eprintid: 14962
rev_number: 62
eprint_status: archive
userid: 587
dir: disk0/00/01/49/62
datestamp: 2009-03-24 13:36:26
lastmod: 2015-07-19 02:20:37
status_changed: 2009-03-24 13:36:26
type: proceedings_section
metadata_visibility: show
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Landa, R
creators_name: Griffin, D
creators_name: Clegg, RG
creators_name: Mykoniati, E
creators_name: Rio, M
title: A Sybilproof Indirect Reciprocity Mechanism for Peer-to-Peer Networks
subjects: 8100
divisions: F46
abstract: Although direct reciprocity (Tit-for-Tat) contribution systems have been successful in reducing free-loading in peer-to-peer overlays, it has been shown that, unless the contribution network is dense, they tend to be slow (or may even fail) to converge [1]. On the other hand, current indirect reciprocity mechanisms based on reputation systems tend to be susceptible to sybil attacks, peer slander and whitewashing.In this paper we present PledgeRoute, an accounting mechanism for peer contributions that is based on social capital. This mechanism allows peers to contribute resources to one set of peers and use this contribution to obtain services from a different set of peers, at a different time. PledgeRoute is completely decentralised, can be implemented in both structured and unstructured peer-to-peer systems, and it is resistant to the three kinds of attacks mentioned above.To achieve this, we model contribution transitivity as a routing problem in the contribution network of the peer-to-peer overlay, and we present arguments for the routing behaviour and the sybilproofness of our contribution transfer procedures on this basis. Additionally, we present mechanisms for the seeding of the contribution network, and a combination of incentive mechanisms and reciprocation policies that motivate peers to adhere to the protocol and maximise their service contributions to the overlay.
date: 2009
publisher: IEEE
vfaculties: VENG
oa_status: green
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
verified: verified_batch
elements_source: Web of Science
elements_id: 112699
isbn_13: 978-1-4244-3512-8
lyricists_name: Rio, MJG
lyricists_name: Griffin, D
lyricists_name: Mykoniati, E
lyricists_name: Landa Gamiochipi, RL
lyricists_name: Clegg, RG
lyricists_id: MJGRI50
lyricists_id: DPGRI47
lyricists_id: EMYKO89
lyricists_id: RLLAN35
lyricists_id: RCLEG46
full_text_status: public
pagerange: 343 - 351
event_title: IEEE INFOCOM Conference 2009
event_location: Rio de Janeiro, BRAZIL
event_dates: 2009-04-19 - 2009-04-25
refereed: TRUE
issn: 0743-166X
book_title: IEEE INFOCOM 2009 - IEEE CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, VOLS 1-5
citation:        Landa, R;    Griffin, D;    Clegg, RG;    Mykoniati, E;    Rio, M;      (2009)    A Sybilproof Indirect Reciprocity Mechanism for Peer-to-Peer Networks.                     In:  IEEE INFOCOM 2009 - IEEE CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, VOLS 1-5.  (pp. 343 - 351).  IEEE       Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14962/1/14962.pdf