Contagion processes of ethnic violence: Group inspiration and government strategic reaction.

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I, Janina Beiser, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the work.

Abstract

Existing research has considered the effect of domestic unrest on repression and the effect of repression on subsequent unrest. However, governments' strategic incentives to use repression as a targeted measure in order to prevent – as opposed to respond to – unrest altogether are understood little. This thesis analyses armed ethnic conflict as well as government repression targeted at ethnic groups in order to prevent them from rebelling. More specifically, this thesis consists of three parts. The first part analyses the effect of information about foreign conflicts on the likelihood of domestic conflict. Here, the argument is that information about foreign conflicts that is transmitted via mass media can inspire groups with similar grievances like the foreign group in conflict to take up arms. This argument is tested empirically in a large-n study on the country level. The second part analyses the concept of repression as a pre-emptive strategy. In this part I argue that governments use group-specific repression to strike a perfect balance between domestic ethnic groups' costs and benefits for fighting in order to prevent them from taking up arms in the most efficient way. Quantitative data on group-specific repression levels is used to empirically test this argument. The third part analyses government reactions to information about foreign conflicts transmitted via mass media in order to prevent domestic unrest. I argue here that governments are aware of the mechanism discussed in the first part and use repression in order to prevent conflict contagion altogether. Again, this argument is tested empirically using group-level repression data.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The Arab spring has brought the possibility of the spread of collective action between different countries to the forefront of public and academic interest. However, even before the Arab spring, groups in similar situations in different countries were aware of each others' struggles and have supported each other. This thesis poses the question of whether the struggles of ethnic groups can inspire groups in other countries to take up arms as well. It argues that such inspiration can take place when domestic ethnic groups perceive a grievance similar to the one addressed by the foreign group in conflict. For this, information flows between countries are expected to be important as domestic groups need to be informed about foreign conflicts and their underlying causes in order to be inspired by them under the mechanism suggested. This thesis explores the role of information flows via mass media in the process by which groups in different countries can inspire each other to rebellion. The analysis presented here is the first to operationalise shared grievance explicitly and thus test whether this mechanism can trigger inspiration between groups. Moreover, it is the first to explore the role of information flows via mass media in processes of armed conflict contagion.

How do governments react to foreign conflicts that may inspire domestic ethnic groups in such a way? This thesis argues that governments use repression as a strategy to prevent domestic ethnic groups from rebelling, both in general and as a response to foreign events that may inspire domestic groups in particular. In empirical repression research, the notion of pre-emptive repression is rarely considered, and if it is, country-level measures are applied to operationalise governments' incentives for pre-emptive repression. This thesis advances and tests a theory of pre-emptive repression as a tool targeted at specific domestic groups in order to prevent them from taking up

arms against the government. I test this notion both in a domestic setting by exploring government repression as a function of domestic and group-specific factors that can be expected to influence an ethnic group's utility for rebellion. In a second step, I test this notion by exploring government repression against ethnic groups in response to foreign events that may inspire these groups to rebellion under the mechanisms developed in the first part of the thesis. Again, information flows via mass media are expected to be a crucial factor in this process as only groups with information about foreign events should be expected by the government to be inspired by them.

The first part of this thesis analyses armed ethnic intrastate conflict, that is armed conflicts within states that are fought predominantly by members of and in the interest of at least one ethnic group (Cederman et al., 2010). Conflicts within states generally have become a prevalent phenomenon since the end of the Second World War. The year 2013 saw 33 armed civil conflicts in the world while not a single armed conflict between states was recorded (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2014a). This observation is part of a larger trend as is illustrated in Figure 1.1. The number of ongoing armed interstate conflicts has stagnated since the end of the Second World War. The number of ongoing armed intrastate conflicts, on the other hand, has increased considerably since then[1].

Figure 1.1: The yearly number of ongoing inter- and intrastate conflicts in the world.



[1]Data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset V4-2014 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen, 2014).

One of the most widely used data sources (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2014b), the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data, defines a conflict as "(...) a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths" (Harbom, 2010, 1). Such a conflict is considered an intrastate conflict if the opponent of the government is a non-government actor and the conflict takes place on a state's territory and an interstate conflict if all opponents are state governments (Harbom, 2010).

Intrastate conflicts have had an intolerable human cost since 1946, both among combatants and civilians. Between 1945 and 1999, intrastate wars have caused five times as many fatalities as wars between states (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). It can easily be argued that civil war is one of the largest threats to human security and well-being in the 21st century.

The world-wide proportion of ethnic groups involved in armed civil conflicts has increased considerably since the end of the Second World War as is shown in Figure 1.2[2]. Ethnic conflicts can be long-winded and bloody. For example, the ethnic conflict between groups representing the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sri Lankan government was active – with rare interruptions – for 26 years and led to almost 60.000 fatalities[3].

However, the absence of ethnic or intrastate conflict more generally is not a sufficient condition for the security and well-being of civilian populations. Instead, government repression, the second type of political violence this thesis analyses, is a prevalent phenomenon as well despite the "(...) right to life, liberty and security of person" (UN General Assembly, 1948) in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the efforts of human rights groups. "By most accounts, repression involves the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as

[2]The figure shows the percentage of politically relevant ethnic groups represented in at least one armed civil conflict in a given year based on data from the Ethnic Power-Relations Dataset Version 2.0 (Cederman et al., 2010), the Non-State Actor Dataset Version 3.1 (Cunningham et al., 2009), the ACD2EPR Docking Dataset (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012), and the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2010 (Gleditsch et al., 2002).

[3]Based on data from the Ethnic Power-Relations Dataset Version 2.0 (Cederman et al., 2010), the Non-State Actor Dataset Version 3.1 (Cunningham et al., 2009), the ACD2EPR Docking Dataset (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012), the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2010 (Gleditsch et al., 2002), and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2014c).

Figure 1.2: The percentage of ethnic groups in conflict.



well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions" (Davenport (2007a, 2) drawing on Goldstein (1978, xxvii)). Figure 1.3 shows the yearly mean of the physical integrity rights index from the CIRI Human Rights data (Cingranelli et al., 2014), "(...) an additive index constructed from (...) Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights)" (Cingranelli et al., 3). It can be seen that on average, states use these repressive measures to a considerable degree and little has changed over time.

In some cases, repression might be the very reason why rebellion does not break out. In Libya, the regime under Muammar Guaddafi showed little respect for citizen's physical integrity rights and was able to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict from its outset until the year 2011. Similarly, Zimbabwe has not seen armed conflict since Robert Mugabe came to power, likely also because of at times widespread abuses of human rights[4].

Considering intrastate conflict in isolation establishes a false dichotomy between situations where civilian populations are safe and where they are not. The causes of government repression are as important to be understood in order to be able to develop tools to protect civilians effectively as are the causes of armed conflict. The scholarly

[4]Based on Cingranelli et al. (2014) and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2014c).

Figure 1.3: Government repression in the world.



community acknowledges the importance of explaining why both civil conflicts and repression occur and academic fields that concern themselves with either one of these issues have developed. Existing research has considered the effect of domestic unrest on repression and the effect of repression on subsequent unrest. However, governments' strategic incentives for using repression in order to prevent – as opposed to respond to – unrest altogether are understood little. If pre-emptive government repression is considered, it is usually addressed on the country-level. The idea that repression may be targeted at specific ethnic groups in order to affect their incentives for action has not been tested empirically to date. This thesis analyses government repression targeted at groups in order to *prevent* them from rebelling alongside armed ethnic conflict.

More specifically, this thesis consists of three parts. The first part adds to current understanding of the underlying causes of armed intra-state conflict. It explores the possibility of and mechanism behind armed civil conflicts spreading between countries, a phenomenon that has increasingly drawn attention of researchers in recent years.

Research into the causes of armed intra-state conflict is a vibrant and long-standing academic field and considerable progress has been made towards explaining the occurence of civil wars. For example, we know that the likelihood of intra-state conflict breaking out is influenced by country-specific factors such as a country's economic wealth (for example Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) and actor-specific factors such as economic (Cederman et al., 2011) and political inequality between domestic ethnic groups

(Cederman et al., 2010, 2011). Finally, a more recent research programme has found that conflicts can be contagious between countries (Forsberg, 2008; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008; Gleditsch, 2007) and groups (Bormann and Hammond, 2013; Forsberg, 2013).

The first part of this thesis adds to the understanding of processes of conflict contagion, that is processes by which conflicts in other countries can inspire domestic actors to take up arms against their own government. Conflict contagion has been studied to date mostly as a phenomenon occurring between states that are geographically close to each other. The only exception is Weidmann (2015) who studies whether conflict is contagious between states where populations communicate frequently by cell phone. The first part of this thesis adds to this research agenda by exploring whether international conflict contagion can also occur between geographically distant countries and groups as a result of information flows via mass media. Moreover, this part explores the causal mechanism behind potential conflict contagion via mass media. It argues that groups are inspired to rebel by observing other groups with similar grievances fighting in other countries. This argument is tested empirically using quantitative data and a number of different approaches and operationalisations.

Conflict contagion is a phenomenon that has come to the forefront of academic and public interest as a result of recent developments in the context of the Arab spring. However, older examples of collaboration and identification between groups in different countries can be found as well. For example, and as is discussed further in chapter three, the ANC in South Africa was aware of similar struggles all over the world. Moreover, it has been reported that ETA in Spain had links with and received training from the provisional IRA in Ireland (Coogan, 2002). Similarly, when Kurdish leader Öcalan was captured in 1999, Fatah officials reportedly protested alongside other Palestinians in his support (Anatolia news agency, 1999). These demonstrations may have been triggered in part by the suspicion that Israel was involved in Öcalans capture (on the latter point see Budeiri, 1999) but there are also signs of a deeper identification of Palestinians with the Kurds. For example, an Associated Press Worldstream article about one of these demonstrations states that "[s]ome of the protesters said there was a special bond between the Palestinians and the Kurds." A protester is quoted as saying: "Öcalan 'leads a liberation movement and we, the Palestinians, are part of the

international liberation movements"' (Budeiri, 1999).

In addition, the case of Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict introduced above may be a case of conflict contagion by inspiration. The Tamils, an ethnic minority group in Sri Lanka, felt that government policies like for example the change of the official language to Sinhala, the language of the ethnic majority, were discriminatory against them. These perceptions fuelled the demand for the state to be transformed to a federal system, but "(...) in 1976, encouraged by the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan and the creation of the state of Bangladesh, the FP transformed itself into the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) and began to push for a separate Tamil or *Eelam* state[5]. Campaigning on this platform at the elections of 1977, the TULF won a majority of seats in the northern province (...)" (Samaranayake, 2007, 173, italics in the original). An ethnic insurgency began in the mid-1970s (Samaranayake, 2007), but only in 1984 the 25 battle deaths threshold has been crossed (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2014c). Samaranayake (2007, 174) suggests that the Bangladeshi case "(...) while also showing what could be achieved by armed struggle indicated, too, the possibility that the Indian government might be persuaded to take up the Tamil cause as it had that of the people of East Bengal". However, it could also be that the increase in violence in the Sri Lankan case was inspired by the Bangladeshi conflict more generally because of shared grievances. After all, reasons for Bangladeshi calls for autonomy in the 1960s was that "[t]he area of East Pakistan (...) suffered marginalisation and economic neglect from the main Pakistani entity (...)" as well as "linguistic issues" (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2014c). Similarly, DeVotta argues that the experience of ethnic discrimination as such "(...) together with the numerous "liberation" clashes taking place in the Third World and Bangladesh's independence in 1971 inspired Tamil youth to believe eelam was realizable, especially if India supported its creation" (DeVotta, 2009, 1027).

The second part of this thesis adds to current knowledge about the causes of government repression against the domestic population by testing whether repression is not only used to punish collective action post facto but also to prevent armed conflict from breaking out altogether. If that is the case, the interpretation of the absence of civil war as a situation of relative security for civilians is incorrect. Again, quantitative

[5]However, talk about secession was present in the party already since the 1960s (Samaranayake, 2007).

data as well as a number of different specifications are considered to empirically test the argument.

Contrary to conflict contagion research which is a relatively recent academic field, the study of government repression is an established academic endeavour. While some have focused on structural factors such as the role of the regime type, others have focused on the interaction between the government and the domestic opposition (for an overview see Davenport, 2007a). Repression is usually seen as a reaction of the government to actions of the domestic opposition such as protest or the use of violence. This thesis explores the relationship between repression and conflict from a different angle: It considers whether repression is also used by governments in an attempt to prevent conflict, that is against groups that are conflict-prone without actually engaging in conflict. For this, I argue that repression is targeted at *specific* domestic actors and the specific likelihood with which they are expected to engage in conflict. Quantitative data on group-specific repression levels is used to empirically test this argument. This approach differs greatly from existing empirical approaches to repression that tend to consider repression as a country-level phenomenon and are usually tested on the country-level (on the latter point see Hill and Jones, 2014). There are many cases of group repression without actual group action. For example, the Baha'is in Iran are a heavily repressed group between 1996 and 2003, the time period under scrutiny in the analyses on government repression in this thesis, even though they have neither engaged in protest nor rebellion. This group could be expected to have reason for rebellion as it faces severe ethnic discrimination (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009).

Finally, with one exception, events in other countries tend to be ignored as potential explanations of government repression (Danneman and Ritter, 2014). However, if conflicts are contagious and if governments are keen to counter threats with repression before they materialise – as is argued in the first and second part of this thesis – , it follows that governments should react with repression to foreign events they expect may have an effect on domestic groups (also see Danneman and Ritter, 2014). The third part of this thesis builds on the foregoing analyses and findings. Here I argue that governments have incentives to react with pre-emptive violence to processes by which they expect foreign conflicts to be contagious to domestic actors. More specifically, I analyse empirically whether information about conflicts by similarly aggrieved groups

or their successes in other countries trigger government reaction against domestic aggrieved groups. Again, quantitative data and research methods are used to answer this question.

This thesis offers three contributions to the study of political violence. Firstly, current conflict contagion literature considers geographical proximity as the main transmission channel for conflict contagion. This thesis explores whether information flows via mass media are also sufficient transmission channels for the contagion of armed conflict. Moreover, it disentangles the mechanism behind information-based conflict contagion by operationalising grievance-based inspiration processes explicitly. Secondly, this thesis constitutes the first attempt to test explicitly whether government repression is used as a pre-emptive strategy against specific domestic actors. Finally, the thesis explores whether governments react to the threat of domestic groups' inspiration by foreign events with pre-emptive repression.

This thesis proceeds as follows. The next chapter discusses the literature on the causes of conflict in general and on conflict contagion as such a cause in particular as well as research on the causes of repression. It situates the arguments made here within existing knowledge about these phenomena and further unpacks the contribution of the arguments made and tested in this thesis. Chapter three develops the argument on conflict contagion and presents the empirical analysis of the contagion argument. Chapter four develops an argument about government repression as a result of the threat posed by specific domestic actors and tests it empirically. Chapter five develops the argument that governments react with preventive repression to foreign events that may cause conflict under the mechanisms introduced in chapter three and test this assertion. The final chapter discusses the findings of this thesis as well as limitations and open questions that provide opportunities for fruitful future research agendas.

Chapter 2

Literature review

Introduction

This thesis consists of three parts. The first part analyses the effect of information about foreign conflicts on the likelihood of domestic conflict. Here, the argument is that information about foreign conflicts that is transmitted via mass media can inspire groups with similar grievances like the foreign group in conflict to take up arms. The second part analyses the concept of repression as a pre-emptive strategy. In this part I argue that governments use group-specific repression to strike a perfect balance between domestic groups' costs and benefits for fighting in order to prevent them from taking up arms in the most efficient way. The third part analyses government reactions to information about foreign conflicts transmitted via mass media in order to prevent domestic unrest. I argue here that governments are aware of the mechanism discussed in the first part and use repression in order to prevent conflict contagion altogether. This chapter provides an overview over scientific literature on armed conflict and government repression and pinpoints the contribution that is offered by the three empirical studies that form this thesis.

Conflict contagion literature

A large and long-standing body of scientific literature is devoted to uncovering the causes of armed intrastate conflict and considerable progress has been made towards understanding factors underlying the outbreak of armed conflict in a country. Firstly, a number of structural factors are known to increase the likelihood of armed conflict within states. Armed conflicts are routinely found to be more likely in states that are less

wealthy (for example Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Similarly, states' regime type has been found to be linked to armed conflict (for example Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). A second strand of conflict research focuses on characteristics of specific actors within states, usually ethnic groups. It has been found that relative disadvantages of groups, both with respect to state power and economic wealth, increase the likelihood of armed conflict (for example Cederman et al., 2010, 2011; Buhaug et al., 2014).

In recent years, conflict research has become increasingly interested in the effect that events in other states can have on the likelihood of domestic actors engaging in armed conflict. The phenomenon by which an armed civil conflict in one state can spread to other states is sometimes described as conflict contagion (for example Braithwaite, 2010). This concept likens armed civil conflict to a disease that can – once broken out in a state – spread to subsequent states (Braithwaite, 2010). This thesis uses the term contagion instead of the term diffusion which appears to be more common in social science literature. Spatial diffusion is defined in Most and Starr (1990, 402) as a phenomenon where "(...) events of a given type in a given polity are conditioned by the occurrence of similar events in other polities at prior points in time." A similar understanding of diffusion has also been introduced by Lake and Rothchild (1998) in the specific context of ethnic conflict. The term contagion is preferred here for this phenomenon as it seems more appropriate in the context of the question why a particular phenomenon in one unit should be contagious to a particular other unit. The term diffusion on the other hand seems to imply the question how far a particular phenomenon can spread through a system.

The first part of this thesis tests whether information flows via mass media can serve as a transmission channel for non-geographic conflict contagion between discriminated groups. The idea that information flows via mass media can trigger ethnic conflict contagion has been advanced by several scholars of conflict (for example Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Kuran, 1998). In addition, the argument that information transmitted by mass media plays a role in the contagion of collective behaviour is supported by empirical studies of protest (for example Hill and Rothchild, 1986; Hill et al., 1998). With the exception of Weidmann (2015), the effect of information flows on the contagion of armed intra-state conflict has not been tested empirically to date. Instead,

quantitative studies of conflict contagion tend to focus on geographic proximity as the transmission channel underlying the contagion of conflict.

Early studies on contagion phenomena were less committed to the necessity of very close geographic proximity and also included information as a transmission channel. Hill and Rothchild (1986) argue that the contagion of what they call political conflict depends on information flows. They argue that foreign protest can increase a mistreated group's sense of collective identity or provide instruction about strategies to those that are disaffected and contemplate action. They test this argument operationalising potentially contagious protests to be in the same region because they assume those to be more likely to be relevant and more likely to be reported about in the media (drawing on others such as Katz and Wedell, 1977). They find that collective protest spreads within geographic regions to countries with a large amount of radios and a previous history of conflict. When restricting the sample to Africa only, on the other hand, radios decrease the likelihood of contagion in such situations. They argue that this is because of government control of the media in many African countries. Similarly, and using the Minorities at Risk data, Gurr (1993) finds evidence for conflict contagion between similar groups in the same region but not for contagion between ethnic kin around the world. Here, the author argues that a group's collective action can be strategically instructive to other groups that are similar because there are direct links between disadvantaged groups.

In recent years, the interest in conflict contagion has been renewed and the focus on close geographic proximity as the transmission channel underlying conflict contagion has increased. Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008) and Gleditsch (2007) find armed conflict to be contagious between close-by states. When Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008) weight foreign conflicts by inverse distance as opposed to direct proximity, on the other hand, they don't find such an effect. They find contagion between neighhbours to be a function of ethnic kinship ties across borders and of territorial conflicts. Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) argue and find refugee flows from direct neighbour states to increase the likelihood of conflict. Refugee flows from further away countries on the other hand do not have such an effect. Other studies explore contagion only in the context of neighbour states. For example, Fox (2004) finds conflict contagion between groups with the same religion in direct neighbour states. Forsberg (2008) finds such contagion between

adjacent states in the presence of ethnic polarisation in the receiving country as well as when there are kinship ties between one of the conflict groups and an ethnic group in the neighbouring country.

As a result of the recent trajectory of conflict contagion research, considerable knowledge has been accumulated about mechanisms underlying conflict contagion between neighbour states. The non-geographic contagion of conflict, on the other hand, has barely been explored. The only exception is Weidmann (2015) who tests empirically whether ethnic conflicts spread between countries where populations communicate directly with each other. The author uses data on phone connections and finds the expectation to be supported.

The first part of this thesis constitutes the first attempt to empirically explore the role of information flows via mass media in conflict contagion processes, a transmission channel that has been suggested but not empirically tested by conflict scholars.

Aside from analysing contagion via mass media, the first part of this thesis also aims at unpacking the causal mechanism behind information-based conflict contagion. In order to identify conflict contagion, it is important to uncover specific mechanisms underlying contagion processes. While the mechanisms underlying geographic contagion are well understood, we know little about mechanisms underlying non-geographic, information-based contagion. This thesis tests the argument that conflicts addressing the grievance of ethnic discrimination are contagious to countries where parts of the population are disadvantaged in similar ways because they raise awareness of systematic discrimination and the intent behind it.

Similar arguments about the role of similar grievances in conflict contagion mechanisms have been made before (for example Byman and Pollack, 2007), albeit to the best of the author's knowledge to date they have not been tested in a large-n study. Following Kuran (1998), this thesis focuses on ethnic discrimination as the potential grievance that can trigger conflict contagion because foreign conflicts can raise awareness of the grievance itself and government intent. Ethnic discrimination has been found to be closely associated with armed conflict in previous quantitative research (Cederman et al., 2010). In addition, some have discussed the importance of actors' awareness of grievances and government intent for collective action. Gurr (2000, 71) argues that overt discrimination coupled with group disadvantage provides strong in-

centives for action "(...) because the combination focuses (...) resentment on the agents of discrimination." Similarly, Buhaug et al. (2014) note the importance of groups' awareness of the issue itself, its injustice and the responsibility of the government for economic inequality to trigger conflict (also drawing on Gamson, 1992). They also note that the political exclusion of groups leads to conflict via "a sense of moral outrage" (Buhaug et al., 2014, 421).

Weidmann (2015) discusses a number of theoretical arguments that predict conflict contagion via information flows, including the suggestion that ethnic groups may become more aware of their own discrimination and its injustice as a result of information about discriminated foreign groups in conflict. However, Weidmann's research design does not allow distinguishing this argument from other ones like for example the notion of strategic learning that he also discusses. The author acknowledges that "[t]he strong effect I find for international phone calls attests to the importance of communication as a strong factor affecting the risk of violence. Arguably, the analysis provided can say little as regards the precise mechanisms that account for this effect (...)" (Weidmann, 2015, 2).

In sum, it is not known empirically whether foreign events can indeed change groups' view of their own situation thereby adding to their sense of injustice and moral outrage. The first part of this thesis helps unpacking the mechanism behind Weidmann (2015)'s initial findings by operationalising and testing the grievance-based mechanism more explicitly. Moreover, the first part of this thesis contributes to our understanding of the role of groups' perceptions and their stability on the likelihood of conflict more generally.

Repression literature

A rich empirical literature on government repression has found that the use of repressive measures is both explained by structural factors such as the regime type and by the amount of domestic dissent governments face at specific points in time (for example Regan and Henderson, 2002; Gartner and Regan, 1996) for overviews see (Davenport, 2007a; Hafner-Burton, 2013). Moreover, a number of studies has focused on legal institutions (for a recent overview see Hill and Jones, 2014). This research agenda has been enriched by a number of recent studies that focus explicitly on the strategic

interaction between governments and the domestic opposition (for example Shellman, 2006; Carey, 2006; Pierskalla, 2010).

Repression as a targeted and pre-emptive measure

There are a number of studies that have found repression to be the result of some form of materialised domestic opposition that threatens the regime (for example Regan and Henderson, 2002; Davenport, 1995). The purpose of such reactive repression is "(...) to neutralize political opponents and/or increase the costs of the behavior to such a large extent that it is no longer deemed a worthwhile strategy of protest" (Davenport, 1995, 685). Repression is expected to deter collective action and violence but governments await the manifestation of dissent before they retaliate with repression.

Literature on the interaction between government and opposition portrays actors as reactive to their opponent's previous action as well. Carey (2006) argues that dissent triggers government repression and government repression triggers dissent and finds empirical support for this expectation. Shellman (2006) argues that government as well as dissident leaders need to reduce audience costs as well as opponent costs and the cost of their action itself in their interaction. Government and group move simultaneously and each actor attempts to match the other's action with a cost-efficient response. Actors use outcomes from the previous round to guide their actions. In that sense, a government is not reactive as it moves at the same time as the opponent and not afterwards. However, it is reactive as it uses information about the opponent's previous action to decide on its current action. In addition, in this model the government tries to match the opponent's action but cannot prevent it.

Similarly, drawing on Lichbach (1987)[1], Moore (2000) develops a model to explain governments' reaction to dissent. The government chooses repression and accommodation in response to the cost that the dissident group has imposed on it. If the group reacts to government repression with costly violence, the government switches its policy towards more accommodation and vice versa. The author finds empirical support for this argument in an analysis of the cases of Sri Lanka and Peru. In this model, the

[1]Lichbach (1987) develops a substitution model of opposition tactics in order to explain dissident reaction to government repression. He argues that the opposition is more inclined to use more effective tactics and less inclined to use tactics that government repression is targeted at. If a government targets the more effective tactic with repression, the group will substitute it with a larger amount of the less repressed tactic. This argument is based on the assumption that opposition groups rationally maximise the benefits of their rebellious action while minimising the costs.

government exclusively reacts to the dissident group's previous action as well and does not take potential future actions of the group into account.

Finally, using a game-theoretic approach, Pierskalla (2010) assumes the government to choose between repression and accommodation in reaction to an opponent's initial decision to protest. After the government's action, the group decides on whether or not to escalate the dispute by rebelling. While accommodation disincentivises the opponent to rebel in response, repression has no impact on the opponent's subsequent decision on whether to fight the government. In the simplest version of the game, repression does not only not have a deterring effect on rebellion but is in fact also not necessary to deter protest[2]. Thus, here, repression is not a pre-emptive strategy that influences subsequent events.

While in empirical repression studies government repression has almost exclusively been explored as a reactive tool, literature on social movements and protest routinely suggests that government repression can increase the cost of action and in some cases that governments use pre-emptive repression for this reason. Tilly (1978, 100) defines repression as "[a]ny action by another group which raises the contender's cost of collective action." He argues that repression is mainly a function of groups' interests and the degree to which they diverge from the government's interest. In addition, he argues that repression is targeted at specific groups. Lohmann (2004) suggests that governments react to past protest with repression because past protest offers incentives for future protests and repression increases the cost of action. Karklins and Petersen (1993) discuss governments' use of pre-emptive repression (albeit in reaction to initial levels of mobilisation) and the deterring effect of repression in case studies on collective action in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Lawrence (2010, 102) argues that governments use repression against the leadership of nationalist movements "(...) precisely to undermine the movement and destroy its ability to organize effectively." She suggests this was the case during the French empire. However, these actions were a response to initial levels of mobilisation as opposed to purely pre-emptive. Finally, Earl (2006) discusses her earlier argument that instead of focusing on government repression, research should be focusing on protest control in a wider sense. This widening of the research agenda will shift focus towards the possibility that "[p]rotest control may be occurring

[2]This is because it is assumed that governments that are weak have a high cost of repression.

long before insurgency is evident. In fact, protest control may play an important role as a switchman, effectively preventing protest mobilization around some grievances and ineffectively allowing some troubles to boil into protest. (...) Protest control occurs at all points across a movement–it does not just affect in-progress protest; it affects whether movements form, how they mobilize, and then the extent to which they mobilize" (Earl, 2004, 77) cited in (Earl, 2006, 130).

In sum, in literature on collective protest, repression is seen to some degree as a pre-emptive tool. However, while this literature discusses and identifies empirical occurrences of various degrees of pre-emptive repression geared to deter subsequent action, its aim is to analyse the occurrence of collective action and not when and to what degree governments use repression pre-emptively. Therefore, albeit the notion of pre-emptive repression is far from novel, to the author's knowledge the pre-emptive aspect of government repression has rarely been explicitly analysed empirically.

There are few empirical studies where repression has been analysed as an explicitly pre-emptive strategy. In a study on regime type and drawing on earlier case studies, Ross (2001) suggests that resource rich states could be more likely to be repressive as they have the capacity to repress in order to prevent demands. He finds some support for this assertion in the case of oil rich states.

Danneman and Ritter (2014, 258) argue that governments use repression in order to prevent the spillover of violent conflict from close-by states before domestic violence has materialised because "[p]reemptive repression makes it more difficult for the group to act and alters its expected utility calculations (...)". They find empirical support for this argument on the country-level. The finding that governments monitor foreign events that increase the likelihood of domestic groups rebelling and react with pre-emptive violence suggests that they should do the same with domestic threats.

Moreover, Herreros and Criado (2009) argue and find that during the Spanish Civil War, the rebels were using targeted repression in the territories they controlled in order to counter perceived threats and pre-empt rebellion against their rule. Similarly, Wood et al. (2012) argues that governments use violence against groups because they perceive them as a threat and that this violence increases as a result of foreign intervention in genocides – at least in the short term – as they increase the perception of this threat. They find support for this hypothesis.

Finally, Nordas and Davenport (2013) argue explicitly that governments have incentives to use repression to prevent rebellion. According to them, the youth can be identified by the government as a high threat group and therefore using repression against them for pre-emptive purposes is cost-efficient. They test this assertion and find that governments in states with youth bulges are more likely to use repression.

In sum, even though the idea that repression is used to pre-empt action is far from new, to the best of the author's knowledge the use of pre-emptive repression against specific domestic ethnic groups with the goal to prevent them from engaging in violent collective action has never been tested empirically. This thesis aims to fill this gap by investigating whether governments use repression against domestic ethnic groups as a result of these groups' incentives for rebelling in the near future.

Repression and foreign events

A considerable body of literature analyses countries' decisions to join international human rights regimes and the effect of international treaties on human rights. For a recent overview over this body of literature see Hafner-Burton (2012). A number of studies have found that states are more likely to ratify certain types of human rights treaties if close-by states do so (for example Simmons, 2009) but as Hafner-Burton (2012, drawing on others) notes, there is no consensus about what types of rights this behaviour exactly extends to. With respect to the effect of international human rights treaties, a number of studies have found no effect on states' human rights record while others find some evidence of positive effects conditional on other factors and some even find negative effects (for an overview see for example Hafner-Burton, 2012).

While a large body of literature analyses the effect of international regimes on repression, the interest in the effect of events in foreign states that has emerged in conflict research in recent years has not been paralleled in repression research. Instead, the actions of governments in response to foreign events are widely ignored for explaining repression (Danneman and Ritter, 2014). There are few exceptions that take the role of governments in conflict contagion processes at least implicitly into account.

Braithwaite (2010) finds that states that are more capable can prevent conflict breaking out as a result of conflict in a neighbour state. However, this paper does not explicitly test whether state capacity has a deterring effect on conflict onset as it

increases the expected cost of attempted rebellion or whether governments take active measures to prevent contagion at which more capable governments are more successful.

Hill and Rothchild (1986) find that in African countries the presence of radios actually decreases the likelihood of the contagion of unrest from other countries. They explain this finding by governments using the radio in order to prevent spill-overs of conflict from other countries. Again, however, it is not entirely clear here whether governments do indeed actively attempt to influence information to prevent spill-overs or whether there is another reason for this observation.

Byman and Pollack (2007, 35) suggest explicitly that governments are aware of external events: in the context of the suggested tendency for secessionism to be copied elsewhere they state that "[r]epressive regimes make this claim frequently to justify harsh actions against internal dissent (...)".

Similarly, in the context of democratisation in post-soviet states, Beissinger (2007) argues that elites learn from the example of successful rebellions in other states. He finds evidence for elites both learning how to oppose rebellion more effectively and officials becoming increasingly likely to defect in expectation of regime change, depending on the timing of a particular rebellion in the overall wave of democratisation. The finding that elites react explicitly to external events in the context of democratisation suggests that the same may hold with respect to other contexts as well.

Danneman and Ritter (2014) are the first to explicitly test whether governments actively try to prevent spill-overs of civil conflicts from other countries to their territory by way of repression. According to the authors, their study is the first attempt to address this gap in two established bodies of literature: They provide insight into whether repression is also influenced by external developments and they investigate the role that governments could potentially play in processes of conflict contagion. They find that governments repress their population as a result of armed civil conflict in close-by countries. Cultural proximity to other states or similarities in regime type on the other hand are not found to be drivers of such contagion processes. While providing valuable insight into the role that direct geographic proximity of conflict plays in governments' reasoning, this study does not consider arguments about inspiration processes between groups. Are governments only worried about close-by states or do they also react to

conflicts that might inspire domestic groups? Inspiration takes place on the group level and thus some groups are more susceptible than others. Do governments target those groups in particular? As Danneman and Ritter (2014)'s study is conducted on the country level, it does not provide insight into these questions. I aim to fill this gap by testing the argument that governments pre-emptively repress groups they expect to become inspired by foreign conflicts.

The question of whether governments react to conflicts in other countries is not only important in order to find an additional determinant of government behaviour towards the domestic population but also because the behaviour of the government towards groups to which foreign conflicts might be contagious could play a role in determining the outbreak of conflict itself. In that sense, government reactions to external conflicts could give important insights into the process of conflict contagion as well, an angle that has been largely ignored in contagion literature. To date, it has been established that governments react with pre-emptive repression to close-by conflicts but it is not clear whether they react to these conflicts because they fear particular mechanisms by which specific domestic groups might become inspired or whether they react to any form of unrest close-by with increases in repression against the entire domestic population. I address this question here by suggesting two mechanisms of inspiration, one based on similar grievance and one based on successful outcomes, to which governments might react by targeting their repression at specific groups they expect to be inspired.

Repression and discrimination

This thesis uses ethnic discrimination to explain government repression. Accordingly, they are seen as conceptually distinct. I follow Cederman et al. (2010)'s definition of ethnic discrimination. Here, an ethnic group is considered to be discriminated if "[g]roup members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted discrimination, with the intent of excluding them from both regional and national power. Such active discrimination can be either formal or informal" (Cederman et al., 2010, 101). On the other hand, "[b]y most accounts, repression involves the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring

specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions" (Davenport (2007a, 2) drawing on Goldstein (1978, xxvii)). Davenport (2007a, 2) suggests that repressive behaviour is not coercion to prevent crime but rather "(...) applications of state power that violate First Amendment-type rights, due process in the enforcement and adjudication of law, and personal integrity or security." This definition explicitly excludes unequal access to resources as a form of repression (Davenport, 2007a). In addition, I explicitly exclude unequal access to power from the definition.

Discrimination is a group's exclusion from power. Discrimination can deprive a group from resources that can be redistributed by the state to other groups (Cederman et al. (2010) drawing on Wimmer (2002), Wimmer (2002)). In that sense, excluding groups is an end that can be beneficial to governments in and of itself. Repression, on the other hand, requires the state to use resources (see for example Davenport, 2007b). Therefore, states should only have an incentive to use repression against a group if repression contributes to a beneficial end from the point of view of a government such as for example tranquility[3] but not as an end in and of itself. In other words, repression is conceptualised here as a means for a state to achieve wanted outcomes[4].

To the best of the author's knowledge, the relationship between ethnic discrimination and government repression has not been investigated empirically in a large-n study to date. However, using discrimination to approximate the likelihood for conflict, as is done here, is in line with attempts in the repression literature to operationalise the potential for dissent using measures such as population (for an overview see Ritter and Conrad, forthcoming, 13).

Repression and conflict

This thesis studies repression as a tool to prevent conflict on the actor-level and thus adds considerably to our understanding of the interdependence of the two phenomena (on interdependence see Carey, 2006). To date, although it is widely assumed that the two phenomena are closely linked, the actual links remain somewhat evasive.

It is fairly well-established in repression literature that high levels of dissent

[3] According to Davenport (2007b), order is the primary reason for states to use repression.

[4] See Davenport (2007b) for an overview over positions where repression is a means towards an end.

(Carey, 2006) lead to government repression. Civil war is found to be the most important predictor of government repression in an analysis comparing a number of explanatory factors for repression (Hill and Jones, 2014), for an overview see Hafner-Burton (2013). However, as Hill and Jones (2014) note, there is some definitional overlap between civil war and repression as non-combatant victims of the government are included in repression measures.

On the other hand, the effect of government repression on subsequent violence is much more controversial. Empirical studies have both found that repression encourages dissent (Carey, 2006) and that high levels of repression deter violent dissent but only in autocracies (Gupta et al., 1993). To the best of the author's knowledge, conflict research has not considered the actual effect of repression on armed conflict. The only exception is Walter (2006) who finds that repression increases groups' likelihood of forming an armed self-determination movement.

One reason for why repression is not included in studies of armed conflict may be the underlying endogeneity that results if indeed repression affects conflict and conflict affects repression. However, exploring the relationship is of utmost importance to understand both phenomena better. This thesis contributes to knowledge about this relationship. It argues that and tests whether repression is used to deter conflicts, that is that a high threat of conflict can lead to high repression. The analyses introduced here allow inference about states' knowledge of causes of conflicts as well as their readiness to counter these causes. If states have such knowledge and act to prevent conflict, studies finding a provoking effect of repression on subsequent violence may in fact reflect a failed preventive rather than a provoking logic. Moreover, the effect of factors known to cause conflict may in part reflect government actions to prevent conflict that are more successful under some conditions than others. Thus, knowledge of whether and when repression is used pre-emptively is of fundamental importance to further understand the relationship between government repression and opposition violence.

Conclusion

This thesis aims to investigate whether armed conflict spreads between states as a result of shared grievances and whether government repression is used to prevent armed ethnic conflict. Both phenomena have severe negative effects on civilians and knowledge

about their causes is important in order to prevent them from occurring. In particular, understanding whether repression is not only used as a reactive but also as a prospective tool that is targeted at specific domestic actors will add to our ability to explain and predict governments' use of repression. This knowledge allows the international community to identify groups whose civilians are in danger of being targeted with government repression in order to be able to monitor and deter such actions.

Of course, if repression indeed deters rebellion – and as noted above, whether that is the case is empirically far from clear – preventing government repression that is targeted at preventing conflict may lead to the actual outbreak of armed conflict and thus have an unexpected negative effect on civilian populations. Therefore, the question on the effect of government repression on subsequent violence remains an important field of investigation. After all, if repression increases the likelihood of violence, communicating this information to repressive states may decrease the use of repression for preventive reasons. However, in order to know whether communicating this is a strategy that will reduce repression, it is important to know whether governments use repression for pre-emptive reasons. On the other hand, if repression indeed deters violence – or at least as long as governments believe so and use repression for that reason – instead of exclusively focusing on deterring government repression it may be necessary for the international community to offer governments alternative ways to prevent conflict. One such way could be decreasing the exclusion of ethnic groups from access to resources. For this, the international community could consider providing governments with resources that could be distributed to discriminated groups.

This chapter has reviewed relevant literature on both armed civil conflict and government repression and situated the contributions made by the arguments and empirical analyses offered in this thesis in existing literature. The next three chapters of this thesis will introduce and empirically test the three arguments on conflict contagion and pre-emptive government repression that are advanced in this thesis.

Chapter 3

Conflict contagion

Introduction

Recent global developments such as the wave of uprisings that spread through the Arab world in the context of the Arab spring and the Occupy movement serve as forceful reminders that collective action can be contagious across state borders. The contagion of armed conflict between countries has increasingly become a subject of interest for scholars of conflict. However, while considerable knowledge has been accumulated about the tendency for armed conflict to spread to close-by states (for example Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008), little is known about non-geographic transmission channels of conflict contagion and about the mechanisms behind conflict contagion via non-geographic channels. Understanding all mechanisms by which conflicts can be transmitted to other countries is of fundamental importance in order to be able to either prevent conflict contagion or to prepare and plan measures to alleviate the suffering of civilian populations beforehand.

A recent study finds that ethnic conflict can be transmitted between countries if populations communicate frequently via telephone (Weidmann, 2015). Weidmann (2015) is the first study to explore the spread of armed conflict via information flows and thus substantively widens current knowledge about conflict contagion. However, Weidmann (2015) does not explore the actual mechanism accounting for conflicts spreading as a result of communication. This chapter adds to our knowledge of information-based conflict contagion by exploring the underlying mechanism by which conflicts can spread through information networks. I argue that information about foreign conflicts involving groups that are ethnically discriminated increases the sense

of grievance amongst groups that are are disadvantaged in similar ways. This argument builds upon Kuran (1998) and is also suggested as one potential mechanism for information-based conflict contagion in Weidmann (2015). However, while Weidmann does not test this argument, this chapter operationalises and tests the grievance-based argument specifically. In addition, this chapter explores the role of information transmitted via mass media as opposed to direct communication in conflict contagion processes.

I find evidence supporting the argument on a contagious effect of armed conflict on countries where groups have similar grievances like the challenger in the original conflict. Thus, grievance-based inspiration seems to be one of the mechanisms underlying information-based contagion processes. The availability of media sources such as radios is found to be important for this process to take place. Other factors that were expected to also play a role for information flows via mass media such as media freedom are not found to be important for conflict contagion under the mechanism tested here. Thus, the chapter finds some evidence that information via mass media contributes to contagion processes.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the argument and the third section discusses the data and methods used to test the argument empirically. Section four presents empirical results and section five introduces a number of robustness test before section six concludes.

The argument

Ethnic grievance and foreign inspiration

Previous research finds that ethnic discrimination increases the likelihood of armed conflict (for example Cederman et al., 2010). An ethnic group is discriminated if "[g]roup members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted discrimination, with the intent of excluding them from both regional and national power. Such active discrimination can be either formal or informal" (Cederman et al., 2010, 101). I argue that ethnic discrimination only provides a group with an incentive to rebel against the government, if a group is collectively aware of its grievance (for example Buhaug et al., 2014; Cederman et al., 2011) and recognises that the grievance is the result of inten-

tional actions by the government[1].

For discriminatory practices against an ethnic group to translate into a grievance strong enough to trigger collective group action[2], group members need to have a clear picture of the actual severity of the disadvantages resulting from discriminatory policies[3]. In order to perceive a group-specific grievance, they also need to be aware of the targeting of discriminatory policies at group members in particular (Klandermans et al., 2001)[4]. If the grievance is not perceived as specific to the group, it is unlikely that mobilisation will take place along ethnic lines[5]. For example, if group members came to believe that the disadvantages members experience are a result of class differences, mobilisation should take place along class lines. Even if group members are collectively aware of their group-specific disadvantage, this may not be sufficient for perceiving a grievance. It is also important that group members have a clear sense of the unjust nature of this disadvantage (also see Buhaug et al., 2014; Cederman et al., 2011). It is possible that groups are aware of disadvantages without being fully aware of the injustice thereof if current circumstances are justified in a credible way. For example, Wood (2003) finds that the conflict in El Salvador was the result of an increasing awareness of the injustice of the labour system and a god given duty to resist that were propagated by agents of the catholic church. Similarly, Gurr (1993, 164) notes that for example "Afro-American minorities in Latin America seemingly accept dominant groups' myth that Luso-Hispanic societies are benignly color-blind." Thus, in sum, for an ethnic group to perceive a group-specific grievance that can result in collective action, group members need to be collectively aware of the disadvantages they face, of the ethnically specific nature of these disadvantages and of the injustice of the current system.

However, even if an ethnic group perceives an ethnically specific grievance that provides a strong incentive for collective action to improve the situation of group mem-

[1] Also see Gurr (2000) and Buhaug et al. (2014), drawing on Gamson (1992), in the context of economic inequality.

[2] See for example Gurr (1993) on the notion that objective disadvantage translates into grievance and on the need of strong grievances for action.

[3] Also see Buhaug et al. (2014), drawing on Gamson (1992), in the context of economic inequality.

[4] Also see Buhaug et al. (2014), drawing on Gamson (1992), in the context of economic inequality; Cederman et al. (2011), drawing on Hogg and Abrams (1988).

[5] Also see Cederman et al. (2011), drawing on Hogg and Abrams (1988); see Martin (1986) for an overview over literature arguing that and investigating whether group grievance causes group action.

bers, different courses of action are possible. For a group to choose action against the government in an attempt to overcome their grievance, group members need to be aware of the government's culpability (Buhaug et al., 2014), drawing on (Gamson, 1992), in the context of economic inequality; also see (Gurr, 2000)[6]. After all, if a group perceives an ethnic grievance as not being caused by government actions, it might not come to the conclusion that struggle against the government is necessary to overcome the grievance. For example, if group members believe that their specific disadvantages stem from the backwardness of the region the group resides in and that the government is trying to solve these structural problems, they might come to the conclusion that disadvantages will resolve over time. Similarly, if group members believe that foreign actors are to be blamed for their situation, they might decide to take actions against them.

How can groups' awareness of their grievance and its causes change? Observing foreign discriminated groups mobilise against the government to improve their position can increase such awareness amongst domestic discriminated groups (Weidmann, 2015)[7]. Kuran (1998) argues that discourses about ethnic discrimination in other societies can lead to an increasing focus on the issue in a country. This can lead ethnic groups to "(...) start blaming their own disappointments on other ethnic groups" (Kuran, 1998, 50) which can in turn result in ethnic conflict[8]. He also argues that information flows transmitted by mass media play a role in this process.

Following Kuran (1998) and Weidmann (2015), I argue that information about conflicts involving foreign ethnically discriminated groups increase awareness of targeted discrimination, of the intent with which this policy is enforced among domestic groups and of the injustice thereof. As a result, the perceived grievance of ethnic discrimination and the expectation that violence against the government is necessary to overcome the grievance increase. The theoretical argument is illustrated in Figure 3.1.

[6]Klandermans et al. (2001) find that trust in the government moderates the formation of grievances in the context of South Africa.

[7]Also see McAdam and Rucht (1993) on the adoption of problem definitions and identities in the context of diffusion from the US New Left to its German counterpart as well as for example Elkins and Simmons (2005)' argument that decision makers can learn from countries with similar visible characteristics.

[8]Kuran (1998) does not explicitly argue that the grievance that will be perceived as ethnic by the inspired population needs to be ethnic in the first place but I take his argument to imply that such demonstration is most likely if there exists ethnic discrimination among potentially inspired groups.

Figure 3.1: The link between a foreign conflict over discrimination, a domestic group's discrimination and anti-government action.



The theoretical argument implies that, empirically, a larger number of conflicts involving discriminated groups in other countries should increase the likelihood of conflict in countries where groups are discriminated against as long as the domestic population gains information about the foreign conflicts. The higher the number of domestic discriminated groups, the higher the probability of at least one of them taking action. Thus, we can derive the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis: Armed conflicts of ethnically discriminated groups in countries J should increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset within a country i more, the more discriminated groups there are in country i but only if the population in i gains information about these conflicts.

I argue here that foreign discriminated groups' violent action can be inspirational to *all* other discriminated groups that become aware of it, irrespective of other factors such as geographic proximity or ethnic kinship. But is it realistic to expect that discriminated groups would become aware of and identify with the struggles of other groups with similar grievances in other parts of the world? An example can shed light on this question.

The African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa formed an armed wing in 1961 in order to oppose the Apartheid government. Initially using sabotage, the organisation engaged in full-fledged armed conflict under UCDP criteria from 1981 to 1988, also due to an improved opportunity for violence as a result of the independence of close-by states which offered support (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2014c). In 1971, Oliver Tambo, then President of the ANC (African National Congress), said in a public statement on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the ANC's armed wing:

> "Now let us talk of Freedom,. [sic!] Everywhere in the world today, the oppressed and exploited masses of people are up in arms. (...) They stand for peace and justice: they clamour for an end to imperialist wars; they yearn for the birth of a new order. And to uphold their convictions they are prepared to pay with their own lives. These men, women and children whose lives are massacred in the struggle for liberation are in Vietnam, in Laos, in Khmer, in Thailand; they are in Palestine, in the Sinai peninsula and other Arab lands under Zionist occupation. There are fierce struggles being waged in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau; there are battles in Zimbabwe and Namibia; in Comoro and other islands in the Indian Ocean. Yes, there is a life and death struggle against United States imperialism and its lackeys throughout the Latin American continent" (Tambo, 1971).

Here, identification with foreign struggles is driven by an awareness of a similar grievance or goal, not by ethnic kinship, a common religion or even direct geographic proximity between countries. Instead, it seems that discriminated groups frame their struggle in the context of a wider struggle against oppression including other groups perceived as similarly oppressed elsewhere.

Even though the argument here focuses on the effect of foreign conflicts, it does not imply that domestic conflicts should not have an effect on other domestic groups' conflict likelihood. One group fighting in a country should be particularly instructive to other domestic groups because information about domestic conflicts is particularly available. However, the study of domestic inspiration is complicated by rival causal mechanisms such as groups learning about their government's behaviour in particular (Walter, 2006) and freeriding between domestic groups with similar goals (Metternich et al., 2013). Which causal mechanism is prevalent in cases of domestic contagion is an important question that would fruitfully be addressed in future research. However,

this question is beyond the scope of this chapter.

In addition, non-violent struggles by ethnically discriminated groups in other countries could increase awareness of ethnic discrimination in a society and thus trigger demonstration effects as well. However, this chapter focuses exclusively on the effect of violent conflict. Investigations into the inspirational effect of nonviolent protest about ethnic discrimination would be a fruitful avenue for future research as well.

Information flows as transmission channel

The causal mechanism suggested here does not require geographic proximity between conflicts and potentially infected countries (also see Weidmann, 2015). Instead, it requires a sufficient number of people in a society to be aware of a particular discriminated group's involvement in conflict elsewhere. Awareness can occur through direct relations and through non-relational channels, for example the mass media[9]. Weidmann (2015) finds initial evidence for the former channel playing a role in the contagion of ethnic conflict. The focus here is on the latter channel.

The likelihood that the domestic population has gained awareness of foreign conflicts via mass media is difficult to determine. Several factors are expected to play a role for information flows between two countries via mass media.

Firstly, the degree to which the population has access to media sources such as radio, print media, TV or the Internet affects the likelihood that a sufficient share of the population in the receiving country gains information about foreign events (also see for example Hill and Rothchild, 1986). As the availability of media sources should increase the likelihood of information about foreign events in a country, the proposition about the empirical implication of the contagion mechanism in the presence of information can be reformulated as an empirically testable hypothesis in the context of media availability.

Hypothesis 1: Armed conflicts of ethnically discriminated groups in countries J should increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset within a country i more, the more discriminated groups there are in country i and the more media sources are available to the population in country i.

[9]See Weidmann (2015) and McAdam and Rucht (1993), drawing on the work of others such as Rogers and Eveland (1981), in the context of general diffusion phenomena.

Secondly, state control of the media can prevent information about conflicts elsewhere from reaching a country or allow the government to frame it in a way that is beneficial for it (Hill and Rothchild, 1986). Therefore, a sufficient degree of openness of the receiving country is expected to be necessary for citizens to gain unbiased information about developments elsewhere through the media. This assertion is supported by the empirical results in Hill and Rothchild (1986). Thus, the empirical proposition derived from the theory can also be formulated as a hypothesis in the context of media freedom as a factor necessary for information to reach a country.

Hypothesis 2: Armed conflicts of ethnically discriminated groups in countries J should increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset within a country i more, the more discriminated groups there are in country i but only if the media in country i are free.

Thirdly, not all countries are equally likely to be covered by the media in different countries. Kuran (1998) suggests that countries that are economically stronger exert a stronger contagious effect on other countries than weaker ones do because they have a greater impact on international information flows. Similarly, Elkins and Simmons (2005) suggest that states are more likely to learn from more prominent countries. Thus, the likelihood of hearing about events in economically stronger countries can be expected to be higher[10]. Accordingly, the proposition can be formulated as a hypothesis in the context of the prominence of the conflict country as a factor increasing the likelihood of a conflict becoming known elsewhere.

Hypothesis 3: Armed conflicts of ethnically discriminated groups in countries J should increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset within a country i more, the more discriminated groups there are in country i and the higher the economic prominence of the conflict countries J.

[10]This expectation is also in line with the notion about the impact of elite nations in Galtung and Ruge (1965)'s prominent study on characteristics of events that increase the likelihood of media attention, even though this article suspects that it may only be of importance in western states. Mowlana (1997, 44-47) provides an overview over research finding that news tend to flow from richer to poorer countries.

Fourthly, there is a geographical element to media coverage: events in more proximate countries are more likely to appear in the media (Hill and Rothchild, 1986), drawing on others such as (Katz and Wedell, 1977); (Mowlana, 1997). However, this factor is somewhat problematic as it is hard to disentangle whether the impact of geographic proximity on conflict contagion is indeed explained by its implications for media coverage, due to direct information-sharing opportunities between close countries or as a result of physical spill-over processes of conflict. Nevertheless, the empirical proposition can be reformulated in the context of capital distance.

Hypothesis 4: Armed conflicts of ethnically discriminated groups in countries J should increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset within a country i more, the more discriminated groups there are in country i and the closer country j is to country i.

Ultimately, all of the factors introduced above are expected to play a role for information flows between two countries via mass media. In particular, media freedom of the receiving country is expected to be a necessary factor for such information flows and as a result the other factors should not be able to exert their effect in the absence of media freedom. High values on media source availability, prominence of the conflict country and proximity between countries on the other hand may not be necessary for information flows between two countries but increase the likelihood of such flows. The main model attempts to test the empirical proposition introduced above in the context of information transmitted by mass media by drawing on all information factors introduced here. Thus, the main model tests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5: Armed conflicts of ethnically discriminated groups in countries J should increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset within a country i more, the more discriminated groups there are in country i and the higher the likelihood that the population in country i gains information about such conflicts in countries J via mass media.

Data and methods

In this section, I introduce the research design used to test the argument that conflicts involving ethnically discriminated groups in other countries can trigger ethnic conflict in countries with discriminated groups if information about these foreign conflicts is available. The units of analysis in this study are country-years. The dataset constructed here covers years from 1949 to 2004.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable takes the value one when at least one ethnic conflict broke out in a country in a given year and zero otherwise. I use data from the Growup database[11]. "For a conflict to be classified as ethnic, armed organizations must both explicitly pursue ethnonationalist aims *and* recruit fighters and forge alliances on the basis of ethnic affiliations" (Cederman et al., 2010, 101). The EPR project requires at least two years below the 25 battle deaths threshold for a year to be counted as a new onset (Hunziker, 2011). Years of ongoing conflict without onsets are assigned the value zero on the dependent variable.

Independent variables

In order to construct measures for testing the hypotheses on the inspirational effect of ongoing conflicts of discriminated groups elsewhere, I start by counting the number of discriminated groups represented in high intensity ethnic conflict by at least one armed group in every country-year[12]. For this I draw on the Growup database. In addition, I include all extrasystemic conflicts in the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2010 (Gleditsch et al., 2002) up until and including the year of independence (Gleditsch and Ward, 2013). In the following I will refer to these conflicts as colonial conflicts for simplicity. There is no data on colonial conflicts in EPR and it is thus not clear in how far groups were discriminated and which ethnic groups were most involved in the uprising against the colonial power. However, I assume that in colonial states the

[11] This database includes data from the Correlates of War State System Membership List v2008.1 (Correlates of War Project, 2008), the Ethnic Power-Relations Dataset Version 2.0 (Cederman et al., 2010), the GeoEPR-ETH Dataset 2.0 (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011), the Non-State Actor Dataset Version 3.1 (Cunningham et al., 2009), the ACD2EPR Docking Dataset (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012), and the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2010 (Gleditsch et al., 2002).

[12] An ethnic group can be represented in several conflicts (Hunziker, 2011) which will all be counted. However, this is very rare.

population in general is politically discriminated as the highest offices are unreachable to them. I only consider conflict years of at least 1000 battle deaths (Harbom, 2010) as inspirational as those are most likely to become known in other countries[13].

In addition, the factors that have been argued to be relevant for information flows between countries above need to be operationalised. The first factor that is expected to enhance information about external events is the availability of media sources in a country i. To operationalise media availability, the average per capita rate of TV and radio is used[14]. Data on the number of radios per capita and the number of TVs per capita is extracted from (Banks, 2011a). To the best of the author's knowledge, the data offered by Banks is the only available quantitative data source on the availability of these media sources. Banks (2011a) combines information from a number of sources such as for example the UN Statistical Yearbook (Banks, 2011b). In addition, some missing data points are filled in by the database using estimates. As the data host acknowledges, the reliability of the data can vary (Banks, 2011c)[15]. I use the natural log of this variable as the average media source rate is skewed.

To operationalize whether the media of a country is free or not, Freedom House Freedom of the Press historical data (Freedom House) is used. The threefold measure of free, partly free and unfree is dichotomized here[16]. Unfree countries are assigned a value of zero and free and partly free ones a value of one as they are expected to be reached by at least some information about external events. The author's own analysis finds some cases of internal inconsistencies in the data. Such cases are excluded from the analysis[17]. Better data on media freedom is not available and thus the author resorts to using this data in order to be able to provide a first exploration of the role of media freedom in conflict contagion processes.

The third factor that is expected to enhance the likelihood of information about

[13] See Mowlana (1997, 52) on earlier studies that find that news about developing countries focus on violence.

[14] For additional information on the coding of this variable see Appendix A.

[15] The data also contains some working estimates that need to be seen with "extreme caution" (Banks, 2011c, 3). However, the predicted probabilities derived from model one on media availability are robust to the exclusion of these estimates. In addition, the author's own analysis shows that there are cases of ten-fold increases or indeed decreases in the per capita rate of a media source in the radio and TV data. However, such cases are rare – .01 per cent of non-missing observations from Banks – and therefore the data is taken at face value without making speculative corrections.

[16] For additional information on the coding of this variable see appendix A.

[17] In addition, the yearly mean of media freedom drops in 1989 which is likely the result of a change in measuring by the data source.

events in a country is economic prominence. Economic prominence of a country j is operationalised by its real GDP per capita (2000 prices) using data from Gleditsch (2002). In the case of colonial conflicts and successes in colonial contexts, I use the GDP of the colonial power.

I also expect that geographic proximity increases the likelihood of information flows between two countries. I operationalise proximity by the inverse of the distance between the capitals of two countries using data extracted from Cshapes (Weidmann et al., 2010). It is expected that capital distance accounts best for the influence of distance on information flows as many media sources and in particular news agencies that redistribute information within countries are likely to be located in capitals and consider events that are closest to them[18].

Finally, and most importantly, an index combining all information-related factors is introduced in an attempt to operationalise the overall likelihood of people in a country i gaining awareness about developments in another country j via mass media. In order to combine logged media availability, GDP of country j and inverse capital distance in one measure they need to be translated to equal scales. For this, percentile scores will be used to assign a score from one to 100 to the values of these variables in each directed dyad[19] and the sum of these scores is used below to weight relevant conflicts. While media availability, proximity and economic strength are expected to increase information and thus can to some degree substitute for each other, a minimum degree of media freedom is considered necessary for information to reach a sufficient number of citizens in a country. Thus, below an interaction between index-weighted high intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups elsewhere and media freedom will be introduced.

As inspirational effects of foreign conflict involvements of discriminated groups are expected to be limited to domestic groups that also experience discrimination, I introduce a variable on the number of domestic discriminated groups of at least five per cent population share using data from the Ethnic Power-Relations Dataset (Cederman et al., 2010). In the following I describe how the variable on domestic discriminated

[18]In the case of etrasystemic conflicts, values on capital distance are interpolated from the first year of independence in pre-independence years.

[19]While percentile scores on media availability have been determined from the entire sample, percentile scores of GDP have been determined separately in each year and percentile scores of inverse capital distance for every country i in each year.

groups in each potentially receiving country, i, is combined with conflict involvements of discriminated groups in other countries, referred to as countries J, and with the information factor in each hypothesis. Table 3.1 gives an overview over the strategies used to test each hypothesis.

To test hypothesis one on the impact of media availability, the number of high intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups in all countries other than a country i are aggregated to a total yearly number. Subsequently, this sum for each country i is interacted with the number of discriminated groups in country i as well as with logged media availability in country i in a triple interaction effect to test the impact of media availability. Similarly, to test hypothesis two on media freedom, a triple interaction effect is introduced between the aggregate number of conflict involvements of discriminated groups elsewhere, the number of discriminated groups in i and press freedom in i.

To test hypothesis three on the impact of the GDP per capita of each country j, I multiply the number of discriminated groups' conflict involvements in each other country j by j's GDP per capita before summing the resulting values of all countries other than i itself in each year. This measure is interacted with the variable on the number of discriminated groups in each country i as well.

Hypothesis four is tested using the inverse capital distance between a country i and a country j to weight conflict involvements in each country other than i before summing them as introduced in the literature on spatial lags (see for example Plümper and Neumayer, 2010). The resulting sum of weighted foreign conflict involvements of discriminated groups for each country i is also interacted with the number of discriminated groups in country i.

And finally, to test the effect of the combined measure operationalising information flows via mass media, I weight conflict involvements of discriminated groups in each country j other than i by the index built from media availability in i, GDP of country j and capital distance between i and j. Subsequently, I interact this measure with the number of discriminated groups in i and press freedom in country i.

The weighted measures[20] are not row-standardised as the theory would expect that

[20]Weighted measures were constructed using the Stata package spmon (Neumayer and Plümper, 2010).

every additional discriminated group engaging in ethnic conflict elsewhere could have an impact on a country as long as society gains information about it, irrespective of how many other events people hear about. This is equivalent to assuming that discriminated groups' awareness of their situation can always become greater.

As endogeneity is a potential problem because influence can be exerted from country i to country j as well as from j to i (Franzese and Hays, 2007; Plümper and Neumayer, 2010) all measures on discriminated groups' conflict involvements are time-lagged by one year to alleviate the problem[21]. To match the variables on inspirational potential, all additional constitutive terms of the interactions introduced above are time-lagged by one year as well.

Table 3.1: Interactions in models 1–5.

Model	Information factor	Interaction terms
1	Media availability	High intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups in J, t-1 * Media availability in i, t-1 * Number of discriminated groups in i, t-1
2	Media freedom	High intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups in J, t-1 * Media freedom in i, t-1 * Number of discriminated groups in i, t-1
3	GDP j	High intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups in J multiplied by GDP of each country j, t-1 * Number of discriminated groups in i, t-1
4	Capital distance	High intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups in J weighted by inverse capital distance between i and j, t-1 * Number of discriminated groups in i, t-1
5	Info index and media freedom	High intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups in J weighted by the information index, t-1 * Media freedom in i, t-1 * Number of discriminated groups in i, t-1

Control variables

Below I discuss control variables that are introduced to prevent confounding (Ray, 2003). Firstly, other close-by conflicts could have an effect on the occurrence of conflicts involving discriminated groups as well as on conflict onset in the country in question. It is important to control for the presence of any close-by conflicts that are not included in the variable on conflicts of discriminated groups. Therefore, I control for whether there was at least one intra-state or colonial conflict in a direct neighbour that does not fulfill the criteria for inclusion in this independent variable of interest. For this I draw on data from the Growup database as well. Whether a country is a direct neighbour is determined using Cshapes (Weidmann et al., 2010) and defining adjacency as a

[21] See Franzese and Hays (2007) for a discussion of shortcomings of this solution and alternatives. The discussion also draws on Beck et al. (2006).

minimum distance of less than ten kilometres between two states[22].

In addition, the regime type could be a confounding factor as it might be causal to variables of interest such as media freedom or political discrimination as well as the likelihood of conflict onset. I use the xpolity measure (Vreeland, 2008) drawing on Polity 4 data (Gurr et al., 1989).

I also control for the natural log of the real GDP per capita from Gleditsch (2002) as this variable might have an impact on the availability of media sources as well as conflict onset. Finally, I control for a country's total population in millions using data from Gleditsch (2002) as more populous countries might have a higher chance of discriminated groups as well as conflict onset.

I also include the year of observation as it might be that the increase in media sources and information flows over time is confounded with other developments over time and as the number of conflicts might follow a time trend as well.

Table 3.2 shows descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analyses.

Estimation and analysis

Only about 1.9 per cent of the country-years between 1950 and 2004 saw the onset of an ethnic conflict. When the event under scrutiny is rare, coefficients estimated using standard logit models are biased and probability calculations following the usual logit formula are problematic (King and Zeng, 2001). I use a rare events logistic regression model to correct for biased coefficients as suggested by King and Zeng (2001) with country-clustered standard errors. In addition, I follow King and Zeng (2001)'s suggestion to simulate probabilities as described for example in King et al. (2000). For this, I use the Stata package developed by Tomz et al. (2003).

It can be expected that the likelihood of ethnic conflict in a given year depends partly on whether there was an ethnic conflict in a country in the year before. Past domestic conflict can also influence additional conflicts elsewhere and might thus be a confounding variable. This time dependency is corrected for by including the number of years since the last ethnic conflict in a country alongside a squared and cubed term (Carter and Signorino, 2010). For this measure, again, I draw on data from the Growup database. In addition, I include a lagged dependent variable as a test sug-

[22] In the case of colonial conflicts in years before independence, again, values on distances are interpolated from the year of independence.

Table 3.2: Variable summary statistics.

Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Foreign high intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups, t-1	2.11	1.43	0	6
Foreign high intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups weighted by GDP, t-1	5555.67	6478.05	0	26351.95
Foreign high intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups weighted by capital distance, t-1	.0006	.0029	0	.1182
Foreign high intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups weighted by info index, t-1	303.11	225.87	0	1160
Natural log of media source availability, t-1	-2.15	1.23	-7.24	1.27
Number of discriminated groups, t-1	.26	.57	0	4
Press freedom dummy, t-1	.60	.49	0	1
Natural log of GDP per capita	8.13	1.11	5.14	11.08
Population (1000000s)	33.45	108.86	.23	1294.85
Xpolity	.73	4.95	-6	7
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1	.42	.49	0	1
Peace years	18.81	15.63	0	55
Year	1979.28	15.56	1949	2004
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1	.02	.14	0	1

gested in Wooldridge (2002)[23] indicates that the peace year terms do not eliminate time dependency in all models.

Table 3.5 gives an overview over the sign and statistical significance of interaction effects introduced in models one through five. To determine significance, I use simulation techniques from King et al. (2000)[24]. I start by simulating the difference in the outcome probability between a scenario with the highest and the lowest occurrence of foreign conflict involvements of discriminated groups at different values of additional interaction variables. I refer to this difference as the inspirational effect of foreign conflict in table 3.5. To evaluate whether the number of discriminated groups has a significant effect on this inspirational effect of foreign conflict, as the theory suggests, I simulate the difference in the strength of this inspirational effect in a scenario with three discriminated groups and a scenario with no such groups. I refer to this difference in table 3.5 as the moderating effect of discriminated groups. In models three and four, conflict involvements are already weighted by the respective information factor and we are only interested in the moderating effect of discrimination on the effect of these weighted conflict involvements. In models one, two, and five, where the respective information factor enters as a third interaction term, we are also interested in whether the interaction between foreign conflicts and domestic discrimination is different in high and low information scenarios. To determine this, I also simulate the difference between the moderating effect of discrimination on the effect of foreign conflict involvements in the respective high and low information scenario. This third layer is referred to as the effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and inspiration in table 3.5[25][26].

Results

In the following I discuss results from models one through five in tables 3.3 and 3.4.

[23] Note that here probabilities were not simulated but calculated using the logit formula.

[24] Unlike suggested in King et al. (2000), I use the median as the point prediction to make results comparable with the Stata package relogitq (Tomz et al., 2003) that is used for predicted probabilities shown below.

[25] Simulations of differences as well as the graphical presentation of results draw on material from Brambor et al. (2006).

[26] In all simulations, I set the control variable on regime type, logged GDP per capita and population size to their respective means. The lagged dependent variable and the variable on conflict in neighbour states are set to zero, the year variable is set to 1990 and the variables on peace years are set to the mean as well as the squared and cubed terms of this value respectively. The models on media availability and

Table 3.3: Ethnic conflict onset depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information factors: media availability and media freedom.

	(1) Media availability	(2) Press freedom
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups, t-1 (Conf)	-0.0467	0.00794
	(0.211)	(0.151)
Natural log of media source availability, t-1 (Media)	-0.347^{+}	
	(0.190)	
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc)	-0.0578	-0.0120
	(0.579)	(0.521)
(Disc)*(Media)	-0.108	
	(0.150)	
(Conf)*(Disc)	0.426*	0.0181
	(0.198)	(0.127)
(Conf)*(Media)	0.00277	
	(0.0692)	
(Disc)*(Conf)*(Media)	0.157*	
	(0.0696)	
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed)		-0.206
		(0.611)
(Disc)*(Freed)		-0.0527
		(0.763)
(Conf)*(Freed)		-0.0630
		(0.172)
(Disc)*(Conf)*(Freed)		0.0897
		(0.229)
Natural log of GDP per capita	-0.222	-0.415*
	(0.175)	(0.162)
Population (1000000s)	0.00193**	0.00195***
	(0.000659)	(0.000562)
Xpolity	0.00902	0.0356
	(0.0339)	(0.0290)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1	-0.107	0.107
	(0.227)	(0.271)
Peaceyears	-0.0939	-0.104
	(0.0692)	(0.0726)
Peaceyears^2	0.00249	0.00165
	(0.00383)	(0.00367)
Peaceyears^3	-0.0000285	-0.00000546
	(0.0000553)	(0.0000494)
Year	0.0507***	-0.00505
	(0.0105)	(0.0161)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1	0.899*	0.627
	(0.358)	(0.465)
Constant	-102.8***	10.53
	(21.47)	(32.28)
Observations	4465	3199

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 3.4: Ethnic conflict onset depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information factors: GDP, capital distance and the information index.

	(3) GDP	(4) Distance	(5) Index and press freedom
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted by GDP, t-1 (GDPconf)	0.00000203		
	(0.0000164)		
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc)	0.321	0.264	-0.248
	(0.196)	(0.202)	(0.584)
(Disc)*(GDPconf)	-0.0000324^{+}		
	(0.0000186)		
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted by capital distance, t-1 (Distconf)		33.27*	
		(13.10)	
(Disc)*(Distconf)		-95.45	
		(143.0)	
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted by index, t-1 (Indconf)			-0.000259
			(0.00124)
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed)			-0.540
			(0.672)
(Freed)*(IndConf)			-0.000469
			(0.00148)
(Disc)*(IndConf)			0.000498
			(0.000969)
(Disc)*(Freed)			0.0351
			(0.790)
(Disc)*(Freed)*(IndConf)			0.000815
			(0.00157)
Natural log of GDP per capita	-0.471**	-0.489***	-0.380*
	(0.152)	(0.147)	(0.189)
Population (1000000s)	0.00185**	0.00191***	0.00210***
	(0.000584)	(0.000542)	(0.000632)
Xpolity	0.0285	0.0252	0.0458
	(0.0293)	(0.0280)	(0.0340)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1	0.312	0.305	-0.126
	(0.226)	(0.214)	(0.282)
Peaceyears	-0.121^{+}	-0.132^{+}	-0.125
	(0.0685)	(0.0676)	(0.0886)
Peaceyears^{2}	0.00372	0.00424	0.00216
	(0.00358)	(0.00353)	(0.00468)
Peaceyears^{3}	-0.0000418	-0.0000477	-0.00000794
	(0.0000492)	(0.0000490)	(0.0000659)
Year	0.0308***	0.0305***	-0.00192
	(0.00625)	(0.00603)	(0.0177)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1	0.601*	0.546^{+}	0.715
	(0.294)	(0.292)	(0.454)
Constant	-61.01***	-60.29***	4.618
	(12.77)	(12.27)	(35.19)
Observations	6505	6578	2525

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 3.5: Significance of interactions in models 1 – 5.

Model	Interaction effect	Sign	Significant (5%)
1. Media availability	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (Media low) (1)	-	No
	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (Media high) (2)	+	Yes
	Effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and inspiration (2) - (1)	+	Yes
2. Media freedom	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (No media freedom) (1)	+	No
	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (Media freedom) (2)	+	No
	Effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and inspiration (2) - (1)	+	No
3. GDP	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict	-	No
4. Capital distance	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict	-	No
5. Info index and media freedom	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (No media freedom) (1)	+	No
	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (Media freedom) (2)	+	No
	Effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and inspiration (2) - (1)	+	No

Model one tests hypothesis one suggesting that armed conflicts of ethnically discriminated groups in other countries increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset within a country more, the more discriminated groups there are and the more media sources are available to the population. Figure 3.2 shows the probability of ethnic conflict onset[27] predicted from model one where information is operationalised as the natural log of the average availability of TVs and radios in a country. The figure shows scenarios with low availability of radios and TV in the panel on the left hand side and scenarios with a high availability of radio and TV in the panel on the right hand side. In both panels, the x-axis indicates different numbers of discriminated groups in a state. Finally, the point prediction in grey illustrates a scenario where the number of conflict involvements of discriminated groups in all other countries is very low and the point prediction in black a scenario where this number is very high. Thus, the difference between the black and the grey prediction can be understood as the effect of an increase in the number of foreign discriminated groups rebelling against their governments. Under hypothesis one we would expect that this difference increases as the number of discriminated groups in a country increases as only those groups should be inspired. However they can only be inspired if they gain information about foreign events. Thus, we expect the difference between the black and the grey prediction to be larger the more discriminated groups there are in a country *and* the more media sources are available. The expected trend is found in Figure 3.2: The effect of foreign conflict involvements of discriminated groups increases as the number of discriminated groups increases but *only* in the panel on the right hand side where the number of radios and TVs available is high.

As can be seen in table 3.5, the moderating effect of an increase in the number of discriminated groups on the effect of increases in foreign conflict involvements of discriminated groups is significantly positive, but only in the scenario where media availability is held at the 90th percentile. When media availability is held at the 10th percentile, the moderating effect of domestic discrimination on the effect of those foreign conflict involvements is negative and not significant. Thus, the effect of foreign discriminated groups rebelling is significantly increased by higher numbers of discrim-

capital distance cover the period from 1950 to 2004, models that include GDP weighted measures cover 1951 to 2004 and models on media freedom and the overall information index cover 1981 to 2004.

[27] All predicted probabilities are simulated using the Stata package relogitq (Tomz et al., 2003).

Figure 3.2: The predicted probability of ethnic conflict onset simulated from model 1 on media availability and foreign high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of discriminated groups.



inated groups in a country but *only* if radios and TVs are readily available. In addition, and as can be seen in table 3.5, the effect of a change in media source availability from the 10th to the 90th percentile on the interaction between domestic discrimination and conflict involvements of foreign discriminated groups is significantly positive as well. Thus, the moderating effect of discrimination on the effect of conflict involvements of foreign discriminated groups is significantly higher in high media scenarios than in low media scenarios. Overall, hypothesis one is supported by the evidence from model one. The availability of media sources such as TV and radio *as well as* a discriminated domestic population is necessary for an increased likelihood of domestic conflict breaking out as a result of foreign conflicts over ethnic discrimination. This finding also suggests that the expectation that media freedom is necessary for inspiration between similarly discriminated groups via mass media is not supported as we see such inspiration without taking the presence of media freedom into account.

Figure 3.2 shows that the substantive effect of the mechanism in hypothesis one is large. In the scenario on the very left, where the availability of radios and TVs is

low and there are no discriminated groups in a country, the predicted probabilities of ethnic conflict onset are almost identical, irrespective of whether the number of conflict involvements of discriminated groups abroad is low (3.1 per cent [1.7; 5.7]) or high (2.2 per cent [.8; 6.1]). This is considerably different in the scenario on the very right, where the availability of media sources is high and three groups are discriminated in a country. Here, the predicted probability of ethnic conflict onset at a low number of foreign conflict involvements of discriminated groups is very low with 1 [.1; 9.3] per cent. On the other hand, when the number of discriminated groups fighting in armed conflicts elsewhere is high, the predicted probability of ethnic conflict onset rises to 77.2 [16.1; 98.3] per cent.

These scenarios are by no means unrealistic. The 90th percentile of logged media availability corresponds to an average per capita number of TVs and radios of about .57, similar to a number of cases in the data, for example Canada in the late 70s or the Lebanon in the late 80s. Six foreign conflict involvements of discriminated groups were experienced by all but the conflict countries in 1982. In 13 countries in the data two groups are discriminated at some point in their history, in four countries there are three such groups and in one country there are four.

Model two explores the role of media freedom in the inspiration process under scrutiny. Hypothesis two expects that armed conflicts of ethnically discriminated groups in other countries can *only* inspire domestic discriminated groups if domestic media are free. The results from model two suggest that media freedom by itself is not only not necessary but also not sufficient as a transmission channel for foreign conflict involvements of discriminated groups. The predicted onset probabilities in scenarios with both high and low numbers of conflict involvements of discriminated groups in other countries are very small and fairly similar irrespective of the number of discriminated groups and the amount of media freedom in a country, albeit here the effect is slightly larger at higher numbers of discriminated groups in the high freedom scenario. The simulated interactions in table 3.5 are substantively as expected but very small and statistically not significant. It needs to be noted that because of a smaller range of years covered in the variable on media freedom, the sample used here is much smaller than in models not including the media freedom measure. If tested in this smaller sample, the hypothesis on media availability is not supported by the evidence either. Therefore,

the results of all models including media freedom need to be seen with some caution.

In models three and four, where conflict involvements of discriminated groups are weighted by GDP of country j and distance between i and j respectively, increases in weighted conflict involvements only have a positive effect on conflict onset when there are no discriminated groups in a country. While in the case of GDP weighted conflicts this positive effect is small, in the case of distance weighted conflicts it is considerable with a 12 per cent increase in onset probability. In addition, and as table 3.5 shows, the simulated interaction with domestic discriminated groups is negative and not significant in both models. This suggests that neither the prominence nor the distance of a conflict country by themselves play a role for the inspiration mechanism introduced here. However, the result on capital distance might suggest that distance plays a role in a different mechanism where low numbers of discriminated groups are favourable conditions. It could, for example, be the case that conflicts are contagious to close-by countries when there is no discriminated population as these governments are not prepared to deal with domestic unrest by aggrieved groups; a threat that might occur as soon as refugees reach a country as suggested by Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006).

Finally, model five explores the effect of the index on information flows where foreign high intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups are weighted by media availability, distance and economic prominence of the conflict country and interacted with media freedom which was expected to be necessary for transmission. As table 3.5 shows, the interactions are as expected in hypothesis five: Domestic discrimination has a positive effect on the effect of increases in index-weighted foreign conflict involvements of discriminated groups. This interaction is stronger in the presence of media freedom than in its absence. However, all these interactions are statistically insignificant. In addition, substantive effects are smaller than in the model on media availability only. As model five is performed on a smaller sample because of the inclusion of the variable on media freedom, the results on the information index need to be interpreted with caution. Additional data on media freedom would be required in order to draw a better comparison between the measure on media availability and the full specification of information flows introduced here.

In sum, the involvement of foreign discriminated groups in high intensity ethnic conflicts abroad increases the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset in countries with dis-

criminated groups. This effect has been found to depend crucially on the presence of media sources in a country. On the other hand, this effect is barely present in any of the models excluding media sources. Thus, the results suggest that a large availability of media sources may be sufficient as a transmission channel for demonstration effects between discriminated groups. In fact, high media availability may even be necessary for transmission via the mass media channel. The results with respect to media freedom and the overall information index are unexpected. Media freedom was expected to be necessary for the transmission of foreign information via mass media but this has not been found to be the case. The results on the information index suggest that the overall specification may capture information flows worse than media availability only. However, additional data on media freedom would be needed for a full assessment of the transmission channel for inspiration between similarly discriminated populations.

Additional tests of the causal mechanism and robustness

The effect of success as an alternative explanation

Some scholars have argued that successful outcomes of conflict can trigger conflict contagion (for example Gurr, 2000, in the context of groups in similar circumstances that are linked by networks of communication). It has been argued that success – even relatively minor – as a result of a struggle might inspire groups with the same goals and identities (Byman and Pollack, 2007, in the context of secessionist groups). Successes are expected to be inspirational because they increase groups' optimism about the likelihood of success for themselves (for example Lake and Rothchild, 1998). In the context of discriminated groups, these arguments suggest that if a group's discrimination ends as the result of a violent struggle, other discriminated groups conclude that violence might be a worthwhile strategy for achieving that goal as well. Under this mechanism it can be expected that an improvement in an ethnically discriminated group's situation as a result of violent rebellion should increase the likelihood of discriminated groups in other countries rebelling as well if they gain information about it.

In order to rule out that results are driven by the success-based mechanism, the implications of this mechanism have been tested as well. For this, the measure on the number of conflict involvements of discriminated groups in all original models has

been replaced by the number of successes of discriminated groups in all other countries. Successes are determined as cases where an ethnically discriminated group was involved in a conflict in a given year and saw an improvement to her situation in the consecutive year. The Ethnic Power-Relations Dataset (Cederman et al., 2010) classes politically relevant ethnic groups' domestic status into nine categories: monopoly, dominant, senior partner, junior partner, regional autonomy, separatist autonomy, powerless, discriminated, and state collapse. For a discriminated group, all categories other than state collapse, separatist autonomy and powerlessness are coded as an improvement of her situation[28]. In addition, cases of colonial independence constitute relevant successes here. As it is not clear which ethnic groups led the struggle for independence, I include all cases of independence (Gleditsch and Ward, 2013) that occur in the same or a subsequent year of an extrasystemic conflict (UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2010 (Gleditsch et al., 2002)) where the majority of the population is no longer discriminated in the first year of the newly independent state according to the Ethnic Power-Relations Dataset (Cederman et al., 2010). Here, the threshold for success is lower than in non-colonial cases as colonial independence is considered to be the main success. Regression results are shown in tables 3.6 and 3.7.

The model on foreign successes of discriminated groups and media availability does not show the trend expected under the success-based mechanism. Instead, an increase in foreign successes of discriminated groups from minimum to maximum has a positive effect on the probability of ethnic conflict onset, but only in scenarios with low media availability. In all scenarios with high media availability, on the other hand, such increases in successes have a negative effect. The effect of an increase in the number of discriminated groups on the effect of success is positive and statistically significant as expected, but only in the low media scenario. In the high media scenario this interaction is negative and not significant. Finally, the effect of media availability on the interaction effect between discrimination and inspiration is negative and insignificant.

These results offer partial support for the hypothesis. Foreign successes of discriminated groups have a positive effect on ethnic conflict onset that significantly increases with the number of discriminated groups. However, this is only the case in scenarios with low availability of media sources. Thus, here the availability of media

[28]More information on the coding of successes can be found in Appendix A.

sources does not seem to be important. It may be the case that successes of similarly discriminated groups are so rare and relevant that they become known to discriminated groups in all countries. But even then some characteristic of low media countries not included in the model may increase the likelihood of contagion between discriminated groups.

Figure 3.3: The predicted probability of ethnic conflict onset simulated from model 7 on media freedom and foreign successes of discriminated groups.



Figure 3.3 shows results from the model on media freedom and foreign successes of discriminated groups[29]. The effect of increases in successes of foreign discriminated groups on the predicted probability of ethnic conflict onset is found to increase as the number of discriminated groups increases in a country. This is the case irrespective of whether the domestic media is free or not. In fact, the moderating effect of the number of discriminated groups on the inspirational effect of foreign successes of discriminated groups is significantly positive in the scenario with no media freedom. The moderating effect of discrimination is also positive in the scenario with media freedom but not significantly so. Media freedom does not exert a significant effect on the interaction

[29] Again, results on media freedom and the information index need to be interpreted with some caution as they draw on a much smaller sample.

Table 3.6: Ethnic conflict onset depending on successes of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information factors: media availability and media freedom.

	(6) Media availability	(7) Press freedom
Foreign successes of discriminated groups, t-1 (Success)	-0.527	-0.635
	(0.785)	(0.418)
Natural log of media source availability, t-1 (Media)	-0.247	
	(0.167)	
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc)	1.008^{+}	-0.118
	(0.561)	(0.324)
(Disc)*(Media)	0.308^{+}	
	(0.166)	
(Disc)*(Success)	-0.373	0.706
	(0.880)	(0.440)
(Success)*(Media)	-0.154	
	(0.240)	
(Disc)*(Success)*(Media)	-0.222	
	(0.218)	
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed)		-0.655
		(0.406)
(Disc)*(Freed)		0.259
		(0.421)
(Success) * (Freed)		1.152*
		(0.481)
(Disc)*(Success)*(Freed)		-0.465
		(0.545)
Natural log of GDP per capita	-0.243	-0.390*
	(0.171)	(0.157)
Population (1000000s)	0.00182**	0.00191***
	(0.000667)	(0.000579)
Xpolity	0.0117	0.0341
	(0.0335)	(0.0293)
Conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1	0.0515	0.233
	(0.221)	(0.295)
Peaceyears	-0.0945	-0.109
	(0.0652)	(0.0760)
Peaceyears^2	0.00244	0.00180
	(0.00355)	(0.00380)
Peaceyears^3	-0.0000271	-0.00000687
	(0.0000511)	(0.0000507)
Year	0.0441***	-0.0101
	(0.0105)	(0.0171)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1	0.870*	0.652
	(0.370)	(0.497)
Constant	-89.52***	20.43
	(21.64)	(34.09)
Observations	4465	3199

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 3.7: Ethnic conflict onset depending on successes of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information factors: GDP, capital distance and the information index.

	(8) GDP	(9) Distance	(10) Index and Press freedom
Foreign successes of disc groups weighted by GDP, t-1 (GDPsuc)	0.0000148		
	(0.0000309)		
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc)	0.142	0.149	-0.238
	(0.186)	(0.191)	(0.369)
(GDPsuc)*(Disc)	0.0000252		
	(0.0000221)		
Foreign successes of disc groups weighted by capital distance, t-1 (Distsuc)		-52.13	
		(306.1)	
(Distsuc)*(Disc)		182.8	
		(194.6)	
Foreign successes of disc groups weighted by index, t-1 (Indsuc)			-0.00470
			(0.00416)
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed)			-0.913*
			(0.406)
(Indsuc)*(Disc)			0.00637
			(0.00410)
(Indsuc)*(Disc)			0.00870
			(0.00530)
(Disc)*(Freed)			0.497
			(0.433)
(Indsuc)*(Disc)*(Freed)			-0.00511
			(0.00474)
Natural log of GDP per capita	-0.452**	-0.479**	-0.373*
	(0.152)	(0.149)	(0.182)
Population (1000000s)	0.00179**	0.00186***	0.00205**
	(0.000569)	(0.000536)	(0.000654)
Xpolity	0.0281	0.0269	0.0421
	(0.0291)	(0.0278)	(0.0334)
Conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1	0.481*	0.421+	0.0220
	(0.220)	(0.215)	(0.309)
Peaceyears	-0.128+	-0.130+	-0.136
	(0.0684)	(0.0670)	(0.0922)
Peaceyears^2	0.00419	0.00419	0.00281
	(0.00362)	(0.00350)	(0.00483)
Peaceyears^3	-0.0000486	-0.0000474	-0.0000171
	(0.0000503)	(0.0000486)	(0.0000674)
Year	0.0330***	0.0295***	-0.00475
	(0.00588)	(0.00589)	(0.0157)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1	0.565*	0.545+	0.762
	(0.277)	(0.301)	(0.472)
Constant	-65.64***	-58.40***	10.10
	(11.82)	(11.94)	(31.16)
Observations	6505	6578	2525

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}\ p < .10$, $^{*}\ p < .05$, $^{**}\ p < .01$, $^{***}\ p < .001$

between inspiration and discrimination in this model. Thus, these results also lend support to the expectation that successes of discriminated groups have an inspirational effect that is associated with discriminated groups elsewhere. However, media freedom plays no role here and is by no means necessary for this process to take place.

In model eight, increases in GDP-weighted successes of foreign discriminated groups have a positive effect on the probability of ethnic conflict onset that increases with the number of discriminated groups. Thus, the interaction is as expected, albeit not statistically significant.

In model nine on distance weighted successes, the effect of increases in foreign discriminated groups' successes weighted by capital distance increases considerably with the number of discriminated groups but this interaction is also not significant. While the effects at positive group numbers are the largest out of all success models, the uncertainty is also considerable in this model. This might suggest that the actual specification of the impact of distance is not correct. In fact, when an alternative specification on minimum distance is used, the interaction is significantly positive. Alongside with results from models on media availability and freedom, this result could suggest that instead of information transmitted by mass media, physical proximity as such is important under the success mechanism.

Finally, in model ten on the information index none of the interactions in question is significant. Substantively, as expected, the effect of index weighted foreign successes of discriminated groups increases as the number of discriminated groups in a country increases. This interaction is stronger if there is no media freedom. The effect of index-weighted successes at high numbers of discriminated groups is not as large as the effect of distance weighted successes.

In sum, the results on success suggest that there might be a success-based inspiration process between similarly aggrieved groups in different countries. However, information transmitted by mass media does not appear to act as a transmission channel for this mechanism. Instead, success-based inspiration seems to be transmitted by geographic proximity. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the results on the effect of media sources above are the result of a mis-specification where instead of the presence of conflict generally successful outcomes drive the results. The findings suggest that exploring the role of foreign successes of groups with similar grievance and the under-

lying transmission channels would be a fruitful endeavour, especially as to the author's knowledge to date successes have exclusively been operationalised in the context of territorial concessions (Forsberg, 2013, for example).

Placebo test

In order to test whether supportive evidence found in the original models is indeed a result of the causal mechanism suggested here or of other effects of foreign conflicts, a placebo test has been conducted. For this, the variables on conflict involvements of discriminated groups elsewhere have been replaced with a variable on high intensity foreign conflict involvements of ethnic groups that are *not* discriminated against. The control variables on additional conflicts in neighbours have been adjusted accordingly. If the mechanism suggested above held, these events should not have an inspirational effect on discriminated groups in particular as they should not raise their awareness for this specific grievance. Thus, the effect of increases in foreign conflicts should not depend on the number of discriminated groups in a country. Predicted probabilities from these models have been simulated using the same substantive values like in the original models to allow for direct comparison. The samples in the models on non-discriminated groups are identical to each respective original model so direct comparison is possible. Regression results can be found in tables 3.8 and 3.9.

With regards to media availability, the positive effect of increases in relevant foreign conflict involvements that was found in high media and high discrimination scenarios in the original model is much smaller here. This suggests that in the context of media availability inspiration is indeed driven by a similarity in grievance.

The placebo test on foreign non-discriminated groups' conflict involvements in relation with GDP per capita of the conflict country produces predicted probabilities fairly similar to the original model suggesting that this factor does not only not play a role for grievance-based inspiration effects of ongoing conflict but also not for other contagion mechanisms involving ongoing ethnic conflict. As opposed to the original models on media freedom and on the information index, the placebo tests do not show any sign of inspiration.

When high intensity conflict involvements of non-discriminated ethnic groups are weighted by inverse capital distance, on the other hand, the effect is similar to the orig-

Table 3.8: Ethnic conflict onset depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of non-discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information factors: media availability and media freedom.

	(11) Media availability	(12) Press freedom
Foreign conflicts of non-discriminated groups, t-1 (ConfNodisc)	0.0643	0.0851
	(0.0646)	(0.0612)
Natural log of media source availability, t-1 (Media)	-0.442*	
	(0.197)	
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc)	0.887	0.150
	(1.129)	(0.542)
(ConfNodisc)*(Media)	0.0184	
	(0.0218)	
(ConfNodisc)*(Disc)	0.00914	
	(0.127)	
(Disc)*(Media)	0.130	
	(0.348)	
(Disc)*(Media)*(ConfNodisc)	0.0178	
	(0.0425)	
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed)		0.673
		(0.716)
(ConfNoDisc)*(Freed)		-0.114
		(0.0858)
(ConfNoDisc)*(Disc)		-0.0117
		(0.0498)
(Disc)*(Freed)		0.257
		(0.730)
(Disc)*(ConfNoDisc)*(Freed)		-0.0105
		(0.0739)
Natural log of GDP per capita	-0.246	-0.412**
	(0.162)	(0.158)
Population (1000000s)	0.00180**	0.00192***
	(0.000652)	(0.000565)
Xpolity	0.0103	0.0383
	(0.0330)	(0.0266)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1	0.00999	0.237
	(0.216)	(0.298)
Peaceyears	-0.106	-0.0927
	(0.0653)	(0.0746)
Peaceyears^2	0.00322	0.000997
	(0.00361)	(0.00378)
Peaceyears^3	-0.0000395	0.00000338
	(0.0000531)	(0.0000510)
Year	0.0434***	-0.0129
	(0.0131)	(0.0224)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1	0.933**	0.587
	(0.357)	(0.460)
Constant	-88.74***	25.36
	(26.42)	(44.28)
Observations	4465	3199

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 3.9: Ethnic conflict onset depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of non-discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information factors: GDP, capital distance and the information index.

	(13) Ethnic conflict onset	(14) Ethnic conflict onset	(15) Ethnic conflict onset
Foreign conflicts of non-disc groups	-0.00000734		
weighted by GDP, t-1 (GDPConfNoDisc)	(0.0000203)		
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc)	0.275	0.281	-0.127
	(0.193)	(0.190)	(0.732)
(Disc)*(GDPConfNoDisc)	-0.00000591		
	(0.0000139)		
Foreign conflicts of non-disc groups		44.86***	
weighted by capital distance, t-1 (DistConfNoDisc)		(13.13)	
(Disc)*(DistConfNoDisc)		-36.11	
		(27.45)	
Foreign conflicts of non-disc groups			0.000594
weighted by index, t-1 (IndConfNoDisc)			(0.000427)
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed)			0.297
			(0.583)
(Freed)*(IndConfNoDisc)			-0.000861
			(0.000570)
(Disc)*(IndConfNoDisc)			0.0000271
			(0.000487)
(Disc)*(Freed)			0.407
			(0.888)
(Disc)*(Freed)*(IndConfNoDisc)			-0.0000488
			(0.000664)
Natural log of GDP per capita	-0.478**	-0.500***	-0.409*
	(0.154)	(0.152)	(0.189)
Population (1000000s)	0.00185**	0.00194***	0.00194**
	(0.000576)	(0.000539)	(0.000641)
Xpolity	0.0266	0.0245	0.0556^{+}
	(0.0288)	(0.0277)	(0.0313)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1	0.293	0.250	0.0397
	(0.230)	(0.224)	(0.316)
Peaceyears	-0.127^{+}	-0.135*	-0.115
	(0.0668)	(0.0677)	(0.0937)
Peaceyears^2	0.00403	0.00437	0.00161
	(0.00352)	(0.00354)	(0.00487)
Peaceyears^3	-0.0000457	-0.0000491	-0.000000287
	(0.0000487)	(0.0000492)	(0.0000676)
Year	0.0356***	0.0287***	-0.0170
	(0.0102)	(0.00583)	(0.0257)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1	0.588*	0.540^{+}	0.676
	(0.288)	(0.289)	(0.461)
Constant	-70.31***	-56.51***	34.04
	(20.35)	(11.75)	(51.20)
Observations	6505	6578	2525

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

inal model: Increases in such conflict involvements have a strong positive effect in a scenario with no discriminated groups in a country i. The difference in the predicted probability point estimates is even stronger than in the model on conflict involvements of discriminated groups in other countries. Thus, *all* ethnic conflicts exert an effect when weighted by distance and this effect is most pronounced when there are no discriminated groups in a country. This finding supports the assertion that the result found in relation with distance is not a result of inspiration but rather an alternative mechanism based on the presence of armed conflict close-by more generally.

Alternative specifications

In addition, a number of alternative specifications of the measures and operationalisations in the models have been tested. Regression tables can be found in Appendix A.

I measure the variable on high intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups in other states in two alternative ways. Firstly, I also test a specification that includes involvements of discriminated groups in all ethnic conflict years above 25 yearly battle deaths as opposed to only years of high intensity. Secondly, I test a specification that includes discriminated groups' year of entering a conflict alongside involvements in conflict years of high intensity. Regression results are shown in tables A.1 through A.4. While results on predicted probabilities are fairly robust to the inclusion of low intensity involvements, they are in parts less robust to the inclusion of onsets alongside high intensity years of conflict. The latter was expected to be the most plausible operationalisation as onset years were expected to be similarly likely to become known elsewhere as high intensity years. However, it may be the case that the year where a group enters a conflict is different from the beginning of a conflict in the perception of the media because of specific coding rules for onset years and groups entering.

Moreover, when the measure on media is not logged (see table A.5), the trend observed in the original model is reflected but no interactions are significant in the regression. However, this is mostly caused by the case of Russia, which has a ten-fold increase in the availability of radio in four years in the data before values drop again by more than a ten-fold proportion[30]. This is likely an error in the data, albeit the project

[30]If only those cases are excluded, the three-way interaction in the regression reaches p=.13.

representative when prompted noted that this pattern is reflected in the original data.

When Internet is also included in the index (using data from the World Bank (World Bank, 2011b) on Internet access), the results reflect the trend found in the original model but interactions are no longer significant in the regression as well. However, as the sample has shrunk considerably because of the coverage of the measure on Internet availability, this is not particularly surprising. These results can be seen in table A.5.

When the minimum distance is included as opposed to the capital distance (again, see table A.5), increases in weighted conflicts barely have any effect at all, irrespective of the number of discriminated groups in a country.

When colonial conflicts are not included, as is shown in A.6 and A.7, all predicted probabilities are robust.

Finally, I also rerun the original models controlling for government repression in the previous year using data from Cingranelli and Richards (Cingranelli et al., 2014). The measure is lagged in time as it is known that civil conflict explains government repression very well (Hill and Jones, 2014). Regression results can also be found in tables A.8 and A.9. When repression is controlled for, the results on the effect of media is no longer robust. Other results are fairly similar and the finding on distance is even more pronounced. The measure on lagged repression is only available from 1982 onwards and thus the sample size is considerably smaller. Thus, it is not clear whether the lack of robustness in the model on media availability is due to the smaller sample or the effect of repression as such. In the latter case, it is possible that foreign conflicts increase repression which in turn increases the likelihood of conflict. If that was the case, the variables on foreign conflicts of discriminated groups in interaction with media availability would not be required in the model as repression correctly captures their effect. However, if the original model on media availability is rerun without the variable on foreign conflicts of discriminated groups and without all interaction terms, the variable on repression carries a negative sign as would be expected but is statistically not significant. Moreover, when the media model is tested on the sample in the repression model but without lagged repression as a control variable, the results are virtually identical suggesting that the hypothesis is not supported in the subsample under scrutiny but not that what we observe in the full sample is a case of omitted variable

bias.

Conclusion

This chapter tests in a large-n study whether information about conflicts involving groups with similar grievances can trigger conflict contagion. It also explores the role of information transmitted via mass media in contagion processes of armed conflict. The chapter finds support for the suggested mechanism in the context of the availability of media sources. Other factors that were expected to play a role for information flows transmitted via mass media such as for example media freedom were not found to be important. In addition, the mechanism was not found to depend on geographical proximity. Two potential alternative mechanisms, one based on successes and one based on the role of repression, can be ruled out. However, the main finding is not robust to the use of a smaller sample that includes years after 1980. It may be the case that this reflects changes in the availability and use of media sources of different types. After all, when media sources include the Internet, the sample is limited to years above 1990 and here the trend in the main model is well observable.

Chapter 4

Pre-emptive Repression

Introduction

Do governments repress domestic groups pre-emptively in order to prevent them from rebelling? With rare exceptions, empirical repression literature does not consider repression as a pre-emptive strategy (also see Nordas and Davenport, 2013). Instead, repression is usually analysed as the result of structural factors (Nordas and Davenport, 2013) or as a reaction to some form of domestic dissent (for an overview see Davenport, 2007a). Little is known about whether governments use repression also as a pre-emptive strategy – that is before collective action has materialised. In addition, empirical analyses of repression are usually conducted on the state-level (Davenport, 2007a). Therefore, we know little about whether government repression is tailored towards specific actors and if so, who the most likely targets are. This chapter aims to fill these gaps in current knowledge by exploring whether governments use repression as a targeted strategy to *prevent* domestic ethnic groups from rebelling against the government. Understanding all facets of governments' incentives for the use of repression is important for the international community in order to be able to prevent and deter the use of repressive measures such as torture and disappearances. In addition, being able to identify groups most at risk of such repression beforehand is particularly important in order to protect civilians.

Governments can use repression to prevent domestic groups from engaging in collective violence (Danneman and Ritter, 2014; Nordas and Davenport, 2013). Repressing groups in order to *prevent* them from rebelling should be a more cost efficient strategy than increasing repression once opposition has materialised (Nordas and Dav-

enport, 2013). After all, once group leaders have mobilised members to some form of collective action, they have an incentive to keep fighting and deliver a positive outcome for the group in order not to lose legitimacy and credibility. As a result, a larger amount of repression or some form of material concession is necessary to quell dissent *after* it has materialised. Thus, I argue here that governments determine the level of repression they use against specific domestic groups not only by each group's current level of dissent but also by the likelihood with which they expect this group to rebel in the near future.

This chapter tests the argument on group-specific pre-emptive repression using comprehensive data on government repression of specific ethnic groups all around the world from the Minorities at Risk project. It is thus able to provide important insight into the targeted, strategic and pre-emptive use of repressive measures by the government. The chapter finds evidence that governments determine the level of repression to be used against a group from factors that influence the group's expected utility for fighting. However, this is only the case when the state's repressive capacity is large in relation to the group's size, likely because in such cases governments can use even high levels of repression against a group without overstretching resources. Thus, the chapter finds that repression is used as a pre-emptive tool but only against the relatively weak.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section develops a theoretical model and derives testable empirical implications. Section three introduces the data and methods used to empirically test these implications. Section four discusses empirical results and section five offers and empirically tests refinements to the theoretical and empirical model before the final section concludes.

The argument

In this section I introduce a simple model to develop the argument that governments have an incentive to use repression to prevent domestic ethnic groups from fighting. The interaction between a government and a domestic ethnic group can be formulated as a simple game where the government, G, chooses the level of repression to use against the group, D, from a continuous range and the group decides whether or not to rebel against the government. This is a bargaining situation similar to the one described in Rubinstein (1982) as the government 'offers' a specific amount of repression and the

group decides on whether to reject the offer by fighting. The game is structurally similar to Fearon (1995)'s bargaining model of inter-state war but differs in substantive terms. While in Fearon (1995) adversaries bargain over a share of a good in question, for example territory, I assume here that governments are not ready to make any concessions and thus do not bargain over the issues underlying the potential conflict. Instead, they try to prevent conflict by increasing their adversary's cost of fighting. Thus, while in Fearon (1995) the cost of fighting is fixed, here the challenger's cost for fighting is variable as the government can influence it by its use of repression.

The game is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The government moves first and decides on the overall level of physical repression to apply against the group in a given round t by changing the initial level of repression, $r_{t-1} \geq 0$, by a certain amount Δr_t. Subsequently, the group D decides whether to fight against the government or not.

Figure 4.1: The game in period t.



$U_{Dt}(\Delta r_t, F_t) = pb_t - c_{Dt} - r_{t-1} - \Delta r_t,$
$U_{Gt}(\Delta r_t, F_t) = p(-b_t) - c_{Gt} - \beta_1 \Delta r_t$

$U_{Dt}(\Delta r_t, \neg F_t) = 0,$
$U_{Gt}(\Delta r_t, \neg F_t) = -\beta_1 \Delta r_t$

Payoffs

In the following I discuss the players' payoffs arising from different outcomes in Figure 4.1. The payoff structure draws on Fearon (1995)[1] but is extended by the effect of repression levels for the challenger and the effect of the manipulation of repression for the government.

If the ethnic group D challenges the government, it gains benefit $b_t \geq 0$ with probability $p \in (0, 1)$ but has to endure a cost $c_{Dt} > 0$. The benefit $b_t \geq 0$ that D

[1] Fearon in turn draws on earlier work such as Bueno de Mesquita (1981).

expects upon winning is derived from its position in society which is proportional to the severity of the discrimination the government subjects it to. After all, if D wins, its discrimination ends and its position improves by the current level of discrimination, b_t. D loses with probability $1 - p$ in which case the status quo, valued at 0, prevails but it still has to endure the cost of the fight. Accordingly, if D does not fight, it gains 0. Thus, a group's expected benefit of fighting is pb_t[2].

The most important assumptions for deriving predictions about the government's incentives to repress the group, however, are about how repression influences the group. Firstly, if the government increases the level of repression, the group's situation is worsened in proportion to Δr_t, independent of which action it actually takes, as it can be assumed that government repression affects group members independently of whether they support a struggle or not. This impact is not included here as it is a constant that won't have an impact on the group's decision.

Secondly, and most importantly, the group's cost of fighting should be affected by the current overall level of physical repression $\Delta r_t + r_{t-1}$. This follows directly from Tilly (1978)'s definition of repression and is also argued for example in (Muller and Weede, 1990; Hasenclever and Rittberger, 1999). Repression affects the cost of fighting because in a more repressive environment it should be harder to mobilise for and organise rebellion (for example Tilly, 1978, in a more general context) and some of the people who try and do so will get caught and punished harshly (also see Hasenclever and Rittberger, 1999). In addition, in a more repressive environment it is harder for rebels to extract resources from group civilians who are under more state scrutiny than in less repressive environments[3]. This effect of repression on groups that decide to fight distinguishes the model developed here from previous theoretical models such as Pierskalla (2010) as it allows the government to use repression to *prevent* rebellion. Thus, in sum, a group's cost for fighting is $c_{Dt} + r_{t-1} + \Delta r$.

Similarly, payoffs arising from all final outcomes can also be formulated for the government. The payoff for the government G if there is no fight can be quantified by the value 0 as its position does not change.

[2]See Buhaug et al. (2009) for the argument that powerful disadvantaged groups are particularly likely to rebel and to be repressed by the government. Operationalising power by group size, they find empirical support for an increased conflict likelihood of these groups.

[3]For an overview over earlier work discussing the effect of repression on the mobilisation of resources for collective action see for example Rasler (1996).

If there is a fight, the government G has to incur a cost of fighting, $c_{Gt} > 0$, as well. Additionally, the government loses with probability p in which case it can expect to be degraded to position $-b_t$. I assume here that upon winning D degrades the government to its own current position in society. After all, the group may reason that its discrimination was due to the state's resource poverty at a given point in time as discussed in Wimmer (2002) and that such discrimination is the easiest way to organise society from the point of view of *any* government. Additionally, the government wins with probability $1-p$ in which case it gains nothing but still incurs the cost of the fight.

Moreover, and following Pierskalla (2010) and others in the assumption that repression is costly, I assume that a cost is associated with increasing repression. The cost of an increase in repression is proportional to the magnitude of the increase because the more state forces are occupied with repressing D, the higher the opportunity cost. Decreases in repression on the other hand carry a benefit proportional to the decrease as resources are freed up. I add coefficient $\beta_1 > 0$ to any changes in repression to express this cost and reward logic of making changes in repression. β_1 can be understood as the government's loss resulting from occupying troops with a specific task.

I assume that $c_{Gt} > \beta_1 r_t$ for all $r \geq 0$. Thus, I assume that fighting in a military conflict against D is in any case more costly than repressing the civilian population of D. This seems sensible as even if repression and conflict incurred similar opportunity costs, in an armed conflict D inflicts additional costs on the government while in the repression case it is passive. In addition, and as argued above, the government can expect the opportunity cost of conflict to be higher than the opportunity cost of pre-emptive repression as group leaders have little incentive to stop fighting before achieving some concessions once they have mobilised members. The same assumption is also made in Pierskalla (2010).

The government might also expect that after winning the challenging group degrades the government group to the level of physical repression it has experienced itself. A cautious government should expect that. However, this is irrelevant for the equilibrium strategy of the government here and is thus omitted from the government's payoff.

Equilibrium strategies

In the following I present each player's subgame perfect equilibrium strategy using simple backwards induction.

The domestic group D's equilibrium strategy $F_t^* : \Delta r_t \in [-r_{t-1}, \infty) \mapsto \{F_t, \neg F_t\}$, is

$$F_t^* = \begin{cases} F_t & \text{if } pb_t - c_{Dt} - r_{t-1} - \Delta r_t > 0 \\ \neg F_t & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{4.1}$$

Intuitively, the challenging group fights whenever her expected benefit of fighting outweighs the cost of doing so.

The government, on the other hand, strictly prefers peace over war in any case, irrespective of the change in repression that might be required to achieve that. After all, changing repression is always less costly than fighting. The government observes the magnitude of all factors feeding into D's utility for different final histories and thus knows whether D would choose to fight at the initial level of repression, r_{t-1}, that is when $\Delta r = 0$. If

$$pb_t - c_{Dt} - r_{t-1} \leq 0 \tag{4.2}$$

that is if D does not fight at the current level of repression, the government has no incentive to increase the level of repression and thereby decrease D's incentive to fight only further. After all, any increase in repression decreases the government's peace time utility as it has to carry the cost of the increase without gaining anything. The government may, however, have an incentive to decrease repression because it is rewarded for freeing up resources. There is only one ideal amount of decrease in that situation: the amount of decrease that puts D's fighting utility on a level with its peacetime utility. By decreasing repression to this amount, G maximises the reward for freeing up resources without facing rebellion.

Thus, in any case where the government knows that D has no incentive to fight at the current level, it has an incentive to decrease repression by

$$\Delta r_t = pb_t - c_{Dt} - r_{t-1} \tag{4.3}$$

However, as negative repression is not possible, the government can at most decrease repression such that $r_t = 0$. Thus, it decreases repression by the ideal amount in equation (3) when the current repression level allows for such a large decrease and otherwise decreases the repression level to the value 0.

On the other hand, if the government observes that the group has an incentive to fight under current circumstances, it has an incentive to increase repression by the ideal amount in equation (3) in order to prevent D from fighting. As the cost increases with the magnitude of the change, the government has no incentive to make a change that is larger than necessary as its peacetime utility decreases with the cost of the change.

In sum, the government's equilibrium strategy is to choose

$$\Delta {r_t}^* = \begin{cases} pb_t - c_{Dt} - r_{t-1}, & \text{if this term is} \geq -r_{t-1} \\ -r_{t-1}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{4.4}$$

Thus, there is an underlying ideal level of change in repression,

$$\Delta {r_t}^{**} = pb_t - c_{Dt} - r_{t-1} \tag{4.5}$$

that translates into the government's strategy Δr^* as follows

$$\Delta {r_t}^* = \begin{cases} \Delta r_t^{**}, & \text{if } \Delta r_t^{**} \geq -r_{t-1} \\ -r_{t-1}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{4.6}$$

Figure 4.2 illustrates these connections. If a group's benefit of fighting outweighs the cost, that is if $pb_t - c_{Dt} - r_{t-1} > 0$, the government's ideal change in repression is an increase which translates directly into its action. Similarly, if this difference is negative, the ideal action is to decrease repression. However, if the negative difference is smaller than a decrease to the minimum level of repression $r = 0$, the actual decrease is necessarily smaller than the ideal decrease. It is easy to see from Figure 4.2 that if there was no repression in the previous time period, that is if $r_{t-1} = 0$, the government can only increase repression or hold it constant.

Figure 4.2: The relationship between a group's cost benefit calculation and the government's change in repression. r_t^* is the government's strategy and r_t^{**} is the underlying ideal change.



The results from the simple game introduced here allow deriving the following propositions:

Proposition 1: If a domestic group's expected cost benefit balance $pb_t - c_{Dt} - r_{t-1}$ is positive, the government increases repression by the positive difference between expected benefit and cost, $pb_t - c_{Dt} - r_{t-1}$.

Proposition 2: If a domestic group's expected cost benefit balance $pb_t - c_{Dt} - r_{t-1}$ is negative, the government decreases repression by the negative difference between expected benefit and cost, $pb_t - c_{Dt} - r_{t-1}$, as long as $pb_t - c_{Dt} - r_{t-1} \geq -r_{t-1}$. If $pb_t - c_{Dt} - r_{t-1} < -r_{t-1}$, the government decreases repression by $-r_{t-1}$. If there is no repression present, that is if $-r_{t-1} = 0$, repression cannot be decreased.

Hypotheses

The following empirical expectations can be derived from the theoretical considerations introduced here:

Hypothesis 1: The larger the discrimination of an ethnic group, the higher the likelihood of an increase in repression against the group. This effect increases as the group's probability of winning increases.

and accordingly

Hypothesis 2: The larger the discrimination of an ethnic group, the lower the likelihood of a decrease in repression against the group. This effect decreases as the group's probability of winning increases.

Hypothesis 3: The larger the cost of fighting for an ethnic group, the higher the likelihood of a decrease in repression against the group.

and accordingly

Hypothesis 4: The smaller the cost of fighting for an ethnic group, the higher the likelihood of an increase in repression against the group.

Data and methods

This section introduces the data and methods used to test the argument on governments using pre-emptive repression to balance groups' expected utility for fighting and peace. The unit of analysis in the empirical analysis is the group-year. The sample of ethnic groups is taken from the Minorities at Risk data (subsequently referred to as MAR data) Phases III and IV (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009). This version of MAR contains an ethnic group if it "(...) collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in a society; and/or (...) collectively mobilizes in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests" (Minorities at Risk Project, 5).

Dependent variable

The dependent variable is a three-category ordered measure on whether the government increases, holds constant or decreases the level of repression it applies against the civilian population of an ethnic group in a given year. The dependent variable is coded

using MAR data on a number of repressive measures. I code an increase in government repression whenever the total number of measures used against group civilians increases and a decrease accordingly. I model the direction as opposed to the actual magnitude of change because of the censored nature of the dependent variable with respect to decreases. In addition, some measures are more severe than others and thus the number of measures that have changed may not be an ideal proxy for the actual intended magnitude of change in repression.

Specifically, the measures of repression that are used here to determine the overall level of repression against civilians from the MAR data are "[f]ew group members arrested", "[m]any group members arrested", "[l]eaders arrested, disappeared, or detained", "[s]how trials of group members or leaders", "[t]orture used to intimidate or interrogate", "[m]embers executed by authorities", "[l]eaders executed by authorities", "[s]ystematic killings by paramilitaries", "[p]roperty confiscated or destroyed", "[r]estrictions on movement", "[f]orced resettlement", "[i]nterdiction of food supplies", "[e]thnic cleansing", "[s]ystematic domestic spying", "[s]tates of emergency", and "[s]aturation of police and military" (Minorities at Risk Project, 91–96).

The variables on repression in MAR contain four categories, where repression can either 1) not be used at all, 2) be used against group members carrying out collective action, 3) be used both against members that do and members that do not engage in collective action or in circumstances where it is not clear whether action is present or 4) be used against group members not carrying out collective action (Minorities at Risk Project). Here, for each measure only cases of the latter category are coded as value one while the former two categories are coded as zero before summing them. Unclear cases and cases containing both categories have to be dropped which leads to a missing value on the overall repression measure. Collective action can refer here both to peaceful and violent action (Minorities at Risk Project).

This coding of changes in repression based on the *number* of measures used is somewhat problematic as it cannot capture a change in the *degree* to which each measure is used. Unfortunately, no group-level data on repression is available that would also allow evaluating the intensity of the use of different measures.

Independent variables

A group's status in society, the benefit of winning b in the theory developed here, is operationalised using the level of political discrimination against a group from MAR. This variable contains five categories where zero stands for no discrimination and four for targeted restriction of political participation by public policy. The variable measures whether groups are excluded from political activity in a state and in how far the state is making attempts to remedy a group's under representation or enforces it by its actions. Only in the severest category of discrimination does the government actually take action to enforce a group's exclusion (Minorities at Risk Project, 36-37).

Ideally, the probability of a group winning p would be predicted in an auxiliary model but this is not possible here as no data is available on the actual outcomes of rebellions. Instead, I use the ratio of group members to non-group members as a proxy for a group's probability of winning. As the variable on group population in MAR contains gaps, I linearly interpolate a group's total number[4].

This operationalisation is based on the assumption that the government and the group have a similar ability to draft and extract resources amongst relevant populations for a potentially existential fight. In that case, the government can increase the army if necessary as the group's members and resources are mobilised. Assuming that the government can draw from all non-group members might be overly optimistic as other groups in the state might not cooperate with the government. However, it is assumed that the government can offer material benefits to supporters in an existential fight that provides incentives to the general population, not only to the government's direct constituency. Unfortunately, this assumption cannot be relaxed as the dataset does not contain all groups in government and therefore their size is not known.

In order to express a group's expected benefit of fighting pb, I introduce an interaction term between the status variable b and the variable on group proportion that is used as a proxy for a group's probability of winning p.

The cost of fighting needs to capture the negative externalities that a group can expect from fighting the government until it is either defeated or wins (also see Fearon,

[4]In MAR Phases 3 and 4, data on a group's size is derived from an estimate on the group's proportion. This proportion is used to derive the total number of group members using data on the total population from the US Census Bureau in 1995 and 1998 and from the CIA World Factbook in 2004. The number of group non-members is determined using data on a country's population size from Gleditsch (2002) (extracted from QoG (Teorell et al., 2013)) in all years.

1995). This will depend on the government's capacity to induce fatalities on fighters as well as potentially civilians. This measure should also depend on the potential strength of the government's army in a fight in relation to the group's strength. Therefore, the cost of fighting should be captured in the ratio of group non-members to group members, the inverse of the variable that is used to operationalise a group's probability of winning.

In addition, as the goal here is to model the balance between costs and benefits, the previous repression level needs to be included. Even though the number of measures used is not an ideal operationalisation of the magnitude of repression, there is no alternative measure available. Because of this concern, below the robustness of results will be evaluated in cases with no previous repression.

Thus, a government's incentive to change the repression level against a specific group is modeled as

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta r_t^{**} &= \beta_1 \frac{\text{members}}{\text{non-members}} \times \text{disc} \\ &+ \beta_2 \frac{\text{members}}{\text{non-members}} + \beta_3 \text{disc} \\ &+ \beta_4 \frac{\text{non-members}}{\text{members}} + \beta_5 r_{t-1} \end{aligned} \tag{4.7}$$

It is expected that coefficient β_1 is positive, β_2 and β_3 are close to 0 and β_4 and β_5 are negative.

The relationship between the variables on repression and discrimination

The relationship between the variables on discrimination and repression still needs to be addressed. Conceptually, the two are distinct. A group's level of discrimination reflects group members' situation vis-a-vis the rest of the society, that is their access to power in a state (Cederman et al., 2010). Similarly, in MAR, a group is discriminated at the highest level if "[p]ublic policies substantially restrict the group's political participation by comparison with other groups" (Minorities at Risk Project, 37). A group can be denied access to power without being actively repressed. Repression on the other hand is "(...) any action by another group which raises the contender's cost of collective action" (Tilly, 1978, 100). Such actions do not necessarily change a group's access to

power. For example, according to MAR the Amhara in Ethiopia did not experience any discrimination in 1999 and according to the EPR data (Cederman et al., 2010) the group was a junior partner to the government. Nevertheless, group civilians were subjected to torture, show trials and arrests according to MAR.

The MAR data provides insight into the types of rights and participatory activities that can be limited for a group. Those are freedom of expression, freedom of movement, rights in judicial proceedings, restrictions on organising, restrictions on voting rights, police/military recruitment, civil service access, access to higher office and an other category (Minorities at Risk Project, 37-38)[5]. However, a group may also be discriminated at the highest level without any of these explicit political restrictions holding.

Some of the political rights associated with discrimination are violated by the use of certain repressive measures contained in the overall repression variable. Therefore, the possibility that the variables on discrimination and repression overlap by definition needs to be considered[6].

Specifically, it appears that a group's freedom of movement is violated if the repressive measures restrictions on movement or forced resettlement are used. However, the relationship between the right and the repressive measures in question in the data is not deterministic. It is possible to see each of these repressive measures in question being used against civilians without the general right being considered restricted. It is even possible to see the use of both measures against civilians without the right being considered restricted. Similarly, it is possible for the right to be considered restricted without seeing any of the potentially related repressive measures being used against civilians.

In addition, it appears that rights in judicial proceedings are violated if any of the following repressive measures are used: few group members arrested, many group members arrested, leaders arrested, disappeared, or detained, show trials of group members or leaders, members executed by authorities, and leaders executed by authorities. Here, again, it is possible for the right in question not to be considered restricted even

[5]Cases of discriminated groups that only face restrictions in the other category are excluded as it is unclear which rights are infringed here.

[6]A project representative noted in an email exchange that to the responsible Research Director's recollection, there is no definitional overlap between the variable on repression and discrimination in the Phase 4 data.

though the group experiences one of the related repressive measures being used against civilians[7] and it is also possible to be considered to be denied the right without experiencing any of the potentially related repressive measures being used against civilians.

Thus, there does not seem to be deterministic definitional overlap between specific rights and related repressive measures in the data. Nevertheless, it might be that the use of a repressive measure against civilians is causally related to an infringement of the potentially related rights. In order to determine whether that is the case, temporal patterns can be exploited: The relationship would be problematic if the use of a repressive measure in a year would result in the violation of the right in the same year without the violation having been present before. While such cases occur in the data, in the sample under scrutiny they are actually rare. There are three cases where an increase in a repressive measure corresponds with a decrease in the potentially associated right. However, this change in rights does not translate into a change in the discrimination level used in the analysis here in any of these cases even though in two of the cases no other rights change.

Similarly, there are two cases where a decrease in the use of a repressive measure against civilians is associated with an increase in the potentially corresponding right. Here the discrimination level does also not change even though all other rights remain the same.

Thus, in sum, while there may be a link between repression and discrimination, this relationship does not seem problematic in the sample under scrutiny and given the level of aggregation.

Control variables

I control for whether a group is a dominant minority according to MAR as the government should not repress such groups and repression against them is unlikely to change as a result. In addition, dominance should be correlated with a group's size. These groups are not excluded as there are cases in the data where these groups are repressed and/or in conflict with the government.

I control for the regime type of a country as measured by the Vanhanen index of democratisation (Vanhanen, 2011) (from QoG) as democracies may be more con-

[7] There is no case in the data where all these measures occur simultaneously.

strained to use repression and higher levels of democracy might prevent political discrimination of specific groups (also see Fearon and Laitin, 2003). I use the Vanhanen measure in order to prevent a more direct definitional overlap between the measures on repression and group discrimination and other accounts of the regime type of a state such as Polity IV (Gurr et al., 1989).

I also control for a country's GDP per capita from (Gleditsch, 2002) – again extracted from GoG – as richer states may be less fearful of groups rebelling as group members may have fairly big opportunity costs for violence (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). As Wimmer (2002) argues that ethnic discrimination should be particularly likely when public goods are scarce, this variable could also have an effect on the likelihood of discrimination.

It is important to control for changes in the group's level of protest and rebellion in any year as the government is likely to react to group actions with increases in repression. In testing the theory introduced here it is vital not to mistake reactions of the government for pre-emptive action, particularly as group rebellion or protest might result in discrimination or a decimation of a group's size. Therefore, I include variables on changes in a group's level of violent rebellion and protest from the previous year respectively. Finally, I include a dummy variable on whether a group engaged in rebellion at the minimum level of local rebellion in the previous year. In MAR (Minorities at Risk Project, 90), a local rebellion requires "[a]rmed attempts to seize power in a locale". Previous rebellion might also lead to changes in group size and status alongside an increased likelihood to increase repression and is thus a possible confounding factor. All these control measures are coded from MAR data.

I also include a three category variable on whether there was an increase or a decrease in the total number of local rebellions fought by other groups in the same country. I add the same measure on changes in other groups' protest. This is important as domestic unrest may lead to general pre-emptive repression as well as have an effect on groups' status if resources are redistributed to groups that protest or rebel. I construct these variables from MAR data and add additional violent conflicts that are considered as non-ethnic from EPR to the conflict variable using the Growup dataset.

Estimation

In the following, I derive the relationship between the ordered dependent variable with three categories and the independent variables. For this I draw on the relationship between a group's cost benefit calculation and the continuous ideal change in repression $\Delta {r_t}^{**}$ derived from the original game.

Like in a standard ordered logit or probit model, the goal of the estimation is to find two cutoff points on an underlying latent variable in order to determine how values on the independent variables correspond to the three outcome categories. The latent variable is the continuous ideal level of change in repression Δr^{**} that translates into the government's strategy Δr^{*} depending on r_{t-1} in the theoretical model. In the empirical model Δr^{**} needs to be translated into the three categories of the dependent variable.

In cases where the ideal change in repression Δr^{**} is a decrease of a certain magnitude but a decrease of that magnitude is not possible, the government's action under the equilibrium strategy Δr^{*} is a decrease to the minimum level of repression, 0. As long as some decrease is possible, however, this is not problematic for the estimation as the dependent variable only considers whether a decrease took place or not. Therefore, the latent ideal change translates into the correct empirical outcome category.

If the government has not repressed previously, on the other hand, a decrease in repression is impossible. Here, cases where the latent variable would correspond to a decrease are associated with the empirical outcome of no change. This form of censoring needs to be taken into account by the model in order to avoid the effect of negative cost benefit assessments on the likelihood of a decrease in repression being underestimated.

Because of these complications, I use a variation of a standard ordered probit model that takes this form of censoring into account[8]. I assume that the effect of the independent variables and a stochastic term $\epsilon \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$ on the underlying latent level of

[8]This estimation strategy is also discussed in Zhao and Glewwe (2010) in the context of explaining educational attainment where some subjects are still in school. Thus, the educational attainment of some subjects is fully known while for others it is only known that the final outcome is larger or equal to a certain value. For the individuals in the latter category, the observed outcome translates to a larger range on the latent variable than is associated with the observed outcome. This is taken into account when formulating the probability of being in the observed category for these individuals exactly like is done here.

ideal change in repression Δr^{**} is linear. However, the difference between an ordinary ordered probit model and the model developed here is that the link function between the latent variable in the empirical model Δr^{**} and the outcomes accommodates the selective censoring. Thus, the latent variable Δr^{**} translates to empirical outcomes as follows

$$y = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } \Delta r^{**} + \epsilon > \tau_2 \\ 0, & \text{if } (0 < \Delta r^{**} + \epsilon < \tau_2) \cup (r_{t-1} = 0 \cap \Delta r^{**} + \epsilon < 0) \\ -1, & \text{if } r_{t-1} > 0 \cap \Delta r^{**} + \epsilon < 0 \end{cases} \tag{4.8}$$

where $\tau_1 = 0$ and τ_2 are cut-off points of the ordered model.

In other words, for cases where no repression is present at the beginning of the time period under scrutiny, there are two reasons why no change in repression occurs: Either because the best option of the government was to do nothing or because the best option was to decrease repression but such a decrease is empirically impossible. In addition, there is only a positive probability of a case showing a decrease in repression if the group was repressed in the previous year.

To account for the fact that the probabilities of being in the no change and the decrease category depend on whether there was previous repression in a MLE context, a dummy δ that takes the value one if there was previous repression will be included directly into the likelihood function. ω_j is a dummy on whether a case is in category j.

The likelihood function is then

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L} = \prod_{i=1}^{n} (\quad \Phi \quad & (-\Delta r^{**})^{\omega_j \delta} (\Phi(\tau_2 - \Delta r^{**}) - \Phi(-\Delta r^{**}) + \Phi(-\Delta r^{**})(1-\delta))^{\omega_j} \\ (\quad \Phi \quad & (\Delta r^{**} - \tau_2))^{\omega_j}) \end{aligned} \tag{4.9}$$

Results

Table 4.1 shows regression results from the model introduced above. Here, the interaction between a group's discrimination and size appears negative and statistically not significant. Thus, hypotheses one and two are not supported by the evidence. The cost term, on the other hand, carries a negative sign and is statistically significant on the ten

per cent level. Thus, there is some support for hypotheses three and four.

Table 4.1: The effect of factors influencing expected utility on increases and decreases in government repression against a group.

DV: Direction change in repression	Estimate	Std. Error	p value
Discrimination level (Disc)	0.17	0.05	0.00
Member to non-member ratio (Size)	0.17	0.18	0.36
(Disc)*(Size)	-0.06	0.07	0.42
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.00	0.00	0.08
Repression, t-1	-0.01	0.08	0.94
Dominant group dummy	0.25	0.33	0.45
Vanhanen index	-0.01	0.01	0.07
GDP (100000s)	0.55	1.38	0.69
Change in group protest	0.12	0.05	0.02
Change in group rebellion	0.13	0.07	0.08
Rebellion dummy, t-1	0.31	0.23	0.19
Change in others' protest	-0.04	0.12	0.76
Change in others' rebellion	-0.38	0.16	0.02
Cut	0.55	0.11	0.00
Constant	0.08	0.26	0.76
N			745
Log-likelihood			-215.893

Figure 4.3 illustrates these findings. It shows the predicted probability of an increase in repression at different values of group discrimination, the proxy for b, across the range of the variable on the member to non-member ratio (minimum to about 95th percentile), the proxy for p. Predictions shown correspond to the median value of 1000 simulations and 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles[9].

At low values of the member to non-member ratio p, the predicted probability of an increase in repression increases sharply with increasing levels of p, both at the highest and lowest levels of discrimination. This sharp increase is a function of the negative effect of the inverse member to non-member ratio that was used to operationalise costs. When groups are small compared to the rest of the population, their cost of fighting is largest. At small proportional group sizes, small increases in group size have a large effect on a decrease in the cost of fighting. As the cost of fighting has a negative effect on repression, decreases in the cost of fighting translate into a sharply increased probability of repression. The incline is steeper at higher levels of discrimination which

[9]In all figures shown the Vanhanen index and the GDP measure were set to their mean while all other variables were set to 0.

leads to an initial increase in the effect of discrimination as p increases.

However, as p increases further, the effect of discrimination on the probability of an increase in repression slightly decreases. This negative interaction between discrimination and the probability of winning is at odds with the theory introduced here where it was expected that the effect of discrimination on repression increases with group size.

Thus, the empirical findings from model one are not fully supportive of the theory developed here. In order to understand the results better, the sample is split between cases with p, a group's member to non-member ratio, below and above the median. Regression results for these models can be found in Appendix B in tables B.1 and B.2.

In the sample with low member to non-member ratio p, the interaction between discrimination and a group's proportional size is positive and significant at the ten per cent level. The cost term carries a negative sign and closely misses significance at the ten per cent level. Figure 4.4 illustrates these relations. Here, the effect of discrimination increases considerably as p increases. This is radically different from the decreasing effect of b as p increases in the full sample. Instead, the positive interaction between b and p is consistent with the expectation that the government assesses a group's expected benefit of fighting via pb.

In the sample of groups with large values of p, on the other hand, the interaction between group size and discrimination is negative and insignificant while the cost term is again negative and significant on the five cent level. Thus, in the sample of large groups, the theory is not fully supported by the evidence.

Overall, the empirical results offer support for hypotheses three and four on governments adjusting repression levels to groups' costs for fighting. With regards to hypotheses one and two on the effect of the expected benefit of fighting, the evidence is less clear. While in the sample of smaller groups the evidence weakly suggests that governments may consider incentives in terms of expected benefits, when groups are large the evidence is directly contrary to this expectation. These findings could suggest that there are different underlying processes at work but it is by no means clear what those are. Therefore, in an attempt to understand these findings further, I offer and test several potential explanations for the inconclusive evidence.

Figure 4.3: The predicted probability of an increase in repression as a function of discrimination and group proportion predicted from Table 4.1.



Refining the model

There are three potential explanations for the inconclusive results found in the original model. Firstly, it could be the case that governments take a more complex effect of repression on groups' expected utility calculations into account. Secondly, it is possible that governments use more complex considerations than the original model assumes. Thirdly, the cost of repression may depend on groups' relative size. Below, each of these possibilities is tested.

Adverse effects of repression

The theory introduced above assumes that repression exerts its effect on domestic groups only by increasing the cost of fighting. In fact, however, the relationship between repression and collective action is far from clear. Some find that repression encourages dissent (for example Carey, 2006), others find a u-shaped effect of repression on political violence (for example Muller and Weede, 1990) and Gupta et al. (1993) find that high levels of repression deter violent dissent but only in autocracies.

Thus, it is possible that the model should also take repression as a potential incen-

Figure 4.4: The predicted probability of an increase in repression as a function of discrimination and group proportion predicted from the sample of cases with small member- to non-member ratios.



tive for action into account. After all, the level of repression of a group constitutes a grievance that a group can end by defeating the government[10]. As a result, the benefit of winning in a conflict may not only be constituted by b but rather by $b + r_t$. If that is the case, a group's expected utility of fighting becomes:

$$U_{Dt}(\Delta r_t, F_t) = p(b_t + r_{t-1} + \Delta r_t) - c_{Dt} - r_{t-1} - \Delta r_t \tag{4.10}$$

In other words, repression deters rebellion but at the same time also provokes rebellion by offering groups an additional incentive for fighting. If that is the case, the government's ideal change in repression becomes

$$\Delta r_t^{**} = \frac{pb_t + pr_{t-1} - c_{Dt} - r_{t-1}}{1 - p} \tag{4.11}$$

Thus, the effect of all variables on the latent change in repression becomes rela-

[10]Lawrence (2010) offers the grievance-based argument as one potential explanation for repression triggering violence.

tively stronger as a group's probability of winning, p, increases and repression becomes a less potent tool to prevent rebellion. This is because as p increases the benefit of winning becomes relatively more important and the effect of repression is increasingly exerted through the expected benefit alongside the cost term.

To test this more complicated version of the model, p needs to be standardised to $p^* \in [0, 1]$. This is achieved by using

$$p^* = \frac{\text{member to non-member ratio}}{\text{max member to non-member ratio}} \tag{4.12}$$

Then, including constitutive terms, we can operationalise the latent change in repression to be

$$\Delta r_t^{**} = \frac{p^* b_t}{1-p^*} + \frac{p^*}{1-p^*} + \frac{b_t}{1-p^*} + \frac{p^* r_{t-1}}{1-p^*} + \frac{r_{t-1}}{1-p^*} + \frac{c_{Dt}}{1-p^*} \tag{4.13}$$

Table 4.2: The effect of factors influencing expected utility on increases and decreases in government repression against a group. Specification with more complex effect of repression.

DV: Direction change in repression	Estimate	Std. Error	p value
Discrimination level (Disc)	0.17	0.05	0.00
Member to non-member ratio (Size)	5.10	7.33	0.49
(Disc)*(Size)	-2.06	2.74	0.45
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.00	0.00	0.09
Repression, t-1 (Rep)	-0.03	0.09	0.79
(Rep)*(Size)	2.00	4.52	0.66
Dominant group dummy	0.26	0.33	0.43
Vanhanen index	-0.01	0.01	0.07
GDP (100000s)	0.55	1.38	0.69
Change in group protest	0.13	0.05	0.01
Change in group rebellion	0.13	0.07	0.08
Rebellion dummy, t-1	0.31	0.23	0.19
Change in others' protest	-0.04	0.12	0.75
Change in others' rebellion	-0.37	0.16	0.02
Cut	0.55	0.11	0.00
Constant	0.09	0.26	0.73
N			745
Log-likelihood			-215.8391

The regression for this model can be found in table 4.2. The log-likelihood of this model is almost identical to the log-likelihood of the original version of the model.

Thus, it appears that the more complex version of the theory is not substantially better equipped to explain the data. In addition, the interaction term between the scaled versions of p and b is still negative. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the poor performance of the theory can be explained by the failure to take a more complex effect of repression on domestic groups into account.

Governments making more complex assessments

Another explanation for the poor performance of the theory introduced here could be that governments observe groups' expected utility for conflict or even their conflict likelihood directly and therefore do not need to estimate expected utility as a result of observed values of few variables. To test whether that is the case, I use an auxiliary logit regression to predict group rebellion in a given year[11]. In this auxiliary model shown in table B.3 in Appendix B, the dependent variable is a dummy variable on whether an ethnic group engages in rebellion at the minimum level of a local rebellion from MAR (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009) in a given year. I use all independent variables from the original model that are expected to be associated with a group's expected utility for rebellion: a group's member to non-member ratio in interaction with its discrimination level as well as the interaction terms, the non-member to member ratio to gauge the costs of fighting and the repression level in the previous year. In addition, I include variables on whether a group is dominant, GDP, the Vanhanen index, and whether a group has a defined regional base in the state, whether a group has kin in a neighbour state, whether a group has engaged in conflict in the previous year and the number of years since a group's last rebellion at the same minimum level from MAR. In the auxiliary model, previous rebellion, peace years and democracy (ten per cent level) have the expected effects on rebellion and are statistically significant. Moreover, kin in a direct neighbour state decreases the likelihood of rebellion significantly at the ten per cent level. None of the other variables are statistically significant and the variables of interest do not have the expected effects.

Nevertheless, the auxiliary model is used in three ways to arrive at auxiliary predictions of a group's likelihood of fighting in a given year. Regression results from these models can be found in tables 4.3 through 4.5.

[11]The auxiliary approach is similar to the one introduced in Kathman (2010) to explain interventions in neighbouring civil wars by the threat of the neighbouring war being contagious.

Table 4.3: The effect of a linear auxiliary prediction on increases and decreases in government repression against a group.

DV: Direction change in repression	Estimate	Std. Error	p value
Linear auxiliary prediction	0.17	0.15	0.27
Linear auxiliary prediction squared	0.01	0.02	0.56
Dominant group dummy	-0.08	0.33	0.82
Vanhanen index	-0.02	0.01	0.02
GDP (100000s)	1.61	1.61	0.32
Rebellion dummy, t-1	-0.58	0.67	0.39
Change in group protest	0.14	0.05	0.01
Change in group rebellion	0.14	0.08	0.09
Change in others' rebellion	-0.33	0.16	0.03
Change in others' protest	-0.03	0.12	0.79
Cut	0.58	0.09	0.00
Constant	1.01	0.42	0.02
N			734
Log-Likelihood			-220.204

Table 4.4: The effect of an auxiliary predicted probability on increases and decreases in government repression against a group.

DV: Direction change in repression	Estimate	Std. Error	p value
Auxiliary predicted probability	3.57	2.26	0.11
Auxiliary predicted probability squared	-0.96	2.06	0.64
Dominant group dummy	-0.03	0.32	0.92
Vanhanen index	-0.02	0.01	0.02
GDP (100000s)	1.24	1.31	0.34
Rebellion dummy, t-1	-1.88	1.13	0.10
Change in group protest	0.14	0.05	0.01
Change in group rebellion	0.14	0.08	0.08
Change in others' rebellion	-0.33	0.16	0.03
Change in others' protest	-0.04	0.12	0.77
Cut	0.58	0.09	0.00
Constant	0.37	0.19	0.06
N			734
Log-Likelihood			-219.549

Firstly, I use the linear prediction from the auxiliary model as an input variable to predict government change in repression in a model that includes only the control variables from the original model. As above results suggest that the likelihood of increases in repression might decrease again when a group's propensity to fight is high, I also include a squared term. In this model, shown in table table 4.3, both the auxiliary prediction and the squared term carry a positive sign and are statistically not significant.

Secondly, the predicted probability from the auxiliary model and its squared term

Table 4.5: The effect of a linear prediction based on factors expected to influence expected utility on increases and decreases in government repression against a group.

DV: Direction change in repression	Estimate	Std. Error	p value
Linear auxiliary prediction (EU vars)	-1.09	1.05	0.30
Linear auxiliary prediction (EU vars) squared	-1.50	0.72	0.04
Dominant group dummy	0.17	0.32	0.59
Vanhanen index	-0.02	0.01	0.01
GDP (100000s)	0.99	1.36	0.47
Rebellion dummy, t-1	0.47	0.23	0.04
Change in group protest	0.12	0.05	0.02
Change in group rebellion	0.16	0.08	0.04
Change in others' rebellion	-0.34	0.16	0.04
Change in others' protest	-0.01	0.12	0.90
Cut	0.59	0.09	0.00
Constant	0.60	0.43	0.16
N			734
Log-Likelihood			-212.144

are included in the control model. Here, the squared term turns negative but again, both terms are not significant.

Thirdly, I calculate a group's latent propensity for fighting from the auxiliary model only using the variables expected to affect a group's expected utility, p, b, pb, c, and r_{t-1} while the control variables in the auxiliary model are set to 0. When this form of auxiliary prediction and a squared term are included in the control model, the squared term is negative and statistically significant on a five per cent level and the log likelihood is highest of all three models on auxiliary predictions. This suggests that governments may use the variables argued to be associated with expected utility as the most important sources of information when estimating the threat that a group poses. However, as the variables do not have the expected effect in the auxiliary model, this is only limited support for the theory introduced here. As Figure 4.5 shows, the relationship between the linear prediction and the government's probability of increasing repression is positive for the vast majority of cases. Thus, governments may use expected utility predictions as suggested here but make different calculations when they expect a group's expected utility for fighting to be very high.

Repression being costly at high expected utility values

Another potential explanation for the inconclusive results from the original model could be that not all governments are willing or able to balance very high expected utilities

Figure 4.5: The predicted probability of an increase in repression as a function of the auxiliary prediction using groups' expected utility variables.



with repression. Repression should become more costly the higher the opportunity cost resulting from it, that is the larger the group compared to a government's repressive capacity. As the group becomes relatively larger, it becomes more difficult for the government to repress the group without becoming vulnerable to other adversaries. Thus, if a large amount of repression is required in order to prevent a group from fighting and if using such a large amount of repression would be particularly costly to a government, the government might be more likely to resort to measures other than repression in order to prevent the group from fighting or might even take the risk of rebellion[12]. Governments that can easily afford to repress a group even if high levels of repression are required, on the other hand, should react as predicted by the expected utility argument introduced above[13].

[12]In Pierskalla (2010), the government's willingness to repress depends among other things on the comparison between the cost of repression and the cost for accommodation. In addition, here, weak governments are assumed to have a high cost of repressing.

[13]Davenport (1995, drawing on earlier work) offers an overview over two potential alternative explanations for the use of repression by governments with large repressive capacity. Firstly, repression is a cheap measure for governments with large repressive capacities which allows for controlling large parts of the population at the same time. This explanation is closely linked to the argument made here albeit it does not consider opportunity costs also with respect to potential external threats. Secondly, repressive

For testing this, I split the data at the median of a variable on a country's military personnel (World Bank, 2011a) per group members. In the sample where this ratio is high, governments should not incur a large amount of opportunity costs even if they use large amounts of repression against a group. Therefore, in this sample, the theory introduced here should still hold. In the sample where the military to group ratio is low, on the other hand, governments incur considerable opportunity costs when using a large amount of repression against the group in question and therefore, here the theory may not hold.

Table 4.6: The effect of factors influencing expected utility on increases and decreases in government repression against a group from the sample of cases with low military to group ratio. Non-dominant groups only.

DV: Direction change in repression	Estimate	Std. Error	p value
Discrimination level (Disc)	0.19	0.08	0.03
Member to non-member ratio (Size)	0.83	0.51	0.10
(Disc)*(Size)	-0.29	0.17	0.10
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.00	0.01	0.87
Repression, t-1	0.03	0.11	0.80
Vanhanen index	-0.03	0.01	0.01
GDP (100000s)	2.59	1.81	0.15
Change in group protest	0.30	0.08	0.00
Change in group rebellion	0.14	0.09	0.12
Rebellion dummy, t-1	0.17	0.34	0.61
Change in others' protest	-0.26	0.18	0.14
Change in others' rebellion	-0.60	0.24	0.01
Cut	0.38	0.20	0.06
Constant	-0.18	0.39	0.64
N			370
Log-likelihood			-114.8625

In these models the variable on groups' dominant status cannot be included as there are only two cases of dominant groups in the sample with large military which both see no change in repression. Instead of just excluding the variable, results below are shown on the subset of cases where groups are not dominant. There are only 27 cases of dominance in the sample with low military to group ratio as well and thus not many cases are lost compared to the models shown above[14].

In the model on the sample of small militaries in relation to the group in question

administrations have an incentive to promote the use of repression.

[14]Tables B.5 and B.4 show results from the split samples below excluding the variable on dominance altogether. Here, regression results are mostly robust in sign but not in significance.

from table 4.6, the interaction between discrimination and group size is negative and significant on the 10 per cent level. In addition, here the cost term is positive and no longer statistically significant either.

Figure 4.6 illustrates these findings. The interaction between discrimination and size increases initially but decreases towards larger group sizes as in the original model. Thus, as expected, when the military is relatively weak, the implications derived from the theory do not hold. Here, governments do not seem to adjust repression to a group's expected benefit or cost of fighting.

Figure 4.6: The predicted probability of an increase in repression as a function of discrimination and group proportion predicted from the sample of cases with low military to group ratio.



Table 4.7 shows regression results from the sample on cases where the military to group ratio is larger than the median. Figure 4.7 plots the predicted probability of an increase in repression from this model. The results from this sample are very much in line with the expectations from the expected utility hypotheses. The interaction term between discrimination and group size appears significantly positive. The cost factor appears negative with $p = .09$. Figure 4.7 illustrates that the effect of discrimination on the probability of an increase in repression is significantly positive at all other than

very low levels of p and increases as p increases. Thus, these results lend considerable support for the expected utility hypotheses introduced above.

In sum, the expected utility argument that is driven by an expected benefit term pb and a cost term c gains considerable support in the sample on cases where governments have large repressive capacity compared to the group they are facing. These findings suggest that governments consider groups' expected utility considerations in order to determine the threat level posed by specific domestic groups. However, they only seem to act upon these considerations with repression if they can afford to do so without incurring large opportunity costs. Thus, repression appears to be used as a pre-emptive tool but only by governments with relatively large repressive capabilities compared to the targets of repression.

Table 4.7: The effect of factors influencing expected utility on increases and decreases in government repression against a group from the sample of cases with high military to group ratio. Non-dominant groups only.

DV: Direction change in repression	Estimate	Std. Error	p value
Discrimination level (Disc)	-0.12	0.16	0.45
Member to non-member ratio (Size)	-45.16	20.26	0.03
(Disc)*(Size)	15.45	6.72	0.02
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.00	0.00	0.09
Repression, t-1	-0.05	0.14	0.71
Vanhanen index	-0.01	0.01	0.73
GDP (100000s)	-1.66	2.60	0.52
Change in group protest	-0.04	0.09	0.66
Change in group rebellion	0.20	0.19	0.30
Rebellion, t-1	0.45	0.40	0.27
Change in others' protest	0.10	0.21	0.62
Change in others' rebellion	-0.26	0.26	0.32
Cut	0.71	0.15	0.00
Constant	1.18	0.64	0.07
N			338
Log-likelihood			-72.1172

Robustness

As noted above, the measure on repression only captures changes in the amount of different repressive measures used but not the degree to which the measures are used. This imprecision can lead to an underestimation of the number of changes in repression. However, as long as all governments have the same tendency to diversify the measures

Figure 4.7: The predicted probability of an increase in repression as a function of discrimination and group proportion predicted from the sample of cases with high military to group ratio.



they use to increase repression and accordingly use fewer measures to decrease it, this should lead to an underestimation of the effect of all variables and in that sense make for a particularly conservative test of pre-emptive repression without inducing bias. In addition, the concern is alleviated as in 83 per cent of cases repression was absent in the previous year. Nevertheless, the robustness of the supportive results from the sample with high military to group ratio is tested in the subset of cases with no previous repression. As in those cases only increases in repression are possible, I run a logistic regression model.

Regression results on the model with high military to group ratio are shown in table B.6. Here, the interaction term is positive with p = .058 and the cost term carries a negative sign but is no longer significant.

Conclusion

This chapter tests whether governments adapt the level of repression they use against specific domestic groups to their expectation about these groups' incentives for re-

belling in order to prevent them from taking up arms. It finds evidence that governments react to group-specific characteristics that increase groups' expected utility for rebellion with repression. However, contrary to the assumption introduced here, not all governments do so but rather only governments that are relatively strong compared to the potential target of repression. This is probably because such governments can afford to use even large amounts of repression without becoming vulnerable to other threats. Thus, the findings suggest that repression is a pre-emptive tool for governments that are strong relative to domestic groups.

Chapter 5

Repression to Pre-empt Contagion

Introduction

Do governments react pre-emptively in order to prevent the spill-over of conflicts from other countries? And, if so, when do they expect a foreign conflict to be contagious and what actions do they consider in order to prevent spill-overs? Apart from one exception (Danneman and Ritter, 2014), these questions have not been considered to date. This is surprising given that scholars widely agree that conflicts can spread between countries and that it seems highly unlikely that governments would either not be aware of that possibility or not be willing to try and prevent such a threat from materialising. Part of the hesitation to address these questions may be due to the remaining uncertainty about the transmission channels of conflict contagion. As we do not know with certainty which conflicts are contagious – and must be even more uncertain about which ones governments might *think* to be contagious – it is difficult to identify relevant foreign conflicts that may trigger pre-emptive government action.

Recent literature finds that governments react to ongoing armed conflict in close geographic proximity with repression (Danneman and Ritter, 2014). Here, repression is measured on the country level and it is thus not clear who is targeted by this repression. Many open questions remain about governments' reactions to the threat of foreign conflicts spilling over to their country. Firstly, if governments expect foreign conflicts to be contagious, do they target the population uniformly with domestic repression or do they target groups they expect to be particularly likely to react to foreign events with rebellion? The latter seems likely but what groups do governments expect to be most likely to be susceptible to conflict contagion? To answer this question, it

is important to know what mechanisms governments expect to trigger the spillover of foreign conflicts. Do they exclusively consider close-by conflicts as threats or conflicts elsewhere more broadly? And are there specific characteristics of foreign conflicts that governments fear to trigger spillovers in particular? These questions are of fundamental importance to understand what triggers governments to react to foreign events with pre-emptive repression and which parts of the population are most likely to suffer from these measures. Moreover, answers to these questions will provide further insight into governments' knowledge of processes triggering armed conflict more generally and into their strategies to prevent such conflict.

Many scholars have argued that inspiration processes between groups have an effect on conflict contagion. The first part of this thesis finds that one of the mechanisms behind conflict spill-overs may be information flows between groups in different countries that share similar grievances. Many others have argued that successful outcomes of the struggles of foreign groups can inspire groups with similar goals elsewhere. This is discussed for example in Horowitz (1985) in the context of secessionist groups and in Gurr (2000) in the context of groups that face circumstances in their home country similar to those of a group in conflict elsewhere. This chapter tests whether governments react to either one of these mechanisms with pre-emptive repression. Under both mechanisms, groups that gain information about these foreign events and that have similar grievances like the foreign group have the highest incentive to be inspired by these events. This chapter tests whether governments target those groups in particular with pre-emptive repression.

In order to test whether governments fear contagion as a result of potentially inspirational information about events in other countries, this chapter conducts a large-n study on the analytic level of the government-ethnic group dyad. Drawing on chapter three, again, I introduce a number of measures for the likelihood of events elsewhere becoming known in a country such as the degree to which the population has access to mass media, the media freedom of a country and geographic proximity between two countries.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the argument about governments reacting to the threat of foreign events potentially inspiring domestic groups. The third section introduces the data and methods used in the empirical test

of the argument in the fourth section. The subsequent two sections test alternative specifications before the final section concludes.

The argument

For making predictions about government repression aimed at preventing conflict contagion, it is of fundamental importance how governments *expect* foreign events to affect domestic groups. In the following I reiterate two alternative arguments about inspiration processes between groups that were first introduced in chapter three: the mechanism based on foreign ongoing conflict and similarity in grievance and the mechanism based on foreign success and similarity in grievance. I derive empirical implications for the behaviour of a government that expects contagion to take place according to either mechanisms in turn and test them against each other.

Grievance based mobilisation

The first mechanism by which governments may expect foreign conflicts to be inspirational to domestic groups follows the argument discussed in chapter three on the inspirational effect of the mobilisation of discriminated groups on other discriminated groups.

Chapter three argues that four conditions must be met for a groups to have an incentive to engage in ethnic violence targeted at the government: Groups must be aware of the severity, targeted nature and injustice of their disadvantages and they must be aware of government intent in causing them. A group's collective awareness of the severity of the disadvantages its members experience is necessary in order for group members to perceive a grievance large enough to trigger action[1]. Moreover, groups need to be aware of the targeted nature of discrimination in order to perceive the grievance as ethnic (Klandermans et al., 2001)[2] and as a result in order to mobilise ethnically[3]. In addition, group members need to arrive at the conclusion that their treatment is unjust (also see Buhaug et al., 2014; Cederman et al., 2011). These factors

[1] Again, see for example Gurr (1993) on the notion that objective disadvantage translates into grievance and on the need of strong grievances for action. Also see Buhaug et al. (2014), drawing on Gamson (1992), in the context of economic inequality.

[2] Also see Buhaug et al. (2014), drawing on Gamson (1992), in the context of economic inequality; Cederman et al. (2011), drawing on Hogg and Abrams (1988).

[3] Also see Cederman et al. (2011), drawing on Hogg and Abrams (1988); see Martin (1986) for an overview over literature arguing that and investigating whether group grievance causes group action.

will cause groups to perceive a group-specific grievance that they have an incentive to address via collective ethnic action.

However, for this action to be targeted at the government, groups also need to gain awareness of the government's responsibility for their circumstances (Buhaug et al., 2014), drawing on (Gamson, 1992), in the context of economic inequality, also see (Gurr, 2000)[4].

The struggles of foreign groups in similar circumstances can increase groups' awareness of all these factors[5]. However, for domestic groups to become inspired by ongoing foreign conflicts of discriminated groups under this mechanism, information about these conflicts and their causes is necessary. Following Kuran (1998) and Weidmann (2015), chapter three argues that information about conflicts involving foreign ethnically discriminated groups increases domestic discriminated groups' awareness of targeted discrimination, of the intent with which this policy is enforced and of the injustice thereof. As a result of this process, the mobilisation of foreign discriminated groups against the government can trigger rebellion among domestic discriminated groups.

If governments are aware of this process, they have an incentive to prevent it from taking place. Thus, they should target domestic discriminated groups with pre-emptive action if foreign discriminated groups rebel against their government. However, as this mechanism only applies to cases where domestic groups become aware of the struggles of foreign groups as well as of the similarity of these foreign groups' situation to their own experience, governments should only react to struggles of foreign discriminated groups if they expect a domestic discriminated group to have gained information about these events. This chapter focuses on the role of mass media in this process. The effect of direct communication between groups – for example as a result of ethnic kinship or cultural similarity – is beyond the scope of this chapter but would be a fruitful avenue for future research.

[4]Klandermans et al. (2001) find that trust in the government moderates the formation of grievances in the context of South Africa.

[5]Also see Weidmann (2015), Kuran (1998) and also McAdam and Rucht (1993) on the adoption of problem definitions and identities in the context of diffusion from the US New Left to its German counterpart as well as for example Elkins and Simmons (2005)' argument that decision makers can learn from countries with similar visible characteristics.

Grievance based success

Moreover, and as introduced as an alternative argument in chapter three, a number of scholars have argued that a group achieving her goal in a conflict can be inspirational to other groups by showing them that such success is possible (for example Horowitz, 1985, in the context of successful mobilisation for secessionism). Gurr (2000) makes that argument in the context of groups that face circumstances in their home country similar to those of a group in conflict elsewhere. Byman and Pollack (2007) suggest that successful secessionist groups can inspire groups in similar situations in the same or neighbouring countries. Under this line of reasoning, successes of groups elsewhere suggest to domestic ethnic groups with a similar goal that they might be equally successful.

Groups' actual goals and as a result the question of what constitutes a success and which other groups might be inspired by these successes is difficult to measure. Empirical literature on success arguments usually considers successes in the context of secessionist groups winning concessions (see for example Walter, 2006; Forsberg, 2013), most likely as they are the most straightforward types of goals and outcomes to observe and measure[6].

However, the general argument about groups gaining confidence in their goal by observing successes of groups with similar goals should apply to similar goals and successes more broadly. For this reason, I consider groups that face political discrimination and assume that their goal is to improve their status in society. As a result, identifying successes is straightforward: a discriminated group is successful in a fight if her status improves and her discrimination ends as a result of the fight. Accordingly, if a politically discriminated group observes the status of a discriminated group in another country improve as a result of a violent struggle, it may come to the conclusion that its own chance of improving its situation with violence is higher than previously expected. This increase in the perceived probability of success increases groups' incentive for fighting and may trigger some groups to take up arms against the government.

Again, under this argument information about the foreign group's political status and the outcome of the conflict for the group needs to be available to domestic

[6]Data on secessionist demands and concessions is not available in the Minorities at Risk framework that is used here.

groups in order to inspire them to action. And again, mass media is the transmission channel for information under scrutiny here. Other forms of information transmission may play a role as well but are beyond the scope of this thesis. In sum, under this argument discriminated groups that gain information about foreign groups with similar grievances fighting and reaching a *successful outcome* should consider fighting more likely to result in success and thus have an increased likelihood of rebelling against the government.

Additional mechanisms

Here, as in chapter three, shared grievance is expected to be the mechanism under which groups identify with and are inspired by the mobilisation for or successful outcome of ethnic violence. Shared grievance offers a clear mechanism by which inspiration is expected to take place. The addressing of the grievance elsewhere raises awareness of the grievance among domestic actors and successes in alleviating the grievance raises the expectation of similar successes with respect to the same goal and method.

Other factors could be expected to link groups with foreign groups in conflict that may also lead to inspiration, either independently or as an amplifier for the mechanisms suggested here. For example, it may be argued that groups in different countries that share the same ethnicity inspire each other to rebellion. Previous research has found evidence for this in the context of close-by conflicts (Forsberg, 2008; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008). However, these tests have not been conducted on the group-level and the mechanism underlying this process is not entirely clear. Nevertheless, it is possible that governments expect contagion under this mechanism and react to it. Danneman and Ritter (2014) test cultural similarity between societies – as opposed to groups as such – as a potential transmission channel for conflict contagion that governments may react to with repression but do not find governments reacting to this. Moreover, other types of shared grievances relying on different group definitions may trigger conflict contagion and/or may be expected by governments to do so and may thus trigger repression. Such considerations provide interesting questions for future research – both on conflict contagion and government pre-emptive reaction – but are beyond the scope of this thesis.

Government pre-emptive repression

Following chapter four, I argue that governments use repressive measures in order to prevent domestic unrest and violence. Repression deters rebellion because it is more costly for a group to organise rebellion in a repressive environment (for example Tilly, 1978). For governments, it is most cost-efficient to use pre-emptive repression to balance groups' utility for war with repression (also see Nordas and Davenport, 2013).

A number of assumptions were introduced in chapter four in order to derive this argument. Firstly, drawing on previous research, repression is assumed to be costly to the government as resources used for repression cannot be used for other purposes. As a result, governments have an incentive to use the amount of repression they believe necessary in order to prevent a group from fighting but not more in order to avoid wasting resources. Secondly, it is assumed that fighting in a military conflict against a domestic group is in any case more costly to the government than repressing the civilian population of said group. Therefore, the government is using repression as a strategy to prevent conflict in all cases. The repression level the government uses against a domestic group should thus always match the group's current expected utility for fighting. The previous chapter tests this notion in the context of domestic factors expected to influence groups' utilities for war and peace. The previous chapter explicitly models changes from the repression level in the previous year in response to imbalances in a group's expected utility. This test was geared at exploring whether governments react to the overall balance of costs and benefits in order to establish whether repression is used in an explicitly pre-emptive way. In this chapter, we are interested in whether the government considers foreign events to be part of the factors that affect a group's expected utility and thus balance the level of foreign inspiration with repression as well. Therefore, here the more straightforward – yet equivalent – formulation of the theory is used where the total repression level matches right hand side variables affecting a group's utility for fighting. Thus, when domestic groups' incentives for rebellion are high as a result of information about foreign events, government repression should be high in order to counterweight these incentives.

Figure 5.1 illustrates the overall argument graphically. The left hand side panel illustrates a situation where governments expect conflict spillovers under the mechanism based on foreign mobilisation and similar grievances. Here, foreign discriminated

groups' conflicts can inspire domestic groups to rebellion by raising awareness of their incentives for violence. Knowing this, upon observing the foreign conflict and if it can be expected that information about this conflict will reach a domestic group and thus inspire its members, a government has an incentive for repression against the group in order to prevent the group from rebelling. If governments expect the grievance based mobilisation mechanism to hold, repression against domestic discriminated groups should be high when the number of discriminated groups fighting elsewhere is high. The right hand panel illustrates the success based mechanism. Here, governments expect foreign successes of discriminated groups to inspire domestic discriminated groups. As a result, governments react with repression when they expect information about a foreign conflict of a discriminated group to reach a domestic discriminated group in order to prevent rebellion. Thus, if governments expect the grievance based success mechanism to hold, repression against discriminated groups should be high when the number of successes of discriminated groups elsewhere is high.

Hypotheses

These considerations allow deriving the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: A high number of discriminated groups fighting the government in other countries should lead to higher levels of repression of domestic discriminated groups. This should only be the case if a government has reason to expect that the group has gained information about these conflicts.

Hypothesis 2: A high number of successes by discriminated groups in other countries should lead to higher levels of repression of domestic discriminated groups. This should only be the case if a government has reason to expect that the group has gained information about these successes.

Data and methods

This section introduces the data and methods used to test the arguments on government repression as a reaction to the threat of a domestic group's inspiration, either by foreign

Figure 5.1: The link between foreign events involving discriminated groups, a domestic group's discrimination and government repression.



discriminated groups' struggles or successes. The unit of analysis here is the group-year and the sample of ethnic groups is taken from the Minorities at Risk data (subsequently referred to as MAR data) Phases III and IV (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009). As there is data on the government's treatment of each of these groups, the data can also be interpreted as group-government dyad years.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable of interest here is the level of repression that a government uses against a specific ethnic group. As in the previous chapter, this variable is coded using MAR data on a number of repressive measures against an ethnic group's civilian population that does not engage in collective action[7]. Here, I use the sum of all measures of government repression that are being used against group civilians.

As noted in the previous chapter, this coding is somewhat problematic as it cannot capture an increase in the *degree* to which different measures are used but no alternative is available.

[7]For an overview over specific measures see the previous chapter.

Independent variables

For operationalising the mobilisation and the success based mechanisms of inspiration, an important question is *which* foreign events that are inspirational under either mechanism should the government expect to actually become known by an ethnic group. In the following I discuss the operationalisation of inspirational events under both mechanisms before turning to this question.

Inspirational events

The mobilisation mechanism introduced in hypothesis one is operationalised as follows. Each discriminated MAR group involved in armed conflict with the government in another state can be inspirational to a domestic ethnic group. Therefore, I code a variable on the total number of these conflicts active in a given year. Here there is less of a concern of simultaneity than in the analysis in the first part of this thesis and therefore this variable is not lagged in time.

Armed conflict is defined as anti-government rebellion at the scale of large-scale guerrilla activity as it is again expected that high intensity conflicts are most likely to become known (Minorities at Risk Project, 90). Foreign groups involved in such conflict are considered discriminated if they are politically discriminated by government policy or social practice according to MAR (Minorities at Risk Project). An alternative measure where conflicts are included from the level of local rebellion (Minorities at Risk Project) onward is also discussed below.

As it is important for the inspirational potential variable to be as complete as possible and as it is not entirely clear in how far MAR data is exhaustive, ethnic conflict involvements of discriminated groups in states that are not included in the MAR data are added to the measure using data from the ETH Growup database used in the analysis in Chapter three.

For operationalising the success based mechanism, I code a variable on the number of successes of discriminated groups that fight the government in other states using MAR data as well. I code a success whenever a discriminated group that is involved in rebellion in a given year at the minimum level of local rebellion achieves an improvement in its status, that is a decrease of its political discrimination, in the next year. I augment this variable with Growup cases for countries that are not in the MAR dataset

as well.

As under both mechanisms only groups that are discriminated are expected to be inspired and thus the government should only take action against them, I interact the variables on inspirational foreign events under both mechanisms with a domestic group's level of discrimination from MAR. As noted in the previous chapter, here, the level of discrimination is a five category ordered measure where zero stands for no discrimination and four for targeted restriction of political participation by public policy.

Information about inspirational events

According to the theory, governments should only react to violent action or successes of similarly aggrieved groups if they have reason to believe that a group has actually gained awareness of these inspiring events. In this chapter, and based on the findings from chapter three that found some measures to be far from relevant, I introduce four ways of operationalising information flows.

Firstly, again, I use the measure on the average number of radios and TVs per capita using data from (Banks, 2011a). I interact the measure on media availability with the measure on discrimination and the number of inspiring events elsewhere – discriminated groups' successes or conflicts – under each mechanism respectively in a triple interaction.

Secondly, the media freedom measure from Chapter three is used here as well. As before, I interact the dummy on media freedom with the measure on a group's discrimination and inspiring events under each mechanism respectively in a triple interaction.

Thirdly, it might be the case that people are aware of events close-by, for example because they have direct contact to the population there or because media are most likely to report events close-by as discussed before. I thus only consider inspirational events under both mechanisms that take place in direct neighbour states. In a fifth and sixth model, only inspirational events under both mechanisms that take place in neighbour states (defined using a minimum distance of 10 km from Cshapes (Weidmann et al., 2010)) are interacted with the measure on group discrimination.

Finally, I also test the overall index of information flows as introduced in chapter three. This index combines a country i's media availability, a country j's GDP

per capita, and the capital distance between i and j in an additive index based on percentile scores. This dyadic index is used to weight foreign conflicts and successes of discriminated groups. The weighted conflict measure is subsequently interacted with the variable on media freedom in country i and a group's level of discrimination.

The following table summarises the measures that are tested in models one through eight.

Table 5.1: Interactions in models 1–8.

Model	Contagion argument	Information factor	Interaction terms
1	Mobilisation	Media availability	Conflicts of discriminated groups elsewhere * Media * Group status
2	Success	Media availability	Successes of discriminated groups elsewhere * Media * Group status
3	Mobilisation	Media freedom	Conflicts of discriminated groups elsewhere * Media freedom * Group status
4	Success	Media freedom	Successes of discriminated groups elsewhere * Media freedom * Group status
5	Mobilisation	Proximity	Conflicts of discriminated groups in neighbours * Group status
6	Success	Proximity	Successes of discriminated groups in neighbours * Group status
7	Mobilisation	Media freedom	Conflicts of discriminated groups elsewhere weighted by information index * Media freedom * Group status
8	Success	Media freedom	Successes of discriminated groups elsewhere weighted by information index * Media freedom * Group status

Control variables

Firstly, under the theory introduced in the previous chapter, the government balances groups' overall expected utility and therefore completeness of the model is nevertheless desirable in order to understand the contribution of each variable. For this reason, here the cost factor from the previous chapter, the inverse of the member to non-member ratio, is included as well.

Moreover, a number of control variables are included to avoid confounding of the variables of interest.

I control for whether a group is a dominant minority here as well. These groups are included in the analysis as it is not impossible for a group to be dominant and nevertheless experience repression and/or discrimination.

I control for the regime type as measured by the Vanhanen index of democratisation (Vanhanen, 2011) (as before from QoG) as democracies may be more constrained to use repression as well as to discriminate against domestic groups.

I also control for a country's GDP per capita from Gleditsch (2002) in 100.000s from QoG. As noted previously, richer states may expect large opportunity costs for violence (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) and may be less likely to discriminate (also see Wimmer, 2002).

Again, I control for a group's own level of protest and rebellion in a year from MAR in order to isolate pre-emptive repression.

Moreover, I also include a variable on the total number of armed conflicts fought by other groups in the same country as well as for an identical measure on other groups' protest. Again, I construct these variables from MAR data and add additional violent conflicts that are considered as non-ethnic from EPR to the conflict variable[8] using Growup data.

Finally, I include a variable on the number of conflicts in direct neighbour states that are *not* included in the respective measure of inspirational potential using data from Growup, MAR and Cshapes. Controlling for those conflicts is important as they might also lead to repression as well as cause conflicts in neighbours that are considered inspirational here. Thus, if those conflicts that are not relevant under the mechanisms introduced here were omitted, the effect of the mechanism tested might be overestimated.

Estimation

I use an ordered logit regression as the dependent variable on the number of measures used can be understood as an ordered measure of the level of repression. I include the level of repression in the previous year here as well as this variable is highly significant in all main models. In this chapter, this is not done as we are interested in

[8]This might lead to overcounting but this is accepted in order to be conservative. In addition, the definitions of ethnic conflicts and groups are fairly compatible between both projects and therefore the concern is minor.

modelling changes but rather to deal with time dependency in the model that could bias results. After all, it is likely that even if governments have an incentive to balance a group's expected utility, part of the repression level is nevertheless explained by the previous repression level, for example because the administration moves slowly or because changes of large magnitude cannot easily be implemented. In that case, including the lagged measure that explains the part of the overall repression level that is not explained by current expectations but by path dependency should improve our ability to find the relationship between the variables of interest. To interpret results, I present first differences in predicted probabilities of being in the lowest category, that is of not seeing any repression. This category is shown as it is the most likely category in the data[9]. Moreover, like in chapter three, table 5.2 gives an overview over the simulated interactions and their significance.

Results

First, models testing hypothesis one on the effect of foreign conflicts of discriminated groups are investigated. These models are shown in tables 5.3 and 5.4.

In model one in table 5.3, information flows are operationalised by the availability of radios and TVs in a country. Here, governments are expected to be more likely to repress domestic groups that are ethnically discriminated when the number of conflicts fought by discriminated groups in other countries is high. This should not be the case for domestic groups that are not discriminated, on the other hand. The effect on a group's likelihood of seeing no repression that results from an increase in foreign conflicts of discriminated groups from minimum to maximum has been simulated in scenarios with the lowest and the highest level of group discrimination, both when the availability of media sources is held at the 10th and at the 90th percentile. Results of these simulations are illustrated in Figure 5.2. The scenario with low media availability is shown on the left hand side and the scenario with high media availability is shown on the right side. Within these scenarios, the case of a non-discriminated group is shown with a filled triangle and the case of a discriminated group is shown with a hollow

[9]Variables of interest are moved from minimum to maximum. The only exception is the media availability measure which is again moved from the 10th to the 90th percentile. Again, control variables on democracy and GDP are set to their means while all other control variables are set to 0. Every simulation shows the median as well as the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile of 100000 simulations.

Table 5.2: Significance of interactions in models 1 – 8.

Model	Interaction effect	Sign	Significant (5%)
1. Media availability and conflict	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (Media low) (1)	-	Yes
	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (Media high) (2)	+	No
	Effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and inspiration (2) - (1)	+	No
2. Media freedom and conflict	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (No media freedom) (1)	-	No
	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (Media freedom) (2)	-	No
	Effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and inspiration (2) - (1)	+	No
3. Conflicts in neighbours	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict	+	No
4. Index and conflict	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (No media freedom) (1)	-	No
	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign conflict (Media freedom) (2)	+	No
	Effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and inspiration (2) - (1)	+	No
5. Media availability and success	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign success (Media low) (1)	+	No
	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign success (Media high) (2)	-	No
	Effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and inspiration (2) - (1)	-	No
6. Media freedom and success	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign success (No media freedom) (1)	+	No
	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign success (Media freedom) (2)	-	No
	Effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and inspiration (2) - (1)	-	No
7. Successes in neighbours	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign success	+	No
8. Index and success	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign success (No media freedom) (1)	-	No
	Moderating effect of discrimination on inspirational effect of foreign success (Media freedom) (2)	+	No
	Effect of information on the interaction between discrimination and inspiration (2) - (1)	+	No

triangle. As can be seen, increases in foreign conflicts of discriminated groups only exert a statistically significant effect in the case of a discriminated group in a country with low media availability. This effect is negative. Thus, for discriminated groups the likelihood of some repression significantly increases when media availability is low. For non-discriminated groups, on the other hand, there is barely any effect in the low media scenario. The simulated interaction between discrimination and the effect of these foreign conflicts is significantly negative in the low media scenario. In the high media scenario on the right hand side, on the other hand, this interaction is positive but insignificant and there is barely any effect of increases in foreign conflicts of discriminated groups on the likelihood of no repression for both types of groups. The effect of media availability on the effect of discrimination is positive but insignificant. Thus, governments are significantly more likely to repress discriminated groups than non-discriminated groups when foreign conflicts of discriminated groups are numerous but only in the scenario where the availability of media sources is low[10]. This suggests that – under some circumstances – governments take action against discriminated groups when they observe foreign conflicts of discriminated groups. However, hypothesis one expected such action when there is a high level of media sources. Instead, evidence for such action is found in the scenario with low media availability. Thus, hypothesis one is not supported.

Next, hypothesis one is tested with media freedom in a country i being the variable assumed to moderate information flows from a country j to i. Regression results can be found in model two in table 5.3. Here, the simulated findings are somewhat similar to model one. In the scenario with no media freedom, an increase in foreign conflicts of discriminated groups is significantly negative, increasing a discriminated group's likelihood of repression. However, the effect is weaker than in the low media availability scenario in the model above. In the presence of media freedom, discriminated groups

[10]When conflicts of low intensity are included in the variable on foreign inspirational conflicts alongside high intensity conflicts from the main specification, the trend, especially in the low media scenario, is similar. In these models, again, the control variable on additional conflicts in a direct neighbour state is adjusted accordingly. In the high media scenario discriminated groups are more likely to see no repression here. However, no effect is significant in this model. When media availability is not logged, results from the low media scenario in the original model are robust while high media scenarios also show a positive but insignificant effect for discriminated groups. The same is the case when Internet is included in the overall index of media availability. Regression results from these additional tests can be found in table C.1 in Appendix C.

are also more likely to see repression, but here the negative effect is weaker than in the absence of media freedom and no longer significant. For groups that are not discriminated, foreign conflicts of discriminated groups have no effect, irrespective of media freedom in a country. In this model, none of the interactions is statistically significant as can be seen in table 5.2[11].

Figure 5.2: The change in the predicted probability of no repression as a function of increases in foreign conflicts of discriminated groups, media availability and group discrimination.



[11]When low intensity conflicts are included alongside high intensity conflicts, discriminated groups see a similarly small increase in the likelihood of repression in the high and low freedom scenario while non-discriminated groups see no effect. No effect is significant. Results from this model can be found in table C.2.

Model three in table 5.4 tests the relationship when only high intensity conflict involvements of discriminated groups in neighbour states are included. Here, increases in such foreign conflicts of discriminated groups have no significant effect on any type of group and the simulated effects are very small. Moreover, the simulated interaction between discrimination and these conflicts is positive which is opposite to the expectation but very small and insignificant[12]. Thus, it appears that conflicts of discriminated groups in neighbour states are not of particular concern to governments.

The final model – model four in table 5.4 – on foreign conflicts of discriminated groups tests the effect of information as a combined index moderated by media freedom. Here, the results are substantively similar to the results in the models on media freedom and media availability: Discriminated groups are more likely to be repressed as a result of increases in foreign conflicts of discriminated groups in the absence of media freedom. This effect reaches statistical significance here. In the high freedom scenario, changes in foreign conflicts slightly increase discriminated groups' likelihood of no repression. On non-discriminated groups, on the other hand, increases in foreign conflicts barely have any effect. No other effect or interaction is significant here[13].

[12]When low intensity conflicts are included as well, the trend is similar and the positive effect on non-discriminated groups is significant. However, here the effect is small as well. Results from this model can be found in table C.2.

[13]Again, results are fairly similar when low intensity conflicts are included too but here the effect of increases in foreign conflicts of discriminated groups in the absence of media freedom is far from significant and there is a larger positive effect on discriminated groups in the presence of media freedom. Results from this model can be found in table C.2.

Table 5.3: Repression depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information based on media and freedom.

	(1) Repression	(2) Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (Conf)	0.0580	-0.00498
	(0.275)	(0.130)
Group discrimination (Disc)	0.922	-1.053
	(1.069)	(0.643)
Radio and TV measure (ln) (Media)	-0.438	
	(1.544)	
Media x Disc	0.740	
	(0.515)	
Conf x Media	0.0126	
	(0.142)	
Conf x Disc	-0.0409	0.0937^{+}
	(0.0973)	(0.0517)
Conf x Disc x Media	-0.0583	
	(0.0476)	
Press freedom (Freed)		-1.603
		(2.279)
Freed x Disc		1.479
		(0.904)
Conf x Freed		0.0460
		(0.186)
Conf x Freed x Disc		-0.0850
		(0.0743)
GDP per capita	2.491	-0.497
	(3.395)	(2.837)
Vanhanen index	-0.0286	-0.0442*
	(0.0186)	(0.0203)
Group rebellion	0.240*	0.242***
	(0.103)	(0.0716)
Group protest	0.294*	0.393***
	(0.118)	(0.0934)
Dominant group	0.959	0.676
	(0.727)	(0.612)
Other domestic protests	0.0298	-0.0148
	(0.136)	(0.141)
Other domestic rebellions	0.0371	-0.0898
	(0.198)	(0.121)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy	-0.548	-0.639*
	(0.343)	(0.304)
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.000771	-0.000708
	(0.000768)	(0.000768)
Repression, t-1	1.733***	1.647***
	(0.227)	(0.191)
cut1		
Constant	4.221	2.080
	(3.023)	(1.682)
cut2		
Constant	5.505^{+}	3.473*
	(3.027)	(1.691)
cut3		
Constant	6.574*	4.710**
	(3.042)	(1.670)
cut4		
Constant	9.400**	7.009***
	(3.205)	(1.776)
cut5		
Constant	10.92**	9.202***
	(3.694)	(2.164)
cut6		
Constant		11.59***
		(2.123)
Observations	577	761

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

So far, the results suggest that governments react to foreign conflicts of discriminated groups by repressing domestic discriminated groups in scenarios with low media availability and freedom respectively. This is contrary to the theoretical expectation that governments only react if they can expect information about foreign conflicts to be transmitted via mass media. In addition, as the moderating effect of the media factors is not significant in any model, the role of information is not clear. In sum, hypothesis one is not supported.

Next, the analysis turns to testing hypothesis two on the effect of successes of discriminated groups elsewhere. These models are shown in tables 5.5 and 5.6. Model five in table 5.5 measures information as a function of media source availability. Here, the simulated effect of foreign successes of discriminated groups increasing from minimum to maximum on the likelihood of a group seeing no repression is shown. The only scenario where increases in foreign successes of discriminated groups have a negative effect and thus lead to an increase in the probability of repression is the scenario where an ethnic group is discriminated and media sources are available. This is as expected under the theory, however, this effect is not statistically significant. Moreover, foreign successes have no significant effect in any of the other scenarios and all interactions are insignificant[14].

The next model operationalises information as media freedom and is shown as model six in table 5.5. In this model, the simulated results are somewhat similar to the findings from the model on media availability but the negative effect of increases in foreign successes of discriminated groups in the press freedom and discrimination scenario is barely discernible. Here, again, no effect or interaction is significant.

[14]Results are similar when media availability is not logged. When the Internet is included in the index as well, the negative effect of increases in foreign successes of discriminated groups in the high media and discrimination scenario is much weaker. Regression results from these model can be found in table C.3 in Appendix C.

Table 5.4: Repression depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information based on proximity and index.

	(3) Repression	(4) Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups in neighbours (NbConf)	-0.205	
	(0.172)	
Group discrimination (Disc)	0.264**	-0.535
	(0.0924)	(0.507)
NbConf x Disc	0.0318	
	(0.0514)	
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups weighted by index (IndConf)		0.000164
		(0.00106)
Press freedom (Freed)		-2.484
		(2.154)
Freed x Disc		1.455+
		(0.786)
IndConf x Freed		0.000360
		(0.00139)
IndConf x Disc		0.000356
		(0.000368)
IndConf x Freed x Disc		-0.000556
		(0.000518)
GDP per capita	1.084	-0.284
	(2.298)	(3.737)
Vanhanen index	-0.0457**	-0.0204
	(0.0175)	(0.0214)
Group rebellion	0.195**	0.267**
	(0.0626)	(0.0941)
Group protest	0.346***	0.335*
	(0.0923)	(0.133)
Dominant group	0.660	0.774
	(0.597)	(0.669)
Other domestic protests	0.0323	0.144
	(0.140)	(0.181)
Other domestic rebellions	-0.106	-0.0416
	(0.129)	(0.206)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy	-0.475	-0.613+
	(0.290)	(0.349)
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.00138	-0.000194
	(0.00107)	(0.000725)
Repression, t-1	1.779***	1.618***
	(0.201)	(0.217)
cut1		
Constant	2.543***	2.395
	(0.433)	(1.620)
cut2		
Constant	3.966***	3.637*
	(0.520)	(1.607)
cut3		
Constant	5.290***	4.688**
	(0.604)	(1.570)
cut4		
Constant	7.670***	7.603***
	(0.798)	(1.714)
cut5		
Constant	9.857***	9.097***
	(1.284)	(2.294)
cut6		
Constant	12.28***	
	(1.333)	
Observations	769	571

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

The next model only considers successes of discriminated groups in direct neighbour states. Regression results are shown as model seven in table 5.6. In this model, effects are small and as before not as expected under the hypothesis. Moreover, again, no effect reaches statistical significance here.

The final model, model eight in table 5.6, operationalises information by the full information index in interaction with media freedom. Here we find that increases in foreign successes of discriminated groups – weighted by information – have a small positive effect on the probability of no repression when groups are ethnically discriminated, almost irrespective of whether media are free or not. The effect on groups that are not discriminated, on the other hand, is positive in the absence of media freedom and slightly negative in the presence of media freedom. Thus, the hypothesis is not supported here substantially. Moreover, none of the effects or interactions is significant here either.

Overall, these results suggest that foreign successes have no effect on governments' treatment of domestic discriminated groups. On the other hand, there is some evidence suggesting that foreign conflicts of discriminated groups increase repression of discriminated groups when media availability is low. Thus, none of the hypotheses above is supported by the evidence here.

Table 5.5: Repression depending on successes of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information based on media and freedom.

	(5) Repression	(6) Repression
Foreign successes of discriminated groups (Succ)	-0.0424	-0.103
	(0.262)	(0.194)
Group discrimination (Disc)	0.462^{+}	0.0680
	(0.252)	(0.133)
Radio and TV measure (ln) (Media)	-0.551	
	(0.380)	
Media x Disc	0.121	
	(0.120)	
Succ x Media	0.0445	
	(0.138)	
Succ x Disc	0.0382	-0.00352
	(0.0819)	(0.0695)
Succ x Disc x Media	0.00883	
	(0.0440)	
Press freedom (Freed)		-1.290*
		(0.646)
Freed x Disc		0.409*
		(0.199)
Freed x Succ		0.0385
		(0.253)
Succ x Freed x Disc		0.0215
		(0.0862)
GDP per capita	2.220	-0.806
	(3.221)	(2.518)
Vanhanen index	-0.0311	-0.0417*
	(0.0199)	(0.0212)
Group rebellion	0.233*	0.235***
	(0.0960)	(0.0593)
Group protest	0.270*	0.386***
	(0.121)	(0.0957)
Dominant group	0.955	0.718
	(0.767)	(0.652)
Other domestic protests	0.0576	0.0519
	(0.140)	(0.137)
Other domestic rebellions	-0.00594	-0.128
	(0.193)	(0.118)
Conflict in neighbour dummy	-0.912*	-0.830**
	(0.357)	(0.321)
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.000958	-0.000976
	(0.000769)	(0.000804)
Repression, t-1	1.733***	1.671***
	(0.223)	(0.193)
cut1		
Constant	3.479***	1.785***
	(0.902)	(0.459)
cut2		
Constant	4.752***	3.159***
	(0.931)	(0.503)
cut3		
Constant	5.831***	4.418***
	(1.007)	(0.592)
cut4		
Constant	8.800***	6.754***
	(1.348)	(0.751)
cut5		
Constant	10.28***	8.878***
	(2.081)	(1.176)
cut6		
Constant		11.35***
		(1.266)
Observations	577	761

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Taking capability into account

As it was found in chapter four that only governments with strong militaries relative to groups may use repression as a balancing strategy, the main models have also been retested in a sub-sample of cases where the military to group ratio is above the median. These models can be found in tables C.4 through C.7.

In the model on media availability, the trend is similar to before but much more pronounced. In the high media scenario, there is a small positive effect on discriminated groups while there is barely any effect on non-discriminated groups. Neither the effects nor the interaction in the high media scenario is significant. In the low media scenario, on the other hand, the negative effect of foreign conflicts on discriminated groups' likelihood of no repression is even stronger than before and significant as well. Moreover, there is a strong and significant positive effect on non-discriminated groups here in the low media scenario. The interaction between discrimination and foreign conflicts in the low media scenario is again significantly negative. Thus, discriminated groups are significantly more likely to see repression here. Moreover, the moderating effect of media on the interactions between conflict and discrimination is now significantly positive as well. These findings lend further support to the previous finding that governments react to foreign conflicts with pre-emptive repression against discriminated groups in low media scenarios. It even appears that they may offer reliefs – potentially as concessions – to non-discriminated groups. This finding also lends credibility to the previous finding that pre-emptive repression is mainly a strategy for strong governments.

In the media freedom model we see a slight negative effect in the low freedom model when groups are discriminated as well but no effect or interaction is significant here. The same is the case in the model on neighbours where results are similar to previously. In the sample on media freedom and the information index, again we see somewhat similar effects like in the original model that are far from significant. Moreover, in the success models effects are either very small or insignificant in all models. Thus, there is no sign of government reaction to foreign successes here.

In sum, so far this chapter finds some evidence for governments repressing discriminated groups as a reaction to foreign conflicts of discriminated groups. However, as opposed to the theoretical expectation, such evidence is found in scenarios where media availability is low. This effect is stronger when governments are strong. Other

Table 5.6: Repression depending on successes of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information based on proximity and index.

	(7) Repression	(8) Repression
Foreign successes of discriminated groups in neighbours (NbSucc)	-0.464	
	(0.928)	
Group discrimination (Disc)	0.285***	-0.0810
	(0.0797)	(0.184)
NbSucc x Disc	0.0398	
	(0.299)	
Foreign successes of discriminated groups weighted by index (IndSucc)		-0.00238
		(0.00173)
Press freedom (Freed)		-2.555**
		(0.866)
Freed x Disc		0.693**
		(0.259)
IndSucc x Freed		0.00276
		(0.00208)
IndSucc x Disc		0.000462
		(0.000591)
IndSucc x Freed x Disc		-0.000584
		(0.000679)
GDP per capita	0.0569	-0.0731
	(2.208)	(3.026)
Vanhanen index	-0.0385*	-0.0270
	(0.0165)	(0.0241)
Group rebellion	0.216***	0.268**
	(0.0619)	(0.0935)
Group protest	0.359***	0.327*
	(0.0899)	(0.129)
Dominant group	0.721	0.905
	(0.664)	(0.715)
Other domestic protests	0.00645	0.179
	(0.128)	(0.162)
Other domestic rebellions	-0.0910	-0.102
	(0.125)	(0.208)
Conflict in neighbour dummy	-0.602+	-1.097**
	(0.313)	(0.343)
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.00178	-0.000456
	(0.00113)	(0.000743)
Repression, t-1	1.773***	1.677***
	(0.199)	(0.230)
cut1		
Constant	2.635***	1.299*
	(0.396)	(0.509)
cut2		
Constant	4.055***	2.543***
	(0.497)	(0.555)
cut3		
Constant	5.397***	3.598***
	(0.601)	(0.623)
cut4		
Constant	7.807***	6.551***
	(0.774)	(1.017)
cut5		
Constant	10.02***	7.971***
	(1.262)	(1.730)
cut6		
Constant	12.41***	
	(1.326)	
Observations	769	571

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

information factors or successes do not seem to play an important role.

Results for time lag

In addition to the results shown above, variables of interest were also lagged in time by one year[15]. Results from these regressions are shown in tables 5.7 through 5.11. Interestingly, in those models, a different picture appears than in the models assuming a simultaneous relationship.

Again, in model one information flows are operationalised by the availability of radios and TVs in a country. Results from this model can be found in table 5.7. As above, effects of increases in conflicts of discriminated groups elsewhere on the likelihood of no repression are simulated in different scenarios. In a scenario with low availability of media sources, discriminated groups are more likely to see repression as a result of increases in foreign conflicts while non-discriminated groups are more likely to see no repression as a result. However, these effects are small. In the high media scenario, the negative effect on discriminated groups' likelihood of no repression is stronger while the effect on this likelihood for non-discriminated groups is similar to the low media scenario. These results are substantively as expected but neither effects of foreign conflicts nor interactions are significant in any scenario. When foreign rebellions of discriminated groups of a lower intensity are included alongside high intensity conflicts of such groups elsewhere, the trend appears as well and reaches statistical significance. These results are shown in table 5.8 and are illustrated in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3 shows the difference in the probability of no repression against a group when the number of foreign conflicts of discriminated groups is increased from minimum to maximum. Again, the two estimates on the left hand side are simulated for scenarios where the logged measure on radio and TV availability is held at the 10th percentile. On the right hand side, two scenarios are shown where the media availability measure is held at the 90th percentile. In both cases, the filled triangle represents a scenario where the domestic group under scrutiny is not discriminated while the hollow triangle represents a case where the domestic group is discriminated at the highest possible level. As can be seen on the left hand side, when the availability of media sources

[15]Here, all control variables other than democracy, GDP and a group's cost of fighting are also lagged in time to be better able to control for confounding.

Figure 5.3: The change in the predicted probability of no repression as a function of increases in foreign conflicts of discriminated groups of all intensities, media availability and group discrimination with a one-year time lag.



is low, increases in foreign conflicts of discriminated groups barely have any effect on a group's likelihood of not being repressed, irrespectively of a group's level of discrimination. On the other hand, and as can be seen on the right hand side, when there is a high availability of media sources, increases in these foreign conflicts have a different effect on domestic groups that are discriminated than on non-discriminated groups. When a group is not discriminated against, its probability of not being repressed increases when the number of foreign conflicts of discriminated groups increases. On the other hand, when a group is discriminated against, her probability of being repressed increases significantly as a result of an increase in the number of foreign conflicts of discriminated groups from minimum to maximum. The interaction between discrimination and the effect of foreign conflict is significantly negative when media availability is high while it is positive and insignificant when media is low. The effect of media on this interaction is negative as expected but not significant[16].

[16]Results from both specifications are not robust to tests with an unlogged media measure and the low media specification is not robust to the inclusion of Internet in the media measure. Regression results can be found in table 5.8 and C.8.

Thus, when time-lagged, results offer some support for hypothesis one. They suggest that governments react to foreign conflicts of discriminated groups with repression against domestic groups that are discriminated as well if a substantial number of media sources is available to the domestic population. However, as the moderating effect of media source availability is not significant here either, the role of media is uncertain. Nevertheless, the substantive finding is in line with the finding on media availability in chapter three. It thus seems not only that discriminated groups are inspired to conflict by information about foreign conflicts of discriminated groups but also that governments are aware of that and make attempts to counterbalance this effect with targeted repression against these groups. However, it is not clear why we observe a seemingly media related government reaction to discriminated groups only with a time lag while instantaneously we find governments to react to discriminated groups in low media scenarios.

Next, hypothesis one is tested with media freedom in a country i being the variable assumed to moderate information flows from a country j to i. In this case, governments with no media freedom are the ones that repress against discriminated groups when the number of foreign high intensity conflicts increases. When media freedom is high, on the other hand, foreign conflicts of discriminated groups barely have any effect. This is similar to the instantaneous results but effects are much stronger here and reach statistical significance.

This is illustrated in Figure 5.4. Here, the scenario on the left hand side illustrates cases with no media freedom and the scenario on the right hand side illustrates cases with media freedom. When there is no media freedom, the likelihood of not being repressed at all increases for groups that are not discriminated when the number of foreign discriminated groups rebelling increases. This effect narrowly misses statistical significance. Discriminated groups' likelihood of seeing some repression on the other hand increases significantly as a result of these changes in the absence of media freedom. As the estimates on the right hand side show, however, foreign conflicts of discriminated groups have barely any effect in the presence of media freedom, irrespective of the status of a domestic group. The simulated interaction effect between discrimination and foreign conflicts of discriminated groups is significantly negative in the scenario with no media freedom while it is negative and insignificant in the sce-

nario with media freedom. Moreover, when simulated, the interaction between media freedom and the interaction between discrimination and foreign conflicts is positive but misses statistical significance. These findings could suggest that governments that restrict media freedom are also using repression to react to foreign threats. This is not surprising if one assumes that governments that adhere to human rights do so because they are under domestic pressure and that they then cannot easily selectively violate other rights. It also shows that governments that restrict media freedom are not content that information about foreign events will not be received as a result of the restriction. Moreover, it may be the case that these governments simultaneously offer concessions to groups in better positions[17]. However, as the moderating effect of media freedom is not significant, the role of media freedom remains uncertain.

Figure 5.4: The change in the predicted probability of no repression as a function of increases in foreign conflicts of discriminated groups, media freedom and group discrimination with a one-year time lag.



In the model on conflicts of discriminated groups in neighbours, there is a positive

[17]When these results are retested in a model on foreign conflicts of discriminated groups of all intensities, the trend is similar but effects are no longer significant. Moreover, here the positive effect on non-discriminated groups in the no freedom scenario is more pronounced while the negative effect on discriminated groups is less pronounced. This model is shown in table C.9.

but insignificant effect of increases in foreign conflicts of discriminated groups on the likelihood of not being repressed that is similar for discriminated and non-discriminated groups here. The interaction is negative as expected but insignificant[18]. Thus, again, foreign conflicts in neighbours do not seem to be of particular concern to governments under the mechanism tested here.

The final model on conflicts tests the effect of information as a combined index moderated by media freedom. Here, the results are substantively similar to the results in the model on media freedom as such. The negative effect of increases in conflicts on discriminated groups' probability of seeing no repression when there is no media freedom is statistically significant. The moderating effect of discrimination in the low freedom scenario is negative and significant. Thus, discriminated groups are more likely to see an increase in repression in the low freedom scenario. Other effects and interactions are not significant. Here, the negative effect on discriminated groups is more pronounced while the positive effect on non-discriminated groups is less pronounced than in the media freedom only model[19].

In sum, these results suggest that governments target discriminated groups with repression as a result of foreign conflicts in high media scenarios with a one year lag. In low media scenarios, on the other hand, discriminated groups are targeted more instantaneously. It is not clear why this is the case. A possible explanation could be that discriminated groups in low media scenarios have mobilised before as a result of structural grievances and therefore governments may react quicker to the possibility of them gaining information about foreign events, for example as a result of direct communication. Moreover, the results from the lagged models on media freedom suggest that there may be a type of generally repressive governments that both restrict media freedom and react to foreign events with targeted repression. However, the moderating effects of both information factors do not reach statistical significance and thus these conclusions contain a considerable amount of uncertainty.

Next, the lagged effect of successes of discriminated groups elsewhere are considered in table 5.10. In model one, we see no significant effects or interactions in

[18]When low intensity conflicts are included there is a positive interaction but again nothing is significant (see table C.9).

[19]When conflicts of all intensities are included, effects are similar but weaker and nothing reaches significance. Again, these results can be found in table C.9.

the simulations[20]. When media availability is not logged (see table C.10), however, we see a significantly positive effect on discriminated groups' likelihood of not being repressed in the low media scenario while we see a negative but insignificant effect on this likelihood for non-discriminated groups. This interaction is significant. In the high media scenario there is barely any effect for both groups. The moderating effect of media is insignificant here.

When media freedom is included in the model instead of media availability, we see a similar effect like in the unlogged media model. When there is no media freedom, increases in foreign successes of discriminated groups lead to a significant increase in discriminated groups' likelihood of no repression while groups that are not discriminated see an insignificant decrease as a result. The interaction is significantly positive here. In the media freedom scenario, on the other hand, changes in foreign successes have only small and insignificant effects. Again, the moderating effect of media is insignificant here.

In the model on neighbour states, there are neither discernible effects nor an interaction.

Finally, in the model on the index and media freedom, discriminated groups are significantly more likely to see no repression as a result of foreign successes of discriminated groups in the absence of media freedom while non-discriminated groups see an increase in the likelihood of some repression that is not significant. The interaction between discrimination and successes in the low freedom scenario is significantly positive. In the presence of media freedom, again, there is barely any effect of foreign successes of discriminated groups and the moderating effect of media freedom is not significant.

In sum, some models find a lagged effect of successes on discriminated groups' treatment. However, governments' reaction here is a decrease in repression which may suggest that they offer concessions to these groups as they expect them to be more inspired when observing successes. However, it is not clear why this is the case only in the low media and no media freedom scenarios. The moderating effect of media sources is not significant in any model here either, thus leaving considerable uncertainty. Nevertheless, these findings are interesting as they again closely mirror findings

[20]The same is the case when the Internet is included (see table C.10).

from chapter three on the actual likelihood of conflict where successes also played a particular role for discriminated groups in low media and low freedom scenarios. Thus, these findings may indeed suggest that governments have knowledge of the processes underlying conflict contagion and act to deter them.

Conclusion

This chapter tests an argument suggesting that foreign conflicts and successes are particularly likely to inspire domestic discriminated groups and as a result governments should be more likely to repress discriminated groups in the light of such foreign events when they can expect domestic groups to have gained information about these events.

It was found that governments indeed increase repression against discriminated groups as a result of foreign conflicts by similar groups when the availability of media sources is high but only with a one year time lag. When media availability is low, governments were found to repress discriminated groups immediately.

Moreover, governments that censor media are found to react to those conflicts with the repression of domestic discriminated groups, likely because they are generally more likely to use repression and do not trust their ability to prevent information from entering.

Finally, governments were found to offer concessions to discriminated groups in low media source and freedom scenarios as a result of foreign successes with a one-year time lag.

The results on low media scenarios are surprising. There seems to be something about low media availability/ freedom scenarios that triggers a quicker reaction against discriminated groups and that leads governments to react to successes as well, a reaction they barely show in high media scenarios. It may be the case that in such countries there are other infrastructural or civil rights deficiencies that lead groups to have generally higher grievances that may coincide with higher levels of initial mobilisation which require quicker and more comprehensive action by the government.

The role of information flows in this chapter has not fully become clear. It may be the case that governments are less concerned about information flows than expected and that variables used here to measure information capture other aspects of the process. One such aspect could be the level of initial grievance and/or mobilisation of a

group that affects the speed and comprehensiveness of government reaction. It would be fruitful to explore this aspect in more detail in future research, for example by considering how government reaction towards discriminated groups differs as a result of their level of political mobilisation or their history of collective action.

Table 5.7: Models 1 and 2 with time lag.

	(9) Repression	(10) Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups, t-1 (Conf)	-0.0416	-0.215^{+}
	(0.187)	(0.110)
Group discrimination, t-1 (Disc)	-0.387	-1.284**
	(0.753)	(0.421)
Radio and TV measure (ln), t-1 (Media)	-0.161	
	(0.838)	
Media x Disc	0.0154	
	(0.384)	
Conf x Media	0.0254	
	(0.0881)	
Conf x Disc	0.0716	0.128**
	(0.0726)	(0.0396)
Conf x Disc x Media	0.00493	
	(0.0384)	
Press freedom, t-1 (Freed)		-4.908**
		(1.807)
Freed x Disc		2.059**
		(0.750)
Conf x Freed		0.375*
		(0.171)
Conf x Freed x Disc		-0.160*
		(0.0707)
GDP per capita	0.101	0.860
	(2.767)	(2.680)
Vanhanen index	-0.0301^{+}	-0.0372^{+}
	(0.0169)	(0.0205)
Group rebellion, t-1	0.0936	0.124
	(0.0807)	(0.0754)
Group protest, t-1	0.0841	0.0877
	(0.0953)	(0.0951)
Dominant group	0.385	-0.344
	(0.746)	(0.759)
Other domestic protests, t-1	0.0103	0.0705
	(0.112)	(0.134)
Other domestic rebellions, t-1	0.120	0.0358
	(0.110)	(0.103)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy, t-1	0.0957	-0.158
	(0.301)	(0.327)
Non-member to member ratio	-0.00275^{+}	-0.00134
	(0.00141)	(0.000918)
Repression, t-1	1.805***	1.678***
	(0.211)	(0.197)
cut1		
Constant	2.073	-0.217
	(1.895)	(1.185)
cut2		
Constant	3.488^{+}	1.151
	(1.893)	(1.213)
cut3		
Constant	4.758*	2.357^{+}
	(1.925)	(1.228)
cut4		
Constant	7.077***	4.662***
	(1.995)	(1.396)
cut5		
Constant	8.999***	6.462***
	(2.122)	(1.662)
cut6		
Constant	11.84***	9.027***
	(2.317)	(1.784)
Observations	745	730

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5.8: Robustness tests for model 1 with time lag.

	(11) Repression	(12) Repression	(13) Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (all intensities), t-1 (ConfAllint)	-0.268		-0.0580
	(0.402)		(0.228)
Group discrimination, t-1 (Disc)	-5.029	-0.607	-0.476
	(3.195)	(0.501)	(1.978)
Radio and TV measure (ln), t-1 (Media)	2.559		
	(3.297)		
Media x Disc	-1.974		
	(1.296)		
ConfAllint x Media	-0.113		
	(0.153)		
ConfAllint x Disc	0.245^{+}		0.0314
	(0.144)		(0.0908)
ConfAllint x Disc x Media	0.0929		
	(0.0600)		
Conflicts of discriminated groups, t-1 (Conf)		-0.0777	
		(0.116)	
Radio and TV measure, t-1 (MediaNolog)		-0.571	-1.811
		(2.747)	(13.29)
MediaNolog x Disc		0.782	-3.825
		(1.239)	(5.466)
Conf x MediaNolog		0.0142	
		(0.260)	
Conf x Disc		0.0764	
		(0.0468)	
Conf x Disc x MediaNolog		-0.0514	
		(0.119)	
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy, t-1		0.0512	
		(0.304)	
Media			0.0635
			(0.612)
Conf x Disc x Media			0.182
			(0.247)
GDP per capita	0.423	1.846	1.946
	(2.832)	(3.891)	(3.891)
Vanhanen index	-0.0330*	-0.0282^{+}	-0.0300^{+}
	(0.0164)	(0.0167)	(0.0161)
Group rebellion, t-1	0.0890	0.0936	0.0878
	(0.0775)	(0.0799)	(0.0766)
Group protest, t-1	0.0818	0.0882	0.0850
	(0.0942)	(0.0958)	(0.0938)
Dominant group	0.478	0.421	0.478
	(0.738)	(0.712)	(0.713)
Other domestic protests, t-1	0.0295	0.00521	0.0188
	(0.120)	(0.110)	(0.117)
Other domestic rebellions, t-1	0.124	0.101	0.115
	(0.121)	(0.108)	(0.120)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy, t-1	0.0416		0.00279
	(0.290)		(0.290)
Non-member to member ratio	-0.00278^{+}	-0.00243^{+}	-0.00251^{+}
	(0.00153)	(0.00126)	(0.00141)
Repression, t-1	1.817***	1.777***	1.790***
	(0.209)	(0.208)	(0.206)
cut1			
Constant	-3.405	1.848	1.357
	(8.824)	(1.247)	(5.011)
cut2			
Constant	-1.998	3.257*	2.762
	(8.814)	(1.275)	(5.039)
cut3			
Constant	-0.736	4.515***	4.024
	(8.825)	(1.315)	(5.063)
cut4			
Constant	1.635	6.819***	6.374
	(8.856)	(1.461)	(5.145)
cut5			
Constant	3.553	8.731***	8.260
	(8.909)	(1.796)	(5.270)
cut6			
Constant	6.470	11.55***	11.11*
	(9.023)	(1.938)	(5.333)
Observations	745	745	745

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5.9: Models 3 and 4 with time lag.

	(14) Repression	(15) Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups in neighbours, t-1 (NbConf)	-0.339	
	(0.230)	
Group discrimination, t-1 (Disc)	0.215*	-0.798*
	(0.0883)	(0.381)
NbConf x Disc	0.0711	
	(0.0658)	
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups weighted by index, t-1 (IndConf)		-0.000911
		(0.000907)
Press freedom, t-1 (Freed)		-3.247*
		(1.339)
Freed x Disc		1.494**
		(0.566)
IndConf x Freed		0.00169
		(0.00109)
IndConf x Disc		0.000629*
		(0.000299)
IndConf x Freed x Disc		-0.000793*
		(0.000404)
GDP per capita	2.054	-0.282
	(2.365)	(2.875)
Vanhanen index	-0.0356*	-0.0383^{+}
	(0.0173)	(0.0208)
Group rebellion, t-1	0.0744	0.119
	(0.0785)	(0.0753)
Group protest, t-1	0.0870	0.0909
	(0.0946)	(0.0959)
Dominant group	0.525	-0.247
	(0.668)	(0.737)
Other domestic protests, t-1	0.0173	0.0651
	(0.120)	(0.130)
Other domestic rebellions, t-1	0.0987	0.0572
	(0.111)	(0.0995)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy, t-1	0.0972	-0.143
	(0.296)	(0.314)
Non-member to member ratio	-0.00255^{+}	-0.00138
	(0.00143)	(0.000923)
Repression, t-1	1.827***	1.681***
	(0.205)	(0.197)
cut1		
Constant	2.515***	0.844
	(0.431)	(1.188)
cut2		
Constant	3.918***	2.207^{+}
	(0.510)	(1.219)
cut3		
Constant	5.193***	3.418**
	(0.632)	(1.246)
cut4		
Constant	7.542***	5.742***
	(0.800)	(1.362)
cut5		
Constant	9.437***	7.567***
	(1.163)	(1.647)
cut6		
Constant	12.39***	10.22***
	(1.365)	(1.857)
Observations	745	730

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5.10: Models 5 and 6 with time lag.

	(16) Repression	(17) Repression
Foreign successes of discriminated groups, t-1 (Succ)	-0.0159	0.203
	(0.286)	(0.208)
Group discrimination, t-1 (Disc)	0.516	0.396*
	(0.316)	(0.186)
Radio and TV measure (ln), t-1 (Media)	0.133	
	(0.450)	
Media x Disc	0.0489	
	(0.162)	
Succ x Media	-0.0491	
	(0.132)	
Succ x Disc	-0.0784	-0.207*
	(0.134)	(0.0916)
Succ x Disc x Media	0.0154	
	(0.0679)	
Press freedom, t-1 (Freed)		-0.234
		(0.787)
Freed x Disc		-0.00321
		(0.254)
Freed x Succ		-0.389
		(0.298)
Succ x Freed x Disc		0.226^{+}
		(0.116)
GDP per capita	-0.266	-0.000216
	(2.823)	(2.736)
Vanhanen index	-0.0306^{+}	-0.0399^{+}
	(0.0166)	(0.0204)
Group rebellion, t-1	0.0709	0.0952
	(0.0794)	(0.0713)
Group protest, t-1	0.0968	0.109
	(0.0923)	(0.0936)
Dominant group	0.421	-0.206
	(0.687)	(0.714)
Other domestic protests, t-1	0.0256	0.0721
	(0.109)	(0.132)
Other domestic rebellions, t-1	0.128	0.0505
	(0.110)	(0.105)
Conflict in neighbour dummy, t-1	-0.218	-0.464
	(0.322)	(0.310)
Non-member to member ratio	-0.00263^{+}	-0.00130
	(0.00143)	(0.000872)
Repression, t-1	1.832***	1.717***
	(0.216)	(0.206)
cut1		
Constant	2.406*	2.193***
	(0.965)	(0.535)
cut2		
Constant	3.799***	3.545***
	(1.001)	(0.586)
cut3		
Constant	5.071***	4.763***
	(1.070)	(0.731)
cut4		
Constant	7.413***	7.079***
	(1.170)	(0.899)
cut5		
Constant	9.337***	8.896***
	(1.425)	(1.184)
cut6		
Constant	12.30***	11.73***
	(1.559)	(1.386)
Observations	744	729

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5.11: Models 7 and 8 with time lag.

	(18) Repression	(19) Repression
Foreign successes of discriminated groups in neighbours, t-1 (NbSucc)	-0.762	
	(0.600)	
Group discrimination, t-1 (Disc)	0.255**	0.402*
	(0.0801)	(0.185)
NbSucc x Disc	0.127	
	(0.244)	
Foreign successes of discriminated groups weighted by index, t-1 (IndSucc)		0.00161
		(0.00180)
Press freedom, t-1 (Freed)		-0.286
		(0.776)
Freed x Disc		-0.0160
		(0.264)
IndSucc x Freed		-0.00295
		(0.00240)
IndSucc x Disc		-0.00158*
		(0.000762)
IndSucc x Freed x Disc		0.00174^{+}
		(0.000941)
GDP per capita	1.358	0.978
	(2.426)	(2.618)
Vanhanen index	-0.0312*	-0.0418*
	(0.0158)	(0.0200)
Group rebellion, t-1	0.0849	0.0967
	(0.0787)	(0.0684)
Group protest, t-1	0.102	0.114
	(0.0942)	(0.0940)
Dominant group	0.497	-0.211
	(0.671)	(0.728)
Other domestic protests, t-1	-0.00542	0.0780
	(0.113)	(0.131)
Other domestic rebellions, t-1	0.130	0.0538
	(0.114)	(0.105)
Conflict in neighbour dummy, t-1	-0.217	-0.499
	(0.313)	(0.307)
Non-member to member ratio	-0.00271^{+}	-0.00138
	(0.00158)	(0.000918)
Repression, t-1	1.804***	1.709***
	(0.208)	(0.206)
cut1		
Constant	2.511***	2.164***
	(0.409)	(0.531)
cut2		
Constant	3.903***	3.536***
	(0.488)	(0.585)
cut3		
Constant	5.168***	4.751***
	(0.608)	(0.729)
cut4		
Constant	7.546***	7.061***
	(0.794)	(0.894)
cut5		
Constant	9.468***	8.873***
	(1.179)	(1.182)
cut6		
Constant	12.38***	11.71***
	(1.380)	(1.394)
Observations	745	730

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Chapter 6

General Conclusions

This thesis analyses armed ethnic conflict as well as government repression targeted at groups in order to prevent them from rebelling. The first part explores the possibility of and mechanism behind armed civil conflicts spreading between countries. This thesis is the first to test in a large-n study whether information about conflicts involving groups with similar grievances can trigger conflict contagion. It is also the first to explore the role of information transmitted via mass media in contagion processes of armed conflict. Chapter three finds support for the suggested mechanism in the context of the availability of media sources. Other factors that were expected to play a role for information flows transmitted via mass media such as for example media freedom were not found to be important. In addition, the mechanism was not found to depend on geographical proximity.

While the findings on media availability suggest that information transmitted via mass media plays a role in the conflict contagion process under scrutiny, the variables used to operationalise such information flows in this study must ultimately be understood as proxies for a very complex concept. In addition, the availability and quality of the data that could be used to explore the role of information transmitted via mass media in the proposed contagion mechanism is limited. Improving and extending data on media availability and freedom in particular is important for better understanding the role of the mass media in contagion processes. Nevertheless, the positive results suggest that further attempts to operationalise media-based information flows between states are important in order to understand the role of information flows in diffusion processes of collective action further. The results also suggest that a measure of media availability should take temporal dynamics into account. The introduction and using

pattern of new media are of the essence for understanding the role of information flows via mass media. Taking changes in type of media available as well as user behaviour over time into account in attempts to operationalise information flows via mass media would be fruitful endeavours in order to further understand the role of information flows via mass media in conflict contagion processes.

In addition, the chapter explores inspiration-based conflict contagion processes on the country level. As a result, the research design does not allow inferring with certainty that discriminated groups are indeed inspired by foreign events and rebel as a result. Instead, more complex processes could be at work. For example, other actors in a state might expect discriminated groups to react and mobilise pre-emptively (also see for example Kuran, 1998). Therefore, the causal mechanisms behind conflict contagion processes need to be disentangled further on the actor level. Actor level analyses would also allow to explore the role of information flows further as some groups within a country might have more information about foreign events than others, for example as a result of diaspora networks and direct communications with similar groups. This suggestion is in line with Weidmann (2015)'s call for data on group-specific patterns of international communication to fully understand the mechanism behind conflict contagion.

Finally, the findings of this chapter suggest that geographical proximity plays a role for conflict contagion, but only under some mechanisms. Inspiration as a result of conflict involvements of discriminated groups has not been found to rely on proximity of capitals at all. Whether geographic proximity is relevant as a transmission channel for conflict contagion seems to depend on the specific mechanism at play. To date the overwhelming majority of conflict contagion literature tests arguments about contagion exclusively in a geographic context. The findings here suggest that it is important to make a clear theoretical and empirical distinction between different transmission channels that specific contagion mechanisms depend on.

The second and third part of this thesis explore the relationship between repression and conflict from a different angle than most existing literature: It considers whether repression is also used by governments in an attempt to prevent conflict, that is against groups that are conflict prone without actually engaging in conflict. This is the first attempt in repression literature to empirically assess the possibility of a targeted and

pre-emptive use of government repression. This approach differs greatly from the view of governments in research on armed conflict. Here, the focus is almost exclusively on potential challengers and factors that increase their incentives for rebellion while the government's role in processes causing conflict tends to be ignored. However, it is very unlikely that the government is as passive of an actor as it is often assumed and exploring government actions to prevent conflict more widely would be a fruitful endeavour for future research. The most important question with regards to governments' role in causing conflict is whether and in how far governments are aware of factors causing domestic groups to engage in conflict and what strategies they choose to react to them. The second and third part of this thesis speaks to both questions.

Chapter four finds evidence that governments react to group-specific characteristics that increase groups' expected utility for rebellion with repression. However, contrary to the assumption introduced here, not all governments do so but rather only governments that are relatively strong compared to the potential target of repression. This is probably because such governments can afford to use even large amounts of repression without becoming vulnerable to other threats. Thus, the findings suggest that repression is a pre-emptive tool for governments that are strong relative to domestic groups.

The conditionality of pre-emptive repression is interesting as it can provide insights for other types of government action as well. It is likely that weak governments are as aware of groups' expected utility calculations as strong ones but do not consider repression a useful response. But what actions do weak governments resort to instead when facing imbalances in groups' expected utilities? They could either offer concessions to groups at risk of rebelling or they might take the chance of fighting. Thus, the theory developed here could also be tested in the context of government concessions as well as armed rebellion actually breaking out. The findings of this chapter also suggest that different types of government actions that can substitute for each other are ideally understood and analysed together and not in isolation (also see Davenport, 2007a, who calls for more holistic considerations of substitutable government actions).

The evidence found in this chapter suggests that governments are by no means only *reacting* to domestic opposition. Similarly, government repression is by no means a phenomenon that takes place on the national level and affects the whole population

equally. Instead, governments use repression also as a pre-emptive tool and adapt their repression level to specific groups' situations. Therefore, fruitful avenues for future research on government repression would be to consider the phenomenon in more disaggregated ways and to take pre-emptive incentives for government repression against specific domestic actors seriously.

The third part of this thesis analyses empirically whether information about conflicts by similarly aggrieved groups or their successes in other countries trigger government reaction against domestic aggrieved groups. Again, quantitative data and research methods are used to answer this question. Chapter five finds that governments react with pre-emptive repression to the potential of ethnic conflict contagion as a result of information flows via mass media between groups that are similarly aggrieved when mass media are operationalised using the availability of media sources – but only with a time lag. This finding is particularly interesting as this mechanism was the one found to trigger conflict as well. As evidence from chapter three suggests that it is not the case that conflict is in fact triggered by pre-emptive repression as a response to foreign conflicts, this would suggest that governments act on correct information about the mechanisms underlying the likelihood of armed conflict. However, this conclusion needs to be seen with some caution. After all, this chapter also finds governments to react to discriminated groups in low media scenarios, this time instantaneously. While this finding supports the part of the argument where discriminated groups are expected to be particularly inspired by foreign conflicts of discriminated groups and that governments thus react to them in particular, it opens questions on what the media availability variable measures. It is possible that this finding is driven by low media availability being correlated with structural factors that lead to a higher chance of groups' previous mobilisation. If that is the case, it may be that governments expect these groups to have such a high conflict likelihood that they either expect them to actively seek out information about foreign conflicts or to be part of networks where they will gain this information anyhow. This would not necessarily mean that the findings on media availability are not showing the effect of information transmitted via mass media. However, in order to gain additional insight into whether that is the case, future research should take group dispositions to violence into account more explicitly when exploring information based conflict contagion and resulting repression.

The finding that governments seem to have a good understanding of at least some aspects of the processes causing conflict raises two question that are of fundamental importance for research on armed civil conflict. Firstly, if governments indeed have a good understanding on what causes conflict, then conflict research needs to be much more conscious of the possibility that some factors may trigger conflict not directly by affecting challengers but rather indirectly by affecting government actions. Moreover, a new set of variables would emerge into the study of armed civil war and that is the information on the part of the government and the preferred strategies of different types of governments. It is likely that some governments have a better understanding of the causes of armed conflict than others and this may be used as an explanatory variable for armed conflict as it can proxy the success of governments' pre-emptive strategy. For example, governments with past experience of armed conflict may have a better understanding of causes of conflict and use their knowledge in order to control domestic actors. These considerations also imply that conflict research may need to be more critical about whether information about the causes of armed civil conflict is used by the international community to protect civilians or whether findings can also lead to increased repression or allow governments to deter peaceful movements.

Secondly, and relatedly, the findings of this thesis raise the question of when and what pre-emptive actions governments take in response to threats? A number of structural variables that are used to explain armed conflict could in fact explain government strategies used when conflict is likely. If that was the case, the exogeneity of many structural factors such as civil liberties and economic measures would need to be called in question. Moreover, our understanding of structural factors could also reflect underlying factors such as for example lack of a repressive capacity early on in a state's history. Once a state is on a trajectory for a preferred response to threats, states may not be able to change this strategy easily. If that is the case, domestic as well as foreign threats may serve as mechanisms to cement regime types and government practices towards citizens.

Overall, this thesis suggests and finds that governments and potential challengers interact with each other in more complex ways than both current conflict and repression literature tend to assume. Instead of analysing these phenomena in isolation, it would be fruitful for future research to consider interactions of challengers and governments

in a holistic way and to consider both actors to be strategic and forward looking. In particular, the question of governments' knowledge and factors affecting it is of fundamental importance for understanding governments' role in causing armed conflict and thus armed conflict more generally. Understanding and analysing the role of governments explicitly is very difficult as there is an inherent issue of endogeneity if the government has control over most of the factors causing conflict and knows their effect. Nevertheless, these questions cannot be ignored as without understanding the government's role our knowledge of causes of armed conflict is likely to be based on incorrect assumptions of exogeneity.

Appendix A

Additional information from Chapter 3

Coding successes from Growup data

As noted in the chapter, a discriminated group advancing to any status other than state collapse, separatist autonomy and powerless is considered a success. An advancement to the categories dominance, senior and junior partner means that a group has become part of the state's government; a clear improvement over being politically discriminated. Similarly, a group with regional autonomy has gained "(...) some influence at the substate level (...)" (Cederman et al., 2010, 100) which is also considered to be a successful outcome for a discriminated group. A group that advances to powerlessness is still not in a position of power but is no longer targeted with state-led discrimination (Cederman et al., 2010). Even though this advancement constitutes an improvement for a discriminated group as well, it is only small and not directly observable as a group remains excluded from the government of a state. Thus, a discriminated group's advancement from discriminated to powerless should not give other discriminated groups reason to emulation. Groups advancing to the category of separatist autonomy have declared themselves to be independent but the government has not agreed to this additional level of regional power (Cederman et al., 2010). This case can thus not be seen as an improvement of a group's situation in the sense that the government has given a concession. Instead, this status might just be a sign that a group has entered a struggle for more regional power.

However, this coding rule might not lead to the inclusion of all successes of dis-

criminated groups. There are cases where a discriminated group fights the government and subsequently disappears from the EPR data, either because it achieved independence like in the case of Bangladesh or because the ethnic relevance of groups changes after the conflict, like in the case of Liberia in 1989. Such cases were considered individually and were included if the situation of the majority of the discriminated group fighting can be considered as improved after the fight using the same criteria as for the other EPR cases. This practice only led to the inclusion of the case of Bangladesh in 1971 as a success.

The index on the availability of media sources

The variables on radio and TV per capita contain zero values that indicate that "(...) no data on radio or TV was available for that country" according to an email by a data project representative. In addition, these values do not seem to be distributed in a systematic way as on the TV variable some cases contain missing values from 1950 until a positive value is coded for them whereas in other cases the documentation starts with zeros in 1950 until a positive value is coded. For these reasons, I recode all zero values on these two variables to missing values.

Moreover, there are some cases where the variable on Internet carries values of 0 before 1990, the first year with cases with non-zero Internet availability. Those cases are dropped.

The variable on media freedom

The coding system of the Freedom House data varies between the years of coverage from 1980 to 2008. Most notably, between 1980 and 1988 the data separates between the freedom of print media and the freedom of broadcasting. While there are several cases in the data where print media is at least partly free while broadcasting is not, there is no case where broadcasting is at least partly free while print media is not. Therefore, in these cases the measure on print media is used.

Regression tables from robustness tests

Table A.1: Ethnic conflict onset depending on ethnic conflict involvements (all intensities) of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information factors: media availability and media freedom.

	Media availability	Press freedom
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups, all intensities, t-1 (ConfdiscAllint)	0.0423	0.0331
	(0.101)	(0.0521)
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc)	-1.015	0.244
	(1.056)	(0.599)
Natural log of media source availability, t-1 (Media)	-0.401	
	(0.317)	
(Media)*(Disc)	0.189^{+}	-0.0183
	(0.101)	(0.0504)
(Media)*(ConfdiscAllint)	0.0105	
	(0.0316)	
(Disc)*(ConfdiscAllint)	-0.409	
	(0.269)	
(Disc)*(ConfdiscAllint)*(Media)	0.0650*	
	(0.0304)	
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed)		-0.0717
		(0.766)
(Disc)*(Freed)		-0.587
		(0.885)
(ConfdiscAllint)*(Freed)		-0.0312
		(0.0636)
(Disc)*(ConfdiscAllint)*(Freed)		0.0749
		(0.0765)
Natural log of GDP per capita	-0.252	-0.419**
	(0.173)	(0.161)
Population (1000000s)	0.00186**	0.00199***
	(0.000665)	(0.000578)
Xpolity	0.0134	0.0355
	(0.0341)	(0.0289)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1	-0.0526	-0.00437
	(0.236)	(0.270)
Peaceyears	-0.0769	-0.110
	(0.0691)	(0.0754)
Peaceyears^2	0.00147	0.00193
	(0.00383)	(0.00383)
Peaceyears^3	-0.0000142	-0.00000937
	(0.0000556)	(0.0000515)
Year	0.0477***	0.00782
	(0.00987)	(0.0271)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1	0.957**	0.653
	(0.367)	(0.477)
Constant	-97.10***	-15.32
	(20.66)	(54.22)
Observations	4465	3199

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A.2: Ethnic conflict onset depending on ethnic conflict involvements (all intensities) of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information factors: GDP, capital distance and the information index.

	GDP	Distance	Index and Press freedom
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted	-0.00000175		
by GDP, all intensities, t-1 (GDPconfAllint)	(0.00000643)		
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc)	0.199	0.279	-0.622
	(0.481)	(0.258)	(0.693)
(Disc)*(GDPconfAllint)	2.05e-09		
	(0.0000109)		
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted		16.28***	
by capital distance, all intensities, t-1 (DistconfAllint)		(4.180)	
(Disc)*(DistconfAllint)		-28.39	
		(71.05)	
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted			-0.000320
by index, all intensities, t-1 (IndconfAllint)			(0.000414)
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed)			-0.495
			(0.767)
(Disc)*(IndconfAllint)			0.000349
			(0.000393)
(Disc)*(IndconfAllint)			-0.000149
			(0.000459)
(Disc)*(Freed)			-1.124
			(2.381)
(Disc)*(Freed)*(IndconfAllint)			0.000882
			(0.00125)
Natural log of GDP per capita	-0.469**	-0.485**	-0.359^{+}
	(0.152)	(0.148)	(0.204)
Population (1000000s)	0.00184**	0.00193***	0.00205**
	(0.000593)	(0.000556)	(0.000624)
Xpolity	0.0256	0.0256	0.0486
	(0.0295)	(0.0280)	(0.0317)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1	0.322	0.291	-0.130
	(0.240)	(0.235)	(0.259)
Peaceyears	-0.125^{+}	-0.128^{+}	-0.146
	(0.0682)	(0.0676)	(0.0908)
Peaceyears^2	0.00403	0.00409	0.00358
	(0.00363)	(0.00352)	(0.00479)
Peaceyears^3	-0.0000462	-0.0000457	-0.0000304
	(0.0000506)	(0.0000487)	(0.0000670)
Year	0.0313***	0.0294***	-0.00766
	(0.00642)	(0.00609)	(0.0280)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1	0.595*	0.572*	0.724
	(0.275)	(0.280)	(0.469)
Constant	-61.85***	-58.11***	16.28
	(13.19)	(12.38)	(55.87)
Observations	6505	6578	2525

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A.3: Ethnic conflict onset depending on ethnic conflict involvements (high intensity and onset) of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information factors: media availability and media freedom.

	Media availability	Press freedom
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups,	0.0143	0.125
high intensity and onset, t-1 (ConfdiscHighons)	(0.183)	(0.104)
Natural log of media source availability, t-1 (Media)	-0.297	
	(0.222)	
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc)	0.402	0.272
	(0.559)	(0.529)
(Disc)*(Media)	-0.0473	
	(0.158)	
(ConfdiscHighons)*(Disc)	0.173	-0.0644
	(0.152)	(0.108)
(ConfdiscHighons)*(Media)	-0.0163	
	(0.0623)	
(Disc)*(ConfdiscHighons)*(Media)	0.0958	
	(0.0594)	
Press freedom, t-1		-0.258
		(0.650)
(Disc)*(Freed)		0.364
		(0.743)
(ConfdiscHighons)*(Freed)		-0.0318
		(0.144)
(Disc)*(ConfdiscHighons)*(Freed)		-0.0489
		(0.178)
Natural log of GDP per capita	-0.207	-0.404*
	(0.171)	(0.163)
Population (1000000s)	0.00186**	0.00190***
	(0.000640)	(0.000566)
Xpolity	0.0119	0.0390
	(0.0335)	(0.0298)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1	-0.0577	0.164
	(0.230)	(0.274)
Peaceyears	-0.0906	-0.105
	(0.0666)	(0.0747)
Peaceyears^2	0.00218	0.00165
	(0.00368)	(0.00374)
Peaceyears^3	-0.0000229	-0.00000527
	(0.0000531)	(0.0000501)
Year	0.0448***	0.000406
	(0.0104)	(0.0158)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1	0.945**	0.681
	(0.364)	(0.468)
Constant	-91.53***	-0.918
	(21.12)	(31.59)
Observations	4465	3199

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A.4: Ethnic conflict onset depending on ethnic conflict involvements (high intensity and onset) of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information factors: GDP, capital distance and the information index.

	GDP	Distance	Index and press freedom
Foreign conflicts of disc groups,	0.00000242		
high intensity and onset, t-1 (GDPconfHighons)	(0.0000135)		
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc)	0.411*	0.350+	-0.0725
	(0.205)	(0.209)	(0.597)
(Disc)*(GDPconfHighons)	-0.0000321*		
	(0.0000156)		
Foreign conflicts of disc groups, high intensity and		23.40*	
onset, weighted by capital distance, t-1 (DistconfHighons)		(11.69)	
(Disc)*(DistconfHighons)		-155.5	
		(146.1)	
Foreign conflicts of disc groups, high intensity and			0.000560
onset, weighted by index, t-1 (IndconfHighons)			(0.000831)
Press freedom, t-1 (Freed)			-0.523
			(0.649)
(Disc)*(IndconfHighons)			-0.0000253
			(0.000762)
(Freed)*(IndconfHighons)			-0.000356
			(0.00104)
(Disc)*(Freed)			0.680
			(0.837)
(Disc)*(Freed)*(IndconfHighons)			-0.000595
			(0.00139)
Natural log of GDP per capita	-0.468**	-0.483**	-0.398*
	(0.152)	(0.147)	(0.191)
Population (1000000s)	0.00183**	0.00190***	0.00203**
	(0.000582)	(0.000541)	(0.000630)
Xpolity	0.0287	0.0249	0.0497
	(0.0294)	(0.0281)	(0.0345)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1	0.334	0.343	-0.0556
	(0.225)	(0.212)	(0.281)
Peaceyears	-0.120+	-0.131+	-0.133
	(0.0684)	(0.0674)	(0.0900)
Peaceyears^2	0.00371	0.00419	0.00271
	(0.00356)	(0.00352)	(0.00468)
Peaceyears^3	-0.0000417	-0.0000472	-0.0000164
	(0.0000489)	(0.0000489)	(0.0000649)
Year	0.0311***	0.0309***	-0.00298
	(0.00650)	(0.00606)	(0.0169)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1	0.593*	0.538+	0.770+
	(0.301)	(0.294)	(0.445)
Constant	-61.53***	-61.15***	6.424
	(13.33)	(12.34)	(33.68)
Observations	6505	6578	2525

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A.5: Ethnic conflict onset depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements, information and ethnic discrimination. Information factors: media availability including Internet, media availability unlogged, minimum distance.

	Media with Internet	Media, no log	Minimum distance
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups, t-1 (Confdisc)	-0.314	-0.0711	
	(0.391)	(0.0886)	
Media source availability including Internet, t-1 (MedInt)	0.207		
	(0.486)		
Discriminated groups, t-1 (1)	-2.297	0.238	0.210
	(3.685)	(0.243)	(0.196)
(Disc)*(MedInt)	-1.153		
	(1.291)		
(Confdisc)*(Disc)	1.030	-0.0458	
	(1.056)	(0.0975)	
(Confdisc)*(MedInt)	-0.214		
	(0.164)		
(Disc)*(Confdisc)*(MedInt)	0.432		
	(0.381)		
Media source availability, t-1 (MedNolog)		0.269	
		(1.346)	
(Disc)*(MedNolog)		-1.094	
		(2.353)	
(Confdisc)*(MedNolog)		0.138	
		(0.315)	
(Disc)*(Confdisc)*(MedNolog)		0.761	
		(0.676)	
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted			0.0201
by minimum distance, t-1 (Mindistconf)			(0.0181)
(Disc)*(Mindistconf)			-0.0126
			(0.0214)
Natural log of GDP per capita	0.0182	-0.496**	-0.485**
	(0.520)	(0.160)	(0.149)
Population (1000000s)	0.00262***	0.00182*	0.00191***
	(0.000747)	(0.000719)	(0.000549)
Xpolity	-0.0585	0.00848	0.0257
	(0.0483)	(0.0349)	(0.0282)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1	0.163	-0.0240	0.285
	(0.470)	(0.221)	(0.221)
Peaceyears	0.0752	-0.111	-0.130^{+}
	(0.142)	(0.0681)	(0.0680)
Peaceyears^2	-0.0103	0.00324	0.00418
	(0.00757)	(0.00381)	(0.00353)
Peaceyears^3	0.000170^{+}	-0.0000385	-0.0000473
	(0.000102)	(0.0000553)	(0.0000488)
Year	-0.149^{+}	0.0336***	0.0303***
	(0.0875)	(0.00874)	(0.00597)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1	0.359	0.898*	0.569^{+}
	(0.552)	(0.363)	(0.295)
Constant	295.1^{+}	-65.86***	-59.89***
	(172.1)	(17.28)	(12.15)
Observations	957	4465	6575

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A.6: Ethnic conflict onset depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information factors: media availability and media freedom. Colonial conflicts are excluded.

	Media availability	Press freedom
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups,	-0.0212	0.00794
excl col, t-1 (ConfdiscNocol)	(0.211)	(0.151)
Natural log of media source availability, t-1 (Media)	-0.356^{+}	
	(0.184)	
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc)	-0.000832	-0.0120
	(0.571)	(0.521)
(Disc)*(Media)	-0.0850	
	(0.148)	
(ConfdiscNocol)*(Disc)	0.398*	0.0181
	(0.195)	(0.127)
(ConfdiscNocol)*(Media)	0.0114	
	(0.0691)	
(Disc)*(ConfdiscNocol)*(Media)	0.145*	
	(0.0679)	
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed)		-0.206
		(0.611)
(Disc)*(Freed)		-0.0527
		(0.763)
(ConfdiscNocol)*(Freed)		-0.0630
		(0.172)
(Disc)*(ConfdiscNocol)*(Freed)		0.0897
		(0.229)
Natural log of GDP per capita	-0.228	-0.415*
	(0.173)	(0.162)
Population (1000000s)	0.00193**	0.00195***
	(0.000662)	(0.000562)
Xpolity	0.00881	0.0356
	(0.0339)	(0.0290)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1	-0.115	0.107
	(0.228)	(0.271)
Peaceyears	-0.0951	-0.104
	(0.0688)	(0.0726)
Peaceyears^2	0.00258	0.00165
	(0.00379)	(0.00367)
Peaceyears^3	-0.0000299	-0.00000546
	(0.0000548)	(0.0000494)
Year	0.0509***	-0.00505
	(0.0103)	(0.0161)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1	0.907*	0.627
	(0.359)	(0.465)
Constant	-103.2***	10.53
	(21.02)	(32.28)
Observations	4465	3199

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A.7: Ethnic conflict onset depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information factors: GDP, capital distance and the information index. Colonial conflicts are excluded.

	GDP	Distance	Index and press freedom
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted by GDP,	0.00000547		
excl col, t-1 (GDPconfNocol)	(0.0000293)		
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc)	0.217	0.245	-0.248
	(0.185)	(0.191)	(0.584)
(Disc)*(GDPconfNocol)	-0.00000482		
	(0.0000193)		
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted		34.43**	
by capital distance, excl col, t-1 (DistconfNocol)		(13.07)	
(Disc)*(DistconfNocol)		-76.66	
		(129.0)	
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted			-0.000259
by index, excl col, t-1 (IndconfNocol)			(0.00124)
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed)			-0.540
			(0.672)
(Freed)*(IndconfNocol)			-0.000469
			(0.00148)
(Disc)*(IndconfNocol)			0.000498
			(0.000969)
(Disc)*(Freed)			0.0351
			(0.790)
(Disc)*(Freed)*(IndconfNocol)			0.000815
			(0.00157)
Natural log of GDP per capita	-0.473**	-0.492***	-0.380*
	(0.153)	(0.148)	(0.189)
Population (1000000s)	0.00186**	0.00192***	0.00210***
	(0.000576)	(0.000540)	(0.000632)
Xpolity	0.0271	0.0252	0.0458
	(0.0292)	(0.0280)	(0.0340)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1	0.301	0.280	-0.126
	(0.223)	(0.215)	(0.282)
Peaceyears	-0.125+	-0.133*	-0.125
	(0.0682)	(0.0673)	(0.0886)
Peaceyears^2	0.00398	0.00428	0.00216
	(0.00360)	(0.00352)	(0.00468)
Peaceyears^3	-0.0000454	-0.0000482	-0.00000794
	(0.0000498)	(0.0000489)	(0.0000659)
Year	0.0316***	0.0307***	-0.00192
	(0.00684)	(0.00601)	(0.0177)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1	0.597*	0.549+	0.715
	(0.292)	(0.293)	(0.454)
Constant	-62.55***	-60.47***	4.618
	(13.82)	(12.24)	(35.19)
Observations	6505	6578	2525

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A.8: Ethnic conflict onset depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information factors: media availability and media freedom. Repression is controlled for here.

	Media availability	Press freedom
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups, t-1 (Confdisc)	0.140	-0.0396
	(0.202)	(0.140)
Natural log of media source availability, t-1 (Media)	-0.513	
	(0.317)	
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc)	1.517	-0.0821
	(1.581)	(0.518)
(Disc)*(Media)	0.703	
	(0.691)	
(Confdisc)*(Disc)	-0.0613	0.0393
	(0.394)	(0.126)
(Confdisc)*(Media)	0.0913	
	(0.0851)	
(Disc)*(Confdisc)*(Media)	-0.0810	
	(0.168)	
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed)		-0.264
		(0.623)
(Disc)*(Freed)		-0.0622
		(0.812)
(Confdisc)*(Freed)		-0.0271
		(0.165)
(Disc)*(Confdisc)*(Freed)		0.0728
		(0.249)
Natural log of GDP per capita	-0.468*	-0.465*
	(0.220)	(0.185)
Population (1000000s)	0.00222***	0.00189***
	(0.000539)	(0.000571)
Xpolity	0.0111	0.0352
	(0.0376)	(0.0297)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1	-0.315	0.0473
	(0.288)	(0.274)
Peaceyears	-0.108	-0.0806
	(0.101)	(0.0784)
Peaceyears^2	0.00165	0.000477
	(0.00509)	(0.00389)
Peaceyears^3	-0.00000254	0.00000983
	(0.0000681)	(0.0000513)
Year	0.00647	-0.0140
	(0.0242)	(0.0183)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1	0.702+	0.640
	(0.413)	(0.440)
Government repression, t-1	-0.00561	-0.0397
	(0.0551)	(0.0538)
Constant	-12.82	29.08
	(48.67)	(36.75)
Observations	2415	3018

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table A.9: Ethnic conflict onset depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information factors: GDP, capital distance and the information index. Repression is controlled for here.

	GDP	Distance	Index and press freedom
Foreign conflicts of disc groups	0.00000206		
weighted by GDP, t-1 (GDPconf)	(0.0000271)		
Discriminated groups, t-1 (Disc)	0.0890	0.134	-0.324
	(0.293)	(0.318)	(0.592)
(Disc)*(GDPconf)	0.000000296		
	(0.0000201)		
Foreign conflicts of disc groups weighted		60.51***	
by capital distance, t-1 (Distconf)		(15.92)	
(Disc)*(Distconf)		-46.21	
		(148.0)	
Foreign conflicts of disc groups			-0.000605
weighted by index, t-1 (Indconf)			(0.00122)
Press freedom dummy, t-1 (Freed)			-0.666
			(0.703)
(Freed)*(Indconf)			-0.0000899
			(0.00148)
(Disc)*(Indconf)			0.000691
			(0.000990)
(Disc)*(Freed)			0.106
			(0.858)
(Disc)*(Freed)*(Indconf)			0.000475
			(0.00179)
Natural log of GDP per capita	-0.490**	-0.489**	-0.438+
	(0.167)	(0.166)	(0.225)
Population (1000000s)	0.00190***	0.00190***	0.00211***
	(0.000556)	(0.000562)	(0.000631)
Xpolity	0.0202	0.0199	0.0428
	(0.0360)	(0.0361)	(0.0353)
Additional conflict in a neighbour dummy, t-1	-0.0347	-0.0330	-0.201
	(0.270)	(0.272)	(0.286)
Peaceyears	-0.0635	-0.0671	-0.110
	(0.0776)	(0.0787)	(0.0978)
Peaceyears^2	-0.00000830	0.000194	0.00118
	(0.00384)	(0.00389)	(0.00510)
Peaceyears^3	0.0000129	0.0000103	0.00000770
	(0.0000504)	(0.0000511)	(0.0000701)
Year	-0.00662	-0.00464	-0.0106
	(0.0173)	(0.0180)	(0.0219)
Ethnic conflict onset, t-1	0.689	0.692	0.722+
	(0.450)	(0.446)	(0.423)
Government repression, t-1	-0.0530	-0.0519	-0.0190
	(0.0509)	(0.0520)	(0.0532)
Constant	14.24	10.25	22.61
	(34.61)	(35.98)	(43.61)
Observations	3084	3085	2364

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Appendix B

Additional information from Chapter 4

Additional information on variables

There is one case where the estimated group population is – slightly – larger than the total population of a state. This is the case of Hutus in Burundi in 2003. This case is coded as missing on the variable of the group to non-group member ratio.

Regression tables from robustness tests

Table B.1: The effect of factors influencing expected utility on increases and decreases in government repression against a group. Sample with group ratio below median.

DV: Direction Change in repression	Estimate	Std. Error	p-value
Discrimination level (Disc)	-0.03	0.16	0.84
Member to non-member ratio (Size)	-28.45	15.48	0.07
(Disc)*(Size)	9.94	5.80	0.09
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.00	0.00	0.11
Repression, t-1	-0.05	0.13	0.72
Dominant group dummy	-4.60	881.79	1.00
Vanhanen index	-0.01	0.01	0.65
GDP (100000s)	-2.79	2.60	0.28
Change in group protest	0.05	0.08	0.59
Change in group rebellion	0.30	0.14	0.03
Rebellion dummy, t-1	0.48	0.34	0.16
Change in others' protest	0.07	0.18	0.69
Change in others' rebellion	-0.47	0.23	0.04
Cut	0.59	0.16	0.00
Constant	0.93	0.59	0.12
N			356
Log-likelihood			-91.14636

Table B.2: The effect of factors influencing expected utility on increases and decreases in government repression against a group. Sample with group ratio above median.

DV: Direction Change in repression	Estimate	Std. Error	p-value
Discrimination level (Disc)	0.16	0.08	0.04
Member to non-member ratio (Size)	0.03	0.21	0.88
(Disc)*(Size)	-0.04	0.08	0.62
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.06	0.03	0.05
Repression, t-1	0.00	0.11	0.98
Dominant group dummy	0.27	0.37	0.47
Vanhanen index	-0.02	0.01	0.03
GDP (100000s)	2.37	1.76	0.18
Change in group protest	0.15	0.07	0.04
Change in group rebellion	0.04	0.11	0.74
Rebellion dummy, t-1	0.09	0.37	0.80
Change in others' protest	-0.11	0.18	0.54
Change in others' rebellion	-0.40	0.26	0.13
Cut	0.49	0.17	0.00
Constant	0.40	0.41	0.32
N			389
Log-likelihood			-117.0143

Table B.3: Auxiliary regression on group rebellion.

	Rebellion
Member to non-member ratio (Size)	0.592
	(0.898)
Discrimination level (Disc)	0.172
	(0.161)
(Disc)*(Size)	-0.140
	(0.328)
Inverse member to non-member ratio	0.00114
	(0.00149)
Repression, t-1	-0.0809
	(0.152)
Rebellion, t-1	2.982***
	(0.563)
Peaceyears	-0.278***
	(0.0720)
Dominant group dummy	1.267
	(0.965)
Territory dummy	0.704
	(0.648)
Kin in neighbour dummy	-0.962+
	(0.556)
GDP (100000s)	-4.608
	(10.35)
Vanhanen index	-0.0600+
	(0.0323)
Constant	-1.151
	(0.950)
Observations	839

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table B.4: The effect of factors influencing expected utility on increases and decreases in government repression against a group from the sample of cases with low military to group ratio.

DV: Direction change in repression	Estimate	Std. Error	p value
Discrimination level (Disc)	0.15	0.05	0.00
Member to non-member ratio (Size)	0.10	0.13	0.42
(Disc)*(Size)	-0.03	0.04	0.43
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.00	0.01	0.54
Repression, t-1	0.01	0.06	0.81
Vanhanen index	-0.01	0.01	0.36
GDP (100000s)	-0.27	1.23	0.83
Change in group protest	0.14	0.05	0.01
Change in group rebellion	0.17	0.07	0.02
Rebellion dummy, t-1	0.48	0.24	0.04
Change in others' protest	-0.12	0.12	0.33
Change in others' rebellion	-0.54	0.18	0.00
Cut	0.29	0.12	0.01
Constant	-0.31	0.21	0.15
N			715
Log-likelihood			-237.7883

Table B.5: The effect of factors influencing expected utility on increases and decreases in government repression against a group from the sample of cases with high military to group ratio.

DV: Direction change in repression	Estimate	Std. Error	p value
Discrimination level (Disc)	0.11	0.08	0.15
Member to non-member ratio (Size)	-3.73	3.42	0.28
(Disc)*(Size)	1.28	1.32	0.33
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.00	0.00	0.16
Repression, t-1	-0.07	0.06	0.24
Vanhanen index	-0.02	0.01	0.08
GDP (100000s)	0.91	1.53	0.55
Change in group protest	-0.04	0.06	0.49
Change in group rebellion	0.23	0.10	0.02
Rebellion dummy, t-1	0.36	0.24	0.14
Change in others' protest	0.09	0.14	0.50
Change in others' rebellion	-0.21	0.17	0.21
Cut	0.65	0.09	0.00
Constant	0.42	0.30	0.16
N			604
Log-Likelihood			-176.0886

Table B.6: The effect of factors influencing expected utility on increases and decreases in government repression against a group from the sample of cases with high military to group ratio. Non-dominant groups with no previous repression only.

	Increase in repression
(Disc)*(Size)	58.59^{+}
	(30.95)
Discrimination level (Disc)	-0.446
	(0.590)
Member to non-member ratio (Size)	-197.9^{+}
	(102.8)
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.00425
	(0.00429)
Vanhanen index	-0.0439
	(0.0551)
GDP per Capita	0.0000147
	(0.0000866)
Rebellion, t-1	-1.459
	(2.507)
Change in group protest	0.0271
	(0.266)
Change in group rebellion	2.850*
	(1.418)
Discrete change in others' protest	-1.162
	(0.861)
Discrete change in others' rebellion	0.0183
	(0.644)
Constant	-0.322
	(2.250)
Observations	290

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Appendix C

Additional information from Chapter 5

Table C.1: Robustness tests for model 1 on media availability and conflicts elsewhere.

	Repression	Repression	Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (all intensity) (ConfAllint)	0.415		
	(0.691)		
Group's level of discrimination	4.926	-1.346^{+}	1.509
	(5.275)	(0.745)	(1.359)
Radio and TV measure (ln) (Media)	-1.944		
	(7.625)		
Media x Disc	2.884		
	(2.528)		
ConfAllint x Media	0.0758		
	(0.351)		
ConfAllint x Disc	-0.204		
	(0.241)		
ConfAllint x Disc x Media	-0.130		
	(0.116)		
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (Conf)		0.00829	0.104
		(0.199)	(0.360)
Radio and TV measure (MediaNolog)		-2.144	
		(6.239)	
MediaNolog x Disc		3.704^{+}	
		(1.931)	
Conf x MediaNolog		0.0737	
		(0.515)	
Conf x Disc		0.143*	-0.0971
		(0.0657)	(0.123)
Conf x Disc x MediaNolog		-0.320^{+}	
		(0.175)	
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy		-0.578^{+}	-0.804*
		(0.338)	(0.364)
Radio, TV and Internet measure (ln) (MediaInt)			-0.541
			(1.780)
MediaInt x Disc			0.921
			(0.589)
Conf x MediaInt			0.0383
			(0.163)
Conf x Disc x MediaInt			-0.0757
			(0.0537)
GDP per capita	2.915	4.860	0.434
	(3.461)	(4.700)	(3.943)
Vanhanen index	-0.0271	-0.0305	-0.0392*
	(0.0195)	(0.0193)	(0.0196)
Group rebellion	0.271*	0.249*	0.263*
	(0.108)	(0.104)	(0.109)
Group protest	0.269*	0.297*	0.259*
	(0.123)	(0.118)	(0.124)
Dominant group	1.047	0.914	0.971
	(0.731)	(0.741)	(0.781)
Other domestic protests	0.00728	0.0213	0.0505
	(0.160)	(0.134)	(0.145)
Other domestic rebellions	0.196	0.0232	-0.0715
	(0.235)	(0.199)	(0.243)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy	-0.361		
	(0.338)		
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.000748	-0.000687	-0.000592
	(0.000713)	(0.000724)	(0.000791)
Repression, t-1	1.704***	1.727***	1.683***
	(0.231)	(0.229)	(0.227)
cut1			
Constant	12.93	2.859	3.936
	(15.10)	(2.401)	(3.902)
cut2			
Constant	14.20	4.158^{+}	5.093
	(15.10)	(2.367)	(3.905)
cut3			
Constant	15.28	5.226*	6.116
	(15.09)	(2.288)	(3.926)
cut4			
Constant	18.17	8.008***	8.910*
	(15.15)	(2.336)	(4.082)
cut5			
Constant	19.69	9.547**	10.41*
	(15.29)	(2.918)	(4.449)
Observations	577	577	542

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table C.2: Robustness tests for models 2 through 4.

	Repression	Repression	Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (all intensity) (ConfAllint)	0.135		
	(0.290)		
Group's level of discrimination (Disc)	-2.409	0.249**	-0.746
	(2.545)	(0.0951)	(0.766)
Press freedom (Freed)	-1.243		-4.400
	(9.358)		(2.801)
Freed x Disc	2.803		2.226*
	(3.836)		(1.126)
ConfAllint x Freed	0.00969		
	(0.426)		
ConfAllint x Disc	0.114		
	(0.115)		
ConfAllint x Disc x Freed	-0.107		
	(0.174)		
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups in neighbours (all intensity) (NbconfAllint)		-0.326*	
		(0.163)	
NbconfAllint x Disc		0.0476	
		(0.0498)	
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups weighted by index (all intensity) (IndconfAllint)			-0.000377
			(0.000807)
IndconfAllint x Freed			0.000855
			(0.00104)
IndconfAllint x Disc			0.000292
			(0.000313)
IndconfAllint x Disc x Media			-0.000583
			(0.000415)
GDP per capita	-0.588	1.273	0.866
	(2.746)	(2.324)	(3.625)
Vanhanen index	-0.0412*	-0.0467**	-0.0132
	(0.0206)	(0.0173)	(0.0218)
Group rebellion	0.261***	0.211**	0.263**
	(0.0765)	(0.0667)	(0.0957)
Group protest	0.381***	0.332***	0.313*
	(0.0962)	(0.0917)	(0.132)
Dominant group	0.780	0.675	0.807
	(0.632)	(0.603)	(0.655)
Other domestic protests	-0.0419	0.0712	0.122
	(0.150)	(0.146)	(0.174)
Other domestic rebellions	-0.0246	-0.0651	-0.0424
	(0.143)	(0.125)	(0.202)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy	-0.469	-0.216	-0.368
	(0.295)	(0.290)	(0.335)
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.000835	-0.00145	-0.0000354
	(0.000797)	(0.00106)	(0.000713)
Repression, t-1	1.640***	1.784***	1.617***
	(0.196)	(0.202)	(0.222)
cut1			
Constant	5.328	2.582***	1.453
	(6.467)	(0.403)	(2.015)
cut2			
Constant	6.709	4.007***	2.692
	(6.459)	(0.494)	(2.012)
cut3			
Constant	7.953	5.341***	3.757+
	(6.425)	(0.583)	(2.005)
cut4			
Constant	10.27	7.749***	6.768**
	(6.475)	(0.783)	(2.075)
cut5			
Constant	12.50+	9.958***	8.240**
	(6.689)	(1.271)	(2.512)
cut6			
Constant	14.95*	12.47***	
	(6.639)	(1.330)	
Observations	761	769	571

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table C.3: Robustness tests for model 5.

	Repression	Repression
Foreign successes of discriminated groups (Succ)	-0.233	0.00575
	(0.212)	(0.337)
Group's level of discrimination (Disc)	0.162	0.510^{+}
	(0.172)	(0.307)
Radio and TV measure (MediaNoln)	-2.745*	
	(1.375)	
MediaNoln x Disc	0.299	
	(0.458)	
Succ x MediaNoln	0.443	
	(0.496)	
Succ x Disc	0.0266	0.00940
	(0.0683)	(0.0991)
Succ x Disc x MediaNoln	-0.0141	
	(0.150)	
Radio, TV and Internet measure (ln) (MediaInt)		-0.358
		(0.405)
MediaInt x Disc		0.124
		(0.129)
Conf x MediaInt		0.0533
		(0.152)
Succ x Disc x MediaInt		-0.00354
		(0.0483)
GDP per capita	5.113	-0.303
	(4.733)	(3.504)
Vanhanen index	-0.0325^{+}	-0.0415^{+}
	(0.0196)	(0.0215)
Group rebellion	0.246**	0.276**
	(0.0947)	(0.0956)
Group protest	0.276*	0.220^{+}
	(0.121)	(0.126)
Dominant group	0.857	1.005
	(0.804)	(0.844)
Other domestic protests	0.0451	0.0761
	(0.142)	(0.154)
Other domestic rebellions	-0.0239	-0.109
	(0.196)	(0.237)
Conflict in neighbour dummy	-0.939**	-1.086**
	(0.348)	(0.366)
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.000889	-0.000767
	(0.000763)	(0.000765)
Repression, t-1	1.726***	1.666***
	(0.225)	(0.219)
cut1		
Constant	1.913**	2.852**
	(0.590)	(1.082)
cut2		
Constant	3.194***	4.000***
	(0.676)	(1.070)
cut3		
Constant	4.278***	5.040***
	(0.750)	(1.127)
cut4		
Constant	7.234***	7.941***
	(1.147)	(1.406)
cut5		
Constant	8.728***	9.390***
	(1.947)	(2.064)
Observations	577	542

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table C.4: Repression depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information based on media and freedom. High military to group ratio only.

	Repression	Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (Conf)	0.282	-0.215
	(0.349)	(0.190)
Group discrimination (Disc)	1.793	-0.819
	(1.498)	(0.855)
Radio and TV measure (ln) (Media)	-5.262*	
	(2.643)	
Media x Disc	2.212*	
	(0.940)	
Conf x Media	0.556*	
	(0.279)	
Conf x Disc	-0.139	0.115
	(0.140)	(0.0713)
Conf x Disc x Media	-0.231*	
	(0.0965)	
Press freedom (Freed)		-0.312
		(2.944)
Freed x Disc		1.003
		(1.491)
Conf x Freed		0.0915
		(0.259)
Conf x Freed x Disc		-0.0851
		(0.135)
GDP per capita	-2.213	-2.348
	(2.689)	(3.660)
Vanhanen index	0.000572	-0.0232
	(0.0254)	(0.0233)
Group rebellion	0.730**	0.345***
	(0.232)	(0.0818)
Group protest	0.391*	0.327**
	(0.183)	(0.126)
Dominant group	-10.05***	-19.44***
	(1.480)	(1.135)
Other domestic protests	0.206	-0.0401
	(0.308)	(0.163)
Other domestic rebellions	-0.306	-0.0691
	(0.442)	(0.181)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy	-0.124	0.247
	(0.613)	(0.480)
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.000427	-0.00171
	(0.000765)	(0.00109)
Repression, t-1	3.099***	2.397***
	(0.585)	(0.477)
cut1		
Constant	7.148+	1.918
	(3.897)	(2.217)
cut2		
Constant	9.522*	4.084*
	(3.979)	(2.058)
cut3		
Constant	11.51**	6.041**
	(4.069)	(1.845)
cut4		
Constant	21.50***	9.870***
	(4.967)	(1.726)
cut5		
Constant		14.40***
		(2.494)
Observations	264	351

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table C.5: Repression depending on high intensity ethnic conflict involvements of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information based on proximity and index. High military to group ratio only.

	Repression	Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups in neighbours (NbConf)	-0.519	
	(0.340)	
Group discrimination (Disc)	0.465**	-1.081
	(0.164)	(1.208)
NbConf x Disc	0.0717	
	(0.0826)	
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups weighted by index (IndConf)		-0.00359
		(0.00306)
Press freedom (Freed)		-4.738
		(4.481)
Freed x Disc		2.329
		(1.655)
IndConf x Freed		0.00429
		(0.00337)
IndConf x Disc		0.00127
		(0.000884)
IndConf x Freed x Disc		-0.00182
		(0.00116)
GDP per capita	-0.549	-0.567
	(2.977)	(3.914)
Vanhanen index	-0.0157	-0.0255
	(0.0217)	(0.0282)
Group rebellion	0.304***	0.536*
	(0.0885)	(0.223)
Group protest	0.331**	0.255
	(0.109)	(0.202)
Dominant group	-10.78***	-10.80***
	(1.495)	(1.474)
Other domestic protests	0.105	0.188
	(0.145)	(0.252)
Other domestic rebellions	-0.174	-0.365
	(0.184)	(0.556)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy	0.584	-0.461
	(0.428)	(0.740)
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.00232+	-0.0000642
	(0.00135)	(0.000690)
Repression, t-1	2.596***	2.979***
	(0.530)	(0.651)
cut1		
Constant	4.043***	-0.186
	(0.730)	(3.801)
cut2		
Constant	6.480***	1.994
	(1.016)	(3.570)
cut3		
Constant	8.400***	4.042
	(1.231)	(3.674)
cut4		
Constant	12.64***	13.11***
	(1.900)	(3.079)
cut5		
Constant	17.09***	
	(2.823)	
Observations	355	261

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table C.6: Repression depending on successes of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information based on media and freedom. High military to group ratio only.

	Repression	Repression
Foreign successes of discriminated groups (Succ)	-0.431	-0.378
	(0.320)	(0.285)
Group discrimination (Disc)	0.112	0.410^{+}
	(0.341)	(0.240)
Radio and TV measure (ln) (Media)	0.279	
	(0.733)	
Media x Disc	-0.236	
	(0.255)	
Succ x Media	-0.125	
	(0.157)	
Succ x Disc	0.154	0.0900
	(0.115)	(0.117)
Succ x Disc x Media	0.0449	
	(0.0621)	
Press freedom (Freed)		0.362
		(1.005)
Freed x Disc		0.0531
		(0.341)
Freed x Succ		0.325
		(0.377)
Succ x Freed x Disc		-0.0447
		(0.143)
GDP per capita	-0.905	-3.394
	(3.787)	(4.036)
Vanhanen index	-0.00151	-0.0290
	(0.0294)	(0.0219)
Group rebellion	0.604^{+}	0.355**
	(0.323)	(0.109)
Group protest	0.424*	0.357**
	(0.168)	(0.136)
Dominant group	-9.180***	-12.38***
	(1.655)	(1.190)
Other domestic protests	0.216	-0.0129
	(0.262)	(0.177)
Other domestic rebellions	-0.426	-0.114
	(0.508)	(0.195)
Conflict in neighbour dummy	-0.867	-0.318
	(0.621)	(0.479)
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.000663	-0.00172
	(0.000787)	(0.00117)
Repression, t-1	2.889***	2.375***
	(0.488)	(0.448)
cut1		
Constant	3.676**	3.548***
	(1.400)	(0.853)
cut2		
Constant	5.935***	5.642***
	(1.672)	(1.047)
cut3		
Constant	7.837***	7.548***
	(2.021)	(1.365)
cut4		
Constant	15.95***	11.17***
	(2.953)	(1.845)
cut5		
Constant		15.39***
		(2.923)
Observations	264	351

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table C.7: Repression depending on successes of discriminated groups elsewhere, information and ethnic discrimination. Information based on proximity and index. High military to group ratio only.

	Repression	Repression
Foreign successes of discriminated groups in neighbours (NbSucc)	0.672	
	(0.714)	
Group discrimination (Disc)	0.532***	0.505
	(0.123)	(0.515)
NbSucc x Disc	-0.223	
	(0.235)	
Foreign successes of discriminated groups weighted by index (IndSucc)		-0.00715+
		(0.00368)
Press freedom (Freed)		1.471
		(1.584)
Freed x Disc		-0.216
		(0.647)
IndSucc x Freed		0.00544
		(0.00439)
IndSucc x Disc		0.00195
		(0.00140)
IndSucc x Freed x Disc		-0.00147
		(0.00160)
GDP per capita	-1.691	-2.656
	(3.133)	(4.489)
Vanhanen index	-0.00749	-0.0520*
	(0.0182)	(0.0252)
Group rebellion	0.278**	0.604*
	(0.0912)	(0.253)
Group protest	0.372**	0.371+
	(0.116)	(0.217)
Dominant group	-11.06***	-9.706***
	(1.129)	(1.420)
Other domestic protests	0.0501	0.113
	(0.153)	(0.220)
Other domestic rebellions	-0.0657	-0.335
	(0.159)	(0.564)
Conflict in neighbour dummy	-0.0626	-1.348*
	(0.460)	(0.675)
Inverse member to non-member ratio	-0.00213+	-0.000596
	(0.00127)	(0.000762)
Repression, t-1	2.444***	2.922***
	(0.432)	(0.504)
cut1		
Constant	4.141***	3.585*
	(0.606)	(1.392)
cut2		
Constant	6.473***	5.601**
	(0.962)	(1.716)
cut3		
Constant	8.310***	7.574***
	(1.201)	(1.800)
cut4		
Constant	12.26***	15.63***
	(1.693)	(3.400)
cut5		
Constant	16.64***	
	(2.685)	
Observations	355	261

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table C.8: Robustness tests for model 1 with time lag.

	Repression	Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups, t-1 (Conf)	-0.00362	
	(0.236)	
Group discrimination, t-1 (Disc)	-0.552	-0.991
	(1.037)	(1.944)
Radio, TV and Internet measure (ln), t-1 (MediaInt)	-0.303	-1.059
	(0.966)	(2.549)
MediaInt x Disc	-0.0561	0.202
	(0.453)	(0.135)
Conf x MediaInt	0.0500	
	(0.0996)	
Conf x Disc	0.0741	
	(0.0970)	
Conf x Disc x MediaInt	0.00437	
	(0.0439)	
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (all intensities), t-1 (ConfAllint)		0.108
		(0.355)
ConfAllint x MediaInt		0.0579
		(0.119)
ConfAllint x Disc		0.0581
		(0.0842)
ConfAllint x Disc x MediaInt		-0.00926*
		(0.00462)
GDP per capita	-1.193	-1.208
	(3.176)	(3.123)
Vanhanen index	-0.0368*	-0.0376*
	(0.0179)	(0.0189)
Group rebellion, t-1	0.0820	0.0921
	(0.0786)	(0.0765)
Group protest, t-1	0.0634	0.0736
	(0.0988)	(0.0966)
Dominant group	0.457	0.548
	(0.749)	(0.793)
Other domestic protests, t-1	-0.00916	-0.0275
	(0.123)	(0.127)
Other domestic rebellions, t-1	0.134	0.154
	(0.116)	(0.122)
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy, t-1	-0.0390	-0.00377
	(0.325)	(0.327)
Non-member to member ratio	-0.00220+	-0.00206+
	(0.00124)	(0.00125)
Repression, t-1	1.730***	1.731***
	(0.221)	(0.222)
cut1		
Constant	1.895	4.452
	(2.385)	(7.808)
cut2		
Constant	3.232	5.782
	(2.378)	(7.788)
cut3		
Constant	4.454+	6.992
	(2.406)	(7.832)
cut4		
Constant	6.677**	9.273
	(2.458)	(7.853)
cut5		
Constant	8.605***	11.23
	(2.535)	(7.932)
Observations	697	696

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table C.9: Robustness tests for models 2 through 4 with time lag.

	Repression	Repression	Repression
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (all intensities), t-1 (ConfAllint)	-0.319		
	(0.231)		
Group discrimination, t-1 (Disc)	-3.558^{+}	0.251**	-0.714
	(1.970)	(0.0933)	(0.748)
Press freedom, t-1	-16.78^{+}		-3.360
	(8.933)		(2.524)
Freed x Disc	5.539^{+}		1.520
	(3.244)		(0.925)
ConfAllint x Freed	0.722^{+}		
	(0.402)		
ConfAllint x Disc	0.167^{+}		
	(0.0899)		
ConfAllint x Freed x Disc	-0.237		
	(0.147)		
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (all intensities)		-0.309	
in neighbours, t-1 (NbConfAllint)		(0.233)	
NbConfAllint x Disc		0.0299	
		(0.0620)	
Additional conflicts in neighbour dummy, t-1		0.199	
		(0.288)	
Foreign conflicts of discriminated groups (all intensities) weighted by index, t-1 (IndConfAllint)			-0.000399
			(0.000846)
IndConfAllint x Freed			0.000921
			(0.00104)
IndConfAllint x Disc			0.000303
			(0.000304)
IndConfAllint x Freed x Disc			-0.000426
			(0.000351)
GDP per capita	1.175	2.286	-0.0923
	(2.814)	(2.376)	(2.992)
Vanhanen index	-0.0354^{+}	-0.0383*	-0.0387^{+}
	(0.0201)	(0.0174)	(0.0207)
Group rebellion, t-1	0.116^{+}	0.0927	0.0994
	(0.0699)	(0.0779)	(0.0737)
Group protest, t-1	0.0852	0.0745	0.0899
	(0.0959)	(0.0930)	(0.0974)
Dominant group	-0.307	0.578	-0.147
	(0.806)	(0.691)	(0.721)
Other domestic protests, t-1	0.0615	0.0792	0.0379
	(0.133)	(0.123)	(0.129)
Other domestic rebellions, t-1	0.119	0.166	0.0991
	(0.119)	(0.128)	(0.105)
Additional conflict in neighbour dummy, t-1	-0.104		-0.109
	(0.293)		(0.291)
Non-member to member ratio	-0.00157	-0.00270^{+}	-0.00154
	(0.00109)	(0.00148)	(0.00100)
Repression, t-1	1.705***	1.819***	1.700***
	(0.202)	(0.207)	(0.204)
cut1			
Constant	-4.778	2.573***	1.115
	(5.106)	(0.420)	(2.087)
cut2			
Constant	-3.430	3.980***	2.458
	(5.118)	(0.489)	(2.113)
cut3			
Constant	-2.236	5.254***	3.662^{+}
	(5.123)	(0.608)	(2.131)
cut4			
Constant	0.0771	7.614***	5.964**
	(5.208)	(0.779)	(2.187)
cut5			
Constant	1.910	9.515***	7.795**
	(5.268)	(1.150)	(2.377)
cut6			
Constant	4.703	12.53***	10.64***
	(5.322)	(1.362)	(2.599)
Observations	730	745	730

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table C.10: Robustness tests for model 5 with time lag.

	Repression	Repression
Foreign successes of discriminated groups, t-1 (Succ)	0.167	-0.0807
	(0.186)	(0.358)
Group discrimination, t-1 (Disc)	0.494**	0.271
	(0.171)	(0.391)
Radio and TV measure, t-1 (MediaNoln)	0.183	
	(1.399)	
MediaNoln x Disc	-0.238	
	(0.513)	
Succ x MediaNoln	-0.418	
	(0.413)	
Succ x Disc	-0.177*	-0.00239
	(0.0822)	(0.168)
Succ x Disc x MediaNoln	0.278	
	(0.218)	
Radio, TV and Internet measure (ln), t-1 (MediaInt)		0.296
		(0.486)
MediaInt x Disc		-0.0676
		(0.164)
Succ x MediaInt		-0.0729
		(0.144)
Succ x Disc x MediaInt		0.0455
		(0.0709)
GDP per capita	1.304	-1.961
	(3.940)	(3.103)
Vanhanen index	-0.0285+	-0.0386*
	(0.0162)	(0.0170)
Group rebellion, t-1	0.0659	0.0654
	(0.0788)	(0.0813)
Group protest, t-1	0.103	0.0752
	(0.0921)	(0.0956)
Dominant group	0.422	0.477
	(0.659)	(0.693)
Other domestic protests, t-1	0.0259	0.0175
	(0.107)	(0.116)
Other domestic rebellions, t-1	0.106	0.119
	(0.108)	(0.112)
Conflict in neighbour dummy, t-1	-0.243	-0.382
	(0.322)	(0.310)
Non-member to member ratio	-0.00233+	-0.00210+
	(0.00128)	(0.00127)
Repression, t-1	1.824***	1.758***
	(0.214)	(0.233)
cut1		
Constant	2.753***	1.677
	(0.548)	(1.179)
cut2		
Constant	4.148***	2.989*
	(0.646)	(1.184)
cut3		
Constant	5.414***	4.205***
	(0.787)	(1.230)
cut4		
Constant	7.745***	6.453***
	(0.940)	(1.338)
cut5		
Constant	9.656***	8.383***
	(1.231)	(1.600)
cut6		
Constant	12.60***	
	(1.493)	
Observations	744	696

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

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