"*Quaeque memoria digna videbantur*: digressions in Sallust's historical monographs"

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I, Edwin Shaw, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

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Abstract

This thesis examines the digressions in the historical monographs of Sallust, as important and under-utilised documents of the construction of his text and of his place within a Late Republican *milieu*. It aims to demonstrate the central place of digressions in Sallust's historiography, and to argue that Sallust is a more sophisticated thinker than is usually recognised, engaging with a variety of contemporary ideas in his construction of a new form of Roman historiography.

The first part of the thesis explores the role of digression, a basically rhetorical technique, within historiography more widely, contributing to the current debate about the relationship between the two genres; I establish that digression is an important aspect of the historian's activity of *dispositio*, through which the historical account is constructed. Drawing on classical rhetorical textbooks, works on historiography and the practice of other historians, I demonstrate that digressions have a key role within historiographical narrative, as impositions reflecting the historian's own analysis of events, and that as such we need to pay careful attention to the relevance of ostensibly digressive material.

The second part of the thesis examines three sets of digressions in detail, arguing that in each case such passages serve to advance Sallust's wider historiographical aims, and that the disparate material they contain demonstrates his close engagement with the intellectual developments of his period in philosophy, historiography, ethnography and geography. By close reading of passages on causation, politics and individual morality, I advance a new interpretation of Sallust's thought and the state of Rome based on the idea of expediency, which is central to the analysis offered in the digressions; approaching these passages from the perspective of the contemporary intellectual climate allows a better appreciation of Sallust's historiographical project.

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This thesis is dedicated to Lucy (*sine qua non*), who has seen it through from planning to completion with encouragement, patience and love, and has become much more familiar with Sallust than could ever have been imagined.

"Digressions, incontestably, are the sunshine;—they are the life, the soul of reading!—take them out of this book, for instance,—you might as well take the book along with them."

Laurence Sterne, *Tristram Shandy* 1.22

Introduction

sed nemo annalis nostros cum scriptura eorum contenderit qui veteres populi Romani res composuere. ingentia illi bella, expugnationes urbium, fusos captosque reges, aut si quando ad interna praeverterent, discordias consulum adversum tribunos, agrarias frumentariasque leges, plebis et optimatium certamina libero egressu memorabant.

Tacitus, *Annales* 4.32.

Let no-one compare my annals with the works of those who have written about the deeds of the Romans in the past. With free digression they recalled great wars, the assaults of cities, defeated and captured kings, or, if they should wish to turn their attentions inwards, the discords between consuls and tribunes, agrarian and grain laws, the struggles between the *plebs* and the *optimates*.

In Tacitus' catalogue of the subject-matter of Republican historiography, a testament to the historiographical traditions within which he located his writing, one of the characteristics mentioned is freedom to write *libero egressu*, to cover a variety of topics in contrast to his own *inglorius labor*.[1] Tacitus mentions no specific predecessors, and the themes cited appeared in many writers' histories; but foremost among them is his great stylistic model, Sallust, whose works have an important place in the tradition.[2] Written in the turbulent period after the Ides of March, Sallust's monographs are our earliest extant works of Roman historiography (excepting Caesar's *commentarii*, distinguished by their particular form and aims).[3] Immediately popular, and central to the Latin historiographical canon throughout antiquity,[4] the *Bellum Catilinae, Bellum Jugurthinum* and *Historiae* represent a

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[1] On Tacitus' digression (and for this translation of *libero egressu*) see Moles 1998:97. The terminology used of digression is variable: Lausberg 1998:§340 collects the following list: παρέκβασις; *parecbasis*; *egressio*; *egressus*; *digressio*; *digressus*; *excursus*.

[2] The themes mentioned are all treated by Sallust: e.g. *ingentia bella*, *Jug.* 5.1; *expugnationes urbium, Jug.* 76; *fusos captosque reges*, *Jug.* 113.6; *discordias*, *Cat*. 36.4-9; *plebis et optimatium certamina*, *Jug.* 41-2. Tacitus' debt to Sallust is frequently apparent in syntax and attitude; *Ann*. 3.30.1 refers to him as *rerum Romanarum florentissimus auctor*. See Syme 1958:196-9, 353-6.

[3] The *commentarii* are at least ostensibly closer to the tradition of political memoir and autobiography (on which see Landau 2011). Cf. Cic. *Brut*. 262 for the distinction and Cleary 1985, Kraus 2009:164-5 on the peculiarities of Caesar's form.

[4] La Penna 1970; Canfora 1986; Syme 1964:274-301; Schmal 2001:154-62.

major *corpus*. Sallust's writing was recognised as among the most important in Latin;[5] his idiosyncratic style spawned a host of imitators.[6]

Sallust's works cast light on the complex political climate under which he lived, providing an informed source on one of the most studied periods of human history, the declining phase of the Roman Republic. Sallust's statement of historiographical intent at the beginning of his first historical work promises to include *quaeque memoria digna videbantur*, "whatever seemed worthy of memory";[7] the purpose of this thesis will be to investigate digression, Tacitus' *liber egressus*, as a feature of Sallust's historiography, and to consider precisely why the subjects he treats might be deemed worth remembering.[8]

Sallustian historiography: structure and style

Before setting out my aims, some remarks as to the nature of Sallust's historiography will prove useful, since my approach is closely linked to the specifics of Sallust's historiographical technique; these considerations are part of the justification of my project. Two factors are worth particular consideration: Sallust's style and the nature of his historiographical form.

Sallust's style is idiosyncratic and difficult: his works combine distorted syntax with archaism in vocabulary and phrasing.[9] Particularly marked is his compression, the *brevitas* which was identified as a virtue of his style, but which when pushed to extremes sometimes could result in difficulties of sense.[10] Sallust's works deviate from a Ciceronian periodic style towards something

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[5] See e.g. Quint. *Inst*. 10.1.101.
[6] Cf. Sen. *Ep*. 114 esp. 17-9.
[7] *Cat*. 4.2.
[8] Translations are my own. References unless otherwise specified are Sallust's works; dates are BC. Abbreviations are as per *L'Annee Philologique*, with the exception of *Cat.* for the *Bellum Catilinae*, *Jug.* for the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, and *Hist.* for Sallust's *Historiae*; *FRHist* is Cornell *et al*. 2013. Texts and translations for passages treated in detail are given in Appendix I; the text used is Reynolds' *OCT*.
[9] Sen. *Ep*. 114:18 suggests that while Sallust's style had many imitators, they replicated only its outward appearance rather than substance. Major treatments of Sallust's style: Kroll 1927; Syme 1964:242-73; La Penna 1968:370-406; Dorado 2010 stresses pervasive irony.
[10] Cf. Quint. *Inst*. 4.2.45.

marked by deliberate disruption, *inconcinnitas*:[11] the "milky richness" Quintilian praised in Livy is alien to Sallust's work.[12] Rather, in conjunction with *testimonia* on the difficulty of Sallust's writing, we should see his as history written for the highly educated elite. The impenetrability of his form deliberately restricts his audience; we should view his as an "insider" form of historical writing, differentiated from the more accessible works of contemporary writers. Quintilian remarked that Sallust's works required a *lector eruditus* to properly appreciate their complexity;[13] while I will avoid imputing to Sallust anachronistically subtle critical approaches, I will therefore treat his writings as complex and difficult documents, engaging closely with the intellectual milieu within which he wrote, and in which his intended audience was also located.[14]

The idiosyncrasy of Sallustian style is mirrored in his choice of form. Rather than *annales* - comprehensive records of the *res gestae populi Romani* - Sallust composed his first works as monographs, tightly focused on specific sets of events.[15] While Sallust's form was not wholly new at Rome (Coelius Antipater had composed a monograph on the second Punic War; a letter of Cicero of the mid-50s requests monographic treatment of his consulship)[16] it was nonetheless innovative; Sallust's are the first historical monographs in Latin which survive.[17] Sallust's selection of the monographic form was perhaps a response to the war monograph of Thucydides, emerging at Rome around Sallust's period:[18] it differentiated his writing from that of the Latin historians who had come before him.

The decision to write monographic as opposed to comprehensive history is another marker of intent: by focusing on tightly circumscribed events, indicative of Roman decline (the armed *coup*

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[11] Cicero makes recommendations for flowing historical style at *Or*. 66, *de Or.* 2.64. On Sallust's style as anti-Ciceronian see Narducci 2001:7; Woodman 1988:117-24, Syme 1964:257; de Meo 1970:16; Smith 1985; O'Gorman 2007. La Penna 1968:376 suggests that this has been overstated; similarly Desmouliez 1978. Fontaine 1962 even argues for strong Ciceronian influence on Sallust's style.

[12] Quint. *Inst*. 10.1.32. De Vivo 2000:27 links Sallust's style to the "historiography of dissent".

[13] Quint. *Inst*. 4.2.45, 2.5.19.

[14] Cf. Scanlon 1987:11 on Sallust's target audience.

[15] See *Cat*. 4.3; *Jug*. 5.1.

[16] Cic. *Fam*. 5.12.

[17] On the form see Puccioni 1981; cf. Kierdorf 2003.

[18] Samotta 2012:364-70.

of a Roman nobleman and a war which particularly illustrated the venality and internal dissension of the Roman elite) Sallust identified episodes critical to the history of his state. The monographic treatment allowed identification of the truly important: while a writer of *annales* might cover deeds comprehensively, Sallust's treatment of things "worthy of memory" imposed analytical selectiveness on his material.[19] As I explore more fully below, the monographic form has implications for Sallust's digression; within tightly circumscribed accounts, inclusion of material beyond the bounds of the subject is a particularly important historiographical technique.

Objectives

The aim of this thesis is to adopt a new perspective on Sallust's writings, focusing on material beyond the main narratives which provide the theme and structure of each monograph - the digressions. Rather than simply extraneous material, these are carefully gauged to contribute to the historical narratives and analysis offered throughout.[20] Sallust's extensive use of digression is, in some senses, a natural counterpart to his monographic form: digressions extend the restricted compass of the historical account.

Through close readings, I will examine the role of specific digressions within Sallust's historical project; new readings of particular passages will contribute to our understanding of the author as a historian and literary artist. The material in Sallust's digressions responds to the intellectual context in which he lived; study of the digressions will also therefore illuminate Sallust's place within this *milieu*. I will also use the digressions (and Sallust's digressive technique) for an enquiry into broader historical and historiographical questions: reading Sallust's digressions relies on appreciating the significance of the technique within classical historiography, and part of the project of this thesis will be to offer a new reading of the significance of digression in historiographical narrative, as a frame within which to place Sallust's use of the technique. As part of this, I suggest a

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[19] La Penna 1968:32-4; Momigliano 1992:503-4.
[20] The nature of digressions as not simply irrelevant or extraneous material is the subject of chapter 2 below.

new approach to the vexed question of rhetorical influence on historiography, stressing concerns of structure and order.

In short, my focus on the digressions will offer a new approach to the well-studied *corpus* of one of the most significant historians of classical antiquity, suggesting new interpretations of specific passages, of Sallust as an author, and of historiographical digression as a literary technique. My approach will illustrate aspects of Sallust as a writer not usually treated: concentrating on the more marginal elements of his text will suggest new readings. The main objective of the thesis, then, is to consider an under-studied aspect of Sallust's historiographical *corpus* in order to draw more general conclusions as to the nature of his historiographical activity and context.

While I cover a wide variety of material, from general considerations of historiographical composition to specific passages, the scope of the thesis imposes certain restrictions. Most clearly, I avoid detailed consideration of the *Historiae*, Sallust's final work. The main reason for this is the state of the text: it survives only in fragments, and what remains, while indicative of the scope of the whole, does not suffice to reconstruct its structure and content in detail. Our fragments treat a broad range of subject-matter, and scholars have made extensive conjectures (with the aid of some scattered *testimonia*) as to what the work's five books might have contained; however, it is impossible to piece together in detail how the work was originally articulated. This nebulousness of structure is a particular problem for my study of digressions, because (as I explore throughout) Sallust's digressions are closely linked to the content of the works within which they are embedded, and the specific positions of digressions within his works are important for assessing their significance. My analysis of what constitutes a digression itself relies on the context provided by a narrative account; given the impossibility of reconstructing extensive narratives of the *Historiae* (beyond the collocation of single fragments on specific themes), it is difficult even to assess which materials might have been digressive. The basic framework within which to consider digressions in

the *Historiae* is lacking: in the absence of more secure *testimonia*,[21] it is valid to focus on the better-attested monographs.

In addition to their preservation, the *Historiae* also exemplify a different historiographical methodology to the monographs. By writing a comprehensive history, as opposed to a circumscribed narrative on a particular theme, Sallust made a fundamental structural shift: while the significance of digression in monographic writings is particularly marked because of the thematic concentration imposed by the form, in an historiographical form more comprehensive and less selective, digressions do not have the same inherent significance. Even if we could identify the digressions in the *Historiae*, they might not be as revealing as those in the monographs, because of the different structural considerations of a changed form.

Within the monographs, it has not been possible to treat all digressions in the same depth. In my case studies, I concentrate on examples, as indicative of the breadth of forms of Sallustian digression, and of the use of specific types of digressive material for particular purposes; although Sallust's major digressions all receive discussion, those are most fully considered which best illustrate the dynamics proper to each form, or which cast particular light on the historian's project or literary techniques. Others are considered in less detail: there, is, for example, no extended discussion of the character-sketch of Sulla at chapter 96 of the *Bellum Jugurthinum* (although the political content of the sketch is dealt with in the chapter on Sallust's politics), since the preoccupations of Sallust's use of character-sketches are better illustrated by the three examples which I treat in more detail. My aim has not been a comprehensive commentary on the digressions in the monographs (although all are at least mentioned); rather, the passages on which I particularly focus provide specific case-studies within a broader analysis of the nature of Sallust's historiography.

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[21] We have some idea as to the work's organisation, e.g. from palimpsest fragments demonstrating the rough structure of the events of particular years (see Bloch 1961); these are not sufficient to allow identification of digressions. On reconstruction of the *Hist.* see La Penna 1963; McGushin 1992, 1994.

Previous scholarship

Before setting out the structure of the thesis, I will consider briefly previous scholarship on Sallust's digressions, with a view to demonstrating its major preoccupations, and establishing the distinctive features of my approach. Scholarship on Sallust generally is extensive, as befits an author so central to the Latin literary canon, and has been treated elsewhere: I will not therefore discuss this in detail (particular questions which have dominated Sallustian studies, such as the political position of the author or the significance of the prefaces, are treated in more detail in the relevant chapters below).[22] The content of particular passages has also been studied in depth, in commentaries, general works on Sallust and more specific treatments: again, I deal with this specific analysis where relevant. While undoubtedly profitable in exploring the subject-matter and construction of individual digressions (with which I will engage in detail in studying specific passages), such an approach tends to fragment the analysis of this important aspect of Sallust's writing, and to diminish the importance of connections between different digressions.

Here, then, I will briefly summarise the scholarship which treats Sallust's digressive technique more generally, and the place of digressions within his monographs. I will consider three categories: first and most important, works dealing with Sallust's digressions *per se*; second, those which treat the digressions from a structural perspective, emphasising their role as points of punctuation within the monographs more generally; third, works which consider the content of the digressions and their thematic links to the texts of which they form part (all of these studies do of course also contain useful material on specific passages).

The digressions have rarely been treated *per se*, more frequently appearing as an *addendum* to more general studies of Sallust's literary technique and works. Some exceptions do exist; some studies take a broad view of Sallust's digressions, surveying them and considering his use of digression itself. The earliest such work, the dissertation of W. Thiessen on the digressions in Tacitus, Livy and Sallust, is heavily influenced by early twentieth century *Quellenforschung*: Thiessen's major

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[22] For general *Forschungsberichte* on Sallust see Becker 1973:720-30; Schmal 2001:168-81. Leeman 1965 gives a bibliography up to 1964.

preoccupation is locating Sallust's sources for his digressions (specifically, and in keeping with contemporary views, arguing that Posidonius' influence underpins all of Sallust's digressions).[23] Thiessen's article draws few conclusions as to the digressions' literary qualities, or even their content, beyond speculations as to derivation. An article by Paul Perrochat on Sallust's digressions is similarly limited; while Perrochat provides a survey of various digressive passages in Sallust's works, with brief remarks on the content of each, he makes little attempt at a synthesis of the common characteristics of Sallust's use of digression, or consideration of the significance of digression as an historiographical technique.[24] Perrochat does not make explicit the criteria by which he defines digression: the passages he treats suggest that his definition is on the grounds of immediate relevance, but (as I explore further below) defining digression according to this criterion begs the question of the role of digression within historiographical composition. Perrochat's collation of Sallustian digressions is useful, but offers little more than studies of the individual passages concerned: nonetheless, his main conclusion that Sallust's digressions are closely linked to his style and historiographical technique is relevant, and I draw on it throughout.

One important strand of work on Sallust has drawn on the evidence in the digressions of Sallust's analytical thought, for example on human nature and historical causation, in order to explore shifts in Sallust's ideas between the different stages of his historiographical career.[25] With this thesis, I will build on this approach, both in terms of the use of digressions as direct illustrations of the historian's analysis (theorised more fully in part I) and also through the use of digressions in parallel to illustrate shifts in the author's writing. However, previous work on this subject, in mining the digressions simply for their analytical content, has not sufficiently considered the relevance of the digressions to the monographs within which they are embedded, and the structural considerations at play on the content of each. My analysis does of course touch on ideas of character and historical causation contained in the digressions; but in foregrounding the sense in

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[23] Thiessen 1912:1-39. On Posidonius see p.101 below.
[24] Perrochat 1950.
[25] See Klinger 1928; Vretska 1937:24-5; D'Anna 1978; D'Elia 1983;Latta 1988; 1989. McGushin 1977:68 assesses previous work.

which digressions contribute to the monograph within which they are embedded, I will also stress the sense in which the deployment of digressions itself changes.

More recently, Catherine Sensal has approached Sallustian digression from a new perspective; she in fact denies that digression is actually a feature of Sallust's works at all.[26] Through consideration of the reception of Sallust's works, Sensal aims to demonstrate that applying the category of "digression" to Sallust's works is erroneous, because this is never used as a term of criticism of his work in antiquity.[27] While I sympathise with Sensal's stress on the digressions as not irrelevant but rather integral parts of the works in which they are embedded, her insistence on discarding digression as a categorical term is unhelpful, and her reading over-literal in focusing on the signposts of *digressio* to the exclusion of structural concerns: claiming that Sallust does not digress simply because his works do not include passages labelled as such is to ignore the comparative evidence of other classical sources (see chapter 2 below). As I demonstrate with this thesis, provided a suitable definition of digression is applied, the category remains a useful one.[28]

Beyond these studies of digressions in particular, useful material exists on the digressions within broader treatments of the literary qualities of Sallust's writing. Scholarship has discussed digressions from a structural perspective, in particular, emphasising their position within the articulation of each monograph: in that the digressions provide recognisable points of formal differentiation, they serve as useful anchors within analyses of structure.[29] This is certainly part of the digressions' relevance: the political digression in the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, for example, is placed at the midway point of the narrative, and differentiates between two thematically separate elements of the text (I explore this further below). However, works which treat the digressions solely as structural devices, and which do not take into account the content of the passages and the nature

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[26] Sensal 2010.
[27] Sensal 2010:288.
[28] Sensal also misses reference to Gran. Lic. *Ann*. 36.30-2, an early imperial reference to digressions as central to Sallustian style.
[29] See La Penna 1968:320-4; Giancotti 1971:41; Steidle 1958:6-7; Wille 1970; Giancotti 1971. Assessments of the digressions in monographs on Sallust often focus on the passages' structural significance, because of their broad approach: see Paratore 1973:172-6; Büchner 1982:131-60.

of their relationships to the rest of the monographs, can be only partial assessments of the passages'

significance: detailed consideration of the content of each passage, as I offer here, demonstrates

that the significance suggested by the monographs' structure is borne out by the thematic

relationship of digressions to other passages.[30]

Some scholarship on particular monographs has stressed the thematic relevance of the

digressions to their themes. Thomas Wiedemann's article on the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, in particular,

demonstrates the importance of digressive material, and is the best example of a work which

attempts to reconcile structural and thematic analysis.[31] Wiedemann focuses on the recurrence of

the theme of *concordia* within the digressions, and elsewhere in the text; it demonstrates the sense

in which digressions substantiate and develop themes suggested elsewhere, serving both a

structural and thematic role.[32] I draw on Wiedemann's approach in this thesis, in considering

thematic links between the digressions and the rest of the monographs, although my reading of the

specific thematic significance of the digressions in the *Bellum Jugurthinum* differs from his.

While much useful material thus exists on Sallust's digressions (as is natural for an author so

central to the Latin literary canon), existing scholarship does not fully treat Sallust's use of digression

within the context of his historiographical composition generally, considering structural, thematic

and interpretative elements as all important aspects of Sallust's use of the technique. My approach,

considering digressions from across Sallust's works in the attempt to identify common aspects of his

historiographical deployment of the form, aims to rectify this: I pay particular attention to the

relation of the themes of the digressions to the rest of Sallust's monographs, and to more general

ideas underpinning Sallust's historical interpretation. The digressions I cover in my case studies

illuminate fundamental aspects of Sallust's conception of his Roman subjects, from general historical

processes to the motivations of individuals; a study of the digressions which considers them as major

contributions to his argument will illuminate aspects of Sallust's texts from a new perspective.

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[30] Becker 1973:739 stresses the digressions as thematic frames for the text.
[31] Wiedemann 1993.
[32] Wiedemann 1993:51.

The structure of the thesis

This thesis will be in two halves. The majority (part II) will be concerned with close readings of specific Sallustian texts, which will illustrate through parallel consideration of digressions from both monographs the varied ways in which digressions contribute to Sallust's historiographical project more generally. However, before embarking on my readings of specific passages, it is necessary to define the terms and methodologies with which I will approach Sallust's texts. Clearly, an important consideration in establishing the scope of the thesis is defining digression, and identifying which passages in Sallust's works should be so categorised; because of the complexities of the term, and the importance of digression as a compositional technique within the arsenal of the classical historians, this requires extensive discussion, and part I of the thesis therefore considers the digression as both a technique and a classification. In that part I therefore covers much of the introductory subject-matter of this study (in defining the terms and the methodology with which I will approach Sallust's text) the primary purpose of the remainder of this introductory chapter will be to summarise previous scholarship on Sallust in general and on the digressions in particular, thus setting my interpretations within the frame of previous work on the author.

The opening part of this thesis will outline some basic criteria for reading Sallust's digressions, in terms of the digression as a technique of classical literature and also considering the nature of the historian's activity on a broader level. In the first chapter, I suggest that in contrast to the contemporary focus in scholarship on the historian's use of *inventio* in their compositions, we should instead stress the activity of *dispositio*, paying close attention to considerations of structure and arrangement which underpin the composition. I consider the testimony of the classical sources on the nature of the historian's activity, and demonstrate that for an author of contemporary historiography such as Sallust, techniques of arrangement were an important tool. In stressing the role of structure and selectivity within the historian's composition, this chapter underscores my focus throughout on the digression as a structural technique, which contributes to historiographical composition in a broader sense.

In the following chapter, I develop the focus on *dispositio* to explore the nature of digression in particular as one of the techniques of the historian's composition. While the stress on *dispositio* emphasises the role of passages which deviate from narrative *reportage*, with this chapter I consider classical testimony on digression itself, in order to establish a paradigm within which Sallust's digressions can be identified and assessed. Based on the evidence of oratorical manuals, I note a fundamental tension within the conception of classical digression, that digressions should be at once divorced from the main subject of a speech but also contribute materially to its argumentation: the contribution of digression to the argument of a whole composition is an important criterion in its use. Based on this theoretical stipulation (and making use of the testimony of Lucian's *quomodo historia conscribenda sit*), I establish a new definition of the digression based on criteria of tempo, derived from narratology: the advantage of this definition is that it can be applied to the historical text without presupposing the relevance or otherwise of digressive material. This provides a coherent means of categorising such passages in Sallust's works; I apply this to the Sallustian monographs, in order to establish the *corpus* to be considered in the second half of the thesis.

The second part of the thesis comprises a series of case studies of specific digressions. In each chapter, I consider digressive passages from both of Sallust's monographs on specific themes, with a view to demonstrating how they contribute to the argumentation of the work in which they are embedded: in each case, I suggest that Sallust's digressions play an important role in establishing the historian's interpretation of historical events, and that the digressions are in fact central to fully understanding the thematic claims which he makes for his works. In addition to the literary role they play in each composition, the digressions – in drawing on material divorced from the immediate historical narrative – provide points of contact between Sallust's text and the intellectual milieu within which he wrote: dealing with subjects such as contemporary politics, philosophy and geography, the digressions provide examples of Sallust's engagement with contemporary ideas, and additional demonstrations of his sophistication as an author.

The third chapter deals with Sallust's large-scale digressions on basically introductory subjects: the *archaeologia* of early Rome and the digression on Africa. Each digression, I suggest, plays a key programmatic role within the narrative in which it is embedded, contributing to the analysis of the narrative which follows, and providing an initial interpretation against which Sallust's audience is to assess events. In addition, each serves within the historian's self-presentation: the African digression, in particular, contributes to the portrayal of Sallust's suitability for his task by demonstrating his intellectual sophistication. Each of these passages provides a clear example of the historian's *dispositio* in action: in appearing so near the beginning of their respective works, the sense in which they disrupt the chronological account is particularly marked.

My second study considers the question of Sallust's politics, with reference to the digressions dealing with Republican politics in the run-up to the civil wars (Marian and Caesarian respectively for the *Bellum Jugurthinum* and *Bellum Catilinae*). These passages, I suggest, are important for two major reasons: they provide markers of Sallust's own political position, and they also play crucial roles within the composition of each monograph. The political digression of the *Bellum Catilinae* is a profound commentary on the nature of the whole of Catiline's conspiracy, and substantiates the thematic claim which Sallust makes of covering a period of unprecedented danger for the state. The importance of the political digression in the *Bellum Jugurthinum* is perhaps even starker: as well as further developing Sallust's own political analysis, the dynamic of partisan strife Sallust elaborates in the digression in fact patterns the narrative of the monograph as a whole, on the broadest structural level.

The final chapter considers the role of individuals within Sallust's works, as expressed through the character-sketches of Catiline, Sempronia and Jugurtha, and the *synkrisis* of the *Bellum Catilinae*. The character-sketches are digressive, in pausing the narrative of events which structures each monograph; but, as with the passages treated in chapter 3, they again play programmatic roles in the audience's comprehension. Sallust's character-sketches do not simply provide additional, irrelevant detail on characters treated within the narrative; they in fact materially supplement the

audience's understanding, by filling in the motivations and natures of the figures concerned. In concert with the moral philosophy which introduces each of Sallust's works, the material contained in the character-sketches offers keys to the interpretation of each of the major figures of the monographs, and clarifies the overall stress of Sallust's histories by demonstrating in practice a model of moral decline which he stresses thoughout. These digressions particularly demonstrate the close connections between digressions and other parts of an historiographical composition (prefaces and narratives): they provide further demonstration of the role of digression within the historian's *dispositio*, and the importance of such passages to the interpretation put forward by the whole work. The *synkrisis*, as an extension and development of the material on individuals, is a particularly important passage: it continues the engagement with Sallust's own moral philosophy attested in the rest of the character sketches, and applies the ideas outlined there to two paradigmatically opposed figures of Roman politics. This passage is a *locus classicus* of the extensive debate over the nature of Sallust's own political opinions: in approaching the passage from a new perspective (emphasising Sallust's complex assessment of individual motivation in late Republican society, and in these two personages in particular) I offer a new treatment of this question.

Finally, I draw together the strands treated in the thesis in the conclusion, to offer a cohesive summary of the nature of Sallust's use of digression, and to explore the important roles such passages play within his historiographical project more widely. I also make some suggestions as to further work.

Chapter 1 – History and Rhetoric

Before considering Sallust's digressions, it will be useful to lay down some more fundamental considerations about the nature of historiographical digression and composition more generally. Only by understanding fundamental concepts governing historiographical composition can digression be properly assessed. With this first chapter, I set out some ideas which will inform the approach which I advance throughout this thesis.

Particularly important in assessing a historian's activity is the idea of the truthfulness of his account. Polybius claimed that history without truth was "an idle and unprofitable tale"; to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, history is "the high priestess of truth".[1] Such assessments - and metaphors - might be multiplied: truthfulness frequently occupied the historians' prefaces, methodological statements, and criticism of their predecessors;[2] history as a genre is frequently defined in classical *testimonia* according to its relationship to true events.[3] However, the truthfulness of the classical historians has come under sustained attack in modern scholarship. What, precisely, do the ancient historians mean by "truth" (usually ἀλήθεια in Greek, *veritas* in Latin)? How sincere are their claims? How far would the audience expect historiography to accurately represent reality?

Full consideration of such questions is far beyond the scope of this thesis, and generalisation is problematic: what we term "classical historiography" includes texts from such a wide chronological and generic range that no single rule can include them all.[4] There is significant methodological distance between Thucydides, writing of events in which he himself participated,

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[1] Polyb. 1.14; Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 8.
[2] Marincola 2007 surveys appeals to ἀλήθεια (with extensive bibliography).
[3] E.g. Arist. *Poet*. 9.2-9; Polyb. 2.56.11-2 (contrast of history with tragedy) 34.4.2; Strabo 2.5.3 (history as opposed to myth); Dion. Hal. *AR* 1.6.5; Cic. *Fin*. 5.64 (opposing *historia* to false *fabula*). Further examples in Avenarius 1956:40-2. Cf. Press 1982 on uses of ἱστορία as a term, stressing its factuality (esp. 39, 50-1).
[4] Wiseman 1993 lists "seven types of mendacity": we should consider multiple "types of truth" appropriate to different historians and methods. Other genres approximated historiographical style, but had different relationships to truth: see Gabba 1981:52-5 (paradoxography); Wiseman 1993:322-3 ("travellers' tales"); Pelling 1990 (biography); Bowersock 1997 (the novel). Cf. Ligota 1982.

and Livy - at least in the extant books - reporting stories in some cases already hundreds of years old.[5] Rather than imposing a single model from Hecataeus to Ammianus,[6] we should be sensitive to the positions of historians along a spectrum, with different works demonstrating more or less fidelity to historical truth as we understand it.[7] This is not to suggest that some historians are simply better or more scrupulous than others: it reflects different influences and expectations across a complex genre.[8]

I will therefore focus on one aspect of the question, which has particularly polarised scholars and which fundamentally affects the historian's composition: the influence of rhetoric, and effect of the application of rhetorical techniques on the historian's narrative. After a brief assessment of the debate, I will discuss the idea that Sallust's work is fundamentally rhetorical, and suggest a new understanding of what this might mean. My approach reconciles rhetorical influence with the reference to factual events which I think distinguishes historiography as a genre: it also suggests a new reading of historiographical activity, particularly relevant to my subject-matter of digression.

My stress on the rhetorical dimension is justified by the nature of Sallust's text:[9] Sallust wrote contemporary history, for which written sources were available (for example, the consular speeches of Cicero, to which Sallust makes direct reference)[10] and in some cases he would have met

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[5] Marincola 1999; Fornara 1983:1-46.

[6] Over-generalising is a strong charge against most universal theories of classical historiography. See Moles 1990:319-20, Brock 1991:101-2.

[7] Different attitudes obtain in works by the same author (e.g. Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and *Hellenica*) and even different parts of the same work: Livy *praef.* 6 and 43.13 demonstrate fundamentally different criteria (see Levene 1993:21-3); 6.1 promises an account *clariora... certioraque* after the Gallic sack in 390, due to availability of better sources. Quadrigarius seems to have refused to treat before the sack for similar reasons: *FRHist* 1.289.

[8] The term *historia* is problematic: the material to which it is applied, including as a term in rhetorical theory, conceals a wide variety of different attitudes. Wiseman 1993 revolves around *historia*, but even within his article there are distinctions between *historia* as *gesta res, ab aetatis nostrae memoria remota* (Cic. *Inv*. 27, cited p.129) and *historia* as a process of enquiry (136). While highlighting the volume of approaches, the relevance of the "*historia* as enquiry" model to which he recurs is sometimes unclear. On the term *historia* see Schissel von Fleschenberg 1913; Müller 1926; Cassin 1990; Cizek 1985:17-20; Rispoli 1988; on *historia* as respectively enquiry, genre and story see Press 1982.

[9] On poetic influence on historiography see Wiseman 1979:143-53; 1981:391; 1993:325-6; 2002; Feeney 1991: 250-312; Leigh 2007; Woodman 1988: 98-101. While Sallust's work is not un-poetic (cf. Skard 1933, 1956; Cizek 1991), its relation to poetic sources (important in Livy's early books, for example) is not relevant to my enquiry.

[10] *Cat*. 31.6.

the major protagonists.[11] There is less scope in his text for the influence of poetic sources, or extrapolation of sparse source-material, than for authors who wrote (for example) about early Rome; the influence of rhetoric is a more significant influence on Sallust's composition than source-questions of this sort. Sallust himself was a proficient orator: his idiosyncratic style is suffused with rhetorical influences.[12] For these reasons, as well as the connections between rhetoric and digression as a technique (treated in chapter 2 below), the rhetorical dimension is a useful starting-point.

Rhetoric and classical historiography

This aspect of the historians' work has been particularly to the fore since A.J. Woodman's seminal *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography*.[13] Woodman's book claimed that the majority of modern scholarship on the classical historians was misguided, in treating their works as analogous to modern-day historiography, with the intellectual apparatus of post-enlightenment thought:[14] instead, Woodman suggested that the works of the historians be seen in a fundamentally literary light, as products of an intellectual and educational system dominated by rhetorical techniques.[15]Although built on existing foundations (notably T.P. Wiseman's *Clio's Cosmetics*, a sustained challenge to the veracity of the Republican annalists)[16] Woodman's book was a watershed, polarising scholars who read the historians for their factual content and those who approached them primarily as literature.[17] These positions differ as to the role allocated to rhetoric in determining the content of the historian's account and consequently how it represents reality,

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[11] E.g. *Cat*. 48.9 refers to acquaintance with Crassus.

[12] On Sallust's career see pp.145-7 below; on his oratory see Sen. *Contr*. 3 *praef*. 8.

[13] Woodman 1988 (the central chapter reprinted with *addendum* as Woodman 2011).

[14] Woodman 1988:1-2.

[15] Woodman 1988:197. cf. Wheeldon 1989, Marincola 2009 on the generic expectations of the audience.

[16] Wiseman 1979, esp.27-40. See also Wiseman 1981, anticipating some of Woodman's remarks on *inventio*. Independent of Woodman see Russell 1967 (treating *inventio* at 135-40); Lichanski 1986; Cizek 1989.

[17] Kraus and Woodman 1997:5-8 explicitly follow Woodman's arguments. Potter 1999:12-19 dismisses them (Woodman 1998 provides a rejoinder). For summaries of the debate see Damon 2007, Laird 2007, Pitcher 2009: Marincola 2001:6-8. Bosworth 2003 argues against Woodman's position with reference to non-contemporary historiography. Shrimpton 1997 considers the similarities and differences between ancient and modern historiographies more widely. For a different approach see Rebenich 2001; Mehl 2011:17-33 provides an alternative (non-Anglophone) perspective.

although the debate has frequently tended towards caricature respectively of naive positivism and focus on literary features at the expense of context.[18]

Central to Woodman's argument is the suggestion that the Roman historians (while he does treat Thucydides, the bulk of the book is concerned with Latin authors) were so influenced by rhetoric - through education and social context - that it exerted a profound influence on their historiography; they saw historiography as a fundamentally rhetorical genre, justifying the application of rhetorical techniques to historical narrative. Woodman pushes this further, to conclude that oratory and historiography, along with poetry, should not be approached as in their modern incarnations as separate genres, but rather as points along a broader *continuum* of rhetorical writing.[19] Stemming from a new reading of Cicero's *de Oratore*, Woodman's argument is for reading historiography as dependent particularly on the forensic technique of *inventio*, the invention of plausible material to flesh out a factual "hard core".[20]

Woodman's suggestions have had lasting impact; his major contentions - that the classical historians should be read differently from their modern counterparts, and that in Rome the influence of rhetoric on historiography was profound - are undoubtedly worth stressing.[21] I have no argument with Woodman's reading of *de Oratore*, which emphasises the application of rhetorical ideas and techniques to historiography: rhetoric *was* central to educational system of the Roman elite of the period,[22] and it follows that the training of the Roman historians in such a milieu *did* affect their writing.

Late Republican *testimonia* do suggest an increasing turn towards the application of rhetorical techniques by historians, paralleling the increase in formal rhetorical teaching at Rome

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[18] Dench 2009 laments the state of the debate; Lendon 2009 exemplifies the "historicist" side of the polemic. Moles 1993:90-1 urges attention to both sides: "'literary' and 'historical' objectives are alike present and deeply interfused" (cf Shrimpton 1997:16-7 for a similar combination, with historiography as a paradoxical mix of rhetoric and science).

[19] Woodman 1988: 100.

[20] Woodman 1988:70-116, esp. 87-95.

[21] Although (as Woodman notes, 1988:ix-x) not new; see Loraux 1980, Wiseman 1979, 1981 and bibliography to which Brunt 1980 responds.

[22] Clark 1957; Clarke 1958. Cf. Cic. *Brut*. 304-16; Quint. *Inst*. 1-2; Suetonius, *Gram. et Rhet.* 25.3-4.

from the latter part of the first century. This is illustrated by some important, albeit problematic, comments of Cicero.[23] In his assessment of previous historiography at Rome in *de Legibus*, Cicero's major criticism is that authors had not approached the subject with sufficient oratorical skill; they had not made use of *erudita Graecorum copia*, "the learned material of the Greeks", or the teachings of rhetoric.[24] The highpoints, in Cicero's assessment, are Coelius Antipater and Sisenna, the former of the late second century and the latter of the generation before Cicero himself: but while these most recent writers were the best, each remained unsuccessful, the first marred by primitive style and the second by over-dependence on the model of Cleitarchus. Licinius Macer, closest to Cicero in age (Macer was four years older) receives particular disdain: his writings, although oratorically influenced, are dismissed based probably on Cicero's bias against both Macer's education (Latin, rather than Greek)[25] and his likely anti-senatorial angle.[26] Cicero's criticism is not that Macer's work was un-oratorical, but that it made improper use of oratory.

Cicero's account is teleological (at its end lies a proposed work by Cicero himself) but nonetheless suggests increasing oratorical influence: this is linked to the growing importance of the oratorical education which was becoming standard at Rome, and manifested itself in political oratory.[27] This recurs in the description of the early historians by Antonius, in the second book of *de Oratore*: *noster Cato et Pictor et Piso, qui neque tenent, quibus rebus ornetur oratio - modo enim huc*

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[23] Major Ciceronian *testimonia* on the nature of historiography, frequently canvassed in the debate, are *Fam.* 5.12; *de Or*. 2.51-64; *Leg*. 1.5-9. The most important discussions include Brunt 1980; Rawson 1972; Lichanski 1986; Woodman 1988:48-116; see also Paladini 1947;Leeman 1955, 1963:170-8, 1985, 1989 (direct response to Woodman 1988); Kelley 1968 (with review of earlier bibliography, 1-27); Petzold 1972; Shimron 1974; Wiseman 1981, 1994:1-7; Cape 1997; Nicolai 2000; Fox 2007:135-48; Northwood 2008 with Woodman 2008; Krebs 2009; Mehl 2011:77-81; Woodman 2012:1-16. See also Appendix II.
[24] *Leg*. 1.6-7.
[25] *Leg.* 1.7. On the Latin rhetorical schools see Aulus Gellius, *NA* 15.11.2. At *de Or*. 3.93-4 Cicero (through Crassus, one of the censors responsible for their closure) suggests that the schools' fault was teaching not the comprehensive wisdom of the true orator, but *exercitatio linguae*, "the exercise of the tongue", leading to *impudentia*. This recalls the debate on the good and bad use of rhetoric (see May & Wisse 2001:20-6); it also implies that the fault was not primarily stylistic but of content. See further Rawson 1985:78, with full bibliography.
[26] On Macer's ideology see Wiseman 2009:19-24, and the speech given to him in Sallust's *Historiae* (*Hist*. 3.48M): his suicide (66 BC) came after conviction for extortion in a trial presided over by Cicero (Plut. *Cic*. 9).
[27] The formalisation of rhetorical education is a theme of the *de Oratore*, set in 91, and on which there is a "generation gap" between older and younger participants: see Fantham 2006:78-101. Suet. *Gram. et Rhet*. 25.3-4 dates the rise in formal oratorical schooling to around the beginning of the first century BC. Cf. Rawson 1985:147-8.

ista sunt importata - et, dum intellegatur quid dicant, unam dicendi laudem putant esse brevitatem.[28]

Antonius' discussion reiterates that even by 91 BC, the dialogue's dramatic date, historiography had become increasingly rhetorically influenced: in the years between 91 and the composition of *de Legibus*, it became progressively more so. These *testimonia* support Woodman's argument.

Woodman's emphasis on the rhetorical nature of historiography also stresses its subjectivity – classical history is not an unadorned record of facts, but a literary work conditioned by interpretation and analysis. While readers of modern narrative historiography expect more or less objective presentation, classical historiography allowed its practitioners greater freedom to impose their own analysis. Subjectivity is in fact central to certain historiographical forms: for history to be useful, either for moral improvement[29] or to provide a political lesson,[30] the significance of events had to be properly gauged and set in context. Interpretation and judgment was the task of the historian, and his account shaped by his subjective assessment.[31]

This too is illustrated by *testimonia*: interpretative and analytical elements are stressed, for example, by a famous fragment of Sempronius Asellio. Asellio wrote on the period from around 146 (perhaps directly continuing Polybius) to the early first century: his decision to treat only his own period was at least unusual, distinguishing him from the annalists who usually began with the city's foundation.[32] In two fragments of his preface, he criticises previous writers for their failure to expand on mere facts: the *minutiae* of *res gestae* failed to accomplish history's proper task of instructing and persuading the reader.[33] Asellio's critique survives thanks to its place in a genre

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[28] *de Or*. 2.53.

[29] e.g. Livy, *praef*. 10.

[30] Cf. Polyb. 1.1 and *passim*; e.g. 12.25b: "mere fact, though it may pique one's interest, is of no benefit: when the understanding of the cause is added, then history becomes useful."

[31] See Cic. *de Or.* 2.36, history as "teacher of life"; cf. 2.63; Woodman 1988:94; Heldmann 2011; Lefevre 1979; Raaflaub 2010 treats "ulterior motives"; Schepens 1975 stresses the subjectivity of the use of sources. Fornaro 1988 stresses historical discourse as elaboration of ideology; McNeill 1986 emphasises the subjectivity of meaningful historiography, ancient and modern.. The analogy of the historian as judge was popular: see e.g. Lucian *Hist. Conscr*. 41.

[32] This is certainly true of contemporary annalists Cassius Hemina, Calpurnius Piso and Gellius. On the divide between contemporary and non-contemporary historiography see Marincola 1997:67-77.

[33] *FRHist* 20 F1-2; cf. *comm. ad loc.*

dispute: Aulus Gellius cites it on the distinction between *historia* and *annales*. However, these terms are problematic, used less systematically in antiquity than in modern scholarship,[34] and Asellio's critique should therefore not simply be taken as an attack by the writer of *historiae* on *annales* generally. That history could be conceived of at Rome – to some authors, at least - as more than unadorned factual material indicates a development in the way that its value was understood.

The difference is in terms of historiography's didactic role. Earlier authors aimed to influence their readership by reference to exemplary deeds and men: while Cato had similarly professed to instruct, and had distanced himself from the subject-matter of *annales*, he attacked the ephemera of grain-prices and weather reports rather than unadorned narratives *per se*.[35] Asellio, on the other hand, emphasises didacticism based on analysis of motives and causes: his methodological statement foregrounds these Thucydidean and Polybian themes.[36] The fragment illustrates a shift in the nature of at least some Roman historiography, towards a model concerned more with subjective interpretative activity.[37] This should again be linked to the assimilation of oratorical concepts and techniques into historiography mentioned by Cicero. Asellio aims to ensure that historiography educates appropriately: in stressing interpretative aspects, he indicates an increasing focus on the persuasive. His methodological polemic is a marker of the growing sophistication of historiography in the late Republic.

Woodman's suggestions as to *inventio* are similarly important. He is surely correct that the historians' accounts encompassed material derived partly from imaginative reconstruction: even the staunchest defender of the historians' accuracy could not deny that speeches are not direct transcriptions of words actually delivered; nor are battle-scenes accurate records of what actually

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[34] See Verbrugghe 1989; Scholz 1994 esp. 75; Cizek 1985.
[35] *FRHist* 5 F80.
[36] The style seems Polybian throughout: see *FRHist* 1.276.
[37] Asellio's work was not especially successful, as attested by Cicero (*Leg*. 1.6) and by its lack of citations before Gellius (*FRHist* 1.277); *annales*, on the other hand, persisted long after his polemic (Livy still aims at the provision of *exempla* [*praef*. 5. with Chaplin 2000], although as he approached his own period this may have shifted).

occurred.[38] However, some of Woodman's more radical arguments are exaggerated: in particular, the claim that the two genres represent points on a spectrum of rhetorical composition, and that rules appropriate to forensic oratory were thus identically applicable to history, is I think overstated. Combining this with the statement that historians' truth-claims signify only freedom from bias,[39] Woodman concludes that what we would term the truthfulness of Classical historiography is minimal, because it depended largely on material based on the historian's imaginative reconstruction of events.[40] This, I think, overstates the application of *inventio*, and elides the generic characteristic of historiography, reference to factual material.

The point at issue is the scope and flexibility of *inventio*. *inventio*, in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, was "the devising of things either truthful or like the truth (*veri similis*), adding to the probability of one's case".[41] In forensic contexts, no distinction was made between things actually true and those simply probable: both served equally in creating a persuasive case. Woodman's argument, based on the suggestions that truth to the classical historians signified only freedom from bias, and that historiography was generically so close to forensic oratory that the nature of the techniques deployed overlapped, is that because the stipulations for the content of the historian's account found in Cicero's *de Oratore* match guidelines for *inventio* in his *de Inventione* and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*,[42] the historian's collection of material for a historical work should be seen

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[38] Woodman 1988:18-9 notes that even in battles of which the historian had eyewitness experience, the details could be hard to recall accurately.

[39] Woodman 1988:73-4; cf. Appendix II.

[40] Woodman's views recall Roland Bartes' insistence on the formal overlap between historiography and fiction, and the lack of criteria for distinguishing them (Bartes 1970), and also the second-century sceptic Sextus Empiricus, who attacked the idea that one could distinguish truth from falsehood from text alone: *Adv. Math.* 1.248-69 (esp. 267).However, Empiricus' argument is part of a wider attack on the unsystematic nature of the grammarians' expertise: it is unclear how far he criticises historiography as opposed to *historia* as rhetorical classification, since he concentrates on truths derived from mythical material, rather than historiography proper (265). On this passage see Marincola 1997:117-27, Wiseman 1993:129-30; Bietenholz 1994:60-1; Rispoli 1988:77-8; Cassin 1990. Petersmann 1993 pushes Woodman's ideas on the fictionality of historiography further.

[41] *Rhet. Her*. 1.3: *inventio est excogitatio rerum verarum aut veri similium, quae causam probabilem reddant*.

[42] *Rhet. Her*. 1.3, Cic. *Inv*. 1.9.

as an identical process.[43] That is, Woodman applies oratorical *inventio* - including the attitudes towards truth and plausibility - to historiography: historians were free to include material *veri similis*, based only on a limited "hard core" of factual material, inasmuch as it advanced the effectiveness of their accounts.[44] According to Woodman, modern conceptions of historiographical truth are "simply talking a different language" to ideas of plausibility and verisimilitude which ruled classical historiography.[45]

I cannot deal in full here with Woodman's arguments: I offer rejoinders to specific aspects - on the nature of the historians' truthfulness, and the identification of historiography with oratory - in Appendix II, along with full bibliography. If these foundations of Woodman's arguments are flawed (as other scholars have also suggested), then Woodman's book does not sufficiently prove that the free composition of *inventio* is an appropriate model for historical composition: if we impute to the classical historians a concern for truth beyond the absence of bias, and differentiate the nature of techniques appropriate to historiography based on its generic characteristics, then the way in which we conceive rhetorical influence on the historian's text must shift.

As I indicated above, this is not to say that *inventio* plays no role: a comparable process must be behind the description of (for example) battles, frequently imaginative high-points within the historian's account; however, this *inventio* is I think restricted to the details of specific episodes, rather than being applied to the events of the historical narrative more generally (I return to this below).

Woodman, it should be noted, does state that reference to a "hard core" of fact is a distinguishing marker of historiography as a genre:[46] but I differ from him in the scope of this "hard core", and the sense in which it might be manipulated. Where Woodman sees a limited factual

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[43] Note that Cicero never uses the term *inventio* of historiographical activity: the procedure is I think different in essentials. Laird 2007:202 notes that theoretical similarity does not imply wholesale application of rhetorical techniques.
[44] Woodman 1988:94.
[45] Woodman 1988:87. Williams 1968:625 makes an interesting connection between oratory and historiography in terms of the argument *ex probabilitate*, but connects it to historical explanation rather than composition.
[46] Woodman 1988:82.

framework within which the historian improvised a plausible account, in my view (particularly as applied to the works of a writer of contemporary history such as Sallust) the "hard core" was a much more significant component and restriction on the historian's account. The use of *inventio* for ornamentation of a minimal "hard core" applies more clearly within non-contemporary historiography, where the "hard core" was less extensive; however, characteristic features of Sallustian historiography (treating recent events, the protagonists of which he had in some cases known, well within living memory of members of his audience) suggest that the factual basis on which the historian based his account was extensive, and the content not open to such significant manipulation. A historian like Sallust, working from a fuller set of factual material, had less freedom to invent than a writer working up a narrative from jejune *testimonia*.[47]

While he might apply *inventio* to specific details, the historian remained obliged to reflect known facts: Sallust might rework the speech of Caesar in the Catilinarian debate into words appropriate to his own interests, but he could not (for example) suggest that Caesar had argued that the Catilinarians be released without charge, or wholly suppress the role of Cicero. Another example is Catiline's speech announcing his conspiracy in the *Bellum Catilinae*, of which Sallust explicitly states that "all witnesses had been excluded".[48] Sallust uses plausible reconstruction to produce Catiline's words (indeed, he draws attention to the device), but this flexibility did not extend to invention of the events themselves. Sallust knew from Cicero that Catiline had given such a speech (although Cicero placed it later in the chronology of the conspiracy):[49] he does not invent, although importantly he does manipulate the order of his narrative to impose a particular dramatic logic (I discuss this below). If Sallust was free to reshape events according to "how it must have been", there would be little point in his discussion of the accuracy of the rumour which held that the conspirators had drunk human blood.[50] Rather than wholesale elaboration of the history according to the oratorical *inventio*, worked-up passages such as these should I think be seen as set-piece episodes

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[47] As Wiseman 1981:390 allows, "for recent history, it is true, plausibility could not be a sufficient criterion."
[48] *Cat*. 20.1: *omnibus arbitris procul amotis…*
[49] Cic. *Mur*. 50.
[50] *Cat*. 22. Cf. Sallust's care for the truth of things elsewhere see Büchner 1967.

embedded in the narrative: the fact that they are highly literary does not infringe the truth-value of the whole, but provides an element of variegation and an opportunity to show off the historian's ability.[51]

If Sallustian historiography was in fact constrained by reference to extensive factual material, *inventio* as a *locus* of the historian's interpretative activity is correspondingly reduced in importance. Rather than *inventio*, the approach I advance in the next section draws on Woodman's analysis of the centrality of rhetoric and its influence on Roman historiography, but expresses this influence differently. I suggest that stress on *inventio* exaggerates one aspect of rhetorical influence, while eliding another, and I wish to refocus the debate, suggesting a new model - not replacing *inventio*, but supplementing it - focusing on the broader application of rhetorical techniques to historiography in terms of structure and arrangement.[52] Rather than limited to the level of content through *inventio*, rhetorical techniques are suffused throughout historiographical composition. Significantly, the reading I propose below does not imply such diminution of the truth-value of classical historiography as Woodman argues: it reconciles continued stress on the facts of the historian's sources with argumentative and literary leeway in construction of the account.

Rhetorical historiography: a new approach

According to the rhetorical manuals, the orator structured his speech and arranged his arguments through his second activity, *dispositio*. *Dispositio* was the process by which the orator laid out material already "discovered" (by *inventio*), to create an effective whole: in particular, it dictated the most persuasive order.[53] In his treatment of *dispositio* in book 7 of the *Institutio Oratoriae*, Quintilian emphasises its importance and likes it to the activity of the sculptor: "Not without good

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[51] See further below pp.41-5.
[52] Similarly Lichanski 1986:42-8; on selectivity and arrangement as central to historiography see Canfora 1972.
[53] Lausberg 1998 §443-52 summarises *dispositio* in the rhetorical manuals; see also May & Wisse 2001: 28-35. On Ciceronian *dispositio* in practice see Tempest 2007.

reason is it placed the second of the five parts of speech, since without it the first is worthless. For even though all of the limbs of a statue have been cast, it is nothing if they are not put together."[54]

In extant treatments, the process by which the orator should marshal his material is frustratingly vague, and *dispositio* plays quite a minor role. Much of what was - according to Aristotle - originally part of *dispositio*,[55] including the analysis of different parts of speech, was subsequently subsumed into *inventio* (a development apparent in both *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and *de Inventione*).[56] Although Quintilian deals in great detail under the heading of *dispositio* with different types of argument, when he comes to the actual construction of the speech, he simply appeals to the practical experience of the orator, and the needs of the case.[57]

The stress on the significance of *dispositio* does, however, indicate recognition of the influence structure and form might have on the effectiveness of a work: it is in this sense that I apply it to historiography. The ordering and structuring of an oratorical argument, I think, provides a useful analogy for the historian's composition: while *inventio* deals with elaboration of content, *dispositio* treats the manipulation of structure and form, dictating the proportions and nature of the history. By shifting our focus to this aspect of the historian's work, it is possible to reconcile generic characteristics of history – reference to "hard core" of factual material – with the interpretative role of the historian himself.

Political historiography of the sort written by Sallust is structured according to a central chronological narrative:[58] this helps to distinguish it from antiquarianism, biography or other forms of engagement with the past at Rome.[59] This imposes a basic order on material (although its nature

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[54] Quint. *Inst.* 7.1 *praef*.

[55] Aris. *Rhet*. 3.13-9 (1414a 30ff.).

[56] Cicero's *de Oratore* is in this respect somewhat unusual: he treats *dispositio* at 2.307-32.

[57] Quint. *Inst*. 7.10.5-11.

[58] *de Or.* 2.63: "narrative requires ordered chronology and description of places: it also demands (in events great and worthy of memory) first plans, then deeds, and then the outcome." As Woodman 1988:84-5 points out, *temporum ordo* is the phrase used at Cic. *Inv*. 1.29 and *Rhet. Her*. 1.15 of the chronology required for clear forensic *narratio*. Cf. Cupaiuolo 2002.

[59] On generic flexibility of engagement with the past see Marincola 1999, Cizek 1985; MacRae 2014 argues against sharp distinction between antiquarianism and historiography. While the boundaries are blurred, historiography from Herodotus onwards is formally unified by a narrative of events, *res gestae*, as against

depends on the form: monographs might cover a single strand, while larger-scale histories included simultaneous events in different theatres).[60] In historiography, the order of events was largely fixed by their chronological sequence (although as I explore below, not absolutely so); the focus of *dispositio*, then, was arrangement and combination of the historical narrative with various supplementary features (speeches, prefaces, moral analyses and so on). I suggest that alongside the chronological narrative which provided the basic structure, the historian's task of *dispositio* consisted of arranging and structuring the text around the narrative, to contribute to his historical interpretation; through *dipositio* he would outline an effective structure for the whole work, combining chronological narration with additional elements.

This model of historiographical composition fits well with the idea of fidelity to an extensive factual core: rather than elaboration of the main narrative itself, *dispositio* includes the effective deployment of already-collected material, and its adaptation to its most effective form. While it does rely on the interpretative activity of the historian, it maintains the distinctive stress of historiography. *Dispositio* does not dictate the content of the narrative: it dictates the form through which that material is made to serve the historian's own objectives. Emphasising the interpretative possibilities of *dispositio* provides a model for understanding the influence of rhetorical composition on historiography, while preserving its status as a genre marked by truthfulness.[61]

Assimilation of the historian's composition to the orator's *dispositio* is supported by methodological statements: in some cases, theoretical remarks stressing the influence of rhetoric on historiography point specifically towards *dispositio*, not *inventio,* as focus of rhetorical activity. Woodman mines such material for evidence of the historian's *inventio* (see also Appendix II): but while Woodman is correct that (for example) Cicero's criticisms of Roman historiography relate to a lack of rhetorical influence, the vocabulary used is at least ambiguous in terms of how that influence

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biography (cf. Plut. Alex. 1.1-2 on Plutarch's focus on illustrative anecdotes over *res gestae*) or antiquarianism (which did not require a narrative frame). See Canfora 2003:14, Bravo 2007, Stadter 2007.

[60] Arrangement of this was a standard criticism of Thucydides, whose treatment by summers and winters was found wanting: e.g. Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 9; cf. Polyb. 38.5-6.

[61] Pfister 1922 (not followed up elsewhere) discusses the importance of proper composition in historiography.

might be expressed. At *de Oratore* 2.54, Antonius castigates earlier writers as *non exornatores rerum, sed tantum modo narratores*: that is – in my view - they failed to elaborate their accounts with features beyond the basic *narratio,* ornamenting them with other elements outside the factual narrative, through the structuring activity of *dispositio*. Even the passage cited by Woodman in support of his arguments on *inventio*, *de Oratore* 2.61-4, emphasises the working-up of the historian's account by means of description and analysis: rather than recommending the use of imaginative reconstruction in creating descriptive material, this could again refer to *dispositio*, and the historian's arrangement of different forms (narrative, description, speech etc.) to create an effective whole.

Also notable is the criticism of Sallust's near-contemporary, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who mentions a process of ἐξεργασία, "fitting-out" or "elaboration", in composing an historical account: this refers in Dionysius' *de Thucydide* to the process by which the historical account is supplemented and ornamented.[62] Dionysius' criticism of Thucydides, although also of his subject-matter, is focused on the criteria of arrangement and proportionality: these concerns are predominantly structural, rather than material, and fall under the heading of *dispositio*.[63] Lucian's description of the historian's task is most explicit: he states that rather than "discovering" the material to be included (the terminology of *inventio*/ἑυρεσις) the historian's role is to arrange it (ταξαι); ταξις was the Greek equivalent term to *dispositio*.[64] Lucian draws a parallel between the activity of the historian and between the task of the sculptor: both are concerned with the fitting together of disparate parts in a seemly fashion. The use of the same analogy as in Quintilian's description of *dispositio* is fitting, and perhaps reflects the similarity of Lucian's terminology of arrangement to the orator's activity.

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[62] 9.7 links it to ταξις, the ordering of material, as one of the features in which Thucydides' account is lacking (cf. *Din*. 8.28, on ταξις and ἐξεργασία as the two aspects of οἰκονομία); 16.2 criticises Thucydides for putting fully worked-up passages (especially descriptions) next to those on which he seems to have expended little effort. For ἐξεργασία cf. Luc. *Hist. Conscr*. 55.11; Josephus uses the term of the historian's activity at *BJ* 1.18.4. Cf. Porod 2013:591-2.

[63] See further below pp.72-4.

[64] See Homeyer 1965:266. Avenarius 1956:119-27 discusses ταξις as applied to historiography, focusing on the difficulties of arranging narratives of simultaneous events; I suggest that its application is broader. Cf. Fox 2001:84 on Lucian's stress away from *inventio*.

Dispositio in practice

To elaborate further how *dispositio* might work in practice, it will be useful to look in more detail at the historians' rhetorical education. Oratory dominated the latter stages of education in late Republican Rome; but for my enquiry the *progymnasmata* - textbooks of an earlier stage of education than oratorical manuals - are valuable sources.[65] As opposed to the elaborate guidelines for speeches found in works like Cicero's *de Inventione*, the *progymnasmata* illustrate an earlier phase of Roman education, undertaken under the *grammaticus* rather than the *rhetor*.[66] Although our examples all postdate the Republican period, and are Greek (with the exception of Priscian's fifth-century translation of Pseudo-Hermogenes),[67] they nonetheless reflect the early education of the late Republican elite.[68]

Rather than fully-fledged speeches, the *progymnasmata* introduce techniques of composition by means of a set of exercises, gradually increasing in complexity. They cover material from the trivial (paraphrasing a fable) upwards, and include exercises such as comparisons and speeches in character, providing practice in applying techniques to set factual material aimed at the inculcation of the appropriate stylistic virtues. Flexibility and subjectivity is emphasised: in the narrative exercise, the task is to rework the same basic narrative in different ways according to different interpretations, while demonstrating the stylistic virtues appropriate to the form. The exercises are not approached from the perspective of forensic oratory, aiming only at the

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[65] On the *progymnasmata* in Greek and Roman education generally see Cichocka 1992; Webb 2001; Kennedy 2003. Gibson 2004 treats the *progymnasmata* and historiography (i.e. history in the curriculum, and relevance of the *progymnasmata* for historiographical composition); cf. Bompaire 1976, Nicolai 1992:83-4. Leeman 1985:287 connects Cicero's remarks on historiographical narrative to the recommendations of the *progymnasmata* (apparently not followed up): my treatment expands on Leeman's. Woodman cites Ps.-Hermogenes on descriptive passages, in support of his theme of *inventio* (1988:89, 108).

[66] See Suet. *Gram. et Rhet.* 25.4 with Kaster 1995 *ad loc*.

[67] See Kennedy 2003. The extant works are by Theon (second century AD, perhaps cited by Quintilian *Inst*. 3.6.48, 9.3.76, and most relevant here), Ps.-Hermogenes (probably third or fourth century AD), Apthonius (late fourth century) and Nicolaus (fifth century).

[68] Quint. *Inst*. 1.9, 2.4, 10.5 cites exercises similar to Theon's. Theon *Prog*. 61 Spengel cites Apollonius of Rhodes on the usefulness of reading aloud; this is probably Apollonius Molon, famous rhetorician of the Late Republican period and teacher of Cicero and Caesar (Plut. *Cic*. 4.5; *Caes*. 3.1, although they probably did not undertake elementary exercises with him).

persiveness of a case:[69] extant *progymnasmata* comment on their usefulness across the spectrum of prose composition.[70] Earlier tasks, in particular, are exercises in the expression of set themes, divorced from argumentative contexts, illustrating the activity of composition (as opposed to the *inventio* found in the oratorical manuals); later exercises do introduce argumentative aspects, demonstrating the application of factual material *in utramque partem*, and again stressing the manipulation of given factual material and the malleability of compositional forms to suggest a particular interpretation.[71]

The *progymnasmata* provide a demonstration of Roman education's approach to prose composition: the exercises illustrate a set of technical building-blocks, out of which larger-scale compositions are supposed eventually to be pieced together.[72] In focusing on the subjective possibilities afforded by set factual material (and its application *in utramque partem*), they illustrate the creation of meaning through the construction of an account, as opposed to through the *inventio* of the material in the first place: exercises practice the imposition of interpretation (and style) on given factual material, according to the possibilities of each individual form. As such, they suggest a useful alternative model for the influence of rhetorical techniques on historiography: relevant to all aspects of literary production, their exercises transcend the characteristics of different genres.

I suggest that the techniques of prose composition taught in the *progymnasmata* provide a model for the historian's construction of a subjective account through *dispositio*. The effective composition of particular formal units and the arrangement of these into a cohesive whole practiced in the *progymnasmata* is comparable to the historian's imposition through *dispositio* of his interpretation onto the details of a narrative.[73] There are also direct continuities between the *progymnasmata* and the historian's activity: particularly noteworthy is the correspondence between

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[69] The fundamental precept of oratory, according to Cic. *de Or.* 1.138, *de Inv*. 1.6: cf. Lausberg 1998 §256.
[70] E.g. Theon, *Prog*. 60 Spengel: "one who has expressed a narration and a fable in a fine and varied way will also compose a history well, and also what is specifically called "narrative" in hypotheses: historical writing is nothing other than a combination of narrations". Cf. Gibson 2004; Webb 2001:290.
[71] See Pseudo-Hermogenes, *Prog*. 11.
[72] Gibson 2004:124-6.
[73] On the *Progymnasmata* as an introduction to structures of speech see Webb 2011:311.

individual exercises of the *progymnasmata* and techniques deployed by historians in specific passages. These similarities are striking: the stylistic virtues expected of each also parallel the historiographical deployment of such forms. I will examine some of these correspondences in more depth, with a view to demonstrating more clearly what I see as the nature of historiographical *dispositio*.[74]

The clearest link between the *progymnasmata* and the activity of the historian is the second of the standard exercises: narrative (διήγημά). The student rephrased a set theme in various modes, adapting a given plot towards specific effects; notably, his manipulation of the content might include putting it into a particular order.[75] The exercise is directly relevant to the historian's activity: Theon in fact states that historical writing is simply a combination of narratives, and his example is drawn from Thucydides.[76] The *progymnasmata* also stress the connection between the individual elements of narrative and the composition as a whole. Each individual narrative unit, according to the terminology of Pseudo-Hermogenes, is a διήγημα: the broader account which these constitute is defined as διήγησις, according to its scope: "the History of Herodotus is a διήγησις, as is that of Thucydides, but the story of Arion or of Alcmeon is a διήγημα."[77] Individual episodes represent the blocks out of which the account is constructed. The combination of individual narratives in order to create a coherent διήγησις is comparable to the historian's activity in combining individual episodes of narrative into a whole history.

The link between historiographical narrative and rhetorical *narratio* has not gone unnoticed.[78] However, the *narratio* treated as an exercise in the *progymnasmata* differs from the *narratio* of the forensic orator: I suggest that viewing historiographical *narratio* in tandem to that of the *progymnasmata*, rather than that of the more fully developed oratorical works, provides a new

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[74] Cf Gibson 2004:108-15 on use of historical material in specific exercises of the *Progymnasmata.*
[75] Theon *Prog*. 85, 87 Spengel.
[76] *Prog*. 84-91 S demonstrates how Thucydides 2.2-6 fulfils the stylistic virtues appropriate to narrative, and then rephrases Thucydides' narration into a direct statement, a question, a command, a wish, etc.
[77] Ps-Herm. *Prog*. 4 Rabe. Episodes referred to are Hdt. 1.23, Thuc. 2.102.
[78] E.g. Woodman 1988:84-7 uses the similarity as part of his argument as to the application of *inventio*.

perspective. Theon's basic definition, "language which describes deeds which have happened, or as if they have happened",[79] is in keeping with those given in *de Inventione* and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*;[80] however, the accounts then diverge. Theon concentrates on the basic elements from which narrative is constructed, the six στοιχεῖα or "circumstances" - the factual material of the who, what, why, and so on of events.[81] On the other hand, *de Inventione* and *Rhetorica ad Herennium* distinguish between three discrete forms of *narratio*.[82] According to the *Rhetorica ad Herennium,*

"of *narratio* there are three *genera*. The first is where we set forth the *res gestae* and we drag (*trahimus*) everything across to our own use in winning the case; this pertains to those cases on which a judgement is to be made. The second *genus* is that which sometimes enters into the case either to win good faith, or to incriminate someone else, or making a transition, or for some other plan. The third type is that which is far from the civil court, but in which it is nonetheless useful to exercise, since by such exercises we can better handle narratives in actual cases."[83]

This distinguishes oratorical *narratio*, aimed wholly at persuasiveness, from a form "far from the civil court". The first *genus* suggests a partial account intended to drag the case over to speaker's side: this implies the use of the orator's arsenal of persuasion, including *inventio*. The third *genus* is distinct, and closer to Theon's exercise:[84] it is "far from the civil court" and explicitly distinguished from those *narrationes* which distort the truth in order to persuade. There is no need for us to import the stress on persuasion *per se*, focus of the first *genus* of *narratio*, into this third: although the third *genus* is useful as practice, this is practice at narrating *per se*, rather than at using the arsenal of persuasive techniques in manipulating the narrative towards one's own side.[85] The

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[79] Theon *Prog*. 78 Spengel.
[80] *Inv*. 1.27; *Rhet. Her*. 1.4.
[81] Theon *Prog*. 78S: πρόσωπον (person), πρᾶγμα (deed), τόπος (place), χρόνος (time), τρόπος (manner), and αἰτία (reasons): "a narrative lacking any of these is incomplete". Cf. Quint. *Inst*. 2.2; Leeman 1985:287-8.
[82] *Rhet. Her*. 1.11-14; Cic. *Inv*. 1.27. cf. Lausberg 1998 §290; Barwick 1928.
[83] *Rhet. Her.* 1.12.
[84] Cf. the word '*exerceri*'.
[85] This is made explicit by Cicero's discussion (*Inv*. 1.27), which identifies different aims for this third *genus* to those of the first: its most important goal is *festivitas*, charm, rather than persuasion. Quint. *Inst*. 2.4.2

distinction is between a technical exercise aimed at clear and effective presentation (Theon's definition), and an argumentative technique with more leeway in material included, as one aspect of an overall strategy of persuasion.

Theon's precepts on the στοιχεῖα are explicitly disdained by Quintilian when he comes to set out his instructions for the oratorical *narratio*.[86] The narrative Quintilian describes, aimed at the persuasion of the court-room, explicitly does *not* require the compositional elements and narrative detail fundamental to Theon's, but focuses instead on the manipulation of *narratio* to fit a wider argument.[87] The similarity in terminology does not imply that the same attitude towards persuasiveness and *inventio* applied to each form: I suggest that the historical *narratio* might, in keeping with Theon's remarks as to his exercise's relevance to historiographical activity, be viewed in the light of progymnastic *narratio* rather than that of the court-room *narratio*. The exercise is a guide to the way the historian should compose history; its focus on the particular στοιχεῖα of the narrative likens it to the historian's employment of the factual "hard core". There is clearer continuity between the historian's activity and the *progymnasmata* than with the oratorical *narratio*.

A second exercise demonstrating continuity is *prosopopoeia*, speech in character;[88] the student composed speeches on set themes, appropriate to the character and circumstances of the supposed speaker. The virtues of the *prosopopeia* were that it should be believable, and correspond to the kind of words the person might use: fitting both speaker and occasion, the speech would serve to delineate them.[89] *Prosopopoeia* is paralleled by the historians' composition of speeches for

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similarly divides historical narrative (a fourth *genus*), *tanto robustior quanto verior*, from the *narratio* of the courts.

[86] *Inst*. 4.2.2.

[87] Cf. Quint. *Inst*. 10.1.31: history is written "to narrate, not to prove, and the aim of the whole work is not a present battle but a record for posterity".

[88] Theon *Prog*. 115 Spengel.

[89] See Gibson 2008:355.

historical personages: for example, the speech of Catiline at *Bellum Catilinae* 20.[90] Sallust uses

speeches as recommended by Theon: they are deployed for characterisation and historical analysis,

delineating both character and circumstances (in this case, the nature of Catiline's revolutionary

designs and manipulation of language, and the programme by which he appealed to his fellow-

conspirators). It is striking how often Sallust produces speeches saying little about their direct

subjects, but much about the speaker himself and about the broader themes of Sallust's historical

analysis:[91] speeches are not included solely as narrative speech-acts, but also for purposes treated in

the *progymnasmata*.

The similarity between *prosopopoeia* as an exercise and the historian's use of speech can

further be demonstrated by comparison of Theon's remarks with Lucian's theoretical work *quomodo*

historia conscribenda sit. Theon terms *prosopopeia* as "the introduction of a person to whom words

are attributed that are suitable to the speaker and have an indisputable application to the subject

discussed" while Lucian recommends "If someone must be brought in to make a speech, it is most

important that his language suits his character and his subject, and these also should be made as

clear as possible."[92] There is clear continuity between the composition of speech as exercise, and its

deployment as historiographical technique.

The actual content of speeches, following Woodman's arguments, is governed by *inventio*; it

is based on his imagination in reconstructing a version of words which might have been spoken.

However, the inclusion of a speech, and its placement, is I think part of *dispositio*. Sallust includes

Memmius' speech in the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, for example, as a document of the oratory current at

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[90] Speech in classical historiography is a subject to which I cannot do justice here. While Thucydides' methodological chapter (1.22) has cast a long shadow, his scruples in claiming to represent his speakers' actual words (however understood) are not shared by all historians: see Fornara 1983:142-68; Pelling 2000:112-22; Foster 2012:12 notes speeches as *loci* of the historian's analysis. Sacks 1986 demonstrates that Dionysius of Halicarnassus was capable of reconciling Thucydides' methodological statement with his own free invention. On Sallust's speeches in particular see Geckle 1995, with full bibliography; Nicolai 2002; Büchner 1982:160-243; Marincola 2010:279-86.

[91] E.g. the speech of Memmius (*Jug*. 31).

[92] Theon *Prog*. 115 Spengel; Lucian, *Hist. Conscr*. 58.

Rome: he uses the speech to reinforce the theme of partisan strife.[93] Even in the case of those representing specific, identifiable speeches (such as of Caesar and Cato on the punishment of the Catilinarians, against which we can compare other versions)[94] the inclusion of direct speech is a structural choice in order to put forward a specific argument - in this case to highlight the parallelism between the two men - and to contribute to the thematic construction of the work.

My final example of continuity between *progymnasmata* and historical composition is *ekphrasis*. A poetic technique, on the precedent of Homer's shield of Achilles in the *Iliad*,[95] *ekphrases* also figured in rhetorical theory, as descriptions aimed at vividness.[96] The term often refers to description of objects; but as both rhetorical textbooks and *progymnasmata* make clear, also among possible subjects were "persons, actions, times, places, seasons and many others... of actions, for example, the description of a land battle and a naval battle; of occasions, for example, peace, war; of places, for example, harbour, beaches, cities; of times, for example, spring, summer, harvest".[97] The *ekphrases* of the *progymnasmata* are, in Lausberg's formulation, set-piece descriptions of specific events "held together by the framework of a (more or less relaxable) simultaneity".[98]

Descriptions of this sort are frequently found in historiography:[99] particular episodes might form the subject for vivid description within the context of an historical narrative. The *progymnasmata* actually draw on historians for their examples: Thucydides' description of the night-battle in Sicily (7.43-4) appears in three *progymnasmata*, as an example of "mixed description" in portraying both a battle and a night scene.[100] Some authors used *ekphrasis* more than others.

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[93] *Jug*. 31. See further below, pp.180-2.
[94] See Drummond 1995:38-47, 72-7.
[95] *Il*. 18.468-608.
[96] Bibliography on poetic *ekphrasis* is extensive, but comparatively little covers the rhetorical aspects which I explore here. For a general summary see Zeitlin 2013; for rhetorical sources Lausberg 1998 §810. Quint. *Inst*. 8.3.61 covers *ekphrasis* as a part of speech; *Rhet. Her*. 4.51 treats *descriptio* as a figure.
[97] Ps-Herm. *Prog*. 22 Rabe. Libanius' *Progymnasmata* include examples of description of an infantry battle and a naval battle: see Gibson 2008: 427-33, 450-1.
[98] Lausberg 1998 §810.
[99] Cf. Cic. *Or*. 66, Lucian *Hist. Conscr*. 19, 57 on the use of description in historiography.
[100] Theon *Prog*. 119 Spengel; Ps-Herm. *Prog*. 22 Rabe; Apth. *Prog*. 37 Rabe.

Polybius' criticism of Phylarchus stresses his over-use of descriptions for pathetic effect:[101] Phylarchus is castigated for his descriptions of "graphic scenes of women clinging to one another, tearing their hair and baring their breasts... Phylarchus reproduces this kind of effect again and again in his history, striving on each occasion to recreate the horrors before our eyes". Phylarchus included repeated *ekphrases* for the purpose of inducing pity: that this is contrary to how Polybius sees the purpose of historiography does not indicate that it was not fairly usual practice.[102]

Given the chronological dimension that *ekphrasis* might include (such as in the description of a battle), we should consider its overlap with *narratio*. The chief distinction was stylistic: *ekphrasis* aimed at ἐνάργεια, vividness, rather than the virtues of narrative of brevity, clarity and plausibility.[103] The aim of *ekphrasis* was to summon up the thing described before the eyes of the audience, in order to stir their emotions or to demonstrate the author's skill. In more extensive passages of description, the techniques by which this could be accomplished were many: the rhetoricians outline a series of methods, all of which aim essentially at placing a dramatised and ostensibly living image of the things described before the eyes of the audience, creating an effect which was realistic and emotive.[104]

Vivid descriptions are distinguished from the body of the chronological narrative by stylistic aims:[105] to understand these passages as formally separate to *narratio* is the best way to make sense of the inclusion of detailed description in the historical account. The inclusion of description within the frame of the narrative provided an opportunity for the historian to foreground specific themes, or to increase the pathos or dramatic effectiveness of his work. Descriptions frequently provide the

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[101] Polyb. 2.56. Cf. Dion. Hal. *de Thuc.* 15 with Walbank 1960:230-1 on vivid description in Thucydides and Xenophon.

[102] On Polybius, Phylarchus and *ekphrasis* in historiography see Marincola 2003:295-302, 2013.On Polybius' exceptionalism see Sacks 1981 esp. 144-66**.**

[103] Nicolaus *Prog*. 68 Felten: "*ekphrasis* is descriptive speech, bringing what is described clearly before the eyes. 'Clearly' is added because in this way it most differs from narration; the latter gives a plain exposition of actions, the former tries to make the hearers into spectators." On ἐνάργεια see Walker 1993; Berardi 2012 esp. 33-40.

[104] Lausberg 1998 §810-19 lists the rhetoricians' techniques of *evidentia*. *Rhet. Her.* 4.51: *hoc genere exornationis vel indignatio vel misericordia potest commoveri*. Cf. Vasaly 1993:110-30 on Cicero's use of *evidentia* in the Verrines.

[105] Wiseman 1993:145 states that Greek and Roman historians "always strove for" ἐνάργεια, but this exaggerates: ἐνάργεια, the specific quality of eyewitness vividness, appears only at certain points (*ekphrases*).

thematic and pathetic high-points of the historian's text: it is an aspect of the historian's *dispositio*, aimed at the effectiveness of the composition as a whole, to include such worked-up passages.

A Sallustian example of *ekphrasis* is the description of the Tullianum in the *Bellum Catilinae*.[106] Sallust describes the prison where the condemned conspirators were taken for punishment; notably, the style of his description deviates from his usual diction. "There is in the prison a place called the Tullianum, a little way up on the left when you go in, sunk some twelve feet into the ground. Walls fortify it all round, and above it joins on a chamber of vaulted stones; in its desolation, shadows and stench, its appearance is hideous and terrible."[107] The vivid sensory description of the *facies* of the prison (in contrast to Sallust's usual avoidance of such details) encapsulates this: the horrible appearance, and the attempts made to dramatise its qualities before the very eyes of the audience, create a strongly affective impression. The most obvious characteristic of the description of the Tullianum, in keeping with the purposes of the *ekphrasis* in the rhetorical manuals, is its vividness, and the element of pathos in its description. This description is formally distinct from other parts of the monograph.

The important stylistic distinction between *ekphrasis* and *narratio* returns me to the questions of truthfulness and the "hard core" discussed above. *Ekphrasis* stresses details which create vividness in the whole: as such, these passages are significant opportunities for the exercise of *inventio* as plausible reconstruction, through the historian's use of his imagination in creating vivid detail. I alluded to this above, in suggesting that the historian might exercise *inventio* on the details of specific episodes: the audience, themselves versed in the exercises of the *progymnasmata*, would I think have recognised such passages as opportunities for the historian to demonstrate literary prowess and to provide a vivid climax to his account.

Practice supports the idea that certain episodes of the historian's account might be more coloured by ekphrastic techniques. A.J. Woodman's best examples of the application of *inventio* to

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[106] *Cat*. 55.3-5. On the passage see Wilkins 1999, esp. 114 on *ekphrastic* elements as distinctive within Sallust's usual practice. Gran. Lic. *Ann*. 36.30-2 attests extensive descriptions in the *Historiae*.
[107] *Cat*. 55.3-5.

depict things "as they must have been" are battle-scenes, and, most persuasively, two Tacitean post-battle visits.[108] The details of battles being notoriously difficult to reconstruct, the combat narratives of the ancient historians are heavily influenced by their own ideas of what was appropriate based on literary models: they often bear more resemblance to each other than to any actual conflict.[109] If we approach these passages not as episodes of historiographical *narratio*, but as discrete *ekphrases* embedded within the historical account, then the application of the imaginative techniques of *inventio* seems more comprehensible within texts otherwise dependent on a factual "hard core".[110] I suggest that instead of seeing the worked-up passages of description Woodman points out as markers of *inventio* in the history as a whole, we should instead see them as embedded passages of *ekphrasis*: importantly, this implies (in the theory of the *progymnasmata* at least) a different set of objectives and stylistic features to those applicable to *narratio*.[111]

Another example cited by Woodman of the application of *inventio* is the description of a captured city: he cites Quintilian's guidelines for the inclusion of the *topoi* of burning temples and falling roofs, and states that "these instructions constitute an example in miniature of precisely the process which I am describing."[112] A captured city without such events is almost impossible to imagine: they are basic components of the scene, and thus are included in the description. I agree with Woodman that such *topoi* are central to the construction of a vivid description of the captured city: but I do not consider this process as analogous to the composition of the history as a whole.[113] The description "in miniature" here is a self-contained *ekphrastic* unit, on which the historian's

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[108] Woodman's demonstration of intertextual parallels between two Tacitean battlefields (*Ann*. 1.62-3 and *Hist*. 5.14-5), 1988:168-79 is a brilliant exposition of the construction of Tacitus' narrative: but it does not demonstrate *inventio* with respect to *narratio* itself.

[109] Woodman 1979:154; 1988:17-23. The unreliability of his predecessors' battle narratives was noted by Polybius: e.g. 12.17-22 on Callisthenes. Lucian *Hist Conscr*. 45 identifies battle-scenes as particularly appropriate for poetic elaboration.

[110] Brunt 1980 notes that the classical historians were capable of descriptions exceeding strict truth, arguing that these represented deviations from the ideal of history for dramatic effect, rather than being fully "truthful".

[111] Rhetorical handbooks treat the intersection between the two categories by categorising descriptions as digressive: see Lausberg 1998 §819.

[112] Woodman 1988: 89-90. The passage cited is Quint. *Inst*. 8.3.67-70.

[113] Cf. Wiseman 1993:144-5.

inventio is applied for vividness, rather than representing the construction of the whole historical account.

That the historian could include such worked-up passages of description does not impinge on the assumption that the narrative closely represented things which had actually happened: that certain parts of the account (*ekphrases*) provided particular opportunities for vivid description does not imply that the historian fully exercised *inventio* on the rest. *Ekphrases* illustrate the supplementing of a historical narrative with other elements through *dispositio*. While the events of the narrative were constrained by the factual "hard core", the historian could exceed this in the rhetorically worked-up passages with which he fitted it out: *ekphrases*, I think, demonstrate not that *inventio* applied uniformly across the whole history, but that parts of an historical work might apply the tools of rhetoric in different ways. They exemplify the idea of the historical account as a composite, of different formal elements with distinct generic expectations.

These examples could be supplemented: the exercise on the delineation of character bears formal similarities to Sallust's deployment of character-sketches; one of the more sophisticated exercises is *synkrisis* (comparison), a form which Sallust famously uses in comparing Caesar and Cato.[114] The exercises of the *progymnasmata*, I think, provide a model for the historian's construction of his text from different formal elements: the *progymasmata* themselves stress the application of different forms (taught in the various exercises) to the creation of cohesive works. In keeping with this, I suggest that the influence of rhetoric on historiography may be felt in the selection, arrangement and manipulation of different structural devices, in combination with the basic factual material of the historical narrative (allowing some degree of flexibility in selectivity and order, but not in terms of the factual "hard core") in order to create an account which serves the historian's interpretation and literary aims. The different elements of the *progymnasmata*,

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[114] For character-sketches and *synkrisis* see chapter 5.

paralleled in various elements of the historical text, illustrate this process at work.[115] I will draw on this model of the historian's activity throughout this thesis, stressing *dispositio* as the way in which the historian imposed his own interpretation onto his account: the centrality of considerations of structure and selectiveness is important to my focus on digression as a fundamentally structural technique (I consider this idea further in the next chapter).

Sallustian *dispositio* in practice

It remains to consider some examples of *dispositio* in practice, illustrating how such structural considerations might serve the historian's argumentative and literary aims: considering some Sallustian examples will clarify my argument.[116] The first is Sallust's technique of arrangement of narrative itself, drawing on some temporal manipulations in the *Bellum Catilinae*; the second is the digression on the so-called "first conspiracy" of Catiline.

An aspect until now postponed is the *dispositio* of the actual narrative itself, and the manipulation which might be exercised on this level. I have delayed consideration of this, because it is a particular telling point of intersection between the truth of events and the historian's representation, and a powerful demonstration of the power of *dispositio* to put forward a subjective interpretation. I have argued in this chapter for a model of classical political historiography founded on a body of factual material to which the historian was obliged to conform. However, as scholars have noted, Sallust's works themselves seem to sometimes depart from such strictures: such departures have provided the basis for scholars who have wished to see him as a distorting propagandist.[117] The most convincing accusations are of chronological manipulation: that is, that

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[115] Russell 1967:140 stresses the influence of exercises.

[116] Cf Devillers 2007, whose catalogue of forms of persuasion in the *Bellum Catilinae* includes techniques similar to those I treat under the heading of *dispositio*. Cf. Tiffou 1973:377-95; Gärtner 1986 on structural techniques in the *Cat*.

[117] Sallust's chronological distortions have been read simply as errors, but are better understood as manipulations for specific effects, in keeping with Sallust's technique of programmatic suggestion (implying a particular interpretation first, in order to throw the logic of the narrative into a particular light). See von Fritz 1943; McGushin 1977:297; Parker 2001, 2004, 2008; Cameron & Parker 2005:33-57. Büchner 1969:83 argues that Sallust is free with chronology in the service of "a deeper and more essential truth".

Sallust is not above misdating events in order to emphasise their inherent drama, or in order to put forth his own interpretation. This is, I think, connected to *dispositio*.

In the *Bellum Catilinae*, I note three particularly relevant chronological distortions - points at which Sallust's order of events conflicts with what we know from other sources (usually Cicero). First, the antedating of the beginning of the conspiracy, with the *contio* in which Catiline outlined his programme; second, the misdating of the attack on Cicero's person, relative to the *senatus consultum ultimum*; third, the timing of the intervention of the *equites* against Caesar in relation to the Catilinarian debate. In each case, the distortion of the Sallustian account is not in terms of factual veracity, but in terms of narrative order: events are shifted out of their proper chronological place. Sallust's temporal manipulations have been noted by previous scholars; my main interest here is to demonstrate the relevance of *dispositio*.[118]

The first charge is the antedating of Catiline's revolutionary designs. Sallust places the beginnings of Catiline's conspiracy – the first meeting of the conspirators - as early as June 64 (in addition to the so-called "first conspiracy", discussed below).[119] This, scholars have argued, is unhistorical: Catiline cannot have had revolutionary designs until after he had failed in the elections for 63.[120] Sallust's version predates the beginning of Catiline's designs, an historical error. This is not simply a mistake: Sallust knew from his sources that Catiline had stood as an ostensibly respectable candidate, and he made use of Cicero's consular speeches, which would have corrected the deficiency. Rather, he transplants a known event backwards chronologically, in order to impute it programmatic significance within the construction of Catiline's character. This is not invention, since the event had actually occurred; the manipulation is of order. By transposing Catiline's designs, Sallust makes his conspiracy appear a more considered threat to the state (by extending its duration), portrays Catiline as a more committed and dangerous enemy, and provides a powerful

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[118] See Leeman 1957:4; Wimmel 1967; Syme 1964:79-81; La Penna 1968:86-9, 98-105; McGushin 1977:296-7; Drexler 1970; Ledworuski 1994: 321-3; Schmal 2001:46-7.
[119] *Cat*. 17.1. Stone 1998 attempts to salvage Sallust's chronology, but his hypothesis is not convincing.
[120] Wimmel 1967:202-5; McGushin 1977:62-3.

and vivid set-piece to open his narrative. This is a rhetorical manipulation, but falls within the bounds of the techniques of arrangement proper to *dispositio*.

The same holds for the next example. Sallust records the passing of the *senatus consultum ultimum* immediately after the attempt by Catiline's men on Cicero's life (November 7th),[121] while we know - again from Cicero - that it actually occurred on 21st October.[122] That is, Sallust moves the bill to postdate the attack on Cicero.[123] This manipulation of order implies a causal link not present in the original sequence: although Sallust does not comment explicitly on this, he structures his narrative to imply that the attack, along with reported stirrings of revolt in Etruria, resulted directly in the passing of the bill. By postdating it, Sallust implies that it was a response to the manifest violence of the conspirators, and that it was based on firmer evidence than mere letters threatening violence (which seem actually to have prompted it). Sallust places the measure on firmer constitutional and evidentiary grounds by emphasising the demonstrable threat to the state, through manipulating the temporal logic of the text.[124]

The third example relates to the Catilinarian debate, and threats made against Caesar by certain *equites* guarding the senate-house.[125] In Sallust's version, Caesar is threatened on his way into the Senate-house, in response to the intriguing of Catulus and Piso against him;[126] however, it seems from other sources (including Plutarch and Suetonius) that the incident actually took place *after* Caesar had spoken, and that the knights' reaction was a response to Cato's attack on Caesar's position.[127] Through manipulation of chronology, Sallust alters the logical progression of events: he shifts blame onto the intrigues of Catulus and Piso, and diminishes the impression that Caesar's speech had been received negatively: this contributes to the parallelism within the debate between Caesar and Cato which is the climax of the *Bellum Catilinae*.

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[121] *Cat*. 29.2.
[122] Cf. Cic. *Cat*. 1.3-4.
[123] Cf. McGushin 1977:174.
[124] See *Cat*. 29.3 for Sallust's opinion; cf. Drummond 1995:79-95 on its inaccuracy. Stone 1999:57 reads this as part of Sallust's support for Cicero (similarly Vretska 1937b:208); Schwartz 1897:577-8, the exact opposite.
[125] On literary manipulations of this episode see Wimmel 1967:192-3; Batstone 1986.
[126] *Cat*. 49.
[127] Plut. *Caes*. 8; Suet. *Jul*. 14.2; see McGushin 1977:234.

Chronological manipulation is paralleled in the *Bellum Jugurthinum*: the chronology of the monograph's opening exemplifies the same selectivity and imposition of structure, albeit more subtly.[128] The monograph begins with Jugurtha's early life: it describes his youth, adoption and upbringing. Again, the significant point for my purposes is the logical connection suggested by Sallust's chronological structure. Sallust does not this time shift the order of events; but he tacitly elides a period of sixteen years between Jugurtha's adoption and the death of his adoptive father Micipsa, in order to suggest a causal connection between influence on Jugurtha by evil elements at Numantia, and his behaviour immediately after Micipsa's death.[129] By reducing sixteen years into the phrase *paucos post annos*, Sallust implies a logical connection which exceeds chronology; his temporal construction of the narrative – linking Jugurtha's misdeeds directly to contact with the Romans - emphasises the Roman corruption which dominates the opening phase of the monograph.[130]

These examples demonstrate the application of *dispositio* in shaping meaning through the ordering of narrative: Sallust hews to the facts of his "hard core", but retains argumentative freedom in structuring his account. This far exceeds the flexibility allowed to modern historians; but it can nonetheless be conceived as manipulation of structure, rather than of historical fact *per se*. Each of the events on which Sallust exercises his rhetorical powers is essentially a self-contained episode (a διηγήμα within the whole διηγήσις): Sallust's activity consists of manipulating the relationship between these episodes. While this is reprehensible by modern standards, it is within the remit of the classical historian, and preserves (within allowable bounds) the historian's subject-matter of *res*

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[128] See Cipriani 1988:23-42.
[129] *Jug.* 9. See below pp.231-4. Devillers 2000:205-8 suggests that temporal manipulations here create an impression of speed, stressing the sense of historical evolution in Africa.
[130] See Büchner 1953:7 for the linking role of these words.

gestae.[131] The historian does not invent: he merely imposes a structure which fits his interpretation.[132]

The other aspect of the historian's *dispositio*, particularly illustrated through the parallels with the *progymnasmata* - the inclusion of material beyond the historical narrative itself - is no less significant in the historian's construction of meaning. My example here is the narrative of the so-called "first conspiracy" of Catiline at chapters 18-9 of the *Bellum Catilinae*: Sallust digresses back before the beginning of his stated theme, treating an apparent earlier attempt by Catiline and associates to overthrow the state in 65. This is a διήγημα in its own right; the events it treats are self-contained and chronologically separate from the subject-matter of the monograph. The placement of the passage is notable: although events depicted are supposed to have happened in 65, Sallust relates them between his account of Catiline's habitat at Rome and the *contio* which inaugurates the conspiracy proper. Structurally, this episode interrupts the portrayal of Catiline in 64, the focus of the monograph up to this point, and intrudes upon it with a separate narrative.[133]

This διήγημα extends Catiline's portrait; but in addition to this, it serves an argumentative role within the construction of the history. This first conspiracy provides a counterpoint to the narrative to come: Sallust suggests that had Catiline not given the signal too soon, *eo die post conditam urbem Romam pessumum facinus patratum foret:* "on that day would the gravest deed since the foundation of the city have been carried out". This alludes counterfactually to the monograph's subject, a *facinus in primis... sceleris atque periculi novitate*, "a deed among the foremost in wickedness and the novelty of the danger":[134] By establishing continuity in Catiline's revolutionary designs, Sallust emphasises the danger he posed (and thus the importance of his

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[131] A distinction between strict chronological order in oratorical *narratio* and a sequence which paid more attention to argumentation, is described in Fortunatus 3.1. See Lausberg 1998 §450.
[132] Wimmel 1967:221 stresses the symbolic power of anticipations; Vretska 1954:25 notes Sallust's imposition of logical connections exceeding historicity.
[133] Pagan 2004:37-40 discusses this (among Sallust's other digressions) as a retarding device, characteristic of a conspiracy narrative.
[134] *Cat*. 4.4.

theme) beyond the bounds of the circumscribed monographic subject-matter of 63; he uses material beyond the bounds of the main narrative in order to supplement it.

There are also considerations of content here. As Ronald Syme and Robin Seager have demonstrated, events of 65 (while it was generally agreed that *something* had happened) were nebulous: our sources disagree on the aims of the attempted *coup*, and whether Catiline was even involved.[135] Sallust's account reflects a combination of invective and retrospective spin against Catiline, drawn partly from the speech *in toga candida* of Cicero's consular canvass.[136] The narrative uses a different set of source-material (i.e. subsequent invective and reports, rather than Cicero's speeches, contemporary to 63, on which Sallust draws for much of the main narrative): the position of this unit outside the main narrative of the text may be related to the deployment of this material, not drawn from chronological accounts of the conspiracy year but rather supplementing it as a kind of character testimony.[137] Sallust did not invent the "first conspiracy": rather, given the confusion that Seager's study of the tradition attests, Sallust put the most useful spin on a muddy period, building on accounts which circulated (through invective, among other means) at the time, but which were not part of the same unified historical narrative as the events of the conspiracy of 64-3.

Conclusion: *dispositio* and digression

This chapter has introduced my examination of digression, through consideration of the historian's compositional activity more generally. I have suggested a new approach to the vexed question of rhetorical influence on historiography, focusing on the activity of *dispositio*. While comparable to A.J. Woodman's theory of *inventio* in terms of the influence of rhetoric and centrality of the historian's subjective interpretation, this model maintains reference to factual material as a generic characteristic of historiography. *Dispositio* concentrates less on the invention of material, and more on techniques of structure and arrangement to support subjective analysis. This has

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[135] Seager 1964 assesses the sources.
[136] Syme 1964:84-102; Seager 1964; McGushin 1977:298-301 summarises other work.
[137] Cf. La Penna 1968:105 on Cicero's elision of the First Conspiracy in the Catilinarians.

important implications for our understanding of the historian's composition; it reconciles historiographical practice with continued focus on fidelity to historical events.[138] Historiography - at least Sallustian historiography - implicitly engages with factual events; but it admits of strong rhetorical influence in the way they are presented, even stretching to manipulations of chronology and narrative order.

The purpose of this refocusing of the debate has been to provide a context within which to place the historian's use of digression. I will build on these foundations throughout this thesis: I will stress the interpretative significance of the relationship between digressions and works within which they are embedded. Under a model of historiographical composition so concerned with structure and selectivity, the decision to digress is particularly marked: if the interpretative weight of the historian's text is concentrated in structural factors, then digressions – in disrupting the historical account - are features of particular significance.

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[138] Pelling 1990 suggests a similar view of Plutarch's composition: he simplifies and supplements to create an effective composition, but does not invent wholesale.

Chapter 2 –Digression in theory and in practice

With this chapter, I will expand on *dispositio* with relation to digression. The stress implied

by *dispositio* on structure and arrangement as *loci* of interpretation suggests that digressions are

significant passages, and thus underpins the approach I advance here; however, this does not serve

to define the digression as an historiographical device, or to indicate the formal characteristics which

distinguish such passages, important precursors to the close reading of Sallust's text which I offer in

the second half of this thesis. This chapter, then, will explore digression within classical

historiography and particularly as relevant to Sallust's practice, aiming at both a definition and a

more general sense of how digression was understood as a literary device: it will survey the classical

evidence, with a view to setting Sallust's use of the form within a wider context.[1] Unfortunately,

evidence for this kind of investigation is patchy, owing to the vagaries of textual transmission and

the nature of the enquiry: it is often difficult to get at basic assumptions of a literary culture through

texts, because they are so deeply embedded that they go unexpressed (the debate on the nature of

truth in classical historiography is testament to this). Little theoretical reflection survives by

historians themselves, beyond the more-or-less formalised commonplaces of their prefaces; there is

still less material on specific literary devices such as the digression.[2]

I will begin by briefly assessing the digressive practice of Sallust's predecessors, as an initial

demonstration of the flexibility of the digression. I will then canvass the classical theory on

digression: owing to the dearth of specifically historiographical material, this mainly consists of

contemporary rhetorical textbooks, and Lucian's *quomodo historia conscribenda sit*. While there are

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[1] It is insufficient simply to define digressions as passages marked as such. Although Sallust marks many digressive passages (see e.g. *Cat*. 5.9, *Jug*. 17.1, *Jug*. 79; on *formulae* introducing Sallustian digression see Wiedemann 1979 with the ensuing debate of Earl 1979, Wiedemann 1980, Malcolm 1980, Earl 1981, illustrating the ambiguities of such phrases), he does not always do so. For example, Sallust's *synkrisis* at *Cat*. 54 is not explicitly marked as digressive, despite clearly shifting the perspective away from narrative time to a viewpoint after the deaths of both Caesar and Cato, deviating markedly from the conspiracy narrative of 63. This thesis will take a more cohesive approach, defining digressions based on structural grounds rather than simply following the historian's indications.

[2] On historians' methodological reflections see Marincola 1997:34-43 and *passim*; on the conventional nature of their prefaces, Earl 1971.

caveats against using such material in relation to historiography, these works do nonetheless suggest initial conclusions as to how the digression was conceived. While useful, these texts are not sufficient to define digression: therefore, the second part of this chapter will draw on narratological theory, in order to formulate a definition to apply to the Sallustian text.

Digression in Sallust's historiographical predecessors

I begin with some consideration of digression in the historiographical practice of Sallust's predecessors. I cannot cover in detail the rich historiographical traditions of Greece and Rome,[3] but even a brief survey will demonstrate the wide variety in the use of digressive material: the ways in which digressive material is employed within the works of different authors suggests some initial approaches to how we might read Sallust's use of the form. However, there are problematic aspects to this: the first relates to definition, and the second to the corpus of material which survives.

Part of the project of this chapter will be to outline a technical definition of digression to apply to classical historiography: however, as this discussion will illustrate, this is complex and requires attention to a range of criteria. For my immediate purposes in this survey, I will define digressions as material which deviates from the immediate subject of the narrative in which they are embedded: while this definition will be refined over the course of the chapter, and the consideration of different sets of *testimonia* as to the nature of digression, it provides a starting-point.

The difficulties here are related to the second caveat, which is that it is largely impossible to assess digression in Sallust's Latin predecessors, because their works are fragmentary.[4] Fragmentary histories pose a number of interpretative problems,[5] magnified by the details of transmission:[6] reconstruction of structure (and thus of digressions) is highly problematic, because it is impossible to

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[3] Canter 1929 provides a catalogue of digression in the major historians, although his definition of digression is far from clear; he concludes that the "better historians" (in his assessment, Sallust and Thucydides) tend to use fewer digressions, and to stick more closely to the narrative itself.

[4] The exception is Caesar's *commentarii*; on their specialised form see above p.7.

[5] See the caveats of Brunt 1980b.

[6] E.g. Sisenna survives largely through citations by fourth-century lexicographer Nonius Marcellus, with book-number but stripped of context (see *FRHist* 1.310-1; Sensal 2003). The same holds for Sallust's *Historiae*, for sixty-one fragments of which (McGushin's edition) Nonius is our source: McGushin 1992:8.

identify immediate narrative context against which passages might be considered to digress. In the absence of context, our best approach might be to attempt to identify material alien to the subject of a work more generally, or outside the period covered: but this does not solve the problem, since the subject-matter of Sallust's historiographical predecessors is itself a *crux*.[7]

A historian who was a major influence on Sallust exemplifies this; the elder Cato.[8] Cato wrote his history, the *Origines*, up to his death in 149. It was highly original, not least in being the first history in Latin: although it survives only in fragments, and our fullest *testimonium* of its contents (Nepos' biography of Cato) is somewhat confused, the remains shed some light on questions of genre and subject-matter.[9] The first relates to the work's title: *origines*, rather than, for example, *ab urbe condita*, indicates the plurality of subjects for Cato's work. Rather than covering only the early period of Rome (although he certainly did)[10] Cato treated the foundations of multiple Italian cities. Influenced perhaps by Greek κτίσις-literature and local history, Cato probably narrated a series of parallel foundations, before bringing his narrative together with the advent of a kind of Italian unity.[11] It is difficult to envisage a cohesive narrative linking the various accounts: sequential treatment seems much more plausible. Within this structure –collation of individual historical accounts - digressions in the sense of deviations from an established structure cannot be clearly identified.

This is reiterated by what we know of the latter books. Our fullest information about their structure is Nepos' assertion that they were written *capitulatim*.[12] The precise meaning of this word

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[7] This assumes that proportionate digressive material is actually transmitted; however, as Race 1980:1 notes, digressions sometimes formed the most memorable parts of a work, more liable to later citation. Cf. Brunt 1980b on the dangers of assuming that fragments unproblematically reflect the whole.

[8] *FRHist* 1.191-218. On Sallust and Cato see Fronto's description: *M. Porcius eiusque frequens sectator C. Sallustius...* (*ep. Caes*. 4.3). Slavish imitation of Cato was a criticism levelled at Sallust by his detractors e.g. Suet. *Gram. et Rhet.* 15. cf. Syme 1964: 267-9; Sklenář 1998; Levene 2000.

[9] Cornell 1972: 16; *FRHist* 1.195-217.

[10] *FRHist* 1.205-13.

[11] Cornell 1972: 68; Astin 1978: 225-32. *FRHist* 1.198-205 discusses the structure of Cato's work: the first three books covered *origines*, the latter four Rome's wars. On κτίσις-literature see *FRHist* 1.209.

[12] Nepos, *Cato* 3-4: *haec omnia capitulatim sunt dicta*. Nepos himself wrote history, and understood its conventions (the biography from which the *testimonia* are taken was probably part of a series on historians); that he terms Cato's *capitulatim* suggests that this was a remarkable feature.

is disputed,[13] but, alongside Cato's distaste for annalistic *minutiae*,[14] it seems to indicate that the work was in some way organised thematically, or at least focused on major events over a comprehensive chronicle. The avoidance of chronological narration in favour of selective or even thematic organisation again reduces the importance of digressions in the work: without the thematic unity of a chronological narrative, diversions are less clearly marked. Cato's work exemplifies the limited usefulness of the fragmentary historians; given too that Roman historiography seems to have been rhetorically unsophisticated (at least according to Cicero) until the generation before Sallust, it is anyway arguable how much Sallust's use of this rhetorical technique might reflect his immediate predecessors.

The Greek authors who influenced Sallust are more useful; the identification of digressions is at least clearer, because of the better preservation of the major authors, and the rhetorical techniques which began to influence Roman historiography relatively near to Sallust's own period were much better established among Greek writers.[15] We can say little of Greek historiography before Herodotus, although Greek historical thought effectively goes back to Homer,[16] whose epics demonstrate use of digression for various purposes.[17] Homer was an important influence on the way the Greeks conceived of historical style,[18] and, although epic poetry presented major generic differences from history, Homer's use of digression demonstrated the narrative possibilities of such passages.[19] In the fifth century, we know of Hecataeus' Περίοδος Γῆς, a primarily geographical account of the countries around the Mediterranean.[20] It seems to have combined many different types of information, which under modern classifications would include myth, geography,

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[13] *FRHist* 5 T1 translates *capitulatim* "in broad outline". Cornell 1972: 96-101 refers it to *capita*, the major events: he draws a parallel with Greek κεφᾰλαιώδης, "summarily". Astin 1978: 214-5 suggests *capitulatim* as "by topic"; both agree that the word distinguishes Cato's practice from *annales*.

[14] See *FRHist* 5 F80.

[15] Sallust's debts to Greek models are treated by Perrochat 1949; Renehan 1976; Nicols 1999; Theiler 1956; on Thucydides' influence specifically see Scanlon 1980 (with full bibliography); Döpp 2011; Redde 1980; Keitel 1987 (a specific example); Gärtner 2011.

[16] See Marincola 2001:9-10.

[17] On digressions in the *Odyssey* see de Jong 2001; in the *Iliad*, *ead*. 2004:83-90.

[18] i.e. a third-person account with a narrator who rarely intrudes into the narrative.

[19] Thucydides considers Homer a historian, albeit a poetic one: 1.3.

[20] *FGrH* 1F37-369.

ethnography and perhaps history.[21] While not a historical work in the sense of Thucydides' or

Sallust's (Hecataeus' work, importantly, does not seem to have been organised according to a

chronological narrative) the combination of disparate material does seem to have influenced

Herodotus.

Herodotus provides an interesting case study in the use of digression, due mainly to the

sheer diversity of material he includes. Unlike Hecataeus', his history is organised along

chronological rather than geographical lines, structured around a central narrative of Persian

imperial rise: but within this frame, it digresses widely on various subjects beyond the chronological

narrative, from the mundane (living arrangements of far-flung peoples)[22] to the bizarre (giant

carnivorous ants).[23] Material outside the central narrative is a fundamental feature of Herodotus'

style: the history is a collection of interconnected "λόγοι", the thematic interrelation of which

creates connections and foregrounds specific themes.[24] While his connecting thread is the growth of

Persian power, Herodotus' argument appears structured by the free association of ideas based on

geographical or other stimuli, with frequent asides prompted (for example) by the region

described.[25] His work is formed of digression upon digression, which, viewed in totality, constitute

the whole: the ubiquitous *logoi* cannot be separated from the whole of which they form a part.[26]

Egbert Bakker has argued that Herodotus' use of *logoi*, through collocation and connection,

is indicative of a whole paradigm of prose composition.[27] He terms Herodotus' style *syntaxis* (as

opposed to *parataxis* and *hypotaxis* - *parataxis* links material with simple conjunctions on the

analogy of beads on a string;[28] *hypotaxis* indicates the hierarchical subordination of ideas). Neither

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[21] E.g. *FGrH* 1.119, on the pre-Greek history of the Peloponnese.
[22] E.g. 4.103-17.
[23] 3.102-5.
[24] See Irwin & Greenwood 2007 (a collection of readings of the *logoi* of book 5).
[25] Sallust makes use of a similar device of geographical suggestion in his introduction of the Philaeni at *Jug.* 79.
[26] See de Jong 2002, esp. 259 on techniques through which Herodotus unifies his *logoi*. De Jong argues (257) that the term *Exkurse* be dropped altogether, as implying disunity (cf. also van Wees 2002:321-3); I suggest a resolution to this definition through thematic unity below (pp.75-80). Herodotus' structuring of his composition out of separate *membra* fits well with my understanding of the historian's *dispositio*.
[27] Bakker 2006.
[28] For Herodotus' dependence on this model (as opposed to periodic composition) see Immerwahr 1966.

parataxis nor *hypotaxis*, Bakker suggests, is an appropriate model for Herodotus: the chief *logos* of his history, the explanation of Persian imperial power, is formed from the concatenation of many smaller *logoi* emphasising particular themes.[29] Bakker's argument stresses the idea of digressions as constituents of meaning: in reading Herodotus' tangents we should be aware of the dialogue between each *logos* and the work as a whole.[30]

Thucydides (as in many respects) provides a contrast to Herodotus' writing. As Lucian notes, Thucydides' practice was to include only brief digressions, which, while containing material strictly unnecessary to the narrative, nonetheless provided detail valuable to the audience's proper comprehension.[31] While digression is an integral part of Herodotus' technique, for Thucydides it is to be embarked upon only sparingly.[32] Two Thucydidean digressions are particularly important: the *archaeologia* and the *Pentekontaetia*,[33] parts of book I treating respectively the pre-history of Greece and the roughly fifty years from 479-435 BC. These passages break the chronology of Thucydides' stated theme,[34] dealing with material beyond the Peloponnesian War. Neither aims to be an exhaustive historical account: each draws on historical material to support Thucydides' argument. As Simon Hornblower has noted, with the *archaeologia* "Thucydides was not trying to write a miniature history of early Greece": [35] rather, he invoked historical material as an illustration of the historical ideas of his work.[36] The *Pentekontaetia* has been the subject of criticism, for a lack of comprehensiveness and the approximate nature of its treatment:[37] but summary history was not Thucydides' aim. His account carefully emphasises the theme of growing Athenian power, central to

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[29] Bakker 2006:95.
[30] For the idea of dialogue see Irwin & Greenwood 2007: 6-10. cf. Flory 1969 on thematic repetition in *logoi*; Van der Veen 1996, on the importance of the seemingly irrelevant in Herodotus' narrative.
[31] Lucian *Hist. Conscr.* 57. Pothou 2009 treats each of Thucydides' digressions systematically but is less useful on the nature of his digressive technique *per se*.
[32] Marincola 2001:68 notes that because of the rarity of Thucydidean digression it has a more powerful effect when it does appear. See Pothou 2009:19-23 for discussion of the terms προσθήκη (in Herodotus) and ἐκβολή (in Thucydides) as illustrative of different roles for digression: Herodotus' represent additions to the main stream of the work, Thucydides' deviations from its unity.
[33] 1.2-20; 1.89-117.
[34] Thuc. 1.1.
[35] Hornblower 1991:8.
[36] Cf. Ellis 1991.
[37] E.g. Gomme 1945 *ad loc.*

the argument of book 1 as a whole.[38] Both passages are digressive, in departing from the subject established in the very first sentence of Thucydides' work; yet they are carefully considered in relation to his central theses.[39]

Comparison of the digressive strategies of these authors demonstrates the flexibility of the form. Variation is partly due to the development of prose between the two,[40] but is also linked to the purpose and subject-matter of each work, and its generic characteristics. Herodotus' historiography is influenced by nascent ethnography and other genres, and includes a wide array of material: his digressions support the breadth of his historiographical project. Thucydides, on the other hand, covers a carefully circumscribed subject (a war monograph), and his use of digressions matches this, contributing to the central account in a clearly argumentative way. The use of digressions in each is representative of the style and approach of the history more generally. Herodotus' historical methodology emphasises the historian's enquiry, and his collection and assessment of disparate materials of the historical record: the digressive nature of his text reflects his activity in compiling the historical account.[41] Thucydides' history seeks to create an impression of objectivity, with the action of the narrator elided as far as possible; his story "tells itself", and the restriction of digressions to the most important explanatory material heightens this effect.[42] As Gribble has demonstrated, when Thucydides does digress, he signposts the relevance of the material to his main narrative, and states his reasons for including it (once again, in contrast to Herodotus' practice).[43]

The expansion of historiography in the Hellenistic period brought new historiographical forms and methods. Theopompus' *Philippica*, for example, is ostensibly part of a new sub-genre,

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[38] Thucydides' introduction of these themes is criticised by Dionysius of Halicarnassus for its digressiveness: *Thuc*. 10. See Rood 1998:225-46 for a narratological approach to the argument of the *Pentekontaetia*.
[39] Cf. the famous digression on Corcyrean *stasis*, on which see pp.157-9 below.
[40] Aristotle's *Rhetoric* portrays Herodotus as exemplary practitioner of the older style of prose: 1240a24.
[41] See Irwin & Greenwood 2007:7-8.
[42] Woodman 1988:16-7 emphasises Thucydides' attempt to present an account with the appearance of complete objectivity: see also Gribble 1998, esp. 41-3.
[43] Gribble 1998:66.

focused around a single individual (in this case Philip of Macedon):[44] however, more than half of the work has nothing to do with Philip, including material outside the time-period proper to the main narrative (for example, the book-length discussion of fourth-century Athenian demagogues, so disjointed from the rest that it perhaps independently circulated under its own title).[45] Theopompus' inclusion of so much material beyond his ostensible subject contributes to his project as a whole, in thematic terms but also in comprehensiveness. Michael Flower has persuasively suggested that to Theopompus comprehensiveness was an aim in itself; he links the inclusion of extraneous material to Theopompus' desire to exceed his predecessors in coverage.[46] While the fragments do not preserve material sufficient to illustrate how Theopompus' digressions were integrated with the Philip narrative, his use of the technique expands his work's horizons (perhaps towards universal history, the genre inaugurated by his contemporary Ephorus).[47] Theopompus' digressions broaden the importance of a history covering a relatively brief period: digression provides a means of overreaching the chosen subject, allowing the historian to make broader points and to contextualise his theme.[48]

A final example of the flexibility of digression is provided by Polybius. His work bridges the chronological gap between the above authors and Sallust's period, covering the period from the Hannibalic War to the sack of Carthage in 146 BC. The work is a universal history, covering simultaneous events in different parts of the world: this imposes particular structural concerns, and has implications for Polybius' use of digression. A methodological statement towards the end outlines Polybius' view.[49] He suggests that a change of subject is often necessary to preserve the interest of the audience: while the "most skilled" (οἱ λογιώτατοι) ancient writers accomplished this by digression, he achieves it by the practice of cycling through the different theatres of his history

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[44] Cf. Fornara 1983:35 on this form.
[45] Pownall 2004:165-6. The digression on the demagogues was *Philippica* book 10.
[46] Flower 1994:153-65, esp. 159-61. cf. Pownall 2004:153-62.
[47] Barber 1935:17-48.
[48] Flower 1994:161-5 on Theopompus' digressions placing him in the Herodotean mode.
[49] Polyb. 38.5-6; cf. Marincola 2001:120-3.

under the rubric of each Olympiad. The format of his work negates the need for digressions to maintain the audience's interest.

In keeping with this, Polybius does not often digress on historical or mythical subjects. When he does digress, he instead provides the audience with the benefit of his experience, moral or political lessons, geographical material or polemic; his subjects are part of a wider didactic programme of the work, and as such serve a purpose which goes beyond the entertaining role Polybius mentions in relation to the practice of previous authors.[50] As well as shorter digressions instructing his readership on practical points, Polybius' technique is demonstrated by the book-length digressions punctuating his work, including the final book of its first hexad.[51] Book 6 describes the constitution and customs of the Romans at the point of their lowest military ebb, after Cannae; Polybius introduces it as "one of the most necessary parts [of the history]", τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων.[52] His introduction demonstrates the close ties between the digression and Polybius' historical project: while it disrupts the narrative itself, it is vital in understanding the lesson. Polybius digressions are not simply for variation, but appear within an history emphasising practical didacticism.[53]

The practice of Sallust's predecessors demonstrates that historians use digressions in markedly different ways, in keeping with their particular historical focus and methodology: the digression in historiography is a malleable form, and admits of considerable variation. Because of this variation, this survey of the practice of Sallust's predecessors does not provide any demonstration of how digressions might be used in his text. Nor does it help in advancing any coherent definition of digression, or the theoretical underpinnings of the form: alternative sources must therefore be sought.

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[50] On Polybius' digressions see Walbank 1972:46-8 (with full list), 122-4.

[51] Cf. book 12 (the end of the second hexad), an historiographical polemic against Timaeus. Book 34 seems to have contained an extensive geographical digression, but is poorly preserved (see Walbank 1972:122-4).

[52] Polyb. 6.2.

[53] The utility of history is a constant theme: see especially Polyb. 1.35; 9.2.1-2. The term πραγματικὴ ἱστορία appears at 39.1.4: "serious history", aimed at practical instruction for statesmen.

Digression in context – the rhetoricians

I turn next to a more detailed set of contemporary evidence. The fullest evidence for the nature of digression is provided not by historians, but by the textbooks of rhetorical theory. In contrast to the scattered methodological remarks of historiography, these aimed at prescriptive comprehensiveness; as such, they provide a more detailed discussion of specific devices such as digression. A number of manuals are preserved, providing theoretical guides to the proper construction and delivery of the speech, although they differ in exact focus and aim. Latin examples include Cicero's *de Inventione* and the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, both from the early first century BC, and Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* which, although written a century later, in most respects follows Cicero,[54] and provides the most comprehensive treatment of many aspects of oratory (including digression).

My use of these theorists builds on the discussion above of the rhetorical nature of historiographical production. I suggested that oratorical manuals should not be taken simply to reflect historiographical practice, because of the frequently unexpressed but important generic characteristics of each form: nonetheless, on the level of specific techniques such as digression, and in the light of the historians' highly rhetorical education, these works do provide a good starting-point. While the textbooks deal in hypotheticals, and ideal speeches (and as such are a flawed source for even oratorical practice),[55] they are nonetheless the best available evidence, and should not be lightly dismissed. I consider further below how their recommendations can be reconciled with the generic characteristics of historiography.

My aim here is to establish a broad approach to digression: I have focused on the fullest treatments, rather than attempting to canvass the views of every extant work (indeed, some avoid

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[54] Quintilian frequently cites examples from Cicero, and borrows from Cicero's own theoretical works (e.g. *Inst*. 12.1.9.).
[55] Cf. Kirby 1997 on the distance between theory and practice.

treating digression entirely – I return to this below).[56] Two authors' discussions are particularly useful, Quintilian's and Cicero's (both also close to Sallust's period); later Latin rhetoricians' accounts of the digression are largely derivative of one or both of these.[57] In addition to providing our best evidence of the rhetorical *milieu* within which Sallust was educated,[58] these two authors provide the most comprehensive treatment of digression. Although Cicero's is earlier, his discussion is less systematic; I therefore begin with Quintilian's first-century AD textbook, the *Institutio Oratoria*.[59]

Quintilian's manual is focused mainly on forensic oratory, and his approach to digression therefore emphasises its application to judicial speech: he treats digression as one of the parts of speech, directly after the discussion of the *narratio*.[60] As I suggested above, the oratorical *narratio* is not identical to the historiographical; but Quintilian's connection of the forms emphasises the links between them. Central to Quintilian's discussion of digression is an almost paradoxical definition: digression is *alicuius rei, sed ad utilitatem causae pertinentis, extra ordinem excurrens tractatio*.[61] The digression comprises material beyond the matter of the case as a whole, but still with some broader relevance to it. The tension between content of digressions and the requirements of a case is maintained throughout Quintilian's treatment: the discussion actually begins with a critique of the practice of lesser rhetoricians, of veering off from the subject of a case without consideration for the structure of the whole speech:[62] Quintilian criticises these lesser speakers for changing the subject without proper regard for the exigencies of the case at hand, thus spoiling their argument.[63]

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[56] Systematic accounts of digression in the rhetorical textbooks: Martin 1974:89-91; Lausberg 1998:§340-5; cf. Laugaa 1971, Sabry 1989, 1992:1-32, Panico 2001, Perry 2009:112-36 for syntheses. Härter 2000 summarises from the perspective of modern critical theory, around a critical model of order and disorder.

[57] Julius Victor's paragraph on digression is dependent on Quintilian, making use of the same lists of subjects and examples: (see *RLM* 428 Halm and *Inst*. 4.3.15); Victorinus' discussion of digression (202.8 Halm) draws on Cicero, *Inv*. 1.27.

[58] Cicero's *de Inventione* is roughly contemporary with Sallust's own rhetorical training: along with the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, it is at least indicative of the intellectual climate in which he was educated.

[59] The *Institutio Oratoria* has been under-studied: the only commentary on the most important book for my purposes (4) is Cousin 1976, and is extremely brief. On Quintilian's treatment of digression see Arenas Cruz 2008.

[60] *Inst.* 4.3.

[61] "The treatment of material which although relevant to the case comes outside of the structure [of the speech]": Quint. *Inst.* 4.3.14. On digression as paradox see Perry 2009:26.

[62] *Inst.* 4.3.1-3.

[63] *Inst.* 4.3.3.

Quintilian's definition, with its focus on the close connection between the digression and the speech, does not sit particularly well with his lengthy treatment of general recommendations for subjects appropriate to digressions. He describes the variety in digressions,[64] this time with the more formal definition that *quidquid dicitur praeter illas quinque quas fecimus partes egressio est*,[65] and citing a series of examples: this includes "praise of men and places, descriptions of regions, exposition of *res gestae* or *fabulae*",[66] appeals to the emotions of the audience, and "passages which make the speech especially pleasing and ornamented, concerning luxury, avarice, religion, and duty."[67] The breadth of this catalogue, and the set-piece nature of particularly the latter subjects, seems difficult to reconcile with the stipulation that the digression should always serve the direct subject of the speech:[68] it seems more appropriate to epideictic display than to forensic argumentation,[69] and is perhaps influenced by the display oratory and *declamationes* of the imperial period, distinct from the Late Republic's "live" political and forensic oratory.[70]

The inclusion of such a variety of material hints at a more pragmatic conception of the digression's purpose - not mentioned in the discussion of the composition of a speech, but recurring in the section on delivery -[71] of providing an opportunity for the refreshment of the audience (actually one of the purposes which Quintilian had castigated in the lesser orators).[72] Quintilian's overall recommendation of the chapter is that even digressions on such general subjects should be subject to the criterion of relevance; but this is mitigated by his actual recommendations, a set of disjointed subjects for show-piece elaboration, with no discussion of how they might fit the

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[64] One technical form of digression is the Latin *egressus* (or *egressio*) and Greek παρέκβασις, a second appeal to the judge following the *proemium*, but this is only one of many ways in which digressions can be deployed: *Inst.* 4.3.12.

[65] *Inst.* 4.3.15.

[66] *Inst.* 4.3.12*.*

[67] *Inst.* 4.3.15.

[68] The focus on persuasion of the judge, as in the rest of book 4, is perhaps linked to Quintilian's own extensive practice in the law-courts: Mastrorosa 2003.

[69] The epideictic subject-matter set out described by Quintilian is similar to the *laudationes* of great deeds given here as possible subjects for digression: *Inst.* 3.4.11-4.

[70] For the prominence of the *declamationes* as a cause of the decline of imperial oratory see the arguments attributed to Messala in Tacitus' *Dialogus de Oratoribus*, especially 31, 35; on the active political engagement of the Republic as compared to the imperial period, *idem* 36-41.

[71] *Inst*. 11.3.164.

[72] Quint. *Inst*. 4.3.2.

requirements of the case. Quintilian is at pains throughout to demonstrate the theoretical appropriateness of his recommendations: the attack on practicing orators which opens his description is probably best understood as an attempt to distinguish himself from their practice, and to claim relevance for his own use of the technique.

The tension between the needs of the case on the one hand, and the ornamentation of the speech and amusement of the audience on the other, recurs in Cicero, as I explore below; but this paradoxical quality also affects the rhetoricians' approaches to digression more generally.[73] Not all of the rhetorical manuals cover digression: some specifically avoid discussion of the technique, including instead strict instructions that the orator should avoid speaking off topic.[74] The refusal to treat digression is linked to the continued stress on the requirements of the case: in that (as Quintilian notes) the digression inevitably departs to some degree from the *causa*, its inclusion is often at odds with the idealised recommendations of the rhetoricians. As Peter Perry has emphasised, digression marks a fault-line between theory and practice of oratory:[75] it might be included because of the taste of the audience, or the orator's desire to show off his erudition, rather than in accordance with "best practice". The continued emphasis in Quintilian's treatment on the relevance of the material contained in digressions to the case (alongside his full treatment of a range of possible subjects) is, I think, an attempt to reconcile the role of digression in practice with the ideal of concentration on the case itself. Stress on argumentative relevance reconciles the inclusion of digression, a technique of ornament and amusement, with the argumentative focus of the ideal speech.

Cicero's treatment is useful in illustrating how reconciliation between theory and practice might be achieved. While Cicero never elaborated as full a theoretical treatment as Quintilian's, he mentions the technique in *de Inventione* - a manual written around 80 BC, under the influence of a

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[73] On digression as a paradoxical text-type see Sabry 1989:273.
[74] Arist. *Rh*. 1.1-3 (with Sabry 1992:26-8), [*Rh. Al.*] 30.1438b.22-8; *Rhet. Her.* 1.9.14. cf. Perry 2009:106-7.
[75] See Perry 2009:117-9.

standard rhetorical education - and also in *de Oratore*, product of a later period of his career and of a more developed conception of the orator's role. The two treatments differ markedly: we might read them as indicative of the gulf between a standard rhetorical approach, and one informed by twenty years of oratorical practice.

In *de Inventione*, *digressio* as a part of speech is discharged with a brief, disapproving reference to the Greek rhetorician Hermagoras, who recommended the introduction of only very tangentially related topics (*a causa atque a iudicatione ipsa remotam*).[76] The phrasing of Cicero's disapproval, as well as the conventional nature of the *de Inventione*, suggests that this is what Cicero had been taught.

However, digression is mentioned again, not as a part of speech in its own right but as a technique within *narratio*. In the first book of *de Inventione*, Cicero defines three *genera* of narrative (the distinction discussed in relation to the *narratio* in chapter 1 above);[77] this time, the second *genus* is the most relevant to my current purposes. Cicero defines it as follows: *alterum, in quo digressio aliqua extra causam aut criminationis aut similitudinis aut delectationis non alienae ab eo negotio quo de agitur aut amplificationis causa interponitur*: "a second [type of *narratio*] is that in which some digression is made outside the case, either to accuse, to make a comparison, to please (in a way not entirely alien to the matter under discussion) or for amplification." Cicero admits digression within the *narratio*, in the sense of material which deviates *extra causam*; in fact, the causes listed here supplement Quintilian's remarks on the contribution of digression, providing specific illustrations of how this might be conceived. Cicero's reasons maintain the criterion of relevance stressed by Quintilian (even for the third cause – *delectatio* - the entertaining material is still to be *non alienae ab eo negotio*); but his discussion illustrates the contribution which digression might make.

The last mentioned, *amplificatio*, is particularly useful: it draws together and illustrates the concept of thematic relevance, and provides a way of reconciling the tension inherent in the

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[76] Cic. *Inv.* 1.97. On Hermagoras' division see Sabry 1992:20-1.
[77] *Inv.* 1.27. On the division see Barwick 1928.

rhetoricians' treatment of digression.[78] *amplificatio* was an important weapon for the orator, the act of making things appear bigger or more significant by using rhetorical techniques to magnify them:[79] one technique was *comparatio,*[80] the use of an external *exemplum* for comparison against which the subject might appear greater. Cicero's reference to *amplificatio* suggests an oblique way in which digression might retain its relevance to the case at hand: even in digressing onto an outside *exemplum*, the orator could contribute to his case by emphasising a specific comparison, and thus linking the content of his digression into the economy of the whole speech. *amplificatio* could reconcile digression genuinely *a causa* with an overall through-line contributing to the argument.[81]

The application of digression for *amplificatio* is illustrated by a famous digression, which Quintilian himself uses as an example: [82] Cicero's Sicilian excursus in the Verrines.[83] Cicero's mythical account of, among other subjects, the rape of Proserpina seems to have little directly to do with the argument against Verres himself. Rather, as Anne Vasaly has pointed out, the significance is oblique and applies on a thematic level;[84] Cicero uses the story to emphasise Verres' own rapacity through *comparatio*. The relevance of this digression to the case against Verres relies on a kind of thematic aggregation, rather than direct argumentation: entertaining for the audience, it is still part of Cicero's attack. Further examples of this form might be cited from Cicero's *corpus*, from political as well as judicial speeches: the digressions in the agrarian speeches against Rullus (63 BC) on the historical strength of Capua, and its role in Roman history, are calculated to amplify the audience's distrust for planned land reform as a whole.[85]

In *de Inventione*, then, as in the *Instituto Oratoria*, stress remains on the contribution of digressive material to the case: digression retains a kind of mixed position, off-topic but (ideally)

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[78] Von Poser 1969:15-22 briefly examines links between *digressio* and *amplificatio* in relation to the classical novel.
[79] See *Inst*. 8.4.1-28. Lausberg 1998:§400-9 summarises the sources.
[80] *Inst*. 8.4.9.
[81] On digressions' "textual expansion" see Panico 2001:488.
[82] Quint. *Inst.* 4.3.13*.*
[83] Cic. *Verr. II.* 4.104-8.
[84] Vasaly 1993:124.
[85] *Leg. Agr*. 1.18-20; 2.86-91. Cf. *Pro Milone* 72-91 with May 1979. On digressions in Ciceronian practice see also Canter 1931, especially 359; Davies 1988.

retaining some general relevance. These theoretical works do not condone digression simply for the purpose of the audience's amusement and relief; but a comparison from Cicero's later work also deserves consideration, and provides some balance to these prescriptive approaches. Later in Cicero's career, as his oratorical ideas developed, he increasingly distanced himself from what he saw as the overly theoretical and prescriptive works of those who preceded him, and indeed from his own *de Inventione*.[86] His more mature attitude is exemplified by the *de Oratore* of 55 BC, which takes a different tack: Cicero attacks the piecemeal compositions which resulted from the rhetoricians' prescriptive guidelines.[87] However, he does not entirely repudiate the content of such works: the *de Oratore* does in fact provide a brief restatement and corrective of such material, in broadly positive terms.[88] The limitation of the rhetoricians' treatments, according to *de Oratore*, is that they lack the touch of the truly expert orator.

Cicero again touches on digression here. This time, he mentions two purposes: for amplification, but also as a flourish for the speech: *iubent enim… ornandi aut augendi causa digredi*.[89] Cicero recognises the practical value of digression in ornamenting a speech, for the benefit of the audience, as well as its contribution to the argument. This perspective is in keeping with that of the *de Oratore* more generally, reconciling aspects of the theoretical approach with more pragmatic ideas drawn from Cicero's experience.[90] The *Brutus*, written in 46, reiterates this view, citing as one of the catalogue of virtues to be expected of the ideal orator - apparently evidenced only by M. Tullius himself - the ability "to digress a little from the case (*a causa*) for the sake of enjoyment":[91] to go *a causa* violates the prescriptions of the *de Inventione* and *Institutio Oratoria*, but is nonetheless part of the skill of the ideal speaker. In offering a reconciliation of theoretical

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[86] Quint. *Inst*. 3.1.20 reports Cicero's opinion that the *de Inventione* was a work of his adolescence, unfortunately widely disseminated (*de Or*. 1.5 refers to it as *incohata ac rudia*).
[87] See *de Or*. 2.77-84; May & Wisse 2001:10-11 and 26-38.
[88] *de Or.* 2.81.
[89] Cic. *de Or.* 2.80: "for they tell us to digress to either ornament or strengthen the speech." cf. also 2.312, which treats digression explicitly under the heading of *dispositio*.
[90] See May & Wisse 2001:10-2.
[91] *Brutus* 322: *delectandi gratia digredi parumper a causa*.

approaches with more pragmatic recommendations based on vast experience, these later works provide a counterpoint to the narrower manuals.

The demonstration of the thematic flexibility of the digression in Cicero's practice, and the acceptance in his mature works of digression's entertaining as well as argumentative effects, recalls the tension between relevance and deviation in Quintilian's original definition. The two purposes admitted into Cicero's conception, *augendi* and *ornandi causa*, represent the two characteristics which emerge most clearly from the rhetoricians' treatments.

From this discussion we can draw two important conclusions. The first is that the rhetoricians' treatment is marked by inherent tension: while theoretical remarks focus on the relevance of the digression, and its contribution to the speech as a whole, in practice the rhetoricians seem to envisage a broader range of material, with little or no discussion of how it could be reconciled with relevance. In practice, the digression seems to be aimed at least in part at entertainment of the audience and ornamentation of the speech. While Quintilian attempts to subsume the entertaining function of digression to overall thematic relevance, this is an ideal, based on the objective of his manual in setting out "best practice", and is not fully borne out in actual speech.

The second conclusion, following from the first, is that it is difficult to define the digression in any prescriptive way beyond the formal grounds of its relation to different parts of speech. It is not enough to simply call the digression a passage departing from the immediate subject, since the point of the rhetoricians' treatment is that digressions' relevance could be understood in subtle ways: simply to identify as digressive those passages which depart from the immediate subject is to beg the question. The necessity of such a broad definition is demonstrated by the disagreement between different rhetoricians on the subject, and by the relation of Cicero's early rules to his more pragmatic later approach.[92]

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[92] On the insufficiency of the rhetoricians' works to define digression see Vergin 2012:24.

This examination of the rhetoricians' views has illustrated some basic ways of approaching digression: in particular, the idea of thematic amplification, and the sense in which digressions might be expected to contribute in different ways to the argument of a whole composition, will be significant for my analysis of historiographical digressions. Nonetheless, it remains to apply the ideas of digression found in the rhetoricians to historiography, and to set out a more coherent definition of what constitutes digression to apply to Sallust's *corpus*.

Lucian and *quomodo historia conscribenda sit*

There are clear differences between oratory as a form (even as codified in the handbooks) and historiography, even taking into account the influence of rhetorical education on historians' practice. For example, that historiography is a written medium rather than one delivered in "real time" is significant; even given the practice of reading aloud, the written text allows the material to be broken up with pauses in order to accommodate the needs of the audience, something impossible in the orator's delivered speech.[93] We cannot simply assume that (for example) the function of refreshment applies to historiography as to the oratorical treatments above.[94] The rhetoricians' stress on argument is also hard to parallel in historiography. Although the historical account certainly is guided by the historian's own interpretation, it is hard to identify in works such as *annales* a single unifying thread: while (for example) Livy's *ab urbe condita* is constructed around particular themes, and the historian certainly does have an agenda of his own,[95] it is difficult to isolate a central argumentative strand against which the relevance of digressions can be assessed comparable to the case of a forensic speech. I will suggest an answer to this below.

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[93] Wiseman (1981:384-6) argues that public readings (ἀκρόασεις) of historiography on the Greek model were common by the late Republic; cf. Fantham 1996:9; Gärtner 1990 specifies Sallust's antithetical style as particularly oral. Race 1980 examines oratorical digressions intended to convey the impression of spontaneity in the delivered speech; this is irrelevant to historiography.

[94] In introducing a digression on a hypothetical conflict between Rome and Alexander, Livy specifically distances his deployment of digression from such concerns: 9.17.1. cf. Morello 2002 on this digression within Livy's historiographical project.

[95] See e.g. *praef.* 9-12.

In exploring the application of these ideas of digression to historiography, it will be useful to examine the testimony of a work treating the genre specifically. Lucian's treatise *quomodo historia conscribenda sit*, from the latter half of the second century AD, is the only extant work on the subject from antiquity.[96] The work is organised in two parts, along the appropriately historiographical lines of what to emulate and what to avoid.[97] The first treats the bad examples of Lucian's contemporaries, with a list of the errors of content and style found in various - possibly fictitious - treatments of the Parthian wars of 162-6 AD; the second half of the work gives Lucian's own recommendations for historiography. While he does provide a series of suggestions, Lucian does not systematically treat historiographical technique: his recommendations are on form and diction, and are more generalised.

Although Lucian's work is unique, we should not overestimate its value. Historiographical composition exhibited considerable variation: any codification of historiographical rules could apply only to some. The variety of approaches is demonstrated by historians' polemic on matters methodological:[98] positions advocated by various writers - on subject-matter, style and aims - were by no means founded on the same ideas as to the role of historiography.[99] Lucian's caricatured Ionian War historians are not simply bad historians, but representatives of different ways of doing history:[100] Lucian's work espouses a dogmatic conception. Despite this, Lucian was not himself a historian: his one work which claims to be historical (the *Verae Historiae*) is in fact a parody of the

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[96] Others certainly existed, e.g. by Theophrastus (cf. Cic. *Orat*. 39) and Varro ("*Sisenna aut de historia*", cited by Aulus Gellius, *NA* 16.9.5; Lehmann & Lehmann 2005 suggest that this influenced Cicero's historiographical ideas). Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *de Thucydide* and Plutarch's *de malignitate Herodoti* contain some methodological criticism. Mattioli 1985, Pernot 2005 treat the relationship between rhetoric and history in the dialogue.

[97] *Hist. Conscr.* 6.

[98] E.g. Thuc. 1.20-1, an implicit corrective to Herodotus (see Gomme 1945:137); more polemically, Polybius book 12. cf. Marincola 1997:217-34.

[99] The literature on "tragic historiography" etc. is vast. Note especially Ullman 1942; Walbank 1960, Faucher 2000; Marincola 2013, all arguing that the tragic was not a separate "school" but better a mode or colouration; in relation to Sallust see Späth 1998. Rebenich 1997:265-73 discusses historiographical "schools" of the Hellenistic period.

[100] Lucian, *Hist. Conscr*. 14-32. We would recognise the historian at chapter 16 as the author of *commentarii* (his characteristics are very similar to those praised in Caesar at Cic. *Brut*. 262); the tragic diction of the historian of chapter 22 is rather the mark of a different style than of a necessarily inferior writer. Cf. Pernot 2005:44-5.

more outlandish and unbelievable tales of some historians.[101] Lucian was the product of a Second Sophistic oratorical education, rather than of practical historiographical experience. His work, then, is only a partial guide to historiographical practice; but it does have some value in suggesting how the rhetorical conception of digression might be applied to historiographical compositions.

The first part of the work touches on off-topic material: Lucian attacks two writers for their unseemly concentration on incidental details at the expense of major events.[102] The first errs specifically in an excess of description (a fault of style), and the second in concentrating on the exploits of a particular Moorish horseman over the crucial event of the Battle of Europus (a fault of content). In both cases, Lucian's criticism is that the detail narrated - unrelated to the main subject - is disproportionately treated, and overshadows the narrative proper: the history as a whole fails, in not providing an appropriate treatment.

The criterion of proportionality is important to Lucian's recommendations on historiographical composition; that material should be treated at a length appropriate to its role within the whole is key to his approach. In discussing brevity (τάχος) as a virtue of historical style, Lucian explains that "[brevity] should come not from words and phrases, but from the subject itself: that is, touching cursorily on insignificant and less necessary events, and fully treating major ones".[103] He emphasises selectiveness, focusing on major historical events and eliding those outside the main narrative.[104] Subject-matter determines the appropriate treatment; those whom Lucian criticises err in failing to observe the proper proportionality between important events, and the secondary subject-matter of description, or more minor historical details.[105] Lucian summarises:

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[101] *VH* 2; cf. Georgiadou & Lamour 1994:1478-80 (on *Hist. Conscr.* and *VH* as "anti-example and doctrina").
[102] *Hist. Conscr.* 19 and especially 28.
[103] *Hist*. Conscr. 56.
[104] *Hist. Conscr*. 56.
[105] *Hist. Conscr*. 56.

"this sort of writer does not look at the rose itself, but carefully examines the thorns about its root."[106]

Proportionality, the necessity of treating historical events according to their importance, also appears as a criterion in other works of historiographical criticism. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, one of the major structural failings of Thucydides' work was that it failed to treat events in proper accordance with their historical significance, unfairly and inaccurately amplifying some and ignoring others; Dionysius claims that Thucydides is inaccurate as a historian, in treating events so disproportionately.[107] Plutarch's *de malignitate Herodoti* levels the same criticism: Herodotus includes Greek misdeeds far beyond their significance or even relevance (Plutarch alleges), in order to further his project of attacking the Greeks, which distorts the content of his historiography as a whole.[108] Failure to reflect events' proper importance is a literary failure, and a failure of truthfulness.

As a structural characteristic - allocating appropriate space within a composition to a given set of events – the stress on proportionality fits with my emphasis on the historian's *dispositio*: Dionysius' criticism of Thucydides' lack of proportion in his narrative is actually an attack on his οἰκονομία, Dionysius' term for the activity.[109] It also suggests a way of reconciling the orators' remarks on digression with historiographical texts. In the absence of the explicit *causa* of a speech, we might – I suggest - use the idea of historical proportionality as a way of conceiving the relationship of digression to the whole, as the through-line by reference to which the rest of the text is assessed. By understanding the main chronological narrative (the historical theme) as the structural backbone of the work, departures from proportional treatment of this narrative can thus be conceptualised in the same way as from the orator's *causa*: when Lucian mentions deviation from historical proportionality, his criticism is similar to the rhetoricians' of unrelated material. Lucian's

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[106] *Hist. Conscr.* 28.
[107] Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* esp. 13-5. Dionysius also attacks Thucydides' preface and *Pentecontaetia* as offences against proportionality: *Thuc.* 19. On Dionysius' criticism see Sacks 1983; Fox 2001.
[108] Plut. *Mal. Her*. 3-6.
[109] Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 9-21 deals with Thucydides' structure and form.

criticism of two failed historians is comparable to Quintilian's attack on digression without thought for the overall structure of the speech.

This shared conception is also illustrated by Lucian's constructive comments, in the second half of the work. He notes the positive value of digression to historiography, properly used: as in oratory, off-topic material could be included, subject to certain provisos. Lucian had stated that description was a fault when taken to extreme length; but when used appropriately, it could contribute. The historian should be sparing, on the model of Homer or Thucydides, dwelling on description only as long as absolutely necessary lest he neglect τὴν ἱστορίαν itself:[110] proportionality must be maintained. Instead of the merely incidental material of the bad historians, subjects appropriate for description (according to Lucian's examples) are those providing "circumstantial detail", not directly necessary to the historical narrative but of value in properly understanding it: description should be both necessary and useful (ἀναγκαῖον καὶ χρειῶδες ὄν).[111] Lucian draws on Thucydides for examples (including descriptions of siege machinery and the plague), contrasted to the extremes of the historians criticised previously:[112] as I suggested, the model of digression outlined is similar to Thucydides' practice. Nonetheless, by placing this within a theoretical schema, Lucian illustrates the application of rhetorical classifications to historiography more generally.

Lucian's view, then, is comparable to the rhetoricians': the same tension obtains between digression as allowable and useful and as a fault. While departing from immediate relevance, digression may nonetheless be approved when it serves the composition as a whole. Lucian makes explicit the criterion of proportionality: even when relevant, digression represents a departure from historical narrative, and must as such be proportional to the scale of the whole.

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[110] *Hist. Conscr.* 57.

[111] *Hist. Conscr*. 57: cf. Quintilian's *ad utilitatem causae pertinentis*, *Inst*. 4.3.14.

[112] *Hist. Conscr.* 57. Lucian defends Thucydides from accusations of tedium in his account of the plague (cf. Dionysius' criticism) by stating that the event was so significant that Thucydides' version was in fact extremely sparing.

A new definition of digression

Studies above have provided demonstrations of how digression was conceived; but they do not define it formally. Lucian's work suggests a definition relative not to a central *causa* but to the requirements of narrative: given the difficulties in defining the digression based simply on relevance (since even an ostensibly digressive passage might – and indeed ought to - contribute to the composition as a whole), I suggest that the best solution is to leverage this basic characteristic of historiographical narrative as a quality against which the digression can be measured. That is, we should consider not only subject-matter in defining such passages (as this must be somewhat subjective) but their structural relation to the chronological narrative which is the historian's subject. To establish a firmer theoretical footing for this, I will make use of certain tools of narrative heuristics – specifically, narratology.

Narratology is a structural approach, aimed at systematic categorisation of a narrative.[113] It is usually applied to fictional texts: comparatively little exists on the narrativity of non-fictional texts, although structuralist and post-structuralist theorists such as Roland Bartes and Hayden White have long argued for the artificiality of historical production (assimilating the historian's narrative to that of the novelist).[114] Nonetheless, some of the basic terminology and techniques of narratological study are highly appropriate to the study of classical historiography: even if we maintain that the historian is fundamentally constrained by the details of events, narratology is nonetheless a valuable tool in illustrating how the finished composition reflects those details.

Narratology has been applied to classical historiography, and has proved useful in suggesting new approaches to historiographical composition and technique (for example, in Simon

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[113] Bal 1985:10.

[114] E.g. Barthes 1970, White 1973, Genette 1990. Cohn 1999:109-31 discusses narratology as applied to non-fictional texts, noting that the model as applied to historiography requires adjustment because of the historian's constraints of fact; cf. Martin 1986:71-2. Gossman 1990:227-56 considers the relationship between history and literature more broadly.

Hornblower's commentary on Thucydides).[115] Sallust is no exception; his works have been considered from narratological perspectives, most effectively in Etienne Évrard's treatment of temporal techniques in the *Bellum Jugurthinum*.[116] However, as an heuristic device, rather than a critical approach in itself, narratology lends itself to a range of readings. I will draw here on only a subset of narratological theory, although an appropriate one given the centrality to classical historiography of chronological narrative. It relates to time, and the temporal construction of the narrative; for this, Gérard Genette's work remains fundamental.[117]

Genette's work (formulated on Proust) approaches the text structurally; he categorises the complex narrative of *À la recherche du temps perdu* according to temporal criteria. Genette's project is particularly appropriate to Proust's complex narrative structure; but in providing a critical vocabulary for describing temporal manipulation, Genette's theory is more widely relevant (including to the classical historians). Part of Genette's work focuses on the classification of narrative according to three temporal criteria of duration, order and frequency: the first two, in particular, can be productively applied as analytical tools to Sallust's text.[118]

Duration, later re-termed "speed",[119] considers the narrator's control of the tempo of the narrative; specifically, the amount of text the narrator expends on a particular event or events.[120] For each narrative element, the critic assesses how the narrator has presented events in relation to their actual duration: Genette opposes narrative time (*temps raconté,* the amount of space on the page) with actual time (*temps du* recit, the actual duration of the events narrated). Since it is

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[115] E.g. on Thucydides Hornblower 1994; Rood 1998; on Polybius, Davidson 1991, Miltsios 2009; on Livy, Tsitsiou-Chelidoni 2009. More general application of narratology to the classical historians: most recently Grethlein & Krebs 2012; Grethlein 2014 (including a chapter on Sallust: 268-308).

[116] Évrard 1998. Williams 1997 applies narratological techniques to the *Cat*.

[117] Most importantly Genette 1980; 1988; also 1982 and, on the application of these ideas to factual as well as fictional narratives, Genette *et al.* 1990.

[118] Williams 1997:149-216 categorises the *Bellum Catilinae* according to Genette's criteria. Frequency, Genette's third criterion (Genette 1980: 113-41), distinguishes between narrative and real *number* (single events narrated multiple times - repetitive - versus multiple similar events narrated only once - iterative). This criterion is more attuned to the peculiarities of Proustian style than the others (Genette 1980:113) and less useful for my purposes, although as Etienne Évrard's analysis of Livy 42.49 demonstrates, such techniques were not unknown to the classical historians (Évrard 1998:41-4). A Sallustian example of iterative narration is the speech of Memmius at *Jug*. 30.4; a single speech illustrates a whole series (see below pp.180-2).

[119] Genette 1988:33.

[120] Genette 1980:86-112.

impossible to relate real time to narrative time on an objective level, Genette takes passages of dialogue as at least conventionally representing parity between narrative and real time, correspondence between time taken for events to happen and time taken to narrate them: other temporal relationships are then defined in relation to this correspondence.

Genette's system allows comparison of the narrator's treatment of specific episodes, in relation to their "real" duration: he develops a four-fold classification to describe the range of such effects.[121] The simplest is the scene, a passage in which real time at least conventionally approximates narrative time. Examples of the scene include dialogue (as noted, the benchmark against which the rest are compared), or detailed relation of events. The summary is a passage in which narrative time described exceeds the real time taken for the narrative: events of a long period are described in a less detailed way relative to the one-to-one correspondence implied by the scene (a longer period is compressed into a shorter narrative). At the extreme ends of the scale, a pause signifies a point at which narrative time is frozen, but which the narrator describes in detail: the correspondence between narrative time and real time is dissolved, because the text continues while narrative time stands still. Similar dissolution is true of the ellipsis, the passing of narrative time which goes unremarked in textual time.

Each of these *tempi* is apparent in classical historiography, as in Proust. In the *Bellum Catilinae*, for example, the Catilinarian debate (including narrative and paired speeches) is a scene;[122] the preparations made by Catiline for conspiracy at Rome, a brief account of the events of some days, is a summary;[123] the central digression on the state of Rome, interrupting and pausing the narrative, is a pause; the events which Sallust does not mention at all (for example, Catiline's activities between the so-called "first conspiracy" and the *contio* at chapter 20) are ellipses.

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[121] I use the terms of the English translation by Jane E. Lewin. Bal 1985:99-110 adds the "slow down", but this is not relevant to my purposes.
[122] *Cat*. 50.3-53.1.
[123] *Cat*. 27.

Genette's second criterion is Order.[124] Here, the focus is on the narrator's control of narrative sequence, and discrepancies between events' chronological order and their narrative order. Genette classifies such discrepancies as anachronies, of two types; the analeptic (looking backwards in time, perhaps to fill in past events or background) and the proleptic (looking forwards in time). Once again, both are traditional resources of narrative, and can be paralleled in classical historiography. In the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, the digression on North African origins and history is an analepsis, looking back to a period before the starting-point of the Jugurthine narrative;[125] the references to events after the end of the monograph, such as Sulla's chequered career, are prolepses.[126] Genette further distinguishes between external anachronies and internal (those which report events outside the time of the main narrative versus those within it, but reported out of order). The African digression begins as an external anachrony, before developing into an internal one (it covers the *status quo* in Africa at the start of narrative time, thus overlapping with the main narrative itself); the Sullan prolepsis is external, in treating material beyond the compass of the monograph.

I have suggested that classical historiography is a basically narrative genre, dealing primarily with a central chronological narrative or set of narratives.[127] There are obvious complicating factors to this - for example, the difficulty of reconciling events in different theatres into a continuous narrative -, but it is supported by theory and practice, and it is notable that Sallust's monographs by their thematic concentration limit the need to cover distinct but contemporary events. I propose applying Genette's classifications to define as digressions all those passages which break the chronology of the narrative set as the historical subject (i.e. stated as the subject of the account,

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[124] Genette 1980:33-84.
[125] *Jug*. 18.
[126] *Jug*. 95.4. On the anachronies of the *Jug*. see Levene 1992, who argues that Sallust deliberately avoids portraying the war as "closed", instead continually pointing out themes and characteristics which overflow the chronological bounds of the work, both before and after.
[127] Cf. Cupaiuolo 2002:33-4; Müller 1986 argues for the inclusion of structural analysis in some of the classical historians; the material he identifies (e.g. Polybius book 6) is what I would class as digression.

against which – in Lucian's formulation – the account's proportionality was to be assessed). That is, digressions are passages which interrupt or distort the chronological narrative, in ways codified by Genette's theory: in practice, digressions disrupt narrative chronology either in terms of duration (i.e. pauses, which break the narrative to include other material) or order (i.e. anachronies, which interrupt chronology with material displaced from its proper chronological sequence).[128]

This technical approach, I think, answers the problems of classification and the purpose of digression identified in this chapter. This definition is broad; but it is systematic, and has the advantage of being based on structure rather than subject-matter, avoiding begging the question of relevance (which, as we have seen, is difficult to assess).[129] It includes all the passages traditionally recognised as digressions in Sallust's text, but sets their analysis on a firmer theoretical footing. In foregrounding arrangement and order, this definition also fits with my arguments on *dispositio;* this temporal definition makes clearer such passages' relationship to the whole, stressing their importance as structural devices.[130]

The Philaeni digression

To draw this chapter together I will briefly consider an example of the use of digression and its possible relevance within the historian's *dispositio*. This is the *logos* of the Philaeni in the *Bellum Jugurthinum*:[131] it obtrudes upon the military narrative with a discussion of the egregious heroic behaviour of two Carthaginian brothers, prepared to die in order to advance the cause of their state.[132] The passage is introduced with a discussion of Leptis, to which it is thematically connected: the whole digression provides a moment of relief from the military narrative.

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[128] Panico 2001:485-6 notes digressions as shifts in narrative *tempo*; my definition draws on his treatment in applying it to historiographical narrative. Geckle 1995:161 notes that speeches too contain proleptic material; in that it is focalised through other speakers, this is not relevant for my purposes.

[129] Genette 1988:28-31 notes that material distinguished on grounds of order is not necessarily secondary in importance.

[130] Cf. Rimmon-Kenan 2002:121 on the importance of "linearity" and order in fictional narratives.

[131] *Jug*. 79.

[132] Other versions: Pomp. Mel. 1.38 (Corsi 1997 compares Mela's with Sallust's); Polyb. 3.39.2, 10.40.7; Val. Max. 5.6.4; Ps.-Skylax 109. See Oniga 1990 for full discussion of the tradition.

The digression is carefully structured. Ostensibly prompted by mention of events in Leptis, Sallust moves to a description of the city and its environs. From there, he moves via geographical suggestion to the story of the Philaeni, whose monuments (the *arae Philaenorum*) were nearby; Sallust claims that "the place itself dictates" he should treat the story.[133] Sallust had made brief reference to these altars as a landmark in the African digression,[134] but the link is not stated initially: reference to the altars is postponed to the end of the passage.

The passage pauses the military narrative, to narrate a chronologically distinct story. The introduction of the Philaeni is somewhat jarring: Sallust simply refers the episode to the period of Carthaginian domination of most of Africa.[135] The contrast with the period of the war itself (in that Sallust has been able to narrate most of the war without once mentioning Carthage) is instructive. The passage, with its invocation of Carthaginian power, draws the reader back into a deliberately non-specific past. The digression also serves (as Ronald Syme suggested) a punctuating role, in marking the winter of 108 to 107, although this is not expressed:[136] the digression conceals an ellipsis in the main narrative.

Sallust introduces Leptis after the capture of Thala at the end of 108.[137] He reports that legates had arrived from the city, warning against the stirring-up there of revolution by a certain nobleman, Hamilcar; in response to this, Metellus sends a deputation to restore order. Leptis' immediate relevance is not clearly articulated; the region has as yet played no role in the narrative (necessitating a synopsis of events there thus far), and has appeared only as a landmark.[138] It is also in contrast to Sallust's usual interests of the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, which do not include garrison

[133] *Jug*. 79.1.
[134] *Jug*. 19.3. On the *arae Philaenorum* themselves, their location and archaeology see Graur 1979, Abitino 2003. On the digression see Corsi 1997; Scanlon 1988:161-7; Oniga 1990; Potz 1998; Devillers 2002.
[135] Corsi 1997:83-4 notes the chronological disjunction.
[136] Syme 1964:145.
[137] *Jug*. 76.
[138] Cf. *Jug*. 19.1.

duty.[139] Neither Metellus' deputation, nor Hamilcar (the alleged ringleader), appear again either here or in other sources, and the alleged threat of revolt turns out to be indeed no more than a threat: Sallust never comments on the accuracy of the citizens' fears,and we are never told of any resolution. This emphasises the sense that the episode is detached from the historian's usual interests and the exigencies of the narrative: it seems plausible that Sallust's decision to treat Leptis is at least influenced by its thematic significance, and the opportunity it afforded for introducing the Philaeni story.[140]

The first part of the digression, the description of Leptis, combines geographical material, such as the treatment of the Syrtes, with a more specific account of the city's foundation. Sallust reports that the city was founded as a result of civil strife, by settlers fleeing Sidon, a Phoenician city. The emphasis is important: comparing the account of the foundation of Leptis with his comments earlier in the monograph (in the African digression) about these Phoenician settlements, it is notable that only here does he mention civil strife as one of the causes of the city's foundation, as opposed to the excess population, desire for change or cupidity identified earlier.[141] The deliberate identification of *discordiae civilis* over factors identified previously is a part of the shift in focus, contributing to the thematic stress of the whole.

This is also manifested in the *logos* itself. Thomas Wiedemann has suggested that by introducing these Carthaginians as *exempla* of *concordia*, Sallust draws a contrast with inadequate Roman *mores* in a period of factional strife: the Philaeni story emphasises the Romans' failures in the persons of Marius and Metellus.[142] This is certainly accurate; the major thematic preoccupation of the monograph is political strife, as I consider in chapter 4 below.[143] In addition to this, scholars have suggested that the passage is a meditation on *virtus*: Renato Oniga has considered the sense that the

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[139] Cf. *Jug*. 47.1-2, Metellus' garrisoning of Vaga; but narrative relevance there is much clearer, connected directly to Jugurtha's renewed attempts to sue for peace (*Jug*. 47.3), and events surrounding Turpilius (*Jug*. 66).
[140] Cf. Tiffou 1974:154; Wiedemann 1993:54; neither treats this idea in depth.
[141] Cf. *Jug*. 19.1.
[142] Wiedemann 1993: 55-7.
[143] Cf. Scanlon 1988:167, reading the Philaeni as direct contrast to Metellus.

Philaeni represent a model of universal *virtus* (applicable to Jugurtha, as to the Romans), lost since the destruction of Carthage.[144] Again, this is clearly relevant (although in keeping with the reading of Metellus I offer in chapter 4 below, I do not read the digression as a direct attack on him, as some scholars have).[145]

I suggest one further possible point, illustrating the digression's thematic correspondence to the rest of the work (and the material with which it was introduced). Sallust's mention of strife at Leptis (as I have suggested, perhaps specifically gauged towards the inclusion of the Philaeni) stressed the role of an otherwise unknown Hamilcar. The name was a common Carthaginian one,[146] and had particular currency in the Roman imagination thanks to Hamilcar Barca, the father of Hannibal and of the Second Punic War.[147] Although Sallust does not tell us explicitly that Hamilcar was Carthaginian, his Roman readership would surely have made the connection. As such, the Philaeni digression, describing the exemplary deed of two Carthaginians of some non-specific time, is in sharp contrast to the sole representative of contemporary Carthage in the monograph, a *homo factiosus*.[148] The collocation of the Hamilcar at Leptis with these heroic Carthaginians of a distant period emphasises the depths to which Carthage had sunk, such that the glorious deed (and the border the Philaeni had marked) was simply no longer relevant; the elision of Carthage from contemporary power subverts the supposedly timeless deed of her citizens. There is perhaps a comparison with Sallust's idealised view of early Rome period, contrasted with what he saw as her contemporary failings;[149] the implicit comparison of these two sets of Carthaginians emphasises the transience of power (I explore this theme further in chapter 3). This offers another way of conceiving Sallust's claim that "the place itself dictates" discussion of the Philaeni.

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[144] Oniga 1990:24-5.

[145] See e.g. Potz 1988:96-7, reading the Philaeni's reaction to *diminutio* (the insult to their propriety) in contrast to Metellus' (replacement by Marius).

[146] Benz 1972:314-5, 348-9 collects epigraphic evidence; Polyb. 36.3.8 attests a Hamilcar as Carthaginian envoy in 149; in the Second Punic War a general Hamilcar is attested by Livy 31.10; for earlier Hamilcares see Hdt. 7.165, Just. *Ep*. 22.2. cf. Günther 1998.

[147] e.g. Livy 21.1; 21.10 calls him (in *oratio recta*) *Hamilcar, Mars alter*.

[148] *Jug*. 77.1

[149] Cf. Scanlon 1988 on associations between Carthage and early Rome in the *Jug*.

The Philaeni digression thus exemplifies Sallust's use of the technique. It serves a structural role, articulating the narrative; it also provides a quasi-paradoxographical narrative of outstanding deeds to set against the military account, providing variation (Sallust promises an *egregium atque mirabile facinus duorum Carthaginiensium*).[150] It similarly amplifies themes of the rest of the text, illustrating the exemplary value of devotion to the state, a quality lacking in the Romans of the monograph. These qualities are all connected to the deployment of the digression at this specific juncture in the monograph's *dispositio*.

Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, and this first part of the thesis, it remains to apply this narratological definition to Sallust's text, to codify the corpus of digressions within his works. Sallust's prefaces, despite not being part of the chronological narrative, have not been included; they are distinguished by preceding the actual statements of theme against which digressions are measured, and draw on a different set of historiographical techniques and *topoi*.[151]

In the *Bellum Catilinae*, the narrative against which digressions are measured - as stated at the end of chapter 4 - is the conspiracy of 63.[152] Within this frame, the passages disrupting the narrative, either by anachrony or by manipulation of duration, are as follows.

Sketch of Catiline	5; 14-5	Pause; retardation of the beginning of the chronological narrative of 63.
The *archaeologia*	6-13	*Analepsis*: description of Rome from *origines* up to the present day.
The "First Conspiracy"	18-9	*Analepsis*: events of 65-64.
Sketch of Sempronia	25	Pause: interruption of the conspiracy

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[150] *Jug*. 79.1.
[151] See Jansson 1964, Earl 1971.
[152] *Cat*. 4.3-4.

		narrative with a sketch of a Roman matron.
status Romae	36.4-9.6	*Analepsis*: developments in Roman politics, 70-63 (also a pause describing the contemporary state of Rome).
Reflections on Roman history; the *synkrisis*	53.2-54.6	Pause: remarks on individuals in Roman history; comparison of Caesar and Cato.

We can apply the same classification to the *Bellum Jugurthinum*. Sallust again sets out his theme towards the end of the preface; the war with Jugurtha, and the challenge to the *superbia* of the *nobiles* which accompanied it.[153]

Sketch of Jugurtha	5-9.4	*Analepsis*: Jugurtha's development prior to the period of the narrative.
The Africa digression	17-9	Pause: nature, history and *status* of Africa.
mos partium et factionum	41-2	Pause: analysis of Roman politics from the mid-second century (including analeptic elements).
Sketch of Marius	63	Pause: introduction of Marius (including detail on his earlier career).
Description of Leptis; the *logos* of the Philaeni.	78-9	Pause: description of the town and its environs. *Analepsis*: the story of the Philaeni brothers.

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[153] *Jug*. 5.1-2.

Sketch of Sulla	95.3-4	Pause: sketch of Sulla.

Each of these passages illustrates the historian's *dispositio*, in supplementing his work with diversions and material divorced from the central narrative: as we will see, each also conforms to the stipulations of Lucian and the rhetoricians in contributing (in different ways) to the history as a whole.

Chapter 3 – The *archaeologia* and African digression

With the second part of this thesis, I will offer readings of three sets of Sallustian digressions: with each chapter, I will consider digressions from both of Sallust's monographs which treat similar subjects, and share certain formal characteristics. The aim of this second part of the thesis is to contribute to some specific debates within Sallustian scholarship (particularly through the new perspectives offered by emphasising structural considerations and the relationship of digressions to the rest), but also to develop a reading of his use of digression more generally, and to explore the sense in which digressions, as *loci* of the interpretative activity of *dispositio*, are central to the historical project of both works.

My first study will examine two passages which appear early in their respective monographs, and which on the most immediate level provide a background for historical events; the *archaeologia* of the *Bellum Catilinae* (the account of Rome's history up to 63) and the African digression of the *Bellum Jugurthinum* (a description of landscape and inhabitants of the theatre of war).[1] Their importance is marked by their positions: each follows soon after the historian's statement of theme, but precedes the actual beginning of the promised narrative. The *archaeologia* precedes the inception of the Catilinarian conspiracy;[2] the African digression, while postdating the murder of Hiempsal (the commencement of Jugurtha's march to power), anticipates Roman military intervention and the beginning of the titular *bellum*.[3] While the digression could provide a point of refreshment for the audience, this was not a pressing need only a few *OCT* pages into a text. We should therefore look closely at argumentative and structural aspects of these digressions.

The two passages are also connected in terms of subject-matter. Each provides background, contextualising the events of the main historical narrative; this context is coloured by Sallust's own interpretative interests, and calculated towards particular aims (as such, these passages are *loci* of

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[1] *Cat*. 5.9-13; *Jug*. 17-9.
[2] Cf. *Cat*. 4.3.
[3] Cf. *Jug*. 5.1.

Sallust's *dispositio*). The nature of the contextual material differs: the *archaeologia* moralistically summarises Rome's development, while the African digression treats the *situs* and *gentes* of Africa. Nonetheless, I will demonstrate that important continuities do exist between the two passages: as I will show throughout, treatment of Sallust's digressions in parallel illustrates similarities and contrasts in Sallust's historiographical technique.

I will begin with some discussion of the passages' characteristics and roles within their respective works. I will then treat the *archaeologia*, suggesting that it is a more sophisticated literary construction than modern scholarship has allowed, and that it demonstrates Sallust's engagement with ideas of historical causation and political philosophy; Sallust's Roman history is distinct from conventional versions of the Roman past, and contributes to his broader historical project. The second half of the chapter will (more briefly) consider the African digression: this again demonstrates Sallust's engagement with the intellectual climate of his period, and plays a thematic role in the construction of its monograph.

Programmatic digression – a Sallustian paradox?

Before considering the content of each digression, it will be useful to examine some distinguishing features they share. I noted above that the passages (given in full in the Appendix) appear at roughly equivalent points, after the prefaces and introductions of the monographs' central figures, but before the events given as the subject-matter of the historical account. In addition to filling in aspects of the background of the narrative, the digressions separate the beginning of each narrative from the preceding material. Each digression is introductory in providing a wider frame against which the significance of the narrative can be understood; but also in establishing the historian's perspective, and illustrating the approach which informs his writing. By placing these large-scale digressions (the longest such passages in Sallust's monographs) in such emphatic positions, Sallust invests them with programmatic significance for the audience's reading of his text.

The programmatic role of these digressions is particularly marked given the unusual construction of Sallust's prefaces, which defy conventional historiographical practice in treating moral philosophy more fully than more usual historiographical subjects.[4] Sallust's prefaces do make some mention of the conventional *topoi* of such passages - the *Bellum Catilinae* treats the author's suitability for his task; the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, the value of historiography -[5] but their tone, and unusual philosophical contents, marks Sallust's historiographical project as a departure from what had come before.[6] Like the prefaces, each digression similarly engages in unusual ways with conventional historiographical subjects: each, in fact, supplements the preface of its respective monograph, as I explore below.

Sallust's introductions to these digressions are also comparable.[7] Each stresses the digression's relevance, and connection to the subject under discussion: although Sallust signals these as departures from his theme, he nonetheless emphasises their importance with reference to the exigencies of the argument (through the phrases *res hortari videtur* and *res postulare videtur*). Both passages encapsulate the tension which I have suggested is central to digression in classical historiography: they retard the narrative (even a narrative not yet properly begun), but supplement the argument of the whole history.

Both passages are also digressions in the chronological sense with which I have suggested we categorise digression. Each treats a period removed from the circumscribed chronological boundaries of the monographic form, expanding the compass of Sallust's account; as I explore throughout this thesis, this is important to Sallust's work in particular because of the strict delimitations of his monographic subjects. As with his predecessors, his digressive technique responds to the requirements of his historiographical form. Broadly, each passage is a diachronic survey. Both start from a period far removed from the period of the history – an external *analepsis* –

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[4] Cf. Earl 1971.
[5] *Cat*. 4.2; *Jug*. 4.1-4.
[6] On *topoi* of historiographical prefaces see Jansson 1964.
[7] *Cat*. 5.9: *res ipsa hortari videtur, quoniam de moribus civitatis tempus admonuit, supra repetere ac paucis instituta maiorum domi militiaeque... disserere*; *Jug*. 17.1: *res postulare videtur Africae situm paucis exponere...*.

and continue up to the author's own period. The African digression, after a brief treatment of geography,[8] goes back to the continent's settling by the dispersing army of Hercules;[9] the *archaeologia* starts from the foundation of Rome by Aeneas and his followers. Each proceeds chronologically, and culminates in a contemporary survey bringing the subject-matter fully up-to-date: in the *archaeologia*, this is a polemic against contemporary moral debasement;[10] in the African digression, a summary of the balance of power in Numidia before the Jugurthine war.[11] Between these chronological bookends, each digression offers an account of development across a long swathe of history (albeit one which is partial, aetiological and teleological). Sallust's accounts are chronologically linked into the periods of the narratives themselves: in both cases, what begins as an external *analepsis* leads directly back into the contemporary period. This continuity makes explicit the connection between digression and the main subject signalled with the introductions.

The chronological span is important to the construction of each passage, particularly because the breadth of Sallust's focus distinguishes these from comparable treatments in Latin literature and previous historiography, as I explore below; it is also connected to the atypicality of Sallust's prefaces, and the innovation of his monographic form. I will argue in this chapter that the provision of highly selective histories of wider periods is an important feature of both passages.

The position, introduction and structure of each passage indicate their function of providing contextual material for the main narrative; but they also make clear the programmatic status of each digression as a tool of the historian's *dispositio*. Sallust's use of these passages is subtle: this chapter will consider them in turn, exploring the sense in which they advance Sallust's wider historiographical aims.

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[8] *Jug*. 17.3-6.
[9] *Jug*. 18.3.
[10] *Cat*. 13.
[11] *Jug*. 19.7.

Bellum Catilinae 6-13 – the _archaeologia_

The _archaeologia_ is in two parts. The first covers Rome's rise: Sallust begins with a brief version of the well-worn subject of the foundation of the city. His version diverges from those of other authors, in giving the leading role in founding Rome itself to the Trojans under Aeneas, rather than to Romulus:[12] this divergence, as I explore below, is significant. Sallust describes the city's early development, and the expulsion of the kings (in the abstract terms of constitutional change);[13] he emphasises the excellence and virtue of the early Romans, particularly in military matters;[14] after a brief digression-within-a-digression on Rome's lack of historical commemoration compared to Greece,[15] he includes a second summing up of the virtues of the city as of the early second century, this time emphasising domestic and what might be termed "civilian" qualities.[16] These old Romans are presented in the most glowing terms, with vocabulary familiar from Roman moral discourse as old as Cato the Elder.[17]

This highpoint marks the break between the two halves, and a development foreshadowed in the negative trajectory suggested by the introduction, which had linked the digression to Rome's contemporary moral debasement. Although Rome's access to the Mediterranean is now unimpeded,[18] and in moral terms too she is apparently at her zenith, the fall of Carthage in 146 is identified as the point at which things darken, and a second phase begins. Most scholarship on the digression, invoking Sallust's theory of _metus hostilis_, allocates the fall of Carthage causal significance for the moral degeneration which follows;[19] for whatever reason, Roman morals begin to slip. Sallust identifies the first symptoms of decline; the rise of ambition (lust for power for its own sake), avarice, and concomitant vices.

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[12] Cat. 6.1.
[13] _Cat_. 6.
[14] _Cat_. 7.
[15] _Cat_. 8 (see Tzounakas 2005 on the _encomium_ of historiography).
[16] _Cat_. 9.
[17] See below pp.110-2.
[18] Cat. 10.1.
[19] e.g. Earl 1961:43-52; Vretska 1976:196-206; Bellen 1985; Garbugino 1998; Dunsch 2006:206-7. Exceptions: Latta 1988:272-3, Heldmann 1993:96-7, Schütrumpf 1998; on _metus hostilis_ see further below pp.112-5.

Sallust elaborates on the beginnings of vice, and includes another temporal marker in Rome's decline, Sulla's march on the city (in 83) and importation of Asiatic vice with his army.[20] By chapter 12, we have reached the contemporary period: Sallust emotively describes contemporary morals, contrasting in particular the *ignavissumi homines* of his day with the *religiosissumi mortales* of the Early Republic.[21] Chapter 13 expands upon the manifestations of depravity with reference to the period of the conspiracy itself, noting in particular the mania for building, and the spending and luxurious habits of her youth. No divide is made between these final two chapters and the beginning of the narrative itself: all are equally products of the post-Sullan period. The concluding chapter of the digression continues directly into the Catilinarian narrative, with the phrase *in tanta tamque corrupta civitate...*[22]

Some highly unusual features are apparent from even this brief summary. For what purports to be an historical account, the factual detail is slim: the only personal names mentioned across half a millennium are Aeneas and Sulla.[23] Sallust's foundation narrative diverges from what had become the canonical version of the story (set out – with variations - by Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus)[24] in favour of a heterodox version of Aeneas settling in Italy, and joining with the rustic *aborigines* to found Rome. Later events are schematic, corresponding only roughly to the details of Roman history: while the fall of Carthage is mentioned, the idealised account makes no mention of the Struggle of the Orders - which loomed large in Roman history as written by Cicero and Livy -[25] or Rome's military disasters (the Caudine Forks and Gallic sack are perhaps hinted at in 6.4, but present no apparent check to Rome's unstoppable rise). Even in the second half of the passage, concrete facts are lacking: there is no mention, for example, of the Gracchi, who although deeply ideologically contested were

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[20] *Cat.* 11.4.

[21] On this phrase see Alfonsi 1969, suggesting that Sallust was motivated by religious and philosophical concerns (Alfonsi 1963 links the same passage to Posidonius' influence).

[22] *Cat*. 14.1.

[23] Cf. Leeman 1967:111: "eine Geschichte ohne geschichtliche Tatsachen".

[24] On Roman origin stories see below pp.103-6.

[25] Cf. Cic. *Rep*. 2; Livy books 2-5. The historicity of this is disputed; see Cornell 1995:242-68, 327-40 with full bibliography.

consistently recognised as turning-points.[26] Sallust identifies 146 and 83 as markers in the state's

slide, but neither are treated *qua* historical events: they simply punctuate a moralistic narrative.

These are unusual characteristics for a historical summary, even by the standards of classical

historiography. Sallust knew his early Roman history better than this account suggests, as

demonstrated by references to (for example) the *leges Porciae* elsewhere in the monograph:[27] he

had been well taught.[28] Rather, his account presents a selective version of the Roman past, for

specific aims.

    The *archaeologia* has been widely treated by modern scholarship, particularly to support

more general conclusions (usually elaborated from the preface) on Sallust's historiography.[29] Some,

of whom Douglas Earl has been perhaps the most influential, have emphasised the role of the

digression as a demonstration of Sallust's moral philosophy 'in practice'.[30] Other scholars have

mined the passage as part of investigations into Sallust's "philosophy of history": of these, the most

important is the article of Bernd Latta, who connects the digression to developments in Sallust's

political understanding.[31] More recently, Konrad Heldmann and Eckart Schütrumpf have considered

the passage in relation to themes and ideas of Hellenistic historiography.[32] Like these latter

approaches, I will also consider Sallust's "philosophy of history", although I will focus less on moral

vocabulary. I also wish to view the *archaeologia* as a passage engaging with a literary tradition,

although my reading will offer a new starting-point drawn from the details of the text itself; I will

focus on characteristics of the account which have previously been little noted. I cannot here cover

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[26] e.g. Florus 2.1; Cic. Rep. 1.31; Vell. Pat. 2.2.3; *Jug*. 42.1.

[27] E.g. *Cat*. 51.22.

[28] Suetonius records that Sallust had a *breviarium* of Roman history from the grammarian L. Ateius Philologus, surely including such well-worn themes as the Struggle of the Orders (*Gram. et Rhet.* 10): see Kaster 1995 *ad loc*.

[29] Commentaries on the passage: Ramsey 2007:73-96; McGushin 1977: 65-104; Vretska 1976:138-245; Garbugino 1998:157-71; Hellegouarc'h 1972:46-62; Mariotti 2007:224-332.

[30] See Earl 1961; Tiffou 1973; Vretska 1937:31-7; see below pp.237-44 on moral philosophy in the preface.

[31] Latta 1988. Cf. Skard 1930:72-81 (linking the passage to the *Epistulae*).

[32] Heldmann 1993:93-117; Schütrumpf 1998.

all aspects: In particular, I postpone most of the treatment of Sallust's moral vocabulary and analysis for subsequent chapters.[33]

My argument is as follows. Rather than replicating the conventional versions of the Roman past, Sallust's early Roman history deviates from the norm, in content and in style. Rather than patterning Rome's development teleologically, emphasising the continuity between early Rome and the author's own period, Sallust sharply distinguishes between the Romans of the earlier period and its contemporary state, in order to portray the city from a perspective divorced from that usually taken. Sallust diverges from well-established convention, in favour of setting the city within a more universal historical schema. His chief literary technique in making this distinction is an important generic allusion which has occasionally been noted, but has been little remarked upon, to ethnography.[34] Sallust's deployment of tropes and vocabulary of ethnography marks an allusion which colours the digression, suggesting an externalising perspective which is important to the argumentation of the chapter.

Combined with the ethnographic aspects, the details of Sallust's description of Roman decline contribute to a broader understanding of the city's place in history, and emphasise her place within more general historical patterns. The *archaeologia* illustrates Sallust's attempt to understand Rome within a contemporary model, and to define her historical trajectory. Sallust does not employ the political philosophy found in, for example, Polybius or Cicero; but this is not because Sallust was incapable (his analysis suggests knowledge of Cicero's political philosophy in particular),[35] but because he applied a different interpretative paradigm. While my approach will be an examination of Sallust's "historical conception" akin to those of other scholars, it particularly stresses the digressive aspects of the passage, and its significance within the construction of the monograph as a

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[33] See chapter 5; Guerrini 1977 links the moral structure of the *archaeologia* to Sallust's *apologia* in particular.
[34] Ethnographical resonances here have been noted only briefly (Mariotti 2007:229-30); no attention has been paid to their significance.
[35] On Sallust and Cicero see Stone 1999 and below pp.248-9 (with further bibliography).

whole.[36] The *archaeologia* does not just digress from Catiline's conspiracy: it digresses from the generic conventions of Roman historiography, and the perspective usually adopted, and replaces them with an alternative approach which has pronounced ramifications. In combining digression with argumentation, the passage is a powerful example of Sallustian *dispositio*.

It is necessary briefly to situate Sallust's digression in relation to comparable accounts. A digression covering the early period of the city was not a new departure for Roman historiography: the early history (and prehistory) of Rome was a common subject for many of the historians who preceded Sallust. The annalists frequently began before the foundation of Rome itself, with Aeneas and the kings of Alba Longa, who preceded the foundation of Rome herself.[37] Rome's early history was also a subject for the poets (including Naevius, who included a major digression on the subject in his epic on the Punic Wars)[38] and increasingly for antiquarians like Varro, who drew on alternative sources in researching the traditions of the city. While it is difficult to generalise from the fragments and *testimonia* which remain, the antiquarians apparently saw their task at least in part as codifying the variant versions of the city's early history, and more securely establishing the factual details of (for example) the development of religion and customs;[39] in Cicero's *encomium* of Varro's activity in the *Academica*, he praises Varro's achievement as rediscovery of data on the religion and custom of the city, particularly as connected to topography and to the physical monuments and shrines of the city, rather than revision of the existing narrative.[40]

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[36] On links between digression and monograph more generally Heldmann 1993, focusing on the preface and only tangentially treating the digression; see further below pp.116-7. Cf. Schütrumpf 1998:681.

[37] Dion. Hal. *AR* 1.7.3 cites a selection of annalistic sources for this early Roman material; cf. also the *Origo Gentis Romanae* . Feeney 1994:142 notes that the *archaeologia* appears at first much like a work of *annales*.

[38] See Rowell 1947; Frassinetti 1969.

[39] On the antiquarians' activities see Rawson 1985:233-49; Fox 1996:236-44;Stevenson 1993, esp. 53-72; on their activities as response to contemporary collapse in the authority of the past see Wallace-Hadrill 1998:12-14.

[40] *Acad*. 1.9.

By the late Republic, a great deal of material existed on which a historian could draw, although the historicity of much of it is seriously questionable.[41] The level of detail attested is remarkable (if historically suspect),[42] and contributes to the so-called "hourglass" shape of previous historians' accounts, which cover the early period of the city and that nearest the author's own day most heavily, with less on intervening years.[43] The divergences between accounts are apparent from fragments which remain, and from later syntheses such as the *Origo Gentis Romanae* or the early books of Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Antiquitates Romanae*.[44] Both discuss the sources of various elements of the story, and demonstrate that considerable variation, as well as detail, existed in these early narratives (particularly of the city's foundation).

Nonetheless, the broad shape of the Roman tradition – especially after the foundation of Rome itself - seems to have been largely agreed. Although in the late Republic the chronology might be refined (as by Varro's calculation of a new date for the city's foundation), the overall story was basically fixed. This more or less conventional version included Aeneas' journey in Italy, the foundation of Alba Longa by Ascanius (and the sequence of kings there), and - some centuries later – the foundation of Rome by Romulus.[45] After the foundation ran the canonical sequence of Rome's seven kings from Romulus to Tarquinius Superbus, with a parallel narrative of the development of Roman *mores* and institutions. In the canonical version (as exemplified by Livy), each major development could be ascribed to the particular character of the king who had introduced it: to Romulus, the statesman, was the foundation of the senate, and growth in Roman power; to Numa, the more peaceful, was the development of religion.[46] This view of the Roman past was teleological: in treating the foundation within a chronological sequence, *annales* emphasised the continuity of

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[41] On Pictor's sources in initiating Roman historiography see von Ungern-Sternberg 2011; Frier 1979 (on the *annales maximi*); on their techniques in elaborating them see Wiseman 1979; Cornell 1986 (part of a wider debate which I cannot treat in detail here).

[42] See Wiseman 1979:21 and *passim* on "the expansion of the past".

[43] On the "hourglass" shape see Badian 1966; Wiseman 1979:9-10; *FRHist*. 1.171 n.53 (with full bibliography).

[44] On Dionysius' aims see Fox 1996:49-95.

[45] On the role of Fabius Pictor see D'Anna 1976:43-143; Casoli 2010; on the Aeneas element of the story see below.

[46] E.g. Livy 1.8 on Romulus; 1.20 on Numa.

the city's history, with the state's institutions running back without interruption to the innovations of the kings, and its development towards a "completed" state.

Demonstrating both the detail which might be contained in an account and the ideological weight which could be put upon it is Cicero's discussion of the early period of Roman history in book II of *de Republica* (mid-50s BC).[47] Placed in the mouth of Scipio, drawing ostensibly on Cato but also largely on Polybius,[48] it stresses the aggregation of Rome's institutions and laws, under the influence of each king. This, according to Scipio/Cicero, was central to the development of Rome as a stable state: her institutions had not been imposed by a single lawgiver, but had grown organically until the constitution reached its full flowering after the reforms of the fourth century.[49] Scipio's formulation emphasises an important characteristic which runs throughout the *de Republica*, which is particularly pronounced in the discussion of the mixed constitution and Roman constitutional stability. This is the idea that Rome was somehow exceptional, suited by her uniquely well-adapted constitution to the universal rule at which she had arrived by the dialogue's dramatic date (129).[50] This idea underpins Cicero's analysis of constitutional strength, and the lengthy historical summary in book II of the work seems calculated towards stressing its historical basis.[51] The second half of *de Republica* is more fragmentary; but a fragment from the preface to the fifth book, preserved by Augustine, attests that Cicero noted the state's moral decline since the dramatic date of the dialogue and called for a return to continuity and morality as a solution to Rome's problems.[52] In Cicero's account, the state's stability even in the late Republican period is linked to continuity back to the kings.

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[47] On this account see Cornell 2001 (emphasising schematic selectiveness and the calculation of the account towards specific literary aims); Fox 1996:5-31, 2007:80-110, Bianchi 2003:202-6; on Cicero as historian generally, Rawson 1972.

[48] Ferrary 1984; Cornell 2001; Rawson 1972:36-7 suggests Cicero may draw on the historians listed at *Leg.* 1.1-5. On use of Scipio as a mouthpiece see Atkins 2013:33-46.

[49] Cic. *Rep*. 2.1-3.

[50] *Rep*.1.14.

[51] Cornell 2001:52-3 stresses Cicero's denial of outside influences on Rome, and emphasis on a high level of native culture *ab initio* (*contra* Livy).

[52] Cic. *Rep*. 5.1.

Against this literary backdrop (and Cicero's version in particular) the unusual nature of Sallust's digression is clear. Although his scope is comparable, in other aspects his version is heterodox. By allocating Rome's foundation to Aeneas, Sallust subverts the weight of tradition, which had established Aeneas' role as bringer of the Trojans to Italy, and father of Ascanius, the founder of Alba Longa. He dispenses entirely with the tradition of the Alban kings, and Romulus' established role in founding Rome. The account of the Roman kings is similarly sparse, in comparison to Livy's or Cicero's: rather than detail on Rome's cultural development, Sallust's version is limited to discussion of the deterioration of regal power into arrogance.[53] His depiction of the birth of the Republic avoids the famous stories, in favour of emphasising that Roman experience was in keeping with universal rules, and the characteristics of the kings common to all monarchies.[54] The tone minimises the specific and exceptional details of Roman development emphasised by other accounts: this, I suggest, is replaced by a universal focus, stressing generalised aspects– the points in which Roman experience overlapped with more universal models - and elides elements established as characteristically Roman. Aspects of this might be ascribed to the brevity of Sallust's account, and its schematic coverage: but the heterodoxy of Sallust's version of such a well-canvassed story is marked.

I suggest that Sallust's digression be read with attention to a difference set of concerns; the perspectives and techniques of the ethnographical tradition.[55] In its most basic sense, ethnography signifies the description of peoples. The genre's literary beginnings lay in the same Ionian intellectual *milieu* as historiography and geography, to which it is closely linked; these forms made use of the same set of investigative techniques and methodologies, and presented their results in similar

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[53] *Cat*. 6.7.

[54] *Cat*. 7.2: *regibus boni quam mali suspectiores sunt semperque eis aliena virtus formidulosa est*. cf. *Cat*. 6.3, *sicuti pleraque mortalium habentur*.

[55] On the ethnographic tradition Trüdinger 1918 remains useful, although heavily reliant on *Quellenforschung*; Müller 1972 is a general survey. Woolf 2011 provides up-to-date bibliography and discussion. Dench 2007 treats ethnography as component of and complement to historiography (cf. Dench 2005 on Roman ethnographies more broadly understood). On Sallust specifically, see Oniga 1995 (on *Jug* and *Hist*., with discussion of the ethnographic tradition at 11-22) and Keyser 1991 (mainly on the *Hist.*)*;* Schmal 2011:96-109.

ways.[56] The earliest works were characterised by permeability of subject-matter, with ostensibly geographical and ethnographical works including material we might term historical, and *vice versa.*[57] Chronology is central to ethnography, in understanding the place of a people within overarching chronological narratives; conversely, geography and ethnography provide the context to these historical narratives. The inhabitants of a region were linked to the land they occupied; as exemplified by the Hippocratic treatise *Airs, Waters, Places*, the idea of climatic determinism – that the nature of a population was affected or even determined by the circumstances under which it lived - was a common explanatory theme in Greek thought.[58] Ethnography and geography featured in many historians' works through digressions, contextualising the events of the narrative and providing information on the ever-expanding *oikoumene*. Indeed, most ethnographic material preserved is in digressions within other texts (in history, but also poetry): authors in other genres could switch into the ethnographic mode for specific sections.[59]

The relevance of such material to historiography was clear: the removal of the historical narrative to a new theatre provided the historian with an occasion to discuss the nature of the countryside and its inhabitants. Most such accounts, in historiography and elsewhere, deal with fairly standard common themes.[60] The *situs*, or geographical description, usually came first; this was followed by *origines* (accounts which often made use of indigenous origin myths), accounts of customs (and especially religious practices), and frequently summaries of *status,* the state of the people described at the point at which they appeared in the historian's narrative, effectively a kind of synchronic description of the features of a people and their ἔθος. The account might also include *mirabilia*, particularly interesting or unbelievable facts associated with the people or places

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[56] Clarke 1999:3; cf. Fornara 1983:13-6.

[57] Hecataeus' fragments (*FrGrH* 1) include a mix of geographical, ethnographical and historical data. Cf. Clarke 1999:3 on the dangers of too sharply defining geography and history.

[58] See Thomas 2000:28-54; Oniga 1995:25-34; cf. Momigliano 1987:13-25 on parallels between historiography and medicine (to which questions such as climatic determinism were central).

[59] See Woolf 2011, 13-17, who also emphasises the permeability of ethnography and its failure (unlike e.g. medicine or epic) to coalesce around an accepted canon; cf. Thomas 1982:5. On geographical and ethnographical digressions in historiography see Lopez Ramos 2008; Heubner 2004:93-5; Dench 2007.

[60] See Trüdinger 1918:21; Thomas 1982:1-7; Oniga 1995:12-3.

described. It is clear from our evidence that ethnographies were not confined to a fixed structure, and the historian could shape his account quite freely:[61] nonetheless, this set of interests is a guide to the ethnographical material with which the Greek historians introduced foreign peoples.

Sallust's predecessors illustrate the inclusion of such material in historiography. Herodotus' work is suffused with geographical and ethnographical material, which (as I explored above) plays a role within the construction of his history: while ethnographical digressions are inherently interesting, they are also a structuring device for the *logoi* punctuating his work.[62] Book II is dominated by the famous description of Egypt, which combines elements of chronological narrative with synchronic and less temporally specific ethnographical material.[63] The extensive ethnography of the Skythians in book IV, while introduced as explanatory detail coinciding with Darius' campaigns, encompasses material on customs, accounts of the Skythians' ideas about their own genealogy, and a series of descriptions of different peoples, in geographical sequence;[64] the whole episode leads into discussion of geography, and the shape of the world.[65] Place and peoples are central to Herodotus' interests, and to the articulation of his historical narrative.[66]

Even in the narrower writing of Thucydides or Polybius, geography and ethnography retained their important position: both included lengthy digressions on the theatres where events took place and the peoples inhabiting them. Thucydides' digression on Sicily was particularly influential (Sallust includes a discussion of Sicily in the *Historiae*, perhaps influenced by Thucydides');[67] Polybius dedicated at least a whole book to geography (as well as briefer digressions) and included an extensive ethnography of the *Cimbri*.[68] These authors do not use place as Herodotus had, to structure their works; indeed, Thucydides' device of narrating events according to strict division by season means that he is less free than Herodotus to expand upon areas beyond their

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[61] Woolf 2011:16 emphasises the looseness of convention and canon.
[62] On Herodotus' digressions see above pp.57-8.
[63] 2.35-99 treats customs and ethnographical material; 2.100-182, Egyptian history.
[64] 4.17-27.
[65] 4.36-42.
[66] See generally Thomas 2000.
[67] Thuc. 6.1-5; Sallust's digression probably appeared in *Hist*. 4; see McGushin 1994:147 for discussion.
[68] Polyb. 34 seems to have surveyed the *oikoumene* in detail; cf. Walbank 1972:122-4.

immediate relevance. Nonetheless, the inclusion of geography and ethnography contextualises these authors' historical narratives, and contributes to the audience's understanding. Thucydides treats Sicily at length in book 6, because the Sicilian expedition was the book's central theme;[69] his account of the disaster of the expedition stresses the Athenians' ignorance as to the extent of Sicily, and the difficulties it posed to invading forces.[70] The digression makes explicit the context, reiterating Thucydides' stress on Athenian misgovernance.

At Rome, a form of ethnography seems to have been practised by Cato the Elder in his *Origines*.[71] Reconstruction of Cato's work must remain somewhat speculative,[72] but the interest paid to the origins of Italian cities suggests detailed engagement with the traditions of non-Roman peoples. Tim Cornell has suggested that Cato's work be read in the light of the development of so-called "universal historiography",[73] and this partly explains Cato's unusual interest in the peoples of Italy: universal historiography seems to have included a good deal of ethnography, as is suggested by the preservation of much ethnographical material in Diodorus' first-century βιβλιοθήκη.[74]

However, before the late Republican period there is little other evidence for systematic Roman ethnographical writing of other peoples:[75] Latin historiography seems as a rule to have been inward-looking, and discussion of origins and customs focused on Rome itself, as attested by the annalists and the antiquarians: in both cases the perspective seems to have been distinctly Roman, and to have stressed particular details of religion and custom rather than attempting more general cultural surveys. Emma Dench has classified the works of the annalists and the antiquarians with the term autoethnography; she reads these as attempts to understand Rome's foundation myths and character within the context of the Greek form, by using Greek approaches to outline

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[69] The digression: Thuc. 6.2-6; on the importance of the expedition cf. 7.87.
[70] Thuc. 6.1.
[71] On the content of the *Origines* see above pp.55-6.
[72] See *FRHist* 1.205-17.
[73] Cornell 2010.
[74] Books 3 and 5 contain extensive ethnographical material; cf. Rawson 1985:253-4.
[75] Garcia Moreno 1994 collects geographical and ethnographical material from the Republican historians.

characteristically Roman ideas.[76] This is relevant to Sallust's activities in this digression, as I explore below.

There is evidence that by the late Republican period ethnographical interests were more pronounced, among Romans as well as Greek intellectuals in the city's orbit.[77] Sallust would have been familiar with Posidonius of Rhodes, the most celebrated philosopher of his generation, and an influence on parts of Sallust's work.[78] In keeping with his Stoic philosophy, Posidonius' history focused heavily on causation, and particularly the causation of national character; as such, ethnographies played a major role.[79]

The most significant Roman evidence is Caesar's *de Bello Gallico*, which demonstrates interest in both geography and ethnography (e.g. of the *Suebi* at the beginning of book 4). Such material was important to Caesar's description of his achievements in a little-known country: they also demonstrate the currency of ethnographic interests in the far-flung inhabitants of Rome's expanding dominion.[80] Varro wrote geographical works, also touching on ethnography;[81] fragments of Nepos betray some interest in the subject.[82] Cicero shows knowledge of geographical questions, although he was dissuaded by their complexity; he was intrigued by the literary possibilities offered by his brother Quintus' expedition to Britain.[83] Sallust's own later works, of course, contain obviously

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[76] Dench 2005:61-9: Dench stresses the value of Roman origin stories as "spaces within which 'essential qualities' of Rome can be staked out" (63).

[77] Rawson 1985:250 calls the Late Republic a "golden age" for Greek ethnography and geography; cf. Garcia Moreno 1994.

[78] On Posidonian influence see Alfonsi 1963; Syme 1964:153; Savagnone 1976; Oniga 1995:15-8; although scholarship has over-emphasised Posidonius' importance as a model for Sallust, despite the protestations of Dobson 1918 (e.g. Thiessen 1912; Klingner 1928; Schur 1934:61-73 and *passim*, 1936) he was a major figure of the first century BC (Clarke 1999:129-30), and aspects of Sallust's writing do suggest his influence (cf. McGushin 1977:293-5). MacQueen 1981:21-6 rejects Posidonian influence, based on Sallust's failure to correspond to Stoic doctrine; but this does not mean that Sallust did not adopt aspects of Posidonius' ideas.

[79] See Strabo's critique at 2.3. On Posidonius' ethnography see Trüdinger 1918:80-120; Clarke 1999:129-87; Müller 1972:310-32; on links between Stoicism and ethnography Thomas 1982:19; 112-8.

[80] Cf. the description of the Britons at 5.12-14.

[81] E.g. Jerome cites Varro on the Celts: *in Gall.* 7.425 Vall.; see Rawson 1985:265; Silberman 1986.

[82] Cf. *FRHist* 1.398-41 on Nepos' *Chronica*; cf. Silberman 1988:xxx-xxxix on late Republican sources for Pomponius Mela's geography, including Nepos.

[83] Cic. *Att*. 2.6 (on a proposed geographical work, abandoned due to complexity); *ad Quint*. 2.15.4. cf. Rawson 1985:257.

geographical and ethnographical material.[84] More survives from the following generation: Greeks (but based at Rome) Strabo and Diodorus Siculus both included much ethnographical material in their works, and also important is the Latin *Historiae Philippicae* of Pompeius Trogus, a contemporary of Livy, who included extensive ethnography in his Latin history.[85] Trogus' text displays Sallustian influences, and his ethnographic interest may have been in part influenced by Sallust's works.[86]

It is within this context of increasing ethnographical interest that I wish to place Sallust's digression. Sallust's later works include ethnographical themes, and have been considered as such; however, the influence of ethnography has not been treated in relation to the *archaeologia*, which I suggest engages with the same tradition albeit more subtly. Sallust draws on ethnographical themes in structure, content and vocabulary, as I will demonstrate; this is an important aspect of the digression, and explains some of its unusual characteristics. The ethnographical colouring is particularly felt in the opening chapter; this sets a tone which colours the rest. That the passage begins with a particularly clear allusion is important: it was standard practice, when embarking on an ethnographical digression, to signal one's intentions with a programmatic statement.[87] While he does not explicitly promise ethnography, Sallust's introduction does refer to *mores civitatis* and *instituta maiorum,* themes of ethnographic descriptions.[88]

The digression's first sentence is famous, not least because Tacitus echoed it in his *Annales*; it also alludes to ethnographic subject-matter and *topoi*.[89] The subject-matter set out is the city's

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[84] On the *Jug.* see below: on the *Hist*. see Keyser 1991; Oniga 1995:95-114.

[85] On Trogus see Alonso-Núñez 1987, 1988 (with full bibliography).

[86] Rambaud 1948:178 cites the Sallustian *synkrisis* between Philip and Alexander at Just. 9.8. Yardley 2003 minimises influence, but is reliant on lexical analysis: given Sallust's stylistic idiosyncrasy, it should not be assumed that he influenced only authors replicating it directly.

[87] Thomas 1982: 1-7. Cf. *Jug.* 17.1: *res postulare videtur Africae situm paucis exponere et eas gentis, quibuscum nobis bellum aut amicitia fuit, attingere*.

[88] Note the use of *instituta maiorum* rather than the more common *mos maiorum*; cf. Pina Polo 2004:163 on history's legitimising function of *mos maiorum*.

[89] *Cat*. 6.1: *urbem Romam, sicuti ego accepi, condidere atque habuere initio Troiani, qui Aenea duce profugi sedibus incertis vagabantur, cumque eis Aborigines, genus hominum agreste, sine legibus, sine imperio, liberum*

origins, a standard opening to ethnographic accounts.[90] The emphatic position of *urbem Romam* emphasises that Rome itself (as opposed to stories before the city's foundation) is Sallust's subject-matter; this, as we shall see, is significant. The phrase *sicuti ego accepi* is also notable.[91] It is usually read as indicating that Sallust's version is one selected from many possible variants, and his adherence to tradition;[92] but (particularly given the digression's heterodox content) it might also be read as a deliberate statement of divergence. Sallust uses the first person singular (with *ego*), rather than the plural: a comparable citation in the description of Africa uses *accepimus* rather than *accepi*.[93] To introduce such a well-known story with "as I understand it", before recounting a tradition attested nowhere else, suggests that while Sallust is treating a known subject, he is doing it differently: the phrase signals a new and distinctive version. Although justifications of one's sources were (of course) a feature of historiography, it is significant that Sallust uses the device of such a well-canvassed subject, and that he does not identify authorities.[94] Source-citations were perhaps even more important in ethnography than in historiography (they could demonstrate eyewitness testimony, particularly valued in the genre): it is in this connection that I suggest we read *sicuti ego accepi*, marking the distinctive content of Sallust's version and also suggesting an allusion to the techniques of ethnography.[95]

The content of Sallust's version of the city's foundation reinforces the divergence. The details of Sallust's origin-story – including the *datum* that Aeneas had founded Rome - are, in fact,

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atque solutum. Cf. Tac*. Ann.* 1.1. Leigh 2013 suggests further parallels, arguing that the form may go back to an epitome of Aristotle's constitutional works: if correct, this further emphasises the quasi-scientific tone of the discussion.

[90] Cf. Mariotti 2007:229.

[91] *Cat*. 6.1.

[92] Commentaries mostly read Sallust's *sicuti ego accepi* as indicating that he followed Cato: Vretska 1976:146-51; McGushin 1977:66-70; Hellegouarc'h 1972:46-8;Garbugino 1998:157-9;Ramsey 2007:73.

[93] Cf. *Jug*. 19.5.

[94] On source-citation see e.g. Marincola 1997:80-5, esp. 84 on the special relevance of source-citation in ethnographies.

[95] cf. below pp.131-3 on Sallust's references to the *libri Punici* of king Hiempsal. Comparable ethnographic source-citations in Latin: e.g. Caes. *BG.* 5.12: *Britanniae pars interior ab eis incolitur quos natos in insula ipsi memoria proditum dicunt*; cf. 4.1, on the *Suebi*: *hi centum pagos habere dicuntur*.

found nowhere else in Latin literature.[96] The bibliography on the Roman origin story and Aeneas'

part in it is vast,[97] but it is enough for my purposes to note that Sallust's version is notably distinct

from other Latin accounts. He cannot simply be said to attest a distinctive source-tradition, because

by the period in which he was writing the variety of accounts had been well codified (attested by the

catalogue of variants found in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a generation later): in the light of this

extensive library – which Sallust entirely disregards - his idiosyncratic version may be a deliberately

heterodox construction.[98] He does not simply privilege one existing account over others; he gives a

partial version corresponding to his particular purposes.[99]

As noted, although considerable variation existed in the detail, Roman tradition had largely

coagulated around a narrative which reconciled the mythical role of Aeneas with the date calculated

for Rome's foundation, using the kings of Alba Longa to bridge the chronological gap between

Aeneas' period and Romulus' foundation of Rome: this is already found in Fabius Pictor's version and

in Cato's.[100] Commentaries on Sallust's version explain that Sallust's origin-story is drawn from Cato,

based on Servius' statement that Cato had described the *aborigines* of Italy;[101] they claim that Sallust

drew on Cato's story of Roman origins. However, while Servius does attest that Sallust follows Cato

on the *aborigines,* Sallust's account differs from the fragments of Cato in a number of respects. Most

obviously, where Sallust has Aeneas found Rome immediately, Cato included a long period of Italian

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[96] Cornell 1975:13.

[97] See most importantly Cornell 1975, with extensive bibliography; Galinsky 1992; Gruen 1992:1-47; Cugusi 2010.

[98] Cf. Cornell 1975:13: "whatever the explanation of Sallust's heterodox version, I find it difficult to imagine that he was reviving an old belief".

[99] Briquel 2006 (largely following D'Anna 1976:113-8) concludes that Sallust's version is derived from Hyperachus of Kyme, through Ateius Philologus; this hypothesis is extremely tendentious, and as she admits (99) there are anyway major differences between Sallust's and Ateius' versions. Given the deliberate *sicuti ego accepi*, and the inherent implausibility of the theory (why would Sallust choose precisely this version in opposition to all other Roman accounts?), it is more plausible that his is a selective version serving a specific purpose.

[100] Dion. Hal. *AR* 1.79.4 states that most Roman authorities followed this version. Cf. *FRHist* 3.72. Livy 1.1 describes two variants, but both lead identically to Aeneas' foundation of Lavinium, and the birth there of Ascanius. See Cugusi 2010:48-9; Bickerman 1952:65-7.

[101] Servius *ad Aen*. 1.6.

history before the foundation of the city.[102] If Sallust did not include even this basic element, it seems erroneous to assume that he drew directly on other aspects.[103] The description of the *aborigines* with whom Aeneas' Trojans mix is also unusual, again distinguishing Sallust's version: Sallust, uniquely, presents these early Latians as a *genus agreste, sine legibus, sine imperio*; other versions, even those which took the *aborigines* as Italian rather than originally Greek, made room in the story for a king - Latinus or someone else - with whom Aeneas could engage in diplomacy.[104]

The distinctive features of Sallust's version are, I think, owed to the ethnographical colouration of his account, and an attempt to present an externalised perspective on Rome's origin. In that Sallust's version specifically denies the *aborigines* any *imperium* (here signifying government)[105] he ignores traditions on the *aborigines* in Latium, and aligns them instead with the ethnographic tropes of primitive and nomadic peoples: as Brent Shaw has demonstrated, lack of laws or institutions is a fundamental characteristic of the ethnographic nomad.[106] Beyond this, the identification of Aeneas as founder is significant, in stressing a Greek-derived narrative over an established Roman one, and in fact elides the indigenously Roman element of Romulus and Remus:[107] by focusing on Aeneas, it connects the Romans directly back to the Greek mythic *continuum*, presenting a simplified version of Roman origins. As Elias Bickerman has shown, connection of subject peoples to their mythic *continuum* (combined with disinterest in genuinely indigenous accounts) was a standard technique by which the Greeks conceptualised the barbarian

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[102] cf. *FRHist* 5 F10 on Aeneas' foundation of Lavinium; *FRHist* 5 F13 shows that Cato counted 432 years between Aeneas' landfall and Rome's foundation. On the difficulties of Cato's account see Richard 1983. Cf. Briquel 2006:93-4 on Sallust's predating of Rome's foundation; her interpretation differs from mine.

[103] Note that Cic. *Rep.* 2.1-3 claims to draw on Cato for his very different version.

[104] E.g. Cato's account at *FRHist* 5 F5 of king Latinus granting the Trojans land; this became standard (*FRHist* 3.68). On Cato's *aborigines* see *FRHist* 2.65-7 and Richard 1983; Martinez-Pinna 1999; Briquel 2006:96-9 (further bibliography in *FRHist ad loc*).

[105] *imperium* is used in the sense of constitutional power: cf.6.6, i*mperium legitumum, nomen imperi regium habebant* (*pace* Heldmann 1993:19-26, who claims that *imperium* has the sense of foreign empire throughout; Schütrumpf 1998:686 refutes this.).

[106] Shaw 1982-3.

[107] Cornell 1975 establishes (against earlier doubts) the Romulus and Remus element to the story as indigenously Roman and ancient.

world (frequently used in ethnography);[108] Sallust thus applies a technique drawn from ethnographic understandings of foreign peoples to his own city. By dispensing with the usual aspects of Roman identity – the kings, the role of Romulus and Remus - and providing a view adopting the perspective of Greek ethnographical techniques, Sallust establishes an externalising perspective. This deviates from Emma Dench's ideas of autoethnography, above; while other Roman authors drew on Greek techniques in order to understand their own traditions, Sallust draws on Greek techniques and perspectives to present a version differentiated from the usual Roman understanding.

Sallust's vocabulary reinforces the colouring of this passage. Use of the verb *habuere* for *incolere* is paralleled in Cato's ethnography of the *Volsci*,[109] and in Sallust's later ethnography of the Numidians.[110] *vagabantur*, used of the Trojans (recurring as *vaga* in the second sentence) stresses a standard defining characteristic of nomadic peoples.[111] The terms used of the a*borigines,* and their portrayal as a *genus hominum agreste,* with neither laws nor rulers, again alludes to one of the standard ethnographical categorisations, according to means of food production.[112] The phrase *incredibile memoratu est*, used in Sallust's description of the state's *concordia* and one of a number of such expressions in the digression,[113] again has ethnographical resonances: while exclamations of this sort do appear in historiography, their repeated use here - referring to what ought to be well-known to all Romans – alludes to ethnography's interest in the extraordinary, and its inclusion of wonders, paradoxographical material and θαύματα. Such descriptions were a part of the genre's appeal, and sometimes spilled over into the geographical and ethnographical passages of more historiographical works: some historians included paradoxographical material in their works (for

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[108] See Bickerman 1952 on the duty of the Greek ethnographer to rectify or supplement indigenous barbarian accounts through Greek pre-history and mythology; cf. also Hercules' role in the foundation-myth of Africa at *Jug*. 18.3. Cf. Gruen 1992:1-47 on the Greek accounts of Rome's foundation and the malleability of the tradition.

[109] *FRHist* 5 F24.

[110] *Jug*. 17.7.

[111] cf. *Jug*. 18.2, 19.5 – both ethnographic usages.

[112] Shaw 1982-3:13 on Aristotle's division of five modes of production, with the wandering nomadic life of pastoralism as the lowest; see also Oniga 1995:34-6.

[113] *Cat*. 6.2. Cf. *Cat* 7.3; 13.1.

example, Aelius Tubero's description of a giant lizard).[114] Rome's *concordia* is described in miraculous terms, emphasising its unusual strength and restating Sallust's position as outside observer.

This opening bears comparison with the ethnographic description of the inhabitants of North Africa (the indigenous *Gaetuli* and *Libyes*) in the African digression (to which I will return in the second half of this chapter). The two passages are similar in style and in content. Structurally, the account of the settlement of Africa by Hercules' soldiers parallels Aeneas' role in Sallust's account of Rome: Hercules - like Aeneas - as a kind of culture hero connects the region into the Greek mythic *continuum*, joining nomads with already civilised peoples known to the Greek world. The nomads themselves are comparable: these earliest inhabitants of Africa, archetypally nomadic down to their diet, are treated in the same terms as the Italian *aborigines*, with the same stress on their lack of organised government and laws.[115]

The combination of many words and phrases with ethnographical significance here is no accident: along with the unusual content, they are a signal to the audience of the digression's atypicality and adoption of a distinct position. Ethnographic vocabulary becomes less prominent in subsequent chapters (although it does not disappear altogether);[116] but the use of ethnographic themes continues throughout. In particular, although the terms of analysis shift to a more moralistic focus (as I explore below) the digression retains an ethnographic structure.

As I noted, the digression is divided into a "rising" and a "declining" phase; but each is light on chronological detail, and is in fact fairly narrowly descriptive. Beyond the account from *origines* to

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[114] *FRHist* 38 F11. Cf. Wiseman 1993:131-2; on paradoxography in ethnography see Garcia Moreno 1994. cf. the parody which is Lucian's *Vera Historia*; on paradoxographical colouration in political historiography see Woodman 1992; on the distinction of "elevated" political historiography and lower forms (including more paradoxographical material) see Gabba 1981:55-9.

[115] Weiss 2007:46 suggests that similarities emphasise the comparable *cupido imperii* and *Expansionpolitik* of the two peoples; I suggest not that the *Jug.* alludes to the *Cat.*, but that both allude to a wider set of ethnographic tropes.

[116] Cf. *documenta* at 9.4 (only here in Sallust): this refers to a proof more appropriate to a scientific or descriptive form than to classical historiography. Cf. Varro, *Ling. Lat.* 6.62: *documenta, quae exempla docendi causa dicuntur.*

the expulsion of the kings, the remainder of the first half is a moralistic portrait of an imagined mid-Republican golden age; once the chronological part is dispensed with, subsequent chapters (within the overall context of Roman rise) synchronically treat Roman customs and peoples under various ethnographically-approved headings. Chapter 7 deals with military matters, and Roman morals as expressed in war and the struggle for *gloria*. Rome's military disasters are subsumed into a single (achronological) narrative of Roman valour and military success; no further specificity of actual facts is necessary. Similarly, chapter 9 concentrates on the Romans' morals at home and in relation to their empire, particularly their religious observance and faith to established moral codes.[117]

Similarly, although the identification of Sulla in chapter 11 does provide some specific punctuation, the bulk of the second half is polemic against contemporary morality, loosely hung on a structure of the growth of different forms of corrupting influence (*ambitio* and *avaritia*) but without other chronological content.[118] The final two chapters in fact describe the status of Rome in 65, when the narrative begins (and are also applicable to the city of twenty years later). It is noteworthy that the features on which Sallust places particular stress (for example, building, sexual mores and eating and drinking habits) are, as well as being moral *topoi*, characteristic interests of the description of ἔθος in ethnographic accounts.[119]

As I noted above, ahistorical aspects to the digression have frequently been remarked upon: the failure to provide any sense of gradual or nuanced development has exercised scholars. However, it does fit more naturally within an ethnographic paradigm. In the light of the ethnographic resonances identified above, I suggest that the remainder of the digression in fact can be read as two separate, synchronic descriptions, one concentrating on a phase of moral rectitude and the other on decline; that is, a pair of descriptions of specific moral *status*, rather than a

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[117] *Cat.* 9.2.

[118] The lack of clear chronology is demonstrated by continued disputes over the order in which these qualities arose: see McGushin 1977:90-1 ("Sallust is guilty of careless writing); Conley 1981, 1981b; Latta 1988:277-82; Heldmann 1993c; Garbugino 2008:163.

[119] Sallust's debased men are almost a reverse of the Germans described at Caes. *BG* 6.21-2, whom Caesar suggests build their houses with care to avoid too great a desire to avoid cold and heat; the themes of the description are very similar (cf. also *BG* 4.1-2).

chronologically developed narrative. This is in keeping with the passage's introduction: *res ipsa hortari videtur... supra repetere ac paucis instituta maiorum domi militiaeque, quo modo rem publicam habuerint quantamque reliquerint....*[120] Sallust does not promise an account of historical development, but a picture of *mores* and *instituta* as at a specific point (*quantamque reliquerint*). The declining phase gives more a sense of development than the first (with the mention of Sulla), but it nonetheless remains more a descriptive than a fully chronological account.

There are parallels for this sort of description of customs and *status*. In Latin historiography, a comparison may be made between the initial chapters of Sallust's *archaeologia* and Pompeius Trogus' account of the origins of the Carthaginians in book 18 of his universal history.[121] Trogus' account is less condensed than Sallust's, and more extensive in its narrative and historical detail, but his structuring of the key stages in the rise of Carthage through *parsimonia et labore* is comparable to Sallust's stress on *labore atque iustitia*.[122] Trogus' account replicates the Sallustian combination of ethnographic description, moral analysis and schematic narrative.[123]

Numerous features of the *archaeologia*, then, suggest an allusion to ethnography: it is appropriate to consider the passage from this perspective. I do not wish to overstate the case: the passage does *not* contain many typical elements of ethnography, for example *situs* (although Rome's geography was presumably well-known enough to Sallust's readers as not to require elaboration).[124] Nor does the passage draw *exclusively* on ethnography (see below). Nonetheless, the ethnographic elements do distinguish Sallust's approach; they suggest a perspective on Roman history which is

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[120] *Cat*. 5.9.

[121] Trog. *ap.* Justin 18.3-7.

[122] Trog. *ap.* Justin 18.4.1; cf. Sall. *Cat.* 10.1; Trog. *ap.* Justin 18.5.17 with Sall. *Cat.* 6.2. Thiessen 1912 suggests Posidonius as common source for Trogus and Sallust; in the absence of proof it is preferable to read the two accounts as reflecting a common conception of the origins of world empires. Carthage, like Rome, was considered to have a particularly strong constitution: see Arist. *Pol.* 1272b-1273b, Polyb. 6.51.

[123] E.g. Trog. *ap*. Justin 18.6.9-12.

[124] There may also be ideological reasons: while many authors emphasised that Rome's geography ideally suited her for empire and moral excellence (e.g. Cic. *Rep.* 2.5-11, Vitruv. 6.1, Vir. *Geor.* 2.136-76), Sallust stresses moralistic factors and the primacy of human agency, as in the work's first sentence (*Cat.* 1.1-4; cf. also *Jug*. 1).

externalised. We should also recall here the formulation with which the passage was introduced, *quo modo rem publicam habuerint quantamque reliquerint*. This implies a sharp divide, rather than continuity. Sallust's portrait of early Rome serves to differentiate the historical early Romans from the corrupt morals of the contemporary period. This attitude towards *maiores* is not unfamiliar in Roman moral and intellectual discourse,[125] but ethnography's externalised perspective makes it particularly pointed. I explore the significance of this further below.

Ethnography and the Roman moralistic tradition

Sallust uses this digression to take a broad view of Roman history, and Rome's place in the world; through the distancing perspective of the ethnographer, he enables a wider view of Rome's historical development than that of previous historiography. Once again, we might draw a contrast with Cicero's *de Republica*. Cicero stresses Roman exceptionalism, and her constitution's unparalleled quality and stability. Sallust, retreating from identification of Rome's origins with her present-day reality, situates Rome more clearly within wider patterns: I will suggest below that his quasi-objective analysis connects Rome into broader theories of causation.

To establish Sallust's place, and the significance of his digression, we must first understand the moral system behind the *archaeologia*: a brief summary is appropriate. To Sallust, the state's success is founded on the citizens' *virtus (*as expressed in the field),[126] derived from thirst for glory.[127] *virtus* (under the headings of *audacia in bello* and *ubi pax evenerat aequitas*) carries the state to her peak.[128] Subsequent decline is ushered in primarily by the vices *avaritia* and *ambitio*, "the roots of all evils",[129] which begin to subvert the Romans' good qualities: they trade *fides* for *superbia, probitas*

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[125] e.g. Cic. *Rep.* 5.1-2 for a similar perspective on decline from ancestral standards. See Wallace-Hadrill's excellent discussion of Roman attitudes towards *maiores*, 2008:213-58 (esp. 229-31 on the theme of ancestral virtue betrayed); cf. Wolff 1993:169-73 on the theme of lost virtue in the *Cat.*

[126] On Sallust's *virtus* see Pöschl 1940, stressing the importance of *labor* and *industria*; cf. Earl 1961. Sallust's *virtus* here is (as Pöschl notes) manifested through activity: see especially *Cat.* 2.7-9. On the peculiarities of Sallustian *virtus* see below pp.243-4.

[127] See especially *Cat.* 7.

[128] *Cat.* 9.3.

[129] *Cat.* 10.3.

for *crudelitas* and other *bonae artes* for materialism and neglect of the gods.[130] The worst aspect of decline - the willingness to do evil for material motives - is prompted particularly by Sulla's importation of luxury and license from Asia, leading to the appalling state of Rome in 63 (and, by implication, 43). Rome fits into a schema of moral development and decline through a series of catchwords.

Such a moralistic reading of the past was not new at Rome. Sallust's analysis (and vocabulary) ties him into a tradition of Roman moral polemic at least as old as Cato the Elder, who made use of essentially the same terminology.[131] The tradition is attested with variations in other authors; different writers had their own dates at which the Republic was thought to have "gone bad". Polybius states that luxury increased after the battle of Pydna in 168; Piso Frugi also cites war with Perseus, although he dates it to 154; Livy suggests the return of Manlius Vulso's army from Asia in 187; Valerius Maximus identifies the period after the end of the second Punic War, particularly the second Macedonian War against Philip V in 197 (and the repeal of the *Lex Oppia*).[132] There was no agreed point to which decline could be dated, and no clearly identifiable cause (in any but the most general terms). While factors such as Asian luxury were agreed to have played a part, drawing on a pre-Roman tradition of the softness and vice of the East,[133] the point at which these began to affect the state was unclear.

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[130] *Cat.* 10.4.

[131] Cf. Knoche 1962:113-5; La Penna 1968:130-7; Levene 2000:170-80. Koestermann 1973:790 notes that stress on *ambitio* is a Sallustian innovation; see chapter 5 below on the significance of this vice.

[132] Polyb. 31.25 (18.35 suggests that Roman attitudes towards wealth did not change until they embarked on overseas wars); Piso, *FRHist* 9 F41; Livy 39.6-7; Val. Max. 9.1.3. On themes of moral and political decline in Roman historiography see Knoche 1962:108-110; Bringmann 1977; Lintott 1972; Levick 1982; Lind 1979; Koestermann 1973. Sallust's date became popular: cf. e.g. Vell. Pat. 2.1. 146 may be dependent on Posidonius: Strasburger 1965:46-9 (followed by Lind 1979:9, and with qualification by Hackl 1980) suggests that Posidonius identified decline with the destruction of Carthage in 146, following Roman Stoic Rutilius Rufus, although Lind also notes (7-8) that Posidonius saw the return of Lucullus in 66 as another crucial turning-point. This is all speculative: Bringmann 1977:37 notes that Posidonius' history did not actually treat 146, and suggests that he probably did not identify this date as the onset of decline (suggesting instead the Cimbric War). See Purcell 1995 on the implications of the sacks of both Carthage and Corinth in 146. Davies 2014 suggests that Sallust's date and analysis draws on Polybius.

[133] E.g. Hippoc. *Aer.* 16: cf. also Hdt. 1.143, 4.142, 9.122; Thuc. 6.77. Cf. Thomas 2000:75-90.

Sallust's digression is located within these established traditions: he draws on their vocabulary and argument. However, it is distinguished by two factors: date and causes of the beginnings of decline. The point at which Cato was already railing against Roman decline is that at which (to Sallust) the Republic was at its happiest and best.[134] Scholars have noted Sallust's variant chronology:[135] but I suggest that central is Sallust's consideration of Rome's historical trajectory within a universal paradigm, rather than concentration on specifically Roman circumstances of decline (as previous authors). Given the ethnographic resonances suggested in the *archaeologia*, we can read the *archaeologia* as an attempt to reconcile the moral analysis of the Roman tradition with an alternative model drawing on the perspective and techniques of ethnography: this digression, I think, adapts Roman moralistic discourse to a structure stressing Rome's place in a Mediterranean-wide *continuum*. The remainder of this discussion considers the implications of this idea.

Causation and *translatio imperii*

Date and cause of decline are apparently clearly stated: "when by labour and justice the commonwealth had grown, great kings had been put down in war, fierce nations and huge peoples subdued by force, Carthage, the rival to Rome's power had perished at the root, and all seas and lands were open, fortune began to turn savage, and to confuse everything."[136] The reference-point is the fall of Carthage (146 BC), allocated a causal force in Sallust's historical understanding by most modern scholarship;[137] this is supported by the role of Carthage and the theory of *metus hostilis* (the moderating power of fear of a rival) in Sallust's later works.[138] However, as Konrad Heldmann and Bernd Latte have recently noted, there is no explicit statement of the theory of *metus hostilis* in the

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[134] *Cat.* 10.1. cf. Knoche 1962:115.

[135] Heldmann 1993:105-6 reads Sallust's dating as deliberately ambiguous, to reconcile variant chronologies of earlier authors; Earl 1961:42-55 reads Sallust's as a rejection of the existing tradition (this is closer to my reading of the digression as deliberately heterodox).

[136] *Cat.* 10.

[137] E.g. Ramsey 2007:84: see n. 90 above for further bibliography.

[138] *Jug.* 41; *Hist.* 1.11M.

Bellum Catilinae;[139] in fact, Sallust's version of the theory does not receive its "classic" statement until the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, and there is no evidence that it applies here. I suggest that Sallust's explanation in fact alludes to a different causal model, connected to digression's other characteristics.

The idea of *metus hostilis* in Roman thought has been widely canvassed, although few solid conclusions have been reached as to its origins.[140] It receives its fullest formulation in the political digression of the *Bellum Jugurthinum* (printed in the Appendix): a comparison is instructive.[141] By comparison with the *Bellum Jugurthinum,* the element missing from the *Bellum Catilinae* is *metus* itself: scholarly stress on the centrality of fear to Sallust's thought belies the fact that he makes no reference to it as a causal factor in the *archaeologia*.[142] There is also a direct contrast in the portrayal of the citizens: while the *Bellum Jugurthinum* refers to lack of competition among the citizens before 146 (*neque certamen gloriae inter civis erat*),[143] the *archaeologia* of the *Bellum Catilinae* states of the early Romans that *gloriae maxumum certamen inter ipsos erat*.[144] Manifestation of decline are also distinct: in the *Bellum Catilinae*, *ambitio* and *avaritia* stem from *otium* and *divitiae* as material circumstances which affect the whole citizenry, whereas in the *Bellum Jugurthinum* the evils of *lascivia atque superbia* emerge out of the lack of fear in particular.[145] This distinction demonstrates development in Sallust's thought between the monographs; we should not simply invoke *metus*

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[139] Heldmann 1993:106 argues that 146 need not represent even the beginning period of Rome's decline, but only the point of her ascendance to *Weltherrschaft*; Schütrumpf 1998:677 similarly stresses that *post hoc* is not *propter hoc*. Cf. Latta 1988:273-4.

[140] Bellen 1985 considers Sallust within a tradition; cf. Hammer 2014:148-54; Lintott 1972:632; Earl 1961:52-4. Debate revolves around whether Scipio Nasica made use of the theory in arguing against the destruction of Carthage, proposed by Gelzer 1931; see Bellen 1985:29-30 (non-committal); Hackl 1980 (arguing that Nasica did deploy similar ideas, but that Posidonius first synthesised them into a coherent form); Bringmann 1977.

[141] *Jug.* 41.2-3.

[142] *metus* appears twice in the *archaeologia*: 6.4 (a deterrent to Rome's erstwhile allies –emphasising Romans' *resistance* to *metus*) and 9.5 (part of the *encomium* of Roman rule, *beneficiis magis quam metu...*).

[143] *Jug.* 41.2.

[144] *Cat*. 7.6.

[145] This doublet is found in Cicero and Polybius, perhaps suggesting a shift in Sallust's political thought towards the ideas of those authors: Cic. *Rep.* 1.3; Polyb. 6.7.

hostilis of the later work to explain the earlier.[146] Although they appear to ascribe Rome's decline to the same point, the models which underpin them differ.

In the absence of *metus hostilis*, we should view the fall of Carthage differently, not with the causal role it receives in later works but simply as one of a series of chronological and descriptive markers, along with the rest of this extended sentence.[147] Roman dating was predicated not on a fixed framework of years, as our BC and AD, but on interrelations between different events serving as chronological descriptors;[148] in the context of a chronologically vague digression, the fall of Carthage provides a significant fixed point (Sallust's other option, naming the eponymous consuls, would be grossly inappropriate in a summary which otherwise mentions only Aeneas and Sulla). The mention of Carthage's fall does not necessarily explain Roman decline; it rather emphasises the chronological break from the first section.

If Carthage is the most important cause of decline, there is also something strange in its being the third in a list of four causes: it is better read as a capstone to the list of Roman military successes (over kings, nations, peoples and finally Carthage). Of equal significance, I think, is the final item in the temporal clause: *cuncta maria terraeque patebant*. This summarises the previous three: Rome's position is so pre-eminent that the whole world lies open. The destruction of Carthage is a temporal marker of Rome's uncontested *imperium*; but the destruction of Carthage and Rome's other rivals are not explicitly the *cause* of decline.

What, then, if not *metus*? An explanation Sallust does mention is *fortuna*: *saevire fortuna ac miscere omnia coepit*.[149] By allocating causal force to *fortuna*, rather than to any human factor, Sallust hews closer to the idea found in some Hellenistic historians of τύκη as an explanatory *deus ex*

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[146] *Contra* Hammer 2014, who attempts to reconcile Sallust's political thought into a single unified argument; similarly Wood 1995, Kapust 2011:27-80.

[147] Ramsey 2007:83-4 identifies historical referents for each aspect of the clause; cf. Vretska 1976:196, Neumeister 1983:13 on Carthage as a temporal anchor.

[148] See Feeney 2007 esp. 7-16; Walters 1996:71-6.

[149] On Sallust's *fortuna* see Stewart 1968 (although his argument that *fortuna* appears only at points of great moment is contradicted by the frequency of the concept in the *Jug*.); Tiffou 1977 (on Sallust's use of *fortuna* as a tragic element).

machina.[150] Rome's decline is beyond human agency, but subject to the vicissitudes of fate. This is emphasised by Sallust's description of the onset of Roman vice: "to those who had easily tolerated works and dangers, crises and hard times, riches and leisure, things to be desired at other times, were a burden and a misery."[151] *optanda alias*, "at other times to be desired", demonstrates the contingency of Rome's fate: the qualities which proved burdensome for Rome were not in themselves problematic, but took on such force only in the context of Rome's changed circumstances. The agency of *fortuna* (which also appears in the context of the different commemorations due to the Romans and the Greeks, the point of the discussion of historiography at chapter 8)[152] does not receive the same emphasis in Sallust's later works: the distinction between the agency of *fortuna* and the full theory of *metus hostilis* in Sallust's later works is perhaps linked demonstrative of the increasing sophistication of his thought.[153]

The model of historical causation in the *archaeologia* is thus not linked to *metus hostilis* as a check to declining morals, although it has similar force. It is the idea of *translatio imperii*, the natural law that power is continually transferred from the weaker to the stronger. Sallust had described this in general terms in the preface, suggesting that the virtue by which wars were won quickly diminished in times of peace, and that power was thus continually shifting; this statement is clearly relevant to the discussion of Roman decline in the *archaeologia*, in that it draws on the same moralistic vocabulary as the digression, and links the morals of the state with *fortuna* as used there.

Sallust's formulation is as follows:

"But if the virtue of spirit of kings and leaders flourished in peacetime as in war, human affairs would run more equally and constantly, and you would not see things passed from one to another, nor everything changed and mixed up. For power is easily retained by those arts by which it is originally born. But when

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[150] Cf. Glücklich 1988:26-9. On τύχη see Marincola 1997:22-3; Walbank 1957:16-26.
[151] *Cat*. 10.2.
[152] *Cat*. 8.1.
[153] Earl 1965b:236 refers to Sallust's *fortuna* as "an empty cliche, a substitute for thought"; I read its causal role as more coherent. Cf. Neumeister 1983:14.

indeed laziness comes in the place of luxury, and instead of continence and equality are desire and arrogance, fortune changes along with morals (*fortuna simul cum moribus immutatur)*. And so power is always being transferred to the best from the less good."[154]

The best treatment of this is by Konrad Heldmann.[155] Against other readings which take this as a reference to internal politics (transfer of power between individuals, prefiguring late Republican upheavals),[156] Heldmann refers it to external affairs (transfer of power between states).[157] Heldmann is correct in emphasising the external relevance of the chapter, and indeed of much of the material in the preface: as he notes, this creates a clearer structure for the preface as a whole, and fits better with the references to external warfare and the examples of Cyrus, the Athenians and Spartans which precede this statement.[158] Heldmann considers Sallust's formulation against a specific model of Hellenistic historiography, dealing with the nature of good imperial governance and based on Xenophon's idealised portrait of Cyrus in the *Cyropaideia*, which he terms the "Cyrus model": he sets Sallust's thought within a known causal pattern of Hellenistic historiography, rather than simply treating it as a moralistic diatribe.[159]

Heldmann's is an important contribution; my argument is predicated on the same idea that Sallust's analysis is an attempt to align Rome with broader patterns. However, Heldmann's approach is I think mistaken, in that while he does establish the "Cyrus model" as a pervasive theme of Hellenistic historiography, he fails to demonstrate its relevance to Sallust's text.[160] In fact, the details of Heldmann's model do not fit with how Sallust characterises Rome's early expansion in the first half of the *archaeologia*: Heldmann elides distinctive features of the passage, not least the explicit causal role of *fortuna* in causing the turn to the savage. While I agree that *translatio imperii* is important, I will briefly outline an alternative understanding of Sallust's application of it, which

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[154] *Cat*. 2.3-6.
[155] Heldmann 1993:15-26.
[156] E.g. Steidle 1964:16;Pöschl 1940:47;Vrestka 1976:70; Wimmel 1967:213.
[157] Heldmann 1993:23-5.
[158] Cf. *Cat*. 2.2.
[159] Heldmann 1993:esp. 54-69. Novora 1972 anticipates some of Heldmann's ideas.
[160] Schütrumpf 1998:683 makes the same complaint.

draws less on philosophical material and more on a structuring device familiar from other historiography.[161]

Central to Sallust's statement of *translatio imperii* in the preface is the connection between *fortuna* and *mores*. *fortuna*, Sallust says, changes when warlike virtues begin to decline in peacetime.[162] This is supplemented by the passage of the *archaeologia*, connecting Rome's rise to hegemony with a shift in *fortuna*; this suggests that Roman moral decline set in once *fortuna saevire coepit*, after the destruction of Carthage. Rome's moral shift is concurrent with that from war into peace: considered against the theorem of *translatio imperii* in the preface, the causal reference to *fortuna* in the *archaeologia* fits Rome into the universal pattern. However, there is a problem: in the *archaeologia*, Sallust states that Rome's moral decline began only *after fortuna* began to turn savage, whereas in the preface the *fortuna* of the state shifts together with moral decline. In the Rome of the *archaeologia*, the causal pattern set out as a rule of shifting morals leading to declining fortunes is apparently reversed; at her zenith, *fortuna* simply turns savage and this leads to decline. Some way to reconcile these ideas is necessary, in order to explain the application of *translatio imperii* to Rome: *why* does *fortuna* turn savage in her case?

I have suggested that Sallust's ethnographic treatment approaches Rome from a universalising perspective: this is important in signalling how Sallust understood the city's decline. By invoking that external view, the digression signals that Rome is to be understood within historical patterns beyond the exceptionalism of accounts like Cicero's in the *de Republica*. We can in fact link Sallust's view of Rome with another model, current in his period: that empires rose and declined according to a fundamental pattern, and that at the point of one's zenith it would inevitably start to decline, to be replaced by the next in the sequence.

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[161] Cf. Schütrumpf 1998, who responds to Heldmann by reading Sallust's analysis against Aristotle's discussion (*Pol*. 1271b3 ff.) of the constitutional defects of states geared around war.
[162] Latta 1988:275 argues that *fortuna* is invoked to explain the unexplainable; as I demonstrate below, Sallust's *fortuna* is rather the catalyst for a decline according to universal patterns.

As Arnaldo Momigliano demonstrated, a version of this theory of imperial power appears in Herodotus' and Ctesias' histories as early as the fifth century.[163] In its most developed form, the idea of a sequence of imperial powers was codified as a theory of four monarchies, holding that a specific sequence of empires (usually Assyrians, Medes, Persians, and finally Macedonians) had held dominion over the *oikoumene*; it is in this form that the theory seems to have been particularly influential. However, there is clear evidence of the model's flexibility, such that other powers could be included without changing the overall idea.

Herodotus, of course, preceded Macedon's rise; but Polybius, treating Rome precisely because her power had become universal, opens his history with a statement of just such a sequence.[164] Polybius identifies the Persians, the Spartans and the Macedonians as great powers of Mediterranean history, but concludes in each case that their imperial sway was less than Rome's.[165] In addition to structuring his work as a universal history of the period of Roman hegemony, Polybius alludes to the sequential transfer of imperial power by his references to the fickleness of human fortune: in narrating the fall of Perseus, Polybius quotes Demetrius of Phalerum on Alexander's overthrow of Persia, that *fortuna* had caused the passing of imperial sway (in Demetrius' case from Persia to the Macedonians; in Polybius' case, from the Macedonians to Rome).[166] Frank Walbank has suggested that in Polybius' work Rome's rise should be read as a direct counterpart to Macedonia's decline, engineered by τύχη: the power of *fortuna* in shifting the fortunes of empires is clear within the structure of his work.**[167]** One of the more famous vignettes of Polybius' work, his eyewitness

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[163] Momigliano 1982:88. Momigliano notes that Thucydides, Xenophon and Theopompus show no interest in the theory: their works were confined to narrower subjects, making consideration of broader historical patterns unnecessary (the scope of Sallust's digression is exceptional).

[164] Alonso-Nunez 1983:425 suggests that Polybius was the first to fit Rome into the sequence; on Polybius' use of this historical schema see Wiesehöfer 2013.

[165] Polyb. 1.2. Momigliano 1982:85 suggests that Athens is ignored because of Polybius' dislike for the democracy; cf. Alonso-Nunez 1983:411-4.

[166] Polyb. 29.21: Livy replicates Polybius' analysis at 45.9.

[167] Walbank 1963:6. Baronowski 2011:153-61 considers Polybius' attitude to Roman imperialism against the inevitable decline imposed by *translatio imperii*; cf. Davies 2014:189 on the importance of 146 as a point in response to which Polybius extended his original historiographical project (cf. Polyb. 3.4.1-12), although as Baronowski 2011:161 notes Rome remained beneficent even after this point in Polybius' analysis. Polybius' text does refer to the conventional "four monarchies" (Polyb. 38.22, *ap*. App. *Pun*. 132): Mendels 1981:333 argues that this was interpolated by Appian (refuted by Momigliano 1982:87).

account of Scipio Aemilianus at the sack of Carthage, makes precisely this point: Scipio weeps for the fall of Carthage, and meditates on the inevitable fall of Rome.[168] The city had been placed within this pattern by other authors too: Momigliano cites the Hellenistic writer Antisthenes of Rhodes, whose history included anti-Roman elements such as the posthumous prediction of the passing of Rome's sway by the corpse of a Syrian officer.[169] Also attested are propagandistic documents of the first two centuries BC, referring to *translatio imperii* and the inevitable collapse of the Romans' dominion:[170] one such is a letter purporting to be from Hannibal to the Athenians, which suggests that the Carthaginians would shortly destroy Roman power just as the Greeks had destroyed that of the Romans' Trojan ancestors.[171]

The model seems to have been known at Rome by Sallust's period. It is perhaps earliest attested there by a *testimonium* of a certain Aemilius Sura, whose sole fragment (as recorded by the *Fragments of the Roman Historians*) is cited by Velleius Paterculus: this *testimonium* has since the sixteenth century been read as an interpolated gloss,[172] but scholars have met with little agreement as to Sura's genuine date (most place him around the 180s BC).[173] Sura states the whole theory:

"The Assyrians became masters of the affairs of all races; then the Medes, afterwards the Persians, then the Macedonians; then, with the two kings Philippus and Antiochus defeated (who had risen up from the Macedonians), not long after the destruction of Carthage the peak of power came upon the Roman people".[174]

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[168] Polyb. 38.22. Davies 2014 argues that Sallust draws Polybius' analysis of the significance of 146 to its logical conclusion.

[169] *BNJ* 508 F2 (cited by Momigliano 1982:89).

[170] Swain 1940 treats these propagandistic usages under the rubric of "opposition history"; cf. Mendels 1981:337.

[171] P. Hamb. 129, cited by Momigliano 1982:88: on this letter see Leidl 1995.

[172] *Contra* Alonso-Nunez 1989:110-2, who suggests Sura as a direct source for Velleius; Schmitzer 2000:66-7 argues against this.

[173] Swain 1940:4 dates Sura to c. 189-71, based on his apparent lack of knowledge of the third Punic War; Alonso-Nunez 1989 agrees, suggesting that Roman triumph at Magnesia prompted Sura's formulation (112). Mendels 1981: 330-2 ascribes the idea to the late 1st century BC; *FRHist* (1.617) places Sura in the imperial period. Walbank 1963:12-3 suggests that Polybius might himself have been influenced by Sura.

[174] Vell. Pat. 1.6.6; *FRHist.* 103 F1.

As well as indicating that Rome could be conceived of within a sequential model of imperial power, Sura's words also attest the place of Carthage within such a system (similarly to Sallust's temporal reference): the analysis of the circumstances of Rome's rise to power are very similar to Sallust's formulation, with the additional feature that Sura links her accession to world hegemony specifically into a broader sequence, and that Sura does not draw the implicit conclusion, that Rome too must fall.[175] Even if Sura's work is in fact later (as Doron Mendels has argued),[176] the model probably was known at Rome in Sallust's period; our evidence becomes much clearer a generation later. It certainly is used by Velleius Paterculus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Pompeius Trogus: indeed, Velleius seems to use this model as one of the structuring devices of his history, perhaps structuring his work to treat in his first (largely lost) book Rome's rise to imperial power, and the exercise of her hegemony in the second.[177] Emil Kramer has linked Velleius to Sura by suggesting that the commentator who interpolated Sura's work into Velleius presumably had Velleius entire, and included the fragment in keeping with the structural schema applied by Velleius throughout.[178] Dionysius of Halicarnassus, writing in Greek but at Rome, similarly adapts the theory to include Rome in the preface of his work, for the purposes of glorifying the state.[179] Trogus, on the other hand, inasmuch as he sometimes records anti-Roman perspectives, may stress Rome's position in the sequence of empires in order to foreshadow subsequent decline.[180] In each case, the theory underpins Rome's position on a universal historical stage.

The decline in the *archaeologia* is I think best explained by reference to this model. It explains date and sequence of decline, while retaining the focus on *fortuna* as a kind of immutable hand of fate to which Rome is subject. Roman decline set in, according to Sallust, after she had

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[175] Alonso-Nunez 1989:119.
[176] Mendels 1981:330.
[177] Kramer 2005;Schmitzer 2000:69.
[178] Kramer 2005:150.
[179] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom*. 1.2-3.
[180] Swain 1940:13-21 on Trogus; Momigliano 1982:92 (emphasising Trogus' assessment of world empire as shared equally between the Romans and the Parthians); Alonso-Nunez 1987 (esp. 66-72 on anti-Romanism), 1988:122. For later uses of the model (including Tac. *Hist*. 5.8-9) see Mendels 1981:334-7; cf. Ovid's sequence Troy-Sparta-Mycenae-Thebes-Athens-Rome at *Met*. 15.424-32, with Schmitzer 2000:66-9.

vanquished previous empires: in dating this to 146, Sallust states that she had vanquished *reges magni*, which of course included Perseus of Macedon and Antiochus III (who had their own places in the sequence, and are identified in Sura's formulation). Reading the reference to Carthage temporally emphasises the significance of *all* of these factors, rather than Carthage alone; with the destruction of this final *aemula imperi* (a phrase also used of Carthage in Velleius Paterculus, who - as above - probably used *translatio imperii* as a structuring device)[181] Rome had taken her place in the sequence and, implicitly, became subject to the vagaries of *fortuna* of all such powers.

It is not the fall of Carthage which *causes* decline; Rome's hegemony is such that she simply declines in keeping with a more universal historical pattern, articulated through *fortuna*. This sequential pattern of *translatio imperii* is distinct from *metus hostilis*, for example, in that it does not deal in detail with causation: it substitutes a model of simple inevitability. The sequence of empires does not imply reference to the restraining fear of another power: it does not presuppose any particular causal model beyond a universal structuring pattern.

Sallust alludes to the idea as a structuring device, and as a proleptic remark on her historical trajectory: the development presupposed by this theory, and the lack of an explicitly causal dimension, fits well with the analysis of the *archaeologia*, that *fortuna* simply grew savage. In addition to the emphasis on manifestations of decline in existing Roman moral texts, Sallust formulates his discussion against this universal model, providing a sense of historical progression and inevitability.

There are references elsewhere in the *Bellum Catilinae* to similar ideas. In the account of the development of empire in the preface, which precedes Sallust's expression of *translatio imperii*, Sallust refers to Cyrus in Asia, and the Athenians and Spartans in Greece: these three form their own sequence of imperial transference. The "digression within a digression" at chapter 8 contrasts Rome's achievement with the Athenians', and recalls the power of *fortuna*: the contrast is couched in the terms of historical commemoration at Rome and at Athens, but the comparison between the

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[181] Vell. Pat. 1.12.6; cf. the same phrase at Pomp. Mel. 1.34.

two makes use of the same frame, comparing hegemonic powers. Sallust's story of the foundation of Rome by Aeneas may itself be linked to the idea of imperial sequence: he links Rome's foundation directly into a more fundamental narrative of imperial succession (of the Greeks' supplanting of the Trojans – the same as in the letter allegedly from Hannibal to the Athenians).

Thus, while Sallust does not refer to the codified Four Monarchies, he conceives of Rome within a model of imperial succession and transfer of power based on a universal pattern of rise and decline.[182] This provides a way of reconciling the Roman moral discourse of decline with the universalised historical model Sallust draws on in the digression, signalled through his externalising perspective. Viewing Sallust's analysis in the *archaeologia* as a reference to this established structuring device avoids imputing to him any more complex formulation than his text actually demonstrates (Heldmann's Cyrus model, or the idea of *metus hostilis*), but also demonstrates his attempt to apply to Rome a considered pattern of historical development. Sallust's innovation over Cato and the others is that his version of Roman decline is clearly set within a universal context: Sallust's places Rome's rise and decline within an existing model, rather than simply identifying it, in an attempt to understand the long view of Rome.[183] This attempt at universalising explanation and analysis fits well with what we know of Sallust's philosophy from his prefaces; as Patrick McGushin notes in his commentary, among Sallust's chief rhetorical techniques is the construction of general rules and *dicta*, which he proceeds to explain by reference to specific examples.[184]

Sallust's application of this theoretical model is linked to his interpretation of Roman history more widely. Most significantly, viewing Rome as one of an inevitable sequence of powers has pronounced implications for the interpretation of her historical trajectory. Such a pattern could be

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[182] Alonso-Nunez 1989:119 stresses the flexibility of the theory of *translatio imperii* to different formulations.
[183] In applying to Rome a broader explanatory model, Sallust follows Posidonius, whose historical method was largely aimed at explaining historical change through philosophical causality: see Kidd 1989. On Sallust and Posidonius see p.101. On earlier theoretical models for understanding Rome's place in the world (particularly Polybius') see Davies 2014.
[184] McGushin 1977:30.

read in in two ways;[185] one, positive, read Rome teleologically as a high-point of historical evolution: Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a generation after Sallust, invoked *translatio imperii* to portray Roman rule as uncontested and immortal, and this impression seems to emerge from Sura's fragment too.[186] However, it could also be read negatively, as the anti-Roman propagandists had, suggesting that Rome - like other great empires – was subservient to the exigencies of *fortuna* and universal historical patterns, and that her decline was also inevitable. This negative reading of Rome within a universal pattern, I think, is the major significance of Sallust's reference to this theory, particularly when set against the moralistic focus of the digression; by setting Rome within a universal context through his ethnographic treatment, Sallust denies Rome any exceptional status, foreshadows her decline from the point of hegemony, and prophecies the transference of her power. In that she was subject to universal rules and the exigencies of *fortuna*, Roman decline could not be rectified by human activity: historical patterns themselves led to a spiral of decline, without any possibility of amelioration. Rome's historical trajectory was set.

This negative view of Rome's trajectory distinguishes Sallust's account from other readings. It is notable that Sallust's *archaeologia* (while treating *instituta maiorum*) makes no use of a model central to much Greek political philosophy (and to Cicero's work).[187] This, again, is connected to Sallust's ethnographic approach, and the explanatory model he selects. An alternative way of assessing the state of Rome was to draw on constitutional theory; Polybius' work exemplifies this approach. While as I have noted, the idea of *translatio imperii* appears in his account (Polybius in fact does hint at Roman decline),[188] the major explanatory digression of book 6 on the reasons for Rome's longevity depends on constitutional analysis, and specifically the model of the mixed

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[185] Alonso-Nunez 1989:115.
[186] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.3.3-6; cf. Alonso-Nunez 1983:418.
[187] Note the extensive discussion of constitutional theory in book 1 of the *de Republica*: Cicero's Roman history in book 2 demonstrates in practice theoretical models already established.
[188] See Polyb. 6.57; cf. n. 132 above.

constitution.[189] According to Polybius' analysis, all governments necessarily degenerated into debased forms; but the mixed constitution could interrupt this sequence.

Aristotle had originally elaborated this idea of "constitutional government" from Plato's *Laws*, adopting earlier categorisations of different constitutional forms and relationships between them but adding a new ideal, which (in keeping with Aristotle's thought on the supremacy of the moderate position) was a combination of the three good forms.[190] Polybius, and later Cicero,[191] applied this formulation to Rome (although the details of its workings differ between the two authors),[192] to suggest that the balance of elements in the Roman constitution - the separation of powers between consuls, Senate and people – made her particularly resilient to the natural deterioration common to states. Polybius' conception of the strength of the system is dominated by the idea of "checks and balances";[193] Cicero's (in the person of Scipio Aemilianus, at the dramatic date of 129) presents a more optimistic idea of the mixed constitution as ensuring equality, thus pre-empting any desire for change.[194] In both accounts (and as we saw above), Rome's constitutional success was based on the development of a balance, through her early history and regal period. Rome's organic evolution of a perfectly adjusted mixed constitution, according to Polybius, gave her the strength to withstand military disasters as bad as the battle of Cannae, and the mixed constitution allowed Rome to stand outside conventional sequence of the decline of states.[195]

Given that this model was widely applied to Rome (Cato himself may have applied it)[196] why did Sallust not make use of it, preferring the universal model of *translatio imperii*? The reason, I think, is his interpretation of Rome's historical trajectory. The model of the mixed constitution is fundamentally positive, in that the supposed strength of the constitution is its stability and

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[189] Polyb. 6.11-8.
[190] Arist. *Pol*. 1727b24-1273b26.
[191] Cic. *Rep*. 1.69.
[192] See Ferrary 1984:90-2.
[193] Polyb. 6.15-8.
[194] Cic. *Rep.* 1.45; 1.69.
[195] Polyb. 6 may have included an extensive *archaeologia* of Polybius' own, describing the development of her constitution: see 6.18.9 with Walbank 1957:636.
[196] *FRHist* 5 F148; cf *comm. ad loc.*; Leeman 1963:69.

resistance to change; it was also connected to Roman history, in that specific events in the past had led to specific constitutional evolutions. By abandoning the standard narratives of Roman history, Sallust also abandons this model of constitutional development; he dispenses with the idea that Rome could be in any sense immune to degeneration. By explaining the city from the perspective of *translatio imperii* instead, he places the contemporary debasement which he attacks into a clear and inevitable pattern, reconciling the moralistic focus of earlier authors on this aspect of Rome's past, with a historical perspective and pattern which denies any possibility of amelioration.[197] This has implications for the analysis Sallust offers of his own day, and Rome's prospects for escaping the chaos of the civil war period: if the city was directed by universal historical patterns, rather than human agency, then her situation could not improve. I will return to this idea of the inevitability of Roman decline and her subjection to broader patterns, in the next chapter.

The *archaeologia* represents a deviation in a number of senses: Sallust abandons the standard foundation-myth of Rome in favour of his own idiosyncratic version; he abandons the constitutional narrative of Cicero and others in favour of a schematic, morally focused account; he abandons the standard perspective of Roman historiography in favour of one influenced by the universalising dimension of ethnography. Given the passage's programmatic position, we should see these as deliberate: as well as illustrating the interpretation on which the rest of the monograph is founded, the digression stresses the distance between Sallust's account and other Roman historiography. I noted above that Sallust's preface is atypical, containing little discussion of the tradition within which his work was situated: we might read the digression as another signal as to the place of his text in relation to other historical thought, and a supplement to the preface. This recurs in the African digression, to which I now turn.

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[197] *pace* Seider 2014:154-8, who suggests that the opening part of the *Cat*. paints the conspiracy as a point from which things might improve.

Sallust's geography: the African digression

The geographical (as well as chronological) boundaries of the *Bellum Jugurthinum* are broader than the *Bellum Catilinae*, with events alternating between the "home front" of Roman politics and campaigns in Africa. The inclusion of a digression on Africa is a marker of this extended compass: a feature of the digression is that it treats not just Numidia but the whole continent (it is not restricted to details bearing on the campaigns of Jugurtha, Metellus and Marius, but has a wider-ranging brief). As the *archaeologia* drew on a conventional subject but in an idiosyncratic way, the African digression similarly corresponds selectively to historiographical convention; I will suggest that the African digression also gives an account manipulated to suit the historian's programme, connected to his project and self-presentation.

In practical terms, before the proliferation of maps, the narrative centrality of Numidia necessitated some treatment of the landscape;[198] but Sallust's inclusion of a geographical digression also engages with well-established historiographical technique. As with ethnography, geography and the description of far-off places had been important components of historiography from Hecataeus onwards (such digressions are found in Herodotus, but also in the more focused histories of Thucydides or Polybius).[199] Practice is supplemented by theory: Cicero includes *descriptio regionum* in the list of *ornamenta* of history,[200] and Lucian's work on the subject, although it castigates over-use of geographical description in the historians who provide *exempla vitium*,[201] nonetheless suggests that such passages be included for comprehension of the narrative, at reasonable length.[202] Although retarding the narrative, such material provided an explanatory frame for the rest, establishing a setting within which events would play out; it fits neatly into the paradigm explored above for the use of digression in classical historiography.

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[198] See Lopez Ramos 2008:304 on Sallust's creation of a "mental map".
[199] E.g. Polybius 34, on the nature of the world.
[200] *de Or*. 2.63.
[201] *Hist. Conscr.* 19.
[202] *Hist. Conscr.* 57.

The African digression is among the best-known of Sallust's digressions.[203] Treatments of the monograph's structure have noted its role in punctuating the chronology of the opening part.[204] Sallust's specifically geographical data have been extensively treated, and their accuracy assessed;[205] I will therefore not treat these technical questions in detail. I will focus instead on aspects of the digression's historiography, particularly its role as a piece of historiographical self-location, a demonstration of the historian's erudition, and a contribution to the argument of the monograph more generally.

The relevance of my approach is signalled by the digression's opening. Sallust claims relevance, in promising an outline of the African peoples *quibuscum nobis bellum aut amicitia fuit*: while the subject is removed from Roman history, the perspective is thus filtered through Roman experience. This is misleading: large proportions of the passage in fact deal with peoples of whom the Romans had little or no experience or ties, and it conspicuously fails to treat those people whose history with the Romans was most significant, the Carthaginians (I return to this below). While Sallust eventually does treat peoples within Roman experience (in the description of the *status quo* which concludes the digression), the introduction stresses the direct relevance of a digression which in reality contains material serving a number of historiographical aims. When King Bocchus is introduced, in the final sentence of the digression, Sallust specifically notes that he had no previous connection with the Romans, either in war or peace; a kind of reverse ring-composition by which Sallust returns to his original claim, but inverting it. The introduction, in emphasising the digression's relevance to Roman experience, operates a historiographical sleight-of-hand to conceal a sophisticated, argumentative passage.[206]

My discussion will be in two parts. I will first consider some literary features of the digression, particularly its engagement with different modes of thinking about the *oikoumene*: Sallust's engagement with different aspects of the tradition is an important aspect of his

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[203] Major treatments: Green 1993; Morstein-Marx 2001; Oniga 1995:37-68; Wiedemann 1993.
[204] Büchner 1953:15-6; Scanlon 1988; Wiedemann 1993; Green 1993:186.
[205] See e.g. Tiffou 1974:151-3; Berthier 1975; Keyser 1991; Goodchild 1952.
[206] *Jug*. 19.7.

construction of an authorial voice for his writing. Second, I will consider the main part of the digression, the historical-ethnographical account at its centre; its structure and content are thematically linked to the rest of the monograph, in keeping with the analytical techniques of Sallustian *dispositio*.

Forms of knowledge in the African digression

The digression is in three parts, distinguished by subject-matter.[207] The first deals with the *situs* of Africa, the arrangement of the continents and Africa's extent within them, and the nature of the land and its inhabitants – what we might term "physical geography".[208] The second is historical; Sallust (drawing allegedly on indigenous sources) discusses the inhabitants of Africa, their origins and development; the ethnographical tone is comparable to parts of the *archaeologia*.[209] The final section covers Africa's contemporary *status*, landmarks along its northern coast and the division of power between Romans, Jugurtha and King Bocchus - "human geography" -[210] before closing with a ring compositional motif marking the end of the interruption.[211] The digression fits the rough pattern of an ethnographical digression: *situs*, followed by an account of *origines* and history (including explanatory material on customs, such as the Numidian *mapalia*), and a *status* of the region (although largely political, rather than describing *mores* and laws).[212] However, this is supplemented by a range of other material. Each section approaches the continent with a different focus; from scientific geography in the opening, to ethnographically influenced narrative, and a contemporary description of the continent's landmarks.

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[207] Weiss 2007:51-2 stresses the importance of treating the digression in three parts, rather than as a unity.
[208] *Jug*. 17.3-6.
[209] *Jug*. 17.7-19.2. Scanlon 1987:38-41, 1988:138-43, Weiss 2007:46-7, Morstein-Marx 2001:192-4 note structural similarities.
[210] *Jug*. 19.3-7.
[211] *Jug*. 19.8.
[212] Cf. Heubner 2004 on the passage's agreement with the structural norms of ethnography.

Sallust conflates different subjects into a single account; he signals his position within a generic *continuum*, and indicates his familiarity with different ways of conceiving the *oikoumene*.[213] The three segments of the digression are, I suggest, included as part of a literary strategy emphasising the author's erudition, and the learned nature of his account: the digression contributes to Sallust's self-presentation, establishing him as capable of writing such a history. This was usually the remit of the historian's preface: but the atypical preface of the *Bellum Jugurthinum* avoided treating the historian's *intellectual* suitability for his task in favour of emphasising the *moral* correctness of his historiographical project.[214] The role of establishing the historian's credibility is thus transposed from the preface into the digression: the discussion of Africa demonstrates the historian's suitability for writing the history of this African war.

Key to Sallust's presentation of his erudition is his attitude towards the sources and methodologies appropriate to each set of subject-matter. This emerges even in the passage's introduction, in which Sallust foregrounds the problem of reliability: he suggests that "there are places and nations which on account of the heat, harsh climate or desert are less frequented; about these I will scarce easily narrate a reliable account."[215] About the rest, the implication runs, the account *will* be reliable: part of Sallust's concern is to demonstrate this.

The subjects of the first section (the nature of the world, shape of the continents and physical geography of Africa) preoccupied a good deal of geographical work: such questions of dimensions and measurement had been recently treated by the polymath Posidonius, in his περὶ Ὠκεανοῦ, and remained a live debate.[216] Sallust's reference is brief, but is enough to situate his account in relation to established scholarship: his version takes account of the contemporary *status*

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[213] Cf. Woolf 2011:57 on different explanatory paradigms in this digression.
[214] Jug. 4.3-4. Cf. Marincola 1997:128-81 on the historian's character and efforts.
[215] *Jug*. 17.2.
[216] On the περὶ Ὠκεανοῦ and its place see Clarke 1999:139-40; Kidd 1988:216-75. Strabo 2.2.1-3.8 is the remaining (lengthy) fragment, interspersed with Strabo's commentary; it focuses on Posidonius' theory of zones (particularly prompting Strabo's ire) but gives indications as to the scope of the rest. Strabo's critique is illustrative of the debates of contemporary geography: see Dueck 2000:53-62. Strabo 2.1 is a lengthy discussion of similar questions of the shape of the world.

quaestionis (it is similar in outline to the much fuller and more technical version found a few years later in Strabo's geography).[217] Notably, Sallust makes reference to a lack of agreement on the part of the technical geographers, between the *pleri* and the *pauci*: Sallust draws no direct conclusions of his own on the matter (recording the variant versions, rather than stating his own conclusions). He demonstrates knowledge of the geographical tradition, but adopts a non-committal position with respect to its accuracy.

This reference to the difficulties of drawing solid conclusions is part of Sallust's historiographical self-location. As opposed to drawing one single conclusion, by reporting multiple perspectives he demonstrates his knowledge of a depth of sources, and establishes a perspective as a discerning reader, unwilling to simply elide the problems of the question into a single authorial pronouncement. This attitude with respect to variant versions and ideas is interesting in relation to Sallust's practice elsewhere:[218] his historiography usually makes little reference to questions of verification and variance, except where the material discussed has some particular significance (for example, Sallust discusses the lack of verification of the rumour that the Catilinarians had drunk of human blood;[219] but even in reporting the rumour as unverified, Sallust still records it, and as such it contributes to his characterisation of Catiline and the conspirators without endangering his image as a reliable authority). In this case, by drawing attention to the polyvalent opinions on the matter even among experts, Sallust demonstrates his erudition in relation to a complex debate.

There may also be an historiographical allusion here: this mode of reference to sources is that found in Herodotus' works, which frequently give variants without explicit judgements as to the truth value. On the other hand, it is in contrast to the practice of Thucydides, whose technique elides such ambiguities in favour of (where possible) presenting a monolithic, authoritative version. Sallust's acknowledgement of disagreement itself aligns him with Herodotean style as opposed to

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[217] Strabo *Geog.* 17.3.1-2 has the same formulation of the three parts of the world, and the nature of the borders of Africa. Nicols 1999:335-6 suggests that Sallust and Strabo shared Posidonius as a source; cf. Syme 1964:152-3; Tiffou 1974:154; Mariotta 2002.

[218] On citations of accuracy and difficulties of judgement in Sallust's work see Funari 1999.

[219] *Cat*. 22.

Thucydidean:[220] this is appropriate to the digression's subject matter, closer to Herodotus'

discussions of the nature of the world than to Thucydides' narrower focus.[221]

It is also significant in relation to the historian's self-presentation that Sallust makes

reference to the works of the technical geographers, but elides eyewitness data on the extent of

Africa, known to the Romans at least since the second century. The historian Polybius had himself

made observations as to the extent and nature of the continent:[222] although it is not clear how such

data were presented (whether in a separate work or within the *Historiae*) they were certainly known

at Rome. That Sallust makes no mention of them in this discussion is a marker of the pronounced

literary and scientific focus of this first part of the digression: by restricting his discussion to this

corpus of erudite sources, he again emphasises his position of knowledge, and locates his discussion

of Africa in relation to theoretical perspectives on the *oikoumene*.[223] In this opening, Sallust's

reference to a specific set of source-material contributes to a particular image of the historian's

competence. This impression is developed with the subject-matter considered in subsequent parts

of the digression: the overall construction of the whole passage contributes to a comprehensive idea

of Sallust's historiographical suitability.

The second section is introduced by another source-citation, which has exercised modern

scholarship: the *libri Punici* to which Sallust refers have been the subject of much debate.[224] Were

these genuinely written by King Hiempsal (or at least believed so), or simply owned by him? Does

Punici imply that the books had been composed in Punic, or that they were Carthaginian in

derivation (and perhaps composed in Greek)? These questions are as insoluble as they are, in fact,

irrelevant: we should concentrate instead on the literary and structural implications of Sallust's

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[220] Cf. Green 1993 on further possible allusion to Herodotean subject-matter in the passage.
[221] See e.g. the discussion of the nature of the world at Hdt. 4.36-45. cf. Pearson 1939 on Thucydides' geographical interests.
[222] Polyb. 3.59.7-8; cf. Eichel & Todd 1976.
[223] On rejection of eyewitness material see Syme 1964:152-3.
[224] *Jug*. 17.7. On the *libri Punici* see Paul 1984:74; Koestermann 1971:90; Matthews 1972; Oniga 1995:51-61; Krings 1990 (with summary of previous scholarship, 111-2); Lipinski 1992:150.

reference to the source, and his derivation from it of an heterodox account. In the *archaeologia*,

Sallust carefully hedged around an unconventional account of the birth of Rome with the phrase

sicuti ego accepi; the reference to the *libri Punici* has the same significance here, and in fact Sallust I

think invokes them partly to justify his unusual history (again deviating from other versions). *ab ea*

fama quae plerosque optinet divorsum est:[225] as before, Sallust at once signals and justifies the

heterodoxy of his version. Sallust's account lacks the detail we find in other accounts of Africa, such

as of Strabo and Pliny only a few years later:[226] to appeal to this source in the context of such a

schematic account makes clear its role in justifying its peculiar details.[227] While the nature and

content of the *libri Punici* are difficult to reconstruct, Sallust's reference to them is itself an

important statement: while material in the digression may well be derived from this source, the

schematic detail of Sallust's account suggests that he probably used them selectively, with some

particular purpose in mind.

The foreignness of the *libri Punici* (whatever their nature) is important, in that they

represent a privileged source to which only Sallust had access, differentiating his version from

previous authors'. This was again a feature of ethnographical digressions in historiography, where it

signalled the accuracy of an account; it also pre-empted criticism.[228] Sallust buttresses this privileged

source with another ethnographical signifier, the reference to the beliefs of the inhabitants of the

land themselves: once again, this staves off criticism of his account, connects him to the generic

traditions of ethnographical writing, and adds credibility and (the appearance of) rigour to his

account. The books and the citation of the inhabitants' own beliefs draw connections between

Sallust's account and ethnography, further demonstrating his erudition. Similarly in accordance with

ethnographical standards is the final comment with which Sallust abrogates responsibility for the

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[225] *Jug.* 17.7; cf. Peremans 1969, Morstein-Marx 2001:195 on the claim to heterodoxy.
[226] Cf. Pliny *HN* 5.1-9, Strabo *Geog.* 17.3.1-24 on Libya.
[227] Servier 1991 claims that Sallust's digression must be derived from existing sources, perhaps a brief "history of Libya"; but there is no evidence for this, and in the light of the manipulation of existing accounts in the *archaeologia* there is no reason to consider it simply "un ouvrage de compilation" (142). Cf. Green 1993:192 on Sallust's acknowledgement of deviation from tradition.
[228] On the appeal to a superior source see Marincola 1997:83-5, 115-6.

truth-value of his text: "but the reliability of this rests with them".[229] To place the burden of proof on his privileged source-material in this way further absolved Sallust's account from criticism, and emphasises the selective and manipulated nature of the account which he presents.[230]

I consider the content of this part further below; but in methodological terms, as well as reference to sources, this material aligns Sallust with contemporary approaches, reiterating his erudition and suitability for his subject. As well as the connection of foreign peoples to the *continuum* of Greek myth (as attested above in the *archaeologia*), a particular method deployed here is etymology, to which Sallust has recourse to explain and supplement his narrative account.[231] This is notable because Sallust rarely uses the technique elsewhere: one of the rare other occasions on which Sallust draws on the evidence of words is his description of the *patres* in Romulus' senate, in the *archaeologia*.[232] Etymology was a widely practiced technique of investigation in Sallust's period, deployed (for example) by the antiquarians with reference to early Rome, and was considered a valid, learned method of research;[233] that Sallust makes such conspicuous use of it here is related to his aims with this digression. Sallust's deployment of etymological material here may be a relic of his source-material for this discussion:[234] but the fact that he deploys the technique so markedly is an aspect of the construction of erudition throughout. The recurrence to this technique again lends credibility to Sallust's account (according to the standards of the period) as a kind of scientific "proof" of his narrative: it also aligns him with contemporary methods, and demonstrates his intellectual acuity and suitability for the task at hand. This material is another aspect of the historian's self-presentation within the digression, and part of a continued effort to justify Sallust's composition.

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[229] Jug. 17.7, *ceterum fides eius rei penes auctores erit*.
[230] Cf Sen. *Quaest. Nat.* 4.3.1 on an extreme form of the source-citation as rhetorical trick, inserted effectively at random; see Wiseman 1993:135.
[231] *Jug*. 18.7;18.10; cf similar geographical etymology at 78.3.
[232] *Cat*. 6.6.
[233] The remains of Varro's *de Lingua Latina* exemplify the technique: e.g. 5.144 on Lavinium demonstrates the application of etymology to reconstruct the details of Rome's foundation. cf. Dench 2005:316-9; Oniga 1995:85-92; Rawson 1985:163 notes the application of etymology to fields as specific as astronomy.
[234] Oniga 1995:63 notes these as markers of Greek scholarship.

The same is true, albeit differently expressed, in the final section of the digression, dealing with the coastline of Northern Africa. While the previous two drew on literary approaches to the continent, the final section shifts towards a more descriptive account of human geography and the *status quo* of Africa in terms of the division of power. The division is clearly signalled: Sallust closes his ethnography with a *praeteritio* of the subject of Carthage (to which I return below); he shifts into the present tense, with a list of landmarks in *asyndeton*; he emphasises the chronological break by specifying *bello Jugurthino* for his description of the political *status*.[235] This part provides the digression's third discrete viewpoint on the continent, and is particularly linked to the passage's contextualising role: the military narratives of the remainder of the *Bellum Jugurthinum* rely more explicitly on the geography developed here than on the ethnographical or scientific discussions.[236] The subject-matter of the digression shifts away from speculative ethnography towards the details of the period of the war: this part serves geographically and chronologically to connect the material of the ethnography into the economy of the main narrative of the work. In effect, this section fulfils the claim with which Sallust had introduced the passage, and makes explicit the connection between ostensibly digressive material and the main theme. As with the *archaeologia* above, the concluding section returns the subject-matter more closely to the narrative's subject.

One peculiarity of this section is worth noting. Given its contemporary content, what is notably missing (indeed throughout the monograph) is reference to eyewitness testimony. Sallust had extensive knowledge of Africa: he had served there during the Caesarian civil war, and later as governor (Sallust's civil war service was on Cercina, at the Northern end of the Syrtes, mentioned here and also in the later description of Leptis).[237] If the digression is, as I have suggested, partly intended to supplement Sallust's historiographical credentials, his lack of reference to this is

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[235] *Jug*. 19.7.
[236] Note the recurrence of Leptis at chapter 78, as a reference-point within the military narrative; this relies on the wider geography established here.
[237] *Bell. Afr*. 8.3; 34.1. On Sallust's African proconsulate see Bertrandy 2005 (stressing that Sallust's peculation was little worse than many of his contemporaries'). On the Syrtes see *Jug*. 78.3..

surprising. Appeal to autopsy was a well-established *topos* of classical historiography:[238] why does

Sallust fail to mention his particular experience of the area?[239]

The reason is again linked to the historian's self-presentation, a marked contrast with the

Bellum Catilinae and indicative of a shift in Sallust's historiographical outlook. The preface to the

Bellum Catilinae referred explicitly to the historian's own career, including an *apologia* for the evil

path along which he had been led (albeit one expressing no remorse);[240] this one, conversely, elides

Sallust's chequered political career, in favour of stressing the superiority of the period of his own

political engagement to the debased state of the contemporary Republic.[241] From references to

Sallust's misbehaviour in our other sources (which, while no doubt prompted by the historical

interest of Sallust as literary figure, were not drawn from his works and therefore must have been

preserved independently) his maladministration seems to have been notorious.[242] It seems to me

that Sallust's elision of his civil war service is part of a deliberate attempt throughout the monograph

to supress this phase of his own career. This is perhaps owed to the moralistic position he adopts on

the contemporary Republic: the lack of reference to his own chequered past avoids undercutting the

polemic of the preface (as I explore further in a later chapter, there is also no reason to suppose that

Sallust remained a Caesarian partisan even up to Caesar's death, let alone after).[243] As throughout,

the digression supports the historiographical positioning of the preface.

The three-part construction of the digression, locating itself in relation to different forms of

thought about the *oikoumene*, serves an important historiographical role. The variety of

perspectives invoked emphasises Sallust's erudition and capacity to write the history of an African

conflict, while hinting only implicitly at his own experience; by establishing his competence across a

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[238] See Marincola 1997:63-86 (83-5 on autopsy in geography and ethnography); Morgan 2000:56.
[239] Cf. Sallust's reference to his own experience elsewhere, for example his acquaintance with Crassus (*Cat*. 48.9), in establishing the authority of the historian's account: the elision is particularly marked here.
[240] *Cat*. 3.3-5.
[241] *Jug*. 4.7-8.
[242] E.g. Dio 43.9.2; [Cic] *Inv. In Sall.* 19.
[243] See chapter 4.

range of approaches, at the same time as setting the immediate scene for the campaigns to come, Sallust supplements his atypical preface. This self-locating aspect is in fact in accordance with some orators' use of digression as opportunity to demonstrate particular knowledge;[244] but it is lent particular force by the characteristic concern of historiography with demonstration of the historian's authority, and explanation of his suitability to write the work on which he is engaged. The formal characteristics of this digression demonstrate a further aspect of Sallustian digression as an historiographical technique, going beyond the kind of historical argument attested by the *archaeologia* to serve a more direct role within the author's construction of an effective literary piece.

Selectivity and emphasis: the themes of Sallust's African ethnography

In addition to its significance as a piece of historiographical self-location, the central part of the African digression also demonstrates techniques similar to the *archaeologia* in providing a selective historical account corresponding to specific themes of the historian's text, setting up programmatic themes for the narrative which follows. With the final section of this chapter, I will explore the particular content of the ethnographic portion of this digression, and the thematic resonances which connect it to the rest of the monograph.[245] Sallust noted in his introduction that his account deviated from that usually held; part of this is due to brevity, but as I explore here his version also stresses certain features of African development and ignores others. I suggested above that the reference to the *libri Punici* was calculated to allow an idiosyncratic version, selective in details: the quasi-historical content of the ethnographical part of the digression demonstrates this.

Sallust's focus throughout is ostensibly on the continental nature of his project: *Africae situs et gentes*. However, consideration of the actual content demonstrates that the account is by no means comprehensive, and does not cover the *gentes Africae* in any representative depth: although

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[244] E.g. Quint. *Inst*. 4.3.2.
[245] Cf. Wiedemann 1993:51-4, who stresses the theme of *concordia* as part of his thematic analysis of the monograph. On the themes of the *Jug*. see chapter 4 below.

purporting to be a broad genealogical survey, it is teleologically driven by a focus on the Numidians themselves, to the exclusion of others. The effect is to contribute to the argumentation of the monograph through characterisation of the people with whom the Romans would shortly be fighting.

Sallust's ethnography begins with the indigenous populations, the Gaetulians and Libyans, described in the same nomadic terms as the Italian *aborigines*. To these are added the remnants of Hercules' dissipating army (Medes, Persians, and Armenians), who combine with them as Aeneas' men had with the Italians: here, as there, Sallust's account draws a structural link between the locals and the world of Hellenistic myth. Hercules' men, like Aeneas', are wandering purposelessly,[246] and their arrival (and mixing with the *aborigines*) represents a comparable "year zero" for the ethnographic and historical record of the continent.[247] Indeed, much of the construction of this digression parallels the *archaeologia*, including elision of historical detail in favour of a clear account of the development of imperial power.[248]

Sallust deploys etymology, in order to establish the connection between these early inhabitants and the Numidians of his own day by linking their status as nomads to their subsequent name: he supplements this with reference to the *mapalia*, further establishing the Numidians as direct descendants of the initial immigrants.[249] Sallust's reference to *mapalia* is interesting. Other sources, including the Elder Cato, other writers and also mosaics, portray them as huts of a round or conical shape (Cato says *quasi cohortas rotundas*);[250] Sallust is explicit in stating that they are *oblonga, incurvis lateribus tecta quasi navium carinae*, data not paralleled elsewhere. The discrepancy between Sallust's description and the rest is suggestive, given the stress he places on *mapalia* as a kind of proof of the inheritance of the contemporary Numidians: it is tempting to see his emphasis on their shiplike shape as part of his overall argument to establish the Numidians'

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[246] *Jug*. 18.3; *Cat*. 6.1.
[247] Hercules frequently played this role: cf. Morstein-Marx 2011:188.
[248] Cf. Scanlon 1988:138-42.
[249] *Jug*. 18.8.
[250] Cato: FRHist 5 F84; cf. comm. *ad loc.* (with bibliography on *mapalia*).

particular seafaring inheritance. Even with this detail, Sallust's account is heterodox and responsive to the requirements of his argument.[251]

The focus on Numidia, and the connection of the Numidians into a Hellenistic *continuum*, continues in the following section, with Sallust's description of the Numidians as derived from the Persians and the Mauri from the Medes (Sallust's most tenuous etymology). The peoples are connected, according to Sallust's narrative: but, in keeping with the historical technique of the *archaeologia*, the link between them is of the most schematic kind. Sallust includes no factual detail on the Numidians' growth, simply stating that their position increased *armis aut metu*.[252] Sallust gives no detail on the nature of this rise: other sources record a narrative of the state's development much more varied and complex than Sallust's selective and schematic version.[253] Sallust makes no mention, for example, of the divisions of the Numidian kingdom into two halves (between the tribes of the Masaesylii and the Massylii), and the lack of a cohesive state until after the Second Punic War.[254]

The lack of detail recalls the *archaeologia*, and conceals the same historiographical strategy, flattening the story of Numidian development into a narrative of unbroken rise through moral qualities (here, as in the *archaeologia*, accomplished through cooperation).[255] The focus of the ethnography, while it does in concluding deal briefly with the Phoenician settlements along the coast, is firmly on a monolithic Numidian power as a teleological structuring device: while the Phoenician settlements were among the major cities of the continent (and indeed figure among the coastal landmarks treated in Sallust's description) they receive no discussion. The landmarks of Sallust's description in the final part of the digression emphasise by contrast the focus on the

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[251] Morstein-Marx 2001:186 reads this as an anthropological commentary on the differences between hard nomads and soft sea-men; but I note that Sallust's account deliberately links the Numidians with the sea, inverting the traditional model of the sea as corrupting factor.
[252] *Jug*. 18.11.
[253] Ancient accounts of North African history are found mainly in the geographical accounts of Strabo 17.3.1-20; Pliny *HN* 5.1-46; Pomp. Mel. 1.25-48 (an account showing some signs of Sallustian influence – for example in the story of the Philaeni) but with much more historical detail.
[254] See Strabo. 17.3.9; Polyb. 3.33.15 on the divisions of Numidia.
[255] *Jug*. 18.12; cf. Wiedemann 1993.

Numidians in the ethnographic section: although his description covers the length of the coast, he provides no detail on (for example) Cyrene, a colony of Thera. The supposedly historical element concentrates on the Numidians, and a specific narrative of Numidian rise, to the exclusion of other factors.

Sallust's source-material of the Punic Books, if indeed they existed and treated this material, must surely have covered the period in greater detail than Sallust attests. Given that Sallust introduced this as an account of the whole of Africa, the fact that he concentrates on a narrative of Numidian rise creates a particular, and programmatic, impression of the nature of the African past. A major factor missing from Sallust's narrative, which his sources must have treated (given their language or at least supposed derivation) was Carthage, the dominant power of North Africa until the mid-second century BC.[256] Carthage was originally one of the Phoenician colonies to which Sallust refers in passing: however, he gives no account of the city itself, explaining its absence by the *praeteritio* of a lack of time.[257] By the end of the sixth century, in fact, Carthage was independent from Tyre;[258] it had considerable power in North Africa.[259] This included considerable influence over Numidian lands: the ongoing conflicts between the two powers - of which Massinissa's participation in the Second Punic War was an offshoot -[260] would certainly have complicated Sallust's account of Numidian rise *armis aut metu*,[261] and in fact it seems that only in the aftermath of Zama did the Numidians establish themselves as a centralised kingdom under Masinissa.[262]

Sallust's criterion of time is expedient, but is insufficient to explain the elision of the city, particularly given the questionable relevance of much of the content of this digression (at least in

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[256] On the history of Carthage in the period described in the digression see Lancel 1995:257-62 (and on the Punic wars and Carthaginian decline up until the period of the Jugurthine War, 361-427); Warmington 1969:55-127)

[257] *Jug*. 19.2.

[258] Lancel 1995:256-7.

[259] The Africans originally demanded (and received) tribute from Carthage, but by the beginning of the fifth century had been forced to relent (Pomp. Trog. *ap*. *Just*. 19.1). Cf. App. *Lyb.* 57, Strabo 17.3.15 on the bounds of Carthage's influence.

[260] See Warmington 1969:226-9; Lancel 1995:398-400.

[261] Livy 34.62.3 notes that even at the beginning of the second century the cities of the Syrtes were paying tribute to Carthage (cf. Lancel 1995:258).

[262] E.g. Livy 30.44.12; Polyb. 31.21.

the terms of the introduction Sallust had given). In avoiding treatment of Rome's most historically significant enemy, a state which had held sway over much of Africa, Sallust's selectivity is drastic. As with the *archaeologia*, Sallust certainly did know more about Carthage than he lets on: he mentions the conflict between Massinissa and the Carthaginians as part of his introduction of Jugurtha's lineage,[263] and the story of the Philaeni brothers elsewhere in the *Bellum Jugurthinum* takes as its subject two Carthaginians, set against a context of African warfare.[264] The engagement with Carthage elsewhere in the text makes its elision here particularly noteworthy, in an ostensibly historical summary of the continent's history: it demonstrates Sallust's selectivity, and his freedom of treatment in digression.

To elide such an important aspect of Roman history was markedly to deviate from standard canons of Roman historiography: in avoiding Carthage, Sallust signals the distance in subject of his account from those of the historians who preceded him, and from a theme which dominated Roman historiographical treatments of Africa.[265] The phrase with which he explains the elision of Carthage is similar to that with which he recused himself from discussion of early Roman successes in the *archaeologia*, explaining that Carthage was not part of his immediate project:[266] his selectiveness again marks off Sallust's historiographical project as distinct.

Avoidance of Carthage contributes to Sallust's selective narrative of African history, particularly to a manipulated account of Numidian rise which glosses over significant factors in the continent's history. The particular construction of Sallust's African narrative, stressing Numidian rise and eliding other important factors (colonisation by Phoenicians is mentioned only with the vague *postea*),[267] demonstrates the use of digression within the construction of the monograph as a whole.

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[263] *Jug*. 5.4.
[264] *Jug*. 79.
[265] The Punic Wars provided important subject-matter for previous Roman historians from Fabius Pictor onwards (it has been suggested that Pictor wrote in Greek in order to provide a Roman perspective on the second Punic War; see *FRHist*. 1.168); Coelius Antipater wrote a war-monograph on the second Punic War; cf. in epic Naevius' *Bellum Punicum*. Comber & Balmaceda 2009:25 suggests that "Sallust presents the Jugurthine War as a debased version of the Punic Wars".
[266] *Jug*. 19.2; cf. *Cat*. 7.7.
[267] *Jug*. 19.1.

By emphasising the historicity of the Numidians (linking them to the original settlers of the continent through a similar mythic genealogy to Rome's, and "proving" his derivation by reference to the *mapalia*) Sallust establishes for them a historical background comparable to Rome's own. The removal of Carthage from the African landscape again emphasises Numidian power, simplifying in order to portray them at the point of conflict with Rome as a civilisation at the zenith of an unbroken rise. These factors reinforce the parallelism between Numidia and Rome, heightening the apparent significance of the war which provided Sallust's subject. In reality, there was little possibility of the Numidians inflicting any kind of substantive defeat on Rome:[268] but by elevating them to a status comparable to Rome's through a selective version of not just their own history but that of the whole continent, Sallust inflates the significance of his subject.

Conclusion

The two passages treated in this chapter are similar. Both play contextualising roles in the narrative; they also programmatically supplement various aspects of the historian's text. They contribute to the interpretation of each monograph, and are vested with meta-historical significance in locating Sallust's writing within a literary context. Sallust's divergence from convention in each case signals an aspect of his historical interpretation: the distinguishing feature of the *archaeologia* is its universalising perspective, emphasising Rome's susceptibility to broader patterns; the account of Africa stresses a sequence of imperial development which deviates from canons of Roman historiography, for argumentative purposes. Both passages flatten the historical record into a selective version serving Sallust's argument.

In addition to their interpretative content, these passages serve the historian's self-presentation, by supplementing his prefaces. Sallust's narrative of early Rome locates his account in relation to historians who preceded him; its schematic nature, deploying the past as descriptive cautionary tale rather than as a detailed narrative, repudiates the tradition tying historical

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[268] Cf. the comparison with the developing Gallic war at *Jug*. 114.

developments to specific individuals.[269] It is indicative of his relationship to these previous authors that although Sallust remarks that he could provide individual *exempla* of Roman virtue, he refuses to do so.[270] The African digression represents a different form of self-location (although in avoiding Rome's old enemy, and subject of much Roman historiography – Carthage – his selectivity once again locates him in relation to previous authors); this digression supplements the preface through its breadth, and the variety of perspectives from which it approaches the continent, to illustrate the historian's suitability for his task.

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[269] On Sallust's view of individuals see chapter 5.
[270] *Cat*. 7.7: *memorare possem quibus in locis maxumas hostium copias populus Romanus parva manu fuderit, quas urbis natura munitas pugnando ceperit, ni ea res longius nos ab incepto traheret*.

Chapter 4 – the Political Digressions

Political aspects of Sallust's work have long provoked debate among his readers ancient and modern. While Sallust's critics in antiquity took issue with what they saw as partisan attacks on Pompey (something the fragmentary *Historiae* certainly seem to corroborate),[1] modern scholarship has more often been concerned with identifying the political perspective from which he wrote, and its effects.[2] Interest in the political content of Sallust's histories is linked to what we know of the author's political life and *cursus honorum*: unlike a career historian like Livy, but in the best traditions of historiography at Rome,[3] Sallust held magistracies, and was an active participant in the civil war. On the other hand, despite this pedigree, Sallust is not a typical Roman senator-historian: while - since the advent of Roman historiography - Romans had written at the end of a political career, that Sallust wrote after the disgrace of a prosecution, rather than from a position of achievement, distinguishes him from both the mainstream of politician-historians and the emergent group of non-politician authors.[4] The tension is demonstrated by Sallust's references to his career in his prefaces, comparing the mistakes of his youth to the more debased state to which the Republic had sunk by the time of composition:[5] The *Bellum Catilinae* attacks the dishonesty required of politics in general, and *invidia* as its consequence; the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, the realities of triumviral politics.[6]

Sallust knew whereof he spoke: but his histories distance him from political practice. Unlike the prefaces to Cicero's philosophical works, the violence of Sallust's attack precludes resumption of

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[1] E.g. Suet. *Gramm*. *Rhet*. 15; on Pompey see *Hist*. 2.17-9 McG; on his (negative) thematic centrality see Syme 1964:201-2; La Penna 1968:275-9;McGushin 1992:17, Katz 1982.

[2] Syme 1964 is the most biographical of the major monographs on Sallust; La Penna 1968 also stresses Sallust's Caesarian partisanship. See further below.

[3] E.g. Cato (*cos*. 195, *cen*. 184), Piso (cos. 133). See Syme 1956; Fornara 1983:47-54 discusses the preference for "insider" political history at Rome over Greece.

[4] Less successful politicians wrote history in the first century (e.g. Sisenna, *pr*. 78 and Licinius Macer, *pr*. 68); but they still derived legitimacy from ongoing careers. Sallust's was more clearly finished than Macer's or Sisenna's (both died while still politically active, although Macer immediately after prosecution for *repetundae*: Val. Max. 9.12). On Sallust's as a new "post-political historiography" see Garcia-Lopez 1997:17; cf. Kierdorf 2003:81 on Sallust's arrogation of senatorial historiography's moralistic traditions.

[5] *Cat*. 3.3-5; *Jug*. 3-4. Cf. La Penna 1973 for a fragmentary Sallustian attack on contemporary political oratory.

[6] *Cat*. 3.3; *Jug*. 3.3; see Guerrini 1977.

a political career.[7] Cicero lamented the state's disruption - for example in the *de Republica* -[8] but returned to active politics in the triumviral period; his verdict on political life is less final than Sallust's, his works less concerned with the creation of a permanent historiographical alternative.[9] Sallust writes from a position of political experience (a quality deemed necessary for historians by Polybius)[10] but stands apart from political divisions.[11] The preface to the *Bellum Catilinae* claims that *mihi a spe, metu, partibus rei publicae animus liber erat*;[12] while such protestations are *topoi*,[13] it is significant that Sallust claims not to be unconcerned with politics *per se*, but with the *partes* of his period.

That scholars have wondered about the effect of this on the content of Sallust's histories, given the overlap between political and intellectual activity in the period,[14] is no surprise. In addition to his career, the content of Sallust's works (and the decision to write contemporary history at all) betray his interest in the contemporary political situation. Sallust is no Livy, riding out a turbulent present by escaping into a semi-mythical past;[15] he deals with the major figures of his generation and those immediately before.[16]

With this chapter, I will consider what can be reconstructed of Sallust's political ideas, through consideration of the major political digressions, *Bellum Catilinae* 36-9 and *Bellum Jugurthinum* 41-2. As well as offering evidence as to the author's political perspective, the political digressions play an important role within Sallust's *dispositio*, in terms of the contributions they make

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[7] Most forcefully *Jug*. 4.4. See Lana 1969; de Vivo 2000; Whitehouse 2010.

[8] Cic. *Rep*. 5.1.

[9] On construction of alternatives to politics in Sallust and Cicero see Baraz 2012:13-35. On the finality of Sallust's conversion see Petzold 1971:220; Viparelli 1996:68; De Vivo 2000; Guerrini 1977.

[10] E.g. Polyb. *Hist*. 12.25g.

[11] Sallust's enthusiasm for Thucydides' historiography of exile may be connected.

[12] *Cat*. 4.2.

[13] Marincola 1997:158-74.

[14] E.g. Caesar (writing *commentarii* and grammatical works), Brutus (*de Virtute* and epitomes of historians) and Cicero (philosophy and rhetoric): all three were of the highest *stratum* of intellectual culture as well as politics.

[15] See Livy *praef*. 5 with Canfora 1972:146-8.

[16] Some scholars have viewed Sallust as primarily an artist and *litterateur* rather than a politician (e.g. Büchner 1969, although Büchner 1953:33 imputes Sallust a *popularis* viewpoint). This goes too far; Sallust's political experience fundamentally shaped his works. Cf. Steen Due 1982:120-2 on the political urgency of Sallust's unedifying subjects; on Roman historiography as inherently political see Heldmann 2011.

to argument and interpretation: as such, a second aim of this chapter is to explore their significant places within the thematic economy of each work.

Ambitio mala? Sallust's political career[17]

Although I suggest that the biographical approach has been over-valued, before considering the digressions it will be useful briefly to recapitulate Sallust's career.[18] A quaestorship (probably in 55) was Sallust's entry into the senate. A tribunate of the *plebs* in 52, during which Sallust spoke from the *rostra* after Clodius' death,[19] need not be seen as a marker of a convinced *popularis* position: Asconius attests subsequent reconciliation between Sallust and Cicero, and we should note that while those alongside Sallust on the *rostra* after Clodius' death – T. Munatius Plancus Byrsa and Q. Pompeius Rufus – were subsequently prosecuted, Sallust was not.[20] Recent scholarship on Republican politics has emphasised the degree to which a *popularis* stance might be adopted temporarily, without dictating the course of a subsequent career: Sallust's speech in 52 need not indicate any deep-set *popularis* or anti-optimate convictions.[21]

In 50 BC, Sallust was expelled from the senate. The ancient sources usually explain this by reference to some act of immorality,[22] but modern scholarship has read it as a partisan political manoeuvre, assuming that Sallust already leaned towards Caesar.[23] Dio states that the expulsions by Appius Claudius - a Pompeian - drove men into Caesar's party, rather than punishing existing

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[17] *ambitio mala: Cat.* 4.2. cf. Malitz 1975.
[18] On Sallust's career to 44 see Syme 1964:29-42; Petzold 1971; Malitz 1975; Allen 1954; Earl 1966; Steen Due 1982; Martin 2009:67-78.
[19] Asc. 37 C.
[20] Asc. 37 C: *postea Pompeius et Sallustius in suspicione fuerunt redisse in gratiam cum Milone ac Cicerone*; on the prosecutions, Dio 40.55. Allen 1954:6 is unjustified in dismissing Asconius' testimony. Cf. Epstein 1987:1-11 on the ease with which Roman enmities might be reconciled.
[21] For Sallust's as a "third way" in 52 see Lepore 1969: 19, Garbugino 2006b:11-13. Earl 1966:310-11 suggests that he escaped prosecution through the protection of Pompey. Scholarship on *popularis* politics has proliferated in recent years, with the ongoing debate about the nature of the Republic's political system, to which I cannot do justice here. See (most importantly of a large bibliography) Millar 1998; Mouritsen 2001; Morstein-Marx 2004; Wiseman 2009:5-32; Hölkeskamp 2010; Robb 2010; Arena 2012.
[22] Dio 40.63.4; Ps-Cic. *Inv. in Sall.* 16.
[23] E.g. recently Schmal 2001:15.

partisanship; we might therefore hesitate in assuming that Sallust was already a Caesarian.[24] Syme

suggests that Sallust's stance after Clodius' death implies that he was not then of Caesar's party;[25]

however, Sallust had during his tribunate passed a law (with the rest of his college) allowing Caesar

to stand for the consulship *in absentia*.[26] The question should therefore remain open.

Sallust certainly did support Caesar by the civil war, when he commanded a legion in

Illyricum.[27] He distinguished himself sufficiently that after holding the praetorship in 46, he was

made governor of *Africa Nova* (where he had served).[28] The possibility of an apparently justified

prosecution for *repetundae* in 44 - along with his political unimportance - perhaps accounts for

Sallust's failure to achieve the consulship.[29] Sallust seems to have played no political role after the

Ides of March, although a cryptic *testimonium*, referring to Ventidius Bassus giving "a Sallustian

speech" at his triumph in 38, has exercised some comment.[30] As Mogens Leisner-Jensen has

demonstrated, it is implausible linguistically and politically that Sallust was "commissioned" to write

a speech; the *testimonium* is invalid as proof that Sallust came to support Antony, as Antonio La

Penna once argued.[31] Some scholars, notably Ronald Syme, have argued that Sallust's historiography

covertly attacks the triumvirs personally.[32] Regardless of his political affiliations (or lack thereof),

Sallust took up history, the project from which evil ambition had diverted him.[33]

Further reconstruction, including possible links to prominent politicians such as Pompey or

Crassus, must be speculative: although as a native of Amiternum Sallust is likely to have had the

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[24] Dio 40.63.3-4; cf. Petzold 1971:231-2.
[25] Syme 1964:29.
[26] Caes. *BC* 1.32.
[27] Oros. 6.15.8.
[28] On Sallust's service *Bell. Afr.* 8.3; 34.1; on the governorship Dio 43.9.2.
[29] See Dio. 43.9 on extortion of his province; 43.47.4 perhaps refers to Caesar's intervention preventing prosecution. Havas 1972 suggests that Sallust felt "let down" by Caesar, as an explanation for critical elements in his portrait.
[30] Fronto *Ep.*2.1 p.123: see Paul 1966:96; Skard 1972; Hidalgo de la Vega 1984-5:105-6.
[31] Leisner-Jensen 1997:331-43 (*contra* La Penna 1961), followed by Garbugino 2006b:131-6. On Sallust as Antonian cf. Allen 1954:10-13;; Tiffou 1982.
[32] Syme 1964:214-40; cf. Malitz 1975:89; Canfora 1985; Garbugino 2006; Gerrish 2012. *contra* MacQueen 1981:16-21. Havas' 1972 suggestion that Sallust's anti-Antonianism caused him personal danger is pure speculation.
[33] *Cat.* 4; Mevoli 1994:21.

support of an established politician, none can be identified.[34] The *Epistulae ad Caesarem*, purportedly dated between about 51 and 48, although still accepted in some quarters are not authentic,[35] and prove no intellectual or political connection between Sallust and Caesar beyond that attested by more reliable sources.[36] The *Invectiva in Sallustium* of pseudo-Cicero, while containing plausible anecdotal material such as Sallust's association with the Neo-Pythagorean Nigidius Figulus, cannot bear the burden of any proof.[37]

Sallust's career was not unlike those of many contemporaries: he emerges as a minor figure of the last generation of the Republic, who saw in Caesar an opportunity for advancement which had been closed off through more well-established channels.[38] In the light of his political record, it is difficult to view Sallust as a man of especially strong political convictions: his attitude (compared to his colleagues') was relatively non-committal in 52, and in the absence of evidence we should be wary of viewing Sallust as an arch-Caesarian, or even assuming that when he wrote Sallust still supported Caesar and approved of his actions.[39]

Despite the lack of evidence, the assumption that Sallust wrote in defence of Caesar's memory, along with the similar idea that he was a *popularis* and implacable enemy of the *nobiles*, has cast a long shadow. The assumed relationship between Sallust and Caesar lay behind the influential reading which emerged in the late nineteenth century, associated with Eduard Schwartz

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[34] Cf. Martin 2009:75. Suggestions that Sallust's career began under the tutelage of Crassus (e.g. Petzold 1971:221-2, Steen Due 1982:118) are based only on the fact that Sallust refers to information heard from him (*Cat*. 48.9). This does not presuppose any significant attachment; Sallust was certainly not close enough (fortunately for him and us) to accompany Crassus on his Parthian adventure.

[35] E.g. recently Martin 2009:76; Samotta 2009.

[36] Syme 1964:314-51 still holds. See Santangelo 2012 on the letters' value as historical *testimonia* (rather than Sallustian *juvenalia*).

[37] *in Sall*. 14.

[38] See Syme 1939:66-77 for comparable Caesarians; Dio 40.63.3 states that Caesar collected those disbarred from more traditional forms of advancement.

[39] Disaffected Caesarians were plentiful in the mid-40s: Brutus (the tyrannicide) governed Gallia Cisalpina while Sallust was in Africa, and was praetor in 44. See Skard 1930:83-5; Schur 1934:81-2; Syme 1964:60-1; Steen Due 1989, esp. 125-30; on Sallust's distance from his Caesarian period see Leeman 1955b:45; Garbugino 2006.

but birthed by Theodor Mommsen.[40] This read Sallust not as historian but as *Tendenzschriftsteller* (partisan pamphleteer), suggesting that loyalty to Caesar was Sallust's major motivation, and that the *Bellum Catilinae* in particular was written as a defence of Caesar and attack on Cicero.[41] The appearance of the work in the late 40s was allegedly a response to Cicero's *de consiliis suis*, a posthumously published exposé of the participation of Crassus and Caesar in Catiline's *coup*.[42] Sallust was loyal to Caesar and hated the *nobiles*, according to Schwartz, because Caesar had been Sallust's last political hope, his assassination the end of Sallust's career.

These ideas proved persuasive.[43] Schwartz started from the assumption that Sallust was a Caesarian through and through, and that even after his death Sallust remained committed to his reputation; however, there is no evidence that Sallust remained Caesarian even before the Ides, and the cruelties of the triumviral period might well have prompted reassessment of the man who ushered it in.[44] Sallust's *apologia* makes no distinction between the period before adherence to Caesar and that after; nor does it imply continued approval of Caesar's policies.[45] Caesar's portrayal is not unqualified approval;[46] nor is Cicero's wholly black.[47] No explanation is offered as to why after the dictator's death Sallust might attempt to vindicate his activities of 20 years earlier: if Caesar's opponents sought to blacken his name as a dangerous revolutionary, more contemporary charges

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[40] Mommsen 1856:177; Schwartz 1897. On the theory's reception see MacQueen 1981:8-10; La Penna 1968:68-82.

[41] E.g. Schwartz 1897:577. La Penna 1968:159-73 notes comparable anti-*nobilitas* assumptions in the *Jug*.

[42] Schwartz 1897:580-1. *de consiliis suis* remains nebulous: see Rawson 1982.

[43] Schwartz's thesis is largely accepted by e.g. Baehrens 1926 (82: "Sallust ist durch und durch Parteishriftsteller"), Seel 1930:36-8;and by von Fritz as late as 1943; Skard 1930:69 already suggested that the dogma of Sallust as Caesarian hindered other readings.

[44] Syme 1964:121.

[45] Büchner 1982:113 suggests that Sallust makes a "clean sweep" of his Caesarian period; cf. Collins 1955, Katz 1983. Martin 2001 views Sallust's literary project as an attempt to rival Caesar's writing.

[46] Christ 1994:31 reads *Jug*. 3 as a direct attack; cf. Havas 1971, Syme 1964:121-2.

[47] Cf. Stone 1999.

presented themselves.[48] The theory is not sustainable, and subsequently fell from favour,[49] although

the idea that Sallust wrote as a Caesarian partisan still appears in recent scholarship.[50]

More tenacious is the suggestion that Sallust was motivated by hatred of the *nobiles*: in its

extreme form, this holds that Sallust wrote with a *popularis* political agenda.[51] Although most would

not state it as baldly as K. Sprey, who wrote in 1931 that "*[Sallustium] etiam pueri popularium

partium fautorem fuisse sciant*",[52] it underpins many treatments of Sallust.[53] This reading is largely

based on similar evidence - support for Caesar in the civil war and the events of the tribunate of 52 -

and the spurious *epistulae*: however, as we have seen, Sallust cannot simply be assumed to replicate

the allegiances of his political life in his work, and it is questionable even how strongly these

allegiances were felt in his career. The "*popularis*" reading receives some support from the texts,

which attack the established order: through selective quotation, a case may be made that Sallust is

motivated by hatred of the *nobiles*, and subjects them to criticism at every opportunity (Syme, for

example, uses Sallust's identification of Catiline as *nobilis* as a demonstration of particular *animus*

against the *nobiles* generally: but Sallust could hardly have left unmentioned such an important

characteristic of a [patrician] Sergius Catilina).[54]

Against these views, other scholars have suggested that Sallust is not motivated by factional

feeling; he is read as disillusioned and disinterested, or as attacking both sides equally.[55] While these

readings are more sustainable (as I demonstrate throughout this chapter), they do not deal fully with

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[48] Cf. MacKay 1962:187.

[49] Early works attacking Schwartz' thesis: Klingner 1928; Drexler 1928; Schur 1934:171-4. Havas 1971 reads the *Cat.* as latent critique of Caesar and Antony, and praise of Cicero (cf. Broughton 1936; Stone 1999; Steen Due 1989; *contra* Devillers 2007:138-40).

[50] e.g. Garelli 1998-9, D'Anna 1990; Martin 2009:102. D'Anna 1990. Christ 1994 stresses that Sallust's portrait is not uncritical, but that Caesar is nonetheless a major influence.

[51] E.g. Baehrens 1926:63-71; Schur 1934: 176; Vretska 1937 (Sallust impartial in the *Cat.* but taking a *popularis* stance in the *Jug.*; similarly Momigliano 1942); Hidalgo de la Vega 1984-5; More qualified views, on Sallust as concerned with the health of the *populus Romanus* above all but against the *nobiles*, see Skard 1930; Klinz 1968; Earl 1961; Schmal 2001:93. Von Fritz 1943 is so convinced by Sallust as *popularis* that factors contradicting this (e.g. positive aspects in Metellus' portrait) are dismissed as ploys establishing the historian's impartiality!

[52] Sprey 1931:103.

[53] MacQueen 1981:15-21 is a *Forschungsbericht*.

[54] Syme 1964:125.

[55] See Schur 1934:81-2; Steidle 1954; Petzold 1971; La Penna 1968 (although La Penna's chapter on the *Bellum Jugurthinum* is titled "le responsabilità della 'nobilitas'"); Christ 1994; Mehl 2011:90.

the complexities of Sallust's thought: as I will explore, he draws on the ideas and rhetoric of both sides in presenting a kind of combined view. I will also argue here that Sallust's blame is evenly shared; the main distinction of my reading in general terms is the analytical frame within which I place Sallust's analysis, stressing the relevance of digressive material. In this light, the digressions emerge as directly explanatory: Sallust did not aim to provide a solution to the Republic's malaise (which, in keeping with the patterning outlined in the *archaeologia*, was terminal),[56] and nor did he cast blame on one political group from partisan motives; nonetheless, political concerns remain central. While divorced from practical politics, Sallust's work remains deeply political in scope: the digressions, I suggest, advance analysis aimed at *explaining* Rome's decline within a worked-out model of political *praxis*, drawing on the political discourse of both sides but more theoretical than practical. Through his themes and presentation – the basic elements of *dispositio* – Sallust puts forth an analysis of the stages of culpability and causation of Republican decline, not limited by partisan bias. I explored above the sense in which Sallust's analysis of Rome's place in the Mediterranean world made her decline somehow inevitable; I now turn to its manifestation.

The political digressions: *Bellum Catilinae* 36.4 - 39.5 and *Bellum Jugurthinum* 41 - 42

The digressions are *Bellum Catilinae* 36.4-39.5, on the state of the Roman people at the time of Catiline's conspiracy; and *Bellum Jugurthinum* 41-2, on the *mos partium et factionum* ("the practice of parties and factions"): the texts are given in full in the Appendix. Although from different monographs, the passages deal with the same problems: on the most basic level, Sallust's theme is the debasement of Roman politics. Nonetheless, each is carefully constructed; the relationship between the specific concerns of each and its place in its monograph is important. It will be useful to examine first some structural features linking them.

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[56] *Contra*. La Penna 1968: 106-123, following Schur 1934:57-9, suggesting that Sallust had a considered reform programme perhaps even anticipating aspects of the Augustan regime). Cf. similarly Steen Due 1989:121. Nothing in the text suggests that Sallust's aims were prescriptive rather than descriptive; La Penna's analysis of Sallust's position is based largely on the spurious *Epistulae*.

The passages are clearly distinguished from the main body of the historical narrative, both structurally and through specific literary signposts. The structure of each monograph has been exhaustively debated, and few universally accepted conclusions reached; however, scholars have usually agreed that the digressions represent points of punctuation in terms of both chronology and themes.[57] Specific devices also serve to mark each digression as a discrete element. In the *Bellum Catilinae*, this is ring composition, with the repetition of *ea tempestate... isdem temporibus* bookending the passage;[58] in the *Bellum Jugurthinum* the passage is closed by the phrase *quam ob rem, ad inceptum redeo*, a standard Sallustian marker.[59] In the *Bellum Catilinae*, the passage is also introduced by an indication of Sallust's own personal reflection on his history, *mihi...visum est*, comparable to similar phrases in the monograph's other digressions,[60] marking a departure from narrative to a more analytical tone: the interpretative activity of the historian is explicitly to the fore.

In addition to this stylistic marking, both passages explicitly interrupt the chronological sequence of events, either by referring back to "a few years before" or by pausing the narrative.[61] As well as retarding the narrative at significant moments, these digressions allow Sallust to push his chronological horizons forwards and backwards, past the boundaries of the main narrative. As above, these digressions provide opportunities for analysis beyond the confines of the monographic genre: by tying political developments into a wider sweep of Roman history, Sallust emphasises the significance and explanatory function of his material.

The *Bellum Catilinae* digression looks back before the narrative period - to the restoration of the power of the tribunate of the plebs in 70 -[62] and forward, to a counterfactual future where Catiline won the battle of Pistoria, and someone else, unnamed but threatening (perhaps Pompey)

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[57] On the *Cat.* see particularly Vretska 1937b; Tiffou 1973:353-77; Giancotti 1971:15-84 (with assessment of previous scholarship, 16-28). I consider the structure of the *Jug.* in detail below.

[58] *Cat*. 36.4, 39.6.

[59] *Jug.* 42.5: cf. *nunc ad inceptum redeo*, *Jug.* 4.9 (with Wiedemann 1979, 1980; Earl 1979, 1981; Malcolm 1980, all on whether or not this really marks a digression, given its location in the preface) and *nunc ad rem redeo*, *Jug.* 79.10.

[60] Cf. *Cat.* 6.1, *sicuti ego accepi* and 53.2, *sed mihi multa legenti, multa audienti*.

[61] *Cat.* 36.4 pauses the narrative with the words *ea tempestate mihi... visum est*; *Jug.* 41.1 makes the break with *paucis post annis*.

[62] *Cat.* 38.1.

emerged to deal with him.[63] Sallust foreshadows his text's conclusion, but leaves open the possibility of Catilinarian victory, alluding to an aftermath not actually treated in the monograph.[64] Similarly, the *Bellum Jugurthinum* digression pushes the timeframe in both directions; backwards to the Gracchi, and forwards to the *vastitas Italiae* in the civil wars.[65] The political changes Sallust describes are placed within a longer view of Roman history, stressing their wider significance.

Each digression is located at a clear narrative turning-point, related to the subject-matter of the digression itself. In the *Bellum Catilinae*, Sallust's reflections on the state of Rome come at the city's *nadir*, and the peak of apparent danger of the conspiracy - immediately after Catiline had left Rome to raise his revolutionary standard in Etruria, before the conspiracy's gradual unravelling. Sallust claims that if the first battle had gone Catiline's way, the state would have been seriously affected.[66] It is striking that Sallust digresses here, even though his counterfactual warning refers to the battle of Pistoria, not fought until nearly the end of the monograph: the digression appears at what later proves to have been a narrative turning-point, with the perceived threat of the conspiracy at its gravest. Sallust's material on the decline of Roman politics is thus cast in an especially negative light.[67]

The *Bellum Jugurthinum* digression is similarly placed soon after the worst military disaster of the war, the surrender of Aulus Postumius, another *nadir*.[68] While the real threat Jugurtha posed Rome is arguable,[69] this was certainly his most successful field operation.[70] The direct background for the digression is the institution of the *quaestio Mamiliana*, the court in which (as Sallust puts it)

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[63] *Cat.* 39.4. For a reference to Pompey see Steidle 1954:11, McGushin 1977:211 (D'Anna 1978:622 identifies Crassus).
[64] The counterfactual remains unfulfilled, but emphasises the decisiveness of the turning-point. Cf. Grethlein 2014 on historiographical "sideshadowing" through counterfactuals.
[65] *Jug.* 41.5; 5.1-3 (linked to the themes of the digression throughout, as I explore below).
[66] *Cat*. 39.4.
[67] This might be a response to Polybius' discussion of the Roman constitution, treated just after Cannae in order to show the outstanding resilience of the state in appalling circumstances (*Hist*. 6.58); Sallust conversely chooses a perilous moment to best illustrate the state's fragility.
[68] *Jug*. 38.
[69] Cf. the genuine threat of the Gauls, *Jug*. 114.2.
[70] Note the depiction of the calamitous arrival of the news at Rome, *Jug*. 39.

those who had abetted Jugurtha's scheming could be tried;[71] the digression marks the end of the first period of the war, in which the *nobiles* had proven themselves unequal to the task. The passage also appears immediately before the introduction of one of the monograph's major figures, Metellus, who - in addition to signalling a new, more successful phase in the prosecution of the war - also marks a thematic shift in Sallust's narrative. The digression is as a point of punctuation, separating two disparate phases of the war narrative (I explore these ideas in much fuller detail below).

The positions of these digressions within the construction of each monograph is key. The passages are, I suggest, fundamental to understanding the monographs; the themes which they emphasise have programmatic importance, and their positions at the centre of their respective works supplement the thematic construction of the histories more broadly. This is demonstrated by reference to the monographs' statements of theme: each digression is closely connected to the theme stated for the text as a whole, contributing to its development; the claims Sallust makes for his subjects are, in fact, only justifiable and explicable in the light of the analytical material contained in the digressions.[72]

The *Bellum Catilinae* was introduced with the claim that Catiline's conspiracy was distinguished by *sceleris atque periculi novitate*, the novelty and danger of his crime.[73] This seems questionable: what distinguished Catiline's attempt from, for example, the *tumultus Lepidi* (considered in Sallust's later *Historiae*)? Given that Catiline's revolution had been snuffed out by a few arrests and a single battle, could it be compared to a consistent thorn in Rome's side such as Sertorius (again, treated in the *Historiae*)?[74] Sallust's claim to greatness of subject may seem nothing more than an historiographical *topos*, following in the footsteps of Thucydides and other historians

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[71] *Jug*. 40.

[72] Steidle 1954 stresses Sallust's construction of arguments to "prove" his thematic statements (similarly Heldmann 2011:79-80). Cf. Wolff 1993:176 on prefaces and digressions alerting the reader to "correct" readings.

[73] *BC* 4.4.

[74] Cf. Havas 1971:51-4.

who magnified their subject-matter:[75] but the reappearance of the theme in this central position suggests that Sallust's claim for the importance of the conspiracy is in fact sincere, or at least borne out by the material with which he supports his case. This digression answers the questions raised by Sallust's claims, and provides the supplementary evidence to "prove" them. The digression opens with a judgement, "at that time the *imperium* of the Roman people seems to me to have been much the most miserable"; Sallust outlines the factors which lead to this conclusion. Only in the light of Sallust's analysis of Rome at its *nadir* can Catiline's conspiracy be ascribed the genuine danger with which the historian invests it: the *sceleris atque periculi novitas* of the preface finds full expression only through the digression.

The connection between thematic statement and digression is yet clearer in the *Bellum Jugurthinum*. Sallust's theme is in two parts: "I will write of the war which the Roman people waged with Jugurtha, the king of the Numidians, firstly because it was great, fierce and of varying fortune, and secondly because then for the first time opposition was offered to the arrogance of the nobility. This contest confused everything, human and divine, and so far progressed in madness that war, and the devastation of Italy, made an end to the civil strife."[76] The latter, the partisan strife of which the Jugurthine War provided the first spark, is the theme to which the *mos partium et factionum* digression explicitly alludes. As with the *Bellum Catilinae*, it is only through the digression that the full implications of the theme are elaborated: the digression, I think, reconfigures the way we are supposed to read the political oppositions manifested in the text, and the structure of the whole work.

These digressions demand extensive consideration, since the analysis they contain is central to Sallust's construction of his monographs: they distinguish Sallust from the political oppositions of his period, presenting him as a political thinker in his own right, with a cohesive reading of the

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[75] On historians' amplification of their subjects see Marincola 1997:34-43 (39-40 on Sallust); Canfora 1972:71-86; cf. Polyb. 29.12.2 as this as particularly relevant to monographers.
[76] *Jug.* 5.1-2.

malaise affecting Rome. In each case, Sallust draws on contemporary political conceptions: but his use of them is distinct.

Before considering the content of the digressions, I must briefly discuss Sallust's terminology. Throughout, Sallust frames his discussions of Republican politics according to two oppositions. The first of these is between the general population - the people of Rome - and the elite, those politically engaged (in effect, the Senate). Sallust focuses heavily on this latter group in his analysis: I suggested in the Introduction that Sallust's insiderist historiography posits a highly educated audience, and the two are largely identical.

The vocabulary used of this divide is variable (including *populus*/*senatus*, *populus*/*patres*, and *plebs*/*senatus*); but the divide itself remains constant, vocabulary rather providing variation than any finer gradation. Chapters 41-2 of the *Bellum Jugurthinum* illustrate this: the same basic antithesis (as Sallust says, *omnia in duas partis abstracta sunt*)[77] makes use of the terms *populus*/*senatus*;[78] *nobilitas*/*populus*;[79] *nobilitas*/*plebs*;[80] *pauci*/*populus*.[81] Although he uses *nobilitas*, this group need not refer only to the established *nobiles* of consular families, but stands *pars pro toto* for the whole group;[82] where Sallust distinguishes such men from *novi*, he indicates this.[83] Sallust occasionally refers to the group even as *patres*;[84] this archaic term is perhaps an allusion to the strife of the period of the Struggle of the Orders.[85] Sallust's vocabulary for this opposition is fundamentally vague: his analysis resists formal classification.[86]

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[77] *Jug*. 41.5.
[78] *Jug*. 41.2.
[79] *Jug*. 41.5.
[80] *Jug*. 41.6, 42.1.
[81] *Jug*. 41.7.
[82] On technical meanings of this terms see n.199 below.
[83] *Jug*. 4.7, 8.1. Smith 1968 suggests an association of *nobilitas* with factiousness; this is possible but Sallust's use is variable (this also depends to a degree on assumptions as to Sallust's political position).
[84] *Jug*. 30.1, *patres* contrasted with *plebs*.
[85] Cf. Hanell 1945:265.
[86] Hanell 1945 stresses Sallust's variation (similarly Hidalgo de la Vega 1984-5:107). Paananen's attempt (1972:23-37) to formulate specific meanings for *plebs*, *populus* etc. is over-literal and arbitrary: he also (48) claims that *nobilitas* is a perjorative in Sallust; but this is not supported by the examples cited (e.g. Sulla at 112.3, a portrait at worst ambiguous – see below pp.207-9).

A second opposition breaks down the senatorial group into two further elements, dividing a central establishment within the political class and those outside it. All are politically engaged; the distinction is between those established in their access to power and the rewards of office (for which he usually uses the terms *pauci*, *pauci potentes* or *factio*),[87] and those agitating in various ways against this established group (exemplified by the tribunes of the *Bellum Catilinae*, or Memmius in the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, as I will demonstrate). Sallust, as has been noted, avoids the word *popularis*;[88] nonetheless, the divide he refers to between a powerful *factio* and those who assailed it does replicate the traditional understanding of the role of *populares* in Roman political culture.[89] *Factio* and similar terms are derogatory, as I will demonstrate, in stressing the partisan elements of Republican political culture; but they are not the only derogatory groupings, since Sallust also attacks those who assail the *factio*, and are I think mainly convenient shorthand for identifying the major dynamics within Sallust's analysis, considered more fully below.

Sallust's analysis is unsophisticated, in contrast to modern studies of Republican political culture;[90] nonetheless, we should pay close attention to the divides which he saw as of prime importance in attempting to understand the model he imposes on his period's strife. Sallust's terminology may not advance our understanding of the dynamics of Roman politics (he only mentions the *equites* as a political group once);[91] but it illustrates what he saw as the key fault-lines of political practice.[92]

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[87] On *pauci* and *factio* see Paananen 1972:48-59, Garbugino 2006. Sallust frequently uses the term *factiosus* (e.g. *Cat*. 18.4, *Jug*. 8.1, 28.4) , always in a derogatory sense of partisan factionality and divisiveness.

[88] Paananen 1972:23. Paratore 1973:20 claims that Sallust emphasises the role of the *equites*; this is not borne out by the monographs.

[89] See Robb 2010:12-33 for a summary of scholarship on the *populares*, stressing the single common characteristic as oppositon between the senatorial majority and their political opponents (33): this largely replicates Sallust's analysis. Cf. works in n. 21 above.

[90] Wiseman 2009:5-32, Hölkeskamp 2010 summarise the *status quaestionis*.

[91] *Jug*.42.1; cf. Pelling 1986:181, D'Elia 1983:155 on Sallust's unsophistication.

[92] I cannot cover the value of Sallust's work as a historical source: Wiseman 2009:6-16 argues for a reappreciation of Roman politics closer to Sallust's binary model.

tanta vis morbi: *Bellum Catilinae* 36.4-39.5

The digression of the *Bellum Catilinae* (text and translation in the Appendix) is in two parts. The first half, to the end of chapter 37, deals with 63 BC, and the conspiracy itself; the second takes a wider view of late Republican politics. The two halves treat different parts of the political landscape: the chronological divide is combined with a shift in emphasis between the *plebs* and others. Sallust begins with the complicity of the *plebs* in Catiline's designs; the second half focuses on those actually active in Roman politics over the preceding decade. The relationship between the two halves is subtle; Sallust does not set the elite in direct conflict with the *plebs*, but uses each group as part of his broader explanatory model. I will consider each part in turn, with a view to demonstrating the explanatory role of Sallust's digression within the monograph. In keeping with my suggestions above as to the thematic centrality of this digression to the *Bellum Catilinae*, I will read the political analysis of the digression as a programmatic contribution to the programme of the work. Sallust connects his analysis to existing ideas, and uses them to illuminate what he saw as significant developments in Roman politics: the digression develops a model of political disorder at Rome, linked to the specific manifestation of Catiline's conspiracy, but with broader relevance.

Before treating content, I must acknowledge an important literary characteristic of this passage, supporting my reading of it as programmatic and analytical set-piece; the allusion to Thucydides' famous digression on Corcyraean *stasis* in book 3 of his history.[93] Thucydides' is a spectacular discussion of the descent of a state into factional strife, treated at length for its programmatic value; enormities at Corcyra provided examples frequently to be repeated across Greece.[94] According to Thucydides, the onset of *stasis* was owed to the war – partisan disputes over to which side to appeal - but also to human nature, which in times of peace and prosperity is able to

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[93] Thuc. 3.82-4. On Thucydidean influence on Sallust see p.56 above.
[94] Thuc. 3.84.

live undisturbed, but in the straitened circumstances of war has to struggle to fulfil its desires. War, for Thucydides, is catalyst for *stasis*.[95]

Thucydides does not identify specific, dateable events, but takes a broader approach, emphasising shifts in behaviour and morality. Foremost is the idea that in civil war, words shift meanings, and that the vocabulary of political morality is lost;[96] morality, too, dissolves, and plots and violence rather than debate become central to political advancement.[97] Attempts at reconciliation are motivated entirely by self-interest, broken as soon as circumstances allow. To Thucydides, political factionalism was the driving force behind the conflict: the use of ὀνόματα εὐπρεπῆ covered up a struggle for self-interest and for the power.[98] On the most fundamental level, according to Thucydides, *stasis* is driven by desire to rule, based on πλεονεξία and φιλοτιμία.

As has long been recognised, many themes of Sallust's digression are derived from Thucydides.[99] In particular, Sallust's claim that the banners of authentic political ideologies concealed struggles for individual power appears directly Thucydidean:[100] the idea of the redefinition of values under the stress of war and disorder deeply affected Sallust, judging by his widespread use of it.[101] Another important aspect of Sallust's moral system in this monograph, the stress on *ambitio* and *avaritia* as the causes of Roman decline,[102] is similarly Thucydidean: this translates precisely πλεονεξία and φιλοτιμία. While both terms are common individually in earlier Roman authors, their coincidence, and the similarity with Thucydides' digression, is suggestive.

There are significant contrasts between Thucydides' analysis and Sallust's: Thucydides emphasised that war was the catalyst for the state's decline into strife, reversing the Sallustian model established in the *archaeologia*;[103] Thucydides stresses the revolutions of equal factions, as

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[95] Thuc. 3.82.2.
[96] Thuc. 3.82.3.
[97] Thuc. 3.82.4.
[98] Thuc. 3.82.8.
[99] See most fully Scanlon 1980; Büchner 1983.
[100] *Cat*. 38.3.
[101] E.g. in Cato's speech, *Cat*. 52.11; *Hist*. 1.12M. cf. Scanlon 1980 esp. 99-102; Büchner 1983; Canfora 1991.
[102] E.g. *Cat*. 10.
[103] *Cat*. 10.2.

opposed to the *status quo* of an established group to which Sallust refers; indeed, Sallust's digression generally focuses less on the factional dimension than Thucydides'.[104] These contrasts demonstrate that while Sallust's digression does demonstrably refer to Thucydides', it is not dependent on it, but advances his own analysis.

The allusion to Thucydides would have been noticed by a contemporary audience. Thucydides' history was increasingly well-known at Rome in the period: Cicero praises it, and alludes to the use of the text as a talisman by the Atticist school of Roman orators.[105] The Corcyrean digression was among its most spectacular parts:[106] not only Sallust would have known the discussion of *stasis*, and his digression cannot but have been meant as a recognisable allusion.[107] In addition to the nod to a major stylistic model, the role of this allusion is two-fold.

Firstly, it prompts the audience to consider the thematic similarities between Rome and Corcyra. The allusion links the extreme violence of Corcyra with (less physically dangerous) Roman politics, to portray Rome as disintegrating *res publica*. Book 3 of Thucydides' work, which also contained the Mytilenean debate, was dominated by themes of demagogy and decline in true political deliberation:[108] Sallust draws on the thematic concentration of Thucydides' work in order to suggest their application to Rome too.[109]

Secondly, Sallust's recognisable allusion to Thucydides' digression perhaps implies that his digression plays a similar structural role. By referring so clearly to the Thucydidean digression, Sallust claims for his own analysis a similar programmatic significance. Thucydides elevated the specific manifestation of *stasis* on Mytilene to a general rule for his work; Sallust, I think, does the same. The deliberate intertextuality is a marker of authorial intention, and further indication of the interpretative significance with which Sallust invests this digression.

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[104] The stress on *mos partium et factionum* in the *Jug.* is a corrective, but that digression is less demonstrably dependent on Thucydides.

[105] Praise: Cic. *Brut*. 287, *de Or*. 2.56; adoption by the Atticists (misguided, in Cicero's view): *Orat*. 30-2. cf. Samotta 2012:364-70, Redde 1980:13-5.

[106] See a brief summary of reception at Hornblower 1991:477-9.

[107] Nicols 1999:332. On allusion in Latin literature see Hinds 1998 (esp. 1-13).

[108] Cohen 1984.

[109] For a similar reading of a Thucydidean allusion, this time in the preface of the *Cat*., see Gärtner 2011.

sicut in sentinam confluxerant: the *plebs*

Sallust begins with an analysis of the constituents and motivations of Catiline's supporters. For a modern historian attempting to discover the nature of economic factors behind this outbreak of strife, Sallust's analysis is inadequate: but it provides an illustration of his use of sources and political ideas.

Sallust made extensive use of Cicero's consular speeches as sources for his monograph.[110] In particular, the first half of this digression closely recalls a passage of Cicero's second Catilinarian speech, delivered before the people on 9th November 63 (after Catiline had left the city), in which Cicero enumerated the constituents of Catiline's support.[111] This is Cicero's fullest depiction of Catiline's following, and Sallust certainly knew it: indeed, he uses this same passage in describing the aristocratic component of Catiline's retinue at chapter 14.[112] However, a comparison of Cicero's description of the Catilinarians with Sallust's demonstrates important discrepancies: Sallust exaggerates parts of Catiline's support beyond what was described by Cicero, and, indeed beyond what he himself reported in his previous reference to Catiline's retinue.

Cicero's analysis of Catiline's support stresses the role of indebtedness: according to the speech, Catiline provided a touchstone for disparate groups, drawn together by his charisma and rhetoric of *tabulae novae*. Debtors make up four of the six groups identified by Cicero: he includes those indebted but unwilling to liquidate property,[113] those indebted by political concerns;[114] veterans from the Sullan *coloniae* who had overreached their new-found enrichment,[115] and an assortment of the generally unsavoury indebted through *inertia*, *male gerendo negotio, partim*

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[110] See McGushin 1977:8; Syme 1964:71-5
[111] Cic. *Cat*. 2.17-24. See Syme 1964:73; Amerio 1988; Funari 1998:27-8 on Sallust's use of Cicero here.
[112] Compare Cat. 14 with Cic. *Cat*. 2.10, on the vices of Catiline's aristocratic adherents.
[113] Cic. *Cat*. 2.18.
[114] Cic. *Cat*. 2.19.
[115] Cic. *Cat*. 2.20. Note Cicero's care to avoid criticism of these men as a class (*...quas ego universas civium esse optimorum et fortissimorum virorum sentio...*), attacking only the disreputable.

etiam sumptibus.[116] In addition to debtors, Cicero identifies an assortment of parricides, murderers and criminals, for whom Cicero proposes no pardon,[117] and Catiline's own retinue, described with the *topoi* of *luxuria* and sexual immorality.[118] Cicero's categorisations serve a particular purpose: in each case, he introduces a specific group and attacks it in order to galvanise the Roman people to his cause.

Sallust's version, although replicating Cicero's structure, differs in terms of emphasis. Sallust includes themes from Cicero's discussion, for example the spectre of Sulla;[119] but his version stresses above all the complicity of the *plebs* (rural and urban), stating that "almost all" of them supported Catiline's designs. This is in sharp contrast to Cicero's account, which avoids implicating the urban *plebs* beyond non-specific allusions, and which - where it does attack identifiable groups (e.g. the Sullan veterans) - paints Catiline's followers as anomalous "bad apples". The reality must lie somewhere between the two accounts: while Cicero's elides the support which must have existed for Catiline among the wider *plebs* (it provided the army defeated at Pistoria, if nothing else),[120] Sallust's wholly revolutionary *plebs* must equally be an exaggeration.[121]

I propose three possible explanations for Sallust's deviation from Cicero's account. The first is the context - historiography, as opposed to Cicero's contional oratory. A consul in a dangerous position (attempting to establish support for his prosecution of the law) would not attack those whom he was directly addressing; the historian, divorced from the need to curry favour, could be less concerned.[122] However, it is striking that Sallust, writing in an elite medium and in a style which restricts his audience to the educated,[123] so emphatically reverses Cicero's bias: his aim is unlikely to

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[116] Cic. *Cat*. 2.21.
[117] Cic. *Cat*. 2.22.
[118] Cic. *Cat*. 2.22-3.
[119] Cf. Cic. *Cat*. 2.20 with *Cat*. 37.6.
[120] Cf. *Cat*. 42 on widespread disturbances among the rural *plebs*; cf. Gruen 1974:422-8 on support for Catiline.
[121] For the actual makeup of Catiline's followers see Seager 1973.
[122] On the nature of oratory in the *contio* and the makeup of the crowd see (illustrative of a wide bibliography) Millar 1998; Mouritsen 2001; Morstein-Marx 2004 (207-28 treats Cicero's deployment of a *popularis* image within *contiones*); Yakobson 2010.
[123] See above p.9.

have been exculpation of the elite, given the attacks which do appear in his works.[124] Further explanation is needed.

Secondly, we might find in Sallust some superior historical understanding or source on the nature of the *plebs'* involvement. However, Sallust's attacks are also historically problematic. He argues that the *plebs* had been affected by widespread movement of the disaffected into the city;[125] but there is no *testimonium* in Cicero or elsewhere that the *plebs'* composition had been fundamentally changed by such an influx. Scholars have noted that most of the population shift into Rome in fact occurred after 58, with the advent of Clodius' corn doles (to which Sallust seems to allude, with his reference to *publicis largitionibus*).[126] Sallust distorts both what is attested by his sources and also the reality of 63. His depiction of the *plebs* represents his own experience of the 50s, rather than the realities of the 60s.

A third explanation for Sallust's deviations from Cicero is his own preoccupations and historiographical aims. The description of the *plebs'* support for the conspiracy at the beginning of this digression portrays the *populus Romanus* in an especially negative light, and extends the basis of the conspiracy to encompass a much broader base of Roman society than described in Cicero's oratory. Sallust, I think, throws particular light onto the participation of the *plebs* in the conspiracy in order to contribute to a political interpretation developed throughout: the stress on the *plebs'* role here (in contrast to previous descriptions of Catiline's support) is particularly significant because of the digression's programmatic and explanatory role. Emphasis on plebeian culpability, exceeding what was attested in his sources, is a part of Sallust's programme. He presents a subjective version of the situation of 63 in order to illustrate a general diagnosis of the nature of Roman politics: stress on plebeian complicity emphasises (like the allusion to Thucydides) the fragility of Roman society,

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[124] e.g. *Cat*. 12-3, 14; *Jug*. 41.
[125] *Cat*. 37.5.
[126] McGushin 1977:204; Brunt 1962:69-70 discusses movement into the city. Plut. *Crass*. 12.2 refers to a huge donative given by Crassus in 70, but this cannot alone explain sustained migration into the city. d'Anna 1990:67 reads Sallust's attack on donatives as latent praise for Caesar, who had dramatically reduced them.

and the readiness throughout its lowest *stratum* for revolution, and thus reiterates the danger presented by Catiline's conspiracy within the thematic statement of the monograph.

The connection between plebeian culpability and the explanatory role of the digression is emphasised by the terms in which Sallust's analysis is couched. Description of the *plebs* emphasises that their behaviour is typical of such groups, assimilating the model Sallust lays out here with the descriptive project of political philosophy: the portrayal of the *plebs* fits into the explanatory role of the digression. In explaining the causes behind the conspiracy, Sallust makes no reference to social or economic factors: the *plebs*' readiness to revolt is ascribed solely to their own moral degeneracy.[127]

Sallust does not portray the *plebs* as driven into debt by the abuses of the *nobiles*, and thus towards Catiline; Sallust does place justifications in the mouths of the conspirators themselves elsewhere in the *Bellum Catilinae* (particularly the letter of Manlius, justifying his actions), but their claims are not replicated here.[128] The *plebs* simply behaves as any mob would, because of innate badness and envy aroused by inequality of wealth. Sallust makes the point explicitly: *nam semper in civitate quibus opes nullae sunt bonis invident, malos extollunt, vetera odere, nova exoptant, odio suarum rerum mutari omnia student*.[129] As well as linking 63 to more general patterns, this alludes to specific political vocabulary of the late Republic. Sallust avoids *optimates* as a political term,[130] but *boni* has a comparable significance, referring to the established citizens identified with the interests of the state. The term appears widely in Cicero's rhetoric of the post-exile period, most famously in *Pro Sestio*: Cicero illustrates the term's ideological slant, using it to distinguish the upstanding citizens against the dangerously fickle *multitudo*.[131] *mali*, conversely, are the worst in society: later in the monograph Cato, exemplar of rectitude, is termed the *malis pernicies*.[132] By using such loaded

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[127] Shaw 1975, argues that debt *was* a genuinely pressing problem in 63.
[128] *Cat*. 20, 33. Cf. La Penna 1968:146-7.
[129] *Cat*. 37.3.
[130] Noted by Ramsey 2007:115; Paul 1984:22.
[131] See Cic. *Sest*. 96-100. On terms of political definition in the passage see Robb 2010:55-67 with full bibliography.
[132] *Cat*. 54.3. On *mali* see Hellegouarc'h 1963:526-8.

terms, Sallust engages with a tradition of the mob as a dangerous and revolutionary element: that such rules hold *semper in civitate* demonstrates the general nature of Sallust's assessment.

This attack on the *plebs* is far from an isolated example.[133] Wherever Sallust mentions the *populus* in his own voice in the monograph, their characterisation is consistently negative, emphasising fearfulness and lack of constancy. When the news emerges at Rome of Manlius' rising in Etruria - comprised of the rural *plebs* -[134] the urban *plebs* are struck with terror;[135] their self-interest is similarly illustrated by their expedient shift towards support of the senate immediately after Catiline's defeat.[136] This holds in the *Bellum Jugurthinum*: the *plebs* remains characterised by changeability, lack of constancy, susceptibility to evil influences, and violence.[137] Even in the speeches Sallust gives to those appealing to the *plebs*, a recurring theme is their apathy and worthlessness.[138]

Sallust draws on established conceptions of the *plebs* in order to fit them into a general model. This is not the idea that the *plebs* might have a useful role to play in the state (for example as part of the mixed constitution, applied to Rome by Cicero and Polybius);[139] Sallust's *plebs* is aligned rather with constitutional change and collapse, replicating anti-democratic arguments found in political philosophy.[140] We will see below that the links between Sallust's depiction of the *plebs* and anti-democractic arguments continue in the second half of the digression, dealing with the dangers of demagogues: Sallust's depiction of the *plebs*, and the ease with which members of the elite stirred them up into violence, again alludes to the characteristic behaviour of the mob of raising up demagogues to rule them.[141]

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[133] On the *plebs* in Sallust see Diesner 1953, Samotta 2009:118-21.
[134] *Cat*. 28.4.
[135] *Cat*. 31.
[136] *Cat*. 48.
[137] E.g. *Jug*. 66.4, 73.
[138] e.g. Memmius (*Jug*. 31) and Macer (*Hist*. 3.48 M); on popular passivity as oratorical theme see Martin 2000:34-6.
[139] Popular elements in the mixed constitution: Arist. *Pol*. 1294a-b; Polyb. 6.14; Cic. *Rep*. 1.54-5, 70.
[140] McGushin 1977:203 cites Plato, *Rep*. 552d, *Laws* 738c; Arist. *Pol*. 1265b. cf. Aris. *Pol*. 4.1295b on the natural tendency of the poor to hate the rich.
[141] See Pl. *Rep*. 562b-567a; Aris. *Pol*. 5.1304b-1305a; Polyb. 6.9; Cic. *Rep*. 1.65-8.

Sallust draws on established views of the mob as inherently revolutionary in order to link Rome into general currents of political change, and to situate her within a broader political pattern: he manipulates the evidence of his sources, and largely ignores factors which drove the *plebs* into conspiracy, in order to develop his own analysis. The treatment of the *plebs* emphasises their complicity, stressing the danger presented by the conspiracy, in keeping with the thematic statement of the monograph. With the second half of the digression, the focus shifts, from this description of the symptoms of Rome's political malaise towards an analysis of its causes: here, again, the content of the digression is calculated to fit the explanatory role served within the *dispositio* of the monograph.

The *malum publicum* – causation and decline

Sallust's subject shifts with the reference to a final group of conspirators; those "of a different party than that of the senate", who "preferred that the state be overturned than that they themselves should do less well".[142] Although part of the same list of Catiline's supporters, Sallust no longer refers to the mob, but to a group out of favour within the political class.[143] The tendency towards self-interest recalls the introduction to the digression, describing "citizens who from their obstinate spirits were advancing to their own destruction, together with the commonwealth's".[144] This cannot include the *plebs*, since Sallust states that they "keep themselves without a care among the mob and seditions, as poverty is easily retained without loss"; the repeated theme emphasises a shift in subject-matter. The divide between *plebs* and elite as subjects for Sallust's analysis is mirrored by a switch in chronological focus, from 63 to the preceding decade. While the first half stressed 63 as a point of extreme danger, by reference to the broad base of revolutionary feeling, the second supplements this by discussion of the preceding years. Each half illustrates Sallust's

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[142] *Cat*. 37.10.
[143] Cf. above p.156.
[144] *Cat*. 36.4.

model in a different way: the first depicts effects; the second the causal model behind Sallust's analysis of Rome at her most miserable.

In keeping with Sallust's lack of interest in causal factors which motivated them, the second half of the digression actually mentions the *plebs* very little: although their readiness for revolt was the central symptom of Rome's decline, Sallust grants them no agency. As we have seen, he elides the abuses of the elite against the *plebs*; instead, he stresses the actions of members of that elite, in stirring up a typically degenerate *populus* into revolutionary feeling for political purposes (Sallust's word is *criminando*, which here as elsewhere refers specifically to *unfounded* accusations).[145] Sallust's analysis is not of struggle between the *plebs* and *senatus*, but of the use the *plebs* as a weapon by members of the elite: not "class struggle", but the struggles within a single class. His emphasis in the digression is on the lack of internal unity among the governing class itself: plebeian readiness to revolt is an aspect of the egregious danger of the conspiracy, but the *plebs* is actually largely passive in his causal model.

Sallust's analysis of increasing discord throughout the 60s focuses on one development in particular as turning-point and catalyst for decline, which again locates his analysis in relation to contemporary perspectives, diminishing the *plebs'* agency. Strife re-emerges with the restitution of the power of the tribunate, accomplished in 70 BC by Pompey and Crassus.[146] Sallust makes no mention of the popular agitation which led to the reform - the tribunate of Licinius Macer, for example, to whom he later gave a speech on the subject -[147] or the intermediary *lex Aurelia* of 75, which had restored to the tribunate its role as a first stage in a political career; there is similarly no reference to the popular violence of the 70s, such as the disturbances of 75 BC (again treated in the *Historiae*) when members of the urban *plebs* attacked the consuls with stones.[148] This would have required inclusion in a comprehensive account, but it is here elided: it does not fit Sallust's thesis.

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[145] c*riminari* elsewhere in Sallust: *Jug*. 79.7, *Hist*. 3.48.17M. Oniga 1990:40 makes a similar point.
[146] *Cat*. 38.
[147] *Hist*. 3.48M. On agitation in the 70s see Wiseman 1994b. On Macer's speech see Latta 1999; Blänsdorf 1978; Wisman 2009:59-79.
[148] See *Hist*. 2.45M; the speech of Cotta at 2.48M was a response to this agitation. Cf. McGushin 1992:208-11.

Sallust also minimises any positive significance of the office. There is no reference to the tribunate understood as a legitimate check to the abuses of the ruling elite (claimed by tribunes of the period, and by Cicero in his speeches *pro Cornelio*):[149] Sallust includes all references to *iura populi* under the heading of latent self-interest.[150] Nor is there any mention of the concessions won: Sallust's interest is not measures like Manilius' proposed reformation of the voting rights of freedmen in 66, but factional episodes exemplified by the fierce conflict between Piso, the consul of 67, and the tribunes Gabinius and Cornelius.[151] Sallust is again selective, identifying the tribunate as catalyst for disorder, and minimising any sense that its agitation might be justified.

Sallust sets out a clear reading of the office in the 60s: as with the *plebs* above, this holds throughout. Whenever the tribunate appears, Sallust portrays it negatively, as a vehicle for sedition or at least a nuisance, and only very rarely a constructive element. The other mention of the office in the *Bellum Catilinae* is at 43.1, describing the tribune Lucius Bestia as a stooge of Catiline; there is no discussion of tribunes who supported the senate, and when Cato (tribune designate) makes his speech on the conspirators' punishment, Sallust makes no mention of his tribunician status.[152] In the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, tribunes mentioned are Gaius Memmius (an ambiguous figure, as I explore below); Gaius Baebius, guilty of bribery on Jugurtha's behalf;[153] and Publius Lucullus and Lucius Annius, by whose attempts to prolongue their offices *res publica atrociter agitabantur*.[154]

The assessment of the tribunate is perhaps suprisingly negative (given Sallust's holding of the office); however, it is consistent with the analysis which he imposes on the politics of the 60s. Sallust's view of the tribunate again engages with contemporary ideas. The office was contentious in late Republican Rome, as demonstrated by the lengths to which Sulla had gone to defang it.[155] One tradition associated it with continuous sedition as far back as the Gracchi: the position against which

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[149] See especially Cic. *Corn*. 1.47-54 C with commentary at Crawford 1994:132-9; Millar 1998:88-91.
[150] This surfaces in Sallust's description of the Gracchi, who are exceptional: see below pp.187-9.
[151] Manilius: Dio. 36.42. Conflicts between Piso and the tribunes: e.g. Dio 36.24, 36.38-9.
[152] *Cat*. 52.
[153] *Jug*. 33-4.
[154] *Jug*. 37.1-2.
[155] See Millar 1998:49-71 on agitation for restitution of tribunician power.

Cicero argues in the *pro Cornelio* attacked Cornelius within a *continuum* of seditious tribunes.[156] Even in instances where opposition to the abuses of the senate might seem justified, as Robin Seager notes "it is clear that from the optimate point of view discord and sedition were created only by those who attempted to reform abuses, not by those who had caused them".[157] This ties in with Sallust's remarks: from 70 onwards some attacks on the senate (for example, the career of C. Cornelius) could be justified as legitimate correctives to senatorial abuses, but Sallust presents all attempts to disrupt the *status quo* as driven by self-interest. Cicero noted – even in front of a senatorial audience in the Verrines - that the abuses of the senate required tribunician correction:[158] Sallust ascribes disorder solely to the tribunes.

Sallust's view recalls opinions ascribed to Quintus Cicero in Cicero's *de Legibus*. As Dyck notes in his commentary, in the third book of the work Quintus voices an optimate perspective, and his opposition to the tribunate may well reflect a personal conviction:[159] comparison with his opinions locates Sallust as part of a late Republican tradition. The office, Quintus suggests, had been born *in seditione* (an uncontroversial reference to plebeian secessions) but also *ad seditionem*;[160] it had since its institution provided a means for seditious elements to attack the best men in society (illustrated by his brother's treatment by Clodius).[161] After approving the Sullan reforms,[162] Quintus attacks Pompey's restitution of its powers.[163] Marcus rejoinders that Quintus' catalogue of abuses is accurate, but that the office's merits in preserving order through mediating the violence of the *plebs* outweigh them: after dismissing his own exile as not the fault of the tribunate itself, he concludes that Pompey's actions were necessary to pacify the *plebs*.[164] Neither Quintus nor Atticus are

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[156] It is a *topos* of Roman historiography that the period of strife began with Tiberius Gracchus' tribunate in 133: see Cic. *Rep*. 1.3.1; Florus *Ep*. 2.2 (also apparently Posidonius' view, *ap*. Diodorus 34.33). See Flower 2010:80-7 on the transfigurative nature of 133-21; Wiseman 2009:7. Sallust does not replicate this; where the Gracchi *are* mentioned (*Jug.* 41) his view is different.
[157] Seager 1972b:337.
[158] Cic. *Verr*. 2.5.175; cf. Millar 1998:67-71 on Cicero's rhetoric here.
[159] Dyck 2004:488; cf. Marshall 1975.
[160] Cic. *Leg*. 3.19.
[161] Cic. *Leg*. 3.21-2.
[162] Cic. *Leg*. 3.22
[163] Cic. *Leg*. 3.22.
[164] Cic. *Leg*. 3.26.

convinced:[165] as Dyck again notes, such lack of agreement is Cicero's preferred literary tactic for dealing with issues difficult to resolve, or for which divergent perspectives were possible.[166] Quintus and Atticus, representative of the optimate view, are unmoved.

Sallust does not directly treat the origins of the office, or the idea that the tribunate was *ad seditionem nata* (although fragments of the *Historiae* seem to suggest that he subsequently drew this conclusion),[167] but he does implicitly recommend Sulla's restrictions – in Sallust's formulation, the period when the tribunate *was* restricted was not afflicted by the *malum* of partisan politics.[168] Sallust ignores the argument that the office served a useful purpose, and that possible damage could be mitigated by its collegiality (such that a good - i.e. pro-senatorial - tribune could usually be found);[169] while he does not demonstrably allude to the *de Legibus*, he replicates Quintus' broadly optimate ideas.

The attacks on the tribunate are a powerful argument against biographical readings of Sallust's text, or *popularis* readings: it is even tempting to connect Sallust's attacks on the office to the *apologia* for his own political career.[170] However, to characterise Sallust's approach as replicating optimate ideas is to elide a central part of his analysis, which paints the established elite (those who claimed to uphold the authority of the Senate) as - although not equally culpable in the onset of strife - at least equally violent in responding to it. Sallust again describes this in Thucydidean terms, emphasising the gulf between pretence and self-interested motives: the response is just as driven by self-interest as the tribunes' attack.

According to Sallust, the seditions of the tribunes provoked a similar reaction. The cycle was broken only when Pompey departed for the East, when the *pauci* began to exercise their domination over the *plebs* particularly fiercely; even before Pompey's departure, in the conflicts of 70-66 *utrique*

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[165] Cic. *Leg*. 3.26.
[166] Dyck 2004:516.
[167] *Hist*. 1.11M.
[168] *Cat*. 37.11. Cf. Martin 2006:86.
[169] Cic. *Leg*. 3.24-5.
[170] *Cat*. 3.3-6. Mackie 1992:73 suggests that Sallust is a bad historical source because his own failures distort his perspective.

victoriam crudeliter exercebant.[171] Sallust's analysis of the period up to Pompey's departure is again largely ahistorical, making no mention of facts of Republican politics (such as Pompey's increasing influence) but referring to him only after he had achieved his extraordinary command; this is itself presented as a boon to the rest of the *pauci*, rather than as the unprecedented individual power which it certainly represented.[172] It is also somewhat unclear: while the analysis of tribunician strife drew an opposition between the upholders of the authority of the senate and the tribunes, Sallust now stresses the abuses of the established group against the *plebs*, conflating the categories of abuses against the *plebs* and infighting among the elite.

This part further illustrates Sallust's highly selective presentation of the facts in order to fit a schematised political model. Pompey's departure, according to Sallust, marked a hiatus in political strife, because the elite now had the upper hand and were able to monopolise the rewards of victory: the domination of the *pauci*, reinforced by their use of the threat of the courts to frighten their opponents into submission, is clearly noted.[173] The *pauci* make ruthless use of their supremacy: like the tribunes, they are driven by self-interest to make unjust use of political power. Sallust suggests that *ei magistratus, provincias, aliaque omnia tenere, ipsi innoxii, florentes, sine metu aetatem agere ceterosque iudiciis terrere, quo plebem in magistratu placidius tractarent*: it is striking that Sallust places this analysis here, at the point of the political supremacy of the *pauci*, rather than in the previous chapter where it might have served to justify the activities of the tribunes: he presents these material advantages as the direct consequence of the diminution of the power of the *plebs*' champions.

This analysis of the use of power by the *pauci* adopts a different perspective from the attacks on the *plebs* and the tribunes. The charges laid against the *pauci* here recall the arguments placed in the mouths of the revolutionaries in Sallust's narrative:[174] Catiline's programmatic speech

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[171] *Cat*. 38.4.
[172] On the ideological significance of the extraordinary commands of the 60s see Arena 2012:179-200 with bibliography.
[173] *Cat*. 39.2.
[174] Catiline's speeches at *Cat*. 20 and 58, and Manlius' letter at *Cat*. 33; Cf. *Jug*. 31, 85.

inveighed against the same domination of the state by a narrow group. We should not read the similarities between Sallust's position and the speech given to Catiline as support for Catiline's position: the monopolisation of the rewards of office described here again represents an aspect of internal conflict among the *nobiles*, and Sallust emphasises in his description of Catiline that despite his claims, in reality he aimed at precisely the same domination and rewards of office that he attacked.[175] Sallust does criticise the behaviour of those in office; but this is not as an unfair balance of power in the state, but as another manifestation of internal strife and self-interest within the elite.

I suggested above that this digression sets out a political model; having considered each section, it is time to draw this together. The two halves of Sallust's description are connected by the repetition of the idea that all those implicated preferred to see the state fall than that their own situation should be worse: the historical distortions which Sallust introduces – painting the *plebs* as generically bad rather than justified in resistance to the abuses of the *nobiles*, the tribunes as wholly driven by self-interest, and the politics of the 60s as decisively shifted in favour of the established elite by Pompey's departure for the East – all serve this. The most important structuring idea is of expediency over the public good, elevated to an inescapable *motif*: the digression's stress on the immediate danger to the state emphasises the application of this value-system to all of Roman society, before illustrating the dynamic in practice through a narrative of cyclical strife. The first half serves to exemplify, and the second to explain, a political paradigm of disorder.[176] A useful phrase under which to conceive this is the *malum publicum*, adduced at the end of the first half of the passage, summing up the attitude of the readiness for civil violence.

The rise of self-interest provides a causal explanation for the increasing pitch of conflict culminating in the Catilinarian conspiracy. Corresponding to the idea that both sides acted on their

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[175] Cat. 21.2.

[176] *Cat*. 37.11: *id adeo malum multos post annos in civitatem revorterat*. Cf. *tanta vis morbi* at 36.5: the *malum publicum* is the plague affecting Rome's political life. Syme 1964: 327 notes the phrase's specificity to Sallust; *malum publicum* is in classical Latin only in the *Cat*. and *Hist*. (more usual is *mala publica*).

own self-interest is the fact that in such a conflict advantages were always pressed to extremes: the extreme use made by each side of its victory prompts a broader cycle of sedition.[177] In Sallust's account, the activity of the *pauci* is manipulated so that it appears to be a response to the stirring-up of strife by those wishing to supplant them; the success of the *pauci* afterwards is the logical consequence of the judgement that *utrique victoriam crudeliter exercebant*. Factional strife, in Sallust's model, is like a pendulum: advantage swings towards the *populares* with the restitution of the tribunate for factional aims, and back to the *pauci* after Pompey's departure. The structure imposed is an aspect of this analysis: the abuses of the *pauci* were not remarked by Sallust before 70, where they might have served some causal purpose in explaining the activities of the tribunes, but are introduced only after the power of the *populares* has receded, and thus logically appear as a kind of revenge.

This model of a *malum publicum* of cyclical strife with changing poliitical dynamics, and the stress on expediency, is central to Sallust's political interpretation; it is again close to Thucydides'. It is in the light of expediency that Sallust returns to Catiline at the end of the digression, with a discussion of the potential consequences of Catiline's success.[178] Catiline emerges from a context in which the *nobiles* have harshly re-established their supremacy, but the plebs are still ripe for revolution because of the self-interested activites of the *populares*; the pendulum is ready to swing back, and this is the possibility to which Sallust refers with his discussion of a possible Catilinarian victory.[179] Even with a hypothetical Catilinarian success, there remains the possible intervention of one *qui plus posset*;[180] within the theory of partisan strife established here, this represents the next swing of the pendulum in the escalating cycle. The "new danger" of Catiline's conspiracy, mentioned in the thematic statement, is the coincidence of his attempt on the commonwealth with the general *malum publicum* and the disintegration of normal political practice which went along with it,

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[177] For the comparable idea that self-interest dictates full use of temporary advantages to damage opponents see the Carneadic arguments of Cic. *Rep*. 3.18-28; on the cruel use of victory cf. also *Jug*. 16.2, 42.4 and below.
[178] *Cat*. 39.4.
[179] *Cat*. 39.4*.*
[180] *Cat*. 39.4: see above n.63.

resulting in the readiness for revolution across society exemplified in the *plebs* of the first part of the digression.

I consider the relation of these themes to other parts of the *Bellum Catilinae* more fully in the next chapter; expediency and self-interest recur in the character sketches. However, the closing sentence of the digression is illustrative, providing a point of contrast between the men of Sallust's own day and those of early Rome. Sallust refers in concluding his digression to a certain Fulvius, the son of a senator who had attempted to join the conspiracy (not known from other sources).[181] Fulvius illustrates the struggles of the elite among themselves, and their readiness for civil violence for advancement; but he also provides a sharp comparison with a Roman *exemplum*. Throughout the *Bellum Catilinae*, Sallust makes oblique reference to Manlius Torquatus as a model of the severity of the Romans of old. As Andrew Feldherr has shown, the reference to Torquatus is many-layered; but central is the fact that Torquatus had killed his own son because he had engaged the enemy contrary to his father's orders.[182] Fulvius, on the other hand, is also killed by his father, but because he had attempted to join the conspiracy – fighting against the state, rather than too eagerly for it: Fulvius exemplifies the shift towards personal expediency over the *res publica*.

Sallust deploys his historical data to argue a particular political model. He is highly selective; his narrative fits Roman events and factors to themes of self-interest and expediency drawn from Thucydides. The analysis is not – importantly – of the justified or unjustified resistance of the *plebs* to the government of a noble elite: both halves of the digression elide "class conflict" in favour of emphasising internal conflict among the political classes, of which the opportunity to abuse the *plebs* is a kind of reward. Different sectors of society are attacked for different reasons, as symptomatic of a broader malaise: the *plebs* are easily played upon by seditious tribunes and are ready to destroy the state; the tribunes themsleves make dangerous use of this weapon in aiming at

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[181] *Cat*. 39.5.
[182] Cf. Feldherr 2012:109 on Torquatus' *exemplum* as deployed in Cato's speech; Kapust 2011:70 stresses the theme of *redescriptio*.

their own interests; the established elite make unjust use of their power in suppressing the *plebs*. While he maintains a binary approach, his analysis is not as simple as *nobiles* versus *plebs*.

Sallust draws at different points on established ideas: his ideas on the tribunate are close to the rhetoric of the optimates, while attacks on the domination of the *pauci* recall Catiline's (specious) justifications. Sallust's combination of these traditions is his contribution: by drawing these perspectives together within a Thucydidean schema emphasising self-interest, he defines an explanatory model applied throughout. The digression is a synthesis of existing ideas contributing to a moralistic and theoretical understanding of Roman decline: as I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, Sallust was an experienced politician, but he wrote from a position of non-engagement, and as such was not constrained by the divisions of practical politics in the late Republic. While Ronald Syme suggested that in this passage "Sallust is against the *nobilitas*. But he is not wholeheartedly on the side of its enemies",[183] this does not do justice to Sallust's attempts to formalise Roman discord within a broader analytical model.

The resurgence of the *malum publicum* is central to Sallust's analysis of Catiline's danger; but Sallust himself noted that it was not new, having returned upon Rome after a number of years, *multos post annos*.[184] The reference is to the period before the Sullan civil war; it is testament to the thematic importance of the analysis outlined here that Sallust took the beginnings of that phase of strife as his next subject.

mos partium et factionum: *Bellum Jugurthinum* 41-2

At the centre of his second monograph, Sallust again places a digression clarifying his theme. In this case, the passage's relevance is even more pronounced, extending to the whole composition: the structure of the monograph is, I think, calculated around Sallust's reading of political strife.

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[183] Syme 1964: 126.
[184] *Cat*. 37.11. Latta 1988:282 refers this to Sulpicius Rufus in 88, although he also claims that in the *Cat*. the era of party strife began earlier (in 70) than in the *Jug*. (146); Mariotti 2006 *ad loc.* refers it to the *tumultus Lepidi*, but this is not comparable.

Sallust's stated subject is not just the war with Jugurtha, but also the first challenge to the *superbia* of the *nobiles*.[185] In keeping with this, political themes are fully integrated into the narrative: although the digression is delayed to the most apposite point, description of people and events in political terms appears more frequently. It is therefore appropriate to set my analysis of the political digression within a thematic synopsis of the whole work: the correspondence between political themes of the digression and the monograph's structure is central to my reading.

Alongside military narrative, Sallust describes political shifts: in this light, the text can be divided into a number of units, in each of which particular themes are stressed, developing across the monograph. The preponderance of political themes throughout necessitates an alternative approach. I will consider the thematic sections of the monograph in more detail: I will briefly assess the themes of each section (focusing on exemplary episodes), before drawing them together with my analysis of the digression. I will suggest here that changes in emphasis across the text respond to the analysis of the digression: the monograph's structure enacts the political model laid out at chapters 41-2, and the digression illuminates the *dispositio* of the whole. While the thematic structure of the *Bellum Jugurthinum* has been treated before, my use of the digression as explanatory model offers a new perspective.[186]

The themes of the *Bellum Jugurthinum*

The monograph can be split into four thematic units (developed further below), although demarcations are blurred. First is the period up to the start of the Roman military reponse to Jugurtha's agression, after the massacre at Cirta.[187] Sallust's major concern is Rome's bad governance by the senate, and failures of "foreign policy": *avaritia* is constantly emphasised as an explanatory *motif* in the character of the hegemonic *nobiles*.[188] The second section, overlapping with

[185] *Jug*. 5.1-2.
[186] On the structure of the *Jug*. See Büchner 1953; Vretska 1954:24-84; Leeman 1957; Giancotti 1971:85-164; Paratore 1973:107-17.
[187] *Jug*. 5-26.
[188] Cf. Leeman 1957:9-10 on this theme.

the first thematically and chronologically, begins with the second Roman commission to Numidia, includes the passing of Aulus Albinus' army under the yoke, and runs to the end of the campaigning season.[189] Sallust retains the emphasis on *avaritia* and misgovernance; but also introduces the idea of unrest, *invidia*, in reference to the growing dissatisfaction of the *plebs*. This is exemplified by the intervention of the tribune C. Memmius, to whom Sallust gives a speech, and culminates in the *quaestio Mamiliana*.

The digression appears here:[190] it brings the civil strife of the thematic statement explicitly to the fore. Coinciding with the *quaestio*, it is a turning-point in the relations of different elements within the state, and in the monograph's construction: subsequent themes are markedly different. The third section records a shift in the military situation, with the arrival of Metellus – a *nobilis* – and his military successes.[191] The venality and *avaritia* of the elite is much less evident; Metellus in fact emerges as a paragon. Relevant politically is the conflict between Metellus and Marius: this runs alongside the military narrative. The final part, marked by the shift in overall command to Marius, is again dominated by military affairs; political themes continue through the juxtaposition of Marius and Sulla (a patrician).

The first phase includes Jugurtha's youth, accession, and increasing aggression. It includes the senate's first response to Jugurtha's criminality, the deputation to Africa: this opening section characterises the Rome with which Jugurtha came into contact, and develops the *motif* which dominates the first half. The predominant theme is senatorial culpability, and in particular *avaritia* as its cause. Sallust's emphasis on venality is contradicted by modern assessments that the senate's actions need not be explained by bribery, but in fact fits with its usual "foreign policy": Sallust distorts to foreground the role of *avaritia* as part of a broader argument.[192] Two episodes exemplify

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[189] Jug. 21.4-40.
[190] *Jug*. 41-2.
[191] *Jug*. 43-86.
[192] See von Fritz 1943; La Penna 1968:174-84. Cf. Parker 2008.

the thematic focus, characterising Rome politically and foreshadowing aspects of the rest: the characterisation of Jugurtha at Numantia; and the senatorial debate on Numidian intervention.

At Numantia, Jugurtha comes into contact with a group of Romans who encourage his ambition by suggesting that *Romae omnia venalia esse*, a phrase emblematic of the themes of this section.[193] As Victor Parker has demonstrated, Sallust states the *motif* and then repeatedly echoes it, in order to colour his audience's reading of the text, throughout the whole of this first part of the work.[194] Scipio warns Jugurtha of the dangers of bribery and factioneering;[195] but Jugurtha is convinced.[196]

These Romans are "new men and nobles (*novi atque nobiles*), to whom riches were of more worth than goodness or honesty; factious at home, powerful among the allies; well-known rather than worthy."[197] As well as the first with whom Jugurtha comes into contact, they are the first Romans to whom the audience is introduced in detail; Sallust's description provides a general commentary on the nature of Roman politics as factious and avaritious, charateristics which emerge as programmatic. The identity of these figures has been disputed:[198] given Sallust's vagueness, it is an attractive hypothesis that he overstates their historical role in order to develop his analysis of a debased, venal Rome. Although his criticism has been read as referring to the *nobiles* alone, this is unconvincing: given the importance of the terms *nobilis* and *novus [homo]* in Republican political vocabulary, it seems unlikely that Sallust would have used this formulation if what he really meant was "*nobiles iuvenes*".[199] Sallust explicitly identifies these men as coming from across the political class: his attack is on those in power, without distinction according to social status. Through this

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[193] *Jug*. 8.1.
[194] Parker 2008:85-6; Parker 2004. The *sententia* is explicitly echoed at e.g. 20.1, 28.4, 32.4, and with Jugurtha's comment "*urbem venalem et mature perituram, si emptorem invenerit*" at 35.10 (cf. below p.183).
[195] *Jug*. 8.2. On Scipio's portrait see Montgomery 2013.
[196] *Jug*. 8.2. On this episode in Jugurtha's characterisation see pp.223-5.
[197] Jug. 8.1.
[198] Dix 2006:95 impugns Sallust's sources.
[199] Latte 1962:16, followed by Koestermann 1971:50. On these terms, and the technical question of what exactly constituted *nobilitas*, see Hellegouarc'h 1963:430-9; Brunt 1982; Shackleton-Bailey 1986; Crawford 2000 (with full bibliography).

vignette of Jugurtha's development, Sallust makes an initial demonstration of the venality characterising Rome's elite.

The account of the initial debate on Numidia is dominated by the same theme: the stress on corruption among those in power is maintained.[200] Two Romans come in for particular opprobrium: L. Opimius and M. Aemilius Scaurus, illustrating in different ways the themes of this section. Opimius' introduction emphasises his partisanship: "a man well-known and powerful in the senate at that time, who when consul, after the killings of C. Gracchus and M. Fulvius Flaccus, had made harsh use of the victory of the nobles over the *plebs*".[201] A prominent member of the senate is directly implicated in a previous outbreak of violence at Rome, and located within a *continuum* of violent political strife. The *princeps senatus*, Aemilius Scaurus, is more complex.[202] Historically, Scaurus was a supporter of the authority of the senate, and a defender of the *status quo*;[203] Sallust terms him simply *homo nobilis*. Sallust states that Scaurus supported the apparently more just position - giving aid to Adherbal, extracting a penalty from Jugurtha for Hiempsal's murder - but nonetheless criticises him in the strongest terms: "energetic, factious, greedy for power, honour and riches; but cleverly concealing his vices".[204] This assessment is puzzling, not least because it can have had no basis in Sallust's sources.[205] The fierce criticism of Scaurus has been ascribed to personal *animus*;[206] however, more significant is Scaurus' position as *princeps senatus*. This lends him paradigmatic value: by ascribing these vices to Scaurus, they rebound on the senate as a whole.

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[200] *Jug*. 16.1.

[201] *Jug*. 16.2.

[202] On Scaurus' career see Bates 1986. Gruen 1968:121-2 states that Scaurus was part of the Metellan *factio*; if accurate, it is perhaps significant for Sallust's portrayal of Metellus that he never mentions any association between them.

[203] Cic. *Sest*. 101.

[204] *Jug*. 15.4.

[205] Scaurus had published his memoirs on the period: Sallust may be directly refuting them. On Scaurus' autobiography see Bates 1983:121-62; Landau 2011:133-8; on sources for the *Jug*. see La Penna 1968:244-6; Koestermann 1971:14-6. Earl 1965:236 calls Sallust's depiction "a piece of self-evident nonsense".

[206] e.g. Hands 1959 argues that Sallust hated *dissimulatio* and that this was central to Scaurus' character; Paul 1966:100 hypothesises that Sallust was motivated by dislike of Scaurus' son; Syme 1964:164-5 stresses Scaurus' popularity with Cicero (La Penna 1968:186-8 calls contemporary literature on Scaurus "almost hagiographic").

Scaurus, Sallust suggests, is not swayed by bribery, because of the *invidia* which would result from such conspicuous corruption.[207] This first section of the monograph stresses *avaritia* and the hegemony of the *nobiles* at Rome; but this reference to *invidia* as consequence of corruption is also thematically significant, prefiguring its subsequent importance. From this point, Sallust develops *invidia*, first as a factor in the Senate's activities and then finally as realised in the *quaestio Mamiliana*; the growth of *invidia*, and the consequent challenge to the *nobiles'* hegemony, is the theme of the second section. Sallust uses *invidia* of the gradually increasing popular unrest at senatorial malpractice, a development in the political situation. However, although the *invidia* emphasised here appears on the surface to be a justified response to incompetence and venality, Sallust's choice of term is significant: where he uses it in the *Bellum Catilinae*, the semantic field is not of unrest or disquiet but of jealousy or unjustified hatred.[208] The mutability of the term will recur in the person of Memmius, as I explore further below.

My next episode is illustrative of *invidia*; Jugurtha's capture of Cirta, murder of Adherbal and slaughter of the traders there.[209] This (finally) prompted the Romans to armed intervention; but Sallust reinforces his themes by recording that certain "agents of the king" – motivated by Jugurtha's money - attempted to block any response by filibustering until "all the *invidia* might be dispersed through drawn-out consultation".[210] This delaying tactic was foiled by the intervention of Gaius Memmius, tribune-elect. Memmius's introduction is a thematically significant moment, making concrete the growth of *invidia*; it also provides the clearest reference yet to the second aspect of the thematic statement, the challenge to the *nobiles*.

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[207] *Jug*. 15.5.
[208] In the *Cat*.: 3.2 (unfair jealousy against deeds recorded by historians); 6.3 (jealousy of the early Romans' success); 23.6 *bis* (the *nobiles'* jealousy if a new man shoud become consul); 43.1 (hatred stirred up against Cicero); 49.4 (hatred stirred up against Caesar, through intrigue); and tellingly 3.5, on the jealousy which accompanied Sallust's career. The use of the term describing unrest against Cicero's execution of the conspirators (22.3) is a lexical *testimonium* of Sallust's attitude. Cf. also Micipsa's assessment of *invidia* at 10.3 (of Jugurtha): *quod difficillimum inter mortales est, gloria invidiam vicisti.*
[209] *Jug*. 26.3. Morstein-Marx 2000 argues that Sallust overstates the massacre's significance to stress senatorial vaccilation: this contributes to the theme I identify throughout.
[210] *Jug*. 27.2.

Memmius is described as a *vir acer et infestus potentiae nobilitatis*, "a fierce man, set against the power of the *nobiles*".[211] This is not unambiguous: those described as *acer* elsewhere include Jugurtha,[212] Bestia,[213] and Metellus;[214] the term is used by Memmius himself of the "fierce enemy" Jugurtha.[215] *infestus* is used of Catiline's hatred of gods and men,[216] and of the state of enmity to which Memmius rouses the *plebs*: neither is positive.[217] Memmius' introduction marks him as a forceful and polarising figure.

Memmius' oratory prevents *invidia* from dissipating, and forces the *nobiles* into action; it is in response to Memmius' agitation (and fear, ascribed to guilty conscience) that the *nobiles* finally resort to military force.[218] The consul sent to Numidia, Calpurnius Bestia, is accompanied by "noble men and factious, by the authority of whom he hoped that his misdeeds would be upheld" (including Scaurus):[219] Sallust refers to the capacity of the factious to govern largely unopposed, but also notes the necessity of considering the perception of misdeeds at Rome (and planning against popular disapproval), a testament to the increasing significance of *invidia*.[220]

Although successful in the field,[221] Jugurtha's influence corrupts Bestia and his legate through *avaritia* into making a privately negotiated peace.[222] However, at Rome the treaty is disputed by both *plebs* and *nobiles*:[223] the challenge of *invidia* to the hegemony of the *pauci* is made manifest.[224] Sallust records at this point that Memmius delivered a series of speeches intended "in every way to inflame the minds of the *plebs*", and reproduces an example.[225] The introductory

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[211] *Jug.* 27.2. Cf. Cicero's description of Memmius at *Brut.* 136. David 1980: 174 identifies *acer* within a group of adjectives used of *popularis* speech.
[212] *Jug.* 7.4, 20.2.
[213] Jug. 28.4.
[214] *Jug.* 43.2.
[215] *Jug.* 31.25. cf. Vretska 1954:85-6 on ambiguity in Memmius' introduction.
[216] *Cat.* 15.4.
[217] *Jug.* 33.3.
[218] *Jug.* 27.2-3.
[219] *Jug.* 28.4.
[220] *Jug.* 28.4.
[221] *Jug.* 28.7.
[222] *Jug.* 29.4.
[223] *Jug.* 30.1.
[224] Büchner 1953:30 notes thematic associations between Memmius and *invidia*.
[225] *Jug.* 30.3.

phrase is significant: "since at that time in Rome the eloquence of Memmius was well-known and potent, I have deemed it useful to write up one of his speeches...".[226] This is not Sallust's usual formulation; his speeches are usually speech-acts of specific narrative significance (such as Caesar's in the *Bellum Catilinae* or Marius' later in the *Bellum Jugurthinum*). Memmius', on the other hand, documents a type of oratory more generally, as "one of many such speeches".[227]

Memmius' speech advances a popular agenda, attacking the *nobiles*; he levels the *topoi* of *popularis* rhetoric against them, invoking the *dominatio* of the *factio* against the *libertas* of the *plebs*.[228] The speech reiterates Sallust's stress on *avaritia*; but it also emphasises the *nobiles'* domination of the *plebs* and monopoly of power, with their behaviour likened to that of masters over slaves.[229] Memmius' invective is aimed - as well as at venality - at the *nobiles'* desire for tyranny and the measures to which they had resorted in achieving it:[230] he refers to the deaths of the Gracchi and their ally Fulvius Flaccus, suggesting that "in both cases the slaughter found its end not in law but in the caprice [of the victors]." Memmius' agitation is placed within a broader historical pattern. However – Memmius argues - unlike the Struggle of the Orders or the violence of the Gracchan period, there is no need of either violence or armed secession, as the *nobiles'* abuses would result in their own destruction.[231] Despite this protestation, the speech in fact stresses the need for revenge, through the legalistic language of punishment:[232] Memmius assesses it shameful for the *plebs* to ignore wrongs done them.[233] The speech is in fact a manifesto for conflict: Memmius argues that no agreement could exist between two such disparate groups, and that reconciliation with the *nobiles*

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[226] *Jug*. 30.4.
[227] *unam ex tam multis orationem*: *Jug*. 30.4. Nicolai 2001 esp. 43.
[228] *Jug*. 31.23. On *libertas* in Republican historiography see Chassignet 2007; in Sallust in particular, Gaichas 1972, Momigliano 1992:507-8. On *popularis* rhetoric in historiography see Martin 2007; on a typology of *popularis* themes, Seager 1977.
[229] On the political and ideological significance of this analogy see Arena 2012:14-44.
[230] *Jug*. 31.11-17.
[231] *Jug*. 31.6. This also recalls Scipio's similarly prescient words to Jugurtha at *Jug*. 8.2.
[232] *Jug*. 33.18 uses the term *vindicare*; cf. *vindicatum in noxios*, *Jug*. 33.26. This is not *vindicare in libertatem* (e.g. Cic. *Rep*. 1.48; Caes. *BC* 1.22; *RG* 1.1; notably *Jug*. 42.1, where Sallust uses it of the Gracchi) but indicates violent revenge, as used at *Jug*. 15.3 (punishment for Hiempsal's death) or 20.4 (of Jugurtha's plot to force Adherbal to retaliate) (cf. also 106.6, 45.3).
[233] *Jug*. 31.21: *viro flagitiosissumum existumo impune iniuriam accepisse*.

would prove the *plebs'* undoing:[234] as such, we might almost view the claim that resistance was unnecessary as a kind of *praeteritio*.

Memmius has been viewed in modern scholarship as a positively portrayed figure, particularly in relation to his speech:[235] however, this relies on assumptions as to Sallust's own position, and consideration of Memmius in relation to the themes of the monograph suggests another reading. Given its introduction and content, his speech should I think be read as exemplifying anti-*nobilis* arguments, as a document of the virulence of factional conflict (recall the disdain with which Sallust in the *Bellum Catilinae* viewed appeals to the *iura populi*):[236] if the speech illuminates the political debate of the period more generally, then the violence which Memmius urges emerges as a central aspect. Memmius is characterised by a partisan nature and rhetoric: he thus fits into the thematic statement of the monograph, which promised attention to the increasing current of resistance to the *nobiles* and partisan strife.[237] While Memmius' intervention prompts the Roman elite into doing "the right thing", this is at the cost of increasingly polarised partisan conflict. Sallust's view of the effects of Memmius' campaign remains ambiguous: in "firing" the spirits of the *plebs* (*plebis animum incendebat*) he is described in the same terms as the tribunes of the *Bellum Catilinae*.[238] Memmius' attacks do seem in some senses justified (the *superba et crudelia facinora nobilitatis* are a theme to which Sallust returns in the digression):[239] nonetheless, they stir up the same unrest as set the scene for Catiline's conspiracy.

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[234] *Jug*. 31.21-29.

[235] See e.g. Vretska 1954:93; Klinz 1968:88-90; Paratore 1973:138-68; Wiseman 2009:35-6. D'Anna 1978 suggests that Memmius' speech represents Sallust's own views (cf D'Anna 1990:79-81). La Penna 1968:190-5 claims that Memmius' speech is marked by "tendenza alla moderazione": I can see no basis for this given the virulence of Memmius' attacks. Steidle 1958:56-60 is an important exception, reading Memmius as factious and violent.

[236] *Cat*. 38.3.

[237] Parker 2004:416 emphasises Memmius' interventions as "almost entirely literary constructs designed by Sallust for argumentative purposes".

[238] *Cat*. 38.1.

[239] Rather than *criminando*, Sallust's verb here is *ostendere*: *Jug*. 30.3. cf. p.166 above.

After the speech, Sallust yet again stresses *avaritia*, this time manifested in the lack of punishment after Jugurtha's *deditio*. Through bribes, Sallust suggests, the king managed to recover his elephants and redeem his deserters: "such was the force of avarice which had invaded their minds like a plague".[240] The plague metaphor is a favourite of Sallust's; *avaritia* recalls the malady of popular unrest in the *Bellum Catilinae*.[241] In both cases, disease-like attacks of moral degeneration provide a context to political infighting: the *avaritia* which is central to Sallust's depiction of the early stages of the Jugurthine conflict is allocated a causal role in the escalation of popular *invidia*.

Here, Jugurtha delivers his famous *dictum*, *urbem venalem et mature perituram, si emptorem invenerit*.[242] Hellegouarc'h has argued that Jugurtha did not actually speak these words, but that they are entirely Sallustian;[243] they serve as a thematic summary of the text thus far, and reiterate the major preoccupation of Sallust's account. However, Jugurtha's prediction remains unfulfilled. While the *sententia* summarises Sallust's thematic preoccupations, it serves to draw them to a close; stress on *avaritia* decreases markedly from this point. After the political digression, the accusation of *avaritia* is in fact only levelled by Jugurtha and by Marius, not – importantly - by Sallust himself:[244] the *motif* which had led Rome to military disaster in fact disappears almost entirely.

The military disaster of Aulus Albinus is the point at which Sallust's other theme, popular *invidia* stoked by Memmius' speech, manifests itself most clearly,[245] with a bill proposed by the tribune Gaius Mamilius Limetanus, punishing those allegedly complicit in Jugurtha's schemes. This is a central moment in the construction of the monograph. "It is incredible to remember how intent the *plebs* was, and with how much force the bill was passed, more from hatred of the nobility – for

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[240] *Jug*. 32.3.
[241] *Cat*. 36.5. See Woodman 2012:162-80 on this metaphor in Latin historiography; Mariotti 2006:343-51 on the theme in Sallust. cf. Skard 1942:142-5.
[242] *Jug*. 35.10.
[243] Hellegouarc'h 1990.
[244] *Jug*. 49.2, 81.1 (Jugurtha); 85.45, 46 (Marius). Other uses: 103.5 (Sulla's actions demonstrate that the Roman reputation for *avaritia* is unmerited); 91.7 (Marius is explicitly not motivated by *avaritia*); 43.5 (a contrast between Metellus and *avaritia magistratuum ante id tempus*); 80.5 (reference back to the opening period).
[245] *Jug*. 38.

whom trouble was growing - than care for the commonwealth: such was the passion for party".[246]

Although Scaurus apparently was on the commission,[247] "the *quaestio* was conducted harshly and violently, based on rumour and the passion of the plebs: as frequently the *nobiles* had, at that time the *plebs* grew insolent from their success."[248] The digression caps the predominant themes of the first half, *avaritia* and *invidia* (both of which subsequently recede): it makes explicit the commentary on partisan strife.

The political digression

It is here –the hegemony of the *nobiles* broken, the *plebs* ascendant – that Sallust places his digression.[249] It immediately follows the inception of the *quaestio* (which, although historically significant, is not treated elsewhere): the digression appears at the point of clearest thematic relevance, "resistance to the *superbia* of the *nobiles*" set decisively in motion.[250] This digression, as above, is in two parts (chapters 41 and 42 respectively): again, one develops the thematic statement, and the other applies the ideas to a wider historical context.

The first begins with a causal analysis of the onset of strife, and perversion of good qualities through peace and prosperity. Sallust again draws on his predecessors in stressing the degenerative effects of prosperity;[251] but the analysis is distinct from that of the *Bellum Catilinae*. In contrast to the *archaeologia*, the theory of *metus hostilis* is clearly stated: the major development is the role of fear as restraining factor and bulwark against moral decline. While in the *Bellum Catilinae* human nature was basically positive until the point of perversion, it now requires external stimulus to

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[246] *Jug*. 40.4.
[247] *Jug*. 40.4. Sumner 1976 persuasively suggests that Sallust has confused two Scaurii (Aemilius and Aurelius).
[248] *Jug*. 40.5.
[249] Vretska 1954:54 notes the digression's structural significance. Commentaries on the passage: Paul 1984:123-32; Koestermann 1971:166-78. Other useful treatments: Bringmann 1974; D'Elia 1983; Garelli & Miravalles 2003.
[250] Kraus 1999:234 refers to the *quaestio Mamiliana* as an attempt to establish order (disrupted by Jugurtha's activities); I see it instead as a point of profound disorder, and political shift.
[251] E.g. Polyb. 6.44, 57.

prevent corruption, a significant reversal.[252] As opposed to the *Bellum Catilinae*, where hegemony was the background for a general change in Rome's fortunes, here fear is the factor preventing interfactional strife and ensuring that the Republic is governed equitably.

As important as causal factors are the manifestations of decline: *lascivia atque superbia*.[253] These are striking, firstly because they represent a diversion from the major vices identified in the *Bellum Catilinae*,[254] and secondly because *superbia* recalls the statement of theme.[255] However, Sallust notably avoids allocating blame to any single group: while these terms are not explicitly linked to *plebs* and *nobiles* respectively, each was associated in the Roman mind with a different *stratum*, and the collocation *lascivia atque superbia* alludes to vices associated in classical thought with democracy and aristocracy respectively.[256] The implication is that the morals of both sections of the community similarly decline. Culpability for the onset of *mos partium et factionum* is shared:[257] neither *plebs* nor *nobiles* is solely to blame, but between them the *res publica* is *dilacerata*.[258] Inasmuch as the *nobiles* come to have the upper hand, this is a result of concentration of power in fewer hands, rather than of more pernicious moral degeneracy.[259] The parallelism of *coepere nobilitas dignitatem, populus libertatem in lubidinem vortere* emphasises this:[260] both sides are tied to the same patterns; had the *plebs* had the opportunity they would have exercised the same domination. This is no unproblematic attack on the *nobiles* alone.

Only with *ceterum* (41.6) does the picture become increasingly specific, focusing on the abuses perpetrated by the *nobiles*: subsequent sentences are strongly critical of the *nobiles'*

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[252] On the development of Sallust's idea of *metus hostilis* see La Penna 1968:55-8,232-9; Dunsch 2006; Latta 1988 and above pp.112-5.

[253] *Jug*. 41.3.

[254] *Lascivia* appears only in passing at *Cat*. 31.3 (of the *plebs*), and so far in the *Jug*. only at 39.5, of lax military discipline under Albinus. On *superbia* see below pp.199-202.

[255] *Jug*. 5.1.

[256] See Polyb. 6.8-9. Cf. Aristotle's description of the degeneration of aristocracy owing to arrogance (*Pol*. 1302b5-21); on too much freedom in democracy see Pl. *Rep*. 557-9 (the democratic man unable to bear any law, terming it simply arrogance), 562c; Cic. *Rep*. 1.62-3.

[257] On the word *factio* in Sallust see Smith 1968, Garbugino 2006; more generally Seager 1972 (see esp. 57 on Sallust's usage).

[258] Earl 1961:15 stresses "initially" shared culpability; my reading applies this throughout.

[259] *Jug*. 41.6-7.

[260] *Jug*. 41.5.

behaviour. The powerful, Sallust argues, had monopolised the rewards of office and used its opportunities to unjustly dominate the *plebs*. Sallust's analysis reflects the grievances of Memmius' speech: this passage is the most ringing indictment of the *nobiles* anywhere in Sallust's works, and in some ways aligns him with *popularis* argumentation. It is stressed by scholars who wish to demonstrate anti-*nobilitas* bias in Sallust's works:[261] however, consideration of these attacks in the context of the rest of the monograph, and indeed the rest of the digression, demonstrates that this is not the whole story.

The *nobiles'* most egregious offenses are ascribed to *avaritia*,[262] an explicit link to the *motif* of the narrative. Sallust also reiterates (as Memmius predicted)[263] that the *nobiles' avaritia* was self-destructive, leading directly to its own downfall; again, precisely this sequence has been demonstrated in the narrative, with the stirring-up of popular *invidia* and the *quaestio Mamiliana* against the *nobiles*. The analysis offered here mirrors the content of the narrative so far; as I examine below, this is significant.

The second half of the digression expands upon the first, dealing (as in the *Bellum Catilinae*) with a more specific pre-history of the monograph's theme; this time, an account of the Gracchi (and Fulvius Flaccus) whom Sallust asserts *veram gloriam iniustae potentiae anteponerent*. The Gracchi had risen against the unjust power of the *nobiles*, initiating the period of civil conflict: *moveri civitas et dissensio civilis quasi permixtio terrae oriri coepit.*[264] The onset of civil strife is comparable to the beginnings of the *malum publicum* in the *Bellum Catilinae*; both are turning-points, initiating the political infighting which is the major subject of each digression. Sallust's portrayal of the Gracchi raises an immediate question: given his claim that the Gracchi had challenged the abuses of the

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[261] Schur 1934:104-5; Momigliano 1992:505-6; Koestermann 1971 *ad loc*. cites the politics of Sallust's own career here.
[262] *Jug*. 41.9.
[263] *Jug*. 31.6.
[264] *Jug*. 41.10: "the state began to shake, and civil dissension to arise like an earthquake". Cf. Garelli & Miravalles 2003 on the metaphor.

nobiles, in what sense could the Jugurthine period be seen as the first resistance to the *superbia nobilitatis*?[265]

The distinction between the Gracchi and the anti-*nobilis* politicians of the *Bellum Jugurthinum* is basically one of results.[266] The Gracchi, despite the justice of their programme, had failed in their efforts to break the *iniusta potentia* of the *nobiles*, (as Sallust notes both here and in the speech of Memmius). The *nobiles* had won - and abused - their *victoria* over the Gracchi;[267] the phrase *primum obviam itum est* in the thematic statement must then refer to the first *successful* challenge to the *nobiles'* arrogance, and the reversal in their fortunes marked by the *quaestio Mamiliana*. While the Gracchi demonstrated the validity of resistance, they had not shifted the balance. We should recall the presentation of Opimius in the main narrative, and the emphasis on the *nobiles'* initially unchallenged hegemony: Opimius, through his role in the violent suppression of the Gracchans after 122, exemplified the unchallenged dominance of the *nobiles* in the opening part.[268]

The Gracchi, while they not been successful, had pointed the way to the strife described in the thematic statement; they prefigure the *malum publicum* of the *mos partium et factionum*, but are not wholly implicated in it. Within the cyclical nature of Sallust's analysis, the Gracchi had not abused victory, because they had not won it; the *nobiles'* exploitation of their supremacy, exemplified in the person of Opimius, represents a starting point for the beginnings of continuous conflict described in the thematic statement. In that they are not directly implicated in the moral morass of partisan strife, the Gracchi also provide a useful point of comparison for the other actors of Sallust's text, in receiving one of his less ambiguous moral assessments: *qui veram gloriam iniustae potentiae anteponerent*.[269] This emphasises the *nobiles'* abuses as *iniusta*; but it also

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[265] Cf. *Jug*. 5.1. Sallust even alludes to the phrase from the thematic statement here: *nobilitas... Gracchorum actionibus obviam ierat*, 42.1. Paratore 1973:14 simply refers the thematic statement to the Gracchi; but this ignores the subject-matter of the monograph.
[266] Cf. Steidle 1954:63-4; D'Anna 1990:72.
[267] *Jug*. 42.4.
[268] *Jug*. 16.2
[269] *Jug*. 41.10.

stresses the propriety of Gracchan aims. The Gracchi show concern for the whole commonwealth; this is not the partisan fighting of Scaurus or Memmius, which results in the *res publica dilacerata*.[270]

Nonetheless, Sallust's attitude towards the Gracchi is problematic: two sentences have provided particularly fertile ground for scholarly debate.[271] *et sane Gracchis cupidine victoriae haud satis moderatus animus fuit; sed bono vinci satius est quam malo more iniuriam vincere*: I translate "Certainly the Gracchi did not have a sufficiently moderate spirit in their desire for victory; but it is fitter for the good man to be defeated than to triumph over injury by evil measures." These words summarise Sallust's historical judgement; but they are also a particularly obscure example of his *brevitas*. The signficance of *bono* has been widely disputed: among possible translations are "for a good man" (*bono* as a masculine substantive), "by good means" (understanding *more*) and "for the public good" (understanding *publico*).[272]

My reading is based on the role allocated to the Gracchi in Sallust's conception of strife. Sallust had already suggested that the Gracchan revolution was the point at which the period of violent conflict had begun; this sentence substantiates the discussion. The immediately preceding sentence described the unlawful killing of the Gracchi, and the fact that Tiberius had been tribune and Gaius a member of the agrarian board; both were magistrates and Tiberius *sacer*. The Gracchi had exceeded the proper way to behave; but despite this, it would still have been better for the *nobiles* to have ceded, rather than having destroyed them *malo more* – by which Sallust means the illegal killing just mentioned. Sallust uses *bono*, then, not in reference to the Gracchi or to the *nobiles*, but to compare the *nobiles'* response to the hypothetical behaviour of a good man (*bono* as

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[270] The idea of *vera gloria* is treated more fully in chapter 5.

[271] On Sallust's view of the Gracchi see Büchner 1964 (wholly positive); La Penna 1968:239-41 (qualified praise, in keeping with Sallust's Caesarism); Mazzarino 1971:100-3;; Di Marino 1973; Bringmann 1974; Christes 2002. In keeping with his reading of Posidonian influence behind every element of Sallust's historiography, Schur 1934:83-9 reads Sallust's opinion as direct polemic against Posidonius. On these sentences see Schwab 2004-5, (with summary of the *status quaestionis*, and a reading of *bono* as aggressively ironic); Lendle 1968 (stressing the distinction between practice and morality); Reinhardt 1984 (reading the sentence as a deliberative question); Latta 1990 (stressing both sides' culpability and refuting Reinhardt); Catalano 1969 (stressing the *bonum* as motivation of the Gracchi); di Marino 1973 (stressing legal aspects and *modestia*); Christes 2002 (stressing the necessity of considering the full context). Cf. also Heubner 1962; Bringmann 1974:95-8.

[272] Schwab 2004-5 links Sallust's *sententia* to words of Memmius' speech as part of an aggressively ironic *reductio ad absurdum* of the optimate position; however, his argument assumes that Sallust writes from an anti-*nobilitas* stance, and that Memmius' words unproblematically represent Sallust's ideas.

a substantive, in direct contrast to the *nobiles*).[273] The *malo more* with which the *nobiles* had responded is the factor which leads to the *permixtio terrae*, and the strife described in the digression: it is tempting – although speculative - to link the word *malo* to the *malum publicum* of the *Bellum Catilinae*.

The *nobiles* had shaken the state by their response to the Gracchan reforms, although they had been provoked by the unprecedented actions of the Gracchi: in some ways, again, culpability for strife is shared between the two sides, although the Gracchi have what is presented as the more just position, and the *nobiles* are motivated more by the self-interest of fear. There is a parallel with Memmius' formulation in his speech, *viro flagitiosissumum existumo impune iniuriam accepisse*:[274] notably, the approach Sallust suggests for the truly good is in opposition to Memmius' partisan rhetoric, as well as to the actions of the *nobiles*.

This reading is simpler than many of the complex hypotheses adduced to explain the sentence; but it makes the best sense of Sallust's judgement within the analysis of the rest. In addition, as is his custom at particularly key moments, Sallust's vocabulary alludes to generalising forms, connecting the specifics of his historical narrative to broader patterns.[275] Contrasting the behaviour of the *nobiles* to that of the *bonus* invokes moralistic and ethical themes: the wording emphasises the importance of the Gracchi's deaths as moments of paradigmatic value. Concluding the digression, Sallust returns once again to his *Leitmotif*: *igitur ea victoria nobilitas ex lubidine sua usa multos mortalis ferro aut fuga exstinxit plusque in relicum sibi timoris quam potentiae addidit.*[276] The *lubido* of the *nobiles* –already mentioned in the discussion of moral decline - trumps the interests of the state, and they abuse their victory: they are thus set within the model of hegemonic abuse of power leading to strife which is the background to the monograph's events.

I suggested above that Sallust's *malum publicum* is a historical mentality within which factional strife found its fullest expression, with the particular characteristics of a shifting balance of

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[273] This is closest to the interpretation of Christes 2002.
[274] *Jug*. 31.21.
[275] Cf. Bringmann 1974:97 on the generalising nature of Sallust's *sententia*.
[276] *Jug*. 42.4.

power (first one side and then the other in the ascendant, making full – destructive - use of victory). This concept, I think, lies behind the *Bellum Jugurthinum* too. Sallust again connects his remarks on Roman politics to more general patterns:[277] he claims that space is insufficient to provide a full theoretical treatment, but his *praeteritio* suggests that he *did* view his subject as a manifestation of a more general model. The *Bellum Catilinae* explicitly connected the *malum publicum* of 63 back into a series of such periods throughout Republican history;[278] the *Bellum Jugurthinum* – with its explicit focus on party strife – describes another such period.

It has been argued that the *Bellum Jugurthinum* is more pronounced in its anti-*nobilitas* bias than the *Bellum Catilinae*;[279] but rather than a wholesale shift in political position, consideration of the works within Sallust's broader ideas demonstrates that apparent differences in Sallust's sympathies are in fact the result of his application of his political ideas to distinct situations. Reading this passage (and the monograph) in the light of the model established in the *Bellum Catilinae* reconciles the apparently divergent perspectives which other scholars have noted in the texts. This model dominates the construction of the monograph.

The idea of a spiral of factional strife, with each side viciously exploiting any advantage gained, is stressed by the sentence preceding the digression: *ut saepe nobilitatem, sic ea tempestate plebem ex secundis rebus insolentia ceperat*.[280] The momentum of the *plebs* - building throughout the first half under the catchword *invidia* - finally comes to fruition with the shift of political power away from the *nobilitas* of the *quaestio Mamiliana*. The first half of the text illustrated the *nobiles'* unjust use of hegemony; scholars have subsequently argued that Sallust's position is fundamentally anti-*nobilitas*. Looking only at the first half of the text, this may be sustainable; as I have shown, Sallust portrays the *nobiles* in the worst possible light through stressing *avaritia* (elevated to a

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[277] *Jug*. 42.4: *quae res plerumque magnas civitatis pessum dedit, dum alteri alteros vincere quovis modo et victos acerbius ulcisci volunt*.
[278] *Cat*. 37.11.
[279] e.g. La Penna 1968:159-73 (with summary of previous scholarship); Momigliano 1992:505-6; D'Anna 1990:74-5; see also works in n.51 above.
[280] *Jug*. 40.5: "as so frequently the *nobiles*, at that time the *plebs* had been made insolent by their success".

recurrent *motif*) and abuses of the *plebs* consequent on the opportunities afforded by their hegemony.

However, with the shift in power of the *quaestio Mamiliana*, the focus of criticism also shifts. The second half of the monograph no longer targets the *nobiles*, actually portrayed in a positive light in the persons of Metellus and Sulla; criticism which remains is mainly concentrated in Marius' speech, a highly partisan source which casts as much light on Marius' own character as on those he attacks, and we must discard the idea that Marius' words unproblematically represent Sallust's views. Once the *nobiles* lose their dominance, in the wake of the *quaestio Mamiliana*, Sallust's criticism is tempered; to call him anti-*nobilis* here is fundamentally to misunderstand the structure he imposes. I explore this further below.

If we view the *Bellum Jugurthinum* as a history of party strife at Rome, and of abuses consequent with hegemony, then implicit in this valuation is some corresponding criticism of the behaviour of those who had broken the *nobiles*' power. In fact, criticism of the *plebs* and its leaders I think runs throughout the second half of the text; the major political theme of this part is the injustice of this group having achieved supremacy. This has already been alluded to in the introduction of the *quaestio Mamiliana*,[281] in Memmius' speech - rousing the *plebs* to revenge itself without concern for the state - and perhaps in the thematic term *invidia* itself.[282] Memmius' exhortations seem to have been made concrete;[283] it is no coincidence that the speech Sallust claims to reproduce is that which led to the institution of the *quaestio Mamiliana*, and resulted in the violent retaliation of the *plebs* against the *nobiles.* The sense in which Memmius' speech is a programmatic delineation of broader political discourse is particularly marked here.

Criticism of the *populares* is less blatant than the attacks on the *nobiles* in the first half; nonetheless, it is an important strand. One figure serves as a particular *exemplum*: Gaius Marius. I

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[281] *Jug*. 40.3.
[282] See n.208. La Penna 1968:194-5 distinguishes between two phases of popular agitation, suggesting that Sallust's view of the first is more positive; the distinction is I think not qualitative, but of the context within which agitation emerges (noble hegemony versus popular ascendancy).
[283] *Jug*. 42.4.

explore the complexities of Marius' portrait, and the political commentary of the second half of the monograph, in the following section of this chapter.

Thus, by comparison with the *Bellum Catilinae* the *Bellum Jugurthinum* deals more specifically with a single shift in power elevated to the subject for a whole monograph - the ascendancy of the *plebs* after the *quaestio Mamiliana* - than the general upheaval of the 60s. The *Bellum Jugurthinum* is not a document of party affiliation, but a case study of the results of partisan hatred and the desire for revenge; Sallust's analysis does not simply cast blame onto a single group, but is a broader meditation on the impact of political strife. This recalls the programmatic statement of theme, this time the second half:[284] "this contest confused everything, human and divine, and so far progressed in madness that war, and the devastation of Italy, made an end to the civil strife". The process which leads to the civil wars is not directly due to the *nobiles*' abuse of the *plebs*, but to the mentality of factional conflict to which opposition gave rise. The leaders of the *plebs* are equally culpable in the wars to come and the devastation of Italy: in effect, I suggest that the action of *resistance* is itself as culpable as the *superbia nobilitatis* in the *vastitas Italiae*. This is substantiated by the themes of the second half of the text.

The *plebs* ascendant: the second half

With the shift to narrative of military campaigns in Numidia, tenor and thematic stress change;[285] but Sallust continues to emphasise internal, as well as external, aspects of the conflict. Subsequent events can be divided based on the general in command, between a Metellan phase of the narrative and a Marian: as I explore below, the themes to the fore in each of these differ. First is Metellus, "a fierce man *(acri viro)* and although set against the party of the people (*advorso populi partium*), nonetheless with an unblemished reputation for fairness".[286] Although Sallust does not mention it, he was also of the highest birth: while not patrician, as Naevius remarked, *fato Metelli*

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[284] *Jug*. 5.1.
[285] On the second half of the *Jug*. as a work of military history see Martin 2002.
[286] *Jug*. 43.1.

Romae fiunt consules,[287] and our Q. Caecilius Metellus was the fourth of the Metelli to hold the consulship in a decade.[288] Sallust avoids remarking on Metellus' birth: this is perhaps indicative of Metellus' distance from *nobiles* who have appeared thus far. Sallust does not even give Metellus' full name (in contrast to the consuls of 111, whom Sallust explicitly identified annalistic-fashion as P. Scipio Nasica and L. Bestia).[289] Although Metellus is opposed to the *populares*, he is not – unlike Scaurus and Opimius - described in the terms of *factio*. There is an implicit comparison with Memmius too, also *acer* and *infestus potentiae nobilitatis (*as against Metellus, *advorsus populi partium*); the reputation for fairness with which Sallust qualifies Metellus' portrait suggests that he is less influenced by partisan feeling. Metellus' is the most positive depiction of any *nobilis* in the narrative so far; he is explicitly differentiated from those who preceded him.[290]

However, Metellus remains something of a cypher, particularly in comparison to Sulla, whose significance to the narrative is more minor yet who receives a much fuller description.[291] Like Cicero in the *Bellum Catilinae*, there is no malice in Metellus' portrait (with the important exception of the *superbia* ascribed him at 64.1, to which I return below); he is simply treated in fairly cursory detail. A possible explanation for the brevity of Metellus' introduction is the sense that he was a less politically divisive figure than Marius or Sulla, and thus needed less qualification.

The presentation of Metellus throughout the military narrative is favourable. He immediately shows his quality, reforming the lax troops left by previous generals: Sallust calls him *magnus et sapiens vir*, praise not given lightly.[292] Metellus' conduct of the war is demonstrably effective, gradually closing off Jugurtha's options. Jugurtha learns his incorruptibility, such that "then for the first time he tried to effect a true surrender";[293] there is an implied comparison with Aemilius

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[287] *ap*. Ps-Asc. *ad* Cic. *Verr*. 1.29.
[288] Gruen 1968:106-35 treats "the emergence of Metellan supremacy".
[289] *Jug*. 38.3
[290] *Jug*. 43.5. On Metellus' portrayal as positive see Vretska 1954:94-100; La Penna 1968:190-9; Klinz 1986:86; Parker 2001; Leeman 1957:15. Fontanella 1992 demonstrates by comparison with Appian's much more hostile narrative that Sallust's attitude is markedly positive.
[291] The extent of Sulla's portrait is owed to his subsequent significance (cf. *Jug*. 95.4); see below pp.207-9.
[292] *Jug*. 45.2; cf. Leeman 1957:15.
[293] *Jug*. 46.1.

Scaurus and the *nobiles* of the first half, whom Jugurtha had initially feared but had come to corrupt.[294] Metellus stands apart from the temptations to which previous *nobiles* had succumbed.[295]

The impression of Sallust's portrayal is of a shift in the character of the Roman leadership. Metellus is a new sort of *nobilis*, unaffected by the corruption stressed in the first half; his position in Sallust's construction of the monograph, immediately after the programmatic digression, marks the thematic break (Sallust could have introduced Metellus before the digression, since he had already been elected – it is notable that he does not).[296] The digression, and the changed character which Metellus exemplifies, shifts the focus away from the venality and incompetence of the *nobiles*. Rather than venality, the focus of the section after the digression is conflict between Metellus and Marius, from the winter of 109, which bears out the themes of the digression.[297] Marius had already been mentioned in the operations of the preceding year, serving as an able lieutenant to Metellus,[298] but chapter 63 marks his character sketch, and the beginning of a significant role. Previously, Marius came to Metellus' aid in battle, displaying sound judgement and military virtue (his prompt obedience to orders rescuing Metellus from a dangerous situation);[299] but from chapter 63, things change, and the character-sketch introduces Marius as an individual actor in his own right, rather than a subordinate.[300]

Marius is a complex figure: a century of scholarship has met with no agreement on his role.[301] He may be a champion of the people - the monograph's true hero, exemplifying Sallust's political ideals - or an ambiguous figure hinting at the latent threat of civil war. As I explore below,

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[294] *Jug*. 46.1.
[295] *Jug*. 55.
[296] Metellus is already consul designate by 43.1.
[297] Gärtner 1986:456-7 describes the stuctural opposition between Metellus and Marius as an elongated *synkrisis*.
[298] E.g. *Jug*. 46.7, 50.2, 57.1, 58.5.
[299] *Jug*. 58.5.
[300] On the structural significance of Marius' sketch see Wille 1970.
[301] Marius as positive figure: e.g. Baehrens 1926:73; Schur 1934:115; La Penna 1968:209-24; Paananen 1972:95-106 claims that Marius is constantly glorified both as an individual and an idealised type. Darker readings: Vretska 1954:101-126; Syme 1964:160-3; Klinz 1968; Dix 2006:226-47.

he is certainly not unproblematic, and it is over-simplistic to view him as the embodiment of Sallust's political ideals. Aspects of his characterisation present considerable difficulties, and hint at a more negative significance. Reading Marius in the light of the analysis of the political digression will provide a new assessment of his significance; consideration of his character in the light of the structure I have suggested underpins the whole monograph brings important aspects to the fore.

The context for Marius' introduction is his consultation of a soothsayer at Utica,[302] who suggests divine approval for his ambition for the consulship; this is a decisive turning-point. Thus far, Marius' career had been competent – indeed, Sallust's account of Marius' early career selectively flattens out his failures into a narrative of uninterrupted success -[303] but restrained by the nature of Roman politics, and specifically the *nobiles'* monopoly of the consulship: Sallust describes it as the magistracy which even then "the nobles passed between themselves hand to hand".[304] However, with the encouragement of the gods, Marius begins seriously to aspire to the honour; this sets up the conflict between Metellus and Marius.

This whole episode is, as Gavin Weiare has demonstrated, problematic.[305] Sallust gives little context; Marius is simply "at Utica at about that time, by chance".[306] Marius' actions are stripped of their relevance: the soothsayer simply provides a *deus ex machina* explaining Marius' newfound ambition. Sallust has not invented the scene (independent versions appear in other accounts);[307] but he pays the details little attention, concentrating attention on the causal significance. In comparison to Plutarch's version which places Marius' consultation of the soothsayer immediately before his departure for Rome (where it makes better logical sense), Sallust's places the episode at Utica

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[302] *Jug*. 63.
[303] Syme 1964:161-2;La Penna 1968:212-3; Weaire 2000:159-69; Schmal 2001:72; see Plut. *Mar*. 5 on Marius' innovative failure in two elections on the same day; Val. Max. 6.9.14 suggests a *repulsa* in a tribunician election. Cf. Evans 1994:18-51.
[304] *Jug*. 63.6-7.
[305] Weiare 2000:190.
[306] *Jug*. 63.1.
[307] E.g. Plut. *Mar*. 8.3. cf. Evans 1994:65.

earlier, giving it more causal importance (as noted above, such manipulations of order are a part of Sallust's *dispositio*).[308]

After the encounter with the soothsayer (in Sallust's version), Marius requests leave to return to Rome and stand for the consulship: Metellus refuses. The decision was within Metellus' purview and not formally wrong, but significantly Sallust presents it as born of *superbia*. His judgement is as follows: "although *virtus*, *gloria* and other good and choice things were abundant in him [Metellus], he had however a contemptuous and arrogant spirit, the common vice of the *nobiles*".[309] Metellus' decision, and subsequent implication that Marius should wait until he could campaign with Metellus' son, inspires Marius' hatred, drives him to act according to *cupido atque ira*.[310] Driven by desire and anger, Marius begins to intrigue against Metellus at Utica and through messages at Rome, to suggest that he should be made leader in Metellus' stead. Combined with the context of growing party strife, this proves successful: "the consulship was sought with the most reputable support of many men; at the same time the *plebs*, with the nobility routed by the Mamilian law, was raising up *novi*. Thus, everything was in Marius' favour."[311] The two elements both play a role.

Taken as a whole, the episode of the soothsayer and Marius' request narrates the arrogance of a *nobilis* in denying the request of a *novus homo*: the episode is obviously linked to the thematic statement, of resistance to the *superbia* of the *nobiles*. However, subsequent developments demonstrate that the blame is not all on Metellus' side; nor is his *superbia* the catastrophic fault which it might seem. These elements, in conjunction with the analysis of the digression, are important to understanding Sallust's political analysis.

An important aspect of this is the portrayal of Marius himself. The *ambitio* encouraged by the soothsayer seems to lead to a genuine shift in Marius' character, from the frugal upbringing

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[308] Cf. Lefevre 1979:265-7 on the "control narrative" of Plutarch's *Marius*.
[309] *Jug*. 64.1.
[310] *Jug*. 64.5. Note that Metellus' remark about Marius delaying is only made in response to repeated pestering: 64.3.
[311] *Jug*. 65.5.

described in Sallust's sketch (leading to a political success idealised beyond what was historically true) towards *cupido atque ira*. While (for example) Scaurus' corruption was portrayed as the manifestation of latent tendency to vice, the change in Marius seems to represent a genuine shift in the man's nature, with *ambitio* for the consulship subverting proper morals.[312] The clearest comparison elsewhere in the monograph for the change in Marius' nature is Jugurtha, also deeply affected by an insult and by the destructive effects of *ambitio*;[313] the parallel is a hint at the significance of Sallust's Marius. This is also the obvious subtext of Marius' rise to the consulship by duplicitous means: the description of Sulla, later in the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, makes an explicit virtue of his not having resorted to such means for advancement.[314] Similarly, the soothsayer recommends that Marius should test his fortune as often as possible:[315] reliance on *fortuna* becomes one of the key features of the characterisation of Marius throughout the rest of the text, and a problematic feature of his character.[316]

These characteristic qualities are combined with the structural presentation of Marius' career: at every stage, his advancement is explicitly linked to broader political developments. Support for his consular canvass is linked to the desire of the *plebs* to advance *novi*;[317] his subsequent election is due (in very large part, in Sallust's formulation) to the hatred of the *plebs* for the *nobiles*.[318] Sallust explicitly comments that "in both cases [Metellus' replacement and Marius' election] party feeling had more influence than good or bad qualities". Marius' appointment to the Numidian command is a direct manifestation of the *plebs'* power;[319] Marius links himself to these same partisan interests in his speech after election.[320] Every time Marius appears in a political

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[312] Wille 1970:318 suggests that *ambitio* is a factor even in the account of Marius' early career; but Sallust makes explicit at 63.6 that this factor only significantly affected him later (*nam postea ambitione praeceps datus est*).

[313] *Jug*. 11.7. On Jugurtha's character see chapter 5.

[314] *Jug*. 96.3: *neque interim, quod prava ambitio solet, consulis aut cuiusquam boni famam laedere.*

[315] *Jug*. 63: "to do what he had in mind, trusting in the gods, and to test his fortune as often as possible."

[316] On *fortuna* in the portrait of Marius see *Jug*. 92.6, 93.1, 94.7, 93.2, 93.4 with Avery 1967; Klinz 1968:84-5; Wille 1970; Tiffou 1977:354-5; Gärtner 1986:462; Kraus 1999:217.

[317] *Jug*. 55.5.

[318] *Jug*. 73.

[319] *Jug*. 73.7: *paulo ante senatus Metello Numidiam decreverat; ea res frustra fuit*.

[320] *Jug*. 84.

context, his success is in some sense owed to the contemporary power of the *plebs* over the *nobiles*: he is thus constantly aligned to the dynamics of party strife highlighted in the text, and linked to the *invidia* of Memmius' speech, the *quaestio Mamiliana*, and the political digression. Sallust's Marius, then, while militarily successful, is politically more ambiguous, dogged by negative characteristics, negative methods and the negative excesses of partisan politics.

The conflict between Metellus and Marius stages the struggle of the *plebs* against the *superbia* of the *nobiles*: we should approach this directly within the political understanding elaborated in the digression. I suggest that the conflict between Metellus and Marius should be read as critical of Marius, in accordance with the structural view of Roman politics set out in the digression. Sallust's political schema depicted shifts of power, and the consequent harsh use of victory: the second half of the monograph, I think, depicts the state after the transfer of power, and, by implication, the use of popular ascendancy by Marius exemplifying the excesses of partisan strife. The analysis of factional strife given in the digression is mirrored in the construction of the whole text: this is in keeping with the ideas I have so far developed of a thematic shift in Sallust's description of the *nobiles*, from criticism of *avaritia* in the first half to a less critical portrait exemplified by Metellus in the second.

Before exploring this further, it is necessary to note Metellus' culpability in the escalating conflict; his arrogant response prompts Marius' anger. However, criticisms of Metellus need careful assessment, particularly in the light of his otherwise markedly positive presentation. The major indictment of Metellus in the work appears in the narrative of his refusal of Marius' request to return to Rome: "Metellus had however a contemptuous and arrogant spirit, the common vice of the *nobiles*".[321] This is a complex assessment. As I have suggested, Sallust has deliberately distinguished Metellus from the *nobiles*, and this continues throughout the monograph; this is the only point which associates him with them as a group. There is therefore a special significance to this

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[321] *Jug.* 64.1: *inerat contemptor animus et superbia, commune nobilitatis malum*.

vice, in affecting even those who had avoided the *nobiles*' other evils; if even an otherwise excellent man such as Metellus could be afflicted, the vice must be particularly pernicious.[322]

Sallust's *superbia* requires comment. Yelena Baraz has showed by lexicographical analysis that *superbia* is used in a very particular way in Republican Latin literature: specifically, it is associated with tyrannical behaviour, and is thus among the worst vices in the Republican imagination.[323] Baraz also suggests a reason for the particular significance of *superbia* as a term of invective: it implied a distinction in the way one valued one's own worth, fundamentally opposed to the Republican ideal of equality. *Superbia* is, effectively, a kind of over-reaching based on misvaluation. The exemplary figure is Tarquinius Superbus: his *superbia*, basically a misvaluation of his role within the state, leads him to act in ways incompatible with proper governance, leading to the expulsion of the kings and the institution of the Republic.[324]

In this light (and Baraz' conclusions are largely replicated by other studies of *superbia* and associated concepts at Rome),[325] Sallust's use of the word of Metellus is at least unusual. Most striking is the sense that Metellus entirely fails to be afflicted by the consequent vices which constitute the true social danger of *superbia*. Metellus does not over-value his own ability: even after his success in 109, Metellus consistently avoided the temptations of success and had stuck to moral behaviour.[326] Even in the description which introduces this accusation, Metellus is characterised with *virtus*, *gloria* and other enviable qualities; Sallust does not grant such praise lightly.[327] What else Sallust describes of Metellus' character fits badly with the accusation of *superbia* as an un-Republican and tyrannical vice. To possess both *virtus* and *superbia* (in this extreme sense) should not be possible: J.M.J. Murphy goes so far as to state that it was effectively a moral obligation

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[322] Montgomery 2013 argues that even Scipio at Numantia episode displays *superbia*: Metellus thus represents the culmination of a lengthy theme (*contra* Josserand 1981, on Scipio as aligned with the uncorrupted Jugurtha through *modestia* and *temperantia*).

[323] Baraz 2008.

[324] Baraz 2008:379-86.

[325] E.g. Murphy 1997:77; Haffter 1956:139; Christenson 2002:44-8.

[326] *Jug*. 55.3-4.

[327] *Jug*. 64.1.

among the Romans to crush the *superbi*, as representing a threat to the state's well-being.[328]

Throughout the text, Metellus' outstanding *virtus* is depicted as a great advantage and contributor to Rome's success; when Metellus does eventually return to Rome, he receives a warm reception.[329] If Metellus is a man characterised by *superbia*, the most dangerous and un-Republican of vices, he does not show it; Sallust's assessment of *superbia* in this sense is belied by his account.[330]

Rather, I suggest that the second half of the sentence is vital, qualifying Sallust's *superbia*: it is the *commune nobilitatis malum*. The usual interpretation of this is to link Metellus to the allegedly anti-*nobilis* programme of the work as a whole, his egregious *superbia* being a standard vice exhibited by all *nobiles*;[331] but I suggest that instead of condemnation of Metellus, it is in fact a qualification of *superbia*, serving to diminish the negative associations of the term. Referring to Metellus' *superbia* as *commune nobilitatis malum* specifies that this is not *superbia* in its full, anti-Republican significance (incompatible with Metellus' positive character): *nobilitatis malum* is a qualification, limiting the quality to the paradigm of party political struggle which dominates the monograph.

As well as a term of moral condemnation, *superbia* was a widespread term of political rhetoric, particularly as used by *populares* and those who attacked the senate: it was one of the standard terms of attack against the *nobiles*.[332] *Superbia* was invoked in situations referring less to the extreme, tyrannous arrogance which was fundamentally incompatible with Roman value-systems, and more as a broader accusation which served to align the speaker with the people, and to present his opponent as a defender of unjust privilege. In this sense, *superbia* is the standard negative catchword assciated with aristocracy, paralleling the attacks of the optimates on popular

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[328] Murphy 1997:77.

[329] *Jug*. 88.1; Sallust does not even mention Numidicus' title or triumph (Lefevre 1979:267).

[330] Cf. Weiare 2000:109 on the lack of concrete effects of Metellan *superbia*.

[331] E.g. Montgomery 2013:37; Katz 1981; Mathieu 1996:30.

[332] Hellegouarc'h 1963: 439-40.

vis and *licentia* in the lexicon of constitutional invective: *superbia* is a term of attack against the *nobiles* as a class.[333]

Superbia, as qualified by *commune nobilitatis malum*, specifies that Metellus is guilty of haughtiness and undervaluing the abilities of Marius as a consequence of his own position, rather than in the tyrannical sense implying harm to the state itself: when Sallust describes Metellus as a man of *superbia*, this is not necessarily a serious moral failing, but a negative assessment specifically of his attitude towards the *plebs*. While there is truth in Sallust's characterisation of Metellus as *superbus*, this is *superbia* expressed through factional politics, without direct negative impact upon the state itself. As illustrated by the rest of his narrative, Sallust's *superbia* is first and foremost a term of factional abuse, reiterating the description of Metellus as *advorsus populi partium*.[334] In short, it characterises a political attitude expressed in Metellus' attitude towards Marius, rather than the kind of vice (like *avaritia*) which led directly to the privileging of personal interest over that of the state.

The difficulty, clearly, is in reconciling this limited significance of *superbia* with the use of the word elsewhere in Sallust, not only but especially in the statement of theme. However, a survey of Sallust's use of the term yields surprising results. Crucially, every time *superbia* is invoked against the *nobiles* in the text, not just in the second half but also in the more directly critical first half, it is either spoken directly by a *popularis* speaker (Memmius or Marius) or focalised through *popularis* speakers, as in opinions which Sallust reports but does not endorse.[335] The sole exceptions are: this characterisation of Metellus; the digression at 41.3, where Sallust states that *superbia* and *lascivia* had grown from prosperity; and in the statement of theme. In all three cases, *superbia* is used more

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[333] e.g. Cic. *Inv*. 1.22 cites *superbia* as conventional *topos* of attack. Hellegouarc'h 1963:440 notes the extension of the value from genuinely anti-Republican vice to a conventional *topos* of attack on political enemies; similarly Haffter 1956:139-40 (having noted the force of the attack since the regal period). Cf. Dunkle 1967 on *superbia* as term of political attack drawn from characteristics of tyranny, but applied in Roman partisan circumstances.

[334] *Jug*. 43.1.

[335] *Superbia* in the *Jug.*: 5.1 (see below), 14.11 (used by Adherbal of Jugurtha), 31.2 (used by Memmius), 41.3 (the poltical digression), 64.1 (the passage discussed here), 64.5 (accusations of Marius against Metellus), 82.3 (an anti-Metellan – not Sallust's own – opinion of Metellus' behaviour), 85.1, 13, 19, 45, 47 (Marius' speech). The same holds for the adjective, *superbus*: 30.3, 31.12 and 85.38.

clearly as a factional description than it is an unambiguous term of moral condemnation: it refers to a vice expressed *via* political relations, but not to one fundamentally affecting the commonwealth. Although Sallust does use *superbia* as an analytical term, we should be wary of assigning it any unproblematic moralistic significance beyond the partisan political dimension illustrated in Memmius' and Marius' speeches.

The use of *superbia* attested throughout, I suggest, prompts a reassessment of the statement of theme. Sallust promised to treat the first resistance to the *superbia* of the *nobiles*: but if *superbia* is understood as a term of factional abuse, rather than as a vice truly dangerous to the state, then the significance of the struggle (which, Sallust tells us, led directly to civil war) is adjusted, and it is in fact the action of resistance which emerges as the major spur to violent strife. Sallust does *not* narrate the challenge of the *plebs* to the *nobiles*' hegemony, or to their *avaritia*; he focuses on a quality which plays specifically into the political analysis of the digression, stressing the pernicious struggles of party political advantage which underpinned Roman political practice. A reassessment of the *superbia* which is levelled against Metellus here leads to a reassessment of the significance of the whole thematic statement, and a reading more in keeping with the political analysis I have suggested underpins the monograph.

I return to Marius and Metellus. As noted, Metellus is generally positively portrayed; the *superbia* for which he is criticised draws on partisan rhetoric, rather than representing a major moral failing. Marius, on the other hand, is aligned with popular *invidia* and the growing power of the *plebs* which is the major development of the second half; Metellus' successful prosecution of the war is undermined by Marius' factious attacks, aimed at the satisfaction of his *ambitio*.

When Marius re-enters the Numidian narrative after his canvass, it is as consul designate, to whom the province of Numidia has been allocated.[336] Metellus' reaction to the news is described in detail: "affected by these things more than is good or proper, he was able neither to restrain his

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[336] *Jug*. 82.2.

tears nor moderate his tongue, a man outstanding in other qualities but too soft in the bearing of hardship. This some ascribed to his *superbia*, others said that a good spirit had been stung by insult; many that a victory almost won had been snatched from his grasp."[337] Sallust gives his own judgement: "for my part, it seems well enough established that he was pained more by the honour given to Marius than the injury to himself, and that he would not have felt such distress if the province had been given to any other than Marius." *superbia* is a possible explanation for Metellus' actions, but it is not endorsed by Sallust. On his exit from the text, as throughout, Metellus' characterisation is not negative: his role in the narrative, which makes no mention of his subsequent honours (although it does emphasise that he was positively received at Rome)[338] casts him as a victim of partisan intriguing, rather than as flawed figure in his own right.

Themes so far established, particularly the characterisation of Marius as driven by partisan hatred and the desire of the *plebs* for revenge, are stressed in the speech Sallust records as delivered by Marius after election. Like Memmius', Marius' speech is a powerful piece of anti-*nobilis* oratory: but again, rather than equating it to Sallust's own views, we should be sensitive to its position within the political analysis of the rest of the text.[339] The speech is introduced as a deliberate attempt to bait the *nobiles*, as well as to encourage men to enlist. Marius' immediate aim is presented as the enlistment of a new class for his Numidian expedition: the *capite censi*, the lowest in society, without any property. Sallust is scathing: "Some say that he did this for want of good men, others recalled his desire for the consulship, since he had been raised up and given that power by the people of this sort; and for the man who seeks power such people are indeed the most outstanding and most useful, since they have no care for his own property (since they have none) and see everything with a price as honourable."[340] This reiterates Sallust's view of the *plebs* as an unstable

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[337] *Jug*. 82.3.
[338] *Jug*. 88.1.
[339] On the speech see Skard 1941 (claiming allusions to Cynic thought); Carney 1959 (following Skard; Klinz 1968; Picone 1976;Geckle 1995:125; Egelhaat-Gauser 2010 (stressing Marius' references to memorialisation).
[340] *Jug*. 86.3.

element; it also emphasises the ambitious element in Marius' appeal, and continues the identification of his career with factional politics.[341] The speech's aims are, according to Sallust's presentation, both partisan and dangerously demagogic.

Marius' arguments recall, in places, the accusations Sallust himself levelled against the *nobiles* of the pre-Gracchan period, and the venality of the *nobiles* in the first half of the monograph. However, they fit much less well with the changed context post- *quaestio Mamiliana*; Marius himself has already been elected consul, and the antagonistic rhetoric with which his speech is filled seems inappropriate (hinted at in Sallust's introduction of the speech). Marius' attacks (making use of the same themes as Memmius'), connect the speech into wider conflict. In the context of the negative portrayal of Marius as a political figure, the speech emphasises the darker side of his character; he relies on partisan attacks without concern for the safety of the state.[342] Marius' speech writes large the problematic themes first established in Memmius'.

Marius' speech attacks the *pauci*, distinguishing his consulship from theirs. He attacks the corruption usually resulting from election; the consulship, he suggests, converts men from being *industrii*, *supplices* and *modici* to *ignavia* and *superbia*. This vocabulary is central to Marius' attack: as I have suggested, *superbia* is a term of factional abuse in the monograph, and clearly so here. "If such men fail," Marius continues "their ancient nobility, the brave deeds of their ancestors, the resources of their cognates and neighbours, their many clients; all are there to assist them."[343] Marius' own resources, on the other hand, are due to his character alone: "the *gloria* of their ancestors is like a light upon their posterity, and suffers neither their virtues nor their faults to be hidden. Of such things I admit myself to have nothing, Quirites; but, much greater, my own deeds enable me to speak."[344] The distinction is forcefully repeated throughout.

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[341] Cf. Klinz 1968:83.
[342] The darkness of the speech and the dynamics of *invidia* are noted by Klinz 1968.
[343] *Jug*. 85.4.
[344] *Jug*. 85.23.

Scholars have argued that Sallust here uses Marius as a mouthpiece for arguments associated with the *novi homines*.[345] In Plutarch's version - probably deriving from non-Sallustian sources, given the discrepancies between his and Sallust's versions of African events -[346] Marius makes the same arguments; that these words play into established tropes of the *novus homo* is plausible, particularly by comparison with similar arguments used by Cicero, and indeed the reference Sallust himself made to the *virtus* of the *novi homines* as their political capital.[347] However, Sallust's Marius is a more complex figure than simply associating him with other *novi homines* would suggest. While other *novi* stressed their own value, as part of a claim to power, Marius explicitly attacks the debased qualities and inadequacy of the *nobiles* themselves, an unusually aggressive approach in contrast to the usual rhetorical strategy associated with the *novi*.[348]

Marius' final argument returns to the subject of the Jugurthine War, suggesting that it would be swiftly concluded with him in charge: *nam quae ad hoc tempus Iugurtham tutata sunt, omnia removistis, avaritiam, imperitiam atque superbiam*.[349] This is a programmatic statement of a sort: Marius' three words can each be associated to a different phase of the war so far.[350] *Avaritia* under Calpurnius Bestia; incompetence under Albinus, and *superbia* under Metellus: such is Marius' summary of the conduct of the conflict. But this judgement is clearly focalised through Marius himself; while *avaritia* and *imperitia* are indisputable from Sallust's description of the opening phases of the war, it remains difficult to see how Metellus' *superbia* is supposed to have manifested itself, except in the limited compass of his relationship with Marius. Marius elevates a personal disagreement into an issue of political polemic, emblematic of his characterisation throughout, which stresses his concern with faction and self-advancement.

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[345] Yakobson 2014; van den Blom 2011:29-58 (cf. 333 on this speech in particular).

[346] Compare Plutarch on the affair of Turpilius (Plut. *Mar*. 8), which includes details not in Sallust (similarly App. *Num*. 3). See Paratore 1973:80-2; Fontanella 1992.

[347] *Jug*. 4.7.

[348] See Yakobson 2014 esp. 295; Skard 1941:99 suggests that Marius' attack stems from an "inferiority complex".

[349] *Jug*. 85.45: "for you have put aside the qualities which up to now have protected Jugurtha - *avaritia*, incompetence and arrogance."

[350] Lefevre 1969:269.

In the light of connections to the themes of the monograph, another aspect of Marius' rhetoric is similarly striking. In Sallust's version of this speech (and not Plutarch's, suggesting that Sallust may have introduced it), Marius makes frequent reference to his own rank as a *nova nobilitas*: he arrogates the term *nobilitas* to himself, redefining the traditional sense of *nobilitas* towards a definition explicitly based on deeds. Marius attacks the *nobiles*' *superbia*, a term of partisan rhetoric: but the implication of Marius' behaviour, and claims to *nobilitas*, is that he in fact acts arrogantly himself. Plutarch explicitly characterises this as a speech of *hubris*, and Marius' actions as arrogant in over-valuing his own achievements: that Marius has effectively absorbed the *superbia* he attacks, is an appropriate characterisation in the light of his place within the monograph.[351]

Marius' speech is a complex document: it is important not to simply take its attacks as replicating Sallust's view of the *nobiles*, but to consider it in context of the political ideas of the monograph as a whole. Marius is portrayed as a partisan demagogue, his character indicative of the political realities of the period of popular ascendancy after the *quaestio Mamiliana*. The introduction of the speech, together with pointed comments elsewhere, are as close as Sallust comes to an explicitly negative assessment of his character and significance; but in the light of the civil wars in which Sallust's audience knew Marius to have been involved, they add up to a more negative view of Marius than is usually assumed.

Subsequent events are less relevant to my analysis, as the partisan dimension of the narrative recedes in favour of a focus on African diplomacy; the major political strand is in the introduction of Sulla, and the contrast he represents with Marius. The military narrative in Numidia continues, with Marius in command:[352] he is successful in various military endeavours (albeit in some cases more by luck than judgement, reiterating his characterisation as dependent on *fortuna*).[353]

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[351] See Egelhaat-Gauser 2010 on Marius' speech as attempt to appropriate the political capital of the *nobiles*.
[352] *Jug*. 88.1.
[353] *Jug*. 94.6.

At chapter 95 Sulla is introduced, with a character-sketch; he subsequently plays a key role in Jugurtha's capture.[354] At the time of the narrative, Sulla was still a young man, his role in the historical events less significant than Metellus' or Marius'; nonetheless, to judge by the space allocated to him in the narrative (and the sketch, comparable in detail to Marius' or even Jugurtha's), Sallust considered him important. Sulla, of course, effected Jugurtha's capture: but Sallust's stress on his character and role in the text goes beyond his historical importance in these years, and is linked once again to the thematic construction of the whole monograph.[355]

The picture of Sulla is positive (perhaps surprisingly so). In Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae* and *Historiae*, references to Sulla are scathing, focusing on the pernicious effects of his actions in the 80s, but Sallust here almost elide these, stressing what he presents as genuinely praiseworthy achievements.[356] Despite the famous attack on Sisenna's overly sycophantic portrayal of Sulla, Sallust's version is not much darker than Sisenna's can have been, with the exception of the final sentence (*nam postea quae fecerit, incertum habeo pudeat an pigeat magis disserere*). For the Jugurthine period, at least, Sulla is a positive *exemplum* of virtue:[357] that the one exception to this is his marital affairs is a fairly minor criticism.[358] We are some distance from the portrayal of Sulla as epochal marker of Roman debasement (appearing in the *Bellum Catilinae*), and from Paul Martin's claim that Sallust's works represent a "brûlot antisyllanien".[359] The positive portrayal of Sulla is significant. Stress on his role is perhaps a response to Sallust's use of Sulla's autobiography as a

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[354] *Jug*. 95.3-4. Wille 1970:306 notes that unlike Marius, Sulla has not been mentioned at all up to this point, marking a more forceful divide.

[355] See Wille 1970:306-9 on the character-sketches as illustrative of the value of individuals in Sallust's historical imagination.

[356] *Jug*. 95.4. Samotta 2009:149-50 argues that the portrait is ambiguous; but in comparison to all of Sallust's other major figures (excepting Caesar and Cato) Sulla's portrait is positive. On Sulla in the *Historiae* see Sensal 2009; Valvo 1995. MacKay's suggestion (1962:186) that Sallust's position towards Sulla in the *Cat*. represents "measured praise" has found little support.

[357] Martin 1986:16 argues that Sulla is negatively characterised because he is "entirely devoid of *moderatio*"; I see no basis in the text for this. On the problematic nature of Sallustian *gloria* see chapter 5.

[358] *Jug*. 95.3.

[359] Wille 1970:306-9 suggests retrospective criticism as important to the sketches of both Marius and Sulla: but this is a less important feature of the Sullan sketch (perhaps deliberately minimised by Sallust) than the Marian. For "brûlot antisyllanien" see Martin 2009:84 (cited by Sensal 2009). Cf La Penna 1968:226-32 on this sketch.

source,[360] and to the importance subsequently placed on Sulla's role in Jugurtha's capture;[361] however, as demonstrated in relation to Scaurus above, Sallust is not so dependent on his sources that he carries over their biases wholesale. Once again, I suggest, the positive portrait of Sulla is in response to the political analysis embodied in the work.

Sulla provides a counterweight to Marius in the political economy of this final section of the monograph. Marius has been portrayed as dangerous, prepared to make use of weapons of factional strife in assailing the *nobiles* and gaining power; Sulla, on the other hand (himself a *nobilis*),[362] refuses to make use of Marius' methods, and wins success through more approved channels. Sulla is an anti-Marius in other senses too: his portrait notably foregrounds details (such as Greek learning, scrupulousness in proper behaviour and eloquence) which Marius explicitly set himself against in his speech.[363] Sulla characterises Marius' methods by contrast: that he achieves the capture of Jugurtha belies Marius' claims as to the effectiveness of his prosecution of the war, and illustrates an alternative model of political practice.

Sulla emphasises by contrast the limitations of Marius as a political figure: he in fact replaces Metellus in the role of a *nobilis* antagonist to Marius. This dynamic was made manifest in the civil wars of the 80s: significantly, Sallust's final comment on Sulla's later career connects him to the *continuum* of civil strife which the audience knew was to follow: "what he did later, I am unsure whether it is more of a sorrow or a shame."[364] These two contrasting figures contain the latent threat of civil war.[365] The portrayal of Sulla, then, foreshadows the *vastitas Italiae*, and maintains this as thematically central; the portrait of Sulla yet again reiterates the model of cyclical strife and the

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[360] Bates 1983:230-84 stresses Sallust's use of Sulla's work; on its reconstruction see Lewis 1991, Tatum 2011:163-74.

[361] See Dijkstra & Parker 2007:154-8.

[362] *Jug*. 96.3.

[363] Cf. *Jug*. 95.3 [Sulla] *litteris Graecis et Latinis iuxta atque doctissume eruditus* with *Jug*. 85. 12-4: see Picone 1976 for this as a demagogic strategy of attack, and a Sallustian illustration of the limitations of the *novus homo*. On eloquence cf. *Jug*. 95.3 and 85.26.

[364] *Jug*. 95.1: *nam postea quae fecerit, incertum habeo pudeat an pigeat magis disserere*.

[365] Kraus 1999:240-1 links the back-and-forth over Jugurtha with the subsequent civil war. Cf. Flower 2010:92, who suggests that Sulla's march led to the collapse of the Republic of the *nobiles*: in Sallust's analysis, Sulla embodies the power of the *nobiles* (88 providing the next shift in the balance of party power).

abuse of victory, through the allusion to perverted behaviour after his accession to the point of supremacy.

With Jugurtha in captivity and Marius in Rome, ready to meet the dangerous threat of the Cimbri and Teutones, the monograph ends, but not without final comment: "at that time the hope and power of the state lay with [Marius]".[366] This is ambiguous, and, as David Levene has noted, points forwards beyond the monograph's boundaries;[367] the final sentence appears ironic in the light of Marius' subsequent involvement in the civil wars (although some scholars do read it "at face value", noting that the immediate consequence of Marius' power was the destruction of the Gallic threat).[368] The political interpretation I have outlined here affords it a new significance: this summation emphasises Marius' hegemonic position at Rome, comparable to that of the *nobiles* in the opening. The final chapter also records Marius' election to a second consulship: such is his pre-eminence that such achievements do not require much comment, despite the lengths to which Marius had been driven in his desire for the first.[369] The balance of power has decisively shifted. The final sentence of the monograph, as the portrayal of Sulla throughout this latter part, demonstrates that the dynamics of strife (of which the monograph had illustrated one example) remain unresolved.

I have suggested here that the political digression of the *Bellum Jugurthinum* plays a central role within the construction of the whole monograph. While in the *Bellum Catilinae* the central digression served to explain Sallust's statement of theme, setting the events of 63 within a broader context of political strife through a Thucydidean model of *malum publicum*, in addition to serving those functions the political model elaborated in the digression of the *Bellum Jugurthinum* is manifested in the actual structure of the monograph, and the thematic form which Sallust imposes.

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[366] *Jug*. 114.4.
[367] Levene 1992; on Sallust's conclusions more generally see Benferhat 2008, Marincola 2005:302.
[368] Reading this ironically: Levene 1992:55; *contra* Montgomery 2004:190-3; Egelhaat-Gauser 2010:177-9.
Vretska 1954:37 reads it as a positive conclusion, the state "closing ranks" in the face of the Gallic threat.
[369] *Jug*. 114.3; see Martin 1986:15.

The opening half, in the context of the *nobiles*' hegemony, is dominated by their abuses of the *plebs*, and particularly by their *avaritia* (the results of their hegemony); the *invidia* of the *plebs* is stirred up against this by members of the opposite party. By the monograph's centre-point, the *quaestio Mamiliana*, the balance shifts: power moves to the side of the people, a theme constantly emphasised in the rise of the emblematic figure of Marius in the second half of the text. The *nobiles* of the second half (exemplified by Metellus and Sulla) are much more positively portrayed than in the first; now, it is the *plebs* (and particularly their emblematic leader Marius) who make use of the opportunity afforded by their ascendancy to attack the other party, and as such are criticised. Marius mirrors the *nobiles* of the first half: he has the same lack of concern for the commonwealth, and the same negative influences work upon his character.

The structure of the monograph, then, enacts the analysis of the digression. Sallust's account, while critical of the *nobiles*, is not *only* critical of them; criticism is in fact tempered by the second half, with the decline of the *avaritia* which accompanied political hegemony. Criticism in the second half is directed rather at the excesses of the *plebs*, and the divisive behaviour of Marius, exploiting the situation to further his own ambitions. Marius' enrollment of the *capite censi* - furthering his *ambitio* - was a factor in the Republic's decline: in this sense, Marius' challenge to the *superbia nobilitatis*, was directly culpable in the *vastitas Italiae* postdating the monograph's end. Sallust's analysis again demonstrates that he is no *popularis* partisan: the anti-*nobilitas animus* by which he is supposedly motivated (particularly in this monograph) is an artifact of a specific part of a considered political presentation.

As with the *Bellum Catilinae*, the political digression of the *Bellum Jugurthinum* is central to the monograph, structurally and thematically: it divides two clearly marked halves. The content of the digression, emphasising shared culpability for strife, comments on the dynamics of political power which the text embodies. The focus of the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, more than the *Bellum Catilinae*, is party politics: while the earlier work focused on individual gain, this one applies the

same stress on expediency and self-interest to parties. Sallust's ideas remain largely constant – they simply expand, in keeping with what Sallust recognised as the major development of the period.

In the light of all this, we can return briefly to the initial thematic statement. Sallust suggested that (in addition to the war) he would describe the first challenge to the *superbia* of the *nobiles*, leading to the wars which would ravage Italy: from this analysis, it emerges that his objective is not so clear-cut as might be assumed. Is *superbia* really the problem, and cause of violence, or is it in fact the strife itself, and the partisan opposition stirred up by Memmius and Marius, which led to the disasters of the period beyond the monograph? Sallust offers no clear answer; but my analysis suggests that blame is not so easily allocated to the *nobiles* as scholars have assumed, and that the digression substantiates a more balanced and considered model.

Conclusion

I hope to have demonstrated here that Sallust's political digressions are fundamental to the the monographs: they substantiate the ideas which underpin his historiography. Given the centrality of this material, viewing Sallust simply as a *popularis*, a Caesarian partisan or an implacable enemy of the *nobiles* is flawed: Sallust's position is more nuanced. In formulating his analysis, he draws on material from both sides: he does attack the abuses of the *nobiles*, but he *also* attacks the methods to which the *plebs*' leaders had recourse in combating them. Sallust's political career, and the disgrace of his prosecution, left him unable or unwilling to participate in practical politics; nonetheless, he draws heavily on contemporary political themes in formulating his models of Rome's inevitable decline. Sallust's analyses are formulated around the idea of personal expediency, and the idea that by his period the citizens were prepared to place their own advancement before the good of the commonwealth; this led to the excesses of partisan strife, and cycles of strife resulting from changing balances of power. I will return to these ideas with the next chapter, considering expediency against the details of Sallust's moral philosophy: Sallust's analysis of

individual character draws on similar themes (the assessment of Marius I have outlined here demonstrates his value as an *exemplum* of wider political trends).

Sallust could not escape his context: his analysis is politically simplistic in our terms, particularly in the binary opposition it imposes between the politically powerful and the *plebs*: although his analysis is emphatically not simply of "class conflict" (it is rather of the conflicts within a smaller elite), he nonetheless recurs to this in formulating his political model. What, then, is Sallust's original contribution? What Sallust adds, I think, is a synthesis of the various positions (along with Thucydidean ideas), and the formulation of an attempt to understand the politics of his own period according to a more general assessment of how strife grew and developed. This was, I think, central to Sallust's thought: the models of political strife expressed in these two digressions fit well with both the reading of Rome's historical trajectory advanced in the *archaeologia* and his reading of individual motivation, to which I turn in the next chapter.

Chapter 5 – the character-sketches and *synkrisis*

I have thus far concentrated on the broad themes underpinning Sallust's historical works; this chapter will narrow the focus, onto Sallust's treatment of specific individuals. I will focus in particular on the character-sketches - digressions on individuals' nature and morals – and the *synkrisis*, the comparison between Caesar and Cato at the climax to the *Bellum Catilinae* (effectively a special type of character-sketch, in drawing on the same ideas, although it combines them with a comparative structure and a more fully developed moralistic focus).

Sallust shows interest in the specific personages of recent history, Roman and foreign.[1] The monographic form was in this sense a powerful declaration of intent: Sallust's monographs, although they certainly cover wider events, are tied to their eponymous protagonists,[2] and attested titles given to Sallust's works illustrate the centrality of individuals to his structuring of historical events.[3] Sallust's interest in individuals and character-description was noted in antiquity; the character-sketches were among the most imitated passages in his works.[4]

The relationship between Sallust's historical ideas (illustrated in previous chapters) and his interest in individuals is complex. In Sallust's history, events reflect wider trends; but his focus on individuals, with monographs structured around individual protagonists, emphasises their important role. This is exemplified by the treatment of Sulla in the *archaeologia* of the Bellum Catilinae:[5] his march on Rome (identified as a moral turning-point) combines individual agency with large-scale patterns of moral change. Sulla is important both as an individual, and in that he represents and catalyses social change more generally.

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[1] On this as characteristic of Sallust's period see Brignoli 1987:37-9.

[2] Cf. the monograph requested by Cicero in *Fam.* 5.12, with its clear focus on the heroics of Marcus Tullius himself.

[3] The monographs sometimes appeared in manuscripts as *liber Catilinarius* or similar e.g. Reynolds' codex *N*. Cosma 2006 stresses the "*a priori* characterisation" of the titles.

[4] Sallust's Catiline, in particular, lies behind both Livy's Hannibal (see Clauss 1997) and Tacitus' Sejanus. Cf. Ducroux 1978 for the influence of Sallust's portraits on Tacitus; Blockley 1975:31-7 on Ammianus' Sallustian sketches.

[5] *Cat*. 11.4;cf. Zecchini 2002:46-7 on Sullan culpability in Sallust.

This idea was fairly common at Rome, where large-scale historical shifts were frequently related to turning-points represented by specific individuals. Tiberius Gracchus was frequently supposed to have initiated the Republic's final political decline; blame for the moral failings which had infested the state was variously pinned on different generals of the first and second centuries BC.[6] The Romans frequently conceived even what they acknowledged as large-scale historical developments according to the agency of individuals.[7] This is paralleled in the annalistic histories of Livy, a monument to the *populus Romanus* as a whole but also to individuals; from Brutus onwards, Republican history was the *res gestae* of important men, and Livy often structures his work around egregious lives.[8] Livy's sources, particularly monuments and the records of the aristocratic *gentes*, to some degree necessitated this approach, as did the focus on *exempla* in Roman views of their past; but even the Elder Cato, who apparently excised names from at least parts of his history, presumably used the names of the consuls to mark the years.[9] Part of the aim of this chapter will be to explore the way that Sallust's ideas of individuals and society fit together.

By way of introduction, I begin with the passage which most explicitly considers the theme of the role of individuals, *Bellum Catilinae* 53. This immediately follows Sallust's version of the debate of 5th December 63; Sallust shifts from the successful speech of Cato to a more analytical tone. "In reading and hearing a great deal about the outstanding deeds of the *populus Romanus*, at home and in the field, on land and at sea, it seemed good to me to pay close attention to what quality had been the foundation of such great achievements."[10] This alludes to the *topos* of the explanatory value of historiography, and recalls Polybius' famous discussion of Rome's rise;[11] but Sallust's explanation is profoundly different to Polybius'. Where Polybius identified the strength of

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[6] Tiberius' tribunate as catalyst for strife: Cic. *Rep*. 1.31; Florus 2.2; Vell. Pat. 2.2.3.

[7] See Earl 1967; cf. Brignoli 1987 on the place of individual biography in Roman historiography.

[8] Cf. the role of figures such as Camillus or Hannibal. On the centrality of individual deeds to Roman memory see Timpe 2011; on individuals in Sallust and Livy see Mineo 1996:48-50.

[9] *FRHist* 5 T1,20*.* Eponymous dating has (as far as I know) not been considered; the idea that Cato excised *all* other names is certainly overstated (see *FRHist* 1.215-6).

[10] *Cat*. 53.2. Mariotti 2007 *ad loc*. notes *mihi multa legenti, multa audienti* - along with *sicuti ego accepi* (*Cat*. 6.1) and *mihi visum est* (*Cat*. 34.1) - as stressing the author's intervention; on the first person marking authorial analysis see Évrard 1997:14-5.

[11] Cf. Polyb. 1.1.4-5. See Heldmann 1993b:202-3 for the comparison with Polybius.

Rome with her mixed constitution,[12] Sallust's reason is the "outstanding virtue of a few citizens",

paucorum civium egregia virtus.[13] It was thanks to these few outstanding men, Sallust says, that

Rome had defeated both Greeks and Gauls and risen to pre-eminence. However, Sallust continues

(in keeping with his theme of *translatio imperii*), pre-eminence was followed by inevitable moral

decline: "after the state had been corrupted by luxury and idleness, the commonwealth in turn

sustained the vices of its generals and magistrates through its greatness and, as if exhausted by

childbirth, for a long period there was almost no-one at Rome who was great in virtue." [14] Individuals

caused the state to rise to power; but with the changing *mores* of its inhabitants, the state itself had

changed and had stopped producing individuals of *virtus*.[15] As Sallust goes on to demonstrate,

Caesar and Cato are exceptional: but even there, as I explore in the final part of this chapter, the

relationship between man and environment is complex. According to this analysis, the character of

the *populus Romanus* shapes and is in turn shaped by the nature of its society. As we will see, this

theme is writ large in the leading figures of Sallust's narrative.

The character-sketches

I begin with considerations of form. The character-sketches are passages interrupting the

narrative which provide developed portraits of specific individuals. There are five in the

monographs: Catiline and Sempronia in the *Bellum Catilinae*, and Jugurtha, Marius and Sulla in the

Bellum Jugurthinum. The sketches are united by a shared literary form and purpose: each interrupts

the chronological narrative, in order to treat more fully - from a perspective focusing on character

and human nature - its major figures. These are significant passages, since their links to the narrative

are so clear; the relevance is more immediately obvious than – for example – the historical

digressions. It might be argued that the character-sketches are not in fact digressions at all, but

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[12] Polyb. 6.11; see chapter 3.

[13] *Cat.* 53.4.

[14] *Cat.* 53.5. The passage contains a *crux* (see Shackleton Bailey 1981:352, Linderski 1999); the sense remains effectively the same. For a similar contemporary idea see Lucr. *RN* 2.1150 with La Penna 2004; cf. Cic. *Rep*. 5.1.

[15] Caesar's speech argues the same theme at 51.42. Heldmann 1993b:199 contrasts this with the idealisation of both *archaeologia* and Cato's speech.

central parts; however, following my definition (avoiding the subjective grounds of relevance) the character-sketches demonstrate the activity of the historian's *dispositio* through interruption and arrangement.

This is illustrated by not only content but also structural considerations. I discussed the sketch of Marius above: as I suggested, it is noteworthy that Marius is drawn as an independent figure only at chapter 63, rather than on his introduction (46.7). By postponing Marius' sketch, Sallust connects him to the developing themes of the monograph as a whole, and locates him within the historical interpretation which structures the text. Rather than simply introducing a major character, a sketch allows the historian to signal thematic shifts (as with the introduction of Marius) or to present particular interpretations. Even for Catiline and Jugurtha, whose sketches appear at the beginnings of their respective works, the sketches are not just descriptive: they represent *loci* of the historian's moral and historical analysis.

A good deal of work has been done on the literary features of the character-sketches (connecting them to the techniques of rhetoric), and on connections with Roman forms such as the *laudatio funebris* and *elogia*.[16] Scholars have linked the sketches to the literary tradition within which Sallust wrote, emphasising their intertextuality (a particularly clear connection has been drawn between the description of Jugurtha's youth and Xenophon's *Cyropaideia*).[17] While such work is valuable in understanding the sketches, and as such I draw on it in what follows, I wish with this chapter to move beyond the literary details of the passages, and to consider their importance to the construction of the work as a whole (reflecting the historian's *dispositio*). I will consider three sketches in detail - Catiline, Sempronia and Jugurtha -‾ and focus on two interrelated aspects. The first is the relationship between each sketch and the rest of the monograph; the second, broader strand is the relationship between individuals and society, a persistent theme.

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[16] See Vretska 1955 (linking Sallust's sketches to encomiastic rhetoric); Riposati 1969; Rambaud 1970; Christiansen 1990:74-104; Utard 2011 (stressing characterisation through speeches). For rhetorical techniques of *laus* and *vituperatio* see Lausberg 1998 §239-45.

[17] Christiansen 1990:17-23; Dix 2006:25-58; Blänsdorf 2007.

Catiline

Catiline's sketch immediately follows the preface of the *Bellum Catilinae*. It is in two parts (chapters 5 and 14-6), separated by the *archaeologia*. The first describes Catiline's nature, upbringing and aims;[18] the second concentrates on his actions leading up to the conspiracy.[19] We should consider these as complementary components of the sketch, since although the latter has a more pronounced narrative form, it still concentrates on Catiline's character and development. The end-point is marked by the beginning of Catiline's revolutionary designs, and the formation of Catiline's plot; this initiates the narrative promised in the monograph's thematic statement: chapter 17 provides the first chronologically specific marker in the whole monograph.[20] The separate digression on Catiline's "First Conspiracy" has been treated above.[21]

The sketch's position gives it a bridging role within the opening of the monograph, linking the moralistic ideas of the preface with the historical world introduced through the *archaeologia*.[22] The integration of Catiline's portrait with the digression on Roman history is a demonstration of the connections between individuals and society, and Sallust makes the link explicitly: Catiline's character prompts Sallust's digression on the state's morals,[23] and the state in turn provides a context within which a man such as Catiline could flourish.[24] Catiline is symptomatic of wider trends.[25]

The most striking feature of the opening part of the sketch is its stress on Catiline as fundamentally contradictory, combining great abilities (*magna vi et animi et corporis*) with evil motives (*ingenio malo pravoque*). The opening sentence is particularly jarring, because it departs from the moral vocabulary deployed by Sallust so far in the monograph. Sallust had spent the

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[18] *Cat*. 5-6.
[19] *Cat*. 14-5.
[20] *Cat*. 17.1.
[21] Cf. pp.49-51.
[22] See Ducroux 1977:99-102.
[23] *Cat*. 5.8-9.
[24] *Cat*. 14.1.
[25] On the juxtaposition of the sketch with the *archaeologia* cf. Seider 2014:155.

opening two chapters of his work establishing a moral philosophy based on the *animus* and *corpus* as the constituent elements of the human *psyche*;[26] these determine individuals' achievements.[27] However, in the person of Catiline this binary opposition is violently overridden.[28] Catiline's *corpus* and *animus*, constituents of the virtuous man, are well-developed;[29] but a virtuous existence is impossible for Catiline, because of the complicating factor of an *ingenium malum pravumque*. The sketch of Catiline disrupts the established moral system of the work and indicates the complexity of the moral assessment of Catiline and his actions.

Catiline's portrait continues to stress this paradoxicality, as Sallust deploys his typical antithesis in describing in turn the qualities of *corpus* and *animus*.[30] Catiline's *corpus* is marked by hardiness, surprisingly so given his dissolute lifestyle (noted in the phrase *supra quam cuiquam credibile est*); his *animus*, on the other hand, contains great potential, but cannot restrain itself from depraved passions. Here, again, Catiline is not easily contained within Sallust's model of human activity, and in fact inverts the usual model of moral decline represented in the preface; while Sallustian depravity takes the form of subordination of the mind to the desires of the body,[31] Catiline's body is strong, hardy, and habituated to activity, but is subordinate to the evil lusts of his mind.[32] The phrase *vastus animus*, the ambiguity of which has exercised modern scholarship,[33] is significant: *vastus*, meaning both "extensive" and "desolate", encapsulates and emphasises the ambiguities of Catiline's character.[34] Sallust describes Catiline as *simulator ac dissimulator*: as well as a reference to Catiline's ability to hide his true character – illustrated historically by the consideration at one point made by Cicero of defending him, and mentioned in Cicero's defence of

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[26] See especially 1.2: *nostra omnis vis in animo et corpore sita est*; see below.
[27] *Cat*. 2.
[28] See Ducroux 1977:107 on Sallust's *ingenium*. *TLL* gives two meanings, one as innate qualities and the other specifically intellectual ones (both with Sallustian examples). *ingenium* here refers to the former, in the sense of Catiline's perverted mentality; the word has so far in the monograph signified the latter (1.3, 2.1, 2.2), stressing the distinction. On "innate qualities" in Roman thought (including *ingenium*) see Pellicer 1959.
[29] *Cat*. 5.1.
[30] *Cat*. 5.3-4.
[31] *Cat*. 2.8-9.
[32] *Cat*. 5.4-6.
[33] E.g. Heurgon 1949; Krebs 2008.
[34] *Cat*. 15.3: *ita conscientia mentem excitam vastabat*.

Caelius Rufus -,[35] this is another significant reminder of the difficulty of assessing Catiline's character according to conventional values.

The contradiction in Catiline's portrait has been frequently recognised, in antiquity and more recently;[36] Antonio La Penna termed the sketch a "*ritratto paradossale*", "paradoxical portrait", and it served as a model for many such portraits in Latin historiography.[37] However, I wish to push Catiline's paradoxicality further, to suggest that the contradiction between great abilities and evil aims is programmatic for not just the portrayal of Catiline himself, but for Sallust's view of individuals within late Republican society. The emphasis placed on this aspect of Catiline's character, continuing throughout the whole sketch, introduces a theme which runs throughout.

It is necessary at this point to demonstrate how far the presentation of Catiline is owed to the historian's interpretation as opposed to his sources, particularly since much of what Sallust says about Catiline is dependent on speeches of Cicero. In his Catilinarians, Cicero had emphasised precisely the bodily abilities stressed in Sallust's *ritratto paradossale*.[38] In the *Pro Caelio* of 56, Cicero presented a more complex assessment, emphasising the paradoxicality of Catiline's nature: "I do not think there has ever been such a monster in any land, comprised of such contrary, opposed and infighting ways of life and desires."[39] Cicero also portrayed Catiline as a skilled and charismatic leader, aligning his inducements to the characters of those whom he targeted.[40] However, we should not simply ascribe Sallust's emphasis on the contradictions of Catiline's character to his use of

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[35] Cic. *Att*. 1.2.1; *Cael*. 12-4. On Sallust's interest in *simulatio* see Hands 1959.
[36] Wilkins 1994; Garcia-Lopez 1997:113-4; Christiansen 1990:115 suggests that Catiline is characterised precisely by failure to pursue traditional *gloria*: but as I explore below this mistakes the role of *gloria* within Sallust's moral philosophy.
[37] La Penna 1976; cf. Carrara 2004.
[38] *Cic*. *Cat*. 1.26; 2.9.
[39] Cic. *Cael*. 12.
[40] Cic. *Cael*. 14.

Cicero: while Sallust draws on the main lines of Cicero's depiction of Catiline, his version twists and supplements Cicero's in a number of ways.[41]

In particular, Sallust's version suggests an alternative model for Catiline's development. Cicero described Catiline's physical qualities as aspects of his evil nature, developed through - and in order to aid him in – his debauched practices and vices.[42] Sallust makes no such assumption. There is no causal link in his sketch between bodily strengths and the virulence of Catiline's desires; Sallust simply juxtaposes them. Unlike Cicero, Sallust makes no assumptions as to the morality of Catiline's bodily qualities.

Sallust's Catiline is also more ambiguous than Cicero's about the cause of Catiline's corruption. Sallust notes that Catiline's *iuventus* was spent in civil war: this reference perhaps implies that it was this had caused the degeneration of Catiline's character (a theory in keeping with the theories of moral development of the major philosophical schools, which allotted a key role to youth in the development of character).[43] It is at least noteworthy that Sallust makes no mention of one of Catiline's most infamous deeds, his murder of Marius Gratidianus in 82 (of which Sallust certainly knew, since it is mentioned frequently by Cicero, and Sallust himself mentioned it in the later *Historiae*);[44] rather, he dates Catiline's evil designs to the period *post dominationem L. Sullae*, "after the Sullan *dominatio*" (the 70s at the earliest).[45] Cicero's Catiline is depraved and evil right from the start, but Sallust's allows the possibility that Catiline's *ingenium* had once been sound.[46] This reconfiguration of Catiline's moral development is important for the way in which Sallust conceives of his significance.

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[41] See Narducci 2001 on Sallust's absorption and adaptation of the literary tradition on Catiline; Henselleck 1967:1-15, Bianco 2009 on Sallust's construction of his portrait as contrasted with Cicero's.

[42] Cic. *Cat*. 2.9: *stuprorum et scelerum exercitatione adsuefactus frigore et fame et siti et vigiliis...*

[43] See Long 1971:185-7, Pembroke 1971 on the Stoa; Pelling 1988:261-4 treats Peripatetic biography; Gill 1983 considers character-development in historiography (with particular reference to Plutarch and Tacitus); cf. Swain 1989. See below pp.231-6 on Jugurtha.

[44] Marshall 1985 discusses the evidence; on Sallust's elision of Catiline's early murders see Martin 2006:85.

[45] McGushin 1977:59-60 refers to Sallust's "failure to capitalise" on unedifying details of Catiline's early career; but the selectivity is deliberate, locating Catiline's perversion more clearly.

[46] Mariotti 2007:212 suggests that Sallust's stress on Catiline's *adulescentia* mirrors the focus on his own youth in the preface.

Sallust's Catiline contains the seeds of morally correct behaviour, although twisted by his evil motives: this makes particularly pointed the collocation with the Romans of the *archaeologia*, who had made use of the same resources of mind and body but to the benefit of the state.[47] The juxtaposition of the sketch of Catiline with this portrayal of the early Romans is, as I suggested, intended to emphasise the contiguity of their qualities of body, and potential for virtuous actions, but also to stress that the motivations guiding them are different. The portrayal of the early Romans focuses throughout on the purity of their motives,[48] a direct contradiction of Catiline's tendencies.

The *archaeologia*, with its treatment of manifestations of Roman moral decline, helps the reader to understand the nature of Catiline's behaviour within the context of Roman values. In the *archaeologia*, the major developments in Roman morality are the onset of *ambitio* and *avaritia*: Sallust identifies these as the particular forces in Roman decline after the year 146.[49] Each presupposes desire (the former for wealth and the latter for power) for its own sake, rather than in the course of service to the state, as had been the rule among the early Romans.[50] Of these two, Sallust specifies that *ambitio* is the closer to virtue (*proprius virtutem*), in aiming at the correct goals albeit by incorrect means;[51] *avaritia*, in desiring only money, led on inexorably to the complete decline of morals and the onset of *luxuria*.[52] *ambitio* is described in the *archaeologia* as *imperi cupido*: its effects are to make men false, and generally to prompt them to present themselves as other than they are for personal gain.[53] Nonetheless, *ambitio* still presupposes the proper delight in *gloria*, *honos* and *imperium*.

Catiline's aims align him with *ambitio*: the elements Sallust emphasises in this vice - the lust for power by whatever means and the encouragement to *dissimulatio* and the arts of deception - are

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[47] *Cat*. 7.
[48] See *Cat*. 7.3-7; 9.1-5.
[49] *Cat*. 10.3-11.3.
[50] Cf. *Cat*. 9.1.
[51] *Cat*. 11.1.
[52] *Cat*. 11.3.
[53] *Cat*. 10.3-5.

those emphasised in his portrait of Catiline. Sallust in fact puts less stress on Catiline's debauched *luxuria* than Cicero does: Sallust's focus is firmly on Catiline's desire for power, establishing the centrality of *ambitio* to his version of Catiline.

The part of the sketch following the *archaeologia* concentrates less on character in the abstract, and more on Catiline's revolutionary designs in action: chapters 14-5 shift away from direct moral description towards a more indirect portrait.[54] Sallust illustrates Catiline's persuasion by portraying him at work on those ripe for conspiracy, emphasising his *simulatio* and the character of his associates. However, the most striking feature of the description of Catiline in this second part of the sketch is the account of his affair with Aurelia Orestilla, and the murder of his stepson.[55] This, according to Sallust, drove Catiline mad, and indeed he displays all of the marks of the insane: "For his polluted spirit, opposed to both gods and men, could be quieted with neither wakefulness nor sleep; in such a way did conscience attack his animated mind. Hence his bloodless complexion; his horrible eyes; his bearing, now fast, now slow; madness was in all his face and his expression".[56]

This description surely exceeds reality, since it is in such contradiction with the skilled *dissimulator*, capable of concealing his true motives and feelings. There is no mention of these obvious symptoms of Catiline's moral turpitude even in the invective of Cicero's consular speeches: while Cicero makes frequent reference to the conspirators' *furor*, this signifies rather a blind rage than physically manifested madness (the closest analogue to Sallust's portrait in Cicero is in the obvious signs of guilt of the captured conspirators, mentioned in the *Third Catilinarian*).[57] While Cicero does refer to Catiline's actions as irrational, Sallust's stock madman is not drawn from Cicero, but from characteristic tropes of tragedy, philosophy and Hellenistic historiography of the madness

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[54] On techniques of characterisation in historiography see Kraus & Woodman 1997:35-6; Pitcher 2007.
[55] *Cat*. 15.2.
[56] *Cat*. 15.5.
[57] The conspirators' *furor*: e.g. Cic. *Cat*. 1.1, 22; the manifest guilt of Lentulus *et al*.: *Cat*. 3.13. cf. Wilkins 1994:29.

of the tyrant.[58] As Patrick McGushin notes, the depiction of Catiline here is very similar to the portrait of Jugurtha's extreme paranoia towards the end of his life.[59] By presenting Catiline as a kind of stock madman, Sallust adds another layer to his portrayal of Catiline: as with the civil war which Sallust hints at as the cause of Catiline's corruption, his *animus* is affected by external factors, and he seems in some senses driven into the conspiracy by madness (albeit self-inflicted).[60] Catiline is a man on whom external forces act, as well as internal drives.[61]

It is hard to reconcile the Catiline described here with the man portrayed earlier. Although there is no chronological differentiation within the sketch – the affair of Aurelia Orestilla precedes the formation of the conspiracy itself – two opposing sides of Catiline's character are displayed. In chapter 14, Catiline is as a charismatic and calculating criminal mastermind; when Sallust thus undermines his portrait as such by presenting an almost theatrical madman, the reader is struck by the contradiction. These aspects add to the complexity of Sallust's Catiline; in some ways, a model of Roman qualities, in others a debased revolutionary with tyrannical characteristics. Such ambiguity is central to the role of Catiline within Sallust's historiography; but it also has a more direct bearing on the construction of the remainder of the monograph: Sallust reiterates the stress on internal contradiction and frustrated potential which dominates the digression throughout the monograph. The sketch and narrative bear out the same thesis in different ways.

When Catiline is mentioned, Sallust makes frequent reference to his self-presentation and *dissimulatio* (for example Catiline's appearance in the Senate at chapter 31, which Sallust explains is *dissimulanda causi aut sui expurgandi*). His paradoxicality and contradiction is also stressed by

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[58] McGushin 1977:111-2; see Filipetti 2010 on differences between Sallust's and Cicero's depictions of Catiline's madness.
[59] *Jug*. 72.2; McGushin 1977:112.
[60] Sallust makes explicit the link between Catiline's guilt and the conspiracy: see *Cat*. 15.3. See Filippetti 2012:387 on Sallust's interest in physical description of Catiline; on anthropological and physical manifestations of Roman corruption in Sallust, Devecka 2012, esp. 94; cf. Hock 1988 on Catiline's madness as part of a plague on the *populus Romanus* more widely.
[61] Blänsdorf 2007:263-4 suggests that Sallust's treatment is distinguished by the attempt to relate Catiline to external *stimuli*.

comparison of his self-presentation with the realities of his programme: Catiline's speech at chapter 20, as has been noted, draws heavily on the Republican vocabulary of *libertas* in justification of the conspiracy, and indeed in some ways it appears as a reasonable call to remedy social inequality,[62] but Sallust undermines Catiline's ostensibly respectable aims with his own assessment of the true objectives of the conspiracy. "Then Catiline promised *tabulae novae*, the proscription of the rich, magistracies, priesthoods, rapine, and everything else which war, and the desire (*lubido*) of the victors, allows... he abused all good citizens with evil words, and praised his own followers, naming them one by one." [63] His appeals to the ideological touchstones of popular politics paint Catiline as a crusader against the excesses of contemporary society; but revelation of his true motives demonstrates the base desires behind the outward appearance.

Catiline's speech, as other scholars have noted, emphasises his *dissimulatio* and manipulation of words: but it also depicts a counterfactual Catiline "as he could have been", a morally justified figure. Catiline's rhetoric presents him as unblemished: only by comparison with the true Catiline as Sallust depicts him can his deviation from this alternate reality be appreciated. The speech emphasises the gulf between Catiline's character, and the potential for salutary action which he could have embodied.[64]

The paradoxical nature of Catiline's character is clearest in the final phase of the monograph, with the battle of Pistoria. As has been noted, Sallust's description of Catiline seems to shift in tone with this military context; the narrative of Catiline's death in particular displays him as a martial hero, alluding to the *topoi* of Roman military heroism.[65] Catiline's pre-battle speech draws on the standard themes of such speeches: notably, Catiline calls his men to fight *pro patria, pro libertate,*

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[62] On this speech's deployment of popular rhetoric see D'Anna 1978:820; Mariotti 2006:313-24; Benferhat 2006:104-5; Gaichas 1972:6-14; Miralles Maldanado 2009. Cf. Martin 2003, 20077 on the tropes of *popularis* rhetoric in historiography; cf. above pp. 180-2 (on Memmius' speech). On Catiline's speeches generally see Batstone 2010.
[63] *Cat*. 21.
[64] On this speech as characterising device see Utard 2011:366; cf. Feldherr 2013 on historiographical implications of Catiline's words.
[65] *Cat*. 60.4. On this section of the narrative see Gugel 1970; Wilkins 1994:51-3.

pro vita against the power of the few at Rome.[66] The peak of the reconfiguration of Catiline comes with his self-immolating death: "when Catiline saw his army routed, and the few men with whom he was left, mindful of his birth and his former *dignitas* he rushed into the thickest part of the enemy and there, fighting, was run through". This recalls the heroic sacrifice of *devotio*: Catiline is motivated by the wholly Roman considerations of birth and dignity, and the enemy to whom he commits himself are described as *hostes*. Catiline in death resembles the heroes of early Roman history.

However, this apparent change does not indicate any developing sympathy for Catiline (*pace* Anne Wilkins, who reads this as a genuine attempt to portray Catiline positively).[67] Rather, Sallust's attitude remains fixed, presenting Catiline in his speech as still a dangerous manipulator of language, and a threat to Roman values and institutions. Only in death can Catiline's achievements appear as unblemished heroism: the apparent virtues which he displays – a noble death and beautiful corpse, testaments to his apparently Roman morals – elide the motives behind the battle, and the characteristics which led to his doom. In his ostensibly glorious death, Catiline leaves the record to which a Roman noble was supposed to aspire – his achievement is in fact the kind of struggle with a small force against a larger enemy eulogised at chapter 53. However, while Catiline's actions (like his abilities) appear positive, they are fatally undercut by the context in which they are employed. Catiline's death preserves no record of the motivations behind his actions: while his end is noble and perhaps even glorious, to read it as such elides of the moral significance of his deeds. Catiline's *actions* are heroic, but their context (fighting against the state which he ought to be defending) configures them as evil: the context in which they are applied, and the motivations behind them, subverts their meaning.[68]

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[66] *Cat*. 58.11; cf. Miralles Maldanado 2009:69, noting intertextualities with Xen. *Cyr*. 3.3.50; Gaichas 1972:20-2 on the call to *libertas*. On the *topoi* of pre-battle speech see Hansen 1993.

[67] Wilkins 1994:51; cf.cf. Garelli 1998-9 for a similar view.

[68] Marincola 2003:313 stresses the ambiguity of this ending; cf. Oppermann 1958:194 on Catiline's exemplary evil, and the contrast of his death to his life.

Catiline in Sallust's sketch and in the monograph more generally embodies the contrast between virtuous qualities and debased motives. As the conspiracy is gradually revealed, and Catiline becomes more like a foreign enemy (the vocabulary of the narrative shifts, portraying the campaign against Catiline as akin to a foreign war),[69] his actions become more like a Roman hero of old. Catiline's death is the final marker of his contradictions: it fits the tropes of glorious military behaviour, but is won through the extreme manifestation of Catiline's opposition to Roman *mores.* Catiline's actions evade simple moral evaluation, as evidenced by the monograph's ambiguous ending, emphasising the unclear legacy of Catiline's struggle: "Throughout the whole army happiness, sadness, grief and joy were variously felt."[70] Sallust's emphasis throughout is on the mutability of the value of human actions, and the counterfactual sense in which Catiline embodies frustrated potential. These paradoxes exemplify the moral decline of society more generally;[71] they are important to Sallust's thought, and are expressed in different ways in his other sketches.

Sempronia

Neither protagonist - like Catiline or Jugurtha - nor major figure - like Marius or Sulla - Sempronia is an ostensibly strange choice for a full sketch.[72] She has no narrative significance (appearing only briefly at 40.5, her house providing a meeting-place for the conspirators): as such, various explanations have been suggested for her sketch, mostly based on some personal *animus* or meta-textual rationale.[73] There is no consensus on the sketch's purpose: it has been seen as a weakness in the monograph's structure (McGushin terms it "a grave structural fault").[74] Sempronia has been considered a counterpart to Catiline, representing the same revolutionary impulses and the female

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[69] Melchior 2010.

[70] *Cat*. 61.9.

[71] *Cat*. 4.4. Wilkins 1994 reads Catiline in the context of decline in social values; but her interpretation of Catiline's significance within this decline differs from mine.

[72] *Cat*. 25.

[73] Büchner 1982:134-5 links the portrait to Sallust's psychological interests; Schwartz 1987:570 reads the sketch as an attack on Sempronia's son, the tyrannicide Decimus Brutus. cf. Fauth 1962, Riposati 1969:51-4. Cadoux 1980 and McGushin 1977:302-3 assess the various theories.

[74] McGushin 1977:303.

contingent of Catiline's support;[75] but as McGushin notes, even if this was the purpose of her inclusion, the sketch's length outweighs what was appropriate.[76] However, the very fact that Sempronia does not play a major role in events makes her sketch particularly interesting for my exploration of the relationship between digression and monograph.

Sempronia provides further indictment of Roman *mores*: Sallust stresses her abandonment of the virtues appropriate to a Roman matron. Her most egregious vice, the tendency to seek out men, recalls Catiline's own lusts: his "shameful affairs" were described in his sketch.[77] Catiline's affairs were *contra ius fasque*: Sempronia's are less unlawful, but similarly contrary to accepted values. However, Sempronia is no second Catiline, because the nature of her character is different:[78] Instead, I read Sempronia as an *exemplum* of a different form of moral debasement than the lust for power depicted in Catiline; her sketch represents an alternative angle. Rather than as a "second Catiline", I suggest we view Sempronia in the context of those who made up his natural constituency. Catiline's sketch emphasised his charisma, in winning over Romans by appeals to their particular vices;[79] Sempronia's sketch illustrates an *exemplum* of this class, not explicitly linked to the conspiracy (certainly without a leading role) but providing the constituency on which Catiline could work.

The vocabulary used of Sempronia is applied throughout the monograph in describing moral decline. Her lack of concern for *pudicitia* draws on a theme already mentioned three times;[80] the disdain for money and repute is another *motif*.[81] As Barbara Boyd has demonstrated, Sempronia is particularly associated with *luxuria*, the result of *avaritia* and over-valuation of wealth, a theme which runs throughout.[82] Boyd reads Sempronia as an inversion of Roman moral norms; but we can I

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[75] See e.g. Fauth 1962; Paul 1985.
[76] McGushin 1977:303.
[77] *Cat*. 15.1. Cf. the description of the deeds of both as *facinora*: *Cat*. 16.1, 25.1. *facinora* has a specific sense in Sallust's vocabulary: see below n.157.
[78] Noted by Boyd 1987:183-4.
[79] *Cat*. 14.
[80] *Cat*. 12.2, 13.3, 14.7.
[81] Cf. *Cat*. 16.1-3.
[82] Boyd 1987:188. Cf. Edwards 1993:173-96 on Roman discourse of sexual immorality and *luxuria*.

think push this idea further, considering the specifics of this vice in the context of the rest of the text. Sallust's stress on *luxuria* recalls one passage in particular; the polemic against Rome's debauched *privati* which concludes the *archaeologia*, drawing the moral analysis up to the historian's own day (the text is the final chapter of the *archaeologia*, in the Appendix).[83] *luxuria* is also Sallust's catchword in introducing that chapter;[84] the manifestations of decline there are the same as Sempronia's. Her *instrumenta luxuriae* are the *lubido stupri, ganeae ceterique* of chapter 13; Sempronia's vice places her among the women whose chastity was *in propatulo*; the theme of accomplishments beyond what was seemly recalls the distinction between possession of money *quippe quas honeste habere licebat* and wanton expenditure. I suggest that Sempronia should be viewed as an exemplary portrait of a member of this group, against which Sallust inveighs in his polemic; through this sketch, he develops the morality of the whole class, providing a good example of Sallust's use of digression (in this case a sketch) to support his analysis.[85]

In order to understand the significance of this, it is necessary to consider Sempronia and the *privati* within the monograph's moral system. I outlined above the analysis of the *archaeologia*, with decline revolving around *ambitio* and *avaritia*. Catiline's energy and lust for power placed him closer to *ambitio*; the effect of *avaritia* was even worse, according to Sallust, in that it effeminised both *corpus* and *animus* of those afflicted, leaving them prey to luxurious desires and unable to escape its insatiable grasp.[86] In this light, it is striking that for the *privati* and Sempronia, both *ambitio* and *avaritia* as actuating vices have in fact disappeared. Neither is mentioned in either passage; instead, the vocabulary stresses desire and luxury. *avaritia* has had its customary effect described in chapter 11, effeminising those on whom it has acted: "*avaritia* entertains the pursuit of money, which no wise man covets; as if imbued with evil poisons, it effeminises the body and the soul; always endless

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[83] *Cat*. 13. See McGushin 1977:99, Steidle 1954:5 on the pervasive link between *luxuria* and *iuvenes* (illustrating that *luxuria* is a developed stage of Roman vice).
[84] Cat. 12.2.
[85] Cf. Fauth 1962:38 on the portrait as polemic against a whole class.
[86] *Cat*. 11.3.

and insatiable, neither surfeit nor want can diminish it."[87] Sempronia and the *privati* exemplify this: accustomed to *luxuria,* and unable to extricate themselves, desire for money for its own sake does not afflict them so much as the appetites derived from it.

avaritia and *ambitio*, in desiring wealth and power, affect the goals towards which the *animus* is driven.[88] On the other hand, *luxuria* implies dedication to the appetites of the *corpus* alone – for food and drink, warmth and sleep on the part of the *privati*, and for sex in Sempronia's case. This recalls Sallust's divide between the *corpus* and the *animus*, and specifically the attacks in the preface against *mortales dediti ventri atque somno*, those dedicated to the appetites of the body without regard for the *animus*, and who in Sallust's estimation left no memory of their existence.[89] Men such as those described at chapter 13 lack even the *ambitio* as a motivation, which aims at the same goals as *virtus* (albeit by different means):[90] Sallust's targets are explicitly *privati*, without even the distinction of political power.

Sempronia's sketch cannot, then, align her with Catiline, because Catiline is driven by *lubido rei publicae capiundae –ambitio*. Catiline is the very opposite of the *privati*: his sketch emphasises his resilience and energy, resistance to hunger and cold - a direct contradiction to the charge against the *privati* of forestalling such things -[91] and the speech with which Sallust develops his character launches similar attacks on the self-indulgence of the wealthy.[92] While Catiline had been spurred on in his conspiratorial designs by the corruption of the morals of the state with *luxuria atque avaritia*, his own behaviour remains above them; Sempronia, on the other hand, is fully implicated.[93] Sempronia's sketch complements Catiline's through an illustration of vice on a different level. She exemplifies a stage of decline not motivated by power or wealth; her participation is to satisfy *luxuria* and *inopia*. The sketch thus contributes to the analysis of Roman morality offered

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[87] *Cat*. 11.
[88] *Cat*. 11.1.
[89] *Cat*. 2.8.
[90] *Cat*. 11.2.
[91] *Cat*. 13.3.
[92] Cf. also *Cat*. 16.3 on Catiline's actions to forestall sloth in his followers by practicing criminality.
[93] *Cat*. 5.9.

throughout: the insignificance of Sempronia in the rest of the text is not a weakness of the monograph's construction, but a development of the Sallust's analysis of the passive support among the elite for Catiline's designs.

It is appropriate that Sallust's *exemplum* of vice should be a woman, because of the persistent topics of effeminisation and masculinity throughout.[94] Love of money effeminises those whom it affects; those afflicted by luxury are charged with "playing the woman"; Catiline's speech contrasts luxurious men (like the *privati*) with those *cui virile ingenium est*, "to whom is a manly spirit".[95] Sempronia is implicated in the erosion of gender roles: she is no traditional Roman matron, and in her pursuit of men appears herself to have masculine characteristics.[96]

Although different in kind, Sempronia shares one feature with Catiline; his frustrated potential. Sallust's introduction refers to the gifts of fortune which she had been granted:[97] but these, together with her *ingenium haud absurdum*[98] are undermined by her moral debasement and subjection to the *corpus*. Like Catiline, Sempronia possesses qualities by which she might distinguish herself;[99] but they go unused: Sempronia's virtues, like Catiline's, suggest an unrealised alternative to her actual behaviour. As a woman, Sempronia could not achieve the political distinction appropriate to Catiline; but that achievements did exist to which Sempronia could respectably aspire is demonstrated in the preface, which states that *gloria* could be won by intellectual means as well as outstanding acts.[100] The allusion to Sempronia's *ingenium* suggests that if not for the perversion of her motivations, she could have distinguished herself along morally correct lines; but like Catiline, her character overrules her potential.

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[94] See Yague Ferrer 1986 on the uniqueness of women Sallust portrays; cf. Posadas 2011. Pagan 2004:15-9 stresses the disruptive role of women as characteristic of conspiracy narratives.
[95] *Cat*. 11.3; 13.3; 20.11.
[96] See Boyd 1987: 200-201; Yagüe Ferrer 1986:928. See also *Cat*. 25.2, *multa virilis audaciae facinora* with. Cic. *Cat*. 2.23: Catiline's retinue share characteristics with Sempronia. On *audacia* in the *Cat*. see Brugisser 2002.
[97] Cat. 25.2; cf. Catiline as *nobili genere natus* at *Cat*. 5.1. Sempronia's and Catiline's nobility contributes to the idea of frustrated possibility developed throughout.
[98] *Cat*. 25.5.
[99] See Yagüe Ferrer 1986:931.
[100] *Cat*. 3.1.

Jugurtha

Jugurtha's sketch, following the preface of the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, differs in one key respect. While the others depict characters effectively fixed (they do not materially change over the course of the narrative) Jugurtha is still in flux. Sempronia's sketch has no chronological dimension beyond the vague *antehac*;[101] Catiline's, while it does mention his troubled youth, is a synchronic portrait of the man *circa* 63. The portrait of Jugurtha, on the other hand, combines character delineation with narrative treatment of historical events, in order to focus the reader on changes in Jugurtha's character. When introduced, he is a youth; over the course of the narrative, his character shifts in a profound way. As such, Jugurtha provides an example of Sallust's idea of the influence of context on character.[102]

Jugurtha's sketch is more developed chronologically than those of Catiline and Sempronia, and its bounds harder to define. Although formally varied, the section from 5.7 to 9.3 all treats Jugurtha's early life, and retards the monograph's stated subject of the war. Sallust introduces Jugurtha's genealogy, his place in the royal household, and his youth;[103] he describes Micipsa's jealousy at Jugurtha's good qualities, and attempt to dispose of him by sending him to Scipio's siege of Numantia. Jugurtha distinguishes himself there, and returns to Micipsa with great honour and Scipio's recommendation.[104] At Numantia, different – military - aspects of Jugurtha's character come to the fore, treated in some detail.

This opening predates the main narrative of the monograph by some sixteen years. The siege began in 134 BC; Micipsa's death, the point at which the chronological thread of the rest of the monograph is picked up, was not until 118. The whole opening section covering Jugurtha's youth should (in chronological terms) thus be classed as a digression. This passage mixes narrative with

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[101] *Cat*. 25.4.
[102] Assessments of Jugurtha's characterisation in the *Jug*.: Green 1991; Cipriani 1988; Kraus 1999. Cf Gill 1983 on character-change in historiography, stressing youth as a period of instability (425). Pelling 1990b notes the usual lack of interest in childhood in Greek biography: that Sallust focuses on Jugurtha's youth here stresses dynamic aspects of his portrait.
[103] *Jug*. 5.7-6.
[104] *Jug*. 9.3.

description, with different phases illuminating different aspects of Jugurtha's nature and contributing to the sense of development; by integrating description with narrative, Sallust dramatises the change in Jugurtha's character.

The first passage of the sketch describes Jugurtha's upbringing. Jugurtha is a model of heroic youth: scholars have noted Sallust's allusions to the youth of Cyrus, in Xenophon's idealised *Cyropaideia*.[105] This allusion to a text on virtuous kingship well-known at Rome depicts a youth with the potential to become a heroic ruler on Cyrus' model. The depiction emphasises Jugurtha's foreignness: differences between his ways and those of the Romans are noted by the phrase *uti mos gentis illius est*. Jugurtha is a kind of reminiscence of former Roman virtue: his concentration on *gloria* proper to youth – through athletic achievement - recalls the focus on *gloria* of the early Romans in the *archaeologia*.[106] Jugurtha's portrait is of an unsullied "noble barbarian", and a model of uncomplicated moral goodness.

This prompts Micipsa's jealousy. Micipsa notes the glory to accrue to the kingdom through Jugurtha's egregious achievements, but dwells on the potential danger of his character: "He was terrified by human nature, greedy for power, and the gratification of the heart's desire, particularly the opportunity offered by [Jugurtha's] age and that of his sons, which leads even ordinary men astray by the hope of plunder."[107] This is of course Sallust's own assessment; he could have no source for the Numidian king's reflections: this theme of human nature as led astray by opportunity demonstrates one of the major themes of the text. Micipsa provides Sallust with a perspective from within the narrative from which to consider Jugurtha and his development, and thus to characterise him indirectly, rather than through direct authorial analysis. As in Micipsa's later deathbed speech,

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[105] Cf. e.g. Xen. *Cyr*. 1.4, on Cyrus' athletic skill, humility, and resulting popularity; cf. Perrochat 1949:62-3; Josserand 1981 links Jugurtha's humility to Stoic virtues; Green 1991 stresses the Cyropaideia allusions throughout.

[106] See especially *Cat*. 7; see Brescia 1988:45 on the Romanness of Jugurtha's *certamen gloriae* here. On *gloria* see below.

[107] *Jug*. 6.3.

warning Jugurtha against attempting to take control of the kingdom and against *discordia* in general,[108] Micipsa's fears prove well-founded.

At Numantia, Jugurtha's greatness is manifested in military and practical virtues: he combines skills of warfare and counsel to an unusual degree, and ingratiates himself with the army and its generals.[109] This second part of the sketch re-emphasises Jugurtha's potential, stressing his great qualities: he is marked by strength of mind (*ingenium*) and capacity to win *gloria* (as Micipsa recognised).[110] However, these recommendations are immediately followed by a passage which, while not explicitly describing Jugurtha himself, is central to his development: the introduction of the corrupt *novi atque nobiles* in the Roman army.[111] Contact with the *novi atque nobiles* ignites Jugurtha's ambition, and suggests bribery as a tool to achieve it. In both cases, changes in Jugurtha's nature which prove central to the subsequent narrative are ascribed directly to the action of these Romans. The sentence also directly recalls Micipsa's fear, that opportunity might drive even a *mediocris vir* astray; Jugurtha, whose *animus* is explicitly *non mediocris*, acts precisely as Micipsa had feared.

Against these temptations, the speech Sallust gives Scipio urging Jugurtha to avoid bribery and to deal honestly with the *populus Romanus* is ineffective. Reference to Scipio's speech is particularly pointed, because of parallels with earlier figures of Roman and African history. Even before the beginning of the sketch, Sallust set the scene with some brief remarks on Jugurtha's ancestry, back to the Second Punic War:[112] he describes Masinissa, king of Numidia and Jugurtha's grandfather, his friendship with Scipio Africanus, and the *amicitia bona atque honesta* which characterised relations.[113] Where Masinissa was *in amicitiam receptus a P. Scipione*;[114] Jugurtha, grandson of Masinissa, is himself *in amicis* of the grandson of Scipio Africanus, Scipio Aemilianus

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[108] *Jug*. 10; see Suerbaum 1964:104 on Micipsa's speech as a device demonstrating Jugurtha's character-change.
[109] *Jug*. 7.3-7.
[110] *Jug*. 6.2.
[111] Cf. pp.177-8 above.
[112] *Jug*. 5.4; Hammer 2014:166 notes the parallel.
[113] *Jug*. 5.4.
[114] *Jug*. 5.4.

(himself later Africanus). Sallust reinforces the parallel: he also refers in each case simply to *P. Scipio*, assimilating the two Scipiones through vagueness.[115] However, what had in the previous generation been a productive display of *bona honestaque amicitia* leads here to the long and fierce conflict which is the subject of the monograph. The parallel drawn here, I suggest, again emphasises frustrated potential within the characterisation of Jugurtha: he could like his grandfather have been a valued friend to Rome, but takes a different path. The Numantine material foreshadows the themes of Sallust's account, suggesting an explanation for the change in Jugurtha between youth and the beginning of the narrative proper (his attacks on Hiempsal and Adherbal).[116]

One of the oddities of Sallust's portrait of Jugurtha is that for all that his account emphasises a shift in Jugurtha's character, he makes no explicit reference to this change. In fact, from contact with the *novi atque nobiles* onwards (and in contrast to what precedes it) there is no direct commentary on Jugurtha's character or morals until after Micipsa's death, some 16 years later. Jugurtha is insulted by his adoptive brother Hiempsal, "from which time he was sharply affected by anger and fear, and planned and turned over in his mind how he might destroy Hiempsal through trickery".[117] In the absence of further explanation for the shift leading Jugurtha to this point, the action of the *novi atque nobiles* receives causal significance; combined with the insult, it determines Jugurtha's character for the rest of the monograph. Jugurtha embodies characteristics from each of these turning-points: he combines the ambition and dependence on bribery learned at Numantia with the scheming and trickery to which he is driven by the desire for revenge against Hiempsal.[118]

These formative events determine the direction of the remainder of the narrative. Description of Jugurtha's character recedes into the background, with the exception of the increasing paranoia which overtakes him:[119] Sallust displays little interest in the details of Jugurtha's

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[115] Montgomery 2013:23.
[116] Cf. Papaioannou 2014:130 on the shift in Jugurtha's character here; Syme 1964:149 calls it Jugurtha's "decisive moment".
[117] Cf. also Jugurtha's disingenuous response to the deathbed speech of Micipsa: *Jug.* 11.1.
[118] On the characterisation of Jugurtha in the rest see Dix 2006:107-37; Green 1991; Kraus 1999. Bribery is Jugurtha's solution to most problems: e.g. 16.3-4, 29.1, 33.2; when it fails (46.1-2), he is at a loss.
[119] E.g. *Jug.* 74, 76.

character beyond dominant *motifs* of trickery and bribery. The description of Jugurtha's youth emphasised his great qualities: but after Numantia the moral context within which these qualities are deployed is effectively set, through the stimulation of Jugurtha's *ambitio*. The influence of the *novi atque nobiles* is significant, as indicated by Sallust's vocabulary: his phrase is *animum accendere*, "to fire the spirit". This powerful metaphor recurs elsewhere: it is used in the description of the influence of their ancestors' *imagines* on Quintus Maximus and Publius Scipio, as part of Sallust's discussion of the value of memory as a moral tool,[120] driving them to supersede their ancestors in *gloria*. The phrase is also used in Catiline's speech, in describing the (alleged) motivation which inspired him to overthrow the established order at Rome.[121] In each case, the point is that the *animus* is fundamentally directed towards specific aims. For Fabius and Scipio, the aim is emulation of their ancestors through *virtus*; the goals of Catiline and Jugurtha are less respectable. The "firing" of the *animus* is the process by which men are shaped morally, and through which inherent qualities – already fixed – achieve moral direction. The role of the *novi atque nobiles*, and their causal significance in directing Jugurtha's development, to some degree explains the sudden debasement of what has hitherto been presented as good character. Qualities and potential remain, but his character is now driven by *ambitio*, which dominates the rest of the narrative: Jugurtha's mental acuity, mentioned in the opening -sketch as marking him out from his fellows, recurs in the ingenuity which marks Jugurtha's guerrilla tactics throughout the military narrative,[122] and the bravery and wisdom shown at Numantia distinguish him throughout the subsequent history.[123] From this point, Jugurtha's character is almost unrecognisably shifted from the idealised portrait of the opening.[124]

Jugurtha's sketch contains similar ideas to Catiline's: both are men of great potential and qualities (which might have outfitted them for glorious deeds) but whose motivation is perverted,

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[120] *Jug*. 4.5-6; see Grethlein 2006 on the ideological significance of these figures' relationships to the past.
[121] *Cat*. 20.6.
[122] E.g. *Jug*. 38.1, 46.8, 55.8; see Cameron & Parker 2005.
[123] E.g. *Jug*. 81, Jugurtha's diplomacy with Bocchus.
[124] Cf. Dix 2006:111 on Jugurtha's acquisition of an *animus ferox*.

leading them to evil. In Jugurtha's case, the point is made more clearly, because Sallust narrates the point of corruption of Jugurtha's *animus*. Jugurtha's adolescence alluded to the education of Cyrus; his own *paideia* has proven evil. It provides a demonstration of two of Sallust's favourite themes, the corrupting power of *ambitio* – the same vice which had actuated Catiline – and the influence of context on the development of moral character.

Each sketch contains hints at possible counterfactual alternatives: in each case, Sallust stresses the potential for morally approved distinction. For Catiline and Sempronia, their perverted characters overshadow genuinely positive qualities of mind; in Jugurtha's case, development from a model prince to a tyrant foregrounds the theme.[125] Debasement of good qualities may explain why Sallust chose these figures for sketches: Sulla, Marius and Pompey –subjects of Sallust's other portraits – also combined egregious qualities with their own great vices and misdirected motives.[126] Each has the capacity to do lasting good to the state, but because of misdirected desires becomes an enemy to Roman *mores*.

Central to understanding the important position of this theme in Sallust's consideration of character is the moral context in which these figures appear. We should consider each against the moral philosophy set out in Sallust's prefaces, and developed throughout his works; the system within which Sallust considers human activity provides a means of understanding the perversion of figures such as Catiline and Jugurtha.[127] With the remainder of this first part of the chapter, I will consider the ideas of character here in relation to Sallust's moral thought, to demonstrate how the sketches reflect wider historiographical themes.

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[125] Martin 1986:16-7 emphasises that Jugurtha's developed qualities demonstrate a descent into the characteristic vices of kings, including *superbia* (cf. *Cat*. 6.7-7.2).
[126] Sallust makes explicit comment on changes for the worse in Sulla and Marius: *Jug*. 63.6; 96.4.
[127] General assessments of Sallust's ideas of character against the material in the prefaces: Earl 1961; Christiansen 1990; Dix 2006. None of these consider the ambiguous aspects of Sallust's philosophy stressed here.

Sallust's moral philosophy: the ambiguity of renown

The ideas which underpin Sallust's works are expressed mainly in their prefaces. Sallust's monographs begin not with a conventional statement of subject or his qualifications to write, but with remarks on the nature and purpose of human existence: the *Bellum Catilinae* stresses the psychology of human actions, and the *Bellum Jugurthinum* the role of *fortuna*. Sallust's philosophical focus was unusual: there is nothing comparable in the historians who preceded him.[128] This beginning signals Sallust's philosophical interest, and suggests that the history would draw on these reflections.[129]

The prefaces have been heavily studied: works proliferate attempting to explain their sources or relevance.[130] Much of the scholarship concerns Sallust's sources: scholars have attempted to separate points where direct influence is demonstrable from what might be seen as commonplaces.[131] However, attempts to identify specific authors behind Sallust's work are speculative, since his philosophy draws on many *topoi*; the firmest conclusion is that the content is eclectic, with direct derivation from any single source impossible to prove.[132] We should look beyond the sources of individual doctrines, at the moral ideas they contain more generally, and at Sallust's philosophical schema as part of an argumentative whole. I cannot treat here the full intricacies of the prefaces: I will stress one element in particular - Sallust's *gloria*, and its sometimes problematic

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[128] Earl 1971:845-9: Sallust is the "one great exception" (844); the closest thing to his prefaces is in Aristotle's *Politics* and ethical works.

[129] As Earl 1971 notes, the preface might lead a reader to expect a work of moral philosophy, not a historical monograph on a Republican *bête noire*.

[130] The most thorough assessment of the prefaces remains Tiffou 1973; other useful works include on the *Cat*. Rambaud 1946; Leeman 1954; La Penna 1959 (=1968:15-31); Novora 1976; Guerrini 1977; Büchner 1982:93-105; Tiffou 1988; Feeney 1994; Viparelli 1996; Garcia-Lopez 1997:4-22; Ducroux 1977; Codoñer Merino 1986:21-48; Franzoi 1997. On the *Jug*. see Hellegouarc'h 1987;Leeman 1955b;Codoñer Merino 1986:49-71.

[131] McGushin 1977:293-5 summarises the vast output of early twentieth century *Quellenforschung*. Of more recent attempts, MacQueen 1981 suggests Plato as major source, but is over-confident (Rawson 1983); Sallust's dualism recalls Plato (Leeman 1955b:39, MacQueen 1981:53) but his focus on *gloria* is most un-Platonic. Grilli 1982 argues for Antiochus. La Penna 1968:22 stresses links to philosophical *protreptici* and philosophical commonplace.

[132] McGushin 1977:295; Syme 1964:240-2; La Penna 1968:34-42; Rawson 1983:327: "Like so many Romans of his day, Sallust is likely to be an eclectic, and the theory of a single dominating source for his thought implausible."

significance. The *Bellum Catilinae* treats this theme more directly than the *Bellum Jugurthinum*; I will accordingly draw primarily on it here.[133]

The *Bellum Catilinae* begins with a statement of the goal of life; to avoid passing through life without leaving a record of one's existence. "For all men, who set themselves to exceed the other animals, it is right to struggle with the highest effort, lest they pass through life in silence like the beasts, whom nature has made supine and subject to their appetites."[134] To this end, Sallust continues, man is comprised of a dual nature, body (held in common with the beasts) and mind (in common with the gods); we should use the resources of the mind (*animus*) to seek *gloria*.[135] "For", Sallust continues "the *gloria* of riches and beauty is variable and fragile; *virtus* is held splendid and lasting."[136]

The separation between mind and body is not absolute: each requires the assistance of the other, as the mind is required to plan one's actions, and the body to carry them out.[137] In the early period of human civilisation (characterised by fellowship and freedom from covetousness) kings made use of either the body or the mind; but the advent of Cyrus in Asia signalled wholesale adoption of the qualities of the mind in waging war. At this point, Sallust indicates, the morals of men changed: "they began to think the lust for dominion was cause for war, and held the greatest *gloria* to be in the greatest *imperium*." Sallust next states his theory of *translatio imperii*, with imperial power constantly passing from the weaker to the stronger, before returning to *gloria* and *virtus*. He summarises:

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[133] *Jug.* exhibits Sallustian ambiguity differently, through contrast between the preface (emphasising human agency over *fortuna,* e.g. 1.1, perhaps a polemic response to Epicureanism [La Penna 1968:53]) and the narrative itself, which repeatedly emphasises (e.g. 62.1; 83.2; 93.1) man's subjection to chance. Cf. Kraus 1999:218.

[134] *Cat.* 1.1: on the dual meaning of *silentio* ("in silence" and "unheralded") see Woodman 1973.

[135] Compare the focus on factors separating men from beasts at *Off*. 1.11; Cugusi 1996:139 connects this section of the *Cat.* to *Off*. 2.46. Both stem from Plato (e.g. *Phaed*. 80a); Sallust's use of the *topos* may be mediated by Cicero's.

[136] *Cat.* 1.4: '*nam divitiarum et formae gloria fluxa atque fragilis est, virtus clara aeterna habetur.*'

[137] *Cat.* 1.5-6.

"Men till the fields, sail, and build; all of these depend on *virtus*. But many mortals, given to their appetites and to sleep, untaught and uncultivated pass through life like mere travellers; for such people, against nature, the body is a source of pleasure and the soul a burden. Of such men I estimate the life and death to be about the same, since no record is left of either. And indeed that man seems to me to truly live, and to make use of his soul, who, intent on his labour, seeks renown through some outstanding deed (*facinus*) or good qualities."[138]

This recalls the opening: the attacks on living unheralded recall the distinction of man from beasts (those who live such a life are *dediti ventri*, similar to the beasts *ventri oboedientia*).[139] These sentences bookend the opening of the preface.

Throughout, stress is on *gloria*. This structures the passage, and in fact I suggest gives meaning to the collection of *topoi* which Sallust includes here: other ideas are introduced only in that they supplement the theme of *gloria*. The statement of mind-body duality, for example, is not considered in any theoretical detail, but is subordinate to the more general discussion of deeds worthy of memory, and the means by which they are be done; it is included because it contributes to the analysis of forms of distinction, and supports Sallust's contention that deeds achieved by the exercise of the mind are more worthy of *gloria* than those of the body alone (in practice, and as we have seen in relation to Catiline, in the narrative itself Sallust abandons this duality).[140] If we accept that Sallust is effectively making use of commonplaces,[141] the structure behind the prefaces becomes clearer. Well-known *topoi* of philosophical thought are adduced because of the support they give Sallust's reflections on *gloria* and reputation. They are useful ideas to argue with: the audience would be already familiar with them, and Sallust could invoke them in support of his central theme. He is not simply retailing standard philosophical ideas of his day for the sake of it, to

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[138] *Cat.* 2.7-9.
[139] Cf. *Cat*. 1.1-2.
[140] E.g. *Cat.* 2.8. Rambaud 1946:119-20 notes that the duality is not invoked philosophically but rather moralistically. Gunderson 2000 applies a Hegelian reading to Sallust's mind-body duality.
[141] Franzoi 1997:194 characterises the philosophy of the prefaces as such.

demonstrate his erudition or to educate his audience; he runs through them precisely because of their usefulness to his emphasis on *gloria*.[142]

This is also true of the historical material adduced in support of the theme.[143] Cyrus' example defines a new phase in measuring human achievement: he exemplifies a new way of conceiving *gloria*, measured according to ephemeral qualities of empire rather than by outstanding deeds *per se*.[144] The Spartans and Athenians recur in the *archaeologia*,[145] where Sallust draws an explicit contrast between Greeks and Romans: the Greeks (he suggests) were more concerned with the memorialisation of historiography than the early Romans, who preferred doing deeds to writing about them. Sallust pointedly elides *gloria* in his discussion of the value of Greek historiography: the Greeks' achievements, he suggests, had been systematically overrated.[146] Sallust's reference to the Athenians emphasises the vagaries of *fortuna* in the way men are commemorated.

The major theme of the preface is thus the necessity of leaving a monument to one's life in the form of *gloria*.[147] Only a few have the capacity to do this; the rest live supine like the beasts. In emphasising the contribution of the mind to *gloria*, Sallust prepares the ground for his *encomium* of historiography at chapters 3-4; but *gloria* remains an important preoccupation throughout. Reflections on *gloria* appear repeatedly in the monograph:[148] they underpin Sallust's ideas of character in particular.

Sallust's focus on *gloria* ostensibly matches a traditional elite ideology at Rome. The renown of outstanding personal achievement, *gloria* represented the most important goal of the *nobiles'* lives, expressed for example in the *imagines* which the politically successful might leave to future

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[142] Cf. Hock 1988:23-4, La Penna 1968:15-6.
[143] Tiffou 1973:326-30 stresses the importance of reading the two parts of the preface as part of the same thought (i.e. on *gloria*).
[144] *Cat*. 2.2.. That Cyrus plays a major role in the changing value of *gloria* lends similarities between Jugurtha's youth and the *Cyropaideia* a certain ironic relevance.
[145] *Cat*. 8. cf. chapter 3 above.
[146] *Cat*. 8.2; on the passage see Tzounakas 2005.
[147] Cf Tiffou 1973:330-1.
[148] At *Cat*. 53 where Sallust meditates on the memory of the deeds of the early Romans: that chapter and the preface impose a ring compositional structure on the narrative.

generations in their *atria*.[149] History as a genre was concerned with the proper allocation of *gloria*, as Sallust himself acknowledges in the preface, although as Jean-François Thomas has suggested Sallust's particular focus on individual *gloria* was something of an innovation.[150]

However, the *gloria* which emerges from this preface is more nuanced than a simple restatement of the aristocratic value: Sallust's *gloria* is a somewhat problematic quality. The first sentence refers to the *divitiarum et formae gloria*:[151] although termed *gloria*, it is in reality *fluxa atque fragilis*, being based on transient advantages rather than on the mental activity which is held supreme. On the other hand, *virtus clara aeternaque habetur*; *virtus* gives rise to a more lasting and true memorial. This complicates Sallust's system. While *gloria* remains the overall focus, this distinguishes between a lesser *gloria* of transient goods, and a more lasting form based on *virtus*. Sallust does not say *virtus clara aeternaque est*, but *habetur*: *virtus* is *believed* to be, rather than simply *being*, *clara aeternaque*. The passive reinforces the parallelism with *gloria*, which manifests itself through the approval and recognition of others. This sentence differentiates two differently valued forms of renown: one less lasting form of *gloria,* won by material goods, and the other manifested through *virtus* itself. The difference is further developed in the reference to Cyrus, discussed above, who values only the *gloria* of transient *imperium* and thus confounds Sallust's assessment of the supremacy of *virtus*.

The distinction between different forms of renown continues through the preface. In light of the difficulties of separating *virtus* from the debased *gloria* of transient things, closer investigation reveals a striking omission in Sallust's definition: *gloria* lacks an explicitly moralistic component.[152] Nowhere in the preface is *gloria* (as opposed to *virtus*) restricted to only morally correct deeds; the

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[149] As well as written *elogia* (e.g. on the tombs of the Scipiones), individual *gloria* is also commemorated in (for example) honorific *cognomina*, monumental building (e.g. C. Duilius' *columnae rostratae*) and *imagines*. Of an extensive bibliography see Roller 2009:218-29; Earl 1967:30-8; Rosenstein 2007; Mehl 2014. Pina Polo 2004 considers Roman historiography as legitimation of the social and political values of the elite. Earl 1961:20-8 links Sallust to this tradition.

[150] *Cat.* 3.2; Thomas 2006:99. On the link of aristocratic *gloria* with the beginnings of Roman historiography see Holliday 2002:1-16.

[151] *Cat*. 1.4.

[152] Cf Batstone 1990:120 on the lack of moral orientation of Sallust's *gloria* in the first sentence.

quality is in fact morally ambiguous, in that it refers only to renown, without restricting it – or the deeds through which it is achieved – to morally approved activities. Also notable is the role of *gloria* in Sallust's account of the onset of vice: he notes in the *archaeologia* that those affected by *ambitio* aimed at the same *gloria*, *honos* and *imperium* as those unaffected.[153] *gloria* is part of what drives the vice of the ambitious.

The ambiguity of *gloria* affects the whole of Sallust's value-system. One of the achievements by which *gloria* might be won in his account was *praeclara facinora*.[154] *facinora* is a highly problematic term: it describes Catiline's conspiracy in Sallust's statement of theme,[155] and elsewhere in Sallust almost always has negative connotations.[156] Sallust makes deliberate use of the word's ambiguity: one of the few ostensibly positive uses of the word is in Catiline's own speech, calling the conspirators to a *maxumum et pulcherrimum facinus*![157] Morally ambiguous use of *praeclarus* is uncommon, although attested: Adherbal describes Jugurtha himself as *sceleribus suis praeclarus*.[158] Sallust's point, I think, is to imply that the *facinus* of the conspiracy might in fact be glorious. It certainly distinguishes Catiline from those who pass through life *silentio* (as the existence of Sallust's monograph attests): his egregious deed marks him as *praeclarus*. In a moral system which stresses *gloria*, distinct from *virtus*, as the aim of those who wish to distinguish themselves, Catiline's actions have a kind of perverse logic.

Previous scholarship has emphasised the role of *gloria* as the summit of Sallust's value-system, for those of pre-eminent virtue:[159] but close investigation of the term in the *Bellum Catilinae*

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[153] *Cat*. 11.2.
[154] *Cat*. 2.9.
[155] *Cat*. 4.4: *nam id facinus in primis ego memorabile existumo sceleris atque periculi novitate*.
[156] The word appears 25 times in the *Cat*. (Bennett 1970), only twice with a positive sense (*Cat*. 7.6, perhaps owed in part to the attractive alliteration of the phrase *facinus faceret*; *Cat*. 20.3, in Catiline's speech). Among negative uses are the putative murder of the consuls (18.8), and the horrors of war (32.2). The same applies to the *Jug*. (e.g. 13.5, of Jugurtha's murder of Hiempsal, 53.7, of military catastrophe). *facinus* is similarly used by Cicero, appearing three times in the First Catilinarian (13, 18, 25).
[157] *Cat*. 20.3. Sallust compounds the irony with the following sentence: *simul quia vobis eadem quae mihi bona malaque esse intellexi*; Catiline's retinue is as morally perverse as he is.
[158] *Jug*. 14.21. The phrase *praeclarus facinus* also appears at *Jug*. 56.4: Jugurtha urges the people of Sicca to turn on their Roman protectors, describing this treachery as an outstanding deed.
[159] See Earl 1961:11. Cf. Rambaud 1946:124; more recently Schmal 2001:112-16.

demonstrates fundamental ambiguity which avoids resolution. The word appears 19 times:[160] none

is unambiguously morally positive.[161] Some are qualified, such as the *gloria belli* ascribed to the

Gauls;[162] others emphasise the subjectivity of *gloria*, using passive verbs to emphasise that it is

bestowed by the *populus Romanus* rather than by Sallust *in propria persona*.[163] While the *gloria*

motivating the early Romans in the *archaeologia* appears positive,[164] Cyrus' example shows that

gloria is mutable, reconfigured with the moral change in states and men, and cannot remain morally

objective.[165] There is nothing intrinsic to the quality of *gloria* which stops it from becoming

perverted.[166] While *cupiditas gloriae* does drive the state's expansion in the *archaeologia*, this is

because deeds done for *gloria* happen to be socially useful: but they need not be, and indeed – as I

develop below – the separation of glorious deeds and those salutary to the Republic is a symptom of

the contemporary malaise Sallust identifies. In short: while Sallust's moral system holds that men

aim at *gloria* as the goal distinguishing them from beasts, this does not presuppose moral rectitude.

The complexity of Sallust's moral vocabulary is not restricted to *gloria*. There is ambiguity in

even the definition of *virtus*:[167] Douglas Earl's formulation of Sallust's *virtus* as "the functioning of

ingenium to achieve *egregia facinora*, and thus to win *gloria*, through *bonae artes*" has been

influential in modern scholarship but is over-simplistic.[168] Rather than exclusively moral goodness,

virtus can equally refer to simple "excellence" in the sense of outstanding skill or capacity.[169] While

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[160] *Cat.* 1.3, 1.4, 2.2, 3.2 (*bis*), 7.3, 7.6 (*bis*), 11.2, 12.1, 12.4, 20.14, 53.3, 54.1, 54.3, 54.6, 58.2, 58.8, 59.6 (using Bennett 1970).
[161] On shifting *gloria* in the *Cat.* see Thomas 2006 esp. 97-9, although he does not go far enough in emphasising ambiguity.
[162] *Cat.* 53.3; cf. 59.6.
[163] E.g. *Cat.* 2.2.
[164] *Cat.* 7.3: *sed civitas incredibile memoratu est adepta libertate quantum brevi creverit; tanta cupido gloriae incesserat*.
[165] *Cat.* 2.2.
[166] On mutability of words and values see *Cat.* 52.11 with Thuc. 3.82; cf. Büchner 1983, Canfora 1991 and above p.158.
[167] On the polyvalence of Sallust's *virtus*, see McGushin 1977:32-3; Büchner 1982:115-20.
[168] Earl 1961:11.
[169] *virtus*: 1.4, 1.5, 2.3, 2.7, 3.2, 3.3, 6.5, 7.2, 8.4, 9.2, 11.1, 12.1, 20.2, 20.9, 51.42, 52.22, 53.1, 53.4, 53.5, 53.6, 54.4, 54.6, 58.1, 58.12, 58.19, 58.21, 60.3.

some uses of the term do have the implication of moral virtue,[170] not all do: Sallust also uses the term of excellence in agriculture, building and sailing;[171] of military excellence;[172] or outstanding intellectual ability.[173] The ambiguity here is again marked: given his focus elsewhere on the linguistic change in Republican society, Sallust's play with the significance of *virtus* and *gloria* is carefully calculated.[174] The two concepts are related: that neither *virtus* nor *gloria* is unambiguously moral emphasises the problematic relationship between them.

Recent scholarship on Sallust has emphasised the sense in which his history undermines the foundations of historical memory itself: work on the speeches of Caesar and Cato, in particular, has read the past itself as a battleground for Sallust's speakers.[175] To suggest that *gloria* is itself a morally ambiguous quality, which although traditionally aligned with the good of the state is not always so, is to develop this further. The attack on the relevance of historical memory, and the question mark which hangs above the definition of glorious behaviour, are two sides of the same coin.

Sallust's ambiguous *gloria* recalls the character-sketches. Catiline and Jugurtha are both men of great qualities, suited to the winning of *gloria* through egregious deeds: but their *gloria* is amoral. Sempronia, on the other hand, possesses the intellectual acuity for the *gloria* of *bonae artes*, but through perversion of her *animus* fails to put her gifts to proper usage: Sallust's sketch is all that distinguishes her from those who pass their lives in obscurity. *Gloria* thus connects Sallust's moral thought to his character delineation; it is central to understanding Sallust's monographs. The remainder of this chapter will explore this idea further, and apply it to another complex section of Sallust's text, the *synkrisis*.

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[170] E.g. *Cat.* 11.1: *sed primo magis ambitio quam avaritia animos hominum exercebat, quod tamen vitium propius virtutem erat.*

[171] *Cat.* 2.7: *quae homines arant, navigant, aedificant, virtuti omnia parent.* Cf. the dismissal of precisely this sort of activity as servile and unworthy at 4.1.

[172] Mentions in Catiline's pre-battle speech: 58.1, 12, 19, 21.

[173] *Cat.* 1.5: *sed diu magnum inter mortalis certamen fuit vine corporis an virtute animi res militaris magis procederet.*

[174] McDonnell 2006 discusses Sallust's use of *virtus* as a moralistic term akin to the Greek ἀρετή, rather than a morally neutral descriptor: but this does not account for the variation. Cf. McDonnell 2003 on differentiable *virtus* in Sallust, with reference to Cato and Caesar (257-61).

[175] See Batstone 1988; Marincola 2010:282-5; Feldherr 2012; Seider 2014:158-64; Hammer 2014:161.

Cicero's *de Officiis* and the recalibration of *gloria*

Sallust's *gloria* must also be considered in the context of contemporary philosophical debates. In the years before Sallust wrote, the idea of aristocratic *gloria* had come under scrutiny, and by reading Sallust's use of the term in the context of contemporary evaluations of *gloria*, his manipulation is more comprehensible. One work presented a particularly important challenge to existing *gloria*, and I argue that Sallust's thought on *gloria* should in some ways be seen as a response to it: Cicero's *de Officiis*.

De Officiis was Cicero's last philosophical work, written up to around November 44 BC and contemporary with the first Philippic speeches against Antony;[176] it dates from the period of political uncertainty after the Ides of March. While ostensibly concerned with the ethical education of Cicero's son Marcus, it is bound up with the political concerns of Cicero himself, and the Republican ideals which he felt necessary to pass on to his son.[177] In three books, Cicero outlines a broadly Stoic position on ethical duties (*officiis*, his translation of the Greek καθῆκον) as the field of philosophy with the widest possible application.[178] The contemporary relevance of the problems discussed is frequently emphasised:[179] the tone of active political engagement here is some distance from the enforced *otium* of the Caesarian period.[180]

The *de Officiis* presents a qualified disavowal of Cicero's customary Academic scepticism, in favour of a coherent Stoic position.[181] Unlike most of Cicero's philosophical works, this is not a dialogue, but a treatise in Cicero's own voice, with a clear authorial line (in contrast to the Academic

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[176] Cic. *Att*. 15.13.6, 16.11.4. For the date, see Dyck 1996:9. For links between the Philippics and the *de Officiis* see Gabba 1979: 117-20.
[177] Dyck 1996: 10-16.
[178] *Off*. 1.4.
[179] e.g. *Off*. 3.56, on hypothetical questions of business conduct: in each case, Cicero gives a definitive and practically useful answer.
[180] Cf. Baraz 2012:191; Osgood 2006:289-90; Samotta 2009:47-58.
[181] *Off*. 1.6-7; cf. 2.6-8; 3.19-20.

ambiguity and dialogue form of the *de Finibus* and other works of the Caesarian period).[182] Cicero's

concern, explaining these unusual features, is to put forward this teaching as clearly and

comprehensibly as possible: the subjects treated had pronounced practical relevance to the political

situation after the tyrannicide,[183] the real world of Republican politics, and the new politics in which

young Marcus was to play a part. Cicero's last philosophical work is immediately relevant: it

supplements his political programme (demonstrated in the contemporary Philippics) by

philosophical means.[184]

The work's context, emphasis on practical relevance, use for illustration of major figures of

Rome's past and present,[185] and independence in relation to its Stoic sources should prompt a

deeper look at Cicero's aims. Twenty years ago, Anthony Long argued that Cicero's account is not

simply derivative of Greek philosophy, but instead presents a version of Roman ideology radically

reworked through Greek philosophical concepts.[186] Long suggests that the *de Officiis* be read

alongside the Philippics, with a pronounced political message;[187] through philosophical channels,

Cicero diagnoses and aims to remedy the diseased state of Republican morals. Central to this project

is *gloria*.[188]

Although central to Roman elite ideology, the pursuit of *gloria* had proven to be a double-

edged sword: by the late Republic and Caesarian period, individual *gloria* had played a major part in

the accelerating crisis which had led to the civil wars. Marius had been driven by pursuit of *gloria* to

seek the Mithridatic command;[189] Caesar's actions in Gaul and the Civil War had been partly driven

by *gloria*;[190] *gloria* led Crassus into his Parthian disaster.[191] Ambition for *gloria* in unscrupulous men

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[182] Baraz 2012:211-2 emphasises the didactic tone.

[183] On the relationship of the post-Caesarian philosophical works to earlier productions see Baraz 2012:187-211; Steel 2005:138.

[184] On the nature of *de Officiis* and Cicero's project see generally Gärtner 2003:248;Barlow 2012:219-21;Bianchi 2003; Samotta 2009 136-47.

[185] See e.g. 2.23-8 with Dyck 1996 *ad loc*: Caesar exemplifies the worst kind of tyranny. Conversely, Regulus provides an *exemplum* of old Roman ethics, from which the state had declined: *Off*. 3.99-115.

[186] Long 1995; see also Dyck 1996:29-36; Gabba 1979.

[187] cf. Gabba 1979.

[188] Long 1995:224-40.

[189] Florus 2.9.6: *initium et causa belli inexplebilis honorum Marii fames*; cf. Vell. Pat. 2.18.6.

[190] Plut. *Caes*. 15, 58.4; Suet. *Jul*. 86; cf. also *Off*. 1.26.

(Caesar and to a lesser extent Sulla) had prompted them to do deeds harmful to the Republic in favour of their own status.[192] According to Long, Cicero recognised this structural problem; in his attacks on contemporary politics, Cicero castigates the excesses to which *gloria* had led politicians of the last period of the Republic.[193]

The aim of *de Officiis*, in Long's view, is the recalibration of *gloria* in a more socially constructive direction, emphasising outstanding deeds in the service of the state.[194] Cicero's focus throughout is on the commonwealth: the discussion of the relative importance of virtues emphasises *societas* and *communis utilitas* over other interests.[195] Cicero also recognised that the most outstanding citizens had the greatest potential to destabilise the state through desire for *gloria*;[196] the emphasis on *iustitia* throughout the work redefines the sense in which *gloria* is truly earned by such men.[197] The distinction is between true *gloria* – manifested through service to the state, and which for Cicero remains the goal[198] – and the false status preferred by some of his contemporaries. Cicero's philosophy draws on the traditional aims of the Roman noble, but supplements them with a new *gloria* emphasising justice and the good of the state. He aims to correct the distortions of contemporary society, by moderating the more destructive elements of Roman ideology.[199]

Long's reading is persuasive, and provides a starting-point for comparison of the *Bellum Catilinae* with the *de Officiis*. I noted above that the prefaces to Sallust's monographs indicate his attention to contemporary philosophical ideas: the approach to *gloria*, I think, demonstrates this. Sallust's problematic *gloria* in some senses responds to Cicero's recalibration of the value: he adapts

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[191] Plut. *Crass*. 14.4; App. *Cat*. 2.18.

[192] *Off*. 1.26, 86; 3.83.

[193] E.g. *Off*. 3.82-5: *hanc cupiditatem si honestam quis esse dicit, amens est; probat enim legum et libertatis interitum earumque oppressionem taetram et detestabilem gloriosam putat*.

[194] *Off*. 1.60; cf. 3.42. *communis utilitas* was already an important theme of *de Republica*, ten years earlier (Büchner 1974:19).

[195] *Off*. 1.152-61; Dyck 1996:340-2.

[196] *Off*. 1.26: "in the greatest spirits and most splendid characters are most often found the lust for honours, commands, power and glory".

[197] *Iustitia* is termed *domina et regina virtutum* (*Off*. 3.28); see Atkins 1990.

[198] Cf. *Off*. 2.31.

[199] Sartori 1994:441-3.

Cicero's redefinition, and recognises the problems with *gloria* that Cicero had identified, although he avoids Ciceronian moral absolutes in favour of a more objective approach.

Before examining links between the two works, it is necessary to establish that Sallust might actually have known the *de Officiis*. There are no *testimonia* to the circulation of the work before probable echoes in Horace and Ovid:[200] but it is clear that other Ciceronian philosophical works were rapidly distributed.[201] It has been suggested (mainly due to unpolished style) that Cicero's work was never fully edited, and perhaps published posthumously;[202] but this is not proven and it seems at least probable that Cicero's work became available to an elite audience fairly quickly.[203] It would be no surprise if Sallust, writing around late 43,[204] had access to the work, even though this would be its earliest attested appearance.[205]

To some rivalry, or Sallustian distaste for Cicero's work, we should attach no significance.[206] While their styles are certainly antithetical, there is no evidence that the political opposition of 52 BC was carried into any kind of lasting feud, or that Sallust's political or personal views precluded him from reading Cicero's work.[207] A number of Cicero's correspondents whom we can identify as Caesarian partisans express interest in his philosophical works (e.g. Matius);[208] even if we identify Sallust as such, political differences would be no impediment to his reading. Even in his assessment of Cicero in 63, Sallust demonstrates no opposition to Cicero's memory: the allegedly dismissive tone

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[200] See Dyck 1996:40; D'Elia 1961, on echoes of *de Officiis* in the *ars amatoria*.

[201] Cf. Cicero's hurried dispatch of the work to Atticus, *Att*. 16.6.4. On the dissemination of literary works in the late Republic see Fantham 1996 esp. 20-54; Rawson 1985:38-51.

[202] Wilamowitz 1932:2.390-1 (cited by Dyck 1996:40).

[203] Thomas 1971:6.

[204] Dating is problematic: estimates run from 43 to 41 (see e.g. Syme 1964:128; La Penna 1968:59-62; McGushin 1977:7; Ramsey 2007:6). Mackay's (1962) theory that Sallust wrote the work around 50 and revised it later is based on no evidence.

[205] Havas 1971:51-4 notes Catiline's reappearance in Ciceronian works of 44, and suggests that it may have prompted Sallust's choice of subject.

[206] Stone 1999 is the best corrective. The misapprehension is largely owed to the *Invectives*, and similarly scurrilous later biographical inventions (e.g. that Sallust, after committing adultery with the wife of Milo [Gell. *NA* 17.18], married Terentia after her divorce from Cicero [Jerome, *Adv. Iovinianum* 1.48]: see Whitehorne 1975, de Vivo 2002:9-12 and Syme 1978:295).

[207] Asconius hints at reconciliation in 52: Asc. *Mil*. 37C (and p.145 above). On style see pp.8-9 above.

[208] *Fam*. 11.27.

used of Cicero in the *Bellum Catilinae* has been claimed as a snub,[209] but these arguments are tendentious, and the comparatively minor role Cicero plays in Sallust's account is better read as a result of concentration on Caesar, Cato and Catiline.[210]

Given the centrality of *gloria* to Sallust's work, exploring the possibility of a link to Cicero's treatise (written just months before, and dealing in depth with the same subject) is a useful approach. There are similarities in terms of project between the two: *de Officiis* demonstrated the potential value of a statesman's *otium*, in dealing with the morals of the *res publica*, and in Sallust's enforced political exile might provide a model.[211] Sallust's prefaces engage with *otium*, and the proper use to be made of one's time away from political activity:[212] his arguments on the didactic value of literature recall Cicero's of the period of political inactivity under Caesar's dictatorship.[213] Sallust's claims a didactic purpose, in that his writing might do service to the *res publica*:[214] this too recalls Cicero's pronouncements.

While scholars have identified some similarities between the two works, the relationship between their ideas of *gloria* has not been treated in detail.[215] There is some similarity in the authors' divisions of true *gloria* from its shadow, in the two authors' understanding of the late Republican situation, and the way the traditional ideology of *gloria* had been perverted. Sallust's discussion might almost be seen as a gloss on Cicero's recognition that the most outstanding men could be the most dangerous to the Republic's stability:[216] that the actions of Jugurtha and Catiline granted them the *gloria* of outstanding record is itself an indictment. However – as historian, rather than philosopher - he does not fundamentally redefine the value system as Cicero had.

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[209] E.g. Lämmli 1946:111-5; cf. Broughton 1936:34-36.

[210] Stone 1999, Wetherell 1979; cf. Broughton 1936, Syme 1964:105-11. Zecchini 1996:535 argues that to Sallust Cicero was simply unimportant.

[211] *Cat.* 3-4 and *Jug.* 4 emphasise the usefulness of the historian's activity (a *topos*, but particularly resonant in the late Republic). Osgood 2006:290-2 treats Sallust's prefaces as direct responses to *Off.*; cf. Baraz 2012:13-35 on justification of *otium* in Cicero and Sallust. Cf. Pöschl 1970.

[212] *Cat.* 3.1.

[213] See Baraz 2012:15-21.

[214] *Cat.* 3.1. On links between the works' political contexts see Zecchini 1996:526-8.

[215] Similarities of expression: Gabba 1979 esp. 141; Cugusi 1996: 136-43. Of theme: Zecchini 1996, Stone 1999:66-8; Dyck 1996:194; Gabba 1979:132-41. Of political thought: Lepore 1990:881-3; Valvo 2006:77-8. Cf. Pöschl 1970 on Cicero as philosophical interlocutor in the *Cat*.

[216] *Off.* 1.26.

Unlike Cicero's division, based on the morality of action, Sallust's *gloria* depends on the manifestation of *virtus* as excellence, either in *praeclara facinora* or *bonae artes*. Unlike Cicero, Sallust does not define *gloria* through utility to the state, but as making use of one's full *virtus*, in contrast to the *fluxa atque fragilis* quality of more transient forms of renown. Sallust's *gloria* does not presuppose that the deeds which win it be beneficial to the *res publica*, a constituent quality of Cicero's redefined *gloria*: it is simply the reward of outstanding deeds, for those of outstanding ability.

While both authors thus reflect on the same problematic quality, they approach it from different perspectives. Sallust's historiography is not amoralistic: his account is suffused with moral polemic, and the Republic's moral decline is directly linked to its contemporary ills.[217] However, the ambiguity of his treatment of *virtus* and *gloria* is part of a commentary on late Republican Rome as a society of perverted values. Sallust does not redefine *gloria* to fit his moral schema, as Cicero had: it reflects what he saw around him. Sallust's histories demonstrate perverted *gloria* in practice: his protagonists are driven into morally bad actions by the desire for pre-eminence itself.

Gloria is thus a problematic value in Sallust's works. Its assessment is changeable (as Sallust noted with reference to Cyrus); its misvaluation is in fact central to both protagonists. Catiline's perverted value of *gloria* is a product of his Roman upbringing, specifically his youth spent in the Sullan civil wars; the point at which Jugurtha himself is profoundly shaped is through contact with the Roman value-system of the *novi atque nobiles* at Numantia. Both are driven by *ambitio*, but their *ambitio* is not directed along morally appropriate channels.

The *gloria* treated here thus links together the key points of the character sketches with the philosophical precepts of the prefaces. Both are more complex than they seem: Sallust's particular stress in his portraits of his protagonists, when considered against a problematic assessment of the goals of human activity, portrays them as profoundly shaped by the value-systems within which they developed. The character-sketches suggest a kind of explanation; in Jugurtha's case in particular, the

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[217] e.g. *Cat.* 12.1.

account of development which Sallust gives points towards an understanding of the man as perverted by his contact with Rome itself, emphasising the pernicious quality of individual *gloria* within a late Republican context.

In the light of the ambiguous qualities outlined in the preface and exemplified in the character-sketches, we must re-examine Sallust's analysis. If qualities at which men are supposed to aim are so fundamentally open to abuse, can there be any unproblematic assessment of the morally good? I contend that even within his system of ambiguous *gloria*, Sallust did appreciate Cicero's distinction between the morally good and bad, and that this emerges from his longest sustained discussion of the problematic nature of *virtus* and *gloria* - the *synkrisis*, to which I now turn. This passage supplements ideas already established of *gloria* and human achievement: it also draws further, I think, on moral categorisations advanced in the *de Officiis*.

The *synkrisis*

The *synkrisis* is chapter 54 of the *Bellum Catilinae*; the formal comparison between Caesar and Cato, it immediately follows the fateful decision that the conspirators taken at Rome should be executed.[218] The meeting of the senate which led to this decision was pivotal: the Senate's (and Cicero's, as presiding magistrate) decision to execute the captured men without formal trial was a decisive - and divisive - step.[219] The debate's significance was appreciated by Sallust: it is the climax of his work, marked by the paired speeches of Caesar and Cato (formally unlike anything else in his writing).[220] The narrative of the debate dwarfs that of the battle of Pistoria which follows:[221] the historian's *dispositio* makes the battle something of an anticlimax.[222]

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[218] *Cat*. 54.
[219] Attacks on Cicero by Metellus Nepos demonstrate the immediate use of the issue as political ammunition (e,g, Plut. *Cic*. 23). Despite (repeated) assertions to the contrary, the events of 5th December 63 shadowed the rest of Cicero's career (see e.g. App. *BC* 2.15.1). On the historicity of Sallust's reconstruction see especially Drummond 1995.
[220] The speeches are Sallust's closest approximation of Thucydides' set-piece debates: see Pöschl 1970b:388-97.
[221] *Cat.* 56-61.
[222] The account resists any sense of closure: cf. Levene 1992 on similar techniques in the *Jug*.

The debate is followed by the most explicitly analytical digression of the *Bellum Catilinae*, a two-part digression which discusses first the role of individuals in Roman history (an introduction), and then compares two outstanding figures, C. Julius Caesar and M. Porcius Cato (the *synkrisis* proper). The passage again illustrates Sallust's engagement with the historical role of individuals: however, the mode in which Caesar and Cato are described and compared differs from the character-sketches so far treated.[223] The term *synkrisis* is drawn from rhetorical theory, and refers to a formalised comparison between two people or things: it is most fully described by the authors of the *progymnasmata*, who preserve guidelines for *synkriseis*, a valuable exercise because of the wide application of its techniques of comparison and praise or blame.[224] An important criterion is that the two elements be genuinely comparable, with some real or possible disagreement as to which was superior;[225] a *synkrisis* was meant to reach some definite conclusion. The technique could thus be a useful tool of the historian's *dispositio*: comparison of two different things allowed the historian to emphasise the specific characteristics peculiar to each, and to draw explicit conclusions.

Sallust's digression is introduced by the phrase *sed mihi multa legenti, multa audienti*:[226] the reference to the interpretative activity of the historian indicates the shift towards a passage of analysis. It appears at the high-point of the monograph, indicating its centrality to the historiographical aims of the *Bellum Catilinae* as a whole.[227] The two men had already been introduced through speeches;[228] but a formal comparison allows Sallust to take an analytical viewpoint, describing the character of each and drawing out some more general conclusions.

Both Cato and Caesar were dead by the time of the work's composition, and the passage is written from a different chronological perspective to the other sketches. While the others mostly describe characters as at a fixed point (with the exception of Jugurtha), the *synkrisis* is

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[223] Although as Rambaud 1970:430, 444 notes, the form is a kind of antithetical double portrait.
[224] E.g. Theon, *Prog.* 112 S; Ps-Herm. Prog. 8.
[225] Theon. *Prog.* 112-3 S.
[226] *Cat.* 53.2.
[227] Note *Cat.* 53.6, *silentio praeterire non fuit consilium*, "it was not my plan to pass over [Caesar and Cato] in silence." Cf. Polybius' major digression on the Roman constitution (6.2.2), similarly presented as integral part of the πρόθεσις.
[228] *Cat.* 51-2.

chronologically broader, its description more detailed and philosophically nuanced. The passage includes material beyond the chronological bounds of the narrative (including Caesar's Gallic wars),[229] and summarises the subjects' whole lives; Sallust's comparison transcends the chronological bounds of the monograph and provides a more general perspective. There is a parallel here with the historiographical epitaph, assessing a man on his death; historians such as Livy took the opportunity afforded by a man's death to reflect on his character and historical significance.[230] Both Caesar's and Cato's deaths fell outside the compass of Sallust's narrative proper: this digression fulfils a comparable purpose.

The importance of the subject is clear. Caesar and Cato, as opposing poles of late Republican politics, figured heavily in political discourse after their deaths. *Catos* and *Anti-Catos* proliferated, including one by Caesar himself,[231] and Caesar's legacy remained a hotly disputed issue:[232] by including this analytical digression on two key figures of his period, Sallust again involves himself in a contemporary debate. The *synkrisis*, along with the views on *gloria* already introduced, is I think central to the programme of the whole monograph. Although (as explored above) it is over-simplistic to see Sallust as a political partisan, some judgement on the complex legacy of the two outstanding men of the previous generation could not be avoided. The choice of precisely Caesar and Cato as pre-eminent figures of the period of Sallust's own political career, and thus the elision of (for example) Cicero and Pompey, is deliberate.[233]

The *synkrisis* is one of the most explicitly political passages in Sallust's writings, and has accordingly been heavily treated in modern scholarship. The passage was central to Schwartz'

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[229] *Cat.* 54.4.

[230] E.g. Livy 38.53 on Scipio Africanus. Seneca attests that Sallust included such analyses *in paucissimis personis*; *Suas.* 6.21 (cf. Pomeroy 1989). As Seneca notes, death-notices drew to some degree on the *laudatio funebris*, the funeral oration of the Roman elite, and could play a similar exemplary role (see Flower 1996:128-58).

[231] Caesar's *Anti-Cato*: Tschiedel 1981. Cicero and Brutus were among those who wrote *Catos*: *Orat*. 35, *Att*. 12.21.1; Suet. *Aug*. 85.

[232] Sallust probably wrote before Philippi, when the armies of Cassius and Brutus provided a concrete reminder of Caesar's divisive legacy.

[233] Silence on Pompey may be reinforced by the phrase *Romae virtute magnus fuit*, alluding to Pompey's honorific *cognomen* (McGushin 1977:270); Mariotti 2007 *ad loc*. suggests a possible parallel between Sallust's *viri duo* and the *duos cives* (Cicero and Pompey) praised by Cicero at Cic. *Cat*. 3.26 (similarly Martin 2006:86).

reading of Sallust as a partisan propagandist; he saw the passage as *encomium* and exculpation of Caesar against accusations of complicity apparently found in Cicero's *de consiliis suis*.[234] However, since the abandonment of the "*Tendenzschriftsteller* theory", the passage has been variously canvassed.[235] The chief point at issue has usually been one of political valuation: different scholars have claimed (through various subtleties) that Sallust demonstrates a preference for one man or the other. Based on these readings, comprehensive theories of Sallust's political position have been elucidated, usually based on the assumption that Sallust remained a Caesarian partisan throughout the 40s (as I suggested above unsustainable).[236]

Much of the scholarship aimed at "resolving" the *synkrisis* reads it against the paired speeches of *Cat.* 51-2, in an attempt to decide which more closely approximates Sallust's own opinions: that man (it is assumed) must be the victor of the comparison. Such scholarship is subjective: it depends on subtle readings of specific qualities attributed to each man, and is frequently based on unexamined assumptions (e.g. Sallust's Caesarian partisanship).[237] Such analysis tends to elide the actual moral and descriptive content of the *synkrisis*, in favour of drawing parallels with the speeches and Sallust's own philosophical ideas. Alternative readings do exist: some scholars have suggested that Sallust deliberately avoids any political judgement one way or another, instead leaving the passage deliberately ambiguous.[238] Ronald Syme proposed the influential suggestion that Cato and Caesar represent two parts of a split Roman virtue, and that the qualities of both together might have saved the state;[239] William Batstone suggested in an important article that the whole

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[234] Schwartz 1897:572.

[235] McGushin 1977:309-11 assesses scholarship up to 1977 (cf. Becker 1973:731-35 and Neumeister 1983:42-3, Lieberg 1997:103-5 on more recent views).

[236] Those who argue that Sallust favours Caesar: Schwartz 1897:572; Seel 1930:38-44; Last 1948; La Penna 1968:138-46; Büchner 1976:54-7 (denying any explicit judgement in the *synkrisis*, but stressing the similarity of Caesar's qualities to Sallust's philosophy elsewhere) Pöschl 1970b:380 (building on Pöschl 1940:59-68) suggesting that speeches and *synkrisis* both demonstrate Sallust's admiration for Caesar). For Cato: Skard 1930:83-95; Lämmli 1946; Earl 1961:99-102; Syme 1964:113-20; Havas 1971:47; Becker 1973:737. Katz 1981:76 suggests that Cato, unlike Caesar, receives "unqualified praise"; Schur 1934:82 notes that he is more in keeping with Stoic virtues.

[237] Syme 1964:117 n.63.

[238] E.g. Nicolai 2011:61.

[239] Syme 1964:113-20. Similar ideas in Schur 1934:191-212, 1936:74; McGushin 1977:311; Wolff 1993. Büchner 1976 suggests that neither man is superior, but Caesar's views are closer to Sallust's elsewhere.

construction of the comparison can be read as a deliberate avoidance of neat oppositions, and thus a comment on the fractured morality of a period which made moral absolutes untenable.[240] Batstone is undoubtedly right in that there is more to the *synkrisis* than a simple comparison, at the end of which one man emerges victorious; but his argument is somewhat over-subtle in its application of postmodernist analysis.[241]

My approach will draw on these alternative readings, avoiding the attempt to align Sallust with one man or the other; rather, I will attempt to consider each figure within the context of the philosophy – and in particular the ideas on *gloria* – which dominates the monograph. Rather than the speeches,[242] I will look primarily at the moral vocabulary and descriptions of the *synkrisis* itself, considering their significance against ideas outlined in the preface and sketches. My emphasis will be on the role of the *synkrisis* and the descriptions of Caesar and Cato within the thematic construction of the *Bellum Catilinae*: while valuation of Caesar and Cato is important *per se*, it forms a part of Sallust's larger didactic purpose, and as the climax of the analysis of the monograph it is appropriate to draw on the themes already established in reading it. I will view the *synkrisis* from the perspective established throughout this chapter, paying attention to Sallust's delineation of character: in conjunction with links suggested with the *de Officiis*, this prompts a new set of readings of the passage.[243]

It is necessary to set the *synkrisis* against the discussion of individuals in Roman history at chapter 53, mentioned briefly above.[244] This introductory passage, taking a historical view of Rome's

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[240] Batstone 1988; followed by Garcia-Lopez 1997:98-9. Batstone 1990:112 ponders whether explaining Sallust's works is a valid goal, stressing the mimetic dimension of his depictions of a period of internal dissension.

[241] Batstone 1988:1-4; see criticism in Lieberg 1997:105.

[242] The speeches contain much of interest, but I cannot treat them here. See Sklenar 1998; Pöschl 1970b; Levene 2000; Tannenbaum 2005; on Sallustian speeches generally see p.41 above.

[243] Dyck 1996:194 suggests links between Sallust's *synkrisis* and the *de Officiis*: I develop his analysis in much more detail.

[244] *Cat.* 53 has been little treated: Batstone 1988b and Heldmann 1993b discuss the passage, but neither explains its implications for the *synkrisis*. Heldmann 1993:202 connects the *egregia virtus* of Cato and Caesar to the historical theory developed here.

development before introducing her two contemporary champions, is significant. By prefixing the comparison of Caesar and Cato with his remarks on the historical centrality of individuals, Sallust shifts the tone from the unedifying specifics of 63 back onto the level of historical generalisations. The state had grown, he suggests, thanks to the *paucorum civium egregia virtus*,[245] the excellence of the most capable men. This recalls the description of *gloria* as goal of life at the beginning of the monograph, just as the chapter recalls the historical subject of the *archaeologia*:[246] the *pauci* who had elevated the state to its current heights were few, because only few possess the capacity and inclination to leave something worthy of record. However, this introduction also emphasises contemporary decline, in that *luxu atque desidia* had meant that no Romans were produced *virtute magnus*; the state had to support itself through its own greatness.[247] This recalls Sempronia and the *privati*, so affected by *luxuria* that they had no urge even to distinguish themselves but only to fulfil their appetites: it also foregrounds *virtus* as the quality in which Cato and Caesar are distinguished. It is necessary to reiterate here the nebulousness of *virtus* throughout Sallust's work: while the context does suggest a moralistic interpretation, Sallust's use of *virtus* generally of "excellence" remains an important subtext.[248]

By introducing Caesar and Cato by reference to the great men of Roman history, Sallust stresses their exceptionality: their roles are similarly decisive.[249] An opposition is set up between these two and the rest of society: their virtues cast them as the *pauci*, apart from the rest of the Roman population.[250] The introduction recalls the preface, where Sallust had suggested that only by

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[245] *Cat.* 53.4. Vretska 1976 *ad loc*. emphasises opposition between Rome and states which were the product of a single lawgiver; but Sallust's stress seems to me to be on the few as opposed to the many, rather than to the one. Mariotti 2007 *ad loc*., observes that the *populus Romanus* is grammatically absent from the sentence, via asyndeton and deliberate elision: Sallust focuses sharply on individuals.

[246] Vretska 1976 *ad* 53.2 reads chapter 53 as deliberate invocation of the *archaeologia*. The analysis here is different in certain respects (e.g. the admission that the Gauls had surpassed the Romans in warfare); the programme of this chapter is different to the heavily schematised *archaeologia*.

[247] *Cat.* 53.5. Vretska 1976 *ad loc*. identifies the state's lack of men of *virtus* as a "*topos* of crisis" found at e.g. Cic. *Verr*. 2.5.25; but Sallust's idiosyncratic *virtus* gives it particular significance.

[248] Büchner 1976:39 emphasises the difficulty of finding a solid quality against which to assess Caesar and Cato. Cf. Batstone 1988:9; Sklenar 1998.

[249] Cf. Wolff 1993.

[250] Steidle 1958:22 sees the two men as historical anomalies in Sallust's thought.

egregious deeds could one ensure an everlasting reputation;[251] Caesar and Cato meet this criterion, as demonstrated by their exceptional *virtus* and as made explicit by Sallust's reference to them as the two men of great *virtus memoria mea*, "in my recollection".[252] Caesar and Cato are *ingenti virtute, divorsis moribus*: one way of reading this is that Cato and Caesar alone of the last generation of the Roman Republic possessed the capacity to achieve the true *gloria* of egregious deeds, in their various forms, rather than that they alone possess the requisite moral goodness.[253]

'item gloria, sed alia alii'

"In birth, age and eloquence they were about equal, comparable in greateartedness, and of equal *gloria* - but of different kinds."[254]

Sallust introduces Caesar and Cato as "of towering excellence, but of different customs", a programmatic statement for what follows.[255] In five antithetical pairs and two longer statements, Sallust sketches the distinct characters of the two men, and the traits which led each to prominence. Caesar's virtues revolve around social qualities, and assistance to the needy; Cato's are coloured by severity and rigorous concern for justice. Both are presented ostensibly positively; contrary to the recommendations of the rhetoricians, Sallust avoids any direct assessment of superiority.

The quality which structures and mediates the comparison between the two men, in keeping with the focus of the rest of the monograph, is *gloria*.[256] This is the reward for the outstanding *virtus* of each man; its centrality is made explicit by the passage's introduction, and, by ring composition,

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[251] *Cat.* 1.1-4.
[252] *Cat*. 53.6.
[253] Mariotti 2007 *ad loc.* suggests that the asyndeton here is "*essenzialmente avversativa*".
[254] *Cat*. 54.1.
[255] *divorsis moribus*, *Cat*. 53.6: *mos* is yet another morally ambiguous term: where used without qualification, it means simply "customs" or "practices", although it might also indicate "morals".
[256] Cf. Lieberg 1997: 115-23; Earl 1961:100; Drexler 1970:60. *contra* Büchner 1976:42, holding *virtus* and *gloria* as effectively interchangeable; Vretska 1976 *ad loc*. proposes *virtus* as the quality under comparison (following Koschinski 1968). Schmüdderlich 1962 suggests that Sallust's analysis of Caesar's *gloria* is deeper and more complex than Cato's.

the direct comparison of the men's *gloriae* at the end of the *synkrisis*.[257] Stress on *gloria* suits the

formal nature of the passage: as I noted, the rhetoricians demanded that a *synkrisis* contain some

shared value around which the two sides could be compared.[258] However, key to Sallust's

composition is his precise statement of this pivotal quality: '*item gloria, sed alia alii*', "equal glory,

but each of a different sort". Sallust refers to a differentiable *gloria*, introducing a layer of complexity

to the analysis which follows. This differentiation can, I think, be connected to both the preface and

de Officiis.

The shift towards differentiated *gloriae* as appropriate to different men is an indication that

the *synkrisis* presents a more nuanced picture of *gloria* in practice than the preface had.[259] While the

preface referred to the *gloria* of temporal possessions as *fluxa atque fragilis*, the *synkrisis* explores

the different forms of *gloria* ascribed to each man from a more analytical perspective. The

differentiation of *gloria*, I suggest, admits an element of explicit moral judgement – so far lacking –

into Sallust's individual philosophy of *gloria*: the analysis of practices – *mores* – through which each

man's *gloria* was earned characterises these different forms, emphasising the basic ambiguity at the

heart of late Republican *gloria*. In the light of this, I reiterate the connection with *de Officiis*.

Together with his revaluation of *gloria*, the categorisation, description and analysis of specific virtues

of character was a major theme of Cicero's work: given that Sallust's thought elsewhere seems to

respond to Cicero's treatment, it is worth considering this passage – Sallust's fullest discussion of

specific virtues and characteristics – in the light of the vocabulary and ideas of *de Officiis*.

As William Batstone has demonstrated, the set of antitheses which structure the *synkrisis*

avoids any neat opposition between Caesar and Cato; it would be erroneous to attempt to impose

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[257] *igitur eis genus, aetas, eloquentia prope aequalia fuere, magnitudo animi par, item gloria, sed alia alii* (Cat. 54.1): the two men are equal in all but the nature of their *gloria*; thus, this is the aspect which should be compared.
[258] Theon *Prog*. 112 S.
[259] Cf. Cicero's remarks on the different natures of individuals (and different qualities appropriate to them) at *Off*. 1.109.

binary divisions on the qualities described in Caesar and Cato.[260] Rather than approaching the

descriptions as direct antitheses, I will therefore read the sets of qualities described against the

descriptions of virtues in the *de Officiis*: looking at the *synkrisis* through this prism illuminates

Sallust's analysis of each man. Similarly important is the construction of each set of virtues: by

gradually filling-out the motives of each man throughout the passage, I think, Sallust places their

total significance into sharper focus, and the passage provides a descriptive crescendo culminating in

a final sentence which summarises each man. This focus on order and arrangement fits well the

themes I have emphasised of the historian's *dispositio*: it also provides a new reading of the passage.

     I begin with Caesar, whose qualities are treated under the following catchwords.

Beneficia/munificentia; *mansuetudine/misericordia*; *dando/sublevando/ignoscundo*; *miseris*

perfugium; facilitas; and the final sentence *postremo Caesar in animum induxerat laborare, vigilare;*

negotiis amicorum intentus sua neglegere, nihil denegare quod dono dignum esset; sibi magnum

imperium, exercitum, bellum novom exoptabat, ubi virtus enitescere posset. Each characteristic is

presented positively, and they fit within a general set of what we might term "social" virtues:

however, each is also in some ways ambiguous, as comparison with *de Officiis* demonstrates. The

variant interpretations of Caesar's qualities are, I think, central to his portrayal. My method here will

be to compare the virtues allocated to Caesar by Sallust with what Cicero says about them; reading

them in the light of Cicero's full discussion illuminates otherwise obscure aspects of Sallust's

analysis.

     Beneficentia is treated at some length in the *de Officiis*.[261] In book I, dealing with the

honestum or morally correct behaviour, Cicero introduces it thus: "nothing is more agreeable to

human nature, but it comes with many caveats".[262] While *beneficentia* is valued in supporting

human society (the main thrust of the group of virtues of which it is a part), it is easily mistaken, and

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[260] Batstone 1988:7 and *passim*; cf. Büchner 1976:53.
[261] *Off*. 1.42-60. See Dyck 1996:106-8.
[262] *Off*. 1.42.

can degenerate into something harmful unless exercised with great care: specifically, Cicero cautions that we should be very careful of the size, motivation and recipients of *largesse*.[263] Cicero particularly attacks *benificentia* that is ostensibly disinterested, but in fact done in self-interest: he castigates those who give unjustly, robbing one man to give to another, especially those '*cupidi splendoris et gloriae*', "desirous of eminence and glory".[264] Cicero's recommendations are qualified, such that the classification of *beneficentia* as virtue appears heavily dependent on circumstances.[265]

Beneficentia reappears in the second book of the work, dealing with expediency – the *utile* – and practical politics.[266] As throughout this book, emphasis is placed on the value of popular support: *beneficentia* is presented as an effective way of achieving this. However, once again Cicero is careful to qualify his approval for the quality by establishing strict moral limits to its exercise, and emphasising the damage done by exercising it in unsuitable ways. He cites Ennius: "good deeds ill-judged are evil deeds."[267] *Beneficentia*, in Cicero's formulation, may be socially beneficial, and benefit the giver: but it can also be destructive, if driven by the wrong motivations or without proper moral consideration.

The problematic character of *beneficentia* is replicated in Caesar's other qualities. Sallust's assessment of his well-known *mansuetudine* and *misericordia*, as scholars have noted, avoids the word *clementia*, coloured as it was by the propaganda of the post-civil war period: [268] but these descriptions are again loaded, as emerges from comparison with *de Officiis*. *Mansuetudo*, and leniency in judgement, receives praise as part of *magnitudo animi* (greatness of spirit), but it is again qualified, this time by the statement that it does not necessarily apply in causes of state: '*et tamen ita probanda est mansuetudo atque clementia, ut adhibeatur rei publicae cause severitatis, sine qua*

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[263] Off. 1.42-50.
[264] *Off* 1.43.
[265] E.g. the summary at *Off*. 1.59.
[266] Especially *Off*. 2.61-71.
[267] *Off* 2.62.
[268] E.g. Ramsey 2007 *ad loc.*; cf. Cic. *Att*. 8.16.2.

administrari civitas non potest'.[269] While *mansuetudo* and *misericordia* endear one to others, in extreme circumstances they must be cast aside.[270]

The speeches given to Caesar and Cato provide a particular counterpoint to this pair of virtues. Caesar's speech begins with the assertion that '*omnes homines, qui di rebus dubiis consultant, ab odio, amicitia, ira atque misericordia vacuos esse decet*';[271] this recalls the Stoic virtue of *magnitudo animi*. However, this is the point of Caesar's speech to which Cato makes the most direct reply: Cato recognises the possibility of *mansuetudo* and *misericordia* being levelled against his counter-argument, but dismisses it. This is also precisely the point at which Cato makes his famous denunciation of the shift in the true meanings of words:[272] Sallust's Cato stresses that *misericordia* and *mansuetudo* are precisely qualities subject to this fundamental reconfiguring and perversion of values. I have avoided reading the *synkrisis* through the speeches alone: but Cato's speech clearly restates the assessment of *de Officiis*, that in moments of importance to the state *severitas* was to be preferred to *mansuetudo* and *misericordia*. The ascription of precisely these virtues to Caesar in this context, then, is somewhat problematic, and particularly so because they are directly contrasted with Catonian *severitas*.

Caesar's other virtues appear in a similar light. *dando, sublevando, ignoscundo* all allude again to the *beneficiis* treated above; while antithesis with Cato's *nihil largiundo* does not suggest that Caesar's qualities *do* imply *largiundo* (a term with negative connotations in *de Officiis*),[273] the forcefulness of presentation of Cato's position nonetheless casts doubt on the motives of Caesar's actions.[274] Description of Caesar as *miseris perfugium*, in contrast to Cato as *malis pernicies*, marks the ambiguity further; while Cato's ferocity is directed at the clearly defined *mali*,[275] *miseri* is only

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[269] *Off.* 1.88.
[270] Cf. Lämmli 1946:98, identifying *misericordia* and *liberalitas* as terms of criticism at Cic. *Att*. 9.7.6.
[271] *Cat.* 51.1: on resonances with Cato's speech on the Rhodians see Levene 2000.
[272] *Cat.* 52.11.
[273] E.g. *Off*. 1.53. Cf. Batstone 1988 on *nihil largiundo* as at most an indirect criticism.
[274] Vretska 1976 *ad loc.* links these qualities to the definition of *magnitudo animi* at Cic. *Part. Or*. 77.
[275] Cf. *Cat.* 7.1. cf. Hellegouarc'h 1963:526-8 on the word in late Republican political vocabulary.

used elsewhere in the *Bellum Catilinae* of Catiline's retinue.[276] While the term appears positive, examination of context and motivation introduces doubts.

While Caesar's qualities are all ostensibly morally good, when read against the discussion of statesmanly virtues in *de Officiis*, they are – significantly - not absolutely so. Each can be misused or misinterpreted, or can stem from the wrong motivations. The final sentence of Sallust's description draws together these ambiguities, illuminating and qualifying the audience's reading of what precedes it.

postremo Caesar in animum induxerat laborare, vigilare; negotiis amicorum intentus sua neglegere, nihil denegare quod dono dignum esset; sibi magnum imperium, exercitum, bellum novom exoptabat, ubi virtus enitescere posset.[277]

Caesar is driven by a plan, which dictates his apparently charitable actions:[278] he desires power, and to demonstrate his pre-eminent ability. Importantly - recalling Sallust's definition of *gloria* - this does not imply concern for the state itself: rather, Caesar's qualities can be construed as self-interested *ambitio* for *gloria*.[279] *bellum novom exoptabat* recalls contemporary controversy over Caesar's actions in Gaul:[280] Caesar stirs up his own war, a decision properly the purview of the *populus Romanus* alone.[281]

In the light of this concluding sentence, Caesar's ostensibly positive qualities demand re-examination. Sallust's sketches stressed the problematic relationship between individual *gloria* and the *res publica*: individual *gloria* led both Catiline and Jugurtha into evil actions. In the light of the

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[276] E.g. *Cat.* 33.1, 20.9, 20.13. Vretska 1976 *ad loc.* suggests that *miseri* can be a positive term (cf. Cic. *Mur.* 62, attacking the over-harshness of Stoicism); but it is a political catchword and in the *Cat.* is associated with the dissolute youth of 12.2.

[277] *Cat.* 54.4.

[278] Vretska 1976 *ad loc.* notes that this was a well-established view of Caesar's career in antiquity.

[279] Cf. Lieberg 1997: 112 on Caesar's stirring up of war to win *gloria*. The activities mentioned here (*laborare, vigilare*) are suggestively similar to Catiline's bodily endurance in carrying out his plans (*Cat.* 5.3).

[280] E.g. Suet. *Jul.* 24.3.

[281] Mariotti 2007 *ad loc.* compares this to similar behaviour of Marius, Sulla, Pompey and Crassus; Ramsey 2008 *ad loc.* stresses the contrast to Pompey in particular. Koschinski 1968 suggests this assessment cannot be negative, but this is by comparison with the pseudographical *Epistulae*.

stress on Caesar's pursuit of temporal power, consideration of his qualities in comparison with *de Officiis* in fact reconfigures all of the virtues ascribed to Caesar as problematic, and while they may be *honestum*, they may equally be motivated by self-interest and expediency. Caesar's virtues initially seem constructive and socially useful, but are reconfigured through the concluding sentence as towards his own ambition.[282] The qualities imputed to Caesar in this description are mutable and deceptive. What are ostensibly selfless virtues are revealed to be part of a grand plan: in the light of the concluding sentence, the latent danger of each of Caesar's qualities is thrown into relief. The stress on the ambiguous nature of Caesar's qualities plays into the redefinition of words which emerges as a theme from Cato's speech,[283] tying the analysis together: as Cato had suggested, Caesar is emblematic of the ambiguous qualities of late Republican politics.

Cato's portrait is different. His qualities are less mutable: throughout the *synkrisis* (and reflected in his speech) his behaviour implies unambiguous concern for the *res publica* itself.[284] The qualities ascribed to Cato are those presented in *de Officiis* as neither the most popular nor the most conducive to the *utile*, but of a sort always to the advantage of the state. His qualities are *severitas, dignitas, constantia*:[285] these virtues, while less "outward" facing than Caesar's, are much less ambiguous. They are all to the fore in the first book of Cicero's *de Officiis*, dealing with the *honestum*:[286] as opposed to Caesar's mutable social qualities, Cato's are strictly in keeping with morally correct behaviour. *severitas* is in *de Officiis* a necessary quality for the true statesman; while it does not endear oneself, it is nonetheless absolutely necessary for the administration of the state (*severitas, sine qua civitas administrari non posset*);[287] *constantia* and *dignitas*, similarly, stress Cato's

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[282] Cf. Lämmli 1946:102, Drexler 1970:63 on links between Caesar's behaviour and *ambitio* at *Cat.* 10.5; La Penna 1968:141 notes the value of Caesar's *ambitio* to the state.
[283] Cf. *Cat.* 52.11; Cic. *Part. Or.* 81; Minyard 1985.
[284] Mariotti 2007 *ad.* 54.2 stresses that Caesar's virtues are marked by *periphrasis*, Cato's by clarity.
[285] *Cat.* 54.2-3.
[286] On *severitas* see *Off.* 1.88; *dignitas* and the *dignum* is stressed throughout Cicero's discussion of the fourth virtue (see Dyck 1994:37); 1.80 discusses *constantia* as the quality of not being swayed from the path of reason.
[287] Cic. *Off.* 1.88.

adherence to the correct course of action, and unwillingness to be swayed from the morally appropriate.[288] The overall impression of the qualities ascribed to Cato is of rectitude and moral certainty; it is in this that he provides a particularly sharp contrast to Caesar, and is linked to the themes of mutable motivation which I have stressed throughout this chapter. The qualities given to Cato stand against the shifting moral valuations exemplified in Caesar.

As above, the concluding sentence draws the portrait together.

at Catoni studium modestiae, decoris, sed maxume severitatis erat. non divitiis cum divite neque factione cum factioso, sed cum strenuo virtute, cum modesto pudore, cum innocente abstinentia certabat; esse quam videri bonus malebat; ita quo minus petebat gloriam, eo magis illum sequebatur.[289]

The assessment of Cato, which - as with Caesar above – summarises and draws together the preceding qualities, stresses his selflessness. Sallust's comment on the nature of his *gloria* stresses the contrast to Caesar; as opposed to Caesar's concern with demonstrable *gloria*, Cato avoids the conventional trappings of influence and power.[290] The formulation '*esse quam videri bonus malebat*' is drawn from Aeschylus:[291] however, it also closely recalls Cicero's description of the man truly devoted to rectitude in *de Officiis*.[292] Cicero uses the idea, which he ascribes to Socrates, precisely in support of his distinction between *vera gloria* and *ficta*: given the connections between the two works which I have been exploring in this chapter, we should view Sallust's deployment of the Aeschylean idea as mediated by Cicero's use of the *topos*, and expressing a similar contrast.

Sallust's portrayal of these two paradigmatic figures of late Republican politics draws on philosophical ideas stated throughout the *Bellum Catilinae*, and on the analysis of motivation

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[288] Cic. *Off*. 1.69 links *constantia* and *dignitas* as the result of freedom from perturbative emotion (they are thus appropriate qualities to Cato as a Stoic).
[289] *Cat*. 53.5-6.
[290] Cf. *neque factione cum factioso*: Seager 1972:54 stresses *factio* here as "undesirable influence".
[291] Aesch. *Sev.* 592; see Renehan 1976, 2000.
[292] *Off*. 2.43: cf. Cugusi 1996:140 stresses Cicero's particular application of the *topos* to *gloria*.

established with the sketches. By analysis of different forms of *gloria*, Sallust portrays the fundamental difference between his two subjects: while both do achieve *gloria* through outstanding deeds, these *gloriae* have markedly different consequences for the state, and are expressed differently. Caesar's is calculated towards his own ambition, Cato's is driven by concern for the *res publica*: the contrast is expressed in the particular virtues ascribed to each man.

The virtues of Sallust's subjects, I think, engage with the argumentation of *de Officiis*: indeed, the opposition between *gloriae* of Caesar and Cato in some ways replicates Cicero's distinction between the *falsa gloria* of self-interest, and the *vera gloria* of great deeds done in the service of the state. Sallust's adaptation of *de Officiis* establishes a philosophical basis for his *synkrisis*. Cato is described in the terms of moral rectitude approved in the *de Officiis*; Caesar's qualities, on the other hand, while appearing to match the pragmatic virtues of the Roman noble as praised in the second book of the work, are undermined by Sallust's concluding judgement, which demonstrates the self-interest in his character. While his qualities are – under the correct circumstances - salutary, they are motivated by personal gain, and as such remain problematic.

Caesar's qualities are of a different sort to Cato's, and the *gloria* earned by each man, while comparable, is therefore distinct - the *alia alii* of the introduction. This would have been appreciated by a late Republican audience, particularly given the frequency with which the accusation of self-interest had been levelled against Caesar: Cicero had in *de Officiis* attacked a whole class of such people who elevated *utile* over *honestum*.[293] In view of the opposition between the characterisations of Cato and Caesar, it is in some ways surprising that Sallust does not emphasise moralistic aspects of his analysis further: he does not state explicitly that Caesar put personal gain above that of the state (although it is clearly implied). The restraint here is the reason that readings of the *synkrisis* which argue that Sallust "judges" moralistically in favour of one man or the other are misguided: moralistic judgement of individuals is not the point. The *sykrisis* is not an attack on Caesar or encomium of Cato, but a commentary on the fundamental forces motivating Republican politics,

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[293] E.g. *Off*. 3.12, 3.17.

with no simple resolution.[294] The passage reiterates concerns established in the preface and the sketches about the values of late Republican society. Cato and Caesar earned equal *gloria* within a late Republican context, despite acting in paradigmatically opposed ways: this indicts *gloria* itself, and thus connects the *synkrisis* into the broader analysis of the monograph.

Cato and Caesar exceed their contemporaries in *virtus* and in *gloria*, but cannot escape the values within which their success is assessed. As the most capable men of their generation, Cato and Caesar exemplify the state's value-shift. In this light, the collocation of the *synkrisis* with the discussion of the role of individuals in Roman history is particularly pointed. The comparison between the glorious deeds of Sallust's own generation and those of the *pauci* of the early Republic demonstrates that as *gloria* has changed, so have the deeds done in order to win it: while the deeds of the Romans commemorated at *Bellum Catilinae* 53 were salutary to the state, the egregious Romans of Sallust's own generation, despite winning comparable *gloria* for outstanding excellence, gave rise to the chaotic mess of the Civil Wars. The analysis of the whole monograph, as expressed through the preface, character-sketches and *synkrisis*, points to the same conclusion: Rome's fractious state is a result of the debasement of values: within a broken society, even outstanding individuals could not avoid perversion.

Conclusion

With this chapter I have explored two aspects of Sallust's treatment of individuals: the paradoxical characters of the sketches, and the enigmatic contemporary heroes of the *synkrisis*. The forms of description are distinct, but are built on the same philosophical system, particularly the idea that the Republican ideal of individual *gloria* had been pushed to breaking point. The individuals treated in detail in Sallust are highly capable (manifesting *virtus*, in the sense of excellence), leaving to posterity such a record as Sallust suggested was the aim of those who wish to exceed the beasts; but in the morally problematic context of the late Republic, the winning of such reputations proved

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[294] On public good and personal self-interest see Sartori 1994, esp. 445-8; Burkard 2003:13-4 sees Cato and Caesar more as ideological systems than individuals.

dangerous to the state. Catiline and Jugurtha deploy their strengths, which might counterfactually have served Rome, to attack the city, because the *ambitio* which they exemplify cannot distinguish between *gloria* properly won and that which simply results from pre-eminence; while Caesar's and Cato's *gloriae* are expressed from within the Republican system, the consequences of their actions and characters position them with respect to the Republic itself in markedly different ways. There is more than a hint of the ambitious anti-heroes of the monographs in Sallust's Caesar.[295] Sallust's sketches are concrete demonstrations of his idea of *gloria*, and the tendency of powerful men to be seduced by self-aggrandisement; the *synkrisis* hints at the same theme, albeit obliquely, suitable for a character of continuingly disputed interpretation such as Caesar.

The figures to whom Sallust gives sketches are individuals, in that his account of their development is linked to specific historical events; similarly, both Catiline and Jugurtha (and in their own ways Caesar and Cato) play key roles in catalysing historical events. However, Sallust also stresses their paradigmatic relevance, and their subjection to wider models. This is in keeping with his use of digression throughout his works, to point out more general points of interpretation beyond the particular. The sketches of such egregious men provide concrete demonstrations of the models of motivation and philosophy which underpin his works; in the light of the moral perversion engulfing the Republic, even the outstanding (such as Caesar) could not avoid implication.

Sallust's theme of *gloria* as manifested in the sketches suggests some further conclusions as to the nature of his historiographical project. By commemorating men like Catiline and Jugurtha (along with Marius and Sulla, both of whom had brought things to "an evil end from a good beginning")[296] Sallust stresses the problematic nature of individual *gloria* and memorialisation in his period. The analysis manifested in Sallust's treatment of individuals stresses by comparison the rectitude of Sallust's own project of historiography: in contrast to the deeds of such men, Sallust's own concentration on intellectual achievement as opposed to *praeclara facinora* is justified. "They act as if the praetorship, the consulship, or the other things of this sort are distinguished and

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[295] Cf. Havas 1971:45-6.
[296] *Cat*. 11.4; *Jug*. 63.6 (on Marius' subjection to *ambitio*).

magnificent in themselves, rather than valued according to the *virtus* of those who hold them";[297]

Sallust's attack on the moral misvaluation of contemporary politics is effectively an attack on the

ambitio of Catiline and Jugurtha, and hinted at in Caesar.

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[297] *Jug*. 4.7-8.

Conclusion

It remains to draw together my arguments. I will begin by recapitulating my major conclusions, and how they relate to the initial areas set out for investigation in the thesis; I will then suggest some ways in which the approaches outlined here might be continued in subsequent work. My major conclusions fall into two categories; I will deal first with those of broader relevance, and second with those applicable to Sallust specifically. These are, I think, new contributions to our view of Sallust as an historian, and in some cases to the study of classical historiography; they demonstrate the value of the approach I have taken here.

The first conclusion, drawn in the opening part and illustrated in practice by the case-studies, is that the activity of the historian can usefully be conceived under the heading of *dispositio*, stressing selectivity and structure within the creation of historiographical meaning. The studies in the second part of the thesis stress connections between digressive material and the composition of the whole of the historical account, and the role of digressions in putting forward the historian's interpretation; in each case, the ordering of material (including but not limited to the inclusion of digression at specific points) plays an appreciable role within the construction of the whole. Structural devices of order and arrangement are particularly clearly demonstrated in my reading of the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, in which the themes of Sallust's narrative are patterned according to the analysis of partisan strife offered in the digression, placed at the fulcrum of the text; but the importance of the order in which events are treated, and deviations from it, is foregrounded throughout.

This is, in my opinion, a substantively new approach. While the interpretative possibilities of order and structure have of course been considered by past scholars, my suggestion of *dispositio* as a model for this process offers a coherent formulation of how this might be understood. In addition, it makes explicit the links between the historian's practice in structuring his text and the dictates of rhetoric: as I demonstrated in the first chapter, the *progymnasmata* - evidence of the application of

rhetorical education to other prose forms than oratory - illustrate the procedure of composition. In contrast to the well-established view of the activities of the classical historians as dominated by *inventio* – which while important has been exaggerated, particularly for a historian such as Sallust – the focus I suggest on *dispositio* suggests new approaches, relevant to all classical historiography. This thesis concentrates on a single aspect of the technique; study of the other aspects of *dispositio* in relation to Sallust and the other historians, particularly the manipulation of narrative order, is a *desideratum*.

My second conclusion follows from this, and again relates to the corpus of the classical historians more broadly: it concerns the role of digression within the historical text. In keeping with the stress on *dispositio* outlined above, we should expect digressions to be passages particularly important to the historian's composition, in that they represent points at which the historian's interpretative activity is particularly clearly felt over the exigencies of the narrative; nonetheless, such passages have been comparatively little studied. My brief examination of the digressive practices of the various historians at least demonstrates the variety of digressive practice, and "modes of digression", among some historians: nonetheless, the important role played by digressions suggests that further work is needed to codify such passages, and to assess their significance on a more systematic level.

One of the major problems in studying digressions is the nebulousness of the definition: simply to class all passages which depart from the immediate subject as digressive is to presuppose a relationship between subject-matter and the argumentative through-line of a work, which as I noted in connection with the works of the orators in chapter 2 is unsupportable. The definition of digression which I have offered and applied in this thesis, making use of the narratological criteria of tempo, provides a solution, and might be applied more widely. Using the formal definition of tempo as a criterion for defining the digression imposes a coherence and methodological rigour on the approach to digression in narrative contexts: this is, I think, a further methodological contribution of this thesis.

My remaining conclusions relate to Sallust specifically. While I have approached his text through a particular formal device, the ideas emphasised within my case studies suggest new readings of Sallust on a broader level: insights gained from the digressions can, I think, be much more generally applied to our reading of Sallust as a historian and thinker. On the most basic level, I hope to have demonstrated throughout this thesis that Sallust is a more sophisticated writer than he is usually given credit for. I have emphasised the role of digression as a complex device within the historian's construction of meaning, calculated towards sophisticated structural patterns; Sallust's deployment of the technique is central to his works' thematic statements. The use of digressions in his work is a major aspect of Sallust's literary composition; appreciating their significance is crucial to a proper assessment of Sallust's work.

A major consideration to which I have frequently recurred is Sallust's genre. In writing monographs - a distinctive form in Latin historiography - Sallust distinguishes his works from those of the historians who had preceded him. In covering circumscribed events, Sallust concentrated on thematically unified compositions, as opposed to the more comprehensive treatments customary in *annales*. This affects every aspect of Sallust's composition (the atypical nature of his prefaces, the structure of his works, the portrayal of the protagonists and the reflection on the nature of the Roman response to them). By restricting his subject-matter to what he saw as the most important episodes of late Republican history, Sallust took a clear position on the significant developments which (in his view) had led the Republic to the precipice; Sallust's monographs are driven by clear interpretations and a strong authorial message, implied by his selection of theme itself.

Emphasising the importance of digressions throws the peculiarities of Sallust's genre into sharper relief. Digressions allow treatment of wider subjects than could be included in a monograph, permitting the historian to set out analysis and material which provides context to the account; digressions allow the historian to deviate from the selectiveness of his form. In the light of the generic characteristics of the monograph, as well as being particularly clearly marked as structural devices, digressions contribute directly to the argumentation of the text as a whole. In each of my

case studies, material contained within the digression plays a key role in setting out the terms of the analysis followed throughout.

Given the variation in the uses of digression throughout Sallust's works, that digressions in various ways supplement the limited compass imposed by the monographic form is an important continuity. Some, as I have demonstrated, provide contextual material extending the chronology of the account beyond the bounds of the episodes described; others fill in the details of the motivations of major figures of Sallust's texts. In both cases, the significance of digression is that it reconciles the tight thematic focus which is central to Sallust's historical interpretation with broader interpretative contexts. Digression is, in this sense, a key part of the historian's *dispositio*, and Sallust's use of the technique should be read as a response to the requirements of his monographic form. Just as the other authors canvassed in the brief survey above deployed digressions in different ways according to the specific natures of their histories, Sallust's use of digression as a structural device responds to his works' generic characteristics.

We can develop this idea further, applying the conclusions drawn from Sallust's use of digression to his corpus more generally. In that they are passages on the same themes, often deployed in similar ways, the digressions provide points of comparison between the different stages of Sallust's historiographical career, and the composition of his two monographs (the *Historiae* are, as I have established, tantalising but problematic). I have emphasised the value throughout of comparing passages which deal with the same ideas, with a view to better illustrating how the specifics of each passage fit within its respective monograph: but can consideration of the digressions illustrate any kind of development within Sallust's historiographical technique more generally?

I noted in the introduction that the material in the digressions has been studied as a demonstration of developments in his philosophy and views of human nature: my study has illustrated (as complement to this) the shifts in historiographical technique. The major conclusion to be drawn from studies of the use of digression across Sallust's works is not profound change, but

rather increasing sophistication. Sallust's historiographical techniques do not fundamentally shift, but the digressions illustrate a more sophisticated methodology. The character-sketches, for example, shift from providing synchronic portraits to more fully developed chronological views, in the person of Jugurtha; the additional temporal dimension makes Sallust's analysis of human motivations, and their perversion, more pointed. The content of the *archaeologia* as compared to the political digression of the *Bellum Jugurthinum* similarly attests development in Sallust's analysis; in particular, from the dominance of *fortuna* in the first monograph towards the fully-formulated theory of *metus hostilis* in the second, illustrative of the increasing sophistication of the theoretical understanding behind his historiography. The political digression of the *Bellum Jugurthinum* illustrates the relevance of digressive material on a structural level. The analysis contained within the digression is more fully integrated than in the *Bellum Catilinae*, because of its influence over the thematic structure of the history itself: the digression of the *Bellum Jugurthinum* illustrates particularly profoundly the historian's activity of *dispositio*, in applying his structural patterning coherently across the whole of a text. Comparison of the digressions thus illustrates in a specific sense developments within Sallust's historiographical technique more widely.

Beyond the level of *dispositio* and historiographical technique, the case-studies of the second part of this thesis further develop our view of Sallust as a historian. Approaches to Sallust have frequently been dominated by attempts to see him within the context of the late Republican political system, and to read his works as motivated by some political *animus*; the case studies in the second half of this thesis substantiate these ideas, by placing the historian within an intellectual, as well as political, context, and viewing the digressions as central to the political ideas adopted. I have stressed in each of my studies the sense in which Sallust responds to a range of contemporary ideas, from the ethnographical themes canvassed in the *archaeologia* to the Ciceronian reflections on the nature of true *gloria* in the character-sketches: although theoretical material does not necessarily dominate the historical methodology of the narrative parts of Sallust's account, its appearance in the

digressions does demonstrate that the historian nonetheless engaged with such ideas in composing his works.

In each case, the uses to which Sallust puts his digressions are profoundly political, in illustrating different aspects of his thought about the nature of the Republic (from her place within wider causal patterns, to the nature of the strife which affected the state); the centrality of this analytical material to the construction of each work suggests new ways of understanding Sallust as a political author. Taking the evidence of these digressions together (applying the readings I have set out in my studies) illustrates the use of digression to establish the fundamental dynamics beneath the surface of Sallust's historical understanding, from the place of Rome within historical patterns to the role of individual motivation in ongoing patterns of strife. The *archaeologia* demonstrates the place of Rome within broader causal models; manifestations of Roman political strife are explained by the selective, schematic analyses of the political digressions. The African *excursus* amplifies the threat posed by Jugurtha, and the significance of the war, positing it as a catalyst in the descending political strife; the character-sketches and *synkrisis* explore in depth the motivations which led individuals to assail the state. This material is far from irrelevant to Sallust's historiographical project, but in fact, as the rhetoricians stipulated, makes a major contribution to the arguments and interpretations of the whole.

Within the compass of this thesis, it has not been possible to go into comprehensive detail. The limitations of textual transmission make consideration of the digressions in the *Historiae* impossible (at least using the narratological definition advanced here); our view of Sallust as an historian is unfortunately coloured by the loss of most of what seems to have been his masterpiece (and the total loss of the structure and order which I have emphasised throughout this thesis). Nonetheless, the direction I have taken here represents a new approach, and suggests some possibilities for further research.

In particular, the application of my focus on *dispositio* to the texts of Sallust and of other historians will I think repay further study: in emphasising a largely different set of concerns to those most often treated in contemporary scholarship, focusing on this aspect of the historian's activity suggests new approaches. I have considered digression; but the relationship between the narrative and the other elements of historiographical composition more generally requires treatment. Sallust's monographs are marked by their unusual prefaces: applying the model of *dispositio* I have established to these passages, by considering more explicitly the structure and proportion of such passages (rather than rehashing the existing debates over their content and *Quellenforschung*) might suggest new conclusions. In general, *dispositio* might also prove a useful approach in considering the works of historians outside the traditional historiographical mainstream: (for example) the works of the antiquarians might benefit from an approach foregrounding order and selectivity, although this is difficult given the fragmentary nature of the texts. Equally, the work of highly rhetorically-influenced writers such as Florus, who displays extreme selectivity and interpretative structure in his *Breviarium*, might prove suitable for such an approach.

Similarly, my approach to digression might also be applied to other authors, although much of its relevance to Sallust is drawn from the sharp thematic concentration of the monographic form. In applying my definition, in particular, adjustments would be required in order to allow for the digressive practices of different authors: as I demonstrated in the second chapter, different historians use digression in widely different ways. It would be particularly interesting in this light to develop a definition of digression as applied to authors whose texts (although dealing with historical subjects) are primarily non-narrative in form. Can a definition be developed of digression, which does not require the temporal aspect I have deployed here? An author to whom this might be usefully applied is Pompeius Trogus: while his work mixes the geographical with the more historical, an approach foregrounding arrangement and digression within the *Historiae Philippicae* would suggest new readings of this author.

In closing, it will be appropriate to say something of the historian himself. The image of Sallust which emerges from this thesis is not the propagandist of Eduard Schwarz; nor is it the largely apolitical literary artist favoured by Karl Büchner; nor even the disillusioned ex-senator of Ronald Syme. Rather, the Sallust that emerges from my study is a writer in touch with the intellectual developments of his period, responding to them through the composition of sophisticated historiographical works, drawing on contemporary ideas in particular for the material which supports the central narratives. As well as an intellectually engaged figure, Sallust is also heavily concerned with the realities of Republican politics, and with the shifts in values which he saw around him: the reflections on Caesar and Cato, in particular, recalling the themes of Cicero's triumviral oratory, demonstrate the importance of the contemporary theme of the relation of morality to political practice within Sallust's reflections on late Republican history. Sallust's is the voice of a man politically engaged, but no longer concerned with political practice: by understanding the contribution of the digressions to his historiographical composition as a whole, it is possible to appreciate more fully the nature of the political ideas he sets out, and to reassess a historian who has been dismissed as biased, ignorant or uninteresting. Despite the evidence of his prefaces, and the disdain he shows for contemporary political practice, Sallust wrote works with pronounced relevance to the contemporary situation of the late Republic, with markedly argumentative contents. A key aspect of his argumentation was the freedom to digress. As I have explored throughout this thesis, Sallust's digressions include a range of material; but all of it is worthy of memory, and worthy of a place in his histories.

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Appendix I – Texts and translations

The following passages are those digressions treated in detail in the text, in the order considered. The text is Reynolds' *OCT* (excepting *v* for Reynolds' *u*). Translations are my own.

Leptis and the Philaeni: *Jug.* 78-9

sed pariter cum capta Thala legati ex oppido Lepti ad Metellum venerant, orantes uti praesidium praefectumque eo mitteret: Hamilcarem quendam, hominem nobilem factiosum, novis rebus studere, advorsum quem neque imperia magistratuum neque leges valerent; ni id festinaret, in summo periculo suam salutem, illorum socios fore. nam Leptitani iam inde a principio belli Iugurthini ad Bestiam consulem et postea Romam miserant amicitiam societatemque rogatum; deinde, ubi ea impetrata, semper boni fidelesque mansere et cuncta a Bestia, Albino Metelloque imperata nave fecerant. itaque ab imperatore facile quae petebant adepti. emissae eo cohortes Ligurum quattuor et C. Annius praefectus.

id oppidum ab Sidoniis conditum est, quos accepimus profugos ob discordias civilis navibus in eos locos venisse. ceterum situm inter duas Syrtis, quibus nomen ex re inditum. nam duo sunt sinus prope in extrema Africa, impares magnitudine, pari natura, quorum proxuma terrae praealta sunt, cetera uti fors tulit alta alia, alia in tempestate vadosa. nam ubi mare magnum esse et saevire ventis coepit, limum harenamque et saxa ingentia fluctus trahunt: ita facies locorum cum ventis simul mutatur, Syrtes ab tractu nominatae. eius civitatis lingua modo convorsa conubio Numidarum, legum cultusque pleraque Sidonica, quae eo facilius retinebant quod procul ab imperio regis aetatem agebant. inter illos et frequentem Numidiam multi vastique loci erant.

sed quoniam in has regiones per Leptitanorum negotia venimus, non indignum videtur egregium atque mirabile facinus duorum Carthaginiensium memorare: eam rem nos locus admonuit. qua tempestate Carthaginienses pleraque Africa imperitabant, Cyrenenses quoque magni atque opulenti fuere. ager in medio harenosus, una specie; neque flumen neque mons erat qui finis eorum discerneret. quae res eos in magno diuturnoque bello inter se habuit.

postquam utrimque legiones, item classes saepe fusae fugataeque et alteri alteros aliquantum adtriverant, veriti ne mox victos victoresque defessos alius aggrederetur, per indutias sponsionem faciunt uti certo die legati domo proficiscerentur; quo in loco inter se obvii fuissent, is communis utriusque populi finis haberetur. igitur Carthagine duo fratres missi, quibus nomen Philaenis erat, maturavere iter pergere; Cyrenenses tardius iere. id socordiane an casu adciderit parum cognovi. ceterum solet in illis locis tempestas haud secus atque in mari retinere; nam ubi per loca aequalia et nuda gignentium ventus coortus harenam humo excitavit, ea magna vi agitata ora oculosque implere solet; ita prospectu impedito morari iter. postquam Cyrenenses aliquanto posteriores se esse vident et ob rem corruptam domi poenas metuont, criminari Carthaginiensis ante tempus domo digressos, conturbare rem, denique omnia malle quam victi abire. sed quom Poeni aliam condicionem, tantum modo aequam, peterent, Graeci optionem Carthaginiensium faciunt ut vel illi, quos finis populo suo peterent, ibi vivi obruerentur, vel eadem condicione sese quem in locum vellent processuros. Philaeni condicione probata seque vitamque suam rei publicae condonavere: ita vivi obruti. Carthaginienses in eo loco Philaenis fratribus aras consecravere, aliique illis domi honores instituti. nunc ad rem redeo.

But at the same time as the taking of Thala, legates came to Metellus from the town of Leptis, begging that he should send a defending force and a prefect. For (they said) a certain Hamilcar, a nobleman and factious, was bringing about a revolution, and against him neither the power of the magistrates nor the laws had any force. If he did not hurry, for themselves their safety was in great danger, and for the Romans their allies. For the Leptitani right from the beginning of the Jugurthine War had sent to Bestia the consul and afterwards to Rome, asking for friendship and alliance. Subsequently, when this was granted, they had remained continually good and faithful, and they had diligently done everything ordered by Bestia, Albinus and Metellus. Therefore they easily

accomplished everything they asked of the general. Four cohorts of Ligurians were sent, and C. Annius the prefect.

The town of Leptis was founded by the Sidonians, whom I understand to have come to those parts in ships, fleeing civil strife; it is located between the two Syrtes, the names of which are derived from their nature. For they are two curves, nearly at the far end of Africa, of unequal size but similar nature. For near in to the land they are very deep, and elsewhere deep, but at other times shallow, as chance dictates; for when the sea begins to swell and to become savage because of the winds, the waves drag along mud, sand and large rocks, so the appearance of the place is changed along with the winds. From this dragging the Syrtes are named. Of this city, the language alone has been changed by intermarriage with the Numidians; the laws and culture are largely Sidonian, which they have more easily retained because they have passed time a good distance from the king of the territory. Between them and more populous Numidia are many desolate regions.

But since we arrive in these regions through the business of the Leptitani, it will not be unseemly to recall the outstanding and miraculous deed of two Carthaginians; the place itself suggests it to us. At that time when the Carthaginians ruled over most of Africa, the Cyreneians were also great and rich. The land between them was a desert, unbroken to the eye; neither river nor mountain was there to mark their boundaries. On account of this, they were embroiled in a great and long-lasting war.

After legions and fleets had many times been beaten and routed on both sides, and they had somewhat weakened each other, fearing lest soon some other might attack both conquered and conquerors alike, both weakened, through truces they made an agreement that on a certain day legates should set out from home. In whatever place they met between them, that should be held as the common border of the two peoples. Therefore from Carthage two brothers were sent out, whose name was Philaeni, and they hastened to complete their journey. The Cyreneieans set off more slowly: whether this happened through laziness or chance I little know. However, a storm in these regions is accustomed to cause as much delay as at sea. For when a wind rises across regions so flat and barren of growth, it stirs up the sands from the earth, and throwing them up with great force it is accustomed to fill the eyes and mouth; and so, with visibility impaired, the journey is halted. After the Cyreneians saw themselves to be somewhat behind, and feared punishment at home because of this mistake, they made accusations against the Carthaginians that they had left home before the appointed time, threw everything into confusion, and preferred anything to going home defeated. But when the Poeni sought some other resolution, as long as it was fair, the Greeks made it the choice of the Carthaginians, that either they should be buried alive there, where were seeking the boundary for their people, or alternatively that the Greeks themselves should advance to whatever region they wished. The Philaeni, with the conditions approved, sacrificed themselves and their own lives to their state; they were buried alive. The Carthaginians in that place consecrated altars to the Philaeni, and other honours were established for them at home. Now I return to my subject.

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res ipsa hortari videtur, quoniam de moribus civitatis tempus admonuit, supra repetere ac paucis instituta maiorum domi militiaeque, quo modo rem publicam habuerint quantamque reliquerint, ut paulatim inmutata ex pulcherrima <atque optuma> pessuma ac flagitiosissuma facta sit, disserere.

urbem Romam, sicuti ego accepi, condidere atque habuere initio Troiani qui Aenea duce profugi sedibus incertis vagabantur, cumque iis Aborigines, genus hominum agreste, sine legibus, sine imperio, liberum atque solutum. hi postquam in una moenia convenere, dispari genere, dissimili lingua, alius alio more viventes, incredibile memoratu est quam facile coaluerint; ita brevi multitudo dispersa atque vaga concordia civitas facta erat. sed postquam res eorum civibus moribus agris aucta satis prospera satisque pollens videbatur, sicuti pleraque mortalium habentur, invidia ex opulentia orta est. igitur reges populique finitumi bello temptare, pauci ex amicis auxilio esse; nam

ceteri metu perculsi a periculis aberant. at Romani domi militiaeque intenti festinare parare, alius alium hortari, hostibus obviam ire, libertatem patriam parentisque armis tegere. post ubi pericula virtute propulerant, sociis atque amicis auxilia portabant, magisque dandis quam accipiundis beneficiis amicitias parabant.

imperium legitumum, nomen imperi regium habebant. delecti, quibus corpus annis infirmum, ingenium sapientia validum erat, rei publicae consultabant; ii vel aetate vel curae similitudine patres appellabantur. post ubi regium imperium, quod initio conservandae libertatis atque augendae rei publicae fuerat, in superbiam dominationemque se convortit, immutato more annua imperia binosque imperatores sibi fecere: eo modo minume posse putabant per licentiam insolescere animum humanum.

sed ea tempestate coepere se quisque magis extollere magisque ingenium in promptu habere. nam regibus boni quam mali suspectiores sunt semperque iis aliena virtus formidulosa est. sed civitas incredibile memoratu est adepta libertate quantum brevi creverit: tanta cupido gloriae incesserat. iam primum iuventus, simul ac belli patiens erat, in castris per laborem usum militiae discebat, magisque in decoris armis et militaribus equis quam in scortis atque conviviis lubidinem habebant. igitur talibus viris non labor insolitus, non locus ullus asper aut arduus erat, non armatus hostis formidulosus; virtus omnia domuerat. sed gloriae maxumum certamen inter ipsos erat; se quisque hostem ferire, murum ascendere, conspici dum tale facinus faceret properabat; eas divitias, eam bonam famam magnamque nobilitatem putabant. laudis avidi, pecuniae liberales erant; gloriam ingentem, divitias honestas volebant. memorare possem quibus in locis maxumas hostium copias populus Romanus parva manu fuderit, quas urbis natura munitas pugnando ceperit, ni ea res longius nos ab incepto traheret.

sed profecto fortuna in omni re dominatur; ea res cunctas ex lubidine magis quam ex vero celebrat obscuratque. Atheniensium res gestae, sicuti ego aestumo, satis amplae magnificaeque fuere, verum aliquanto minores tamen quam fama feruntur. sed quia provenere ibi scriptorum magna ingenia, per terrarum orbem Atheniensium facta pro maxumis celebrantur. ita eorum qui ea fecere virtus tanta habetur, quantum ea verbis potuere extollere praeclara ingenia. at populo Romano numquam ea copia fuit, quia prudentissumus quisque maxume negotiosus erat: ingenium nemo sine corpore exercebat; optumus quisque facere quam dicere, sua ab aliis benefacta laudari quam ipse aliorum narrare malebat.

igitur domi militaeque boni mores colebantur; concordia maxuma, minuma avaritia erat; ius bonumque apud eos non legibus magis quam natura valebat. iurgia discordias simultates cum hostibus exercebant, cives cum civibus de virtute certabant. in suppliciis deorum magnifici, domi parci, in amicos fideles erant. duabus his artibus, audacia in bello, ubi pax evenerat aequitate seque remque publicam curabant. quarum rerum ego maxuma documenta haec habeo, quod in bello saepius vindicatum est in eos qui contra imperium in hostem pugnaverant quique tardius revocati proelio excesserant quam qui signa relinquere aut pulsi loco cedere ausi erant; in pace vero quod beneficiis magis quam metu imperium agitabant et accepta iniuria ignoscere quam persequi malebant.

sed ubi labore atque iustitia res publica crevit, reges magni bello domiti, nationes ferae et populi ingentes vi subacti, Carthago aemula imperi Romani ab stirpe interiit, cuncta maria terraeque patebant, saevire fortuna ac miscere omnia coepit. qui labores pericula, dubias atque asperas res facile toleraverant, iis otium divitiae, optanda alias, oneri miseriaeque fuere. igitur primo pecuniae, deinde imperi cupido crevit: ea quasi materies omnium malorum fuere. namque avaritia fidem probitatem ceterasque artis bonas subvortit; pro his superbiam, crudelitatem, deos neglegere, omnia venalia habere edocuit. ambitio multos mortalis falsos fieri subegit, aliud clausum in pectore aliud in lingua promptum habere, amicitias inimicitiasque non ex re sed ex commodo aestumare, magisque voltum quam ingenium bonum habere. haec primo paulatim crescere, interdum vindicari; post ubi contagio quasi pestilentia invasit, civitas immutata, imperium ex iustissumo atque optumo crudele intolerandumque factum.

sed primo magis ambitio quam avaritia animos hominum exercebat, quod tamen vitium propius virtutem erat. nam gloriam honorem imperium bonus et ignavus aeque sibi exoptant, sed ille vera via nititur, huic quia bonae artes desunt, dolis atque fallaciis contendit. avaritia pecuniae studium habet, quam nemo sapiens concupivit; ea quasi venenis malis imbuta corpus animumque virilem effeminat, semper infinita insatiabilis est, neque copia neque inopia minuitur. sed postquam L. Sulla armis recepta re publica bonis initiis malos eventus habuit, rapere omnes, trahere, domum alius, alius agros cupere, neque modum neque modestiam victores habere, foeda crudeliaque in civis facinora facere. huc adcedebat quod L. Sulla exercitum quem in Asia ductaverat, quo sibi fidum faceret, contra morem maiorum luxuriose nimisque liberaliter habuerat. loca amoena, voluptaria facile in otio ferocis militum animos molliverant. ibi primum insuevit exercitus populi Romani amare potare, signa tabulas pictas vasa caelata mirari; ea privatim et publice rapere, delubra spoliare, sacra profanaque omnia polluere. igitur ii milites, postquam victoriam adepti sunt, nihil reliqui victis fecere. quippe secundae res sapientium animos fatigant: ne illi corruptis moribus victoriae temperarent.

postquam divitiae honori esse coepere et eas gloria imperium potentia sequebatur, hebescere virtus, paupertas probro haberi, innocentia pro malivolentia duci coepit. igitur ex divitiis iuventutem luxuria atque avaritia cum superbia invasere: rapere consumere, sua parvi pendere, aliena cupere, pudorem pudicitiam, divina atque humana promiscua, nihil pensi neque moderati habere.

operae pretium est, quom domos atque villas cognoveris in urbium modum exaedificatas, visere templa deorum, quae nostri maiores, religiosissumi mortales, fecere. verum illi delubra deorum pietate, domos suas gloria decorabant, neque victis quicquam praeter iniuriae licentiam eripiebant. at hi contra, ignavissumi homines, per summum scelus omnia ea sociis adimere quae fortissumi viri victores reliquerant, proinde quasi iniuriam facere, id demum esset imperio uti.

nam quid ea memorem quae nisi iis qui videre nemini credibilia sunt, a privatis compluribus subvorsos montis, maria constrata esse? quibus mihi videntur ludibrio fuisse divitiae: quippe quas honeste habere licebat, abuti per turpitudinem properabant. sed lubido stupri ganeae ceterique cultus non minor incesserat: viri muliebria pati, mulieres pudicitiam in propatulo habere; vescendi causa terra marique omnia exquirere; dormire prius quam somni cupido esset, non famem aut sitim neque frigus neque lassitudinem opperiri, sed ea omnia luxu antecapere. haec iuventutem, ubi familiares opes defecerant, ad facinora incendebant: animus imbutus malis artibus haud facile lubidinibus carebat; eo profusius omnibus modis quaestui atque sumptui deditus erat.

The matter itself seems to urge me, since the opportunity arises for considering the morals of the state, to go back and briefly to discuss the institutions of our ancestors, at home and in the field, how they held the Republic and how they left it to us, such that little by little it has been changed from the most attractive and best into the worst and most infamous.

The city of Rome, as I understand it, the Trojans at first founded and inhabited, who, with Aeneas as their leader, were wandering about in their flight, with no fixed territories; with them, the Aborigines, a savage race of men, without laws, without government, free and unrestrained. After these groups came together within one wall, of unequal race and different language, each living according to different customs, it is incredible to relate how easily they were joined together. Thus, in a short time, *concordia* made a state of a dispersed and wandering crowd. But once their status seemed rich enough and powerful enough, having grown in men, customs and in land, as very often happens among mortals, envy arose from prosperity. Therefore kings and neighbouring peoples tried war on them, and few of their friends came to their aid; for the others, struck by fear, dodged these dangers. But the Romans, exerting themselves at home and in the field, made haste, prepared, encouraged each other, and went to meet the enemy to defend their freedom, homeland and parents with arms. When once these dangers had been fended off by virtue, they brought assistance to their allies and friends, and more by giving than accepting benefits they began to prepare friendships.

They had a legitimate government, under the name of kingship. Chosen men, whose bodies age had made infirm, but whose minds were strong with wisdom, consulted for the commonwealth; they were called *patres*, either on account of their age or of the similarity of their care. When the rule of kings, which initially had been for the conservation of freedom and the increase of the commonwealth, turned into arrogance and domination, by changed custom they made two men rulers, with yearly power; in this way they thought human nature least able to grow insolent through license.

But at that time each man began to extoll himself more, and to hold his abilities more to the fore. For to kings, the good are more suspect than the bad, and the virtue of others something to be feared. But it is incredible to relate how much the state, having put on freedom, grew in a short time; such great eagerness for glory was in them. Now for the first time the youth, as soon as they were ready for war, learned military ways through their labour in the camp; they had their pleasure more in proper arms and military horses than in prostitutes and drinking-parties. Therefore, to such men no labour was unaccustomed, no place either rough or difficult, no armed enemy fearful; virtue ruled everywhere. But their greatest contest for glory was among themselves; each hurried to kill the enemy, to climb the walls, and to be seen doing such a deed. These things they though riches, good reputation, and great nobility. Greedy of praise, they were free with their money; they wanted great glory and honest wealth. I would be able to recall the places in which the *populus* Romanus defeated great forces of the enemy with but a small force, and the cities, fortified by nature, which they took by fighting, if this did not take me too far from my beginning.

But surely, fortune rules in all things; she celebrates all things and obscures them, by fancy more than by truth. The deeds of the Athenians, as far as I understand it, were great and magnificent enough, but truly somewhat less than their repute would suggest. Since there came into being there writers of great intellect, the deeds of the Athenians are enormously celebrated throughout the whole world; thus, the virtue of those who did these things is held to be as great as those outstanding minds were able to extoll them in words. But to the Roman people was never that opportunity, since the most prudent were also those most engaged in matters. No-one ever exercised the mind without the body; the best preferred to do than to say, and that his own deeds be praised by others than that he himself should narrate theirs.

Therefore at home and in the field good morals were cultivated; there was great *concordia*, and very little *avaritia*; justice and goodness flourished among them not more by laws than by nature. Struggles, discord, fights they prosecuted with their enemies; citizen vied with citizen in virtue. In the worship of the gods they were lavish, in their own houses sparing; to their friends, they were faithful. By these two arts - daring in war, and equality when peace came - they looked after themselves and their commonwealth. Of these things I have a very great illustration. In war, punishment was more often levied on those who had fought the enemy against orders, and who had fallen back from the too battle slowly when called back, than had dared to abandon their colours or to cede a position when attacked. Indeed, in peace, they governed more by kindnesses than by fear, and having received some injury they preferred to ignore than to prosecute it.

But when by labour and justice the commonwealth had grown, great kings had been put down in war, fierce nations and huge peoples subdued by force, Carthage, the rival to Rome's power had perished at the root, and all seas and lands were open, fortune began to turn savage, and to confuse everything. To those who had easily tolerated labours, dangers, doubtful and hard situations, leisure and riches - to be desired by others - were a burden and a misery. And so first of money and then of power the desire increased; these were as the seed of all other evils. For *avaritia* overturned faith, probity, and the other good practices; in place of these, it taught arrogance, cruelty, neglect of the gods, and the holding of everything for sale. *ambitio* forced many men to become false, to have one thing closed in their heart and another ready on their tongue, to value friendships and enmities not of themselves but of their usefulness, and to have a better appearance than a mind. These things at first grew gradually, and were sometimes punished; but when the contagion had invaded like a

plague, the state was changed, and their government from the most just and best turned into something cruel and intolerable.

At first, *ambitio* more than *avaritia* exercised the spirits of men, because although a vice, it was closer to virtue. For a good man and a bad equally desire glory, honour, and power; but the former ascends by the true path, and the latter, in that he is destitute of good qualities, contends by tricks and deceptions. *Avaritia* entertains the pursuit of money, which no wise man covets; as if imbued with evil poisons, it effeminises the body and the soul; always endless and insatiable, neither surfeit nor want can diminish it. But after Lucius Sulla, having retaken the state with arms, had made an evil end of good beginnings, all men despoiled and pillaged, desired this one a house, that one land, had neither method nor restraint in their victory, and inflicted terrible and cruel deeds on citizens. This was exacerbated because Lucius Sulla had treated the army which he had led into Asia, in order that they should be beholden to him, with luxury and with too much freedom, contrary to the *mos maiorum*. Soft and voluptuous places had easily softened the fierce spirits of the soldiers in leisure. There, first, the army of the *populus* Romanus became accustomed to love, to drink, to wonder at signs and painted tables and embossed vases; in private and in public to pillage, to despoil temples, and to pollute everything, sacred and profane. Therefore these soldiers, after they had won the victory, left nothing of the remains to the conquered. Given that prosperity fatigues even the souls of the wise, these men of corrupt morals did not temper their victory.

After riches began to be honoured, and glory, power and might followed after them, *virtus* grew feeble, poverty was held to be a disgrace, and innocence began to be taken as evil. Therefore, out of riches, luxury, *avaritia* and arrogance began to invade the youth: they stole, they consumed, they held their own resources as nothing, they desired those of others, they gave no thought to modesty, chastity, all common things either divine or human, they had no moderation.

It is worthwhile, when you look at the houses and villas built like cities, to visit the temples of the gods, which our ancestors, the most religious of mortals, had made. Truly, they used to decorate the shrines of the gods with piety, and their own houses with glory, and did not take anything from the conquered except for their licence to do injury. But these, most corrupt mortals, through the greatest wickedness have eaten up all things from the allies, which the truly brave men had left them when they were victorious; in sum, they act as if to do injury were all of governance.

For why should I recall things which are believable to none but those who have seen them, that the mountains have been thrown down and the seas covered over by many private citizens? To such men their riches seem to me a mockery; the money which they were permitted to have honourably they hurried to throw away shamelessly. But the desire for disgrace, gluttony and the rest, once acquired, had no less invaded them; men played the roles of women, women held their chastity for public sale. In the cause of gluttony they scoured all the lands and seas; they slept before they needed sleep; they waited for neither hunger or thirst, nor cold or exhaustion, but forestalled them all by extravagance. Such things fired the youth to enormities, once they had exhausted the wealth of their families. A mind suffused with evil practices could not easily resist its desires, and thus they were the more dedicated to gain and wantonness.

The African digression: *Jug.* 17-9

res postulare videtur Africae situm paucis exponere et eas gentis quibuscum nobis bellum aut amicitia fuit adtingere. sed quae loca et nationes ob calorem aut asperitatem, item solitudines minus frequentata sunt, de iis haud facile compertum narraverim; cetera quam paucissumis absolvam.

in divisione orbis terrae plerique in parte tertia Africam posuere, pauci tantummodo Asiam et Europam esse, sed Africam in Europa. ea finis habet ab occidente fretum nostri maris et Oceani, ab ortu solis declivem latitudinem, quem locum Catabathmon incolae appellant. mare saevom, inportuosum; ager frugum fertilis, bonus pecori, arbori infecundus; caelo terraque penuria aquarum. genus hominum salubri corpore, velox, patiens laborum; plerosque senectus dissolvit, nisi qui ferro aut bestiis interiere, nam morbus haud saepe quemquam superat. Ad hoc malefici generis pluruma animalia.

sed qui mortales initio Africam habuerint quique postea adcesserint aut quo modo inter se permixti sint, quamquam ab ea fama quae plerosque optinet divorsum est, tamen uti ex libris Punicis qui regis Hiempsalis dicebantur interpretatum nobis est, utique rem sese habere cultores eius terrae putant, quam paucissumis dicam. ceterum fides eius rei penes auctores erit.

Africam initio habuere Gaetuli et Libyes, asperi incultique, quis cibus erat caro ferina atque humi pabulum uti pecoribus. ii neque moribus neque lege aut imperio quoiusquam regebantur: vagi, palantes, quas nox coegerat sedes habebant. sed postquam in Hispania Hercules, sicuti Afri putant, interiit, exercitus eius, conpositus ex variis gentibus, amisso duce ac passim multis sibi quisque imperium petentibus, brevi dilabitur. ex eo numero Medi, Persae et Armenii navibus in Africam transvecti proxumos nostro mari locos occupavere, sed Persae intra Oceanum magis, iique alveos navium invorsos pro tuguriis habuere, quia neque materia in agris neque ab Hispanis emundi aut mutandi copia erat; mare magnum et ignara lingua commercio prohibebant. ii paulatim per conubia Gaetulos secum miscuere et, quia saepe temptantes agros alia, deinde alia loca petiverant, semet ipsi Nomadas appellavere. ceterum adhuc aedificia Numidarum agrestium, quae mapalia illi vocant, oblonga, incurvis lateribus tecta, quasi navium carinae sunt.

Medis autem et Armeniis adcessere Libyes — nam ii propius mare Africum agitabant, Gaetuli sub sole magis, haud procul ab ardoribus — iique mature oppida habuere; nam freto divisi ab Hispania mutare res inter se instituerant. nomen eorum paulatim Libyes corrupere, barbara lingua Mauros pro Medis appellantes.

sed res Persarum brevi adolevit, ac postea nomine Numidae, propter multitudinem a parentibus digressi, possedere ea loca quae proxume Carthagine Numidia appellatur. deinde utrique alteris freti finitumos armis aut metu sub imperium suum coegere, nomen gloriamque sibi addidere, magis ii qui ad nostrum mare processerant, quia Libyes quam Gaetuli minus bellicosi. denique Africae pars inferior pleraque ab Numidis possessa est, victi omnes in gentem nomenque imperantium concessere.

postea Phoenices, alii multitudinis domi minuendae gratia, pars imperi cupidine, sollicitata plebe et aliis novarum rerum avidis, Hipponem Hadrumetum Leptim aliasque urbis in ora marituma condidere, eaeque brevi multum auctae, pars originibus suis praesidio, aliae decori fuere. nam de Carthagine silere melius puto quam parum dicere, quoniam alio properare tempus monet.

igitur ad Catabathmon, qui locus Aegyptum ab Africa dividit, secundo mari prima Cyrene est, colonia Theraeon, ac deinceps duae Syrtes interque eas Leptis, deinde Philaenon arae, quem locum Aegyptum vorsus finem imperi habuere Carthaginienses; post aliae Punicae urbes. cetera loca usque ad Mauretaniam Numidae tenent, proxumi Hispania Mauri sunt. super Numidiam Gaetulos accepimus partim in tuguriis, alios incultius vagos agitare, post eos Aethiopas esse, dehinc loca exusta solis ardoribus.

igitur bello Iugurthino pleraque ex Punicis oppida et finis Carthaginiensium quos novissume habuerant populus Romanus per magistratus administrabat; Gaetulorum magna pars et Numidae usque ad flumen Muluccham sub Iugurtha erant; Mauris omnibus rex Bocchus imperitabat, praeter nomen cetera ignarus populi Romani itemque nobis neque bello neque pace antea cognitus.

de Africa et eius incolis ad necessitudinem rei satis dictum.

The matter seems to suggest that I treat the geography of Africa and her peoples, with whom we have had either war or friendship. But there are places and nations which on account of the heat, harsh climate or desert are less frequented; about these I will scarce easily narrate a reliable account. With the rest I will deal as briefly as I can.

In division of the world, many set Africa as a third part; some though have just Asia and Europe, with Africa part of Europe. On the West, she has as her boundary the strait between our sea and the Ocean, to the East the sloping latitude, the place which the inhabitants call Catambathmos. The sea is rough and unharboured, the land fertile of grain, good for animals but bad for trees; earth and sky are both scarce of water. The race of men is healthy of body, swift, and accustomed to hard

work. The majority die of old age, excepting those who perish by the sword or by beasts; not very often does disease overcome them. In addition to this, there are very many animals of injurious sort.

As to what men first lived in Africa, who came later, and how they were intermixed, although it is different to that report which the majority choose, my interpretation is taken from the Punic books which are called King Hiempsal's, and is what the inhabitants of the land themselves believe; I will dispatch it as briefly as possible. Nonetheless, the trustworthiness of the account will lie with these authors.

The Gaetulians and Libyans lived in Africa at the beginning, rough and uncultured peoples, whose food (like animals) was the flesh of wild beasts and the fruits of the earth. They had no customs, no laws and were not ruled by anyone's authority; wanderers and strays, they slept where night compelled them to stop. But after Hercules had died in Spain (as the Africans believe), his army, comprised of various peoples, having lost their leader and at the same time with many seeking his authority, shortly broke apart. From that number the Medes, Persians and Armenians, having crossed by ship into Africa, occupied places bordering our sea, the Persians closest to the Ocean. They lived in the upturned hulls of their ships as their dwellings, since there was no material in the fields, nor for purchase or barter from Spain, since the greatness of the sea and ignorance of the language prohibited them from commerce. They after a short while intermixed themselves through marriage with the Gaetulians, and, because they had often moved from place to place trying out the fields, they were called Nomads. Indeed, to the present day the buildings of the country-dwelling Numidians, which they call *mapalia*, are oblong and roofed with curved sides like the hulls of ships.

The Medes and the Armenians, though, neighboured the Libyans, for they lived nearer to the African sea; the Gaetulians were closer to the equator, not far from the fiery regions. They soon lived in towns; for divided from Spain by a strait, they had begun to barter things among themselves. Their name after a short while the Libyans corrupted, in their barbarian speech calling them Mauri rather than Medes.

The Persian state soon grew, and afterwards some under the name of Numidians, having split off from their parents because of their multitude, took possession of the area near Carthage which is called Numidia. Then both sides, relying on the others, compelled their neighbours under their power, with arms or with fear, and increased their renown and glory; the more so those who had come near to our sea, since the Libyans are less warlike than the Gaetulians. Subsequently the greater part of Africa *inferior* was possessed of the Numidians, and all of the conquered were drawn together under the name and race of the victors.

Subsequently the Phoenicians, sometimes for the sake of diminishing the crowding at home, at other times with the common people persuaded away by the desire of power and at still others desirous of new things, founded Hippo, Hadrumentum, Leptis and other cities on the coast; these after a short time were greatly increased, with some a defence to their parent cities and others an ornament. About Carthage I think it better to be silent than to say too little, since time warns me to hurry on to other things.

And so up to Catabathmon, which is the area which divides Egypt from Africa, following the sea, the first landmark is Cyrene, a colony of Thera, and then the two Syrtes, with Leptis in between. Then the altars of the Philaeni, which place the Carthaginians considered as the border of their empire and Egypt; after these, the other Punic cities. The Numidians hold the other areas up to Mauretania; those closest to Spain are the Mauri. Beyond Numidia, I understand, are the Gaetulians, some in huts and others, more uncivilised, live as wanderers. After these are the Ethiopians; beyond there, the regions scorched by the fires of the sun.

During the Jugurthine war the Roman people used to administer many of the Punic cities, and the lands of the Carthaginians (those they had most recently held), through magistrates. The greater part of the Gaetulians and the Numidians up to the river Muluccha were under Jugurtha; King Bocchus ruled over all of the Mauri, a man who knew nothing of the Roman people but their name, and who similarly had previously been known to us in neither war nor peace.

Concerning Africa and its inhabitants enough has been said, according to the requirements of the matter.

Politics of the 60s: *Cat*. 36.4-39.5.

ea tempestate mihi imperium populi Romani multo maxume miserabile visum est. quoi quom ad occasum ab ortu solis omnia domita armis parerent, domi otium atque divitiae, quae prima mortales putant, adfluerent, fuere tamen cives qui seque remque publicam obstinatis animis perditum irent. namque duobus senati decretis ex tanta multitudine neque praemio inductus coniurationem patefecerat neque ex castris Catilinae quisquam omnium discesserat: tanta vis morbi aeque uti tabes plerosque civium animos invaserat.

neque solum illis aliena mens erat qui conscii coniurationis fuerant, sed omnino cuncta plebes novarum rerum studio Catilinae incepta probabat. id adeo more suo videbatur facere. nam semper in civitate quibus opes nullae sunt bonis invident, malos extollunt, vetera odere, nova exoptant, odio suarum rerum mutari omnia student, turba atque seditionibus sine cura aluntur, quoniam egestas facile habetur sine damno. sed urbana plebes, ea vero praeceps erat de multis causis. primum omnium qui ubique probro atque petulantia maxume praestabant, item alii per dedecora patrimoniis amissis, postremo omnes quos flagitium aut facinus domo expulerat, ii Romam sicut in sentinam confluxerant. deinde multi memores Sullanae victoriae, quod ex gregariis militibus alios senatores videbant, alios ita divites ut regio victu atque cultu aetatem agerent, sibi quisque, si in armis foret, ex victoria talia sperabat. praeterea iuventus quae in agris manuum mercede inopiam toleraverat, privatis atque publicis largitionibus excita urbanum otium ingrato labori praetulerat. eos atque alios omnis malum publicum alebat. quo minus mirandum est homines egentis, malis moribus, maxuma spe, rei publicae iuxta ac sibi consuluisse. praeterea, quorum victoria Sullae parentes proscripti bona erepta, ius libertatis imminutum erat, haud sane alio animo belli eventum exspectabant. ad hoc quicumque aliarum atque senatus partium erant conturbari rem publicam quam minus valere ipsi malebant. id adeo malum multos post annos in civitatem revorterat.

nam postquam Cn. Pompeio et M. Crasso consulibus tribunicia potestas restituta est, homines adulescentes summam potestatem nacti, quibus aetas animusque ferox erat, coepere senatum criminando plebem exagitare, dein largiundo atque pollicitando magis incendere, ita ipsi clari potentesque fieri. contra eos summa ope nitebatur pleraque nobilitas senatus specie pro sua magnitudine. namque, uti paucis verum absolvam, post illa tempora quicumque rem publicam agitavere honestis nominibus, alii sicuti populi iura defenderent, pars quo senatus auctoritas maxuma foret, bonum publicum simulantes pro sua quisque potentia certabant. neque illis modestia neque modus contentionis erat: utrique victoriam crudeliter exercebant.

sed postquam Cn. Pompeius ad bellum maritumum atque Mithridaticum missus est, plebis opes imminutae, paucorum potentia crevit. ii magistratus, provincias aliaque omnia tenere; ipsi innoxii, florentes, sine metu aetatem agere, ceterosque iudiciis terrere, quo plebem in magistratu placidius tractarent. sed ubi primum dubiis rebus novandi spes oblata est, vetus certamen animos eorum adrexit. quod si primo proelio Catilina superior aut aequa manu discessisset, profecto magna clades atque calamitas rem publicam oppressisset, neque illis qui victoriam adepti forent diutius ea uti licuisset, quin defessis et exanguibus qui plus posset imperium atque libertatem extorqueret. fuere tamen extra coniurationem complures qui ad Catilinam initio profecti sunt: in iis erat Fulvius, senatoris filius, quem retractum ex itinere parens necari iussit.

At that time the state of the Roman people seems to me to have been much the most miserable. Among those whom all others, subdued by force of arms from the rising to the setting sun, were obedient, and to whom peace and riches abounded at home (things which mortals think preeminent), there were nonetheless citizens with minds set on bringing destruction on both themselves and the state. For in spite of two decrees of the senate, no-one was led by the reward to betray the conspiracy, nor did anyone desert Catiline's camp. Such was the force of the disease which had invaded the minds of many of the citizens like a plague.

Such insanity did not affect only those who knew about the conspiracy, but the whole of the plebs approved of Catiline's schemes for revolution. In this way they seem to have acted according to their usual practice: for always in a state those who have no money envy the good (*boni*), raise up the bad, hate the old, uphold the new and through hatred of their own station desire everything to be changed; they keep themselves without a care among the mob and seditions, since poverty is easily retained without loss. But the urban plebs were to the forefront here, for a number of reasons. Firstly, all of those who were particularly outstanding in degeneracy and shamelessness, those who had lost their patrimonies through indecencies, and all of those whom crimes or evil deeds had forced out of their homes, had flowed into Rome as into a sewer. In addition to this, many, recalling the victory of Sulla in which men had been raised from the common soldiery to the senate and others had become so rich that they lived with the food and manners of kings, hoped for similar victories for themselves if they should take up arms. The youth, in particular, who had supported a needy existence by the work of their hands in the fields, moved by the private and public handouts had chosen the idleness of the city over their thankless work; these, and all the others, exacerbated the public ills. From such things it is the less to be wondered at, that poor men, of evil morals, took counsel for the republic as for themselves. In particular, those whose parents had been proscribed, whose goods had been snatched away, and whose right of *libertas* had been infringed by the victory of Sulla, were looking forward to the advent of war in a similar spirit. In addition to this, whoever was of other parties than that of the senate, preferred that the state be overturned than that they themselves should prosper the less. Such an evil had returned, after many years, upon the state.

For after the tribunician power had been restored in the consulship of Pompey and Crassus, young men, having been raised to that high power, and whose ages and spirits were fierce, began to stir up the plebs by launching accusations against the senate, and then to fire them even more by donatives and promises, in order to make themselves more well-known and more powerful. Against them, the greater part of the *nobiles* laboured with all of their resources, ostensibly on behalf of the senate but really for their own greatness. For, to explain the truth in a few words, after that time whoever assailed the government under honest names, some claiming to defend the rights of the people and others valuing the authority of the senate as preeminent, feigning the public good really fought for his own power. Among them was no restraint nor moderation: both sides used their victory fiercely.

But after Cn. Pompeius had been sent to the pirate war and the Mithridatic war, the resources of the *plebs* dwindled and the power of the few grew. They held the magistracies, the provinces and everything else; they spent their time untroubled, flourishing, and without fear while terrifying others through the courts, in order that they might deal with the people more peaceably during their own magistracies.[1] But when first in uncertain times the hope was held out of revolution, the old struggle came back to their minds. If Catiline had been superior, or even held his own, in the first battle, certainly a great slaughter and calamity would have fallen on the Republic; nor would those who had achieved victory been able to use it for long, before someone more powerful snatched away the power and *libertas* together of tired and disheartened men. Even outside the conspiracy, there were many who went to Catiline after the beginning. Among them was Fulvius, the son of a senator, whom his father ordered to be brought back and killed.

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[1] The sense is difficult, compounded by textual discrepancies (see McGushin 1977:210). Rolfe prints "in order that while they themselves were in office they might manage the people with less friction", Woodman "they used the courts to terrify the others, so that the latter during any magistracy of theirs would handle the plebs more peaceably". Ramsey 2007 reads the threat of prosecution as deterring potential demagogues, taking *placidius* as "more moderately". This seems best: Sallust may be thinking of the prosecution - on trumped-up charges, but probably related to his *popularis* tribunate and support for Pompey - of C. Manilius in 65 (see Plut. *Cic*. 9).

Mos partium et factionum: Jug. 41-2

ceterum mos partium [popularium] et factionum [senatores][2] ac deinde omnium malarum artium paucis ante annis Romae ortus est otio atque abundantia earum rerum, quae prima mortales ducunt. nam ante Carthaginem deletam populus et senatus Romanus placide modesteque inter se rem publicam tractabant, neque gloriae neque dominationis certamen inter civis erat: metus hostilis in bonis artibus civitatem retinebat. sed ubi illa formido mentibus decessit, scilicet ea quae res secundae amant, lascivia atque superbia, incessere. ita quod in advorsis rebus optaverant otium, postquam adepti sunt, asperius acerbiusque fuit. namque coepere nobilitas dignitatem, populus libertatem in lubidinem vortere, sibi quisque ducere trahere rapere. ita omnia in duas partis abstracta sunt, res publica, quae media fuerat, dilacerata.

ceterum nobilitas factione magis pollebat, plebis vis soluta atque dispersa in multitudine minus poterat. paucorum arbitrio belli domique agitabatur; penes eosdem aerarium provinciae magistratus gloriae triumphique erant; populus militia atque inopia urgebatur, praedas bellicas imperatores cum paucis diripiebant; interea parentes aut parvi liberi militum, uti quisque potentiori confinis erat, sedibus pellebantur. ita cum potentia avaritia sine modo modestiaque invadere, polluere et vastare omnia, nihil pensi neque sancti habere, quoad semet ipsa praecipitavit. nam ubi primum ex nobilitate reperti sunt qui veram gloriam iniustae potentiae anteponerent, moveri civitas et dissensio civilis quasi permixtio terrae oriri coepit.

nam postquam Ti. et C. Gracchus, quorum maiores Punico atque aliis bellis multum rei publicae addiderant, vindicare plebem in libertatem et paucorum scelera patefacere coepere, nobilitas noxia atque eo perculsa modo per socios ac nomen Latinum, interdum per equites Romanos, quos spes societatis a plebe dimoverat, Gracchorum actionibus obviam ierat; et primo Tiberium, dein paucos post annos eadem ingredientem Gaium, tribunum alterum, alterum triumvirum coloniis deducundis, cum M. Fulvio Flacco ferro necaverat. et sane Gracchis cupidine victoriae haud satis moderatus animus fuit. sed bono vinci satius est quam malo more iniuriam vincere.

igitur ea victoria nobilitas ex lubidine sua usa multos mortalis ferro aut fuga exstinxit plusque in relicuom sibi timoris quam potentiae addidit. quae res plerumque magnas civitatis pessum dedit, dum alteri alteros vincere quovis modo et victos acerbius ulcisci volunt.

sed de studiis partium et omnis civitatis moribus si singillatim aut pro magnitudine parem disserere, tempus quam res maturius me deseret. quam ob rem ad inceptum redeo.

Besides, the practice of parties and factions, and all the evils arising from them, had arisen at Rome some few years before, with the peace and abundance which men value highest. For before the fall of Carthage, the people and the Senate of Rome governed the commonwealth calmly and with moderation between them; there was no contest of glory or of domination between citizens. The fear of the enemy held the state in its good habits. But when that burden had been lifted from their minds, of course, those things increased which love unchallenged prosperity – wantonness and arrogance. And so the peace for which they had wished in hard times, after it was won proved harsher and more violent. For the nobles changed their dignity and the people their liberty into lust; each side stole, pillaged and plundered in their own interests. And so everything was broken into two parts; the commonwealth, which was in the middle, was ripped asunder.

Otherwise, the faction of the nobles prospered the more, for the force of the *plebs*, spread and dispersed among a multitude, could accomplish less. By the judgement of the few things were governed, in war and in peace; in their power were the treasury, the provinces, the magistracies, the glories and the triumphs. The people were weighed upon by military service and poverty; the generals split the bounties of war among just a few. At the same time the parents or small children of the soldiers, if they neighboured one more powerful, were driven from their homes. In this way alongside power avarice, without method or moderation, invaded, polluted and laid waste eveything; it held nothing to be respected and nothing sacred, until eventually it destroyed itself. For

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[2] I do not translate or consider these interpolations.

when first there emerged out of the nobility men who preferred true glory to unjust power, then the state began to shake, and civil dissension to arise like an earthquake.

For after Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, whose ancestors had added much to the commonwealth in the Punic and other wars, began to redeem the liberty of the *plebs* and to expose the crimes of the few, the nobility, guilty and thus much struck by this, opposed the actions of the Gracchi - through the allies and the Latins, and subsequently through the *equites*, whom they split from the *plebs* by holding out hope of an alliance – with the result that first Tiberius, and then a few years later Gaius, were put to the sword, alongside M. Fulvius Flaccus – the one a tribune, the other a triumvir for the establishment of colonies. And certainly the Gracchi did not have a sufficiently moderate spirit in their desire for victory; but it is fitter for the good man to be defeated than to triumph over injury by evil measures.

Therefore the nobility, making use of their victory according to their passions, destroyed many men with the sword or with banishment, and added to their fear more than their power for subsequent events. Such things have proved evil for great states, when one side wishes to destroy another by any means, and the conquered to revenge themselves yet more harshly.

But if I were to discuss the nature of parties and the ways of states either in detail or in accordance with their importance, my time would run out before the theme. Thus, I return to where I left off.

Catiline: *Cat.* 5

L. Catilina, nobili genere natus, fuit magna vi et animi et corporis, sed ingenio malo pravoque. huic ab adulescentia bella intestina caedes rapinae discordia civilis grata fuere, ibique iuventutem suam exercuit. corpus patiens inediae algoris vigiliae supra quam quoiquam credibile est. animus audax subdolus varius, quoius rei lubet simulator ac dissimulator, alieni adpetens, sui profusus, ardens in cupiditatibus; satis eloquentiae, sapientiae parum. vastus animus immoderata incredibilia nimis alta semper cupiebat.

hunc post dominationem L. Sullae lubido maxuma invaserat rei publicae capiundae, neque id quibus modis adsequeretur, dum sibi regnum pararet, quicquam pensi habebat. agitabatur magis magisque in dies animus ferox inopia rei familiaris et conscientia scelerum, quae utraque iis artibus auxerat quas supra memoravi. incitabant praeterea corrupti civitatis mores, quos pessuma ac divorsa inter se mala, luxuria atque avaritia, vexabant.

Lucius Catiline, born of a noble family, had great force in both mind and body, but a character evil and depraved. From his adolescence, internal wars, slaughter, rapine and civil discord were welcome to him; there he spent his youth. His body was tolerant of hunger, cold and lack of sleep beyond belief; his spirit was daring, cunning, changeable, a skilled simulator or dissimulator, covetous of others' property, profligate with his own and violent in its desires. He had sufficient eloquence, but too little wisdom. His desolated mind was always craving things immoderate, incredible, and beyond his means.

After the tyranny of Sulla, a great desire had afflicted him of taking control of the state; he had no thought for how this might be achieved, so long as he should achieve regal power. His feral mind was afflicted more and more each day by the poverty of his household, and by the consciousness of his crimes (both of which had grown through those arts which I have noted). The corrupt morals of the state also urged him on headlong, which were afflicted by two great and opposite evils, luxury and avarice.

Cat. 14-16.3

In tanta tamque corrupta civitate Catilina, id quod factu facillumum erat, omnium flagitiorum atque facinorum circum se tamquam stipatorum catervas habebat. nam quicumque [impudicus ganeo aleator] manu ventre pene bona patria laceraverat, quique alienum aes grande conflaverat, quo flagitium aut facinus redimeret, praeterea omnes undique parricidae, sacrilegi,

convicti iudiciis aut pro factis iudicium timentes, ad hoc quos manus atque lingua periurio aut sanguine civili alebat, postremo omnes quos flagitium, egestas, conscius animus exagitabat, ii Catilinae proxumi familiaresque erant. quod si quis etiam a culpa vacuus in amicitiam eius inciderat, cotidiano usu atque inlecebris facile par similisque ceteris efficiebatur. sed maxume adulescentium familiaritates adpetebat: eorum animi molles etiam et fluxi dolis haud difficulter capiebantur. nam ut quoiusque studium ex aetate flagrabat, aliis scorta praebere, aliis canes atque equos mercari, postremo neque sumptui neque modestiae suae parcere dum illos obnoxios fidosque sibi faceret. scio fuisse non nullos qui ita existumarent, iuventutem quae domum Catilinae frequentabat parum honeste pudicitiam habuisse; sed ex aliis rebus magis, quam quod cuiquam id conpertum foret haec fama valebat.

iam primum adulescens Catilina multa nefanda stupra fecerat, cum virgine nobili, cum sacerdote Vestae, alia huiusce modi contra ius fasque. postremo captus amore Aureliae Orestillae, quoius praeter formam nihil umquam bonus laudavit, quod ea nubere illi dubitabat, timens privignum adulta aetate, pro certo creditur necato filio vacuam domum scelestis nuptiis fecisse. quae quidem res mihi in primis videtur causa fuisse facinus maturandi; namque animus impurus, dis hominibusque infestus, neque vigiliis neque quietibus sedari poterat: ita conscientia mentem excitam vastabat. igitur color ei exanguis, foedi oculi, citus modo modo tardus incessus: prorsus in facie voltuque vecordia inerat.

sed iuventutem quam, ut supra diximus, illexerat multis modis mala facinora edocebat. ex illis testis signatoresque falsos commodare; fidem fortunas pericula vilia habere, post, ubi eorum famam atque pudorem attriverat, maiora alia imperabat. si causa peccandi in praesens minus suppetebat, nihilo minus insontis sicuti sontis circumvenire, iugulare: scilicet, ne per otium torpescerent manus aut animus, gratuito potius malus atque crudelis erat.

Catiline began to draw around him troops of all kinds of criminals and renegades as if bodyguards, a very easy thing to do in such a great and such a corrupt city. Whoever [a shameless man, glutton or gambler] had wasted his patrimony with his hand, stomach or penis; whoever had contracted huge debts, by which he might redeem some disgrace or debt; all those in particular on every side who were parricides, or sacriligous, convicted in the courts or fearing judgement for their deeds; in addition to these, those whom hand or tongue supported by perjury or civil bloodshed; also all those whom disgrace, poverty, or conscience of mind assailed: such men were Catiline's nearest familiars. And even if someone empty of blame should fall into friendship with him, by daily usage and enticements he was easily made just like the others. He particularly attracted the intimacies of the young; their soft and pliable spirits were easily captured by his enticements. For according to the desire that burned in each of them (according to age), he procured prostitutes for some, and dogs and horses for others; he spared neither expense nor modesty, as long as he could make them beholden and faithful to him. I know that there are several who reckon that the youth who frequented the house of Catiline set little store by their chastity; but that rumour gained purchase more from other factors than because anyone knew it to be true.

Already as a youth Catiline had had many shameful affairs, with a noble virgin, with a priest of Vesta, and others similarly against law and propriety. Subsequently, he was seized with love for Aurelia Orestilla (of whom no good man ever praised anything other than her appearance); because she hesitated to marry him, fearing his stepson of mature age, it is held certain that by killing his son he made an empty home for a scandalous marriage. This in fact seems to me to have been among the major causes of the hastening of his enormity. For an impure spirit, set dead against gods and men, could bear neither wakefulness not sleep; just so did conscience lay waste his excited mind. Therefore his bloodless complexion, his bestial eyes, his pacing now slow, now fast; madness wholly occupied his face and appearance.

But the youth (which as I said above he had ensnared) he taught evil deeds in many forms. From among them, he supplied false witnesses and signatories; he ordered them to hold reputation, fortune and danger at nothing, and then after he had worn down their reputation and chastity, he

ordered still greater things. If circumstances gave less immediate cause for wrong-doing, no less did he waylay and kill the innocent, along with the guilty; lest the hand and spirit grow weak through leisure, he would rather they were evil and cruel.

Sempronia: *Cat*. 25

sed in iis erat Sempronia, quae multa saepe virilis audaciae facinora commiserat. haec mulier genere atque forma, praeterea viro atque liberis satis fortunata fuit; litteris Graecis [et] Latinis docta, psallere [et] saltare elegantius quam necesse est probae, multa alia quae instrumenta luxuriae sunt. sed ei cariora semper omnia quam decus atque pudicitia fuit; pecuniae an famae minus parceret haud facile discerneres; lubido sic accensa ut saepius peteret viros quam peteretur. sed ea saepe antehac fidem prodiderat, creditum abiuraverat, caedis conscia fuerat: luxuria atque inopia praeceps abierat. verum ingenium eius haud absurdum: posse versus facere, iocum movere, sermone uti vel modesto vel molli vel procaci; prorsus multae facetiae multusque lepos inerat.

Among these women was Sempronia, who had often committed many deeds (*facinora*) of manly daring. This woman in birth and appearance, and particularly in husband and children, had been amply favoured: learned in Greek and Latin letters, able to play and to dance more skilfully than is necessary for a respectable woman, and with many other accomplishments which are the instruments of luxury. To her, everything else was dearer than her modesty and chastity; you could scarcely tell whether she cared less for her fortune or her reputation. She was so afflicted by desire that she more often used to seek men than they her. But before this she had frequently broken faith, reneged on debts, been privy to murder; she had fallen headlong through her luxury and poverty. In truth her mind was by no means contemptible; she could write verses, bandy around jests, and deploy language either modest, or tender, or lascivious; in all, in Sempronia was much that was elegant and much that was charming.

Jugurtha: *Jug*. 5.7-9.3

is Adherbalem et Hiempsalem ex sese genuit Iugurthamque filium Mastanabalis fratris, quem Masinissa, quod ortus ex concubina erat, privatum dereliquerat, eodem cultu quo liberos suos domi habuit.

qui ubi primum adolevit, pollens viribus, decora facie, sed multo maxume ingenio validus, non se luxu neque inertiae corrumpendum dedit, sed, uti mos gentis illius est, equitare iaculari, cursu cum aequalibus certare, et cum omnis gloria anteiret, omnibus tamen carus esse: ad hoc pleraque tempora in venando agere, leonem atque alias feras primus aut in primis ferire; plurumum facere, [et] minumum ipse de se loqui.

quibus rebus Micipsa tametsi initio laetus fuerat, existumans virtutem Iugurthae regno suo gloriae fore, tamen, postquam hominem adulescentem exacta sua aetate et parvis liberis magis magisque crescere intellegit, vehementer eo negotio permotus multa cum animo suo volvebat. terrebat eum natura mortalium avida imperi et praeceps ad explendam animi cupidinem, praeterea opportunitas suae liberorumque aetatis, quae etiam mediocris viros spe praedae transvorsos agit, ad hoc studia Numidarum in Iugurtham adcensa, ex quibus, si talem virum dolis interfecisset, ne qua seditio aut bellum oriretur anxius erat.

his difficultatibus circumventus, ubi videt neque per vim neque insidiis opprimi posse hominem tam acceptum popularibus, quod erat Iugurtha manu promptus et appetens gloriae militaris, statuit eum obiectare periculis et eo modo fortunam temptare. igitur bello Numantino Micipsa, quom populo Romano equitum atque peditum auxilia mitteret, sperans vel ostentando virtutem vel hostium saevitia facile eum occasurum, praefecit Numidis quos in Hispaniam mittebat.

sed ea res longe aliter ac ratus erat evenit. nam Iugurtha, ut erat impigro atque acri ingenio, ubi naturam P. Scipionis, qui tum Romanis imperator erat, et morem hostium cognovit, multo labore multaque cura, praeterea modestissume parendo et saepe obviam eundo periculis in tantam claritudinem brevi pervenerat ut nostris vehementer carus, Numantinis maxumo terrori esset. ac

sane, quod difficillumum in primis est, et proelio strenuus erat et bonus consilio, quorum alterum ex providentia timorem, alterum ex audacia temeritatem adferre plerumque solet. igitur imperator omnis fere res asperas per Iugurtham agere, in amicis habere, magis magisque eum in dies amplecti, quippe quoius neque consilium neque inceptum ullum frustra erat. huc adcedebat munificentia animi atque ingeni sollertia, quis rebus sibi multos ex Romanis familiari amicitia coniunxerat.

ea tempestate in exercitu nostro fuere complures novi atque nobiles, quibus divitiae bono honestoque potiores erant, factiosi domi, potentes apud socios, clari magis quam honesti, qui Iugurthae non mediocrem animum pollicitando accendebant: si Micipsa rex occidisset, fore uti solus imperi Numidiae potiretur; in ipso maxumam virtutem, Romae omnia venalia esse.

sed postquam Numantia deleta P. Scipio dimittere auxilia et ipse revorti domum decrevit, donatum atque laudatum magnifice pro contione Iugurtham in praetorium abduxit ibique secreto monuit ut potius publice quam privatim amicitiam populi Romani coleret neu quibus largiri insuesceret; periculose a paucis emi quod multorum esset. si permanere vellet in suis artibus, ultro illi et gloriam et regnum venturum, sin properantius pergeret, suamet ipsum pecunia praecipitem casurum.

sic locutus cum litteris eum, quas Micipsae redderet, dimisit. earum sententia haec erat: "Iugurthae tui bello Numantino longe maxuma virtus fuit, quam rem tibi certo scio gaudio esse. nobis ob merita sua carus est; ut idem senatui et populo Romano sit summa ope nitemur. tibi quidem pro nostra amicitia gratulor. en habes virum dignum te atque avo suo Masinissa."

igitur rex, ubi ea quae fama acceperat ex litteris imperatoris ita esse cognovit, cum virtute tum gratia viri permotus flexit animum suom et Iugurtham beneficiis vincere adgressus est statimque eum adoptavit et testamento pariter cum filiis heredem instituit.

He [Micipsa] had the sons Aderherbal and Hiempsal, and took into his palace Jugurtha, the son of his brother Mastanbal, whom Masinissa – because he had been born from a concubine – had kept a private person, with the same upbringing as his own sons.

When Jugurtha first grew up, endowed with strength, of pleasing appearance, but much more gifted in intellect, he did not give himself over to luxury or to sloth, but – as is the custom of his race – he rode, threw the javelin, ran races with his fellows, and although he outclassed them all in *gloria* he was very dear to them all. As well as this he spent much time in hunting, being the first or among the first to kill the lion and other fierce beasts – he achieved a great deal but spoke very little of himself.

Although Micipsa was initially pleased at these things, thinking that the virtue of Jugurtha would be a glory to his own reign, when he subsequently realised that the young man was growing more and more, and that he himself was aged and his children small, he was much struck by the business, and turned the matter over in his mind. For the nature of mortals terrified him, avid of power and particularly to gratify its desires, and particularly the opportunities of his and his children's ages, which drives astray even moderate men through hope of reward. In addition to this, he noted the keenness of the Numidians for Jugurtha, from which (if he should kill such a man through some trickery) he was anxious either sedition or war would arise.

Beset by these problems, when he saw that he could not dispose of a man so dear to the *populus* by force or treachery, because Jugurtha was so ready with his hand, and desirous of military glory, he decided to put him in harm's way, and in this way to test his *fortuna*. Therefore when Micipsa sent cavalry and auxiliaries as assistance to the *populus Romanus* in the Numantine War, he put Jugurtha in charge of those whom he sent to Spain, hoping that either through showing off his virtue or the savageness of the foe he would easily be killed.

But what happened was a long way from what he had planned. For Jugurtha, as he had a keen and sharp mind, when he became acquainted with the mind of P. Scipio (who was then the Roman commander) and the practices of the enemy, with much labour and much care shortly acquired a reputation such that he was greatly dear to our men, and a great terror to the Numantines, in particular by the most modest obedience and often undergoing dangers. In fact he

was both fierce in battle and good in counsel, which is among the greatest difficulties since the one is accustomed very often to give rise to timorousness through providence, and the other temerity through rashness. Therefore, the general accomplished almost all difficult tasks through Jugurtha, had him as a friend, and grew more and more intimate with him daily, since no counsel of his nor any deed was failed. He also had a generous spirit and witty mind, through which qualities he had joined many of the Romans to him in familiar friendship.

At that time, there were in our army many men, both *novi* and *nobiles*, to whom riches were more persuasive than goodness or honesty - factious at home, powerful among the allies, well-known rather than honest – who fired Jugurtha's spirit, not moderate, by suggesting that if Micipsa should die, then he would be able to exercise sole power in Numidia; in him was the greatest virtue, and at Rome everything was for sale.

But after Numantia had been destroyed, and P. Scipio resolved to dismiss the auxiliaries and to return home, he took Jugurtha, having been given gifts and high praise in public, into his tent, and there warned him in private that he should rather cultivate the friendship of the *populus Romanus* in public than in private, and should not accustom himself to bribery; it was dangerous to buy from a few what belonged to the many. If Jugurtha should remain constant in his practices, both glory and kingship would come to him unaided; but if he should act too quickly, he would bring about his fall by his own money.

Having spoken thus, he sent him home, with a letter which he sent to Micipsa. Of this, the judgement was as follows: "The virtue of your Micipsa was exceedingly great, which I know for certain will be a joy to you. He is dear to us on account of his merit; we will struggle with all of our resources such that he might be the same to the senate and the people of Rome. To you, on account of our friendship, I send congratulations; in him you have a man worthy of you and his grandfather Masinissa."

When the king found out from the letter of the general that the report he had heard was accurate, moved by both the virtue and grace of Jugurtha he changed his mind, and tried to conquer Jugurtha with kindnesses; at once he adopted him, and set him in his will equally with his own sons.

Individuals and the *synkrisis*: *Cat*. 53-4

sed mihi multa legenti, multa audienti quae populus Romanus domi militiaeque, mari atque terra praeclara facinora fecit, forte lubuit adtendere quae res maxume tanta negotia sustinuisset. sciebam saepenumero parva manu cum magnis legionibus hostium contendisse; cognoveram parvis copiis bella gesta cum opulentis regibus, ad hoc saepe fortunae violentiam toleravisse, facundia Graecos, gloria belli Gallos ante Romanos fuisse. ac mihi multa agitanti constabat paucorum civium egregiam virtutem cuncta patravisse, eoque factum uti divitias paupertas, multitudinem paucitas superaret. sed postquam luxu atque desidia civitas corrupta est, rursus res publica magnitudine sua imperatorum atque magistratuum vitia sustentabat ac, sicuti †effeta parentum†, multis tempestatibus haud sane quisquam Romae virtute magnus fuit. sed memoria mea ingenti virtute, divorsis moribus fuere viri duo, M. Cato et C. Caesar. quos quoniam res obtulerat, silentio praeterire non fuit consilium, quin utriusque naturam et mores, quantum ingenio possum, aperirem.

igitur iis genus aetas eloquentia prope aequalia fuere, magnitudo animi par, item gloria, sed alia alii. Caesar beneficiis ac munificentia magnus habebatur, integritate vitae Cato. ille mansuetudine et misericordia clarus factus, huic severitas dignitatem addiderat. Caesar dando sublevando ignoscundo, Cato nihil largiundo gloriam adeptus est. in altero miseris perfugium erat, in altero malis pernicies. illius facilitas, huius constantia laudabatur. postremo Caesar in animum induxerat laborare, vigilare; negotiis amicorum intentus sua neglegere, nihil denegare quod dono dignum esset; sibi magnum imperium, exercitum, bellum novom exoptabat, ubi virtus enitescere posset. at Catoni studium modestiae, decoris, sed maxume severitatis erat. non divitiis cum divite neque factione cum factioso, sed cum strenuo virtute, cum modesto pudore, cum innocente

abstinentia certabat; esse quam videri bonus malebat: ita quo minus petebat gloriam, eo magis illum sequebatur.

But for my part, in reading much and hearing much about the outstanding deeds done by the *populus Romanus* on land and at sea, it by chance seized me to find out by what quality such great affairs had been carried out. I knew that they had often fought with a small number against great legions of the enemy; I knew that with small forces war had been waged with great kings, and that on top of this they had borne the violence of *fortuna*; that the Greeks had exceeded the Romans in eloquence, the Gauls in warlike glory. And to me, considering these things a great deal, it became clear that all of these things had been done according to the outstanding *virtus* of a few citizens, and that through them it had happened that poverty had defeated riches, and a few a multitude. But after the state had been corrupted by luxury and apathy, in turn the commonwealth began to sustain the vices of its magistrates and leaders through its greatness, and, as if the state was exhausted by childbearing, for a great time there was no-one at Rome who was great in *virtus*. But in my memory there were two men of great excellence, but diverse customs, M. Cato and C. Caesar; since the opportunity presents itself, and to pass over these two in silence not being my plan, I will now lay out the nature and character of each, as far as I have the ability.

Therefore: in birth, age and eloquence they were about equal, comparable in greatheartedness, and of equal *gloria*; but [*gloria*] of different kinds. Caesar was thought great on account of his services and munificence; Cato, the integrity of his life. The one rose to fame through clemency and pity; to the other, his severity added dignity. Caesar obtained *gloria* through giving, assistance and forgiveness; Cato through handing out nothing. The former was a refuge for the unfortunate; the latter the bane of the wicked. The good nature of one received praise; the constancy of the other. Finally, Caesar had taken it into his mind to work, and to remain alert; intent on the business of his friends, to neglect his own; to deny nothing worth the giving; he desired a great command, an army, and a new war in which his excellence could shine out. But to Cato was the study of modesty, decorum, and especially severity. He did not contend with the rich in riches, nor the factional in factionalism, but with the vigorous in excellence, with the modest in decency, and with the innocence in abstinence. He preferred to be, rather than to seem, good; and thus the less he sought *gloria*, the more it followed him.

Appendix II – A.J. Woodman and *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography*

In my first chapter, I suggest that while A.J. Woodman's book *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography* is an important corrective to readings of the classical historians which assume that they write as von Ranke *togatus*, aspects of Woodman's argumentation are unsustainable, at least with regard to Sallust's contemporary political historiography. In particular, I dispute the suggestion that rules appropriate to forensic oratory were identically applicable to history, and thus that techniques of *inventio* could be used to flesh out a minimal "hard core" of fact, according to the method of forensic rhetoric.[1] This argument, I think, elides important generic characteristics of Sallustian historiography, dissolving the clear relationship of his work to actual events. This elides some particularly interesting aspects of Sallust's rhetorical approach to his material: in that he was I think constrained by the factual material available, the ways in which he manipulates this are particularly interesting (the *dispositio* I stress throughout). My arguments throughout about Sallust's rhetorical engagement with his material assume that the major factual detail of his narrative largely was constrained by reference to known facts; with this appendix, I offer some rejoinders to aspects of Woodman's arguments against this.

Truth and bias

Before considering *inventio* (but fundamentally) Woodman attacks the idea that the ancient historians' claims to truthfulness approximate to what we would understand as historical truth: he suggests instead that "truthfulness" means simply freedom from bias. This is exaggerated: freedom from bias is not the whole significance of truth-claims in classical historiography, but merely one of a number of constituents of truthfulness. Other scholars have noted problems with Woodman's argument here;[2] nonetheless, it is relevant to my argument on *dispositio* to reassess the value of

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[1] Woodman 1988:70-116, esp. 87-95.
[2] Marincola 1997:158-74 discusses the *topos* of impartiality, "of all the claims made by ancient historians... by far and away the most common" (158). He cites Woodman, but notes other determinants of truth, terming

truthfulness, in order to repair the connection between the historian's account and actual events which Woodman's arguments dissolve.

Woodman's argument begins in his book's second chapter, with the testimony of Cicero's famous letter to Lucceius.[3] Based on a reading of this letter, Woodman suggests that the goal of truth as claimed by the Roman historians in fact meant no more or less than impartiality, and a promise not to be swayed by any considerations of personal feeling. The argument is important, since if it is accepted then the implicit connection between external events and the way they are reported is dissolved; the methodological ideal of modern historiography - representing things which actually happened – is replaced with the internal criterion of freedom from bias, allowing the historian a great deal more freedom in the elaboration of his narrative. This has important ramifications for the kind of material which could appropriately be included in historiography, and the way in which it could be developed.

Woodman begins by citing *ad Familiares* 5.12.3, where Cicero apparently identifies the fundamental laws of history, *leges historiae*, with the claim to be free from partiality. His translation is as follows (Latin citations are Woodman's own): [4]

"So I repeat – elaborate [*ornes*] my activities even against your better judgement, and in the process disregard the laws of historiography [*et in eo leges historiae neglegas*]: that prejudice [*gratiam*], which you discussed quite beautifully in one or other of your prefaces and which, you revealed, could no more influence you than Pleasure could influence Hercules in Xenophon's book, well, please don't suppress it if it nudges you strongly in my favour, but simply let your affection [*amori*] for me take a degree of precedence over the truth [*veritas*]."

Woodman states that "Cicero contrasts truth (*veritas*) with prejudice (*gratia*, *amor*), from which it appears to follow that Cicero saw the truth in terms of impartiality";[5] he goes on to discuss the *topos* of freedom from bias in *testimonia* from historians themselves. However, even discounting the limitations of Cicero's letter as an indicator of historiographical practice – Cicero only dabbled in history,[6] and the work he suggests to Lucceius has a markedly promotional bent – there are problems with the emphasis of Woodman's reading of the letter.[7] Of particular note is the emphasis in the translation on a direct opposition between truth, *veritas*, and bias, *gratia*; his translation, in making *amor* the subject of the last clause, distorts the emphasis. The text is as follows: *si me tibi vehementius commendabit, ne aspernere amorique nostro plusculum etiam, quam concedet veritas, largiare*.[8] A more literal translation might read "...do not suppress that prejudice, if it commends me to you more strongly, and even grant to our mutual affection rather more than the truth might allow." The opposition is not expressed between *amor* and *veritas* in such a binary way as Woodman claims: truth can in fact be read an external factor limiting the influence of bias, rather than as a direct opposite.

Woodman's argument, moreover, relies on the identification of this discussion of bias with what Cicero describes as the "laws of historiography". The text is as follows:

itaque te plane etiam atque etiam rogo ... ut in eo leges historiae negligas gratiamque illam, de qua suavissime quodam in prooemio scripsisti, a qua te flecti non magis potuisse demonstras quam Herculem Xenophontium illum a Voluptate, eam... ne aspernere...[9]

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[5] Woodman 1988:73.

[6] Kelley 1968:154-64 collects the *testimonia*.

[7] Although *Att*. 4.6.4 states that Lucceius agreed to the task, conversation on the matter subsequently dries up, and we must presume that the work was never written (*Att*. 2.1.1 suggests a similar sequence of events in connection with Posionius). As Woodman recognises (1988:110 n. 91), the letter's value can only be in illustrating the preconceptions behind broader ideas such as "truth", even as it seeks to subvert them. Cf. Rudd 1992 on Cicero's request for a "bogus *historia*" (3); Fox 2007:256-63; Paladini 1947:115 argues that Lucceius must have shared Cicero's conception of history, but that Cicero here is really asking for *encomium* rather than historiography in this letter (cf. Fornara 1983:101: the letter "reveals the importunities to which historians were exposed").

[8] Cic. *Fam*. 5.12.3.

[9] *idem*.

Notably, Woodman does not translate the –*que* of *gratiamque*: his translation implies that the material on bias *constitutes* the historiographical laws, but it can instead be considered as a *supplement* to them. Indeed, if *gratia* is really the only constituent of truth, the plural *leges historiae* seems unexplained. Woodman's argument from the letter is that "truth and falsehood were seen in terms of prejudice and bias"; his *testimonia* reinforce the importance of freedom from bias as a quality of the historian. However, he exaggerates in suggesting that this was the totality of historical truth: the sentences he cites illustrate a component of truth, but not its whole.

Woodman follows the same argument in reading *de Oratore* 2.51-64, a much-discussed passage.[10] Part of Cicero's treatise on the art of oratory, written in the same year as the letter to Lucceius, these chapters provide a theory of historiographical practice from the perspective of the orator (as a man skilled in all forms of literary communication).[11] Woodman begins by suggesting that the laws of history as expressed here are the same as those in *Fam*. 5.12, and that they again imply freedom from bias. The text and Woodman's translation are as follows:

nam quis nescit primam esse historiae legem, ne quid falsi dicere audeat? deinde ne quid veri non audeat? ne qua suspicio gratiae sit in scribendo, ne qua simultatis? haec scilicet nota sunt omnibus.[12]

"Everyone of course knows that the first law of historiography is not daring to say anything false, and the second is not refraining from saying anything true: there should be no suggestion of prejudice for, or bias against, when you write. These foundations are of course recognised by everyone..."[13]

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[10] Woodman 1988:74-95 (quotation 75). This passage of *de Oratore* has been the focus of sharp scholarly disagreement. Woodman's criticism is directed especially at Brunt 1980; Fornara 1983, esp. 91-141. Other important readings predating Woodman's are Rawson 1972; Leeman 1985; Kelley 1968; Petzold 1972. Woodman's reading of the passage has not been universally accepted: see Leeman 1989; Brock 1991; Rhodes 1994; Leeman, Pinkster, Nelson 1985:248-69; May & Wisse 2001; Bosworth 2003: 169-70; Northwood 2008 and Fox 2007 (with Woodman 2008); Pitcher 2009 (cf. Woodman 2012:10-13). For a different reading, stressing Cicero's innovation and distance from conventional Roman historiographical practice, see Feldherr 2001.

[11] The view of the orator as rounded intellectual, knowledgeable across many different fields, is central to *de Oratore*. See May & Wisse 2001:9-13; Fantham 2006:78-101.

[12] *de Or.* 2.62-3.

In contrast to previous translations,[14] Woodman thus reads the series of rhetorical questions as expressing two *leges*, again assimilating impartiality to truthfulness: "Antonius' first pair of rhetorical questions, dealing with *falsum* and *verum*, are explained by his second pair, which deal with *gratia* and *simultas*."[15] However, Woodman's identification of these as two pairs, with the second questions effectively a gloss on the first two, begs the question somewhat: it seems as natural to read these as four allied tenets of historiography, with bias as a component rather than the whole definition of truthfulness.[16] Woodman's argument repeats and depends on the earlier (but uncertain) conclusions from the letter to Lucceius.

Woodman's supplementary evidence in support of his claim that truth equalled freedom from bias is varied. He cites the *topos* of freedom from partisanship as a guarantor of historical truth in Sallust, Livy and Tacitus,[17] and also Lucian's theoretical text *How to Write History*.[18] Woodman is correct that this is an important recurring feature of both practical and theoretical reflections on historiography; but others exist.[19] To read freedom from bias as the only criterion is to ignore the range of criticisms historians make of each other's working practices: for example, Polybius's

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[13] Woodman 1988:80.

[14] Woodman 1988:81 cites versions from Walsh 1961, Kelley 1968 and Brunt 1980.

[15] Woodman 1988:82.

[16] Woodman 1988: 82: "[Antonius] twice explicitly says that the 'first and second laws of historiography' *are* familiar" (Woodman's emphasis). Antonius says no such thing: the laws of historiography he mentions are simply *haec*, without numerical qualification. As evidence for these representing two, rather than four, laws, Woodman cites *Off*. 1.20, *Rep*. 1.38, *Leg*. 3.19, *Verr*. 5.90, examples of *primum… deinde…* used of two related clauses (1988:105); these are not conclusive. One might also ask why, if these ideas were apparently so familiar, they would need the gloss of a second set of qualifications. Woodman's reading is criticised by Bosworth 2003:168-71; Pitcher 2009: 15-24 esp. 18: Cf. Woodman 2012:10-13, which clarifies the original argument somewhat but remains inconclusive.

[17] Woodman 1988:73-4 cites Sall. *Cat*. 4.2-3, Livy *praef*. 5 and Tac. *Hist*. 1.1.3, *Ann*. 1.1.3; however, Livy's is not really a claim to impartiality, since he explicitly disqualifies bias as an aspect of his coverage of Rome's early period. Woodman does suggest elsewhere that Livy's historiographical style developed with growing optimism at the peace brought by the Principate (1988:136-40): but Livy seems in fact to suggest here that the role of the non-contemporary historian is explicitly distanced from the criteria of impartiality (cf. Marincola 1997: 170 on Livy as an example of a historian who specifically *avoids* professing impartiality).

[18] Woodman cites Lucian, *Hist, Conscr*. 7,9,10,11, all of which do deal with bias; but he makes no mention of 47-8, chapters which describe the historian's actual working practices in the collection of information, and stress careful enquiry to achieve the most accurate possible account.

[19] Pelling 1990:42 n.65 argues that (for example) the historians' emphasis on the difficulty of recovering the truth from documents implies a meaning beyond the idea of impartiality.

extended polemic against the methods of his predecessor Timaeus returns frequently to the theme

of falsehood born of insufficient research or critical reflection, as well as of bias.[20]

Moreover, as T.J. Luce has shown, the claim to freedom from bias is a *topos* only of a specific

sort of historiography, contemporary or near-contemporary history: it does not extend to authors

(like Livy) who wrote accounts of distant periods from existing historical sources.[21] Freedom from

bias as the only sort of historical truth, fails to explain appeals to ἀλήθεια found in authors such as

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who covered the period only up to the First Punic War.[22] Since (as Luce

has demonstrated) bias was itself understood primarily in the sense of courting of material gain,[23]

Dionysius seems unlikely to have had it in mind.

The reason for the claim of freedom from bias being a *topos* of contemporary history and

not non-contemporary history, I suggest, is related to the methodologies of the two forms.[24] The

material for the former came supposedly from the historian's own enquiry, and the collection and

employment of different testimonies;[25] the latter was seen as a process of collating existing versions,

with a view to improving on them either in terms of style or accuracy.[26] In the terms of Pliny's letter

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[20] Polyb. 12.4d: Timaeus' research is inaccurate; 12.7.4: he relies too much on the subjective criterion of probability; 12.23: Timaeus' reporting of speeches owes everything to rhetorical *inventio* and nothing to the truth. Polyb. 12.12.3-4: "there are two types of falsehood, the first born of ignorance and the second of deliberate choice: we should pardon those who fall away from the truth through ignorance, but condemn irreconcilably those who lie deliberately". On the tropes of historiographical polemic here see Marincola 1997:148-58, 225-36; for bias as an evil to be avoided *because of* the damage it does to the truth rather than as the opposite of truth *per se*, Marincola 2009:18-9.

[21] Luce 1989. Woodman's example of *inventio* in practice (the elaboration of a triumphal-notice, 1988:88-9, is in fact taken from exactly the sort of historiography which does not regularly deploy the *topos* of freedom from bias).

[22] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.2.

[23] Luce 1989:17-22; cf. Lucian, *Hist. Conscr.* 39.

[24] Luce 1989:20 explains Livy's lack of the claim to be free from bias by the fact that bias applied only to individuals, rather than to states; while significant, this is not the only reason. Cf p. 25 on non-contemporary history as more objective, and thus "better", according to classical *testimonia*.

[25] The classic statement of the requirements of contemporary "pragmatic" historiography is Polybius 12.25-28a, with Sacks 1981:144-66, Walbank 1972:66-96, Marincola 1997:63-86, 128-74; cf. Lucian *Hist. Conscr.* 47-8 with Porod 2013:550 on Lucian's adherence to the Thucydidean/Polybian methodology. Our sources provide no detailed guidelines as to the collection and sifting of information: such material would obviously be foreign to the focus in the *de Oratore* on the use of *eloquentia*, and Lucian similarly concentrates on the presentation of the account over its content. That neither of these rhetorically-inflected sources contains such discussion does not mean that it was not important: Marincola 2009:19 notes how alarmingly rarely classical authors mention the difficulties of research.

[26] Summed up by Livy, *praef*. 1: *...dum novi semper scriptores aut in rebus certius aliquid allaturos se aut scribendi arte rudem vetustatem superaturos credunt.* The idea of accuracy - *in rebus certius* - should be

on historiography, the distinction is of *inquisitio* versus *collocatio*[27] - enquiry as to the way events were remembered and commemorated versus collation of a series of already existing accounts. That contemporary history was ideally based on enquiry and evaluation of sources is central: truthfulness, in the sense of reflecting what actually happened, should be understood as the whole aim of the historian's activity in finding his material. The historian was therefore obliged to demonstrate that he approached the process of enquiry without bias, explaining the relevance of the historians' truth-claims as cited by Woodman. Freedom from bias was again a prerequisite of truth, but not the whole truth itself, which was discovered by the historian from the investigation of the sources which his task comprised. For non-contemporary history, in which the historian's material was based on collation and embellishment of disparate but pre-existing sources, the truthfulness of an account was dependent on fidelity to the critical processes already exerted by their original authors.[28] Non-contemporary historians such as Livy believed their sources to be on the whole accurate, so long as they could not identify specific bias in their original composition.[29] Where discrepancies existed, these had to be explained by reference to the specific shortcomings (including, but not limited to, bias) of different accounts.[30] Bias itself was not a consideration of the actual task of the non-contemporary historian in the same way: this is why it appears much less frequently as a *topos* of the historian's methodological remarks.

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understood in the sense of most effectively combining the already extant sources, although new sources (such as Licinius Macer's *libri lintei*, on which see *FRHist* 1.324-6) could be invoked to supplement or correct the existing version. Cf. Marincola 1997:95-117. On the difficulties of non-contemporary historiography for Woodman's arguments see Bosworth 2003.

[27] Pliny, *Ep*. 5.8.12: Pliny described *vetera* as *parata inquisitio, sed onerosa collatio*. On this letter see Woodman 2012:223-42.

[28] When non-contemporary historians do comment on their sources, it is often to remark on their accuracy or otherwise. The unquestioning approach to previous sources, and the idea that weight of tradition is a good gauge to the truthfulness of an historical fact, is demonstrated by their (for us, problematic) readiness to believe things based on how widely they are attested. Cf. Marincola 1997:105-7; Shrimpton 1997:25.

[29] E.g. Arrian, *Anab. Praef*. 1.3, in which he promises to report in full "everything which Ptolemy and Aristobulus have described in the same way", while making judgments in disputed cases based on the criteria of persuasiveness and entertainment. Cf. Marincola 1997:95-117.

[30] Examples of criticisms of bias in source material by non-contemporary historians: Polybius 1.14.1-9 (Pictor's bias towards the Romans, Philinus' bias against); Livy 7.9.3-5; Tac. *Ann*. 1.1.2; Sall. *Jug*. 95 (on the pro-Sullan bias of Sisenna's account). Cf. Marincola 1997:114-5.

In short, Woodman's argument that truth in the Roman historians should be identified with freedom from bias is exaggerated. While he is correct that this is part of the truth-claims of the Roman historians, he goes too far in calling it the *exclusive* determinant of truth. To allow the classical historians external criteria of determining whether or not an account is true, as well as the internal criteria of bias, is to grant a closer relationship between literary accounts and objective reality than Woodman allows. If we reject Woodman's claim for such a limited value of truth, then the *testimonia* he cites in fact seem more to be restatements of the historiographical ideal as careful adherence to an accepted set of facts.

Inventio: oratory and history

According to the second part of Woodman's argument, historiography was not seen in antiquity as a separate genre, but as one point on a spectrum of rhetorical forms, also including poetry and oratory. Woodman elides generic divides, in order to suggest that rules appropriate to oratory were similarly applicable to historiography (leading to his analysis of the role of *inventio*). Again, this is founded on a reading of the second book of Cicero's *de Oratore*: as above, Woodman uses Cicero's remarks as a means to draw more general conclusions as to classical historiography. This time, he takes the second half of Antonius' discussion in the *de Oratore* (2.62-4), describing the content of the historical account. Based on a new reading of the passage, emphasising its application to the content (*res*) of the historical account as well as the *verba*, Woodman outlines a form of historiography wholly dependent on rhetorical techniques for working up both style and content.

The application of Cicero's remarks to content as well as style cannot be faulted:[31] the idea that rhetoric exerts a fundamental influence on the construction as well as expression of the historical account is one on which I draw for my idea of *dispositio*. However, Woodman continues by stressing the role of *inventio*, the orator's activity of "discovering" the arguments necessary for his case, to historiography, suggesting that the historian exercised similar techniques in "discovering"

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[31] Northwood 2008 tries, based on mistaken readings of both Cicero and Woodman, and is chastised by Woodman 2009.

through imaginative reconstruction the material for his historical account. History, according to Woodman's reading, was approached similarly to a speech aimed at persuasion, and importantly did not require fidelity to strict truth, but rather criteria of plausibility and verisimilitude. In Woodman's argument, it should be based only on salient facts - what Woodman terms the "hard core" – the rest coming largely from the historian's imaginative reconstruction of "how things ought to have been". I will not deal in detail with the criteria of verisimilitude stressed by Woodman: rather, in conjunction with the arguments above as to the nature of historical truth it is sufficient here to argue against Woodman's identification of the two genres. Maintaining the generic identity of *historia* allows preservation of its implicit relationship to truth as distinguishing factor, signalled by the frequent references to truth throughout historical compositions.

Woodman depends on two contentions: first, that the tasks of the orator and the historian are essentially identical; and second, that historiography could thus be conceived in the same terms as judicial oratory, with assumptions and techniques of oratorical argumentation transplanted wholesale into historiographical composition. However, I suggest that while there are similarities between the genres (based on their shared background in rhetorical education) these are not sufficient to entirely assimilate them. Woodman's focus on the imaginative reconstruction of *inventio* exceeds what was allowed to historians. The "hard core" of available facts was less malleable than Woodman implies, and generic assumptions governing historiography implied fidelity to the factual "hard core" beyond what was required of the forensic speech.[32]

Woodman's assimilation of the genres is based on the testimony of Cicero's *de Oratore* that history was the task of the orator, and the similarity between the terms in which Cicero describes fully worked-up history and those of the speech. However, the case is not as clear as Woodman suggests. Although Woodman emphasises his intention of taking Cicero's discussion of

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[32] Wheeldon 1989:44-5 emphasises that the generic expectation of historiography was that the events it had described were actually true: "the reader would have learned in school that history recounts *res gestae*, and is to be generally regarded as exclusive of *res fictae* and *res fabulosae*" (44). The reader's predisposition towards believing the events narrated in a history removed some of the burden of persuasion from the author. Cf. Kraus 2012 on further literary characteristics peculiar to historiography.

historiography (*de Oratore* 2.51-64) within its full argumentative context, in practice this means simply taking the whole of the passage on historiography as one argumentative unit (marked by ring composition), rather than setting the discussion in its full context of the second book of *de Oratore*.[33] The *de Oratore*, a product of Cicero's mature thought, sets forth an unusual vision of the orator's competences, going far beyond the standard divisions of the speech to encompass a wide variety of communicative forms. Cicero's orator is a kind of classical "Renaissance man", widely knowledgeable and able to turn his hand to all forms of speaking through *eloquentia*.[34] Historiography appears in book 2, alongside philosophical questions,[35] as part of a demonstration of the limitations of the established theories of the rhetoricians, emphasising the application of the learned techniques of oratory to non-forensic contexts.[36] That is, the discussion of historiography is introduced specifically in that it is *not* conventionally part of the canon of material treated by rhetorical theory, and has not been approached oratorically by previous Roman writers.

Cicero's aim in this passage is not to claim historiography for the *rhetors*, but to treat it (ostensibly in passing, although we might suspect that the passage is included because of Cicero's own historiographical interests)[37] as one of those things "which sometimes fall to the orator".[38] That is, while Cicero outlines a series of occasions on which careful speaking is required, each representing an opportunity for the exercise of the orator's skills, this does not mean that all such cases were to be subsumed under the same laws as the orator's forensic practice. Cicero's argument

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[33] *Contra* Leeman 1985, who emphasises the context provided by the whole of book 2, in which Cicero's Antonius rehearses other appropriate opportunities for the orator to make use of his skill. Leeman 1985:250 (followed by Leeman, Pinkster, Nelson 1985:250) reads Antonius' remarks that no rhetorical precepts had been laid down for historiography (2.64) not as a complaint, but an indication that none were needed (cf. very similar remarks at *de Or.* 2.47-50), and notes that book 2 broadens the conception of the role of the orator from the limited *ars persuadendi* to the broader *ars bene dicendi*. Leeman argues (287-8) that this whole passage is not a theory of historiography as such, but a demonstration of the power of the orator (*mutatis mutandis*) across all forms of verbal communication. Cape 1997:220-1 links the desire for new rules to the *rhetorici Latini*.

[34] The breadth of the orator's purview stems from the all-encompassing definition Cicero gives to the art of oratory itself: see especially *de Or.* 2.33-8. Leeman 1989:240 attacks Woodman's failure to take the idealised nature of Cicero's *orator perfectus* into account.

[35] *de Or.* 2.64-73.

[36] See especially *de Or.* 2.69-73.

[37] On which see Kelley 1968:142-71; Rawson 1972; Woodman 2012.

[38] *de Or.* 2.47: *quia nolo, inquit, omnia, quae cadunt aliquando in oratorem, quamvis exigua sint, ea sic tractare, quasi nihil possit dici sine praeceptis suis.*

recalls the encomium of history earlier in the *de Oratore*, at 2.36: "and truly History, the witness of times, light of truth, life of memory, teacher of life, and messenger of things passed; by what voice except that of the orator is she commended to immortality?" Cicero's remarks suggest that the orator is the best man to write history because of his pre-eminent *eloquentia* and skill in speaking, *not* that history is an extension of oratory, accordingly to be approached in an identical way.[39] The *de Oratore* treats historiography as a part of Cicero's extremely broad conception of the orator's task more generally: while this illustrates the application of the techniques of eloquence to other genres, it does not demonstrate that historiography was ever conventionally understood as the same as oratory in its codified form.[40] This whole section of book 2 of the *de Oratore* (including the remarks on philosophy, as well as on history) contributes to Cicero's unusually broad vision of the orator's task specifically by invoking subject-matter which, while it might benefit from the orator's eloquence, was not conventionally part of the orator's purview: Cicero's discussion of the suitability of the orator to write history is rather a claim to the wide application of the competences of the true orator than a statement that historiography was to be approached identically to forensic speech.[41]

This context must be considered in reading Cicero's remarks on historiographical narrative. As a set of guidelines for historiography, Antonius' recommendations can only be partial, and we should expect them to minimise the aspects of the historian's practice beyond *eloquentia* and the construction of the literary text (for example, the historian's collection and assessment of source materials): these are not the focus of the discussion, which focuses on the aspects of historiographical practice in which the historian's task most resembled that of the orator. The parallels on which Woodman founds his argument, between remarks on historiography and those elsewhere which refer to oratory, are in fact to be expected, given the focus of Cicero's work and his approach to historiography as relevant to the orator. Woodman's reading of *de Oratore*, while

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[39] My interpretation is the same of the other passages where Cicero calls history a task for the orator, e.g. *Leg*. 1.5: [*historia est*] *opus, ut tibi quidem uideri solet, unum hoc oratorium maxime*. The *ut-* clause also perhaps emphasises that this is not necessarily a majority view: cf. Woodman 2012. Cf. Leeman 1985.

[40] See above, chapter 1. The breadth of Cicero's reflections on *eloquentia* here is very unusual: his treatment at *Orator* 65-6 distinguishes much more clearly between philosophy, history and oratory in terms of *eloquentia*.

[41] Cf. Leeman, Pinkster & Nelson 1985:248-51.

valuable in demonstrating a conception of historical writing which draws on the techniques of rhetoric in working-up a literary account, does not demonstrate that the two genres are wholly to be assimilated.

The material Woodman adduces to support this claim beyond the *de Oratore* is also somewhat weak. His chapter focuses on the assimilation of historiography to specifically judicial oratory (the main focus of the more practical parts of the *de Oratore*), but in a seven-page postscript he acknowledges "alternative definitions" of historiography which liken it instead to epideictic and to poetry.[42] Woodman argues once for the permeability of the three *genera*, and indeed for the assimilation of poetry, oratory and historiography as aspects of a continuum of literary production: but the fact that historiography can be compared with so many genres, while not quite being identified with any, must itself imply the existence of some distinguishing characteristics.[43]

By reference to overlaps between the three *genera* of oratory, Woodman here attempts the same kind of argumentation as applied earlier in the chapter to historiography and oratory: but his argument minimises fundamental generic characteristics which separate them. The three oratorical *genera* were separated by basic characteristics: the distinction of the type of case (determining the *genus* of the speech) was one of the first questions the orator considered in preparing his speech.[44] Each genre of oratory has its unique distinguishing features, and no level of permeability in terms of specific techniques can elide these. The fact that historiography is conceived in epideictic terms, as

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[42] Woodman 1988:95-101. Cf Fornara 1983:169-70 on history and oratory as fundamentally opposed.

[43] Woodman cites Quint. *Inst*. 3.7.28: *totum autem habet aliquid simile suasoriis, quia plerumque eadem illic suaderi, hic laudari solent.* "[Epideictic] has this in common with persuasive speeches, in that many of the things which are advised in that genre are praised in this one." To claim that this shows that "the three types of judicial, epideictic and deliberative oratory were in no way mutually exclusive" (Woodman 1988:96) is to exaggerate: while the examples Woodman cites do demonstrate a degree to which the techniques of one *genus* might reappear in the others, this does not imply that the genre boundaries in terms of general aims were not well understood. We might for example cite Quint. *Inst*. 10.1.31: *historia... est enim proxima poetis, et quodam modo carmen solutum est, et scribitur ad narrandum, non ad probandum, totumque opus non ad actum rei pugnamque praesentem sed ad memoriam posteritatis et ingenii famam componitur*, "history is very close to poetry, and is almost in the manner of a prose poem; and it is written to narrate, not to prove, and its purpose is not a present matter or quarrel, but it is written for the memory of posterity, and the reputation of the mind." From Aristotle (*Rhet*. 1358a) onwards the three genres are separated according to the criteria of the audience's role, to simply spectate or to make a decision, and, if the latter, whether the decision relates to the past or the future. While each type may contain elements of the others, the categorisation is arrived at deductively and thus every speech falls into one of the three categories. Cf. Lausberg 1998 §59-65.

[44] The process is *intellectio*: cf. Quint. *Inst*. 3.4, Lausberg 1998 §97.

well as judicial, indicates not the similarity of the two *genera*, but rather the nebulous place of historiography itself within categorisations based on the standard categorisations of speeches, and its distinction from oratorical forms: history has certain things in common with each of the *genera*, but is differentiated on a fundamental level, which remains, in my view, the criterion of its reference to external events (once again, refuting Woodman's limited idea of historical truth reinforces this).

Woodman concludes his argument with a reference to the second-century grammarian Rufus of Perinthus, the interpretation of which he takes as a marker of the difference between his approach to the classical historians and more traditional readings. Rufus, the author of a brief set of rhetorical precepts, added a fourth *genus* to the three conventional *genera causarum* of the speech, the ἱστορικὸν.[45] While Peter Brunt saw this as a deeply heterodox division, which would have been unacceptable to Cicero or to the historians, Woodman sees it as indicative, confirmation that history was regularly viewed as a subgenre of rhetoric.[46] In my view, Brunt is closer to the truth. Rufus' definition is highly unusual, and perhaps reflects a tendency among the rhetoricians towards subdivision: indeed, it is cited by the *progymnasmata* of Nicolaus as an example of excessive categorisation, which could isolate as many as thirty different kinds of speech.[47] In my view, Rufus' ἱστορικὸν should be understood as a peculiar and specific subgenre of epideictic, rather than referring to conventional written historiography. The definition Rufus actually applies to epideictic refers to it strictly in the terms of praise and blame; the ἱστορικὸν might perhaps be understood as comparable to the *encomium* as defined in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, as a speech of praise based on deeds which have actually been done, rather than simply on an individual's qualities.[48] Rufus' adoption of the term ἱστορικὸν demonstrates the malleability of that word within rhetorical contexts rather than providing an appropriate way to approach the writing of an author such as Sallust.

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[45] Rufus of Perinthus p.399 Spengel: εἴδη δὲ τοῦ ῥητοριχοῦ ἐστι τέσσαρα, δικανικὸν συμβουλευτικὸν ἐγκωμιαστικὸν ἱστορικὸν... ἱστορικὸν δέ, ἐν ᾧ διηγούμεθα πράξεις τινὰς μετὰ κόσμου ὡς γεγενημένας.

[46] Brunt 1980:332; Woodman 1988:116 n.158. cf. Lichanski 1986:21-4.

[47] Nicolaus, *Prog*. 55 Felten. Nicolaus' appears to be the only other mention of this doctrine, excepting Syrius' commentary on Rufus' work (2.11 Rabe).

[48] Arist, *Rhet*. 1.9.33(1367b). Rufus' stipulation that the ἱστορικὸν be written μετὰ κόσμου recalls the emphasis on the *ornatus* in epideictic works.

Against Woodman's identification of historiography and oratory, it is possible to cite a number of alternative definitions and *testimonia* as to the nature of historiography, stressing its fundamental truthfulness, and that this was a factor which distinguished it from oratory or other genres: the most persuasive examples are the vast array of truth-claims found in the historians' own works.[49] In this light, it does not seem to me justifiable to minimise the sense in which history was supposed to represent actual events, but rather to believe that the historians' claims represented at least an ideal of practice. It would be foolish to believe everything the classical historians say about their sources and practices, but it is I think reasonable to believe that political historiography in the Sallustian mould was conceived of as distinguished from oratory and other forms by close adherence to the facts the author had at his disposal, rather than elaboration of significant material through *inventio*.

In sum, Woodman does not I think sufficiently demonstrate with either of his arguments that historiography was close enough to oratory, and its attitude towards truth far enough from what we would consider historically truthful, for the rules appropriate to *inventio* - of large-scale imaginative reconstruction according to the criterion of *veri similis* - to be applicable in cases where extensive factual material did exist, such as Sallust's works. The criterion of truth for the classical historians (at least contemporary historians) is stronger than he allows: maintaining the idea of accuracy to external referents restricts the application of *inventio* to the elaboration of details of material which was fundamentally fixed, as I suggest in my discussion of historiographical *ekphrasis*. Plausible reconstruction based on *inventio* should I think be restricted to a narrower field, consisting of the details of material such as speeches or description. The influence of rhetoric for an author such as Sallust was, I suggest, concentrated more heavily in arrangement and structural

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[49] Cf. *testimonia* on claims to truth in historiography in Avenarius 1956:40-2; Marincola 2007; see also p.21 n.3 above. Nicolai 2000:122 stresses poetic truth as distinct from historical truth. Moles 1990 suggests that against every major contention of Woodman's book significant classical *testimonia* can be cited (320). Cf. Moles 1993 on Woodman's engagement with the question of truth; 117 notes that overgeneralisation is the most questionable aspect of Woodman's arguments. Fornara 1983:175 argues for "the assumption of objectivity" as a standard for measuring history against other forms: while I do not go so far as him (for instance, suggesting that the details of speeches could be passed down accurately by the oral tradition until historians wrote them up, 163) the idea of generic assumptions of truthfulness does seem to me correct.

considerations than in the material of the narrative; that is, the *dispositio* which I treat throughout the thesis as an alternative model for the historian's rhetorical activity.