account of emotional therapy described in the previous chapter would work with regard to our fear of death. For the difficulty becomes apparent when we consider *what* it is we must practice in order that we might alter the appearance of death (and our accompanying feelings). In the cases discussed thus far, through experience of *the object of our emotion* we gain access

to a feature of that object (or a feature of that experience) – or in Epicurean terms, the object emits a string of images from which we form an impression – and this impression can inform our future directed appearances (which in turn cause us to experience a feeling of pleasure or pain also constitutive of emotion). But in the case of death, the object of the emotion is not something that we can directly experience or practice, and by that means alter the appearance we have of it. The point is that – as Epicurus himself tells us! – we *cannot experience death*. Death is not like public speaking, in which we can present a paper and find that it is not so bad, or a roller-coaster which we can ride five times and find exhilarating, not terrifying. Epicurus may indeed be right that there is no sensation and no pain in death – and thus no *justification* for fear – but the very nature of death prevents us from experiencing this.

On the one hand, this goes some way towards accounting for the particular recalcitrance of this fear and difficulty in vanquishing it (acknowledged by the Epicureans). But given that Epicurus does believe that this fear *can* be vanquished and *ataraxia* is achievable, our interpretation must offer an explanation of the process by which we can alter the appearances and affects which strike us in the expectation of death. This, I believe, is the central problem that Epicurus' ethical philosophy must deal with[96], for if the *appearance* of death stands in the way of our achieving *ataraxia*, then Epicurus must offer a means of changing this appearance.

4.2.1. *The Appearance of Death*

The desired goal of accustoming for Epicurus is that we are able to hold that 'death is nothing to us', - which requires that we are no longer pained in the expectation of death, and indeed, that we expect nothing painful. When we imagine death, we must be able to see it not as "an impending destructive or painful bad thing" (*Rhet.* 1382a) but as something of no concern to us; something in which there is no sensation, where we do not exist. I indicated above the difficulty we face in explaining how we can become acquainted with these properties of death and thus imagine death under this aspect – but rather than tackling this problem head on, it might be helpful to begin by considering first what it is that Epicurus thinks we *do* imagine when we anticipate death; what appearances we need to change. A further question that we

---

[96] That is not to claim that this is the only concern of Epicurean ethics. Other features of Epicurus' ethics are also essential to achieving *ataraxia* – such as the cultivation of simple and inexpensive desires. In §4.2.2 of this chapter I will explain how I believe these concerns are importantly related.

should keep in mind is how these 'false' appearances themselves arise, how it is we came to view death under these aspects in the first place, and our answer to this might provide a clue as to how they can be altered.

Epicurus' own writings unfortunately give us little detail as to the content of the (inaccurate) appearances that cause our fear of death. When speaking of our expectation of death Epicurus tends to talk in more general terms, of what is "fearful in not living" (*LS* 24A3), rather than the particular content of that fear. If we look to the later Epicureans, however, we find much more enlightening descriptions of our imaginings of death. Just as Warren claimed, on the intellectualist reading, that there are in fact various beliefs associated with the fear of death (and thus in fact various fears, individuated by these beliefs) so too we discover are there various ways in which death might appear to us. I shall briefly review a number of the ways in which these later Epicureans believed we might 'incorrectly' imagine our state of death, and will claim that by considering how these impressions of death are formed, we are can understand how they may then be altered.

In his treatise *On Death*, Philodemus offers an extensive review of the fears associated with death and shows, with reference to Epicurean doctrine, each to be groundless. The content of the fears described by Philodemus would, on the intellectualist view, be taken to indicate further beliefs we hold about death, or the grounds we might cite for our fear in spite of Epicurus' original arguments. So we might, for example, accept that there is no sensation and thus no pain in death, but nevertheless fear that we might die without children (22.37). My concern, at this stage, is not to consider whether these might be beliefs the Epicurean student would cite as grounds for their fear, but rather to note that the descriptions indicate how we might *imagine* our deaths. So we might imagine ourselves dying in a foreign country (25.37), at sea (32.31), in bed rather than through a great deed (28.1), etc. We need not believe that these are likely ways in which we will die, or hold that '*dying* childless' or '*dying* at sea' is a harm; rather it is the image of ourselves in peril at sea, or simply *being* childless (and thus by association, being *alone*) that produces the negative response. A question that arises is why we are struck by such images of our death, by which we might mean either 'why do imagine our death in such a way', or 'why do such images concern us'? And I believe Lucretius offers a clue to the answer.

De Rerum Natura is littered with descriptions of the evils that the many imagine when contemplating death. In particular, Lucretius notes a set of imagined mythical punishments – "Cerberus, the Furies, and the pitch black pit of Tartarus", Tantalus quaking at the rock above him, Tityos savaged by birds, (*LS* 24F6) – imaginings which arise through the appearance in the mind of the punishments in life. These, Lucretius tells us, appear to the mind through its awareness of its wicked deeds, which offers an important diagnosis of how at least certain appearances arise and thus how they might be avoided. If we have acted badly, we will be aware of this and the prospect of punishment, and likely to project such imaginings in our anticipation of death. This idea is anticipated in *VS* 6 where Epicurus writes:

"It is impossible for a man who secretly violates the terms of the agreement not to harm or be harmed to feel confident that he will remain undiscovered, even if he has already escaped ten thousand times; for until his death he is never sure that he will not be detected."

Similarly, Lucretius tells us that "Sisyphus too *exists before our eyes* in real life" (*LS* 24F7), as the man who pursues the empty and unobtainable goal of power, and this appearance set *'before our eyes',* is likely to influence our imagining of death. Indeed, this fits also with Lucretius' account of memory, where he tells us that some images affect us to make us think repeatedly of their object.[97]

In both Lucretius and Philodemus' descriptions it seems that we project our everyday concerns (punishment, being alone, being in peril) when we imagine our death. But why should this be so? Lucretius again offers an explanation: these are appearances that come readily to mind, since they either exist before our eyes or present themselves through our awareness of our or others' deeds, in our everyday living. But why, we might ask, do these appearances arise when we imagine our death, and not when we imagine or anticipate other situations? These appearances may be frequently before the mind, but I do not imagine other future events in this way. I believe, however, that we can offer an explanation, and it is one that we have already considered in setting out the problem at the beginning of this chapter: namely, that we do not and cannot have any experience of death. In anticipating death there is no experience and little information to draw on, and thus we imaginatively transfer elements of our experience (or concerns) from living into the future-directed imagining of death. Again, the point is not that we believe this is what death must be

---

[97] Cf. *DRN* IV.962.

like, but rather given that there must be some content to our imagining of death, we fill it with whatever other impressions are most salient to us.

4.2.2. *Altering the Appearance of Death.*

In having identified Epicurus' conception of our mistaken impression of death, and having suggested how we form such an impression of death in the first place (namely through the projection of the concerns and most striking appearances of our daily life) we should now have an idea as to how the appearance of death might be altered. We cannot directly experience the lack of sensation in death and in that way form the correct impression of it, but we can alter the way in which we do imagine it by projecting positive, or simply 'neutral', appearances onto death, rather than those negative appearances described by Lucretius and Philodemus. And since the appearances that we project are those which strike us most in our everyday life, our job lies in altering these appearances, forming positive/neutral impressions which will supersede those negative impressions we otherwise hold in our minds. How is this to be achieved? By living a good, Epicurean life.

Take first our projected anxieties about punishment, which Lucretius believes plague us in our everyday life, as a result of our awareness of those bad deeds we have committed. If we did not commit deeds which, if discovered, would result in punishment, we would not live in the fear of such discovery and punishment – as Epicurus appears to suggest in his instruction to "do nothing in your life that will cause you to fear if it is discovered by your neighbour" (*VS* 70). And if we do not live in fear of punishment, we will not constantly be imagining punishments or other such consequences of our actions and will thus not have such images impressed in our minds when we also come to anticipate our death.

Likewise for those imaginings of death in which we envisage an afterlife of unfulfilled desires and striving for the unobtainable. In his remarks on pleasure and desire Epicurus warns us that if we harbour those desires for what is 'unnatural' and 'unnecessary' we will often find ourselves in a state of mental or bodily pain, for the desired objects are often hard to procure and we are often left dissatisfied. The feelings of pain and impressions of unfulfilled desires that thus make up the experience of those who do not heed Epicurus' advice are then projected when they contemplate death. If we follow Epicurus' advice, however, and cultivate only natural

and necessary desires, not only will the easy satisfaction of those desires enable us to maintain a state of *aponia* in our day to day living, but we will *lack* the experience of dissatisfaction which otherwise saturated our contemplation.

Leading the kind of life Epicurus recommends not only means one is not exposed to those sources of pain, anxiety or distress by which our minds are otherwise impressed in everyday living and that thus *lacking* such impressions we cannot project them in our imagining of death. It also means that those impressions derived from everyday living will contain largely positive/neutral features, since in our everyday living we will be experiencing feelings of pleasure or painlessness and impressions of satisfaction and the tranquil life. And these, then being the sort of appearance which strikes us most are also that which we would project from our everyday living onto death. The carefree and undisturbed impression we have of life becomes the way in which death appears to us; in other words, it appears 'nothing to us'.

The key point of this interpretation is that the way you live determines the kind of things you are exposed to; and not only the external objects you encounter, but the (emotional, conative) way in which you relate to them. And this exposure will play a large part in determining how well or badly, in Epicurean terms, your life goes. If you pursue what is unnatural, unnecessary or hard to procure, live unwisely or dishonourably, then you will constantly experience feelings of pain and dissatisfaction as a result of your many unfulfilled desires or live in the constant awareness of the looming punishments for your vicious deeds – all of which will influence how you anticipate or imagine objects or future events such as death. If, however, you live the sort of life that Epicurus recommends, in which you seek pleasure, but harbour only desires for what is simple, inexpensive and easy to procure, then you will be able to see most objects as 'nothing to you' and will experience constant pleasure or painlessness, which again affect the way you look on things in the future. Epicurus states: "It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and honourably and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and honourably and justly without living pleasantly" (*VS* 5).

The upshot of this interpretation is that *ataraxia* is achieved by *going and living* a good (Epicurean) life, and on this I wish to make a few comments. On the one hand, we might be tempted to say 'we already knew this' – and I agree that a positive feature of this interpretation is that it coheres with (is supported by, and reinforces) much of

what we already knew from the fragments. One of Epicurus' clearest instructions after all is that we should not to pursue wealth or fame or those things that will cause disturbance[98] and instead to live wisely, honourably and justly, cultivating simple and inexpensive desires.[99] And I believe that his analyses of the sources of pleasure and pain not only inform us (on an academic level) of the ingredients of a good life, but are transformed by Epicurus *the doctor* into prescriptions for a good life. We should "practice these things that bring you happiness" (*Ep. Men.* 123), which on my interpretation is taken to instruct not that we repeat the mantras of Epicurean philosophy, but that we practice what those mantras instruct.[100]

Most commentators accept that, on Epicurus' account, the pursuit of the unnatural or unnecessary will ultimately bring pain and prevent us from leading an untroubled life; thus one task in achieving *ataraxia* is to eliminate such desires. But this points us to a way in which our interpretation differs from standard interpretations; for whilst the accepted goal on both is the *ataraxia*, there are different sources of disturbance and it on the standard interpretation, different things that need to be done to remove them. So, on the one hand we suffer mental and bodily disturbance as a result of unfulfilled desires, and on the other we are disturbed by our fears of death and the gods. The first is removed by altering our habits of desire, and the other by instilling the correct beliefs. In this thesis I have argued that the latter is not the case, and that the removal of fear is achieving by changing the way in which you see an object. But I have now added that in the case of death[101], changing the way it appears is achieved by leading a good life. Removing both mental/bodily pain caused by unfulfilled desires, and those pains produced by future-directed imaginings (of death) are in fact achieved *in the same way,* and thus we see the significance, and I believe priority, granted by Epicurus to the type of life we actually *lead*.

---

[98] At *VS* 51 Epicurus warns us against breaking laws, disturbing proper and established conventions, distressing our neighbours, ravaging our bodies or squandering the necessities of life.
[99] Indeed, in *Ep. Men.* he tells us not only that "the habit of simple and inexpensive diet maximises health and makes a man energetic in facing the necessary business of daily life", but adds that it "also *strengthens our character* and emboldens us in the face of fortune".
[100] As Philodemus remarks of Epicurus, "above all, he establishes the principles of philosophy, by which alone it is possible to act rightly" (*De Elect.* VIII).
[101] And perhaps the gods also, although our attitude towards these has not been our focus and would need to be explored further to support this claim.

4.3.   Concluding remarks

I have offered an interpretation of Epicurus' recommendations for achieving the Epicurean *telos*. I wish now to make two concluding remarks on the consequences of this thesis for how we might understand Epicurean ethics and philosophy in general.

Firstly, the picture I put forward of Epicurean philosophy is a philosophy deeply concerned with our engagement in the world. This is in part the position that we began with, where I emphasised in the Introduction the practical aims of Epicurean philosophy for alleviating suffering and living the good life. But it is not simply a practical as opposed to academic concern of the philosophy I am emphasising; rather a concern in general with how we interact with the world, instead of the stance we take towards it. Epicurean psychology begins with impressions (what we are literally impressed by), his epistemology places our perceptions (our immediate interaction with the world) as the mark of truth, and his ethics places our pleasurable and painful sensations as the starting point for all choices and avoidances and criteria for all things good or bad. Epicurus is concerned by what strikes us (our sensations, in perception, in emotion) rather than the intellectual stance we take towards the world.

Finally, I wish to make a remark on where this thesis places Epicurus within the history of philosophy. Epicurus, of course, emphasises his originality and independence from his philosophical predecessors, never aligning himself with any particular tradition. Nevertheless, the orthodox interpretation of Epicurean emotion portrays the Epicureans as advocating a position similar to the Stoics[102], and in doing so aligns the school with the Socratic, intellectualist tradition. On the reading I advocate, however, I align Epicurus much more with the Aristotelian tradition. Certain connections between the two were, of course, made explicit in Chapter Two, where I suggested that Aristotle's remarks on habituation and conception of emotion may serve as a model for Epicurean thought, and further echoes of Aristotelian thought were noted as we returned to the Epicurean fragments. But more generally, I maintain that like Aristotle, Epicurus recognises the importance of our patterns of behaviour, our habits of action and feeling and the non-rational motivations and responses that make up much of our lives. Both see the achievement of a good life as *first* involving that these non-rational responses are correctly aligned, rather than

---

[102] Albeit weaker – both in the relation between emotion and judgement it posits, and claims regarding what emotion must be expunged to live a good life.

claiming that the first stage of a good life is ethical knowledge.[103] Of course, there are significant differences between the two [104] and my characterisation of Epicurus' prevailing concern with what strikes us is not one I wish to necessarily transfer to Aristotle. But in the sense that both see the living of a particular life as essential to the achievement of the *telos*, which for both involves a settled state of character (in turn, involving the correct desires and emotional responses and, importantly, future confidence in these), then I believe insight into the thought of each school may potentially be gained from a reading of the other.

---

[103] Aristotle believes knowledge is necessary for the good life, but it is not that from which we *start*.
[104] Aristotle places equal, if not ultimate, store in the life of contemplation, which Epicurus does not; Aristotle maintains the goodness and nobility of virtue, Epicurus insists only on its extrinsic value for the achievement of pleasure, etc.

Bibliography

i. Ancient Sources

Barnes, J. (ed), (1984). *Aristotle, Complete Works* Vols. I & II, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Crisp, R. (trans.), (2000). *Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Henry, W. B (trans.), (2009). *Philodemus, On Death*, Society of Biblical Literature.

Hett, W. S. (trans.), (1936). *Aristotle VIII (On the Soul),* Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Hicks, R. D. (trans.), (1925). *Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, Vol II, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Inwood, B. (trans.), (1994). *The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia*, Indianapolis IN: Hackett.

Konstan, D., Clay, D., & Glad, C., Thom, J., & Ware, J. (trans.), (1998). *Philodemus, On Frank Criticism*, Society of Biblical Literature.

Long, AA., & Sedley, D., (1987). *The Hellenistic Philosophers* Vol I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1987.

Smith, M.F. (trans.,) (2001). *Lucretius, On the Nature of Things*, Hackett.

Smith, M. F., (1971). 'New Fragments of Diogenes of Oenoanda', *American Journal of Archaeology,* Vol. 75, No. 4. pp. 357-389

ii.   Modern Sources

Algra, K., Barnes, J., Mansfield J., & Schofield, M., (1999). *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Annas, J., (1993). *The Morality of Happiness*, Oxford University Press.

Annas, J., (1992). *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Annas, J., (1989). 'Epicurean Emotions', *Greek, Roman & Byzantine Studies* 30. pp. 145-64.

Annas, J., (1987). 'Epicurus on Pleasure and Happiness', *Philosoophical Topics,* Vol XV, No.2. pp.5-19.

Asmis, E., (1999). 'Epicurean Epistemology', in Algra et al (eds), *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp.260-94.

Bedford, E., (1956-7). 'Emotions', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, New Series, Vol. 57. pp. 281-304.

Bostock, D., (2000). *Aristotle's Ethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Burnyeat, M.F., (1980). 'Aristotle on Learning to be Good', in Rorty (ed) *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics.* pp.69-92.

Cooper, J.M., (1999). *Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cooper, J.M., (1999). 'Pleasure and Desire in Epicurus', in Cooper (ed) *Reason and Emotion.* pp.485-514.

Cooper, J.M. (1996). 'An Aristotelian Theory of Emotions', in Rorty (ed) *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric.* pp. 238-258.

Crane, T., (2003), 'The Intentional Structure of Consciousness', in eds. A. Jokic and Q. Smith, *Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Deigh, J., (2010) 'Concepts of Emotions', in Goldie (ed) *The Oxford Handbook to Philosophy of Emotion.* pp.17-40.

Dow, J., (2010). 'Aristotle's Theory of Emotion' in Pakaluk & Pearson (eds) *Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle.* pp.47-74.

Dow, J., (2009). ‘Feeling Fantastic? - Emotions and Appearances in Aristotle’, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, vol. XXXVII. pp.143-175.

Erler, M., & Schofield, M., (1999). ‘Epicurean Ethics’, in Algra et al (eds) *The Cambridge Companion to Hellenistic Philosophy*. pp.642-74.

Everson, M., (1999). ‘Epicurean Psychology’, in Algra et al (eds) *The Cambridge Companion to Hellenistic Philosophy*. pp.542-59.

Fish, J., and Sanders, K., (2011). *Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fortenbaugh,W., (1975). *Aristotle on Emotion.* London: Gerald Duckworth & Co.

Furley, D., (1986). ‘Nothing to us’, in Schofield & Striker (eds) *The Norms of Nature.* pp.75-91.

Gerson, L, (ed) (1999). *Aristotle: Critical Assessments,* London: Routledge.

Gill, C., (2010). ‘Stoicism and Epicureanism’, in Goldie (ed), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion,* pp.143-166.

Goldie, P. (ed) (2010). *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goldie, P., (2000). *The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Graver, M., (2007). *Stoicism and Emotion.* Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press.

James, W., (1884). ‘What is an Emotion?’ *Mind*: Vol.9, pp.188–205.

Konstan, D., (2009). ‘Epicurean ‘passions’ and the good life’, in Reis (ed), *The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics.* pp.194-205.

Lawrence, G., (2010) ‘Acquiring Character: Becoming Grown-Up’, in Pakaluk and Pearson, pp. 233-283.

Lear, J., (1988). *Aristotle: The Desire to Understand.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Leighton, S., (1996). ‘Aristotle on the Emotions’, in Rorty (ed), *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric.*

Mitsis, P., (1988). *Epicurus’ Ethical Theory: The Pleasures of Invulnerability.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Nagel, T., (1979). 'Death', *Mortal Questions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nieuwenburg, P., (2002). 'Emotion and Perception in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*' *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 80 (1), pp.86-100.

Nussbaum, M., (2001). *Upheavals of Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nussbaum, M., (1994). *The Therapy of Desire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Nussbaum, M., (1986). 'Therapeutic arguments: Epicurus & Aristotle', in Schofield & Striker (eds) *The Norms of Nature*. pp.31-74.

O'Keefe, T., (2010) *Epicureanism*. Durham: Acumen.

Pakaluk, M. & Pearson, G. (eds), (2010). *Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rorty, A.O. (ed), (1996). *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric,* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rorty, A.O. (ed), (1980). *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rorty, A.O. & Nussbaum, M. (eds), (1992). *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Sanders, K., (2011). 'Philodemus and the Fear of Premature Death', in Fish and Sanders (eds) *Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition*. pp.211-234.

Sanders, K., (2008). 'Mens and Emotion: De Rerum Natura III.136-46', *Classical Quarterly,* Vol 58. No. 1, pp.362-366.

Schofield, M., & Striker, G. (eds), (1986). *The Norms of Nature*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sedley, D., (1994) 'Review of Nussbaum', *TLS*, June 24 1994.

Sherman, N., (1999). 'The Habituation of Character', in Sherman (ed) *Aristotle's Ethics,* Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

Sihvola. J., (1999). 'Emotional Animals: Do Aristotelian Emotions Require Beliefs?' in Gerson (ed) *Aristotle: Critical Assessments*. pp. 50-82

Solomon, R., (2004). *Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sorabji, R., (2000). *Emotion and Peace of Mind*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Striker, G., (1996). *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tsouna, V., (2009). 'Epicurean Therapeutic Strategies', in Warren (ed) *The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism.* p.249-264.

Tsouna, V., (2007). *The Ethics of Philodemus*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Warren, J., (2009). 'Removing Fear', in *The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism*, in Warren (ed) *The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism.* p.234-248.

Warren, J. (ed), (2009). *The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Warren, J., (2004). *Facing Death: Epicurus and his Critics*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Warren., J., (2000). 'Epicurean Immortality', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 18, pp.231-61.

Williams, B., (1973). 'The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality', *Problems of the Self.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.82-100.