eprintid: 14962 rev_number: 62 eprint_status: archive userid: 587 dir: disk0/00/01/49/62 datestamp: 2009-03-24 13:36:26 lastmod: 2015-07-19 02:20:37 status_changed: 2009-03-24 13:36:26 type: proceedings_section metadata_visibility: show item_issues_count: 0 creators_name: Landa, R creators_name: Griffin, D creators_name: Clegg, RG creators_name: Mykoniati, E creators_name: Rio, M title: A Sybilproof Indirect Reciprocity Mechanism for Peer-to-Peer Networks subjects: 8100 divisions: F46 abstract: Although direct reciprocity (Tit-for-Tat) contribution systems have been successful in reducing free-loading in peer-to-peer overlays, it has been shown that, unless the contribution network is dense, they tend to be slow (or may even fail) to converge [1]. On the other hand, current indirect reciprocity mechanisms based on reputation systems tend to be susceptible to sybil attacks, peer slander and whitewashing.In this paper we present PledgeRoute, an accounting mechanism for peer contributions that is based on social capital. This mechanism allows peers to contribute resources to one set of peers and use this contribution to obtain services from a different set of peers, at a different time. PledgeRoute is completely decentralised, can be implemented in both structured and unstructured peer-to-peer systems, and it is resistant to the three kinds of attacks mentioned above.To achieve this, we model contribution transitivity as a routing problem in the contribution network of the peer-to-peer overlay, and we present arguments for the routing behaviour and the sybilproofness of our contribution transfer procedures on this basis. Additionally, we present mechanisms for the seeding of the contribution network, and a combination of incentive mechanisms and reciprocation policies that motivate peers to adhere to the protocol and maximise their service contributions to the overlay. date: 2009 publisher: IEEE vfaculties: VENG oa_status: green primo: open primo_central: open_green verified: verified_batch elements_source: Web of Science elements_id: 112699 isbn_13: 978-1-4244-3512-8 lyricists_name: Rio, MJG lyricists_name: Griffin, D lyricists_name: Mykoniati, E lyricists_name: Landa Gamiochipi, RL lyricists_name: Clegg, RG lyricists_id: MJGRI50 lyricists_id: DPGRI47 lyricists_id: EMYKO89 lyricists_id: RLLAN35 lyricists_id: RCLEG46 full_text_status: public pagerange: 343 - 351 event_title: IEEE INFOCOM Conference 2009 event_location: Rio de Janeiro, BRAZIL event_dates: 2009-04-19 - 2009-04-25 refereed: TRUE issn: 0743-166X book_title: IEEE INFOCOM 2009 - IEEE CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, VOLS 1-5 citation: Landa, R; Griffin, D; Clegg, RG; Mykoniati, E; Rio, M; (2009) A Sybilproof Indirect Reciprocity Mechanism for Peer-to-Peer Networks. In: IEEE INFOCOM 2009 - IEEE CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, VOLS 1-5. (pp. 343 - 351). IEEE Green open access document_url: https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14962/1/14962.pdf