UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
DEPARTMENT OF GREEK AND LATIN

RESHAPING HERODOTEAN RHETORIC

A study of the speeches in Herodotus' Histories *with special attention to books 5-9*

VASILIKI ZALI

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DECLARATION

I, Vasiliki Zali, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Signature

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the speeches in Herodotus' *Histories*, especially in books 5-9, with reference to overriding narrative themes like the self-other polarity (Greeks vs. barbarians/Persians), the themes of freedom and free speech, the relation of speech to power and authority, and the fragility of the Greek coalition. The thesis has a double aim. First, it seeks to present Herodotean rhetoric as an idiosyncratic system, which not only borrows and reworks traditional and contemporary components in a new form, so that they underpin broader narrative themes, but which also influences Thucydidean rhetoric and later rhetorical developments. Second, it investigates the extent to which Herodotean rhetoric can be used to re-evaluate Herodotus' narrative technique and to challenge the model of dialogism ascribed to the *Histories*.

Chapter 1 sheds light on the problematic representation of both Greek and Persian debate in the *Histories*. It demonstrates the dangerous and slippery nature of rhetoric in circumstances where the Greeks lack pan-Hellenic aspirations, with individualistic tendencies leading the way. The following two chapters turn to more specific speech genres, alliance speeches and pre-battle speeches. Through examination of examples of scheming rhetoric, dubious motives and power struggles, chapter 2 demonstrates the difficulty of achieving unity among the Greeks, while chapter 3 unveils the relative character of a type of exhortation which is partly stripped of lofty intentions, reflecting the delicate balance of the relationships between the Greeks. Both chapters 2 and 3 problematize the self-other distinction. Chapter 4 considers examples used in speeches and shows how they represent the circumlocutory nature of rhetoric in both Persia and Greece, as well as the slender Greek alliance. Chapter 5 looks at the implications of allotting speech to individuals and ethnic groups for the self-other distinction, the Greek coalition, and the relation of speech to power and authority.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations of ancient authors and their works are mainly these used in *OCD*[3]. Abbreviations of journal titles follow the system of *L'Année Philologique*. In addition to these, the subsequent abbreviations are used:

BE	J. Robert and L. Robert, *Bulletin Épigraphique* in *RÉG* 86 (1973)
FGE	D.L. Page (ed.), *Further Greek Epigrams* (Cambridge 1981)
Hude	C. Hude, *Herodoti Historiae* (Oxford 1927[3])
LGPN II	S. G. Byrne and M. J. Osborne (eds.), *Lexicon of Greek* Personal Names, vol. II: Attica (Oxford 1994)
LGPN III.A	P. M. Fraser and E. Matthews (eds.), *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names*, vol. III.A: *The Peloponnese, Western Greece, Sicily and Magna Graecia* (Oxford 1997)
LSJ	H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon,* With a Revised Supplement, rev. by H. S. Jones (Oxford 1996[9])
OCD[3]	S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (eds.), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (Oxford 2003[3] [revised])
PMG	D. L. Page (ed.), *Poetae Melici Graeci* (Oxford 1962)
Powell	J. E. Powell, *A Lexicon to Herodotus* (Cambridge 1938)
Radermacher	L. Radermacher, *Artium scriptores* (Wien 1951)
RE	A. Pauly, G. Wissowa and W. Kroll (eds.), *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgard 1893-1980)

Spengel	L. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, vol. II (Lipsiae 1854)
Stein	H. Stein, *Herodotus* (Berlin 1901[6])
Usener/ Radermacher	H. Usener and L. Radermacher (ed.), *Dionysii Halicarnasei Opuscula* (Lipsiae 1899-1929)
West	M. L. West (ed.), *Delectus ex Iambis et Elegis Graecis* (Oxford 1980)

NOTE ON TEXT AND TRANSLATIONS

I cite Herodotus by the Oxford Classical Text (OCT) of C. Hude. Translations of Herodotus are based on those of A. D. Godley (Loeb), A. de Sélincourt as revised by J. Marincola (Penguin Classics) and R. Waterfield (Oxford World's Classics). When I found the existing translations unsatisfactory, I offered my own adapted version. In translating Greek proper names, both personal and geographical, I follow English spelling, e.g. Herodotus, Darius, Artemisium.

Introduction

Herodotus presents us in his *Histories* with a huge range of both charming and historico-politically valuable material. The contrasting qualities as well as the remarkable flexibility of his inquiry have earned him the opposing titles of 'father of history' (Cicero *Laws* 1.1.5: *pater historiae*) and 'father of lies' (Plutarch *On the Malice of Herodotus*).[1] However, since the modern recognition that fictional and factual writing are not that far apart[2] and, consequently, that the literary and the historiographical aspects cannot be separated,[3] the historian and the storyteller can coexist, especially in a writer who is creating the genre. Accordingly, Herodotus no longer qualifies for the role of the untruthful and naïve storyteller, and even Plutarch's strictures on the supposed falsehoods of Herodotus can help to illuminate his method.[4]

The recognition that historiography in general and Herodotus in particular operate according to principles which are in varying degrees artistic as well as technical has led to increasing application of modern critical frameworks to Herodotus. This is by virtue of two factors: on the one hand, the centrality of Herodotus in the history of historiography, which makes it necessary that every attempt to discuss historical writing in conjunction with and interpret it on the basis of literary theory start from his work; and, on the other, the varied character of the *Histories* which offers fertile ground for the application of literary theory.

Hartog's influential book *Le miroir d'Hérodote* (1980),[5] taking a structuralist and anthropological line, opened the way to the re-appreciation of Herodotus through the application of the principles of New Historicism. New Historicism,[6] informed among others by the work of Barthes and Foucault, views the literary work as a direct product

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[1] In modern times see Armayor 1985; West, S. 1985; Fehling 1989.

[2] See Genette 1993: 54-84.

[3] See White 1984: 1-33; Barthes 1986: 127-40 (esp. p. 138: 'historical discourse is essentially an ideological elaboration or, to be more specific, an *imaginary* elaboration' [Barthes' italics]). See also Hornblower 1994a: 133-4 (esp. p. 133: 'By examining the techniques of historical presentation we do not necessarily imply that the subject-matter of that presentation is true or false. True facts can be presented rhetorically or non-rhetorically. Or rather, true facts may be presented with a rhetoric which is more or less obtrusive').

[4] See Baragwanath 2008 (esp. pp. 9-22).

[5] Translated in English in 1988 by J. Lloyd under the title *The Mirror of Herodotus. An Essay on the Interpretation of the Other*.

[6] On new historicism see Veeser 1989.

of the time, place, and circumstances of its composition rather than as an isolated creation. On the other hand, the increasing interest in the persona of the author of the literary artefact and the architecture of the composition, fostered mainly by theorists of narratology, intertextuality and dialogism,[7] has shifted the focus to Herodotus' narrative technique and authority.

As a result, modern research has laid mounting emphasis on the nuanced composition of the *Histories*, and especially on Herodotus' creation and employment of his authorial persona. Several aspects of his authorial persona have been discussed, the ways the narrator presents himself and constructs his authority have been analysed, and his thoughtful methodology and the attempt to create unity through various devices have come under scrutiny.[8] Herodotus is nowadays seen as an author who makes conscious choices and is in control of his narrative; in Dewald's formulation, he is an 'author acting as a master raconteur, subduing difficult and diverse narrative material to his will'.[9] Furthermore, Herodotus is not viewed anachronistically from perspectives imposed by subsequent developments in historiography but is recognized as the father of a whole new genre, which combines elements from different literary genres.[10]

This study attempts to contribute to this re-evaluation of Herodotus through examining closely and approaching afresh Herodotean rhetoric. To approach afresh is to reshape, to provide in other words new insights into the complex network of speeches embedded in the narrative, change the way they are viewed, and reassess their value to the better understanding of the narrative composition and the setting up of Herodotus' authority.

The study concentrates on the rhetoric of Herodotus in the narratives of the Ionian revolt and the Persian Wars (books 5-9). My general purpose is twofold: on the one hand, to establish Herodotean rhetoric as a distinctive creation, which merges together elements from the tradition and the contemporary context, moulds them together and gives them in a new form so that they meet the purposes of the immediate and broader narrative context; on the other hand, to interpret the consequences of a highly

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[7] Cf. Segal 1999: 4.

[8] On the Herodotean narrator see Dewald 1987: 147-70; 2002; 2006: 170-5; Marincola 1987; Darbo-Peschanski 1987: 107-12, 164-89; Brock 2003; de Jong 1999; 2002; 2004: 101-7; Luraghi 2006 (esp. pp. 85-8). Cf. also Lateiner 1989: 30-4, 55-108 (*passim*). On the creation of Herodotus' authority see Calame 1995: 75-96; Marincola 1997: 63-7.

[9] See Dewald 1987: 149. Cf. Dewald 1998.

[10] On Herodotus' new genre see Boedeker 2000; Luraghi 2006.

sophisticated rhetorical system for the reassessment of Herodotus' narrative technique and dialogism.

1. Previous work on speeches and the contribution of this study

The amount of research on Herodotus' speeches is considerable. The first attempts to analyze Herodotean speeches are the works of Deffner *Die Rede bei Herodot und ihre Weiterbildung bei Thukydides* (1933) and Schulz *Die Reden im Herodot* (1933). Both of them adopt Jacoby's[11] distinction between the 'novelistic' speeches of the first books of the *Histories* and the 'political-historical' speeches of the later books, and they deal principally with speeches reported in direct discourse. These works are deficient in two regards: on the one hand, they examine the function of the speeches in the immediate and not the broader context; on the other, they focus largely on the most prominent and well-known speeches.

1976 saw the appearance of another two books on speeches by Heni *Die Gespräche bei Herodot* and Hohti *The Interrelation of Speech and Action in the Histories of Herodotus*. The typologies they both suggest seem to be problematic to the extent that they force all speeches into their limited categories. However, although their studies are very descriptive and none of them considers the speeches in the wider narrative context, Hohti deals with indirect speeches and connects speech to motivation.

Lang, in *Herodotean Narrative and Discourse* (1984), although she takes into account both direct and indirect discourse, applies very strict criteria, dividing the speeches into single speeches and pairs of speeches, which in longer dialogue sections form triads, tetrads, and so on (with respect to the number of speeches). Nevertheless, Lang acknowledges some important functions of the speeches such as explanation, motivation, prefiguration, justification of actions and characterization of individuals.

Along with these broad treatments of the speeches, one should also mention two important thematic studies, focused on a more specific speech category, that is the speeches of wise advisers, by Bischoff *Der Warner bei Herodot* (1932) and Lattimore 'The Wise Advisor in Herodotus' (1939). In addition, there are two excellent articles by Solmsen, 'Speeches in Herodotus' account of the Ionic revolt' (1943) and 'Speeches in Herodotus' Account of the Battle of Plataea' (1944), where she emphasizes Herodotus' innovatory techniques and discusses the speeches in relation to their context.

[11] See Jacoby 1913: 492.

The most recent systematic treatment of Herodotean speeches is by de Bakker *Speech and Authority in Herodotus'* Histories (2007). De Bakker divides the speeches in character- and informant-speeches and explores the ways they enhance the historiographical authority of Herodotus. His approach is narratological and he examines both direct and indirect speech modes. Scardino's book *Gestaltung und Funktion der Reden bei Herodot und Thukydides*, published also in 2007, offers a detailed discussion of the function and rhetorical structure of Herodotean speeches in comparison with Thucydidean speeches. Scardino interprets the speeches in close relation to the narrative context; he focuses, however, mainly on direct discourse and only on books 7-9. Among recent scholarship on speeches Pelling's work stands out, as he has attempted successfully to elucidate particularly the relationship between speech and narrative (2002; 2006a; 2006c). Barker's chapter on Herodotus in his forthcoming book *Entering the Agon. Dissent and Authority in Homer, Historiography, and Tragedy* is also important in that it discusses the way Herodotus creates and reinforces his authority through the representation of debate.

My study seeks to build on Pelling's work. In addition, I use the relation between speech and narrative to address questions of authority. My analysis adds to Herodotean scholarship in that it investigates further aspects of sophisticated composition and narrative management, and argues that a new system of rhetorical composition, which buttresses wider narrative themes, is brought to the fore. I examine primarily the way the rhetoric is closely intertwined with the narrative not only at a micro- but also at a macro-level,[12] that is, not only with the immediate and broader narrative context, but also with broader themes that permeate the Herodotean text. Such themes include principally the following: the self-other polarity (Greeks vs. barbarians/Persians); the themes of freedom and free speech; the relationship between speech and power and between speech and authority; the fragility of the Greek coalition. Thereby such an approach emphasizes the unity of the work, illustrates the level of elaboration of both speech and narrative, and highlights the authority of Herodotus from a different angle challenging the model of dialogism most commonly ascribed to his text.

Dialogism, the plurality of voices in a text as defined by Bakhtin,[13] has been considered a conspicuous feature of Herodotus' text by virtue of the multiplicity of

[12] Cf. Griffiths (2006: 132): 'His [i.e. Herodotus'] declared intention to probe the history of 'small cities as well as great' (1.5) demonstrates his belief that explanatory significance may be found at the microscopic level as well as the macro'.

[13] See Bakhtin 1981: 259-422. Cf. also Todorov 1984: 60-74.

sources, voices and viewpoints presented throughout the narrative, which widen the scope of interpretation extrapolated by the readers and threaten the authoritative narrative by displacing the authority from the author to the reader.[14] However, it has also been observed that all this openness of the *Histories* makes the readers put their confidence in the voice of Herodotus, thereby corroborating his authority.[15] This study takes up the challenge to add to and develop further this restricted conception of dialogism by looking at the speeches, which provide a very different picture: the calculated use of direct and indirect speech modes, the selectivity in recording the speeches, the silences and omissions of speeches, and the distribution of speeches to certain individuals limit considerably the scope of dialogism and bring to the fore the strategic artistic plan of Herodotus and the way this serves to buttress his authority.

2. Terminology

My interest lies primarily in Herodotus the artist and the way he represents the speeches in his text. On this basis, I shall explain the key terms I use in this study: speech; narrative; polarity between speech and narrative.

2.1 Speech:

I take rhetoric to encompass all kinds of speech voiced by characters other than the narrator in the text, recorded either in direct or indirect speech and introduced by a verb of speaking. The third kind of speech mode, the 'Record of Speech Act' (RSA), introduced by Laird,[16] which is a kind of indirect speech mode, is included largely in indirect speech, unless it makes much difference to the text and my purposes. I take RSA as a more strict and remote form of indirect speech, which summarizes the content

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[14] On Herodotean dialogism see Dewald 1987; 1999; 2002; 2006: 180-2; cf. Lateiner 1989: 31; Kurke 1999: 29; Pelling 2000: 83; Boedeker 2003: 30-1.

[15] See Goldhill (2002: 28): '…even the explicit denial of evaluation becomes part of the rhetoric of authorization. The author's refusal to pass judgement becomes a lure for the reader to adopt a critical position, to engage in the process of *historiê*. So the hesitations and qualifications about truth, accuracy and plausibility *buttress* his assertiveness elsewhere'; Goldhill (2002: 30): 'Stories are powerful tools in the contests of ideology – and Herodotus knows this well and is a brilliantly persuasive writer, especially when his story-telling so well conceals its ability to mould and direct its audience'. See also Boedeker 2000: 111-13; Dewald 2002: 287.

[16] See Laird 1999: 99-101. He explains RSA as follows (p. 99): 'We are given merely an indication that something was said or thought and we have much less information about the original utterance'.

of an utterance. Sometimes it is not at all easy to distinguish between indirect discourse and RSA. This category of RSA will be more relevant in chapter 5.

Since speeches are only one of a number of verbal acts of persuasion, I also include under this heading letters and messages written or inscribed, but I exclude oracles which belong to the realm of the divine, unless they are embedded in speeches. Speeches included in digressions are used when and where convenient to corroborate my points and disclose the importance, further effects and placement of other speeches within the narrative plan. Speeches attributed to Herodotus' sources (e.g. 'the Persians/Spartans/Athenians say…') or to non-specific individuals (e.g. 'it is said…') reported in indirect discourse (what de Bakker calls 'informant-speeches')[17] are also used to complement my analysis. However, since these are frequently undeveloped and, where they are developed, it is rarely possible to separate with confidence the primary narrator from his sources, I treat them fairly often as narrative rather than speeches, where the focalizer is other than the narrator.

With respect to the speeches I wish to elaborate further on two aspects: the degree of truthfulness of the different speech modes and, closely related to this, the matter of Herodotus' sources (the way they do or do not affect the choice between different speech modes).

2.1.1 Truth vs. direct and indirect speech modes

The difference between direct and indirect speech has traditionally been thought to be verisimilitude. *Oratio recta* has been considered to be closer to reality than *oratio obliqua*, which has been generally held to be a means to create distance between the event and both the narrator and the surrounding narrative, in other words a means to express either disbelief or scepticism.[18] This clear-cut division, however, has recently been challenged, and it has been shown that it is a fallacy to associate the direct speech with the transmission of valid information. In 1989 Lateiner already observed that 'Speeches in *oratio obliqua* are, as a rule, more likely to represent accurately the gist of actual words and discussions. This is the form in which Herodotus will first have

[17] See de Bakker 2007: 6, 160.

[18] See Gould (1994: 96): '…Herodotus sometimes feels that he requires additional weight of evidence, that is or may be impossible to identify the power concerned or be certain of its motive, and that such reports may be better distanced from the rest of the surrounding narrative by being given in *oratio obliqua*'. Cf. Cooper 1974; Waters 1985: 69, 79; Gould 1989: 50-1; Lateiner 1989: 22-3; Calame 1995: 81-2.

learned the contents of all verbal communications (…), before he elaborated the main points of some of them for thematic and dramatic purposes. Short addresses and dialogues in *oratio recta*, on the other hand, seem especially dramatic because of their conversion to direct speech (…). All speeches in the earlier books, which deal with more distant epochs, are more likely to be embellished and thus often appear in *oratio recta*'.[19]

More recently Laird, using Latin literature as his main test case, has shown that both direct and indirect speech carry the same possibility of manipulation – and this stands for literary/fictional as well as historical/factual texts.[20] This could equally be applied to Herodotus. A similar stance has been adopted by Feeney, who appears hesitant to accept that 'reported speech is an automatic sign of personal scepticism' on the part of the author; he rather suggests that 'the issue here is the way in which Herodotus is setting out the terms for the technology of his new form of rhetoric'.[21] De Bakker has also suggested that Herodotus uses in many cases the informant-speeches ('these speeches are not addressed to another character within the narrative, but are used by Herodotus to present material which he ascribes to informants') not to distance himself from the information he records but to lend authority to his narrative.[22]

It becomes clear that the picture is much more varied and that the preference for direct or indirect discourse depends on stylistic and narrative purposes rather than

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[19] See Lateiner 1989: 21. Cf. also p. 20: '*Oratio recta*, in both the progression of thought and the verbal expression, is the writer's own reconstruction, for Herodotus could not have sound authorities for the intimate and sometimes trivial thoughts and conversation of kings in high council, at table, or in bed. *Oratio recta*, so unlike the canonical modern use of quotation marks, was intended as a sign of the author's intervention, not meant to be read as a sign of the author's gullibility'. See also Bers 1997: 220-4. Thucydides himself is helpful here as well, since (unusually) in 1.22.1 he gives us an insight into the process of (re)constructing speech in historical narrative: 'As to the speeches that were made by different men, either when they were about to begin the war or when they were already engaged therein, it has been difficult to recall with strict accuracy the words actually spoken, both for me as regards that which I myself heard, and for those who from various other sources have brought me reports. Therefore the speeches are given in the language in which, as it seemed to me, the several speakers would express, on the subjects under consideration, the sentiments most befitting the occasion, though at the same time I have adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what was actually said'.

[20] See Laird 1999: 116-52.

[21] See Feeney 2007: 243 n. 28. Cf. Harrison 2000: 25-30; Mikalson 2003: 145. Cf. also Harrison's discussion of Cooper's article (2000: 248-50) concluding that intrusive oblique infinitives are not 'a sufficiently clear indication of distance'.

[22] See de Bakker 2007: 160-78. Cf. also de Jong 2004: 109.

degrees of veracity.[23] This is the position I take in this study: beyond aspects of sources and actual veracity of the speeches I will be dealing with stylistic aspects, that is the conscious use of certain speech modes and their placement in certain points in the text to achieve various effects.

I would like to underline the superficiality of such a distinction between speech modes and veracity based on three examples from the *Histories*. My first and second case show that the mere use of indirect speech is not necessarily an indication of disbelief or scepticism on Herodotus' part, unless it is additionally emphasized by 'distancing devices' or straightforward authorial evaluation of the information. The narrative presentation of Pan's epiphany in book 6 is a very neat demonstration of the use of such 'distancing devices'. Not only is the account given in indirect discourse (6.105-106.1), but Herodotus also uses three parenthetical phrases in an such a way that they function as 'distancing devices': *ὡς αὐτός τε ἔλεγε Φιλιππίδης* (6.105.1: 'as Philippides himself used to say'); *καὶ* (*ὡς*) *Ἀθηναίοισι ἀπήγγελλε* (6.105.1: 'and [as] he told the Athenians');[24] *ὅτε πέρ οἱ ἔφη καὶ τὸν Πᾶνα φανῆναι* (6.106.1: 'when he said he had seen Pan'). It is thus emphasized that all of this was what Phillipides himself claimed he had seen.[25] Consequently the additional 'distancing devices' function as markers of Herodotus' scepticism rather than merely the use of indirect speech, although in this case it is not that easy to decide whether Herodotus believes the story to be true or not.[26] What is more, this observation could be put forward as an argument for the authenticity of the story at least partly, since, 'even if the incident had not really happened, it was Philippides who dreamt it up and not the Athenians'.[27]

My second example is the different versions of the story about the medism of the Argives (7.148-52). The speech mode employed by Herodotus in this section is indirect discourse throughout, apart from a short direct speech by Xerxes (7.150.2). Herodotus

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[23] For a similar tendency in Thucydides see Hornblower 2008: 32-5 (in particular in books 5.25-8.109).

[24] Note also that the conjunction *ὡς* lends the sentence it introduces a sense of subjectivity.

[25] See Hohti 1976: 90 n. 1; Hornblower 2001: 143; 2002: 379, 381. Cf. also Cooper 1974; Lateiner 1989: 22-3; Scott 2005: 369.

[26] Cf. Hornblower 2002: 382. Cf. also Harrison 2000: 82. According to Harrison (2000: 83) another possible indication of Herodotean disbelief might be the participle *πιστεύσαντες*: the Athenians believed Philippides' story, they built a shrine of Pan and established a festival of Pan (6.105.3). Cf. also Hornblower (2001: 144): 'At a minimum this means Athenians at large, not just Philippides, thought a real epiphany had occurred, though, as Alan Griffiths points out to me, the word *πιστεύσαντες* implies that other views were possible'.

[27] See Harrison 2000: 83.

records his four different sources of the variant versions, that is the Argives, the Greeks, some of the Greeks and some people in general (7.152.3: *ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτα λέγεται*), but this does not say much about the authenticity of the stories. In the end of the section Herodotus boldly states 'my business is to record what people say, but I am by no means bound to believe it – and that may be taken to apply to this book as a whole' (7.152.3). That is, Herodotus simply cannot vouch for the truth of any of the different versions. Conversely, when Herodotus wants to pass a judgment, he does so explicitly.[28]

Equally problematic is the use of direct speech. The problem becomes more serious when we have more than one embedded focalization,[29] that is speech within a speech and both of them within a third speech, as is the case with Alexander in book 8.[30] Is Herodotus trying to maintain the impression of verisimilitude through the use of three speeches embedded into one another? By attributing the speeches to Mardonius and Xerxes, Alexander definitely increases the authority of his speech and consequently its persuasiveness. On the other hand, the multiple levels of focalization make it possible that something has been lost in the procedure of transfer, with the interference of all these go-betweens. Multiple focalization indeed increases the distance from reality. On this basis, the refusal of the Athenians to accept Xerxes' offer may be explained not only on patriotic grounds, but also on narratological grounds: Alexander's speech does not give a strong impression of verisimilitude as it is distanced so much from Xerxes, the alleged source of the message, and it is not anticipated or explained by the narrative at all.

2.1.2 Sources

As mentioned above, I am not primarily interested in Herodotus as a historian, that is, in the question whether he communicates an accurate and truthful record of the past. Hence, aspects of truth and falsification are not strictly relevant to my subject. What interests me here is Herodotus as a literary artist; therefore I look at the way he presents the speeches within his narrative to serve particular aims and achieve variant effects. I regard Herodotus as holding sole responsibility for recording the speeches and giving them the form, structure and content they have, all the more so for deciding which

[28] On this cf. Calame 1995: 83-5; Luraghi 2006: 76.

[29] Borrowing the concept from narratology. On focalization see Genette 1980: 185-98; Bal 1985: 100-15.

[30] Multiple focalization is a technique modelled on Homer, where we go as far as three-fold focalization. A very striking case of embedded focalization we find also in Plato's *Symposium*. Four-fold focalization appears for the first time in Herodotus.

speeches he should report in direct and which in indirect speech modes. In that sense, it does not matter for my purposes whether the speeches are in effect reliable accounts of what was actually said, or partly or largely fabricated. Neither is it of much importance whether the speeches were free versions of what Herodotus learnt from his sources and informants that was said, or what he was able to gather from other kinds of evidence and documents. The focus has shifted from Herodotus as a trustful historian to Herodotus as an author who tries to establish credibility and authority. The *Histories* is Herodotus' own creation and the speeches embedded in the text are what he believes would or should have been said, which brings him close to Thucydides.

Herodotus' attitude towards his sources, however, might be linked with his decision to quote a speech and to omit another or to report one speech in direct speech modes while another in indirect speech modes, to prolong, shorten or suppress speeches. But Herodotus seems to distribute responsibility and blame equally to more than one agent. Neither does he have more sympathies with nor does he accuse the one or the other side, be it Greeks or Persians, Athenians or Spartans, several groups of the Ionian Greeks or even the leaders of the Ionian revolt.[31]

In general, Herodotus quite often proves to be an impartial historian, for example when he pays tribute to both Sparta and Athens for their performance in the Persian Wars and their contribution to Greek victory.[32] Another indication of lack of bias on Herodotus' part is what was first observed by Strasburger,[33] the contemporary echoes and the warnings he addresses the Athenians about the future of their newly emerging empire.[34] The picture of Persia especially under Xerxes reflects the Athenian behaviour

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[31] On Herodotus' attribution of motivation see Baragwanath 2008.

[32] See e.g. 9.64.1: *καὶ νίκην ἀναιρέεται καλλίστην ἁπασέων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν Παυσανίης ὁ Κλεομβρότου τοῦ Ἀναξανδρίδεω* (on Pausanias' victory at Plataea); 7.220, 222 (on Thermopylae); 7.139 (on the contribution of the Athenians to the war), see esp. 7.139.5: *νῦν δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἄν τις λέγων σωτῆρας γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι τἀληθέος.*

[33] See Strasburger 1955. Since then the bibliography on the connections between Athens and Persia has been vast. To mention only some of the most important works: Fornara 1971a; Konstan 1987: 72-3; Raaflaub 1987; 2002: 164-83; Ostwald 1991; Stadter 1992; Moles 1996; 2002; Blösel 2001 (on Themistocles' ambivalent behaviour as reflecting the Athenian attitude from the Persian Wars to the Archidamian War); Fowler 2003.

[34] This does not necessarily presuppose that Herodotus published his work at least as late as 424/5, or even later, in 414. On the date of Herodotus' publication, which remains a matter of controversy with the strongest contestants being years 424/5 and 414, see Fornara 1971a: 75-91; 1971b; 1981; Sansone 1985; Evans 1987; Gould 1989: 18; Johnson 1994; Hornblower 1996: 25-8; Fowler 2003: 305-7 (Moles [2002:

a short while after the founding of the Delian League, when Athens rises to an imperial power taking over Persia's place. Indeed Herodotus neither eulogizes Athens nor praises unreservedly the Athenian democracy.

Such allusions to contemporary events are very important for my subject matter and the justification of the book limitation of my study. The problem of sources will come up again frequently when talking about treatment of particular speeches, and it becomes particularly significant in the narrative of the Ionian revolt, all the more so, since many groups of Ionian Greeks are implicated and the matter of who is responsible becomes highly contested. These aspects will be discussed in their proper place.

One has to bear in mind the general impartiality of Herodotus and that his elaborate composition is above any factions and domestic quarrels. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that his choice of narrative modes reflects any personal or political bias he might have for or against any of his sources, although in some cases it is difficult to eliminate completely any such possibility. This approach also helps to support the argument of those who contest the popular belief that the use of indirect speech signposts automatically the critical posture of Herodotus towards his information. In the course of the study I will suggest other plausible artistic purposes for the choice of indirect speech, which relate to serving specific narrative needs.

2.2 Narrative:

The concept of narrative is used to denote two things. On the one hand, it signifies what is not speech, that is description of events, or better deeds, as opposed to words. On the other, it signals larger narrative units (what could also be labelled as *logoi*), and especially for my purposes battle narratives (e.g. Marathon narrative). Sometimes it is also used collectively for the whole of the work (Herodotean narrative).

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34 n. 13] gives good bibliography on Herodotus' publication date). One should also take into consideration the possibility that Herodotus was reciting parts of his work before its publication, which may explain the contemporary allusions as well as references to Herodotus in comedy and tragedy. On oral features in Herodotus see Murray 1987; 2001; Evans 1991: 89-146; Thomas 1992: 103-4, 125-6; 1993: 225-44.

2.3 Polarity between speech and narrative: towards a rhetoric of deception and manipulation

Although Herodotus does not establish plainly in his work the distinction between speech and narrative as Thucydides[35] does in his celebrated passage on his method (1.22.1-2: *καὶ ὅσα μὲν λόγῳ εἶπον...τὰ δὲ ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων...*), this does not reduce the preponderance of this polarization in the *Histories*. Following the tradition initiated by Homer, where being 'speaker of words and doer of deeds' is considered one of the major qualities of a hero (*Il*. 9.442-443: Phoenix to Achilles), speech and action are inextricably related to each other,[36] Herodotus employs the *logos-ergon* antithesis of word and deed in even more complex ways. It is all the more intriguing that Herodotus delays to introduce the dichotomy and when he does he simply does so in an outstanding way, attributing it to the great Persian king, Darius.

The polarity between *logos* and *ergon* claims an important place in the *Histories* from the moment it is introduced in the work by Darius in book 3: 'Otanes, there are many occasions when words are useless, and only deeds will make a man's meaning plain; often enough, too, it is easy to talk – and only to talk, for no brave act follows' (3.72.2: *Ὀτάνη, [ἦ] πολλά ἐστι τὰ λόγῳ μὲν οὐκ οἷά τε δηλῶσαι, ἔργῳ δέ· ἄλλα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ λόγῳ μὲν οἷά τε, ἔργον δὲ οὐδὲν ἀπ' αὐτῶν λαμπρὸν γίνεται*). Rather than extolling the importance of deeds, Darius here emphasizes the need for combined words and actions.[37] From then on, the *logos-ergon* opposition comes up recurrently in the work, more or less explicitly.[38] In a more covert way this contrast lies at the heart of the typical Herodotean figure of 'wise adviser', the man who advises (*logos* both as speech and thought: advisory speech reflecting careful thought) another man who yearns to act impetuously.

The relationship between speech and narrative, *logos* and *ergon*, which is central to my approach, covers highly varied aspects of interaction: speech and narrative may

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[35] On the *logos-ergon* polarity in Thucydides see Luschnat 1942; Hunter 1973; Parry 1981; Macleod 1983: 52-67, 88-122; Ober 1998: 53-63; Morrison 2006.

[36] See Parry 1981: 21-7.

[37] Cf. 3.134.6: *ταῦτα εἶπε καὶ ἅμα ἔπος τε καὶ ἔργον ἐποίεε*. Note also Herodotus' praise of Demaratus: 'he had been a man of the highest distinction in Sparta, both in action and in counsel' (6.70.3: *ἄλλα τε Λακεδαιμονίοισι συχνὰ ἔργοισί τε καὶ γνώμῃσι ἀπολαμπρυνθείς*). This comment brings Demaratus quite close to the Homeric heroic ideal.

[38] E.g. 3.134.6; 5.24.1, 74.1; 7.135.1; 9.79.2, 92.1. And more implicitly at 8.144 and 9.27 (Athenians: 'time to act and not to talk').

reveal, reflect, anticipate, support, verify, complete, explain, exemplify or even undermine one another.

In Herodotus it is Darius again who gives an additional twist to the *logos-ergon* antithesis by emphasizing the undermining aspect of their relationship when in the same passage (3.72) he goes on to reveal the seductive power of rhetoric, thus moralizing the use of deception to achieve one's purposes: 'if a lie is necessary, why not speak it? We are after the same thing, whether we lie or speak the truth: our own advantage. Men lie when they think to profit by deception, and tell the truth for the same reason – to get something they want, and to be the better trusted for their honesty. It is only two different roads to the same goal. Were there no question of advantage, the honest man would be as likely to lie as the liar is, and the liar would tell the truth as readily as the honest man' (3.72.4-5).[39]

Deception manifests itself in various forms in the work, ranging from actual deception to speaking indirectly and from manipulation of reality to complete distortion. Or it might even take the form of inconsistency between words and deeds in the same or different narrative contexts. Speech is most often deceptive, used to mask one's purposes,[40] or speech and narrative may complement one another in the game of deceit.[41] Herodotus himself intervenes fairly often to comment and reveal ulterior motives. Thus authorial comments or even the events themselves frequently disclose a picture very different from the one given by the arguments in the speech.

Logos, *ergon*, deception, manipulation: there is a strong bond between them all. One should always bear in mind that rhetoric is by nature the art of persuasion, that is, the art of making one's arguments strong, and manipulation in a higher or lower degree is usually the way to go about this.[42] The role of the audience (its type, knowledge,

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[39] Raaflaub (2002: 160) connects this passage to Gorgias' *Helen*: '…Gorgias' discussion of justified deception (e.g., *Hel*. 10-11) reflects ethical relativism and the importance attributed to the *sumpheron* (advantage, interest) and is perhaps echoed in a speech given to Darius (3.72; cf. 1.138)'. Is Darius one of Herodotus' alter egos? Even if he is not, he certainly gives rhetorical tips and sketches out the lines along which we are to read the rhetoric in the work. However, such a connection has further implications for Herodotus' authority and adds to Steiner's (1994: 127-85) argument that Herodotus risks entering the world of the tyrant while he composes. Thomas (2006: 69) also makes the connection between Herodotus and Darius based on 3.38.3-4, where the Persian king is presented as investigating foreign cultures.

[40] Cf. the distinction between Gelon's alleged and real purpose at 7.155.1: *τῷ λόγῳ…τῷ ἔργῳ.*

[41] Cf. 4.139.1 (the Danube bridge debate): *ἔδοξέ σφι πρὸς ταύτῃ τάδε ἔργα τε καὶ ἔπεα προσθεῖναι.*

[42] Cf. Protagoras' doctrine in his *Antilogies* about how to make the weak argument strong (Radermacher B III 16-17).

perceptions, ideas and expectations) in this procedure is cardinal. My further task here is to investigate the ways Herodotus has his speakers fail or succeed through accommodating the arguments to the respective audience and circumstances, and using diplomacy, twists and turns to achieve persuasion, so that, in the majority of cases, they pursue their individual aspirations.

Skilful manoeuvring and management of reality prompted by expediency is cleverly introduced at the very beginning of the work by means of the mythical seizures of women. Herodotus recounts the *logoi* related by different sources about the abduction of Io, and each of them apparently tends to be self-interested: the Persians accuse the Greeks and the Phoenicians; the Phoenicians deny their share of guilt and offer an alternative version which whitewashes them (1.1-5). These 'informant-speeches' (de Bakker's phrasing), these *logoi*, both in the sense of words and stories, appear self-serving, each version supporting its agent.[43] The case with the speeches of certain characters differs very little.[44]

3. Contextualizing Herodotus

The tailoring of arguments by Herodotean speakers, so that they may be convincing, entails two further important dimensions. First, it brings to the fore arguments used in similar circumstances and for comparable purposes, that is model arguments, which will shortly be discussed in two generic categories: alliance speeches and pre-battle speeches. Second, it evokes affinities with the previous literature which Herodotus employs, enriches and develops to suit the needs of his narrative.

The second point, which I shall discuss here, brings in another aspect of my contribution: to establish Herodotus as an important link between, on the one hand, the previous literary tradition and, on the other hand, Thucydides, as well as the much later rhetorical handbooks, viz. the earliest surviving ones, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the *Rhetoric to Alexander*.[45] This entails embedding Herodotus in the tradition and the contemporary context, and comparing him to the future rhetorical classifications.

From the elegiac inscription newly discovered in Halicarnassus dated to the second century B.C., which describes Herodotus as 'the prose Homer' (v. 43: *Ἡρόδοτον τὸν*

[43] Cf. Dewald 1987: 168-9; 1999: 225-6 (note also p. 226: 'The unspoken Greek version, we may note, is every bit as self-justifying as the two Persian and Phoenician stories that precede it'), 232-3; 2002: 270-1.

[44] See e.g. the speeches of Aristagoras (below pp. 91-9); the debate between the Tegeans and the Athenians in book 9 (below pp. 179-88).

[45] The treatise is considered pseudo-Aristotelian, but it is also frequently attributed to Anaximenes.

πεζὸν ἐν ἱστορίαισιν Ὅμηρον),[46] to Longinus, who in the first century C.E. calls Herodotus 'most Homeric' (*Ὁμηρικώτατος*),[47] and from Cornford,[48] associating Herodotus with the epics and Thucydides with tragedy, to Pelling's[49] most recent article on Homeric echoes in the *Histories*, the affiliations between Herodotus and Homer have always been considered important.

Homer seems to be the source for many Herodotean narrative features and strategies. To mention only a few of them: theme of war between Greeks and barbarians; commemoration of human deeds and preservation of glory (*kleos*); direct speech; storytelling; ring-composition; digressions; omniscient narrator (the Herodotean narrator at least partially); Homeric diction. Of course there are major differences as well, and in some cases Herodotus seems even to provide correctives of an evidently Homeric tradition;[50] here, however, we are interested only in the affinities.[51] Starting from Homer, my study discusses possible echoes between Herodotus and the epics, but it also extends to other kinds of tradition from which Herodotus seems to be borrowing, such as myth and lyric poetry.[52]

Drama is also a fruitful point of comparison, and I shall be referring to potential parallels and influences, as it either belongs roughly to the same period as the *Histories* or they have common antecedents – the epics. The relation between Herodotus and the tragic poets has been researched at length. The most striking resonances are those between the *Histories* and Aeschylus' *Persians* (influence on Herodotus, for chronological reasons), as well as between the *Histories* and Sophocles' *Antigone* (Herodotus' influence on Sophocles). [53]

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[46] See Lloyd-Jones 1999.

[47] See Longinus *Subl*. 13.3.

[48] See Cornford 1907: 137-9.

[49] See Pelling 2006b.

[50] E.g. 2.116: the story of Helen of Troy. See Boedeker (2002: 108): 'Indeed, as a number of scholars have recently argued from very different perspectives, in clearly recalling epic themes and language (especially in the proem), Herodotus is not only paying homage to Homer but challenging his primacy' (see also her n. 37).

[51] On several aspects of the relation between Herodotus and Homer see (selectively) de Jong 1999: 220-3; 2004: 101-2; Boedeker 2002: 97-109; Pelling 2006b; Griffiths 2006: 135-6.

[52] On Herodotus and the past poetry see Marincola 2006. On the historiography of fifth century and the elegiac and iambic poetry see Bowie 2001.

[53] On Herodotus and tragedy see Saïd 2002; Griffin 2006; Hornblower 2006: 306-7; esp. on Sophocles see West 1999; Dewald and Kitzinger 2006.

Herodotus is no longer considered as belonging to the archaic age, but as a writer contemporary to his era (mid-fifth century), deeply involved in and familiar with the intellectual trends of his time. His method of historical inquiry has many points in contact with the scientists of his time, be it physicists, doctors, pre-Socratic philosophers,[54] sophists or medical writers. The language of proof and display is one of the most apparent similarities,[55] which provides Herodotus with such qualities that make de Jong identify 'an epideictic narrator' as one of the aspects of the Herodotean narrator.[56] Herodotus' thought is also informed on the one hand by sophistic interest in the relation of *nomos* and *physis* to human character and society, and on the other hand by the influence of climate and geography on national character. The latter is an idea found in pre-Socratics and medical writers.[57]

There were many historians earlier than and contemporary with Herodotus, but they are all preserved only in fragments. The best preserved amongst them is Hecataeus. However, for our purposes here these historians are excluded since there are no extant pieces of their work to allow a juxtaposition with our subject, Herodotean speeches.[58]

The similarities between the sophistic language of *antilogiai* as well as the element of *epideixis* are particularly important for this study.[59] The practice of *dissoi logoi*, that is arguing both sides of a question, was developed by the sophists and is attested by Protagoras' *Antilogies*, which survives only in fragments but gives an idea of the opposition of arguments, Antiphon's *Tetralogies* – the earliest extant model speeches based on opposing arguments – and the anonymous treatise *Dissoi Logoi*. The use of argument and counter-argument plays a vital role in the way Herodotus sets up his speeches and debates. Antithetical arrangement is reflected either in speeches

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[54] Herodotus has even been considered a pre-Socratic thinker by Myres 1953: 43 ('the only "Pre-socratic" writer who is preserved in full').

[55] It is to be borne in mind that the language of proof, apart from the relation to the sophists, is evidence of the oral origins of the *Histories* and their public performance.

[56] See de Jong 1999: 227-9; 2004: 107.

[57] On the associations between Herodotus and his intellectual environment see Thomas 2000 (ethnography, science, philosophy, rhetoric); 2006; Raaflaub 2002. On Herodotus' relation to the sophistic movement especially see Dihle 1962; Hunter 1982; Hartog 1988.

[58] On Herodotus and the earlier and contemporary historians and ethnographers see Fowler 1996; 2006. On Herodotus and Hecataeus see esp. West 1991; cf. Calame 1995: 92; note also Fowler (2006: 37): '…the problematisation of *logoi* already in the opening words of Hecataeus' *Genealogies* confirms our general assessment of their importance' (cf. his note 41).

[59] On *epideixis* and *antilogiai* see also below p. 130.

supporting different views in the context of a debate (e.g. Artabanus and Mardonius in book 7; the most famous example is the Constitutional debate in book 3) or in two variant alternatives presented within the same speech (e.g. Artemisia 8.68α.1-γ; Themistocles 8.60α-γ [*ἀντίθες γὰρ ἑκάτερον ἀκούσας*]; Themistocles 8.83; Miltiades 6.109.3-6).[60]

The element of *epideixis*, also introduced by the sophists, is frequently employed by Herodotus in his speeches and is a feature shared with fifth- and early fourth-century epideictic oratory (funeral and panegyric speeches). In Herodotus, epideictic display dominates when it comes to speeches intending to praise the speaker himself or the addressee (e.g. the Tegean-Athenian debate in book 9), or to exhort or discourage the addressee (e.g. Miltiades' speech to Callimachus 6.109.3-6).

In such cases it is not safe to search for the primary source of influence and make wild guesses about who has borrowed from whom. Neither is it safe to try to identify analogies or trace one to one influence from specific works. Since Herodotus was active in the same period, he might simply have been affected by the trends and the way of thought dominating at that period.

Similar trends were reflected in the political or even legal environment contemporary with Herodotus. Herodotus is familiar with all the types of political debate conducted in public arenas like the assembly and the law-courts. Rhetoric was at its peak and Herodotus was exposed to all the methods of argumentation and ways of persuasion. Furthermore, Herodotus' treatment of rhetoric and in particular of deception intersects with the contemporary debate about the power and perils of rhetoric. The Athenian audience of the fifth century was used to listening to speakers in the assembly and the courts and trying to figure out the truth of their claims, as it was to some extent aware of the ambiguity and deceptive power of speech above all in an agonistic atmosphere.

One of the most fashionable rhetorical strategies was the 'rhetoric of anti-rhetoric'. This is when the speaker disclaims any knowledge and use of rhetorical strategies and deceptive methods, which he consequently attributes exclusively to and of which he accuses his opponent. But in doing so he avails himself of the same rhetorical means. The use of the 'rhetoric of anti-rhetoric' is reflected neatly in Thucydides' Mytilenean Debate, Aristophanes' *Knights* and *Acharnians*, and Euripides' *Hippolytus*,

[60] Cf. Protagoras' *Antilogies*: 'Before any uncertainty two opposite theses can validly be confronted' (Radermacher B III 18-19). Cf. Artabanus to Xerxes at 7.10α.1.

Andromache and *Hecuba*. In all these works, which aim at raising the awareness and scepticism of the audience, nothing is straightforward in terms of rhetoric, as the orators very often adopt the persona of simple people who are not initiated into the secrets of oratory.[61] The Herodotean debate between the Tegeans and the Athenians (9.26-7) presents striking analogies with this practice. The Athenians say that there is no point in getting into a contest of words at such a critical moment just before the battle at Plataea. However, this is exactly how they act and thus they end up doing the very same thing of which they accuse the Tegeans.

Contextualized in this way in his contemporary times and given the contemporary historical allusions of the *Histories*,[62] Herodotus no longer seems either 'simple' or 'archaic' nor does he seem so different from Thucydides, his successor. Although the traditional and apparently false impression that Thucydides and Herodotus belong to two completely different worlds and that Thucydides condemns his predecessor and his work[63] has been seriously challenged and even subverted, this is often neglected.

The dissociation of Herodotus from Thucydides has been largely due to the misapprehension that Thucydides in his methodological chapter dismisses especially Herodotus and his work (1.21-2: *τὸ μυθῶδες, ἀγώνισμα*).[64] After the discovery of the New Simonides the picture has changed significantly since Simonides' Plataea elegy, a historical poem, is now included in Thucydides' historiographic predecessors.[65] Thucydides does not seem to be so, or even not exclusively, disdainful to Herodotus and the two historians are closer than usually assumed.[66] This tendency was first informed

[61] See Hesk 1999; 2000: 202-91. Cf. also Dover 1974: 25-8.

[62] See above pp. 20-1.

[63] See von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1908: 7; Usher 1969: 23; Kennelly 1994.

[64] On Thucydides referring to Herodotus only see Fornara 1971a: 60; Gould 1989: 112; Hornblower 1991: 61.

[65] See Boedeker 1995: 226-9; 2001: 120 and n. 2; Hornblower 1996: 27-8; Rood 1998b.

[66] See Hornblower (1996: 123): 'It is even possible that the two men were in a real sense contemporaries and rivals' (cf. 1996: 27); Hornblower (2006: 308): 'Thucydides may have disapproved of Herodotus methods and outlook, but he was not above showing off how well he could 'do a Herodotus' when he felt like it'; Rood (1999: 166): 'Perhaps Thucydides' anti-Herodotean reaction reflects not his rejection of Herodotus, but his perception that Herodotean history was not adequate to convey the intensity of the suffering caused by the realization of the tensions Herodotus had so perceptively intimated'; Rogkotis 2006 (note esp. p. 86: '…far from being separated by an unbridgeable chasm, they [i.e. Herodotus and Thucydides] display numerous striking affinities…Thucydides offered a creative continuation, development, and refinement – rather than a pugnacious refutation – of his predecessor'); and most recently Lateiner (2009: 49, reviewing Irwin and Greenwood 2007b): 'Classicists now comfortably grant

by Cornford's book *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (first published in 1907), which signified Thucydides' fall from objectivity by highlighting the parallels between the expedition of Xerxes against Greece in Herodotus and the Athenian expedition to Sicily in Thucydides for the first time. Hunter's work *The Artful Reporter* (1973) several years afterwards further emphasized the artificial character of Thucydides' *History*.

Modern scholars have discussed the various reasons for thinking that Thucydides had knowledge of and was influenced by the work of his predecessor: interest in political history; self-interest as a factor influencing decisions of individuals and people; likeness of human nature; desire for liberty and power; Herodotean colouring in Thucydidean passages like the *Archaeology* and the lives of Themistocles and Pausanias, or the story about Harmodius and Aristogeiton at 6.54-9 (storytelling; details; sexual element); narration of the Peloponnesian War based on the Persian Wars (Thucydides indeed saw the Athenians of the present as the Persians of the past and the Sicilian expedition as a recollection of Xerxes' expedition against Greece);[67] analogies between the Ionian revolt and the Sicilian expedition;[68] assumption of Herodotean material and usage of Herodotus whenever Thucydides refers to the past in his speeches; methodology and religious attitude; views on historical explanation.[69]

I shall try here to corroborate the relation between the two historians, focussing on the level of speech composition and management: kind of arguments, structure, location and allocation of speech. To start with a preliminary comment which shows the merits of such an approach, I shall use two examples from books 5 and 9. At 9.6 Herodotus gives a summary of the Athenians' thoughts, plans, explanation of their motivation, aim and content of their intended speech. Shortly after, their speech follows in direct discourse at 9.7α.1-8β.2, which actually repeats the preceding narrative. The case with

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Herodotus credit for Thucydidean levels of historiographical sophistication…Two political junkies, from Halicarnassus and Halimous, both sides of the Aegean pond, anatomise communal dynamics, eccentric geniuses and international power. Their 'agonistic intertextuality'…and Thucydides' 'anxiety of [demonstrable] influence' will soon become even more prominent'.

[67] See Rood 1999.

[68] See Kallet 2001: 85-97.

[69] Hunter (1982) was the first to attempt a comparison of the historical methodology of Herodotus and Thucydides, when dealing with past and present specifically, and view them as contemporaries. On the relation between Herodotus and Thucydides see Hornblower 1987: 26-33; 1996: 19-38, 122-45; 2006: 308; Marinatos-Kopff and Rawlings 1978 (religious stance); Pelling 1991 (on the comparison between Thucydides' Archidamus and Herodotus' Artabanus); Rogkotis 2006 (on thematic, structural and lexical links).

the Spartans in book 5 is the same. The historian briefly quotes the Spartan fears in 5.91.1 in indirect discourse as part of his narrative and his own appreciation of the events. And then we are given the elaborate and manipulative Spartan speech to the allies (5.91.2-3), which is rather a replication of the preceding narrative. Emphasis on the motivation and speech manipulation in both cases is a possible reason, but it does not have to be the only reason. If we compare these passages with Thucydides' statement on methodology (1.22), then the parts reported in indirect discourse might stand as a methodological statement for the specific cases. In other words, Herodotus might be saying here: 'that is the essence of their speech, which I came to know from my sources and I myself figured out; and here is my version of the speech delivered'. In a way he informs us that the Spartan and Athenian speeches are fictitious. And they could well be. It is what the Spartans and the Athenians ought to have said according to what Herodotus thinks, and, thus, Herodotus anticipates Thucydides' approach.

The significance of the proem for the understanding of the relationship between Herodotus and the precedents and antecedents of the *Histories* is more important than usually observed; it is in fact fundamental. For in the proem both sophistic and Homeric features are joined together: sophistic display and evidence (*ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις* 'display/ performance of inquiry'; *ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροισι ἀποδεχθέντα* 'great and marvellous deeds, some displayed by Greeks, some by barbarians')[70] as well as the search for causes (*δι' ἣν αἰτίην*); the Homeric *kleos* (*μήτε ἀκλεᾶ γένηται*) and the deeds of Greeks and barbarians together with the cause of the conflict.[71] Together with these the proem brings in Thucydides as well with the mention of the cause of the conflict and the hope that the achievements of Greeks and barbarians 'may not become forgotten in time' (*τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται*), which recalls the Thucydidean 'timeless possession' (1.22.4: *κτῆμα ἐς αἰεί*). Such a unique combination has been brought forward well by de Jong when she observes that 'the Herodotean narrator has the persona of a historian, poses as an epideictic speaker, and allows himself the liberties of an epic singer'.[72]

The distinctiveness of Herodotean rhetoric lies largely in its deploying elements from the tradition and the rhetorical theory and practice of Herodotus' own time, and

[70] Kurke (2000: 119-20) connects this notion of 'display' to traditional oral forms of performance (epics, Ionian logographers).

[71] On Herodotus' proem bringing together Homeric and contemporary language see also Thomas 2000: 267-9; Goldhill 2002: 12-13.

[72] See de Jong 2004: 107.

giving them a new twist, embedding them into the narrative strands and making them part of and tool for his grand enterprise. Herodotus' contribution can also be identified at a more specific level, namely in the nuanced use of direct and indirect speech modes, a strategy which Thucydides develops further at a later stage. This tendency to innovation and creativity within traditional patterns not only informs Thucydides and the later historians, but also the much later rhetorical treatises. Herodotus' speeches anticipate elements associated with the systematization of oratorical strategies in later rhetoric.

4. Justifying the scope of the analysis: major themes and contemporary historical context

The limitation of the analysis to the last five books of the *Histories* is imposed by the nature of this study. On the one hand, the Ionian revolt and the Persian Wars are the parts which mostly interact with and allude to the contemporary historical context, generating further affinities and inviting juxtaposition and comparison. On the other hand, book 5, our starting point, occupies a key position[73] as it introduces themes which pervade the narrative as a whole and are of specific interest to this study: the self-other polarity (Greeks vs. barbarians/Persians); deriving from this polarity the aspects of freedom and free speech; the relationship between speech and power and between speech and authority; and the fragility of the Greek coalition. Such selectivity does not mean that books 1-4 are disregarded. On the contrary, they serve recurrently as an important point of comparison, all the more so since, as I will demonstrate, they provide us with quite a few template arguments which are replayed and reworked in the course of the *Histories*.

Let us say a few words about some of the major subjects. The Ionian revolt brings Greeks and Persians in direct conflict: the twenty ships the Athenians send to support the Ionian revolt are signified as the 'beginning of evils for both Greeks and barbarians' (5.97.3: *ἀρχὴ κακῶν*) – with the word *ἀρχή* acquiring different meaning for a contemporary audience since it alludes to the Athenian *arche*/rule, which was indeed the beginning of evils or the 'empire of evils' as it recalls neatly chapter 6.98.2 (*ἐγένετο πλέω κακὰ τῇ Ἑλλάδι...ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν κορυφαίων περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς πολεμεόντων* 'Greece

[73] On the importance of book 5 in relation to its central position in the *Histories* see also Irwin and Greenwood 2007a: 25-40.

suffered more evils…from her own internal struggles for supremacy').[74] The Ionian revolt provides the Persians with the reasons to attack Greece and take their revenge on the Athenians who burned Sardis. This reason is interestingly used as a rhetorical argument in the mouth of clever and duplicitous individuals like Mardonius and passes on consequently through them to Xerxes' vocabulary.[75]

As the focus of the narrative changes from the East to the West, the Greeks play a starring role and are seen to interact closely with each other and with the Persians. The polarity between Greeks and Persians has been challenged long before by scholars, starting with Hartog's *Mirror of Herodotus* – the first work elaborating on a 'rhetoric of otherness' in Herodotus' Scythian *logos* – which suggests that the image of the Scythian Other is built upon the image of the Greek Self; that is the Other is the opposite of the Self, which makes one understand one's self better.[76] This view has been criticized, or rather complemented, by the more recent work of Dewald (reviewing Hartog)[77] and Pelling ('East Is West And West Is East'),[78] concluding that the categories are not that stable, and we can find 'Self in Other and Other in Self' in Herodotus, in Pelling's phrasing. Herodotus himself introduces this instability already in the prologue of his work in a double way: first, the abductions of women hint at a 'potential instability of race and culture';[79] then, Herodotus states that most of the cities which were great once were small in his time, and those which were small once were then great, for human prosperity never remains in the same place (1.5.4). In this way he gives us programmatically the keys to interpret the whole work: things are not always what they seem *prima facie* to be; stereotypes may thus be easily constructed and intriguingly deconstructed.

It is attractive to see how this 'rhetoric of otherness' works when dealing with rhetoric itself on both the Greek and Persian side; that is if Hartog's 'mirror' can be in this case self-reflexive. This interaction between Greeks and barbarians, mainly Persians in the last books, reveals comparable cases and draws many similarities which challenge

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[74] See Irwin 2007a: 47 n. 16. Cf. also Munson 2007: 152-3, 155; Pelling 2007: 182; Henderson 2007: 305. Cf. also 8.142.2 (the Spartan speech to the Athenians): *περὶ ὑμετέρας ἀρχῆθεν ὁ ἀγὼν ἐγένετο.* ('it began by being a war for your territories only').

[75] Cf. Darius' order to his slave to repeat to him the phrase 'Master, remember the Athenians' every time he sat down to dinner (5.105.2).

[76] On the Greek/barbarian polarity in similar terms see Cartledge 2002[2]; for tragedy see Hall 1989.

[77] See Dewald 1990.

[78] See Pelling 1997.

[79] See Dewald 1990: 220.

the contrast between Greeks and Persians in new and interesting ways at the level of structure, allocation and manipulation of speech.

In book 5 Socles' speech problematizes for the first time explicitly the dynamics of Greek debate and free speech. The debates between Aristagoras and his supporters introduce us to the theme of speaking freely to people in power in a Greek context. Another dimension is also added to the aspect of free speech: the degree of manipulation of arguments and consequently of reality. The short digression (*logos*) about the handling of the Persians by Alexander reveals the misleading power of speech (5.17-22), a feature which is openly introduced in rhetorical speech with Aristagoras' speeches at Sparta and Athens (5.49-51, 97). Equally problematic appears the representation of Greek debate throughout books 5-9.

Besides, Greek unity already seems to fracture and the failure of the Ionian revolt entails also the factor of disunity. Individuals like Aristagoras, Histiaeus and even Coes, as well as people like the Athenians, who ask for Artaphrenes' help at 5.73, turn to the Persians to serve their vested interests. Monarchs like the Macedonian tyrants work together with the Persians. The intervention of one city in the internal affairs of another city implies highly competitive relations (e.g. Aristagoras' willingness to help the Naxians). The tension between Athens and Sparta starts to rise as the Spartans intervene in Athenian politics, abolish tyranny and then attempt twice to reinstate it (Isagoras and Hippias); we get a very strong sense of Greeks jostling for position amongst themselves.[80]

This is one side of the coin. The other side includes pleas to kinship bonds and the need to strengthen unity among the Greeks. However, even in such circumstances, kinship is used in a manipulative way, and the same people can claim or disclaim the same kinship bonds in different contexts. The distinction between Dorians and Ionians is the basic template on which kinship arguments can be played out according to what is convenient at the time: Aristagoras claims that the Ionians, being Greeks, have the same blood as the Spartans, whereas in Athens the Ionians are presented as exclusively Athenian kin (5.49-51, 97); the death of Dorieus in Sicily, Cleomenes' brother whose name alludes to the Dorian origins of Sparta, remains unavenged by the Spartans (7.158.2); Cleomenes dismisses his Dorian origin when he replies to the priestess of Athena's temple on the Acropolis 'I am not a Dorian but an Achaean' (5.72.3). Greek unity is as fluid as the kinship claims and the Ionian-Dorian categories.

[80] Cf. also Croesus' searching for the most potent of the Greeks to ally with in book 1.

Greek collectivity is a desideratum but not a reality. The numerous autonomous and free Greek cities (democracies and oligarchies) pursue and fight for their own interests. This is evident again when the Greeks 'who were loyal to the general cause' call for help from Argos, Sicily, Corcyra and Crete in the face of the Persian attack (7.145). Unity can only be imposed by charismatic leaders, like Themistocles, whom the Greeks will recognize as such. Other tangible demonstrations of disunity manifest themselves in the fighting over leadership. The Salamis debates best illuminate the tensions between the Greeks and the individual tendencies towards supremacy. The quarrelsome and shaky Greek coalition has obvious implications for the contemporary historical context and the major conflict for domestic supremacy, the Peloponnesian War (cf. 8.3.1). [81]

5. Structure of the discussion

In my attempt to discuss Herodotean rhetoric I move in a deductive mode. Starting from the more general picture of debates in Herodotus, my analysis turns to more specific speech genres, namely speeches arguing for alliance and pre-battle speeches, and then focuses even more specifically on the examples, a particular kind of arguments employed in speeches. The discussion is rounded off with a chapter on the allocation of speech.

Identifying in Herodotus' work categories which appear only later in the rhetorical handbooks (i.e. alliance and pre-battle speeches) may seem precarious. However, the rhetorical treatises from the fourth century onwards in effect systematize what was there before and do not create categories which did not exist.[82] So there is nothing artificial about using later frameworks as a basis for analysis. It is interesting to see that the precursors of these categories are already to be found in Herodotus, even in an under-developed, incomplete form. The military theme of the composition encourages the distinction between these two categories as the majority of the speeches fall into the one or the other genre. I base my criteria for the categorization of the speeches on the circumstances and the purposes of deliverance. The fact that my criteria are flexible does not indicate a tendency to force as many speeches as possible into these categories.

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[81] On the problem of Greek unity and the power of circumstance as a factor regulating the care for Greek freedom see van der Veen 1996: 105-10; cf. also Immerwahr 1966: 215-18; Raaflaub 1987: 240; Munson 1988: 100-2 (esp. p. 101 n. 31).

[82] See Noussia 2006: 134-5; 154 (she discusses the rhetorical qualities of Solon's elegies based on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the *Rhetoric to Alexander*); Carey 2007: 236 and n. 2.

On the contrary, it reflects the flexibility of Herodotean rhetoric, which merges different elements to achieve various new narrative purposes.

My first chapter deals with problematic debates, in contrast with the sense of achievement we get in the *Iliad*, but at the same time in line with an equally problematic notion of debate in Thucydides. Aspects of vocabulary and other narrative strategies serve Herodotus' purpose and contribute to the marginalization of debate. The reasons for defective debates in Greece and Persia sometimes differ and sometimes coincide. Debates form the wider background against which Herodotus projects the themes of the self-other polarity, freedom and free speech, and the impending fragmentation of the Greek alliance. In a broader context, Herodotus in this way highlights the problematic and precarious nature of rhetoric itself in a world where trickery is needed to achieve unity, and particularism tends to overshadow communality.

In the second chapter I discuss 'alliance speeches'. This category is mainly concerned with the quest for Greek unity and the arguments which the Greeks consider suitable to achieve this unity. First, I give a typology of arguments used in such speeches, bringing out the gradual reworking of arguments in the course of the narrative. On the basis of this typology, I compare Herodotus with past and future literature to underline his contribution and distinctiveness. Lastly, I concentrate on specific test cases to stress the difficulty of achieving unity, as reflected through the precariousness of rhetoric (manipulative rhetoric), blurred motivation (self-interest vs. common interest) and the fight for leadership.

The third chapter analyzes 'pre-battle speeches'. At a first level, an overview and comparative discussion of previous and subsequent literature shows once again the uniqueness of Herodotean exhortation: it is a fluid category which marries variant rhetorical elements to serve multiple narrative functions. At a second level, I focus on whether and how the Greeks and the Persians are exhorted into battle. After dealing with the majority of exhortations, I suggest that frequently they show a tendency to overrate the personal motivation at the expense of the ideal (in Greece, whereas a contrasting tendency may be observed in Persia, at least partly), which ties in well with the theme of disunity. Further, I argue that the coupling of features of epideictic speeches in the Greek hortatory speeches reveals similar fragmenting tendencies in the Greek alliance.

The use of examples in speeches is the subject of the fourth chapter ('paradigmatic speeches'). Heavily rooted in traditional patterns, Herodotus' work employs features like fables, storytelling, maxims, generalizations and paradigms, taken from the past and

the present. I discuss the way Herodotus incorporates these elements in his work, gives them new functions and supplies a pattern for later literature. Then, I turn to specific cases where paradigms are used and make two suggestions concerning their employment in Greece: on the one hand, they aim at exemplifying the fragility of the Greek coalition (especially in the case of the Tegean-Athenian debate where examples serve to stress the superiority of the interlocutors against each other); on the other hand, they show that rhetoric is rarely straight and that the same indirectness is frequently required both in the Persian monarchical context and the free Greek political environment (e.g. Socles and Leotychides).

My last chapter deals with the allocation of speech to people and in particular points of the work. Here I combine several modern literary theories including narratology (different speech modes, narrative pace),[83] discourse analysis[84] and speech-act theory.[85] The centre of attention is the way the distribution, management and placement of speeches recorded in different speech modes, and even the suppression and omission of speech, reflect on matters of Greek disunity, Graeco-Persian polarity, speech and power, speech and authority, freedom and free speech. Further effects like manipulation of narrative pace, narrative economy, variation (speeches as a literary technique of *variatio*), vividness and dramatization are also discussed.

The five chapters reveal different aspects of a highly individualistic rhetorical system which fulfils the particular needs of the narrative, brings to the fore and reinforces wider themes of the work. In this line, the speeches acquire a strong sense of performativity, which complements the performative function of the *Histories*.[86] And this performativity brings words and actions so close to each other that it could potentially erase any distinction between the two. The case of Greek disunity being performed is relatively straightforward: the Greeks accuse one another, fight over leadership, pursue their personal interests, deceive each other, threaten to betray the Greek cause and contemplate taking the side of the Persians.

Such an elaborate composition suggests a strong tendency on the part of Herodotus to reinforce his authority and challenges the facile assumption that his text is dialogic.

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[83] On narrative pace see Genette 1980: 86-112; 1993: 63-4; Bal 1985: 68-77.

[84] On discourse analysis see Johnstone 2008[2].

[85] On speech-act theory (theory of performativity) see Austin 1962; Searle 1969; 1976; 1979. On its application to literature see Pratt 1977; Petrey 1990.

[86] On the performative role of the *Histories* see Nagy 1990 (the *Histories* as *ainos*). For the application of speech-act theory to the *Histories* see Munson 1993a; cf. also Munson 2001: 14-17.

This dialogism is evidently in need of reconsideration. The plurality of voices and viewpoints combined with narratorial glosses certainly widens the scope of potential interpretations. Still, the argumentation and arrangement of the speeches, even the suppression of voices, reveal deliberate authorial choices and corroborate Herodotus' authority. The active engagement through juxtaposing speech with narrative, to which Herodotus invites his readers, is more or less explicitly, but nevertheless delicately, guided by Herodotus himself. This is not to say that the role of the reader in interpreting the text is neglected, but rather that the basic keys of interpretation are provided by the author.

Chapter 1: Debates

Notwithstanding the recent growth in Herodotean studies and the attention which has been given to the role of speech in Herodotus, the widespread view that Herodotus' *Histories* contains only a small number of debates still prevails. The relative neglect of debates is principally due to two factors: it has to do partly with the superficially uncomplicated nature of the *Histories* and partly with Jacoby's[1] influential division of the speeches into 'novelistic' in books 1-6 and 'political-historical' in books 7-9. I would also add a third factor, namely the report of debates in different speech modes and not only in *oratio recta*, which given its vitality, immediacy and dramatic attributes, naturally attracts more the attention of the readers. Based on this last point, I believe that the inadequate appreciation of the Herodotean narrative technique has led to a great extent to disregarding the function of debates in the work.

In the first four books, where the centre of interest is the East, indeed one comes across many more private conversations and counselling within the barbarian royal court, be it Lydian, Median or Persian, in an environment where freedom of speech is restricted. Nevertheless, debates are not absent: we find the Constitutional debate (3.80-2), the debate summoned by Cyrus before the expedition against the Massagetae (1.206.3-207) and the debate on the interpretation of the Scythian gifts (4.131.2-132). Going from the East to the West we experience a change as debates multiply within a free Greek political context. This turn is marked by the Skythian *logos* at the end of book 4, where we find Greek (Ionian) tyrants debating for the first time.

In this chapter we shall view Herodotean speeches as embedded in the context of longer debate scenes. By debates I mean formal public discussions entailing exchange of opposing opinions between two or more interlocutors over important issues dealing with decisions that affect the whole community. Thus the context of the debate is primarily political, most often dealing with wider issues of national strategy.[2]

The discussion of debates in both Persian and Greek context reveals a stance on the part of Herodotus which is anything but simple. Debates constitute the basic canvas on which Herodotus projects themes that pervade the *Histories* as a whole. The more problematic the picture of debates emerges, the more complex the themes become.

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[1] See Jacoby (1913: 492): 1-6 'novelistic' speeches; 7-9 'political-historical'.

[2] A list of debates in Herodotus' books 5-9 is given in 'Appendix 1'.

My argument here is that Herodotean debate is almost consistently problematic: whereas people try to discuss, debate proves defective and deficient in its purposes. The defectiveness for dissimilar or even comparable reasons in Greece and Persia both distances and connects Greeks and barbarians, thus both feeding and challenging the self-other categories. That is why Hohti's[3] view, formulated more than thirty years ago, that speech restrictions occur only in Persian context seems out of place, while Pelling's[4] discussion about 'travestied' debates in both Greece and Persia tackles the problem neatly.

The representation of debates as abortive in conjunction with the Graeco-Persian polarity leads to a complexity in the handling of the aspects of freedom and free speech as well as Greek disunity. Behind the many dissenting voices something always seems to go wrong: backstage policy; efforts to press one's own interests. However, Herodotus is being strongly selective, as he does not allow all the speakers to voice their opinion. The implications of such a treatment of debates for the dialogic reading of Herodotus are particularly important, an issue which will be discussed partly here and to which we shall come back in the last chapter.

1.1 Between Thucydides and Homer

Before embarking on the discussion proper, let us say a few words on how this representation relates to the literary tradition and whether Herodotus is the first to depict so vividly the uncertain nature of rhetoric. Barker,[5] in the first study specifically devoted to debate from Homer to tragedy, has suggested that in the *Iliad* the Achaeans gradually manage to gain the right to dissent in the assembly for themselves. They do so with the help of Achilles, who opposes Agamemnon in their first gathering in book 1. Debate thus emerges as an achievement the Achaeans get for themselves after many attempts and successive councils which try to frame the boundaries of dissent. However, in the epics the representation of debate is anything but one-dimensional. For the Iliadic picture of the assembly as 'an institution of social cohesion'[6] with a beneficial outcome is substituted in the *Odyssey* by the marginalization and suppression of dissident voices, so that only the voice of Odysseus is heard in the end.

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[3] See Hohti 1974: 20.

[4] See Pelling 1991; 1997; 2000: 10-12; 2002; 2006c.

[5] See Barker (forthcoming). Other studies on Homeric debate include Martin 1951: 17-41; Momigliano 1973; Finley 1977: 77-81; Ruzé 1997: 13-106; Hölkeskamp 1998; Hammer 2002: 80-92.

[6] See Barker (forthcoming).

Thucydides, on the other hand, exposes the defects and weaknesses of debate, criticizes democratic deliberation and shows how to debate better.[7] The debate in Sparta in book 1 is emotional and irrational. The Mytilenean debate presents us with highly manipulative uses of rhetoric by both Cleon and Diodotus. And in the Plataean debate the Spartans assert their power over the weak by narrowing down dissent.

Herodotus stands somewhere in the middle. He follows the *Iliad* in that he maintains debate as an important element of his narrative, but his stance towards debate is rather 'Odyssean'.[8] Deeply embedded in the narrative context and strongly tied with themes which run through the whole of the *Histories*, the role of debate in Herodotus is as divisive, problematic, unfruitful, and marginal as in the *Odyssey*. Odysseus' attempts to exert control over debate have been replaced in the *Histories* by those of clever and persuasive individuals. This picture of Herodotean debate is not very much different from Thucydides' view of debate, with which it also shares the assessment of debate as a defective institution which frequently goes wrong within a political community; thereby the historian has the obligation to demonstrate how to do politics.

1.2 Greece

In what follows I explore the representation of Greek debates in the work. I start with some comments on Herodotus' general positioning towards Greek debates and how the *Histories* portrays the precarious nature of freedom with a strong sense of disunity and expediency lurking behind the actions of people. Then, I turn to the use of particular vocabulary by which dissonance, clash of opinions and disunity are emphasized. After this, I discuss further narrative strategies which reflect the suppression and, consequently, the marginalization of debate. Finally, I look closely at specific cases which illustrate best the deficiency of debate in the *Histories*: the Danube bridge debate in book 4 in conjunction with the debate at Sparta where Socles speaks against the Spartan proposal; the debates between Aristagoras, his supporters and Hecataeus; and the Artemisium and Salamis debates.

[7] On Thucydidean debate see Cogan 1981; Macleod 1983: 52-67, 88-122; Ober 1998; Barker (forthcoming).

[8] See Barker (forthcoming).

1.2.1 Herodotus' stance on debate and the nature of freedom

Herodotus' attitude towards debate is essentially ambivalent. Although he censures the way the Greeks conduct discussions, on the other hand he positively acknowledges the importance of debate for the common good of the people. The best examples to illustrate this attitude are found in books 1, and 5 and 7 respectively.

In book 1 Herodotus has Cyrus observe: 'I have never yet been afraid of men who have a special meeting place in the centre of their city, where they swear this and that and cheat each other. Such people, if I have nothing to do with it, will not have the troubles of Ionia to chatter about, but their own' (1.153.1).[9] Herodotus intervenes to explain Cyrus' remark: Cyrus criticizes here the Greeks because they have markets for buying and selling, unlike the Persians who never buy in open market, and indeed have no single market-place in the whole country (1.153.2). Far from being an innocent intervention, the comment on the different ways of trade serves as a covert criticism underlining the puzzling nature of Greek debate.

By contrast, the Theban debate in book 5 accentuates the importance of open debate. At 5.79-80 the Thebans, urged by the Pythia, summon a public meeting to discuss the meaning of the Delphic oracle. The obvious interpretation leads them nowhere, but through open discussion they are able to make out the true significance of the oracle, as in the course of the debate a certain man comes up with the correct interpretation. His suggestion seems to be the best solution to the problem, it is adopted and proves eventually successful. It is equally important that here the institution of the assembly gets divine approval: the Pythia replies they have to 'lay the matter before the many-voiced/the many voices' (*ἐς πολύφημον*).

Likewise, at 7.142-4, the Athenians discuss the interpretation of another Delphic oracle, that of the 'wooden wall'.[10] Opinions are divided as to whether the oracle means the Acropolis or ships. The professional interpreters wrongly take the words about Salamis to signify that the Athenians will be beaten in a battle there. Themistocles (son of Neocles [*Νεοκλῆς*: glory newly acquired], 'who had recently come into prominence' [7.143.1: *ἀνὴρ ἐς τοὺς πρώτους νεωστὶ παριών*]) then speaks up and suggests that the oracle refers to the defeat of their enemies in a sea-battle, for which the Athenians

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[9] See 1.153.1: *Οὐκ ἔδεισά κω ἄνδρας τοιούτους, τοῖσί ἐστι χῶρος ἐν μέσῃ τῇ πόλι ἀποδεδεγμένος ἐς τὸν συλλεγόμενοι ἀλλήλους ὀμνῦντες ἐξαπατῶσι. τοῖσι, ἢν ἐγὼ ὑγιαίνω, οὐ τὰ Ἰώνων πάθεα ἔσται ἐλλεσχα ἀλλὰ τὰ οἰκήια.*

[10] Note an important difference: whereas at Thebes the advice of the god is needed to start debating the matter, at Athens people start debating by themselves.

should start to prepare themselves (7.143.2). His suggestion is considered preferable to that of the professional interpreters' and Salamis is eventually the greatest naval victory of the Persian Wars won by the Athenians.

In the last two cases, debate proves beneficial to the community since, among the many different views laid before the people, they choose what they consider best and they get the most desirable result. Herodotus then does not deny that open debate can help the community. Nevertheless, as we shall see, this kind of debate is ineffective not only within a pan-Hellenic context, but often also within the community. The Greek state (irrespective of constitution) has structures for ratifying decisions. However, this does not make intra-state debate infallible (cf. the case with Athens at 5.97, where Herodotus notes the openness of democracy to manipulation), but it is generally more stable than inter-state deliberation, where there is no constitutional framework other than merely consensus or its absence.

Book 5 is further expressive of Herodotus' critical attitude towards debate. That this book is half way through the work adds to the importance of the observation. The relevant passages are 5.78 and 5.97. In the first passage, Herodotus attributes the growth of Athens, after it got rid of the tyrants, to *isegorie* (equality in freedom of speech) thus praising debate (5.78: *ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὡς ἐστὶ χρῆμα σπουδαῖον*). The second passage is complementary to the first. The context of 5.97 is important: it is part of Aristagoras' attempt to secure help for the Ionian revolt. After an unsuccessful petition to the Spartan king Cleomenes, Aristagoras turns to Athens and manages to get twenty ships. Herodotus appears here a critical admirer of Greek freedom and the Greek cause, since he enters his text twice to pinpoint the flaws of the Athenian democracy. On the one hand, he observes that the Athenian decision, that is the dispatch of the ships, will be the beginning of evils for both Greeks and barbarians (5.97.3: *ἀρχὴ κακῶν*). On the other hand, he criticizes Athenian democracy and through it the weaknesses of free and open debate: 'it is easier to deceive many than one' (5.97.2: *πολλοὺς γὰρ οἷκε εἶναι εὐπετέστερον διαβάλλειν ἢ ἕνα*).

In this Herodotus is not alone, as Thucydides offers here the most telling example: in book 2 Pericles, who is confident of the rightness of his views, summons no assembly, thus imposing silence on the Athenians to restrict their freedom of expression (possibly acting like another Themistocles). Demosthenes commenting on the Athenian democracy underlines also the dangers of a constitution based on speeches (19.184: *ἐν λόγοις ἡ πολιτεία* 'city based on words'). This brings us back to Thucydides book 3 and the remark of Cleon when criticizing Athenian speech habits: 'you have become

spectators of speeches and listeners of deeds' (3.38.4: *οἵτινες εἰώθατε θεαταὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων γίγνεσθαι, ἀκροαταὶ δὲ τῶν ἔργων…*).

Herodotus delicately suggests that the nature of freedom itself is the main factor which hampers debate. The complicated picture of debate is due to the absence of any compulsion, which enables the Greek cities to pursue their own interests.[11] No one forces the Greeks to fight the Persians: at the eve of the Persian invasion they decide freely on whether they want to fight for the common cause and be free (7.132, 178.2) or join the Persian side or remain neutral (7.132, 148-52, 157-63, 168-9). Moreover, throughout the *Histories*, there is a clash between conflicting private interests and quarrels between cities and individuals. During the Persian Wars the two main opposing interests, the Athenians' and the Spartans'/Peloponnesians', continue to generate disputes, especially over fighting at Salamis or the Isthmus (8.49-81). These disputes result in the division of the Greek forces after Mycale (9.114.2), and the implications point further to the contemporary situation and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (the passage is located at the very end of the *Histories* which makes it all the more suggestive).

In order to reach a final decision and further pan-Hellenic policy open discussion needs to become closed, speech restrictions must be enforced and backstage policy seems at times necessary rather than inevitable. Thus, far from being presented in a favourable light, the Greeks in the *Histories* are often incapable of discussion, as expediency and disunity are obstacles to the common cause.

The same picture of fragile Greek coalition is sketched through several Persian remarks: Xerxes (7.101.2: *μὴ ἐόντες ἄρθμιοι*), Artabazus (9.41.2-3: he suggests withdrawal within the fortifications of Thebes and sending presents to the most influential of the Greeks, instead of fighting),[12] Achaemenes (7.236.1 on jealousy

[11] That Eurybiades is the commander-in-chief at Salamis is not inconsistent with the freedom of the Greeks. He makes the decisions and Themistocles addresses him when he cannot convince the allies. But Eurybiades decides neither alone nor arbitrarily: when he is persuaded by Themistocles to fight at Salamis, the allies obey (8.64.2). Yet, they cannot accept it as a final decision and another debate breaks out at 8.74.2. On the other hand, in the barbarian court there are limitations of choice (*αἵρεσις*), especially in the case of Gyges and his alleged 'choice' offered by the queen in book 1: his choice is evidently a one-way. Accordingly, the free choice urged by Darius to Coes and Histiaeus at 5.11 seems questionable also.

[12] Cf. the Theban advice at 9.2.2: 'divide the Greeks by sending money to the leading men in the various cities, otherwise they are all too powerful'.

among the Greeks) and most explicitly Artemisia (8.68β.2: *ἀλλά σφεας διασκεδᾷς, κατὰ πόλις δὲ ἕκαστοι φεύξονται*).

1.2.2 Language

Herodotus maintains and reinforces the dynamic and antagonistic atmosphere among the Greeks with the help of certain language choices. Division of opinion is recurrently emphasized: *ἐβουλεύοντο οἱ Ἕλληνες, καὶ σφεων ἐσχίζοντο αἱ γνῶμαι· οἱ μὲν …οἱ δέ* (7.219.2); *οἱ μέν...Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ Αἰγινῆται καὶ Μεγαρέες...* (8.74.2).[13] On the other hand, battle-like language is used to describe debates as on-going struggles,[14] which consequently anticipate the actual battles to follow.[15] Such battle language includes mainly the following words, used both in a literal and figurative way: *ὠθισμός*, *ἀκροβολίζομαι*, *ἀμφισβασίη*.[16] *Ὠθισμός* describes both 'hand-to-hand combat' in the battles of Thermopylae (7.225.1) and Plataea (9.62.2),[17] and 'wrangling of words' in the debates of the Greeks before Salamis (8.78) as well as in the debate of the Tegeans and the Athenians before Plataea (9.26.1). *Ἀκροβολίζομαι*, which literally means 'skirmish' and is used to describe 'battle from distance' as opposed to close battle, has here a unique metaphorical use describing the quarrelling in the Greek debate before the battle of Salamis ('verbal skirmishes'). *Ἀμφισβασίη* (8.81: *τῶν δὲ αὖτις ἐγένετο λόγων ἀμφισβασίη* 'thereupon another dispute broke out'), functioning as a variation of *ὠθισμὸς*, intensifies the violent atmosphere of Greek debates.

Another linguistic means to build up this atmosphere is the combination of the noun *γνώμη* with the verb *νικάω-ῶ* in debate scenes (5.36.4, 118.3; 6.109.2; 7.175.1).[18]

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[13] Cf. 6.100.1-2: *ἐφρόνεον δὲ διφασίας ἰδέας. οἱ μέν...ἄλλοι δὲ*; 6.109.1-2: *τοῖσι δὲ Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῖσι ἐγίνοντο δίχα αἱ γνῶμαι…ὡς δὲ δίχα τε ἐγίνοντο*; 7.142.2: *οἱ μέν...οἱ δ' αὖ*; 9.106.2-3: *Πελοποννησίων μέν...Ἀθηναίοισι δέ.*

[14] Note also the comparison between debate and races (*ἀγῶσι*) drawn by Adeimantus (8.59) in his exchanges with Themistocles (fighting language).

[15] Cf. Pelling 1997. Cf. also Immerwahr (1966: 274): 'before Salamis the Greeks were intent on verbal battles rather than on the real one' and n. 102. The most successful battle foreshadowing happens in the case of the Tegean-Athenian quarrel: it is described as *ὠθισμός*, while the battle of Plataea ends with just such an action (9.62.2: *ἐς ὃ ἀπίκοντο ἐς ὠθισμόν* 'till they started fighting hand-to-hand').

[16] On *ὠθισμός* see Powell s.v.; cf. also How and Wells 1912: 262; Macan 1908b: 453. On *ἀκροβολίζομαι* see Powell s.v.; see also LSJ s.v.; cf. How and Wells 1912: 256. On *ἀμφισβασίη* see Powell s.v.

[17] Note that we also find the verb *ὠθίζομαι* in the figurative sense of 'wrangle' at 3.76.3 (the meeting of the seven Persian conspirators): another nice touch on the challenging of Graeco-Persian polarity.

[18] Cf. also 8.9: *πολλῶν δὲ λεχθέντων ἐνίκα τὴν ἡμέρην ἐκείνην αὐτοῦ μείναντάς τε καί...*

The structure is quite common and it occurs also in Homer, where one finds the noun *βουλή* instead of *γνώμη* (*Od*. 10.46: *βουλὴ δὲ κακὴ νίκησεν ἑταίρων*), Thucydides (e.g. 2.12.2) and elsewhere (e.g. Eur. *Med*. 912; Xen. *Anab*. 6.2.12). The use of the verb 'win' together with the noun 'opinion' contributes in a lively way to the representation of debate as a confrontation of opinions.

This battle-like atmosphere of Greek debate becomes more meaningful if juxtaposed with two features of the depiction of Persian debate: its order (*kosmos*), and the 'coming together' of the Persians to discuss by 'putting things into the middle'. First, by contrast to the disorder of the Greek assembly, the Persians sit in order of rank and wait for the king or his representative to ask for their opinion (8.67.2).[19] Yet again, in the actual fighting the picture is reverse: the Greeks preserve their *kosmos*, but the Persians do not (7.223.3; 8.86).[20] Consequently, those Persians who lose their order when fighting cannot take advantage of the Greek disunity and as a result they lose the war.[21]

Second, whereas the Greeks come to debate as if coming in a fight, the Persians 'come together to words' or 'put things into the middle/throw the matter into open discussion' instead. The phrase 'come together to words' (*ἔρχομαι ἐς λόγους*) is used frequently for the Persians (1.86.4; 4.98.2; 7.105, 213; 9.41.1). The expression 'put things into the middle/throw the matter into open discussion' ([*προ/κατα*]*τίθημι τὸ πρῆγμα/πρήγματα ἐς μέσον*) occurs three times in the work, always in Persian context: Cyrus 1.206.3; Xerxes 7.8δ.2; Otanes 3.80.2. In all these cases the expression describes Persian debates or the way Otanes suggests Persian debates be conducted. The Persians also seem to share features of the Greek assembly, where everyone is allowed to speak freely.[22] However, whenever the Persians decide to throw the matter into open

[19] Persian debate is certainly more orderly, though not more effective. The lack of openness can trip the Persians up, as when Xerxes in book 7 first invites debate and then suppresses dissent. If the absence of absolute power can cause problems and necessitate manipulation of various kinds in Greece, in Persia the heavy hand of absolute power accompanied by fear can stifle dissent where dissent and dispute would avoid error. Persian debate in this respect is inferior to intra-state debate in Greece (e.g. to the Theban debate which gets the answer to the oracular riddle at 5.79-80).

[20] Cf. de Jong 1999: 268; Pelling 2006c: 112 n. 34.

[21] Cf. also Harrison 2002: 568-9.

[22] Note that the word *τὸν βουλόμενον* ('whoever wishes') put in the mouth of Xerxes at 7.8δ.2 specifically adds to the irony of the scene, as it alludes proleptically to *προθέντος Εὐρυβιάδεω γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον* (8.49.1), and thus becomes suggestive of the problematic Greek debates to follow. Cf. also the use of the same word for Coes at 4.97.2 (*πυθόμενος πρότερον εἴ οἱ φίλον εἴη γνώμην ἀποδέκεσθαι παρὰ τοῦ*

discussion (as open as it can be, having only the Persian commanders participating or, even worse, only the seven conspirators) the outcome is neither positive nor desirable: in book 1, when the debate actually works and Cyrus listens to Croesus' view (apparently because this was his personal view also, compatible with the Persian custom of uncompromising aggression), then the Persians are defeated by Tomyris and Cyrus himself is killed; in the 'Constitutional debate' in book 3 we come back again to monarchy (any change is averted); in book 7 Xerxes rejects Artabanus' view at first, then he reconsiders, but a vision forces him to change his mind once again and thus the expedition ends in a disaster.

1.2.3 Other narrative strategies to de-emphasize the assembly

Apart from the calculated use of words to show how discord is an obstacle to open discussion, Herodotus uses other narrative strategies to de-emphasize and marginalize the notion of debate. These devices may be summarized as follows: (1) suppression and compression of most debates; (2) description of long and perplexed debates to stress the inability of the Greeks to discuss and act collectively; (3) focusing on individuals.

(1) The first point is examined extensively in chapter 5. There I discuss Herodotus' selective recording of debates and the way he either reduces the dissenting opinions to two opposing ones or gives only the prevalent view or the one he considers best, which he contrasts to the opinion of the majority. A tendency to compress or even suppress debates prevails in the *Histories*, as the most lengthy and formal debates are confined to the debate between the Tegeans and the Athenians before Plataea (9.26-7), the Greek messengers to Gelon (7.157-62), Alexander and the Spartans to the Athenians (8.140-4), the Athenian envoys at Sparta (9.7-11)[23] and the debates at Salamis. All the other debates are only briefly dealt with and they are mostly reported in indirect speech modes.

This brings us to (2): whenever a debate is given most formally on the Greek side, then the effect is to stress the difficulties of debating and the fragility of the Greek alliance. The first two of the prolonged debate scenes mentioned above, the Tegean-Athenian dispute and the speeches of the Greek heralds to Gelon, bring to the fore the matter of leadership. Fragmentation, lack of mutual trust and rhetorical trickery lie

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βουλομένου ἀποδείκνυσθαι). The word is reminiscent of the question 'who wishes to speak?' that the herald asked in the democratic assembly. See also Rood 1999: 158. Cf. Pelling 2006c: 108.

[23] I discuss the Tegean-Athenian set of speeches in ch. 4 based on the distinctive feature of structuring their argumentation on paradigms. On the next three sets of speeches see ch. 2.

beneath the exchanges at Athens and the subsequent Athenian request for help at Sparta (8.140-4; 9.7-11).

Salamis stands out as an extraordinary case. Here the issue of disunity comes up frequently, not only through the successive debates which often lead nowhere[24] and make Themistocles' backstage policy necessary,[25] but also through the danger of fragmentation of the Greek forces, initially brought forward by Mnesiphilus (8.57.2) and then by Themistocles (8.62.2), as well as through the quarrels between Themistocles and Adeimantus (8.59-60.1, 61), Timodemus and Themistocles (8.125), and between the Greek generals (8.123-4).

(3) More than any other part of the work, the Salamis narrative emphasizes the role of individuals in the context of debates. At Salamis Herodotus suppresses all the other voices only to give prominence to Themistocles and positively accentuate his contribution to the outcome. Other similar cases where the action of individuals is emphasized at the expense of the institution of the assembly include the anonymous Theban (5.79-80), Miltiades, Socles and the little Gorgo. To elaborate on some of the examples, Miltiades is the only one to speak at Marathon, his opinion is considered the best (the opposite of *χείρων τῶν γνωμέων* [6.109.2]) and brings about the best results for Athens (and, therefore, Greece); making Socles' speech the longest in his *Histories*, Herodotus lays the weight on his speech and not on the debate.[26]

The case of Gorgo is distinctive. Gorgo's interference highlights her role in the final decision-making, even if the exchanges between Aristagoras and Cleomenes are more of a conversation than a debate. The central part she plays in the narrative may be also emphasized in another more covert way. Cleomenes has Aristagoras wait for three days before he gives his definite reply. Asking for this relatively big time span most plausibly indicates that Cleomenes intended to consult someone, which must have been either the Gerousia or the Ephors. By omitting any reference to such a discussion, Herodotus manages to focus the readers' attention on Gorgo, the only person to advise Cleomenes.

It is to be borne in mind also that the ability of a person to speak freely and affect the result of a debate is a consequence of the free political context. Such a context allows even anonymous people (not named in the narrative or otherwise insignificant as

[24] Cf. Macan 1908b: 350.

[25] See also Immerwahr (1966: 274): 'Because of these verbal vacillations the battle came to be the decision of a single man, rather than the result of democratic debate'.

[26] However, the result comes about from the fact that all the allies present agree with Socles.

they appear in the text only once) to speak. This is also reflected in the standard formula of the Athenian assembly where 'whoever wishes' can express his opinion. Apart from the anonymous Theban and Socles, another anonymous person, Mnesiphilus, intervenes and gives the salutary advice at Salamis.[27] This constitutional strength of Greece is in sharp contrast to what happens in the Persian court, neatly explained at 9.16: the Persian who knows the truth never speaks it to his commander and he even remains anonymous in the text.[28]

1.2.4 Test cases

a) Debate purpose distorted: the cases of the Ionian tyrants and Sparta

Although book 4 does not fall immediately within the scope of the present study, the debate of the Ionian tyrants in book 4 is worth mentioning because it is the first debate among Greeks in the work (4.137)[29] and functions programmatically for the Greek debates to follow. It provides the basic motifs of narrative modes (indirect speech and limitation of the opinions to two opposing ones) as well as a sense of something going wrong in the procedure of debating on the Greek side. The purpose and the result of the council bring it close to another critical debate, the one among the Spartans and their allies in book 5.

After the Scythians have urged the Ionians to cut off the bridges, desert the Persians and go home as free people, the Ionians are deliberating. The prevalent opinions are Miltiades' in favour of the Scythian suggestion and Histiaeus' against it. When Histiaeus' opinion is laid before the interlocutors, everyone who was supporting Miltiades before changes sides.

The argument put forward by Histiaeus is strictly based on expediency: under Darius each one is a tyrant in a separate city; if Darius is defeated they are going to lose their power, since every city will prefer democracy to tyranny (4.137.2-3). Histiaeus'

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[27] These otherwise 'anonymous' people are actually 'named' in the text, and they both have evocative names: So(si)cles: 'save the *kleos* (glory)' of Athens, of the allies, even of freedom (or, according to Moles [2007: 264], 'So/cles 'saves his own fame' (this being his only appearance in Herodotus) and he 'saves the anti-tyrant fame of the Spartans'); Mnesiphilus: 'remember the friends'. Both names do not seem to be fictitious as, according to the *LGPN* (II; III.A), they are fairly common in Corinth and Athens respectively. However, Herodotus' known fondness of 'speaking names' (popular wisdom is also fond of them) makes it probable that he might have fabricated the names to suit his needs or that he might have picked up the names from his informants whether fabricated or not.

[28] On the relation between speech and power in different social contexts see ch. 5.

[29] There is also the Samian bag episode (3.46).

view wins the day as the tyrants are not willing to lose their power for freedom and democracy. Their choice might be only partly justified, as they are tyrants themselves and by definition interested in their personal benefit. But things are not as simple as that. Their decision cannot be seen as disengaged from their Ionian ethnicity.

Servility and self-interest exist as two main features of the Ionian character.[30] Self-interest makes Histiaeus, who now opposes freedom and democracy, become ironically the instigator of the overthrow of the Persian yoke together with the self-centred Aristagoras – who ejected the Ionian tyrants and set up popular governments (*ἰσονομίην*) to win public support (5.37.2, 38.2).[31] When the circumstances change, the same people who now reject freedom revolt against the Persians to claim their freedom back. On the other hand, the servile nature of the Ionians comes up frequently in the text, as when they turn down proposals by Bias (1.170) and Maeandrius (3.142-3) which might have enabled them to gain their freedom, or when they themselves, fed up with Dionysius' of Phocaea hard training scheme, declare they prefer the coming Persian slavery instead (6.12.3). The Ionian behaviour at the Danube bridge (reject freedom; help the Persians; deceive the Scythians) prompts a celebrated disparaging Scythian comment: 'the Scythians have a low opinion of the men of Ionia in consequence of all this: to consider them as a free people, they are, they say, the most despicable and craven in the world; and, considered as slaves, the most subservient to their masters and the least likely to run away' (4.142).[32]

The debate is important for another reason also: a word from the 'democracy' family appears here for the first time in the work, tellingly in the speech of Histiaeus and, even more tellingly, in a debate which aims at suppressing freedom and democracy (4.137.2: *δημοκρατέεσθαι*) only a few chapters before the outbreak of the Ionian revolt. The same verb occurs at 6.43.3, where Herodotus, trying to silence any objection of his Greek audience to Otanes supporting democracy in Persia, relates that Mardonius, after the Ionian revolt, suppressed the tyrants in all the Ionian states and set up democratic institutions (*δημοκρατίας*) in their place. Democracy occurs one last time in book 6, as part of an important comment about Cleisthenes (6.131.1: *Κλεισθένης τε ὁ τὰς φυλὰς καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίην Ἀθηναίοισι καταστήσας*).

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[30] Cf. also below pp. 134-5.

[31] The failure of the Ionian revolt is a very delicate matter. Whether it was due to the Ionians' own nature and their laziness or this is Athenian propaganda it is hard to say. Cf. Solmsen 1943: 203-5; Hohti 1976: 47.

[32] See also below p. 134 n. 77.

Both the reference to democracy in a passage which strives to prove the authenticity of the 'Constitutional debate' (6.43.3) and the remark about the Athenian democracy create strong irony. Democracy is not exclusive to the Greeks, and its nature may appear problematic: whereas the Persians discuss the possibility of democracy – although they reject it in the end –[33] and Mardonius sets up democracies in Greek cities,[34] the Ionian Greeks reject democracy and a Cleisthenes is needed to set it up in Athens. Besides, the accumulation of the words 'tyranny' (three times), 'freedom' (once) and 'democracy' (once) is rather disproportionate to the brevity of the debate. The signs of the distortion of Greek debate in the *Histories* are already here. We will indeed be surprised by the very nature of debate in the course of the narrative.

The debilitating effects of tyranny connect the Danube bridge debate to the debate between the Spartans and their allies in book 5 to reinstate Hippias in Athens. This is a further narrative invitation to compare the Spartan attitude to tyrannical rule. And if the Ionian tyrants can be partly exculpated as they are committed to a different way of thinking, Spartans have no excuse. They are trying to justify themselves by saying that they expelled Hippias from Athens, after having been deceived by lying divinations, which they are too religious to ignore (5.91.2). Behind all this pretence one cannot fail to notice that Sparta is trying to establish its own power over others in the manner of a tyrant.[35] That Socles manages to strangle this tyrant at birth, just as the Bacchiads tried to strangle the baby Cypselus in Socles' paradigmatic story, reinstates the proper function of debate. But let us see what happens here in more detail.

The Spartans summon a debate[36] with the proclaimed purpose of reimposing tyranny on Athens, whose increase of power, after it got rid of the tyrants,[37] causes the Spartans disquiet (5.91-3).[38] Although the Spartans are trying to disguise their purpose

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[33] Cf. also the fight of the Medes against the Assyrians to gain their freedom, which, however, they do not enjoy long as the fair judge Deioces turns into a tyrant (1.95-6).

[34] But cf. 7.99, which undercuts the truth of 6.43.3: Artemisia is said to be the queen of Halicarnassus, Cos, Nisyros, and Calymnos. Where are the democracies then? See *OCD*[3] s.v. Artemisia (1).

[35] Cf. the notion of the 'tyrant city' later applied to Athens e.g. in Thuc. 2.63.3; 3.37.2; 6.85.1; Ar. *Knights* 1113-14.

[36] Although it has been argued that this Spartan speech is made by Cleomenes (e.g. Pelling 2006b: 106-8), this is not supported by the text, which states explicitly that the speakers are the Spartans (cf. de Ste. Croix 2004: 224).

[37] See 5.78: *…ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων μακρῷ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο*; 5.66.1: *Ἀθῆναι, ἐοῦσαι καὶ πρὶν μεγάλαι, τότε ἀπαλλαχθεῖσαι τυράννων ἐγένοντο μέζονες.*

[38] Cf. Thuc. 1.88 on the causes of the Peloponnesian War.

in emotionally powerful language, reassuring their allies that they are acting just in their common interest and trying to correct their previous mistake (5.91.3),[39] their self-centred motives are brought forward constantly in a nice blending which blurs their intentions all the more and uncovers ironies. In this way, while they present their proposal as an action already decided upon, they mask it by placing emphasis on the joint decision and action: *κοινῷ τε λόγῳ καὶ κοινῷ στόλῳ* 'unified counsel and power' (5.91.3).

It seems then that the circumstances of the debate are totally absurd: they call a free debate to set up tyranny in a city which they themselves had freed before; on the other hand, the debate is conducted in fear of censorship which would suit a despotic regime. Although the allies are invited to speak their views, and although they disagree expressively, *no one dares to speak freely* apart from the Corinthian Socles (5.92.1: *οἱ μὲν ταῦτα ἔλεγον, τῶν δὲ συμμάχων τὸ πλῆθος οὐκ ἐνεδέκετο τοὺς λόγους. οἱ μέν νυν ἄλλοι ἡσυχίην ἦγον, Κορίνθιος δὲ Σωκλέης ἔλεξε τάδε*).[40] The connections point at the Spartans behaving in a despotic way and the contemporary allusions are inescapable and add forcefully to the irony: during the Peloponnesian War the same Spartans, who now want to set up tyrannies, advertise themselves all around Greece as liberators from the Athenian rule. And if one reads Socles' speech, which answers the Spartan suggestion, as associating Sparta with baby Cypselus and thus Sparta with a growing-up tyrant, then the connections become all the more poignant.[41]

Only after Socles' speech – a tirade against tyranny, repeating over and over again words from the 'tyranny' family, framed by chapters 5.91 and 93 which include freedom vocabulary – do the allies dare to express their discontent (5.93.2) and thus balance is restored to the debate. The 'free speech' of Socles (5.93.2: *Σωκλέος εἴπαντος ἐλευθέρως*) brings freedom into prominence again, making the decision that of the majority: the allies urge the Spartans not to tamper with the affairs of any Greek city.

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[39] That they present their plan as a justified revenge over the ungrateful Athenians resonates with Mardonius and Xerxes justifying their expedition against Greece on the basis of the punishment of the enemies who have done wrong against the Persians (Mardonius: 7.5.2, 9.1-2; 8.100.3; 9.58.4 – Xerxes: 7.8α.2-β.3, 8γ.3).

[40] Though the Spartans are already campaigning with Peloponnesian forces earlier (5.74), this occasion could stand as the foundation of the Peloponnesian League as it is the first recorded instance of the consultation of the allies by Sparta (cf. How and Wells 1912: 50-1; see also Johnson 2001: 7-8 n. 17). The point is critical since already at the very beginning a Spartan initiative is met with disapproval by the allies: the Spartans cannot do whatever they wish without asking for the permission of the allies.

[41] On Socles' speech see in detail below pp. 168-74.

Still, this is not the result of a debate but of the interference of a single anonymous person, Socles. And if one presses things further, the whole idea of this debate becomes questionable: would there even be a Peloponnesian War if Socles had not made that speech or if the Spartans had acted as tyrants and imposed their decision upon the allies? Is freedom always beneficial? And what about the relationships between Corinth and Athens at the eve of the Peloponnesian War? The Corinthians would probably have wished never to have defended the freedom of the Athenians. Herodotus keeps on deconstructing, reconstructing and again deconstructing the debate.[42]

b) Best advice neglected: Aristagoras and Hecataeus debating in the Persian way

The picture of Aristagoras, Histiaeus' deputy tyrant of Miletus, calling for a meeting reminds us of Xerxes summoning councils in books 7 and 8. Xerxes calls for council, although he rejects the best proposals as he does what he thinks is right. Subsequently, Xerxes walks straight into disaster. The similarities with Aristagoras' case are striking.

In both councils called by Aristagoras (5.36, 124-6) all his supporters are said to agree with him apart from Hecataeus, whose advice is neglected twice. In the first meeting Aristagoras sets out his views about a potential Ionian revolt (5.36). Hecataeus opposes the idea arguing that Darius rules over a great number of nations and has immense power. When this argument fails to persuade, he resorts to the second best: they need to become masters of the sea, which means they have to construct ships, using the treasure from the temple at Branchidae (5.36.2-3). In the second conference (5.124-6) Hecataeus once again opposes Aristagoras' views: he counter-suggests Leros as a refuge against Sardinia and Myrcinus proposed by Aristagoras.

In neither case is Hecataeus' opinion adopted. Both decisions seem to have already been made by Aristagoras (and Histiaeus himself who also urges Aristagoras to revolt), so debate becomes pointless. That Hecataeus' opinion might have been the best and the one favoured by Herodotus himself is implied by the fact that Herodotus records it, even though it is not ultimately followed, and also by Herodotus picturing the Ionian revolt in not a very favourable light.[43] Besides, Hecataeus' suggestion to use the money in order

[42] On the ironies and contemporary allusions to the Corinthian-Athenian hostility see below pp. 172-3.

[43] By this I do not imply any partisanship displayed by Herodotus since I mention elsewhere (see above pp. 19-21 and below pp. 135-6) that he appears to be generally unprejudiced. The narrative shows that Herodotus considered the Ionian revolt an unwise enterprise which brought about the Persian threat against Athens and Greece (cf. 5.97.3, 105; 6.94).

to build a fleet, and consequently gain power, is strongly reminiscent of Themistocles' advice to the Athenians at 7.144.1 (exploit the money from the mines of Laurium to make ships) or even of Thucydidean passages such as the Syracusan defeat by the Athenians at 6.70-1 (mention of both the treasure and the ships).[44] Accordingly, Hecataeus' advice might have been as successful as Themistocles' and it is also significant that the final defeat comes at sea at the battle of Lade.

In the second debate, Aristagoras himself has now officially but only allegedly abdicated his tyranny in favour of popular government (5.37.2: *λόγῳ μετεὶς τὴν τυραννίδα ἰσονομίην ἐποίεε τῇ Μιλήτῳ*). Being consistent with his role, Aristagoras still acts like a tyrant when he ostensibly asks for opinions, but he is not receptive to any counterproposal as he has already made up his mind. Aristagoras actually invites the supporters to choose between the two alternatives he himself thinks best.[45] The narrative both corroborates and undermines the debate: Aristagoras is wrong, he goes to Myrcinus and gets killed (5.126.2); the revolt eventually fails; and Hecataeus proves to have been right all along.

That Herodotus still calls Aristagoras 'tyrant of Miletus' at 5.49.1, when he arrives at Sparta (*ὁ Μιλήτου τύραννος*), and also has Aristagoras refer to himself (through his messenger) as tyrant at 5.98.2 (*ὁ Μιλήτου τύραννος*), after Aristagoras has already abdicated his tyranny (5.37.2), has strong ironic resonances.[46] Aristagoras may have fooled the Milesians when he renounced his title, but he did not fool Herodotus who states boldly that Aristagoras only pretended to have done so (*λόγῳ μετεὶς τὴν τυραννίδα*: arguably focalized both by Aristagoras and Herodotus). Rather than an inconsistency on Herodotus' part this is a pointed allusion to Aristagoras' vested interests. The use of the word *ἀρχή* in the same sentence to indicate Cleomenes' reign at Sparta adds considerably to the negative meaning of the word *τύραννος* by juxtaposing a legal ruler with an usurper.[47] All the more, the word 'tyrant' at 5.49.1 draws expressly the contrast

[44] See also Lateiner 1982: 147; Kallet 2001: 92; Munson 2007: 160.

[45] Aristagoras' tyrannical behaviour is additionally stressed through the use of singular verb forms (5.36.1, 124.2: *ἐβουλεύετο*; cf. also 5.126.1: *αὐτῷ δὲ Ἀρισταγόρῃ ἡ πλείστη γνώμη ἦν ἐς τὴν Μύρκινον ἀπάγειν*). Singular forms are also used for Xerxes.

[46] Cf. also Nenci 1994: 222.

[47] Cleomenes might not be an usurper but he appears to be a bit of a tyrant himself, an association invited by the phrase 'tyrant of Miletus' used for Aristagoras. That Aristagoras addresses him alone and not the Ephors or the Gerousia as well – Cleomenes might consult the Ephors or the Gerousia in the three days he keeps Aristagoras waiting at Sparta, but any such mention is omitted – and that the whole scene is presented as a private conversation invites us to see the matter more as a discussion between tyrants, all

between Aristagoras' words and actions. Since he fooled the people into thinking that he abdicated his tyranny in order to manipulate them and gain their support for revolt, it is only too predictable that his present appeals to freedom are empty. The same man who was trying a while ago to convince Artaphrenes to subjugate Greece (5.31.1-3) now for his own advantage urges the Greeks to liberate the Ionians.

c) Artemisium and Salamis: dissonance, irresolution and Themistocles' offstage policy

Artemisium seems like a pre-play of what is at stake at Salamis, and consequently Themistocles' activity there prepares the way to his master interference in the Salamis debates.

The circumstances at Artemisium are grave and quite similar to Salamis: the Euboeans want the Greek fleet to remain and fight at Euboea to protect them against the Persians so that they have time to move the civilians away in a safe place. Eurybiades refuses as the Greeks are terrified by the size of the Persian army and intend to flee. The Euboeans turn next to the Athenian general, Themistocles, and bribe him in order to arrange a fight between Greeks and Persians at Artemisium (8.4).

The desire of the Euboeans to have a battle at Artemisium touches upon the theme of disunity of the Greek forces in a double way. On the one hand, it emphasizes the self-serving motivation of the Euboeans who are not really interested in the Greek cause. On the other hand, a fight at Artemisium is the only way to keep the Greek fleet together in order to enforce unity upon the Greeks. If the Greeks do not fight at Artemisium, they will disperse to the inner parts of Greece;[48] otherwise they will stay united.

Themistocles manages to retain the unity of the Greeks through backstage machinations: he undercuts the debate (8.4.1: *ἐβούλευον*) on whether the Greeks should leave or stay using a part of the money of the Euboeans to bribe Eurybiades and Adeimantus in order to fight where they are (8.5). On Eurybiades Themistocles tries the argument that the money is a personal gift and comes from Athens. To Adeimantus he says that the money he will give him to stay outweighs the money the Persian king would ever give him to abandon the Greeks. Although the final decision is manipulated, everyone is satisfied in the end (the Euboeans, Eurybiades, Adeimantus and Themistocles himself) and more importantly the Greek coalition retains its cohesion.

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the more so since only tyrants work together with tyrants (see the Spartan speech 8.142.5). Note also that Cleomenes supported Isagoras' attempt to establish a tyranny in Athens (5.70-4).

[48] Cf. Adeimantus' firm decision to withdraw from Artemisium (8.5.1).

The template introduced by Artemisium is fully developed at Salamis. Nowhere is the flexible and dynamic atmosphere of Greek debate more manifest than in Salamis. Freedom allows dissonance of opinions, which is reflected in debates interrupted (8.56) and resummoned to revise decisions (8.74), or even in verbal attacks (8.59-63).[49] In such a riotous atmosphere Herodotus emphasizes the impossibility of debate among the Greeks, which makes Themistocles' interference essential. His role is thus over-stressed but, on the other hand, he is also held responsible for the debates lacking the sense of achievement. The result is that we have the desirable outcome at the expense of open debate and *parrhesia*.

The advice on the possibility of fragmentation of the Greek forces at the Isthmus, which Themistocles receives by Mnesiphilus, triggers Themistocles' active involvement in the debates and the decision-making from now on. That Themistocles assumes Mnesiphilus' advice for himself when addressing Eurybiades in private (8.58.2: *ἑωυτοῦ ποιεύμενος*), is a first indication of trickery.[50] When Themistocles convinces Eurybiades to call another council to reconsider the decision of the Greeks to fight at the Isthmus, he himself oversteps the limits and violates debate: he does not let Eurybiades lay the purpose of the council before the generals but he bursts into an impassioned speech.

At this point Adeimantus intervenes to restore order to the debate and point out the proper attitude: 'wait till your turn has come, like in the races, otherwise you get whipped' (8.59).[51] In this way, however, Adeimantus hampers Themistocles' freedom to speak in an open debate. Themistocles passes over Adeimantus' comment quickly with a mild answer[52] and he tries to convince the allies and Eurybiades using for the moment a more suitable strategic argument rather than the fragmentation:[53] if the

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[49] On the 'travestied' debates at Salamis see Pelling 1997.

[50] According to Plutarch (*On the Malice of Herodotus* 869 d-f) Herodotus uses Mnesiphilus in order to 'deprive Themistocles of the credit for persuading the allies to remain and fight at Salamis'. How and Wells (1912: 254) attribute the incident to the 'prejudice of Herodotus' Attic informants'. Hignett (1963: 204) likewise considers the episode between Themistocles and Mnesiphilus 'a spiteful invention to deprive Themistocles of the credit for his originality and insight'. On the other hand, Fornara (1971a: 72 n. 19) argues that the mention of Mnesiphilus gives 'dramatic emphasis to the crucial moment at Salamis'. I agree more with Fornara, on the basis that Herodotus' treatment of Themistocles does not seem polemical. On Mnesiphilus cf. also Frost 1971: 20-5.

[51] On the use of the word *agon* here see above p. 44 n. 14.

[52] The use of the word *τότε* (8.60.1) signals in the form of a prolepsis the continuation of the insults, this time vehemently at 8.61.1-2.

[53] See 8.60.1: *παρεόντων γὰρ τῶν συμμάχων οὐκ ἔφερέ οἱ κόσμον οὐδένα κατηγορέειν.*

Greeks with their inferior numbers fight in the narrows, the Persians will not be able to take advantage of their great numbers (8.60α-γ).[54]

Adeimantus reacts again, this time only to deprive Themistocles of his right to speak. Not only does he interrupt Themistocles' speech, but he also insults Themistocles saying he has to find himself a city before he has any right to vote and offer advice (8.61.1).[55] Themistocles puts him in his place, emphasizing the power of the Athenian fleet in comparison to the Corinthian, which Athenian fleet the Greeks cannot possibly beat. This argument opens the way for Themistocles' subsequent threat of the fragmentation of the forces: the Athenians will sail to Italy if the allies do not agree to fight at Salamis (8.62.2).[56] The debate is immediately cut short as Eurybiades gives in to the blackmail. After Themistocles' threat Eurybiades' freedom of choice is restricted and the decision taken is a forced one.[57] Still, this is the only way to go about as the chaotic atmosphere of the debate, reflected especially in the insults exchanged between Adeimantus and Themistocles, renders it impossible for a debate to be productive.

The enmity between Adeimantus and Themistocles alludes clearly to the tense relationships between Corinth and Athens in Herodotus' time. If one connects this incident to Socles' speech in book 5, one cannot escape thinking that probably the Corinthians, represented by Adeimantus, have regretted defending Athenian freedom ('We preserved your freedom then and now you want to do what you like?'). A comparison with Plutarch is fruitful at this point and makes it highly likely that Adeimantus' intervention is fabricated by Herodotus. In Plutarch's *Themistocles* 11.3 it is Eurybiades who insults Themistocles and even attempts to strike him with his staff. The same version occurs in all the later writers from Plutarch onwards. Hence, Herodotus probably intended to involve Corinth in this game as well, in order to create

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[54] The same logic, i.e. to turn the great size of the Persian army to the Persians' disadvantage, lies behind the decision to fight at the straits of Thermopylae (Thermopylae anticipate Themistocles' argument).

[55] The episode is very much reminiscent of the scene between Thersites and Odysseus in *Iliad* 2.212-69. However, Plutarch's variation of the story with Eurybiades' attempted striking is much closer to the Iliadic scene (see below on the same and the next page [pp. 56-7]).

[56] Hohti's (1976: 65) view that Herodotus' intention is to stress the significance of the Athenian fleet, hence the superiority of Athens, might be partly right. However, to consider this as the only purpose narrows considerably the scope of interpretation.

[57] Cf. Pelling (2006c: 112): 'and if freedom carries the perpetual danger of fragmentation, if the possibility of choosing for oneself means that everyone can go their own way, we have the final paradox that it was the danger of fragmentation that imposed the victorious unity'.

contemporary affinities (i.e. hostility between Athens and Corinth) and to increase the irony of the scene (Sparta is already implicated with Eurybiades). It is equally interesting that the scene is remarkably reminiscent of Thucydides' book 1: Corinthians and Athenians speak in front of Spartans who have to come up with a decision (1.67-88).

Coming back to the Salamis narrative, dissonance of opinions breaks out again. Themistocles' blackmail fails and at the point when the Peloponnesian view is about to prevail it is time for some backstage policy. Themistocles secretly sends Sicinnus to deliver to the Persian commanders the message that the Greeks are planning to leave Salamis (8.74-5). As a result the Greeks soon find themselves surrounded by the Persian fleet at Salamis and are forced to fight there. The decision has already been taken before the Greeks even get to know that the Persian fleet has changed position. By trying to avert the undesirable outcome of the meeting, Themistocles undermines free debate through deceptive means. Yet the ones being tricked here are the Greeks – as Themistocles himself admits to Aristeides later on (8.80) – for the enemy is in fact being told the truth, i.e. the Greeks want in fact to run away, and so things happen faster.

The last Greek council in the account of Salamis, which takes place at Andros while the Greeks run after the enemy, is the only case when we see freedom of speech and choice in practice, all the more so, since in the end the view of the majority wins. The view of Eurybiades and the Peloponnesians against reaching the Hellespont and breaking the Persians' bridges prevails over Themistocles' dissenting opinion. Interestingly, in open, or in other words 'un-travestied', debate without artifice Themistocles loses.

Yet, even in this case, Themistocles turns the debate to his advantage. There is always room for political manoeuvring. Themistocles' failure to persuade the generals makes him shift and speak the opposite opinion to the Athenians (8.109.1: *μεταβαλὼν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους*): their victory against the Persians was the work of the gods and heroes, not the Greeks; so the Athenians should now look after themselves and their families (8.109.3-4). The following narrative explains his treacherous behaviour: he tries to 'lay the foundation for a future claim upon Xerxes, in order to have someone to turn to in the event of his getting into trouble with the Athenians' (8.109.5). Themistocles actually cancels, or undermines – to use milder language – the preceding debate. Instead of informing the Athenians about the decision taken by the majority after discussion, he presents this decision as his personal viewpoint. With this feature of

his we are not unfamiliar since he has transmitted Mnesiphilus' advice to Eurybiades as his own.

In addition to this, Themistocles also deceives Xerxes through a message delivered by Sicinnus, which announces that Themistocles himself stopped the Greeks from pursuing the Persian fleet. Themistocles' frequent messages and secret communication with the Persians, as well as his subsequent attempts to take money from Andros and other islands with the threat he will lead the Greek fleet against them (8.111-12), are ironic in view of his later career and end as related by Thucydides: Themistocles is accused of collaboration with the Persians, eventually flees to Persia and lives in the court of Artaxerxes receiving great honours.

Themistocles succeeds (at Salamis in particular) not because the Greeks and Eurybiades see that he is right in his arguments, but because he uses other devices to serve his aims, like blackmail and secret messages. I will not speculate further on his real ends. It seems, however, that he combines both selfish and selfless motivation, in perfect accordance with the Athenian character.[58] The focus here lies on the series of contradictory conclusions: the plurality of dissident voices cannot make free, frank, open debate work effectively; Themistocles has to interfere, force and manipulate decisions, thereby making the function of free debate abortive;[59] still it is eloquently ironic that this is the only way for a debate to reach a decision. It is to be borne in mind, however, that, especially in the case of Salamis (and to a lesser extent Themistocles' volte face in 8.109), it is less about the need for other means in order for a debate to reach a decision than about the vulnerability of debate to manipulation to ensure a desired decision and the readiness (and ability) of certain characters to manoeuvre in this way.

1.3 Persia

1.3.1 General observations

Monarchy in the barbarian court does not suppress debate completely but rather sets different rules. The king himself summons conferences and the fear he causes to his

[58] On the Herodotean Themistocles mirroring the Athenians in Herodotus' time see Blösel (2001: 179-97). Cf. also Miltiades' behaviour after Marathon (on Miltiades acting typically as all the Athenians who combine 'nobility and baseness' see Thompson 1996: 40).

[59] Cf. also Munson (1988: 98): 'democracy appears to be impossible among the Hellenes. These, unlike Xerxes' allies, exercise their right to vote as free men, but Themistocles uses military force to reverse their decision'.

subjects does not allow neither free nor frank speech. The courtly protocol dictated by the constitution makes the representation of Persian debate more formal than that of the Greek debate, in the sense that we find here two polarized views. Moreover, the absence of any personal contact between the king and his generals is clearly juxtaposed with the direct nature of Greek dialogue. This can be seen in the dispatch of Mardonius by Xerxes, before the battle of Salamis, to ask the opinions of the commanders on giving a sea-battle.[60]

A certain social status is the necessary premise for one to be able to speak to the king or his representatives, such as Mardonius at Plataea. Speech and power go hand in hand in the Persian court. The authority of the individual is something different and not everyone who has power also has authority. Whereas the nature of power is more unreasonable, authority includes among others the following: persuasion, rhetorical and strategic skills, ability to advise, judgment and influence. In my chapter 'Allocation of Speech' I discuss in detail the relation between speech – power and speech – authority. Let us mention here only the supreme irony: the all-powerful Xerxes lacks authority; the one to have the absolute and total right to speak and make decisions does not take advantage of this right. On the other hand, the opinion of people who have authority like Artabanus, Artemisia, Demaratus is often disregarded by the king.[61]

The connection between speech and power in the Persian court is very well demonstrated by two digressions: the dialogue between Dicaeus and Demaratus (8.65.4-5), and the Theban banquet (9.16). In book 8 Demaratus forbids Dicaeus to tell anyone about the fateful sign (they hear divine voices from the deserted Attica, which probably anticipate a great disaster for the Persians), as the latter would lose his head if the king got to know it (8.65.4-5). In book 9 the Persian's answer to Thersander's question why he does not tell Mardonius his fears about the future is revealing: 'Many of us know that what I have said is *true*; yet, because we are constrained by necessity, we continue to take orders from our commander. No one would believe us, however *true* our warning. This is the worst pain a man can have: to know much and have no power to act' (9.16.4-5). The Persian who knows more than the rest is bound to silence and anonymity by contrast to the Greeks.[62]

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[60] Cf. the dispatch of Alexander to the Athenians by Mardonius, and his three-fold message at 8.140 (Xerxes – Mardonius – Alexander).

[61] See ch. 5.

[62] Cf. above pp. 47-8.

This key comment, which in fact reveals the whole spectrum of the relationships between the king and his subjects in Persia and the futility of debate, is properly reserved for the last book of the *Histories*. The problem of speech restrictions in Persia in the mouth of a Persian vividly recalls the chorus of Persian elders in Aeschylus' *Persians* singing the triumph of freedom of speech and thought after the Greek victory at Salamis: 'No longer will men keep a curb upon their tongues; for the people are set free to utter their thoughts at will, now that the yoke of power has been broken. The blood-stained soil of Ajax's sea-washed isle holds all that once was Persia'.[63]

Persians do understand the limitations and weaknesses of their constitution, but they cannot do anything to change them, unless an external power, like the Greeks in Aeschylus, brings tyranny to an end. As we shall see in what follows, even in such political circumstances the Persians do actually try to discuss, but they are bound to fail by virtue of their constitution. Here I will deal with several Persian debates and explore how the Persians make considerable, still unsuccessful, efforts to discuss.

1.3.2 Test cases

a) Persia approaches Greece: the Constitutional Debate (3.80-2)

By no means can a study of Persian debate exclude the debate on the constitutions in book 3. The quasi-sophistic argumentation as well as features of the Greek intellectual trends and political thinking of the 5th century B.C. embroiled in the discussion[64] is only one way to challenge the Graeco-Persian polarity, and it is rather superficial. Here I would like to emphasize the significance of the debate to seriously challenge the way Persian debates are perceived in relation to Greek debates and the representation of debate in Herodotus' work in general.[65]

Having eliminated the Magus, the Persians are for the first time free to decide on the fate of their country. It is their only chance to get rid of monarchy and change regime. We are given the speeches of the three out of the seven conspirators: Otanes'

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[63] See Aesch. *Pers*. 591-7: *οὐδ' ἔτι γλῶσσα βροτοῖσιν / ἐν φυλακαῖς· λέλυται γὰρ / λαὸς ἐλεύθερα βάζειν, / ὡς ἐλύθη ζυγὸν ἀλκᾶς. /αἱμαχθεῖσα δ' ἄρουραν / Αἴαντος περικλύστα / νᾶσος ἔχει τὰ Περσῶν.*

[64] The bibliography on the subject is vast. Some indicative references include: Wells 1907: 40; Lamb 1914: 133, 135; How and Wells 1928: 277-8; Kagan 1965: 69, 71; Evans 1981: 79-80, 83-4; Waters 1985: 78-9, 93 n. 8; Raaflaub 1989: 41; Gould 1989: 15; Lateiner 1989: 167; Fisher 1992: 346-9; Dawe 1982: 183.

[65] On the implications of the debate for the concept of monarchy/tyranny in Greece and Persia and the consequent challenging of the polarity in this respect see Pelling 2002.

for democracy, Megabyxus' for oligarchy and Darius' for monarchy. It is the first formal debate in the work where three people of the same background discuss about what seems the most absurd reason within a traditionally monarchical background: to decide the best constitution for Persia. Multivocality actually works out, as the final decision is a result of democratic procedures; democratic in the sense that the view of the majority prevails after four out of seven men take Darius' side and monarchy wins.[66] Nevertheless, things are more complicated than that.

Darius chooses the right arguments and manages to take the conspirators on his side, whereas his interlocutors fail to see through the psychology and the expectations of their audience. On the one hand, Otanes' suggestion of democracy sounds radical indeed. Still, the argument is not buttressed adequately as it is confined to giving only a vague idea of democracy, while it dwells on the drawbacks of monarchy. On the other hand, Megabyxus, although he suggests what seems the most sensible choice in that all seven conspirators will have their share in power, is given only a weak defence, confined to one sentence which rounds off his speech (3.81.3: *ἀρίστων δὲ ἀνδρῶν οἰκὸς ἄριστα βουλεύματα γίνεσθαι* 'the best men in power produce the best policy'). All the more, Megabyxus surprisingly ends up supporting the very political system he opposes, i.e. monarchy, when he states he prefers the rational rule of the king to the irrational mob (3.81.2).[67] Both Megabyxus and Otanes find it difficult to adjust Greek ideas to the Persian way of thinking and to present them as attractive and plausible alternatives.[68]

Retrospectively it is also obvious that neither Otanes nor Megabyxus can escape thinking in terms of self-interest and thus they come closer to monarchy.[69] Megabyxus indicates naked self-interest when he includes himself and his interlocutors among the *ἄριστοι* (3.81.3: 'let us choose the best men and give them the complete power, and, of course, we are amongst the best men'). Otanes, on the other hand, uses arguments contradictory to democratic principles: when he favours democracy, he limits the case

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[66] The debate which decides that Deioces will be made king of the Medes (1.97.2-98.1) provides an interesting point of comparison. This debate is also democratic as the opinion of the majority prevails. Still Deioces soon turns his rule into tyranny (1.98.2-100).

[67] A view amplified by Herodotus' comment that Aristagoras deceived 30,000 Athenians, but failed to do so with Cleomenes of Sparta (5.97.2). Cf. Evans 1981: 83; Lateiner 1989: 273 n. 17.

[68] Cf. Thompson 1996: 72, 75. Cf. also Pelling (2002: 140-1) on Otanes: 'if there is an expressive 'Greekness' in the way Otanes is prepared to think, it is equally expressive that this Persian approaches these unfamiliar ideas in a fumbling, uncertain, gingerly way'.

[69] Cf. Pelling 2002: 139-42.

amongst the seven conspirators only excluding all other Persians (3.80.2: *ἐμοὶ δοκέει ἕνα μὲν ἡμέων μούναρχον μηκέτι γενέσθαι* 'we should not have one of *ourselves* as monarch'); when the conspirators decide on monarchy, Otanes suggests that one of *themselves* should be the king (3.83.2: *δῆλα γὰρ δὴ ὅτι δεῖ ἕνα γέ τινα ἡμέων βασιλέα γενέσθαι*); he then suggests that the king could be chosen in a democratic way, either by lot or elected by the Persian common, but he goes on to claim protection for his family from the Persian rule (3.83.2). This is indicative of the puzzling way the Persians conceive both democracy and debate. If they have not digested the institutions of which they perform as proponents and if they have not got over their traditional monarchical thinking, they cannot expect their audience to do so either.

The experiences of the audience are the cornerstone of Darius' rhetoric.[70] Darius connects monarchy to the Persian tradition so that any other constitution would seem to violate the customs (3.82.5: 'we should refrain from changing the ancestral laws, which have served us well in the past'). Besides, he pointedly alludes to Cyrus as the liberator of the Persians, thus relating monarchy to freedom (nation's freedom to dominate aliens): 'we were given our freedom by one man' (3.82.5). Hystaspes explicitly says so to Cyrus in book 1: 'you have made the Persians free instead of slaves and rulers of all instead of subjects' (1.210.2). The mention of the word freedom (*ἐλευθερία*) sounds inappropriate and daring in a speech in favour of monarchy, when not even Otanes uses it in his speech for democracy (he speaks of *ἰσονομίη* instead).[71] However, it is the particular mention of freedom which secures the success of his speech: Darius makes it clear that there is no other way of gaining freedom apart from monarchy which provided the Persians with their freedom in the past.

After these 'democratic' procedures and the triumph of monarchy, Darius steamrolls free debate by using a ruse to win the throne for himself (3.85-7). Even if he equates the best with the strongest (*ἄριστον* with *κράτιστον*) in his speech (3.82), the neigh of a horse is not a reliable criterion for the appointment of the Persian king and

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[70] Cf. Thompson 1996: 72, 77; Pelling 2002: 145-8 (but cf. Pelling [2002: 145]: 'when taken in context, the rhetoric looks more flawed'). For an opposing view see Raaflaub (1989: 41): 'Accordingly, the result of the debate, i.e. the victory of monarchy, is dictated by the historical context and has nothing to do with the actual debate'; Fisher 1992: 346. Both Raaflaub and Fisher argue that Darius' arguments are neither better nor prevailing, but they are ultimately accepted as monarchy belongs to the Persian tradition; accordingly, there is no matter of changing constitution. Such a view, however, underestimates both the importance of debate and Herodotus' artistry.

[71] For the importance of the word in Otanes' speech see Pelling 2002: 135-8.

the *ἄριστος* ('excellent') king is rather chosen at random. Besides, in his speech there are already markers which disclose the qualities of a rather propagandistic speech, such as the frequent use of verbs of revealing (*φαίνω*, *διαδείκνυμι*, *θωμάζομαι*, *δηλόω*) by him alone of the three speakers; 'all this openness is meant to underline his secret intentions'.[72]

This is not the first time Darius acts like this. At 3.71, when the conspirators discuss the options, Darius uses blackmail to force his opinion: he will betray the conspiracy to the Magus if they do not act immediately (3.71.4-5).[73] One should not forget either that Darius features in the work as the master performer of deceit and the one to moralize its use to achieve one's own advantage (3.72.4-5).

To sum up, when the Persians discuss the opportunity to change the constitution, debate works in that the view of the majority wins the day. However, debate actually fails, since they cannot understand its importance and defer to the power of one.[74] This automatically suspends the chances of dissent, as only one will be responsible for everything and will have absolute power. The implications for the rest of the debates to follow in the work are particularly significant: even when debate seems to work well, it almost always goes wrong. This is most frequently due to the interference of an individual, e.g. Themistocles. However, just as Themistocles brings debates and dissent to an end through shortcuts and leads the Greeks to victory, in the same way Darius through similar shortcuts leads things where they should be led: the Persians cannot escape monarchy, as they do not know how to operate in any other institutional framework.

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[72] See also Benardete 1969: 86 n. 35. Benardete mentions also the introduction of Darius' speech with *ἀπεδείκνυτο γνώμην*, whereas the other two are said to *γνώμην ἐσφέρειν*. Cf. also the manipulation of sight by Thucydides' Brasidas at the battle of Amphipolis to deceive the enemy (Thuc. 5.6-11) as well as the oversupply of verbs of sight, on which see Greenwood 2006: 24-33.

[73] Cf. Otanes' reaction: 'since you compel us to rush, and you will not allow us a moment's delay for deliberation, tells us how to get into the palace to attack' (3.72.1). See also Thompson (1996: 72): 'In the debate scene, too, Darius impedes at every turn the uncertain and undirected nature of free discourse. Open debate is a risk he shuns, and he will manage and manipulate it rather than allow its unpredictable turns'. Themistocles at Salamis (8.108-9) also avoids open debate, because without deceit he would lose his case (see above pp. 57-8).

[74] Cf. Thompson (1996: 77): 'As Herodotus depicts the Persians' acquiescing in Darius' authoritative, traditional speech, he captures them in their pivotal and lost opportunity to listen to the diverse claims to rule and to appreciate debate as a productive activity. This is the main thrust; the Persian debate is a debate to inhibit all future debates…'.

The discussion over whether the debate is invented by Herodotus or not, also in view of Herodotus' insistence on its historicity (3.80.1; 6.43.3: 'things unbelievable to the Greeks'),[75] misses the actual point. Herodotus' emphasis on the historicity of the debate seems to deliberately draw the attention of the readers to the importance of the debate, so that they start unpacking its role in the *Histories*[76] in particular with reference to their Greek status.[77] In this respect, one crucial aspect is highlighted: the Persians do not know how to discuss, but they do try even if they fail in the end; the Greeks know how to discuss but still they cannot do it properly. The Persians are tampering with notions they ignore such as freedom and democracy, whereas the Greeks know them well but fail to perform them successfully. Instead of doubting that the Persians could ever have tried to conduct such a debate, the readers should think how they could put in better practice what they consider to be their exclusive privilege.

b) 'Forgive me Persians for changing my mind so quickly; for I am not yet come to the fullness of my wisdom': Xerxes reconsiders

The Persian debate on the expedition against Greece at the opening of book 7 leaves us with the impression that dissent can actually work its way through the Persian court, even though through a long way, complicated procedures and initial resistance on the part of the king. Still, the Persian tradition, as reflected in the monarchical constitution and the *nomos* of expansion, is constant reminder that debate is out of place in Persia and manifests itself in the form of a dream, thus deconstructing any attempt at actual discussion.

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[75] On Herodotus' potential sources for the debate see Wells 1907: 39-40; How and Wells 1928: 277; Lateiner 1989: 272 n. 12. Moles (1993: 119-21) argues against the historicity of the debate. Hohti (1976: 32) argues for the historicity of the debate. In support of the historicity of the debate West (1999: 124 n. 62) compares to Herodotus' text 'the objections to monarchy voiced in vain by the prophet Samuel in response to popular demand for a king (1 Sam. 8: 11-20)' which prove that 'the use of dialogue form was not a Greek monopoly'. This flash-back (6.43.3 to 3.80-2) is not necessarily an indication of the earlier composition and publication of book 3. Herodotus most probably continued adding material to his work after parts of it had become known to the public, and he thus was aware of that scepticism of the audience and replied to an audience which knew (see How and Wells 1928: 277; cf. Evans 1981: 80; Moles 1993: 119; West 1999: 111).

[76] Cf. Moles 1993: 119-21.

[77] See Pelling (2002: 125-6) commenting on 6.43.3: 'The 'Greekness' of the debate is not something which somehow crept in under Herodotus' guard, something which he crassly failed to spot; it is something to which he himself draws attention, which is essential in making it the 'wonder' which it is'.

The first focal point is Xerxes' call for different opinions while he has already made up his mind. After having decided to launch an expedition against Greece – urged by Mardonius and the Greek renegades – Xerxes summons the high-ranking Persians to announce his thoughts and find out their attitude towards the war (7.8.1).[78] At the end of his long speech he states in a grandiose way that 'that is what must be done' (7.8δ.2: *ποιητέα μὲν νυν ταῦτά ἐστι οὕτω*) and then throws the matter for open discussion (7.8δ.2).[79] The inconsistency between the first and second part of his words is crucial to our understanding of the defective nature of Persian debate: it is a discussion over a predetermined decision.[80]

Other opinions are invited provided of course that they do not oppose the view of the Great King, as his vehement reaction towards Artabanus' dissenting view demonstrates in the course of the debate (7.11.1). In this context, Mardonius' speech in support of Xerxes' plan is welcome and elicits no further response. Mardonius succeeds by reinforcing the existing decision of Xerxes, after he pays a compliment to Xerxes' intelligence acting like the archetypal flatterer (7.9.1: 'Master, of all the Persians who have ever lived and of all who are yet to be born, you are the greatest. Every word you have spoken is true and excellent…'). Mardonius speaks about increasing the Persian power, adding to the conquests of the empire, poor Greek fighting skills, inferior numbers and ease (7.9). His speech is misleading, but complies perfectly with the Persian nature and climaxes Mardonius' preceding efforts to persuade an initially reluctant king[81] to undertake the expedition against Greece (7.5.2-6.1).

This is the furthest a debate can get in Persia, since Herodotus informs us that there actually were opposing views which no one dared to speak (7.10.1: *σιωπώντων δὲ τῶν*

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[78] The latent *hysteron proteron* we have here *ἵνα γνώμας τε πύθηταί σφέων καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν πᾶσι εἴπῃ τὰ θέλει* (7.8α.1) stresses the parody of dialogue. Immerwahr (1956: 274) argues that the fact that Xerxes wants to hear opinions, although he has already made up his mind, casts doubts on 'the desirability of the campaign'.

[79] See 7.8δ.2: *ἵνα δὲ μὴ ἰδιοβουλέειν ὑμῖν δοκέω, τίθημι τὸ πρῆγμα ἐς μέσον, γνώμην κελεύων ὑμέων τὸν βουλόμενον ἀποφαίνεσθαι* 'but so that I shall not appear to take counsel of myself alone, I lay the matter before you all, and ask any of you who may wish to do so, to express his views'.

[80] Cf. also Murnaghan 2001: 58-9.

[81] See 7.5.1: *ὁ τοίνυν Ξέρξης ἐπὶ μὲν τὴν Ἑλλάδα οὐδαμῶς πρόθυμος ἦν κατ' ἀρχὰς στρατεύεσθαι*; cf. also 7.6.1: *χρόνῳ δὲ κατεργάσατό τε καὶ ἀνέπεισε Ξέρξην ὥστε ποιέειν ταῦτα.* Immerwahr (1966: 128) considers Xerxes' initial unwillingness to fight Greece as a motif, which later develops into that of Xerxes' ambivalence in the dream scene. Pelling (1991: 131) also suggests that 'Xerxes' night-time vacillations still point to a deep inner uncertainty'.

ἄλλων Περσέων καὶ οὐ τολμώντων γνώμην ἀποδείκνυσθαι ἀντίην τῇ προκειμένῃ…),[82] and that everyone rejoices later on when Xerxes withdraws his decision to attack Greece (7.13.3: *Πέρσαι μὲν ὡς ἤκουσαν ταῦτα, κεχαρηκότες προσεκύνεον*). This obviously means that they are on Artabanus' side and disapprove of the campaign (i.e. Artabanus' view is that of the majority). To this authorial gloss of 7.10.1 adds the king's violent reaction when Artabanus challenges his view (7.11.1).

Artabanus, entitled by his close kinship to Xerxes, joins the debate and, paradoxically enough, speaks freely (7.46.1: *ὃς τὸ πρῶτον γνώμην ἀπεδέξατο ἐλευθέρως οὐ συμβουλεύων Ξέρξῃ στρατεύεσθαι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα*) in a despotic environment and tries fervently to make the king revise his decision. His language is mild and cautious as he uses delicate examples and generalizations (envy of the gods, importance of careful planning). He introduces his speech with a general quasi-sophistic statement about why it is best to hear two contrasting opinions on a matter, so that one is able to choose the best (7.10α.1). His proem has a double function. On the one hand, it recalls that Xerxes himself asked for opinions and so he is now doing what he was asked to. In that sense, this piece is indeed very wisely placed in the preface of his speech 'to create willingness to hear' (*εὔνοια*).[83] On the other hand, an argument, which stresses the value of debate, would sound more fitting in the mouth of a Greek. Nevertheless, Herodotus uses it here intentionally to achieve a twofold effect: to contest the Graeco-Persian opposition and at the same time to define it sharper by showing that in the Persian court debate is unusual and therefore it requires good backing up to be conducted, as the Persians need to get acquainted with the Greek way of discussion. There is, however, an important structural difference between debate as conducted in Greece and Persia: in Persia debate fails because an outcome can be imposed irrespective of the opinions present, spoken or unspoken. This is one reason Artabanus simply cannot win. Another reason is that his view comes in contrast with the Persian nature, just as democracy and oligarchy do not comply with the Persian *nomos*.

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[82] Cf. the debate at Sparta in book 5, where only Socles speaks: *οἱ μὲν νυν ἄλλοι ἡσυχίην ἦγον, Κορίνθιος δὲ Σωκλέης ἔλεξε τάδε* (5.92.1). It is not surprising, then, that there might be some dissidents even among the commanders of the Persian army who agree on a sea-battle at Salamis, but they are afraid to speak up (8.68.1: *οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι κατὰ τὠυτὸ γνώμην ἐξεφέροντο, κελεύοντες ναυμαχίην ποιέεσθαι*). The use of a single sentence summarizing their view instead of a collective public speech emphasizes additionally that they are afraid to express themselves freely, even to agree with the king.

[83] See Solmsen 1982: 85 and n. 28.

The public presentation of Artabanus' opinion is an invitation to Xerxes to change his mind now, in council. In spite of all the indirectness of Artabanus' speech[84] and although he is delicate enough and simply asks Xerxes to dismiss the meeting and rethink about his plans (7.10δ.1), so that he may not seem to press Xerxes openly to change his mind, Xerxes gets angry at Artabanus' opposing view and threatens him. Only his kinship bonds with Xerxes save Artabanus from a more severe punishment – he is only lightly punished by being made to stay behind (7.11.1).[85]

Xerxes' outburst against Artabanus, his intolerance and exaggerated emphasis on the Persian tradition and his predecessors are part of his attempt to make it clear to the others and himself that this is what must be done. He is the king, the decision is his, and no one will make him recall his judgment. Or so he thinks. For during the same night Xerxes stays up having second thoughts about Artabanus' words (7.12: *καὶ Ξέρξην ἔκνιζε ἡ Ἀρταβάνου γνώμη*) and decides it is a false decision to attack Greece. At this critical point, when the dynamics of the debate seem actually to be working with Xerxes having reconsidered his decision, that is when something simply incompatible with the Persian political context starts happening, this discrepancy triggers the dream:[86] the dream comes in and warns Xerxes to go back to his original plan.

Nevertheless, Xerxes neglects the apparition and his reaction the next morning marks the top moment of the debate: Xerxes proclaims in front of the leading Persians that he actually took into consideration the previous discussion and resolved to change his previous wrong decision to attack Greece (7.13.2-3: *Ἄνδρες Πέρσαι, συγγνώμην μοι ἔχετε ὅτι ἀγχίστροφα βουλεύομαι*).[87] Debate seems to work finally in Persia as Xerxes

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[84] On the indirectness of Artabanus' speech see ch. 4.

[85] There is always the fear of punishment in case the king hears something displeasing (even if the advice is true and sincere). Although the speaker is invited to talk fearlessly, fairly often he gets punished. Xerxes' answer to Pythius is revealing: 'Mark my words: it is through the ears you can touch a man to pleasure or rage – let the spirit which dwells there hear good things, and it will fill the body with delight; let it hear bad, and it will swell with fury' (7.39.1). Pythius merely requests Xerxes to release the eldest of his sons from army service and, in fact, after he has been urged by the king himself to ask anything he wishes as a reward for his previous service. But Xerxes gets angry (7.39.1: *ἐθυμώθη; Ὦ κακὲ ἄνθρωπε, σὺ ἐτόλμησας...ἐὼν ἐμὸς δοῦλος...*) and punishes Pythius in the cruelest way, killing this very same son. Cf. also Gelon's answer to Syagrus: 'My Spartan friend, reproaches have a way of making a man angry' (7.160.1).

[86] On the dream see Pelling 1999: 17-22.

[87] Xerxes' relatively weak personality invites us perhaps to anticipate a change of opinion, so that the following events do not come as a complete surprise. See also ch. 5.

recognizes he was wrong to let himself be persuaded by Mardonius' constant pressure and reject Artabanus' just advice. He knows that they are attacking good men (7.53.2); he has clearly seen through Mardonius' silly and dismissive underestimation of the Greeks (7.9). It is almost incredible to see the Great King demonstrating such a receptive and recessive attitude, and asking his subjects for forgiveness. Xerxes himself with his presence and reactions cancels debate initially, but then he makes things work.

The vision, however, is calculated to restore the balance and is necessary for the story to unfold the way it does.[88] Even if Xerxes disregards the first warning of the vision, the dream will not allow conversation to function properly. The repeated visits of the dream to Xerxes and Artabanus disclose the inevitability of the expedition, so that even Artabanus himself urges the king to carry out the enterprise (7.18.4: *Ἀρτάβανος, ὅς πρότερον ἀποσπεύδων μοῦνος ἐφαίνετο, τότε ἐπισπεύδων φανερὸς ἦν*). The dream is obviously intended to deceive:[89] it does not promise Xerxes success in the expedition, only the loss of his throne if he does not pursue it. And it deceives by saying merely the truth, that is the abandonment of the Persian *nomoi*, which have made Persia a great empire, will endanger Xerxes himself and his kingdom.[90] Whether the dream is sent by the god or inserted by Herodotus is not as important as the narrative effect of the dream: it shows the impossibility of debate in the Persian court; the Persians do try to debate but this just cannot work well.

c) Calling for the truth and rejecting it: Xerxes vs. Demaratus and the problem of free debate

Another Persian debate between Xerxes, Demaratus and Achaemenes goes astray in the end of book 7. Herodotus' play in the way he builds up our expectations to the opposite direction, that is that there might be a chance that debate actually works this time, is compelling.

The narrative built-up starts when Xerxes recognizes Demaratus as a good man and sees the truth in his words (7.234.1: *Δημάρητε, ἀνὴρ εἶς ἀγαθός. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ τῇ ἀληθείῃ*). In their earlier conversations, before the battle at Thermopylae, Xerxes always

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[88] See Murnaghan (2001: 59): 'At the same time, the debate involving Artabanus actually seems, nonetheless, to work, although slowly, as a medium of rational persuasion, only to be overwhelmed by a divine destiny that is aligned with the inevitable impetus of Persian imperial expansion'.

[89] The dream clearly alludes to the deceitful dream (*οὖλον ὄνειρον*) sent to Agamemnon by Zeus at *Il*. 2.5 ff. Cf. Macan 1908a: 22; How and Wells 1912: 131; Harrison 2000: 133 and n. 43.

[90] Cf. Evans 1961-62: 109-11.

invites Demaratus to tell him the truth about matters relating to the Greek – and more specifically Spartan – valour and fighting habits (7.101-5; 209). The emphasis Demaratus places on Greek/Spartan freedom and courage is recurrently confirmed by the narrative.[91] Truth (*ἀληθείη*) is Demaratus' primary concern in all his speeches.[92] Xerxes, however, being over-confident in his power, repeatedly misunderstands Demaratus' words, neglects the truth and even laughs at it.[93]

The Spartan resistance at Thermopylae is the ultimate proof of the soundness of Demaratus' claims. The events at Thermopylae make Xerxes reconsider his attitude; or so it seems. We have already seen Xerxes changing his mind once before, right after the council of the leading Persians at the beginning of book 7. Hence, any change in his attitude towards Demaratus, and consequently toward debate itself, would not be unexpected. Still this just cannot happen. Before it was the dream which took good care so that the Persian tradition is not violated; now it is Achaemenes who makes sure that debate is again abortive.

Xerxes wants to know the easiest way to defeat the Spartans. Demaratus advises Xerxes to divide the fleet and conquer the Peloponnesians by attacking them from the island of Cythera, otherwise the king will have to face all the Peloponnesian army assembled in the narrow Isthmus in even bloodier battles (7.235). Having served as king of the Spartans before, Demaratus knows perfectly well that Cythera is the most suitable place for strategic operations against Laconia.[94]

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[91] The Spartans are said to be the most prominent and the bravest among the Greeks by Croesus' messengers (1.69.2: *ὑμέας γὰρ πυνθανόμενος προεστάναι τῆς Ἑλλάδος*) and by Aristagoras in his speech to Cleomenes (5.49.2: *ἔτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμῖν, ὅσῳ προέστατε τῆς Ἑλλάδος*; 5.49.3: *ὑμεῖς τε τὰ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἐς τὰ μέγιστα ἀνήκετε ἀρετῆς πέρι*). Cf. also the performance of the Spartans in the battle at Thyrea at 1.82; the attitude of the Spartans and the Athenians towards Darius' messengers (7.133.1); and the dispatch of Sperthias and Bulis to Persia to die for Darius' messengers, as well as their conversations with Hydarnes and Xerxes (7.134-6).

[92] The word *ἀληθείη* and its derivatives occur five times in Demaratus' speeches at 7.102, 104, 209. Interestingly truth is also connected to Demaratus life story: on account of his questionable paternity he questions his mother trying to find out who his real father is (6.68-9: here the concept of 'truth' occurs five times). Cf. also Boedeker 1987: 194-6.

[93] See 7.103.1, 105, 209.2. On the ill-boding and fateful character of laughter in the *Histories* see Lateiner 1977; Flory 1978. It is also ironic that laughter features often in stories dealing with Demaratus, like at 6.67.2, when Leotychides attempts to mock and humiliate Demaratus (*ἐπὶ γέλωτί τε καὶ λάσθῃ*).

[94] The Athenian occupation of Cythera in the 450s and 420s is indicative of its value as a naval base to attack the Peloponnese (see Thuc. 4.53; Paus. 1.27.5). See How and Wells 1912: 233. Cf. also Macan 1908a: 346-7.

Achaemenes interferes in the debate, voicing the opposing opinion: if the Persians keep their great fleet together, the Greeks will never risk an engagement; and, if fleet and army advance together, they can support each other. In case the Spartans decide to fight the Persians again, 'they will certainly not repair the injury they have already received' (7.236). Besides, Achaemenes speaks very harshly of Demaratus, calling him a jealous man and a traitor to Xerxes. He also tries to present Demaratus' sound argument as totally absurd, and as tending to the impoverishment of the Persian forces: 'if you divide the fleet, the enemy will be a match for us'. In other words: 'what Demaratus advises you to do is for your own disadvantage; the Persians will thus be weakened and defeated'.

Xerxes takes Achaemenes' more pragmatic view. Still, he defends Demaratus vigorously against Achaemenes' slanders, stressing his friendly status next to the king and ordering that no one says any disparaging words about Demaratus in the future (7.237.3). Herodotus plays with the expectations of the audience, but debate is not working here either. For in the end Xerxes chooses the opinion he himself considers best. Achaemenes' opinion is successful in that it reflects his fears of the division of the Persian forces which are shared equally by all the Persian generals and the king.[95]

Thus, discourse ends up being defective, even though Xerxes is able to see the truth through Demaratus' words. Artemisia's case is comparable. The affinities may be summarized in the following: just like Demaratus she is also praised for her wise counsels (8.68γ.2, 101.4, 103), but only after the defeat at Salamis (that is retrospectively, just like with Demaratus) is Xerxes absolutely convinced of the rightness of her advice and asks her view on how to act next; yet Xerxes only follows her advice this time because it happens to coincide with his own thoughts (8.103). Evidently, Demaratus' advice is not attuned to Xerxes' personal views. Had he listened to Demaratus, bloodier battles at Artemisium and Salamis would indeed have been avoided.

The dynamic of the debate is clear once again. Xerxes summons the council. He asks specifically for Demaratus' opinion, which is justified by the confirmation of his counsels at the battle of Thermopylae. He was right. Xerxes' inability to conceive the

[95] Slandering and jealousy among officers are indeed common in the Persian court (e.g. Megabazus 5.23.2-3; Artemisia's enemies 8.69.1). However, jealousy as Achaemenes' motivation for slandering Demaratus is not plausible, since Achaemenes is not any general, but the brother of Xerxes himself. His speech might, then, be motivated more by genuine concern about the Persian interests.

power and meaning of freedom explains and foreshadows his inability to conduct a proper debate even if he proposes to do so. Both his dialogues with Demaratus are very relevant here. Above all, Xerxes cannot conceive the truth about the power of freedom, which inevitably relates in turn to the institution of free debate.

d) 'My men have turned into women, my women into men': Artemisia speaking freely

Artemisia's robustly dissenting voice complicates the representation of the Persian debates at Salamis on a double basis: on the one hand, she speaks with even more freedom than her position allows, as she is subject to the power of the Great King; on the other hand, although being a woman non-member, she actually intervenes decisively in the debates, thereby proving them inadequate to their purpose.

Artemisia's portrayal in the work blends two different sets of polarity: the Greek-barbarian and the man-woman. On the one hand, she is of Greek origin, born to a Halicarnasian father, i.e. of Greek descent (Hdt. 1.171: Halicarnassus was colonized by Dorians) and a Cretan mother (Hdt. 7.99.2). On the other, her manly qualities – also encompassed in her Greek nature and opposed to the effeminacy and softness of the barbarians – are recurrently confirmed and emphasized in the narrative, starting with the weight Herodotus lays on her 'spirit of adventure and masculine courage' in the catalogue of the Persian forces (7.99.1: *ὑπὸ λήματός τε καὶ ἀνδρηίης ἐστρατεύετο*) and finishing with Xerxes' celebrated comment on Artemisia's fighting at Salamis 'my men have turned into women, my women into men' (8.88.3: *οἱ μὲν ἄνδρες γεγόνασί μοι γυναῖκες, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες ἄνδρες*).[96] Her status, being somewhere in the middle of these two categories, allows her to carry the Greek features of free will and lack of fear to speak freely.[97]

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[96] On the importance of the comment see Bowie 2007: 179. Cf. Artemisia's advice to Xerxes he should avoid a naval battle for the Greeks are as far superior to his men in naval matters as men are to women (8.68α.1), as well as the Athenian dislike of the fact that a woman should appear in arms against them, which results in the offer of a reward for capturing her alive (8.93.2). Note also that Artemisia is sent back to Persia together with Xerxes' sons and Hermotimus the eunuch, who has a man-woman status (8.103-4). Artemisia, the masculine woman, is always associated with matters of gender. Hornblower (2003: 43) suggests further that the reference to the Pedasan bearded priestess in the same context (8.104) is particularly pointed: the priestess is the opposite of Hermotimus and the equivalent of Artemisia.

[97] Note also that Artemisia partakes in the campaign with her own will and without being forced like the other subjects of Xerxes (7.99.1: *ὑπὸ λήματός τε καὶ ἀνδρηίης ἐστρατεύετο, οὐδεμιῆς οἱ ἐούσης ἀναγκαίης*). On Artemisia's freedom and courage cf. also Munson 1988: 91-7.

Indeed before Salamis Artemisia dares to oppose the prevalent view agreeing on a sea-battle when Mardonius is dispatched by Xerxes to ask the views of the generals:[98] there is no reason to fight since Xerxes has already Athens and the rest of Greece in his power; whether he stays where he is or goes to the Peloponnese, the Greeks will be forced in the end to leave Salamis, disperse and go home (8.68α-γ).

The same argument has more force when tried by Themistocles on Eurybiades (8.58.2; 62.2). And that is due to the inflexibility of barbarian debate.[99] The peculiar dynamic of the Persian debate is underlined in the text in an additional way: Xerxes is pleased with Artemisia's advice and respects her even more, but he agrees with the majority, since he believes that his men did not fight well at Artemisium because he was not there to watch the battle. So, he is now going to watch the naval battle himself (8.69.2). The train of thought is revealing and suggestive of the monarchical political system.[100] The result is a sham debate, emphasized by the phrase 'his orders were that the advice of the majority should be followed' (8.69.2: *ὅμως δὲ τοῖσι πλέοσι πείθεσθαι ἐκέλευε*), as we know very well that Xerxes would not have adopted the opinion of the majority had it not coincided with his own.

Even at the point when Artemisia's straightforwardness overruns the limits so much that she astonishes her friends as well as her enemies in view of a potential punishment by the king (8.69.1), she gains higher esteem at the eyes of the king.[101] She is the woman who surprisingly makes debate work till a certain point, but then again it has to conform to the will of the Great King.

After the Persian defeat at Salamis another debate is brought about by Mardonius, who prompts Xerxes either to attack the Peloponnese or go back and leave him with a part of the army to subjugate Greece. Xerxes summons a council to consider the best alternative. We are not given any of the speeches of the debate until Artemisia is invited to join in and everyone else is dismissed (8.100-1).[102]

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[98] I treat this as a debate since Mardonius lays the opinions of the generals before Xerxes and he 'chooses' between them. We shall see whether he actually chooses, or follows his own plan.

[99] Cf. also Pelling (2006c: 111): 'The reasons have to do more with the rhetorical dynamic of the debate than with the merits of the argument'.

[100] Cf. Pelling 2006c: 111. According to Dewald (1985: 50) 'the scene in 8.68-69 exposes the frivolity of Xerxes' political decision making'.

[101] This is also in accordance with the unpredictable and capricious nature of Xerxes, a recurrent feature of his characterization. See also ch. 5.

[102] I take this also as a debate since Xerxes, after having consulted with his counsellors, invites for Artemisia's opinion in order to make up his mind.

By allowing a woman to speak, Xerxes acknowledges free debate while at the same time he confirms its deficiency. The way Xerxes addresses, or better does not address, Artemisia complicates things even more. Artemisia is the only person whom Xerxes does not call by name, which is the common way to address one's subjects (e.g. 5.106.1: *Ἰστιαῖε*; 7.101.1: *Δημάρατε*; 7.11.1: *Ἀρτάβανε*; 7.237.1: *Ἀχαίμενες*), or by any other word. The normal address for a woman would be *γύναι*, but, as mentioned above, Artemisia's status is androgynous and such an address would also underestimate her status and the value of her advice.[103]

This time Artemisia advises Xerxes to protect himself by returning back to Susa and leaving Mardonius behind with some of the forces, since the actual goal of this whole expedition, i.e. the burning of Athens, has been accomplished. Her speech is thus very well rounded off with Xerxes presented like a victor who can benefit by a potential success of Mardonius, otherwise he will lose nothing but a mere slave (8.102). Once again, as with Mardonius in book 7, one notes the value of extravagant flattery in dealing with the king.

When Xerxes takes Artemisia's advice, one is made to think for a moment that he is actually receptive to different opinions. The subsequent narrative, however, overturns any such expectation: Xerxes accepts the advice just because this happens to coincide with what he has in mind **(**8.103: *ἥσθη τε δὴ τῇ συμβουλῇ Ξέρξης· λέγουσα γὰρ ἐπετύγχανε τά περ αὐτὸς ἐνόεε*). The authorial gloss which follows, sheds some light on Xerxes' motivation: he 'would not have stayed in Greece, had all his counsellors, men and women alike, urged him to do so; for he was so much frightened' (8.103: *οὕτω καταρρωδήκεε*).

Therefore, it is not the opinion of the adviser or the majority Xerxes expects to hear and follow – as he allegedly claims at 8.69.2 – but eventually it is his own personal will or whim. Moreover, even though Xerxes understands retrospectively the soundness of Artemisia's advice,[104] by assuming the role of the king, he has bound himself to the Persian *nomos* of unremitting imperialism. Thus we come again full circle wondering about the point of debate in Persia: is there any point in asking for the opinions of his generals (i.e his subjects),[105] if Xerxes is the absolute master and makes the final

[103] See also Dickey 1996: 245.

[104] See 8.101.1: *ἔδοξέ οἱ καὶ Ἀρτεμισίην ἐς συμβουλίην μεταπέμψασθαι, ὅτι πρότερον ἐφαίνετο μούνη νοέουσα τὰ ποιητέα ἦν*; 8.101.4: *καὶ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ναυμαχίης εὖ συνεβούλευσας τῆς γενομένης οὐκ ἐῶσα ποιέεσθαι.*

[105] See 8.67.1: *ἐνθαῦτα κατέβη αὐτὸς Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὰς νέας, ἐθέλων σφι συμμεῖξαί τε καὶ πύθεσθαι τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων τὰς γνώμας.*

decision? The Persians contemplate the possibility of debate, some people, like Artemisia, actually speak freely (though, as noted above, she has to be circumspect), but everything is bound to the Persian custom.

There remains another possibility to explore, which seems quite tempting, although somewhat far-fetched: Artemisia might in effect be manipulating her interference in the debate at 8.100-3 by performing a brave deed in the battle. It is attractive to see the participation of Artemisia to the second debate as a result of her exquisite performance at Salamis. Xerxes is specifically calling for her and her advice (8.101.1, 101.4). It seems as if Artemisia has somehow secured the right for herself to take part in the debate and to speak freely. This is because she proved to be right and also because, on account of an incident which is singled out by Herodotus, she has strengthened her image in the eyes of the king and won additional admiration and respect (8.87):[106] in order to escape from an Athenian trireme chasing her, Artemisia rams and sinks the allied ship of the Calyndian king Damasithymus.

Although Herodotus is reluctant to pass a judgment on this action (there might have been either some quarrel between Artemisia and Damasithymus at the Hellespont, or Artemisia might have already planned it before, or the ship might have been in her way by chance), the point is that Artemisia manages to get a double benefit out of it (8.87.4: *διπλὰ ἑωυτὴν ἀγαθὰ ἐργάσατο*): on the one hand, the Athenian captain stops chasing her, thinking she fights on the Greek side, which saves her life; on the other hand, Xerxes thinks she sinks an enemy ship and appreciates her even more (8.88.1-2). She was lucky enough that no one survived from the Calyndian ship to accuse her (8.88.3). Artemisia thus resembles Themistocles in that they both deceive their enemies and their allies. She uses the ship in a similar way Themistocles uses for example the Persian fleet at the battle of Salamis (8.75, 79-80). Both Artemisia and Themistocles turn a situation to their own advantage and get double profit (8.5.3; 8.22.3: *ἐπ' ἀμφότερα νοέων*)'.[107]

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[106] See Hdt. 8.87: *κατὰ μὲν δὴ τοὺς ἄλλους οὐκ ἔχω* [*μετεξετέρους*] *εἰπεῖν ἀτρεκέως ὡς ἕκαστοι τῶν βαρβάρων ἢ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἠγωνίζοντο· κατὰ δὲ Ἀρτεμισίην τάδε ἐγένετο,....*

[107] On the relation between Artemisia, Themistocles and contemporary Athens in terms of self-interest and trickery see Munson 1988: 103, 105; cf. Lateiner 1990: 231-2. But cf. also Munson (1988: 104): 'Unlike the presentation of Themistocles, the narrative of Artemisia at Salamis emphasizes less the trickster's intention to deceive (*ἔδοξε οἱ τόδε ποιῆσαι*, 8.87.2) than the confusing nature of an experience that has become susceptible to manipulation (see 87.2, *θόρυβος*)'.

If Artemisia's motivation is that unclear, then the picture of debate gets even more warped as backstage policy is brought forward again and two questions are generated: does Artemisia only care about herself since Xerxes did not listen to her advice? does she exploit the incident to raise Xerxes' sympathies with her so that she is sent off safe to Ephesus later, with the honourable duty to escort the sons of the Great King? The questions are generated only to remain open, but they are certainly worth asking as they enrich the text's interpretative possibilities and add a further dimension to the way Herodotus treats barbarian debate.

e) Speech and power: Mardonius vs. Artabazus

In book 9, towards the end of the *Histories*, Persian debate is being replayed again, this time between Mardonius and Artabazus, and the issue of speech and power is reworked and becomes once more the centre of our attention.[108] This aspect has been reintroduced in book 9 earlier on at the Theban banquet and the exchanges between a certain Persian and Thersander. Here it is exemplified through Mardonius.

Before the battle at Plataea, Mardonius and Artabazus debate whether to fight the Greeks or not. Artabazus suggests not to risk a battle but to withdraw within the fortifications of Thebes and offer presents to the most influential of the Greeks instead (9.41.2-3). Herodotus himself remarks about Artabazus' view: 'this opinion coincided with that of the Thebans; for they reckoned that Artabazus was a man of more than average foresight' (9.41.4: *τούτου μὲν ἡ αὐτὴ ἐγίνετο καὶ Θηβαίων γνώμη, ὡς προειδότος πλεῦν τι καὶ τούτου*).[109] Even if the focalization is Theban, it cannot escape notice that it is Herodotus speaking here.[110] The narrative proves his arguments wise: the Greeks are good fighters and have already defeated the Persians at Salamis, therefore they might

[108] On speech and power see ch. 5.

[109] Artabazus is pictured here as wise adviser (cf. also Lattimore [1939: 24-35], who places him specifically in the category of 'tragic warners'). Flower and Marincola (2002: 181) draw the parallels between Mardonius – Artabazus and Hector – Polydamas (parallels may be also drawn between Xerxes – Artabanus and Hector – Polydamas [see Pelling 1991: 120-121, 135]). However, Artabazus' advisory role becomes ambiguous later on when he deceives the Thessalians (9.89). Here, I find myself in disagreement with Flower and Marincola (2002: 260) arguing that Artabazus' 'cleverness in fooling the Thessalians once again serves to highlight his sagacity'.

[110] Note that Mardonius does not always reject the Theban advice: a short sentence in indirect discourse at 9.31.2, where Mardonius is said to take the advice of the Thebans on the placing of his army in the battleline, indicates that the commander trusts in their opinion. Mardonius also takes (*ὁ δὲ μαθὼν τὴν παραίνεσιν εὖ ἔχουσαν*) another Theban advice, that of Timagenides (9.38.2).

beat them once again. Artabazus has also the support of the Thebans,[111] who have already advised Mardonius to send money to the Greeks in order to divide and thus defeat them (9.2.3).[112]

The comment becomes all the more telling as it precedes the negative criticism about Mardonius' view being 'vehement and intemperate, and not at all leaning to moderation' (9.41.4: *Μαρδονίου δὲ ἰσχυροτέρη τε καὶ ἀγνωμονεστέρη καὶ οὐδαμῶς συγγινωσκομένη*).[113] Mardonius' main argument is the Persian *nomos* of endless expansion and it recalls his own and Xerxes' utterances at the beginning of book 7. Indeed Mardonius here has taken the place of Xerxes, being put in charge of the army by the Great King himself. Accordingly, his opinion is bound to prevail, as Herodotus comments, stressing once again the futility of debate (9.42.1: *τούτου δὲ οὕτω δικαιεῦντος ἀντέλεγε οὐδείς, ὥστε ἐκράτεε τῇ γνώμῃ· τὸ γὰρ κράτος εἶχε τῆς στρατίης οὗτος ἐκ βασιλέος, ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἀρτάβαζος*).[114] Should one expect Mardonius' rule to be looser than Xerxes, one will be disappointed. Besides, the position he occupies is equal to the king's. Artabazus on the other hand is esteemed highly by Xerxes; had it been Xerxes in charge he might have listened to Artabazus' advice – prone as he is to the advice of others.[115] But this is Mardonius with whose imperialistic policy we have become all too familiar by now.

The game between speech and power carries on: in the course of the debate Mardonius calls his generals to speak of any prophecy they know about the annihilation of the Persian army in Greece, but everybody remains silent. Mardonius states clearly

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[111] See 9.41.4: *τούτου μὲν ἡ αὐτὴ ἐγίνετο καὶ Θηβαίων γνώμη*. Even if we do not get a clear picture from Herodotus the passage may suggest that the Thebans are also present at the conference, and possibly they speak in support of Artabazus repeating what they have said at 9.2. Furthermore, more than one participant is implied by the phrase *τούτου δὲ οὕτω δικαιεῦντος ἀντέλεγε οὐδείς, ὥστε ἐκράτεε τῇ γνώμῃ* (9.42.1). On this see also Macan 1908b: 680.

[112] Giving people money to achieve one's purposes is particularly connected with the Thebans in the account of Plataea. Cf. also the suggestion of the Theban Timagenides to his fellow-citizens to hand over to the Greeks the medisers at the prospect of offering them money to secure their acquittal (9.87).

[113] Strikingly *ἀγνωμοσύνη* is attributed to Mardonius for the second time here (first at 9.3.1). It is also attributed by Mardonius to the Athenians at 9.4.2, and to all the Greeks at 7.9β.1. In all these contexts the word is, one way or the other, associated with Mardonius, so that we are made to think it is a distinctive characteristic of his, which will lead to disaster. Cf. the strong ironic forebodings of Mardonius' ignoring the warnings from the sacrifices of Hegesistratus (9.41.4).

[114] Cf. the silence here with the silence in book 7 after Mardonios' speech: *σιωπώντων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Περσέων καὶ οὐ τολμώντων γνώμην ἀποδείκνυσθαι ἀντίην τῇ προκειμένῃ* (7.10.1).

[115] On Xerxes' power and authority see ch. 5.

the situation in the Persian court: 'since you either know nothing or do not dare to speak, I know and I will tell you' (9.42.2: *σιγώντων δὲ τῶν ἐπικλήτων, τῶν μὲν οὐκ εἰδότων τοὺς χρησμούς, τῶν δὲ εἰδότων μέν, ἐν ἀδείῃ δὲ οὐ ποιευμένων τὸ λέγειν, αὐτός γε Μαρδόνιος ἔλεγε· Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ὑμεῖς ἢ ἴστε οὐδὲν ἢ οὐ τολμᾶτε λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐρέω ὡς εὖ ἐπισταμενος*). Fear dominates and does not allow the tongue to speak freely.

The paradox is then that, although Mardonius knows no one is going to oppose him or express an opinion freely, he still asks for opinions acting like another Xerxes. So he goes on to speak about a certain oracle, according to which the Persians will be destroyed if they sack the temple at Delphi. But he interprets the oracle the other way round: 'if we do not plunder Delphi, we will not perish'.[116] The narrative evidently undercuts his argument: in the previous year the Persians had actually tried to attack Delphi, but were crashed through by stones fallen from Parnassus (8.39.2). If we follow Harrison,[117] who suggests that, according to the story of Glaucus told by Leotychides at 6.86, the mere consideration or intention of committing a crime is the same as performing the crime, then Mardonius' argument proves invalid and indicates his blindness, or in other words his *ἀγνωμοσύνη*. Whether Mardonius says here that, since they failed once, they will not try again, or the event possibly happened before Mardonius learns the oracles (probably by Mys of Euromus[118] whom he sends to consult as many oracles as possible) and so he thinks if they do not plunder Delphi they will win, or even if Mardonius might not know of the expedition against Delphi,[119] still the allusions to a bad end and the irony are obvious.

1.4 Conclusion: problematization of debate and Herodotean dialogism

The plurality of viewpoints and contrasting versions of events dominating the *Histories* looks different when it comes to the performance of dissent within the context of debate. The Greeks are presented as not being able to discuss properly for reasons which have to do mainly with particularism and disunity. Debate proves inefficient to

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[116] Cf. Mardonius' attitude to Leotychides' regarding the name of Hegesistratus as a good omen in the Mycale narrative (see also Hohti 1976: 127 n. 2).

[117] See Harrison 2000: 150 n. 104.

[118] Hude reads Europus. Stein, however, based on Mys' Carian origin (8.135.3), suggests that the correct reading is Euromus, which is the name of a Carian city (*pace* How and Wells 1912: 279). Europus is apparently used by the Carians as a variant for Euromus in the fifth and third centuries B.C. (see Robert 1950: 36; *BE* 1973 no. 415; see also Hornblower 1982: 347 and nn. 136, 140; Bowie 2007: 221).

[119] Cf. Flower and Marincola 2002: 186.

its purposes and is suppressed not only by the Greeks (viz. Themistocles) but also by Herodotus himself through varied narrative means.

This picture affects two further aspects: the self-other contrast and the dialogism of the text. With reference to the self-other contrast, the failure of debate in Greece is balanced by the repetitive, still futile, efforts of the Persians to discuss. The representation of Persian debate with its fixed formalities and inflexible nature underpins the Graeco-Persian polarity. At the same time, other features suggest the contestation of this polarity: sharing of debate summoning formulas; relative free speech of certain people; reconsideration of decisions.

The problematization of debate indicates that multivocality is a fiction. In the *Histories* we do hear many voices and we do find multiple versions of events and other more or less credible stories. Herodotus praises polyphony and misses no opportunity to present the Persians debating. On the other hand, the polyphony in the debate scenes is delicately and shrewdly suppressed through compact debates and indirect discourse used on the Greek side, and through a handful of individuals who speak in front of the king, as dictated by the monarchical constitution. Herodotus is thus reinforcing his authority, leading his reader secretly to adopt his own voice. The control Herodotus attempts to exert on his debates confirms his authority as writer of his text and limits its dialogism.

Chapter 2: Alliance Speeches

The previous chapter has shown the difficulties of conducting debate among the Greeks and the Persians. We have seen that the picture of Greek debate is quite vague and complicated, and often debates become even impossible, with interesting consequences for the contesting of the Graeco-Persian polarity. Greek disunity is the principal factor which effects such a representation. In this chapter we shall move on to a closer examination and a more specific speech genre, the alliance speeches. The aim is to explore the kind and effectiveness of the rhetorical arguments the Greeks put into practice in order to achieve unity within a fragmented world of independent Greek cities and against the vast forces of the enemy. The dominant impression is that factions are multi-faceted and pervade more or less explicitly every attempt to secure unanimity. On the other hand, parallels drawn between Greek and Persian alliance speeches or other speeches relating to war suggest affinities between the two enemies and overturn the stereotyped binary opposition between Greeks and barbarians.

2.1 Definition and generic features

Let us first define what we mean by 'alliance speeches'. Under this label I include deliberative speeches (*συμβουλευτικοὶ λόγοι*) aiming at achieving alliance, which may be hortatory ('ally with us') or dissuasive ('do not ally with them'), or may even ask for neutrality. The most common words Herodotus uses to refer to alliances and allies are *συμμαχίη*[1] and *σύμμαχος*[2] respectively. An alternative word for alliance is *ὁμαιχμίη*, which is employed twice (7.145.1 [Greek context]; 8.140α.4 [Persian context]).

The *Rhetoric to Alexander* provides us with the first specific treatment of speeches relating to alliances (*Rh. Al.* 1424b27: *περὶ συμμαχιῶν*). However, this category is not very strict, but rather flexible since, given its symbouleutic nature and the war context, it presents similarities with other speeches delivered in war circumstances, such as speeches urging war,[3] as we shall see in more detail in the course of this chapter, and pre-battle speeches.[4]

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[1] According to Powell the word occurs 27 times in the *Histories*.

[2] According to Powell the word occurs 79 times in the *Histories*.

[3] Cf. the similar arguments given in *Rh. Al.* 1425a9-28; cf. also the passage on war and peace as topics of deliberative oratory in Arist. *Rh.* 1359b33-1360a5.

[4] See below pp. 130-3.

2.2 Sketching out the lines of the analysis

Since alliance speeches form a quite flexible category and apart from Anaximenes' recommendations there is no other subject-specific template of arguments, my principal criteria for identifying utterances as speeches arguing for alliance have been the comparable circumstances as well as the aim of the speech: a party tries to persuade an other party a) to lend its help in order to face an enemy (on the Greek side), b) to ally with it so as to enjoy the benefits of such an arrangement (on the Persian side), c) not to ally with the rival party, d) to take a neutral stance in an impending conflict .

The speeches which meet the above criteria and may qualify as alliance speeches in Herodotus are the following: Naxians – Aristagoras – Artaphrenes (5.30-1); Aristagoras – Cleomenes (5.49-51); Aristagoras – Athenians (5.97); Philippides – Athenians (6.106.1-2); Plataeans – Spartans (6.108.2-4); Spartans – Argives (7.148.3-149); Xerxes – Argives (7.150.2-3); Argives – Artaxerxes (7.151); Gelon – Greeks (7.157-62.1); Greeks – Corcyraeans (7.168.1); Greeks – Cretans (7.169); Thessalians – Greeks (7.172); Greeks – Locrians of Opus and Phocians (7.203); Themistocles – Ionians (8.22.1-2); Alexander – Spartans – Athenians (8.140-4); Murychides – Athenians (9.4-5); Athenians – Spartans (9.6-11); Megarians – Greeks (9.21.2); Hegesistratus – Leotychides (9.90.2-91.2); Leotychides – Ionians (9.98.2-3).[5]

In what follows first I offer a typology of the common motifs and arguments (*topoi*) employed in alliance speeches in the *Histories*. It thus emerges that the argumentation is deployed and redeployed in the text by adept speakers, who always make sure to accommodate it to the respective audience. At the end of this section and basing my self on the Herodotean *topoi*, I examine Herodotus side by side with his literary predecessors and successors. After this general analysis, my study turns to particular Herodotean test cases, which present special interest in that they indicate the

[5] We also have some alliance speeches given in indirect speech modes (indirect speech and RSA) which are delivered in comparable circumstances but there is no elaboration on their content: Aristagoras – Athenians (5.103.1); Ionians, Greeks and Spartans (8.132); Athenians – Artaphrenes (5.73). In the first two cases the reason for the brevity is narrative economy: Aristagoras had already had his fair share of speech when addressing Cleomenes and the Athenians, and we shall also see later another Ionian, the Samian Hegesistratus, asking for the help of the Greeks; thereby we have become familiar with the key arguments of the Ionians at crucial moments. In the third case, where the Athenians ask for Artaphrenes' help to face the Spartans, Herodotus delicately silences any arguments presented by the Athenian embassy to the Persians, in order to picture the incident as an independent initiative of minor importance, not supported by the Athenian people. Still, the mention of the event creates forceful irony and neatly underlines dividing tendencies in the Greek world.

difficulty of achieving unity between the Greeks, the language of diplomacy and deceit at work to achieve this unity, and the ever-lasting presence of self-interest masked in varied forms. I will demonstrate that Herodotus consistently highlights the disunity which impedes each attempt to get the Greeks together. My examples include: Aristagoras, the Greek embassies to Gelon, Alexander and the Spartans to the Athenians, and the Athenian embassy to the Spartans.

2.3 Herodotean *topoi*

The *topoi* used in alliance speeches in the Histories include appeals to friendship and freedom, excellence and self-interest of the addressee, and responsibility of the addressee for the war. Several devices are also used to manipulate the addressee by reshaping reality. Such devices may vary from negotiating tricks and ruses to deceptions and actual lying.

Herodotus introduces both recurrent motifs and devices as means of persuasion very early in the work. I should like to attract attention to three relevant cases, which function programmatically for the speeches to follow. First, the earliest attempt to create an alliance succeeds by virtue of a ruse: when Alyattes approaches Thrasybulus to conclude a truce, Thrasybulus pours all the grain he can find on the streets and orders the people to pretend to be drinking and feasting. Alyattes gets the impression of a wealthy and thus powerful addressee and concludes an alliance, thus proving Thrasybulus' visual rhetoric effective (1.22.4).[6]

Second, when Croesus asks for the alliance of the Spartans to attack the Persians, the excellence of the addressee is a principal feature of the speech (1.69.2: 'you are the most prominent amongst the Greeks') and it is also conspicuously emphasized as the main reason for the acceptance of the alliance by the Spartans (1.70.1). Friendship in the form of favourable disposition through previous service plays a role too: when the Spartans wanted to buy gold from Croesus to make a statue of Apollo, he accepted no money and gave them the gold as a gift (1.69.3-4: *εὐεργεσίαι*). It is also important that the speech is delivered by an Eastern monarch, one who is closer to the Greeks; that is, Herodotus is already blurring the Greek/barbarian categories.[7]

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[6] Cf. Thrasybulus' other visual display to Periander's messenger (5.92ζ.1-η.1). On the power of visual rhetoric see Murnaghan 2001 (esp. on Thrasybulus see pp. 63-4, 66). Note also that the word *σύμμαχος* occurs here for the first time in the work.

[7] Cf. 1.29.1: Croesus' court was open to all the great Greek teachers of that period; 1.94.1: the Lydian customs are very similar to the Greek. See also Pelling 1997; 2006a: 172-3.

Third, the Scythians in book 4 threaten their neighbours that, if they do not help them to ward off the Persians, they themselves will come to terms with the enemies (4.118). That this is merely a rhetorical trick is made clear by the following narrative: no intention of subjecting themselves to the Persians is mentioned again; the Scythians decide firmly on resistance instead (4.120.1). Moreover, the self-interest of the addressee is stressed when they try to convince the leaders of the neighbouring nations through an elaborate argument that by helping them (the Scythians) they will actually help themselves, for the Persians intend to subjugate them also. Another important aspect of this incident has to do once more with the challenging of the self-other categories: the present Scythian attitude is similar to the Athenian attitude towards the Spartans at the beginning of book 9,[8] an observation which becomes all the more relevant if one recalls the analogies between the Athenians and the Scythians suggested in the Scythian *logos*.[9]

Let us now deal with each of the *topoi* individually.

2.3.1 Friendship:

According to Aristotle, friendship manifests itself in several forms such as companionship, intimacy, kinship (*Rh*. 1381b34). The argument about friendship, or goodwill (εὔνοια), has a double effect as it relates closely to both the *ethos* (*Rh*. 1378a6-8; cf. 1380b35-6) and the *pathos* (*Rh*. 1378a18-19) of the speech in the following ways: on the one hand, it explains and reinforces the authority of the speaker as well as establishing him worthy of confidence; on the other hand, it achieves the *captatio benevolentiae* and thus creates strong obligation to the addressee to help the speaker.

Friendship is mentioned either in alliance speeches as an argument to increase the chances of persuasion or in the narrative to explain the circumstances which allow a speaker to approach the specific addressees. Kinship, more specifically, is used either as factual kinship, through racial or marital relationships, or as suggestive/metaphorical kinship, reflected in guest-friendships between individuals or groups of people (*xenia*), or even in bonds of trust between a state and a foreign individual (*proxenia*, which

[8] See below pp. 108-12. Cf. also Macan (1895: 83): 'With some very trifling verbal changes the speech which follows would have done admirably in the mouth of an Athenian addressing the congress at the Isthmos, before the invasion of Xerxes'.

[9] On the analogies see Hartog 1988: 198-204; Munson 2001: 107-18 (analogies with both Sparta and Athens). Cf. also Irwin and Greenwood 2007a: 23-4.

initially developed from *xenia*).[10] It has so prominent a position in the argumentation of this kind of deliberative speeches that we may even speak, with Jones, of 'kinship diplomacy'.[11]

Strong kinship claims are made by the Argives and, surprisingly, by the Persians: a story was told around Greece that during the Persian Wars Xerxes asked the Argives to remain neutral on the grounds that Argives and Persians were both descended from Perseus, through their ancestor Perses who was a son of the Argive hero Perseus and Andromeda (7.150).[12] The argument is used reciprocally, since Xerxes also says that kinship to the Argives prevents the Persians from fighting their ancestors.[13] Later on, in the 460s the Argives themselves send representatives to Artaxerxes to ask if they still have friendly relationships with the Persians on the basis of Xerxes' argument (7.151).[14]

Before the Ionian revolt, certain Naxian oligarchs, who have been forced into exile, approach Aristagoras of Miletus and ask for his help to recover their position at home on the basis of their previous *xenia* with Histiaeus (5.30.2). In his turn Aristagoras claims Artaphrenes is a friend of his, which makes it easier to approach him (5.30.5). The same Aristagoras, when addressing the Spartan king Cleomenes to ask for help for the Ionian revolt, refers to the common gods and Greek origin of the Ionians (5.49.3: *νῦν ὧν πρὸς θεῶν τῶν Ἑλληνίων ῥύσασθε Ἴωνας ἐκ δουλοσύνης, ἄνδρας ὁμαίμονας*).[15] When addressing the Athenian assembly, Aristagoras makes this argument even more

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[10] See *OCD*[3] s.vv. *friendship, ritualised* and *proxenos/proxeny*.

[11] See Jones 1999.

[12] For a variant see Diodorus 10.27. But cf. Hdt. 6.54, where the Persians maintain that the Argives were really of Egyptian descent. The Persian behaviour towards myth is not very much different from the Greek: they use a myth at one time, they reject it at another, and then they use it again when convenient. Cf. Euphemus in Thuc. 6.85.1: *ἀνδρὶ δὲ τυράννῳ ἢ πόλει ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ οὐδὲν ἄλογον ὅτι ξυμφέρον οὐδ' οἰκεῖον ὅτι μὴ πιστόν· πρὸς ἕκαστα δεῖ ἢ ἐχθρὸν ἢ φίλον μετὰ καιροῦ γίγνεσθαι*. Cf. Vandiver 1991: 52; Buxton 1994: 196. See also the comparable way Hermocrates at first denies the significance of the racial factor (Dorian-Ionian) in Thuc. 4.61.2-3 and asserts it at a later stage in Thuc. 6.77.1, 79.2.

[13] The same argument, this time about the danger of leading the Ionians against their Greek kinsmen, is used by Artabanus at Abydos (7.51.2-3). Xerxes disregards the argument then (he is convinced of the Ionians' faithfulness), but he uses it at 7.150 to convince the Argives to remain neutral.

[14] On the use of kinship diplomacy by the Argives see Hornblower 2002[3]: 77-9.

[15] Cf. Xen. *Hell*. 6.3.6, where the Athenian Callias relates the myth of Triptolemus to the Spartans to indicate that Athenians and Spartans are linked with bonds of friedship. On the effect of Aristagoras' argument on the Dorian Cleomenes see Hornblower 2007a: 172 (note also 'Euripides at the end of the *Ion* (line 1590) was to make Dorus and Ion half-brothers, and perhaps this is what Aristagoras has in mind. Or did he know that Cleomenes was a half-hearted Dorian?').

intimate, emphasizing the 'mother-daughter' relationship between Athens and Miletus (5.97.2: *οἱ Μιλήσιοι τῶν Ἀθηναίων εἰσὶ ἄποικοι*).[16] Hegesistratus, just like Aristagoras, appeals to the common gods and the blood bonds of the Greeks and the Ionians (9.90.2).[17]

Kinship is the main reason which leads the Greeks to send embassies to the most powerful Greek communities (Argos, Sicily,[18] Corcyra, Crete) to request their help to repel the barbarians (7.145.2). The address of the Thessalians to the Greeks 'Men of Hellas' (7.172.2: *Ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες*) hints also at kinship matters. Themistocles uses the kinship argument when inscribing the message to the Ionians on the rocks of Euboea (8.22.1). And again kinship is behind Leotychides message to the Ionians fighting with the Persians (9.98.2).

In Alexander's case, the narrative qualifies him as the most appropriate messenger: Alexander is both *πρόξεινος* and *εὐεργέτης* of the Athenians[19] and connected with the Persians through his sister's marriage to the Persian Bubares (8.136.1). Besides, Alexander opens his speech to the Athenians with an emphatic reference to his 'goodwill' (8.140β.1: *εὐνοίη*).[20] A third reference to 'kinship' and friendly bonds occurs this time in the Athenian answer to Alexander (8.143.3: *πρόξεινόν τε καὶ φίλον*).

2.3.2 Excellence of the addressee:

The people addressed are said to have the material means – money and army – and the qualities – bravery, experience in war – to help the party asking for alliance. Frequently this argument is used in speeches and singles out the addressee from the rest;

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[16] Note that the name Melanthius of the general of the Athenian forces (5.97.3) recalls Melanthus, one of the old Ionian royal family of Athens (Hdt. 1.147; 5.65). Cf. Hornblower 2002[3]: 128-9; Zacharia 2003: 50.

[17] On the role of Dorianism and Ionianism in the 5th and 6th century B.C. see Alty 1982: 1-14. Cf. also Irwin and Greenwood 2007a: 29-33. Immerwahr (1966: 301 n. 180) notes that there is no mention of the particular colonial relationships between the Ionians and the Athenians in Hegesistratus' speech, but only after the battle at 9.106.2-4. Maybe this is because the main commander-in-chief of the Greek army, who has the last word, is the Spartan Leotychides and so such an argument would be unnecessary.

[18] Cf. 7.157.2: *καὶ μοῖρά τοι τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἐλαχίστη μέτα ἄρχοντί γε Σικελίης* ('as lord of Sicily you possess no inconsiderable portion of the Greek world').

[19] On the complicated matter of how Alexander acquired this status as an old friend to Athens see Wallace 1970: 199 n. 13; Walbank 1978: 66; Meiggs 1982: 123; Scaife 1989: 135. The best discussion is by Badian 1994: 119-27; cf. Hornblower 2002: 382-3.

[20] Cf. the emphasis on *εὔνοια* (goodwill) in Brasidas' speeches in Thuc. 4.87.2-3, 114.4.

otherwise it is given in the narrative, which thus becomes necessary to understand the speech. It is of course a logical argument since the addressee is able to help. In addition, it flatters the addressee and stresses the dependency of the speaker and so invites a mood conducive to a positive response.

Accordingly, Aristagoras tells the Naxians he will appeal to Artaphrenes because he is the governor of the whole coastal district of Asia and has a great army and navy (5.30.5). The narrative explains Aristagoras' later attempt at Sparta: he is in search of a powerful ally to revolt against the Persians (5.38.2). This argument is worked over and employed in the speech to Cleomenes: Spartans are the leaders of Greece and the best fighters (5.49.2-3). And this is frequently demonstrated by their battle performance in the narrative.[21]

Aristagoras' subsequent decision to request help from Athens is explained in the preceding narrative about how the Athenians were liberated from the tyrants and, consequently, grew in reputation and strength (5.78; 5.91.1-2). By the time Aristagoras visits Athens, it is – according to Herodotus – the most powerful city in Greece after Sparta (5.97.1), an argument repeated by Aristagoras himself in his speech to the Athenians (5.97.2). On the other hand, Gelon is presented in the narrative as being far more powerful than anyone else of Greek nationality (7.145.2, 153-6); and this argument is also employed by the Spartans in their speech to Gelon (7.157.2).

2.3.3 Self-interest of the addressee:

It is always necessary to persuade the other party that the alliance is to its own advantage (*συμφέρον*),[22] either because the enemy is common or because the addressee is going to enjoy great benefits – material like wealth and property or friendship, honour and good repute –[23] if he accepts the alliance or if the impending conflict is successful. It is a way of increasing the *pathos* of the speech, thus achieving the *captatio benevolentiae*.

Accordingly, Xerxes tells the Argives he will hold them in greater esteem than anyone else if they remain neutral in the war (7.150.2). Alexander tells the Athenians that, if they accept the alliance, they will receive a whole chain of benefits, some of which will be: taking their land back and any other territory they wish, having self-

[21] Cf. Thyrea (1.82), Thermopylae and Demaratus' sayings in his dialogues with Xerxes (7.104.5, 209.4).

[22] Cf. Arist. *Rh*. 1358b21-5 ('the aim of the deliberative speaker is the expedient or harmful'), 1362a17-21, 1417b34-6.

[23] Cf. Arist. *Rh*. 1362b10-28, 1359b33-1360a5; *Rh*. *Al*. 1422a4-15.

government, having their burnt temples rebuilt (8.140α.2) and becoming friends with the king (8.140.4). The Greek heralds bind their interest to Gelon's trying to persuade him that he is the next target of the Persians (7.157.3: 'by supporting us you will be defending yourself').[24] And Hegesistratus appeals to the profit the Greeks will get out of helping the Ionians (9.90.2).

Aristagoras makes systematic use of the self-interest argument in all his speeches – which creates strong irony as he acts purely out of self-interest.[25] More specifically, Aristagoras tends to offer power/empire to all his interlocutors in order to secure their compliance (including Athens, where Herodotus says that he repeats the arguments used with Cleomenes [5.97.1-2]). According to Aristagoras, Artaphrenes will profit from the Naxian expedition in two ways: on the one hand, Aristagoras will provide him with a large amount of money above the expenses of the expedition; on the other hand, Artaphrenes will please the king by adding to the Persian conquests not only the prosperous island of Naxos (5.28), but also the Cyclades, which benefit from a strategic position, and wealthy Euboea (5.31.2-3). The same practice is used at Sparta in its most elaborate form, as almost one-third of the speech describes the wealth of the vast Persian empire, which the Spartans will enjoy if they help the Ionians (5.49.4-8). Self-interest is stressed once again in Aristagoras' speech at Athens (5.97.1: *περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίῃ*).[26]

2.3.4 Appeal to freedom:

The appeal to freedom appears also often in these speeches, when Greeks address Greeks. The fight for freedom against the barbarians, who want to impose slavery on the Greeks, is used as an argument to unite all the Greeks against the common threat: 5.49.2-3; 6.106.2; 7.157.2; 8.22.1, 142.3; 9.90.2, 98.3.

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[24] They thus recall the Scythians in book 4 (see above p. 82).

[25] See 5.98.1: 'Aristagoras…adopted a plan of action from which no advantage could possibly accrue to the Ionians – indeed he did not intend that it should, his only object being to annoy Darius'. See also below pp. 91-9. On the self-centred motivation of Aristagoras and the people he addresses see also Baragwanath 2008: 170.

[26] Cf. also Pelling (2007: 180): 'So Persians can be pressed to westward desires, Greeks to eastward: Aristagoras, rhetorically adept as he is, can obviously argue this either way, and make either argument as attractive as the other'.

2.3.5 Responsibility of the addressee for the war:

The responsibility of the addressee for the war is mentioned in order to make the other party feel guilty and thus lend its help or remain neutral (again the effect sought is *pathos*). This is what Themistocles adds at the end of his message to the Ionians: 'if you cannot join us, then either remain neutral or at least fight badly, since what is happening now has initiated on your account' (8.22.2: *ἀρχῆθεν ἡ ἔχθρη πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον ἀπ' ὑμέων ἡμῖν γέγονε*). This is also what the Spartans tell the Athenians: 'It was you, in the first place, who started this war – our wishes were not considered. It began by being a war for your territories only – now all Greece is involved' (8.142.2: *ἀρχῆθεν*).[27]

2.3.6 Rhetorical devices:

In the category of 'rhetorical devices' we may include:

- deception by over-emphasizing the material benefits of the victory and the ease of the venture: this is exactly Aristagoras' tactic in his speeches to Artaphrenes, Cleomenes and the Athenians. I shall return to this in more detail when dealing with his speeches independently.
- use of a strategy with two alternative benefits: Themistocles and Leotychides provide us with two such examples. Themistocles inscribes a message for the Ionians on the rocks of Euboea after the battle at Artemisium: 'either join us or remain neutral, and ask the Carians to do the same; if you cannot do either and you must fight against us, fight badly' (8.22.2). He has in mind that either the Ionians will join the Greek side without Xerxes getting to know of the message or they will be slandered to Xerxes, if he gets to know of it, and they will not participate in the war (8.22.3; cf. 8.19.1). The same alternatives are sought by Leotychides' speech to the Ionians fighting on the Persian side at the battle of Mycale, as explicitly stated in the narrative: *ὡυτὸς δὲ οὗτος τυγχάνει νόος τοῦ πρήγματος καὶ ὁ Θεμιστοκλέος ὁ ἐπ' Ἀρτεμισίῳ* (9.98.4).[28]

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[27] On the implications of *ἀρχῆθεν* ('in the first place') here see above pp. 31-2 and n. 74 and below p. 106.

[28] Diodorus 11.34.4-5 relates another effective trick exercised by Leotychides this time on the Greeks fighting on the Greek side: he announces the Greek victory at Plataea, although, according to Diodorus, it became known only later that the two battles (Plataea and Mycale) took place on the same day. Since due to the long distance it would take long for the news of the victory to arrive, Leotychides invented a supposed victory (but cf. Green 1996: 281-2; 2006: 93 n. 146). A similar trick was exercised by the Persians at Mycale to lift up the spirit of the army: they spread the rumour that Xerxes himself was coming to help them with a great power (Diod. 11.35.4).

- false claims that reinforcements are on their way: This is the case in the speech of the Greeks to the Locrians of Opus and the Phocians (7.203). To persuade them to join in the battle of Thermopylae, the Greeks claim that the forces at Thermopylae (3,100 soldiers in total)[29] are only the forerunners of a larger allied army expected any moment now. In the text we read that Sparta would send more soldiers to Thermopylae after the feast of Carnea, and so would the Peloponnesian allies after the Olympic festival, as they did not expect the battle to be fought so soon (7.206.1-2).[30] The following narrative, however, undercuts the truth of their intentions by recording that Leonidas asks again for help (7.207): it turns out that the promised forces have not yet been sent, otherwise they would have been already on their way. Therefore, the argument about the reinforcements may well be fabricated in order to persuade, that is it may be merely a 'negotiating trick'. Furthermore, the validity of the argument decreases through certain syntactical structures: it is given in indirect speech in the form of dependent infinitives (7.203.2: *εἶναι*, *εἶναι*, *ἔσεσθαι*, *ὀφείλειν*) and indirect statements introduced by the conjunction *ὡς* – which adds to the subjectivity of the claim – accompanied by optatives (7.203.1: *ἥκοιεν*, *εἶεν*, *εἴη*).[31]

- threat to leave one's post or to cooperate with the enemy if help is not given: The Thessalians warn the Athenians that they shall come to terms with the Persians if the Athenians do not help them defend the passage past mountain Olympus (7.172.2-3). The Athenians threaten the Spartans with an alliance with the Persians, since the Spartans have not fulfilled their promise to help them (9.11.1-2). The Megarians warn

[29] See 7.202, 207, 208.1.

[30] Some scholars emphasize the importance of the religious grounds for the Spartans (Popp 1957: 126-7; Goodman and Holladay 1986: 157-8; Lazenby 1993: 135). Some others insist on the secondary role of Thermopylae compared to Artemisium (How and Wells 1912: 371; Hammond 1996: 12). On the infamous reluctance of the Peloponnesians to dispatch their forces far away from the Peloponnese to the north as an additional reason for the small size of Leonidas' army cf. Evans 1969: 393-4; Lazenby 1993: 136. But, had they considered the role of Thermopylae secondary, they would not have put a king in charge of the force; and if they actually considered the Isthmus as the last line of defence, then probably they would have sent adequate forces with the king for this purpose (Evans 1969: 393-5; Simpson 1972: 4; cf. Macan 1908a: 309). The narrative confirms that Leonidas and his army, though small in numbers, were holding the pass until Ephialtes revealed to Xerxes the Anopaea pass and Thermopylae were, thus, overturned (7.210-11, 213).

[31] Cf. also Macan (1908a: 304): 'the change in construction (*ὡς…ἥκοιεν*, *εἶεν*, *εἴη bis*, to *οὐ γὰρ εἶναι κτλ.*) coincides with the transit from fact to argument'.

the rest of the Greeks that they will quit their position unless the Greeks send some extra troops to relieve them (9.21.2).[32]

- attribution of the speech for alliance to a higher power to lend the speech authority and, thus, effectiveness, as when Alexander addresses the Athenians delivering Xerxes' message as delivered to him by Mardonius (8.140). This case will be discussed extensively later on.

2.4 Earlier and later literature

On the basis of the above categorization of the arguments deployed by Herodotus in alliance speeches, a comparison with similar pieces of alliance rhetoric in Homer as well as in later authors, more particularly Thucydides and the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, proves rewarding. Elements from Homer are there already. More than that, Herodotus acknowledges the importance of, and employs repeatedly, arguments which Thucydides develops later, such as expediency, and which are listed even later as the main arguments of alliance speeches in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*.

In Homer there is an example which has some kind of similarity to Herodotean speeches of persuasion for alliance: the embassy to Achilles in *Iliad* 9.[33] At the instigation of Nestor the people chosen to address Achilles are the dearest to him among the Achaeans (9.204 [*φίλτατοι ἄνδρες*], 642), which facilitates their approach to, and positive reception by, Achilles. This is indeed calculated to corroborate the *ethos* of the embassy and produce *pathos* on the part of the addressee. Of the arguments used, the excellence of the addressee prevails: he is presented as the only one who can help the Achaeans in their distress. Much emphasis is also laid on friendship/companionship through repeated requests to Achilles to help the rest of the Achaeans, his comrades, who honoured him with much love (esp. 9.630-1). The reward the speakers promise Achilles in exchange for his help may be interpreted as touching on the addressee's self-interest (9.260-98).

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[32] This kind of threats are not necessarily always fake, or rather we cannot assess with certainty their validity. However, they do function as rhetorical devices to achieve persuasion and they actually succeed in their aim. Of the three cases, the threat of the Thessalians is fulfilled as soon as the Greek allies abandon them (7.174). To the intriguing case of the Athenians I shall return shortly.

[33] A more distant example is the scene between Glaucus and Diomedes in *Iliad* 6. The exchange between them does not aim in effect at concluding an alliance. The alleged 'alliance', or rather reconciliation, comes as a result of the speeches which reveal an old guest-friendship (*xenia*) between the families of the two enemies.

The parallels with Thucydides are more easily detectable. In the speeches of the Corinthians and the Corcyreans to the Athenians in book 1, we come across arguments like past favours, which create a kind of friendship, and self-interest of the addressee: he will receive the gratitude of the speaker, his power will grow since the power of the speaker will add to it (cf. the Corcyreans at 1.33.1 saying 'our navy is greater than any but your own') and finally the addressee protects himself by helping the speaker, as the enemy will attack the addressee later on. Other relevant examples include the speech of the Mytileneans at Sparta (3.9-14: excellence and personal advantage of the addressee, kinship) and the Spartan speech to the Athenians (4.17-20: self-interest of the audience).

The relation between the *Rhetoric to Alexander* and Thucydidean speeches arguing for alliance has been discussed extensively by Macleod, with particular focus on the speech of the Mytileneans at Sparta (3.9-14).[34] Hornblower has also commented on the affinities between speeches in Thucydides and the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, using as his basic example the Spartan speech to the Athenians in Thuc. 4.17-20.[35] Hornblower concludes that there is a two-way influence: Thucydides of course did work in an environment where rhetoric was flourishing and in his turn with his work he exercised influence on the later rhetorical handbooks.

But we need not consider Thucydides as the only source the handbooks had drawn on. Without trying to impose later categories on a much earlier text,[36] I suggest that Herodotus was one of the tributaries which shaped the later rhetorical treatments of the alliance motif. More specifically, a great many formulaic elements to request alliance listed in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* are already to be found in Herodotus – and indeed even in Homer as mentioned above. One should also bear in mind the analogies drawn above between Herodotus and the recommendations of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on the expedient as the primary aim of deliberative speeches as well as the importance of goodwill (*εὔνοια*) to a persuasive speech as a register to reinforce *ethos* and *pathos*.[37] The friendship argument, both as kinship and friendly disposition through previous good service, the wealth and the power to be gained from the alliance and the imminent conflict occur both in Herodotus and *Rhetoric to Alexander* 1424b27-41 (alliance speeches) and 1425a9-28 (speeches urging war). We have already argued the

[34] See Macleod 1983: 64-78.

[35] See Hornblower 1987: 46-52; cf. Hornblower 1996: 83-4.

[36] See above pp. 34-5.

[37] See above p. 86 nn. 22 and 23, and p. 82 respectively.

importance of manipulating the emotional state of the audience in Herodotus, that is generating *pathos* especially through appeal to feelings of friendship. Such manipulation is given a prominent place in the structure of an alliance speech in *Rh*. *Al*. 1439b15-17: 'If we are urging our audience to render assistance to certain parties, whether individuals or states, it will also be suitable briefly to mention any friendly feeling or cause of gratitude or compassion that already exists between them and the members of the assembly' (cf. 1440a26-9). Another interesting parallel is found in Hdt. 6.108, when the Spartans reject an alliance with the Plataeans with the excuse that they live far away and the Plataeans may be enslaved several times before the Spartans even hear of it. This corresponds to the prescription for opposing an alliance in *Rh*. *Al*. 1425a 4-6: 'the proposed allies…are remote in locality and not really able to come to our assistance on the suitable occasions'.

2.5 Case studies

2.5.1 Self-interest cloaked: Aristagoras and the 'rhetoric of deceit'

Aristagoras, as he goes around asking for alliance, is presented as the typical opportunist. The arguments he uses about self-interest, friendship and excellence of the addressee on the one hand, as we have seen, tally in broad lines with the content of similar alliance speeches. On the other hand, his speeches have some distinctive characteristics which allow us to speak of 'Aristagoras' rhetoric', whose exclusive aim is to deceive and promote his own interests.

Aristagorean rhetoric is a 'rhetoric of deceit', represented as a stock vocabulary which includes arguments worked and reworked each time to suit the respective audience.[38] Aristagoras has a limited repertoire but he uses it (for a while) effectively. His appeals to self-interest are always carefully tailored to the speaker in front of him at any time, while his appeal to kinship is differently formulated according to the nature of the affinity claimed at Athens and Sparta.[39] The ease of the enterprise (*εὐπετέως*) is another motif which Aristagoras reuses with flexibility. This has an important place in his argumentation as well as in the narratorial glosses, which comment on his actions: just as the Persians can be *easily* defeated (5.49.3-4, 97.1), Euboea can be *easily* attacked and subjugated (5.31.3), the Spartans can *easily* become masters of the whole of Asia (5.49.8) and Aristagoras can deceive the Athenians more *easily* than Cleomenes

[38] In this vein Herodotus is very close to Thucydides' treatment of Brasidas and what Hornblower (1996: 81, 86-9, 276-7) calls the 'periodically adjusted manifesto'. See below pp. 204-5.

[39] Cf. Jones 1999: 25-6.

alone (5.97.2). 'Ease' is always the keyword to urge rash ventures.[40] But in the same way the narrative undercuts the rest of Aristagoras' arguments and proves them to be invented to produce a more attractive speech, so whatever is promised by Aristagoras to be easy turns out to be very difficult.[41]

Let us now explore in more detail the way the narrative reveals Aristagorean rhetoric as specious and self-centred. Aristagoras has three out of four influential speeches (Naxians, Artaphrenes, Athenians). In all three cases deceit seems to be the necessary premise for success. An authorial intervention names expediency as the reason which makes Aristagoras help the Naxians: 'This suggested to Aristagoras that if he helped the exiles to return he himself would be ruler of Naxos; so using their friendship with Histiaeus as the pretext, he made them an offer' (5.30.3). The vocabulary used also emphasizes the deception: *σκῆψιν δὲ ποιεύμενος* (5.30.3); *μηχανήσομαι* (5.30.4);[42] *ἐπινοέω* (5.30.5); *τοῦτον ὦν δοκέω τὸν ἄνδρα ποιήσειν τῶν ἂν χρηίζωμεν* (5.30.5). In the last sentence Aristagoras gives himself out, as he includes himself in the first person plural verb: Artaphrenes will do whatever the Naxians and Aristagoras want, but Aristagoras works for himself and not for the Naxians.

The case with Artaphrenes (5.31) is similar, with both narrative and reality undermining Aristagoras' arguments. By contrast to Aristagoras' claims, Naxos is not at all a small island but the largest island in the Cyclades and it is not at all close to Asia but about one hundred miles from the coast of Asia Minor; so Aristagoras is lying. Not only does Artaphrenes, ignorant as he is,[43] believe Aristagoras, but he also is so over-

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[40] On the similar arguments about ease and expansionism in Aristagoras' speeches to Artaphrenes and Cleomenes cf. Solmsen 1943: 199. Note that the ease of the enterprise is an argument employed also by Hegesistratus (9.90.2-3) and again here subverted in the course of the narrative (9.102.2, 103.1: the Persians fight bravely and cause the Greeks many casualties). On the similarities between Aristagoras' and Hegesistratus' speeches cf. below pp. 205; cf. also Macan 1908b: 782; Flower and Marincola 2002: 263-4.

[41] Note that the adverb *ῥᾳδίως* has a similar meaning in Thucydides, on which see Hornblower 1991: 241; cf. also Rood 1998a: 34 n. 30 (the first to notice the correspondence between Herodotus and Thucydides). On ease as one of Aristagoras' cliché arguments and its further associations see also Pelling 2007: 179-83 and n. 3.

[42] Cf. Hdt. 5.70.1: *ἀντιτεχνᾶται τάδε*; 1.60.3 (Peisistratus deceiving the Athenians): *μηχανῶνται* (twice). Cf. also Thuc. 5. 45. 2 (Alcibiades deceiving the Athenians): *μηχανᾶται δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοιόνδε τι ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης*. On the use of other similar phrasing in Thucydides, including *μηχανῶμαι*, *τεχνάζομαι*, *ἐπινοῶ*, see Hornblower 2008: 105-6. Cf. also Schindel 1970: 286-7.

[43] Cf. also Kallet 2001: 92.

persuaded that he sends two hundred ships, that is double the number Aristagoras asks for.[44] The enterprise eventually fails and another piece of trickery is being unmasked later on in the narrative: Aristagoras says he is ready to provide loads of money, but he runs out of money to pay the fleet (5.35.1). Self-interest, although shrewdly covert, cannot escape the attention of the reader: the claims presented to Artaphrenes may work to Aristagoras' interest as well. Naxos was at its peak just before the Ionian revolt. Just like Miletus, it was the richest island in the Aegean (5.28). This made Naxos a desirable target for both the Persians, who had none of the islands of the Cyclades under their control (5.30.6), and for Aristagoras, who anticipated to become the ruler of the island (5.30.3).[45]

Aristagoras fairly easily persuades thirty thousand Athenians to help him with the Ionian revolt. And he does so using by and large the same arguments which fail to persuade at Sparta. Herodotus exposes the rhetoric of deception exercised by Aristagoras when he famously concludes: 'it is easier to deceive many people than one' (5.97.2: *πολλοὺς γὰρ οἷκε εἶναι εὐπετέστερον διαβάλλειν ἢ ἕνα*).[46] A very subtle and well-calculated indication of base motivation in the speech is encompassed in the phrase *ὡς οἱ Μιλήσιοι τῶν Ἀθηναίων εἰσὶ ἄποικοι, καὶ οἰκός σφεας εἴη ῥύεσθαι δυναμένους μέγα* (5.97.2: '…that the Milesians are colonists of the Athenians and it is only natural that the Athenians may help them, powerful as they are'). The subject of *δυναμένους* may be either the Athenians or the Milesians. In the former case, Aristagoras evidently thinks in terms of his interests (the Athenians are powerful). In the latter case, Aristagoras uses an argument about the self-interest of the Athenians, i.e. 'we, the Milesians, are very powerful and you, Athenians, could benefit from such a cooperation'. The syntactical

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[44] Another aspect of this development is the sense that Aristagoras does not grasp the power of the forces he unleashes.

[45] Histiaeus, Aristagoras' mentor, makes a similar offer to Darius with reference to Sardinia, the biggest of islands (5.106.6). If one recalls the prominence of Sardinia in the Ionian tradition as the symbol of an ideal place to settle a community (1.170.2; 5.124.2), Histiaeus' promise takes a more self-serving twist: would Histiaeus actually bring this island under Darius' power instead of establishing an Ionian community under his own power?

[46] The etymological meaning of *διαβολή*/*διαβάλλω* is rather neutral ('division/divide'). In the fifth century the meaning of the word takes a negative twist and most often it denotes 'slander' or 'deceit' – with numerous examples especially in forensic rhetoric, as well as in comedy and historiography. On the sense and employment of *διαβολή* see Carey 2004 (note esp.: 'It is regularly viewed as irrelevant material intended to create prejudice, generally by distortion or falsification'); on the meaning of *διαβάλλω* and its use in Herodotus see Pelling 2007: 183-5. Cf. also Hornblower 2008: 338-9.

ambiguity of the phrase *δυναμένους μέγα* leaves no room for common good and ideal motivation.[47] Aristagoras' self-interest is also underlined by the narrative comment that he 'promised everything that came into his head' (5.97.2).

The failure of Aristagoras' petition at Sparta adds to the importance of deceit for a persuasive speech in a different way: when deceit stops, persuasion is hampered. At first, Aristagoras manipulates his arguments carefully and even shows a map, but then he says the truth about the long journey to Persia thereby undoing any chance of a successful speech. It is interesting to see in more detail how this reversal happens.

Aristagoras' rhetoric is proved to be misleading[48] by the narrative, which once again undercuts most of his statements. The argument about the bad fighting performance of the Persians, their weapons and dress[49] is shown invalid by the text. For in the account of Marathon the Persians in their allegedly 'effeminate dresses' are said to frighten the Greeks even by their name, and the Athenians are recorded as the first Greeks 'who dared to look without flinching at Median dress'[50] (6.112.3); and at both Plataea and Mycale the Persians fight exceptionally well (9.40, 62.3-63, 71.1, 102.2-3, 103.1). By contrast to abundant lies and overemphasized material inducements, there is hardly any sign in the speech of any real interest in or anxiety about the Ionians. Neither is there any sign of a prospective Persian attack against the Greek mainland, which is another indication of disingenuousness and corrupt motives.

However, it is debatable whether a specious and elaborate speech, which suggests such a daredevil enterprise, is appropriate for a Spartan audience. The Spartans are notorious for their dislike of long sophisticated discourse.[51] But Aristagoras knows perfectly well whom he addresses and tailors his arguments accordingly. For Cleomenes is not at all the typical Spartan.[52] During his reign Sparta appears less conservative and

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[47] See Baragwanath 2008: 168 and n. 17.

[48] Lang (1968: 31) argues that Aristagoras' speech to Cleomenes is 'so much the stock *Peitho*-speech'.

[49] The same argument is picked up again by Aristagoras at Athens (5.97.1).

[50] Cf. also Pelling (2007: 94 n. 51): 'Nor is a taste for elegant dress a sign of soft unmanliness: notice 1.135.1, where it is a matter of Persian pride that they wear this Median dress, finer than their own as it is, into battle.'

[51] Cf. the Samian speech to the Spartans at 3.46.

[52] On a variant interpretation of the character of Cleomenes and the Spartans (playing with Spartan stereotypes) see Pelling 2007: 187-94.

pursues energetic foreign policy.[53] Furthermore, the preceding story of Dorieus (5.40-8), Cleomenes' brother, whom the Spartans provided with men and sent away with their blessings, shows Spartan interest in colonization. Hence, it would not be strange if Cleomenes granted Aristagoras his request.

Indeed Aristagoras fares very well, since Cleomenes is not wholly negative at the beginning and asks for a couple of days to think about it. When Aristagoras reveals to Cleomenes, however, that the journey from the Ionian coast to Susa takes three months, the king dismisses him refusing any help (5.50).[54] Herodotus is expressive: 'till now, Aristagoras had been cunning and fooled the Spartans right well; but here he made a false step' (*τἆλλα ἐὼν σοφὸς καὶ διαβάλλων ἐκεῖνον εὖ, ἔν τούτῳ ἐσφάλη*). If he wanted to induce the Spartans to invade Asia, he never ought to have told the truth; but he did and said the journey took three months' (5.50.2).

Aristagoras is successful so long as he uses treacherous oratory (*διαβολή*). The very moment he decides to speak the truth, his otherwise great performance goes astray and he loses his audience. It is plainly ironic that the only time Aristagoras actually resorts to truth, he fails. This echoes very much other individuals who manipulate and trick their audiences, like Darius and Themistocles, both of whom perform well when working backstage and consciously avoid open debate.[55]

In his effort to make his speech more convincing, Aristagoras combines verbal with visual, carrying with him a map of the world[56] engraved on a bronze tablet

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[53] On the relative shift and openness in the Spartan policy during the reign of Cleomenes (late 6th to early 5th century) see Baltrusch 2006: 176-88; cf. Griffiths 1989: 54; Hornblower 2002[3]: 121, 216-18 (on the limits of Spartan xenophobia); de Ste. Croix 2004: 421-38.

[54] Cleomenes has strong reasons for his refusal (How and Wells [1912: 350-1] consider this refusal a crucial point in his foreign policy): on the one hand, Sparta was reluctant to undertake distant expeditions as there were past failures in overseas ventures (e.g. Sparta's delusive alliance with Lydia and Egypt [1.69]; the abortive expedition against Polycrates [3.56]; the failure of Dorieus' venture); on the other hand, the position of Sparta at the moment committed it to a policy of inactivity at the prospect of imminent conflicts in the Peloponnese, and especially with Argos, and of an impending revolt of the helots.

[55] See above pp. 62-3 and n. 73. Cf. also Dewald (1985: 54): 'The trickster figures, on the other hand, manipulate situations for their own benefit, in order to accomplish their own political ends…They persuade others to do what they want, or they do it themselves through deception…The trickster figures know that they cannot get what they want through open means'.

[56] The map is typical of the Ionian intellectual activity (Ionian geographers) and Aristagoras seems to be fully engaged in contemporary Ionian intellectual activity (cf. the map of Hecataeus). A comparable connection between map and deception occurs in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. In that play Strepsiades cannot

(5.49.1). But the map instead of reinforcing the speech actually has the opposite effect; it eventually sabotages the speech. When Aristagoras starts interpreting the map, deceit stops and truth comes in, according to Herodotus' comment (5.50.2). Persuasion fails as the map proves that the emphasized contiguity of the several people of the Persian empire ('all the people border on one another')[57] is only intended to conceal the real distance of Susa from the Greek mainland.[58]

The map is then a mere trick, an illusion. Whether one accepts that Cleomenes is so good an interpreter of signs that he sees through the trick and asks the critical question ('how long will that take?'),[59] or whether Aristagoras 'is taken by surprise' by the 'unexpected question' and therefore tells him the truth,[60] does not really matter. What is important is that Herodotus makes Aristagoras ignorant to the lesson he should have learnt from the Samians in book 3: they also support their long speech with visual rhetoric, presenting a bag, and they fail. Prolonged speeches accompanied by demonstration and explanation of an object are extravagant for the Spartans. Furthermore, Aristagoras follows the same practice when he pleads Cleomenes later privately in his house. Aristagoras, holding a branch of olive, presents himself as a suppliant. This branch, however, is both needless and not appropriate for a supplication in someone's house.[61] The bough is as superfluous as the map and the prolonged speech, and this may also count against Aristagoras.

Aristagoras seems to have learnt his lesson by the time he goes to Athens, because the map is not mentioned in the text as an extra help.[62] Since the map has tripped him up, he would be very unwise to use it again. Nevertheless, we deal here with Athens, whose policy is far more energetic and restless than that of the Spartans, and so the

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recognize a map which features in Socrates' school. Aristophanes thus associates maps and all the contemporary science with the sophists, and consequently with sophistry and deception.

[57] Note the pointed usage of ἔχεσθαι by Aristagoras, on which see Pelling 2007: 189.

[58] On the opposite effect of Aristagoras' map cf. also Murnaghan 2001: 69-70.

[59] Dewald (1993: 64 n. 16, 58 and n. 7; 1985: 54) emphasizes Cleomenes' 'abilities to resist the map's persuasive powers', since, being a trickster, he is a good reader of objects. At another occasion he realizes that the cups branded by Maiandrius of Samos are really bribes, and so he tells the ephors the Samian should leave the country, before he corrupts either him or some other Spartan (3.148.2). However, the comment which follows about the folly of telling the truth (5.50.2) suggests that Cleomenes has not in fact penetrated the false claim of 'ease' and that all that rejection follows on the revelation.

[60] See Hartog 1988: 361-2.

[61] See Naiden 2006: 144.

[62] Cf. Pelling 2007: 184. *Pace* Munson 2001: 209.

display of the map would perhaps not be that detrimental. On the other hand, the map might have been simply unnecessary since, according to the preceding narrative, the Athenians at that time were openly at war with Persia (5.96.2) and Aristagoras had every reason to address the Athenians and hope to get their help against the Persians.

Manipulation of real facts, trickery, lies, expediency: these are the qualities Aristagoras contributes when trying to set up an alliance. Stressing the benefits the addressee will get if he agrees on the alliance, is one of the typical motifs of alliance speeches. However, Aristagoras provides us with hints that his aim is to achieve his personal aspirations, even when he elaborates on the advantages that will accrue to his audience. His self-centred motives, as well as the motives of Histiaeus, the other instigator of the Ionian revolt, partly explain the failure of the revolt and largely anticipate the conflicting interests of the Greeks soon after, during the Persian Wars. One may add that it is also important that in this case we have alliances which are designed to sustain a weak cause, since Herodotus has indicated from the start that the Ionian revolt is badly planned. Hence only falsehood can sustain it. Certainly Aristagoras' motives are a significant element. But the ease which he promises to others reflects also a serious miscalculation by Aristagoras himself about the nature of the task he has undertaken. So, though he calculatedly misleads others, he does so on the basis of his own error of judgment.

Before we move to the next test case, I should like to discuss briefly Aristagoras in conjunction with other speeches urging war in the work, particularly those by Miltiades and Mardonius. The passage under scrutiny concerning Miltiades is 6.132. Miltiades – having ensured the *εὔνοια* of his audience through his *ethos*, as he has acquired greater reputation in Athens after their victory at Marathon – persuades the Athenians to give him ships, army and money for an expedition 'without even telling the Athenians the object of the expedition he had in mind, but merely saying he would make them *rich* (*καταπλουτιεῖν*) if they followed him; for he would bring them to a country where they should *easily* (*εὐπετέως*) carry away *abundance of gold* (*χρυσὸν ἄφθονον*)'. The ease of the expedition and the profit the Athenians will get out of it recall unmistakably Aristagoras' arguments. But there is more to it. The Athenians get excited and provide him with what he asks for (6.132: *ἐπαρθέντες*), just as Artaphrenes gives Aristagoras double the ships he requests.

When Miltiades sails for Paros, he uses as a pretext (6.133.1: *πρόφασιν*, *πρόσχημα*) for the attack the fact that the Parians had sent a trireme to Marathon with the Persian fleet. Herodotus intervenes to pin down self-interest as the real reason: 'he was angry

with the Parians because Lysagoras, the son of Teisias, a Parian by birth, had slandered him to Hydarnes the Persian' (6.133.1). When the enterprise fails and Miltiades returns without any money and without having subjected Paros (6.135.1), Xanthippus, the son of Ariphron, brings Miltiades 'before the people to be tried for his life on the charge of defrauding the public (*Ἀθηναίων ἀπάτης εἵνεκεν*)' (6.136.1). Deceit features as the distinctive attribute of Miltiades' speech in the same way it features in the context of Aristagoras' speeches (5.50.2: *διαβάλλων*; 5.97.1: *διαβεβλημένοισι*; 5.97.2: *διαβάλλειν* [twice]).

The same pattern is replicated in the Persian debate in book 7 by Mardonius, Aristagoras' Persian counterpart. A comparison between the two provides significant insight to the Greek-barbarian division. Mardonius' speeches employ many arguments recommended by the rhetorical handbooks (*Rh*. *Al*. 1425a9-28) when one wants to make war:[63] self-interest of the addressee (7.5.2-3, 9.2: expansionism, glory, wealth and fertility of Europe); revenge on the wrongdoers (7.5.2, 9.1-2; 8.100.3); belittling of the resources and the power of the enemy (7.9α.1, 9β.1-γ). The arguments are evidently comparable to those of alliance speeches, but what brings Mardonius' argumentation closer to Aristagoras' is interestingly the 'rhetoric of deception'. Both Aristagoras and Mardonius are opportunists and deceivers.[64]

The narrative undercuts Mardonius' arguments. On the one hand, the description of Europe as a beautiful place (and as such a worthy acquisition for the king) is a lie, since in the *Histories* elsewhere the Persian opulence is in marked contrast to European poverty.[65] On the other hand, Mardonius' personal experience is misleading, since his expedition was a fiasco. That he is lying again about the Greek war affairs and underestimates the Greeks' military skill is evident from the Greek victories at Marathon, Artemisium, Salamis and, finally, Plataea, where Mardonius is defeated and killed. A commentary on Mardonius' treacherous rhetoric is provided this time not by Herodotus, as in the case of Aristagoras (5.50.2, 97.1-2), but by Artabanus, who accuses

[63] They also employ hortatory themes on which see ch. 3.

[64] See 7.6.1: *ταῦτα δὲ ἔλεγε οἷα νεωτέρων ἔργων ἐπιθυμητὴς ἐὼν καὶ θέλων αὐτὸς τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὕπαρχος εἶναι* ('Mardonius' motive for urging the campaign was love of mischief and adventure and the hope of becoming governor of Greece himself').

[65] Cf. the episode with the Spartan and Persian dinner prepared under Pausanias' orders at 9.82.

Mardonius of slander (*διαβολή*) (7.10η.1-2).[66] The similar representation of deceit in Greece and Persia is another thing which brings closer these two different worlds.

2.5.2 Turning a request for alliance into fight for leadership ('how to lose an ally'): the embassy to Gelon

The alliance speeches of the Spartans and the Athenians to Gelon are examples of the speaker's uncompromising insistence, which leads to ineffectiveness. The scene is intentionally prolonged and elaborate to shed light on the constant strife for command among the Greeks in the Persian Wars, projecting it also in Herodotus' time (proleptical function).

The Greek messengers approach Gelon with an appeal for help against the Persians, asking for unity in view of the common enemy. Gelon appears willing to support them on the condition that he will be the general and leader of the Greeks against the barbarians (7.158.5). His request stirs reaction and endangers the unity of the Greeks, as neither the Spartans nor the Athenians can 'swallow their pride'. Although the Greek envoys have already emphasized the need for unity to fight the enemy (7.157.2), now they refuse to negotiate leadership.

The Spartans reply that, if Gelon is not willing to be their subordinate, then they do not need his help (7.159). What they go on to say about Agamemnon's reaction, had he known that the Spartans yielded command to Gelon (7.159: *Ἦ κε μέγ' οἰμώξειε ὁ Πελοπίδης Ἀγαμέμνων πυθόμενος Σπαρτιήτας τὴν ἡγεμονίην ἀπαραιρῆσθαι ὑπὸ Γέλωνός τε καὶ Συρηκοσίων*), again contributes to the division of the Greek forces. The associations of the Spartans with Agamemnon are part of their propaganda to legitimise their claim to the leadership of the Peloponnese and subsequently the whole of Greece.[67]

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[66] The word 'slander' (see above p. 93 n. 46) is also reserved for Histiaeus, who deceives Darius (5.107), and Themistocles, when he addresses the Athenians (8.110). In all these cases, including Aristagoras' case, the word comes directly after the speeches as an authorial comment; in Mardonius' case Artabanus takes on the role of Herodotus instead. This may corroborate further viewing Artabanus as Herodotus' alter ego.

[67] These claims involved not only the Achaean Agamemnon, who was made himself king of Sparta, and his tomb was located at Spartan Amyclae, but also the return of the Heracleidae after the Trojan War (Stesichorus [fr. 39 *PMG*] and Pindar [*Pyth*. 11.16; 31-2; *Nem*. 11.33-4; 8.12] supported this policy). The allegations about Agamemnon were additionally linked with the transfer of Orestes' bones to Sparta. On the Spartan propaganda – a product of the 6th century – see Forrest 1968: 74; Cartledge 1979: 138-9; Alty 1982: 13; Hooker 1989: 129-31; Murray 1993^2: 263. That Herodotus is aware of the propagandistic policy may be inferred by 5.72.3, where the priestess of Athena's temple on the Acropolis forbids

A last alternative offered by Gelon is that he commands either the army or the navy. The reference to the navy rings a bell with the Athenians, who may now conveniently enter the discussion: if Sparta does not want the command of the fleet, this belongs to the Athenians, who have built the finest navy in Greece. This is allegedly the only concession they make for the sake of Greek unity. And this is not the only time we see them compromising for the same reason: due to the dissatisfaction of the allies, the Athenians waive their claim to the command of the fleet in order not to break the Greek alliance at Artemisium (8.3.1).

The Athenians use two more arguments to justify their claim to leadership: autochthony and their role in the Trojan War. Autochthony (7.161.3: 'the most ancient of all Greek peoples, the only nation never to have left the soil form which it sprang'), being one of the four myths of the Athenian identity,[68] stands next to the Achaean origin propagated by the Spartans (7.159). Since the autochthony distinguishes Athens from all other Greek cities,[69] what the Athenians are actually doing here is implicitly doubting the Spartans' claim to leadership. Explicitly they attack Gelon and the Syracusans, who are not indigenous, Syracuse being a colony of Corinth.[70]

By contrast to this indisputable argument, what they say about the Trojan War, taken in its literal sense, is rather weak. The Athenians cut a rather poor figure in the Trojan War, being mentioned with their leader Menestheus in the Catalogue of Ships (*Il*. 2.546-56) and a few other places. However, if this argument is taken suggestively, it then has a double effect. At a first level, the Trojan War stresses the need for Greek unity: just as the Greeks were united and successful then, they have to act in a similar manner now. At a second level, the Trojan War has ironic implications as it marks the lurking danger of Greek disunity: then the Greeks collaborated and won; now there seems to be quarrel over the command which might potentially fragment the common Greek cause.[71]

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entrance to Cleomenes for 'No Dorian is permitted to come in' and Cleomenes replies 'I am not a Dorian but an Achaean' (a word-play on his brother's name [*Δωριεύς* = Dorieus/ Dorian] for which see already Macan 1895: 217). For a multi-faceted discussion of this incident see Parker 1998: 1-33 (on the Spartan propaganda see especially pp. 4-6 and nn. 8, 9).

[68] See further Hornblower 2002[3]: 127-30.

[69] The only other autochthonous Greeks are the Arcadian Tegeans (Thuc. 1.2.3), which explains why autochthony is absent from the dispute between the Tegeans and the Athenians over the left wing in book 9. See also below pp. 184-5.

[70] See Hornblower (2008: 21-2 and n. 27) on the 'youth' of colonial Syracuse.

[71] Cf. the use of the Trojan War argument in the Tegean-Athenian dispute in ch. 4.

In effect, the Greeks prove Gelon's help unnecessary and refuse his alliance. The Athenian answer is revealing: 'we do not need commanders but an army' (7.161.1). And the pompous Spartan statement about Agamemnon with its Homeric resonances[72] sounds inappropriately formal and rather scornful (7.159). In a sense, both the Athenian and Spartan reaction invert the appeal to the pride and power of the addressee noted above as a *topos* in alliance speeches.

It is practically impossible to expect to win an ally in such an unconditional and arrogant manner. Gelon, irritated by their behaviour, comments: 'Men of Greece, have you the face to come here and urge me with your selfish arguments (*λόγον ἔχοντες πλεονέκτην*)[73] to help you resist a foreign invader?' (7.158.1; cf. 7.160.1). Gradual alienation from Gelon is demonstrated by the subtle changes in the language employed: at first they ask for his help, Greek as he is, for a common cause (7.157.2); when Gelon asks for the supreme leadership, he stops being part of Greece and is treated like a foreigner who is asked to help Greece (7.159.1: *βοηθέειν τῇ Ἑλλάδι*; 169.1). Gelon's last words that 'the spring has gone out of the year' (7.162.1) separate him completely from Greece, verifying that 'Greece is one thing and he is another'.[74]

Gelon's answer gives the punch line not only of the episode but also of the relationships between the Greek states, especially between Sparta and Athens: 'it looks as if you have the commanders, but you will not have any men for them to command' (7.162.1). He is right. Besides, being the tyrant of Syracuse, he could not stand going to the Peloponnese and submitting to the Spartans (7.163.1). He is not to blame.

Who is to blame, then? Obviously the Spartans and the Athenians, who turn an attempt to win an ally into verbal duels about who is in charge, thus proving complete inability to respond flexibly to the situation. Neither is this the first nor the last time this happens. A similar rigid attitude featured earlier on in the exchanges between the Spartans and the Argives when the Greeks ask for the Argive help against the Persians (7.148.3-149). The Argives ask the Spartans for half of the leadership. The Spartans deny and offer only a third share of command. The Argives then, indignant at the Spartan avarice (*πλεονεξίην*), consider it better to be ruled by foreigners than yield to the Spartans (7.149.3). In another version of this story, it is stated that the Argives knew

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[72] On the connections of this passage to Homer (cf. *Il.* 7.125: *ἦ κε μέγ' οἰμώξειε γέρων ἱππηλάτα Πηλεύς*) see Pelling 2006b: 90.

[73] The word *πλεονέκτην* neatly echoes *πλεονεξίην* of the Argive speech at 7.149.3, on which see below on the same and the next page (pp. 101-2).

[74] See Pelling 2006b: 91.

that the Spartans would never agree on giving them a share in the command, and they would use this as an excuse for not participating in the war (7.150.3). Soon after the negotiations with Gelon another dispute breaks out, this time between the Tegeans and the Athenians over the command of the left wing just before the battle at Plataea (9.26-7). The audience is further invited to project this fight for leadership beyond the scope of the *Histories* to the contemporary context, the clash between the two super-powers, Athens and Sparta, and the Peloponnesian War.

Gelon's speech suggests yet another indication of egocentrism on the part of the Greeks. In his reply the tyrant reminds the Greeks of a similar past case, when he himself had asked for their help against the Carthaginians. The Spartans had then the chance to avenge Dorieus' murder by the Egestans.[75] In addition, Gelon had promised to help free the trading posts which have been the source of much profit and advantage to the Greeks (7.158.2). Still, the Greeks refused to offer him any aid.

The validity of the argument is, however, questionable. The narrative does not support it. Had such a war and Gelon's appeal actually taken place, this would have been mentioned in the immediately preceding digression describing how Gelon became a tyrant (7.153-6), or at least in the history of Dorieus (5.42-6).[76] On the other hand, one of the fundamental features of Herodotean narrative is the postponement of information for the most effective point, so omission in the previous narrative is not a sufficient reason. Nevertheless, there is no historical record of such war either and there was no time for another Punic War between the accession of Gelon and the great invasion of Sicily at 480 B.C., since Gelon was busy with the other wars related in the digression. Maybe what we have here is a Punic War under Hippocrates, which is here transferred to Gelon, who may have taken an active part in it.[77] A third possibility which undercuts the argument is that Gelon could not make such a claim about Dorieus, for the narrative reports Dorieus was rightfully punished as he transgressed the instructions of the oracle (5.45.1).[78] Still, that Dorieus is represented by the narrative as bringing on his death need not affect Gelon's view of the matter.

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[75] On Cleomenes not avenging the death of his brother and a 'serious and humiliating Spartan defeat in Sicily' see Hornblower 2007a: 172-3.

[76] How and Wells (1912: 196) explain the omission by attributing the story to an independent source. Cf. also Macan 1908a: 221.

[77] See Macan 1908a: 220-1.

[78] *Pace* Macan 1908a: 221.

Whether fabricated or not, the argument reflects Gelon's views on Dorieus and conveniently serves Herodotus' intention to emphasize the selfish motivation of the Greeks. Gelon sees through it and is not convinced by their arguments nor is he shaken at all by the common danger. The Greeks did not help him against his own barbarian enemies and come to him only now that they need him (7.158.3: *νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ περιελήλυθε ὁ πόλεμος καὶ ἀπῖκται ἐς ὑμέας, οὕτω δὴ Γέλωνος μνῆστις γέγονε*).

The readers are invited to see the exchanges with Gelon as a test the Greeks have to pass. If they accept to grant Gelon half of the command, they will prove how much they care about his help and the preservation of Greek unity. But the Greeks expect unconditional help, yield nothing and consequently fail to put collective above local interest.

2.5.3 Constructing a debate to display ethnic feelings: Alexander and the Spartans at Athens

The attempts of Alexander and the Spartans to take the Athenians each on their side at the end of book 8 seem at first sight a set of balanced and straightforward speeches arguing for alliance. Still, far from being a set of rather 'innocent' exchanges, the debate embroils and unveils the fragility of the Greek confederation and, further, the ongoing conflict between Sparta and Athens. These are spelt out in the narrative in a double way: through the Spartan anxiety that the Athenians might in fact fall for the Persian offer and, most importantly, through the construction of the debate by the Athenians for the mere reason to show off their resolve to the Spartans.

Alexander of Macedon brings to the Athenians an offer of submission to the Persians on Mardonius' behalf. If they accept the offer, they will receive the greatest benefits, such as land and autonomy.[79] His speech incorporates three messages: Xerxes' (as reported to Alexander by Mardonius), Mardonius' and Alexander's own. The embedded speeches create an anti-climax in the authority of the speakers, which brings the Persian threat gradually closer to the Athenians: from the ideas of the remote Great King to those of the closer general and, ultimately, to the personal experience of the general's envoy.[80] The proposal becomes also progressively urgent: the initial reward

[79] On the appeals to self-interest see above pp. 85-6.

[80] The announcement of the suggestion of the distant king mirrors once again the indirect character of Persian communication. A similar case is Salamis, where Xerxes dispatches Mardonius to ask the opinions of the generals whether to fight a sea-battle, and record them back to him. The contrast with the free Greek debate is sharp. See also Pelling 2007: 112-13.

becomes a threat and then a warning. In addition, 'autonomy' (Xerxes) is replaced by 'freedom' (Mardonius) and lastly by 'friendship' (Alexander). All this rhetorical embellishment – combined with threats and material enticements – makes the suggestion increasingly attractive.[81]

This speech is, however, subverted by the narrative of chapter 8.136, which indicates it is a trick fabricated by Mardonius. The latter, after getting to know the oracles by Mys of Euromus,[82] sends Alexander to deliver a message to the Athenians (8.136.1). At 8.136.2 Herodotus expounds Mardonius' thoughts in detail and states overtly that the initiative for the mission is Mardonius'. It is important to notice that the focalizer here is Mardonius himself. Besides, later on, at the beginning of book 9, it is Mardonius again who sends another envoy to Athens.

Furthermore, it is not likely that Xerxes is behind all that, since up to this point of the narrative the king is nowhere presented as contemplating, still less of having any firm intention to offer amnesty to the Athenians. Also, there is no hint of a connection between Xerxes and Mardonius after the parting of the forces. Although it has been suggested that perhaps in this case the source of Herodotus attributed the offer to Xerxes, or else Herodotus himself may have considered it incorrect to assign so decisive a move to Mardonius alone,[83] I am more inclined to accept the message as a rhetorical device to achieve persuasion. Had Xerxes initiated the message, Herodotus could have indicated this in his narrative. Here silence is significant, since we are given an explicit indication where the initiative was taken. By ascribing the original offer to Xerxes, the impact of the scene, the authority of the message, as well as the benefits offered undoubtedly increase.

The Spartan speech reinforces the impression of Alexander's speech being fabricated by Mardonius.[84] On the one hand, the Spartan statement *βαρβάροισί ἐστι οὔτε πιστὸν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὐδέν* (8.142.5: 'You cannot trust or believe barbarians at all') alludes, and replies, to what Mardonius says about making an alliance with the Persians *ἄνευ τε*

[81] On the rhetorical elaboration of the speech see Solmsen 1982: 164; Scaife 1989: 136; Masaracchia 1990^2: 228.

[82] See above p. 77 n. 118.

[83] See Solmsen 1944: 244 n. 10.

[84] Another indication of fabrication is the specific reference to Mardonius in the Athenians' answer to Alexander: 'tell Mardonius' (8.143.2).

δόλου καὶ ἀπάτης ('without craft and deceit').[85] Herodotus exploits this standard expression[86] and throws it back again at the face of the Persians: the barbarians cannot even make reliable treaties. Apart from their treaties it may also refer implicitly to their speeches. In other words, Alexander's speech is pure *δόλος* prompted by Mardonius, i.e. the very same thing Mardonius himself rejects in his speech. The idea of barbarian perfidiousness takes, thus, an additional ironic colour.

Besides, the phrase *λεήνας τὸν Μαρδονίου λόγον* (8.142.4) in the Spartan speech means Alexander softens Mardonius' sayings. This is important in two respects. First, it implies that the Spartans also hold Mardonius responsible for the message and not Xerxes. Next, Mardonius' speech to Xerxes at the Persian council scene concludes with a similar phrase (7.10.1: *Μαρδόνιος μὲν τοσαῦτα ἐπιλεήνας τὴν Ξέρξεω γνώμην ἐπέπαυτο*). At that point Mardonius makes false claims that the Greeks are bad fighters and that they did not dare to confront him in a battle. In light of this passage, we may infer that the word *λεήνας* has here the same meaning of 'smoothing over' or, in other words, 'lying' on Alexander's part. And the use of the same verb ([*ἐπι*]*λεαίνω*) for both the general and his messenger may not be random.

Alexander uses the language of diplomacy to report a harsh speech and make the offer tempting, but he fails. It is for the audience to decide whether the Athenians can see through Mardonius' *δόλος* and reject the offer. But there is something more significant here: the Spartan intervention to stress the deceitful Persian offer is not as altruistic and devoted to the common cause as it seems.

The narrative points to the real motivation of the Spartans: they are alarmed at the prospect of an alliance between the Athenians and the barbarians, because they remember a prophecy that the Dorians would one day be expelled from the Peloponnese by the Persians and Athenians. Therefore they send their heralds to Athens in order to prevent an Atheno-Persian alliance (8.141.1).[87] The Spartans then want to protect their

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[85] Cf. also 1.69.2; 9.7α.1. But even the Spartans are considered to be neither trustworthy nor reliable by the Athenians (9.54.1). See also Masaracchia 1990^2: 230. Cf. Hall (1989: 214): 'Euripides' *Andromache* sees Spartans in terms of barbaric qualities including treachery, cunning, duplicity, lust, lust for power, lawlessness, self-aggrandizement, and female freedom – in the cause of the Peloponnesian War'.

[86] It is a solemn standing formula of Hellenic and international diplomacy. See Macan 1908b: 582; Masaracchia 1990^2: 229.

[87] Another case of selfish Spartan motives occurs in book 3: the reason for the Spartan decision to help the Samian exiles was not gratitude for previous Samian service, but rather to avenge the robbery by the

own interests and apparently they do not trust the Athenians. Other hints in the speech reinforce the impression of opportunistic attitude on behalf of the Spartans by pointing forwards and backwards. There is a striking verbal echo in 5.93.2 and 8.142.1: in the latter passage, the Spartans themselves urge the Athenians 'not to interfere rashly in Greece' (*μήτε νεώτερον ποιέειν μηδὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα*); in the former, the allies urge this time the Spartans, who want to restore Hippias in Athens, 'not to interfere with another Greek city' (*μὴ ποιέειν μηδὲν νεώτερον περὶ πόλιν Ἑλλάδα*). At 5.93.2 the Spartans want to deprive Athens of its freedom, whereas at 8.142.3 they appeal to the same freedom and the Athenians' reputation as 'liberators' to dissuade the Athenians from allying with the Persians.[88]

The Spartan words about tyrants working together with tyrants take also an interesting and deeply ironic twist if juxtaposed with the prior narrative. Sparta has clearly supported tyranny in the past. It has cooperated with Isagoras and Hippias, and it would readily accept the aid of Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, upon conditions. Not to forget the contemporary allusions and that at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War Sparta too looks to Persia for allies.[89]

Not only do the Spartans act out of self-interest, but they also appeal to the Athenian interest in a speech which allegedly dwells on the Greek cause (8.142.2: 'for any of the Greeks to do such a thing would be inconsistent with decency and honour; for you it would be far worse, for many reasons'): the Athenians need to live up to their reputation as 'liberators' (8.142.3). And there is also a nice play, as the Spartans accuse the Athenians of expediency in a roundabout way by using the word *ἀρχῆθεν* (8.142.2), which bears a double meaning indicating at the same time the 'beginning' and the 'empire'.

All these references to each city's own advantage gradually spell out the nature and purpose of this debate. The narrative relates that the Athenians deliberately create the circumstances for the conduct of the debate (8.141.2: *ἐπίτηδες ὧν ἐποίευν*): they keep Alexander waiting, before he speaks in public, until the Spartans send their own representatives so that they are present when the Athenians declare their views (8.141.2). Otherwise the speeches would not have been delivered at the same time in

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Samians of valuable gifts (3.47). Note that the focalizers here are the Spartans themselves: *ὡς δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι λέγουσι* (3.47.1).

[88] Cf. also Hooker 1989: 129 (concluding 'So while it is true that Sparta had never been ruled by a tyrant, it cannot be true that she hated tyranny on principle'); Pelling 2006c: 113 and n. 37.

[89] See Macan 1908b: 586; van der Veen 1996: 108 (on their inconsistent attitude).

front of the same audience. Consequently no speaker wins his case, for the audience has already made up its mind and it is not persuaded by the Spartan speech, even if it rejects Alexander's offer.

The Athenians' aim is to emphasize their decision not to yield to the Persians as product of their strong devotion to the Greek nation. The lofty language and stylistic elevation[90] culminate in the celebrated definition of ethnicity (*τὸ Ἑλληνικόν*), thus making the speech a eulogy of Athens as the defender of Greek unity.[91] However, together with the contempt for the Spartan fears (8.144.1), all of this points to yet another direction: it underlies the antagonism between the two most powerful Greek cities, especially since the Athenians separate themselves from all the other Greeks. The debate functions in substance as a performance[92] for the Athenians to show off their commitment to the Greek cause.

The devotion to the Greek nation, which is defined as the community of blood, language, temples and ritual, and the common way of life (8.144.2), is the vehicle to bring to the fore the contribution of the Athenians and the major role they play in the war, as well as their distinguished position among the Greek cities. Such an attitude

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[90] E.g. 8.144.1: *οὔτε χρυσός ἐστι γῆς οὐδαμόθι τοσοῦτος οὔτε χώρη κάλλεϊ καὶ ἀρετῇ μέγα ὑπερφέρουσα, τὰ ἡμεῖς δεξάμενοι ἐθέλοιμεν ἂν μηδίσαντες καταδουλῶσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα* ('there is not so much gold in the world nor land so fair that we would take it for pay to join the common enemy and bring Greece into subjection'); 8.143.2: *ἔστ' ἂν ὁ ἥλιος τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ἴῃ τῇ περ καὶ νῦν ἔρχεται, μήκοτε ὁμολογήσειν ἡμέας Ξέρξῃ* ('so long as the sun keeps his present course in the sky, the Athenians will never make peace with Xerxes'. An equivalent of the latter phrase can be found only in Socles' speech: 'earth and sky will soon be changing places, men will be living in the sea and fish on land' (5.92α.1) (see Macan [1908b: 588], How and Wells [1912: 286] and Masaracchia [1990^2: 230]; they all cite the parallel, and compare it also to Soph. *Phil*. 1329-31). Although in both cases we deal with a kind of tirade against tyranny-slavery, the difference is that, whereas in Socles' case we have only an *ἀδύνατον* employed to emphasize the impossibility of the intended action with vividness (Nenci 1994: 285), here we have something more than a mere similar rhetorical figure. It is more solemn, like in the chorus in Euripides' *Electra* 700-40, where Zeus shows his displeasure at Thyestes' crimes by changing the course of the sun. Correspondingly, it would be an appalling crime, if the Athenians came to terms with the Persians. To the solemnity of the speech adds also the poetic word *ὄπις* (8.143.2) which occurs with slightly different meaning in Homer (*Il*. 16.388; *Od*. 14.12; 21.28; 20.215), Hesiod (*Op*. 249, 706; *Theog*. 222), Theocritus (25.4.) and Pindar (*Pyth*. 8.71; *Ol*. 2.6; *Isth*. 5.58). Herodotus is the only one to use the word here and at 9.76.2 with the particular meaning of the awful regard which men pay to the gods. Cf. also Macan 1908b: 588; LSJ s.v. *ὄπις*.

[91] Cf. also Hohti 1976: 70; Solmsen 1982: 165.

[92] On the performative aspect of speech see 'Introduction' and ch. 5.

alludes directly on the one hand to the tension between Sparta and Athens, and on the other to the tyrannical behaviour of the Athenian empire, which seeks for the Persian help at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.[93] Along the same lines, the characterization of the Athenians by the Spartans as 'liberators' (8.142.3: *ἐλευθερώσαντες*), apart from a reference to the mythical protection of suppliants, also has contemporary echoes since during the Peloponnesian War it was the Athenians who had taken the place of the oppressor, whereas the Spartans were then acting as 'liberators' – this time from Athens.[94] The following and last test case sheds additional light on the ironies of the pompous Athenians declarations.

2.5.4 Threatening with betrayal to achieve unity: employing negotiating tricks to face a non-responsive audience (9.6-11)

Only a few chapters after their robust refusal of the Persian alliance, the Athenians declare at Sparta that they will ally with Xerxes. The prominence of the speech is defined by the combination of three parameters: the inconsistent Athenian attitude in view of the Athenian speech at the end of book 8; the pregnant ironies that emerge in conjunction with the contemporary events; and, most importantly, the use of the argument about an Atheno-Persian alliance as a rhetorical device to achieve persuasion. I shall start with and focus more on the last point; the other two points will be naturally incorporated in the course of my discussion.

Let us see then how the trick works and why this is better understood as a trick.[95] The protracted inaction of the Spartans, after the departure of their messengers from Athens, forces the Athenians to send their messengers to Sparta to settle the matter. Except for reminding the Spartans of Alexander's appealing offer (8.140),[96] the speech

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[93] Macan (1908b: 589) points out another ironic hint in the phrase *μηδίσαντες καταδουλῶσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα* (8.144.1): 'there is only too much point in the participle; the Athenian *arche* was originally based upon opposition to Persia, but opposition to Persia did not preclude *καταδουλῶσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα* – rather it furnished the means and excused therefore. This passage reads so naïvely that it looks early; not like an apology on the part of the *τυραννὸς πόλις* of the age of Perikles, but rather like a bid for the hegemony of a free Hellas'.

[94] Thuc. 2.8 and frequently.

[95] Cf. Pelling (2006c: 114) who also considers the threat 'simply a negotiating trick'. *Pace* Munson 1988: 101 and n. 31.

[96] Cf. the verbal echoes: *τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλην πρὸς ταύτῃ ἐλέσθων αὐτοί, ἥντινα ἂν ἐθέλωσι,...* (8.140α.2) – *ἐθέλει δὲ καὶ ἄλλην χώρην πρὸς τῇ ἡμετέρῃ διδόναι, τὴν ἂν αὐτοὶ ἑλώμεθα* (9.7α.1); *ἔστε ἐλεύθεροι, ἡμῖν ὁμαιχμίην συνθέμενοι ἄνευ τε δόλου καὶ ἀπάτης* (8.140.4) – *τοῦτο δὲ συμμάχους ἐθέλει ἐπ' ἴσῃ τε καὶ ὁμοίῃ ποιήσασθαι*

adds a new touch: the Athenians are well aware that a confederation with the Persians would be *more to their advantage*; nevertheless, they will never *willingly* come to terms with the enemy (9.7α.2). The agreement with the barbarians appears now to be *a non-desirable, but forced last choice*, if the Spartans do not help them. At this already hints the phrase *εἰ μὴ ἀμυνεῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι, ὡς καὶ αὐτοί τινα ἀλεωρὴν εὑρήσονται* (9.6), which precedes the direct speech. Thus, the passage stresses the urgency of the circumstances and introduces the messengers' speech as threat-like.[97]

The ploy goes on in order to put the Spartans under additional pressure. The Athenians accuse the Spartans of indifference: the Spartans feel now reassured when they are almost completing the wall on the Isthmus and they also know that the Athenians will never betray Greece – after the impassioned Athenian speech at 8.143-4; so they do not care to help the Athenians and allowed the barbarians to invade Attica (9.7β.1).[98] The previous haste of the Spartans to prevent the Athenians from agreeing with the Persians is therefore in sharp contrast with their present inactivity and consequently it seems motivated by cold pragmatism.

A serious disparity lurks nonetheless behind this allegedly 'inconsistent' Spartan behaviour: the Spartans have never promised to send reinforcements to the Athenians. They mention nothing about this in their speech at 8.142 – they promise only to 'provide support for all the women and other non-combatant members of their households, for as long as the war lasts' – and leave Athens without replying at all. That the Athenians interpret the departure of the Spartan messengers from Athens with no reply as a tacit agreement to aid them is a possibility. However, the clever construction of this piece of rhetoric and the constant allusions to a supposedly 'broken promise'[99] of the Spartans strike more as a rhetorical means to achieve greater effectiveness.

ἄνευ τε δόλου καὶ ἀπάτης (9.7α.1). Macan (1908b: 603) considers the repetition of the words from 8.140 'very tell-tale and inconsequent'.

[97] Cf. also Flower and Marincola (2002: 109), who state that the indirect discourse used here makes 'the gravity of the Athenians' threat as immediate as possible'. Note also the use of the subjective conjunction *ὡς*, which might imply trickery on the part of the Athenians.

[98] The Athenian focalization here coincides with Herodotus' focalization given at 9.8.2, which might reveal Herodotus' Athenian sources.

[99] Mark also the clever use of the word *προδίδωμι* twice in different context: the Athenians will never betray Greece (9.7β.1: *οὐδαμὰ προδώσομεν τὴν Ἑλλάδα*), whereas the Spartans betrayed the Athenians by allowing the Persians to invade Attica (9.7β.1: *συνθέμενοί τε ἡμῖν* [*τὸν Πέρσην*] *ἀντιώσεσθαι ἐς τὴν Βοιωτίην προεδώκατε*).

Still, the skilfully calculated words of the Athenians bear no fruit, as the Spartans delay their reply for ten days. They do not seem to realize the covert threat of an Athenian-Persian alliance and, only after being prompted by the Tegean Chileus, the Spartans are able to see through the speech and reach a final decision. Chileus merely stresses the obvious point, hinted at also by the Athenian messengers beforehand: if the Athenians unite with the Persians, the Spartans will be in great danger notwithstanding the fortification of the Isthmus (9.9.2) – another argument from expediency. Chileus' advice confirms the narrative of 7.139 (flashback): had the Athenians compromised with the Persians, the wall would have been useless;[100] the Athenian fleet added to the Persian would bring about the destruction of Greece, for whichever side the Athenians joined was sure to prevail.

The Spartans do not seem to realize that by themselves. On the other hand, if we compare the length and the elaboration of the Athenian speech to Chileus' speech, we may infer that the Spartans (on the basis of their reaction towards the Samian speech in book 3) do not understand the point of the speech or even forget its content. Instead Chileus summarizes the substance in two sentences, which set out the threat openly.[101]

The Spartans, known as men of few words, although they take Chileus' speech into account and dispatch Spartan troops immediately, they do not give any response to the Athenian messengers yet. And the Athenians need to keep on playing their game. They now make their point in a succinct and overtly threatening speech, the masterstroke of their trickery: the Athenians will come to terms with the Persians (9.11.1-2: *δῆλα γὰρ ὅτι σύμμαχοι βασιλέος γινόμεθα*).[102] Using forceful language[103] they show disdain for the Spartans, who are presented now as 'having utterly betrayed' the Athenians (*καταπροδόντες*).[104] This way the Spartans are forced to finally give out the information –

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[100] Cf. also Artemisia at 8.68β. The connection of Chileus' deliberation with 7.139 suggests to Flower and Marincola (2002: 115) the use of the motif of 'wise adviser', who expresses and supports Herodotus' personal viewpoint. Lattimore (1939: 24-35) also includes Chileus in his list of 'practical advisers'.

[101] See also Pelling (2006c: 114): 'And yet is Chileos *right* about that, given the genuine Athenian commitment to liberty which the text suggests? There are paradoxes everywhere: it is eventually Chileos' misreading of rhetoric, the failure to identify a rhetorical ploy which the more straightforward ephors find persuasive, which gets the Spartans to do the right thing' (his italics).

[102] Note the use of *δῆλα ὅτι* with the indicative (*γινόμεθα*) to increase the truth of the statement.

[103] See Hdt. 9.11.2: *ὑμεῖς δὲ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν μαθήσεσθε ὁκοῖον ἄν τι ὑμῖν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐκβαίνῃ.*

[104] This is more powerful than what we have in the previous speech of the heralds: there it was the Greeks in general who 'betrayed utterly' the Athenians (9.7α.2: *καταπροδιδόμενοι*), whereas the Spartans only 'betrayed' them (9.7β.1).

in one single sentence of condensed indirect discourse – that their army is already on the march against the barbarians, taking oaths to make the Athenians believe them (9.11.2).

The behaviour of the Athenians creates the impression of inconsistency. The impression is correct: not only the Athenians,[105] but also the Spartans –[106] though the Athenians are genuinely under pressure, unlike the Spartans – and each individual Greek city are motivated primarily by self-interest,[107] something which is amplified by the impossibility of debate among the Greeks at Salamis and alludes further to the Peloponnesian War.[108] Not to mention that Herodotus himself at 7.139.3-4 discusses the possibility that even the Spartans, in a difficult situation and without allies, could have either fought against the Persians or come to terms with them. This mirrors perfectly the Athenian case.

The indications of an opportunistic attitude are there indeed. The speeches give a different picture of the Athenians and, to a lesser extent, of the Spartans, in comparison to the speeches in chapters 8.140-4.[109] But to regard the Athenian attitude as straightforwardly contradictory is to oversimplify Herodotus. And it is precisely in the wide scope of interpretations his work allows that Herodotus' artistry lies.

One has to go carefully through the whole scene to understand the Athenian behaviour as a diplomatic trick.[110] After the Athenians' resolute refusal to come to terms with the Persians and after stoning Lycides and his family to death, for he merely suggested discussing Mardonius' proposals at the assembly (9.5), the formal statement of the Athenian representatives in Sparta *ὅτι σύμμαχοι βασιλέος γινόμεθα* (9.11.2) comes as a surprise. But all this is a part of their strategy to overcome Spartan inactivity. Besides, had they made up their minds to compromise with the Persians, they would not waste their time begging the Spartans and, moreover, the information about the Spartan army already on the march would not change their decision that easily. The frequent

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[105] Cf. also the Athenian behaviour in the digression on the Athenian affairs in book 5: at 5.73 the Athenians ask for the Persian help against Cleomenes.

[106] See above pp. 105-6.

[107] Cf. also van der Veen 1996: 105-10.

[108] On the allusive importance and ironical effect of 9.6-11 with respect to the contemporary historical context see Fornara 1971a: 86. *Pace* Macan (1908b: 593) who argues that Herodotus 'appears quite unconscious of the satire he thus levels against Athens'.

[109] *Pace* Solmsen (1944: 247-8): she interprets the function of 9.7-11 rather unilaterally as merely stressing the paramount importance of Athens' behaviour and performing a complementary function to 8.140-4.

[110] Pelling (2006: 113-14) connects this trick to Themistocles' deceitful behaviour at Salamis.

mention of a potential alliance with the Persians in the narrative context and its gradual introduction in the game of rhetoric decreases the credibility of the argument, rather than increasing it, and presents the alliance as the argument with the greatest effect.

The successive ironies pointing forwards and backwards, both in the text and outside the text, emphasize the urgent quest for Greek unity with its strong contemporary implications. Hohti[111] gives an additional perspective to the function of the speeches, focusing on Chileus' speech, which, Hohti argues, provides the solution of the critical situation and, thus, anticipates the Greek victory.

2.6 Conclusion

Made out of traditional material and feeding the later literature, Herodotean alliance speeches deploy and redeploy generic material which is accommodated to different contexts and audiences. In all the cases, however, a common element is a more or less direct intention to protect one's own interests. The arch-operator and cynic Aristagoras asks for help for the Ionian revolt to save his skin and pursue his private ambition. The Athenians and the Spartans demand Gelon's help without even being willing to resign from half of the leadership of the forces, with the result that the negotiations turn into a quarrel over the command of the Greek forces between Sparta and Athens. The Athenians construct a debate to display their pan-Hellenism in front of the Spartans. And again the Athenians proclaim they will side with the Persians if the Spartans do not assist them.

We have seen how the arguments and the specific language choices, charged with ironies and ambiguity, cloak regional and personal interests which endanger the Greek collectivity. We have also seen the misleading power of rhetoric operating in comparable ways on the Persian side, with Mardonius cherishing his self-serving aspirations. In the same way the stereotypes become unstable with respect to the performance of deceit by both Aristagoras and Mardonius, the Greek coalition becomes rather shaky too as characters overplay or misplay their hands, misjudge audiences and situations. Alliance is desirable, but ends up being ephemeral and as elusive as the speeches which try to achieve it.

[111] See Hohti 1976: 72.

Chapter 3: Pre-battle Speeches

In chapter 2 we examined how the Greeks, through successful or unsuccessful alliance speeches, manage one way or the other to sustain their slender coalition. This chapter turns to speeches delivered after the formation of alliance and before a battle, the pre-battle speeches (otherwise known as *παραινετικοὶ λόγοι*, *παραινέσεις*, exhortations, harangues, *cohortationes*). This genre-specific category includes utterances by generals to their troops to raise their morale before a combat. Although these utterances are not many in Herodotus, they are interesting as they present us with remarkable twists in their purpose. Behind the apparent aim to encourage unity and brave fighting against the enemy lies the feebleness of the Greek alliance, a theme which is also supported by the generic fluidity of exhortations and their employing elements from epideictic oratory. Besides, the juxtaposition of Greek and barbarian exhortations both widens and narrows the gap between the two enemies. All these render the style of Herodotean harangue highly distinctive. The harangue stands out as the product of the redemployment of traditional material and its further development in a way which allows greater flexibility in exhortation and establishes Herodotus as a strong link in the development of exhortation before it takes its polished form in Thucydides.

3.1 Discussion of the genre

3.1.1 Modern scholarship

The necessary condition for this discussion is that one accepts the existence of such a generic category as pre-battle speeches in both real life and literature. The issue of whether they constitute a separate genre or not is controversial because of Hansen's[1] thesis that all exhortation speeches in historiography from ancient to medieval and early modern periods are fictitious; real exhortations were confined in 'a few encouraging apophthegms that, with variations, could be shouted to the soldiers as he [i.e. the general] walked along the front line of the phalanx', and Thucydides invented the literary genre of battlefield exhortation. The evidence Hansen uses to back up his theory is the supposed lack of any treatment of this kind of speech in the rhetorical handbooks.

[1] See Hansen 1993: 161-80; 2001: 95-116. Cf. Flower and Marincola (2002: 134). Similarly Fornara (1983: 162) argues for invention since the content of the harangue was limited in some popular commonplaces.

The nature of battle itself complicates the matter even more since it is only plausible that similar *topoi* will be used in similar circumstances.

Pritchett,[2] on the other hand, argues that these speeches do constitute a separate genre and they are historical; he refutes Hansen's arguments by offering evidence from Graeco-Roman oratory and rhetoric. Among other examples he cites from Greek and Roman history, all of which prove that exhortations belonged to the normal military practice, Pritchett mentions Dionysius' of Halicarnassus *Ant. Rom.* 7.66.3, Cicero's *Phil.* 4.5 and Caesar's *B Civ.* 3.90. Ehrhardt[3] offers another two examples from Roman history, Plutarch *Ti. Gracch.* 9.5 and Caesar *B Gall.* 2.20.1-2. Hornblower[4] also disagrees with Hansen, pointing to a passage in Thucydides (5.69). After giving the harangues of the Mantinean, Argive, and Athenian generals before the battle of Mantineia (5.69.1), Thucydides records that the Spartans sang war-songs to encourage each other and 'calling on their comrades, as brave men, to remember what each knew so well, realizing that the long discipline of action is a more effective safeguard than hurried speeches, however well they may be delivered' (5.69.2). The example overtly indicates that exhortation speeches had been an established rhetorical genre. To these cases we may add others, and among them is a striking passage in Polybius, where the historian, distinguishing between several kinds of speeches, mentions exhortation to troops (*παρακλήσεις*) as one of them (12.25a.3).

3.1.2 Rhetorical handbooks

Beyond the modern scholarly controversy, it is necessary to look at what the available rhetorical handbooks say about exhortation speeches or whether they discuss them at all. The earliest rhetorical handbooks, that is Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, do not contain any specific reference to pre-battle speeches, nor do they classify them under any of the rhetorical categories they distinguish. The same applies to the categories of Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Menander Rhetor.

Still we do find some brief and rather cursory references. Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* when discussing maxims and proverbs mentions as an exemplary case the use of proverbs by the general who exhorts his soldiers before battle (*Rh.* 1395a10-18: *παρακαλοῦντι*). The first of these proverbs cited by Aristotle is significantly a most

[2] See Pritchett 1994: 27-109; cf. Pritchett 2002: 1-80. Cf. also Clark 1995: 375-6 (historical reality and not invented by Thucydides).

[3] See Ehrhardt 1995: 120-1.

[4] See Hornblower 1996: 82-3.

famous Homeric line spoken by Hector: *εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης* (*Rh*. 1395a14 = *Il*. 12.243). Anaximenes uses the term *προτρεπτικόν εἶδος*, which he considers one of the seven types of public speeches (*Rh*. *Al*. 1421b9), but he uses it in a very general way and it cannot be directly connected to the pre-battle speeches. The closest reference to pre-battle speeches that we have in rhetoric is Dionysius' of Halicarnassus *προτρεπτικὸς ἀθληταῖς* (285.5-91 Usener/Radermacher), where Dionysius gives the recommendations for exhortation to athletes comparing it with exhortation to soldiers. Lesbonax of Mytilene composed two speeches under the title *προτρεπτικός*, both of which are speeches by generals.[5] Theon in his *Progymnasmata* refers to the example of a general's speech to the soldiers just before the battle when he talks about *prosopopoeia*, that is the introduction of a character who delivers speeches suitable to himself and the circumstances (115.12-16 Spengel). Hermogenes also mentions a general encouraging his soldiers after their victory as an example of *ethopoieia* (15.24-8 Spengel). [6]

That rhetoric, one way or the other, deals with pre-battle speeches, proves sufficiently they were considered a real-life genre. Yet, the difficulty of placing this kind of speech in one or other category and of dealing with it as a proper literary genre reflects the complex nature of exhortation. The treatment of exhortation in later rhetoricians brings out well the different strands combined in the exhortation: the deliberative and the epideictic – something which is already evident in Herodotus as we shall see later on.

In that sense exhortations are much closer to Isocrates' perception that epideictic oratory includes symbouleutic oratory. This is plainly demonstrated especially by his *Panegyricus* and *Panathenaicus*, both of which are speeches of the symbouleutic kind, which also encompass encomiastic material. Although Aristotle's definition is not as wide, he does recognize affinities between the epideictic and the deliberative genres: 'praise and counsels have a common aspect; for what you might suggest in counselling becomes encomium by a change in the phrase' (Arist. *Rh*. 1367b37-68a1).[7] The most striking example of such a match in historiography is Pericles' funeral oration in Thucydides 2.35-46: it combines in a balanced form the laudation of Athens (epideictic

[5] See Kiehr 1907.

[6] On pre-battle speeches in rhetoric see Burgess 1902: 209-11, 229-34; Pritchett 1994: 35-41; Zoido 2007 (on imperial age rhetoric in particular).

[7] For more details on the introduction and meaning of the term 'epideictic literature' and its relation to symbouleutic oratory see Burgess 1902: 91-103.

speech) with the encouragement to fight for the city imitating the deeds of the dead (exhortation).

3.2 Literary overview:

Before we turn to the examination of pre-battle speeches in Herodotus, we shall have a look at the first literary instances of exhortation and its deployment in other literary genres, ending with historiography.

3.2.1 Homer:

The first texts to introduce us to such a kind of speech are unsurprisingly the epics. The *Iliad* offers a great deal of exhortations[8] and Fenik has proved, in fact, the importance of the exhortation speech in Homer, as it already appears here as an integral and formulaic part of the battle scene.[9] Most of the typical harangue themes that occur in Homer, such as expediency, justice, the possibility and ease of victory, honour, devotion, the customs of the ancestors, necessity, become later on standard components of an exhortation speech. Besides, the form of the Homeric harangue (paired speeches by opposing generals; *epipolesis* [a general's speech to different army groups or different individuals in charge while reviewing the troops] and its variants; generalized exhortations) as well as the function of the harangues (accumulation of speeches to emphasize the importance of the moment and increase dramatic effect; describing tactical plans) exert a more direct influence on the shaping of the exhortation in the historians.[10] The link between Homer and exhortation was so strong and widely recognized in antiquity that Plato makes Ion, in the homonymous dialogue, say his knowledge of Homer is sufficient to make him a good general since he has been taught from Homer to speak the right words of encouragement to his troops (*στρατηγῷ στρατιώταις παραινοῦντι*) (*Ion* 540d-541b3). Although this is obviously a

[8] E.g. *Il*. 2.110-41, 284-333; 4.234-420; 8.228-44; 13.47-59; 16.198-209. See in detail Fenik 1968; cf. Keitel 1987: 153-72. Pritchett (1994: 96) lists some indicative examples. Cf. also Pritchett (2002: 25) quoting Woodman and Martin (1996: 346): 'Military *hortationes* were from the earliest times common in epic (nearly 50 exs. in the *Iliad* acc. to A. Fingerle, *Typik der homerischen Reden* (unpubl. Diss. Munich, 1939) 82-108)'.

[9] See Fenik 1968.

[10] Keitel (1987: 153-72) discusses the affinities between the harangue in Homer and the historians – focussing mainly on Herodotus, Thucydides and Livy – in respect of argumentation, form and function.

misunderstanding by Ion, still the passage acknowledges haranguing the soldiers as an important part of the general's task.

3.2.2 Martial hortatory elegy

Martial hortatory elegy is another antecedent of pre-battle speeches.[11] This genre, being a sub-genre of elegy,[12] flourished in the 7th cent. B.C. and is chiefly represented by Tyrtaeus (frs. 10-12 W) and Callinus (fr. 1 W). Other poets who also composed such elegies are Mimnermus (fr. 14 W),[13] Solon (frs. 1-3 W) and, surprisingly, as shown by some new fragments recently published, Archilochus (frs. 7a-b).[14] Horace in his *Art of Poetry* recognizes the boosting of the soldiers' morale before the battle as the main purpose of elegy and highlights the close relationship between Tyrtaeus' poetry in particular and that of Homer: 'after these, excellent Homer and Tyrtaeus animated the manly mind to martial achievements with their verses' (*Ars P*. 401-2: *post hos insignis Homerus/ Tyrtaeusque mares animos in Martia bella/ versibus exacuit*).

3.2.3 Drama

Drama also often uses exhortations in the long battle descriptions embedded in messengers' speeches or in the lyrical parts sung by the chorus.[15] The first example which comes to mind is the famous Greek cries of encouragement in the battle of Salamis in Aeschylus' *Persians*: *δεύτερον δ' ὁ πᾶς στόλος/ ἐπεξεχώρει, καὶ παρῆν ὁμοῦ κλύειν/ πολλὴν βοήν· "ὦ παῖδες Ἑλλήνων ἴτε,/ ἐλευθεροῦτε πατρίδ', ἐλευθεροῦτε δὲ/ παῖδας, γυναῖκας, θεῶν τε πατρῴων ἕδη,/ θήκας τε προγόνων· νῦν ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀγών* (*Pers*. 400-5). Other examples occur in Euripides (*Heracl*. 824-9; *Supp*. 701-5; *Phoen*. 1143-8; *Hec*. 929-32). In all these instances the exhortation is recorded in direct discourse and the purpose is to increase the tension and anxiety, so that it implicates both the internal and external audience in a bathetic situation.

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[11] On the relationship between the Homeric *parainesis* and specifically Callinus' and Tyrtaeus' elegies see Latacz 1977; cf. also Irwin 2005: 22-9 (with much relevant bibliography), 35-62 (where she discusses in detail affinities of content and context).

[12] On the generic and performative (sympotic context) features of martial exhortation elegy see Bowie 1986 (esp. on the generic 15-16); 1990; Irwin 2005: 30-3. *Pace* West (1974: 10-13) who argues for several performative contexts.

[13] See Cook 1958-59: 28; West 1974: 74.

[14] The image of a coward Archilochus who leaves his shield in the battlefield to save himself (fr. 5) is thus deconstructed. On the new Archilochus see Peek 1985; West 1985: 9-10.

[15] See Burgess 1902: 211; de Romilly 1956: 116-23.

An interesting twist in the exhortation is given in Euripides' *Medea*. In her monologue Medea encourages herself to commit the appalling deed and the playwright makes her employ a typical hortatory motif: 'Into the fray! Now it is a contest of courage' (*Med*. 403: *ἔρπ' ἐς τὸ δεινόν· νῦν ἀγὼν εὐψυχίας*). The effect is all the more expressive since the character delivers a self-exhortation; that is Medea assumes two simultaneous roles for herself: she is both the general and the soldier, a mixture which anticipates her intense internal fight and her emotional outbursts in the course of the play.[16]

Aristophanean comedy uses consistently references to the glorious past, drawing motifs both from exhortation and funeral orations. In this way, Aristophanes expands significantly the functional spectrum of exhortation, which corresponds to the social and political character of the satire and thus becomes primarily political. The choruses in the *Wasps*, *Lysistrata*, and *Acharnians* consist of old men who have fought in the Persian Wars and particularly at Marathon, the most important battle for Aristophanes (*Marathonomachai*).[17] The repeated references to the glorious past and the Marathon victory operate as an exhortation to the Athenian people to live up to the standards of their ancestors and the previous achievements of their city. We may sense the same nostalgic and hortatory tone in *Knights* 1334, when the Demos is said by the chorus to be worthy of the city and the Marathon trophy, or in Bdelycleon's exhortation to the jury to enjoy a life worthy of their land and their victory at Marathon (*Wasps* 711; cf. 682-5).

3.2.4 Historiography

Historiography is the genre which uses exhortation speeches most consistently as it is very much in keeping with their war dominant theme. With Herodotus leading the way – to whose contribution to the development of the genre I shall come back shortly – and drawing on traditional motifs, already known from Homer and elegy, pre-battle speeches take their standard form in Thucydides, which is retained by the later historians, both in Greece – Xenophon (*Cyropaedia* and *Anabasis*),[18] Polybius,[19] Diodorus – and Rome (Tacitus, Livy, Caesar).

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[16] Cf. also Mastronarde 2002: 237.

[17] E.g. *Wasps* 1075-90; *Lys*. 273-82, 667-9; *Acharnians* 179-85, 676-702.

[18] On the pre-battle speeches in Xenophon see Pritchett 1994: 71-82 (he lists and discusses most of them). On exhortations specifically in *Cyropaedia* see Gera 1993: 109-15.

Exhortation in Thucydides acquires its own distinctive strict and solemn style, combined with a remarkably functional flexibility. Together with a more elaborate rhetorical form, exhortation fulfills several narrative functions ranging from deceleration of narrative pace (fulfilling the role of digressions which are few in number) and bringing suspense to a climax by revealing and explaining the psychology and thoughts of the people, their motivation and circumstances. The enrichment of the forms of exhortation based on Homeric material is another important development. Paired exhortations, full and condensed *epipoleseis*, and generalized cries of exhortation are all employed and given enhanced usage.[20]

3.3 Herodotus

The battle exhortation in Herodotus has not been given enough attention. A review of the scholarship to date shows that the dominant trend is that there actually are exhortations in the *Histories*, but they are presented in an incomplete form and are merely the forerunners of exhortation speeches.[21]

Pritchett[22] is the only scholar to have listed the harangues in Herodotus and classified the relevant *topoi*. Apart from his analysis, and Keitel's[23] brief discussion of the several forms and functions of the *cohortatio* in Herodotus, there is no specific study of the battle exhortation in the *Histories*. Even Zoido's otherwise excellent article,

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[19] Pritchett (1994: 84-90) gives a list and brief discussion of the harangues in Polybius. See also Wooten 1974: 243.

[20] On Thucydidean exhortation see Luschnat 1942; Leimbach 1985; Zoido 2007: 141-58. For a list and brief discussion of harangues in Thucydides see Pritchett 1994: 54-70.

[21] See Hansen (1993: 161): 'Harbingers of the genre can be found in Herodotos' (similarly Hansen 2001: 96). But cf. his page 173: 'In Herodotus' *Histories* there is not yet any genuine battlefield exhortation to be found. It must be Thukydides who invented the genre, which was then adopted by later historians and became more and more rhetorical in character'. See also Burgess (1902: 211): 'Herodotus shows the general's speech in rudimentary form'. Deffner (1933: 17-23), Keitel (1987: 153-72), Gera (1993: 111 n. 272), Pritchett (1994: 52-4, 103-5; 2002: 26-7) and Zoido (2007: 143), all accept the presence of exhortation speeches in Herodotus. On individual speeches taken as harangues see Solmsen 1944: 252 and n. 27 (Pausanias 9.60; Miltiades 6.109.3-6; Dionysius 6.11.2-3); Flower and Marincola 2002: 38 (Pausanias 9.60), 134 (Harmocydes 9.17.4). Hohti (1976: 10) rejects exhortation speeches in Herodotus: 'it seems to me that, for example, the exhortation of the generals before the battles are missing from the *Histories*'. However, he agrees with Solmsen (1943: 206 n. 19) that the speeches of Miltiades and (6.109.3-6) and Dionysius (6.11) are battle exhortations (Hohti 1976: 75 n. 2).

[22] See Pritchett 1994: 52-4, 103-5.

[23] See Keitel 1987: 148-72.

where he discusses Thucydidean pre-battle speeches as a brand new form of exhortation, spares only a cursory reference to Herodotus, who is merely mentioned as belonging to the previous literary tradition which provides Thucydides with the parainetic motifs.[24]

Solmsen alone has commented on the further narrative functions of some exhortations in the *Histories*. While discussing the speech of Dionysius of Phocaea in book 6, she appends a footnote where she remarks that, if the speeches of Dionysius of Phocaea (6.11.2-3) and Miltiades before Marathon (6.109.3-6) are examined in connection with their context, then they appear to serve novel functions: they foretell future development, respectively that disorder will bring about defeat and disaster for the Ionians, and that the victory at Marathon will be crucial for Athens.[25] Solmsen observes that what we experience here, with respect to Dionysius' speech and which also applies to Miltiades', is a further development of the Homeric motifs: 'The speech started in the form of an exhortation speech which in epics often announces decisive events. But its second part, which pictures the consequences of discipline and disorder, is an addition to the original exhortation speech of epics'.

The relative neglect of exhortation in Herodotus is largely due to the assumed dissimilarity with Thucydides,[26] who is even credited with the invention of the genre and whom his predecessors use as a model when it comes to the exhortation. Furthermore, Herodotus' tendency not to use consistently standard formulas either at the beginning or the end of his harangues, unlike Thucydides,[27] renders it all the more difficult to identify some speeches as exhortations.

Therefore, the definition of pre-battle speeches in Herodotus needs some adaptation. The scope needs to become wider to cover all the cases when an exhortation is delivered in war context, even if it is not preliminary to battle. A safer guide to this is the combined use of three factors, the content, the placement and the aim of the speech: the content includes the typical hortatory themes; their placement is before a battle (or, in some cases, even during a battle just before the final blow) or before an expedition (Persian Wars); the target is to encourage and inspire the people to fight bravely in the battle/war at hand. The addressee need not always be the soldiers, but occasionally may

[24] See Zoido 207: 143.

[25] See Solmsen 1943: 206 n. 19.

[26] See von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1908: 7; Usher 1969: 23; Kennelly 1994.

[27] See below 'Terminology' pp. 122-4.

even be a general, or, in the case of the Persians, the supreme commanders of the military units.

Along these lines, the following speeches in Herodotus may qualify as pre-battle speeches:[28] Dionysius of Phocaea (6.11.2-3); Miltiades (6.109.3-6);[29] Xerxes (7.53); Themistocles (8.83); Harmocydes (9.17.4); Mardonius (9.42.2-4);[30] Mardonius (9.58.2-4);[31] Pausanias (9.60).[32]

Though such speeches are not normally part of a debate – with the possible exception of Miltiades' speech to Callimachus – they share with debate speeches the practical purpose of persuasion. Hence, it is interesting to look into the way the argumentation is built (potential adaptation of reality, deception, use of paradigms), whether it is tailored to the respective audience and how these speeches connect to the narrative, that is what their function and implications far and beyond the exhortation are.

Next to the aforementioned cases which conform to the criteria listed above, one may add another interesting piece of rhetoric delivered in battle circumstances, which does not employ, however, the common exhortation patterns: the Paeonian remark at 5.1. The Paeonians had received an oracle urging them to march against the Peirinthians and, if the latter called them by name, to attack them, otherwise to not advance. The Paeonians undertake the fight and both enemies decide that the result will be determined by three combats between a man, a horse and a dog from each side. The Peirinthians take two out of three combats, become excited and start singing the paean (*Io Paean*). The Paeonians think this is the fulfilment of the oracle, that is that the Perinthians are calling them by name, so they attack and conquer them (5.1.2-3). The significance of this case lies in the strangely reversed form of the exhortation: the attacked exhorts the

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[28] Most of the passages recorded here are also mentioned in Pritchett's listing (1994: 52-4); some others have also been labelled as exhortations by other scholars (see above p. 119 n. 21).

[29] The hortatory status of this speech is rather ambivalent since it urges Callimachus to adopt the decision to fight, that is that a battle will take place is still uncertain. However, it contains the usual hortatory *topoi* and, even if addressed to one man only, it is still delivered by a general before a battle.

[30] This speech is recorded as a *parainesis* at 9.44.1. Powell (s.v. *παραίνεσις*) translates the word in the particular passage as 'exhortation'. I accept this interpretation.

[31] Deffner (1933: 21) considers this speech clearly a harangue. Hohti (1976: 75 n. 2) disagrees, arguing that Mardonius does not address the troops. The validity of his argument is disputed, as the political system in Persia does not allow the king or his representative to address the soldiers, but only the leading Persians.

[32] Flower and Marincola (2002: 38) consider Pausanias' speech clearly a pre-battle exhortation.

attacker, who, in the context of an oracular response, interprets a celebratory shout as a call for assault.[33]

In what follows I shall start first with the terminology linked to exhortations. Then, I shall discuss the way Herodotus uses the tradition, that is both hortatory motifs and popular wisdom. The kinds of exhortation employed in the *Histories* are the third issue of our interest here. Another focal point is the generic versatility of pre-battle speeches in Herodotus: I discuss the relation between Herodotean pre-battle speeches and deliberative and epideictic speeches, thereby explaining the difficulty of defining exhortation in Herodotus, and the new form it acquires in Herodotus through the combination of elements from different rhetorical genres. Although Thucydides has been considered the importer of this feature into historiography,[34] surprisingly Herodotus already attempts such a match of elements to serve his wider narrative purposes. After this prefatory part, the centre of our focus moves on to the most crucial feature of Herodotean exhortation: its function within the narrow and wider narrative context. Analysing most of the speeches I have identified above as exhortations, I illuminate the ways they underpin the major themes of the dichotomy between the 'Self' and the 'Other' as well as the difficulty of the Greeks to preserve their unity.

3.3.1 Terminology

A variety of words has been used by different literary genres to describe exhortations: *προτρεπτικὸς λόγος* (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Lesbonax), *παράκλησις* (Polyb. 12.25a.3), *παραινῶ* (Plato *Ion* 540D: *παραινοῦντι*), *παρακελεύομαι* (Hdt. 8.15.2; Xen. *Cyr*. 3.3.43).[35] This reflects also the ambivalent character of the exhortation and the difficulty of defining it within a specific literary genre, as perceived especially by the later rhetoricians.[36] It seems that in Thucydides the words *παραινῶ* and *παρακελεύομαι*, as well as their derivative nouns *παραίνεσις* and *παρακέλευσις* respectively,

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[33] For a discussion of the passage see Irwin 2007a.

[34] See Zoido (2007: 146): 'Maxims and exhortative motifs no longer sufficed to meet the new functions demanded of the speech in Thucydides' work, and so he was forced to avail himself of the resources of oratory and rhetoric of the late fifth century BCE, along with the Homeric model, blending the most useful elements of these to achieve his ends'. On Thucydides' relation to deliberative and epideictic oratory see Zoido 2007: 146-50.

[35] See also above pp. 114-15. For more details on the terminology *παραίνεσις*, *προτρεπτικὸς λόγος* and *παρακέλευσις* see Burgess 1902: 229 n. 2. Cf. also Zoido 2007: 152-3.

[36] See above pp. 114-15.

become technical terms for the pre-battle speech. Thucydides always demarcates a pre-battle speech from its context by using one of these words[37] and often by repeating them at the end of the speech in the form of ring-composition.[38] It is, therefore, easier to identify some speeches as harangues in Thucydides, although it is not an infallible criterion as the words do not always introduce or conclude exhortations – of course the context has an important role to play here also.

In Herodotus we come across both *παραινῶ* and *παρακελεύομαι* in connection with exhortations. However, they do not always serve the purpose of introducing exhortation speeches nor are the exhortation speeches always introduced by these words. Most often *παραινέω* and *παραίνεσις* have the meaning 'to advise, to order' and 'a piece of advice' respectively.[39] They are used only three times in the context of military exhortation: Themistocles (8.83.2: *παραινέσας*), Mardonius (9.44.1: *παραίνεσιν*) and Harmocydes (9.17.4 – 9.18.1: introduced and concluded by *παραίνεε* in the form of a ring-composition). *Παρακελεύομαι* is mostly used with the meaning 'to enjoin' (with the following subtle variations depending on the context: 'to order, to command, to instruct, to counsel').[40] In Herodotus it is used twice to denote generalized cries of exhortation only: 8.15.1,[41] 15.2.[42] Likewise, Thucydides uses the word to refer to generalized cries of encouragement, but he also extends its use to speeches of individual generals.[43]

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[37] E.g. Thuc. 2.10.3: *παρῄνει*; 7.70.7: *παρακέλευσις*.

[38] E.g. Thuc. 2.86.6 – 2.88.1: *παρεκελεύσαντο*; 4.9.4: *παρεκελεύσατο* – 4.11.1: *παρακελευσαμένου*; 5.69.1: *παραινέσεις* – 5.69.2: *παρῃνέθη*; 7.60.5: *παρεκελεύσατο* – 7.65.1: *παρακελευσάμενος*.

[39] See Powell s.vv. *παραίνεσις* and *παραινέω*.

[40] See Powell s.v. *παρακελεύομαι*.

[41] Note that Hude reads *παρασκευασάμενοι* at 8.15.1 (given by ms. d) instead of *παρακελευσάμενοι* (given by ms. aP). Immerwahr (1966: 267 n. 83) accepts *παρακελευσάμενοι* as the right reading, based on the following text as well as the repetition of the verb at 8.15.2 (*παρεκελεύοντο*). In both cases he translates as 'encourage by shouts', and he attributes the same meaning in all probability to *παρακελεύομαι* at 9.102.2. Bowie (2007: 108) also accepts the reading *παρακελευσάμενοι* at 8.15.1 which, according to him, 'gives a more dramatic picture than the alternative reading *παρασκευασάμενοι*'. He also translates *παρακελευσάμενοι* and *παρεκελεύοντο* (8.15.2), as well as 9.102.2, as 'encouraging each other'. LSJ (s.v. *παρακελεύομαι*) translates 9.102 as 'encourage one another by shouting'. Powell (s.v. *παρακελεύομαι*) translates as 'give the word' (i.e. 'give order') at 8.15.1 and 9.102.2, and the impersonal pluperfect passive at 8.93.2 as 'orders had been given'.

[42] In neither case does Powell (s.v. *παρακελεύομαι*) translate the word as 'to exhort'; for 8.15.1 he has 'give the word' and for 8.15.2 'enjoin'.

[43] E.g. 7.70.7 (Athenian and Syracusan shouts of exhortation [*παρακέλευσις*]); 6.67.3 (the speech of Nicias).

Intriguingly the word *παρακελεύομαι* occurs in all probability for the first time in Greek literature in Herodotus, who is also the first to use it in the sense of 'exhort'.[44] Herodotus may reflect general usage and Thucydides may simply be narrowing that usage; if Herodotus does not use *παρακελεύομαι* as a technical term, one need not assume Herodotean influence at all at the level of terminology. On the other hand, since Herodotus uses the word less systematically than Thucydides, who in turn employs the word consistently in exhortation contexts, it is tempting to assume that Thucydides might have taken the word from Herodotus and developed its use further through connecting closely, but not exclusively, the word with the battle exhortation framework. But never can one be certain about the dates or the source of influence.

3.3.2 Traditional material:* topoi *and proverbs

Herodotus places himself in the tradition of exhortation through the consistent use of many of the traditional hortatory *topoi*.[45] His speakers, thus,

- give military instructions before the battle (Dionysius of Phocaea 6.11.2);
- invoke the gods (Dionysius of Phocaea 6.11.3; Xerxes 7.53.2; Miltiades 6.109.5);
- highlight the consequences of defeat mainly by opposing slavery to freedom (Dionysius 6.11.2; Miltiades 6.109.3-6; Pausanias 9.60.1);[46]
- mention the rewards to the victors (Miltiades 6.109.3-6; Xerxes 7.53.2);
- refer to achievements of past and ancestry (Xerxes 7.53.1);
- appeal to patriotism and a common goal (Xerxes 7.53.1);
- emphasize the glory of a brave death and the disgrace of defeat (9.17.4);
- stress that valour and not numbers prevails in war: this is implied by the Greek-barbarian contrast drawn by Harmocydes at 9.17.4, which also alludes to the contrast between freedom and slavery, and in general the superiority of the Greeks to the barbarians;

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[44] See LSJ s.v. *παρακελεύομαι*.

[45] On the exhortation *topoi* in the historians see Burgess 1902: 212-13 (based on selected speeches); Albertus 1908: 37-93; Pritchett 1994: 102-5 (Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius). Here I combine the categorizations by Burgess (1902: 212-13) and Pritchett (1994: 102-5).

[46] With respect to the theme of freedom *versus* slavery, Scott (2005: 100) considers it a 'commonplace' mentioned frequently in Herodotus in relation to the polarity between Greeks and barbarians – the Greeks are free and the barbarians are slaves – seen again in Miltiades' speech at 6.109 and Pausanias' appeal at 9.60. However, Scott does not say it is a *locus communis* in the exhortation speeches.

- underline the magnitude of the occasion: on the Persian side, this is demonstrated in Xerxes' speech by the phrase 'if we defeat the Greeks, no other army in the whole world will ever stand against us' (7.53.2); on the Greek side, this is indicated by making clear that the freedom of the Greeks depends altogether on the fight at hand (6.11.2, 109.3);
- underline the wrongs suffered at the hands of the enemy, which justify the war (Mardonius at 9.58.4);
- highlight the possibility of victory based on bravery and compare the forces of the enemy in terms of courage (bravery against cowardice – disdain for the enemy) (9.58.2);
- abate the tone of overconfidence: Xerxes at 7.53.2: 'for as I am assured, we march against valiant men'.

Apart from these motifs, already known from Homer and elegy, Herodotus uses other traditional material in the form of proverbs or maxims.[47] The use of proverbs when exhorting troops must have been quite common, as one may gather from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (*Rh*. 1395a10-18). Proverbs belong to popular wisdom and as such they increase the authority of the speech, since they have a greater impact on the audience.[48] Thucydides also uses maxims (*γνῶμαι*) in his exhortations, mainly in the form of generalizations or universal truths about human nature and affairs.[49] Herodotus uses proverbs in the speeches of Dionysius of Phocaea and Harmocydes.[50]

Dionysius opens up his speech with an arresting phrase, which sounds proverbial: 'things are on the razor's edge' (6.11.2: *ἐπὶ ξυροῦ γὰρ ἀκμῆς ἔχεται τὰ πράγματα*). At the same time and most importantly the phrase bears clearly Homeric resonances echoing *Iliad* 10.173: 'since now for all (the Achaeans) it stands on a razor's edge' (*νῦν γὰρ δὴ πάντεσσιν ἐπὶ ξυροῦ ἵσταται ἀκμὴς*).[51] The epic flavour is strengthened through the use of an additional Homeric word, as Hornblower[52] observes. That word is the verb *ἠγορόωντο*

[47] On proverbs and maxims in Herodotus see 'Appendix 2'.

[48] Cf. Arist. *Rh*. 1395a8-13; Quint. *Inst*. 5.11.21.

[49] On generalizations in Thucydides see Meister 1955; cf. Rutherford 1994: 56-9.

[50] See also Shapiro 2000: 112, 114.

[51] On the epic echo see Deffner 1933: 23 n.1; Solmsen 1944: 203-4; Hornblower 1994: 66-7; Scott 2005: 99; Pelling 2006: 80. *Pace* Hohti (1976: 47 n. 2), who considers the phrase most probably a 'common enough proverb without having any clear connection with the epic'. Macan (1895: 276): 'This proverbial expression is as old as Homer, *Il*. 10.173'.

[52] See Hornblower 1994: 66-7.

(6.11.1) and is used uniquely here in Herodotus, but it occurs frequently in Homer (e.g. *Il*. 4.1; 8.230). If Herodotus wanted his phrase to be merely proverbial, then he would have skipped the nice Homeric reverberation just before Dionysius' speech.

One of the reasons might be that Herodotus wants to exaggerate the Ionian fondness of ornate and pompous speeches.[53] In a similar line, the Homeric parallel drawn might aim at contrasting the two situations and thereby playing down the importance of the moment for the Ionians. However – and this need not mean that any such irony is excluded – since the moment is indeed so crucial for the Ionians, the parallel seems rather to liken the urgency of both circumstances: life at risk for the Achaeans (*Il*. 10.173) and freedom at stake for the Ionians. The use of elevated rhetoric aims exactly at underlining the importance of the battle to follow for the freedom of the Ionians; if they lose, their status will be even worse than before: they will not only be slaves, but runaway slaves. Dishonour and disgrace will be double: they try to gain their freedom from the Persians, but if they do not achieve it they will be wholly responsible for this, as victory is possible provided they endure hardness and toil only for the present time. This is where irony becomes more evident: this elaborate speech is followed by the worst reaction, as the Ionians initially vote enthusiastically for Dionysius, but after seven days they are displeased, demonstrate indifference and stop obeying Dionysius. All this fuss for nothing; lofty language falls on deaf ears. The Ionians always abandon their efforts: they decide to get trained and they abandon training; they decide to get rid of their slavery and they become runaway slaves.[54]

Solemn moments indeed require solemn language. In a similar vein, Harmocydes declares 'it is better to die actively defending ourselves than just to give up and suffer a shameful death' (9.17.4: *κρέσσον γὰρ ποιεῦντάς τι καὶ ἀμυνομένους τελευτῆσαι τὸν αἰῶνα ἤ περ παρέχοντας διαφθαρῆναι αἰσχίστῳ μόρῳ*). This proverbial expression also carries poetic overtones. The phrase *ῥάπτειν φόνον* occurs in Homer *Od*. 16.379: *φόνον αἰπὺν ἐράπτομεν*.[55] The expression *αἰσχίστῳ μόρῳ* – the word *μόρος* occurs once again in Herodotus at 5.21.1: *τούτῳ τῷ μόρῳ διεφθάρησαν* – occurs also in Sophocles and slightly

[53] See How and Wells (1912: 68): 'The word (i.e. *ἠγορόωντο*) in this epic form may be ironically reminiscent of such passages as Il. iv. 1, viii. 230. Elaborate oratory, an Ionic failing (iii. 46), was certainly unseasonable…'.

[54] Cf. also Pelling 2006: 80.

[55] See Macan 1908 b: 625; How and Wells 1912: 293; Flower and Marincola 2002: 135.

differently in Aeschylus.[56] Besides, the use of *τελευτῆσαι τὸν αἰῶνα* is more solemn than the simple *τελευτᾶν*, and this occurs twice more in Herodotus 1.32.5 and 9.27.3.[57] The speech in its narrow context is expressively ironic, since the battle is not fought eventually. Once again, there is so much fuss for nothing. In the wider context, it may serve as a more generalized exhortation for the last battles of the Persian Wars, that is Plataea and Mycale – to this last aspect I shall come back later on.[58]

The historians acknowledge that elements inherited by tradition constitute the raw material on which every harangue is built. Thucydides famously recognizes the themes as commonplaces in Nicias' exhortation in book 7. At 7.69.2 Thucydides reports Nicias' speech in indirect discourse and he comments: 'he said other things too, the things that men can be expected to say when they are actually on the edge of the event and do not bother to avoid giving the impression of using conventional language (*ἀρχαιολογέειν*: 'taking in an old-fashioned way'); instead they bring forward the kind of appeals that can generally be used on all occasions'. In a similar vein, Polybius uses frequently the expression *τὰ πρέποντα τῷ καιρῷ*/*τοῖς καιροῖς* (usually with *παρακαλῶ*) (1.60.5; 2.64.1), just as Diodorus makes use of expressions like *τοῖς οἰκείοις λόγοις* (with *παραθαρσύνω*, *παρακαλῶ* etc.) (13.98.1; 15.74.5; 19.81.6).

Herodotus shows a comparable level of awareness. The key example of this is the pre-battle speech given by Themistocles at 8.83. The speech, although classified as a pre-battle speech,[59] has not attracted much scholarly attention – most likely due to its brevity and compression. Nonetheless, it is crucial to the unlocking of Herodotean narrative strategy in particular with reference to exhortation. In my chapter 'Allocation of Speech' I discuss the speech as a prominent case of silence which attributes to the dramatic representation of Themistocles. Here I wish to look at the speech from a different angle and argue that Herodotus deliberately presents a summarized version of

[56] See Soph. *Aj*. 1059: *αἰσχίστῳ μόρῳ*; Aesch. *Pers*. 444: *δυσκλεεστάτῳ μόρῳ*. See also How and Wells 1912: 293; Flower and Marincola 2002: 135.

[57] See Flower and Marincola 2002: 135.

[58] Cf. Flower and Marincola 2002: 38.

[59] Bowie (2007: 172-3): 'Themistocles' speech is in a long tradition of pre-battle orations that goes back at least to the *Iliad*, but H., having already used a number of important speeches, does not let another one get in the way of the description of the start of the battle'. Immerwahr (1966: 282 n. 127) in particular characterizes this speech as 'a typical general's speech, such as we know from Thucydides and later authors'.

the speech because it contained some of the common hortatory motifs with which the audience was already familiar.

Let us see how the speech achieves this result. The speech is merely suppressed in a few lines of indirect discourse and complemented by authorial comments. We are given two pieces of basic information. First, Themistocles gave a speech which outmatched all other speakers in that it was the only speech to foretell of good fortune, that is victory (*εὖ ἔχοντα*).[60] Second, summarizing the content of the speech Herodotus states it was a comparison of the best and worst in human nature and condition, and eventually he was exhorting them to choose the better.

We are not told what those best and worst things were. This is precisely because Herodotus knows that the basic content of the harangues was familiar and the audience could easily improvise a speech. The reader is thus invited to complete the exhortation himself. We may assume that it was built on antithetical pairs, probably involving the most common harangue antitheses: victory vs. defeat, freedom vs. slavery, bravery/glorious death/honour vs. cowardice/shameful death/disgrace.[61] A long piece of rhetoric at this point would be wearisome, all the more since we have been long waiting for the actual fighting to begin. Herodotus saves the *topoi* for when it suits the needs of the narrative. And Themistocles has already said his old-fashioned speech where it would be most effective, that is in the council of the Greek generals before Salamis, when talking to Eurybiades (8.60α-γ).[62]

3.3.3 Forms of exhortation:

Apart from exhortation speeches by individual generals, Herodotus employs other kinds of pre-battle speeches also, drawing heavily on Homeric examples. The form is somewhat underdeveloped compared to the more systematic form they take in Thucydides. The variants we come across are the following:

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[60] Graham (1996: 321-6; cf. esp. 323: in Herodotus *εὖ ἔχοντα* 'was an accepted form of understatement for victory, victorious etc. in battle') and Bowie (2007: 173) translate *εὖ ἔχοντα* as 'good fortune/victory'. This translation seems to be more preferable than the alternative 'fine/well' used in the Penguin ('Themistocles gave the finest speech there') and the Loeb translations ('Themistocles made a harangue in which he excelled all others').

[61] Cf. also Macan's attempt to restore the general schema of the speech and its impact on the audience (1908b: 488).

[62] On the combined form of this speech (deliberative with exhortation features) see below pp. 131-3.

a) <u>Paired generalized cries of exhortation:</u> The soldiers on both sides exhort each other during the fight. The very first example of such a form of exhortation occurs in Homer *Il*. 17.414-23 during the fight over the dead body of Patroclus; the Achaeans and the Trojans each encourage the men of their side to stand up bravely and fight for the dead man, although there is the prospect of death, because retreat would entail disgrace for different reasons on each side. Thucydides uses the same model in his description of the last naval battle at Syracuse (7.70.7): we are given the shouts of encouragement (*παρακέλευσις*) on both the Syracusan and the Athenian side. In Herodotus there is one comparable case at 8.15.2, where the words of encouragement on both the Greek and the Persian side during the battle at Artemisium are recorded.[63]

b) <u>Paired exhortations:</u> The technique of giving the exhortations of both generals in the opposing camps appears already in Homer. An indicative example occurs in *Il.* 20.353-73, where we are given the harangues of both Achilles and Hector to their companions. In Thucydides the technique becomes so common that rarely do we come across an exhortation lacking its pair on the side of the enemy.[64] These paired exhortations very often seem to reply to or pick up points from each other. Herodotus provides an example very close to these sets of speeches: the speeches of Mardonius (9.58.2-4) and Pausanias (9.60).[65] Mardonius and Pausanias echo each other: *ὑπὸ τὴν παροιχομένην νύκτα καὶ οἱ πάντες ὁρῶμεν διαδράντας* (9.58.2) – *ὑπὸ τὴν παροιχομένην νύκτα διαδράντων* (9.60.1); *ἐπαινεόντων τούτους τοῖσί τι καὶ συνῳδέατε* (9.58.3) – *συνοίδαμεν δὲ ὑμῖν* (9.60.3).[66] There is, however, a slight difference in what they say: whereas Mardonius says the

[63] See also Immerwahr (1966: 267 n. 83): 'these shouts, then, concern the main issue of battle, and they are related to generals' speeches as a fixed literary genre'. See also above p. 123 n. 41.

[64] Paired exhortations include the Peloponnesian generals and Phormio before the battle of Naupactus (2.87, 89), Pagondas and Hippocrates before the battle at Delium (4.92, 95), Nikias and Gylippus' and the Syracusan generals' speeches before the sea-battle at Syracuse (7.61-4, 66-8). On the function of paired exhortations in Thucydides see de Romilly 1956: 138-61.

[65] Cf. Deffner (1933: 21) who considers this speech clearly a harangue and the counterweight to Pausanias' subsequent speech at 9.60. Hohti (1976: 75), although he does not consider Mardonius' speech a harangue, also accepts Pausanias' speech as a counterpart to Mardonius' previous speech. *Pace* Gera (1993: 111): 'Herodotus, for example, has very few military harangues and no pairs of exhortations by opposing leaders'.

[66] Cf. Macan 1908 b: 724, 726.

Spartans fled, Pausanias claims the allies abandoned them (and the Tegeans) and the Athenians.[67]

3.3.4 Exhortation vs. deliberative and epideictic oratory: mix and match

The ambivalent status of exhortation, reflected in the lack of any unanimous terminology, and the difficulty of categorization found within rhetorical treatises, is already reflected in the way Herodotus composes and employs harangues, which is quite similar to Thucydides' attitude towards harangue. The role of the intellectual environment of the late fifth century is very important in this. On the one hand, the sophists introduced the antithetical arrangement of arguments which forms the basis of deliberative speeches (see Protagoras' *Antilogies*; Antiphon's *Tetralogies*; the treatise *Dissoi Logoi*). On the other, epideictic display, which is at the core of epideictic speeches, was also introduced by the sophists and is manifest in scientific, philosophical and rhetorical texts of this period. Antiphon's *Tetralogies* are an early example of *epideixis*. Gorgias' speeches *Helen*, *Palamedes* and the *Funeral Oration*, the earliest examples of rhetorical exercises, are another important example of *epideixis*, all the more interesting as they merge epideictic with quasi-forensic elements.[68] Apparently, deliberative, epideictic and forensic speeches already existed as different strands, and there also were combinations of elements of those strands. These categories are never hard and fast until Aristotle. One should acknowledge, however, that the categories are not rigid but rather subject to dynamic evolution; they are not strictly distinct but they change, incorporate, discard, borrow and mix elements.[69]

In Herodotus, harangues often mix features of either deliberative or epideictic speeches, or even both, and deliberative or epideictic speeches borrow hortatory themes. The identification of points of contact between hortatory and epideictic speeches is rather anticipated, as they serve similar goals: praising one's side and blaming the

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[67] Cf. also Macan (1908b: 724): 'There is, however, some virtue in the word *διαδράντων* here; for it supports the hypothesis that the Greek centre had not all retired on precisely the same point, but that at this moment the Greek forces are at four distinct positions: the Lakedaimonians on the Argiopion, the right centre at the Island, or thereabouts, the left centre at the Heraion, and the Athenians apparently 'on the plain''.

[68] See Thomas 2000: 221-8, 249-69 (in more detail); Long 2004: 17-116. For a discussion on the relation between Herodotus and the contemporary intellectual trends see 'Introduction'.

[69] On the recent tendency to recognize the fluidity of generic boundaries see Depew and Obbink 2000a; Day 2000; Most 2000; Barchiesi 2001; Carey (forthcoming).

enemy so that people are incited into action and invited to meet certain standards achieved by the ancestors or contemporary fellow-citizens.

Let us now turn to some intriguing cases. A neat example of exhortation, which carries with it deliberative and epideictic features, is Miltiades' speech to Callimachus before Marathon. Miltiades' effort to explain in detail the pros of a battle and the cons of avoiding it – moreover since a final decision has not yet been taken – bring it close to a symbouleutic speech on the advisability of a course of action.

Themistocles' speech to Eurybiades is a symbouleutic speech which forms part of a debate. Still, it presents us with an interesting blend of exhortatory elements with deliberative argumentation. On the one hand, Themistocles expatiates on the two possible alternatives, analysing the drawbacks and advantages of both. On the other, in terms of the structure of the argument there is a striking analogy between this speech and Miltiades': the appeal to save Greece against the appeal to save Athens, which is also introduced by similar phrasing.[70] Themistocles' reference to the gods is an additional common hortatory motif: 'Let a man lay his plans with due regard to common sense, and he will usually succeed; otherwise he will find that god is unlikely to favour human designs' (8.60γ).

In a similar line, the dispute between the Tegeans and the Athenians combines deliberative, exhortative and epideictic features. This set of deliberative speeches has been categorised by Pritchett[71] as pre-battle speeches on account of their placement before the battle of Plataea. The employment of the usual epideictic *topoi* (the glorious past; on the Athenian side: the Heraclidae, the Theban contempt of the Argive corpses, the Amazons and Marathon) shows affinities with the epideictic genre.[72] At the same time, such motifs point at further affinities with harangues. Beyond this, in the debate we have a reminder of the fight at hand in the mouth of the Athenians, saying that they should not be quarrelling over precedence in the battle line but be focused on the fight instead (9.27.1, 27.6). Here, they actually exhort the Spartans, the Tegeans and the allies to start the fighting.

Finally, in the Athenian speech there are some indirect references to the polarity between freedom and slavery, one of the cardinal antitheses of exhortations: they defeated the Persians at Marathon (9.27.5); they saved the Heraclidae from slavery by

[70] See 6.109.3: *ἐν σοί νῦν, Καλλίμαχε, ἐστὶ ἢ καταδουλῶσαι Ἀθήνας ἢ ἐλευθέρας ποιήσαντα*...; 8.60α: *ἐν σοὶ νῦν ἐστι σῶσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα*… See Hohti 1976: 65. Cf. also Lang 1984: 57-8; Scott 2005: 382.

[71] See Pritchett 1994: 54.

[72] I discuss in detail the analogies between this pair of speeches and the epideictic speeches in ch. 4.

bringing down the tyrannical rule of Eurystheus (9.27.2: *δουλοσύνην*). One cannot fail to read a further exhortation lurking behind these arguments: 'give us precedence to save Greece from slavery, as we have always been defenders of freedom'.

The communality of a military background suggests also affinities shared between pre-battle speeches and, in particular, deliberative speeches relating to war. These include either speeches advising war or speeches urging an alliance in the context of debates. In chapter 2, I discuss the similarities between the recommendations for making war or an alliance with somebody given in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the *Rhetoric to Alexander* on the one hand, and the speeches of persuasion for alliance and other speeches urging war in Herodotus on the other. Exhortations seem both to draw from and enrich the same scope of argumentation.

Mardonius' speeches to Xerxes eloquently prove the interaction. In his attempt to convince Xerxes to attack Greece he deploys the following parainetic motifs: the fight is just in order to punish the wrongdoers (7.5.2, 9.1-2; 8.100.3); the benefits for the winners (7.5.2-3); the disgrace of defeat (8.100.4); comparison of forces (7.9α.1, 9β.2-γ).

Xerxes uses similar arguments when opening the council in book 7: revenge (7.8α.2-β.3, 8γ.3); rewards to the victors (7.8γ). He begins his speech to the leading Persians with praise of the Persian empire and the ancestors who empowered it, and connects this past with his obligation to continue the tradition (7.8α), not unlike the typical praises of epideictic oratory (cf. Pericles' funeral speech), and, very much like the funeral speeches, he ends with an exhortation: 'If, then, you wish to gain my favour, each one of you must present himself willingly on the day which I shall name; whoever brings with him the best equipped body of troops I will reward with those marks of distinction held in greatest value by our countrymen' (7.8δ.1).

Of speeches aiming at alliance, the speeches of Aristagoras at Sparta and Hegesistratus present similarities with exhortations in the following points: invocation of the gods – although in a slightly different sense, that is they invoke the common Greek gods to stress kinship bonds (5.49.3; 9.90.2); freedom vs. slavery (5.49.3; 9.90.2); rewards to the victors (5.49.2-3; 9.90.2). Next to these speeches one may place Philippides' speech to the Spartans, which also deploys the contrast between freedom

and slavery, the most prominent harangue *topos*, in order to stimulate the Spartans into action.[73]

Other than the generic flexibility of harangue, the interaction between these different kinds of speeches may also be read as a first indication of divisive tendencies within the Greek coalition and the ever present prospect of the fragmentation of the Greek purpose. Persuasive rhetoric demands that common interests are combined with vested interests and the display of one's achievements can make its way through exhortation and advice. The invocation of the gods and of freedom, notwithstanding the sincerity of the claims, is always a clever way to introduce, buttress, or round off deliberative and epideictic arguments. Rhetoric usually works its way through deception, even on the Persian side, where Mardonius stands as the advocate of rhetorical manoeuvring.

3.3.4 The function of exhortations: test cases

a) Greece

a.1) Prefiguring Ionian and Greek disunity: Dionysius of Phocaea (6.11.2-3)

Dionysius tries to encourage the Ionians and to persuade them to undergo military training. For this purpose, he emphasizes the importance of discipline and training for the victory against the Persians – hence the striking contrast between *πόνος* and *μαλακίη*/*ἀταξίη*. By doing this, Dionysius in fact pinpoints the main disadvantages of the Ionians and, eventually, the main causes of the failure of the revolt, i.e. lack of judgment, training and unity.[74] The placement of the speech at this point shows that the Ionians really had a chance to win the fight, had they been willing to work harder. Thus, the function of the speech appears to be two-fold: on the one hand, it encourages the army; on the other hand, it is a prolepsis, in the sense that it foreshadows the causes of the defeat at the battle of Lade, which decides the result of the Ionian revolt.

The references to *μαλακίη* and *ἀταξίη* in Dionysius' speech complement the authorial gloss in the previous passage, which characterizes the refusal of the Ionians to come to terms with the Persians as unreasonable stubbornness: 'but the Ionians demonstrated an uncompromising attitude' (6.10: *ἀγνωμοσύνῃ τε διεχρέωντο*). The scene is rounded off with the Ionians' collective rejection of Dionysius' hard training scheme

[73] See 6.106.2: *καὶ μὴ περιιδεῖν πόλιν ἀρχαιοτάτην ἐν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι δουλοσύνῃ περιπεσοῦσαν πρὸς ἀνδρῶν βαρβάρων*.

[74] On the anticipatory function of the speech see also Solmsen 1943: 204-6 and n. 19; Hohti 1976: 47 n. 3. Cf. Scott 2005: 100.

(6.12.3). Using exaggerated language[75] they equate the training with slavery, compared to which their enslavement to the Persians is far preferable. Eventually they abandon their training.

Let us start with the Ionians' preference for the coming Persian slavery. The Ionian servile nature becomes frequently apparent in the text:[76] the Ionians reject Bias' suggestion to settle a new colony at Sardinia, where they will escape slavery and be prosperous (1.170); the Samians do not seem to yearn for their liberty as they reject the *isonomie* offered to them by Maeandrius (3.142-3). The negative Scythian impression of the Ionians is also telling: 'the Scythians have a low opinion of the men of Ionia in consequence of all this: to consider them as a free people, they are, they say, the most despicable and craven in the world; and, considered as slaves, the most subservient to their masters and the least likely to run away' (4.142).[77]

Now the ease with which the Ionians accept Dionysius as their leader – reflected also in the immediate and straightforward way it is given in the narrative in one line of Greek text (6.12.1: 'after hearing Dionysius' sayings, they decided to take orders from him') – anticipates the ease with which they decide to mutiny against him. Besides, the continuous change of heart of the Ionians demonstrates lack of judgment and control of the situation: they refuse to become traitors, which crowns their initial successes at the eve of the revolt (they burn Sardes [5.100-102.1]; they take control of many cities at the Hellespont and they ally with the greater part of Caria, Caunos and Cyprus [apart from

[75] Note e.g. that the word *παραφρονήσαντες* is used elsewhere to indicate the madness of Cambyses (3.34.3) and Cleomenes (6.75.2).

[76] Cf. also the comparison between the Ionians and the tattooed slave drawn by Munson (2007: 167): 'As the central and helpless element in a triptych, between Aristagoras and Histiaeus, between East and West, they bear a striking resemblance to their ridiculous unspoken embodiment, the man with APOSTASIS branded on his head'.

[77] However, the evaluation of the Ionians by the Scythians should not be disengaged from the contemporary historical context which presents us with a double-edged judgment. On the one hand, there are passages in Thucydides which prove Athenian propaganda and their attempts to emphasize their supremacy at the expense of their Ionian kinsmen, like 1.74-5 and 99. On the other hand, against those one may place other Thucydidean passages, like 5.9.1, 6.77.1 and 7.5.4, where Brasidas, Hermocrates and Gylippus respectively consider the Ionians as servile and less courageous than the free Dorians and identify the Athenians with the Ionians. Additionally, one may also refer to passages where Nicias speaks openly about Athenian reluctance and lack of discipline, like 6.9.3 and 7.14.2 (Nicias' letter). Cf. also Kallet (2001: 93-4 and n. 22) who considers this a further echo which corroborates her comparison of Herodotus' description of the Ionian revolt and Thucydides' of the Sicilian expedition. On the Scythian remark see Irwin and Greenwood 2007a: 21-5.

Amathus] [5.103-4]; they win a fight at Pedasus with the help of the Carians [5.121]), but then they disobey Dionysius and declare they prefer the Persian slavery. This attitude and their *ἀταξίῃ* (repeated twice at 6.12.2, 13.1) lead to the detachment of the cities from the alliance, with the Samians leading the way (6.13.1, 14.3). An authorial gloss at 6.14.1 gives another hint of disunity: 'I cannot relate for certain which of the Ionian contingents fought well and which fought ill; for the reports are confused, everybody blaming everybody else' (*ἀλλήλους γὰρ καταιτιῶνται*).

Ionian disunity also reflects Greek disunity during the Persian Wars and at the outset of the Peloponnesian War.[78] The rejection of a leader who would join all the Ionians and lead them to victory through hard training is not very different from the case when the Greeks (Athenians and Spartans) reject Gelon's request to be the leader either of the infantry or the fleet in book 7. In both cases the problem is one of command and the ability to retain unity. By contrast to the Ionians, however, the Greeks do manage to generate sufficient coherence to defeat Persia at Salamis and Plataea. Clearly there is an intrinsic tendency toward fragmentation, but some degree of coherence is achieved intermittently, even if unity is sometimes produced by sleight-of-hand.

Of course one has always to be alert concerning possible bias derived from Herodotus' sources and the degree to which Herodotus' own attitude towards the Ionians is prejudiced. Scholars have considered the presentation of the Ionian revolt more or less biased, based on several sources, such as Athenian, Samian, or other Ionian.[79] However, looking into the multiple interpretations and vagueness of motivation suggested by the narrative and the speeches embedded within it is more rewarding than trying to find out what really happened and to which group Herodotus appears more sympathetic.[80] Thomas,[81] for example, argues that such a story as the

[78] Tozzi (1978: 43-4) draws particularly the similarities between the battles at Lade and Salamis. Cf. also Munson 2007: 147-8.

[79] On Herodotus' biased stance towards the Ionians see Macan 1895: 277; How and Wells 1912: 69; Cary 1926 (specifically pro-Athenian and pro-Samian); Blamire 1959; Lang 1968; Lateiner 1982; Stadter 1992: 803-8. Mitchell (1975: 87-91), Scott (2005: 103) and Murray (1988: 487-8) argue for pro-Samian sources. On Herodotus' narrative as relatively unbiased see Waters 1970 (he focuses on Herodotus' historical methodology); Chapman 1972.

[80] See Thomas 2004: 27-42; Munson 2007; Baragwanath 2008: 186-9 (esp. on the motivation of the Ionians).

[81] See Thomas 2004: 37. Similarly on the account serving the Ionian's interests Munson 2007: 148-9, 167.

Ionian rebellion against Dionysius' leadership could very neatly serve the interests of different groups at the same time, the Samians, the other Ionians, and even the Athenians. All these anticipate comparable tendencies and self-serving motivations during the Persian Wars. In quite similar ways, the narrative of the battle at Plataea, where the Athenians gloriously retire from the scene as, obstructed by the Persians, they cannot be of any help to the Spartans, and the Spartans fight bravely to the end and win, may be seen as serving both Athenian and Spartan interests.

a.2) Emphasizing self-serving motives: Miltiades (6.109.3-6)

The function of Dionysius' speech in the context of the Ionian revolt is very close to the function of the speech of Miltiades in the broader context of the Persian Wars, and even the Peloponnesian War.[82] Within an otherwise forceful hortatory speech, which allegedly presents us with the usual ideal motives put forward in similar circumstances, Herodotus nests partly egotistical motives.[83] Here, strangely for a pre-battle speech, the noble has been substituted by the expedient.

These motives may be interpreted on a double level: on the one hand, Miltiades presses claims of local patriotism; on the other hand, he presses Callimachus' vested interests. Athens is the main focus of Miltiades' rhetoric. His speech concentrates on the dangers of a potential rejection of a battle for Athens and the future glory which would ensue from a potential victory (6.109.3-6). The argument that Athens will become the first among the Greek cities is repeated twice and alludes clearly to the Athenian hegemony: *ἢν δὲ περιγένηται αὕτη ἡ πόλις, οἵη τέ ἐστι πρώτη τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πολίων γενέσθαι* (6.109.3) – *ἔστι τοι πατρίς τε ἐλευθέρη καὶ πόλις πρώτη τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι* (6.109.6). As for Callimachus, the lure for him is the glorious memory[84] he will leave behind for all future generations (6.109.3: *…μνημόσυνον λίπεσθαι ἐς τὸν ἅπαντα ἀνθρώπων βίον οἷον οὐδὲ Ἁρμόδιός τε καὶ Ἀριστογείτων* [*λείπουσι*]). The lack of a sense of communality and any interest in the common danger which threatens Greece echo the pragmatic arguments employed by Aristagoras in his speech to Cleomenes: there we

[82] On the analogies between the two speeches see above p. 120.

[83] Cf. Baragwanath 2008: 170-1.

[84] But see Scott (2005: 383): 'A *μνημόσυνον* is an actual memorial, not the memories which future Athenians would have'. However, whether it is taken to mean a monument or a memory it does not make much difference for my purposes here.

also miss any reference to the common danger to both the Ionians and the mainland Greeks (5.49.2-8).[85]

His subsequent failed expedition against Paros (6.132-135.1) adds to the vagueness of Miltiades' motivation. Miltiades asks the Athenians to provide him with an army and money to attack Paros and promises great rewards, presenting reasons other than his real self-centred motives (6.133.1). The pretexts he uses as well as the accusation of beguiling the public made against him by Xanthippus in view of the unsuccessful expedition (6.136.1: *Ἀθηναίων ἀπάτης εἵνεκεν*) clearly point to deception.[86]

On the other hand, one cannot escape the recollection of Miltiades' performance at the Danube bridge debate, where he laid out his political agenda championing freedom for Ionia (4.137.1). Although this is in line with his attitude now when pleading with Callimachus to save the freedom of Athens, in the context of the Paros expedition it blurs his motivation even more.

Likewise, Philippides' speech (6.106.2) presents us also with a motivation which is difficult to pin down. Although it might seem as a counterbalance to Miltiades' speech in that it brings into the Marathon narrative the ideal motivation, in fact the two speeches are very close and do not contrast but rather complement each other. Philippides introduces the concept of Greek unity through a double repetition: *ἐν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι, ἡ Ἑλλάς*. Still, we may read an ambivalent motivation here also. Except for the stress on the pan-Hellenic significance of a victory against the Persians, the importance of Athens as the most ancient city of Greece is also emphasized through *πόλιν ἀρχαιοτάτην* (6.106.2). The phrase carries with it implications of autochthony, and thus superiority; therefore, it alludes to Miltiades' argument about the prominence of Athens among the Greek cities. Even if only delicately implied, the hint of Athenian local patriotism, or at least self-interest, is still there.

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[85] But cf. the speech of the Greek heralds to Gelon of Syracuse: 'Greece united will be strong and a match for the invader; but if some of us betray and others stand aside, and only a minority is sound, then there is reason to fear that all Greece may fall. Do not imagine that if the Persians defeat us in battle they will not afterwards visit you, but be on your guard in time' (7.157.2-3). However, expediency is always a readily deployed argument to persuade the other party that the plan to be adopted or the alliance to be concluded is to its own advantage. Motives are hard to unmask; they form the most complicated networks, as both self-serving and ideal arguments seem to be at play. On the blurred nature of motivation in Herodotus see Baragwanath 2008 (see esp. pp. 3-5).

[86] See also above pp. 97-8.

In that sense, Philippides' speech may be viewed as an exemplary speech, which gives in a sketchy way the contradictory character of the Athenians, who try to combine both self-interest and the pan-Hellenic cause. This is a feature shared by both the Athenian people and individuals like Themistocles and Miltiades, which prevails in the Marathon narrative and marks the picture of Athens during the Persian Wars and at the eve of the Peloponnesian War.[87]

Coming back to the speech of Miltiades, he manages to persuade Callimachus. What Callimachus' motives are when accepting to vote in favour of a battle we cannot be certain.[88] Though his role was appreciated by the Athenians and he was commemorated in the Stoa Poikile, his reward in Herodotus is not what Miltiades promises. Miltiades takes all the credit here,[89] whereas Callimachus receives only one sentence relating his death after having fought bravely (6.114).

The focus does not lie on Callimachus; it lies on Athens instead. The speech also anticipates the importance of the victory at Marathon for the Athenians themselves: within the time span of ten years Marathon has already been mythicized and constitutes the strongest argument the Athenians use in their dispute with the Tegeans to claim precedence in the battle line before the fight at Plataea (9.26-7). Along these lines, Miltiades' recurrent argument that Athens will be the most prominent Greek city after a victory at Marathon in effect justifies in advance the Athenian claim for precedence in the battle line at Plataea: the Athenians won the fight and their city is the first city in Greece.

a.3) Supporting and contesting the Graeco-Persian polarity: Pausanias glorifying Athens and Sparta (9.60)

Pausanias asks for the help of the Athenians when the Persian cavalry falls upon the Spartans. He does so by emphasizing the importance of the present conflict, as well as the importance of Athenian eagerness in the war. The fact that the speech actually

[87] Cf. Immerwahr 1966: 250-1; Hohti 1976: 49.

[88] For an interesting interpretation see Baragwanath (2008: 171): 'The narrative of the aftermath, however – where Kallimachos, unnamed (now described simply as *ὁ πολέμαρχος*, the 'War Archon'), is slain alongside many other famous Athenians (6.114) – shifts the reader's focus to the selflessness of the outcome rather than the partly self-regarding motives to which Miltiades had appealed'.

[89] The matter of sources plays an important role and the praise of Miltiades at the expense of Callimachus may be attributed to Philaid bias or even to Herodotus' personal bias and selectivity. To the same Philaid source may be attributed the debate at the Danube bridge when Miltiades defends freedom. See How and Wells 1912: 111; Waters 1985: 148; Scott 2005: 19 n. 60, 24-5 and n. 77, 382-4.

repeats things the Athenians and the readers already know (9.52-7), and which Mardonius has also mentioned in his speech (9.58.2), and so Herodotus reiterates himself, may point to an Athenian source.[90] This is not improbable, as the speech may also serve the function of paying additional tribute to Athens, thus complementing one of the functions of the Tegean-Athenian exchanges won by the Athenians (9.26-7). Besides, the immediately following narrative proves the speech futile, for the Athenians are held up by the Persian forces, and are eventually unable to support the Spartans and the Tegeans.

However, one should not forget that we deal here with a piece of rhetoric which strives to achieve persuasion. And one of the best ways to win the favour of the audience is to flatter it, especially in the epilogue of the speech, which is designed to increase the *pathos*. This is helped by the way in which Pausanias tries to persuade his audience into a certain state of mind, by putting it in the position of the speaker: 'if the cavalry had attacked you first, we should have been bound to come to your assistance, together with the Tegeans, who are, like us, loyal to the cause of Greece' (9.60.2). Pausanias even gives an alternative to make things easier for the Athenians: 'If you are in any difficulty which prevents you from coming to our aid, then send us your archers and we shall be grateful' (9.60.3). So, far and beyond, or even together with, potential Athenian bias, the speech is designed to be all the more effective, and it is this.

At the same time, the deployment of the speech serves also to emphasize the contribution of the Spartans to the present fight. The stress on the urgency of the moment highlights the importance of the occasion and the battle for the Greeks. In this sense then the speech may be also interpreted the other way round: it exalts the Spartan spirit, as the Spartans managed to defeat the Persians and ward them away from Greece at such a critical moment.[91]

Another interesting point which again relates Sparta to Athens is the expression *δίκαιοί ἐστε* (9.60.2). The same phrasing is used by the Athenians in their quarrel with the Tegeans: *δίκαιοί εἰμεν* (9.27.6). In both cases, the notion of something being right or, in other words, of someone deserving something, buttresses the argumentation and the speakers are successful. They present the argument in such a way that there is no

[90] Cf. Macan 1908b: 726. *Pace* How and Wells (1912: 313): 'But it is quite natural that Pausanias, who probably thought he was attacked by the whole force of the enemy, should ask for reinforcements from his nearest allies, and especially for archers to help him against the Persian cavalry'.

[91] Note also the tribute paid to the Tegeans (9.60.2: *χρῆν δὴ ἡμέας τε καὶ τοὺς μετ' ἡμέων τὴν Ἑλλάδα οὐ προδιδόντας Τεγεήτας βοηθέειν ὑμῖν*).

alternative but to accept it: 'if the cavalry had attacked you first, we should have been bound to come to your assistance, together with the Tegeans, who, like us, did not betray Greece; but as we, not you, are bearing the whole weight of the attack, it is your duty to support those who are hardest pressed' (9.60.2); '…then Marathon alone would be enough to qualify us not only for the privilege we are claiming but for others too; for in that fight we stood alone against Persia, and we dared a mighty enterprise, came out of it alive and we defeated forty-six nations. Is it not our right to hold this post for this act alone?' (9.27.5-6). In the latter case, the argument is apparently effective as the Spartans give the position of honour to the Athenians. And the Athenians are now invited to interpret the argument in a similar way: 'you deserved the position and we gave it to you; now we deserve your help and you have to give us a hand'. The constant juxtaposition of 'us' and 'you' in the speech makes the contrast between Athens and Sparta even sharper.

The particular *topos* about the urgency of the fight on which depends the freedom or enslavement of Greece, is also not randomly used. Not only does it foreground the Greek-barbarian polarity which is in question here, it also points to Pausanias' relevant behaviour after the battle of Plataea as demonstrated specifically by four incidents (the first three being rather anecdotal stories): Pausanias and the woman of Cos (9.76), Lampon of Aegina (9.78-9), the Greek and Persian meals (9.82), and Pausanias and Attaginus' children (9.87-8). The common feature of these stories is the moral superiority of Pausanias and the inexplicit but sharp moral contrast between the Greeks and the barbarians. Still, taking into account Pausanias' later career the self/other antithesis becomes in the end considerably shaky.

In the first story, Pausanias saves from slavery a woman from Cos, a prisoner of war – concubine of the Persian Pharandates – thus honouring his guest-friendship[92] with the woman's father, Hegetorides of Cos, and demonstrating himself markedly different from the Persians, 'those who revere neither gods nor divinities' as the woman says in her impassioned speech. In the second story, Pausanias refuses Lampon's invitation to mutilate Mardonius' body to avenge the maltreatment of the body of Leonidas, stating that such things are more befitting to barbarians than to Greeks, and yet even then they are still abhorrent (9.79.1: *τὰ πρέπει μᾶλλον βαρβάροισι ποιέειν ἢ περ Ἕλλησι· κἀκείνοισι δὲ ἐπιφθονέομεν*). In the third story, Pausanias, after ordering the cooks to prepare a typical Persian and a typical Spartan meal, comments on the difference between the luxurious

[92] On the external relations of the Spartans see above p. 94-5 and n. 53.

Persian dinner and the poor Spartan, demonstrating the Persian folly and evidently opposing the Greek toughness to the Persian softness.[93]

Lastly, Pausanias at 9.88 spares the lives of the sons of the Theban traitor Attaginus, for they are mere boys and cannot be accused of medism (*φὰς τοῦ μηδισμοῦ παῖδας οὐδὲν εἶναι μεταιτίους*). This attitude emphasizes Pausanias' noble nature, who knows how to show moderation in victory and has high moral standards in contrast to the Persians, who face everyone in the same way, either they are guilty or not, as seen strikingly in the speech of Xerxes at 7.8γ.3 (*οὕτω οἵ τε ἡμῖν αἴτιοι ἔξουσι δούλιον ζυγὸν οἵ τε ἀναίτιοι*), as well as in their frequently cruel attitude towards innocent young people.[94] As we move on to the end of the work the Spartan behaviour is juxtaposed to the Athenian: the Spartans emerge as more just than the Athenians, who kill both guilty and not guilty without any discrimination (cf. the slaughters of whole populations by the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War); the contemporary situation with Sparta acting as liberator from Athens is very neatly hinted at.

There is yet another strand of interpretation: the attitude demonstrated by Pausanias in these stories lasts until the end of Herodotus' *Histories*.[95] In Thucydides, Pausanias' autocratic behaviour is amply demonstrated: Pausanias later starts communicating secretly with the Persians and espouses the Persian way of life[96] and, furthermore, demonstrates arrogant and tyrannical behaviour (Thuc. 1.95.3). Relevant hints are already to be found in Herodotus, who talks about Pausanias' desire to become master of Greece and his arrogance (Hdt. 5.32: *ἔρωτα σχὼν τῆς Ἑλλάδος τύραννος*

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[93] For we see repeatedly in the work that when poor people are attacked, the soft invader is always defeated, as has been so far the case with Croesus and the Persians, and Darius and the Scythians. It is a recurrent pattern in the *Histories*, emphasized by the counsels of people like Sandanis advising Croesus on the Persians in book 1 (1.71) (see also Hohti 1976: 75; Pelling 2006c: 115-16), Artabanus advising Darius on the *aporia* of the Scythians in book 4 (4.83.1), and even Cyrus at the very last chapter of the work (9.122) – where he warns the Persians to prepare themselves not to rule any more, but to be ruled by others, if they become soft men.

[94] Cf. 4.84: Darius orders the killing of the three sons of Oebazus; 7.39.3: Xerxes orders the killing of Pythius' eldest son.

[95] Note that the first two stories implicitly emphasize this different side of Pausanias' character through the woman's kingly address – in conjunction with Homeric echoes: supplication scene, friendship bonds in the field of battle – and Lampon's words about *kleos* and his kingly dismissal by Pausanias. On these hints see also Pelling 2006c: 115.

[96] Note Thuc. 1.130.1: Pausanias held banquets in the Persian way which alludes ironically to our third Herodotean story.

γενέσθαι ‘when he had his heart set on making himself master of Greece’; 8.3.2: *τὴν Παυσανίεω ὕβριν* ‘the insufferable behaviour of Pausanias’).[97] The allusions to the elision of the distinctions between Greek and Persian conduct are inescapable.

b) Persia

b.1) Urging the necessity of Persian unity: Xerxes (7.53)

Xerxes’ speech in which he exhorts the leading Persians runs more smoothly than any other hortatory speech in Herodotus and looks like a typical exhortation before a battle.[98] Since it consists purely of commonplaces and touches upon themes already known from the speeches of Mardonius and Xerxes in the Persian council scene at the beginning of book 7,[99] it does not seem to add a different dimension to the picture of Xerxes.[100] On the contrary, the speech seems to corroborate some of the features which comprise the picture of Xerxes in the narrative, such as anxiety about his status and devotion to tradition which disclose his rather weak authority.[101]

The speech interacts with the surrounding narrative context in two ways. First, it underlines the bravery of the Greeks. The word *ἀγαθός*, repeated three times, stresses the need for valour against a brave enemy. That need is also stressed by the element of exaggeration: ‘if we defeat the Greeks, no other army in the whole world will ever stand against us’.[102] It is also important that in acknowledging Greek courage Xerxes has taken Artabanus’ previous advice at 7.10α.3 and 10β.1 (7.53.2: *ὡς γὰρ ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι* ‘for as I learn’)

Second and most important, the speech delicately hints at Greek disunity through Xerxes’ emphasis of the need for Persian unity. The same thing is also implied by

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[97] Note, however, the cautious phrasing in both passages: *εἰ δὴ ἀληθής γε ἐστι ὁ λόγος* ‘if the story is true’ (5.32); *πρόφασιν* ‘excuse’ (8.3.2). On this cf. also Flower and Marincola 2002: 12-13.

[98] Note also the parallel between Xerxes’ speech at 7.11 and Pausanias’ at 9.60: *ποιέειν ἢ παθεῖν πρόκειται ἀγών, ἵνα ἢ τάδε πάντα ὑπὸ Ἕλλησι ἢ ἐκεῖνα πάντα ὑπὸ Πέρσησι γένηται* (7.11.2) – *ἀγῶνος μεγίστου προκειμένου ἐλευθέρην εἶναι ἢ δεδουλωμένην τῆν Ἑλλάδαν* (9.60.1).

[99] See 7.5.2: ‘people will think twice in future before they invade your country’ (Mardonius); 7.8γ.3: ‘For, as I learn, there is not a city or nation in the world which will be able to withstand us once these are out of the way’ (put slightly differently by Xerxes).

[100] I disagree with Macan (1908a: 74), who argues that Herodotus is being inconsistent here when presenting Xerxes as ‘brave, courteous, pious, not immodest, not insolent, not egotistic’.

[101] See ch. 5.

[102] Note that the same sense of uniqueness, this time of Athens, is also present in Miltiades’ speech: another affinity between Athens and Persia.

Xerxes at 7.101.2: 'My own belief is that all the Greeks and all the other western peoples gathered together would be insufficient to withstand the attack of my army, still more so if they are not united' (*μὴ ἐόντες ἄρθμιοι*).

Still, all Xerxes says about each individual and all the Persians together striving to achieve a common goal sound very much like contemporary political catchwords. The most striking example is again Pericles' funeral oration, which joins the private advantage with the common. If we compare Xerxes' speech to Pericles' funeral oration then the suggested links between the two leaders, therefore between the Persian and the Athenian empire, become all the more strong – the key difference being, however, that Xerxes can force unity, while Pericles cannot. And if one presses the comparison, one can easily imagine Xerxes' comment that none will resist them if they defeat the Greeks in the mouth of the Athenians, thinking that no one is able to resist them at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.

b.2) Misreading reality: Mardonius' futile exhortations (9.42.2-4, 58.2-4)

Whereas Xerxes' exhortation challenges significantly the self/other opposition, Mardonius' hortatory speeches work in another direction and redefine it rigorously.

Mardonius at Plataea encourages and reassures the Persian commanders and the Greek officers under his service that they will defeat the Greeks (9.42.2-4). The promise of victory is absolutely sane in the mouth of a general who seeks to boost the morale of his soldiers. Their morale has been significantly weakened by the procrastination of the battle and by unfavourable omens (the sacrifices of the soothsayer Hegesistratus 8.38).[103]

However, the argument Mardonius uses is problematic. He speaks about an oracle which predicts the defeat of the Persians if they ravage the temple at Delphi. Mardonius' harangue rests on planning not to lay a hand on the temple. However, the narrative shows the basis of his argument to be empty, and cancels the value of his exhortation. Herodotus relates the unsuccessful attack of the Persians against Delphi (8.39.2), which means that Mardonius misapprehends the facts and builds his encouragement on a fallacy. Even if one assumes that he might ignore the attack against Delphi, the ironic play is still intense.[104]

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[103] Note also the anxiety shared by Artabazus and the Thebans that they may soon run out of supplies at 9.41.2.

[104] On this passage see also above pp. 76-7.

Mardonius' subsequent exhortation to the sons of Aleuas, Thorax of Larissa and his two brothers, Eurypylus and Thrasydaeus – Thessalian medizers – reveals a similar misinterpretation of reality (9.58.2-4). Mardonius thinks that the change in the position of the Greek army is an indication of Spartan cowardice. His speech encompasses a strong rebuke of the Greeks, using exaggerated and sharply sarcastic language,[105] and a vehement attack against Artabazus' 'shameful' suggestion to retreat into the Theban fortifications in the preceding debate (9.41-42.1).

However, neither the Greeks nor the Spartans are the cowards he thinks. He reads strategy as cowardice,[106] and thus misinterprets reality. For the Persians will lose eventually, and it is he, and not the Greeks, who will be punished for his blindness, and he will die before he informs Xerxes about Artabazus' disgraceful policy. Yet it is exactly this policy which, had it been followed, might have led to victory, since the weak point of the Greeks is their fragile unity, a unity which could have been fragmented through bribery. The latter narrative ironically subverts Mardonius' speech, proving once again his distorted perception of the facts: the crossing of the Asopus river is an additional hint at the bad ending of Mardonius and his venture (9.59.1). The river represents in Herodotus a moral boundary, so its transgression is identified with *hybris*, which is ultimately punished – just like in the cases of Croesus crossing the Halys, Cyrus crossing the Gyndes and the Araxes, Darius crossing the Ister, Xerxes crossing the Hellespont.[107]

Barbarian proneness to excess and violation of any kind of limits, including excessive confidence, lead to delusion even for Mardonius, the Persian master of delusive argumentation. Consequently, he unconsciously misleads his audience in his effort to raise their spirit.

c) Between Greece and Persia: Harmocydes of Phocis (9.17.4)

The harangue by the Phocian Harmocydes is an interesting piece of rhetoric in that it comes from a medizer whose status is somewhere between the Greeks and the Persians. The picture of the huge Persian army surrounding the small Phocian army

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[105] See Hdt. 9.58.2: *διέδειξάν τε...ὅτι οὐδένες ἄρα ἐόντες ἐν οὐδαμοῖσι ἐοῦσι Ἕλλησι ἐναπεδεικνύατο.* Note also the rhetorical question introducing the speech 9.58.2: *Ὦ παῖδες Ἀλεύεω, ἔτι τί λέξετε τάδε ὁρῶντες ἔρημα;*

[106] But cf. Macan (1908b: 720): 'to believe that Mardonius represented the Spartan retirement as a *φυγή* would at once lower our opinion of him as a general'.

[107] On the symbolism and the use of the river motif in Herodotus see Immerwahr 1954: 28 and n. 22; Immerwahr 1966: 293-4 and nn. 162, 163.

foreshadows the last major conflict at Plataea and also serves as a parallel for the Graeco-Persian Wars *in toto*.

When the Phocian general Harmocydes arrives at Thebes with one thousand hoplites to join the army of Mardonius, a rumour circulates that Mardonius plans to kill them. In these circumstances, Harmocydes exhorts his men to withstand the attack of the Persian cavalry. After shooting a few arrows and facing the resistance of the Phocians, the Persians retire and no battle is fought.

Herodotus gives two alternatives to explain the incident: either the Thessalians had asked the Persians to kill the Phocians, but the Persians seeing the Phocian defence became afraid they might suffer severely and so they retreated following Mardonius' orders, or Mardonius merely wanted to test the Phocian valour (9.18.2). Herodotus appears rather hesitant to choose between the two options (9.18.2: *οὐκ ἔχω δ' ἀτρεκέως εἰπεῖν*). Mardonius' words transmitted to the Phocians by his herald after the incident that 'you have proved yourselves brave men, quite contrary to the report I had of you' (8.18.3) together with Harmocydes' perception that they have been slandered by the Thessalians (9.17.4), corroborate the view that the incident might have been prompted by the Thessalians; all the more so since they were on bad terms with the Phocians (8.27-31).

The distinction between Greeks and barbarians made by Harmocydes in this passage becomes all the more meaningful if one recalls the refusal of the Phocians to betray Greece and the common cause, when the Thessalians blackmail them (8.30.2). Besides, the Phocians, according to Herodotus, did not medize willingly, although Herodotus underlines that their motives were not ideal: 'now the Phocians were the only people in this part of Greece who had not gone over to the Persians, and in my opinion their motive was simply and solely their hatred of Thessaly. If Thessaly had remained loyal, no doubt the Phocians would have deserted to Persia' (8.30.1-2); 'not all the Phocians had gone over to Persia' (9.31); 'The Phocians had, indeed, warmly embraced the Persian interest, but under compulsion and not of their free choice' (9.17.1: *οὐκ ἑκόντες ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀναγκαίης*).[108]

In any case, the test or mock battle may well take a tellingly different twist if one thinks of the tricks the Phocians have played on the Thessalians before and have used to

[108] Flower and Marincola (2002: 133) suggest that Harmocydes and his soldiers are those of the Phocians who did not manage to find refuge in the mountains together with the rest and were captured by the Persians (8.31-3).

defeat them (8.27-8: the whitewashed men who give the impression of an appalling apparition and the empty jars covered with soil where the Thessalian horses break their legs). The reader cannot help thinking that it is time for the Phocians to play their own game of plotting: all this fuss and such an inspiring exhortation are for nothing.

Konstan[109] has noticed the affinities between the ruses of the Phocians, their fight against the allied forces of the Thessalians and the Persians, as well as their explicit denial of willing submission on the one hand, and on the other, the Athenian nature and their attitude towards the Persians – especially as reflected in Themistocles (including also his approach to the Persians).[110] The Thessalians then are more similar to the Persians. Therefore, the quarrel between the Phocians and the Thessalians may correspond to the conflict between Greeks and barbarians.

In a similar vein, the Phocian incident may be also interpreted in view of the defeat of the Persian cavalry by the Athenians which follows soon afterwards (9.20-4). The bullying attitude of the Persian cavalry complements the test the Phocians are put to (9.20), but soon the Persians are punished, as the Athenians manage to kill the leader of the Persian cavalry, Masistius, and make the Persians retire.

On the basis that the Phocians are connected more to the Greeks than the Persians and that the battle is not ultimately fought, the speech anticipates the battles to follow in book 9 at Plataea and Mycale. That the speech may then serve as a substitute for an exhortation before these battles, or better complete the exhortation by Pausanias, adds to its complex function. Besides, apart from Hegesistratus' appeal for help, that is arguing for an alliance, the battle of Mycale lacks any exhortation.[111] Other than that, the speech, bringing the Thessalians into the game and thus bringing to surface slander and self-interest, engages with the issue of Greek disunity and a shared cause which is either fragmented or in the process of being fragmented or even invoked simply for convenience.[112]

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[109] See Konstan 1987: 71.

[110] Cf. also the similar phrasing: *ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔσεσθαι ἑκόντες εἶναι προδόται τῆς Ἑλλάδος* (8.30.2: Phocians); *…τῶν προδότας γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους οὐκ ἂν εὖ ἔχοι* (8.144.2: Athenians); *οὐ μὲν οὐδὲ ὁμολογήσομεν ἑκόντες εἶναι…ὅτι οὐδαμὰ προδώσομεν τὴν Ἑλλάδα* (9.7α.2-β.1: Athenians).

[111] See also above pp. 126-7.

[112] Cf. Baragwanath 2008: 171-2.

3.4 Harangues and Herodotean narrative

It is interesting to look at the way Herodotus employs exhortation in his narrative, all the more so since this complements the flexibility of this kind of speeches in the *Histories*. In terms of narrative placement, pre-battle speeches in Herodotus are not to be found where expected and, likewise, they do not always have the elaboration and force expected. Any long inspiring exhortation speech by a prominent general is lacking. For example, anyone who expects to read a lengthy piece of refined hortatory rhetoric by Themistocles will be disappointed. Strangely enough, Dionysius and Harmocydes, both of whom appear only once in the narrative and play a minor role, are allowed forceful exhortations with distinct Homeric and other poetic resonances. Similarly, there is not one proper exhortation before the great battles of Marathon, Thermopylae, Plataea and Mycale.

All this is part and parcel of Herodotus' elaborate narrative technique. Herodotus is an unconventional writer. Accordingly, he embraces several kinds of traditional material and gives these new forms and functions, making them an integral part of a monumental authorial enterprise which can be understood – though never fully – only if speech and narrative are constantly and actively juxtaposed with each other. Variety and flexibility, which thus emerge as principal qualities of Herodotus' composition, describe also the function and the form of exhortation in Herodotus, as we have already seen. Narrative pace is another significant reason which drives Herodotus' choices.[113]

Bearing these things in mind, omission of pre-battle speeches should not be interpreted as authorial deficiency. Several kinds of speeches, if not exhortations, are placed by Herodotus before all major conflicts. This emphasizes what is at stake every time.[114] If there is no pre-battle speech before Mycale, Hegesistratus' speech contains similar hortatory motifs. If there is no harangue at Thermopylae, this is to emphasize the bravery of the Spartans who willingly decide to stay and fight to the death. The exchanges between Xerxes and Demaratus (7.101-5, 209) as well as Dieneces' bold statement 'then we shall have our battle in the shade' (7.226) all serve the same purpose.

Then, there is the way that the allocation of exhortations reflects Herodotus' attitude towards the polarity between Greeks and Persians. The effect is double. On the one hand, Herodotus seems to feed this polarity. Indeed, pre-battle speeches occur from

[113] See ch. 5.

[114] Cf. Flower and Marincola 2002: 211.

book 6 onwards, that is when the scenery has already been transferred to Greek ground. Before that, we do not come across any exhortation in the Persian court: Croesus, Cyrus, Cambyses, and Darius are never allowed an exhortation. This observation seems to be also in line with the constitutional context: in a monarchy the soldiers are merely slaves serving the king; if they retreat they are flogged to move forward again (cf. Xerxes at 7.103.4);[115] harangue is not needed in such a context. Whenever we are given Persian exhortation it is in the mouths of either Xerxes or Mardonius, who do not address the whole army, but only the leading Persians, or the officers and leading commanders. By contrast, the Greeks fight for their freedom, their families, their ancestors, and they need to be reminded of all these things before the fight to be encouraged. Besides, what prevails in all Greek exhortations, all the more so what makes the speeches qualify as exhortations, is to a great extent the reminder that the situation is urgent since the freedom of Greece is at stake.

On the other hand, through exhortations Herodotus also invites his readers to challenge the Graeco-Persian polarity. The Persians are not that different. After all they too exhort deploying motifs similar to those of the Greeks – though not freedom.[116] Indeed, the Persian expedition against Greece starts more solemnly with an exhortation by Xerxes, whereas the Greeks are presented as unable to deliver any comparable hortatory speech before the great battles. This last point also mirrors once again the lack of unity: in the midst of disagreements and successive debates, there is neither time nor particular interest in haranguing the troops. Ironically enough, the Greeks do not seem to have anything similar to counterpoise Xerxes' lecture on a common cause (7.53.1), but merely a lack of a sense of common achievement, something which is evident also in their debates.[117]

There is yet another dimension: the narrative play of ironies and subversion, raising expectations and disappointing them. Barbarian exhortations deepen the *pathos* and intensify the irony. Xerxes is made to deliver an excellent exhortation before the

[115] Cf. also 8.86 where the Persians fight better at Salamis than at Euboea being afraid of Xerxes' presence; still they do not win.

[116] See above pp. 124-5, 142-4. Cf. the comparable treatment of Persian and Assyrian harangues by Xenophon. In *Cyropaedia* 3.3.34-45 Cyrus himself exhorts his peers, his companions from his earliest youth, and the rearguard officers; he also reports the exhortation of the Assyrian king in direct speech, which is very similar to Cyrus' own. See also Gera (1993: 112), who suggests that the similarities between the two harangues demonstrate that 'the two opponents, Assyrians and Persians, go to war according to the same rule and share the same values'.

[117] See ch. 1.

Persians set off for a war which is ultimately lost. Greek exhortations are cut short. The most proper exhortations are voiced by the Phocian Harmocydes, a medizer, who appears in the text only once, in the context of a mock battle, and Dionysius, whose exhortation goes astray as the Ionians reject his leadership and lose the war.

3.5 Conclusion

The traditional purpose of exhortation is to transmit a sense of excelling oneself in service of one's country. Herodotus uses this as his canvas against which he sets his variant exhortation. Although in Thucydides we are on more solid ground, as exhortations take their final shape as a genre, Herodotus' technique is of equal or more interest. Exhortation in Herodotus carries further implications and invites further associations.

That Herodotus departs from the typical hortatory motifs and the confined purposes of harangues is evident if one juxtaposes speech with narrative, a reading to which Herodotus himself guides us. Part of this departure, and in consequence of the new functions exhortation needs to serve, is the coupling of features from epideictic and deliberative oratory. Different categories are intermeshed with each other and constitute part of a conscious narrative plan, which subtly brings to the fore the relativity and dangerous balance of the seemingly harmonious relationship between the Greeks and severely problematizes and questions the self/other distinction.

Chapter 4: Paradigmatic speeches

After exploring generic speech categories which conform with and serve wider narrative themes, it is time to look more closely at specific kinds of arguments employed in the speeches: the examples (*paradeigmata*). The notion of 'paradigm' in general and in Herodotus in particular, as we shall see, covers a wide spectrum which includes fables (*ainoi*),[1] mythological examples, and historical examples from distant or recent (in some cases very recent) past. The coined term 'paradigmatic speeches' is used to cover both speeches whose argumentation is entirely based on the deployment of certain examples and speeches in which examples form a part of the argumentation, thus performing subsidiary but nonetheless important functions.

The inclusion of a chapter focused especially on paradigms is not random. On the one hand, the analysis from the general to the gradually more specific (debates, alliance speeches, pre-battle speeches, paradigmatic speeches) reinforces the perception of the work as a unified body. On the other hand, the paradigms are particularly significant as their nature is intimately connected to the purpose of the *Histories*. This purpose, as already mentioned in the 'Introduction', is primarily didactic: the *Histories* allude to and invite associations with the contemporary historical context, serve as a warning to newly emerging empires, and their message transcends the limits of time and space.[2] Accordingly, the speakers use the examples to draw similarities between their stories and the current situations they address, in order to teach the audience a lesson. The purpose of the examples is also instructive: they suggest a course of action to be followed or avoided by the addressee.

Taking this as a premise, it is interesting to see how Herodotus uses the examples in the mouths of individuals, that is when the focalization is other than authorial, in

[1] See *OCD*[3] s.v. *fable*: 'a short story in the popular tradition of Greece and other ancient cultures…They usually deal with a conflict in which animals speak and intervene, but the characters may also be plants, sundry objects, men, or gods. Fable normally deals with the triumph of the strong, but also portrays the cunning of the weak and their mockery of, or triumph over, the powerful. Fables also stress the impossibility of changing nature; some give aetiological explanations. Most often there is a comic element; sometimes the 'situation' of a protagonist is depicted, from which the audience may draw analogies…'. Cf. Zafiropoulos (2001: 1): 'The Greek fable is a brief and simple fictitious story with a constant structure, generally with animal protagonists (but also humans, gods, and inanimate objects, e.g. trees), which gives an exemplary and popular message on practical ethics and which comments, usually in a cautionary way, on the course of action to be followed or avoided in a particular situation'.

[2] See above pp. 20-1.

order to buttress the themes of Greek disunity and the relation between the self and the Other. In other words, and to make a word-play of the kind Herodotus so much enjoys, I shall demonstrate *how the examples exemplify* the dominating narrative themes. It will be shown that the use of paradigms is in keeping with the general gist of speaking in the *Histories* where speech limitations are present and discourse gets warped regardless of the political context and in ways that are suggestive of fragmenting tendencies within the Greek alliance.

4.1 Literary overview

Before turning to our subject proper, it is fundamental to our analysis to explore Herodotus' place in and position relative to the tradition of storytelling and employment of examples – which supplies Herodotus with the stock material he deploys, reworks and tailors to the respective context – as well as the way he is connected to later literature. Our discussion, thus, opens up with a brief overview of the use of different kinds of examples in other literary genres and moves on to historiography and the *Histories*.

4.1.1 Rhetorical handbooks

Prior to turning to the specific literary uses of *exempla*, let us look first at what the earliest systematic rhetorical treatises, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the so-called *Rhetoric to Alexander*, say about *exempla*. Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* defines the example (*παράδειγμα*) as one of the two kinds of logical proof (*πίστεις*) (the other being the *enthymeme*) common to all three kinds of rhetorical speeches (forensic, deliberative, epideictic) and discusses it in detail (*Rh*. 1356a34-1356b11, 1393a28-1394a18). He also distinguishes between two different types of examples: those which involve relating things that have happened before and those which the speaker invents himself. These 'fictitious' examples are further divided into comparison (*παραβολή*) or fable (*λόγος*) (*Rh*. 1393a28-31).

In a similar vein, the *Rhetoric to Alexander* emphasizes the importance of examples (events of the past and those occurring now), either comparable or opposite to the situation at hand, to illustrate and thus corroborate one's argument (*Rh*. *Al*. 1429a21-1430a13).[3] Next to these two passages one may place the emphasis Isocrates puts on the

[3] The same line is followed by later orators, who all emphasize the importance of examples in argumentation. Cf. Cic. *Inv. Rhet.* 1.47; Quint. *Inst*. 5.11.1-2; 6; *Rhet. Her*. 4.49.62.

importance of the use of the 'right historical example at the proper moment' (*Paneg*. 9-10; cf. 15).[4]

These passages are essential to our perception of the notion of the paradigm, as they shape its broad spectrum of contents: myths, history, fables and comparisons. The distinction between the mythical and the historical paradigm is passed over in the *Rhetoric*,[5] whereas the mention of events of the past and events occurring now in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* may be a slight hint of an attempt to distinguish between the mythical and the historical example.

On the other hand, the *Rhetoric* elaborates on the fable. Aristotle defines fable as one of the two kinds of 'fictive examples', and after referring to both the Aesopic and the Libyan fables (1393a28-31) he goes on to give two indicative examples of fables, one taken from Stesichorous and one by Aesop (1393b8-1394a1). The later rhetorical handbooks confirm also that the fables were held as a common and important means of persuasion.[6]

4.1.2 Epic, lyric, drama, oratory, philosophy

a) Historical and mythical examples

The use of paradigms can be traced all the way back to Homer, where they already form an integral part of argumentation. We may recall several cases of such speeches in the *Iliad*, the most distinctive among them being: the four stories Nestor recounts from his youth (1.254-84; 7.124-60; 11.656-803; 23.629-42); the story of Meleager (9.527-99); the story of Bellerophon (6.155-205); the Niobe story (24.602-17). In the *Iliad* paradigms always refer to the past, and usually to other myths, which are often adapted or even invented to suit the poet's requirements.[7] The *Odyssey* also provides us with a

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[4] Cf. *Panath*. 1, where he contemns the use of mythical themes.

[5] *Pace* Chaplin (2000: 6 n. 16) who argues that the distinction between the mythical and the historical exists already in Aristotle.

[6] See Zafiropoulos (2001: 17 n. 54) who gives a list of later rhetorical treatises as well as relevant bibliography.

[7] On the use of paradigms as part of Homeric rhetoric see Oehler 1925: 5-31; Kakridis 1949: 96-105, 111-42; Willcock 1964; 1977; Lohmann 1970: 69-94; Braswell 1971: 16-26; de Jong 1987a: 160-8; Swain 1988: 271-6 (specifically on invention in the story of Meleager); Rutherford 1992: 63-5; Toohey 1994 (on the relation between the Homeric speeches and the later rhetorical practice [esp. 153-62]); Olson 1995: 24-42 (on the story of Agamemnon's death).

great number of examples used in speeches, with Odysseus being the exemplary storyteller.[8]

Apart from the epics, we may identify extensive use of mythical examples in lyric and elegy,[9] as well as in tragedy,[10] comedy,[11] even in philosophical texts,[12] and especially in the long corpus of Greek oratory in all three kinds of speeches (mythical along with historical paradigms).[13] I shall come back to this last matter later on when discussing in particular the relationship between the dispute between the Tegeans and the Athenians and the epideictic speeches (funeral and panegyric) of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.

b) Fables

Fable did not appear first in Greek but originated in the Near East and is found in Egyptian, Sumerian, Akkadian and Hebrew.[14] The first fables attested in Greek literature occur in Hesiod – who writes didactic poetry *par excellence* – and Archilochus. In *Works and Days* 202-12 Hesiod relates the story of the hawk and the nightingale. In the fragments of Archilochus, we come across two fables, that of the eagle and the fox (frs. 172-81 West), and that of the monkey and the fox (frs. 185-7 West).

Indeed iambic poets are very keen on using fables (cf. Semonides),[15] as are elegists (Theognis), lyric poets (Simonides), playwrights (Ar. *Wasps* 566-7, 1427-49,[16] 1181;

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[8] Cf. especially the stories Odysseus relates to Alcinous in books 9-12.

[9] E.g. Pind. *Pyth*. 1.50 ff.; Thgn. 1123-8, 1231-4.

[10] E.g. Aesch. *Cho*. 831 ff.; Soph. *Ant*. 823-33; Eur. *Hipp*. 439-66; *Her*. 1314-21.

[11] E.g. Ar. *Lys*. 781-96, 805-20 (the stories about the misogynist Melanion and the misanthrope Timon); and *Wasps* 1174-8. On the example in comedy see Nouhaud 1982: 37-40.

[12] E.g. the *Symposion* of both Plato and Xenophon (8.28).

[13] E.g. Isoc. 15.111; Dem. 9.41-5; 21.58-65; Aes. 3.190-2; Andoc. 1.106-9; Antiphon 5.67-9. On the use of the historical examples by the orators see Perlman 1961; Worthington 1994a; cf. also Pearson 1941; Nouhaud 1982; Harding 1987. On the mythical examples in Greek literature see Oehler 1925 (epic to comedy). On the mythical examples in Greek and Latin poetry see Canter 1933. Chaplin (2000: 5-6) gives a good summary of the bibliography on the use of examples in both Greek and Latin literature.

[14] See Burkert 1992: 120-4; West 1997: 319-24, 502-5.

[15] Cf. also Semonides fr. 7.43-56 West (satire on the different types of women which correspond to different animals).

[16] The context of 1427-49 is particularly significant as Philocleon uses Aesopic fables in a trial, which is in accord with the use of fables in forensic speeches mentioned in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

Aesch. *Ag*. 717-36) and even Plato.[17] Being traditionally a non-aristocratic element, as it involves popular material (and most often animals), fable is evidently frequent in less aristocratic literary genres (e.g. *iambos*),[18] but does not appear in Homer or (at least not to a great extent) in lyric poetry. With respect to this matter the issue of genre is definitive, as the language and themes of these genres are more elevated and largely deal with an elite society, where there is no room for the masses.[19]

4.1.3 Historiography

The purpose of historiography is generally didactic: recounting the past to serve as a guide for the future. The instructive role of the historian is reflected in the way he uses the past and the present to warn, educate and alert contemporary and future generations. Starting with the more complex and implicit statements in Herodotus' proem and continuing with Thucydides' explicit declaration that his work is meant to be a 'possession for ever' (1.22.4), the use of examples in both speeches and narrative, as well as the representation of the historical writing as a paradigm itself, becomes a common feature of Classical historiography in more or less comparable ways (e.g. Xenophon, Cicero, Tacitus, Livy, Polybius). These examples draw their themes mainly from history and myth.[20] However, one does find fables in Herodotus and also in later historians – who possibly follow Herodotus' track – like the fable of the lion, the maiden and her father in Hieronymus of Cardia (Diod. 19.25.5-6), the fable of the middle-aged man and his wives in Diodorus (33.7.6), the fable of War and Insolence in

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[17] He associates specifically Socrates with Aesopic fables in his *Phaedo* 60b-61b.

[18] On the use of fable in Archaic and Classical literature see Zafiropoulos 2001: 12-19 (with very good bibliography). Cf. Edmunds 1990a: 2-10 (*passim*). For a catalogue of fables in Greek Literature see Karadagli 1981; van Dijk 1997.

[19] See Griffiths 1995: 85-103. Especially on epic and fable see van Dijk 1997: 124-6 (and 124 n. 3); Zafiropoulos 2001: 13 n. 43. Note that in the epic we do have animal similes but not fables. Rutherford (1992: 64 n. 88), however, observes that although in *Odyssey* 14.508 Eumaeus describes the preceding story of the beggar Odysseus as *ainos*, the same word is used by Homer to describe a story told by Nestor in *Iliad* 23.652. So he concludes that the acknowledgement of *ainos* as a 'lower form of paradigm' becomes highly problematic. But see van Dijk (1997: 125): 'Although the meaning of this term can be "fable" (see above, Chapter I.III, 1.1), this is not the case in the passage under consideration (as can already be deduced from Pseudo-Diogenianus (1T2; G28)), mainly because, unlike fables, Odysseus' story is not metaphorical (and n. 11)'. Karadagli (1981: 9-11) argues the same.

[20] Cf. the myth of Triptolemus used as political argument in Xen. *Hell*. 6.3.6.

Theopompus (Theon *Prog*. 2 = 66.12-13 Spengel) and the fable of the horse in Philistus (Theon *Prog*. 2 = 66.10-11 Spengel).

Thucydides in particular uses examples regularly in the speeches he embeds in his work (e.g. in 1.40.5, 144.4; 3.54-5, 61-4; 6.16.6, 82). These examples come exclusively from history, either distant or recent. Storytelling speeches, including myths and fables, are strictly and consciously avoided, thereby asserting the intention of the author professed axiomatically at 1.22.4, that is to exclude from his narrative the mythical element (*τὸ μυθῶδες*).[21] Evidently, using mythical examples or fables to buttress political arguments seems to be entirely out of place in Thucydides.

Yet, Thucydides constructs his narrative in a way that indicates the existence of traditional story patterns taken from epic and tragedy on the basis of his *History*.[22] Besides, the shape of the narrative itself has strong Herodotean colouring in that there are in effect patterns in Thucydides' narrative, that is recurrent situations, events, or human behaviour which work at two levels, internal and external. Internally, they reflect, recall and allude to former or later events in the narrative, and characters appear to learn from their experiences and those of others. Externally, they serve as an example to the readers of the text.[23]

Another point, which suggests closer affinities between Herodotus and Thucydides as regards the use of examples in the latter, is the following observation by Hornblower:[24] Thucydides frequently, when he refers to past history (pre-479) in his speeches, draws on Herodotus; however, this does not happen that often in the speeches in books 4-5.24, including Pagondas' (4.92) and Hippocrates' (4.95) speeches, which refer to the *pentekontaetia* history, that is events which Thucydides himself relates. In other words, in Thucydides Herodotus becomes the cardinal source of deriving distant historical paradigms for the speeches. Apart from challenging the assumption of a dismissive attitude towards Herodotus on the part of Thucydides, this influence also

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[21] There are, however, some passages (e.g. the stories about Harmodius and Aristogeiton, Themistocles and Pausanias), which present storytelling qualities and have a distinctively Herodotean flavour (see Hornblower 2006: 308).

[22] See Cornford 1907; Macleod 1983: 140-58; Pelling 1991.

[23] On patterns and paradigms in Thucydides' *History* see Hunter 1973 (learning from one's own or others' experiences). On the different kinds of instruction (incl. generalizations and historical examples) in Thucydides see Rutherford 1994: 53-68. On examples in Thucydidean speeches see also Nouhaud 1982: 32-7.

[24] See Hornblower 1996: 129-34; cf. 31-2, 84-6.

proves Herodotus' work successful in its aim, viz. to become an example beyond spatial or temporal restrictions.

4.2 Herodotus

The origins of the *Histories* entail an active merging of several genres, traditional patterns and oral features.[25] As a consequence of this generic variety, Herodotus' work encompasses all kinds of examples in narrative and speeches:[26] fables, myths, storytelling, paradigms taken from the past and the present, maxims and generalizations.[27] The basic function of the use of examples in the speeches is the amplification of the argumentation of the speaker as they establish the analogy between present and past situations. At another level, the examples contribute to the embellishment of a speech and by adding to its vividness they make it more interesting and attractive to the audience.[28]

Although the focus of the analysis is the employment of examples by Herodotean speakers, this associates closely with the character of the *Histories*, as pointed out at the opening of the chapter, and the character of the *Histories* reflects back on the role of the examples within the work. That Herodotus writes 'paradigmatic history' has long been observed. His work is dominated by patterns which recur in the course of his narrative. The law of decay initiated by acts of *hybris* and the cyclic nature of history are at the heart of his historical thought. In the *Histories*, we come across tyrants like Croesus, Cyrus, Cambyses, Darius and Xerxes, or even Polycrates, and political men like Cleomenes, who are all prone to excess and end up badly. The major example which bridges the two halves of his work is the Scythian expedition, which functions as paradigm of Xerxes' expedition.[29] Maintaining these patterns, Herodotus invites us to decipher the purpose of his *Histories*, that is, to remain a 'possession for ever' and help the generations to come to learn from the past (see prologue: *ὡς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ*

[25] On the *Histories* as a blend of different genres see Boedeker 2000; Kurke 2000.

[26] *Pace* Immerwahr (1966: 122) who argues that the only speeches using parables in Herodotus are those of Socles and Leotychides.

[27] On maxims and proverbs see 'Appendix 2'.

[28] On the purposes of using examples see Canter 1933: 201-2.

[29] On the Scythian expedition see Hartog 1988: 357. On Herodotus' model of the reciprocal action of history see Gould 1989: 63-85. On the cycle of human affairs see Immerwahr 1966: 46-78, 148-237. On the paradigmatic role of the Croesus *logos* see Pelling 2006c: 146, 155, 172. See also Saïd 2002: 117-47 (identification of tragic motifs in the work and their influence on the scope and the style of the work as a whole).

ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται 'so that human achievements may not become forgotten in time'), a proposition in many ways comparable to Thucydides'.[30] Besides, Herodotus' aim to write didactic history is already evident in the prologue of the work when he talks in general about human instability (1.5.3-4). And since history repeats itself, Herodotus' work may thus claim for itself the role of 'exemplary history'. In the same line, Nagy[31] speaks of Herodotus' history as *ainos* with a function analogous to Pindar's odes: they both merge the past with the present, aim at glorification and preservation of *kleos*, carry obscure meaning, moral messages and warnings.

In this 'exemplary history', where individuals are represented either as learning or failing to learn from the successes or failures of their predecessors, the use of the paradigms within the speeches becomes all the more important. With respect to the speakers using paradigms, some of them, like Artabanus, Socles and Leotychides, resemble Herodotus himself and the way he develops his own narrative through paradigms and patterns. This is particularly true in the cases where the speakers interpret their examples and provide us with the kind of explanation we are used to being given by the author himself. Let us take Socles and Leotychides as indicative examples: among other points of comparison between him and Herodotus, Socles explains to his audience the meaning of Thrasybulus' visual display;[32] in a similar vein, Leotychides highlights the meaning of his story: 'Why I've told you this story will now be stated' (6.86δ).[33]

The picture of the Athenians *qua* Herodotus in their dispute with the Tegeans is equally intriguing (9.26-7). By denying the appropriateness of their mythical deeds, the Athenians resemble Herodotus when he rejects all the mythical versions of how the enmity between the Greeks and the barbarians started only to focus on historical time and the one whom he knows to have started the injustice (1.5.3).[34] The idea of former virtue, then, being no guarantee of present virtue reflects the aspect of Herodotus' historical thought about the fluctuations of human fortune: 'I will proceed with my history telling the story as I go along of small cities of men no less than of great. For

[30] Cf. Rösler 1991: 215-20; 2002.

[31] See Nagy 1990: 215-338.

[32] Cf. Murnaghan 2001: 69.

[33] Cf. Lateiner 1989: 144.

[34] Cf. also Loraux 1986: 90; Flower and Marincola 2002: 156.

most of those which were great once are small today; and those which used to be small were great in my own time' (1.5.3-4).[35]

In the same way that each individual speech becomes elaborate and lively, and at times convincing, through the addition of paradigms, Herodotus' narrative becomes more elaborate, intriguing and attractive, embracing all these bits and pieces into a coherent whole which strives to claim authority and be persuasive.[36]

Coming back to the usage of examples in Herodotean speeches, their frequent deployment is justified by two fundamental qualities: flexibility and indirectness. Their flexibility facilitates their application in different circumstances through their tailoring to suit the respective narrative needs and even invention of details to achieve the closest possible similarity with the situation at hand. Indirectness is another major advantage of *exempla*. Frequently, they transmit concealed messages which would be rather inappropriate or undiplomatic if spoken openly (e.g. Artabanus to Xerxes). In this way, one's utterances may avoid being offensive and be acceptable or even persuasive instead (e.g. Leotychides to the Athenians; Socles to the Spartans and the allies).

The distinctiveness of Herodotus' art lies in that he employs traditional forms, like fables, storytelling and mythical examples, together with historical examples in ways that serve his wider narrative purposes. Both the flexibility and the indirectness of the paradigms prove cardinal in this procedure: adaptation meets the needs of different contexts; indirectness brings the different political systems in Greece and Persia closer.

Before outlining the structure of the analysis, I wish to add two points about Herodotus' contribution to the use of paradigms. First, a significant contribution is his further development of the Homeric technique of contextualizing traditional forms of examples so as to serve not merely as didactic means but as important means of persuasion.[37] Those do not occur in Thucydides and through Herodotus are passed on to later literature and provide material for the rhetorical handbooks. Second, Herodotus introduces the strategy of intervening in the text to pinpoint events as exemplary, a rhetorical trope which Xenophon develops further.[38] I shall mention two indicative cases: at 9.34 Herodotus relates the story of Melampous, which he parallels to the framing story, that of Teisamenes; commenting on Leotychides' trick exercised on the

[35] Cf. also Saïd 2002: 146-7; Flower and Marincola 2002: 156.

[36] Cf. Murnaghan 2001: 69; Johnson 2001: 2, 24.

[37] See e.g. the stories of Niobe and Meleager in the *Iliad* (24.602-17 and 9.527-99 respectively).

[38] *Pace* Chaplin 2000: 10 and n. 33 with relevant bibliography.

Ionians at Mycale, Herodotus observes 'in this he had the same intention as Themistocles had at Artemisium' (9.98.4).

In what follows, I shall discuss briefly the different types of examples identified in Herodotus in conjunction with their context, dividing them in two broad categories: fables and stories; historical and mythical examples.[39] Then, I will move on to examining the way three specific case studies of speeches wholly built on examples support larger narrative themes. The case studies are the following: the speech of Socles (5.92), the speech of Leotychides (6.86), and the debate between the Tegeans and the Athenians before Plataea (9.26-7). Our first two cases focus on the difficulty of speaking openly and frankly even within the free Greek political system, which is a quality associated with the Persians. The third case presents us with an intense exchange where Greeks use paradigms against Greeks to claim supremacy for themselves. The links between the examples and the narrative context, the interpretation of the examples by their audiences and their effectiveness, all come under scrutiny too.

4.2.1 Kinds of Herodotean paradigms

a) Fables and other stories

The use of fables and stories in the *Histories* is in accordance with the distinctively oral and popular character of the material they incorporate (oral traditions, stories, anecdotes, proverbs, fables).[40] Homeric storytelling and the Aesopic fable have a prominent place in the work. Herodotus even mentions Aesop by name once: he was slave of Iadmon of Samos and a storyteller (2.134.3: *λογοποιός*).[41] On the other hand, Herodotus' use of fables and myths also affiliates him with the sophists of his time and the kind of storytelling they were using while teaching. This is particularly reflected in Plato's dialogues, where sophists are presented as using fables and myths, like the myth of Protagoras.[42] There is yet another feature of Herodotean narrative associated with

[39] On examples in Herodotean speeches see also Nouhaud (1982: 30-2) (he does not distinguish between historical and mythical examples, but views myth as ancient history and thus talks of historical examples only).

[40] On traditional motifs in Herodotus see Aly 1969[2]; Gray 2002; Griffiths 2006. On particular Herodotean stories see Pelling 1996; Griffiths 1999; 2001.

[41] Interestingly, Herodotus uses the same term (*λογοποιός*) for the historian Hecataeus (2.143.1; 5.36.2, 125).

[42] See Aly 1929; cf. Thomas 2000: 174-5.

fables beyond the use of actual fables in the work. As Griffiths[43] observes: 'In fact the patterns characteristic of fable permeate Herodotean narrative, which has a similarly moralistic thrust; and many individual pericopes show a clear relationship to particular fables'.

Although it is not our purpose here to trace connections between Herodotus and Near Eastern narratives, still it is worth noting that fables are also employed in the Bible, a text which has many affinities with the *Histories*.[44] The Old Testament contains such fables, like the fable of the ewe lamb in 2 Samuel 12.1-14, told by the prophet Nathan to David,[45] and the fable of the thistle and the cedar tree in 2 Kings 14.9.

It is not easy to identify some stories as fables with certainty, since fables in many respects merge with myth, proverb and anecdote. My purpose is not to subject the several stories to any strict categorization, but rather to discuss their contents with an eye to their contexts. Therefore, adopting the definition of the fable, as given by *OCD*[3] and Zafiropoulos,[46] I have tried to divide myth from fable by listing fables, fable-like stories, animal stories, enacted riddles and traditional stories under the label 'Fables and other stories'.

a.1) Traditional morphological features

Before dealing with the stories, let us first explore another important characteristic of Herodotean storytelling which further illustrates how deeply his work is informed by tradition. This entails specific traditionally storytelling elements which occur also in Socles' and Leotychides' *ainoi*, thus incorporating them in a long tradition of storytelling. First, Socles' paradigm is introduced by *γάϱ* (5.92β.1), which is used again in the speech to introduce the story of Thrasybulus' advice to Periander (5.92ζ.2). This

[43] See Griffiths 2006: 139.

[44] On analogies between stories in Herodotus and the Bible see Griffiths 1987; Hornblower 2003.

[45] See 2 Sam. 1-7: 'And the Lord sent Nathan unto David. And he came unto him, and said unto him: 'There were two men in one city, the one rich and the other poor. The rich man had exceeding many flocks and herds. But the poor man had nothing, save one little ewe lamb, which he had bought and nourished up. And it grew up together with him and with his children; it did eat of his own meat, and drank of his own cup, and lay in his bosom, and was unto him as a daughter. And there came a traveller unto the rich man, and he spared to take of his own flock and of his own herd, to dress for the wayfaring man that was come unto him; but took the poor man's lamb, and dressed it for the man that was come to him…And Nathan said to David 'Thou art the man…'.

[46] See above p. 150 n. 1.

conjunction is a common way of introducing paradigms. It occurs frequently in Homer (cf. *Il*. 24.602: *καὶ γάρ τ' ἠύκομος Νιόβη*...; 1.260: *ἤδη γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ καί*...), and there is also a famous case in *Agamemnon*, where Aeschylus has Clytaemnestra use *καὶ γάρ* to introduce her example from the past when addressing Cassandra (*Ag*. 1040: *καὶ παῖδα γάρ τοι φασίν*...).[47]

Next, Socles' story is concluded by a sentence including *τοιοῦτο* and *τοιούτων* (5.92η.4), while introduced by *τοιήδε* (5.92β.1), and Leotychides' story is concluded by *οὕτω* (6.86δ). These words are all typical ways to introduce and conclude stories, as well as to draw the analogy between the story and its context. Homer provides us with several such examples (*Il*. 9.524: *οὕτω καὶ*...; 7.133: *ὡς ὅτ'*...; 11.671: *ὡς ὁπότ'*...; 23.630: *ὡς ὁπότε*...), and Aeschylus also uses *οὕτως* to introduce the fable of the lion cub and the man in *Agamemnon* 717-36.[48]

Another typical feature of fables is used to separate the story from its context, namely the device of ring-composition, which is used in both Socles' (5.92α.1-β.1 – 5.92η.4-5) and Leotychides' speeches (6.86α.1 – 6.86δ). Likewise, the fable of Cyrus is demarcated from its context through ring-composition (1.141.1 – 1.141.3). In Homer ring-composition marks the story from its context most evidently in the stories of Niobe (24.602 – 24.618-9) and Meleager (9.524-6 – 9.600-4). A very good parallel is also provided again by *Agamemnon* and the fable of the lion cub and the man (717-8: *ἔθρεψεν*...*δόμοις* – 736: *δόμοις προσεθρέφθη*)'.[49] Finally, there is the repetition in the fable/story of key words from the context in Socles' (5.91.1: *τυραννίδος* [context] – 5.92α.1: *τυραννίδας*; 5.92α.2: *τυραννεύεσθαι*; *τύραννον*; *τυράννων*; 5.92ε.2, 92ζ.1, 92η.4-5 [speech]) as well as in Leotychides' speech (*παραθήκη*: 6.86.1; 73.2 [context] – 6.86α.1, 86β.1, 86δ [speech]).[50]

a.2) Herodotean examples

Solon is the first to introduce the use of examples in speeches delivered by characters in Herodotus' work. In his conversation with Croesus about human prosperity (1.30.3-31), Solon relates the stories of Tellus and of Cleobis and Biton to explain why he considers them the happiest of men. However, his words go astray, as

[47] See Fraenkel (1950: 470) who cites other examples as well.

[48] See Fraenkel 1950: 338-9; van Dijk 1997: 173.

[49] See van Dijk 1997: 172.

[50] On the traditional devices used to separate the story from and connect it to its context see van Dijk 1997: 362-76.

Croesus cannot understand the meaning of the comparison and does not take his lesson.[51] Similar kinds of stories are employed by Socles (5.92) and Leotychides (6.86)[52] in the context of political argument, speeches with which I shall be dealing separately in the course of the chapter.

Notwithstanding Herodotus' familiarity with the work of Aesop and his interest in describing animals and their habits, there is only one story in the *Histories* which can be taken as a fable in the fullest sense.[53] It is the story of 'the flute player and the fish' which Cyrus relates to the Ionian and the Aeolian envoys, when they ask him to be his subjects under the same terms they had when they were subject to Croesus (1.141.1-4).[54] According to the story, a flute player saw some fish in the sea and started playing his flute to make them come ashore. When he could not make them do so, he took a net, gathered in a large amount of fish and dragged them out of the water. As the fish were jumping about, he ordered them to stop dancing, as they would not come out dancing before when he was playing for them. Herodotus intervenes to explain the analogy Cyrus attempts to draw between the fish and the Ionians and Aeolians: 'The point of the story was that when Cyrus had sent to the Ionians messengers to ask them to revolt from Croesus, they had been unwilling to do so, though they were ready enough to offer their allegiance now that everything was settled in his favour. Cyrus was angry with them and hence his reply' (1.141.3-4). Although Cyrus makes his point allegorically, the audience is able to grasp the meaning of the fable as the narrative informs us that they started preparing for war (1.141.4).[55]

It is not mere coincidence that Herodotus puts his only proper fable in the mouth of Cyrus. This agrees in general with Cyrus' portrait in the *Histories*: a wise man who gave the Persians their freedom. Besides, Herodotus closes his work by referring to Cyrus' wise advice to the Persians, when he articulates the connection between land and national character: 'soft countries breed soft men' (9.122.3-4).

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[51] On Croesus' inability to learn properly see Pelling 2006a.

[52] Karadagli (1981: 35-7) also takes this as a fable. *Pace* van Dijk (1997: 656-7): 'a (pseudo-)historical *exemplum* (possibly…fabulized into *fab*. *aes*. 214 Hausrath (*Aes*. 239)), which allegedly really happened (86.1 *συνηνείχθη γενέσθαι*) and is non-metaphorical, as both context and story deal with a refusal to give back a *παραθήκη* (86.1 *bis*)…'.

[53] Cf. Griffiths 2006: 139.

[54] The fable is part of a collection of stories ascribed to Aesop (see Perry 1952: P11a).

[55] For a multi-faceted discussion of the fable see van Dijk 1997: 270-4.

Another interesting case occurs at 1.159.1-4:[56] the Cymaean Aristodicus consults the oracle at Branchidae whether the Cymaeans should hand over Pactyes the Lydian, who was their suppliant, to the Persians (this was the second time, as messengers from Cyme had already consulted the oracle before and had got a positive answer from the god). Aristodicus, dissatisfied with the god's response, goes around the temple and takes the sparrows and other birds from their nests. When the god Apollo reproaches him for disrespecting his suppliants, Aristodicus in his reply draws a comparison between Pactyes, suppliant of the Cymaeans, and the birds, suppliants of the god: 'Lord Apollo, do you protect your suppliants, yet tell the men of Cyme to abandon theirs?' The use of the comparison and the accompanying action is rather detrimental as the god becomes angry: 'Indeed I order you to abandon your suppliant, that you may suffer the sooner for the sacrilege, and never come here again to consult my oracle about handing over suppliants' (1.159.4).[57]

Animals are also used in another occasion, this time in a symbolic meaning: the Scythians send a bird, a mouse, a frog and five arrows as presents to Darius (4.131).[58] Gobryas interprets the gifts correctly: 'Unless you Persians turn into birds and fly up in the air, or into mice and burrow under ground, or into frogs and jump into the lakes, you will never get home again, but stay here in this country, only to be shot by the Scythian arrows' (4.132.3). This episode resembles more an enacted riddle, as it is not an example used within a speech, but rather an example used as speech. What we have here is the use of visual rhetoric instead of verbal. Darius fails to interpret the riddle, fails also to follow the cautious advice of his 'wise counsellor', and consequently his expedition fails.

The story of Periander as related by Socles (5.92ζ.2-3) is close enough to this last case.[59] When Periander, the tyrant of Corinth, sent his messenger to Thrasybulus, the tyrant of Miletus, to ask him the best way to rule his city, Thrasybulus instead of giving a verbal reply used visual rhetoric:[60] he took the messenger with him and went for a walk to a cornfield; as they were passing through the field, Thrasybulus cut off the

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[56] Van Dijk (1997: 656) considers this an 'anecdote, including symbolic action'.

[57] For a discussion of the incident see Brown 1978; Asheri, Lloyd and Corcella 2007: 183.

[58] Karadagli (1981: 91-2) takes this as a fable. *Pace* van Dijk (1997: 656): 'anecdote, including symbolic action'.

[59] Karadagli (1981: 75-6) takes this as a fable. *Pace* van Dijk (1997: 656): 'anecdote, including symbolic action'.

[60] Cf. the visual trick Thrasybulus plays on Alyattes (1.22.4), on which see above p. 81.

tallest of the stalks and threw them away, until he had destroyed the finest part of the crop. Socles explains that Thrasybulus intended to draw the analogy between the tallest stalks and the outstanding, therefore dangerous, citizens, whom he thus advised Periander to murder (5.92η.1).

Another example occurs at 6.37 where Croesus threatens the Lampsacenes to cut them down like a pine-tree if they do not set Miltiades free. In this case, it is an old man who interprets Croesus' words: the pine-tree is the only tree which, if cut down, dies off completely. The threat is effective and Croesus achieves what he wants (6.37.2).

b) Historical and mythical examples

b.1) Myth vs. history

The distinction between myth (viewed as 'ancient history') and history in Greek culture is a complicated question and has been the subject of an ongoing debate.[61] For Herodotus the issue becomes still more problematic, since he blends myth with history,[62] and, not unlike Pindar,[63] gives his own version, adding different dimensions to the stories. Herodotus himself seems, however, to draw a line between mythical and historical times in his celebrated chapter 3.122, when talking about Polycrates' dominion of the sea: 'for Polycrates was the first Greek we know of to plan the dominion of the sea, unless we count Minos of Cnossus and any other who may possibly have ruled the sea at a still earlier date. But of what is called the human race, Polycrates was the first'.[64] Still, we should be careful enough so as not press the division too hard; in no way does this comment explicitly indicate a discontinuity between the human and the mythical.

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[61] On the relationship between myth and history see Brillante (1990: 93-138) who argues for a vague separation between myth and history (particularly on Herodotus p. 102). *Pace* Edmunds 1990a: 1-20. On the distinction in Herodotus see Cobet 2002: 405-11; Boedeker 2002: 109-16 (esp. p. 110 and n. 43 [with useful bibliography]). Cf. also Lateiner 1989: 123-4; Raaflaub 2002: 159 n. 36; Osborne 2002: 513-20.

[62] See West 2002: 1-48; Boedeker 2002: 109-16 (mythical patterns in Herodotus' historical narrative); Saïd 2002: 117-47 (identification of tragic patterns in Herodotus); Stadter 2004: 31-46 (on the myth recreated as history in Herodotus). See also Hunter 1982: 97-8.

[63] Boedeker (2000: 111-12) points out that 'judging among different traditions' in Pindar does not serve the same aims as in Herodotus.

[64] Cf. the age of heroes in the Myth of the Ages in Hes. *Op*. 159-60. On the problem of Minos' thalassocracy see Williams 2002: 149-71 (esp. pp. 155-61); Irwin 2007b (esp. pp. 213-19); cf. also Hornblower 1996: 125.

Though the distinction between the mythical and the historical argument is not rigid, nonetheless Herodotus' sense of a divide justifies us in drawing a firm distinction here. The use of myths by characters in the *Histories* largely reflects the use of myths by Herodotus himself, and in the dispute between the Tegeans and the Athenians (9.26-7) Herodotus undermines expressly the value of mythical arguments as an effective means of persuasion. This attitude is then very much in keeping with Herodotus' stance towards myth in his work: myth intermeshes with history, since myth is not enough itself and cannot respond to every situation, but the comparison with and the help of history is always useful.

b.2) Herodotean examples

Artabanus makes considerable use of historical examples in his exchanges with Xerxes in book 7. To justify his reservations about a campaign against the Greeks Artabanus recalls the unsuccessful expeditions of Cyrus against the Massagatae (7.18.2), Cambyses against the Ethiopians (7.18.2), and Darius against the Scythians (in the last expedition Artabanus took part himself; 7.10α.2, 18.2), as well as the most recent defeat of Datis and Artaphrenes by the Athenians at Marathon (7.10β.1).

The last example plainly demonstrates the valour of the Greeks. Of the remaining examples, Artabanus elaborates only on Darius' Scythian expedition, which thus becomes largely a reflection of Xerxes' own expedition against Greece. The comparison between the Scythians and the Greeks, drawn vividly, is particularly important: Darius suffered severely by the Scythians, 'those wanderers who live in a cityless land'; the Greeks are far more superior to the Scythians both by land and sea (7.10α.2-3). Then Artabanus compares Xerxes' plan to bridge the Hellespont with Darius' bridging of the Thracian Bosporus and the Danube (7.10γ.1-2). There is also another implicit example: Artabanus' negative attitude towards Darius' plan and his subsequent justification by events, which foreshadows a similar course in Xerxes' case.

The *paradeigmata* Artabanus uses are carefully selected in that they are always negative and any successes of the Persians are totally omitted; such an attitude is also in accordance with Artabanus' role as 'tragic warner'.[65] Together with possibilities of adaptation, the examples give Artabanus another advantage: they enable him to speak more obliquely and subtly, to present his speech as an invitation to Xerxes to embrace the lesson provided by the failures of his predecessors and reconsider his decision, so as

[65] See Lattimore 1939: 24-35.

not to get himself into the same dangers (7.10δ.1). It is evidently a more diplomatic way of putting it, since straightforward advice to Xerxes, not to undertake the expedition, would not be appropriate and would drive him to even greater wrath than he shows. However, the ultimate effectiveness of these arguments is questionable: at first they are ineffective, then they make Xerxes reconsider, but finally we come back full circle as Xerxes is forced by the dream to complete his plan.[66]

Mardonius also employs paradigms in his speech that supports the expedition against Greece. These are juxtaposed with Artabanus' in two ways: on the one hand, Mardonius mentions only the successful enterprises of the Persians, whereas Artabanus picks only the failures; on the other hand, Mardonius refers to his personal experience in an egoistic way (7.9α.2: *ἐπειρήθην δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἤδη*; cf. also 9.58: *ἀπείροισι*; 8.100.2: *πειρήσεται*; 8.100.3: *πειρώμεθα*), while Artabanus' arguments stem from the experience of a greater range of Persians (7.10γ.1: *ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδεμιῇ σοφίῃ οἰκείῃ αὐτὸς ταῦτα συμβάλλομαι*).

The selection of the arguments in Mardonius' case serves his purpose to urge Xerxes to undertake the campaign. To achieve this, though, a certain degree of adaptation is needed, as well as exaggeration of the ease and the benefit of the deed, which entail in their turn the distortion of reality. The description of the Greeks as bad fighters falls into this category (7.9α.2-γ): it is an example which Mardonius takes from his previous expedition against the Greeks. However, he shrewdly omits the fact that his expedition failed. And the narrative gives a very different picture of the Greeks' military skill through their victories at Marathon, Artemisium, Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale. Similarly, Mardonius overstates the sphere of the Persian control when saying that the Persians rule over the Sacae, Indians, Ethiopians and the Assyrians, since only some parts of these people were subject to the Persians.[67]

Neither do Xerxes' speeches lack for examples. The argument which belongs to his standard repertoire is the paradigm of his predecessors Cyrus, Cambyses, and Darius, who have always been adding to the power and conquests of the Persian empire, and whose policy Xerxes is obliged to follow (7.8α.1-2, 50.3). In obeying the Persian law of endless expansionism, Xerxes seems to have learnt his lesson, that is he must not fall short of the example of previous kings. Besides, following the example levelled by his predecessors serves Xerxes' own purpose, which is to corroborate his rather vulnerable

[66] On the role of the dream see ch. 1.

[67] See How and Wells 1912: 129. On Mardonius' treacherous rhetoric see also pp. 98-9.

authority.[68] He urges the leaders of the Persians to do the same thing: 'you must show courage and not disgrace the former great and glorious deeds of the Persians' (7.53.1). Another two examples Xerxes uses are Darius' Scythian expedition and the starting of the injustice by the Athenians. In the Scythian expedition, the Ionians proved they can be absolutely loyal (Artabanus himself can verify this as he participated in the campaign), so there is no reason not to trust them again now (7.52.1). The unjust behaviour of the Athenians, who burnt Sardis, occurs repeatedly in Xerxes' speeches (7.8β.2-3, 11.2) and in Mardonius' speech (7.9.2). Xerxes uses mythical examples as well, such as the fact that the Phrygian Pelops, a slave of the Persian kings, subdued the Greeks (7.11.4), and that the Argives and the Persians are kin on the basis of their common origin from Perseus (7.150).

Before Marathon, Miltiades exhorts Callimachus to fight the Persians, mentioning among other reasons the glorious memory Callimachus will leave for posterity if he helps to liberate Athens. His glory will be even greater than that of Harmodius and Aristogeiton (6.109.3). The example is not random. On the one hand, Harmodius and Aristogeiton share some commonalities with Callimachus, as they come from the same deme, Aphidna (5.57; Plut. *Quaest*. *Conv*. 628d). On the other hand, the importance of the example lies not so much in the glory derived from the deed as in the deed itself: just as the tyrannicides freed Athens from the tyrants, in the same way Callimachus will secure the freedom of Athens from the tyranny of the Persians.[69] But behind all this, one can read a more self-centred motivation, which already indicates the disunity lurking behind the Greek coalition.[70]

In their speeches to Gelon, the Spartan and the Athenian messengers deploy examples from the mythical and the historical past to justify their excellence. Both the Athenian and Spartan paradigms are calculated. The Spartans invoke their alleged relationship to Agamemnon and thus their claim to the rule over the Peloponnese (7.159). The Athenians appeal to their autochthony and their role in the Trojan War (7.161.3). On the one hand, the Athenians, as the only aboriginal Greeks, separate themselves from the rest of the Greeks, including Spartans and Syracusans. On the other hand, the Trojan War both supports and challenges the Greek unity.[71]

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[68] See ch. 5.

[69] See Scott 2005: 383.

[70] See above pp. 136-8.

[71] On the Trojan War see also above p. 100 and below pp. 183-4.

The assessment of the effectiveness of these paradigms is complicated. It is important to bear in mind not only the rhetorical strategy of the speakers but also that of the narrator. The examples might not meet their initial aim, but it is important what this aim has turned into by the end of the discussion. In effect, they want Gelon to be subject to the Spartan and Athenian leadership, but they cannot have their cake and eat it too. With their arguments they prove Gelon's alliance unnecessary. Herodotus takes the opportunity once more to stress the danger of Greek disunity, which emerges constantly behind the alleged cooperation on the common Greek cause.

In a comparable epideictic-like vein the Tegeans and the Athenians use historical and mythical paradigms to prove their preeminence and claim the lead of the left wing before Plataea (9.26-7) – I shall return to this set of speeches at the end of the chapter. And the Spartans use the reputation of the Athenians as liberators based on past achievements (clearly a reference to the mythical past) to remind them of their role and duty and persuade them not to betray the freedom of Greece by being subdued by the Persians (8.142.3).

4.2.2 Test cases

a) Reading between the lines: Socles' storytelling speech (5.92)

In a 'debate'[72] summoned by the Spartans in order to reinstate tyranny in Athens, Socles advises otherwise and delivers a speech which relates the troubles the Corinthians suffered at the hands of the Cypselids (Cypselus and Periander). That his speech, the longest in the *Histories*, is built solely on the complex deployment of seemingly irrelevant and straightforward stories is arguably the most definitive proof of the need for elaborate and circumlocutory rhetoric among the Greeks, making them fairly similar to the Persians.

The embellished details in Socles' stories offer fertile ground for several comparisons between the characters in the stories and Socles' audience, thereby making the speech the most symbolically freighted in Herodotus. At the same time, all this suggestiveness has stoked much of the criticism the speech has received,[73] due to its

[72] For the limitations of the debate see ch. 1

[73] The speech has been considered much inept, irrelevant to the occasion and not at all historical, but a mere chance to tell stories (see Macan 1895: 235-6, 242; How and Wells 1912: 51; cf. Schmid and Stählin 1934: 603 n. 2, 605 and n. 2; Pohlenz 1937: 214; Andrewes 1956: 47; Waters 1971: 14; van der Veen 1996: 71-86; Forsdyke 2002: 542-5). *Pace* Johnson (2001: 2): (on the speeches of Socles and

isolation from the context and thus its misapprehension. To assess the appropriateness and effectiveness of the speech, one has to look at the wider and broader narrative context as well as at the role of the addressees, both internal (the Spartans, Hippias, the allies) and external (readers), and ultimately the aim the speech serves in Herodotus' narrative plan and the way it encompasses important principles which permeate the whole work.

Socles proclaims the assumed purpose of his speech, that is, to show the 'evil and bloodthirsty' nature of tyranny, as the Corinthians have experienced it, to the Spartans, who have had no direct experience of living under a tyranny (5.92α.1-2). At the most superficial level, the three stories the speech includes (the birth and survival of the baby Cupselus; Thrasybulus' cruel advice to Periander; and the stripping of the Corinthian women by Periander) serve the purpose of exemplifying the evils of tyranny. This is more evident in the case of Periander: sexual excess; injustice; waste of grain, men, textiles.[74]

The case of Cypselus is less straightforward: there is merely an oracle which suggests that Cypselus will be responsible for the death of many Corinthians (5.92β.3), and two lines of printed Greek which describe his evil behaviour as a tyrant (5.92ε.2). Other than that, Cypselus' story encompasses familiar fairy-tale motifs in such a way that historical elements become inextricably intertwined with mythical ones. Such folklore elements are common to stories of the rise of new rulers[75] and are also to be found in the lives of Cyrus (1.108-16) and Peisistratus (1.59.1-3).[76]

However, as we may readily deduce from other comparable Herodotean stories, there is always adaptation to fit the requirements of the specific context, in our case it is to present the tyrants in the worst possible light.[77] In Cypselus' story, there are two such tailored details: the baby-smile and the second oracle which compares Cypselus to a

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Leotychides) 'the apparent dissonance between these speeches and their immediate context is only apparent'; Moles (2007: 254): 'Socles' speech seems excellently suited to its complex context'.

[74] Socles' speech acquires thus an additional paradigmatic function: it provides the examples for Otanes' speech on the vices of tyranny in the 'Constitutional debate' (3.80; esp. 3.80.5: 'he [i.e. the monarch] breaks up the structure of ancient tradition and law, forces women to serve his pleasure, and puts men to death without trial').

[75] E.g. Moses, Perseus, Romulus and Remus, Sargon of Akkad. See Hornblower 1987: 17; Murray 1993^2: 147-9.

[76] See Gray 1995: 186-7. On the similarities between the stories of Cypselus, Cyrus and Periander's persecution of his son Lycophron see Gray 1996: 367-77.

[77] Cf. Fornara 1983: 165.

lion. First, however innocent his baby-smile may seem, it is ultimately deceptive –[78] and deception is without a doubt one of the primary qualities of a tyrant:[79] Cypselus' smile causes the Bacchiads to pity the baby and spare its life – though it is destined to become a tyrant and inflict bad things on the people of Corinth.[80] Second, the oracle which likens Cypselus to a lion (5.92β.3) is only seemingly favourable. The picture of the lion combined with the smile of the baby recalls the gentle, soft look of the lion cub in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* 742, with which Helen is compared (lion cub to destructive lion image)[81] and which fools and ultimately destroys the Trojans.[82] In particular, the lion[83] and the boulder[84] are details readapted to suit the context, that is, by allowing aggressiveness and injustice to present tyranny as the 'more murderous and more unjust' thing in the world.[85]

So we have *paradeigmata* representing the bad side of tyrannical rule. Yet, there are other significant and deeper strands of interpretation which involve several audiences (Spartans, allies, Hippias, readers). That tyranny is a bad thing and that the Corinthians do not agree with it the readers, the Spartans and the allies already know through the previous narrative: in the flash-back to the Athenian affairs, the Corinthians are said to have abandoned Cleomenes' expedition against Athens to make Isagoras tyrant of Athens, which they considered 'unjust' (5.75.1: *οὐ ποιεῖν τὰ δίκαια*). The allies then followed the Corinthians in their decision, especially since there was discord between the Spartan kings (5.75.3).

This passage (5.75) is, then, crucial to the interpretation of the speech. It becomes an example, this time taken from very recent history, which is dragged implicitly into the play of hidden meanings (possibly through the repetition of *δίκαιον*).[86] In this way, it adds considerably to the force and the connotations of the speech. The analogy is plain:

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[78] Cf. also Johnson 2001: 13 (note also: 'Cypselus' name, which derives from this incident, alludes to his ability to hide'); Moles 2007: 259.

[79] This tyrannical feature is frequently demonstrated by the narrative: Periander fools the women of Corinth; Peisistratus fools the Athenians twice (1.59-60); Deioces (1.96-8); Darius 3.85-7 (the use of a ruse to get the throne).

[80] Cf. Lateiner 1977: 176 n. 9; Johnson 2001: 13-14; Moles 2007: 259.

[81] Note that, other than Helen, the lion cub may also refer to Paris (see Nappa 1994).

[82] See McNellen 1997: 18.

[83] Cf. *Il.* 15.592-3; 630-6.

[84] Cf. *Il.* 13.137.

[85] See Gray 1996: 372-6; cf. Johnson 2001: 16. *Pace* Moles 2007: 257 and n. 58.

[86] Cf. 5.92α.1: *τοῦ οὔτε ἀδικώτερόν ἐστι οὐδέν*; 5.92η.5: *παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον*.

the previous resignation of the allied troops demonstrated that the allies did not wish to support the Spartan enterprise, at least not without the Corinthians; why then should they support it now, since the Corinthians are not willing to do so? Socles hopes they will follow the Corinthian decision once again. We are also invited to contemplate the same possibility. Similarly, this may be an eloquent allusion to what we are to expect now: it is left to the Corinthians to make the first move as the allies do not dare to voice their disapproval (5.92.1). The Spartans are then to consider the same likelihood: they will get neither the Corinthians nor the rest of the allies to agree with them on the very thing they have already rejected in the past.

Another important point the allies are to grasp from Socles' speech is the association between Sparta and tyranny: Sparta actually represents the baby Cypselus. The analogies between a potentially tyrannical Sparta and the tyrant Cypselus, and hence those between the allies and the Bacchiads, have been thoroughly discussed;[87] any repetition would be pointless. I would like to stress only one rather neglected point which highlights the association from a different angle: the implications of *xenia* (guest-friendship).

Although it is not explicitly stated, in the story of Periander, Thrasybulus' advice is triggered by *xenia*. We get the information that Thrasybulus was Periander's *xeinos* from the narrative of 1.20 (*Περίανδρον τὸν Κυψέλου ἐόντα Θρασυβούλῳ τῷ τότε Μιλήτου τυραννεύοντι ξεῖνον ἐς τὰ μάλιστα*), which explains why Periander would send a messenger to him to ask for advice on how to rule best. After Thrasybulus' advice, Periander's reign becomes extremely harsh (5.92ζ.1).[88] Yet another *xeinos* of Periander features in Socles' speech: a *xeinos* who had left Periander a deposit, about which Periander consults the nekyomanteion in Thesprotia (5.92η.2).

This has a huge amount to do with Sparta. Friendships with foreign tyrants can be dangerous, that is, the friendship of the Peisistratids can be dangerous for the Spartans

[87] See Gray 1996: 383-4; Johnson 2001: 3-8, 14-15; Moles 2007: 251, 254-5.

[88] *Pace* Pelling (2006a: 107) who suggests wrongly that 'Soclees, like those Persian grandees, talks only of the internal impact of a tyrant, in this case the outrages committed by Cypselus and Periander against their fellow-citizens'. Cf. also Immerwahr (1966: 122): 'The speeches complement each other to some extent, for the first deals with internal politics in the city-state, and the second with Greek international affairs'. Spartans talk about external affairs and inter-state relationships (the threat of Athens to the other Greek states), and Socles does address this issue as well, both explicitly through the story of Thrasybulus, and implicitly through the associations between Sparta and Athens and tyranny. The advice of Thrasybulus is both external in that it comes from abroad and internal in that it recommends pruning the tallest stalks in one's own field.

(5.91.2: *ἄνδρας ξείνους ἐόντας ἡμῖν*), and the friendship of Thrasybulus for the Corinthians. Herodotus in fact indirectly connects the Peisistratids with the Cypselids through a place which thus performs a symbolic function, that is Sigeion.[89] Sigeion is the refuge of the Peisistratids where Hippias goes into exile (5.91) as well as the place that the Athenians take by committing their dispute with the Mytileneans to the arbitration of Periander (5.95.2)

It is also intriguing that in the text which relates the Spartan attempt to set up Isagoras as a tyrant in Athens – the occasion which foreshadows and explains the present speech – we are informed that Cleomenes was Isagoras' *xeinos* (5.70.1). And then Cleomenes still failed. The Spartans have actually been consistently working with tyrants, which makes their later words to the Athenians in book 8 sound rather ironic: 'the tyrant works with a tyrant' (8.142.5). The meaning is that, if the Athenians cooperate with tyrants (Persians and Alexander), they will be acting as tyrants themselves; but the Spartans also support tyranny, and the contemporary resonances are inevitable: they are asking for Persian help during the Peloponnesian War. In that sense, Socles both warns the Spartans about the dangers of working with tyrants and reminds the allies that only tyrants work with tyrants.

A different interpretation may be placed on the associations between Sparta and the Bacchiads, and accordingly between Cypselus and Athens: baby Cypselus is Athens, which grows steadily after the deposition of the tyrants to become a tyrant city itself. The image of Cypselus *qua* lion is strongly evocative in this reading, as later on we are given an oracle which this time likens Pericles to a lion (6.131.2). If we recall Thucydides saying that Athens was only by name a democracy and that in reality Pericles held the power (Thuc. 2.65.9), then the association between the two, Cypselus and Pericles, becomes even clearer. Alternatively, we may recall passages from Thucydides (2.63.3; 3.37.2; 6.85.1) or even Aristophanes (*Knights* 1113-4), where individuals are made to label the Athenian empire a tyranny.[90]

The Spartan words also point in this direction: 'since then these people (i.e. the Athenians) have been growing in reputation and strength, as their neighbours the Boeotians and the Chalcidians have learnt to their cost, and as others perhaps will also discover, unless they mind their step' (5.91.2). Their speech sounds surprisingly up-to-date and anticipates the Corinthian attitude towards Athens on the eve of the

[89] As Simon Hornblower points out to me. Cf. the comparable symbolic role of Atarneus in the story of Hermotimus (Hornblower 2003: 37-57).

[90] See Gray 1996: 385-8; Pelling 2006a: 108.

Peloponnesian War, as described in Thucydides' book 1. There (1.67-88) it is the same Corinthians who have been harmed by the Athenians and urge the Spartans to attack Athens. Whereas in our Herodotean passage the Corinthians in a long speech ask the energetic Spartans to save poor Athens from tyranny, in Thucydides the same Corinthians in another long speech ask the inactive Spartans to 'do something with Athens'.

The most explicit contemporary allusions come at the end of the debate from the ominous words in the mouth of Hippias: 'the day would come when Corinth would find itself plagued by the Athenians, and then the Corinthians would long for the Peisistratids more than for anyone else in the world' (5.93.1). His answer slips our attention as it is given in indirect speech, possibly so that it sounds intentionally more enigmatic. This is the punch line of a debate, which ironically stresses the delusion of the Corinthians and the rest of the allies. But for the moment no one can understand Hippias' words.[91] However, soon enough we get some hints of the tense relationships between the Corinthians and the Athenians in the narrative, namely at Salamis and the quarrel between Themistocles and Adeimantus.

The text underpins all these complementary and even contrasting readings and makes them equally possible. It may even support the pragmatic view, put forward by Macan and How and Wells, which regards Socles' speech as propaganda for the sake of Corinth, thus balancing the propaganda performed by the preceding Spartan speech. The Corinthians wanted a strong democratic Athens as a counterweight to Aegina, Corinth's rival in commerce. Furthermore, if Athens were to become subject to Sparta, Corinthian liberty would be in danger as well.[92]

Such a wide scope of interpretation and so many hints pointed at the Spartans and the allies require tactfulness and delicacy which is achieved by virtue of the examples. Carefully fabricated rhetoric and diplomacy are definitely not exclusive qualities of the barbarian court. Socles' tactic recalls Herodotus' comment on Themistocles' speech before Salamis: it would be unbecoming to accuse any of the allies to their face (8.60.1). In the same way, it would have been equally unbecoming to accuse the Spartans explicitly in front of the allies, or even to offend the allies in front of the Spartans.

According to the text, Socles' speech succeeds in its aim. Whether the allies draw the comparisons between Sparta and tyranny and between Athens and tyranny we

[91] See also Gray 1996: 385-7.

[92] See Macan 1895: 242; How and Wells 1912: 51.

cannot tell, but they are certainly invited to do so, just as the readers are invited to do the same. I would suggest, however, that the text itself provides us with the key to read the result of the speech. Soon after Socles finishes his speech, Herodotus does not say that the allies are convinced by the speech, or that they suddenly realize what a bad thing tyranny can be. He rather draws our attention to the fact that the allies, after hearing Socles speaking freely, also speak up freely and oppose the Spartan proposal.

That the allies have already formed their opinion is clear from the text. Socles is supposed to excite neither hatred for the misdeeds of Cypselus and Periander nor sympathy for the smiling baby Cypselus. Further, there is no question of making the Spartans feel pity for the potential subjugation of the Athenians to the tyranny of Hippias. Sentiments have no place in politics. And, in any case, what the Spartans – and obviously their allies – yearned for, was to diminish Athenian power. Socles is speaking in the interests of the allies. If we stick to the analogy between the Spartan cooperation with tyrants and the tyrant Periander, then, unless the allies oppose Spartan tyranny, they will be stripped of their dignity and consequently their freedom, just as Periander stripped all the Corinthian women naked of their finest clothes.[93] But Socles is also speaking in the interests of the Spartans: if they do as they please, they will disadvantage themselves in a triple way as they will lose their allies and their reputation as 'opponents of tyranny', and they may even taste tyranny themselves in the future (tyrants working together with tyrants).[94] Ultimately, Socles' speech indirectly puts across the conflicting interests of the cities and the fight of the major Greek cities for dominance, thus representing the multiple faces of the sensitive balance of the Greek confederacy.

b) Successful* exempla *misinterpreted or conscious trickery? The speech of Leotychides (6.86)

Leotychides' speech to the Athenians is another case where a Greek speaker cannot speak straight. The speech has been considered irrelevant and ineffective,[95] but we shall see that there is something deeper underlying the strategy of persuasion; in effect here, deception and manipulation are shrouded in rhetoric.

The aim of the speech is to convince the Athenians to return the Aeginetan hostages (6.85.3), who had been given as deposit to the Athenians by both Cleomenes

[93] Cf. Moles 2007: 254.

[94] Cf. Moles 2007: 252, 254.

[95] See Schmid and Stählin 1934: 603 n. 2, 605 and n. 2.

and Leotychides (6.73). After Cleomenes' death the Spartans decide that the Aeginetans have been wronged by Leotychides and hand him over to the Aeginetans as an exchange for their hostages held in Athens. The Aeginetans agree on sending an embassy with Leotychides to Athens to claim the hostages back. The Athenians, however, use as an excuse the fact that the deposit was made by two Spartan kings (Cleomenes and Leotychides), and so now they cannot return them to Leotychides alone. Therefore, Leotychides relates the story of the Spartan Glaucus: not returning a deposit is a bad thing as there is a story told in Sparta about a man who contemplated doing so and taking false vows and was severely punished; so they should return the deposit (6.86).

It has been suggested that the speech is remarkably apt to the occasion,[96] in that the story parallels exactly both the Athenian and the Aeginetan situations.[97] All three of them, Glaucus, the Athenians, and the Aeginetans, receive a deposit (*παραθήκη*) (money, hostages, Leotychides). Glaucus thinks of swearing a false oath (i.e. that he never received any money from the father of the Milesians) to rob the Milesians of their money, just as the Athenians find excuses not to give back the hostages. On the other hand, the Aeginetans, at the instigation of Theasides (6.85: the Spartans would sometime destroy them in revenge), decide not to take Leotychides as a prisoner, just as Glaucus reconsiders when he receives the horrible oracle. In all three cases merely the intention of not returning the deposit is as bad as actually committing the crime, and there follows punishment, even if the deposit is eventually restored: Glaucus is punished by having his entire line wiped out; the Athenians will in a way be punished soon after by the Aeginetans (6.87, 93) and later in the Peloponnesian War;[98] in the same war the Aeginetans will suffer at the hands of the Athenians (6.92; cf. Thuc. 2.27).

Besides this, there is a discrepancy between the impious speaker and the moral character of the story: Leotychides became a king through false divination (6.66: Cleomenes corrupted the Pythia). His punishment came soon enough, when he was caught red-handed in an expedition, sitting on a glove full of coins, was banished from Sparta and died in exile, while his house was demolished (6.72). The picture of

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[96] See Johnson 2001: 21.

[97] See Johnson 2001: 21-3. On the connection between the situation of Glaucus and that of the Athenians see also Immerwahr 1966: 213-15.

[98] Still the Athenians suffer nothing as bad as Glaucus' fate immediately after Leotychides' terrible threats, which according to Davies (1997: 56) carries further implications for the contestation of Apollo's moral authority. But cf. below in the same and next page for the point that the Athenians do not act according to Leotychides' story as they have not taken any vows.

Leotychides *qua* Glaucus is intensely ironic: Leotychides' house was destroyed (6.72.2: *τὰ οἰκία οἱ κατεσκάφη*); Glaucus, his descendants and his household 'have been utterly uprooted from Sparta' (6.86δ: *ἐκτέτριπταί τε πρόρριζος ἐκ Σπάρτης*).[99]

Such comparisons may indeed be pursued and do not seem to be entirely out of place. However, overemphasizing the moralizing meaning of the story[100] is to neglect one very serious detail which makes a big difference to the interpretation of the paradigm:[101] in contrast to Glaucus, the Athenians are not considering swearing a false oath that they had never received the hostages, nor have they taken or broken any oaths. Three points may support this argument. First, the Athenians, in their first reply to Leotychides' request, are not presented as proposing to take false oaths; in fact they do not refer to any oaths at all, but merely to the fact that the hostages had been deposited by both Spartan kings and they could not return them only to one of them (6.86.1); after Leotychides' story they do not even listen to what he says, and Leotychides departs (6.86δ). Second, if the Athenians had indeed taken oaths, Herodotus would not possibly withhold such a fact if he really did wish to draw close parallels between Glaucus and the Athenians and he would have recorded so at 6.73 where he deals with the hostages. Third, if this had been the case, then Leotychides would have invoked the Athenian oaths right from the beginning to get what he wanted.

If the Athenians do not break any oaths, and thus are not punished, then the point of the story becomes more oblique and needs further explanation. The story seems to be part of a conscious rhetorical strategy. Leotychides knows very well that the Athenians had sworn no oaths because he was present when the hostages were deposited in Athens (6.73). Therefore, the whole issue of perjury seems to be part of Leotychides' effort to trick the Athenians: he selects an extreme example in order to exaggerate their alleged offence. On the basis that committing perjury was indeed a severe offence, the use of

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[99] See Immerwahr 1966: 214. Cf. also Munson 1993b: 46 n. 41; Harrison 2000: 118; Johnson 2001: 21-2; Scott 2005: 315. *Pace* How and Wells (1912: 98) who consider an impropriety to put such a moral story in the mouth of such an immoral man.

[100] See Harrison (2000: 118): 'The moral of the story may then be precisely that moralizing is useless', since the Athenians do not listen and are not convinced. *Pace* Fisher (2002: 200): 'However, the impression the passage may give of a simple moralizing designed to have a straightforward effect on its hearers or readers is partially undermined by the broader context'.

[101] See Hornblower 2007b: 139-40. By contrast, Immerwahr (1966: 213-15), Harrison (2000: 117-20) and Johnson (2001: 20-4) all overlook the incongruity. Harrison (2000: 119) explicitly speaks of 'the Athenians' perjury'. How and Wells (1912: 98) observe the inaccuracy of the comparison between the Athenians and Glaucus, though without further justification.

perjury to face several diplomatic situations was not uncommon; and very often the accusation would answer an accusation of perjury by the other party. In such cases, as Hornblower remarks, 'people so accused would naturally ignore the accusation, and when they did, they often got away with it'.[102] In Thucydides we come across several such examples. To mention only a couple of them: Alcibiades urges the Athenians to inscribe on the Laconian pillar below the main inscription the words 'the Spartans have not kept their oaths' (5.56.3); the Spartan request that the Athenians drive out the Alcmaeonid curse (1.127.1) is met with the Athenian request that the Spartans purify both the curse of Taenarus and of Athena of the Brazen House (1.28.1) – but in the end neither the Athenians nor the Spartans take any action. Leotychides' case seems rather similar, especially since there is an analogy with the above Thucydidean cases in that the Athenians in the end do nothing.[103] In addition, one may also think of the famous Spartan duplicity,[104] which ties in very well with the speech being a piece of Spartan sophistry.

The speech, taken out of its context, is frightening indeed. However, if contextualized, it seems completely irrelevant to the situation at hand, and it might then be a fair assumption that the Athenians are able to see through the trickery and are not convinced.[105] Leotychides tries to instil fear in his audience, that is, to increase the *pathos* of his speech through the use of a moral argument which is in fact irrelevant (especially the last frightening bit, 6.86δ). *Pathos* falls apart the moment the audience realizes the discrepancy: 'it is a fearsome story, but it does not apply to our case'.

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[102] See Hornblower 2007b: 139.

[103] See Hornblower 2007b: 139.

[104] They are considered to be neither trustworthy nor reliable by the Athenians at 9.54.1: 'the Athenians being well aware of the Spartan habit of thinking one thing and saying another…'. Another demonstrative case of Spartan duplicity occurs when the Plataeans, while having problems with Thebes, request to put themselves into Spartan hands (6.108.2-3). The Spartans then reply that their help will not be useful as they live far away and so the Plataeans could even be enslaved before the Spartans even get to learn of it. Accordingly they advise them to ask for the help of neighbouring Athens. Herodotus' comment gives away the true Spartan motive behind the specious and pseudo-advisory rhetoric: the Spartans want to create hostility between Athens and Boeotia. Cf. Thucydides' comments on Brasidas at 4.108.5. On Spartan duplicity see Bradford 1994: 59-85. Cf. also above p. 105 n. 85. See also Powell (1988: 96-135) on the Spartans' intelligent imperialistic policy in 478-431 B.C.

[105] Cf. Fisher (2002: 200): 'The Athenians pay the story no attention, and the impression is given that they already regard it as an old-fashioned rhetorical strategy'. However, Fisher (see esp. p. 200 n. 3) affiliates this strategy with the Athenians' general neglect of arguments from reciprocity and he also overlooks thus the fact that the Athenians have not given any oaths.

When *pathos* fails, *ethos* might work in favour of the effectiveness of the speech. Still, Leotychides' *ethos* is also disputed, as he is condemned by his fellow-citizens to be given up to the Aeginetans in exchange for the Aeginetan prisoners held in Athens. His *ethos* becomes even weaker as he is not accompanied by the other Spartan king when he claims the hostages from the Athenians by himself. Thus the argument of the Athenians that the hostages were deposited with them by both kings and therefore they cannot hand them over to only one of them, might not be a mere pretence.[106]

Part of the same rhetorical plan seems to be the use of devices which are traditionally used to link stories to their context, in order to further emphasize the comparison and the relevance to the present situation.[107] We shall focus on two particular words with this function: *λέγομεν* and *παραθήκη*. On the one hand, the story is introduced by the typical storytelling verb *λέγομεν* (6.86α.2), which is also accompanied by another typical storytelling verb, *φαμὲν* (6.86α.2).[108] If we bear in mind that, when Herodotus uses the verb *λέγω* to introduce information in his narrative, this is to lend authority to his narrative,[109] then it is quite attractive to interpret the word here as follows: 'this is what we say in Sparta, I know it well because I have heard it, and it is probably true'. On the other hand, the importance of *παραθήκη* for the essence of my argument here is crucial.[110] *Παραθήκη* serves the trickery performed by Leotychides as it attempts to connect falsely the story to its context and thus draw virtually invalid comparisons. *Παραθήκη* is also the word Herodotus uses when referring to the deposited Aeginetans (6.73.2). Herodotus thus plays with the words and prepares the ground for Leotychides' argument. This is an excellent example of how a narrative seed can be developed and explained in a subsequent speech, and this way a false story can lay claim to reality, and eventually persuade the audience.

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[106] Cf. Hornblower 2007b: 140-1; Scott 2005: 315.

[107] See above pp. 160-1.

[108] See Fraenkel 1950: 470. Given its introduction this story was most probably a popular *ainos* at that time.

[109] See above p. 17.

[110] On *παραθήκη* see also Macan (1895: 331): 'The word is not used haphazard, but smooths the way for the wondrous argument put into the mouth of Leotychides, c. 86 *infra*'. Cf. Hornblower 2007b: 140. Hornblower (2007b: 140 n. 5a) also correctly observes that if at 6.86 we accept the reading *παρακαταθήκη* which some mss. have instead of *παραθήκη* (on this see Scott 2005: 313-14), then 'this would reduce the echo'.

What we get in the end is an irrelevant tale, delicately masked so that it appears to be all the more appropriate to its context. Indirectness is an important means of persuasion, especially in circumstances where the argument has no real bearing on the present situation, since there is no risk of swearing false oaths or even violating one's oaths. And, if one presses things further, the speech may come to reflect the divisive tendencies in the Greek world: the Spartans (Leotychides) try to fool the Athenians, who appear to be negative and non-responsive towards the Aeginetans and the Spartans.

c) Instantiating Greek disunity: myth vs. history in the Tegean-Athenian debate (9.26-7)

The celebrated dispute between the Tegeans and the Athenians over the command of the left wing before the battle at Plataea is an intriguing piece of rhetoric in that it exemplifies in the finest way the weakness in the Greek coalition. It is a unique case where we see Greeks openly competing for preeminence, building their argument on examples drawn from myth and history. The tension between myth and history, the old and the new, with the Tegeans supporting the prevalence of old deeds and Athenians of the recent deeds, is also an important issue in the narrative agenda of Herodotus, who seems to take sides here.

The Tegean speech comes first and the Athenian follows, thus recalling the speech sequence in the dramatic *agon* where the winner speaks last.[111] The Tegean speech already presents us with the polarity old vs. recent deeds, which underlies the debate (9.26.2: *καὶ τὸ πάλαι καὶ τὸ νέον*), and tellingly closes with a similar phrase in the form of ring-composition (9.26.7: *οὔτ' ὢν καινὰ οὔτε παλαιά*). The structure of the speech is relatively simple, with two clearly distinguishable main arguments. The first argument is the Tegeans' traditional right of precedence in the battleline. This is in turn supported by a sub-argument, which refers to the distant mythical past: the defeat of Hyllus, the leader of the Heracleidae, by a Tegean king, named Echemus. The second argument relates to the Tegeans' *ἀξιονικία*, and is supported this time by a historical *paradeigma*: the Tegeans are more worthy than the Athenians to hold this position due to the glorious battles they have fought against Sparta and other cities in recent times (9.26).

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[111] The Athenians will not fall short of both old and new deeds, complying to the rules of the competition the Tegeans set. See 9.27.1: *ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ Τεγεήτης προέθηκε*. Flower and Marincola (2002: 153) note that the verb is commonly used of 'setting up' contests (e.g. Eur. *Med*. 546: *…ἄμιλλαν γὰρ σὺ προύθηκας λόγων*; Thuc. 3.67.6: *οὐ λόγων τοὺς ἀγῶνας προθήσοντες ἀλλ' ἔργων*).

Correspondingly, the Athenians prove their valour (*ἀξιονικία*) through the use of both mythical and historical examples. Initially, they mention four mythical examples: Eurystheus and the return of Heracleidae, the fight at Thebes, their memorable fight against the Amazons and the Trojan War. Then they talk about their glorious role at Marathon (9.27).

Measuring the arguments of both speeches against each other clearly shows that the Tegeans offer only one specific argument, and this is a mythical one. Although this argument is extremely long and detailed, it does not actually support their case. The Tegeans killed the leader of the Heracleidae and prevented them from returning home (9.26.2-5). By contrast, the Athenians relate how they received the Heracleidae, and how they defeated the Tegeans, who claimed to be the leaders of the Peloponnesians at that time, together (9.27.2). Since the Heracleidae were held to be the ancestors of the Spartan royal houses,[112] the Athenians make clever use here of the kinship argument, which they turn to their own advantage: the Spartans clearly had better reasons to be friendly to the Athenians.[113] The example also holds important implications for the internal audience of the speech, the Spartans: the collective action of the Athenians and the Heracleidae is reflected in the Spartan-Athenian alliance of the present war.[114] The external audience is expected to interpret the argument ironically in light of the Athenian-Spartan conflict during the Peloponnesian War.

Of their recent deeds the Tegeans have nothing more to add than merely a general statement about their victorious battles against the Spartans and others (9.26.7). We are not told what these fights are; they might have been so well-known that there was no need to repeat them. In all probability they allude to their fights against the Spartans mentioned at 1.66-67.1. On the other hand, this might well be a rhetorical trick to aggrandize their deeds without being specific. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Athenians present their celebrated victory at Marathon (9.27.5), where they proved their valour against the barbarians, as a counterargument. The Tegeans have fought only against Greeks within the boundaries of the Peloponnese instead.

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[112] See above p. 99 and n. 67.

[113] Cf. also Immerwahr 1966: 215; Flower and Marincola 2002: 154. Kinship is undeniably one of the most important and readily employed arguments in all kinds of rhetorical speeches. On the importance of kinship see above pp. 82-4.

[114] Cf. also Flower and Marincola 2002: 154.

The scales thus lean in favour of the Athenians who outweigh the Tegeans in both past and recent deeds.[115] Yet there is an important twist in the Athenian speech, which marks the dismissal of the heroic past, when they turn from the mythical to the historical part of their speech: 'enough with this ancient history, since from then till now things might have changed, and the brave might not be brave still, whereas the non-brave might have improved by now; so let us leave ancient history out of it, and come to the present' (9.27.4-5); the hint at the insufficiency of the Tegean arguments is more than straightforward here. The Athenian statement is echoed by Thucydides twice: first at 1.73.2 by the Athenians in their speech at Sparta (*Καὶ τὰ μὲν πάνυ παλαιὰ τί δεῖ λέγειν, ὧν ἀκοαὶ μᾶλλον μάρτυρες ἢ ὄψις τῶν ἀκουσομένων;*), and then at 2.36.4 in Pericles' funeral Speech (*μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν οὐ βουλόμενος ἐάσω*) – still the Athenians include a reference to the Persian Wars, whereas Pericles does not.[116] A similar attitude in disputing the validity of mythical deeds in comparison with Marathon is to be observed in Demosthenes' *Epitaphius* 8-10: after mentioning all the typical *topoi* of funeral speeches, Demosthenes states that those who fought in the Persian Wars were much superior to those who fought at Troy.

Herodotus' interestingly 'Thucydidean' remark becomes all the more significant given the similarities there seem to be between the Athenian speech and fifth- and early fourth-century funeral orations (*ἐπιτάφιοι λόγοι*) and similar panegyric speeches. This point needs further elaboration.

Three of the four mythical examples the Athenians mention (i.e. the Heraclidae, the Theban contempt for the Argive corpses, and the Amazons), as well as their one historical *paradeigma* (i.e. Marathon), are typical *paradeigmata* of funeral orations and panegyric speeches, which become fixed in the later tradition and are treated at greater length, as seen in Thucydides, Lysias, Demosthenes, Isocrates, Hypereides, Plato's *Menexenus*.[117] The comparison may even be extended to verbal echoes.[118]

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[115] Note that the phrase *παλαιά τε καὶ καινά* (9.27.1) at the beginning of the Athenian speech neatly echoes in reverse order the last phrase of the Tegean speech *οὔτ' ὢν καινά οὔτε παλαιά* (9.26.7). Cf. also Flower and Marincola 2002: 152.

[116] The past-present contrast also surfaces in the Plataean debate in Thuc. 3.53-68, though there with reference to historical events; the Spartans there are interested in the current war, not in the aid they received from the Plataeans in the distant past.

[117] The employment of these mythical and historical *exempla* reflects two particular Athenian qualities emphasized in both tragedy and rhetoric: compassion for the weak and oppressed, and the representation of the Athenians as benefactors of all Greece. On epideictic topics see How and Wells 1912: 297; Walters 1981: 204-5; Thomas 1989: 207-13 (especially pp. 211-12); Flower and Marincola 2002: 152-4. Cf. also

It would be tempting to consider the Tegean speech as a kind of *epitaphios* or panegyric speech also. The form and structure of the Athenian speech is based exactly on the Tegean speech, as the Athenians claim (9.27.1). Hereby the Athenians acknowledge in fact, on the one hand, that their speech is some kind of *epitaphios* or panegyric speech, and, on the other hand, that their speech has been prompted by the corresponding Tegean speech. In any case, history and myth feature in both speeches, and, as How and Wells observe, 'the idea seems that the Tegean has instituted a contest in self-laudatory panegyrics'.[119]

What is remarkable is that the Athenians deprecate in their speech not only the mythical arguments – one of the cardinal features of epideictic speeches – but they also disapprove of this very attitude of speaking on such a critical occasion twice in their talk – at the beginning and at the end, in the form of ring-composition (9.27.1, 27.6). Hence this contradictory statement, stressed through ring-composition, taken strictly implies the undermining of both speeches. Can we conclude that Herodotus demonstrates his disapproval of epideictic speeches in this way? This may be a fair assumption. A counter-argument would run thus: the contrast between *λόγος* and *ἔργον* and the subsequent deprecation of speech is a commonplace in epideictic speeches.[120] One can hardly deny that. However, in the orators, this deprecation runs differently: 'it is not easy to use words to describe so great deeds'. Here, the Athenians do find the appropriate words to describe their deeds and consequently dismiss the whole debate as inhibiting the immediate action they need to take, i.e. the battle against the Persians. In that sense, it may be read very much like the sort of hard-headed thing said by Athenian speakers in Thucydides (e.g. 5.89 at Melos). In any case, it is important in reading the Athenian speech in Herodotus to bear in mind that this is a situation where a practical

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Maass 1887: 589-90 n.1; Meyer 1899: 219-21; Solmsen 1944: 248; Loraux 1986: 67. On Herodotus' familiarity with epideictic topics see Burgess 1902: 198; Flower and Marincola 2002: 152-3; *pace* Boardman (1982: 6): 'Herodotus, then, is our first evidence for this group of myth-historical deeds which were to be regularly repeated by later encomiasts of Athens and writers of funeral orations, real or imaginary'. Particularly on the influence of Pericles' funeral oration on Herodotus see Meyer 1899: 221-2; How and Wells 1912: 198; Bury 1958: 63. On the relation between Herodotus and Lysias and Isocrates see Nouhaud 1982: 118-20. On Herodotus' familiarity with Simonides' Plataea elegy see Boedeker 2001.

[118] On such verbal echoes see Solmsen 1944: 249; Loraux 1986: 68, 232-6; Flower and Marincola 2002: 153.

[119] See How and Wells 1912: 297.

[120] See Loraux 1986: 232-6; Flower and Marincola 2002: 153.

decision has to be taken, unlike the occasions of epideictic oratory; the rejection of mythic *topoi* for laudation has to be seen in context.

In the Athenian statement there is also implicit something deeper: on the one hand, the Athenians care for Greek unity and reject any quarrels; on the other hand, their rationality is emphasized (i.e. 'we have a battle at hand; let us not procrastinate'). If the speech is interpreted in isolation, then it might be taken as a pro-Athenian gesture in the context of both the Persian Wars and the Peloponnesian War. A very different picture emerges when looking at the surrounding context, as the Spartans win the battle of Plataea with the help of the Tegeans and the Athenians play no further active role. This is then the most appropriate point to recall Marathon, the greatest Athenian service in the Persian Wars. Along with the defeat of Masistius' cavalry by the Athenians (Olympiodorus' deed), this speech, being closely akin to the *epitaphioi logoi*, is the most suitable way to honour the Athenians and close the reference to them before they disappear into the background. It is part of the victory they win in this speech-conflict. Ironically this oratorical victory balances their eventual non-participation in the military victory at Plataea.

But the speeches reveal even more about the way Herodotus uses his paradigms. For this purpose, the comparison with the rhetorical speeches may still prove very fruitful. Two differences present special interest: Herodotus mentions the Trojan War, but he does not mention autochthony. Looking for exact correspondence between Herodotus and the funeral/panegyric speeches would indeed be futile. Herodotus has certainly borrowed elements from the tradition used to praise Athens, but his variations are telling, in that they disclose his artistry when choosing and tailoring his examples.

First, Herodotus refers to the Trojan War, but there is no reference to this war in any of the epideictic speeches in the long corpus of the oratory that has come down to us. Whenever a speech includes such a reference, it is only to reject it.[121] Perhaps the Trojan War was much used in epideictic speeches before the Persian Wars, but became redundant after they provided a more forceful example.[122] This might also explain in part the brief and vague reference of the Athenians to their role in the Trojan War (another reason would be the inferior role of the Athenians in this war).[123] The only text we have from the period close to the Persian Wars which refers to the Trojan War is

[121] E.g. Dem. *Epit*. 10.

[122] See Thomas 1989: 211-12.

[123] The Athenians are mentioned in the Catalogue of Ships (*Il*. 2.546-56) and a few other places. See also Macan 1908b: 647; Flower and Marincola 2002: 156.

Simonides' Plataea elegy. The poem is an attempt to immortalize the Greeks who participated in the battle of Plataea by establishing the analogy between these Greeks and those who fought at Troy. Herodotus might have been influenced by this text.[124]

No matter what his source is, Herodotus consciously chooses to include this paradigm to add pan-Hellenic colouring. Such carefully tailored argumentation has a bearing not only on Herodotus' ingenuity, but also on the Athenian need to aptly address an external audience. In Herodotus' time the mention of the Trojan War would seem out of place in a purely Athenian speech. Nevertheless, at the time of the text and before Plataea, Athens is not yet the super-power it has become by the time of Herodotus.[125] All the more so, the fight before them is common to all the Greeks, who need to unite their forces, and some adjustment of the *topoi* might be necessary to meet the requirements of a non-Athenian audience. On the other hand, just like in the case of Gelon, we cannot escape the ironic implications this reference entails: the fragility of the Greek cause.[126] There might be another explanation, provided Herodotus has been influenced by Simonides' text: Simonides connects the Greeks who fought at Plataea, that is the Spartans and the Tegeans, with the Greeks who fought at Troy; Herodotus, in his attempt to present us with a balanced narrative both puts the mention to the Trojan War in the mouth of the Athenians, who leave the war thus gloriously, and also enriches his Plataea narrative with Homeric overtones.[127] So both Sparta and Athens take their share of the glory of the Greeks who fought at Troy.

Second, Herodotus omits a reference to autochthony, which belongs to the customary themes of epideictic speeches.[128] This might seem surprising at first, since this particular mythical example could be a very strong and effective argument for the Athenians. However, if one recalls that the Tegeans are also indigenous (Hdt. 8.73.1; cf. Thuc. 1.2.3), the omission seems more intentional; the Athenians would not in this way

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[124] On the possible relationship between Herodotus and the New Simonides see Boedeker 2001 (on the Trojan War parallel see esp. pp. 124-6); cf. also Rood 1998b. However, Boedeker (2001: 125-6) also rightly points out that we should not overdo it and consider the Plataea poem the direct and single source for Herodotus, for the analogy between the Persian and the Trojan War was very widespread after the battle at Plataea, as proved by public monuments and by part A of the 'Eion poem' (XL *FGE*).

[125] On the Trojan War see in detail Loraux 1986: 70-2.

[126] Cf. Pelling 2006b: 90 n. 42.

[127] On epic colouring in the Plataea narrative see Boedeker 2001: 122; Flower and Marincola 2002: 201-2; Pelling 2006b: 98-100.

[128] Autochthony is one of the four myths of Athenian identity, the other three being the suppliant motif, the gift of grain and Ionianism. See further Hornblower 2002^{3}: 127-30.

prove that they are better than the Arcadians.[129] Accordingly, the Tegeans are careful enough not to use the same argument, as it could not secure them victory in the quarrel, being easily refuted by the equivalent Athenian autochthony claims. A potential hint, however, at the autochthony of the Tegeans, and suggestively of the Athenians, may be the use of the word 'Arcadians' at 9.27.1.

It has been clear so far throughout the above analysis that Herodotus picks his examples carefully and tailors them to his current purposes. At this point, I may conveniently come back to what I proposed at the beginning of the chapter: the use of mythical and historical paradigms by the orators. Myth and history have been regularly employed and adapted for political purposes in oratory.[130] The case of the Amazons is particularly indicative of myth manipulated to suit and reflect historical events: Theseus and the rape of Amazon were forgotten, and the Persian Wars or even the Ionian revolt may have inspired Theseus' expedition against the Amazons, their subsequent invasion of Attica and their repulse by Theseus.[131] Of the historical examples, Marathon has received considerable manipulation to reflect the same picture of the Athenians as benefactors of all Greece and liberators of the oppressed. Only ten years later Herodotus makes the Athenians at Plataea claim that Marathon was as a purely Athenian victory. The same point about the Athenians fighting alone at Marathon is made by Artabanus at 7.10β.1,[132] and by the Athenians at Sparta in Thucydides 1.73.4. These fifth-century examples find firm parallels in the fourth-century tradition, namely in Andokides, Lysias and Demosthenes. The Plataean help at Marathon, although recorded by Herodotus (6.108.1),[133] has regularly been ignored.[134]

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[129] Cf. also Rosivach 1987: 305 n. 40; Thomas 2000: 118.

[130] For more details on the use of myth as political argument see Buxton 1994: 193-8; cf. also Calame 1999: 125-36 (more specifically on Isocrates). See also Tyrrell (1984: 15): 'Funeral oratory distorted and falsified mythical and historical events; it created a myth, a reality of words, which explained aggression as assistance and altruism and which transformed isolation from that of a tyrannical city into the desertion of Athenians by other Greeks, a desertion which left them the solitary defenders of the common cause'.

[131] See Boardman 1982: 6, 12-14, 27; Tyrrell 1984.

[132] Cf. Pausanias who uses the example of Marathon when claiming that the Athenians have experience of fighting the Persians (9.46.2).

[133] Apart from Herodotus, two more texts, both dated after Herodotus' *Histories*, stress the role the Plataeans played in the Persian Wars: Thuc. 3.54, and Dem. 59.94 – the latter probably taken from Thucydides.

[134] Cf. Walters 1981: 204-11; Thomas 1989: 221. This kind of political propaganda is also reflected in art through the use of mythical themes, the most typical and obvious example of this trend being the Stoa

Let us now turn to the result of the dispute and whether this depends on the effectiveness of either speech. In the end the Spartans give the position of honour to the Athenians, but no speech ensues; they vote through shouting instead (9.28.1), that is in the normal Spartan way. The Tegean speech proves ineffective. Is this really the case though? If the Tegeans actually wanted to win the lead of the left wing for themselves, they would not have been so unwise as to refer to present deeds at all, since they could remind the Spartans merely of several glorious fights conducted against them. In addition, they definitely remembered Marathon and the heroic deed of Olympiodorus (9.21-3), which would evidently give the advantage to the Athenians.[135] Lack of tact and diplomacy[136] may sound conveniently simple reasons for their attitude. Yet we do see a lot of ineffectual argument – as for instance when the Greeks seek the aid of Gelon. The Tegeans may impress the Spartans despite their poor rhetoric and this seems to be their ultimate purpose, that is to win the Spartans' respect. And they actually do so, if their argument that they defeated the Spartans is interpreted as follows: 'We even defeated you, who are the best, therefore we are better than you and we deserve this place in the battle'.[137] The Spartans are able to see through this and they place the Tegeans next to themselves in the battle line 'both to do them honour and for their valour' (9.28.3).[138]

Two things seem to play a role in the Spartan decision in favour of the Athenians: the victorious experience of the Athenians against the Persians at Marathon; and the deprecation of speech in favour of deeds (9.27.1; cf. 9.27.6), which is in accordance with the characteristic Spartan preference for action at the expense of words.[139] Another factor contributing to the Spartan decision might be the historical background of the relationships between Sparta and Tegea. The Tegeans and the Spartans had been long-lasting enemies (Hdt. 1.66-67.1). It was only after the transfer of the bones of Orestes

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Poikile at Athens, which represents mythical next to recent conflicts. On this see Buxton 1994: 61-2; cf. also Hall 1989: 68-9.

[135] Macan (1908: 645) suggests that the heroic deed of Olympiodorus had probably not taken place when the dispute for precedence arose, since the Athenians do not refer to this at all.

[136] See Macan 1908b: 644-5.

[137] Tegea is also distinctively recorded as the only city which defeated the Spartans (1.65.1), and as the leader of the left wing in battles – although not always. We are thus invited to think that the Tegeans were more powerful than the Spartans and, had it not been for the transfer of Orestes' bones to Sparta, the Tegeans would have carried on defeating the Spartans.

[138] Cf. Flower and Marincola 2002: 148.

[139] See ch. 5.

from Tegea to Sparta at about 560/50, when there possibly was an alliance and a treaty between the two cities. There was another treaty in the 460s. If there had in fact been no treaty between Sparta and Tegea in 560/50 and it is just Herodotus projecting an alliance of his own day (460's) back into the sixth century,[140] then the tense relationship between Sparta and Tegea might be a possible reason for the Spartan decision. Herodotus' text actually provides us with the only indication of hostility between Sparta and Tegea before the Persian Wars at 9.37.4: *Τεγέην, ἐοῦσαν οὐκ ἀρθμίην Λακεδαιμονίοισι τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον.*[141] The Spartans, being on bad terms with the Tegeans (9.37.4), possibly judge the dispute in favour of the Athenians. This affects all the more negatively the relationships between Sparta and Tegea and results in their fighting each other (9.35.2).[142] Thus the speeches create additionally ironic forward allusions, in light of the future relationship between Sparta and Tegea.

The Athenian speech itself also works to remind the Spartans and readers of the tension between Sparta and Tegea through the repetition of a very important word: the adjective *χρηστὸς* (9.27.1 [twice], 27.4, 27.6). The word is attested in the content of the treaty between Sparta and Tegea.[143] The treaty stipulated, among other things, that the Messenians should be expelled from the Tegean territory and that no one should become *χρηστοί*. No matter what the exact meaning of *χρηστοί* is,[144] it is compelling to see it as a clever allusion to the treaty. Furthermore, at this point any other word could have been employed by the Athenians, such as for example *ἄξιος*, which is used once by the Athenians (9.27.5: *ἄξιοι*), or *ἀξιόνικος*, used by the Tegeans in the comparative degree (9.26.6: *ἀξιονικότεροι*). In such a case, there might be a deeper irony in the Athenians'

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[140] See Nielsen 2002: 190-1. On the date and importance of the treaty see also Forrest 1968: 73-6; Cartledge 1979: 138-9; Hammond 1982: 355; Murray 1993[2]: 262-3; Cawkwell 1993: 368-70; Braun 1994: 42-5; Nielsen and Roy 1999: 96.

[141] Macan (1908b: 674) is skeptical arguing that 'if Tegea was at war with Sparta before the Persian invasion, of which no other record survives, then this feud should have been noticed in 7.145 as one of those composed in 481 B.C.' (together with the quarrel between Athens and Aegina). This is not sufficient indication to make us doubt Herodotus' comment, for at 7.145.1 Herodotus refers to 'a number of such disputes at the time, the most serious being the quarrel between Athens and Aegina'; so any possible dispute between Sparta and Tegea might still exist but not be considered serious enough.

[142] See also Lewis 1992a: 104-6.

[143] See Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 277a-c; *Quaest. Graec.* 292b.

[144] According to Aristotle it means 'dead' (Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 277a-c; *Quaest. Graec.* 292b) (argued also recently by Cawkwell 1993: 368-70; Braun 1994: 40-5; Nielsen 2002: 394). Jacoby (1944: 15-16) translates it as 'citizen' (cf. also Forrest 1968: 79; Cartledge 1979: 138; Murray 1993[2]: 263).

words, which undermines the Tegean speech: the Tegeans have not always been allies of the Spartans, as they (the Tegeans) like to say, but only since the treaty was signed; so their argument is only partly valid.

The Tegean-Athenian dispute reflects as straightforwardly as possible the difficulty of the Greeks in working together towards a common goal. The subject of the dispute, that is the position of honour in the battle line, is particularly suggestive for inter-state conflicts. The structuring of the speeches as self-glorifying accounts of each side, corroborated by their affinities to epideictic speeches, point at self-centred rather than pan-Hellenic motivation. The mention of the Trojan War brings the past unified Greek cause into juxtaposition with the present threatened cause. Besides, there are other factors also analysed above: the historical background of bad relations between Sparta and Tegea, and the emphasized Athenian help for the Heraclidae. This debate in the form of an intense competition for supremacy, taking place just before the final battle of the Persian Wars, adds to the picture of fragmented Greek cause. The recognition by the Spartans of Athenian preeminence against the Tegeans is only the first step towards the strengthening of Athenian rule and the confirmation of Athenian primacy over the Greek world in Herodotus' time.

4.3 Conclusion

Examples, with their obliqueness and adaptability, reveal the roundabout nature of rhetoric and Herodotus' techniques of composition. Traditional patterns and folkloristic motifs come together, are deployed or deconstructed and re-distributed to enable Herodotus to flesh out the larger narrative framework. The implicitness and delicacy of the paradigms suit not only tyrannical institutions like the Persians', but also the free Greek political context. Comparable speech limitations in both Greece and Persia demand carefully designed rhetoric. Socles and Leotychides talk vaguely and leave room for various interpretative possibilities. Examples allow them the freedom denied by context.

Vagueness and recollection of past stories may seem innocent but are eventually seriously guilty of supporting the gradually shattering Greek unity. Regional quarrels for reasons of expediency, may be read between the lines in Socles' and Leotychides' speeches. Fashionable epideictic motifs deployed by the Tegeans and especially the Athenians, strive to certify the dominance of each city over the other at the expense of Greek coalition, and even seek to justify the present Athenian empire.

Chapter 5: Allocation of speech

The previous chapters have taken us through the general problematic representation of debate scenes to the more specific problematic depiction of alliance and pre-battle speeches and, at a third even more specific stage, to the indirect nature of the examples employed in speeches. We have thus examined different ways, nested in each other, in which Herodotus substantiates his view about the fluid, manipulative, easily refashioned, highly varied and thereby precarious nature of rhetoric, which on the one hand divides the Greeks, while on the other brings together Greeks and Persians. This last chapter adds to the picture drawn so far by engaging in structural aspects. What I propose to do here is to interpret the allocation of direct and indirect speech modes to individuals and groups in certain narrative points with a view to the wider dominating themes of the *Histories*.

It is initially necessary to oppose three widespread beliefs as regards the use of different speech modes in literature: veracity of direct speech; prejudiced sources; dramatization of direct speech. First, an important premise of the analysis is the collapse of the common conception that the difference between direct and indirect speech modes is one of veracity. In the 'Introduction', where I explain and discuss the different speech modes, I challenge the substance of the equation direct discourse = faithful representation of reality, indirect speech = adaptation/fabrication, and argue for its precariousness.[1] Second, another crucial aspect is viewing the selection of speech modes as disengaged from matters of authenticity, sources and Herodotus' personal bias to the highest degree possible.[2] Third, direct speech has so far been considered mainly as a means of *variatio*, which provides the narrative with dramatization. It will be demonstrated that the implications of selectivity in the deployment of speech are associated with deeper interpretative strands which permeate the work, and that silence in Herodotus like speech carries also dramatic qualities.

Focusing on aspects like who speaks, who does not, whether they receive direct or indirect speech, and why they speak at specific points in the text, has further implications for the self-other distinction (Greeks vs. Persians), the Greek confederacy (Spartans vs. Athenians), the relation between speech and power and speech and

[1] See above pp. 16-19.

[2] See above pp. 19-21.

authority, in conjunction with the last topic, freedom and free speech, and the dialogism of the *Histories*.

This chapter also draws frequently on modern literary theory, employing and playing with narratological notions, speech-act theory, and discourse analysis. This combination proves fruitful as it brings out the complex nexus of the Herodotean narrative technique, which seeks variant effects at the same time.

The chapter commences with a discussion of further purposes of the alternation between different speech modes, tracing the technique in earlier, contemporary and later literature. The following part deals with varying degrees of silence, ranging from compression or suppression to total omission of speeches, and the ways they complicate the dialogism of the text, the nature of rhetoric, the Greek unity, and the relation between speech and power as well as authority. The last subchapter deals with the arrangement and distribution of speech within the frame of the underpinning and questioning of the Graeco-Persian polarity. I conclude that such a conscious usage of different speech modes brings Herodotus' dialogism under severe scrutiny and demands thorough re-examination.

5.1 Alternation between direct and indirect speech modes

Herodotus is not the first to alternate between different speech modes, that is to transition from direct to indirect speech modes and *vice versa*.[3] The model is already to be found in Homer. By this I do not mean the use of speeches which interrupt the narrative and are introduced with specific *formulae*, but the points where we find direct speech embedded in the speeches of several characters (narrative style turns into speech). A very neat example of this is *Il*. 6.164-5, where Glaucus quotes directly Anteia's words in the Bellerophontes story.[4] Likewise the variation between *oratio recta* and *obliqua* occurs in lyric poetry, especially in Pindar, Bacchylides (11.104) and Sappho (1.18 L-P).[5] Hornblower[6] draws attention to a unique example in Pindar, Themis' speech in *Isthmian* 8.31-5a, 'whose integration into the narrative is particularly interesting and subtle, and which is unlike anything in Homer or the historians in that narrative and speech, or rather indirect and direct speech, merge without a formulaic

[3] What Laird (1999: 101) calls 'angled narration of dialogue' (AND).

[4] For more examples see de Jong 1987: 168-79.

[5] Cf. Bers 1997: 19-21.

[6] See Hornblower 2004: 320 (on pp. 325 ff. he gives a list of the direct speeches in Pindar and Bacchylides); cf. Hornblower 2008: 33.

introduction for the direct speech.' The same technique is taken up by tragedy. Fraenkel in his commentary on Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* line 611 already observes the 'very natural' transition between direct and indirect speech in Clytaemestra's speech.[7] Euripides also makes extended use of the technique in the messenger-speeches (he uses direct speech in his messenger-speeches much more often than Aeschylus and Sophocles).[8]

In Herodotus the shift from indirect to direct speech modes or *vice versa* may be observed either in debates or within the speech of the same speaker. Some striking examples of the debates category are given in the following table:[9]

Passage	**Speaker**	**Addressee**	**Speech mode**
5.30.3	Naxians	Aristagoras	RSA
5.30.4-5	Aristagoras	Naxians	DD
5.30.6	Naxians	Aristagoras	ID
5.49.2-8	Aristagoras	Cleomenes	DD
5.49.9	Cleomenes	Aristagoras	DD
5.50.1	Cleomenes	Aristagoras	ID
5.50.2	Aristagoras	Cleomenes	ID
5.50.3	Cleomenes	Aristagoras	DD
5.51.1	Aristagoras	Cleomenes	RSA
5.51.1	Cleomenes	Aristagoras	RSA
5.51.2	Aristagoras	Cleomenes	RSA
5.51.2	Cleomenes	Aristagoras	RSA
5.51.2	Aristagoras	Cleomenes	RSA
5.51.2	Gorgo	Cleomenes	DD

[7] See Fraenkel 1950: 303. This is very effective dramatically, and looks as if the playwright intends to incite the audience after hearing the long speech of Clytaemestra, and just before it finishes, to have a powerful *exordium*.

[8] See de Jong 1991: 131-9. See also Bers 1997: 23-128.

[9] ID = Indirect Discourse; DD = Direct Discourse; RSA = Record of Speech Act (on the different speech modes see above pp. 15-16).

6.1	Artaphrenes	Histiaeus	ID
6.1	Histiaeus	Artaphrenes	ID
6.2	Artaphrenes	Histiaeus	DD
7.135.2	Hydarnes	Sperthias & Bulis	DD
7.135.3	Sperthias & Bulis	Hydarnes	DD
7.136.1	Persian guards	Sperthias & Bulis	RSA
7.136.1	Sperthias & Bulis	Persian guards	ID
7.136.2	Sperthias & Bulis	Xerxes	DD
7.136.2	Xerxes	Sperthias & Bulis	ID
7.209.2	Xerxes	Demaratus	ID
7.209.2-4	Demaratus	Xerxes	DD
7.209.5	Xerxes	Demaratus	ID
7.209.5	Demaratus	Xerxes	DD
8.57.1	Mnesiphilus	Themistocles	ID
8.57.1	Themistocles	Mnesiphilus	ID
8.57.2	Mnesiphilus	Themistocles	DD
8.58.1	Themistocles	Mnesiphilus	RSA (silence)
8.58.1	Themistocles	Eurybiades	ID
8.58.1	Eurybiades	Themistocles	RSA
8.58.2	Themistocles	Eurybiades	RSA
8.59	Eurybiades	Greek generals	ID
8.59	Themistocles	Greek generals	RSA
8.59	Adeimantus	Themistocles	DD
8.59	Themistocles	Adeimantus	DD
8.60α-γ	Themistocles	Eurybiades	DD
8.61.1	Adeimantus	Themistocles & Eurybiades	RSA
8.61.2	Themistocles	Adeimantus	ID
8.62	Themistocles	Eurybiades	DD

9.90.2	Hegesistratus	Leotychides	ID
9.91.1	Leotychides	Hegesistratus	DD
9.91.1	Hegesistratus	Leotychides	DD
9.91.2	Leotychides	Hegesistratus	DD

I have been able to identify two cases of a switch from direct to indirect speech modes in the same speech: Mardonius' repeated speeches to Xerxes to persuade him to march against Greece, where we move from direct to indirect speech modes (7.5.2-3); and Aristagoras' speech to Artaphrenes, this time from indirect to direct speech modes (5.31.1-3).

Apart from the variety[10] and dramatization[11] produced by the alternation between direct and indirect speech,[12] another important reason for Herodotus to choose between speech modes is narrative pace (acceleration, retardation). Herodotus thus prolongates speeches or whole scenes, which are important to his narrative, by quoting them in direct discourse,[13] or in this way pauses the narrative to increase the suspense.[14] For example, Socles' speech, the longest direct speech in the *Histories*, is important in that it highlights the urgency of the situation; the intense debates before Salamis dramatize the circumstances and increase the suspense by underlining the fragility of the Greek alliance; Miltiades' speech before Marathon functions both as a narrative delay before the battle of Marathon and as a device to instigate action, since the Athenian participation in the battle depends on the persuasiveness of the speech.

Furthermore, in this kind of construction, indirect speech functions as a focusing device, thus attracting the attention of the audience to the direct speech which follows

[10] See Waters 1985: 69.

[11] See de Jong 1991: 131-9 (esp. 131).

[12] De Jong (1987a: 178-9) neatly summarizes the effects of embedded direct discourse in the *Iliad*: dramatic vividness intended by the characters when they want 'to draw attention to an important point in their story', 'to increase the apologetic, persuasive or taunting force of their speech', 'to externalize their own hopes/fears'; embedded indirect discourse on the other hand is used when 'what counts is content rather than impact', 'a speaker wishes to play down the importance of somebody else's words'.

[13] Cf. Lang 1984: 148. See also de Bakker 2007: 36-48. The distinction between the time of the story and the time of the telling is one of the key distinctions in narrative theory; duration signals importance (see Genette 1980: 86-112; 1993: 63-4).

[14] Similarly Scardino (2007: 122) accepts importance and suspense as effects of the embedding of direct speeches in the Herodotean text. There is a strong tendency in Homer also to slow down the narrative at moments of high tension in order to increase the suspense (see de Jong 2007).

(or in some cases precedes). Accordingly, the utterance quoted in direct speech is emphasized and at the same time the person who uses direct speech is singled out from the rest.[15] This is the case with Xerxes and Demaratus, Mnesiphilus and Themistocles, Themistocles and Eurybiades, Aristagoras, Cleomenes and Gorgo, Hegesistratus and Leotychides, Socles and Hippias (5.92-93.1), and Aristagoras and the Naxians. Of course in each case more than one effect is sought at the same time: Hippias' answer appears rather enigmatic and out of place after Socles' long and elaborate speech, but it is recalled soon enough at Salamis in the quarrel between Themistocles and Adeimantus and applies perfectly to the contemporary situation; Herodotus draws attention to Gorgo's single direct utterance, which becomes all the more powerful since she is not expected to speak at all, moreover because she is an innocent child (her role has been however anticipated in the narrative by Aristagoras' request to Cleomenes to send her out); Aristagoras' speech interacts with the accompanying narrative which explains his motivation and thus reflects the manipulation of truth (cf. the pointed use of the word *μηχανήσομαι*); Leotychides' direct speech draws attention to the decisive role of the omen in the narrative.[16]

The alternation between direct and indirect speech modes often becomes the means by which the contrast between the reticent Spartans and their verbose and eloquent interlocutors is drawn. The Spartans are thus allocated indirect discourse or RSA, whereas their interlocutors are given direct speech – I shall return to and deal with Spartan silence in detail later. For the moment, it suffices to mention an example where the variation between speech modes brings into juxtaposition very successfully Spartans and Athenians, that is the Athenian embassy at Sparta in the first chapters of book 9. Here the direct discourse of the Athenians (9.7α.1-β.2, 11.1-2) stands against the indirect speech modes of the Spartans (9.8.1 [RSA], 11.2 [ID]).

It is equally important that Herodotus does not confine himself to reporting in direct speech major figures who play key roles in the narrative. He also seeks to emphasize words uttered by otherwise unknown or even anonymous individuals, who play a secondary role in the *Histories,* and they either appear once or a few times. The

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[15] Cf. Laird 1999: 135-6; 101: 'The words of one speaker are spotlighted by being given in direct discourse; whilst the words of his interlocutor are presented by the narrator in indirect discourse…The dramatic facility of the direct speech modes tends to give most prominence to a speaker. The indirect modes, on the other hand have the usual effect of distancing the audience from whatever characters may have said, whilst rendering at least a part of it'. Cf. also Lang 1984: 148.

[16] Cf. Heni 1976: 114; Stadter 1992: 792.

Thersites figure, marginalised and silenced in the elitist Homeric society, is here rather celebrated. This is the case with Mnesiphilus, Socles, Gorgo, the anonymous Persian in the Theban banquet (9.16.2-3), Dicaeus (8.65.2-4) and even the Phocian Harmocydes (9.17).

The case of the alternation between direct and indirect modes within the same speech of a single person is slightly different. Indirect speech is used to relate the fictive arguments: concerning Aristagoras, Naxos may be a prosperous island, but it is not small as it is the largest island in the Cyclades, and it is not at all close to Asia, but about one hundred miles from the coast of Asia Minor (5.31.1); concerning Mardonius, a wealthy and fertile place may be a worthy acquisition for the king, but Europe is neither wealthy nor fertile (7.5.3). Thus indirect speech in these cases indicates distance of the utterance from truth rather than distance on the part of the author or even downplaying of the arguments. An interesting variant of this strategy occurs in the Scythian speech to their neighbours to ask for their help against the Persians (4.118). The shift from indirect to direct speech signals the transition from the description of the facts to the rhetorical ploy of the speakers: they proclaim they will probably come to terms with the Persians if they receive no help; however, the narrative subverts their allegations as they are not presented as contemplating surrender but as hanging on to their resistance instead (4.120.1).

One last aspect with reference to the shift from direct to indirect speech modes has to do with the way Herodotus treats people destined to play a major role in the narrative. When Herodotus introduces such people for the first time in his text, he gives them indirect speech, and later on he takes advantage of the most suitable opportunity to give them direct speech. This is the case with Histiaeus (4.137.2), Artabanus (4.83.2), Demaratus (7.3.2-3) and Themistocles (7.143), all of whom are given indirect discourse when they first appear in the narrative. However, Herodotus never seeks one effect alone, and in this case the compressed indirect discourse functions as a device analogous to silence, intended to increase suspense and dramatization if juxtaposed with later scenes when the individuals are actually allowed speech.[17]

5.2 Silence

The rhetoric of absence is as important as the rhetoric of presence. Indeed the attention of the people is particularly attracted when something is not there where it is

[17] On this see below pp. 205-7.

expected. In contrast to the considerable emphasis on Thucydides' selectivity in omitting or including events and speeches in his *History*,[18] Herodotus' selectivity has received much less attention, and the scholars focus mainly, on the one hand, on explicit omissions whereby Herodotus admits his ignorance (i.e. weakness of his method) or considers them unworthy of commemoration,[19] and, on the other hand and most recently, on his political and religious silences.[20] Omission, or in other words silence, is what I will de dealing with here, not in terms of historical events however, but in terms of speeches. Silence is not an absolute but a relative phenomenon as the degree of silence may vary from complete silence to suppression of speech through compression (most frequently through indirect speech/RSA).

Narrative economy is one important reason for choosing omission or compression of speeches; avoidance of repetition is another. However, the reasons are not limited to these two, and in most cases it is a combination of more than one effect which explains the specific choice of the author. In what follows the division into sub-categories is to facilitate the analysis and is based on what is mostly emphasized each time. Accordingly, this part focuses on: the compressed and suppressed Greek debates which have implications for a dialogic reading of the text in an interesting way and question Greek unity; omissions to direct attention to Atheno-Spartan tension; omissions to illustrate the illusory nature of rhetoric; character silence as both creating dramatic effect and affecting the power and authority of individuals (speech vs. power and authority); Spartan silence to counter Athenian verbosity.

5.2.1 Greek debates compressed and suppressed: Greek unity and Herodotean dialogism?

A strong degree of selectivity is evident in Herodotus' narration of debates. The longest, most elaborate and formal debates occur before Salamis, before Plataea when the Tegeans and the Athenians are quarrelling (9.26-7), and in cases of persuasion for alliance, like Gelon (7.157-62), Alexander and the Spartans (8.140-4), and the Athenian envoys at Sparta (9.7-11). Apart from these intense verbal exchanges Herodotus glosses

[18] On selectivity and omission in Thucydides see Rood 1998a: 133-58, 205-24. See also Hornblower 1992: 169-97. Cf. Greenwood 2004: 185-93.

[19] See Lateiner 1989: 59-75.

[20] For partial exploration of political silences see Badian 1994. For partial exploration of religious silences see Mora 1981; 1987: 43-56; Gould 1994. Cf. also Hornblower 2002: 380-3 (on political and religious silences). On Herodotus' silences as generic markers see Boedeker 2000: 108-11.

over all other Greek debates, which he usually compresses by quoting them largely in indirect discourse (or RSA). A strong indication of selectivity is already given in the 'Debate on the constitutions' in book 3, where Herodotus has the seven conspirators debating, but only three of them actually speak in the text and the rest have to choose between the three opinions. It seems perfectly convenient to have three speeches, which correspond to the three forms of government, that is democracy, oligarchy and monarchy. In the scenario envisaged by Herodotus, on such an important occasion there must have been many quarrels among the conspirators with the throne of Persia at stake. But Herodotus gives a balanced and three-part, quasi-sophistic discussion, probably to cover all three possible choices of government – the same tripartite distinction of the constitutions occurs in Pindar's *Pythian* 2.[21]

When it comes to the Greek debate, Herodotus reduces the existing opinions to two opposing ones or he even gives only the prevailing one, and we are informed only in passing about other views through narrative comments such as 'there were many other views' (e.g. 5.118.2-3: *συλλεχθέντων δὲ τῶν Καρῶν ἐνταῦθα ἐγίνοντο βουλαὶ ἄλλαι τε πολλαὶ*...).[22] In other cases Herodotus gives only the view of the majority, which is the prevalent and that eventually taken (e.g. 7.175.1: *ἡ νικῶσα δὲ γνώμη ἐγίνετο τὴν ἐν Θερμοπύλῃσι ἐσβολὴν φυλάξαι*).[23] That majority view is often merely given compressed in one sentence of indirect speech/RSA instead of a collective speech (e.g. 5.36.2: *οἱ μὲν δὴ ἄλλοι πάντες γνώμην κατὰ τωὐτὸ ἐξεφέροντο, κελεύοντες ἀπίστασθαι*).[24]

A specific structure, that is *οἱ μέν* – (*ὁ*/*οἱ*) *δέ*, is used fairly often to juxtapose the opinion of one or few people to the prevalent view of the majority. The first part

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[21] See Pind. *Pyth*. 2.86-8: *ἐν πάντα δὲ νόμον εὐθύγλωσσος ἀνὴρ προφέρει, παρὰ τυραννίδι, χὠπόταν ὁ λάβρος στρατὸς, χὤταν πόλιν οἱ σοφοὶ τηρέωντι* 'and under every regime the straight-talking man excels: in a tyranny, when the boisterous people rule, or when the wise watch over the city'); cf. 11.52-3: *τῶν γὰρ ἀνὰ πόλιν εὑρίσκων τὰ μέσα μακροτέρῳ σὺν ὄλβῳ τεθαλότα, μέμφομ' αἶσαν τυραννίδων*. Cf. also Kagan 1965: 72 n. 4.

[22] Cf. 7.142.1-2: *γνῶμαι καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ ἐγίνοντο...οἱ μὲν...οἱ δ'*; 8.74.2: *σύλλογός τε δὴ ἐγίνετο καὶ πολλὰ ἐλέγετο περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, οἱ μὲν...Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ Αἰγινῆται καὶ Μεγαρέες*...; 6.11.1: *μετὰ δὲ τῶν Ἰώνων συλεχθέντων ἐς τὴν Λάδην ἐγίνοντο ἀγοραί, καὶ δή κού σφι καὶ ἄλλοι ἠγορόωντο, ἐν δὲ δὴ καὶ ὁ Φωκαιεὺς στρατηγὸς Διονύσιος λέγων τάδε*. Cf. 4.137.1-2: *πρὸς ταῦτα Ἴωνες ἐβουλεύοντο. Μιλτιάδεω μέν...Ἰστιαίου δὲ.*

[23] Cf. 8.9: *πολλῶν δὲ λεχθέντων ἐνίκα τὴν ἡμέρην ἐκείνην αὐτοῦ μείναντάς τε καί*...; 8.49.2: *αἱ γνῶμαι δὲ τῶν λεγόντων αἱ πλεῖσται συνεξέπιπτον*; 9.51.1: *βουλευομένοισι δὲ τοῖσι στρατηγοῖσι ἔδοξε.*

[24] Cf. the Persian parallel at 8.68.1: *οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι κατὰ τὠυτὸ γνώμην ἐξεφέροντο, κελεύοντες ναυμαχίην ποιέεσθαι*. Cf. also 1.206.3: *τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὠυτὸ αἱ γνῶμαι συνεξέπιπτον κελευόντων ἐσδέκεσθαι Τόμυρίν τε καὶ τὸν στρατὸν αὐτῆς ἐς τὴν χώρην.*

introduces the opinion of the majority and the second that of the minority (e.g. 5.36.2: *οἱ μὲν δὴ ἄλλοι πάντες γνώμην κατὰ τωὐτὸ ἐξεφέροντο, καλεύοντες ἀπίστασθαι, Ἑκαταῖος δ' ὁ λογοποιός…*; 7.207: *τοῖσι μέν νυν ἄλλοισι Πελοποννησίοισι...Λεωνίδης δέ*).[25]

Both the suppression of dissenting voices through their compact versions and the use of the *μέν…δέ* formula function as focusing devices to underline the rightness of the opposed opinion which is favoured by Herodotus himself.[26] Herodotus even elaborates on the views he considers as best, even if they are usually neglected in the end, to explain the negative outcome as a consequence of ignoring this advice, either because the rest of the interlocutors do not have the insight of the person who suggests it (e.g. the Carians at 5.118) or because they aim at private profit (e.g. Aristagoras at 5.36).[27] A sharp contrast is thus created with the opinion of the majority, which is taken instead and quite often brings about failure and disaster.[28]

Selectivity in recording speeches is not limited to Herodotus alone. The juxtaposition between the one and the many reflected in the *μέν...δέ* construction goes

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[25] This is also the case with Artemisia: *οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι κατὰ τώυτὸ γνώμην ἐξεφέροντο, κελεύοντες ναυμαχίην ποιέεσθαι, Ἀρτεμισίη δὲ τάδε ἔφη* (8.68.1). Cf. also Croesus when addressing Cyrus: *τῶν δὲ κατὰ τώυτὸ αἱ γνῶμαι συνεξέπιπτον κελευόντων ἐσδέκεσθαι Τόμυρίν τε καὶ τὸν στρατὸν αὐτῆς ἐς τὴν χώρην. Παρεὼν δὲ καὶ μεμφόμενος τὴν γνώμην ταύτην Κροῖσος ὁ Λυδὸς ἀπεδείκνυτο ἐναντίην τῇ προκειμένῃ γνώμῃ λέγων τάδε* (1.206.3-207.1). The only case when the opinion of the minority is given first (*οἱ μέν*) and the majority second (*οἱ δέ*) occurs in the Greek debate before Thermopylae (7.219.2: *ἐβουλεύοντο οἱ Ἕλληνες, καὶ σφεων ἐσχίζοντο αἱ γνῶμαι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔων τὴν τάξιν ἐκλιπεῖν, οἱ δὲ ἀντέτεινον*). The effect of the reverse structure is the emphasis on the important choice of the minority. Note also the odd way the conflicting opinions are recorded: first the one for staying given through negation, and then the other against staying given in an affirmative way through a verb which bears negative meaning. See also Macan 1908: 323.

[26] Herodotus plainly favours some opinions (5.118.2-3: *συλλεχθέντων δὲ τῶν Καρῶν ἐνταῦθα ἐγίνοντο βουλαὶ ἄλλαι τε πολλαὶ καὶ ἀρίστη γε δοκέουσα εἶναι μοι...αὕτη μέν νυν οὐκ ἐνίκα ἡ γνώμη*; 5.36.4: *αὕτη μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἐνίκα ἡ γνώμη, ἐδόκεε δὲ ὅμως ἀπίστασθαι*) and disapproves of some others (6.109.2: *ὡς δὲ δίχα τε ἐγίνοντο καὶ ἐνίκα ἡ χείρων τῶν γνωμέων*) through authorial interventions (authorial focalization).

[27] However, note that Miltiades manages to take Callimachus on his side, and so the 'best' opinion, according to authorial focalization, prevails in the end.

[28] The only case where Herodotus expands on a majority view, which brings in the end undesirable results, is Thermopylae (7.175.1). Herodotus explains the reasoning in detail, thus justifying (though in quite an apologetic tone) the view of the majority to guard the pass at Thermopylae (7.176-7). And he makes it clear that the Greeks had no idea of the Anopaea pass – which was used by the Persians to turn the position – but only learnt of it from the people of Trachis after their arrival; that was the only defect of the plan. But cf. Macan 1908a: 257.

back to Homer, where it also functions as focusing device.[29] A similar effect is achieved thought the use of the formulaic verse *ὣς ἔφαθ', οἳ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ*. The formula appears at the end of a person's speech and creates a contrast between the rest who remain silent and the person who speaks and replies to the previous speech. A good example of this is the contrast between the other gods who remain silent, astonished as they are by Zeus' speech, and Athena who replies to him in *Il*. 8.28-30; equally powerful is the contrast between the rest of the suitors and Amphinomos, the only one to reply Antinoos' speech in *Od*. 16.393-4.[30]

Thucydides uses the *μέν...δέ* construction in a comparable way. In the *History* the expression 'other opinions were expressed (on both sides) and also…' becomes almost formulaic and again functions as a focusing device. Some examples include the following: *καὶ τῶν μὲν πλεόνων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αἱ γνῶμαι ἔφερον·...παρελθὼν δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος...ἔλεξε τοιάδε* (1.79.2); *καταστάσης δ' εὐθὺς ἐκκλησίας ἄλλαι τε γνῶμαι ἀφ' ἑκάστων ἐλέγοντο καὶ Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου,...παρελθὼν αὖθις ἔλεγε τοιάδε* (3.36.6); 1.139.4; 4.58.1.[31] This is an extreme case of selectivity, where Thucydides chooses to quote the rest of the speeches in indirect speech (or RSA) and only one in direct discourse.[32] He also suppresses the debates and quotes them in compact form.[33] A striking case is the

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[29] E.g. *Il*. 2.211-12: *ἄλλοι μέν…Θερσίτης δέ* ('now the others sat down and were restrained in their places, only there still kept chattering on Thersites of measureless speech…'); *Od*. 8.532-3: *ἔνθ' ἄλλους μὲν πάντας...Ἀλκίνοος δέ* ('now from all the rest he concealed the tears that he shed, but Alcinous alone was aware of him and noticed…').

[30] The formula is strongly reminiscent of three Herodotean cases: 5.92.1: *οἱ μὲν νυν ἄλλοι ἡσυχίην ἦγον, Κορίνθιος δὲ Σωκλέης ἔλεξε τάδε*; 7.10.1: *σιωπώντων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Περσέων καὶ οὐ τολμώντων γνώμην ἀποδείκνυσθαι ἀντίην τῇ προκειμένῃ*; 9.42.2: *σιγώντων δὲ τῶν ἐπικλήτων, τῶν μὲν οὐκ εἰδότων τοὺς χρησμούς, τῶν δὲ εἰδότων μέν, ἐν ἀδείῃ δὲ οὐ ποιευμένων τὸ λέγειν, αὐτός γε Μαρδόνιος ἔλεγε*.

[31] See Hornblower 1991: 225; 1996: 221, 284; Rood 1998a: 137 and n. 16. Cf. Thuc. 5. 27. 2: 'the others went home; but the Corinthians went to Argos and entered into negotiations…' against Hdt. 5.92.1: *οἱ μὲν νυν ἄλλοι ἡσυχίην ἦγον, Κορίνθιος δὲ Σωκλέης ἔλεξε τάδε*, also about a Corinthian (Hornblower 2008: 60).

[32] Although this technique is more common in epic and historiography, there is an interesting example in Euripides' *Hecuba* 107-40, cited by Bers (1997: 24-5) as an example of 'those passages of narrative that report an individual voice that is given special prominence': 'Only Achilles' voice is rendered in OR; the three specific opinions put forward to the assembly are narrated in *oratio obliqua* (four if we count separately the two sons of Theseus who share an opinion: 123-5), the final one headed by a florid introduction and given at great length (Odysseus 131-40)'.

[33] E.g. Thuc. 4.88.1: *οἱ δὲ Ἀκάνθιοι, πολλῶν λεχθέντων πρότερον ἐπ' ἀμφότερα, κρύφα διαψηφισάμενοι...ἔγνωσαν οἱ πλείους ἀφίστασθαι Ἀθηναίων* ('the people of Acanthus, after much had been said on both sides, voted by ballot, and the majority decided to revolt from Athens').

notorious suppression of the two debates at Athens to decide whether to accept the words of the Corinthians or the Corcyreans just before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (1.44): Thucydides records only that they changed their minds in indirect discourse/RSA and he merely gives the motivation behind that change.[34] A last case of compression is when a single direct speech is allocated to more than one speaker, such as in 2.86.6 ('Knemos, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian commanders') and 7.65.3 ('Gylippos and the generals')[35]

Coming back to Herodotus, the compressed debates contribute to the picture of hampered debate among the Greeks.[36] The binary opposition of opinions is another way to emphasize the constant division among the Greeks, and especially the conflicting Spartan and Athenian interests. In addition, whenever the narrative pace slows down and long debates are recorded, this has effect of juxtaposing and splitting the Greeks instead of getting them together.

All the more, the calculated use of debates severely runs counter to the supposed dialogism of Herodotus' text. By allowing many different voices to be heard and at the same time suppressing these different voices in the context of debate, Herodotus affirms his control over his narrative enterprise. The text multiplies and at the same time limits the dialogue within it. This is not to deny that it generates dialogue with the reader; it certainly does so. The narrative ploy and play of Herodotus is based on the multiple simultaneous effects, explanations and possible interpretations. To the dialogism of the text and the importance of the presentation of Greek debate as opposed to the Persian I shall come back at the end of the chapter.

5.2.2 Omissions to hone in on Atheno-Spartan relations

a) 'They said the same things'

There are some particularly interesting cases, where Herodotus explicitly states narrative economy as the reason for the omission of speeches or larger debates through the use of expressions like 'they said the same things'. However, behind the economy of the narrative and the mere avoidance of repetition looms more or less implicitly Herodotus' intention to sharpen the antagonism between Sparta and Athens. There are

[34] Cf. Hornblower (1991: 88) who quotes Kitto, H., *Poiesis* (Berkeley, 1966), 293, 'on Thucydides' handling of this debate': 'what persons, considerations, passions, produced the change? [that is the mood on the second day]. He has no interest in this; he treats it all externally'.

[35] Cf. Hornblower 1987: 56.

[36] See also ch. 1.

two such examples: the speeches of the Greek messengers to get the support of Argos, Corcyra and Crete (7.148-9, 168-9); and the speech of Murychides, Mardonius' messenger, to the Athenians (9.4.1).

In the latter case, Murychides' speech is omitted and Herodotus merely mentions that 'he told the Athenians what Alexander had already told them before' (9.4.1: *…φέροντα τοὺς αὐτοὺς λόγους τοὺς καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Μακεδὼν τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι διεπόρθμευσε*). In the first case, the speech to the Corcyreans is omitted and we get only Herodotus' passing comment that they said to the Corcyreans exactly what they had already said to Gelon before (7.168.1: *λέγοντες τοὺς αὐτοὺς λόγους τοὺς καὶ πρὸς Γέλωνα ἔλεγον*). We may guess that the same thing is implied about the speech of the Greek messengers to the Cretans by *οἱ ἐπὶ τούτοισι ταχθέντες Ἑλλήνων* (7.169.1: 'those of the Greeks who were charged with this task'). Likewise, the plea to the Argives is easily dismissed as *τὰ ἐντεταλμένα* (7.148.3: 'the words they were charged with'). That all these speeches must have had similar content may be gathered from the intentions of the Greeks serving the common cause as reported at 7.145.1-2. Indeed we find the argument about the common danger in the collective speech of the Greek messengers to Gelon (7.157.2-3). In the cases of Corcyra, Crete and Argos, Herodotus emphasizes the futility of the pleas focusing on the different reasons which make them not offer help: Corcyrean duplicity and personal interest; Cretan piety; Argive hostility towards the Spartans.

Herodotus' treatment of the Argives is of considerable length. Recording the Argive version of the story, Herodotus only gives the answer of the Argives to the Greek plea, their request and the Spartan answer: they cannot give the Argives half of the leadership, unless the Argives accept only a third of the share (7.145.2). However, the Argives reject this proposal. Here there is no need of a further elaborate exchange, since we are already invited by the narrative to foresee the ineffectiveness of the attempt: Argos has long ago been at odds with Sparta, since the battle of Thyrea, and more recently, as Herodotus reminds us, the Argives had suffered a bloody defeat by the Spartans under Cleomenes at Sepeia (7.148.2). Therefore, we would not expect them to have forgotten such a recent tragedy.

Both the speeches to Gelon and Alexander's speech, which are referred to as models, are given in detail and in extensive debate scenes exactly at the points where they would have the biggest impact. On the one hand, instead of hearing an anonymous person speaking we have Alexander himself with his ambivalent status somewhere in between the Greeks and the Persians, and so the Athenians are able to make clear both

to the Spartans and the Persians through Alexander their decision to fight for their freedom. On the other hand, whether Herodotus completed his *Histories* before the Sicilian expedition or not, when we see the Spartans and the Athenians fighting with Gelon over the leadership and refusing to swallow their pride and respond flexibly to the situation, we cannot escape thinking of the later events and the irony generated: Sicily is the ground where the decisive conflict between the Athenian sea-power and the Spartan land-power takes place. All the more so, the compact exchanges between the Spartans and the Argives (7.148-9) function as an experimental pre-play of the long scene between the Greek messengers and Gelon, where the issue of leadership arises again, this time between the Spartans and the Athenians.[37]

b) Omission of Aristagoras' speeches at Eretria and Argos

As a means to speed up the rhythm of the story (narrative pace) Herodotus withholds the speeches of Aristagoras at Eretria and Argos. The effect is that we are only given Aristagoras' speeches at Sparta and Athens. Silencing Aristagoras' speech at Eretria and Argos says a lot about Herodotus' purpose to feed in the conflict between Sparta and Athens.

There is no mention of a speech by Aristagoras at Eretria, but we get the information that Aristagoras managed to get five Eretrian triremes to come to his aid (5.99.1), i.e. he had asked the Eretrians for their help. Herodotus' statement that the Eretrians offered the ships 'to pay a debt of honour to the people of Miletus, who some time previously had fought at their side all through their war with the Chalcidians, who in their turn had the support of Samos' (5.99.1) almost certainly must have been a cardinal argument in Aristagoras' speech to the Eretrians.

If Aristagoras addressed all the powerful Greek cities, then he must certainly have addressed Argos as well – and the logical place for this was between his visits to Sparta and to Athens. But apparently the Argives did not offer any help. That there might be an oracle which did not let them do so may be assumed by the narrative context: the Argives had received an oracle by the Pythia, when they asked about the salvation of their city, the famous 'epicene oracle' which was given to both the Argives and the Milesians, although the latter were not present (6.19.1-2, 77.2). If we accept 499/8 B.C as the date when the oracle was given to the Argives,[38] that is just after Aristagoras went

[37] Cf. above pp. 101-2.

[38] See Bury 1902; de Ste. Croix 2004: 426. Piérart (2003: 289-96) does not reject the possibility that an oracle was given to the Argives when Aristagoras asked for their help but argues that the text as we have

to ask for the help of the Argives, then the oracle explains a speech made by Aristagoras at Argos and the speech explains the oracle.[39] Accordingly, the Argives consulted the oracle for guidance on what to do,[40] but the fearsome divination made them reject Aristagoras' request.[41]

Aristagoras indeed had a very good argument in hand, that is the kinship bonds between the Argives and the Ionians, since Ionia had been partially colonized from Argolis.[42] However, another speech by Aristagoras would delay the narrative and be rather dull and repetitive, moreover since the answer was negative. We have seen Herodotus recording, though briefly, the unsuccessful attempts to achieve alliance with Argos, Corcyra, and Crete; but here the use of the oracle to explain in retrospect the negation and omission is a masterstroke, tying in very well with the narrative pace. That the audience and the readers would notice the associations and recall the oracle is highly possible. That they would be able to interpret it in this way is difficult to say, but they are certainly encouraged to do so.

Playing down the other cities to bring to the fore Sparta and Athens, is a consistent Herodotean strategy since the very beginning of the work. Already in book 1 Croesus looks for allies in Greece and Sparta is set against Athens, with the former gaining Croesus' favour in the end as being the most powerful (1.53-70). In our case the report of Aristagoras' speeches only at Sparta and Athens presents the Ionian revolt as another case of antagonism between Sparta and Athens, and brings for the first time the Athenians in contact with their future Ionian subjects.

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it in Herodotus was most probably composed after the battle at Lade and the fall of Miletus, reflecting anti-Ionian attitude and approving of a Greek non-interventionist policy on the Ionian revolt. Cf. Murray (1988: 482): '…the oracle given by Delphi to the Argives about this time, with its clear prophecy of doom for Miletus (6.19), can be seen as a warning to the rest of Greece not to become involved'.

[39] See Bury (1902: 18): '*For this oracle is explicable only on the assumption that the Milesians asked Argos to send help*' (his italics).

[40] In Thucydides there are several examples of cities consulting the oracle in similar circumstances (Thuc. 1.25.1, 118.3).

[41] See Bury 1902: 17-18, 25. *Pace* Murray (1988: 482): 'it is unlikely that Aristagoras could have appealed to Argos at the same time as Sparta…'.

[42] See Bury 1902: 18.

5.2.3 'Aristagoras said at Athens the same things he said at Sparta': telescoping the rules of political propaganda

The case of Aristagoras' speech at Athens is another example where narrative economy is again given by the author as the reason for the compression of the speech: 'he repeated at Athens the same things he said at Sparta' (5.97.1-2: *…ταὐτά τε δὴ ἔλεγε τὰ καὶ ἐν Σπάρτῃ περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίῃ καὶ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ Περσικοῦ,...ταῦτά τε δὴ ἔλεγε...*). We are given only a compact version of the speech (5.97) in a few lines of indirect discourse, whereas Aristagoras' speech at Sparta is given in the form of a long and elaborate passage in direct discourse. Since we already have his speech at Sparta in detail, we do not need another extensive passage of repetitive rhetoric.[43] The only thing that needs to be said is the new part added: the special relationship of metropolis and colony between Athens and Miletus (5.97.2: *…καὶ πρὸς τοῖσι τάδε, ὡς οἱ Μιλήσιοι τῶν Ἀθηναίων εἰσὶ ἄποικοι...*). Aristagoras had played the ethnic card at Sparta; here he tries a more promising one, because the relationship of the Athenians to the Milesians is closer – and kinship appears as a variation of ethnicity.

However, there is more to it than that. If Aristagoras' treatment is juxtaposed with the treatment of Brasidas in Thucydides, then there might be a dimension additional to that of narrative pace.[44] This is the attempt to describe the deceptive nature of rhetoric and furthermore to delineate the outlines of political propaganda. To see how this works let us first look at the way Thucydides deals with his Brasidas.

Brasidas' speech at Acanthus is recorded in *oratio recta* (4.85-7), while his speeches at Torone and Scione are recorded in *oratio obliqua*. Commenting on Brasidas' speeches at Torone and Scione, Thucydides points out that at Torone Brasidas said things similar to those he said to the Acanthians (4.114.3), while at Scione he said what he said at Acanthus and Torone (4.120.3). Thucydides evidently uses Brasidas' speech at Acanthus as the basis for the speeches he makes at Torone and Scione; hence he reports only the changes and the additions to the main body of a speech-pattern (4.120.3: *περαιωθεὶς δὲ καὶ ξύλλογον ποιήσας τῶν Σκιωναίων ἔλεγεν ἅ τε ἐν τῇ Ἀκάνθῳ καὶ Τορώνῃ, καὶ προσέτι...*). This is what Hornblower calls the 'periodically adjusted

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[43] Cf. Hornblower 2008: 33.

[44] Such a comparison may also be fruitful in another way: Hornblower (2008: 33) argues that, like in the case of Aristagoras, avoidance of repetition is one reason for the similar treatment of Brasidas' speeches in Thucydides.

manifesto'.[45] Thucydides himself comments on Brasidas' speeches and labels them as pure guile: *διὰ...τὸ ἐπαγωγὰ εἰπεῖν τὸν Βρασίδαν* (4.88.1); *ἐφολκὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ ὄντα* (4.108.5).

Although Herodotus' version is less sophisticated, the technique seems to be comparable to Thucydides': the Spartan speech of Aristagoras is used as the basis for his later speech at Athens and so we are given only the additions in view of the specific audience and circumstances. Herodotus, just like Thucydides, also comments on Aristagoras' slanderous rhetoric: *τἆλλα ἐὼν σοφὸς καὶ διαβάλλων ἐκεῖνον εὖ, ἓν τούτῳ ἐσφάλη* (5.50.2); *πολλοὺς γὰρ οἷκε εἶναι εὐπετέστερον διαβάλλειν ἢ ἕνα* (5.97.2). To this one may add that the arguments Aristagoras uses with Artaphrenes are also drawn from the same pool of manipulative *topoi* (ease and gain presented as a chain of conquests). And if one presses the similarities between Aristagoras' speeches and Hegesistratus' speech at Delos in book 9 (9.90.2-3), one may come up with an intriguing twist in Herodotus' technique. Both Aristagoras and Hegesistratus use analogous arguments, which may well be why Hegesistratus is given only indirect discourse since the arguments are already familiar from the long direct speech of Aristagoras at Sparta. I take the phrase *πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα* as implying both a selection of the points made by Hegesistratus and more specifically of those points which allow the comparison between his speech and Aristagoras'. Herodotus thus sketches the rules of political propaganda and reinforces the picture of deceptive rhetoric employed to serve narrow personal interests. It is a rhetoric remarkably adaptable to the circumstances.

A last observation needs to be added here with respect to the use of indirect discourse. Hornblower suggests that the use of the Acanthus speech as the basis for the subsequent speeches may be a criterion for the authenticity of that speech, at least in part: Brasidas said what Thucydides makes him say, not exactly, but he obviously did.[46] This may well be true for Herodotus and his treatment of Aristagoras, or even Hegesistratus. In that case, we do have an excellent use of indirect discourse: it becomes the means in the hands of the historian to corroborate the validity of direct speech.

5.2.4 Mastering character silence

The importance of character silence as a very powerful rhetorical means has been recognized since Homer, and was then taken up and further developed in tragedy and

[45] See Hornblower 1996: 81, 86-9, 276-7.

[46] See Lewis 1992b: 426 n. 142; cf. also Hornblower 1996: 81, 86-7.

rhetoric.[47] Homer and the tragedians draw our attention to silence, which they use as a device to stress the intense emotional state (both negative and positive) of individuals in order to create dramatic effect. Some of the most famous silences in Homer include Ajax's silence when Odysseus meets him in the underworld (*Od*. 11.563), which is also imitated by Virgil in his presentation of Dido (*Aen*. 6.467-71), and Odysseus' silence when he sees his son for the first time in front of Eumaeus (*Od*. 16).[48] Aeschylus is famous for his protracted silences,[49] the most notable being the silence of Prometheus in the prologue of the homonymous tragedy and the reticence of Cassandra in *Agamemnon* 1035 ff., until she spectacularly breaks her silence.[50] Equally important are the cases where a person breaks his long silence to burst into speech, either a shorter or a longer utterance, just like Pylades in *Cho*. 900-2.[51]

Similarly Herodotus uses dramatic silences extensively. A nice example is Gorgo, the daughter of Cleomenes. Like the characters in tragedy she stays one-dimensional up until the point it is useful and dramatically necessary to give her a voice. Moreoever, here we get the impression that she is a mute person since she is female and a child at the same time. At first, the attention is drawn to her presence and then, all of a sudden, her outburst of one powerful sentence of direct speech intervenes decisively in the debate affecting its outcome (5.51.2-3). Moles[52] pinpoints another two prominent examples: the dumb son of Croesus who unexpectedly speaks in order to save the life of his father (1.85.4), and the Spartan allies who remain voiceless after the speech of the Spartans and only break their silence when hearing Socles speaking. The treatment of Themistocles is not much different and I shall deal with that in detail shortly.

Alternatively silence is also used as part of the characterization of both individuals and national groups. In Homer there is the silence of Patroclus in *Iliad* 9, which may be considered as part of his character and his devotion to Achilles.[53] Another interesting

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[47] On silence see also *OCD*[3] s.v. *silence*.

[48] Cf. Rutherford 1992: 68-9.

[49] Cf. also Aristophanes' *Frogs*.

[50] Cf. also Oedipus' silence in Soph. *OC* 1252 ff. and the silence of Phaedra in Eur. *Hipp*. 310. On the complicated interplay between speech and silence in *Hippolytus* see Knox 1979: 205-30.

[51] On silence in tragedy see Montiglio 2000: 158-251; Taplin 1972 (esp. in Aeschylus).

[52] See Moles 2007: 255.

[53] See de Jong 1987b: 117-18; 117: 'It is the reflection of Patroclus' unquestioning loyalty to Achilles: from his non-participation in the discussion we may gather that he is prepared to accept any decision of his friend, whether it be to stay in Troy or to return. Only Nestor's long and highly rhetorical speech in

parallel occurs in Pindar's *Pythian* 4. Pindar makes very delicate use of silence as the words introducing Pelias are in line with his mild character as presented by Pindar.[54] Virgil does the same with Aeneas: in private he is not given substantial speech and when he does it is unsuccessful and, thus, becomes 'the poem's most consistent and prominent paradigm of the weak and insubstantial nature of human interchange'.[55] Herodotus in his turn reflects national characteristics or regulates the authority of individuals through denying or allowing them speech. This last effect is crucial as speech and power as well as speech and authority both constitute themes which form the core of Herodotean thought.

a) Dramatic silence

a.1) Silencing Themistocles

Herodotus keeps Themistocles silent until his performance of master rhetoric at Salamis. Although we get from Plutarch the information that he was *strategos* of the Leontis tribe (*Arist*. 5) at Marathon, Herodotus does not introduce him before book 7. There he is presented as helping the Athenians to interpret the Delphic oracle, but he is given only indirect speech (and RSA) (7.143), and a flash-back again in RSA informs us about his previous beneficial advice to the Athenians (7.144). He is present with the Greek forces at Tempe as the Athenian general and obviously he goes back with them at the Isthmus, where they debate. The conference is, however, described in indirect speech (RSA) and the content is given in compact narrative form without any individual opinions being recorded (7.175). At Artemisium Themistocles is allocated only one sentence of direct discourse (8.5.2) and some indirect speech (8.19). The first longer and substantial piece of speech comes in the form of a message (a kind of direct discourse) to the Ionians carved on the rocks of Euboea (8.22.1-2).

In the first Greek debate before Salamis, Themistocles is not mentioned at all (8.49, 56). Only when the generals reach the decision to fight the battle at the Isthmus does Themistocles intervene decisively (having taken Mnesiphilus' advice) and he is allowed to speak at length in direct discourse. Herodotus wittily arouses the expectations of the audience, on the one hand, through providing adequate information

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XI.656-803, held in the absence of Achilles, will encourage Patroclus to confront Achilles and to suggest a different course of action'.

[54] See Hornblower (2004: 323): 'By a kind of logical extension of this picture of dissimulation, Pindar makes telling use of silence (line 156) as part of his characterization of Pelias'. Cf. also Segal 1986: 38.

[55] See Feeney 1983: 204-19.

about Themistocles' rhetorical and advisory skills, and on the other hand through withholding Themistocles' speech until the right moment comes, that is at the most climactic point.[56]

Another case of silence that is equally interesting, but far more complicated in terms of narrative function, is the omission of an answer by Themistocles to Mnesiphilus. Herodotus himself draws attention to the silence: *οὐδὲν πρὸς ταῦτα ἀμειψάμενος* (8.58.1). The silence has high dramatic effect because the scene is structured like a dialogue between Themistocles and Mnesiphilus, hence after Mnesiphilus' advice in direct speech Themistocles' non-reply sounds very powerful and strange at the same time.[57]

Herodotus similarly denies Themistocles an elaborate hortatory speech before the battle at Salamis (8.83). He gives a suppressed version of the speech in indirect discourse (RSA) supported by narrative comments. These narrative parts on the one hand explain Herodotus' choice to single out and record even briefly Themistocles' speech: it was the finest speech of all the other speeches delivered, or the only speech to predict victory (8.83.1: *προηγόρευε εὖ ἔχοντα μὲν ἐκ πάντων Θεμιστοκλέης*).[58] On the other hand, the same narrative makes us wonder at the omission of this most successful speech. Herodotus could have further developed especially the antitheses used by Themistocles – one of the most fashionable contemporary rhetorical trends (sophists: antithetical arrangement; cf. Thucydides) – to demonstrate once again Themistocles' exceptional rhetorical skills.

The acceleration of narrative pace is an obvious reason, since the battle narrative has been already delayed due to the repeated and protracted meetings of the Greeks. Still Themistocles' rhetorical skills have been fully demonstrated at Salamis, and also the patriotic motivation together with other typical exhortation *topoi* have been

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[56] Macan (1908b: 589) comments on Themistocles' silence at 8.144: 'He is, indeed, conspicuous by his absence on this occasion'. Perhaps Herodotus wants to ascribe the speech to the Athenians in general, so as not to be accused of partiality in favour of Themistocles by having him speak in such a crucial occasion.

[57] A far-fetched but, according to Alan Griffiths, attractive interpretation is to explain Themistocles' silence in the context of Mnesiphilus *qua* a dream which has evaporated. Griffiths corroborates this by pointing out that the scene seems structurally to recall the dream of Agamemnon, of Nestor sent by Zeus, at the beginning of *Iliad* 2 (meeting – commander gets advice at night – second meeting to change policy).

[58] On the different interpretations of the phrase see above p. 128 and n. 60.

presented (Miltiades' speech at 6.109.3-6)[59] and will be also presented elsewhere (Harmocydes' speech at 9.17.4). So we should also consider the possibility that silence here implies a tacit judgment on Themistocles' character: Herodotus does not deny that he is a successful orator and an insightful general, but he cannot picture him as a great patriot, hence as the right person to encourage the troops, by virtue of his secret communication with the Persians.

However, even in this case of suppressed exhortation, Herodotus provides us with hints which make Themistocles' ability to use diplomatic spin and to manipulate his audience the focus of attention: on the one hand we are told that his speech was the best, and on the other hand that as soon as he orders the men to embark on the ships they obey and the text echoes the same word twice (8.83.2: *ἐσβαίνειν ἐκέλευσε ἐς τὰς νέας. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ ἐσέβαινον*). Silencing Themistocles on this occasion highlights his talking and backstage policy at Salamis even more and provides a more dramatic effect. The omission of Themistocles' speech at Andros has a similar effect (8.108.2): when we think that all is settled, and the view of the majority has won, Themistocles strikes again and receives speech operating outside the context of the debate, as he deceives the Athenians with a masterly piece of rhetoric (8.109.2-4).

a.2) Silencing Aristeides

Aristeides' case is slightly more complicated. Although Plutarch in the *Life of Aristeides* mentions him as one of the ten generals at Marathon, *strategos* of the Antiochis tribe (*Arist*. 5), Herodotus denies him any such mention. Aristeides is also mentioned as the Athenian general at the battle of Plataea (Hdt. 9.28.6). According to Plutarch (*Arist*. 10), Aristeides dictated the answer to Alexander and the Spartans at 8.144.[60] However, the only time Herodotus allocates speech to him is just before the battle at Salamis, when Aristeides comes to the meeting of the Greek generals and, ironically, informs Themistocles about the Greek blockade by the Persians (8.79.3-4).

Why is Aristeides given speech, why direct speech, and why here? Silencing Aristeides in all the other contexts enables Herodotus to attempt the most powerful characterization of Aristeides at the point where it has the greatest effect: at Salamis against his political opponent, Themistocles. In a battle account where disunity dominates and is the main obstacle to efficient discussion and the reaching of a final

[59] Cf. Waters 1985: 10 and n. 18.

[60] Macan (1908b: 589) is sceptical, but still describes the allocation of the speech to Aristeides '*ben trovato*'.

decision Aristeides' speech is emphasized as one major attempt at reconciliation. Aristeides' willingness to put aside personal differences (8.79.3: 'we can fight some other time over who of us has benefited his country more') makes a stark contrast to Themistocles, who is pictured as thinking always of the personal even when he thinks of the national interest, and always looking to his own future prospects. Taken as a strong piece of characterization, the speech confirms the authorial comments preceding Aristeides' speech, focusing precisely on the inimical relationship between Aristeides and Themistocles, and 'the best and the most just' nature of Aristeides (8.79.1: *ἄριστον ἄνδρα γενέσθαι ἐν Ἀθήνῃσι καὶ δικαιότατον*).

Aristeides' speech is also important for another reason: it adds to the dramatization of the scene, as he comes in like the tragic messenger to let the characters know what is going on off-stage. The purpose here is double: on the one hand, Aristeides lets Themistocles know that his stratagem has been successful and on the other he becomes virtually Themistocles' mouthpiece when he takes up the role of informing the Greek generals about the cutting off of the Greeks.

b) Speech vs. power and authority

The relation of speech to power in Herodotus includes several aspects: the way Herodotus exercises 'power' over his material while composing his text, i.e. his own speech; the way the respective political context allows speech to powerful people or recognizes everyone as equally 'powerful' so as to receive speech; the way the individuals are made to claim, assert or make their power contestable through their speech. Playing with different notions of power is part of the Herodotean narrative technique.

However, there is another notion which relates to power and makes things more complex, and that is even more intriguing; that notion is authority. Although it has been so far a *topos* to consider authority as a synonym for power, power and authority are substantially different. A passage from Augustus' *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* can help us to elucidate the distinction: *Post id tempus auctoritate omnibus praestiti, potestatis autem nihilo amplius habui quam ceteri qui mihi quoque in magistratu conlegae fuerunt* (*Res g. d. Aug*. 34: 'After that time I excelled all others in dignity, but of power I held no more than those who were my colleagues in any magistracy'). Power (*potestas*) then entails political or social power and potentially carries a sense of irrationality and lack of moderation. Authority (*auctoritas*) involves qualities of a higher moral nature, like dignity and judgment, personal attributes and managerial abilities.

Discourse analysis, which deals with the relations between discourse and power in a social context,[61] is pertinent here and may help us to better explain the dynamics, as the constitutional context in Greece and Persia is decisive to the distribution of power. Thus, in Persia speech is a manifestation of power only for the king (viz. Xerxes) who exercises absolute control: he can speak whatever and whenever he wants, he gives other people the right to speak, and his speech reaffirms his power. The ordinary citizen in Persia lacks that potential. In Greece, on the other hand, a citizen is someone who speaks with power and can influence the final decision, like Socles or Mnesiphilus – by contrast to Dicaeus and the Persian in the Theban banquet.

The authority of individuals both in Greece and Persia depends on Herodotus' generosity when giving them speech. In the case of Xerxes, this may also support significantly the self-other categorization. Accordingly, the almighty king Xerxes is empowered to speak but does not receive any substantial speech and is deprived of moral and intellectual authority. On the other hand, people whose authority is even recognized by the king himself, like Artabanus, Artemisia and Demaratus, do not have the power to influence the king and find it difficult to speak truth to someone who is in power.

Here I shall argue that Herodotus uses either omission or compression of speech (indirect discourse or RSA) to regulate the authority of his speakers. Indirect discourse is definitely a way to minimize the focus of the audience on any one specific speaker, the audience thus being led to dismiss the person as unimportant if he is not rhetorically adept.[62] More particularly, the omission of direct discourse indicates oratorical deficiency, which more likely implies strategic deficiency, and certainly reduces the *ethos*, that is the moral qualities of the individuals. I shall discuss the cases of Eurybiades and Callimachus, Cleomenes, and Xerxes.

Before turning to the subject proper, let us mention two other authors who employ a comparable narrative technique: Tacitus and Thucydides. As regards Tacitus, Scott has suggested recently that the omission of direct discourse and consequently the

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[61] On discourse analysis see Johnstone 2008[2]. On the relation between discourse and power see also Foucault 1981; 1998.

[62] Similarly Lang (1984: 148): 'The distinction between direct and indirect quotation may convey not only the relative importance and unimportance of what is said but also the relative importance and individuality of the person(s) speaking. Thus anonymous persons like heralds and ambassadors as well as undifferentiated groups are often quoted indirectly; strong personalities, on the other hand, are both reflected and exemplified in direct quotation'.

suppression of Nero's speech might be a technique in the denigration of Nero in the last books of the *Annals*: Tacitus associates Nero's rhetorical incompetence with his immorality.[63] Thucydides, on the other hand, persistently suppresses the voice of Cleon, although he was one of Pericles' most prominent political opponents, and presents Pericles as facing no opposition when speaking in the assembly. Even when Pericles is out of the political arena, Thucydides allocates to Cleon direct speech only once at the Mytilenean debate (3.37-40), while he dismisses the debate about Scione through one mere sentence of indirect speech (4.122.6: 'they made a decree immediately, persuaded by Cleon's view, to recapture and kill the people of Scione'). The debate at Athens about Pylos, when the Athenians appoint Cleon as general, is also reported in indirect speech, and Cleon does not receive any direct speech within it (4.27-8).[64] Together with exonerating Pericles' policy Thucydides aims at reducing the authority and the abilities of Pericles' opponents, and in particular of his grand opponent Cleon.

b.1) Eurybiades and Callimachus

Herodotus never allows Eurybiades, the Spartan commander in charge of the Greek navy at Salamis, direct discourse. His speech is always suppressed and most often compressed into a short expression in reported speech.[65] Eurybiades seems to be chairing meetings and staying in the background. Through the whole construction of the speech section it becomes obvious that Themistocles is behind the success and victory at Salamis. Eurybiades does not even have the time to talk and explain to the generals the reasons why he gathered them again for the second meeting, for Themistocles bursts into speech (8.59). Eurybiades is only once allocated extensive speech in the conference of the Greeks at Andros, where he opposes Themistocles (8.108.2). However, this is indirect discourse which also represents the opinion of the Peloponnesian generals partaking in the meeting (8.108.4). The representation of a collective view may explain the elaboration here at the expense of Themistocles' opinion, which is merely given in one sentence of reported speech.[66] It seems as if Herodotus seeks to justify his choice to record Eurybiades' opinion in its full extent, i.e. the narrative explains the speech and the choice of the specific speech mode.

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[63] See Scott 1998: 8-18.

[64] Cf. Hornblower 1987: 55-6; Rood 1998a: 145-53.

[65] See Hdt. 8.49.1, 59, 63.

[66] See Hdt. 8.108.4: *ταύτης δὲ εἴχοντο τῆς γνώμης καὶ Πελοποννησίων τῶν ἄλλων οἱ στρατηγοί.*

The treatment of Callimachus at Marathon is similar.[67] Just as Eurybiades is pushed aside by Themistocles, Callimachus is shoved aside by Miltiades and he is given no speech.[68] Although it is Callimachus' opinion which decides the conduct of the battle, Herodotus does not even spare him one word apart from a generous comment on his glorious death (6.114: *καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πόνῳ ὁ πολέμαρχος* [*Καλλίμαχος*] *διαφθείρεται, ἀνὴρ γενόμενος ἀγαθός*). The parallels, in points of introduction, exhortation *topoi*, argumentation structure, emotive language,[69] between the speeches of Themistocles to Eurybiades (8.60α-γ) and Miltiades to Callimachus (6.109.3-6) point additionally to the similar treatment of the exchanges between Eurybiades and Themistocles on the one hand and Callimachus and Miltiades on the other. The omission of direct discourse indicates oratorical deficiency, which more likely implies strategic deficiency. In other words, the status of the leading commander is undermined, for in general major figures are not silenced.[70]

The influence of Herodotus' sources may be essential here as well, as the commendation of Miltiades may mirror Philaid sources or still partisanship on the part of the historian.[71] Likewise, the overshadowing of Eurybiades by Themistocles may point towards pro-Athenian attitude. Even so, Herodotus could have just as easily made their speeches up, since no one would ever know. However, as already stated in the 'Introduction', I accept Herodotus as generally impartial, and he frequently proves so in his narrative when he does not hesitate to give both Athens and Sparta credit for their performance in the Persian Wars. What interests us here is not the historical truth of the speeches, but the reasons we have them in such a form in the narrative. On this basis it is the authorial choice which plays the cardinal role.

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[67] Cf. Evans' (1991: 77) description of both Eurybiades and Callimachus as 'faceless'.

[68] Cf. Evans (1991: 79): 'Herodotus leaves little doubt that Themistocles was the architect of victory at Salamis quite as much as Miltiades was at Marathon'. See also Waters 1985: 10. Waters (1985: 10 n. 18) points out also the resemblance between the position of Miltiades at Marathon and that of Themistocles at Salamis: they both have the role of the 'deviser of the strategy and tactics but not the commander-in-chief. In both cases tradition gave the junior commander the credit – possibly owing to rivalries between cities or factions'.

[69] On the parallels cf. Hohti 1976: 65; Lang 1984: 57-8; Scott 2005: 382. Macan (1908b: 447) suggests Themistocles' speech is the pattern for Miltiades' speech. But the opposite is equally plausible.

[70] See Scott 1998: 9-11. Cf. also Miller 1975: 45-57. Cf. above p. 211 and n. 62.

[71] See also above p. 138 n. 89.

b.2) Cleomenes

Cleomenes is not given any substantial speech in the *Histories*. In his conversation with Aristagoras his words are recorded either in direct or indirect discourse (or RSA),[72] but still in short and straightforward sentences. The focus on his little daughter Gorgo in this scene, who is given only one sentence of direct discourse though very powerful, other than obscuring his motivation, challenges the male dominant model, and particularly his own personal role, in decision-making.[73]

Cleomenes is also given two rather witty answers, which include puns: his answer to the priestess of Athena on the Acropolis 'I am not a Dorian but an Achaean' (5.72); and his reply to Crius of Aegina when he makes a pun on his name (6.50). Another line of direct discourse comes out of Cleomenes' mouth when addressing Apollo after he burns the sanctuary of god Argos: 'Apollo, God of prophecy, you did indeed deceive me when you said I should take Argos, for now I believe that your prophecy to me is fulfilled' (6.80). Herodotus mentions Cleomenes' mental instability, but still he underlines his witticism. He also underlines his impiety.

The exchanges between Cleomenes and Maeandrius are quoted in indirect discourse. Cleomenes presents himself here, according to Herodotus, as the most just of men, when he refuses to be bribed by Maeandrius and suggests his dismissal from Sparta in order to ensure that he does not bribe another Spartan (3.148). This attitude towards the Ionian Maeandrius anticipates Cleomenes' attitude towards another Ionian later on in the narrative, the Milesian Aristagoras. However, there it is his daughter Gorgo who intervenes decisively and averts her father from being bribed.

The Maeandrius episode is a strong piece of Cleomenes' characterisation given that it records Herodotus' most favourable judgment on Cleomenes: 'most just of men' (3.148: *δικαιότατος ἀνδρῶν*). Its quotation in indirect speech does not reflect scepticism about the historical truth of the incident on Herodotus' part. On the contrary, it seems that Herodotus accepts the incident as factual, but speaks in passing about it wishing to minimize its importance, since it is one of the two passages complimentary to

[72] See the table above pp. 191-3.

[73] Cf. also Naiden (2006: 144): 'The daughter's name, translatable as ''Gorgon,'' refers to the apotropaic quality…Thanks to this quality, she not only sees what the adults do not – the threat overlooked by her father and the offence unacknowledged by Aristagoras – but also protects the adults from the consequences of what they are about to do. They are venal or weak but she is strong, a contrast that is all the greater because they are leaders'.

Cleomenes (6.61.1 is the other), a character whose picture in Herodotus is not at all flattering.

Scholars have long argued that Herodotus – or his sources – is biased against Cleomenes, whom some have regarded as the most successful interventionist Spartan king of them all.[74] There indeed are many points in the narrative which support this view[75] and such prejudiced representation may still have, at least to some extent, a bearing on Herodotus' allocation (or not) of speech to Cleomenes.

b.3) Xerxes

The allocation of speech to Xerxes underlines his restricted authority. The suppression of speech is only one way Herodotus minimizes Xerxes' authority; the allocation of both non-substantial and rather repetitive speech full of commonplaces is, significantly, another.

Both Xerxes' power and authority appear vulnerable already when he actively enters the narrative for the first time in book 7: he has to 'fight' to win the throne, and he does so with the help of Demaratus and largely of his mother Atossa, who had 'immense power' (7.3.4). After a few chapters we get to know that Xerxes was very reluctant to attack Greece at the beginning, but he was incited and eventually convinced to do so by Mardonius, as well as by other factors which came to Mardonius' aid (7.5.1-6.1).

With this background it is all the more important that Xerxes in his first long speech in *oratio recta* (7.8) repeats more or less Mardonius' arguments with some extra elaboration: he makes Mardonius' idea about an expedition against Greece his own, and he talks about the fertility of Europe and avenging the Athenians. Xerxes' utterances at Abydos that 'the usual thing is that profit comes to those who are willing to act, not to the overcautious and hesitant' (7.50.2) and 'only by great risks can great results be achieved' (7.50.3) also echo Mardonius at 7.9γ: 'let us be ever venturesome; for nothing comes of itself and all men's gains are the fruit of adventure'. Furthermore, the plan to bridge the Hellespont, which he proclaims, is not at all his own but has already been foreseen by Onomacritus (7.6.4). Xerxes' next direct speech at 7.11 dwells once again on revenge against the Athenians, the continuation of the Persian tradition and the law of endless expansionism; this last bit has already been mentioned by Xerxes in his

[74] See How and Wells 1912: 347-9; Cartledge 2003[2]: 82-90; de Ste. Croix 2004: 421-40.

[75] See e.g. 5.42 (Cleomenes' madness vs. Dorieus' virtue); 6.74 (Cleomenes plotting against Demaratus).

previous speech, and rather reveals the need to corroborate his authority. Furthermore, Xerxes' hortatory speech to the Persians at 7.53 contains common exhortation *topoi* and picks up some of the points of his speech at 7.8. Also, in the Salamis account we mainly get Xerxes' reactions to what he hears in reported speech.[76] The direct discourse he is allocated at 8.101.2-3 serves to let Artemisia know about Mardonius' counsel, hence it repeats the content of Mardonius' words. His exchanges with Ephialtes in Thermopylae are also suppressed (7.213.1, 215).

Most frequently Xerxes is not allowed to use substantial direct speech, but his words and thoughts are given compressed in indirect discourse (or RSA). Generally Xerxes is presented as calling for the advice of others and he seems to be dependent on it. He never sets out a plan of his own in detail, but chooses between opinions laid in front of him instead. When Xerxes is given direct discourse, it is largely to allow him to express his arrogance,[77] or even his madness.[78]

Let us examine for example his exchanges with Demaratus. Xerxes, speaking in *oratio recta*, invites Demaratus to have a discussion; yet, his utterance is nothing more than empty boasts of Persian supremacy (7.101, 103). At the end of the discussion, Xerxes' reaction is given in RSA (7.105: *ὁ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα ἀμείψατο, Ξέρξης δὲ ἐς γέλωτά τε ἔτρεψε καὶ οὐκ ἐποιήσατο ὀργὴν οὐδεμίαν, ἀλλ' ἠπίως αὐτὸν ἀπεπέμψατο*).[79] At 7.209 Xerxes is given no speech, and we have only the general gist of his sayings in one sentence of indirect speech (RSA) at the beginning (7.209.2) as well as at the end of the scene. Especially at the end of the debate the phrase *ταῦτα λέγων οὐκ ἔπειθε τὸν Ξέρξην* (7.209.5) has a very strong effect corroborating Xerxes' status: 'he could not convince Xerxes'; 'full stop'; this is the end. The brevity indicates the absolute power of Xerxes, and at the same time his rhetorical weakness and lack of authority. In the last conversation with Demaratus, Xerxes is given some direct speech again, when he merely asks Demaratus to give him advice on the Spartans (7.234.1, 234.3).

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[76] See Hdt. 8.69.2: *ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀνηνείχθησαν αἱ γνῶμαι ἐς Ξέρξην, κάρτα τε ἥσθη τῇ γνώμῃ τῇ Ἀρτεμισίης*; 8.101.1: *ταῦτα ἀκούσας Ξέρξης ὡς ἐκ κακῶν ἐχάρη τε καὶ ἥσθη*; 8.103: *ἥσθη τε δὴ τῇ συμβουλῇ Ξέρξης.*

[77] Cf. his speeches in the Persian council scene at the beginning of book 7. Cf. the whipping of the Hellespont at 7.35.2; 8.114.2, 118.3.

[78] Cf. the episode between Pythius and Xerxes at 7.38-39. Cf. the story of Masistes' wife (9.108-13).

[79] If the exchanges are seen as a dramatic agon, where most often the second speaker wins the case, then Xerxes' silence here has further implications for the result of the agon: Demaratus is the winner in this case, and he will prove to be right in the end.

Herodotus seeks to play down the authority of Xerxes. By withholding substantial speech from Xerxes and suppressing his words as well as his initiative, Herodotus denies Xerxes' authority, but he does not deny him power. Xerxes does seem both dependent on people and very much at the mercy of circumstances; and the people advise him because Xerxes seems so low in spirit. Such an interpretation robustly corroborates the assumption that Alexander's claim, that he transmits the words of Xerxes to the Athenians at the end of book 8, is merely a trick played by Mardonius to lend authority and persuasion to the Persian offer.[80]

While representing Xerxes as an inept orator and leader, Herodotus emphasizes his ruthlessness and proneness to emotional extremes. Instead of or together with spoken reactions we are often given the emotions by which Xerxes is driven: *θυμωθείς* (7.11.1, 39.1, 210.1, 238.2; 9.111.5); *ἡσθείς* (7.28.3); *περιχαρής* (7.37.3, 215); *ἐθυμώθη* (7.39.1, 238.2); *ἡδύ* (7.101.1); *ἥρεσε, περιχαρής* (7.215). Moreover, we see a Xerxes calling himself happy at one moment and weeping at another at Abydos (7.45-46.2), jumping off his throne in fear for his army at Thermopylae (7.212.1), and even punishing Leonidas in the cruellest way by cutting off his head and crucifying his body (7.238.1),[81] punishing the Hellespont by having his men whip it (7.35.2), punishing the men responsible for building the bridges at the Hellespont by cutting off their heads (7.35.2-3), killing his brother Masistes together with his children for the love of a woman (9.108-13), punishing Pythius by having his eldest son killed, when Pythius asks him to release this very same son from army service (7.39.3). Xerxes' himself admits his emotional nature when he tells Pythius 'Mark my words: it is through the ears you can touch a man to pleasure or rage – let the spirit which dwells there hear good things, and it will fill the body with delight; let it hear bad, and it will swell with fury' (7.39.1).

In light of this attitude, Xerxes' short exchanges with Pythius at 7.28-9, when he makes Pythius his guest-friend, his moderate and intimate words about Demaratus to Achaemenes (7.237), and his generous reply to Sperthias and Bulis (in indirect discourse) at 7.136.2,[82] rather reveal Xerxes' emotional instability: he is not able to

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[80] See ch. 2.

[81] Cf. also the treatment of Amasis' body by Cambyses (3.16); that of the body of Cyrus the younger by his brother Artaxerxes (Xen. *Anab*. 1.10.1; 3.1.17); and that of the body of M. Crassus by Surenas (Plut. *Crass.* 32).

[82] Cf. Pausanias' answer to Lampon at Plataea: 'these things are fitter for barbarians than Greeks, and even then we think it repulsive' (9.79.2: *τὰ πρέπει μᾶλλον βαρβάροισι ποιέειν ἢ περ Ἕλλησι· κἀκείνοισι δὲ ἐπιφθονέομεν*).

keep his temper within limits. To this we may add the easy change of his mind when Herodotus has him reconsider his decision to attack Greece and then come back to his original plan (7.11-18). Definitely such a quick change negatively affects the authority of the monarch, especially when he himself admits in front of all the leading Persians that he is not yet come to the fullness of his wisdom (7.13.2-3).[83]

Xerxes' representation becomes all the more interesting if juxtaposed with the representation of his father Darius in the *Histories*. Herodotus allows him important pieces of rhetoric, like the definition of the good counselor, though in a speech calculated to seduce Histiaeus (5.24.3-4), a statement moralizing the use of deceit in persuasion (3.72.4-5), the introduction of the polarity between word (*logos*) and deed (*ergon*) in the work (3.72.2), and the speech in defence of monarchy which wins the day in the so-called 'Constitutional Debate' (3.82). Instead of repeatedly asking for counsel like his son, Darius appears quite energetic,[84] with strong authority and equally strong rhetorical attributes (see for example his elaborate and delicately seductive speech to Histiaeus at Megabazus' instigation; he takes Megabazus' advice on the 'mild way' and is able to construct two suitable speeches [5.24]; we doubt whether Xerxes would be likewise able or successful). Darius is well aware of the power and dynamics of rhetoric, as well as the role of deception in persuasion.[85]

5.2.5 Speech and national character: Spartan silence

Another aspect of characterization through the allocation of speech is the description of national features. Since we are mainly talking about silence here, we shall examine the way Herodotus emphasizes the Spartan attribute of parsimony with words through the allocation of speech to different national groups and the omission or suppression of Spartan speech. At this point, Athenian eloquence is a further way to set Sparta and Athens in opposition to each other.

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[83] The same picture of an irresponsible Xerxes we come across in Aeschylus' *Persians*. Although he is supposed to be the hero of the play, Aeschylus has him appear only in the end in the last choral, dressed in rugs and weeping over his defeat.

[84] See the way he manages the whole conspiracy against the Magi and takes hold of the Persian throne (3.71-87).

[85] Cf. above pp. 62-3. Cf. also Harrison (2004: 257): 'Herodotus' emphasis is on, on the one hand, the childlike and perverse devotion to truth of, say, Cambyses and Xerxes, and on the other hand on the Odyssean tricksterishness of Darius'.

Herodotus denies the Spartans the opportunity to speak; he even intentionally emphasizes Spartan reticence. This choice reflects perfectly the Spartan character: the dislike of long elaborate speeches, and the like of brevity and outspokenness. The Spartans consider deeds more important than words. This is already made clear in the famous incident with the Samian envoys in book 3: when the Samians appeal to the Spartans for assistance with a long speech, the Spartans reply that they have forgotten the beginning of it and cannot understand the end; the Samians then bring a bag remarking it needs flour and the Spartans respond that the word 'bag' is superfluous (3.46).

A more implicit manifestation of the same Spartan trait occurs in book 1, when the Spartans, unimpressed by the luxurious vest and the long speech of the Phocaean Pythermus, reject his request to help the Ionians (1.152.1-2). In Plutarch's *On Chattering* 513a we also find a striking example: when King Philip of Macedon writes to the Spartans to ask them if they will receive him in their city, they write on the paper a large 'no' (*οὐ*) and send it back in reply. The letter sent to Sparta by the Spartan vice-admiral Hippocrates in Xenophon's *Hellenica* 1.1.23 is another case indicative of laconic temperament: 'The ships are gone. Mindarus is dead. The men are starving. We do not know what to do'. The Spartan Sthenelaidas states explicitly the Spartan distaste for lengthy speeches in Thucydides book 1: *τοὺς μὲν λόγους τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐ γιγνώσκω* (1.86.1).[86]

Herodotus allows the Spartans either indirect speech or RSA. There are only two examples of collective Spartan speeches in direct discourse, one in book 5, where they address the allies and suggest the reinstitution of tyranny in Athens, and another one at the end of book 8, where the Spartan messengers address the Athenians trying to avert them from cooperating with the Persians. A closer reading should prove that in the *Histories* the Spartans who are given *oratio recta* are 'un-Spartan', like Pausanias and Demaratus, who, one way or the other, relate to the Persians sooner (Demaratus), or later and outside the scope of the *Histories* (Pausanias). Cleomenes is consistently silenced and merely given some short expressions.[87] Similarly, in his conversation with

[86] On the Spartan silence as a channel of communication and its sophisticated manipulation see especially David 1999: 117-46. Cf. also Flower and Marincola 2002: 196-7. However, cf. the Scythian Anacharsis in book 4: the Spartans are the only Greeks 'to be able to keep up a sensible conversation' (4.77.1: *δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον*). If the Scythians are the 'other', then we may gather that the Spartans are the Greek 'other'.

[87] See above pp. 214-15.

Aristagoras, he is allocated nothing but two short utterances in direct discourse (5.49.9, 50.3), otherwise his speech is presented in indirect discourse or RSA only. In book 6 another plea for help in direct discourse this time by the Athenian Philippides is met with a Spartan reaction given in RSA (6.106). Eurybiades is also denied speech at Salamis in contrast to the eloquent and versatile Themistocles.[88] In most cases the suppressed speech of a Spartan is either followed or preceded by the direct speech of another non-Spartan individual or group, most often Athenian. Herodotus thus masterly extends the effect of the alternation between direct and indirect speech modes not only to emphasize the Spartan parsimony with words, but also to sharpen the confrontation between Sparta and Athens.

The representation of the Spartan speeches becomes more interesting in the context of longer battle accounts. Proper, long and elaborate debate scenes, or even substantial exchanges among the Greeks are absent from the accounts of Thermopylae, Plataea and Mycale, where the Spartans feature more prominently. But debates are not absent from Salamis (and to a lesser extent from Artemisium and Marathon), where the Athenians are the leading men, by virtue of which we have long negotiations, many speeches and successive debates. It seems that the allocation of speech in the various battle narratives is closely associated with the national character of the protagonists in each battle.

I wish to elaborate particularly on the case of Plataea, where the suppression of Spartan speech reflects the Spartan tendency not to talk much, being thus in line with the national character of the leaders in this battle. I shall start from the end of book 8, which leaves a very strong impression of Spartan reticence. After the Athenians reject the Persian offer, the Spartan messengers depart without replying to the Athenian call for help (8.144.5). Likewise, they give no answer to the Athenian messengers' call for help against the Persians at the beginning of book 9 (9.8.1), and, in fact, they do not speak until they decide to take some action after Chileus' speech. Yet again, they do not inform the Athenians about their decision (9.10.1: *φράσαντες οὐδέν*), and only after the second quasi-extortionate speech of the Athenians do the Spartans announce their intentions, reported in one single sentence of indirect discourse (9.11.2: *οἱ ἔφοροι εἶπαν ἐπ' ὅρκου καὶ δὴ δοκεέιν εἶναι ἐν Ὀρεσθείῳ στίχοντας ἐπὶ τοὺς ξείνους*).

Herodotus' careful manipulation of Spartan speech comes up again in the debate between the Tegeans and the Athenians: being the adjudicators, the Spartans have to decide who is the more worthy of the two contestants, but they merely shout (9.28.1:

[88] See above pp. 212-13.

Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ ἀνέβωσε ἅπαν τὸ στρατόπεδον…), that is voting by acclamation in the typical Spartan way.[89] The result of the acclamation and the placement of the Tegeans next to the Spartans in the battle line could have generated a very forceful speech, but this is the Spartan way: to say it with deeds. In the same dispute there is a delightful hint in the Athenian speech which points to the Athenian awareness of the Spartan nature and also to their rhetorical adeptness: 'we are here to fight and not to talk' (9.27.1).[90] This is exactly what suits the Spartans, and its use is probably calculated by the Athenians to win them over. Yet the Spartans do not even answer Mardonius' challenge to a duel at 9.48.[91] Also, Pausanias at 9.82 after the battle of Plataea uses a simple display (9.82.3: *δεικνύς*) and only a few words to compare Persian luxury and Greek indigence.[92] In the same vein Leotychides interrupts Hegesistratus' speech later on before the battle at Mycale (9.91.2), just as Cleomenes has cut off Aristagoras' speech before (5.50.3).

The most eloquent demonstration by far of the laconic Spartan character in the Plataea account is Amompharetus' episode (9.53-5). First of all, there is no direct speech in the whole scene; all the quarrels between Pausanias and Euryanax on the one hand and Amompharetus on the other are recorded in indirect discourse or RSA instead. Amompharetus' persistent refusal to run away from the enemy culminates in him laying a large stone at Pausanias' feet as his 'voting-pebble' against flight.

The throwing of the stone by Amompharetus as his 'voting-pebble' is a reaction perfectly compatible with the Spartan dislike of words in favour of deeds. Amompharetus 'says it with deeds', and not with words. A mere sentence in indirect discourse accompanies his action. However, at the same time, the stone Amompharetus uses is not the typical Spartan way of saying it, for the Spartans usually 'Say it with Sticks', and 'leave it to the less disciplined folk to Say it with Stones', as Hornblower observes.[93] However, Amompharetus does not want to follow the orders of the

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[89] The acclamation is the typical way of voting for the Spartans instead of the ballot, as we learn from Thucydides (1.87.2: *κρίνουσι γὰρ βοῇ καὶ οὐ ψήφῳ*). This might also relate to the laconic Spartan character.

[90] See Hdt. 9.27.1. However, this is not the only case, since in Thucydides 3.67.6 the Thebans also try to make the Spartans consider the deeds more important than the words (*οὐ λόγων τοὺς ἀγῶνας προθήσοντες ἀλλ' ἔργων*). Cf. Flower and Marincola 2002: 153.

[91] Their silence is properly emphasized by the double negation: *οἱ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἀπεκρίνετο* (9.49.1).

[92] Cf. Lateiner 1989: 29.

[93] See Hornblower 2000: 57-82 (especially on Amompharetus see p. 74).

commanders, which makes him appear undisciplined, and, thus, perhaps allows him to 'Say it with Stones'.

The direct speech at this point would have provided the scene with dramatic vividness. However, the picture is described in such a lively fashion that eventually the visual element, maybe the mere mention of the stone, is enough, and a direct exchange would make the situation too comic. This way it preserves its grandeur, and we have no pointless narrative retardation.

The case of Thermopylae is even more rewarding in terms of speech allocation. In this battle the Spartans star, so there is not much emphasis placed on debates or other exchanges. All the Greek debates are given in indirect speech or RSA (7.175.1-2, 207, 219.2). We find another four compact indirect speeches, three of them at 7.219.1: Megistias, the Greek soothsayer, who 'advises the Greeks of the death which awaits them in the morning', deserters who come 'with news of the circuit made by the Persians' at night, and the same news is brought by 'watchers running down from the heights at dawn'. Three compact speeches anticipate the coming death. The last indirect speech is Deineces', saying 'if the Persians hide the sun we will fight in the shade' (7.226).

Herodotus denies any speech to the general Leonidas.[94] His opinions and decisions are merely recorded as speech-acts (RSA) (7.205.3, 207, 219.2). Leonidas thus stands as an indicative example of Spartan reticence. On the other hand, the omission of speech functions as a focusing device for the preceding and following narrative, which relates Leonidas' deeds, and underlines his character elaborating on his choices, thoughts and motivation. Herodotus does not want to distract his reader from the actual fighting and he also portrays Leonidas as the most typical example of Spartan – or Greek in general – bravery.

It is interesting to explore how Herodotus achieves such a powerful effect only through the exploitation of the narrative and with no speech. First, it is Leonidas' introduction into the narrative: he is presented in an impressive style as the 'most respected' and the commander-in-chief of the whole army (7.204: *ὁ δὲ θωμαζόμενος μάλιστα καὶ παντὸς τοῦ στρατεύματος ἡγεόμενος Λακεδαιμόνιος ἦν Λεωνίδης*...),[95] whose

[94] But in Plut. *Apophth. Lac*. 225 Dieneces' saying (7.226) as well as other apophthegms are attributed to Leonidas.

[95] Both Leonidas and Artemisia (7.99.1: *Ἀρτεμισίης δέ, τῆς μάλιστα θῶμα ποιεῦμαι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα στρατευσαμένης γυναικός*,...) are placed in the category of *θωμαστά* that Herodotus has singled out for

descent goes back to Heracles.[96] This grandiose introduction of Leonidas has three effects: first, it emphasizes Leonidas' central role in the narrative, all the more so since the descent is usually a mark of honour;[97] second, it suggests Leonidas' virtue, displayed later on in the battlefield; third, Leonidas' ancestry from Heracles brings him very close to the Homeric heroes whose origin is traced back to gods.[98] Then, the authorial intervention at 7.220.2, which explains Leonidas' decision to dismiss the rest of the army and stay with his Spartan regiment, serves to emphasize his valour, the glory (*κλέος*) he left behind him, and the prosperity of Sparta he thus preserved.[99] Following this, Herodotus records that Leonidas was aware of the Delphic oracle given to the Spartans at the very beginning of the war, saying that Sparta was destined either

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attention in the first sentence of his proem: *ὡς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται, μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροισι ἀποδεχθέντα, ἀκλεᾶ γένηται.*

[96] This is one of the first things the spy reports to Xerxes at 7.208.1 (*Λεωνίδης, ἐὼν γένος Ἡρακλείδης*); it is again repeated in the Delphic oracle at 7.220.4 (*ἀφ' Ἡρακλέους*).

[97] Such examples (origin as 'a remark of honour') may be traced in Homer (*Il*. 10.68), Herodotus (3.1.4; 6.14.3; 8.90.4), and, also, Thucydides (7.69). In Herodotus the same honour is attributed to Leotychides (8.131), Alexander of Macedon (8.139), and Pausanias (9.64). See also How and Wells 1912: 69, 223.

[98] See Immerwahr 1966: 263; Boedeker 2003: 34; Pelling 2006b: 92-8 (on the Homeric characterization of Leonidas and Thermopylae). A fourth effect is the ironic association between Leonidas and Xerxes, who also refers to his genealogy in a grandiose way in book 7 (7.11.2) – but, whereas for Leonidas the genealogy is a sign of honour, for Xerxes it is rather a form of 'dramatic' introduction. The irony may be explained in light of the narrative context: they both have a great origin, but Leonidas is related to a demi-god, i.e. Heracles, and is said by the oracle to have the power of Zeus (father of Heracles) (7.220.4), whereas Xerxes has no real connections to a god, and rather tries to become equal to one (cf. 7.8γ.1: 'we shall so extend the empire of Persia that its boundaries will be god's [Zeus'] own sky'; 7.56.2: 'Why, oh Zeus, have you assumed the shape of a man of Persia, and changed your name to Xerxes,…?' [by a Hellespontian man, when Xerxes crosses the bridge at the Hellespont]). The Greeks can, however, recognize that the invader is not a god, but a mortal, and thus he is bound to fall (7.203.2). Cf. also the comparison between Zeus and Darius and eventually between Zeus and Sparta by Aristagoras: 'If you take Susa, you need not hesitate to compete with Zeus himself for riches' (i.e. Darius is as rich as Zeus) (5.49.7). That Spartan and Persian kings relate in some way to gods is another link established between the Spartans and Persians in the work, from the parallels between the funeral ceremonies of the Spartan and barbarian kings (6.58.2-59) to the madness of Cleomenes and Cambyses, and to Pausanias' autocratic behaviour. On the associations between Spartans and Persians in Herodotus see Lewis 1977: 148-52. Specifically on the similarities between Cleomenes and Cambyses see Hartog 1988: 337-9; Griffiths 1989: 70-2. On the heroization/deification of the Spartan kings on and after their death see Cartledge 1987: 331-43; 1988: 43-4; *pace* Parker 1988: 9-10 (heroization/deification only at death).

[99] See Hdt. 7.220.2: *μένοντι δὲ αὐτοῦ κλέος μέγα ἐλείπετο, καὶ ἡ Σπάρτης εὐδαιμονίη οὐκ ἐξηλείφετο.*

to be destroyed or lose a king (7.220.3-4), which additionally emphasizes Leonidas' bravery and determination.

All three narrative parts speak for Leonidas, thus compensating abundantly for his silence. Moreover, structurally Leonidas' role is also emphasized by the placement of his fateful decision right in the middle of the Thermopylae narrative. Even Leonidas' death speaks eloquently for him, being described in one short though succinct phrase expressing unreserved respect, admiration and grandeur (7.224.1: *καὶ Λεωνίδης τε ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πόνῳ πίπτει ἀνὴρ γενόμενος ἄριστος*).[100] Besides, Herodotus cleverly links Leonidas to himself through the use of the word *kleos* (7.220.3-4). *Kleos* refers analeptically to the programmatic statement of Herodotus' *prooimion* that one of the aims of the *Histories* is that 'great and marvelous deeds – displayed by Greeks and barbarians both – may not be without their glory' (*ἀκλεᾶ*). In that sense both Leonidas and Herodotus play similar roles: they ensure that the deeds do not fade away; Leonidas does so for Sparta, and Herodotus for Leonidas.[101]

That is not to say, however, that Sparta does not have a voice in Herodotus. What balances Leonidas' reticence – and the absence of Spartan speech in general – is the abundant distribution of speech to the Spartan Demaratus.[102] Demaratus can presumably be licensed by Herodotus to speak in this way because as an exile he is outside the active sphere of Spartan policy and warfare. He converses three times with Xerxes in the text (7.101-5, 209, 234-5). The exchanges express in words what remains unexpressed on the Spartan side, that is the Spartan virtue and devotion to their master, the Law. In other words, the speeches of Demaratus stand ingeniously for all the suppressed speech which could have been given to the Spartans. Hence, Demaratus' words highlight the relationship between speech and action from a different and interesting angle: at Thermopylae Demaratus does the talking, whereas Leonidas does the acting. In this way Spartan virtue is made explicit by both speech and action.[103] Indeed this builds up strong ironic allusions, for Xerxes appears to be incapable of understanding Spartan virtue, even if expressed in every possible way (*logos* and *ergon*).

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[100] Gould (1989: 62) describes it as 'unqualified and simple admiration'. But cf. Plutarch *On the Malice of Herodotus* 866a.

[101] Cf. Munson 2001: 177. Cf. also Pelling 2006: 93.

[102] Note also that the name of Demaratus represents a speech act: the prayer of the people that Ariston might have a son (Hdt. 6.63.3).

[103] Cf. also Boedeker 1987: 198.

The Spartans express themselves laconically. The Athenians receive abundant speeches in the text, both longer and more elaborate than the Spartan speeches. The difference becomes all the more obvious when we hear them both speaking in the same context. A good example of this is the answers of the Spartan and the Athenian messengers to Gelon, where the Athenian speech is double the length of the Spartan (7.159, 161). The Ionians are also given speech in the mouth of Aristagoras, Histiaeus, and Dionysius of Phocaea, in the collective Ionian speech as a reaction to Dionysius' hard training. Also in the first chapters of book 9 almost everybody speaks (in direct discourse), the Athenians, the Thebans,[104] the Tegean Chileus, the Argives, the Megarians, the Phocian Harmocydes, a Persian in the banquet of Attaginus and Mardonius.[105] Not to mention that the longest speech in the work is delivered by the Corinthian Socles in book 5. In a wordy context the Spartan silence becomes more intense and remarkable.[106]

The allocation and management of Spartan speech by Herodotus expresses exactly the Spartan characterization as men of few words. In terms of speech-act theory then, the Spartan speech itself becomes an action which pictures the Spartan nature. This nature, frequently and intentionally confronted with the Athenian speech-loving character, adds to and underlines the differences between Sparta and Athens, which make the alliance of the Greeks very delicate indeed.

5.3 Greeks vs. Persians

The examination of the allocation of speech to the Greeks and Persians may prove very rewarding and shed additional light on the Graeco-Persian polarity. I have already discussed in detail the inability of the Persians to enter into discussion and the defectiveness of their attempts to do so in connection with their institutions.[107] This explains the relative absence of so many speeches made by Persians. Still, the allocation of speeches to both Greeks and Persians is balanced, so that in each battle account we

[104] Hohti (1976: 71) argues that the direct speech at 9.2.2-3 stresses the aspects of disunity and bribery in the chapters to follow.

[105] I do not agree with Solmsen (1944: 248) who argues that chapters 9.12, 17-18 and 21 have no wider importance, but merely stress the events with which they are concerned (the conspiracy of Argos with Mardonius; the remarkable experience of the Phocian detachment; the unfavourable situation of the Megarian cavalry before the Athenian help causes a change for the better).

[106] Cf. Pelling 2006: 114.

[107] See ch. 1.

hear not only the Greek but also the Persian side. At Thermopylae we have debates among the Greeks and likewise among the Persians, with Xerxes and Demaratus exchanging extensive pieces of direct discourse. At Salamis next to the Greeks we find Xerxes receiving advice from Artemisia. And at Plataea we have Mardonius and Artabazus engaging in argument.

On the other hand, there is another interesting detail to add, a more subtle stylistic point: the relatively small amount of Persian debate is largely given in direct discourse – frequently extensive – by contrast to the Greek debates which are given both in direct and indirect discourse (or RSA). More than that, 'Appendix 2' shows clearly that the majority of the thirty five (roughly) Greek debates in books 5-9 are recorded either totally or partly in indirect speech/RSA, mostly compressed. Of the (roughly again) seventeen Persian debates, Herodotus quotes only two in indirect speech. To these one may also add another two debates reported in *oratio recta*, which occur in books 1-4: the debate summoned by Cyrus, where Croesus speaks up (1.206.3-208), and the debate among the seven conspirators on the constitution of Persia (3.80-2). The effect is imposingly ironic and contributes to subverting the stereotyped polarity between Greek and barbarian debate (freedom vs. slavery).

Moreover, when Greeks debate, Herodotus alternates more often between direct and indirect speech modes. The shift of speech modes on the Greek side reflects tense clashes of opinions as well as discord, and subsequently crystallizes into the flexibility of debate in a free political context. In Greece freedom allows many different opinions which would blur the picture of the conferences and severely delay the narrative. Indirect speech allows focus on the important parts, quoted in direct speech, and the summary of the huge variety of opinions. Indirect speech becomes thus a more effective way to emphasize Greek disunity and multivocality. Along these lines speech acquires an additional dimension, that of performance. Succession of variant speech modes and *oratio obliqua* perform political freedom and dissent within the Greek alliance.

In Persia, by contrast, debate and other speech, apart from the king's, occur only as a temporary aberration. So Herodotus needs to slow down the narrative pace in order to emphasize the importance of the circumstances and thus the need for discussion. The direct discourse and formality of the Persian debates reflect the inflexibility and strictness of Persian institutions. This is a very different sense of performativity than in Greece. Anyway, it seems reasonable on the basis that the limits are strictly defined in the Persian court so that everybody speaks in turn and in order of rank; not many people speak, which makes it easier for Herodotus to expand on individual views, as everything

is so clear-cut: a certain person said this, and another said that. That direct speech is used to counsel a king in an indirect way to avoid punishment is part of Herodotus complex play. To the same play belongs the handling of the 'Constitutional debate', the first debate on serious political issues given as a sophistic-style discussion on Persian ground and itself constituting the pattern of many debates to follow.

5.4 Conclusion: Herodotean dialogism revisited

The management and distribution of speeches to individuals in the text is notably scrupulous, thereby implying a highly provocative narrative architecture. Herodotus goes to considerable pains and appears extremely selective to serve the economy of his text, to speed up or to slow down the narrative pace, and to provide his *Histories* with vividness and dramatic qualities.

At the same time, and at a second more implicit level, the different speech modes are seen to buttress or even exemplify dominant themes of the *Histories*. The scheming character of rhetoric is suggested by the shift between direct and indirect speech modes. Allocation of speech binds speech and authority closely, and sharply redraws the Greek vs. barbarian opposition, with an all-powerful Xerxes lacking speech and thus authority. Greek disunity, as polarized in the contrast between Sparta and Athens (to climax later in an internecine war), underlies Spartan silence as well as the alternation between direct and indirect speech modes when Athenians and Spartans respectively speak. Beyond Atheno-Spartan relations, Greek disunity in general is reflected in the alternation of speech modes in Greek debates and the employment of indirect speech modes. The distribution of different speech modes to Greeks and Persians performs and challenges the Graeco-Persian polarity: different speech modes embody the openness and freedom of the Greek political system; on the other hand, the preference for indirect speech modes gives a sense of restricting that same freedom and openness, in contrast to the long Persian exchanges in direct discourse.

All these observations render the dialogism of the *Histories* deeply intricate. By no means can the dialogism be full-fledged and some modification is required. The reproduction of Greek debate and thereby its suppression, the regulation of speech distribution and consequently the regulation of authority, and the allocation and non-allocation of speech to individuals and groups, are all elements which help Herodotus to get his voice heard. Indeed, polyphony is present and many people do get to speak, but we also have seen how dissonance of opinions among the Greeks is delicately held back. The dialogism of the *Histories* does not dispute the authority of Herodotus. It

should rather be refashioned into a more moderate dialogism, that is a diversity of voices managed by Herodotus himself.

Conclusion

Multiplicity of voices, oversupply of different and even competing accounts of the past from variant informants, broad or even unlimited range of interpretation: these are commonly recognized as the main virtues of Herodotean narrative strategy. This study has argued that the picture is far more complex when it comes to Herodotean rhetoric. Aspects, such as who speaks and who does not, whether the speakers are given direct or indirect speech, what they speak about, when they speak, whom they address, with what implications and to what effect, turn into tools in the hands of Herodotus to explore, problematize and complicate the self-other categories, the themes of freedom and free speech, the relation of speech to power and authority, and the impending fragmentation of the Greek alliance. The basic ground on which Herodotus constructs these themes is the supple and illusory nature of rhetoric. All in all, we are dealing here with a highly sophisticated and individualistic rhetorical system.

Herodotus carefully sets up his rhetorical system in ways that, if closely inspected, strengthen the unity of his artifice. Starting from the more abstract category of debates we moved progressively to more concrete speech genres, the alliance and pre-battle speeches, and then to a more specific kind of arguments deployed in speeches: the examples. Each chapter adds its own unique and distinctive element to the bigger whole, and each chapter approaches the speeches from a different angle so that, through the variety and flexibility of the possibilities of speech arrangement, Herodotus is seen to relay, replay and rework his material in a sophisticated way to serve the larger themes which pervade the whole of his narrative.

The manifold dimensions and the flexibility of the text and its rhetoric, which have a prominent precedent in Homer, explain the ability of the text to incorporate disparate elements into a harmoniously unified whole. Elements from epideictic and deliberative oratory are used in Herodotean speeches. The rhetorical handbooks base their commendations on Herodotus among others. Expediency, a famously Thucydidean notion, is already the primary human motivation in Herodotus. And if Thucydides is famous for his silences, Herodotus' silences are equally prominent and notably eloquent.

In Herodotus the procedure of speech articulating narrative themes is artfully woven. Debates ineffective and abortive, conducted in a battle-like atmosphere and introduced by battle-like language; self-interest vested in alliance speeches and pre-

battle speeches to the achievement of an allegedly common pan-Hellenic goal; circumlocutory argumentation in the form of roundabout paradigms: they all exemplify a partisan and highly biased rhetoric which primarily serves private and regional interests. Even in terms of speech allocation the laconic Spartan character is juxtaposed with the verbose Athenian, while the alternation of different speech modes reflects Greek strife.

The Greeks know well how to use factional and manipulative rhetoric, and so do the Persians. Just as Aristagoras, Miltiades and Themistocles are capable of manipulating decisions and audiences, Darius and Mardonius also know how to deceive and manipulate their audiences. The affinities between Greeks and Persians or even, alternatively, the assimilation of Greek behaviour to barbarian norms go beyond that, thus destabilizing the Greek/barbarian categories: the Persians discuss in a Greek-like manner; whereas the Greeks discuss in ways that implicate them with notions of tyranny. Xerxes calls for union of hearts and contribution to a pan-Persian cause before the expedition against Greece, while the Greeks call for the salvation of Athens; the free and equal Greeks are given largely indirect speech modes but also alternating speech modes, whereas the slavish Persians are given largely direct discourse.

Speech is thus charged with an additional function; it 'performs' certain acts. In the 'Introduction' we emphasized the relationship between speech and narrative, that is the importance of the *logos-ergon* polarity in the *Histories*. The flexible dynamics of this relationship extend from corroboration to subversion. At the same time speech performs the narrative in the sense that it represents, exemplifies and reinforces aspects which constitute the basic lines of Herodotean thought. And in that sense, the polarity between speech and narrative turns in effect into an equation.

Enacting disunity and self-other polarity, while also challenging the latter, anticipates the exchange of roles between conquerors and defenders, Persians and Greeks, and more specifically Athenians, the breaking of the weak Greek alliance and the internal war. These are analogies which inevitably struck, and were meant to strike, contemporary and future audiences.

Further, the performative function of the speech has a double effect: it ties the work together as a whole and consolidates the authority of Herodotus, thus limiting the dialogism of his text. The masterful management and arrangement of the speeches makes it hard to justify the argument that the *Histories* is a dialogic text. Dialogism cannot be unqualified, when voices are silenced and suppressed and debates are compressed. The argument for dialogism needs nuancing. In the same way that

Herodotus challenges the Graeco-Persian antithesis, he also contests the dialogism of his text. In the *Histories* there is room for several voices, but the authority of Herodotus is felt to be managing everything.

However, although the text is not unreservedly dialogic, this does not reduce its ability to generate dialogues with the readers beyond and over space and time limits. There is dialogue within the text and dialogue with the readers so that readers are invited to get deeply involved in the text, make the associations and extrapolate the meaning, and work out and decipher the ploys and plays of the narrative plan. Herodotus supplies his readers with insinuations, more or less subtle, and it is up to the response of the readers[1] to grasp and interpret the point, which is never one-dimensional.

Momigliano once memorably wrote of Herodotus 'the secrets of his workshop are not yet all out'.[2] This thesis has attempted to prise the door of that workshop open a little further.

[1] On reader-response theory see Iser 1978; 1989.

[2] See Momigliano 1966: 130.

APPENDIX 1: Catalogue of Greek and Persian debates (books 5-9)

Following the definition of debate given in ch. 1,[1] I have been able to identify the subsequent sets of speeches in the Histories as debates:
(Abbreviations explained: ID = Indirect Discourse; DD = Direct Discourse; RSA = Record of Speech Act)

GREECE

Debate number	Passage	Speaker	Addressee	Speech mode
1.	5.79.2	Thebans	Assembly	DD
	5.80.1	Theban	Assembly	DD
2.	5.91.2-3	Spartans	Council of allies	DD
	5.92α.1	Socles	Council of allies	DD
	5.93.1	Hippias	Council of allies	ID
	5.93.2	Allies	Council of allies	RSA
3.	5.97.1-2	Aristagoras	Athenians	ID
	5.97.2	Athenians	Aristagoras	RSA
4.	5.103.1	Aristagoras	Athenians	RSA
	5.103.1	Athenians	Aristagoras	ID
5.	5.118.2	Carians	Council	RSA
	5.118.2	Pixodarus	Council	RSA

[1] See above p. 38: 'By debates I mean formal public discussions entailing exchange of opposing opinions between two or more interlocutors over important issues dealing with decisions that affect the whole community. Thus the context of the debate is primarily political, most often dealing with wider issues of national strategy'.

	5.118.3	Carians	Council	RSA
6.	5.124.2	Aristagoras	Council	ID
	5.125	Hecataeus	Council	RSA
	5.126.1	Aristagoras	Council	RSA
7.	6.11.1	Ionians	Council	RSA
	6.11.2-3	Dionysius of Phocaea	Council	DD
	6.12.1	Ionians	Council	RSA
8.	6.100.1	Eretrians	Athenians	RSA
	6.100.1	Athenians	Eretrians	RSA
9.	6.100.2	Eretrians	Council	RSA
	6.100.2	Eretrians	Council	RSA
10.	6.106.2	Philippides/ Athenians	Spartans	DD
	6.106.3	Spartans	Philippides/ Athenians	ID
11.	6.109.1	Athenian generals	Council	RSA
	6.109.2	Athenian generals	Council	RSA
	6.109.3-6	Miltiades	Council	DD
12.	7.142.1	Athenians	Assembly	RSA
	7.142.2	Athenians	Assembly	ID/RSA
	7.142.3	Interpreters	Assembly	ID
	7.143.1-3	Themistocles	Assembly	ID
13.	7.145.1-2	Greeks	Council	ID/RSA
14.	7.148.3	Greek messengers	Argives	RSA
	7.148.4	Argives	Greek messengers	ID

	7.149.2	Sparta messengers	Argives	ID
	7.149.3	Argives	Greek messengers	ID/RSA
15.	7.157	Greek messengers	Gelon	DD
	7.158	Gelon	Greek messengers	DD
	7.159	Syagrus	Gelon	DD
	7.160	Gelon	Syagrus	DD
	7.161	Athenians	Gelon	DD
	7.161.1	Gelon	Athenians	DD
16.	7.168.1	Greek messengers	Corcyreans	RSA
	7.168.1	Corcyreans	Greek messengers	ID
17.	7.169.1	Greek messengers	Creatans	RSA
	7.169.2	Cretans	Greek messengers	RSA
18.	7.172.2	Thessalians	Greeks	DD
	7.173	Greeks	Thessalians	RSA
19.	7.175.1	Greeks	Council	RSA
20.	7.207	Peloponnesian generals	Council	RSA
	7.207	Leonidas	Council	ID
21.	7.219.2	Greeks	Council	RSA
	7.219.2	Greeks	Council	RSA
22.	8.2.2	Greeks	Council	ID
	8.3.1	Greeks	Council	ID
	8.3.1	Greeks	Council	RSA
	8.3.2	Athenians	Council	RSA
23.	8.9	Greeks	Council	RSA

24.	8.49.1	Eurybiades	Council	RSA
	8.49.2	Peloponnesian generals	Council	ID
	8.50.1	Athenian messenger	Council	ID
	8.56	Greeks	Council	RSA
25.	8.58.1	Themistocles	Eurybiades	ID
	8.58.1	Eurybiades	Themistocles	RSA
	8.58.2	Themistocles	Eurybiades	RSA
	8.59	Eurybiades	Greek generals	ID
	8.59	Themistocles	Greek generals	RSA
	8.59	Adeimantus	Themistocles	DD
	8.59	Themistocles	Adeimantus	DD
	8.60α-γ	Themistocles	Eurybiades	DD
	8.61.1	Adeimantus	Themistocles & Eurybiades	RSA
	8.61.2	Themistocles	Adeimantus	ID
	8.62	Themistocles	Eurybiades	DD
26.	8.74.2	Peloponnesian generals	Council	ID
	8.74.2	Athenian, Aeginetan, Megarean generals	Council	ID
27.	8.81	Aristeides	Council	ID
	8.81	Greeks	Council	RSA
28.	8.108.2	Themistocles	Council	RSA
	8.108.2-4	Eurybiades	Council	RSA/ID
29.	8.140α.1-β.4	Alexander	Athenians	DD
	8.142	Spartan messengers	Athenians	DD
	8.143	Athenians	Alexander	DD
	8.144	Athenians	Spartans	DD

30.	9.5.1	Murychides	Athenians	ID
	9.5.1	Lycides	Athenians	ID
31.	9.7α.1-β.2	Athenians	Spartans	DD
	9.8.1	Spartans	Athenians	RSA
	9.9.2	Chileus	Spartans	DD
	9.11.1-2	Athenians	Spartans	DD
	9.11.2	Spartans	Athenians	ID
	9.11.3	Athenians	Spartans	RSA
32.	9.26.2-7	Tegeans	Spartans	DD
	9.27	Athenians	Spartans	DD
	9.28	Spartans	Council	ID
33.	9.51	Greeks	Council	RSA
34.	9.98	Greeks	Council	RSA
35.	9.106.2	Greeks	Council	RSA/ID
	9.106.3	Peloponnesian generals	Council	RSA
	9.106.3	Athenian generals	Council	RSA

PERSIA

Debate number	**Passage**	**Speaker**	**Addressee**	**Speech mode**
1.	7.8α.1-δ.2	Xerxes	Persian grandees	DD
	7.9.1-γ	Mardonius	Xerxes	DD
	7.10α.1-θ.3	Artabanus	Xerxes	DD
	7.11	Xerxes	Artabanus	DD

2.	7.234.1	Xerxes	Demaratus	DD
	7.234.2	Demaratus	Xerxes	DD
	7.234.3	Xerxes	Demaratus	DD
	7.235	Demaratus	Xerxes	DD
	7.236	Achaemenes	Xerxes	DD
	7.237	Xerxes	Achaemenes	DD
3.	8.67.2	Xerxes (via Mardonius)	Generals	ID
	8.68	Generals	Xerxes (via Mardonius)	RSA
	8.68α.1-γ	Artemisia	Xerxes (via Mardonius)	DD
	8.69.2	Mardonius	Xerxes	RSA
	8.69.2	Xerxes	generals	RSA
4.	8.100.2-5	Mardonius	Xerxes	DD
	8.101.1	Xerxes	Mardonius	ID
	8.101.2-4	Xerxes	Artemisia	DD
	8.102	Artemisia	Xerxes	DD
	8.103	Xerxes	Artemisia	RSA
5.	9.41.2-3	Artabazus	Mardonius	ID
	9.41.4	Mardonius	Artabazus	ID/RSA
	9.42.1	Generals	Mardonius	RSA

APPENDIX 2: Maxims and proverbs

Maxims (*γνῶμαι*) constitute the premise or conclusion of the enthymeme, i.e. the other kind of proofs along with the example (Arist. *Rh*. 1393a24-6, 1394a26-8). Aristotle defines the maxim as a general statement, which concerns what 'should be chosen or avoided with reference to the human actions' (*Rh*. 1394a21-5; cf. *Rh*. *Al*. 1430a40-1430b1). He also places some proverbs (*παροιμίαι*) in the category of maxims (*Rh*. 1395a19-20). For my purposes here it would not make much difference to distinguish between maxims and proverbs; hence I take them as denoting the same thing.

Maxims belong to the popular wisdom and as such they can be readily employed since they may have a greater impact on the audience. They are popular and so they increase the authority of the speech, as everyone recognizes them as true.[1] The purpose of the maxims is didactic – like that of the examples – and also very often moral. Mostly they support or explain arguments and they aim either at exhorting or discouraging the people from doing something.

Herodotus uses proverbs extensively in the mouth of individuals to enable them reinforce their arguments through resorting to traditionally acknowledged means of persuasion, truths that are generally accepted.[2] The short form of the maxim makes it rather convenient to use as it facilitates making one's point succinctly. They are a form of 'compact wisdom'. Besides, they are very useful as they consist of generalizations and can be easily adapted to different situations. Another advantage of the maxim is that it makes a point in an indirect way, so that it may not seem offensive or improper to the audience. Of course, their suitability proves the rhetorical aptness of the speaker.

Interaction between speech and narrative plays here again an important role, as some maxims/proverbs might seem not very relevant or might even seem contradictory to their context. However, careful contextualization may disclose the multiple strands of the underlying meaning and reveal the different reflections of the reality they suggest.

The importance of maxims in Herodotus may be gathered from the fact that frequently whole scenes are built on the pointed use of maxims and their further implications, such as the episode between Gyges and Canduales, or even the dialogue

[1] Cf. Arist. *Rh*. 1395a8-13; Quint. *Inst*. 5.11.21.

[2] On the use of maxims and proverbs in Herodotus see Lang 1984: 58-67; Gould 1989: 78-82; Shapiro 2000: 89-118.

scene between Solon and Croesus, both already in the first chapters of book 1.[3] But since it is not my purpose to discuss the use of proverb exhaustively, I will restrict myself to a general assessment and a few comments on some of the most striking cases.

Maxims may be used by generals when exhorting the soldiers, like in the cases of Harmocydes (9.17.4) and Dionysius of Phocaea (6.11.2) with effect only to the particular situation of war. Otherwise, they may be useful to express a point indirectly without naming people, as when the Athenians state that one who was brave in the past might not always be brave (9.27.4), apparently pointing at the Tegeans. The indirectness of maxims is a feature which suits perfectly the case of Artabanus: he cannot accuse the king straightforwardly of *hybris* and thoughtless decisions; thus, so as not to oppose him openly stirring his rage, he uses more oblique ways and talks about the importance of careful planning (7.10δ.2, 10ζ, 49.5), and the dangers of divine jealousy (7.10ε, 46.3-4) and insatiable desire (7.16α.2, 18.2). The same stands for Demaratus when he obliquely refers to the value of sound advice (7.104.2). Let us note that both Artabanus and Demaratus prove right in the end.

In other cases these *gnomai* may also be a part of treacherous rhetoric in the hands of people who exploit the authority of popular belief to achieve egotistic aims. Mardonius and Darius are indicative cases. The former rounds off his speech to Xerxes with a general statement about the need of risks to achieve gains (7.9γ: 'let us be ever venturesome; for nothing comes of itself and all men's gains are the fruit of adventure'). The latter convinces Histiaeus to become his counselor, so that he keeps an eye on him, through stressing the importance of having a wise and loyal friend (5.24.3).

Besides, maxims very often reflect wider issues which constitute the core of Herodotus' historical thought. Thus, on the one hand, we come across the aspect of divine jealousy mentioned by Artabanus, which comes up again in the Solon – Croesus and Amasis – Polycrates scenes. On the other hand, there is also the belief that 'soft countries produce soft men' put in the mouth of Cyrus (9.122.3).

In other cases, maxims are used suggestively carrying allusions and hidden meanings which implicate in them the speakers themselves or the addressees and become clear only later. Xerxes is the most striking example of this sort. His use of maxims reveals his ruthlessness and bad temper (cf. 7.39.1: the Pythius episode), all the

[3] On the suggestiveness of the proverbs in the Gyges – Candaules and Solon – Croesus scenes see Pelling 2006a: 141-77 (see esp. p. 145 [his italics]: 'it only subsequently emerges *how* the proverbial wisdom is true'). On Gyges and Candaules see also Shapiro 2000: 89-118 (an interesting discussion of the ways contradictory proverbs elucidate Herodotus' historical analysis).

more so since he does not receive any substantial pieces of rhetoric in the work.[4] At Abydos, when he talks about 'great results achieved only by great risks' (7.50.3) or when he says that 'the end is not always to be seen in the beginning' (7.51.3), he creates strong ironic allusions to the bad end of his expedition. Besides, Xerxes' proverbial remark about the courage of Artemisia 'my men have turned into women, my women into men' (8.88.3) – which recalls Artemisia's comment that the Greeks are as far superior to the Persians in naval matters as men are to women (8.68α.1) – alludes to the common belief that the barbarians were effeminate and bad fighters by complete contrast to the Greeks; hence Xerxes alludes to his own defeat.

Similarly, the proverb uttered by the Spartans in their speech to the Athenians 'for surely you know that in foreigners there is neither truth not trust' (8.142.5) turns against them as they worked with tyrants in the past and they will continue to do it in the future. Finally, Gelon's answer to the Spartan and Athenian messengers includes two proverbs, which prove rather ominous and come true through Greek disunity at the expense of the Greeks towards the end of the *Histories* and especially at the time of Herodotus (7.162.1: 'it looks as if you have the commanders, but you will not have any men for them to command'; 'tell Greece that the spring of the year is lost to her').

A last interesting case is the episode of Hippocleides (6.129). When Cleisthenes, after Hippocleides dancing and demonstrating shameless behaviour in the dinner of the suitors, says that Hippocleides has danced away his marriage to Agariste, Hippocleides replies he does not care (6.129.5: *Οὐ φροντὶς Ἱπποκλείδῃ*). This proverb serves no other function in the context. Herodotus himself explains that the reason for mentioning the incident is that this expression became proverbial from then on (6.129.5: *ἀπὸ τούτου μὲν τοῦτο ὀνομάζεται*). The example is important – note also that the proverb is given in direct discourse – as it illustrates Herodotus' interest in purely folkloric elements.

[4] See ch. 5.

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