

Adult Education and Modernity in the Arab Republic of Egypt
A Comparative Study of Adult Education Policy
in the Arab Republic of Egypt and England

By

Saeed Gamil Soliman

B.A., Ac. Dip., M.A. (Education)

Volume I

Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
to the Institute of Education, University of London

1979



IMAGING SERVICES NORTH

Boston Spa, Wetherby

West Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ

www.bl.uk

BEST COPY AVAILABLE.

VARIABLE PRINT QUALITY

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my sense of deep gratitude to Professor Brian Holmes, Professor and Head of Comparative Education Department, Institute of Education, University of London, for supervising this study since its very start in January 1975. I have benefited greatly from his knowledge, wisdom and experience. I have always received his unfailing help especially when the storm was too hard for the boat. Throughout the four years of full-time study under his supervision, my eyes have been open much wider to methods of research in Comparative Education. Thanks to the carefully conducted Ph.D. seminars, which I regularly attended since October 1975, I have come into contact with researches undertaken by students from almost everywhere in the world. My previous preparation was thus complemented and deepened, and the gaps thoughtfully filled through various activities that I count myself lucky to watch and participate in some.

I also feel greatly indebted to Mr R. Cowen who joined supervision since April 1976. Throughout this period he has been a major source of guidance. His scholarly and critical comments on the chapters of the study have helped me to reconsider and crystallize many points.

Dr Youssef K. Youssef, Director of the National Centre for Educational Research, Cairo, was kind enough to provide me with almost all the studies so far made ^{on adult education} by the N.C.E.S.R.T. and some of the A.S.F.E.C studies. These helped me greatly to indulge deeper into adult education policies in Egypt.

I also feel indebted to the library staff of both the Institute of Education, and Senate House libraries. To the S.O.A.S. and the British Library I owe special debt for unmistakable facilities. I was also given access to the library of London School of Economics, for one year from September 1975, as well as the library of the D.E.S. and the N.I.A.E.

I do feel grateful to the Egyptian Government which sponsored me throughout these years, and to the Egyptian Cultural Bureau under the former Counsellor, Mr Koraitim and the present, Professor A.E. Sarhan, for the facilities offered.

Last but not least, thanks are due to my wife Evon and my two kids Hany and Raef who had to endure my absence while the thesis was in the making.

ABSTRACT

ADULT EDUCATION AND MODERNITY IN THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT- A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ADULT EDUCATION POLICY IN THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT AND ENGLAND

By Saeed G. Soliman

The present study is an attempt to apply Holmes' "Problem approach" to the staggering modernity stride in the Arab Republic of Egypt since 1952. Throughout the whole period, various documents have been keen on expressing the leaders' zeal for the establishment of a modern State both politically and economically. However, the outcome has been disappointing. An inapt adult base in terms of unmodified internalised attitudes and inadequate skills, has made the realization of modernity proposals difficult. With the possible contribution of adult education in mind, the study assumes that if Egypt is to modernize, an adult education policy that penetrates the Egyptian adult masses is a pressing demand for Egypt's future.

Part one deals with 'Problem Statement' through which the background of the problem is given in terms of 'rising expectations' versus 'growing frustration' in many countries of the underdeveloped world since the mid-twentieth century. The part reviews as well the inconsistency as clear in the Egyptian case, raises the hypothesis and explains the method followed throughout the study.

Part two deals with 'Problem Intellectualisation' after Holmes' 'Change-No-Change' method of analysis. 'Change' is illustrated by modernity proposals in post-1952 documents in comparison with those before 1952. 'No-Change', on the other hand, is represented in the unmodified attitudes of the adult masses, and skill inadequacy that have stood in the way of realizing the above proposals.

Part three deals with the 'Proposed Policy Solution' which is reached through the identification of 'modernity' in various schools, the ideal typical modern society and man; together with the investigation of the possible contribution of adult education to modernity in so far as attitudes and skills of its clientele are concerned.

Part four deals with the 'Contextual Analysis' in which the adult education policies in post-1944 England, and post-1952 Egypt are analysed. The socio-economic differences between the two countries are well recognized, but two major policy trends form the basis of cultural borrowing, namely the integration of adult education into the national system of education, and partnership between providing agencies.

Part five deals with the 'Workability of the Solution'. It takes some salient ^{aspects} of Egypt's institutional, normative and environmental conditions as base for judging possible success in the adoption and implementation of the recommended policy.

CONTENTS

	Page
Acknowledgements	i- 11
Abstract	iii
Contents	iv-viii
List of Tables	ix-xi
List of Figures	xi-xii
 PART ONE : PROBLEM STATEMENT	 I
 <u>Chapter One : Introduction and Methodology</u>	 3
Introduction	4
The Problem	13
Relevance of 'Adult Education'	26
Limitation of the scope of investigation	29
Hypothesis	33
Methods of inquiry	34
Notes	38
 PART TWO : PROBLEM INTELLECTUALISATION	
 <u>Chapter Two: Change: Modernity Proposals before and after 1952</u>	
The setting from which the pre-revolutionary proposals sprang	48
The political setting	48
The economic setting	52
<u>Modernity proposals 1923-1952</u>	58
General norms	58
Proposed norms in the political realm	60
The Constitution	60
Legislature	60
Political parties	61
The executive	62
Judiciary	63
Proposed norms in the economic realm	63
Climate for the shift in modernity proposals	65
The emergence of an Egyptian cultural movement	66
The culmination of class struggle	66
Futility of democratic façades	67
The aggravation of social injustice	69
<u>Modernity proposals since 1952</u>	
a) 1952-1956	73
1. Political realm	73
2. Economic realm	77
b) 1956-1961	83
1. Political realm	83
2. Economic realm	87
c) 1961 until present	93
1. Political realm	93
1964 Constitution	97
The A.S.U. as the one political organization	98
2. Economic realm	102
Notes	109

<u>Chapter Three: No-Change: (I) Unmodified Attitudes of the Adult Masses</u>	II5
Attitudes toward participation in political action	II8
Attitudes toward scientific thinking	I23
Attitudes toward work, precision and time	I31
Familism	I36
Apathy	I37
Attitudes toward Government	I41
Attitudes toward change	I46
Notes	I50

<u>Chapter Four: Skill Inadequacy as Constraint to the Realization of Modernity</u>	
<u>Proposals</u>	I55
Quantitative inadequacy	I56
Qualitative inadequacy	I63
Notes	I73

PART THREE : FORMULATION OF POLICY PROPOSALS

<u>Chapter Five: Modernity: Identification and Models</u>	I79
What 'modernity' is	I80
Modernity identification through contrasts	I84
Modernity identification through indicators	I86
Modernity identification through evolutionary stages	I92
Identification of modernity as a multi-dimensional integrative whole	I97
The psycho-sociological trend for modernity identification	202
Western model as expressive of modernity	209
Shils and modernity proposals in the 'New States'	214
Political aspect of modernity	215
Components of political democracy	217
Economic aspect of modernity	224
'Modern' versus 'Traditional' economy	224
Ideal typical modern economy to the leaders of the New States	226
Industrialization	227
Planning	232
Change directed through science	233
Ideal typical man in modernity	236
Ideal typical norms of modern society	250
Notes	257

<u>Chapter Six: Possible Contribution of Adult Education to Modernity</u>	
<u>Realization</u>	266
<u>I. Adult education and attitude modification</u>	263
The impact of literacy	268
Openness to change	275
Empathy	277
Familism	279
The impact of adult vocational education	280
The impact of adult civic and political education	284
<u>2. Adult education and skill adequacy</u>	286
Functional literacy and skill adequacy	292
Notes	295

PART FOUR : CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

<u>Chapter Seven: Political and Economic Proposals in Post-1944 England</u>	303
<u>Effective democracy in Post-War II Proposals</u>	305
Individual freedom	308
Social freedom	311
Equality of opportunity	313
<u>Industrialization in Post-War II Proposals</u>	318
Immediate challenges that initiated proposals	318
Industry and State in Post-War proposals	322
Industrial production	326
Industrial training	331
Notes	336
 <u>Chapter Eight: Adult Education Policy in Post-1944 England</u>	 342
Indicators of change in adult education policy	343
Past defects as indicators of policy change	345
Future aspirations as indicators of policy change	350
Official structure of adult education	357
<u>I. Integration of adult education within the national system of education</u>	360
a. Integration of adult education through progression of educational stages	361
b. Integration of adult education through re-definition of State Responsibility	367
c. Integration of adult education through consolidation of L.E.A.'s role	370
<u>2. Partnership between bodies involved in adult education provision</u>	375
Partnership as an adopted policy for post-War adult education	375
Types of post-War partnership	378
Financial partnership	379
Teaching-service partnership	386
Consultative partnership	391
Role of N.I.A.E. in consultation	395
<u>The extent to which the integration-partnership policy has worked</u>	397
<u>I. Policy of integration</u>	399
Finance	408
Planning	414
Administration	418
<u>2. Policy of partnership</u>	420
Notes	433
 <u>Chapter Nine: Adult Education Policy in Post-1952 Egypt</u>	 444
Identification of post-1952 adult education policy trends	445
Adult illiteracy eradication as the major goal of adult education policy	448
1. Ministry of Education's Plan (1972-1982)	452
2. The Supreme Council's National Plan (1973-1980)	455
3. The N.C.E.S.R.T.'s National Comprehensive Plan (1975-1980)	462
Types other than illiteracy eradication in adult education policy	467
Workers' Education	467
Popular Culture	471
Adult technical and vocational training	476
Vocational training for adults	476
Accelerated Training Centres	477
Upgrading Training Centres	477

Industrial and scientific sections in the Popular Culture Classes	378
Vocational Rehabilitation Centres and Offices	378
The Instructor Training Institute	379
Continuation education for adults	480
University Extension system for adults	480
Extension at the below-university level	481
Adult education for community development	482
<u>How far the Post-1952 adult education policy has worked</u>	484
I. Marginality of adult education within the national system of education	484
Inspecifity of adult education conception	490
Neglect of communicative channels between 'formal' and 'adult education'	496
Parsimony in the finance of adult education	498
2. Weak spirit of partnership between adult education providers	505
a. At the illiteracy eradication level	505
b. At the level other than illiteracy eradication	511
Accomplishments of the post-1952 adult education policy	516
i. Accomplishments at the illiteracy eradication level	516
ii. Accomplishments at other than illiteracy eradication level	534
Workers' Education	535
Adult Vocational Training	540
Popular Culture	544
Universities	551
Notes	557

PART FIVE: THE SOLUTION AND ITS WORKABILITY UNDER SPECIFIC INITIAL CONDITIONS

<u>Chapter Ten: The Solution</u>	574
<u>Policy adoption</u>	583
Reaching a comprehensive clear-cut definition for adult education	583
Planning new organization for the national education system	584
Elimination of overlap between agencies involved in the formulation and adoption of national policies for adult education	587
<u>Policy implementation</u>	591
Provincial adult education councils	591
Town adult education councils	592
Village adult education councils	592
<u>How partnership between bodies involved will be operationalised</u>	595
Finance	595
Consultation	595
Teaching-service	598
Notes	600

Chapter Eleven: Workability of the Solution in Egypt's Initial Conditions

I. Policy Adoption

<u>Bodies and groups involved in the formulation and adoption of adult education policy</u>	603
I. At the national level (a) Public Interest	603
The Supreme Council for Adult Education and Illiteracy Eradication	603
Committee for Illiteracy Eradication and Adult Education of the N.C.E.S.R.T.	606
Illiteracy Eradication Committee of the Arab Socialist Union	609
'Permanent Committee for Education and Scientific Research' of the People's Assembly	613

(b) Managerial	614
Ministerial Committee on Education	615
General Directorate of Adult Education and Illiteracy Eradication (Ministry of Education)	616
Ministerial Committee for Local Government	619
2. At the Regional Level (a) Public Interest	620
P.C.A.E.I.E.	620
Popular Councils of governorates	622
A.S.U. governorate committees	624
(b) Managerial	625
Departments of Illiteracy Eradication and Adult Education in Educational Zones	625
3. At the Local Level	626
(a) Public Interest	626
A.S.U. Executive Committees in towns and villages	626
(b) Managerial	627
Town and village councils	627
Education Directorates in towns	628
<u>Pressure groups with influence on adult education policy</u>	629
Faculties of Education	629
A.R.L.O.	631
Teachers' Syndicate	633
Al-Azhar and other religious bodies	635
<u>Anticipated difficulties in the way of adopting adult education policy</u>	636
1. Legislative difficulties	637
2. Blurred conception of adult education and its functions	643
3. Reluctance of bodies involved in policy-making to adopt the recommended policy	648
Notes	675

Chapter Twelve: Workability of the Solution in Egypt's Initial Conditions

2. Policy Implementation

<u>Institutional</u>	685
Bodies involved in adult education policy implementation	685
(i) At the national level	685
Ministry of Education	685
(ii) At the regional level	687
Educational zones	687
P.C.A.E.I.E.	688
(iii) At the local level	689
Anticipated institutional difficulties	689
Teachers for adult education classes	691
Availability of buildings and equipment	704
Effectiveness of the P.C.A.E.I.E.'s	706
Effectiveness of local councils	709
<u>Normative</u>	715
<u>Environmental</u>	727
Demographic conditions	727
Rural dominance in Egypt's demographic structure and its impact on adult education schemes	728
Population growth and its impact on adult education schemes	737
a. The impact on adult learners	742
b. The impact on educational provision	746
Agricultural resources	755
Mineral resources	760
Notes	764

LIST OF TABLES

<u>Table 2.1:</u> Percentage distribution of labour force by economic activity 1897-1927	53
<u>Table 2.2:</u> Number of landless families in rural Egypt before the revolution	56
<u>Table 2.3:</u> Distribution of landownership in Egypt in 1950	70
<u>Table 3.1:</u> Correlation coefficient between degrees of prevalence of superstitions in the sectors as regards the three dimensions	I27
<u>Table 3.2:</u> Response classification to Melaika's question about the most important problem in Egyptian village	I38
<u>Table 3.3:</u> Egyptian villagers' activities in leisure time	I39
<u>Table 3.4:</u> Content with village as a place to live in	I40
<u>Table 3.5:</u> Percentage of various responses to the question: Who, in your opinion solves the village problems	I45
<u>Table 3.6:</u> Percentage of various responses to the question: Suppose the government did nothing to solve this problem, is there anything to be done	I46
<u>Table 4.1:</u> Egyptian labour force by occupational categories in 1960	I57
<u>Table 4.2:</u> Targeted percentages for the occupational structure categories	I58
<u>Table 4.3:</u> Development of structure of labour force in industry in German Democratic Republic	I58
<u>Table 4.4:</u> Anticipated supply and demand in labour force required for development plans in 1970, 1975 and 1980	I59
<u>Table 4.5:</u> Percentage distribution of the unemployed by age-groups in 1970	I61
<u>Table 4.6:</u> Distribution of work force in major divisions of the Public Sector according to educational level in 1972	I66
<u>Table 4.7:</u> Educational level in industrial companies	I67
<u>Table 4.8:</u> Distribution of the Public Sector work force intermediate and below intermediate qualifications in 1972	I68
<u>Table 4.9:</u> Labour productivity compared to wage per worker during First Plan period	I69
<u>Table 4.10:</u> Indices and average annual rates of growth of labour productivity in Egyptian industry 1939-1970	I70
<u>Table 5.1:</u> Characteristics of modern and traditional economic systems	224
<u>Table 5.2:</u> Characteristics of ideal traditional and modern societies	252
<u>Table 6.1:</u> Changes related with EWLP at the level of the three dimensions	269
<u>Table 6.2:</u> Views of literate and illiterate cultivators and factory workers as regards their approval of family planning	276
<u>Table 6.3:</u> Correlates of empathy with education among Syrians in Lerner's study	277
<u>Table 6.4:</u> Positive effects of literacy irrespective of occupation	279
<u>Table 7.1:</u> Financial results of the nationalized industries in Britain	326
<u>Table 7.2:</u> Industrial production in the U.K. and other countries	329
<u>Table 8.1:</u> L.E.A.'s which offered no special provision	407
<u>Table 8.2:</u> Percentage of L.E.A.'s making special provision	407
<u>Table 8.3:</u> Fees and student numbers 1975/76 to 1976/77	413
<u>Table 8.4:</u> Types of courses provided by universities and W.E.A.	430

<u>Table 9.1:</u> Distribution of learners, classes and costs over the Plan years	454
<u>Table 9.2:</u> Numbers of S. C.'s national plan distributed over the provinces	458
<u>Table 9.3:</u> Size of illiteracy in the population 14-34	459
<u>Table 9.4:</u> Size of illiteracy in the 'Mass Sector' in age-group 14-34 years	459
<u>Table 9.5:</u> Classes and learners in the 'Mass Sector' distributed over the seven years	460
<u>Table 9.6:</u> Teachers and inspectors required for classes of the 'Mass Sector'	460
<u>Table 9.7:</u> Learners and classes in the N.C.E.S.R.T.'s National Comprehensive Plan 1975-1980	465
<u>Table 9.8:</u> Classes, teachers and inspectors in the N.C.E.S.R.T.'s Plan	465
<u>Table 9.9:</u> Costs of the N.C.E.S.R.T.'s Plan distributed over the five years	466
<u>Table 9.10:</u> Total budget of Ministry of Culture 1969/70 and the percentage of each sector	499
<u>Table 9.11:</u> Development of illiteracy eradication budget 1964/65 - 1970/71	501
<u>Table 9.12:</u> The budget of primary education and the total budget of the Ministry of Education	502
<u>Table 9.13:</u> Population growth and the absolute number of illiterates (10+) in the censuses of 1937, 47, 60, 66 and 1976	517
<u>Table 9.14:</u> Total number of illiterates (5 years+) and their percentage to population since the outset of present century	519
<u>Table 9.15:</u> Inter-census and average annual progress in illiteracy eradication since the outset of the present century	520
<u>Table 9.16:</u> Percentage of illiteracy in 1947 and 1960 by age-group	520
<u>Table 9.17:</u> Numbers of illiterates who sat for examination, those who passed and total expenses in the three phases 1946-1960	521
<u>Table 9.18:</u> Progress in illiteracy between 1960 and 1966 for both sexes	523
<u>Table 9.19:</u> Effectiveness of the Cairo Project (1961-1964)	524
<u>Table 9.20:</u> Effectiveness of the Cairo Project as indicated by ratios	525
<u>Table 9.21:</u> Accomplishments in illiteracy eradication at the national level 1964/65 to 1969/70	526
<u>Table 9.22:</u> What could be accomplished in the Government Sector in the years 1971/72 and 1972/73	529
<u>Table 9.23:</u> Re-distribution of the remaining illiterates in the Government Sector	530
<u>Table 9.24:</u> Returned classes and financial allocations	531
<u>Table 9.25:</u> Illiterates in Monoufia distributed over age-groups	532
<u>Table 9.26:</u> Accomplishments of illiteracy eradication in Monoufia	532
<u>Table 9.27:</u> Enrolees in various types of W.E.A. programmes	535
<u>Table 9.28:</u> Numbers covered by W.E.A. programmes	535
<u>Table 9.29:</u> Enrolees in various W.E.A. programmes 1973-1975	536
<u>Table 9.30:</u> Technical Personnel of the W.E.A. by educational standard	539
<u>Table 9.31:</u> Numbers of students accepted under the 'External System' in Egyptian Faculties of theoretical studies	552
<u>Table 9.32:</u> Extension and Public Service students	554
 <u>Table 12.1:</u> Absorption and admission ratios in primary stage 1963/64 - 1973/74	 693
<u>Table 12.2:</u> Primary classes and teachers 1963/64 to 1973/74	693
<u>Table 12.3:</u> Comparison of the 1964-1974 period with 1975-1985	694
<u>Table 12.4:</u> Qualified and unqualified teachers in primary schools in Egypt	696
<u>Table 12.5:</u> Classification of the educational qualifications	714

<u>Table I2.6:</u> Statistical table of the follow-up of the Tersa Experiment learners from February to December 1976	721
<u>Table I2.7:</u> Percentage of drop-out among learners, March-Dec. 1976	722
<u>Table I2.8:</u> Enrollees, applicants for exam. and the successful in the Tersa Pilot Experiment	722
<u>Table I2.9:</u> Wastage due to drop-out in illiteracy classes	723
<u>Table I2.10:</u> Responses of villagers in Melaika's study	724
<u>Table I2.11:</u> Times when Egyptian villagers finish work	725
<u>Table I2.12:</u> Rural and urban population in Egypt since the outset of the present century	728
<u>Table I2.13:</u> Rural and urban population in Egypt (November 1976)	731
<u>Table I2.14:</u> Percentage distribution of population by sex in 1960 and 1976 censuses	735
<u>Table I2.15:</u> Birth, mortality and natural increase 1952-1975	738
<u>Table I2.16:</u> Projected population in Egypt in 1980 and 1985 by age-groups	740
<u>Table I2.17:</u> Distribution of population in Egypt, England and India by age-groups in 1969	741
<u>Table I2.18:</u> Distribution of population over age-groups in Arab, developing and developed countries	741
<u>Table I2.19:</u> Egyptian dependency ratios	742
<u>Table I2.20:</u> Average GNP per capita in the Arab countries in 1970	744
<u>Table I2.21:</u> Projected population at school age (6-12)	747
<u>Table I2.22:</u> Distribution of investments for general and technical education in the Five-Year Plan 1978-1982	748
<u>Table I2.23:</u> Enrolled students in each stage as proportion of relevant age group in 1965/66 and 1975/76	752
<u>Table I2.24:</u> Percentage of college graduates: Egyptian, Indian and American executives	754
<u>Table I2.25:</u> Landreclamation in Egypt 1952-1975	758

* * * * *

LIST OF FIGURES

<u>Figure 2.1:</u> The A. S. U. Organization structure (1970)	100
<u>Figure 4.1:</u> (a) the case of skilled labour	160
(b) the case of unskilled labour	160
(c) the case of semi-skilled labour	160
<u>Figure 6.1:</u> Difference between 'functional literates' and 'functional illiterates in Rogers' study	274
<u>Figure 8.1:</u> Planning and decision-making in English education	358
<u>Figure 8.2:</u> Official structure of adult education in England & Wales	359
<u>Figure 8.3:</u> A typical regional organization and its financial links	378
<u>Figure 8.4:</u> Flow of teaching services and money between the major adult education providers in England	386
<u>Figure 8.5:</u> Links between various stages of education in 1944 Act	401
<u>Figure 8.6:</u> Public educational system in England and Wales (1935)	402
<u>Figure 8.7:</u> Public educational system in England and Wales (1965)	402
<u>Figure 8.8:</u> Adult education as part of Further and Higher Education	404
<u>Figure 8.9:</u> Students in grant-aided courses of Responsible Bodies	411
<u>Figure 8.10:</u> Enrolled students in Extra-Mural and W.E.A. courses	411
<u>Figure 8.11:</u> Students in Evening Institutes (1925-1967)	412
<u>Figure 8.12:</u> Boundaries of W.E.A. Districts, and Universities in adult education service	422

<u>Figure 8.I3</u> : The boundaries of the new local authorities of education	424
<u>Figure 8.I4</u> : Existing boundaries of major providers of adult education	426
<u>Figure 9.I</u> : Structure of Egyptian system of education	486
<u>Figure 9.2</u> : Unsteadiness in the development of illiteracy eradication budget	501
<u>Figure 9.3</u> : The steady rise in the budget of Egyptian primary education	502
<u>Figure 9.4</u> : The rise in the population 10 years and over, and the rise in illiterates 10 years and over from 1937 to 1976	517
<u>Figure 9.5</u> : Illiteracy for the whole world population (15+) 1950-1970	518
<u>Figure 9.6</u> : Steady decline in the average annual figures who sat for examination during the period 1946-1960	522
<u>Figure 9.7</u> : Total learners in illiteracy classes of the Ministry of Education compared to those of all other ministries and associations from 1964/1965 to 1969/1970	527
<u>Figure 9.8</u> : Steady decline in learners in illiteracy eradication classes from 1964/1965 to 1969/1970	528
<u>Figure 9.9</u> : Fluctuations in the total number of enrollees in W.E.A. programmes	536
<u>Figure 9.I0</u> : Number of enrollees in various branches of 'Popular University' until 1957/1958	545
<u>Figure 10.I</u> : Suggested official structure of adult education planning	590
<u>Figure 10.2</u> : Suggested official organization down from the P.A.E.C.'s	594
<u>Figure 10.3</u> : Suggested structure of Provincial Adult Education Councils	597
<u>Figure 11.I</u> : The proposed 'National Body for Cultural Development' amidst the suggested national educational structure	671
<u>Figure 12.I</u> : Lower Egypt Governorates	729
<u>Figure 12.2</u> : Upper Egypt Governorates	730
<u>Figure 12.3</u> : Intercensal population growth rate by governorate	739
<u>Figure 12.4</u> : Estimated dependency ratios in some countries (1960)	743
<u>Figure 12.5</u> : Population pyramids in Egypt (1927-1970) and in Sweden (1958-1962)	745
<u>Figure 12.6</u> : Cultivated areas in Egypt	757
<u>Figure 12.7</u> : Areas where the major agricultural crops are grown	759
<u>Figure 12.8</u> : Mineral and other extractive resources in Egypt	760

PART ONE

PROBLEM STATEMENT

The starting point of a 'problem' in Holmes' approach is expressive of a 'confused situation' that an investigator sees as such from his own experience, background of knowledge or from his awareness of educational debate. It is possible that the problem of an investigator's choice may have a broader or even universal scope which touches upon countries other than his own. The starting point acquires its special relevance in the 'Problem approach' in so far as it gives a certain perspective to the problem under consideration, and whether it is socio-economic, educational, or otherwise.

Part one of the present study includes one chapter (chapter one) in which is displayed the background of the problem as one common among many countries of the underdeveloped world struggling for modernity since the middle of the present century, but with a great deal of frustration. Egypt, as one of these, is suffering from a staggering stride notwithstanding the detailed and carefully worded plans included in its various political documents. The chapter suggests that the Egyptian adult masses, who are still 'pre-modern' in terms of their attitudes and skills, loom large among other impediments to the realization of modernity proposals.

The chapter intuitively takes adult education that penetrates the greatest numbers of such masses to be capable of making them more apt for the realization of such proposals. The chapter displays, as well, the method followed throughout the study, which is Holmes' 'Problem approach'.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Following the end of World War II, the achievement of 'modern state' has more than ever before become the passionate preoccupation of the millions throughout the underdeveloped world. The expectation explosion after six years of sufferance by a great many countries involved in War served to deepen the feeling of discontent with what had already been accepted before War as status quo. Change in the aspirations of peoples and governments alike as reaction to the destruction caused by War was, indeed, dramatic.

Moreover, the struggle against imperialism in many parts of the world gained momentum in the two decades after the end of War. So high was the tide of independence that between 1945 and 1968 more than sixty states got their independence.⁽¹⁾ This was not without significance to the cause of modernity. Millions of individuals in Africa, Asia and Latin America were put face to face with their destiny and with aspirations for a greater share in the life and goods of modern world.⁽²⁾ Government, in most cases, has been placed in the hands of nationalist leaders, and many of the native experts hurriedly replaced foreigners in key posts that required knowledge and experience. But, awareness of the unfavourable conditions amidst which they were left to struggle for modernity was governed by sentimental rather than rational thinking. Feeling of national dignity was the new impetus that their nationalist leaders succeeded to arouse. Acceptance of backwardness or underdevelopment

as destiny was shaken when the great dream of independence eventually came true. The lucid account given by Abernathy is worth quoting:

"The belief has spread that poverty and weakness are not tolerable facts of life but intolerable liabilities, and that through conscious effort, man can realise more fully than ^{even} before his own potentialities and those of his environment." (3)

But the expectations which are easily aroused can only with great difficulty be turned into reality. The 1950's, which was a decade of growing expectations for the under-developed world, soon eclipsed before a decade had passed. Many such countries, which embarked on modernization schemes after gaining their independence, failed to put their high expectations into sound practice and hence, many were led to disappointment, though at varying grades. If the 1950's was the decade of rising expectation, the 1960's was rightly seen by Rogers as a decade of 'growing frustration'. (4)

How the 'rising expectations' turned into 'frustration' is a complicated matter in which a great many interrelated and interdependent factors are involved, which we are not concerned with in the present study except from one angle. The problem with many of these countries is not whether to modernize, simply because they have detailed proposals for modernity which are eloquently worded in various political documents, constitutions, programmes of political action and speeches of leaders. The gap between what is proposed

and what is actually attained points out to defects in the human factor. 'Man' in such countries is inapt whether in his internalised attitudes or his skills in carrying out the proposals included in various documents. In simple words, 'pre-modern man' in such countries is given the responsibility of building 'modern' state and hence, these countries fall short of fulfilling one essential condition for the realization of modernity which can easily be deduced from the following statement by Inkles and Smith:

" a nation is not modern unless its people are modern ..."(5)
Only when ^{modern} man in such countries is available in terms of his attitudes and skills that it is possible to see modernity proposals realized.

The necessity of having individuals with favourable internalised attitudes as a condition for modernity realization is no exaggeration. The united Nations strongly advocates that:

"Within the range of the possible, attitudes are usually the decisive factor. Whether initial community progress can be maintained and the needed institutional machinery firmly established will be apt to depend on attitudes."(6)

Such decisiveness of attitudes is what eminent educationists, sociologists and economists have put before the eyes of the aspiring countries. There is, as Holmes states, "a limit beyond which institutional change cannot proceed without creating severe problems unless appropriate attitude modifications occur fairly rapidly in the relevant sectors of the normative pattern."(7) Palmer, holds a view similar

to Holmes' asserting that "changes in institutions and techniques will not solve the problems of development unless they are accompanied by radical changes in beliefs and behaviour."⁽⁸⁾ Recent empirical studies support the views of both Holmes and Palmer, and even go further. In their 'Becoming Modern', Inkles and Smith studied individual development in six underdeveloped countries, and one conclusion which they came to was that:

"nation building and institution building are only empty exercises unless the attitudes and capacities of the people keep pace with other forms of development."⁽⁹⁾

The above argument serves to support the notion that 'modernity' or 'backwardness' is, in the first place, attributed to the people themselves rather ^{than} to physical and other factors. While not ignoring the economic factor, Adam Curle, with his long experience with such peoples, came to associate underdevelopment with the people themselves. To him, some countries are underdeveloped:

"because most of their people are underdeveloped, and when people are underdeveloped, national institutions acquire a form which impedes progress and growth of egalitarian policies."⁽¹⁰⁾

Stating that the people are 'underdeveloped' is echoed in the term 'tradition bound' which is used by Palmer and Stern.⁽¹¹⁾ They use it to indicate that only a small segment of the people is modern in its orientation. Enchantment with tradition 'regardless of the modernizing aspirations of

their leaders' stands behind the failure of the efforts to accomplish modernity.^(I2) Recognition of the link between underdevelopment and the people themselves is encouragement enough to accept Lerner's outlook at underdeveloped countries as those in which the 'moderns' are few and the 'traditionals' many, or in other words, a few only in those countries are committed to change both in their values and their needs. It is seen rather as an association between the degree of a society's modernity, and the number of 'moderns' among its individuals, for, "The more persons who are 'going modern' in any country, the higher is the overall performance on the indices of modernity."^(I3)

Building on the above views, a society is generally regarded as traditional if ways of behaviour among a great many of its individuals continue with little change from generation to generation regardless of the aspirational, institutional and other changes brought about around them.^(I4) When traditionalism is prevalent, the behaviour of the majority of the masses does not accord with the requirements of change, and the society is generally governed by custom.

Other features of traditionality are generally shown in both 'apathy' and 'lack of consciousness' among the individuals of the change around. The former refers to the degree to which they are aware of the changes and ready to respond favourably to them. They show little 'empathy', or to use Lerner's terms

they have little readiness to place themselves in the roles of others.⁽¹⁵⁾ On the other hand, without adequate consciousness, the positive attitudes of the individuals towards change are hardly found and modernity realization is hampered as Berger has found:

"The people caught in the throes of transformation may not be aware of the degree of the change going around them and, therefore may fail to work toward change in the other traditional sectors of their social life"⁽¹⁶⁾

But, the possible harm of having so many individuals with traditional or unmodified attitudes exceeds mere apathy or unawareness of change. The traditional elements in a society may be a source of both active and passive resistance to change. In their old state, they are committed by a limited perception of alternatives and rigorous sticking to traditional loyalties and status-structures, or by self-interest, to blind preservation of existing values and institutions. Accordingly, the new proposals for modernity as well as the institutions founded in accordance with such proposals may fall without being given a fair chance to be tested. Hence, the efforts for the accomplishment of political or economic systems, however faithful, may be impeded. An individual who is deviant in respect to his values, is a threat to the social group by implying a low valuation on the things which the group holds high, and a high valuation on the things which the group holds low or in negative regard. In the absence of

a real proximate reference group large enough to sustain his convictions, he will be unable to exercise influence within the society or take over action to change it. (I7)

In addition to the above, the prevalence of the traditional and unmodified attitudes represents a heavy burden on the stride of modernity in that an extra effort is needed to modify the antecedent values of the people favourably with the new goals. Such effort may be exerted at the expense of the modernization process itself. Apter, for example, denies that the traditionalist systems do not change, yet the problem as he views it, is rather with innovation which is extra-systemic has to be modified within the social system and linked with antecedent values. (I8)

But the internalised attitudes, however great their impact on modernity might be, do not explain the whole matter. It is argued that advanced or 'modern' economy needs individuals with skills be they literate workers, technicians or scientists 'if it is to maintain its efficiency.' (I9)

Complex technical occupations on which modern economy is based necessitate that 'man' has realized a certain degree of skill. Such occupations, as Radwan believes, 'cannot be acquired haphazardly by any individual. Because of their complicated nature and the informational background involved, they necessitate certain aptitudes and capacities.' (20)

To develop these capacities is essential, yet difficult to come by. On the one hand, the matter is broader than mere vocational training but rather a matter of discovering and developing capacities. On the other hand, the development of capacities does not function in vacuum or in seclusion, but rather in accordance with broad policies whether economic or otherwise.

The special attention given to the development of capacities was not without relevance to the cause of modernity. Modern economy, which until the middle of the twentieth century was associated in the first place with capital and secondly to labour, begins to witness reverse in priority as Young,⁽²¹⁾ Harbison and Ibrahim,⁽²²⁾ have advocated in the case of Egypt. The United Nations has also come to reconsider its thoughts in a similar way. The proposals of action of the 'United Nations' Development Decade' put the new trend in clear-cut words:

"Economic growth in the advanced countries appears to be attributable in larger part than was previously supposed to human skills rather than to capital.

Moreover, the widening of man's horizons through education and training, and the lifting of his vitality through better health, are only essential pre-conditions for development, they are among its major objectives.....

While at the beginning of the last decade the problem of developing countries was viewed essentially as a problem of producing wealth, by the end of the decade it became widely acknowledged that the crucial factor was not production but rather the capacity to produce, which is inherent in people."⁽²³⁾

The above argument serves to throw light on the puzzle of 'rising expectations' versus 'growing frustration' in the underdeveloped countries struggling for modernity. The key is to be attempted in 'man', whose attitudes are still unmodified and his skills inadequate for the realization of modernity. The lesson they have eventually come to learn is that the proposed aspirations in whatever sphere remain unattainable in the world of reality unless the individuals are oriented for modernity in terms of their attitudes and skills. Only when this twofold task is adequately fulfilled it is likely that their people are capable of shouldering the responsibilities of modernity, similar to what Lerner calls 'the prevalence of the modern group'.⁽²⁴⁾ Failure to get this task fulfilled simply means that the bright aspirations for modernity are undertaken by inapt individuals. A problem is at hand represented in the gap or conflict between, on the one hand, 'high aspirations for modernity', and on the other, 'low internalised attitudes ' and 'inadequate skills'. The outcome is stagnation rather than modernity. The latter is especially the case with the Arab Republic of Egypt since 1952.

The Problem

A new regime started in Egypt in 1952 with the cause of modernity on the top among the national goals to which the revolution leaders have ever since dedicated themselves. A quarter of a century of such dedication has shown itself in the various political documents as well as in the many speeches given by the leaders themselves. Throughout all this period, the aspirations for modernity were not always the same in specificity or clarity, for they ran along distinguishable chronological stages in the lives of the governing leaders themselves, first as young military officers equipped with no theoretical guideline, as Nasser its leader admitted, except the six major principles announced on the eve of the revolution.⁽²⁵⁾ With experience in rule, revolutionary documents expressed the maturity gained. In 1962, the 'National Charter' was issued after a unanimous approval on the part of the whole popular powers. The revolutionary theory that the Charter dealt with in detail was once more ascertained in the 'Permanent Constitution' (1971) as well in other documents only with slight changes in the last few years.

The revolutionary regime brought with it different proposals for modernity from what had been before, in matters of politics and economy. The two major proposals that the 1923 Constitution fostered, and which continued

without change until 1952, related with the accomplishment of complete national independence and the establishment of a democratic rule approved by the people after a long period of suspension.

The country had been under the British occupation since 1882 and only gained its independence with four reservations in February 1922.⁽²⁶⁾ This 'partial' independence was seen as violation to Egyptian sovereignty over its territories, and was thus recognized in various documents and manifestoes of political parties as an urgent goal to be accomplished. The 1936 Treaty with Great Britain served very little to abate the nationalist feeling.

To have a constitutional democratic rule was the second goal that the popular revolution of 1919 presented to the masses. The first Egyptian constitution in the country's modern history was promulgated in 1923. However, the democratic principles brought forth by the Constitution, reflecting the socio-economic conditions, cared little for the 'ignorant, sick and poor masses'.

As a grant from the King,⁽²⁷⁾ the democratic principles included in the Constitution had to accord with his will in the first place. By the Constitution text, two fifths of the Senate members were to be appointed by him as the head of the executive authority. Besides, he had a strong suspensory veto and the right to prorogue the Parliament and adjourn it for a month.⁽²⁸⁾

It is true that the Constitution recognized the formation of political parties giving them due political heaviness. Yet, amidst the country's conditions in the pre-revolution era, the whole authority was placed in the hands of a handful of feudalists and capitalists supported by the king. Common people were reluctant to participate in the democratic façades that were created in accordance with the Constitution, and the democratic experiment remained futile until the mid-century.

Economic proposals before the 1952 revolution were as well confused and vague. Concentration of both wealth and political power in the hands of a few feudalists and capitalists, who accounted for 5% of the whole population⁽²⁹⁾ served to shape the economic goals away from the interests of the broad masses. The image of an agrarian economy was thought to be the most fitting. Meanwhile, two attempts to introduce industry were made, the first of which was carried out amidst the 'Egyptianization Movement'⁽³⁰⁾ in the early 1920's. The second took place in the 1930's and was carried out throughout and after the Second World War. Both attempts emerged mostly out of the desire to benefit by the international climate in the world around rather than out of a carefully worked out plan to diversify economy and launch it in the direction of modernity. Private enterprise with some direct, though limited, government

intervention was encouraged to serve the interests of rich capitalists.⁽³¹⁾ With the prevalence of the above economic trends, the utmost that could be aspired for was the attainment of a decent standard of living for the people, the vast majority of whom lived in rural areas mostly at subsistence level in the vast estates of the feudal lords.⁽³²⁾

With 1952, the revolution flared up bringing with it a clear change in the aspirations for modernity both in the political and economic realms. Six major principles were announced on the eve of the revolution as a guide for the national stride.⁽³³⁾ Though broad and vague, these marked a shift in the aspirations that the new leaders found worthy of struggle. They included, beside the establishment of a 'sound democratic system', other goals such as the accomplishment of complete national independence, the ending of feudalism, the elimination of monopoly and the domination of capital, the establishment of social justice and the building of a powerful national army.⁽³⁴⁾

The concept given to 'sound' democracy in the post-revolution documents differs from that given before mainly in matters of 'participation' and 'representation' of the broad masses in the political affairs of the country. Political democracy was identified by Nasser as the one form capable of achieving compromise between the inherent value of the individual, whatever his social or economic status, and the community at large. While political democracy appreciates

the active participation of the long deprived masses, it offers, in the meantime, protection for the interests of the whole community from the domination of feudalism and capitalism that had turned the pre-revolution democratic experiment into a dictatorship of reactionaries'. (35) In the National Charter (1962), the aspired for democracy was given six basic features, namely the rejection of the domination of one class, the inseparability of social and political democracy, the adoption of co-operation between all the powers of working population, the encouragement of trade unions for workers and co-operative societies for farmers, and freedom of criticism and self-criticism.

The socialist style of the 'one-party system' was adopted since the liquidation of all political parties in January 1953. Whether in the 'National Union' (1957-1961) or in the 'Arab Socialist Union' established since 1962, the alliance of the whole popular powers within one political organization was strictly adhered to. However, with the faults that arose in application, a radical change in the concept of 'political democracy' was witnessed since the mid-1970's when political parties were once more allowed.

In the economic realm, industrialization is taken in various revolutionary documents to signify modernity, a trend which Shils found to be common among the 'new states'. (36)

The National Charter justifies the high regard given to industrialization on the grounds that it is capable of realizing the aspirations of the economic and social development as well as enlarging the production base in a revolutionary and decisive manner and in a short time.⁽³⁷⁾ However, conceiving modern economy as one based on various industrialization schemes does not mean, in various documents of the post-1952 era, dropping agriculture from account or even underevaluating its role in an originally agricultural country like Egypt. Horizontal and vertical agricultural expansion was stated as necessary for the modern economic system.⁽³⁸⁾ To these is added the belief in planning both short-and long-termed, comprehensive and sector-wise.⁽³⁹⁾ A fourth trend is associated with the effective role that the State has to undertake in order to ensure that the economy is directed the way that serves the set goals.⁽⁴⁰⁾

However, when the bright aspirations for modernity are put aside, actuality shows very modest accomplishment which is hardly comparable to aspirations, what Rejwan identified as 'the gap between the lofty ideals of the Egyptian revolution and the grim, age-old realities of contemporary Egyptian society and culture'.⁽⁴¹⁾

Political documents were honest enough to admit various failures. The October Working Paper (1974) did not hesitate to condemn the democratic line since 1952 as deviation from sound democracy. In clear words the Paper states:

" we must honestly concede that political freedom has not run the course the people wanted. Centres of Power and other bodies rather imposed their custody on the masses and several restrictions and measures ensued. This went to the extent of diverting measures of social conversion..."⁽⁴²⁾

The political organizations, initiated by the revolution, failed one after the other. 'The Liberation Rally' (1953-1956) gave place to the 'National Union' (1957-1961) which soon proved to be ineffective in mobilizing the masses or infiltrating the reactionary elements. The 'Arab Socialist Union' came into being in 1962 but its failures were such that President Sadat had to announce ^{in 1975} its futility as a political organization.⁽⁴³⁾ The alternative solution since 1976 has been the establishment of various political parties.

If the Egyptian experiment since 1952 has not been so successful, Egyptian 'man' is brought in the focus. Active participation was encouraged but never adequately responded to by the masses. Criticism and self-criticism were allowed by the National Charter (1962) as necessary for enriching the democratic experiment.⁽⁴⁴⁾ All guarantees for the practice of freedom were repeatedly ascertained by

(45)
the government since the early 1970's. Yet, the easily stirred masses were moved by extremists to commit acts of violence under the veil of freedom. The heavy losses of January 1977 induced the government to condemn the misuse of democratic atmosphere. (46)

In economy, the standard of living is very low, and is found to be even lower than all the other Arab States with the exception of the Sudan and the two Yemeni Republics. (47) Per capita production, as El-Ghannam found (1975) is very modest when compared to other countries. (48) Planning is carried on with some success. Yet, the economic crisis since the early 1970's could not be predicted in due time. Industrialization, which is seen by the October Working Paper as 'Egypt's future' (49) was given a great push in the 1960's but has slowed down its tempo in the 1970's due to various socio-economic conditions. (50)

Apart from Egyptian documents, failure is pointed out by prominent figures like Lerner, Apter, Wilber and Szychiowicz. The last of these figures was given to lament that:

"Twenty years have elapsed since the revolution, and many aspects of the Egyptian life have still not undergone the transformation that was anticipated by most observers." (51)

Failure to accomplish the aspirations for modernity is attributed to the Egyptian individual who makes it 'the main

job of the government to prevent the population that has tasted modernization, but cannot quite cope with it from slipping back.' (52) The above analysis by Apter seems to be echoed by Wilber who, as well, throws the responsibility on the Egyptian masses who are passive and apathetic. (53) He seems to favour attitude change as a solution for such dilemma:

"The recent Egyptian aspirations are of a degree and kind that will require, if they are to be achieved, the transformation of the traditionally passive masses into a source of active political, economic and military strength." (54)

To the present study, the above argument seems plausible in so far as ^{it} attributes the staggering modernity in Egypt to defects in 'man' who is still pre-modern in terms of attitudes and skills.

The Egyptian masses still have passive attitudes toward participation in political action. (55) Reluctance of many among them to share actively in government severely diminishes their role, particularly in the countryside, to mere 'receptients to government edicts'. (56) The passive and apathetic attitudes among the masses toward the examination of the political and other decisions, impedes the process of sound decision-making which is based on a variety of initiative views raised by those who are concerned. (57) Another phase of passive attitudes is shown

in the use of the masses to their ballot right which was weak until it was made compulsory since 1957.⁽⁵⁸⁾

The adult masses, particularly in the countryside, show unwillingness to cope with the authorities which blows up bridges of mutual confidence that the government tries to build for the benefit of the peasants themselves. The family and the clan, not the State, are still the most important social units and therefore elicit the deepest loyalties.⁽⁵⁹⁾ To this is added the apathetic attitudes among many adults toward the service of society as might be indicated in the weak spirit of public service. A still dominant feature of the character of the 'Fahlawi' among the Egyptian masses is the indifference to the problems of society.⁽⁶⁰⁾

In economy, the internalised attitudes of the adult masses are no better than the ones previously mentioned in politics. While industrialization represents the major phase of modernity in the economic perspective, the attitudes of the adult masses toward work, especially 'manual' work, are still undesirable. To the majority, it is disgraceful and ^{even} shakes the image of the individual before others.⁽⁶¹⁾ In the meantime, clerical and white-collar jobs are given exaggerated social ranking whatever the salary or chances of employment and promotion. This is illustrated by the reluctance on the part of many youth to join technical

and vocational schools and centres, pressing hard to join liberal education. Consequently, a great surplus of the graduates of the theoretical studies, whether on the secondary or higher education level, is suffered from. In the meantime, the country suffers from an acute shortage in skilled and semi-skilled workers for industry which threatens the industrialization schemes and is expected to aggravate until 1985.⁽⁶²⁾

Whatever high is the place given to science and scientific thinking in the Permanent Constitution (1971),⁽⁶³⁾ the National Charter (1962)⁽⁶⁴⁾ and the October Working Paper (1974),⁽⁶⁵⁾ fatalistic attitudes still prevail among a great many among the adult masses urging them to see the will of God as a sufficient explanation for all matters of life. The human effort is, subsequently, minimized with whatever bearing on productivity.⁽⁶⁶⁾ Other than in production, the fatalistic attitudes among the masses paralyse the enthusiastic efforts made by the government to check the population explosion that the Charter regards as 'the greatest obstacle that faces the Egyptian people.'⁽⁶⁷⁾ With all the efforts made in birth control and family planning, the rate of natural increase has dropped only from 23.0% in 1953 to 22.6% in 1973.⁽⁶⁸⁾

Attitudes toward time, punctuality and perfection among Egyptian masses still do not accord with the ideals of modernity.

Considerable degree of leniency characterizes the behaviour of the rural masses. Individuals, particularly those flocking to towns from rural areas in search for better employment or living chances, are not adequately adjusted to the requirements of the new conditions. The need for haste or punctuality has always been disregarded in the country life, but has to be replaced by more favourable attitudes to production.

In matters of skill, the majority of the Egyptian adult population fall short of satisfying the requirements of modernity. With the prevalence of illiteracy, the promotion of their skills becomes a difficult task. The Five-year plan (1978-1982) recognizes ^{that} the high illiteracy rate 'means the incapability to cause comprehensive and deep cultural changes as well as the inability to rise to the level of 'modern' society. (69) The main obstacle is represented in the inability of the trainees to understand the necessary instructions. Heavy industrialization schemes are, thus, undertaken by a workforce, most of which are ^{un}skilled and illiterate.

Quantitatively, shortage in semi-skilled labour is estimated, by the Institute of National Planning, at 500.000 in 1975, and this affects the execution of various industrialization schemes. Likewise, in the category of skilled and assistant technicians the shortage amounts

to 267.000 in the same year. The dilemma of skill in Egypt^{is} complete when unskilled labour is taken into consideration. Paradoxically, the acute shortage in the above mentioned categories coincides with a much greater surplus in the third category of the unskilled labour exceeding 1.019.000 in the same year. (70)

When stated in specific terms, the problem of the present study runs as follows:

The aspirations proposed by various documents in Egypt since 1952 for the realization of modernity in the political and economic realms hit with many barriers. Among these must be regarded the unfavourable geographical and physical resource conditions with over 96% of land barren desert, and the difficulty of horizontal and vertical expansion of agriculture due to access to water for irrigation. Besides, one must have in mind the population explosion, the incapability of the country's education to respond to the requirements of modernity, the inherited heavy burden of backwardness and instability that has accumulated throughout long periods of foreign domination, to mention a few. However, the prevailing internalised attitudes among a great many of the Egyptian adult masses and their inadequate skill loom large among impediments.

Some adjustment in the attitudes of the masses has actually been attained, and some attempts to raise skill of the adult masses have been successful. (71) Yet, the element

of timing, which Holmes highly regards in so far as the response to change is concerned, is still lacking in the Egyptian case. The rate of change in the modification of the anti-modern attitudes, and the promotion of skills of the masses is slower than the change in modernity proposals. While change in the latter is quick and vigorous, change in the former, if any, is out of proportion with what modernity realization requires.⁽⁷²⁾

Relevance of Adult Education

Recognition that the inaptness of 'man' is a major constraint before the realization of modernity proposals signifies, in an indirect way, that education is involved. To deal with the quality of 'man' is, to deal with his education and absorption capacity for knowledge, skill and experience. The challenge of modernity, in this sense, turns to be an educational challenge that necessitates the provision of good-quality education to as many individuals as possible. The whole argument runs in line with the ever growing belief since the 1960's in education as the 'key that unlocks the doors to modernization'.⁽⁷³⁾ From this argument may be deduced the relevance of adult education as recently expressed by Rogers and Groombridge 'that a country which is backward in adult education will be backward absolutely.'⁽⁷⁴⁾ Yet, in specifying that scientific research requires, such a statement is likely to be

a too

/broad generalization unless the nature of such relation is elaborated.

It has to be admitted that data on the relation between 'modernization' and 'education' is still inadequate. One cause for this is that the concept of 'modern' state has not yet got universal agreement.⁽⁷⁵⁾ Until recently, terms like 'modernity' and 'modernization' are admitted by scholars to be vague and that standard definition is, accordingly, non-existent.⁽⁷⁶⁾ Szyliowicz admits the existence of semantic difficulties. Though he admits that education contributes directly to modernization, the complaint is rather that "no adequate body of theory is yet available to permit the testing of specific hypotheses with data from the Middle East".⁽⁷⁷⁾

However, lack of theories that specify the role of education does not conceal the responsibility of investigators to deduce such role from what it has been capable of doing.

Taking adult education as specific case, the underdeveloped countries of the present time are invited to learn from the great social movements of the West represented by the Industrial Revolution, the Renaissance and other similar upheavals. Adult education, in whatever form, stood as noticeable driving force behind the accomplishment of social change. Such great movements, it is stated, 'were all founded on the ability of the adult mind to learn and change.' ⁽⁷⁸⁾

In Scandinavia, adult education movements have done a great deal to consolidate the chosen social order, Western democracy based on social justice. The folk high schools with their more conservative and nationalistic orientation associated themselves with groups having a conservative philosophy. Meanwhile, the Workers' Institutes became closely related to the political and economic branches of the rising labour movement. Social democracy with its great emphasis upon social justice and the welfare State became the dominant political ideology in the Scandinavian countries. (79)

Other than the lessons of history, the association between the education of adults and social change is ascertained in studies by such scholars from the underdeveloped countries, as Roy Prosser⁽⁸⁰⁾ in so far as such education increases the absorptive capacity of the masses to social change. (81) Adequate adult education provision, to Prosser's way of thinking, narrows the gap between what is supposed and what the masses actually undertake. Cole's argument of the contribution of adult education to the processes of national development is made in accordance with two propositions: the first associated with the improvement of human resources, and the second links improvement with the total mental development, not merely the acquisition of vocational skills. (82)

The twofold mission of adult education carries within it differentiation between the materialistic task, that is the satisfaction of the needs for skills in certain numbers; and the human development that transcends mere vocational aspects. The matter is, hence, related with individual orientation as it is with materialistic advance, the former being condition for the fulfilment of the latter. The twofold task of education is also ascertained by Korten and Korten (1972) when studying the problems of modernization in Ethiopia. They see education as capable of at least two critical contributions to the modernization of the individual. 'The first is the development of the relevant skills and the second is the development of modern motivational and attitudinal orientations.' (83)

What Prosser, Cole, the Kortens and many others claim must be taken only with caution. What one means by 'adult education' may, quite possibly, be different from the others. Giving a common definition of the term 'adult education' is one of the difficulties of the present study.

Limitation of the Scope of Investigation

'Adult education' has hardly got, until present, a universal agreement on the international level as to what it actually is, the tasks expected of it, policies of provision or content of programmes. Concept difficulty

is admitted both on the international and local levels. The report of the 'First International Conference on the Comparative Study of Adult Education' (Boston, 1968) admitted the lack of international agreement in terms of defining adult education.⁽⁸⁴⁾ Though a recommended definition was adopted by the 'Third International Conference on Adult Education' (Tokyo, 1972) as:

"a process whereby persons who no longer attend school on a regular and full-time basis (unless full-time programmes are especially designed for adults) undertake sequential and organized activities with a conscious intention of bringing about changes in information, knowledge, understanding or skill, appreciation and attitudes; or for the purpose of identifying and solving personal or community problems,"⁽⁸⁵⁾

the 'Final Report' had still to express an urgent need 'for more and better documentation and for internationally comparable statistics.'⁽⁸⁶⁾ As for the terms used by the Conference delegates, they were 'ambiguous and unclear,.... .. an international dictionary of adult education was badly required.'⁽⁸⁷⁾

On the local level, i.e. the level of individual countries, adult education has not got universal concept within national systems of education comparable to what 'formal education', for example, has got.⁽⁸⁸⁾ Egyptian educationists and policy-makers have not yet reached a clear concept of the term on which a comprehensive strategy might be built.⁽⁸⁹⁾

In England, the case is evidently better, but not without vagueness. Lowe (1970), criticizes lack of taxonomy for describing the education of adults in England and Wales, and laments that "If only we knew exactly which forms of education and what scale of provision are currently being provided, then at least we would have a firm base from which to plan development."⁽⁹⁰⁾

When educationists within one country are not so much in agreement about what adult education actually is, difficulties arise before comparatists who touch upon adult education in their studies. The difficulties are lucidly described by Lowe:

"Confusion still reigns about the meaning of adult education both within each country and in international exchanges of ideas and information. What appear to be more or less similar phenomena are described by a perplexing welter of names such as Fundamental Education, Social Education, Mass Education, Continuing Education, Life-long Learning and Education Populaire*⁽⁹¹⁾

Investigators who undertake comparative studies on adult education, are left to choose from the 'welter' of definitions given. However, it is possible to distinguish two broad types of adult education:

(a) Random adult education that comes randomly as a result of the wide-range contact that the adults have with the environment, be it a political organization, a religious meeting, a sporting club, ... etc. Such scope is broad enough to include what Bergevin lists as 'Listening to

* italicised in the original

radio, watching television, reading, talking to people, planting flowers, going to concerts, playing bridge or pool, and everything else an adult does, is adult education of one kind or another."⁽⁹²⁾

(b) Organized adult education which comes intentionally, i.e. as a conscious effort by certain agents to change human behaviour, knowledge, skills, .. etc. It is easy to distinguish the organized type of adult education on the basis that, whether in its dissemination, programmes or other practices, it is subject to planning towards goals it attempts to achieve.

For the present study, the second type suggests a more practicable treatment. Within organized adult education, one cannot fail to find a minimum common ground for comparison if one sticks to adult education of formal nature which is provided through funds or financial support out of rates and taxes for that purpose.

The present study is after policies not institutions, though the organic relation between policies and institutions is not disregarded. The warning that Coombs addresses to those who undertake comparative studies on adult education in 'advanced' and 'underdeveloped' countries is taken into account.⁽⁹³⁾ The due consideration to differences that Coombs preaches is as well shared by Holmes whose 'Problem approach' is followed in the study. The key to such consideration is the function of the English case in the method

followed. Concentration is, in the first place, on the Egyptian case as the core of the present study. Adult education policy in England since 1944 is put under focus mainly to see in what way it might enrich the Egyptian experiment. 'Comparing what is comparable', which the 'Problem approach' highly regards,⁽²⁴⁾ is committed to. What is more, is that whatever might be the trends of policy that are recommended for the Egyptian case, they are subject to careful examination in the light of Egypt's initial conditions.

Hypothesis

The realization of modernity proposals depends on the availability of 'apt' man whose abilities and attitudes are shaped mainly through education. The logical examination of the hypothesis suggests that if the relation between modernity and education is true both in the positive and negative states, it is then true that in education we find a clue for the rise or decline on the indices of modernity. If we accept that modernity is associated with man's attitudes and skills, and if these are, in turn, associated with the kind of education provided to him, then change in education yields change in man. Hence, education becomes a basic factor for encouraging or impeding the realization of modernity proposals.

Given that the inavailability of apt man in Egypt is a big hindrance for the realization of modernity, and that adult education in Egypt is such that the majority of the masses have remained incapable of assimilating and implementing modernity proposals, then the fundamental reform of adult education policy to meet such requirements represents a main factor for bridging the gap between what is proposed and what is attained, and subsequently for the realization of modernity.

Methods of Inquiry

The study follows Holmes' 'Problem approach' as its major framework. The inconsistency between the expressed wishes for modernity whether in the political or economic realm since 1952, and the policy of adult education that has been incapable of extending the service to penetrate the majority of adult masses, is identified as a problem in accordance with Holmes' approach. Holmes recognizes the rise of a problem if norms, values, attitudes, etc... on the one hand, and social institutions on the other, plus the physical environment, show signs of inconsistencies. In case any of the above elements does not change (within a particular social order) at the same time as others, inconsistencies arise which are the outcome between and/or within 'non-material culture' (norms, values, laws,.. etc) and, 'material culture' (social institutions) and 'economic institutions'.(95) Hence, the previously stated lag in

the case of Egypt forms one example of inconsistency that needs be cleared up. The way in which the problem is dealt with until it reaches a solution (perplexity resolved) takes into consideration the characteristics of the followed approach and its suggested steps.

What distinguishes the 'problem approach' from other approaches in 'Comparative Education' falls in two points: (a) The resort to the scientific method of thinking in all its recommended steps and which are ultimately directed to educational reform. The selection of a problem for study, its intellectualisation, identification of initial conditions under which the solution might work, and the prediction of outcomes, are all, as Togores states 'well interrelated and grounded on theoretical bases'.⁽⁹⁶⁾

(b) Commitment to 'prediction' which, however difficult for investigators, is seen as the key to more recent thinking in Comparative Education. While the possibility of explaining the differences in terms of existing school systems is not denied by Holmes, yet it is made clear that:

"A more difficult and yet more rewarding study would be one which attempted to predict and compare cross-culturally the educational consequences of a reform ...".⁽⁹⁷⁾

The 'problem' in the Holmsian sense has to run through two distinctive stages: selection and analysis. Selection as has also been recommended in various methodologies,

depends upon the investigator, whose experience, knowledge and awareness of current educational debate direct his attention to a confused situation or 'problem' whether in his own culture or of international significance. Stopping at mere statement of the problem, and hurrying prematurely to examine its solution may cripple further steps of the study. 'Problem Statement' requires further analysis in which Holmes recommends that the data relevant to the problem to be solved, and out of which the problem becomes clearly formulated, has to be included in what he terms: 'Problem Intellectualisation' or 'Analysis'. (98)

Next to intellectualisation, the policy solution is to be attempted through analysis and specification of context. In the present study, as has been mentioned before, the solution centres round the possible contribution of adult education to the realization of modernity. Comparable aspects of adult education policy in England since the end of World War II presents an example which has its relevance to the Egyptian case.

However, the predicted solution in the 'problem approach' represents only one link in a series of stages each leading naturally to the next. There are four such stages:

(a) The 'intuitive' stage in which the solution springs spontaneously from the rather vague presentation included in the introduction, and which is inspired by the hypothesis or solution formation.

(b) The stage in which the solution ceases to be a mere possibility and turns into 'tested probability'. Such a stage requires a theoretical basis in the light of which the proposed policy solution might be analysed. In case of the present study, 'modernity' has to be defined and identified in various schools of thought, followed by an analysis of the possible contribution of adult education to modernity. Following this, analysis and specification of context is made possible, and the investigator eventually comes to recommend a solution to be attempted for the problem tackled.

(c) The stage of 'implemented solution' is recommended to build on sound 'cultural borrowing', that is by taking the initial conditions under which the solution would work into the investigator's consideration. To see whether the

lines that have characterized adult education policy in England since 1944 would work in Egypt, necessitates an analysis of the predicted difficulties of adopting these lines of policy as well as the difficulties involved in implementation.

(d) The fourth stage which completes the above three, is to anticipate the 'outcomes' of the solution, a step which Holmes admits to be difficult, yet completes the rungs of a long chain. Educational reform based on scientific thinking is eventually made possible.

1. BUTTS, R. F. "Civilization as historical process: meeting ground for comparative and international education", Comparative Education, Vol. 3, No. 3, June 1967. p. 156.
2. *ibid.*
3. ABERNATHY, D. B. The political dilemma of popular education: an African case. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969. p. 3.
4. ROGERS, E. M. Modernization among peasants, the impact of communication. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969. pp. 12-13.
5. INKLES, A. and SMITH, D. H. Becoming modern, individual change in six developing countries, London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1974. p. 9.
6. UNITED NATIONS, Community development and economic development. Part I. A study of the contribution of rural community development programmes to national economic development in Asia and the Far East. Bangkok: United Nations Publications, 1960. p. 68.
7. HOLMES, B. Problems in education, a comparative approach. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965. p. 83.
8. PALMER, M. Dilemmas of political development, an introduction to the politics of developing areas. Illinois: F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1973. p. ix.
9. INKLES, A. and SMITH, D. H. *op.cit.* p.3.
10. Quoted by OPARE-ABETIA, J. 'The role of adult education in orienting a rational tradition in Africa for economic and social development', in L. Olof EDström et al (editors) Mass education studies in adult education and teaching by correspondence in some developing countries. Stockholm: The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1970. p. 271.
11. PALMER, M. and STERN, L. 'Introduction: traditional societies and social change', in M. Palmer and L. Stern (editors), Political development in changing societies. Canada: Heath and Company, 1971. p. 4.
13. LERNER, D. The passing of traditional society, modernizing the Middle East. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1964. p. 83.
12. PALMER, M. *op.cit.* p. 10
14. see HAGEN, E. On the theory of social change: how economic growth begins. Illinois: The Dorsey Press, Inc. 1962. p. 55.
15. LERNER, D. *op.cit.* p. 50.

16. BERGER, B. Societies in change, an introduction to comparative sociology. London: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1971. p. 40.
17. HAGEN, E. op.cit. p. 72.
18. APTER, D. E. The politics of modernization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965. p. 83.
19. BANKS, O. The sociology of education. London: ^{B.T.} Bastford, ^{1st edition} 1968. p.21.
20. RADWAN, A. A. Old and new forces in Egyptian education. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers' College, Columbia University, 1951. p. 173.
21. YOUNG, W. L. "Human resources and economic development: manpower, education, and the "Lewis Model" in Egypt, 1952-1967"
Genève- Afrique, Vol. XIV, No. I, 1975. pp. 78-102.
22. HARBISON, F. and IBRAHIM, I. A. Human resources for Egyptian enterprise. New York: Mc Graw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1958. p. 131.
23. UNITED NATIONS, The United Nations' Development Decade, proposals for action, E/3613 May 1962 pp. vii and 2 - quoted by El-RASHIDI, F.
Human aspects of development. Brussels, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1971. p. 9.
24. LERNER, D. op.cit. p.51.
25. ABDEL-NASSER, G. Speech before the National Assembly on March, 26, 1964. Cairo: Dar al-Ma'aref, n.d. p. II.
26. VATIKIOTIS, P.J. The modern history of Egypt. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969. pp. 265.
27. Preamble to the 1923 Egyptian Constitution. (Arabic text)
28. The 1923 Egyptian Constitution, ibid. articles 38 and 39.
29. SAID, G. E. M. The way to socialism, the July 23 revolution
Cairo: Dar al-Nahda al-Arabia, 1962. p. 265. (Arabic text).
30. A national movement in Egypt in the early 1920's led by Talat Harb and some national economists, intellectuals and politicians.
The aim of the movement was the diversification of Egyptian economy and lessening the entire dependence on cotton cultivation. The movement was also an expression of resentment of the control of economy by the foreign community.
see MABRO, R. The Egyptian economy 1952-1972. London: Oxford University Press, 1974. pp. 107-109.
31. ROSHDI, M. Economic development in Egypt, Vol. 2
Cairo: Dar al-Ma'aref, n.d. p. 101. (Arabic text)
also SAID, G.E.M. op.cit. pp. 261-262.
32. SAID, G. E. M. ibid. pp. 46-102.

33. ABDEL-NASSER, G. op.cit. p. II

34. ibid.

35. UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT. Draft of the Charter, May, 21, 1962. Cairo: 1962. p. 35.

On page 35 of the 'Charter' it is stated that:

"The domination of feudalism in collusion with the exploiting capital over the economy of the land, naturally and inevitably enabled them to dominate political activities in all their forms, guaranteed their direction to serve their alliance at the expense of the people and to subjugate the masses by deceit or terrorism until they either acquiesced or surrendered. Democracy on this basis was merely the dictatorship of reaction. The people's loss of their social freedom led to the robbing of the political freedom- bestowed by the ruling reaction- of every significance. Therefore, the 1923 constitution was a gift graciously donated by the king."

36. SHILS, E. Political development in the new states. Paris, Mouton, The Hague, 1968. p. 9

37. The National Charter, op.cit. pp. 57-58.

38. ibid. p. 57.

The Charter stressed the three areas in which the great battle of production must take place in Egypt for the sake of the development of its countryside:

"First: The horizontal extension of agriculture, by reclaiming the desert and the waste land. The process of land reclamation should never cease for a second. The area of green fields must become larger every day in the Nile Valley. We should reach a stage at which every drop of the Nile water could be transformed on its banks into creative life that would not be wasted. Second: The vertical extension in agriculture through raising the productivity of cultivated land. Third: The industrialisation of the countryside which is based on agriculture opens vast ranges for the chances of work in the country (The Charter, pp. 55-56)

39. ibid.

40. ibid. chapter 6. p. 45.

41. YOUSSEF, A. S. "The Charter as a basis for a theory of values" Al-Tale'ah (monthly Egyptian magazine), Year 2, No. 6, June 1966. p. 107. also REJWAN, N. Nassirist ideology: its exponents and critics.

Tel Aviv: The Shiloah Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, Israel, 1974. p. 4.

42. MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, STATE INFORMATION SERVICE, The October Working Paper, presented by President M. A. El Sadat, April 1974. Cairo: n.d. p. 38.

43. EL-SADAT, President M. A. Speech given on June 16, 1977
Al-Ahram (Daily Egyptian paper), issue No. 33061, June 17, 1977.
p. 3 and 12.
44. The National Charter, op.cit. pp. 71-72.
45. The October Working Paper, op.cit. pp. 37-40.
46. EL-SADAT, President M. A. Speech given before the Supreme Council
of Universities, January 30, 1977. Al-Ahram, issue No. 32924,
January 31, 1977.
also President's speech to the nation on February 3, 1977.
Al-Akhbar (Daily Egyptian paper), Year 25, issue No. 7687, February
4, 1977.
47. The average GNP per capita in 1970 was only 210 U.S. dollars
which is seen as one of the lowest throughout the Middle Eastern
area.
see AHMAD, Y. J. Absorptive capacity of the Egyptian economy, an
examination of problems and prospects. Paris: O E C D, 1976.
Table 2.b p. 18.
see also EL-GHANNAM, M. A. 'Development, human resources and
adult education', paper presented to the International Expert Panel
on Adult Education and Development with Special Reference to the
Arab States, Sirs-El-Layyan: 29 November-9 December 1975.
Table I, p. 13.
48. EL-GHANNAM, M.A. ibid.
50. HANSEN, B. and NASHASHIBI, K. Foreign trade regimes and economic
development: Egypt. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research,
1975. pp. 222-223 also Table 8.6 p. 224.
49. The October Working Paper, op.cit. p. 64.
51. SZYLIOWICZ, J. S. Education and modernization in the Middle East.
London: Cornell University Press, 1973. p. 256.
52. APTER, D. E. op.cit. p. 47.
53. WILBER, D. N. United Arab Republic - Egypt: its people, its
society, its culture. New Haven: Hraf Press, 1969. p. 94.
54. ibid.
55. ZARTMAN, I. W. Government and politics in Northern Africa .
London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1964. p. 115
also SMITH, H. H. et al, Area Handbook for the United Arab Republic .
Washington: The American University, Foreign Area Studies, October
1970. p. 277

56. WILBER, D. N. op.cit. p. 99.
57. ibid.
58. ZARTMAN, I. W. op.cit. pp. II4-II6 and II8.
59. WILBER, D. N. op.cit. p. 90.
60. MELAIKA, L. K. Between positiveness and apathy, a study on the attitudes of villagers toward team work in five years.
Sirs-El-Layyan, A.S.F.E.C., 1966. pp. 32-54. (Arabic text).
61. BAHGAT, A. "The soft hands". Al-Ahram, Year IO3, issue No. 32963, March II, 1977.
Bahgat supports the view that Egypt's need at present is for 'stained hands and clean brains'. He laments that all hands in Egypt have turned into 'soft hands' only for stamping signatures and giving instructions while no one produces or stains his hands at work.
62. YOUSSEF, Y. K. and EID, W. M. "Manpower Planning in the U.A.R.", study presented to the Seventh Long Training Session, Beirut: UNESCO, 1967. Journal of Educational Planning in The Arab States (Beirut), Year 6, No. I7, August 1968. p. 32
63. THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, The Permanent Constitution, 1971. article 49. (Arabic text)
64. The National Charter, op.cit. pp. 74-76.
65. The October Working Paper, op.cit. pp. 45-46
66. UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, MINISTRY OF PLANNING. Follow-up and evaluation report on the First Five-Year Plan 1960/61 - 1964/65. Part I, Follow-up and evaluation of development basic facts. Cairo: 1966. p. 57.
67. The National Charter, op.cit. p. 53.
68. CENTRAL AGENCY FOR PUBLIC MOBILISATION AND STATISTICS, Statistical Year book of the Arab Republic of Egypt 1952-1973 Cairo: CAPMS, October 1974. p. I4.
69. ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, MINISTRY OF PLANNING The Five-Year Plan 1978-1982. Vol. 2: Egyptian Man - Education, Scientific Research, Training and Manpower Planning. Cairo: 1977. p. I7.
70. YOUSSEF, Y. K. and EID, W. M. op.cit. p. 32.
71. IBRAHIM, N. I. and MANSOUR, R. F. Superstitious thinking, an empirical study. Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1962. p. I39 (Arabic text)
72. SOLTAN, M. E. S. Studies in education and society. Vol. I Cairo: Dar al-Ma' aref, 1975. pp. I-8 and 36-52. (Arabic text).

73. HARBISON, F. and MYERS, C. A. Education, manpower and economic growth, strategies of human resource development.
New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1965. p. 181.
74. ROGERS, J. and GROOMBRIDGE, B. Right to learn: the case for adult equality. London: Arrow Books Limited, 1976. p. 13.
75. This point will be elaborated in chapter 5 of the study.
see ROBERTSON, R. and NETTL, J. P. International systems and the modernization of societies, the formation of national goals and attitudes. London: Faber and Faber, 1968. pp. 42-57.
76. *ibid.*
77. SZYLIOWICZ, J. S. *op.cit.* p. 6.
78. MILLONZI, J. C. Citizenship in Africa, the role of adult education.
New York: Syracuse University, 1975. pp. 13-14.
79. see MANTYNEN, H. T. U. A conceptual analysis of the role of adult education in nation building, unpublished
Ph. D thesis, Indiana University, 1969. pp. 62-63.
80. An adult educationist from Kenya who got his Ph. D from the U.K. He has some contributions to the role of adult education in underdeveloped countries. His thesis subject was:
"The development and organisation of adult education in Kenya with special reference to African rural development 1945-1970",
Edinburgh University, 1971.
81. PROSSER, R. Adult education for developing countries.
Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967. pp 2-5.
82. COLES, E. T. Adult education in developing countries
London: Pergamon Press, 1969. p. 3.
83. Though KORTEN and KORTEN were mainly concerned with formal education, it is possible to take their argument as supporting to the above view of Coles in so far as the twofold task of education is applicable to adult education.
- KORTEN, D. C. and F. F. Planned change in a traditional society: psychological problems of modernization in Ethiopia. London: Praeger Publishers, Inc. 1972. p. 334.
84. LIVERIGHT, A. A. and GREENWOOD, N. The Exeter Papers: report of the First International Conference on the Comparative Study of Adult Education. Boston: C.S.L.E.A, 1968. p. 10.
85. UNESCO, Third International Conference on Adult Education (Tokyo 25 July-7 August 1972). A retrospective international survey of adult education (Montreal 1960 to Tokyo 1972). Reference document. Paris. UNESCO, 1972. p.24.

86. UNESCO, Third International Conference on Adult Education.

Final Report

Paris: UNESCO, 1972. p. 13.

87. *ibid.*

88. COOMBS, P. H. The world educational crisis, a systems analysis.

London: Oxford University Press, 1968. p. 138.

Coombs argues that '... in contrast to the relative neatness and coherence of the formal education system, nonformal educational activities are an untidy mélange that defies simple description, or the diagnosis and measurement of systematic planning. Few nations have even a moderately good inventory of their present activities in this realm, much less an assesment of future needs and how best to meet them' (pp. 138-139)

89. ABDEL-MEGID, M. "Adult education in Egypt between theory and practice", Education of the Masses, Vol. 2, No. 4, September 1975.

pp. 108-123.

(Arabic text).

90. LOWE, J. Adult education in England and Wales, a critical survey.

London: Michael Joseph, 1970. p. 29.

91. LOWE, J. 'Introduction' in J. Lowe (editor), Adult education and nation building, a symposium on adult education. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1970. p. 3.

92. BERGEVIN, P. A philosophy for adult education. New York: The Seabury Press, 1967. p. 52.

93. COOMBS, P. H. *op.cit.* p. 142.

94. HOLMES, B. *op.cit.* p. 47.

95. *ibid.* pp. 73-78.

96. TOGOIRES, A. 'Scientific method and research in comparative education.' Paper presented before the Ph. D. seminar of Comparative Education, Institute of Education, University of London, October 14, 1975. p. 14.

97. HOLMES, B. *op.cit.* p. 44.

98. *ibid.* p. 33.

PART TWO

PROBLEM INTELLECTUALISATION

Having stated a problem in a rather brief and vague manner, a researcher following the 'Problem approach' has to go deeper. Holmes agrees with Dewey on the necessity of analysing or 'intellectualising' it, i.e. turning what has so far been stated as a 'confused situation' into a 'problem' with specific dimensions. This is made through an analysis of the data relevant to the problem. Besides helping the clearer formulation of the nature of the confused situation, intellectualisation 'sharpens the foci' of a researcher on specific aspects and relations to which his attention in later stages of his study will be directed.

How this 'intellectualisation' is reached, has to do with the conception of 'inconsistency' that Holmes envisages between any and/or the normative, institutional and environmental realms. Such inconsistency may be guided by reflection on the three major explosions that the world has witnessed, especially since the mid-twentieth century, namely explosion of population, of expectations and of knowledge. When these are not met by proportionate change in any educational, social or economic aspect, an inconsistency arises which needs detailed analysis.

In the present study, the aspirations for modernity in Egypt since 1952 have far exceeded the availability of an adult 'modern' base on whom the realization of proposals largely depends. In this line, the argument is made in chapters 2, 3 and 4 which form this part. Chapter 2 deals with the 'change' aspect showing how the modernity proposals in Egypt have changed since 1952. 'No-change' is dealt with through an analysis of the two areas that have, more than others, crippled the realization of proposals, namely the unmodified attitudes of the Egyptian adult masses, and skill inadequacy. Both are dealt with in chapters 3 and 4 respectively.

Chapter Two

Change: Modernity Proposals Before and After 1952

When modernity proposals in the Arab Republic of Egypt are dealt with, 1952 is taken as a transitionalist date that separates two distinguishable epochs: the pre- and the post-revolutionary. However, a further limitation has still to be made as regards the initiation of the pre-1952 era. This date is suggested to be 1923 which, similar to 1952, stands as an important landmark in Egypt's modern history. By that date, Egypt had resumed its constitutional democratic life as a partially independent country, after a long period of suspension since 1883. The 1923 Constitution remained the main document that unfolded the aspired for norms until the mid-century. Except for an entrim period between October 1930 and December 1935, when a substitute constitution more favourable to the Royal authority was imposed, writers agree to take it as the main document regulating Egyptian life and expressing the peoposals that the country was aspiring for until the Constitution was cancelled in December 1952. (I)

The setting from which the pre-revolution modernity proposals
sprang

A. The Political Setting

With the British Occupation of Egypt in 1882, the country's position as an independent state within the Ottoman Empire was violently shaken. Soon after, the constitution that

had been in action until then, was cancelled in line with Lord Doverein's suggestions of 1883.⁽²⁾ In place of the old democratic setting, Doverein's 'Organic Law' (1883) provided for representative institutions, provincial councils, Legislative Committee, and General Assembly. However, these were 'purely consultative and had no influence on policy'.⁽³⁾ Feeling that the new setting that emerged was imposed rather than chosen by free will, helped as well to shape the national objectives at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. Led by the 'National Party' and its leader Mustafa Kamel, the country had its political aspirations centred round two proposals: independence, and constitutional democratic rule which, however understandable to the illiterate masses, were agreed upon as the national goals worth of struggle.

With the resignation of Lord Cromer in 1908, the British showed more understanding to the national goals. Instead of allowing a complete constitutional life at one dose, Sir Eldon Ghorrest, Cromer's successor, tended to broaden the scope of tasks undertaken by the 'Provincial Councils'. These councils were granted more independence and elasticity in practising their tasks. Furthermore, he cancelled the 'Consultative Committee' and the 'General Assembly' that had so far existed and issued a law according to which more importance was

attached to the 'Legislative Committee'. The attempt, however, did not appeal to the masses who were successfully mobilized by the 'National Party'. The 'Legislative Committee', even with a broader scope of tasks, was basically consultative in most matters. It had not the right of initiating legislations or censorship. What was more important from the point of view of Professor Rateb is that the Cabinet of Ministers was not responsible before it.⁽⁴⁾ The first elections for this 'Legislative Committee' were made in 1913, and its elected members met for the first time in January 1914. They practised their tasks for approximately . five months only, at the end of which the 'Committee' was suspended due to the conditions of the First World War and the declaration of Egypt as a 'British Protectorate'.

The outbreak of the World War (1914-1919) served to indicate the strategic importance of Egypt~~/~~and its Canal to the British interests. On the opposite side, the incidents of the War gave rise to another matter which proved more influential on the development of the political aspirations until 1952. Encouraged by President Wilson's pronouncement of the principles of self-determination (1917), the Egyptian leaders began to press harder for the attainment of political independence and for separate representation at the 'Peace Conference'. By late 1918, al-Wafd al-Misri (The Egyptian

Delegation) emerged under the leadership of Sa'ad Zaghloul, as a broadly based nationalist political organization which held a very high standing in Egyptian politics as the most powerful of all Egyptian parties until the liquidation of all parties in 1953.

The unrest that prevailed the country due to the failure of the nationalist leaders to get a hearing at Paris, induced the British Government to send a special mission headed by Lord Milner in 1922 to explore the probable solutions. The mission proposed the renunciation of the Protectorate, the declaration of Egypt as an independent country, and the convention of an alliance treaty between Egypt and Britain to ensure the respect of the British and foreign interests. However, the negotiations failed. Soon after, the Lloyd George Government gave the famous '28th February 1922 Declaration', according to which Egypt was proclaimed an 'independent sovereign' but, with four reservations left subject to further negotiations and which included: security of the British Empire Communications through Egypt, defence of Egypt by Britain against all forms of foreign aggression, protection of foreign interests and protection of minorities in Egypt, and the ^{postponement} of any decision of the status of the Sudan until further agreement. (5)

Feeling that the 'Declaration' was announced only on one part, and that it did not give the 'complete' independence

the leaders had aspired to accomplish, drove the matter of the accomplishment of complete political independence at the top of the goals that all the political parties until 1952 worked to accomplish.

B. The Economic Setting

The First World War witnessed the consolidation of the 'laissez-faire' economic policy in Egypt according to which the State abdicated from the commanding position it had held over economy during the reign of Mohammed Ali (1805-1849). To O'Brien, it retreated further from interference with production than any time since 1800.⁽⁶⁾ Its commercial policy was characterized by free trade and no restriction was put on capital movement across the frontiers. Until the early 1920's she had not got a central bank or attention forms on the money supply.

The economy until 1920 was predominantly agricultural and even more, with specialization in the cultivation of one crop 'cotton', the size of which increased from 3,100,000^{cantars} in 1879 to 7,700,000 in 1918, i.e. it more than doubled in less than forty years.⁽⁷⁾ Thus, the total area cultivated with cotton alone rose from 11.5% of the cultivable land in 1882 to about 22.5% in 1914.⁽⁸⁾

With the continuation of such a policy, the agricultural sector remained dominantly the biggest and the balance with other economic sectors was lost. ^{In 1907,} 2.3 millions representing 70.3% of the whole manpower were engaged in agricultural production. By 1917, the number amounted to about four millions ⁽⁹⁾ who represented 68%. ⁽¹⁰⁾

Industry, as will later be indicated, was stagnant throughout the first two decades of the 20th century, with even a tendency of decline in the number of its absorbants as indicated in table 3.

Table 2.1

Percentage Distribution of Labour Force by Economic Activity
(11)
1897-1927

Years	1897	1907	1917	1927
Agriculture	68.0	70.0	68.5	67.0
Industry	11.5	11.5	11.5	10.6
Transportation and commerce	8.0	7.6	10.0	12.5
Services	12.5	10.9	10.0	9.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Rather than supporting industry, the economic policy of that time gave priority in public expenditure to the execution of schemes that ^{were} thought more relevant to the country's

economic growth.⁽¹²⁾ Almost all attention was given to irrigation, drainage and other sectors related to agriculture. The Aswan Dam was built in 1902, heightened in 1907 and 1910, Zefta Barrage was established in 1901 and 1902, Assiut Barrage in 1902, and Isna Barrage between 1905 and 1908.⁽¹³⁾ Such was the attention given at that time to agriculture that an American scholar could only describe it as an 'agricultural revolution'.⁽¹⁴⁾

As for industry, no measures were taken to encourage and protect it until World War I. The 8% tax imposed in 1901 by the government on all cotton manufactures led only to the depression of the existing industries.⁽¹⁵⁾ A system of loans and other facilities was not available. Industrial schools were inadequate both quantitatively and qualitatively for the satisfaction of the industrial expansion with the trained manpower required.⁽¹⁶⁾

Egyptian investors, on the other hand, were reluctant to invest their money in industry. Investment in industry amidst the country's unstable socio-economic conditions represented a greater risk than investment in property or other sectors.⁽¹⁷⁾

Absence of protection for industry under the 'open-door' policy that the government followed served to deal heavy blows to the existing industries of the day. Only a few companies

survived under the 'open-door' policy, and even this few suffered greatly during the crisis of 1907. Between 1907 and 1914, 26 companies with a paid-up capital of LE. 2,251,000 or 26.8% of the total industrial capital were liquidated. (18)

The social setting of that time had an influence that cannot be ignored. The emergence of a powerful class of large landowners that grew under the system of landownership was a characteristic of the Egyptian economy throughout the nineteenth and during the early decades of the twentieth centuries. (19) With the majority of the labour force living on agriculture, the distribution of ownership became relevant. Such a distribution, by the end of the 19th century, was clearly uneven, but was aggravating more in the earlier decades of the 20th century. In 1896, the number of large landowners (who possessed over 50 feddans) amounted to 12,475 or 1% only of the total landowners the number of whom was 1,153,749. These rich landowners possessed 2,366,602 feddans or 45.3% of the total agricultural land area out of 5,289,277 feddans. At the other end, 87.2% of the landowners possessed less than 5 feddans each, with a total area of 1,264,084 feddans or 24.5%. In 1914 and 1918, the larger landowners possessed 43.9% and 42.0% of the total land respectively while they represented no more than 0.8% and 0.7% of the total number of owners respectively. (20)

In the two decades that preceded the rise of the 1952 Revolution, the rural population grew from 10,579,000 in 1929 to 13,700,000 in 1950 meanwhile the number of landless families as a percentage of the total rural families grew from 24% to 44%. The number of landholding families declined from 1207 to 997 during the same period. This explains the aggravation to which social injustice has sunk in the middle of the 20th century as indicated in table 2.2.

Table 2.2

(21)

Number of landless families in rural Egypt before the Revolution.
(in thousands)

Agricult. census Yr.	Rural Pop.	No. of rural families	No. of landholding families	No. of landless families	Landless families as a percentage of total rural families
1929	10.579	2116	1207	508	24%
1939	11.664	2333	993	887	38%
1950	13.700	3740	997	1217	44%

The population growth since the outset of the 20th century added to the grinding effect of the uneven distribution of landownership making the gap between the rich and the poor even wider. The per-capita share of cultivated land declined from 0.53 feddans in 1897 to 0.39 in 1927, a drop of about 27% over a period of 30 years. As for the per capita of the cropped

land, it dropped from 0.71 feddans to 0.48 during the same period, a drop of about 32%.⁽²²⁾

One more effect of the uneven land distribution, was concerned with class stratification which, in turn, had its effect on the ongoing political and economic affairs during that period. The large landowners, whatever the ethnic and social differences among them, formed on the whole, a distinguished coherent class: the 'agrarian bourgeoisie'. Their material status enabled them, amidst the unstable conditions of the day, to be most influential in all spheres of the Egyptian life. They came to occupy the top of the social hierarchy and hence, political authority forming a class that looked down upon the wide masses of landless and poor peasants who lived almost at subsistence. With time, both political and economic policies were easily directed the way that protected their interests. To Mabro and Radwan, their privileged position:

"enabled them to dominate the country's political institutions. They were referred to as "representatives of real interests" in the country. Successive governments made sure that their economic policies were primarily designed to protect and promote those "real interests".⁽²³⁾

Modernity Proposals 1923-1952

General Norms

From the above preconditions emerged the aspirations that the leaders in the pre-revolution era hoped to see realized. Such aspirations found expression in the 1923 Constitution as well as in other political documents. All these aspirations were mainly drawn from the goals of the 1919 outburst led by Sa'ad Zaghloul, and which can be put under four broad ones:

1. The accomplishment of complete national sovereignty by ending the remaining phases of foreign occupation particularly the 'four reservations' included in the 28th February 1922 Declaration.
2. The abolition of 'Foreign Capitulations' ⁽²⁴⁾ so that a fair chance might be given to Egyptian citizens to share in the fields of industrial and commercial activity.
3. The establishment of a democratic constitutional rule in which the people share in the affairs of the country through their representatives.
4. To have a more firm presence of the state whether in politics or in economy in a way that might put some limitation on the tyranny of 'the class of feudalists

and rich capitalists. This was envisaged as a necessary step if the rising middle class, . . . and especially its intellectual elements, were to participate in the rule and in the issuance of the political, economic and social legislations. (25)

As for the economic realm, the aspirations were mainly concerned with the reform of the imbalance in the economic structure that the incidents of the World War I had served to show. Industry had to be given a place side by side with the dominant agricultural sector.

Talat Harb, together with a group of nationalist economists raised the call for a more sound Egyptian economy to serve the interests of the whole Egyptian nation and limit the excessive role played by the foreigners. Their call was the seed of what came to be the 'egyptianisation' and the 'diversification' of the Egyptian economy. The first, aimed at encouraging the Egyptians by all means to take hold of their economy through limiting the excessive role undertaken by foreigners and which flourished under the system of 'Capitulations'. The second trend was fired by the report of the 'Agriculture and Industry Committee' (1917) to which further reference will be made. The Committee suggested a new policy for industrialization in Egypt capable of protecting the country from the harms of complete dependence on cotton

cultivation with the incessant shakes it caused to the Egyptian economy due to the fluctuations of cotton prices in world markets which Egypt had no control of.

Proposed Norms in the Political Realm

The Constitution

The 1923 Constitution, prepared by a group of thirty distinguished characters appointed by the King soon after the declaration of the country's 'partial' independence, was to express the national aspirations that the 1919 outburst fostered. Yet, of no less importance is that the Constitution was presented as a 'grant' from the King as he expressed in the Royal Decree on April 19, 1923. Thus, the Constitution sprang, not from the popular will that watches over the respect of its text, but from the will of the King who granted it and had the right to stop it. (26)

Legislature

The norms of the democratic rule as regards legislature, political parties, the executive, judiciary and others were included in the texts of the 1923 Constitution.

According to the Constitution, the legislative authority was to be undertaken by the King in collaboration with the Parliament. (27) The two-chamber Parliament for Notables

and Senates was instituted by direct universal suffrage except for two fifths of the Senate members to be appointed by the King (article 73). Parliament members were to represent the whole nation, and the executive authority had no obligatory rights to impose upon them (article 9I). All provinces and governorates were to elect their representatives on equal footing in accordance with the number of population. One Senate member was to be elected for every governorate or province with 90,000 to 180,000 (30,000 to 60,000 in the case of notables). Small governorates with a population less than 90,000 were to elect their senate members unless they are added to another governorate or province (article 75).

Parliament members were to be elected periodically. Membership was limited by ten years for the Senates and five years for the Notables (articles 79 and 86 respectively). Half the appointed Senators and half the elected have to be replaced each five years. However, the Senator, whose membership has ended got the right for another period (article 79).

Political Parties

'Political Parties' which had even existed before the promulgation of the 1923 Constitution, were allowed in

compliance with articles 12, 14 and 21 of the Constitution. They were allowed to undertake their role as one of the three forces that dominated the political scene until 1952: the King, the political parties and the British authorities.

The Executive

The 'Executive Authority' according to the text of the Constitution was left heavily to the discrete of the King (article 29). It was the responsibility of the King to appoint and retire officials in accordance with the law (article 44). The Ministers were no exception, their appointment and retirement was affirmed in article 49 as the King's right.

However, the King's executive authority was not left absolute by the Constitution. The upperhand of the executive authority was, according to the text, supposed to be the Cabinet's (article 57). Articles 48 and 61 showed how the authority was to be delegated from the King to the Cabinet with the latter as the body responsible before the Chamber of Notables in all the matters concerned with the public policy of the state.

Hence, the problem tended to be not with the texts of the Constitution itself as it was with the defective application of these texts in the political life of the country.

Judiciary

Judiciary was independent by the text of the Constitution. No authority had the right to interfere in the work of judges (article 122). Judges were to enjoy immunity against dismissal from their posts or transference except as organized by law (article 125).

Individual liberty, equality, ownership, belief, worship and opinion were recognized by law (articles 2-22). The Egyptian individuals had the right of assembly but with some stated restrictions as precautions for the maintenance of social system (article 20).

Proposed Norms in the Economic Realm

In his analysis of the Egyptian economy, Professor Saeed admits that the period that preceded the outbreak of the 1952 Revolution had no clear stable line. 'There were no drawn goals that the governments worked to realize in Egypt'.⁽²⁸⁾ But, a review of the aspirations expressed by such nationalist political leaders as Mustafa Kamel and Mohammed Farid, or economists as Talat Harb, shows that there were, at least, four broad goals in the economic realm during the three decades that preceded the 1952 Revolution:

(I) Encouraging Egyptian industry to expand, protecting it from unfair competitions. Thus, the dominantly agrarian

economy that depended almost completely until that time, on cotton cultivation would be diversified. The violent shakes caused by the fluctuation in the cotton prices in world markets would more likely be avoided if Egypt had other sectors to depend on apart from agriculture.

(2) A fairer distribution of wealth for the benefit of the suffering masses. This objective was initially raised by the masses that participated in the 1919 outburst, but was accepted with caution and even with resentment on the part of the ruling classes. It should be noted that the ministers and the political party leaders alike were mostly wealthy landowners who had naturally no sympathy for such claims but could not show such feelings explicitly.

(3) A more effective role to be played by the state in directing the Egyptian economy in accordance with the national interests. Running in the same line with this goal was to have the economy organized in accordance with stable rules. The economy should be subject to some 'planning' so that the country might avoid the previous economic relapses represented in the foreign debt that started in the 1860's and was ever with the country since then, and until it was ended in 1943. (29)

(4) Putting some limit on the ever expanding role undertaken by foreign capitalists in Egyptian economy. The 'Capitulations System' under which such role was consolidated had to give place to a more fitting formula that regards the country's interests.

Climate for the Shift in Modernity Proposals

The mid-twentieth century came over Egypt while the general climate was prepared for some new modernity proposals to work for. Rather than from the ecstasy of success, the need for change sprang from the bitterness of failure. The three preceding decades had witnessed clear deterioration in the country's conditions in almost all realms.

Politically, the attempt at a modern political system that had started since the promulgation of the 1923 Constitution, proved slow and ineffective. The democratic institutions, founded in accordance with the Constitutional text, could not touch the lives and aspirations of the masses, and hence failed to motivate them to participate actively. The Constitution itself was stopped for over five years, and its text was violated several times by the ruling classes. The proclamation of martial laws most of the time between 1937 and 1952 served more to create an anti-democratic climate that led to instability. It was thus that a step forward toward the accomplishment of 'Political Democracy' remained unfulfilled ^{until} the outbreak of the 1952 Revolution.

On the other hand, the Egyptian economy could not be launched in the direction of modernity. The country remained dominantly agricultural despite the two attempts at industrialization. The experience with the two five-year plans in the 1930's and 1940's was not encouraging. A clear role for the State in economy was actually started, but had to keep away from the interests of the feudalists and capitalists who were most influential.

However, some four elements had special role in the shift in modernity proposals :

I. The emergence of an Egyptian cultural movement

In the 1930's and 1940's, Egypt witnessed the relative flourish of an intellectual movement at the hands of some Egyptian thinkers whose works served to spread, among the individuals of the middle as well as the poor classes, some progressive outlooks. New terms such as 'progressiveness', 'social justice', 'equality of opportunities' and 'political democracy' began to be heard. Furthermore, a brave wave of criticism of the social ills from which the society suffered, was led by such eminent figures as Tawfik el-Hakim, Taha Hussein, Ahmad Hussein and many others. Tawfik el-Hakim criticized the futility and showiness of the democratic system. (30) Taha Hussein objectively analysed the Egyptian culture in the light of other cultures concentrating on the necessity of deserting the traditional outlooks that had created a wide gap between the Egyptian society and the modern ones of the West. (31) Ahmad Hussein preached social justice and the necessity to have radical change in the social structure and relations in the Egyptian society. (32) The writings of the above figures left on the Egyptian society what the writings of Rousseau, ~~Montaigne~~ ^{Montesquieu}, Voltaire and others had done in France in so far as the preparation of a new climate for change is concerned.

2. The culmination of class struggle

The odd division that characterized the Egyptian society in the first half of the twentieth century had a driving force on the shift in modernity proposals since the early 1950's.

According to Issawi, the Egyptian society was classified into landowners, bourgeoisie, urban petty bourgeoisie, town workmen and peasantry.⁽³³⁾ Nevertheless, two distinct classes encompassed the majority of the population. At the top of the social scale, there was the very rich and influential class represented by almost five per cent⁽³⁴⁾ of the whole population, and whose individuals were strong enough to safeguard their inherited rights and re-inforce them day after day. The second encompassed the vast majority of the population: farmers, farm labourers and workmen, etc. whose social, economic and cultural conditions imposed on them to be placed on the other extreme. Their influence on the ongoing affairs of the country was, on the whole, very limited. There was as well a middle class, or as it was sometimes called 'the class of bourgeoisie',⁽³⁵⁾ which was mostly formed of officials: doctors, engineers, lawyers and officers most of whom were sons of the poor class who were lucky enough to get some sort of education. The majority of this class were, nevertheless, tortured between their belongingness to the poor class and their wild aspirations to join the rich one. Whatever was their number, they were too weak to be able to destroy the exploitation and monopoly exercised by the upper class or to purify the administration from corruption.⁽³⁶⁾ Amidst such a division, class struggle emerged and aggravated in the pre-revolution era.

3. Futility of the Democratic Façades

Despite the institutional establishments brought forth

in accordance with the 1923 Constitution including the Parliament, political parties, judiciary, press, ... etc., the spirit of genuine democracy was lacking.

Forgery of the will of the poor masses was practised on a large scale. Whether in the countryside or in the towns, peasants and workmen were nominally free to choose their representatives and practise their political rights, but, in fact, were far from doing so. The prevailing illiteracy among the vast majority of them was a big impediment. Besides, there was pressure practised on the part of the influential classes, feudalists, capitalists and the like to forge their will, or at least, direct it the way that served the latter's interests, to quote an Egyptian scholar:

" Feudalists robbed the peasants of their political rights taking the advantage of their affiliation to them. Hence, freedom was practised only by feudalists. Likewise, monopolists and capitalists robbed the political rights of industrial workers in the presence of the trade unions that were merely toys in the hands of such capitalists." (37)

Parliament members cared, if any, very little for the interests of the people whom they claimed to represent. 'Their presence', says Issawi, ' makes itself felt at election times. Otherwise, they tend to leave the peasants alone'. (38)

Amidst the showiness of the democratic façades, the country lost a good chance of having a sound popular organization to encompass and lead the popular ^Astruggle. The political parties could do so, had they tended to give the poor masses a fair chance of membership side by side with the feudalists and capitalists. The tendency to ignore the masses led the political

parties more and more into alliance with the King, the foreign powers and the feudalists. Thus was formed a state that Nasser described as:

"a limited company for theft and robbery in which the people had no share".⁽³⁹⁾

Amidst the showiness and fulfity of the democratic façades in the pre-1952 Egypt, the country fell into a state of political instability felt most in the period that followed the end of World War II. One clear indicator of such instability was the number of new cabinets formed, some of which lasted only for a few weeks, others even for days.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Another indicator is the acts of violence particularly the assassination of political leaders among whom Prime Ministers, Ministers and party chiefs. Such a move reached zenith in the mid 1940's and continued until the outbreak of the Revolution. Dekmejian's study on the political development of Egypt asserts that:

"The period from 1945 to 1952 can best be described as one of protracted violence where, due to progressive decrease in traditional-legal legitimacy, there was increasing reliance on force as a means of control. The chain of political assassinations by Ikhwan and the Green Shirts were an unmistakable sign of deepening crisis. The only institution that had not been directly involved in the conflict before 1948 was the military establishment." ⁽⁴¹⁾

4. The Aggravation of Social Injustice

The wide distinctions between the rich and the poor classes which have already been mentioned earlier in this chapter⁽⁴²⁾, continued and was even aggravated until the mid-twentieth century.

Landownership as one indicator of income distribution may fit with an agricultural country like Egypt. Of the owners of the agricultural land in Egypt, only 0,4% owned 34,2% of the cultivable area while the remaining 99,6% owned 65.8%⁽⁴³⁾ Furthermore, while 72% of the total population at mid-century owned 13.1% of the land, sixty individuals only owned an average of 4545,2 feddans each.⁽⁴⁴⁾ It was counted that the average land holdings for the above mentioned 0,4% was 171,3 feddans each, while 96% of the owners possessed only the third of the total cultivable area with an average of 0,8 feddans each.⁽⁴⁵⁾ Table 2.3 indicates the distribution of landownership in 1950.

Table 2.3

Distribution of landownership in Egypt in 1950⁽⁴⁶⁾

Bracket	Landowners 000	Area owned	Average individual ownership
Less than 5	2600,2	2104,1	0,8
5 - 10	80,0	531,0	6,6
10-20	45,1	626,7	13,6
20-30	31,1	313,1	22,9
30-50	9,4	351,6	37,6
50 and over	11,9	2036,2	171,3
Total	2760,8	5962,7	2,2

Taking shares as another indicator shows that 4,1% of the share holders owned 48,6% of the total share value, and that 2,2% of the share holders, whose number did not exceed twenty six individuals, had an average share possession of LE 976,384 each. ⁽⁴⁷⁾

The gap between rich and poor became wider year after year by the low rate of development in the National Income as well as the National Production compared to the rapidly rising rate of population growth. From 1933 to 1950, the average annual growth rate in National Production did not exceed 2,5% ⁽⁴⁸⁾ and the average annual growth rate in the National Income was only 1,5%, while the average annual growth rate in population was 1,9%. ⁽⁴⁹⁾ This worsened the economic conditions of the poor masses much more than it did to the rich classes. The rate of increase in the area under cultivation throughout the first half of the twentieth century averaged 0,5% annually, ⁽⁵⁰⁾ which, amidst the high population growth rate that far exceeded that rate, dealt a heavy blow to the per-capita share of land as has already been mentioned ⁽⁵¹⁾ and affected the standard of living of the masses greatly. Besides, there was the deteriorating productivity of the Egyptian soil which was felt in the 1940's. Out of six million feddans under cultivation, there was about 20% of poor land, the productivity of which was affected by a number of factors, alinity, alkalinity ... etc. ⁽⁵²⁾

From the above climate flared up the 1952 Revolution with an enthusiastic desire to make up for long underdevelopment and accomplish modernity in Egypt both politically and economically. The analysis of change in modernity proposals and institutions throughout the twenty five years of revolutionary regime need be made in accordance with the three distinctive stages already mentioned in chapter one. (53)

The first of the three is often defined as the 'three years transition period', (54) while some, especially economists, see it rather a four-year period until 1956. (55) During this period, attention was almost wholly directed the gaining of recognition for the new rule both on the home and the foreign fronts. Having no set of detailed programmes of action, the leaders could only present six major principles or goals on the eve of the Revolution:

- The eradication of imperialism and its agents.
- The extinction of feudalism.
- The eradication of monopolies, as well as the control of capitalistic influence over the system of government.
- the establishment of a strong army.
- The accomplishment of social justice.
- The establishment of a sound democratic life. (56)

The second covers the period from 1956 to 1961. It started with the promulgation of the 1956 constitution in place of the old one which the new leaders had stopped since December 1952.

The provision of the 1956 Constitution remained almost unchanged throughout the period eventhough the country entered an experiment of unity with Syria under the 'united Arab Republic' (1958-1961). During the unity, a new constitution was promulgated in 1958 but was almost a copy of the 1956 Constitution.

The third covers the period from 1961 to the present day, and is characterized by the issue of the 'National Charter' in 1962 and which has ever since remained the major source of inspiration for all subsequent documents including the 1964 Constitution, the 30th March Declaration (1968), the Permanent Constitution (1971) and the October Working Paper (1974).

Modernity Proposals Since 1952

a) 1952-1956

I. Political Realm

The revolutionary proposals raised on the eve of the Revolution, general and vague as they were, carried within them the determination to adopt a different line from that of the pre-revolution era. The order of the goals to be sought shows that the freedom of the country was given priority over the freedom of the individual. Without the attainment of the first, the second would only remain

an unrealized dream.

The conception of the new leaders as regards 'sound democracy' was, in the first period, far from compliance with the 'modern' democratic system as indicated by Shils.* However, the criticism of the revolutionary conception of 'political democracy' has to take into consideration the many challenges that were encountered during the period.

Stopping the 1923 Constitution meanwhile a substitute was not at hand **meant** the resort to emergency measures in the form of commands from the 'Revolution Command Council' in collaboration with the Cabinet of Ministers. Hence, the country remained without constitution until 1956. Besides, the showiness of the political parties in the pre-revolution period served to direct the conception of political parties to a line that defies the norms of 'political democracy'. The seeds of the 'one-party system' could be traced to the early period of the Revolution.

Participation in public affairs was suggested to be through the 'Liberation Rally' (1953) the purpose of which was:

"to prepare the people to participate on a national scale in the new political parties that we hoped to create before the third anniversary of the Revolution". (57)

The above declaration by the head of the Revolution Command

* Shils' views on 'Political development in the new States' will be elaborated in detail in chapter 5 of the study.

Council shows that the idea of different political parties was not altogether discarded until that time. The programme of the 'Liberation Rally' was to cover eleven tasks:

- I. Complete and unconditional withdrawal of British troops from the Nile Valley.
2. Self-determination of the Sudan.
3. The aspirations of the people will be expressed in a new constitution.
4. The 'welfare state' through a social system in which all citizens will be entitled to protection against unemployment, illness and old age.
5. An economic system designed to encourage a fair distribution of wealth, full exploitation of natural and human resources, and the maximum investment of new capital.
6. A political system in which all citizens shall be equal before the law and in which freedom of speech, assembly, press, and religion shall be guaranteed within the limits of the law.
7. An educational system designed to develop a sense of social responsibility by impressing youth with its duties and rights.
8. Friendly relations with all Arab states.
9. A regional pact designed to increase the influence of the Arab League.
10. Friendly relations with all friendly powers.
- II. Firm adherence to the principles of the United Nations. (58)

The above principles, on which the first political organization initiated by the revolution was to function, accord with the ideals of political modernity, particularly the sixth which gave special regard to the equality of all before the law, and the guarantee given for free press, speech and assembly. However, one major difference should be taken into account when comparing the 'Liberation Rally' with subsequent revolutionary organizations as the 'National Union (1957-1961)' or the 'Arab Socialist Union' (1962-1978), is that the 'Liberation Rally' was not meant to be a political party but rather, as Nasser meant it to be, "a body that would organize the people's forces and overhaul the social setup. The Liberation Rally is the school where the people will be taught how to elect their representatives properly." (59)

Policy formulation was almost totally laid in the hands of the new leaders jointly with Cabinet of Ministers, and both called for the assistance of newly established councils such as 'The Permanent Council for National Production' (1952) which was an independent body attached to the Cabinet Office and presided over by the Prime Minister, or the 'Council For Public Services (1953)'.

No substitute was suggested in place of the cancelled 1923 Constitution except a brief one made by the Revolution Command Council in 1953 but which placed almost all authority in their hands. Policy adoption remained largely in the hands of the new leaders and Cabinet members. Hence, it is hard to trace modern political democracy proposals in the first years of the revolution.

2. Economic Realm

Whether the Revolution leaders have got, since the outbreak of their movement in 1952 an 'economic ideology' other than the redistribution of land ownership, is a controversial issue. Mabro, an economist who lived in Egypt for a period, suggests that the revolution leaders 'had from the beginning other objectives' of which he gives mention to economic diversification and the consolidation of State's role in economic affairs.⁽⁶⁰⁾

In contrast with Mabro's view, another economist, O'Brien, favours the view that the new leaders were without an economic ideology at the outset of their revolutionary regime.⁽⁶¹⁾

The writer of the present study is more inclined to accept O'Brien's view which seems to be supported by the economic analysis made by some Egyptian economists, together with the words of the revolution leaders themselves. Amin, an eminent Egyptian scholar, raises a view similar to that of O'Brien affirming 'the relatively modest and traditional character of the economic goals of that period.'⁽⁶²⁾ Reflection on the six major goals announced on the eve of the Revolution indicates how they hardly go beyond the general statements of opposing feudalism, preventing monopoly and capitalism from dominating the State, and the recognition of the need for social justice.⁽⁶³⁾ The words of Nasser himself in 1963 support our view:

"We had the courage, at the beginning of the revolution, to declare that we had no theory, although we did have clearly defined principles. We declared that we would proceed, by trial and error, to construct a theory, we proceeded thus for 10 years."⁽⁶⁴⁾

In the laws issued in the first four years of the revolution it is possible to find clues of the normative trends in the economic realm. Many of these trends, it is admitted, had their origin, in some form or other, in the pre-revolution era. However, three salient trends can be pointed out:

(1) That the distribution of landownership until the mid-twentieth century was unfair and hence, should give place to a fairer form of distribution. Such a trend could easily be exemplified by the Law of Land Reform.

(2) That 'agrarian economy' is no more fitting by itself for a country with a high rate of population growth like Egypt and in which land reclamation is severely limited by access to water.

(3) That effective economic planning should be attempted to avoid the pre-revolution economic shakes.

The concern with the accomplishment of a fairer distribution of landownership in an agricultural country like Egypt has existed in the decades that preceded the 1952 Revolution. The norm was there, but the influence of the feudal capital lords was strong enough to keep the status quo. Two concrete proposals for land reform were turned down. A law was promulgated in 1946 according to which tracts amounting to three thousand feddans were to be distributed among landless peasants in the Gharbia Province between 1946-1949. However, the very low

Hence, the 1952 Law of Land Reform and the subsequent ones were after six goals:

financial status the Egyptian peasants had reached was the greatest impediment. The government tendency to sell its land to landless peasants proved failure as, says Baer, 'the small peasants could not take advantage of the offer, mainly because of the very high immediate payment required'. (65)

The first Law of Land Reform issued by the Revolution came out only forty days after its outbreak, fixing a two hundred feddans on personal ownership with another 100 feddans to children 50 feddans per child. The rest would be distributed among landless peasants. As far as the first Law is concerned, the big land owners had the right of full compensation of the distributed land as well as supplementary charges, and the debt carried 3% interest.

But, land re-distribution had in the minds of the revolution leaders more than the financial bearing. It was taken by them as the means to achieve 'social justice' in the Egyptian society. In this sense, Professor Saeed rejects the delimitation of the significance of land reform to the mere redistribution of land. To him, it is :

"more general and more comprehensive. It is a great social liberation movement from the shackles of feudalism. It is a means for the realization of equal social and political opportunities". (66)

In addition, the new leaders meant by the law to affect the direction of the investment movement in Egypt that had concentrated heavily on agricultural land in the last decades before the revolution. By the new law, it was hoped that the tide for investments in industry would find a favourable climate.

Hence, the 1952 Law of Land Reform and the subsequent ones were after six goals:

1. Liberation of the agricultural society from the domination of a small class feudalists who stood as well, as a symbol of political and economic exploitation.
2. Lessening the distinctions between various classes and hence, the realization of social peace.
3. Uplifting agriculture and raising the level of production.
4. Finding a more suitable formula for the relation between landlords and tenants.
5. Improving the conditions of agricultural workers by securing a minimum wage.
6. Directing investment and employment to new sectors other than in the possession of agricultural land. (67)

Another major concern in the first four years of the Revolution was the accomplishment of a quick uplift of the existing industries or more specifically, 'giving private investors every possible incentive to place their savings with manufacturing firms'. (68) This trend has required of the revolutionary leaders to issue, at the outset of their regime, some laws which may be taken as reverse to the movement of 'egyptianization' that had been started by Talat Harb in the 1920's. Law No 156 of 1953 gave the right of possessing 51 per cent of the shares of joint stock companies to **foreigners** while it had been only 49 per cent in Law No 147 of 1947. Furthermore, under the new law, it was made possible that the share issue be open to public subscription regardless of nationality if the required proportion was not

utilized by native citizens within a month. (69) Later on, laws No 26 and 475 gave the foreign capital more chances and better facilities than before.

The protection of Egyptian industry was made clear through a number of legislations. In August 1952, the 1 per cent uniform ad valorem duty of 1932 was raised to 8 per cent. As for machinery, fuel and important raw materials for industry, they were rated less or even exempted from this levy. The additional ad valorem duty was extended in 1952 and 1954 to cover a wider set of items than those included in the 1949 decree until, as Mabro and Radwan state: 'the rates increased to almost prohibitive levels on certain luxury elements'. (70)

A clear tendency for more effective economic planning had its origin in the earliest phase of the revolutionary regime. According to decree No 213 of 1952, planning was to be undertaken by an independent body that looks after the realization of the following goals:

- (a) To study the development of agriculture, electricity, commerce, transport and industry, and to examine the means of internal and external finance available to these projects.
- (b) To prepare an integrated program of national economic development plan to be carried over three years; pending the completion of the plan, the Council may present well conceived projects for immediate execution.
- (c) To reorganize domestic markets, promote exports, and attract both foreign and local capital. (71)

b) 1956-1961

The need, however, arose to create some sort of co-ordination and balance between the institutions of 'Services' and those of 'Production'. Such a trend was the drive behind the promulgation of Law No 493 of 1953 for the establishment of another council to undertake the realization of the following goals:

- a) To study the policies and put the plans for the education, construction, and social affairs coordinating between them in a way that leads to social development.
- b) To help in assessing and promoting the public services offered by the State as regards the level of their design, their organization and orientation in a way that ensures the people's active responses and participation in social activity.
- c) To follow-up the execution of various schemes as well as undertaking specific studies and researches.
- d) To study the work of voluntary organizations within the Council's scope of interest with the aim of coordinating their efforts and ensuring the utmost possible effectiveness. (72)

A third cycle in the trend was taken in March 1955 by the issue of Law No 141 for the establishment of the 'National Planning Committee' to drive the cause of economic planning a step further.

Whether the norms behind the economic planning trend were successfully institutionalized, or proved abortive; (73) the quickness by which new laws ^{were issued} to replace or orient the existing ones, and the successive changes in the economic realm in the first years of the revolution formed a difficulty for economists to trace a clear line in the economic development until 1956.

b) 1956-1961

I. Political Realm

A constitution was drafted by the new leaders in 1956, and was accepted by popular referendum in June 1956. It asserted the trends involved in the six major goals for the revolutionary stride which were announced on the eve of the revolution. Besides, it introduced some new trends directed on the whole, to take the establishment of an Egyptian welfare state within the context of Islamic and nationalist ideals. The 1956 Constitution, to some thinkers, is a "synthesis of reformist ideas in the direction of a welfare state, with Islamic and nationalist concepts." (74)

With the settlement of the cause of complete national independence through the treaty convened with Great Britain in 1954, internal affairs were concentrated upon and were given due attention as might easily be deduced from the Constitution text. Its preamble stated the political aims or proposals in the form of 'contract' between the people themselves. In this, it stands as different from the 1923 Constitution which was given to the Egyptian people as a 'grant' by royal will. The first introducing words of the 1956 Constitution run as follows:

"We, the people of Egypt
inspired by the lesson of the past, and armed with the strong
determination of the present to lay down the broad landmarks
of a future free from fear, from want and free from subjugation;
able to master all our capabilities for a massive positive effort
toward building a welfare society wherein will be assured ... (75)

Then the above introduction was followed by the six major goals for the revolutionay stride.

The 1956 Constitution declared in its articles that Egypt is a sovereign, independent democratic Arab Republic whose people are part of the Arab nation. The Republican system was strongly affirmed as the basis of the country's political structure. Continuation of the Republican regime was taken, in the Constitution text, as political necessity. It accords with the democratic logic and sovereignty of the people that were violated under the Monarchy. (76)

However, with the corruption of the old political parties in the pre-revolutionary era in mind, the formula of divergent political parties was rejected. The Constitution preached instead, the one-political organization for the whole nation within which they might express and practise their political views and activities. According to article no. 192:

"The citizens form a 'National Union' to work for the realization of the goals for the fulfilment of which the Revolution has broken out and to urge the sound structure of the nation politically, socially and economically." (77)

Seen against the model of political modern system after the Western type, this formula is less in accordance with modernity than in the pre-revolution era. Whatever might be stated in justification, it proved to be more harmful to political democracy than beneficial. Under this one mould dominated by the State, passivity and showiness in political action were more than ever, ^{prevailent} on the part of the masses. (78)

The 'Presidential' system of government was adopted with the President of the Republic undertaking the greatest share in the responsibility of rule. President was made the head of the Cabinet as well.

The Constitution recognized the three authorities: the legislative, the executive and the judiciary, and a line of differentiation between the three was drawn. Co-operation between the legislative and the executive was arranged, and the authority of the Parliament members was ascertained as regards the right to question Ministers and prevent trust from them.⁽⁷⁹⁾ On the other hand, judiciary was recognized as independent, as has been the case with the 1923 Constitution, and the judges were stated as immune against any harms due to the tasks they undertake.⁽⁸⁰⁾

Individual freedom was given a heavy weight in the 1956 Constitution. In part 2 (articles 30-63), the public rights and obligations of individuals were dealt with and can be classified under the following major trends:

1. That all Egyptians are equal in their rights and duties without any discrimination on the basis of race, language, religion or belief. (article 30)
2. Freedom of worship, expression, scientific research, the

press and peaceable assembly is guaranteed within the limits allowed by law. (articles 43-46)

3. For the first time in the modern history of Egypt, women were given the same franchise rights as men.

4. Education as a right to all Egyptians (article 49).

5. The right of employment is a commitment of the state towards Egyptian individuals (article 52).

6. The right to unionization was secured. (article 55).

Seen against the ideal typical modernity (that will be elaborated in ch. 5), it is clear that the 1956 Constitution represented a change towards sound 'political democracy'. The affirmation of the principle of equality, which Shils (81) gives due attention in political modernity, is evident. Freedom for individuals to express themselves by all means was guaranteed. Recognition of universities and the press as free institutions for public opinion accord with the ideals of typical modernity. (82) More important still, is the grant of franchise to women, which must be taken as indicator of the zeal for active participation in politics by all individuals with no regard to sex. One more consolidating step to the trend toward widening the franchise base is clear in the Law No 73 for 1956 which brought down the age of an Egyptian elector into eighteen years after it had been 25 and 21 for Senates and Notables respectively in the 1923 Constitution. (83)

The 1956 Constitution introduced more democratic trends than the ones that prevailed even in the first years of the revolution, and according to which many key administrative posts were a privilege for free officers of the first and second line. The principle of preferring men of trust (ahl al-thika) to men of experience (ahl al-khibra) was shaken, but not ended, by the 1956 Constitution. On the one hand, elections were performed on an expanded franchise basis. Provisional councils that were initiated in the first years of the revolution under the supervision of the Revolution Command Council, as the Presidential Council, and the Executive Councils, were to give place to a relatively more constitutional system to operate.

2. Economic Realm

A climate more favourable to change in economic proposals was found in Egypt by 1956. The new leaders, by that time, had accomplished a complete national independence that many former governments had failed to do. Besides, the dispute over leadership was settled and the legitimacy of the new regime was ascertained. Anti-revolutionary elements were removed or driven underground.

From the text of the 1956 Constitution, it is possible to point out three major trends in the economic realm:

I. That the State should practise more control in economic affairs, a trend that has remained ever since. Government share in development rose accordingly from about 28 million pounds in 1952, to 34 in 1953, 53 in 1954 then to 66 in 1956 but with vigorous rise since then amounting to 2400 millions in the 1970's. (84)

2. That the diversification of economy through industrialization -whatever the difficulties encountered in the first four years of the revolution- should be vigorously pushed meanwhile horizontal and vertical agricultural expansion should not cease.
3. Planning is necessary, and it should be 'comprehensive' side by side with the previous sector-wise planning.

The 1956 Constitution gave a clear indicator of what role the private economic activity should play in the national economy. In the first place, private activity and private ownership were recognized (article 3). What is more, private activity was given guarantees to remain, 'free from state interference' (article 8). However, according to the same article, some rules were put expressing a tendency toward 'controlled capitalistic economy'. In order for the private activity to enjoy that freedom, the Constitution stated that it should not 'prejudice public interests or endanger the people's security, or infringe upon their freedom or dignity' (article 8). In this way, the Constitution called for what might be called a reconciliation between private and public economic activity 'in the way that ensures social aims and public welfare' (article 10).

The presence of the state in regulating the economic affairs, which was in the first of the revolutionary periods hidden behind the arrangements that were designed to attract

both foreign and national capitalists to invest in industry, showed some change in the second period. State interference became clearer, and legitimately justified in the country's constitution. The trend toward state guidance in economy was even clearer in the field of industry. The trend was justified by the Minister of Industry in 1957 on the grounds that:

"If capitalists were left free to invest their capital in the industries they liked, or were able to determine the place, volume and object of their projects in the manner they desired without control or supervision or guidance from the Government, whose task is to see that they avoid ways leading to risks and to protect them from the consequences of bad investment, great harm would befall the public welfare. It has been observed that this absolute liberty most often leads to the existence of industrial projects not needed in any way for the national economy". (85)

The call that the state should have more role to play in Egyptian economy springs, in the 1956 Constitution, from the responsibility of the state toward the living conditions of all its subjects. According to article 17:

"The State endeavours to secure a decent living standard for every citizen, with the aim of providing food, housing, health, cultural and social services for all". (86)

It was accepted that the natural resources should be subject to firm control on the part of the State. The Constitution text left no shadow of doubt that:

"Natural resources, whether subterranean or in territorial waters, are the property of the State which it administers taking into account the exigencies of national wealth and national economy." (article 26)

Economic diversification through industrialization gained more acceptance in the second period of revolutionary development in comparison with the first. A clear tendency to elevate industry within a national industrial programme was embarked upon in 1956/57 with five objectives to be attained:

1. To accelerate the rate of growth in the national economy through the industrialization schemes to be carried out particularly the heavy industries. The above plan was thought of as a 'preliminary step for quick industrialization in the future'.⁽⁸⁷⁾
2. To increase the national income through an increase in the investment in industry. The anticipated net increase in income as a result of the execution of the plan was 80 million pounds. The share of industry in the national income is to rise from 11% to 19% by the end of the five years.
3. The increase of the chances of employment absorption. It was estimated that the plan would allow a total increase of 500.000 employees.
4. Narrowing the gulf in income and wealth. The increase of individual income especially for the working and the middle class was assumed to help in creating the socialist society that aims at minimum class distinctions.⁽⁸⁸⁾

The special attention given to industry could also be deduced from legislations. Law No 21 of 1958 was concerned with the organization and encouragement of industry. ^{It} was issued initially

to direct the industrial activity in the country according to the rules that might fill the gaps in the previous industrialization attempts, and to allow the utmost possible benefit for the national economy from the limited development resources. The establishment, alteration or change of purposes of the industrial firms had to be licensed by the Ministry of Industry. (89) The Ministry of Industry was allowed by law, to give all kinds of technical, financial and training aid for the encouragement of industry. All information about the industrial firms was to be presented to the Ministry of Industry.

As for planning, the success of the trend in the first revolutionary phase -judged by the number of projects that could be executed- raised more the value of planning in the eyes of the leaders. Law No 78 of 1957 was issued introducing for the first time in the Egyptian economy the 'long-range' comprehensive planning through the 'Supreme Council for National Planning' and the 'National Planning Committee'. (90) The first, was to be concerned with defining the economic and social goals of the State as well as approving the development plans in various stages. The second was concerned with the preparation of the general plan for economic and social development based on the studies it performs and the projects presented to it by various ministries especially with regard to the following:

I. Size and kind of the financial, material and human resources available.

2. Ways of utilizing these resources in production, investment, private and public consumption.
3. Systems of finance in both the private and public sectors.
4. Special systems related with the provision of foreign currency.
5. Programmes and projects of development in all economic and social sectors.
6. Programmes of technical and vocational training.
7. Organizing the co-ordination between the economic and executive bodies, whether public or private. (91)

With this wide range of tasks that were attached to the 'Supreme Council for National Planning' and the 'National Planning Committee', there was but little need for the two previous councils for planning previously established in the first revolutionay phase (1952-1956) namely, the 'Permanent Council for National Production' (P.C.N.P.) and the 'Permanent Council of Services' (P.C.S.) which were abolished with the issue of the above law (No 78 of 1957).

c. 1961 until present

I. Political Realm

The major landmark in the period is the promulgation of the 'National Charter' in 1962 after the unanimous approval on the part of the 'National Congress of Popular Powers'. It draws a clearer differentiating line from the pre-revolution 'political democracy' than does the 1956 Constitution. By 1962, the Revolution leaders had become more mature with ten years of experience in rule. So clear and specific is the line drawn by the 'Charter' that it presents the base on which all subsequent documents especially the 'permanent Constitution' (1971) and the 'October Working Paper' (1974) built.

It is true that political democracy was regarded in the documents of both the pre- and post-revolution eras as the utmost the country could aspire to reach. But the difference stems from two matters which have their wide-scale repercussion in the democratic application, namely the participation of the masses in the political affairs of the state and the way they are represented.

While the Egyptian masses were evidently neglected in the pre-1952 democracy as a reflection of the domination of the feudalists and capitalists allied with the King, the place of the masses in the 'National Charter' is much higher. 'The value of the true revolution lies', as the Charter states, 'in the degree of its popularity, in the extent to which

it is an expression of the vast masses, in the extent to which it mobilises their forces to build the future, and also in the extent to which it enables these masses to impose their will on life'.(92)

The philosophical basis on which the democratic perception in the 'Charter' was founded, links 'revolution' and 'progressiveness' with 'active participation' and 'sound representation' of the whole people in the rule. From this angle, the perception of democracy is made a cause of life for the new regime to accomplish rather than a matter of 'granted' rights to the long deprived masses. The 'Charter' states that:

"A revolution is naturally a popular and progressive action. It is the action of the whole people mustering their strength in a determined attempt to remove all obstacles and barriers standing in the way of life they conceive as desirable. It is also a jump across the economic and social underdevelopment, with the intention of making up for what was lost and of realising the great aspirations which form part of what the people want for the future generations.

The revolutionary action, therefore, would not be possible unless it possessed these two attributes:

1. popularity
2. progressiveness

A revolution is not the work of one individual, otherwise it would be merely a subjective and desperate action against a whole society. Nor is a revolution the work of one group, otherwise it would be a mere clash between this group and the majority of the population." (93)

In later documents, the ideals of political modernity in the minds of the leaders is shown revolving round the two cores previously mentioned: 'active participation' and 'sound representation' especially in so far as the masses are concerned. Democracy came at last to mean the assertion of the people's sovereignty, the placing of all powers to serve their ends. Such a trend is made clear in the 'Permanent Constitution' which states that sovereignty is solely for the people who are the source of all power. While the people practise it, they practise and safeguard the national unity. (94)

Two major principles govern the concept of political democracy in the 'Charter' as well as in subsequent documents:

1. That political democracy cannot be separated from social democracy.
2. That political democracy cannot exist under the domination of any one class. (95)

The disregard of 'social democracy' in the 1923 Constitution, as has already been mentioned, had far reaching effects on the pre-revolution democratic experiment. Economic as well as political power largely sank in the hands of an alliance between the capitalists, the feudalists and the King while the masses had no role to do except to watch the struggle over power. Such a lesson was learnt by the leaders of the Revolution as is clearly expressed in the 'Charter'.

A citizen could not be imagined as free to vote unless he enjoys three guarantees:

2. That the way in which sound representation of the popular masses might be accomplished, is for the political organization to be elected on free and direct elections.
- (a) He should be free from exploitation in all forms.
 - (b) He should have an equal opportunity for a good share in the national wealth.
 - (c) He should be free of all anxieties that undermine the security of his future. (96)

Such guarantees were thought of with the aim of protecting the poor masses from future possibilities of forging their will as was the case before 1952. From this angle two guidelines were stated by the 'Charter' and were assured in subsequent documents particularly the 'Permanent Constitution' and the 'October Working Paper':

I. That the masses of peasants and workmen should get at least half of the seats in the political and popular organizations at all levels including the 'National Assembly', on the grounds that they represent the majority of the people.

A peasant was operationally defined as the individual who, including his immediate family, does not own more than ten feddans of land. He must be living in rural areas and his only source of income should be from the production of his agricultural land. A worker is one who is engaged in either industry, agriculture or services with his only income from his salary. He cannot belong to a professional organization and is not a graduate of a university, a higher institute or a military academy. (97)

2. That the way in which sound representation of the popular masses might be accomplished, is for the political organization to be based on free and direct election. (98)

The 1964 Constitution

The principles that were initiated in the National Charter, were affirmed in the 1964 Constitution. A clearer differentiation of authorities was fostered by the new Constitution. Policy drafts whether by the Executive or other bodies, have to gain the consent of two-thirds majority of the National Assembly. Balance in power between the President of Republic and representatives of the people (National Assembly members) was maintained. In case President opposes one law passed by the National Assembly, it is automatically promulgated if the Assembly passes it another time by a two-thirds majority. Confidence could also be drawn from the Government by the National Assembly. In case the President dissolves the National Assembly, he must call for new elections at a maximum of two months.

In 'policy implementation', the Cabinet of Ministers, headed by Prime Minister is entrusted with undertaking policies at the national level. Concentration of many economic and political activities within State control remained unchanged.

With the 1964 Constitution, it can be said that representatives of the people gained greater responsibilities

which later documents secured. The chance of active participation was, in the meantime, made open for all Egyptians with no regard to sex, race, religion, social status, economic conditions .., etc. However, it must be taken as a different cause whether the Egyptian masses benefited by the new chances open for their active participation.

The A.S.U. as the one political organization


The A.S.U. Statute (1962) proposed that there be a "social vanguard which leads the people, expresses their will, directs national action and undertakes effective control of the progress of such action.." ⁽⁹⁹⁾ The formula, which was unanimously accepted by the people, was the establishment of the 'Arab Socialist Union' (A.S.U.) as the one comprehensive political structure that encompasses all categories of the popular powers. The goals attached to it were:

1. The realization of sound democracy by the people and for the people/so that the revolution might be 'by' the people in its style, and 'for' the people in its aims and purposes.
2. The realization of the socialist revolution which is the revolution of the working people.
3. Driving the probabilities of progress in a revolutionary way for the benefit of the masses.
4. Protecting the securities stated in the National Charter. ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

The proposed organization of the A.S.U. was designed to cover the whole country geographically as well as categorically. From the twenty-five governorates (muhafazat), down to districts or major towns (marakez) further down still to cover the major villages (qura), in each of the last category were formed 'basic units' (lijan asasiyia). Twenty members for each basic unit were elected by all citizens registered in the electoral lists for public election. From among the elected twenty, the secretary and assistant secretary were to be forwarded up to the 'markaz' level. Similarly, town or district secretaries were entitled to join the next level (the governorate level). The proposed hierarchy is shown in the following chart.

Chart 2.I

The Arab Socialist Union Organization Structure (1970) ^(IOI)



The proposed goals and structure of the A.S.U. were not sound when put into practice. The gravest of the defects were related with its failure to mobilize the masses and showiness which prevailed among its members, as was reported by Mayfield (1971).⁽¹⁰²⁾ President Sadat recognized these defects and severely condemned the rise of 'Power Centres' (Marakez al-Quwa) who turned the political organization into a futile tool under which respect for law and for individual freedom were relaxed.⁽¹⁰³⁾ Rectification of the 1952 revolution was started in 1971. The Permanent Constitution (1971) strongly emphasized the rights and freedom of individuals declaring the illegitimacy of any arrest, violation of privacy or any sort of restriction of personal freedom unless by judicial order.⁽¹⁰⁴⁾

The one-party system was subject to examination on a large scale since 1974 on the part of the government, the National Assembly members, and a great many intellectuals. The outcome was a condemnation of the A.S.U. as the one political organization. A new trend in favour of the Western model of parliamentary system gained many adherents. Since 1976, political parties have been allowed, but it is too early to pass judgement on the new experiment.

2. Economic Realm

Two major trends have been emphasized in the National Charter (1962), the 30th March Declaration (1968), the Permanent Constitution (1971) and the October Working Paper (1974), namely the necessity of scientific culture for Egyptian society, and 'social equality' among its individuals. With these two major trends, the thoughts about modern economy in Egypt since the early 1960's are concerned.

On the one hand, backwardness was linked in the National Charter with the absence of scientific spirit.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ On the other hand, 'Arab Socialism' was suggested as a formula, not copied from the Marxist or Western teachings, but originating from the Arab Islamic heritage.⁽¹⁰⁶⁾

'Arab Socialism' was to aim at the realization of both political and social freedom for individuals and their protection from exploitation and anxieties. This was suggested to foster the inherent rights (al-huquq al-tabeyah) which are put in five:

1. The right to life (al-hayah), and the preservation of health.
2. The right to freedom (al-hurriyah), human freedom, civic freedom, social freedom, and moral freedom.
3. The right to education and knowledge (al-ilm), which is of higher value than piety.
4. The right to dignity (al-karamah), i.e. to have the right to enjoy an honoured position in society.
5. The right to own property (al-tamalluk) with labour as means of acquiring property and place in society.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

The doctrines of 'Arab Socialism' were put in a series of legislations all designed to ensure the above 'inherent rights' and prevent all forms of exploitation to be practised against the poor classes:

- a. Law No III and II2 of I96I for the distribution of the profits of companies allocating 25% for the workers and officials, and the 75% that remains for share holders.
- b. Law No II3 of I96I putting a maximum limit of LE 5.000 annually for the head of a board of directors.
- c. Law No II4 of I96I that the workers should be represented in boards of directors by two out of the seven. One of the two is to be elected as representative of workers and the other as representative of the officials.
- d. Law No II5 of I96I orienting steep taxation on income in the highest categories to reach 90% of the ^{net} total income in case it exceeded LE IO.000.
- e. Law No II7 of I96I for the nationalization of I49 firms including all the banks and insurance companies.
- f. Law No II9 of I96I that limited the individual possession in I59 companies with a maximum of LE IO.000. The excess should be taken as the State's possession.
- g. Law No II8 of I96I that the 'Public Sector' should share in 9I companies with a share that is not less than 50% of the capital.
- h. Law No I20 of I96I for the organization of cotton export firms.
- i. Law No I27 of I96I to bring the maximum of landownership to IOO feddans. Law I29 exempted the peasants who benefited by the

Law of Land Reform of half the instalments and interests due on them.

j. Law No 133 of 1961 limiting the work hours ^{to} 42 hours weekly as a maximum.

The above laws issued mainly in 1960 and 1961 represent what economists often regard as the 'socialist revolution'. (108)

The National Charter came out in 1962 to lay the socialist trends on solid ground of legitimacy by affirming five rules on which modern economy in Egypt should be based:

(1) That the major skeleton of the production operation including railways, roads, dams, sea, land and air transportation,... etc. together with the public services should be within the framework of public ownership.

(2) The majority of industries whether heavy or medium together with mining should be part of public ownership. Light industries, however, must always be beyond monopoly.

(3) The people practise full control over trade through the 'Public Sector'. A place was, nevertheless, kept for private capital though within a certain limit as the Charter states:

"Though it is incumbent upon private capital to participate in the export trade, the Public Sector must have the main share in that field to preclude all possible fraudulency". (109)

(4) In finance, all banks should be within the framework of public ownership. Capital's role is a national one that must not be left to speculation and adventure. Insurance companies should

as well be public ownership.

(5) A clear distinction should be made between two kinds of private ownership: the exploiting and the non-exploiting. (II0)

The principles of 'Arab Socialism' were also included in one way or other, in later revolutionary documents such as the '30 March Declaration' (1968), the 'Permanent Constitution' (1971) and the 'October Working Paper' (1974) despite an increasing tendency towards liberalising economy witnessed since the early 1970's as will later be indicated.

The trend toward comprehensive planning was continued and even consolidated by the socialist line drawn in the Charter which regards that:

"efficient socialist planning is the guarantee for the sound exploitation of actually existing resources, or those which are latent or potential. At the same time, it is a guarantee for the continued distribution of fundamental services. It is also a guarantee for raising the standard of services already now offered. It is guarantee for extending those services to the areas which had fallen victim to negligence and inefficiency" (III)

The first five -year plan for the years 1960-1965 as a part of a broad 10-year plan (the second part of which was severely handicapped by the 1967 War) aimed high at the achievement of three main goals:

1. to double the national income over ten years,
2. to achieve larger equality of opportunity, as well as a fairer distribution of income and property, and
3. to expand employment opportunities. (II2)

The tendency toward a more liberal economic system in Egypt since the early 1970's was dictated by some unfavourable socio-economic conditions particularly since the 1967 defeat. President Sadat who succeeded Nasser after the latter's death in September 1970, highly favours what came to be termed 'Economic Overture' (al-infatah al-iktisadi) which means the liberalisation whatever the contradictions with the former revolutionary experience might rise. Expressing Sadat's view on this concern, Ahmad, in a recent OECD study on the 'Absorptive Capacity of the Egyptian Economy' (1976) states that such an attempt at liberalisation 'must come in terms with the existing realities: any resulting contradictions being accepted as creative and, more or less, permanent elements of a new, liberalised institutional framework'. (II3) As far as the new trend is concerned, Egypt should be open to the whole nations of the world and should not confine herself to one bloc. By all means, foreign and Arab investors should be encouraged to flow into Egypt, meanwhile all facilities and assurances of protection against nationalization are given. Among the six major tasks set by the President of the Republic to the 1973 Cabinet of Ministers were:

"to carry out the "open-door" policy and to provide trust and facilities for all; to spare the people the brunt of the world's high cost of living and to provide an acceptable standard of living for all people; and to maintain the respectability of law, the inviolability of public funds and the integrity of public services." (II4)

The trend toward a more serious outlook at science and its necessity in building 'modern' Egypt, was preached in the National Charter on account of the country's underdevelopment and its lagging behind in science and its application. It identified a wide gulf between the country and the world scientific progress, and called for a harder trial to catch up with the revolution of science or, at least, narrow the gulf that was admitted to be widening. Thus, the resort to science was expressed in the National Charter as an inevitable solution:

"Our ability to master the various branches of science is the only way left for us to compensate for underdevelopment. If the national struggle reaches our advanced science, it would have a greater opportunity for progress; it would make the former underdevelopment seen an advantage, for, then by comparison the new achievement would appear spectacular. If the nations on whom underdevelopment was imposed, could now make a start supported by advanced science, they would be at a starting point, superior to that from which other advanced nations began." (II5)

With this view at the role of science, the National Charter comes to the conclusion that 'The major economic and social problems confronting our people, at present, must be resolved on a scientific basis'. (II6) Thus, the new outlook at science was delineated by a utilitarian view taking science as a means of solving pressing economic and other problems, rather than 'science for science's sake'. However, it was envisaged that only at a later stage of the country's development that the latter trend might be applicable to Egypt. The National Charter argues, in this respect, that:

"science for its own sake is a responsibility which our national potentiality cannot shoulder. Therefore, science for society should be the motto of the cultural revolution at the present stage. The achievement of the objectives of the national struggle will enable us at a further stage of our development, to make a positive contribution to the world in the domain of science for its own sake..... We cannot waste a moment before entering the atomic age. We lagged behind in the age of steam and the age of electricity. This underdevelopment, although arbitrarily imposed by imperialism, has and still is costing us a great deal. We are now required, at the dawn of the atomic age, to join those who have embarked on this age." (II7)

A close look at the proposals included in the various documents convince any observer that Egypt has a deep desire to build a 'modern' State, and that the objective estimation of requirements is not lacking. Egypt's greatest dilemma is in turning rosy dreams into fact. If 1952 is taken as a turning point in its 'rising expectations' for modernity, the 1960's and the 1970's are illustrative of its 'growing frustration'. 'Man' in Egypt is still the weakest rung in the chain leading to the realization of modernity. Hence, the October Working Paper (1974) was right to call that

Egyptian man has to be adapted to modern age of science and technology if 'modern State' is to be a fact. (II8)

While the Five-year Plan (1978-1982) is honest in admitting Egypt's failure to establish a sound economic reform that a modern State requires, it was careful to diagnose the cause of malady and the way to recover. The striking conclusion to which it came is that: "the starting point must be Egyptian man". (II9)

Notes - Chapter Two

1. WILBER, D. N. op.cit. p. 139.

also SMITH, H. H. et al. op. cit. p. 192.

2. RATEB, A. The July 23 revolution. Cairo: Dar al-Nahda al-Arabia, 1969. p. 55. (Arabic text)

3. ISSAWI, C. Egypt: an economic and social analysis. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London: Oxford University Press, 1947. p. 33.

also RATEB, A. ibid.

4. RATEB, A. ibid.

5. ELGWOD, P.G. The transit of Egypt. London: E. Arnold and Co., 1938. Appendix 3.

also LACOUTURE, J. and S. Egypt in transition. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1956. p. 89.

6. O'BRIEN, P. The revolution in Egypt's economic system, from private enterprise to socialism. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London: Oxford University Press, 1966. p. 44.

7. SHARABI, H. B. Governments and politics in the Middle East in the twentieth century. N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962. p. 194.

8. LOTFI, A. Economic development, an analytical study of the economic history of Europe and Egypt. Cairo: Dar al-Quran, 1975. p. 212. (Arabic text)

9. ROSHDI. M. op.cit. vol. I. p. 176.

10. CENTRAL AGENCY FOR PUBLIC MOBILISATION AND STATISTICS. Population and development. Cairo: CAPMS, June 1973. Table 3.I.6 p. 174.

11. ibid.

12. AHMAD, Y. J. op.cit. p. 45.

13. ROSHDI, M. op.cit. p. 176.

14. WILBER, D. N. op.cit. p. 284.

15. LOTFI, A. op.cit. p. 244.

16. SHENOUDA, E. F. H. History of industrial education until the July 23, revolution. A published M.A. thesis, Faculty of Education, Ain Shams University. Cairo: Ministry of Culture, 1967. pp. 231-242. (Arabic text)

17. MABRO, R. and RADWAN, S. The industrialization of Egypt 1939-1973: policy and performance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976. p. 23.

18. ibid.

19. ibid.

20. ROSHDI, M. op.cit. p. 180 and 228.

21. ABDEL-FADEL, M. Development, income distribution and social change in rural Egypt 1952-1972: a study of the political economy of agrarian transition. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1975. Table I.2. p. 5.
22. C.A.P.M.S., Population and development. op.cit. p. 172.
23. MABRO, R. and RADWAN, S. op.cit. p. 24.
24. A system that was found in Egypt under Colonial rule and until 1937. According to such system, foreign subjects were allowed certain privileges in legal and personal matters outside the commitment to local laws of Egypt. This was a sort of diplomatic and economic immunity.
25. EL-BARRAWI, R., The military coup in Egypt. Cairo: The Renaissance Bookshop, December 1952. p. 46.
26. see Preamble to the 1923 Egyptian Constitution, op.cit.
27. Article 72 of the 1923 Constitution.
28. SAID, G. E. M. op.cit. p. 77.
29. YEHIA, G., The revolution and political organization. Cairo: Dar al-Ma'aref, 1966. Chapter 2, pp. 165-189. (Arabic text).
30. EL-HAKIM, T., Maze of justice. Translated by A. S. Eban. London: Harvill Press, 1947.
31. HUSSEIN, T. The future of culture in Egypt. Cairo: Al-Ma'aref Bookshop and Press, 1938. (Arabic text).
32. see JANKOWSKI, J. P. Egypt young rebels 1933-1952. California: Hoover Institute Publications, 1975. pp. 60-71. also see: HUSSEIN, M. Class conflict in Egypt 1945-1970. Translated by M. and S. Chairman et al. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973.
33. ISSAWI, C. op.cit. p. 148.
34. SAID, G. E. M. op.cit. p. 265.
35. EL-FEKI, H. Cultural history of education in the United Arab Republic. Cairo: Dar al-Nahda al-Arabia, 1965. p. 192. (Arabic text).
36. INSTITUTE OF NATIONAL PLANNING, Research project on employment and unemployment among the educated. Cairo: Institute of National Planning, 1963. p. 24.
37. SAID, G. E. M. op.cit. p. 265.
38. ISSAWI, C. op.cit. pp. 149-150.
39. Quoted by MAYFIELD, J. B. Rural politics in Nasser's Egypt, a quest for legitimacy. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971. p. 103.
40. YEHIA, G. op.cit. p. 251

- also see SALEH, Z. and EID, E. S. H. Glimpses of the history of the Ministry of Education as shown by the work of its ministers. Cairo: Museum of Education, 1959. (Arabic text)
- The book gives record of twenty nine different ministers of education for the period between March 1923 and July 1952 stating the period during which each minister was in power.
41. DEKMEJIAN, R. H. Egypt under Nassir: a study in political dynamics. London: At the University Press, 1972. p. 19.
42. Vide Supra pp. 55 - 57 .
43. SAID, G. E. M. op.cit. p. 266.
44. C.A.P.M.S. Handbook of the United Arab Republic 1952-1967 Cairo: CAPMS, June 1968. p. 50.
45. LABIB, R. et al., History and system of education in the Arab Republic of Egypt. 3rd edition Cairo: The Anglo Bookshop, 1972. pp. 142-143. (Arabic text).
46. ibid. p. 142.
47. SAID, G. E. M. op.cit. p. 266.
48. Al-Tale'ah (Cairo monthly magazine), Vol. 4, No. 9, September 1968. p. 16. (Arabic text).
49. HUSSEIN, M. and HABIB, K. Social change and education Cairo: al-Waay al-Arabi Bookshop, 1972. pp. 65-66 (Arabic text).
50. INSTITUTE OF NATIONAL PLANNING, Research project ... op.cit. p. 22.
51. From 0.48 feddans in 1907, the per capita share of cultivated land steadily dropped to 0.41 in 1917. 0.39 in 1937 and to 0.30 in 1947. see vide supra pp. 56-57 and 69-71.
52. INSTITUTE OF NATIONAL PLANNING, Research project ... op.cit. p. 23.
53. Vide supra, p. 13.
54. ZARTMAN, I. W. op.cit. p. 106.
55. O'BRIEN, P. op.cit.
56. The National Charter, op.cit. pp. 6-7.
- * An eminent contemporary American sociologist whose views about modernity will further be elaborated in chapter five.
57. NAGUIB, M. E., Egypt's destiny London: Victor Gallanez, 1955p. 181.
58. ibid. pp. 184-185.
59. Quoted by WHEELOCK, K. Nasser's new Egypt: a critical analysis. London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1960. p. 23.
60. MABRO, R. op.cit. p. 107.

61. O'BRIEN, P. op.cit. p. 68.
62. AMIN, G. 'The Egyptian economy and the revolution', in P. J. Vatikiotis (ed.), Egypt since the revolution, S.O.A.S. Studies in Modern Asia and Africa, No. 7.
London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1968. p. 40.
63. DEKMEJIAN, R. H. op.cit. pp. 122-123.
also see SAID, G. E. M. op.cit. p. 449 in which is states that:
"When the 23rd July 1952 revolution broke out in the face of social injustice it had not already got a planned programme or a clear view of what would be the social, economic or political system notwithstanding the existence of strong determination among the revolutionary vanguards to develop the society in accordance with the six remarkable principles."
64. Quoted by SMITH, H. H. et al. op.cit. p. 280.
65. BAER, G. A history of landownership in modern Egypt 1800-1950
London: Oxford University Press, 1962. p. 86.
66. SAID, G. E. M. op.cit. p. 299.
67. ibid. p. 304.
68. O'BRIEN, P. op.cit. p. 70.
69. ibid. p. 71.
70. MABRO, R. and RADWAN, S. op.cit. p. 57.
71. Law No. 213 of 1952.
72. Law No. 493 of 1953.
73. see O'BRIEN, P. op.cit. p. 85 in which he expresses his doubt about their success.
74. see JONES, C. F. "The new Egyptian Constitution", Middle East Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1956. pp. 300-306.
75. The 1956 Egyptian Constitution.
76. ibid.
77. ibid. article 192.
78. ibid.
79. In chapter 3 of this study, it will be shown in some detail how the one 'political organization' in Egypt under the name of 'Liberation Rally' (1953-1956), the 'National Union' (1956-1961) and the 'Arab Socialist Union' (1962 and until 1975 when it got its present fluid position) all failed one after the other to mobilize Egyptian masses to participate actively in political action.
80. The 1956 Constitution. op.cit.
81. SHILS, E. Political development in the new states, op.cit. p.8.
Shils indicates in clear words that 'Modernity entails democracy, and democracy in the new states must above all be equaliterian'.

82. *ibid.* pp. 54-55 also pp. 45-46.
83. Law No. 73 of 1956.
84. O'BRIEN, P. *op.cit.*
85. MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, Industry after the revolution and the Five-Year Plan. Cairo: Ministry of Industry, 1957. Appendix 4.
86. The 1956 Constitution, *op.cit.* article 17.
87. SAID, G. E. M. *op.cit.* p. 395.
88. *ibid.* pp. 395-397.
89. Law No. 21 of 1958, article 1.
90. Law No. 78 of 1957.
91. Presidential decree No. 78 of 1957, article 7.
92. The National Charter. *op.cit.* p. 31.
93. *ibid.*
94. The Permanent Constitution, 1971. *op.cit.* article 3.
95. The National Charter. *op.cit.* pp. 31-32.
96. *ibid.* p. 38.
97. *ibid.* p. 40 in which it is definitely stated that:
- " ... farmers and workmen will get half the seats in political and popular organisations at all levels, including the House of Representatives, since they form the majority of the people. Moreover, they are also the majority who have been longest deprived of their inalienable right to shape and direct their future."
- For the definition of 'farmer' and 'worker' see Al-Ahram (daily Egyptian paper), May 31, 1968. p. 4.
98. The National Charter, *ibid.* p. 39.
99. ALDERFER, H. F. et al, Local Government in the United Arab Republic. Cairo: Institute of Public Administration, 1964. Appendix 3.
100. *ibid.*
101. MAYFIELD, J. B. *op.cit.* Appendix I.
102. *ibid.* pp. 131-133.
- Mayfield was impressed by the account given by one member of the A.S.U. evaluation team on the public meeting he attended for the discussion of the mission of 'lajnat al-'ishrin' (committee of twenty)
- " These sessions clearly confirmed the villagers' inability to organize themselves, to express their problems coherently, and their tendency to rely on the state to find solutions to the problems they themselves cannot solve. These sessions also demonstrated the ineffectiveness of lajant al'ishrin which had no conception of the aims and aspirations of the Arab Socialist Union...."
103. The October Working Paper, *op.cit.* p. 38.
104. The Permanent Constitution, 1971, articles 41-57.

- IO5. The National Charter, op.cit. pp. 74-75.
- IO6. ibid. Chapter 3, pp I7-22 and chapter 6 pp. 43-51.
- IO7. Al-SIBA'I, M. The socialism of Islam. Quoted by J. B. Mayfield, op.cit., pp. II2-II3.
- IO8. SAID, G. E. M. op.cit. p. 448.
- IO9. The National Charter. op.cit. p. 47.
- II0. ibid. pp. 47-48.
- III. ibid. p. 45.
- II2. HANSEN, B. and MARZOUK, G. op.cit. p. 295.
- II3. AHMAD, Y. J. op.cit., p. 58.
- II4. ibid. conveyed in a letter to Mr Hegazy on his appointment as Prime Minister, 1974.
- II5. The National Charter. op.cit. p. 75.
- II6. ibid.
- II7. ibid.
- II8. The October Working Paper. op.cit. pp. 67-69.
- II9. ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, MINISTRY OF PLANNING, General Strategy of the Five-Year Plan 1978-1982. Vol. I
Cairo: Ministry of Planning, August 1977. p. I6.

Chapter Three

No-Change: (I) Unmodified Attitudes of the Adult Masses

The response of Egyptian adult masses to modernity proposals included in such revolution documents as the National Charter (1962), the Permanent Constitution (1971) and the October Working Paper (1974) gives clue to the staggering stride of modernity since 1952. Analysis of the unmodified attitudes of the masses as constraint to modernity proposals, is the major task of the present chapter. However, one should not underestimate the bright aspects of behaviour and attitude among Egyptian masses, which scholars like Galal (1966),⁽¹⁾ Ewais (1970),⁽²⁾ and Refae (1971)⁽³⁾ have cared to analyse. Nor is it fair to deny that some success in attitude modification among limited sectors of the population has been reached in the last quarter of a century. But objective thinking indicates that such modification has been inadequate. Adult masses have remained inapt in their internalised attitudes to undertake the realization of modernity proposals.

As early as 1957, Nasser, leader of the revolution, had to admit before the National Assembly, that contrary to expectations, the intended transformation advocated by the revolution was not an easy task, being conditioned by success to transform Egyptian 'man', a task he saw as very difficult:

" ... the most important, the most difficult, the most crucial of our problems is to create in this part of the world a dynamic and watchful nation and that human beings are the raw material from which a nation is made.... To build factories is easy, to build hospitals and schools is possible, but to build a nation of men is hard and difficult task."⁽⁴⁾

Four years later, he had to repeat in a more explicit way that the values and mores of the society have not undergone the necessary change required for transformation. In an address to the nation in October, 1961, he lamented that:

"The legacy inherited by the Revolution was dark and cumbersome, both in the machinery of government and its conditions, and in the sphere of class stratification and its rules ... We have to embark on a full-scale operation aimed at a reformation of the values and mores of society."⁽⁵⁾

Awareness of the problem, did not mean the ability to deal successfully with it. Unmodified attitudes, like passivity, was found to be prevalent not only among the ignorant rural masses, but, to Haykal's surprise among the educated as well. He cared to explain how the question was not one of political loyalty to the revolution, but participation in it and interaction with it.⁽⁶⁾ Passivity of the intellectuals has left the masses without the vanguard to lead the way before them:

"The collaboration of the intellectuals with the revolutionary drive after July 23, 1952 is not the ultimate aim. The natural and inevitable role for the intellectuals to play

was not "merely to collaborate with the Revolution"; it should have been "to interact with it, to adopt its cause, to take it in, to give it ... its national ideology, to distill from their consciences and their knowledge its revolutionary doctrine, i.e. its road to the radical basic change in the structure of Egyptian society."⁽⁷⁾

Failure to modify the attitudes of the masses in line with the preached proposals resulted in a serious handicap. Population explosion could not be checked as the masses have not responded adequately to family planning programmes. Apathy, irrationality, passivity and familism remained as prevalent as ever. At the high level of responsibility, it was admitted that Egyptian masses have attitudes which contrasted with the basic values of the socialist transformation. The director of the Arab Socialist Union Institute specified fatalism, absence of faith in science and its findings, apathy, refusal to submit to the requirements of organized work; and the rejection of any planning or regulation of life.

In the following part of the chapter the unmodified attitudes of the adult masses as constraint to modernity are put in the socio-economic context.

(a) Attitudes toward participation in political action

Attempts to build sound democracy, as one of the six major goals announced on the outbreak of the revolution

required that the masses should, by all means, be attracted to participate actively in political action. Such participation could not be secured meanwhile the old political parties of the pre-revolution era remained the centre of political heaviness. Their failure to respond to the directions to rectify their organisational structure led to the liquidation of all parties in January 1953. In the meantime, there were other steps to eliminate all obstacles before the realization of political modernity. Corrupt monarchy was to leave its position to Republican regime in June 1953. Accomplishment of complete national independence of British rule, was a third battle fought at the same time. Amidst these, it was supposed that the masses should back the cause of political modernity by active involvement. However, passivity remained as before the revolution, and Nasser lamented in 1955 that:

"Many people ... stood to one side as mere spectators, observing our revolution, as though they had nothing to do with it. They only waited for the result of a struggle between two opposing forces, neither of which concerned them. Sometimes I resent this. Sometimes I demand of myself and my comrades: why don't they come out of their hiding places to speak^{up} and to act?" (8)

Alliance of the whole popular powers within one political organization was adopted as a policy aimed at political integration. There was a series of such organizations starting with the Liberation Rally 'Hayat al-Tahrir' (1953),

followed by the National Union 'al-Ittihad al-Qumi' (1957), then the Arab Socialist Union 'al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki al-Arabi' (1962).

Enthusiasm of the leaders to mobilize the masses, and to teach them "how to elect their representatives properly"⁽⁹⁾ through membership of the Liberation Rally was, quantitatively, a considerable success, what Professor Halpern described as 'the mobilization of millions in a few weeks'.⁽¹⁰⁾ But, the attitudes of the masses involved was the decisive factor. Jeane and Simone Lacouture, who happened to be in Egypt during that time, were led to the belief that the great numbers who flocked to have their names registered on the lists sought membership, not as a means to share actively in political action, but 'merely in order to obtain support and protection'.⁽¹¹⁾ What the country needed for the enrichment of the cause of political democracy was ^{not} the showy task of registration. The need was urgent to extend political action to the whole population and penetrate the rural masses. Such showiness yielded more harm than benefit for it gave false optimistic indication of political involvement.

In the same way, the attitudes of the masses toward active participation were behind the failure of the 'National Union'. In its structure, it was led by nominated well chosen cadre who was to interact with the elected committees on the basic-unit-level. Representatives by election filled 29,000 positions in its hierarchy. However, active involvement on

the part of the elected local leaders was not up to the standard. To Zartman, political action was characterized by showiness and futility.⁽¹²⁾ With the absence of modified attitudes towards political action, the whole matter was blurred. Giving elected peasants in the rural areas the responsibility of leading political action in the community was double-edged weapon. Reluctant to take action on their own, whether because of the prevalent illiteracy or lack of enthusiasm, the basic units turned into miniature of government offices always waiting for instructions. The dilemma, as one Cairo magazine found, was a matter of attitudes of the elected members of the basic units toward involvement in political action, for "... all they wanted was to be regarded as government officials, and after they had been elected, they still looked to the government for instructions."⁽¹³⁾ Passivity of the masses was behind the failure of the second of the revolution's political organization as Mansfield,⁽¹⁴⁾ Baer,⁽¹⁵⁾ and Zartman,⁽¹⁶⁾ tend to believe. The writer agrees with Mansfield that 'The National Union never gained the confidence or interest of the mass of the people during the five years of its legal existence.'⁽¹⁷⁾

Such lack of interest on the part of the masses, besides crippling the effectiveness of the National Union, gave an easy access to anti-revolutionary elements to penetrate its activities and subvert it from within. Nasser admitted this

as a grave mistake:

" ... we committed a grave mistake We formed the National Union to act^{as} a frame encircling the conflict between classes... Reactionary elements which infiltrated into the National Union managed to paralyse its revolutionary effectiveness consequently, the most important thing today is the popular reorganization of the National Union to change it into a revolutionary organ in the hands of the national people... The National Union should be opened for^{the} labourers; the farmers; the intellectuals; the owners whose property is not based on exploitation; to the officers and soldiers who represented the vanguard on July 23." (18)

The mistakes of the 'National Union' seemed to be in mind when the revolution established the 'Arab Socialist Union' in 1962. Insistence to reach the masses by all means, and in whatever place was the slogan. The basic units were formed in villages, workshops, companies, schools, Ministries, professional syndicates, even in small residential suburbs. Furthermore, farmers and labourers were allowed a minimum half of the seats in all units and at all levels up to the National Council. (19)

The new trends were nominally applied, but in practice passive participation of the masses was, but slightly changed. In the 30th March Declaration (1968), Nasser was inclined to imagine that the continuation of passive attitudes was likely to result of occupying all leading positions in the A.S.U. by nomination which seemed to block the way upward from the basic units. (20) Hence, the organization, of the whole setting

from base to top by election was thought of as a fitting solution for the activation of political participation. Even after this reorganization, masses lacked enthusiasm toward political action. With time, Nasser's diagnosis proved false, for the experiment was actually staggering from the passive attitudes on the part of the masses themselves together with the failure to recruit efficient and committed cadres to keep democratic interaction alive.

With the persistence of passivity and showiness in political action, the A.S.U has lost any influence on the masses. The whole political structure in the country was to be re-examined in the 1970's. The one-party political system was declared to be "sound in theory; in practice it is bad."⁽²¹⁾ From the unsuccessful democratic experiment emerged an attempt since 1976 to allow divergent political parties, but an assesment of the new experiment has not been made so far. The vicious circle is expected to continue unless the masses have better attitudes toward participation in political action.

(b) Attitudes toward scientific thinking

'Rationality activism', which characterizes modern man are still not prevalent among Egyptian masses at large. Non-scientific attitudes and blind sticking to unfounded beliefs are suffered from. With the exception of the industrial sector, the tools used by the majority are still traditional

and primitive.⁽²²⁾ Non-scientific modes of thinking are admitted to be prevalent at large and even among some sectors of the educated elites. Severe attack on these has been launched by an Egyptian scholar who was bold enough to argue that:

"methods of thinking in our country are backward .

to the extent that scientific thinking is lacking even in universities which are supposed to initiate such outlooks... As an outcome of the absence of the scientific method, our mode of thinking is undisciplined, unplanned and unsettled together with incapability to discriminate. We still give importance to appearance rather than to coherence, and our behaviour is dominated by sentimental upheavals. With absence of scientific means, our thinking is characterized by adherence to metaphysics, reliance on luck, rope-dancing and indifference, and hence, fatalism."⁽²³⁾

The above view deviates from sound scientific analysis.

It resorts to undesirable generalization with a great deal of exaggeration. However, to take the argument as applicable to the rural masses, it seems plausible especially in the light of the prevalence of fatalistic attitudes among the vast majority of them.

Taking 'fatalism' in the Rogerian sense as "the degree to which an individual perceives a lack of ability to control his future,"⁽²⁴⁾ calls for the recognition of three subdimensions of fatalism:

(a) supernatural influence indicated by belief in theological and magical explanation of human behaviour,

(b) situational fatalism indicated by the belief in limited opportunities for improvement of conditions, and (c) project negativism or apathy toward development activity which is due to past failures.⁽²⁵⁾

In his classification, Rogers was focusing on Columbian peasants on whom he performed his study in the mid-1960's. However, applied to the Egyptian rural masses, Rogers' classification proves the prevalence of fatalism.

Belief in the 'supernatural' is still a dominant characteristic of the Egyptian masses. Peasants believe in the existence of the 'jinn' whom they imagine as "a society of unpredictable, capricious and tyrannical spirits who live under the earth, yet who in large measure provoke and stimulate the forces of nature that would do one harm."⁽²⁶⁾ Association is made by them between these supernatural creatures and the ununderstandable misfortunes that befall them and which they fail to predict as in the case of floods, storms, .. etc. Absence of scientific explanation reinforces the non-scientific attitudes.

More than the jinn, there is the prevalent belief in malevolent creatures known as the 'aqrān', spirits double of each peasant. This ghostly twin as perceived by Egyptian peasants "is born and dies with its earthly fellow and tends to have the same characteristics. Jealousy is one of the salient features of these barren spirits and their

supposedly incessant efforts to harm or entice away the children of these living doubles causes the fellahin endless anxiety and worry."⁽²⁷⁾

Egyptian peasant has a clear tendency to resort to religion and holy books, sometimes moderately, but often with some exaggeration. His incessant fear of the future is linked or intermingled with supernatural powers. "His only hope", states Mayfield, "is to appease God by prayer or by seeking to bribe his spirits (jinn) that may well have caused this disaster in his life. Thus, continual prayer, combined with magic and the placating of evil or unfriendly spirits, is the major way of obtaining help."⁽²⁸⁾

The extent to which superstitious thinking is prevalent among Egyptian people was a subject of empirical study by Ibrahim and Mansour (1962).⁽²⁹⁾ Their sample included 2102 individuals representing sectors that varied according to education, class, place of residence, and sex. The statistical analysis of the findings ascertained the prevalence of superstitious thinking along the three dimensions dealt with in the study: the class dimension, the rural-urban dimension and the sex dimension. The correlation coefficient of the prevalence of superstitions in the sectors included in the study as regards the three above-mentioned dimensions are indicated in the following table:

Table 3.I

Correlation coefficient between degrees of prevalence of superstitions in the sectors as regards the three dimensions (30)

Dimension	Sectors between which the degree of correlation of superstition prevalence was calculated	Correlation coefficient
Class	Mid. class town male Low class town male	,84
	" " " fem. " " " fem.	,95
	Mid. class rural male " class rural male	,88
	" " " fem. " " " fem.	,91
Rural-urban	Mid class rural male Mid class town male	,86
	" " " fem. " " " fem.	,93
	Low " " male Low " " male	,89
	" " " fem. " " " fem.	,95
Sex	Mid class town male Mid class town fem.	,86
	" " rural " " " rural "	,82
	Low " town " Low " town "	,91
	" " rural " " " rural "	,89

The figures of the above table show the compliance of superstition prevalence in the three dimensions. The conclusion reached is that despite the variation in the eight sectors in terms of their individuals' belief in superstitions, they agree, to a great extent, in the type of superstitions that prevail in them. (31) The prevalent superstitions were related with omens, keeping healthy, status of women, giving birth, pregnancy and marriage.

Ewais (1970), made another study in which he attempted

to find out the change in the features of the Egyptian society from 1952 to 1959. He regarded addressing holy saints by complaint messages sent to their tombs a phenomenon worth of study to see the extent of the prevalence of non-scientific thinking. After examining 163 messages sent to the tomb of Imam el-Shafae (one eminent Muslim saint who died 1150 years ago), he classified them in three categories as follows:

- (a) Of the messages, 71 (48.5%) were addressed to Imam, of which 51 messages were addressed to Imam in person.
 - (b) 46 messages (31.5%) were addressed to the tomb of Imam.
 - (c) 29 messages (20%) were addressed to the religious bodies in charge of Imam's mosque.⁽³²⁾
- The conclusion to which Ewais came was, that such types of irrational thought paralyse the efforts made by authorities to solve the people's problems and watch over their interests. More important still is the strong control practised by the dead over the present generation of adults. They face their life with a naïve intellectual mode, a non-scientific one.⁽³³⁾

The resort to saints' tombs for healing instead to going to physicians, among the least educated masses, is another sign of irrationality. Ewais was struck to discover that certain tombs have got reputation of healing specific maladies.⁽³⁴⁾ This runs in line with a saying adhered to by the masses: "Ask a man of experience rather than a physician". Hence, the resort to a tomb of a holy man or to a man of experience, no matter his degree of learning

may be a reflection of the attitudes of the least educated to scientific thinking. Mayfield's comment is worth quoting:

"In such a fantastic world, the magician and medicine man play a large part. They are in fact the only allies known to the fellah who can counteract the force of the unseen spirits, including the occult malignity or evil eye ('ain al-hasud) of his fellows."⁽³⁵⁾

The way the uneducated masses conquer the unknown is highly irrational. Some thinkers, like Amin,⁽³⁶⁾ put it under the Egyptian's belief in luck. Various forms of astrology are found. Some daily papers even present a readable article under 'your luck today'. There is no great harm if such an article is read by the least educated and for fun. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. In a study made on the attitudes of such readers, Ewais (1970) found that 75% of the employees in one government office were regular readers of it. Some of them read it just for fun, others as a good omen, a third group to compare what is predicted with what actually befalls. Some even believe that what they read usually comes true. The classification made covered a wide range of ages between 17 and 55 years of age, 63% of whom were under thirty. Males represented 78%, Muslims represented 82%, unmarried represented 50%. As for their educational standards, 90% were holders of intermediate certificates, and 10% were university graduates.⁽³⁷⁾

Fatalism among the Egyptian masses in rural areas blurs the cause-effect relationships. They believe that life, death and growth are matters which an individual has no influence upon. This leads to apathy as regards the problems encountered. While suffering greatly from a deteriorating standard of living^{as} reflected on his food, clothing, accomodation, health, .. etc., he looks with apathy at the untiring attempts to convince him of the value of family planning. In Namek's analysis:

"He knows that nature is irrisistible. It is God's desire that he will have many offspring, whose number increases with time. By no means should he stand against such a mighty desire."(38)

His firm belief is that when a baby is born, food, clothing and all other necessities are sent from God. The matter then does not demand the slightest bother on his part. Accordingly, all efforts that the government make to check population have been futile. Issawi asserts this by quoting what a doctor in charge of one village social centre told him that: "the number of peasants who consulted him on means of having more children was, if anything, larger than that of those who wished to limit their number."(39)

One explanation to the population growth dilemma in Egypt associates it with exaggerated involvement in religion. Since the mid-20th century, many religious pronouncements by ulama (learned men of religion) have affirmed that birth control

is in no contradiction with the tenets of Islam. These pronouncements, however, did not in the least solve the problem for, it is a matter of internalised attitudes. Hence, as Professor Baer argues, religious pronouncements are of only limited influence for, "belief has decisive social significance."⁽⁴⁰⁾

(c) Attitudes toward work, precision and time

Attitudes of Egyptian individuals toward work in general, and particularly 'manual' work are still unfavourable to the realization of modernity. Reluctance to work is shown by an eminent Egyptian thinker and previous Minister of Social Affairs.⁽⁴¹⁾ He analyses the present economic crisis in Egypt in the light of these anti-modern attitudes. The general path of an Egyptian youth is to learn at school with the main view of getting an official post in one of the government offices 'where there is no work to be done'.⁽⁴²⁾ Work, to many of the Egyptian youth, as Hussein argues, has become a disgrace which the uneducated only have to endure.⁽⁴³⁾ It is possible to reject Hussein's argument on account of being exaggeration given in the absence of scientific researches on the point. However, his long experience with the youth as a Minister of Social Affairs and chief of the 'Socialist Party' before the revolution of 1952 induces to take his analysis seriously.

As for 'manual work', parents are reluctant to send their

children to technical schools and vocational centres, on which the future of industrialization depends. Shortage in skilled labour is aggravating day after day, as will be elaborated later.⁽⁴⁴⁾ So difficult is the dilemma that an Egyptian writer raises the cry:

"If we are embarking on a great industrial and economic movement, from where can we get the labour power to fill the vacancies in various projects? How can we attract our students to study at technical schools and institutions?"⁽⁴⁵⁾

What is more revealing of the persistence of these unfavourable attitudes, is the Minister of Education's complaint in August 1976 that the low passing rate of the G.S.C. exam is due to the great numbers of students from technical schools who sit for the exam more times in the hope of catching with a chance to join the university instead of carrying on with their technical and vocational studies.⁽⁴⁶⁾

The report of the Ministerial Committee for Labour Power (1966) suggested a plan for the provision of manpower in Egypt more fitting for the quick industrial expansion. Assuming that Egypt's needs for skilled workers and technicians is far greater than its needs for clerks and government officials until 1985, the report recommended that 80% of the Preparatory Certificate holders should be directed to technical education, and that only the remaining 20% should be encouraged to join the academic secondary education.⁽⁴⁷⁾

Such recommendations could not actually be put into practice due to irresistible pressure in the direction of academic education at the expense of vocational and technical education. Labour power estimates for 1980 show an estimated shortage in skilled labour amounting to 759.000 and a surplus in clerical posts reaching 160.000.⁽⁴⁸⁾ Taking the present and anticipated shortage in skilled labour from the perspective of imbalance between general and technical secondary education shows that the problem, in one of its aspects, is one of norms. One cause for the failure to carry out the Ministerial Report's recommendations is, to Professor Labib, due to reluctance of preparatory school graduates to tread the path of vocational or technical education.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Such attitudes explain why the progress attained since the revolution in expanding technical education has been 'evolutionary' rather than 'revolutionary' despite what reports recommend.

The attitudes of the new entrants to the field of industry who flock from rural areas to industrial towns are found to impede the expansion of industry. Quoting what Nasser had bitterly commented that 'Our factories are filled with peasants', Palmer and Stern specified the case of Egypt as regards the need to modify the attitudes of such new entrants into the disciplined precision, punctuality and factory

orientation.⁽⁵⁰⁾ It is much doubted that Egypt could accomplish such a task in the two decades that had elapsed since it embarked on wide-scale industrialization.

A low degree of precision has been observed among workers in general, or what Ewais put as the preference of quantity at the cost of quality.⁽⁵¹⁾ Causes to such a state are varied.

On one hand, this runs in accordance with the prevalent traditions that favour outer appearance of matters -as illustrated by quantity- much more than they do with the coherence of matters -as illustrated by quality. The behaviour of many is still governed by such sayings as:

- The bigger the pile, the less the mockery of the enemies.
- To a lover, an onion is a sheep.

-Better receive me warmly than provide me with lunch.⁽⁵²⁾

An interpretation to the undesirable attitude towards precision is given by ^{the} same sociologist who argues that Egypt started the process of transformation in the early 1950's, which is much later than other countries, ^{and} from a point much below that from which many other countries started.⁽⁵³⁾

It seems that the severe struggle with time in order to catch up with others, and the national feeling, fired by the revolution leaders, that Egypt can compensate underdevelopment in short time, have driven such a defect further steps. ⁽⁵⁴⁾ Amidst the zeal to reassure identity, supremacy has to be shown, if not in quality, be it through quantity.

On the other hand, attitudes of the masses still reflect the agricultural type of life that has been with Egypt since time immemorial. Execution of wide-scale industrialization schemes hit with the attitudes toward time and punctuality. The strict regard of time and punctuality that modern industrialization schemes require are only met by leniency. Time is still measured not by minutes and seconds, as is the case with industrially advanced countries, but rather in terms of the four segments of the day between the five prayers of a good Muslim. An individual's time is still arranged as 'tomorrow', 'in the afternoon', 'after sunset', 'in the evening', or 'before noon'.

Complementary to the above defect is that the Egyptian masses live in the past and present more than they live in the future. Hence, the difference between the Egyptian masses and those of the more advanced countries of the West, lies in that, for the Egyptians, the present turns into past at the very moment the individual is conscious of it. So, the future becomes present at every second of life. The case on the other side is different. While people of advanced countries think of the present or the future, they make precise account of both. In accordance with their more favourable modes of rational thinking, they try to predict the future so that when it comes, they are not taken by

surprise, for they are always ready for it.⁽⁵⁵⁾

(d) Familism

Strength of the attitudes toward family and clan among the Egyptian masses, has been reported in various studies.⁽⁵⁶⁾ With time, familism has lost but very little of its strength. Two studies, in the 1930's and the 1950's are taken by Baer to show the persistence of familistic attitudes.⁽⁵⁷⁾ The former study was made by an anthropologist on one Egyptian village and one salient conclusion was:

"the family is the social unit; over it the only meaningful unit is the community of believers, all differences of origin, nation and race disappear in this unit."⁽⁵⁸⁾

The second study, carried out in Alexandria indicated that familism still persisted. It found that the greatest degree of individual participation whether in the formal groups or the unorganized ones, was mainly based on religion and kinship.⁽⁵⁹⁾ These two studies supported by Baer, run in line with a third performed in the 1960's. Melaika,⁽⁶⁰⁾ performed an empirical study in 1963 and 1958 in which he found from the comparison of results, that the change away from the tight grip of familism in Egypt is 'low in rate'.⁽⁶¹⁾

In Melaika's findings, groups in Egyptian villages are formed mostly, on family basis. Although he found no contradiction between loyalty to family and loyalty to local community and the society at large, he distinguished between loyalty to family and the strict support to it, what he called excessive involvement in family relations (al-asabeya al-ailliya) which forms constraint before successful team work. (62)

The still existent familistic attitudes among the Egyptian masses is illustrated by the prevalent sayings quoted in every day speech, and which generally favour the special consideration given to clans and family members. Of these sayings:

- My brother and myself stand against my cousin, both my cousin and myself stand against the stranger.
- Relatives are more worthy of favour than others. (63)

With the persistence of familistic attitudes, proposals often hit , when executed, with ascription. The governor of one of Egypt's provinces lamented in 1967 that:

" ... the social (and political) relationships in the village have not changed in proportion with the revolutionary activities taken by the Committee of Liquidation of Feudalism." (64)

(e) Apathy

If the awareness of the problems of the society around is a preliminary step that preceeds active involvement

in solving them, apathy that still prevails among Egyptian rural masses explains the inability to carry out social promotion schemes successfully. Over 13% of the respondents to Melaika's study, mentioned above, admitted (whether in the first stage of the study in 1958, or the second in 1963) that they did not know the most difficult problem that faced their village. Though it might be argued that such a percentage is not high, Melaika took it a good indicator that more effort should be made to increase , among the masses, an awareness of their problems and motivate them to respond actively to solve them.⁽⁶⁵⁾ The following table classifies the responses that Melaika got for the question he addressed to individuals of the group he studied:

Which, in your opinion, is the most important problem in your village ?

Table 3.2

Response classification to Melaika's question about the most important problem in Egyptian village⁽⁶⁶⁾

Response	Percentage of responses	
	1958	1963
I do not know	13.88	13.09
Economic problems	26.18	13.09
Agricultural Problems	21.8	28.14
Inadequate infrastructure	19.42	27.75
Inadequate services	15.85	16.64
Inadequate institutions for team work	2.76	1.19

Another phase of apathy is shown in the reluctance of many to participate in public service when a problem is at hand, or when they are asked to share in solving it. The 'Fahlawi' character (the rope-dancer) is still prevalent among the masses both with its positive and negative aspects. Of the negative ones that impede the realization of modernity, is the indifference to public service. In the above study by Melaika, it was reported that whenever the villagers were invited to participate in collective work for the benefit of the whole village, the response was often apology due to shortness of time, or exhaustion after day's work. Melaika could only accept these excuses as indicators of apathy to participation in public service.⁽⁶⁷⁾ He built his argument on the length of leisure time which often formed a problem to many of them as how to spend it.⁽⁶⁸⁾ He ascertained their apathetic attitudes through asking about their activities after work as is shown in the following table:

Table 3.3

Egyptian villagers' activities in leisure time ⁽⁶⁹⁾

Type of reponse	Number of respondents	
	1958	1963
Doing nothing at my leisure time	66	87
Sitting with my family	44	42
Sitting with friends and neighbours & other prople	44	49
Doing some work to raise my family's standard	--	3
Public service and collective work	I	4

The above responses which Melaika got (155 for 1958 and 185 for 1963) aroused his fears from two angles in which the individuals prove to be far below the standard required by the ambitious aspirations of the Egyptian society. On the one hand, there was the growing trend to spend the whole of the leisure time doing nothing, or just taking rest. On the other, he condemned the very weak desire among them to discuss matters of public interest.

Stranger still, according to the same study, that such 'apathy' among villagers coincided with their severe complaints from the village's modest share in various aspects of reform which make of it not so good as a place to live in. Over 40% of the responses that Melaika got for 1958 and 1963 were expressive of such resentment in one way or other as is shown in the following table:

Table 3.4

Content with the village as a place to live in (70)

Type of response	Percentage	
	1958	1963
The village is a good place to live in	56,55	56,91
The village needs many reforms before it turns into a good place for living	32,28	33,33
The village is unfit for living in	10,66	8,44

Once more, the paradox is interpreted in the light of the prevalent 'Fahlawi' character that induces an individual 'to dispose of any work or responsibility by giving it to someone else and claiming the affair is outside his scope of jurisdiction'. (71)

Moreover, as the figures of the above table indicate, the strong desire to have the village changed into a better place coincides with refraining from active participation which often demands sacrifice with time, effort or money. If he has no choice but to participate, he resorts then to some witty means by which his participation is only counted in form while he does not actively participate. With these unmodified attitudes it is easy to find an interpretation of the showiness that characterizes the execution of various schemes, particularly in the social field, and futility becomes unavoidable as in Mayfield's analysis:

"In a community where the fahlawi personality predominates, it is easy to stimulate and attract people to the idea of starting a new school, a clinic or a youth clubhouse, but it is very difficult to make them follow through, to complete it, or, if by chance it is completed, to maintain it in good condition." (72)

(f) Attitudes toward Government

Two types of unmodified attitudes in the relation between the Egyptian masses and Government can be distinguished: the first of distrust and hostility, the second of excessive reliance. Both types make it difficult to realize proposals for a modern political and economic system in Egypt.

A state of mutual understanding between the Egyptian masses and the government has ever been lacking. Long periods of foreign rule since 525 B.C and long sufferance

at the hands of these rulers have left deep abyss between 'ruler' and 'the ruled' in Egypt to the present time. Hostility, sometimes overt, but most of the times hidden toward government representatives who were very cruel in collecting taxes, especially under the Turkish rule (1517- 1914) could not be possibly altered in less than thirty years of nationalist rule since 1952. The apathetic attitudes toward government were accounted by Nasser to sediments of the Mamluk rule* on Egyptian masses:

"The Mamluk amirs had fought each other, and their horsemen had met in fierce battles on the streets, while the people would stampede to their houses, locking themselves in, and thus avoiding a struggle which was not their concern." (73)

The prevailing hierarchical family setting in Egypt has also its influence on the attitudes of the masses towards the government. Obedience to the father and to adults is strictly observed. The system of child rearing has its own impact on attitudes in later life. While cultivating a docile and yielding disposition, trickery and other evils grow with the child into adulthood affecting his attitudes towards 'authority' in its general and broad sense. Ammar, (74) cared to trace the undesirable attitudes of Egyptian adults towards authority to earlier experiences during the process of child rearing:

* The Ayybid dynasty which started in Egypt in 1163 was supplanted by the Memluks who ruled as independant sultans from 1250 to 1517. With the Turkish invasion in 1517, they continued to rule under the nominal authority of Turkish Sultans until Mohammed Ali (1805-1848) got rid of them.

"very little chance is given to the child to justify his misdemeanour, and hardly any effort is made to persuade him to avoid falling into the same error. Moreover, in administering punishment, there is no consistency or regularity; for the same offence the child might be beaten harshly, or his offence allowed to pass unnoticed It does not require any emphasis here to point out that the effects of these techniques of fear as forcing children to resort to lies and deception are reflected later in the prevailing atmosphere of adult life which is charged with suspicion, secrecy and apprehension".⁽⁷⁵⁾

Indicators show that, until present, the Egyptian adult masses, particularly those in the rural areas, have no ready response to what the government suggests for their benefit. Lack of appreciation of government sponsored economic institutions such as banks of agricultural credit, was justifiable before 1952, because it involved becoming implicated with government procedures, which farmers liked to avoid.⁽⁷⁶⁾ But, such attitudes, as Baer found, are still persistent in the 1970's.⁽⁷⁷⁾ Guides and specialists sent by the government to disseminate new useful methods among peasants as regards the quality and amount of their crops, are often hampered by distrust, and sometimes hostility on the part of the peasants themselves.⁽⁷⁸⁾ This has recently been described by one Egyptian scholar that Egyptian peasant still fears the government representatives and uses all his cunning with them, and never gives them his trust.⁽⁷⁹⁾

Associated with the above attitudes, is the tendency to throw all responsibility and blame on the government and its machinery in an unsympathetic way. The burden has grown heavier every day, until the Minister of Planning announced in August 1977 that responsibilities thrown on the government have become too heavy for her to carry. These have extended to encompass the following:

- Securing unconditioned employment and gaining for all Egyptians.
- Responsibility for social welfare including housing, health, education and other services.
- Responsibility for administering, conducting and maintaining almost the whole of the country's infrastructure and most of the productive units.
- Responsibility of providing the masses with commodities whether basic or welfare.
- Responsibility for the availability of commodities and at reasonable prices which low incomes can afford.⁽⁸⁰⁾

When the responsibility of the common man is traced amidst such responsibilities it ^{is} severely inadequate, being confined in most cases to criticism and complaint of the inefficiency of the government machinery.

The above attitudes were also studied by Melaika in his above mentioned study. When his respondents were asked what could be done to solve the problems which they reported in their village, and who was to undertake such solutions,

a high percentage (34.38% in 1958 and 64.06% in 1963) agreed that solving the problems was the responsibility (81) of the government. The rise in percentage from 34.38% to 64.06% in five^{years} is not without relevance to the inability to carry out various modernity proposals, especially in the light of the decline in the percentage of those who believed that problems could be solved through self-help efforts from 30.43% in 1958 to 14.06% in 1963.⁽⁸²⁾ To the writer of the present study, this signifies the aggravation rather than modification of anti-modern attitudes. Various response percentages are shown in the following table.

Table 3.5

Percentage of various responses to the question: Who, in your opinion solves the village problems?⁽⁸³⁾

Type of response	Percentage	
	1958	1963
The government	34.38	64.06
The people (self-help efforts)	30.43	14.06
Joint (government and people)	21.74	9.38
Leaders and renowned people	13.05	12.50

In the light of the above figures, it is easily seen how the burden is apathetically thrown on the government. Initiabiveness and self-help efforts have a diminishing role which is better indicated from the responses given to the question: Suppose the government did nothing to solve this

problem, is there anything to be done?

Once more, the responses affirmed the existence of the above anti-modern attitudes. 68.08% of the 1958 responses and 88.44% of 1963 stated that only the government could solve the problem. Those who believed in the value of self-help efforts declined in percentage from 19.15% in 1958 to only 4.76% in 1963 which is a significant decline indicative of aggravating prevalence of the above attitudes as is indicated in the following table.

Table 3.6

Percentage of various responses to the question: Suppose the government did nothing to solve this problem, is there
(84)
anything to be done?

Type of response	Percentage	
	1958	1963
Only the government can solve the problem	68.08	88.44
Self-help efforts undertaken by people	19.15	4.76
The village leaders	12.77	6.12

(g) Attitudetoward change

Egyptian masses, especially in rural areas, are mostly 'tradition bound' on account of the passive attitudes with which they react to the new. They generally follow the

prescribed ways of their ancestors, sometimes out of ignorance and lack of information about the available alternatives, but most of the time out of what Mayfield found as "conflicting feelings of resistance to change."⁽⁸⁵⁾ No convincing justifications are given, on the part of the masses except that they follow the steps of the 'good ancestors' (al-salaf al-saleh).

Some sociologists argue that the Egyptian peasant is 'socially stagnant'.⁽⁸⁶⁾ on the grounds of his reluctance to benefit by any chance offered for him to better his life if it requires some change in his habits. In a recent study, Abdel Rehim (1975) ⁽⁸⁷⁾ascertains the above view by certain observations. Egyptian peasant still builds his home in the same old way of his forefathers, cultivates his crops in the way that the ancient Egyptians had used, maintains the same old habits of visiting tombs of his dead relations on feast days asking mercy for them, and uses the Coptic Calendar that had been in use for over one thousand years. He generally follows the same type of life that had been known since the ancient Pharaonic days in his clothing, his food, the upbringing of his children, and in his relations with his neighbours.⁽⁸⁸⁾

Such insistence on tradition and resistance to the calls for change|severely limit his scope of aspiration within a narrow circle. It has proved difficult to arouse his

enthusiasm for the new, as he still holds high such old sayings as: "He who leaves his past gets lost".⁽⁸⁹⁾

Persistence of the old anti-modern attitudes aggravates the country's inability to attain modernity. Habashi,⁽⁹⁰⁾ a former Minister of Commerce and Industry, interprets the country's economic backwardness on account of the attitudes of the masses until present to use the tools, and follow the techniques that have descended to them from their forefathers with no zeal for their alteration, while the modern alternatives have now covered the universe far and wide.⁽⁹¹⁾ These constraints to modernity proposals are what President Sadat meant in his speech before the members of the conference: 'Egypt in the Year 2000' (Cairo, January 1977):

"Although our Egyptian farmer is one of the ablest in the whole world, I'm not happy to have him. We still have to irrigate the feddan* with approximately 700 cubic feet of water despite the availability of modern technological methods of irrigation."⁽⁹²⁾

The President's remark supports what an American professor wrote in 1967 that, "Probably no more conservative man than the Egyptian peasant is alive today."⁽⁹³⁾

* * * *

With the examples given of the internalised attitudes prevailing among the Egyptian adult masses, and which are

* a feddan= 1,038 acres or about 4,201 square metres

in disharmony with the proposals for modernity set by the leaders since 1952, a problem is at hand the outcome of which is that Egypt has failed to reach modernity whether politically or economically despite all the good and faithful intentions of its leaders. If we accept the previously quoted view raised by Inkles and Smith, that 'a nation is not modern until its people are modern',⁽⁹⁴⁾ we have a clue to the solution to be proposed, that the attitudes of the masses have to be favourably modified to serve the cause of modernity which requires a certain type of man not yet found in Egypt.

Notes - Chapter Three

1. GALAL, A. F. A. K. 'Adult education in the U.A.R. (Egypt) with special reference to the work of selected organizations'. Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Institute of Education, University of London, June 1966. pp. 32-41.
2. EWAIS, S. A talk about culture: some facts about contemporary Egyptian culture. Cairo: The Anglo Egyptian Bookshop, 1970. pp. 76-II9 (Arabic text).
3. REFAEE, A. A. National feature in Egyptian character. Cairo: Dar al-Nahda al-Arabia, 1971. pp. 222-246. (Arabic text).
4. INFORMATION DEPARTMENT, Nasser's speech before the National Assembly 1957. Cairo: Information Department, 1957.
5. ABDEL-NASSER, G. 'An address to the nation. October 5, 1961'. AlAhram (daily Egyptian paper), October 6, 1961.
6. HAYKAL, M. H. Editorial Al-Ahram, June 9, 1961.
7. ibid.
8. ABDEL-NASSER, G. Egypt's liberation: the philosophy of the revolution Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955. pp. 63-64.
also ABDEL-NASSER, G. The philosophy of the revolution. Cairo: National Publications House, n.d. in which he drew a lively contrast between how ^{he} expected the people would behave and react to the ideals of the revolution, and how they came 'struggling in scattered groups. The Holy March to the Great Goal was halted, and the picture of these days looked dark, dastardly and foreboding.' (p. 22).
9. NAGUIB, M. op.cit. p. 181.
10. HALPERN, M. The politics of social change in the Middle East and North Africa. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. p. 310.
11. LACOUTURE, J. and S. op.cit. p. 272.
12. ZARTMAN, I. W. op.cit. p. 114.
13. Ruz al-Yusuf (Egyptian weekly magazine), October 19, 1959.
14. MANSFIELD, P. Nasser's Egypt. London: Penguin Books and Paul Mall, 1965. p. 198.
15. BAER, G. 'Basic factors affecting social structure, tensions and change in modern Egyptian society', in M. Milson (ed.) Society and political structure in the Arab world. New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1973. p. 19.
16. ZARTMAN, I. W. op.cit. pp. 115-116.
17. MANSFIELD, P. op.cit. p. 198.

18. ABDEL-NASSER, G. Speech on October 16, 1961. Al-Ahram, October 17, 1961.
19. The National Charter. op.cit. p. 40.
20. INFORMATION DEPARTMENT, The 30th of March Declaration.
Cairo: 1968.
21. HAYKAL, M. H. article in Al-Ahram, February 11, 1966.
22. SOLTAN, M. E. S. op.cit. pp. 44-50. Soltan laments that:
" .. while modern and advanced societies have surpassed the age of steam, electricity, atom, electronics and automation to the age of space, we still ride asses in the countryside and use them in fertilizing our limited cultivable land. Still the processions of our sufi sheikhs stop the traffic in the streets of Cairo in the 1970's. Magic (al-zar) and all superstitions associated with it are still observed" (p. 45)
23. El-ZAYYAT, L. "The outcome of intellectual struggle, nucleus of the new culture", Al-Tale'ah, Vol. 2, No. 6, June 1966. p. 115.
(Arabic text).
24. ROGERS, E. M. op.cit. p. 55.
25. ibid.
26. MAYFIELD, J. B. op.cit. pp. 64-65.
For a detailed account of prevalent superstitions among Egyptian masses see: IBRAHIM, N. I. and MANSOUR, R. F. op.cit. Chapter 5 pp. 109-130.
27. MAYFIELD, J. B. ibid. p. 65.
28. ibid. p. 64.
29. IBRAHIM, N. I. and MANSOUR, R. F. op.cit.
30. ibid. Table 4, p. 132.
31. ibid.
32. EWAIS, S. op.cit. pp. 138-139.
see also REFAEE, A. A. op.cit. pp. 205-209. Refaee ascertains the prevalence of these trends until the present time in all Egyptian governorates. From his analysis, he comes to a conclusion that the control practised by the dead over the alive is evidence enough of the prevalence of irrational thinking among the latter.
33. EWAIS, S. ibid. pp. 124-125.
34. ibid. pp. 134-137.
35. MAYFIELD, J. B. op.cit. p. 65.
36. AMIN, A. Dictionary of Egyptian manners, customs and expressions
Cairo: Lajnat al-Talif wa'l Tarjama wa'l Nashr, 1953. p. 171.
(Arabic text).
37. EWAIS, S. op.cit. pp. 222-223.
38. NAMEK, S. E. Overpopulation and economic development in the United Arab Republic. Cairo: Dar al- Ma'aref, 1966. p. 38. (Arabic text).

39. ISSAWI, C. Egypt in revolution, an economic analysis.

London: Oxford University Press, 1963. p. 302.

40. BAER, G. 'Basic factors ...', op.cit. p. II.

41. HUSSEIN, A. "Project of the year, a new way to help Egypt out of its economic crisis by work, production and self-reliance", Al-Ahram, Year 103, issue No. 32956, March 4, 1977.

42. *ibid.*

43. *ibid.*

44. Chapter 4 of the study, Table 4.4 and Figure 4.I.

45. EL-NIMR, A. "When Technical Training Institutes become a disgrace for their students", Watani (weekly Egyptian paper), Year 12, No. 926, August 22, 1976.

46. Quoted by AL-NIMR, A., *ibid.*

47. UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FOR LABOUR POWER, Report on educational policy. Cairo: 1967. p. 16.

The report drew the attention that preparatory school certificate holders have a strong tendency to join the general secondary school. Meanwhile those wishing to join secondary technical schools did not exceed 24% 'although the technical and vocational education is the basis of our national economy.' (p. II)

48. YOUSSEF, Y. K. and EID, W. M. op.cit. p. 32.

49. LABIB, R. et al. op.cit. p. 291.

50. PALMER, M. and STERN, L. op.cit. p. 5.

51. EWAIS, S. op.cit. p. 230.

52. *ibid.*

53. The National Charter, op.cit. pp. 56-57 and 74-75.

The Charter ascertains that Egypt has to accelerate its stride by all means to make up for previous backwardness, and to join other countries that have entered into the age of atom and space in the shortest possible time.

also The October Working Paper, op.cit. p. 56.

The Paper is, as well haunted by the urgent need of Egypt 'to push ahead the wheel of work at full capacity with all available production motive powers and elements in various spheres.'

55. EWAIS, S. op.cit. pp. 226-227.

also AYROUT, H. H. The Egyptian peasant. Translated by J. A. Williams. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963. pp. 140-141.

Father Ayrout argues that the soul of the Egyptian peasant is best understood in terms of his preoccupation with the 'here' and 'now'. He builds his argument on the fact that the Egyptian fellah:

"does not think outside the immediate present; he is fettered to his moment. No time and place except the present have much effect on his mind ... It is a fact that they do not think or act except as the occasion demands, according to the pressures of the moment. Their reactions are determined by immediate sensation. Thus they are both credulous and mistrustful, individualistic and gregarious, miserly and thriftless, long suffering and fiery tempered."

56. See BAER, G. 'Basic factors ..', op.cit. pp. 8-10.

WILBER, D. N. op.cit. pp. 82-83.

MAYFIELD, J. B. op.cit. p. 86.

EWAI, S. op.cit. pp. 152-154.

57. BAER, G. ibid. p. 9.

58. ibid. p. 10.

This point has been elaborated by many writers as well. See H. H. Smith et al, op.cit. pp. 380-381, also D. N. Wilber, op.cit. p. 97. The analysis given by the latter induced him to state that:

"The intensity of the allegiance given to the family and the lineage is achieved at the expense of the society in general. The attitudes and views which concentrate on the advancement of one's own group lead to favouritism, nepotism and corruption-patterns of behavior that plague the administrative services of the government, yet are not really to be condemned. The hiatus between loyalty to the nation or government has proved to be source of considerable difficulty in the building of modern Egypt as in a number of other countries."

59. BAER, G. ibid.

60. MELAIKA, L. K. op.cit.

61. ibid. p. 35.

62. ibid.

63. EWAI, S. op.cit. p. 153.

64. Al-Akhbar (daily Egyptian newspaper), January 13, 1976. p. 8.

65. MELAIKA, L. K. op.cit. p. 45.

66. ibid.

67. ibid. p. 30.

68. ibid.

69. ibid. p. 31.

It has to be noted that Melaika's respondents were encouraged to give mention to three activities, but I05 and II7 gave no second answer in 1958 and 1963 respectively. As for the mention of a third activity, 207 and 234 in 1958 and 1963 failed to do so.

70. ibid. pp. 39-40.

71. MAYFIELD, J. B. op.cit. p. 72.

72. ibid.

73. ABDEL-NASSER, G. op.cit.

74. AMMAR, H. Growing up in an Egyptian village, Silwa, Province of Aswan. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1954.

75. *ibid.* pp. 138-139.

76. see BAER, G. 'Basic factors ...' *op.cit.*, p. 18.

77. *ibid.*

78. WILBER, D. N. *op.cit.* p. 90.

Wilber argues that the 'Solidarity among the rural society against the ruling authorities still prevails, in spite of the efforts carried on since 1952 to build a bridge of mutual confidence across the very deep abyss that separates the rural areas and the government.'

79. ABDEL-REHIM, A. M. pp. 107-108.

80. General Strategy of the Five-Year Plan 1978-1982, Vol. I
op.cit. p. 23.

81. MELAIKA, L. K. *op.cit.* pp. 59-62.

82. *ibid.*

83. *ibid.*

84. *ibid.* p. 61.

85. MAYFIELD, J. B. *op.cit.* pp. 8-9.

86. ABDEL-REHIM, A. M. *op.cit.* p. 106.

87. *ibid.*

88. *ibid.* pp. 106-107.

89. In Arabic 'ilily malhoush kadim malhoush gedid' meaning that it is only in the light of the past that one's position is provided.

90. HABASHI, S. 'How we can get out of our crisis'. Akhbar al-Yuom, (weekly Egyptian paper), Year 33, No. 1698, May 21, 1977. (Arabic text).

91. *ibid.*

92. EL- SADAT, President M. A. Speech delivered before the Conference of 'Egypt in the Year 2000' (Cairo: January 1977).

Al-Ahram, January 27, 1977.

93. Quoted from Professor Polk's article: "The Middle East: analysing social change", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 23, Nos. 12-19, January 1967, by J. Chase (ed.) The Conflict in the Middle East. p. 19.

94. INKLES, A. and SMITH, D. H. *op.cit.* p. 9.

Chapter Four

Skill Inadequacy as Constraint to the Realization of Modernity Proposals

Other than the constraint imposed on the realization of modernity proposals in Egypt by the unmodified attitudes of a great many among adult masses, skill inadequacy in both the quantitative and qualitative sense, puts further limits on the success of modernization schemes. In quantity, there is imbalance between supply and demand on labour force which has given rise to bottlenecks in some sectors such as 'skilled labour' in which shortage is felt most, and abundance in the 'unskilled' sector with overt and disguised unemployment ratio that amounts to 12.63% of the total labour power in 1976.⁽¹⁾ In quality, lack of skill among the individuals involved in various modernization schemes has its bearing on the dropping rate of development at the national level from an average annual rate of 6.7% during the period from 1959 to 1965 to 3.5% for the period from 1967 to 1973.⁽²⁾ It is true that many factors may be involved in such a case including beside skill inadequacy, various others such as the availability of capital, the existence of markets, the transport and communication facilities, .. etc., what Hoselitz (1966) recognizes as a 'whole set of institutions and installations which must be interrelated and co-ordinated in order to make this objective (reaching an effective production-oriented level) possible.'⁽³⁾ However, quantitative and qualitative skill inadequacy are focused upon in analysing the inconsistency with modernity proposals.

Quantitative Inadequacy

The 'unskilled' are taken to signify those who need no special training before engagement in jobs, while the 'semi-skilled'

are assigned jobs that do not require a high degree of skill, and must work under specific supervision. (4) Some studies tend to join both categories (unskilled and semi-skilled) in one, (5) while others like to treat both separately. (6) The 1960 figures by the Institute of National Planning found that the unskilled among the total labour force in Egypt were 2,575,570, or 38.194 %, while the semi-skilled were 2,557,630, or 37.928 %. Joined together, they form 76.122 %. Skilled labour, on the other hand, were only 751,268, or 11.141 % of the total labour force. As for technicians and foremen, they were 141,470, or 2.098 %. (7) Such structure is uneven in that the category of the least skilled encompasses the vast majority, while categories of skilled labour, technicians and high professionals form, by their numbers, a very marginal position in the structure, as is indicated by table 3.I

Table 4.I

Egyptian labour force by occupational categories in 1960 (8)

Occupational Category	Number	Percentage
1. Managers	56939	0.844
2. High Professional	91297	1.354
3. Technicians and Foremen	141470	2.098
4. Assistants	569234	8.441
5. Skilled Labours	751268	11.141
6. Semi-skilled Labours	2557630	37.928
7. Unskilled Labours	2575570	38.194
Total	6743408	100.00

Imbalance, however, has continued until present time, and is even projected to continue throughout the 1980's. Unskilled and semi-skilled categories together will represent 58.86% in 1980, and 54.0% in 1985 of the total labour force while the skilled category will represent 27.58% in 1980, and 25.0% in 1985.⁽⁹⁾

The whole projections are indicated in the following table:

Table 4.2

Targeted percentages for the occupational structure categories⁽¹⁰⁾

Occupational Categories	1970	1975	1980	1985
1. Managers	1.15	1.35	1.60	1.90
2. High Professionals	2.30	2.75	3.21	3.80
3. Technicians	4.97	6.30	7.52	8.90
4. Assistants	8.00	7.70	7.60	7.22
5. Skilled Labours	16.21	18.70	21.21	24.18
6. Semi-skilled Labours	31.65	29.62	27.585	25.00
7. Unskilled Labours	35.90	33.58	31.275	29.00
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Even with the anticipated improvement, displayed by above figures especially as regards the rates of unskilled and skilled categories, the imbalance is expected to remain. Improvement in skilled labour in Egypt takes double the time of other countries like the German Democratic Republic, for example. Skilled labour in G.D.R.^{industry} has risen from 45.0% in 1964, to 47.4% in 1966, then to 52.5% in 1970, a 7.5% in six years as shown in the following table:

Table 4.3

Development of structure of labour force in industry in G.D.R.⁽¹¹⁾

	1964	1966	1970
Skilled labours	45.0	47.4	52.5
Semi-skilled labours	43.0	41.0	37.9
Unskilled(ordinary) labours	12.0	11.6	9.6

Imbalance of skill in Egypt delays the accomplishment of modern economy due to what Harbison recognizes as abundance of unskilled labour.⁽¹²⁾ Supply of unskilled labour exceeds demand by 991.000

in 1970, 1.019.000 in 1975, and 1.620.000 in 1980, according to a study by the Institute of National Planning. In skilled workers, the shortage is seen to be aggravating from 139.000 in 1970, to 267.000 in 1975, then to 759.000 in 1980. Even in the figure of the semi-skilled, shortage is seen rising from 433.000 in 1970, to 500.000 in 1975, then to 656.000 in 1980.⁽¹²⁾

The whole picture drawn by the above study is one of contrast between surplus in the unskilled, the clerks and the managers, met, on the other hand by shortage in ^{the} skilled, the semi-skilled and the technicians. The figures, however, put it more strikingly as one of abundance among the 'unskilled' and acute shortage among the 'skilled', as is shown in the following table:

Table 4.4


Anticipated Supply and Demand in Labour Force Required for
(13)
Development Plans in 1970, 1975 and 1980 (in thousands)

Categories	1970			1975			1980		
	Demand	Supply	±	Demand	Supply	±	Demand	Supply	±
Managers & Specialists	216	225	+9	256	277	+21	338	346	+8
Technicians	513	300	-213	610	347	-263	780	407	-373
Clerks	720	505	-215	856	846	-10	1170	1330	+160
Skilled Labours	1152	1013	-139	1370	1103	-267	1872	1113	-759
Semi-skilled Labours	2160	1727	-433	2568	2068	-500	3510	2854	-656
Unskilled Labours	4239	5230	+991	5040	6059	+1019	5330	6950	+1620


Figure 4.I

Skill dilemma in Egypt based on above estimates until 1980


(a) The case of skilled labour



(b) The case of un-skilled labour



(c) The case of semi-skilled labour



Shortage and surplus in labour force in Egypt are related, and both are related with unemployment and potential unemployment. The size of unemployment, overt and disguised, has reached 1,479,000 in 1976.⁽¹⁴⁾ 84% of the unemployed are adults in the productive age-group (15-64) according to official figures of 1970.⁽¹⁵⁾ Distribution is shown in the following table:

Table 4.5

Percentage distribution of the unemployed by age-groups in 1970.⁽¹⁶⁾

Age Groups	Distribution of the unemployed %	Rate of Unemployment %
10-	15.0	4.1
15-	27.0	5.3
20-	30.3	2.9
30-	12.0	1.2
40-	8.0	1.1
50-	6.7	1.0
65 or more	1.0	0.6

Underemployment, which is most prevalent in the agricultural sector, is related with the overall imbalance in skills in Egypt. Along 166 years (1800-1966), the cultivable area could be increased from 2.2 million feddans* to 6 million feddans, that means 2.72 times. In the meantime, population has increased from 2.5 millions to 30 millions, that is twelve times.⁽¹⁷⁾ The imbalance of growth in both aspects has left its stamp on man/land ratio. From 0.48 feddans in 1907, it dropped to 0.41 in 1917, 0.39 in 1937 and to 0.364 in 1952.

* a feddan is 1.038 acres.

With continuous depression during the revolutionary era, the ratio came down to 0.207 acres, which is hardly one tenth the ratio in a country like the United States. (18)

The actual holdings of workforce in agriculture are low even after the laws of land reform in 1952 and 1961. (19)

72% of farmers in 1956 were found to have holdings less than one feddan. With large families in rural areas in mind, full employment is far from being accomplished. (20)

Underemployment stems from the small holdings' inability to provide employment for all, or all the year round.

It is estimated that " $\frac{1}{2}$ of the present rural workers can be considered surplus in the sense that their removal would not reduce total output, given the present techniques." (21)

Besides, the average number of work days per worker per year has dropped from 230 in 1907 to only 144 in 1966. (22)

This means that an average underemployment of seven months a year is current among adults in rural areas. The problem tends to be one of skill in the first place, and the availability of chances of work in the second place. If some of the underemployed thousands of adults get some training, this will lessen the striking mal-distribution of skilled and unskilled labour.

When the age structure of the Egyptian population is considered, the 'dilemma of skill' turns to a severe challenge that has to be encountered if Egyptian economy is to become a modern one. Age structure is more in favour

of children at the expense of producing age-groups. In 1970, the category 15-64 years was only 54% of the total population.⁽²³⁾ This is low, and evidently so even in comparison with the percentage of the whole developing countries which was 63% in 1965.⁽²⁴⁾ On the other side, the rate of children in Egyptian community (under 15 years old), is found by the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics (1973) to amount to 42.7% against 23.3% only in each of France and Sweden, and about 29% in the U.S.A. As for the rate of adults in the same year, it was found to be 53.8% for age-group 15-64, against 62.6% in the U.S.A., 64.6% in France, 65.7% in Italy, and 66.3% in Sweden.⁽²⁵⁾ The latest Egyptian census (November 1976) ascertains that the trend still persists which means that the 'skill dilemma' among adult population has to be solved urgently. To have 31.6% of the total population in 1976 in the category under 12 years throws a heavy burden on the economically active sectors, especially with a very low ratio of female participation of only 9.2% among females six years and over.⁽²⁶⁾

Qualitative Inadequacy

The relation between the level of individuals' education and their performance, or productivity is difficult to ascertain unless a countless number of interrelated factors are taken into consideration.⁽²⁷⁾ However, Schultz (1962) argues that a certain kind of quantity of education must

be regarded as a necessary input to achieving rising development rates. He suggests that the achievement of higher rates of literacy, specific vocational training, and training for intermediate and higher administrative and managerial positions, fall within this category.⁽²⁸⁾ His line of argument draws near to another by Harbison and Myers that all developed countries have in common, certain educational characteristics. These were found to include accomplishment of nearly universal literacy, compulsory school attendance at least to the end of primary education, high ratio of educational enrollments in relation to respective age-groups. On the other side, they reported some one billion of the world's adult illiterates as residing in less developed countries.⁽²⁹⁾

The significance of the level of education as predictive of individual skill, and hence of productivity is reported in many studies. Galal (1964) proposes the productivity of the illiterate worker to ^{be} less in quantity and quality than the literate one.⁽³⁰⁾ Hasanein (1970) ⁽³¹⁾ also observed that the increase in the productivity of workers due to education, amounts to an average of 30% a year. Productivity of literate workers was 43% higher than that of the illiterate ones.⁽³²⁾

When the case of Egypt is seen in the light of the above studies, the 'low rate of worker's productivity' reported by the 'Follow-up and Evaluation Report on the First Five-year

(33)

Plan (1960/61-1964-65) points to the low level of education and training among Egyptian adult labour force to which Harbison⁽³⁴⁾ attributed, together with other factors, Egypt's economic underdevelopment:

"Egypt's most plentiful, if not almost limitless resource is uneducated, untrained and unskilled manpower. There are vast surpluses of underemployed agricultural labor which, with few exceptions, are located fairly close to the centres where industrial establishments are concentrated. Moreover, in the already overcrowded urban areas there is an almost inexhaustible pool of unemployed and partially employed labor.....⁽³⁵⁾

According to the 1976 census, the percentage of illiteracy among the total population over ten years, is 71.0% for females and 43.2% for males, with an average total of 56.5% for both sexes.⁽³⁶⁾ Furthermore, if the educational standard required by complex modern society is regarded to demand more than mere ability to read and write one's name, the picture becomes darker. To the above, is added an extra 25.1% (16.2% for females, and 33.2% for males) who are enumerated as 'able to read and write'. The total percentage of illiterates and semi-illiterates in 1976 is 81.6% of the total population 10+.

Such a condition is reflected on the country's labour force, the structure of which is characterized by a very low educational level. Of the total work force in all productive units of the Public Sector, and which encompasses 29.457 workers in the 'Agricultural Sector', 572.600 in the

'Industrial Sector', and 266.2I6 in the 'Services' Sector' in 1972, those without any qualification represented 69%. Those with qualifications less than intermediate represented 4.5%. Holders of qualifications above intermediate together with those with intermediate qualifications represented 35 % , 19% of whom were holders of intermediate qualifications with varied specializations.⁽³⁷⁾ The whole distribution is indicated from the following table:

Table 4.6

Distribution of work force in major divisions of the Public Sector according to educational level in 1972⁽³⁸⁾

Educ. Level	Without Qualif.	Qualif. below Interm.	Interm. Qualif.	Qualif. above Interm.	Univer sity	Above Univer sity	Total
Companies of Agricul Sector	I3857	90I	I0220	223I	2224	24	29457
Companies of Indust. Sector	407770	27920	I03792	80I5	2377I	I332	572600
Companies of Service Sector	I78I96	I0060	52626	3922	20473	939	2662I6
Total	599823	3888I	I66638	I4I68	46468	2295	868273
Percentage	69,0%	4.5%	I9.0%	I6.0%	5.4%	0.3%	I00%

When the 'Industrial Sector' is brought under more focus, as the one with higher relevance to modernization schemes,

the educational level of the work force of the industrial companies affiliated to the 'Public Sector' is generally lower than the overall picture drawn above. This is indicated in the following table:

Table 4.7

Educational level in Industrial companies affiliated to the Public Sector Compared to the overall picture of Work force in Public Sector⁽³⁹⁾

	Overall Percentage of Public Sector	Percentage of Industrial companies
Without Qualification	69.0%	71.3%
Below Intermediate	4.5%	4.9%
Intermediate	19.0%	18.1%
Above Intermediate	1.6%	1.4%
University Degree	5.4%	4.1%
Above University Degree	0.3%	0.2%
Total	100.00	100.00

The findings of the above study which covered 73.5% of the total Egyptian labour force in 1972 explain what the Five-year Plan (1978-1982) recognizes as 'sluggishness in rates of development in the early 1970's'⁽⁴⁰⁾ This accords also with what Mongi put before the Conference on Apprenticeship System (Cairo, March 1976):

"The structure of the technical labour force in units of production in the Arab Republic of Egypt is extremely modest in terms of educational level, and it is one cause for the deteriorating performance rate and low rate of productivity in many companies.⁽⁴¹⁾

A look at the categories of intermediate and below intermediate level, which encompass 92.5% of the work force included in the above study ascertains Mongi's conclusion. If qualifications are left aside, it is possible to find a more detailed classification in terms of various specializations. Mongi classified the intermediate and below intermediate categories into ten sub-divisions as follows:

Table 4.8

Distribution of the Public Sector work force intermediate and below intermediate qualifications in 1972 ⁽⁴²⁾

	Males	Females	Total	Percentage
Illiterate	154835	5760	160595	19.9%
Reads and writes	393138	15504	408642	50.8%
Other qualifications	1013	1806	2819	0.4%
Religious qualific.	815	8	823	0.1%
Not indicated	29548	1038	30586	3.8%
Industrial	53851	786	54637	6.8%
Commercial	31649	13831	45480	5.6%
Agricultural	7128	15	4143	0.9%
General	45824	9912	55738	6.9%
Primary	34891	3390	38881	4.8%
Total	752692	52650	805342	100.00

From the figures of the table, the above argument is ascertained that the burden of executing the modernization schemes in industry, agriculture and services fall on a work force that is low in its educational and training level. The Follow-Up and Evaluation Report of the First Five-year Plan (1960/61-1964/65) complained of the low increase rate of worker's productivity even below the

Increase in per capita wages as is shown in the following table:

Table 4.9

Labour Productivity Compared to Wages Per
Worker During Plan Period (43)

First Plan Period (1950/60-1964/65)*

Sector		1950/60 Base Year	1960/61	1961/62	1962/63	1963/64	1964/65	Increase in the Fifth Year Over Base Year	Percentage Increase in the Fifth Year Over Base Year
Agriculture	A	179.2	161.9	156.9	172.3	184.3	219.4	40.2	22.4
	B	30.2	27.5	32.5	34.8	37.2	44.3	14.1	46.7
Industry	A	1805.7	1841.9	1764.7	1835.5	1904.8	1968.0	162.3	8.9
	B	147.6	125.3	132.7	172.3	174.9	181.3	33.7	22.8
Construction	A	1546.2	1679.4	1830.8	1816.1	1933.0	2172.2	626.0	40.5
	B	201.7	251.9	251.7	241.4	251.4	261.1	59.4	29.4
Electricity	A	551.9	605.4	536.8	525.5	617.3	524.9	- 27.0	- 4.9
	B	161.6	164.5	159.3	150.1	155.1	155.6	- 6.0	- 3.7
Total Commo- dities Sector	A	484.9	458.6	497.2	557.8	589.5	649.1	85.0	21.1
	B	55.9	50.2	60.5	71.4	75.6	82.7	19.0	42.2
Transport and Communication	A	619.9	579.7	670.2	732.3	809.5	826.4	206.5	33.3
	B	172.8	171.3	165.2	165.8	215.6	226.5	46.7	25.9
Trade and Finance	A	260.2	295.6	262.7	266.9	304.5	317.8	57.8	22.2
	B	110.4	116.0	120.6	126.6	134.1	139.4	29.0	26.2
Housing	A	4750.0	4845.8	4411.1	4480.7	4448.6	3757.1	- 992.9	- 20.9
	B	62.5	112.5	105.6	88.4	86.5	85.7	23.2	37.1
Public Utilities	A	440.5	465.0	446.5	446.0	447.5	491.7	51.2	11.6
	B	214.3	197.5	217.7	216.0	216.9	231.0	16.7	7.8
Services	A	280.2	273.6	275.4	319.1	317.6	464.6	184.4	65.8
	B	167.1	164.4	163.3	189.0	193.5	201.3	34.2	20.5
Total Services Sector	A	350.0	354.1	359.3	360.9	404.8	491.4	134.5	46.7
	B	149.9	150.0	153.4	169.2	176.6	184.5	38.5	22.9
Grand Total	A	440.8	420.9	454.1	505.5	530.3	598.0	101.2	29.5
	B	86.6	82.5	89.8	102.4	96.7	115.7	29.8	20.9

In almost all sectors, productivity is seen to be below wages. It is not possible to determine precisely the share of the low level of education and skill among the work force in the unsatisfying level of productivity that official reports have complained of.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Yet, in the light of the above mentioned studies,⁽⁴⁵⁾ one may accuse the low level of education and training of being a major cause

* A : value of production per worker
B : wages per worker

of the unsatisfying level of productivity eventhough Mabro and Radwan⁽⁴⁶⁾ see the index of labour productivity growth as an outcome of a wide set of interrelated factors, of which labour learning and skill form one. They studied rates of growth of labour productivity in Egypt and computed them in the following table:

Table 4.10

Indices and average annual rates of growth of labour productivity in Egyptian industry (1939-1970)⁽⁴⁸⁾

Years	Indices		Average annual rates of growth		
	Output per man	Output per man/hour	Periods	Output per man	Output per man/hour
I939 I942 I945	I00.0 II0.0 II4.6	I00.0 II0.0 I23.6	I939-45	2.3	3.6
I945 I954 I962	I00.0 I56.2 205.0	I00.0 I53.3 222.5	I945-62	4.3	4.8
I963/4 I966/7 I969/70	I00.0 85.2 79.0	I00.0 72.1 71.0	I963/4-69/70	-3.9	-5.5
I939 I952	I00.0 I51.5	I00.0 I63.4	I939-52	3.2	3.8
I952 I962	I00.0 I55.0	I00.0 I68.3	I952-62	4.5	5.3
I959 I964/5	I00.0 99.1	I00.0 II2.7	I959/60-64/5	0	2.3

The average rates of labour productivity growth in industry as shown from above figures are fairly high. Between I945 and I962 the average of annual output per man was 4.3, and

that for output per man/hour was 4.8. Such increases were associated with considerable rises in what Mabro and Radwan recognized as capital intensity which rose from index 100 in 1945 to 232 in 1960 and 199 in 1962.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Yet, skill was behind that rise as well, which verifies our point of view as regards skill. Improvement in skill-composition of the labour force due to the injection of some 200.000 skilled workers who had been employed by the Allied military establishment, and who came to join Egyptian industry after WarII was one decisive factor. "More skilled labour working with more and better capital equipment," say Mabro and Radwan, "as well as shifts in the composition of industry towards activities where output per man is typically high, must have accounted for most of these increases."⁽⁵⁰⁾

If the injection of skilled labour after World War II has served to drive productivity of Egyptian industry forward until 1962, it is in the rush of thousand of unskilled labour to the field of industry since the 'Socialist Laws' (1961), according to which most industries were nationalized, that the picture of productivity has reversed into a much darker one. The level of output per man, and per man/hour after 1962 is seen 'in sharp contrast with earlier periods.'⁽⁵¹⁾ Between 1963/64 and 1966/67 output per man/hour fell by 28 per cent, and output per man fell by 15 per cent as is shown in the table above. Throughout the following years, decline continued, though at a comparatively slower rate.

The decline in output per man, and output per man/hour after 1962, partly because of skill inadequacy among labour force, and partly for other socio-economic reasons, is expressive of the staggering stride for modernity in Egypt. The sudden turn in productivity ratio after 1962 'accounts for the zero average rate of growth of output per man during the Plan, as earlier gains were wiped out towards the end of the five-year period.'⁽⁵²⁾

The above defects have continued to hinder the realization of economic proposals for a modern State. Lessons of the 1970's indicate that the rate of development in Egypt has dropped from 6.7% (1956-1965) to less than 5% annually after that.⁽⁵³⁾ This was mostly associated with military expenditure, and the delay of replacement and renewal whether in the essential utilities or production and service units.⁽⁵⁴⁾ However, productivity of 'man' that has severely declined since the early 1960's seems to be a decisive factor that has to be carefully attended to if the required revolutionary change in development rate, which the Five-year Plan (1978-1982) proposes, comes true. To raise the annual development rate from less than 5 per cent to an average annual rate of ⁽⁵⁵⁾ 9-10 per cent is a highly ambitious proposal to be attained within few years unless the skill of the adult population is brought, quantitatively and qualitatively, in harmony with the aspired goals.

Notes - Chapter Four

- I. ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, MINISTRY OF PLANNING. The Five-Year Plan 1978-1982, Vol. 2 'Egyptian Man'.
Cairo: Ministry of Planning, 1977. p. 58. (Arabic text).
2. The Five-Year Plan 1978-1982, Vol. I. op.cit. p. 48 and 52.
3. HOSELITZ, B. "The influence of cultural factors on technological change in developing economies", in J. Stieber (ed.) Employment and problems of automation in advanced technology. London: Macmillan, 1966. p. 53.
4. ROFAEL, S. et al., 'A working paper on prospected employment growth by occupational categories in the U.A.R. 1970-1985', a study presented to 'Seminar on Manpower Planning' (Cairo: 20-24 February, 1968) organised jointly by the O.E.C.D. and Institute of National Planning, Cairo.
Cairo: Institute of National Planning, n.d. p. 5.
5. ibid. p. 6. *et al.*,
6. EL-SHINNAWY, M. A. 'A working paper on a study of the occupational structure for the sector of health services with an analysis of the projected manpower requirements for the branches of rural health services and preventive medicine in 1985', a study presented to 'Seminar on Manpower.....' ibid. p. 5.
7. ROFAEL, S. et al., op.cit. p. 6.
8. ibid.
9. ibid. p. 9.
10. ibid.
- II. MONGI, M. A. F. 'Inevitability of attending to sy⁵tem of apprenticeship by Public Sector companies, and the necessity of expanding such a system', a study presented to the 'Conference on Training for Apprenticeship' (Cairo, March 1976). Table 6. p. II.
12. YOUSSEF, Y. K. and EID, W. M. op.cit. Table 6. p. 32.
13. ibid.
14. The Five-Year Plan 1978-1982, Vol. 2, op.cit. p. 58.
15. C.A.P.M.S. Population and development, op.cit. p. 199.
16. ibid. Table 3.2.7 p. 199.
17. ELWAN, A. E. S. Analysis of the conditions of human resources in the new Egyptian communities, in Development of human resources in the new communities. Cairo: Al-Ahram al-Iktisadi, March 1974.
p. 46 (Arabic text)
18. WILBER, D. N. op.cit. p. 297 and 304.
19. ibid.

20. ISSAWI, C. Egypt at mid-century: an economic survey. Quoted by W. L. Young, op.cit. p. 79.

21. YOUNG, W. L. *ibid.*

22. NAGI, M. H. Labor force and employment in Egypt: a demographic and socio-economic analysis. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. pp. 71-72.

23. EL- GHANNAM, M. A. Development, human resources and adult education, Paper presented to the International Expert Panel on Adult Education and Development with Special Reference to the Arab States (Sirs-El-Layyan, 29 November-9 December 1975). Table 6, p. 16.

24. *ibid.* p. 5.

25. C.A.P.M.S. Population and development, op.cit. p. 176.

26. C.A.P.M.S. The preliminary results of the general population and housing census 22/23 November 1976 in Egypt. Cairo: C.A.P.M.S., n.d Table 7, p. 30.

It has to be noted that the percentage of economically active population (individuals six years and over)/^{in 1960} was found in the above census to be 55.1% for males and 4.8% for females with an average of 30.1% for both sexes in 1960. As for 1976, the percentage was found to be 52.9% for males and 9.2 for females with an average 31.5% for both sexes.

27. MABRO, R. and RADWAN, S. op.cit. p. 145.

Mabro and Radwan do not favour the simple cause-effect deductions. They argue that:

"An increase in the land yields or in labour productivity does not necessarily imply that the natural fertility of the soil or the human qualities of the labour force have improved".

It is possible, in their view, that a countless number of factors are involved including water, fertilizers, capital inputs to a unit of land, labour, change in methods of organization or techniques of production ... etc. When applying their argument to the productivity of a human being the same line is adopted:

"Labour is capable of learning, and increases in productivity in so far as they reflect the accumulation of experience, may be attributed to labour itself. But the index of productivity growth by itself does not provide information on the causes of changes - whether learning by doing, technical changes, or increases in the volume of other factors of production. It simply reveals the magnitude of changes or movements over time."

28. SCHULTZ, T. W. "Reflections on investment in man", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXX, No. 5, Part 2, October 1962. pp. 1-8.

29. HARBISON, F. and MYERS, C. A. op.cit. Chapter I, pp. I-I4.
30. GALAL, A. F. K. 'Urbanization in Egypt and its implications for education 1900-1960'. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Institute of Education, University of London, 1963. p. 214.
31. HASANEIN, A. S. 'Agricultural development in the Arab states: its structure and hindrances with concentration on the intellectual, cultural and social aspects of human resources', Paper presented to the 'Study Session on Illiteracy Eradication in the Service of Development and Production in the Arab States' (UNESCO, Beirut II August - 1st September 1969). Sirs-El-Layyan, 1970. p. 64.
32. UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, MINISTRY OF PLANNING
Follow-up and evaluation report on the First Five-Year Plan (1960/61-1964/65). Part I, Follow-up and evaluation of development basic figures of the First Five-Year Plan. Cairo: Ministry of Planning, 1966.
33. ibid. p. 59.
34. HARBISON, F. 'Egypt', in W. Galenson (ed.) Labor and economic development. New York: John Willey & Sons, Inc., 1959. pp. 146-185.
35. ibid. p. 154.
36. C.A.P.M.S., The preliminary results..... op.cit. Table 8, p. 30.
37. MONGI, A. A. F. op.cit. Table 3, p. 6.
38. ibid.
39. ibid. abstracted from Tables 3 and 4 pages 6 and 8 respectively.
40. The Five-Year Plan 1978-1982, Vol. I, op.cit. p. 74.
41. MONGI, M. A. F. op.cit. p. 9.
42. ibid. Table 5, p. 10.
43. C.A.P.M.S. Population and development, op.cit. Table 3.2.9 (A), p. 201.
44. Follow-up and evaluation..... the First Five-Year Plan, Part I. op.cit. p. 57. The report puts it plainly that:
"One of the economic variables that had no much success in the First Five-Year Plan is the low increase of workers' productivity below the increase rate of per capita wages. Whereas per capita wages in the national economy rose by 31.3% in the fifth year, worker's productivity only rose by 18.3%, hence worker's wages went far ahead his productivity." *
(* underlined in the original).
45. HASANEIN, A. S. (1969), op.cit.
MONGI, M. A. F. (1976), op.cit.
HARBISON, F. (1959), op.cit.
GALAL, A. F. A. K. (1963), op.cit.
SCHULTZ, T. W. (1962) op.cit.

46. MABRO, R. and RADWAN, S. op.cit.

47. *ibid.* p. I45.

48. *ibid.* Table 8.6, p. I47.

49. *ibid.*

50. *ibid.*

51. *ibid.* pp. I47-I48.

52. *ibid.* p. I48.

53. The October Working Paper (1974), op.cit. p. 55.

54. *ibid.*

It is noted that defence expenditure estimates for 1974 put it as high as 35.8% of GNP meanwhile it is much lower in some other countries for the same year. It was only 3.3% in the case of Algeria, 7.0% in Iraq, 10.9% in Jordan, 1.5% in Quwait, 15.4% in Oman, 1.5% in Tunisia, and 3.5% in Libya. (abstracted from AHMAD, Y. J. op.cit. Table I8, p. 67).

55. The Five-Year Plan 1978-1982, Vol. I. op.cit. p. 48.

PART THREE

FORMULATION OF POLICY PROPOSALS

With a problem already intellectualized, a researcher has to turn his attention to the formulation of policy proposals. Such formulation has to work for a situation in which the previously intellectualized inconsistency is resolved. It probes the situation in which a clear basis of the solution is reached through the use of models. In other words, the 'proposed policy formulation' represents the theoretical basis for the solution. Later, a researcher has to examine the proposed solution practically, i.e. in the light of specific conditions.

Part three includes two chapters. Chapter five investigates 'modernity' and various approaches for identifying it in contemporary thought. This review levels the ground for the selection of a model of 'modernity' both in the political and economic realms. It also facilitates the argument about the ideal typical models of 'man' and 'society' in modernity.

Chapter six investigates the possible contribution of adult education to the realization of modernity proposals. In other words, the chapter attempts to investigate the extent to which 'adult education' forms a possible solution to the problem of staggering modernity. This is reached through an analysis of the impact of adult education on pre-modern attitudes and inadequate skills.

Chapter Five

Modernity: Identification and Models

What 'modernity' is

The nature of the term 'modernity', and its relatively recent introduction into scientific investigation have their bearing on its treatment as a subject of study. Some difficulties are associated with the definition given to the term. Until present, it has hardly got a convenient standerdized concept that might be accepted without argument, but has got instead, a divergent set of concepts expressing divergence in trends of identification. Nettl and Robertson⁽¹⁾ specify three difficulties as regards the definition of 'modernity'. In the first place, there is the major problem of "confusion and vagueness".⁽²⁾ The second is related with both explicit and implicit suggestion that modernity pertains to the characteristics of Western industrial democracies whether social, political or economic. The third is related with the rigid confinement of 'modernity' to certain moulds, what they express as "the suggestion that modernity represents a single, final state of affairs, namely 'the state of affairs' to be found in a number of Western societies which everyone should try to emulate, and which the most successful could reach."⁽³⁾

In ordinary speech, 'modern' is frequently equated with 'recent', or 'more recent' as distinct from the old or ancient. In the 'Oxford Illustrated Dictionary', it is given the meaning 'Of the present and recent times'.⁽⁴⁾ In this sense, a society may^{be} simply described as modern if it has exchanged its old ways for more recent ones. Compliance with contemporary

cultural traits of the age is what Ewais stresses in his definition.⁽⁵⁾ He cares to point out to the relative changeability of the concept of 'modernity' with change of time. Our concept of what is modern in the second half of the twentieth century is likely to differ from the one^{we} may have in the 21st century.⁽⁶⁾

In some other views, 'modernity' signifies a society's success to accomplish material flourish in accordance with certain measures or indicators. This, in turn, opens a wide door for the intermingle observed in many writings between a society's modernity and the successful execution of 'modernization' and, sometimes, 'development' schemes. To a sociologist like Palmer:⁽⁷⁾

"The terms "modernization" and "development" are generally synonymous, the exception being that "modernization refers to the process of moving toward the idealized set of relationships posited as 'modern' by various social theorists. "Development" refers to the process of achieving parity with the world's most economically developed states in the production of goods and services."

This seems in line with what Cyril Black accepts as a wide usage of the term 'modernity' as description of "the characteristics common to countries that are most advanced in technological, political, economic, and social development."⁽⁸⁾ 'modernity' in such a usage, is organically related with technological and other aspects of advance, simply with the execution of modernization schemes.

However, such a definition might be criticized on account of

locking the term within the materialistic aspects regardless of the human factor. It is doubtful that one African country, for example, might be regarded as 'modern' only with a wealth of minerals that makes possible the execution of many modernization schemes with international or foreign aid. To the writer's way of thinking, 'man' has to be included in any definition of modernity. Definitions given by psychologists and social-psychologists tend to fill such a gap. 'Modernity' is seen rather as a state in which the norms and attitudes of the people in a certain society are 'modern' in the sense of compliance with certain characteristics such as rationality, calculation, ... etc. 'Modernity', to Lerner⁽⁹⁾ is:

"primarily a state of mind - expectation of progress, propensity to growth, readiness to adapt oneself to change." (10)

From such a conception of modernity springs the high place that Lerner gives to 'empathy' and the acceptance of innovations on the part of individuals. Searching for modernity characteristics within 'man' is the trend that Rudolph and Rudolph (1967)⁽¹¹⁾ follow, and may be seen as running, generally, with what Lerner accepts:

"modernity" assumes that local ties and parochial perspectives give way to universal commitments and cosmopolitan attitudes; that the truths of utility, calculation and science take precedence over those of the emotions, the sacred, and the non-rational; that the individual rather than the group be the primary unit of society and politics; that the associations in which men live and work be based on choice not birth; that mastery rather than fatalism orient their attitude toward the material and human environment; that identity be chosen and achieved, not ascribed and affirmed; that work be separated from family, residence, and community in bureaucratic organizations; (12)

The angle through which modernity is looked at, decides to an extent, the definition that individual thinkers give to it, hence the danger of having two such thinkers dealing with 'modernity' but with totally different views. Some economists and sociologists, having the whole society in the forefront of their thoughts, highly appreciate such aspects as industrialization, mass education, bureaucratization, ... etc., which, in their totality, indicate modernity. Others take a different line with stress laid only on one or few aspects that are, to them, most significant in a modern society, giving but slight attention to others. The economic realm is stressed by some thinkers being the one in which modernity is most likely to be shown.^(I3) To others, modernity is rather a spiritual phenomenon or a kind of mentality with little regard to what an economic or political system takes.^(I4)

The above muddle of modernity definitions make the review of contemporary schools of thought and their broad trends of identifying modernity a necessary step. Five major trends in the identification of modernity can be distinguished each ^{being} adopted by one contemporary school of thought. However, sharp barriers between each of the trends and the others are not found.

Modernity identification through contrasts

Modernity may be identified through the notion of contrast that stems from the comparison of 'modern' and 'traditional' societies: the former representing the ideal model meanwhile the latter stands for the other extreme. Contrasts are, hence, models of rational structures set as instruments to facilitate the description and analysis of the social status that characterizes each type. To Kahl:

"Traditional society" and "modern society" are abstractions, mental constructs that create simplified models in order to help us understand the central factors that explain the complexities of historical reality. They are "ideal types" in which a limited number of characteristics in "pure" form are used to develop the theoretical model." (I5)

The 'contrast' trend is favoured by many sociologists since the outset of the present century and even before in the discrimination they attempted to make between 'simple' and 'complex' societies.

One earlier attempt to explore modernity is Henry Maine's in which he distinguished a society based on inherited social status from the other based on contractual relations. (I6)

Another is the 'Community' and 'Society' or the 'Gemeinschaft' and 'Gesellschaft' types of societies made by Tönnies distinguishing the society dominated by elementary clan relations and the one dominated by secondary contractual. (I7)

Robert Redfield, as well, contrasted the 'folk society' with the 'urban society'.⁽¹⁸⁾ The list may be expanded to include Howard Becker's contrast of 'sacred society' with 'secular society', Durkheim's 'mechanical' and 'organic' types of society ... and so forth.

However, most notable of all attempts included is Weber's with the three categories he postulated: the rational-legal, the traditionalistic and the charismatic.⁽¹⁹⁾ His classification has, to a greater or lesser extent, influenced later typologies as Parsons' and others. As for Parsons' typology, it is built on the well-known five 'Pattern Variables' he made of traditional and modern societies as will be elaborated later.⁽²⁰⁾

According to the views included in the 'contrast' trend, underdeveloped societies of the present day have, in a sense, the characteristics of simple, traditional, or pre-civilised societies. Isolation, prevalence of elementary relations, family centrality and other non-formal controls, traditionality and slow change, are all likely to be prevalent in them in one degree or another. Passive characteristics are generally isolated as signifying backwardness, whereas modernity is associated with the other extreme. The modernization process is taken to signify the process that tends to eliminate such passive characteristics and acquire the ones of the modern model.

Useful as the above outlooks at modernity might be, in drawing distinctive lines between 'modern' on the one hand, and 'less modern', 'traditional' or 'backward' on the other, the actual conditions of societies are likely to defy such theoretical abstractions. There is, indeed, a great deal of interactions that allow a wide space between the 'black' and 'white' colours filled by an infinite number of graded shades. Hence, the severe limitation imposed on the practical use of the 'contrast' trend bringing it down to the provision of methodological instruments for the understanding of analysis process. Besides, the trend encourages arbitrary judgements for, when contrasting concepts, there is always the temptation to attribute the positive value to the one, and -necessarily- a negative value to the other.

Modernity identification through indicators

An indicator is taken in language as 'that which points
(21)
out or indicates'. In science, it reflects, directly or indirectly the amounts that cannot be subject to direct measurement or observation hence, exceeding the significance of the 'index figure' which is mainly concerned with the changes in time and place to which a directly measurable amount is subject whether in itself or in practice. (22)

Indicators of modernity may take the form of one 'core' that a thinker concentrates upon and to which he attaches the greatest relevance in modernity. Levy, for example, judges a society to be modernized according to its capability to use 'inanimate' sources of power as well^{as} the use of 'tools' to multiply the effect of effort. To him,

'A society will be considered more or less modernized to the extent that its members use inanimate sources of power and/or use tools to multiply the effects of their efforts.'⁽²³⁾

To others, modernity is indicated by a number of cores that, in their overall form show the degree to which a society is 'modern' or 'traditional'. In such a trend, the notion of contrast might as well be included, thus modern and traditional societies are contrasted through the use of a number of indicators. A good example of a sociologist who identified modernity that way is Kahl who gave seven characteristics the presence of which indicates modernity.

I. The division of labour, namely the proportion of labour force engaged in agriculture. While traditional societies may have 70-80 per cent of their workers engaged in tilling the soil, the percentage in modern societies is less than 10 per cent. Nonagricultural labour force may be divided into 'traditional sectors' including artisans, priests and lawyers, while modern sectors might include industrial

workers, clerks in bureaucracies, and engineers.

2. The state of technology related with the sophisticated engineering based upon the latest scientific researches characterizes a modern society whereas the traditional one uses customary techniques of production.

3. The degree of urbanization which Kahl builds on the rationale that 'Since modern agricultural technology permits a small proportion of the labor force to feed the remaining of the population, using a low ratio of men to land, most of the society becomes urban'. (24)

4. The economy. While the economy in a modern society is based on complex commercial markets unifying all parts of the nation, per capita production and consumption are high, we find the traditional society, on the contrary, based on localized markets where the production is mostly for a meagre level of subsistence.

5. The system of social stratification. Modern society is characterized by a range of statuses reflecting the range of positions in the division of labour. These are many with no sharp distinctions between one and the other. 'The distribution of prestige, of income, and of power', states Kahl, 'become more equalitarian and the rate of mobility between strata increases'. (25) The traditional society, on the contrary, is characterized by sharp division between landlords and peasants.

6. Education and communications. Modern society is literate with widespread secondary education that narrows the gulf between mass and elite. The whole system moves toward the technical and pragmatic. Mass media in a typical modern society cater to the bulk of the population shaping new images that replace customary symbols. As for the traditional society, it is on the whole illiterate, with only a few elite having a high level scholarship.

7. Values. Modern values are, as Kahl states, 'rational and secular, permit choice and experiment, glorify efficiency and change, and stress individual responsibility'. (26)
Traditional values, on the contrary, are compulsory in their force, sacred and stable calling for fatalistic acceptance of the world as it is and exaggerated respect to those in authority. (27)

Parsons, as well, was concerned with contrasting variable tendencies of ideal modern and traditional systems. His dichotomies were presented through his 'Pattern Variables': universalism-particularism, achievement-ascription, affectivity-neutrality - affectivity, specificity-diffuseness; and collectivity-orientation -self-orientation. As will be elaborated in detail in this chapter, social systems and subsystems to Parsons, would thus be amenable to modernity if their goals significantly reflect five tendencies involved in the dichotomies:

- a. General standards and criteria than particular cases.
- b. Judgement of action on the basis of what individuals do rather than what they are.
- c. The function favours long-term objectives rather than immediate ones.
- d. The operation of laws which are rationally defined, differentiated and changeable rather than diffuse and traditionally handed canons.
- e. Collective interest rather than self-interest.⁽²⁸⁾

Concerned mainly with the economic aspect of modernity, Hoselitz highly favours three only of Parsons' five variables:

1. Universalism and particularism, that the individual in traditional societies is treated according to subjective norms. Performance judgement is, hence, made not on the basis of efficiency and experience, but for personal and family considerations. In modern societies, performance judgements are decided according to general considerations.

Posts, for example, are occupied mostly on the basis of efficiency and/or experience. Individuals are ruled by well-defined criteria to which all are committed.

2. Ascription and achievement, that backward economies are dominated by clan relations. The distribution of goods and services is made not according to the effort exerted by individuals, but on the basis of family relations. On the other extreme, the effort and achievement become the criteria of such distribution:

3. Specificity and diffuseness, that division of labour is not applied in traditional societies and is both cause and effect of low productivity. In modern societies, specialization and labour division dominate, and every individual has a small, well defined task in the process of production in accordance with his efficiency and technical skill.⁽²⁹⁾

With this view of traditional and modern economy, it is easy to see how Hoselitz' view bears resemblance to Parsons'.

Smelser made a similar attempt in his analysis of the mechanisms of change and adjustment to change, as well as in the theorization of the process of modernization.⁽³⁰⁾ He differs in view from Levy and some others in that he preaches the futility of the views that concentrate on the economic aspect disregarding the social one.

He criticized the economic theories that bear heavily on the interaction between economic variables such as saving, investment, productivity and organization. Sociological variables, to him, are of no less importance including family systems, class stratification and political situation with their impact on the economic variables. While an aspect like saving, for example, is connected with the levels of investment it is in the meantime related with the 'image' of investment. The former is affected by the level of

income and the costs of living, the latter is affected by the prevailing values and attitudes which might induce individuals in a traditional society to spend on boasting and showy consumption.

Class positions are, as well, likely to affect saving and investment. Smelser sees the social status in most rural societies associated with land possession, and so the ultimate hope of an individual in such societies centres round the increase of his possession of land. This directs the savings basically to the buying of agricultural land that is assumed to give the family a higher social prestige.

As for the family system, Smelser points out that rural and tribal societies with their social systems based on the family system, locality and religion stand in the way of initiation. (31)

Modernity identification through evolutionary stages

'Modernity' in this trend represents the highest stage in a series of evolutionary stages that societies are assumed to pass through. Throughout these stages, modernity has developed in a series of historical processes that took place first in Europe and created not only new social structures and organizations, but also what Eisenstadt calls a 'non-traditional great tradition', or a new type of civilization. (32)

Stages are marked by dynamic events which might be of political nature, as those witnessed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while some stages are marked by more general and cumulative positions like the scientific revolution or the development of rationalization which are assumed to have direct and strong connection with trends in economic development. But, casual events, however great, cannot, by themselves, be taken to manifest separate stages of evolution unless they are marked by certain features. Of these are the transformation they accomplish of the nature and contents of the centres of society, of rules and patterns of participation and access to them, and of the relation between cultural and political centres on the one hand and the periphery on the other. The transformation in the content of these orders takes, according to Eisenstadt, three phases: secularization, reconsideration of the givenness of these contents and emphasis on the active and autonomous participation of broader groups in the formation of cultural traditions. (33)

The writings of Rostow and Wallace clearly favour the evolutionary trend, though the first is specifically concerned with the economic aspect, while the latter adopts a more general approach of cultural stability.

The 'Stages of Economic Growth' is an analysis of

comprehensive and evolutionary stages which make possible the identification of all societies whatever their degree of growth as lying within one of five categories:

1. The traditional society.
2. The pre-conditions for the take-off.
3. The take-off into self-sustained growth.
4. The drive to maturity.
5. The stage of high-mass consumption. (34)

The fifth stage is the one most likely to represent modernity, and is linked with the preceding one (the drive to maturity) in that, when maturity approaches its end, three remarkable changes are witnessed:

The first is in labour power as regards its structure, wage level, outlooks and degree of skill. While before the 'Take-off' 75% of the labour power worked in agriculture generally getting low wages hardly sufficient for subsistence, the percentage comes as down as to 40% near the end of the 'Take-off'. When maturity is accomplished, this latter figure drops to 20% only. Besides, the level of wages especially of technical labourers, rises, and workers organize themselves in unions that look after the promotion of their conditions and living standards.

The second change is in the nature of leadership which moves from those who have founded their wealth through their ownership of factories, to the efficient entrepreneurs who undertake administration in various institutions.

The third change takes place in 'thoughts', aspirations and outlooks of individuals as the society generally suffers boredom and loses much of the zeal for the miracles brought about by industry. (35)

The 'High-mass consumption' is the stage in which the role of leadership is moved to the sectors engaged in services and in production of cars, electric washing machines, refrigerators, radio and television sets, simply the lasting goods. The societies that rose to that stage (the United States, Western Europe and Japan) witnessed two significant turns:

- a. The rise of the individuals' income to the extent that a great many of them have the ability to spend on consuming expenditure that surpasses what they actually need for food, housing and clothing.
- b. A change in the structure of the working power when the percentage of the city residents to the population rose. The percentage of workers in offices and technical jobs in factories rose subsequently. (36)

Apart from these changes, societies that have reached the 'High-mass consumption' devote an increasing amount of their resources for welfare purposes and social security. Not only do individuals enjoy the possession of lasting consumer goods, but enjoy as well health, medical, cultural and recreative services.

Wallace, on the other hand, focuses the attention on the stages of 'social change' building on the notion that cultural diffusion is a basic factor in change and development. The cycle of change takes five stages:

(a) The stage of stability which represents the preconditions for change, and is characterized by a state of integrity and balance between the prevalent cultural elements. In such a stage, the society allows all the cultural types to co-exist so long as they are capable of satisfying the requirements of the individuals and groups.

(b) The growth of individual requirements

The requirements of individuals grow while the prevalent cultural patterns prove incapable of satisfying the steady increase in the individuals' requirements, and hence, rises the need for some change in the current cultural patterns.

(c) The state of cultural distortion

When the prevalent cultural patterns fail to satisfy adequately the requirements of individuals, the society resorts to borrowing cultural types from other societies which are thought to be capable of achieving development. However, contradiction soon arises between the new cultural patterns and the old ones. This results in difficulties in absorption and assimilation of the new elements and hence, lead to the 'distortion' of the original cultural elements. This represents

a major challenge to the society.

(d) Revitalization

The society attempts to balance itself through the revitalization of its old cultural elements meanwhile it benefits by the new cultural elements that have proved from its experience, to be effective and fitting to it. Notwithstanding the many challenges encountered by the society during that stage, it can face them successfully by the elimination of the routine that stands against organization as well as by accepting the cultural elements and traits that are useful to it. The process of cultural transformation is, hence, complete.

(e) The new stage of stability

When the society succeeds in achieving the balance once more between its cultural elements, it returns to its normal state and is, by then, dominated by a state of stability different from the one it had witnessed before. By then, it had covered a good distance in the way leading to development or modernity. (37)

Identification of modernity as a multi-dimensional, integrative whole

This trend does not confine itself to one or even some sets of indicators through which modernity may be identified. It does not rely on a partial interpretation of development

nor does it recommend the outlook based on evolutionary stages/^{that}societies have to go through before they reach modernity. It rather follows a conceptual organic line based on the 'wholistic' view at society in terms of the interaction and interdependence between various social phenomena and systems.

Sorokin suggested that the integrative concept of the social life phenomena be based on a set of items, some of which point to the nature of the current social conditions, others are related with the structural ingredients of social phenomena while others still express the image in which the social phenomena are interrelated. (38)

The writings after the integrative line of modernity identification generally stress the various systems through which the integrative whole is identified. Nine such systems are frequently mentioned in one form or other namely, the demographic, the family, the educational, the ecological, the economic, the political, the normative, class structure, and health condition;

Myrdal suggests that the social system is affected by a set of economic and social forces. In case some change occurs in one aspect, the reaction caused as a result of that change does not take the form heading for a reverse direction of the old change, but rather it leads to the emergence of helping changes to the first, and hence, drives the system in the same direction that the first change has taken, and consolidates it.

Myrdal affirms the contact between the economic and social variables severely criticizing the traditional economic theory. He rejects the traditional trend that disregards the non-economic factors. To be practical, he suggests, necessitates that the economic analysis takes into consideration all the relevant factors. In other words, it must concentrate on the causality cumulative principle between various factors in the social system. (39)

One clear example after the integrative trend which expresses the point of view of the developing countries may be deduced from 'Essay of Socio-economic Typology in Latin American Countries' (40) where social and political variables are integrated. A set of five variables are introduced for the consideration of those who attempt to measure the degree of development. Such an effort bears some resemblance to what has already been enlisted under the "indicators' trend". The five variables are:

- a. The economic variable which includes a set of indicators such as the average income of the individual, the consumption of electricity, cement, the issue of newspapers, the calories that an individual gets, and the percentage of the labour force engaged in the agricultural sector.
- b. Social graduation which includes a set of indicators namely, distribution of population over urban and rural areas, and distribution of power over various productive sectors.

c. The cultural variable including indicators such as illiteracy percentage, the percentage of students in various stages of education compared to the age groups, the individual's share in newspapers, radio sets and cinema seats. Other indicators are concerned with health level as represented in the number of physicians to every 100,000 of the population and the individual share in hospital bedding in addition to birth and mortality rates.

d. The demographic variable which includes two basic indicators: the degree of homogeneity among the population and the percentage of the foreigners to the nationals.

^{The}
e. Political variable which is represented in the degree of parliamentary representation, the actuality of political ideas, the degree of integrity of the pressure groups or other groups influencing political life, and the degree of the representation of the electorates in the system of political parties. (41)

The integrative bases for Moore, on which the degree of modernity of a society may be identified are put in a classificatory system different from the above. They include: values, systems, organization and incentives:

I. Values It is necessary to have a framework of values that allows an easy mobility for the individuals, as well as an employment system based on technical efficiency and capability of performance. Such a demand is seen by Moore,

as sometimes contradictory to a number of prevalent values in the society such as the inclination to prefer clans, and hence the change of the framework of values becomes a basic condition of modernity. (42)

2. Systems Development is closely connected with a system of ownership, work and exchange as well as with political and economic systems. Work has to be mobile whether geographically or socially and employment should run in accordance with efficiency with no regard to previous social status. A high degree of political stability is a necessary prerequisite. A change in the educational system as well as in the public and private organizations that look after the promotion of education and technology is also a condition for the accomplishment of development. To Moore, some pioneer sectors of population should tend to put programmes to identify the technical methods that should be borrowed or oriented as well as the new inventions that can be applied in unusual conditions.

3. Organization As industrial advance is related with specialization and labour division, there should be a systematized administrative organization that makes decisions.

4. Motivation The more desire for a better life, does not -automatically- mean attaining it. Hence, change should be introduced in the prevalent social systems and organizations. (43)

The psycho-sociological trend for modernity identification

In this trend, modernity is identifiable by a group of structural characteristics that distinguish the 'modern' society from a 'traditional' one. On the individual basis, modernity signifies a group of attitudes, values and styles of feeling and work that active and clever participation in a modern society demands of its individuals.

To psycho-sociologists, Man's modernity precedes and is even a condition for accomplishing the modernity of social systems. Hence, psychological characteristics of individuals and groups are concentrated upon as basic areas of investigation. Their rationale is that, to reach modernity, a State has to depend on an efficient system of bureaucracy, advanced science and technology, sound planning, ... etc., the realization of which requires that individuals possess certain traits, values and attitudes. This explains why a good deal of the efforts exerted by psycho-sociologists has been directed to the study of the behavioural characteristics of 'modern man', as may be deduced from the work of figures like Mc Clelland, Inkeles, Smith, Kahl which will be elaborated later. (44)

The growing data obtained from the empirical studies in the field seem to support many of the views raised by the above figures, and many others as regards the individual traits of 'modern man'. However, the trend, on the whole, is subject to criticism from, at least, four angles:

- I. That the differentiation made between 'modern' and 'traditional' or 'non-modern man' builds on arbitrary basis. This may be explained by the lack, until present, of universally acceptable characteristics of 'modern' man to rely upon. Accordingly, it is difficult to find a typical man whom we may call 'modern'.
2. That most of the psycho-sociologists who have dealt with individual modernity are from the West. It is not strange, hence, to find that the characteristics of 'modern' man to them are unconsciously delineated with the traits they suppose to characterize Western man. As will later be shown,⁽⁴⁵⁾ linking modernity with Western outlooks and Western styles of life, however unavoidable, leads to some conclusions that do not accord with underdeveloped countries whose actual setting differs from the setting out of which the 'Industrial Revolution' and other great movements of the West have sprung.
3. Because the cultural items vary from one underdeveloped country to another, it is hardly acceptable that one set of behavioural characteristics may work for all of them. It has to be recognized that behavioural characteristics and traits may interact in a way that varies with the variation of cultures. The natural outcome is varied characters and varied types of societies.
4. That the measurement of behavioural characteristics is not reliable until it builds on accurate means of measurement. Great as the efforts made in this respect, the available measures, as Hassan believes, 'is still in need of great orientation and development if a high degree of reliability and stability is to be attained'.⁽⁴⁶⁾

Other than characteristics and traits of 'modern' man, the role played by individual and social values in the accomplishment of modernity is another field of interest of such psycho-sociologists as Lerner, Mc Clelland, Hagen and others.

In 'The Passing of Traditional Society', Lerner stresses the importance of exposure to 'communication' in the process of modernization. He was concerned with the degree of 'empathy' of individuals as the crucial variable intervening between mass media exposure and modernization effects. In this way, 'modernity' is associated with 'empathy', the latter taken to signify the capacity to see oneself in another fellow's view.⁽⁴⁷⁾

In his field research performed on six Middle Eastern countries (of which Egypt was one), Lerner interviewed approximately 1,600 individuals. His interviews included nine items designed to test the individual's ability to project himself into the position of another, and express a judgement as regards what he would do or feel if he were the other persons. Three of these items called upon the respondent to give his opinions, not those of others. These six form the nonrole-taking items in Lerner's empathy scale. The respondent was asked:

1. what he missed by not getting a newspaper,
2. how people who attend movies differ from those who do not,
3. in what other country he would like to live,

4. what he would like to know more about that country,
5. what problems people like himself face in life, and
6. what people like himself can do to solve these problems. (48)

Lerner then presents a cross-classification of the individuals interviewed in accordance with four considerations:

- (a) empathy whether they scored high or low scores in empathy.
- (b) media-participation: whether they participated much or little in the use of modern communication media (radio, newspaper, movies, ..)
- (c) urbanization: whether they lived in a city or elsewhere.
- (d) literacy: whether they were or were not literate.

The table below presents what Lerner could reach; a classification into modern, transitional and traditional on the basis of scores. The 'plus' signs in the table show a high degree of the characteristic indicated, a 'minus' sign indicates a low degree: (49)

Type	Literacy	Urbanization	media Participation	Empathy
Modern	+	+	+	+
Transitional A	-	+	+	+
B	-	-	+	+
C	-	-	-	+
Traditional	-	-	-	-

It is clear from Lerner's table above how empathy among the individuals is the first step towards the accomplishment of modernity. First, an individual becomes emphatic, then he becomes urban, and

comes to use modern communication media, and then becomes literate. There is, as Lerner believes, a mutual interaction among these changes cited above, and an increase in urbanization, contact with information through modern communication media, literacy or empathy probably tend to increase the others. However, empathy of individuals is held in a superior standing than urbanization and the use of media in terms of its being the causal initiating factor in the sequence. (50)

McClelland, who might be taken as a typical representative of the psycho-sociological trend, concentrates on the role played by values and psychological drives in the rate of economic and social development that a country reaches. He introduced the 'Achievement Motivation' or what was termed 'need achievement' or 'n Achievement' that signifies 'a certain way of thinking that was relatively rare but, which, when it occurred in an individual, tended to make him behave in a particularly energetic way'. (51)

McClelland's examination of Weber's general hypothesis (52) that Protestantism led to an economic development and perhaps to an increase in achievement motivation or certain values associated with Protestantism in the West, drove him to ask if the independence and the 'early mastery training' produce higher n Achievement only in the West, or in other areas of different cultures as well. If the high n Achievement was associated with Protestantism:

"what about Japan, whose economic development seemed quite rapid, but could in no way be attributed to the Protestant Reformation? Was it higher n Achievement that led to economic development in Japan and if so what parental values produced it there?". (53)

With these enquiries in mind, McClelland was driven to test his own hypothesis that there was a connection between n Achievement and economic development on a large scale that surpassed the limits of 'Christianity' and 'Westernism'. Depending on the analysis of 25 folk tales and stories chosen randomly from the texts used for teaching at the second, third and fourth grade levels of primary schools in twenty-three countries and which were published in the 1920's (also the same in the 1950's), formed his base for the judgement of national n Achievement level. The level of economic growth for each nation was judged by the per-capita consumption of electricity in Kilowat-hours.

The result of McClelland in so far as our present study is concerned, has revealed that countries with higher scores of n Achievement in the 1920's showed more rapid economic growth later on than those with lower scores of the n Achievement in the same period. For the 1950 period, which included a larger number of countries, he got almost the same result. (54)

Most important of Clelland's findings is that a precondition for the achievement of modernity in a country, particularly in so far as economy is concerned, is the change in the people. Economic growth can be promoted only when the values and motives of individuals are successfully changed, what he likes to put as:

"The shortest way to achieve economic objectives might turn out to be through changing people themselves". (55)

Western Model as Expressive of Modernity

What is meant by 'changing people themselves' is that they become more achievement oriented. The way this change is brought about is:

"by persuasion or education, by introducing changes in the social system and by early character training." Of these three approaches, the third "is by all odds the one most likely to succeed..." (56)

Hagen's line in modernity identification bears some resemblance to McClelland's. Hagen was mainly concerned with a question to which he attempted to give an answer through his theory of 'Social Change' (1962). (57)

"Why have the people of some societies entered upon technological progress more effectively than others?"

He felt that the answer could be in the realm of what he called: 'personality formation and the social conditions affecting it'. (58)

The difference he could find was associated with the social-psychological process of childhood personality development, where social values are learned.

A similar trend may be pointed out in Hirschfeld's writings, where 'modernization' is historically looked at as the process of change towards social, economic and political systems of Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the twentieth century. (60) While the difference between 'modernity' and 'modernization' is not overlooked, the latter type to him is clearly a Western one.

Western Model as Expressive of Modernity

The contemporary thoughts about modernity reviewed above serve to give a clearer vision of how 'modernity' is identified by various thinkers. However, they raise a question as regards the institutional and normative forms that modernity takes, and whether they are necessarily 'Western'. The transformation of traditional, medieval lifestyles into 'modern' ones in Western Europe, has, not without cause, been the main source of inspiration before economists and sociologists who dealt with modernity. The age of Exploration, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution in England, have all been great landmarks from which stemmed various Western outlooks about modernity. Hence, 'modern' has currently been used as a synonym of 'Western'. To an eminent sociologist like Shils, 'modern' means:

"being Western without the onus of dependence on the West. The model of modernity is a picture of the West detached in some way from its geographical origins and locus (59)

A similar trend may be pointed out in Eisenstadt's writings, where 'modernization' is historically looked at as the process of change towards social, economic and political systems of Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the twentieth century. (60) While the difference between 'modernity' and 'modernization' is not overlooked, the ideal type to him is clearly a Western one.

To a third, like Lerner,⁽⁶¹⁾ the Western model is applicable anywhere in the world, for "it is only historically Western; sociologically it is global."⁽⁶²⁾

But, equating 'modernity' with Western institutions and lifestyles locks it within narrow confinement that may overlook the aspirations and experiences of underdeveloped countries in other parts of the world. Such a view is advocated strongly by Frankel,⁽⁶³⁾ who argues that:

"The problem is not to wipe out the slate clean in the underdeveloped countries, and to write our economic and technical equations on it, but to recognize that different peoples have a different language of special action and process, and, indeed have long exercised, peculiar aptitudes for solving the problems of their own time and place; aptitudes which must be further developed in the historic setting of their own past to meet the exigencies of the present and the future." (64)

The Western model is best suited to certain 'place' at a certain 'time'. Blind application of Western standard of values to the citizens of the underdeveloped countries is seen as 'totally inappropriate' for researchers carrying out cross-cultural studies.⁽⁶⁵⁾ To see modernity only from the Western perspective, is, to Bernstein,⁽⁶⁶⁾ associated with colonial perspective, and can hardly be accepted as innocent of ethnocentrism.⁽⁶⁷⁾

As for the intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries, they seem to be tortured between the Western type, which they see working well, and between their own traditions which cannot be easily discarded; in other words the conflict is between 'borrowing' and 'originality'.⁽⁶⁸⁾

Western civilization, to many of them, should not be regarded as the ultimate end that the whole humanity should strive to reach, but rather a transitory phase. Hence, the growing call for models of modernity adjustable to the economic, political and social conditions of the underdeveloped countries. (69)

An eminent Egyptian thinker classifies the reaction of Arab intellectuals to ideals of modernity into three divisions:

(a) Those who reject the spirit of the age, and lock themselves within the limits of tradition (al-turath). They take an extremist position towards the recommendation of strict application of religious rules in organizing life affairs, regardless of what is suggested by others as 'modern'.

(b) Those who accept all waves of 'modern' thought coming from the West without question. Whatever might be the contrast between what is 'modern' and the 'tradition' that has been with the Arabs for hundreds of years, the latter is always to be sacrificed on the alter of change.

(c) Those who represent the greatest section of contemporary intellectuals and whose adherents are increasing every day. They adopt a line in between the two extremes trying to form a compromise within which 'modern Arab culture' true to Arab conditions may be established meanwhile the spirit of the age is not rejected. (70)

To see whether the Western model is applicable to the underdeveloped countries, two points have to be taken into consideration;

Firstly; that associating 'modernity' with the Western model can only be regarded as 'ethnocentric' in case a successful alternative raised by the underdeveloped countries is available. So far, this alternative has not been found. What the intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries aspire to realize, as will later be seen, accords in one way or other, with the Western model. 'Political Democracy' based on parliamentary representation, political parties, free press, periodical executive power, .. etc. is the core of the Western model from the political angle. In the economic realm, the benefit of the fruits of science and the promotion of technology in the form of wide-scale industrialization are the main bases. Both of the two can hardly be examined apart from the Western experience. Refusal to consider the Western model, by some sectors, does not indicate a defect in the model itself, but is rather dictated by bitter feelings towards Western colonization. Ghandi's call to reject the railway, the telegraph, the hospital and other phases of Western culture, can only be seen as one of this type.⁽⁷²⁾ The argument against the Western model is not because of the 'content' but because of the 'form' which only leads, in the view of one Egyptian scholar, to seclusion from the world around, not for the sake of reaching truth, but out of bias to the old.⁽⁷²⁾ The argument of the above sectors seems to be what Lerner meant in his study about 'The Passing of Traditional Society' (1958)⁽⁷³⁾ which he made on six Middle Eastern countries, that "Middle Easterners more than ever want the modern package but reject the label 'made in U.S.A.'" (74)

Secondly; it is not sound to regard the Western model as wholly the contribution of the Western world. The impact of the Egyptian as well other cultures on the Greek civilization cannot be denied.⁽⁷⁵⁾ Alexandria, at the time of Alexander the Great (332-323 B.C.) became a great source of cultural radiation that influenced the Greek culture as well as the cultures of the peoples with whom Egypt contacted. When Europe contacted the Greek civilization during the Renaissance, it was, in fact, benefiting indirectly from the outcomes in which various cultures had contributed. Politically, the Western concept of democracy can be traced to the ideals of great religions and ancient philosophies.⁽⁷⁶⁾ The ideals found affirmation in the Greek practice through political organizations of Athens. From them, Western democracy got its origin. Although some claim that the idea of democracy to the Greeks was not the same as the modern one adopted by the West, the historical significance of the Greek experiment and its impact cannot be ignored.⁽⁷⁷⁾ Borrowing is, hence, not something to be ashamed of so long as it is based on assimilation and careful selection. While adopting the Western technological culture, it is not desirable that the underdeveloped countries should copy the whole Western structure, for this might prove more harmful than beneficial, but rather as El-Biblawy (1972) puts it: 'they have to select what they see fitting and reject what is not.'⁽⁷⁸⁾ If 'Political Democracy' and 'Industrialization' are the main phases of Western modernity

in political and economic realms, it is reasonable that they have rational aspirations towards the Western model at this present stage of development, what Shils and others have found.⁽⁷⁹⁾

Shils and Modernity Proposals in the 'New States'

The writings of Edward Shils, particularly his 'Political Development in the New States' (1968)⁽⁸⁰⁾, and 'Scientific Development in the New States' (1966),⁽⁸¹⁾ are of special help to the argument about the case of Egypt in the light of four considerations:

1. The basic concern of Shils' model, which is systemic, is with the 'aspirations of the new states to modernity',⁽⁸²⁾ which helps to identify the gap that actually exists between the high aspirations for modernity in such states against the lower valuations, or what they are capable of accomplishing of these aspirations.
2. Shils adopts the integrative approach in identifying modernity. While giving special significance to the political aspect of modernity, other aspects are not disregarded. The brevity with which the economic aspect is tackled, which must be expected of a sociologist like Shils, does not prevent the writer from supporting Shils' views with the contributions made by other thinkers that run along the main line.
3. The Arab Republic of Egypt is mentioned as one of his 'new states',⁽⁸³⁾ which have the following common features:

- (a) They have recently gained independence following a substantial period of foreign rule; therefore their indigenous machinery of government is of quite recent origin.
- (b) Their social structures and cultures are, on the whole, highly traditional.
- (c) Significant sections of their elites are concerned to modernize their social structure, their culture as well as political life and outlook.⁽⁸⁴⁾
- (d) Amidst what Dahl recognizes as "a flood of 'typologies' or proposed ways of classifying political systems",⁽⁸⁵⁾ Shils' typology is highly favoured by sociologists on the grounds that it, "facilitates the comparison not only of the emergent nations but of most political systems in the modern world."⁽⁸⁶⁾

I. Political Aspect of Modernity

The association between 'modernity' and 'political democracy' is recognized both by advanced and underdeveloped countries alike. To Shils, "Modernity entails democracy, and democracy in the New States must above all be equalitarian."⁽⁸⁷⁾ He presents a typology of five-alternative course of political development which include:

- a. Political democracy
- b. Tutelary democracy
- c. Modernizing oligarchies
- d. Totalitarian oligarchies
- e. Traditional oligarchies.⁽⁸⁸⁾

From all five, Shils accepts 'political democracy' as the ideal model that could be aspired for by the new states. He raises a question the answer to which explains his views:

"What is the predominant, visible model which commands assent by its actual achievement and by the prestige of the power and ascendancy of its earthly embodiments? It is the model of a regime of civilian rule through representative institutions in the matrix of public liberties, those three components of a modern conception of democracy." (89)

These components of 'political democracy' bear resemblance to what is suggested in Western thought about democracy.

One definition that sums the Western outlook runs as follows:

"a modern state is generally a territorial nation, organised as a legal association by its own action in creating a constitution (such action being in some cases, as in Great Britain, a process along a line of time rather than an act at a point of time), and permanently acting as such an association, under that constitution, for the purpose of maintaining a scheme of legal rules defining and securing the rights and duties of its members." (90)

The 'legal rules' as regards democratic institutions as Parliament, parties, franchise rights, free press, ... etc. are well defined and carefully adhered to, in most cases.

The high esteem that 'political democracy' has gained among the leaders of the new states, or underdeveloped countries, is no less remarkable than in the West. Such a condition is attributed by Shils to, "Their hunger for modernity, the liberal auspices of their independence movement, their general tendency toward populism". (91) However, some other considerations make these countries ready to introduce substantial admixtures of oligarchy, but still the position remains evidently in favour of 'political democracy' as

the ideal model to be aspired for. Shils clearly states that :

"no regnant elite in the new states of Asia and Africa believes that its ultimate aspirations would be adequately and definitively realized in any of the latter alternatives or that any defections or variants are anything but second best." (92)

Components of Political Democracy

Shils recognizes four such componenets in a modern political system, namely the legislative, the executive, the political parties and the independent judiciary:

I. The focal point in 'Political Democracy' is, in Shils' view, a legislative body periodically elected by universal suffrage. It is empowered to initiate legislation through its individual members or committees and through the leadership of the executive branch which may be seperably elected (as in the U.S.A.) or selected from members of legislature (as in Great Britain). Legislatively, this assembly is supreme and has the right to accept or reject any proposals put to it by the executive, and no bill can become law without its consent.

2. The executive carries out its policies through a hierarchically organized bureaucracy which is ultimately answerable to its political head or minister under whose guidance it operates, and who, in his turn is answerable to the legislative.

3. Political parties are an integral part of the system.

Candidates for election as legislatures do so in association with,^{and} as the candidates of, one of the parties. It is thus that political parties are, to Shils, a necessary component of political democracy. The party which wins the largest number of seats dominates the legislature alone, or it does so in coalition with other parties or with dissident number of other parties.

4. The existence of an independent judiciary, and the recognition of all political actors that their conduct must be circumscribed by the provisions of the constitutional, conventional and legal limitations. (93)

Political power in a modern political system is held for a comparatively short period of time, and the conditions for maintaining it must be fairly precisely defined. Periodically, the electorate is given the opportunity to choose anew between the contending groups for political office.

In case the government is dismissed through the loss of a vote of confidence in the legislature, or through the loss of general elections, the truly democratic system curbs any tyrannical or arbitrary power. (94)

What Shils meant to give a great stress is, that political democracy is not a matter of institutions to be founded. Rather it needs a certain number of conditions without which

the effective and continuous functioning of the institutions of political democracy, and hence, political modernity, will not be attained. It is for this that he recognizes five preconditions for political democracy:

(a) Stability, Coherence and Effectiveness of the Ruling Elite

- i. The government must have confidence in its own practices and in the support which it will receive.
- ii. The continued acknowledgement of the government's authority throughout most of the society.
- iii. There must be political leaders who are attached to the representative institutions.

(b) The Practice and Acceptance of Opposition

The effective and continuous existence of political democracy requires a fairly coherent and responsible opposition to the ruling party working within the rules of the parliamentary game. This opposition should not simply interest itself in the obstruction and depreciation of the majority.

(c) Adequate Machinery of Authority

This requires, in Shils' view, competent civil service with training and organization well enough to carry out the measures taken by the legislative or executive leadership. Shils sees that it must be sufficiently detached in its own political orientations and sufficiently loyal to any institutional government, to make the effort to carry out the policy decided by the political elite, and sufficiently independent

to be capable of offering assessment to the measures which the government is proposing.

(d) The Institutions of Public Opinion

An important factor in the preconditions to political democracy is related with the existence of a self-confident and self-sustaining set of institutions of public opinion including press, universities, civic interest associations, trade unions, local government bodies, ... etc., which, in Shils' view, have to be widely spread throughout the different classes and regions of the country. This entails an autonomous set of institutions for gathering, interpreting and diffusing information to the public as well as to the government. It entails as well, the freedom of expression together with associations whether to individuals or bodies for the study of the cause of events. This, in turn, requires three things:

- a. a corps of journalists, publicists, and university and college professors who are honest and forthright in their expression,
- b. a group which upholds the symbols and programs of modernity other than the class of professional army officers. There is thus a need for modern civilian intelligentsia, a fairly numerous, moderately educated and reasonably politically concerned sections of the population. Those constitute in Shils' view:

"The reservoir from which the leaders of public opinion come, the audience for those leaders, and the resonance which will make itself audible (in a variety of peaceful ways) to legislators and administrators." (95)

c. a fairly dense and elaborate system of private and voluntary associations which have their rôle in the arena of public opinion meanwhile talk on behalf of their members. Shils gives examples of such voluntary associations as: trade unions and employers' associations, professional associations, cooperative and private corporations which produce and distribute commodities, autonomous universities and research institutions. The expected results of having adequate and active institutions of public opinion on the political life is interpreted, in Shils' words as follows:

"By the performance of such functions, an 'infra-structure' of decision and authority is constituted which reduces the amount of decision exercised and of decisions made by the state. By membership in such bodies, the citizenry, at least that significant section which makes up the elites of the 'infra-structure', become trained in the exercise of authority and the making of decisions. Even more important, they become jealous of their rights to exercise authority and to make decisions, and they become attached to the symbols of their autonomy." (96)

The activities performed by the institutions of public opinion drive the cause of political modernity forward in that they put limit to the power practised by the state, especially that directed to the checking of inimical attitudes to the regime of civilian rule.

(e) The Civil Order

Of the five major preconditions to political democracy, this one is highly significant to the intellectualization of the problem at hand. In the first place, the solution

of the major crises encountered by the new states in their struggle for modernity, is associated in one way or other with the civil order. Political modernity proposals will ever remain unfulfilled unless an actively participant civil order undertakes its responsibility. Institutions of political democracy must, in Shils' view, rest on a widely dispersed civility which should embrace:

a. A sense of nationality which Shils explains by 'a firm but not intense attachment to the total community and its symbols'.⁽⁹⁷⁾

b. A degree of interest in public affairs that is likely to impel most of the adults to participate in the political affairs as represented in the elections, the attentive and watchful follow up of what is going on in the country as a whole, and a reasonable ability to judge the quality of the candidates.

c. Acceptance and affirmation of the legitimacy of the country's political order.

d. That the individuals should have a sense of their own dignity, rights and obligations 'on which must rest their interest in maintaining their own private sphere, free from arbitrary intrusions of authority'.⁽⁹⁸⁾

e. An adequate degree of agreement upon values, institutions as well as practices to accept limits that the country's interests may require on their own self-aggrandizing tendencies.⁽⁹⁹⁾

The above qualities need not be either equally or universally shared, yet fulfil a minimum requirement, that of being 'common enough to serve as a leaven in the society at large'.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ Only when the preconditions are fulfilled and the components of 'Political Democracy' are found, that a modern polity is at hand which, Abernethy described as 'an independent nation-state, composed of citizens who are equal before the law and at least nominally able to participate in the selection of ^{the} ruling elite; its government is relatively centralised, accepts some responsibility for the welfare of the citizens, and efficiently deploys its human and material resources in the solution of pressing policy problems'.⁽¹⁰¹⁾

The Economic Aspect of Modernity

'Modern' versus 'Traditional' economy

Modern and mobilized economy is characterized by certain features that put it in contrast with the traditional types. Such features of modernity are associated with aspects like the economic units, the use of technological innovations, capital, equipment, manpower,... etc. The characteristics of both types of economy are indicated in the following table:

Table 5.1

Characteristics of Modern and Traditional Economic Systems⁽¹⁰²⁾

Modern	Traditional
Unifunctional or limited-function units, clearly differentiated and autonomous from other societal units(banks,corporations,unions)	Multifunctional units poorly differentiated and possessing minimal autonomy from other/societal units(families, clans, tribes)
Primarily industrial	Primarily agrarian, nomadic
High per-capita income and consumption	Low per-capita income and consumption
High surplus capital and production	Low surplus capital and production
Well-developed economic infrastructures (dams, roads, monetary systems)	Minimal infrastructure development

The above contrasts of the characteristics of modern and traditional economic systems serve as indicators but are too general to give the minimum discrimination required for the identification of modern economy.

A more specific attempt for the identification of the characteristics of a modern economy covers a wider range including technological application, labour division and specialization, manpower skill, capital, production, innovation and initiation, high level of material well being, the shift to manufacturing industries, the spread of wage labour principle; and the minimized natural hazards. The characteristics included in the above attempt run as follows:

- "1. "increasing application of technology, and of inanimate energy, to enlarge and diversify the production of goods and services per capita;
2. a growing specialization of labour and subdivision of productive processes within and among firms, industries, occupations, and territories, and an increasing interdependence and mobility of individuals and groups within a network of widening impersonal markets;
3. a concomitant improvement in human skills and economic efficiency, especially at the higher technical and managerial levels;
4. an accumulation of capital goods in more productive forms and in growing amounts per worker, financed by a complex of financial institutions that characteristically divorce the savings from the investment process in order to pool liquid resources for the growing stream of investment;
5. production, transport, marketing and finance organised on an increasingly large-scale, with concomitant tendencies to the concentration of decisions over economic life;
6. as the dynamic force behind the above processes, a society increasingly oriented to the pursuit of innovation and growth, infused (especially within the elite) by a spirit of innovation and growth, and increasingly rational in its choice of techniques and allocations of resources to achieve its economic goals;

7. as a result of these processes -and despite a characteristic increase in population- a rise in the level of material well-being, usually a widening of the range of personal choice, and sooner or later, a reduction in the range of economic and social inequalities;
8. as incomes rise, a shift in the balance of employment and production from the extractive industries to manufacturing and the services, within a concomitant urbanization of the labour force;
9. the spread of wage labour as the chief form of gainful employment, and commonly the separation of ownership and management; and,
10. the replacement of natural hazards (e.g. weather) as the main source of insecurity by technological change, the uncertainties of the market, and the bargaining disadvantage of the individual in relation to his employer and the state". (103)

Ideal Typical Modern Economy to the leaders of the New States

Though the leaders of the new states are generally committed to the cause of economic development, which is clear in their concern with the search for more physical resources, the increased efficiency of processing resources, the accumulation of capital through various means, yet their motives for the accomplishment of a modern economy are found to be multiple. (104) Many are driven by the hope to raise the standard of living of their people. The image of modern economy to them is that of industrialized, rationalized and economically advanced. Others are after self aggrandisement whether politically or materially regarding economic development as a useful instrument for the accomplishment of the aims in mind. But, whatever the variation between the leaders of new states in this concern, the view of the masses to modern economy is strikingly less. According to Shils' analysis:

"There is, however, little evidence that there is an intense and persistent demand for economic progress from the mass of peasantry. The industrial working class is too negligible in most of the new states for its members' views to constitute a major factor, although their trade union leaders- who have tended to be middle-class intellectuals- are very strongly for economic development, as long as it causes no additional hardships to their constituents." (105)

A modern economy as conceived by the leaders of the new states is associated, as in Shils' writings, with three basic phases which we do not fail to find in the writings of contemporary thinkers dealing with modernization and modernity from the point of view of the underdeveloped countries. The three are:

- a. The diversified economy through industrialization.
- b. The economy that is arranged in accordance with plans.
- c. The rationally directed economy, i.e. scientifically oriented.

On these three, concentration is made as the most salient aspects that characterize the modern economic system from the point of view of the leaders of the underdeveloped countries.

a. Industrialization

In almost all the writings about modernity, industrialization is given a distinguished position. Levy, for example, measures the degree of a country's modernity according to

'the extent that its members use inanimate sources of power and/or use tools to multiply the effects of their efforts.'(I06)

Palmer and Stern, as well, regard industrialization as the basic feature of modernity in the aspirations of the leaders of underdeveloped countries. To them, industrialization remains:

"the most visible distinction between the developing and developed areas today. For the modernizing leader, industrialization has become both the means and the symbol of modernity."(I07)

Robert Ward follows the same line. He lists ten characteristics the presence of which makes economy modernized, most salient of the ten are:

1. intense application of scientific technology and inanimate sources of energy,
2. high specialization of labour and interdependence of impersonal markets,
3. large-scale financing and concentration of economic decision making, and
4. rising levels of material well-being. (I08)

The first and most important of Ward's list pertains to industrialization to which Shils, as well attaches similar importance.

Shils, expressing the aspirations of the leaders of the new states for modernity justifies the unique position attached to industrialization in modernity:

"The proponents of modernity assert that no country can claim to be modern without being economically advanced or progressive. This is the very center of dynamism. To be advanced economically means to have an economy based on modern technology, to be industrialized, and to have a high standard of living." (I09)

It is thus accepted by the leaders of the underdeveloped countries that industrialization is one major phases of modernity as well as being a prerequisite for economic expansion and social welfare. A scholar from one such underdeveloped countries (Egypt) asserts that industrialization today 'symbolizes the aspirations of the developing countries, which are most often predominantly agricultural'. (I10)

But taking industrialization as the embodiment of modern economy, cannot be accepted without reservations. On the one hand it might lead to an underestimation of the value of the human element whether as regards skill or internalised attitudes. It is this consideration that urges Foster to use the term 'socio-technological' instead of 'technological'. His view is that:

"Associated with every technical and material change, there is a corresponding change in the attitudes, the beliefs and the behaviour of the people who are affected by the material change. These non-material changes are more subtle. Often they are overlooked and their significance is underestimated. Yet the eventual effect of material or social improvement is determined by the extent to which the other aspects of culture affected by it can alter their forms with a minimum of disruption." (III)

On the other hand, other aspects of economy have not to be disregarded or underestimated. Mier fears that the exaggerated importance attached to industry is likely to be at the expense of agriculture. He gives basic justifications for the rejection of the exaggerated place of industry in economic development.

First, the concentration of a large percentage of production in the primary sector cannot be accepted, in itself, as the cause of the poverty of most developing countries, for, the low productivity in agriculture may be the cause.

Second, that progress in industrialization depends, to a great extent, on agricultural development. He warns the developing countries that 'without the necessary support of improvements in primary production, the policies of industrialization will be severely handicapped.' (II2)

Third, that economic developmentⁱⁿ Meier's view, as well as Black's in 'Dynamics of Modernization' (II3) is much more than the simple acquisition of industries, but requires of no less importance,

the attainment of a number of modernization ideals such a rise in productivity, social and economic equalization, modern knowledge, improved institutions and attitudes together with a rationally co-ordinated systems of policy measures capable of remaining undesirable conditions in the social system. (II4)

Papnek holds a view similar to Mier's in that he affirms the place of agricultural expansion in economic development side by side with industrialization. Agricultural and rural

production can be raised rapidly with little capital as is the case, for example, with doubling crop production or raising crop in previously uncultivated areas. Besides, as in the third of Mier's justifications above, Papnek postulates that agriculture is necessary for the flourish of industry and lessening the probable side-effect of industrialization.^(II5) Johnston and Mellor give evidence to the view that increased agricultural output and productivity contribute to the overall economic growth. The rationalization of their view builds on five points as follows:

- "(1) Economic development is characterized by a substantial increase in the demand for agricultural products, and failure to expand food supplies in pace with the growth of demand can seriously impede economic growth.
- (2) Expansion of exports of agricultural products may be one of the promising needs of increasing income and foreign exchange earnings, particularly in the earlier stages of development.
- (3) The labor force for manufacturing and other expanding sectors of the economy must be drawn mainly from agriculture.
- (4) Agriculture, as the dominant sector of an underdeveloped economy, can and should make a net contribution to the capital required for overhead investment and expansion of secondary industry.
- (4) Rising net cash incomes of the farm population may be important as a stimulus to industrial expansion."^(II6)

It is thus accepted that industrialization, while indicating a modern economic system, has to be complemented with agricultural expansion both vertically and horizontally. Together, they form a major phase of modern economy.

b. Planning

'Planning', in its general sense, means 'target setting, determination, and a mechanism of mobilizing resources. In this sense, planning is a necessary precondition for accelerated growth'. (II7) To be advanced economically, requires, according to Shils, economic planning accompanied by the employment of economists and statisticians, conducting surveys, controlling the rates of Saving and investment, controlling imports and foreign exchange, constructing new factories, building roads, etc'. (II8)

In traditional societies, the components of economy are so fitted that the spontaneous interplay of economic forces keeps the society in a stationary state. Putting the system into dynamic action requires the introduction of three elements that Hosney put in short words as: an objective, a drive, i.e. a determination to achieve specific objectives; and a mechanism for collective mobilization of resources. (II9)

Planning, is associated in the minds of the leaders of the new states with policies of governmentally controlled economic development which are imposed by the conditions of such states. Examples of the conditions are seen by Shils in the increasing size of the civil service and the large increase in its powers particularly the powers of the politicians and high civil servants responsible for economic development. (I20)

c. Change Directed through Science

Shils states that, 'To be modern is to be scientific', and relates it indirectly with economic progress as in the following argument:

"Science is today part of the regalia of national greatness; it is linked, in popular opinion, with a complex technology and hence ostensibly with economic progress." (I21)

The dynamic modern elites in the new states aspire to direct change in their countries through the use of science. The first among the principles is setting face against guidance of policy whether in economy or other sectors, by the old traditional procedures as astrology, magical practice and the like.(I22) Apter explains the zeal on the part of the leaders of the new states to direct change through science in much the same way as Shils did. The leaders believe that only through science, they are capable of making up for the long backwardness. Science, as they believe, gives the great push needed for the present and the future alike. Such leaders, as in Apter's words,

"share an urgent and understandable desire to make a gigantic leap across time, to bypass slower and more 'natural' processes of economic and scientific growth and place science at the service of an immediate technology -a technology of improved agriculture, of industrial expansion, of health sanitation, and of startling new methods in education and training."(I23)

One more consideration with which Shils interprets the trend toward science, is that the economic development requires the prospecting and appraisal of resources. Soil, minerals, marine, animals, water resources, .. etc., are all matters of importance that any plan for economic development has to take into account. However, Shils adds that, 'in all these matters, a country which aspires to economic development must know where it stands, what it can count on, and what it must reckon with. It is the first task of almost every new state to organise its survey machinery and to staff it with competent persons'. (I25)

Shils tends to believe that modern economy to the new states of the underdeveloped world is related with the advancement of scientific knowledge which is capable of making their land reveal whatever secrets. This makes scientific research a matter of relevance to their schemes of economic development.

However, Shils raises a question as regards the type of scientific research needed. He strongly argues in favour of the view that these states, in their struggle for reaching modern economy in short time, need not start from the zero point in which most of them find themselves at the present time, but rather from the point to which

advanced countries have already reached. Hence, he assures that the first priority in the new states is to be given to the organization of 'survey machinery' and its adequate staffing. From this, he proceeds to specify the particular type of research needed amidst their particular conditions:

"This does not require original research of a fundamental character. The techniques have already been formed in the advanced states, and most of the colonial powers and their business adjuncts had made some progress in the conduct of geological, zoological, entomological, hydrological, and other types of surveys. The pattern of organization is well established, the skills required are fairly well defined, and the techniques are available." (I25)

The type of research that the new states require is the 'adaptive research'; that which is after adapting to their specific conditions an industrial or agricultural process already known and applied in advanced countries. What these aspiring countries urgently need is not the original research of fundamental character, but rather the upgrading of the skill of their manpower.

Ideal Typical Man in Modernity

A model for the norms of man in modernity signifies that such norms stand as antithetical to those of traditional man. The latter is narrow-minded, apathetic, possessing few individual opinions, excessively cautious and suspicious, fatalistic, living entirely to the 'now' with exaggerated respect for the sacred past. In other words, he is non-rational and highly superstitious. (I26) Modern man, on the contrary, is open-minded towards others as well as towards situations, rational and emphatic. Modern man, as Apter suggests, may be judged on the criterion of 'rationality-activism', (I27) which is taken to mean his orientation toward the future with an outlook at change as the norm rather than the exception, self-consciousness about his own thinking processes, and placing a premium on scientific modes of explanation. (I28)

With Parson's typology previously mentioned, modern man is seen as having clear inclination to 'universality'. Opposite to traditional man, he has no special regard to family, clan, tribe, class or ethnic group. He has^{no} excessive 'particularity'

such as the one that directs the behaviour of the individual in a traditional society and which urges the latter to consider the members of his own family, clan or class as deserving particular and favoured treatment.

The achievement versus ascription index of norms would require a modern man to favour the granting of status and authority to others, not on the basis of ascription, but rather on the basis of demonstrated ability. A modern man hence, believes in accomplishment and qualification as essential criteria for recruitment into social roles and positions. Such rationalist-positivist criteria make of him skill-oriented, ingenious and a man of the world.

Contrary to the tendency of the traditional individual, who is generally inclined to view other individuals in emotional terms heavily coloured by personal values and with an absence of 'mental status' of things, a modern man is seen as 'affectively neutral' in terms of his willingness to perceive other individuals and institutions as neutral, disinterested, fair-minded and unbiased.

Specificity, which is included as one of the characteristics of the modern man, is exemplified by the precise and specific nature of modern legal and contractual systems. In these, specific obligations are codified and sharply defined. Contrary to these, are the 'diffuse' roles,

obligations and 'ties' prevalent among individuals of traditional societies. The interaction between individuals in a modern society is regulated by internalised norms that direct the attitudes and modes of behaviour rather than by explicitly defined codes.

If Parsons' concept of individual modernity builds on the five contrasting variable tendencies of the ideal 'modern' versus 'traditional', which will later be applied to society in the present chapter, Mc Clelland builds his concept of individual modernity on what he called 'need achievement', a 'mental virus' that a modern man comes to possess. By 'need achievement' is meant, not the need to attain a certain station in life, but station satisfaction in the process of achieving. It is a need distinguished sharply from the feeling that one has a duty to accomplish. Mc Clelland sees it as a 'certain way of thinking that was relatively rare, but which, when it occurred in an individual, tended to make him behave in a particularly energetic way'. (129)

Lerner, on the other hand, represents a slight deviation from the 'contrast' dichotomous typologies of 'modern' versus 'traditional' individual in that he recognizes the existence of a third group of individuals in between the two extremes and whom he called the 'transitionals'. This latter group is classified under several categories. While the 'moderns'

are cosmopolitan, urban, literate, generally well-off and seldom deviant, the traditionals, representing the other extreme, have opposite characteristics. The 'transitionals' share some of the empathy and psychic mobility of the moderns meanwhile lack the essential components of the modern style. (130)

The high 'emphatic' capacity is what Lerner gives due attention in the identification of typical individual modernity. He is interested in empathy as the inner mechanism which enables newly **mobile** persons to 'operate efficiently' (131) in a changing world. Empathy, as he defined it is:

"the capacity to see oneself in the other fellow's situation. This is an indispensable skill for people moving out of traditional setting." (132)

The degree of 'empathy' an individual has is associated with his education. The more educated the individual, the more emphatic he becomes, i.e. the greater his readiness to offer opinions in response to the challenges encountered. (133)

Together with 'empathy', Lerner's stress in the identification of individual modernity is laid on the 'mobile personality', a term often used by other thinkers as signifying modernity. Lerner distinguishes a mobile person by:

"a high capacity for identification with new aspects of his environment; he becomes equipped with the mechanisms needed to incorporate new demands upon himself that arise outside of his habitual experience."(I34)

These mechanisms for enlarging a man's identity operate in two ways:

- I. projection which facilitates identification by assigning to the object certain preferred attributes of the self (others are 'incorporated' because they are like me).
2. interjection which enlarges identity by attributing to the self certain desirable attributes of the object (others are 'incorporated' because I am like them).

Lerner uses the word 'empathy' as shorthand^t for both these mechanisms. It is thus that empathy is given a high value on the grounds of being the inner mechanism which enables newly mobile persons to operate efficiently in a changing world.
(I35)

The properties attributed by Lerner to a 'mobile person' bear clear resemblance to the findings of modern recent studies. Inkles and Smith, for example, support the concept of empathy in their 'definition of the modern man', particularly what they include in qualities number 1 and 2 namely, openness to new experience and the readiness for social change.
(I36)

Yet, a difference in the statement of individual modernity has to be pointed out. If individual modernity to In^ekles and Smith is similar in some respect to those suggested by Lerner and some other sociologists, In^ekles and Smith prefer to see it, not as a single-quality type, i.e. single traits, but rather a syndrome or complex of qualities. They developed a long list of 'themes' each of which might reasonably be reflected in the attitudes, values and behaviour of the 'modern' man. Their list was subject to a further step until they eventually nominated twenty-four 'dimension^s' of individual modernity as follows:

- | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| I. Active public participation | I3. Information |
| 2. Aging and the aged | I4. Kinship obligations |
| 3. Aspirations | I5. Mass media |
| 4. Calculability | I6. New experiences |
| 5. Change orientation | I7. Planning |
| 6. Citizenship | I8. Religion |
| 7. Consumption | I9. Social class stratification |
| 8. Dignity | 20. Time |
| 9. Efficiency | 21. Technical skill |
| 10. Family size restrictions | 22. Understanding production |
| 11. Growth of opinion | 23. Work commitment |
| 12. Identification with nation | 24. Women's rights |
- (I37)

The selection of these themes by In^ekles and Smith was guided by three perspectives: the analytic, the topical and the behavioural.
(I38)

It is true that there are very few studies that tackle individual modernity from the angle of underdeveloped people, but two stand as distinguished examples. The first is Kahl's study (1968) in which he concentrated on individuals from Brazil and Mexico⁽¹³⁹⁾, and the other, is the previously mentioned study by Inkeles and Smith who concentrated on individuals from six underdeveloped countries: Argentina, Chile, East Pakistan, India, Israel and Nigeria.⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ Their findings are, hence, most likely to serve the purpose of the present study.

Kahl described 'the ideal typical modern man' by the answers he gave to the items in seven core scales that included: activism, low integration with relatives, preference for urban life, individualism, low community stratification, high mass-media participation; and low stratification of life chances.⁽¹⁴¹⁾ On these seven we throw some light.

A typically modern man is activist in the sense that he believes in making plans in advance with a sense of confidence in his ability to bring such plans to fruition. In that, he is in contrast with the fatalistic peasant who, according to Kahl, 'follows the routines of life and shrugs his shoulders to indicate that much of what happens will be beyond his control'.⁽¹⁴²⁾

The second of Kahl's cores is indicated by the

modern man's willingness to move away from his relatives depending on his own initiative in order to carry out his plans. He refuses the burdensome responsibility of nepotism, and is characterized by a high degree of individualism. The ideal typical modern man, thus,

"avoids extreme identification with people in his own work group. Therefore, he says that he would prefer to express his own ideas and make his own decisions even if his peers disagree." (I43)

The modern man, besides, prefers the open scene of the big city for carrying out his plans finding strong stimulation and better opportunities in the urban life.

Contrary to the traditional man who perceives himself as permanently stuck in an uncontrollable life which does not change putting thus severe limitation on his expectation to gain and drive him to seek security through personal ties, the typical modern man has a clearly different perception:

"he perceives the world around him and its opportunities for himself, and through the way he chooses which paths to follow, is a man who seeks to control his life, plan his future, climb up a bit in the status of hierarchy, and improve his material circumstances -because these ends are desirable and also because they are seen as obtainable." (I44)

To the above major characteristics of the ideal typical modern man, Kahl adds some others which are termed 'subsidiary characteristics' on the grounds that they appear with less frequency.⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ These include the modern man's willingness to let his friends and relatives enter into the secrets of his life, his trust in others, his regard to manual work as a worthy contribution to life, his willingness to take risks, and his acceptance of more freedom to be granted to women and children.⁽¹⁴⁶⁾

The ideal typical norms of modern man are, to Kahl concentrated round rationality-activism with a great deal of openness to others as well as to new experiences.

The modern personal qualities as presented by Inkles and Smith form another good basis for the present argument due to their rejection of the personal qualities that have heavy bearing on the Western views. The approach they adopted takes the differences into consideration stressing the trends springing from underdeveloped countries, culture and individuals.

The concept of a modern man's character that they developed encompasses four major areas:

1. The informed participant citizen.
2. The one with marked sense of personal efficiency.

3. High independence and autonomy in his relation to traditional sources of influence.

(I47)

4. Open-mindedness and cognition flexibility.

The list of norms of modern man that Inkle and Smith put, and which the present study favours as the most expressive of ideal typical individual modernity, includes twelve themes that cover a wider range than what Kahl included in his study. These twelve themes can easily be seen as the development of the nine ones that Inkle had suggested in 1966. (I48) A review of the twelve themes serves the argument of the present chapter and present the chosen model of the ideal typical norms of man in modernity. They include:

1. Openness to new experience. What counts in this respect is the psychological disposition rather than the specific techniques or skills that man passes.

2. Readiness for social change which is related to, but goes beyond the openness to new experience. Differentiation, however, is made on the grounds that the latter asks something for oneself whilst the former allows it to others as well. In the light of this, a modern man is:

"One who more readily acknowledges the process of social transformation taking place around him and who could more freely accept the changed opportunities which others, previously more restricted might now be enjoying. He is, in a sense, less rigid, less anxious about allowing others to do things in a new way, in sum, less rooted in tradition." (I49)

3. Similar to what has already been mentioned as regards Lerner's regard of 'empathy' as expressive of individual modernity,⁽¹⁵⁰⁾ Inkles and Smith took a man to be modern if he had a disposition to form or hold opinion on a large number of things. They measured such a quality in the individuals they interviewed in their study by the number of times each of the individuals responded to their question by saying, 'I don't know', or 'I never thought about that', as well as the number of themes he introduced in reply to question about his views concerning national, local and family problems. They also judged an individual to be modern according to three other criteria they put:

- (a) if the degree of awareness he showed of the diversity of attitude and opinion round him is high, i.e. if he acknowledges differences in opinion,
- (b) if he does not automatically accept the opinions of those above him, or reject the opinions of those below him, and
- (c) if he is less likely to evaluate opinion in a strictly autocratic or hierarchical way. ⁽¹⁵¹⁾

4. The measure of information. Being modern meant not merely having opinions but basing them on facts and information that are energetically acquired.

5. Time. More modern man would be oriented to the present or the future than to the past.

6. Efficiency. Efficiency of the modern man may take the following forms:

- (a) the individual's belief that man can learn how to exert considerable control over his environment,
- (b) the belief that care will help prevent accidents,
- (c) the belief that human nature can be changed.

It can thus be taken that 'the modern man's sense of efficiency would express his confidence in his ability, alone and in concert with other men, to organize his life so as to master the challenges it presents at the personal, interpersonal, and even the international levels'. (152)

7. Planning. Man is rated as more modern according to his orientation toward long-term planning both in public affairs and in his personal life.

8. Calculability or trust. Modern man is seen as the one who has more confidence that this world is calculable and that the institutions around him can be relied upon to meet their obligations. He is more inclined to trust a stranger than a traditional man does. His belief in fate contributes to the consideration of his degree of modernity. Accordingly, a modern man, 'would not agree that everything is determined either by fate or by the whims and the inborn character of man. In other words, he believes in a reasonably lawful world under human control'. (153)

9. The valuing of technical skills or the degree of shift in the individual's preference from skills which are more valued in the 'traditional village setting' to those which are 'technical' or more required in the industrial world.

10. Educational and occupational aspirations. The more modern man is defined as having interest in and placing higher value on formal education and schooling in such skills as reading, writing and arithmetic rather than the concentration on religious teaching. In matters of occupation, the modern man prefers to see his son leave his occupation sanctioned by tradition, to one more closely associated with new ways of doing things.

11. Awareness of, and respect for the dignity of others.

12. Understanding prediction, i.e. how far man grasps the logic underlying decision making at the basic level of production in industry. (154)

The above 'analytic perspective' is supplemented in the same study by what Inkles and Smith called 'The Topical perspective', which calls the attention to many matters that other thinkers stressed as well in their concern with individual modernity. While many of the items of the 'topical perspective' were widely accepted, some were

regarded as 'counter to popular impression'. However, the striking thing observed as regards these was that nearly all of them 'had been the object of very little systematic research'. (I55) The items of 'topical perspective' include the attitude of the individual toward the following:

1. Kinship and family.
2. Woman's rights.
3. Birth control, or restriction to family size.
4. Religion.
5. Aging and the aged.
6. Participation in politics.
7. Communication media, mass and non-mass.
8. Consumption or 'consumerism'.
9. Social stratification.
10. Work commitment. (I56)

Ideal Typical Norms of Modern Society

Adopting the same argument previously followed in dealing with the norms of man in modernity, the norms of the ideal typical society in modernity can be taken as the ones that run counter to those of the traditional society. In the same way that the five famous variables of Parsons were adopted for the differentiation of a 'modern' man from a 'traditional' one in terms of affective-neutrality, collective-orientation, universalism, achievement, and specificity characterizing the modern man, as against the affectivity, self-orientation, particularism, ascription, and diffusion of the traditional man, so might be the case with 'modern' and 'traditional' societies. The prevalent attitudes and modes of behaviour of individuals eventually determine the ranking of society in modernity.

Looking at universalism-particularism from the societal perspective induced Wißeman to pose several questions that are likely to throw light on the ideal typical norms that govern a modern society:

"Are the laws applied without regard to person? do the judges operate according to the "rules of the game"; or do particularistic factors such as family, kinship or social position enter into such relationships? Are all the people treated according

to the same standard, e.g equality before the law or according to their personal qualities, or their/particularship in a class or group? Are value standard highly generalized or are they significant for a particular actor in a particular relation with particular objects[^](I57)

Thus, while the traditional societies tend to be 'particularistic' in the sense that the members of one clan, family, or ethnic group have special position and deserve particular and favoured treatment, the norms of modern society that sums the whole argument is put by Palmer in the single statement: 'All people are equal in the eyes of the law'.^(I58)

Likewise, with "achievement-ascription" Wi^eseman directs the attention to the way status and authority are granted in a society. A society is inclined to modernity if selection at various levels is made on the basis of achievement. The contrast within the above pair indicates what Wi^eseman sees as 'the difference between ability or performance; or achievement on the one hand, and race, birth or social status on the other'.^(I59)

In "specifity-diffuseness", the modern society is of specific nature which is exemplified by modern legal and contractual systems. The distinction between modern and traditional societies in this respect is explored

by Wiseman's questions:

"Is the relationship bounded by the obligations of contract strictly limited to specific obligations or by a limited scope of interest in the object with no obligation beyond the scope indicated in the contract?; or is there an undefined range of obligations as those between close kinship roles? How are the votes granted to candidate and how is he judged by the voters? What kind of relation is there between ministers, civil servants as well as between local administrators and the public they serve? and what part does the family, caste, tribe etc. have in such relations?"(160)

When the attitudes and behaviour patterns of a modern society are seen against a traditional one, it is possible to get a number of themes that Palmer could compile in the following table.

Table 5.2

Characteristics of ideal traditional and modern societies (161)

Attitude and behaviour patterns

<u>Modern</u>	<u>Traditional</u>
High ego development	Low ego development
Rational scientific reasoning	Superstition
Other directed	Tradition directed
High demand and expectation levels	Low demand and expectation levels
High demand of human volition and efficiency	Low evaluation of human volition and efficiency
High empathy	Low empathy

Strong identification with secondary symbols	Minimal identification with secondary symbols
Long-range time perspective	Short-range time perspective
High sense of civic responsibility	Low sense of civic responsibility
High innovation	Minimal innovation

But it should be noted that the ideal typical norms of modern society are, by themselves, not enough indicators for the explanation of differences between 'modern' and 'traditional' societies. When the abstractions of 'modern' norms are applied to actual conditions of societies, they take the shape of what is termed as the 'evolutionary universals'. There are three such universals: social mobilisation, social differentiation and social integration. (I62) These were seen by Eisenstadt as 'providing the most general and pervasive force of change in the modern and modernizing world'. (I63)

The idea of 'evolutionary universals' as explanation of the road from traditionalism to modernity is accepted by other sociologists though under different names and ⁱⁿ a less number. Palmer, for example, expresses them in terms of 'disintegration' and 'reintegration'. (I64) He distinguishes between the two in that:

"Disintegration involves reducing the utility of effectiveness of traditional institutions, beliefs and behavioral patterns. Reintegration involves inducing the individuals to accept a new set of institutions, beliefs and behavior patterns radically different from the old. (I65)

The previously mentioned 'evolutionary universals' are initially intended to explain the 'modernization' process. However, they are relevant to the argument of the present chapter in so far as they throw light on how the already stated abstractions of 'modernity' are applied to actuality and a society becomes eventually a modern one.

(a) Social mobilisation

Eisenstadt highly appreciates Karl Deutsch's definition of social mobilisation as 'the best over-all summary of socio-demographic indices of modernization'. (I66) Deutsch defined social mobilisation as 'the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded and broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior'. (I67) He gave it certain main indices such as exposure to aspects of modern life through demonstrations of machinery, buildings, literacy and so forth. (I68)

(b) Social differentiation which is concerned with the continuing process of the separation of tradition-bound roles from the ascriptive moorings, and the growth of social organizations that house them in order to enable modernizing societies to adopt the changes affecting their environments. (I69) Eisenstadt identifies two aspects in which differentiation affects a modernizing society: the occupational and the institutional. As for the first, the person possessing a particular role is not automatically entitled to engage in others in whatever sphere. As for the latter, it is characterized by the emergence of distinctive units into^{oals} organized around the goals specific to each sphere without being fused with personal bases: familial, kinship or other. (I70)

The relation between social 'mobilisation' and 'differentiation' denotes several processes developing side by side with basic structuring changes in all major institutional phases of social life of modern or modernistic societies. (I71)

(c) Social integration in which kinship, tribe, trade guilds and other organizations are duly differentiated and brought together to form a part of a larger aggregate. (I72) Thus, the society, as in Palmer's words steps from disintegration to reintegration. (I73)

Such step from disintegration to reintegration by which a society enters the stage of modernity, is neither immediate nor automatic, as it hits with the enchantment that the individuals have towards traditional ways thus the stride for modernity is slackened. However, when a society successfully eliminates such impediments, it is assumed to have moved from 'traditionality' to 'social integration', a state in which:

"the individual ties with local, regional and other intermediate structure are reduced at the same time that his ties with the larger and more diffuse urban and industrial network are strengthened. This shift in relationships gives the individual the advantages of greater opportunities in a more flexible society and a larger share in the distribution of resources in terms of education, consumer goods, and a variety of services" (I74)

* * *

Having dealt with 'modernity' and how it is identified in contemporary thought, it was possible to see how 'modernity' of politics and economy is likely to be. A step further was to deal with the ideal 'typical' modern man and 'modern society'. The whole argument induces a researcher looking for fitting 'solution policy proposals' to ask whether adult education has got a role to play in the realization of modernity particularly in terms of attitude modification and skill upgrading of its clientele. Such role is elaborated in chapter 6.

Notes - Chapter Five

- I. NETTL, J. P. and ROBERTSON, R. International systems and the modernization of societies: the formation of national goals and attitudes. London: Faber and Faber, 1968.
- also BLACK, C. E. 'The dynamics of modernization: an overview' in R. Nisbet (ed.) Social change. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972 . p. 242. Black affirms that the term 'modernity' in itself 'does not convey a meaning that is as yet widely understood or accepted'.
2. NETTL, J. P. and ROBERTSON, R. *ibid.* p. 42.
3. *ibid.* pp. 42-43.
4. COULSON, J. et al (editors), The Oxford Illustrated Dictionary. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975. p. 543.
5. EWAIS, S. *op.cit.* p. 16.
6. *ibid.*
7. PALMER, M. *op.cit.* p. 4.
- also APTER, D. E. *op.cit.* p. 9. It is to be noted that Apter takes 'modernization' as 'the process leading to the state of modernity'.
8. BLACK, C. E. *op.cit.* p. 242.
9. LERNER, D. *op.cit.*
10. *ibid.* Introduction, p. viii.
11. RUDOLPH, L. I. and S. H. The modernity of tradition: political development in India. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 1967.
12. *ibid.* pp. 3-4.
13. see LEVY Jr., M. J. Modernization and the structure of societies: a setting for international affairs. Vol. I N. J. : Princeton University Press, 1966. p. II.
14. DE SOLA POOL, I. 'The role of communication in the process of modernization and technological change', in B. F. Hoselitz and W. E. Moore (editors), Industrialization and society. Paris: UNESCO, 1963. pp. 281-282. It is to be noted that De Sola Pool defines a 'modernized' society not in terms of GNP per capita, nor of the proportion of population engaged in industrial endeavour, as one might recommend, but rather:
- "in terms of certain values and modes of behavior shared by the inhabitants. These values - e.g., high achievement motivation, secularism, functionally specific relationships, mobility, etc.."
- Pool then classifies under 'modernized' 'both industrially advanced countries and regional enclaves and educated groups which have only recently acquired the cultural prerequisites of industrialization.....'

- One has to note as well that W. E. Moore, adopts in the identification of 'modernity' a similar line to the above, stressing the 'specific values and principles of conduct appropriate to modernization'. Among these are included rationality, punctuality, achievement and mobility aspirations, ... see MOORE, W. E. 'The strategy of fostering performance and responsibility', in E. de Vries and J. M. Echavarria (editors) Social aspects of economic development in Latin America. Vol I. Paris: UNESCO, 1963. pp. 236-237.

15. KAHL, A. J. The measurement of modernism: a study of values in Brazil and Mexico. Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1968. p. 4.

16. MAINE, H. Village communities east and west, with other lectures, addresses, and essays. 3rd edition. London: John Murray, 1876. pp. 17-28.

17. TOENNIES, F. 'From community to society', in A. and E. Etzioni (eds.) Social change: source, patterns and consequences. London: Basic Books, 1964. Chapter 10, pp. 64-72.

18. REDFIELD, R. 'The folk society', American Journal of Sociology, Vol. Lii, 1947. p. 293.

In another book of his: 'Peasant society and culture', Redfield delineates the fundamental characteristics of a peasant society, which Mayfield (op.cit.) sees as 'applicable to the fellahin in Egypt, although in many details, the Egyptian rural community is quite unique..'
MAYFIELD, J. B. op.cit. p. 59.

19. WEBER, M. The theory of social and economic organization. Translated by A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons. London: Oxford University Press, 1947.

20. PARSONS, T. 'Evolutionary universals in society', American Sociological Review, Vol. 29, No. 3, 1964. pp. 339-357.

21. The Oxford Illustrated Dictionary, op.cit. p. 427.

22. RAW, M. V. S. 'Socio-economic indicators for development planning', International Social Science Journal, Vol. 27, No. I, 1975.

23. LEVY, Jr., M. J. op.cit. p. II.

24. KAHL, J. A. op.cit. p. 5.

25. ibid.

26. ibid. p. 6.

27. ibid. pp. 4-6.

28. PARSONS, T. The social system. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967. pp. 101-112.

29. HOSELITZ, B. F. Sociological aspects of economic growth. New York: The Free Press, 1960. Chapter 2, pp. 23-50.

30. SMELSER, N. 'Mechanisms of change and adjustment to change', in B. F. Hoselitz and W. E. Moore (eds.) op.cit. pp. 32-48.

31. SMELSER, N. and LIPSET, M. S. (eds.) Social structure and mobility in economic development. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966. pp. 23-29.
32. EISENSTADT, S. N. Tradition, change and modernity. London: John Willey and Sons, Inc., 1973. p. 203.
33. *ibid.* p. 204.
34. ROSTOW, W. W. Stages of economic growth: a non-communist manifesto. 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. pp. 4-72.
35. *ibid.*
36. *ibid.*
37. WALLACE, A. F. C. Culture and personality. New York: Random House. Chapter 4, pp. 120-163.
38. SOROKIN, S. Social and cultural dynamics.
39. MYRDAL, G. Economic theory and underdeveloped regions. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., Ltd., 1957. Chapters 2 and 3, pp. 11-38. Myrdal argues that 'if the realisation of the hypothesis of circular causation is accepted, certain general conclusions can be drawn which it is worth while to spell out at this point. To begin with, it is useless to look for one predominant factor, a 'basic factor' such as the 'economic factor'. (p. 19)
40. VEKEMANS, R. R. and SEGUNDO, J. L. 'Essay of a socio-economic typology in Latin American countries', in E. de Vries and J. M. Echavarria (eds.), *op.cit.* pp. 67-84.
41. *ibid.*
42. MOORE, W. E. Social change. 2nd edition. N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974. pp. 98-102.
43. *ibid.*
44. INKLES, A. 'The modernization of man', in M. Weiner (ed.) Modernization: the dynamics of growth. London: Basic Books, 1966. pp. 138-145.
45. see the argument on pp. 209 - 214.
also see KAHL, A. J. *op.cit.*
46. HASSAN, A. E. M. Social development. Cairo: Wahba Bookshop, 1977. pp. 314-315. (Arabic text).
47. LERNER, D. *op.cit.* p. 50.
48. *ibid.* pp. 69-70.
49. *ibid.* p. 71.
50. *ibid.* pp. 71-72.

51. Mc CLELLAND, D. C. The achieving society. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1961. pp. 45-46.
also Mc CLELLAND, D. C. 'The impulse of modernization', in M. Weiner (Ed.), op.cit. pp. 28-39.
52. WEBER, M. The Protestant ethic and the spirit of Capitalism . Translated by T. Parsons, forwarded by R. H. Tawney. London: Allen and Unwin, 1974. pp. 48-51.
53. Mc CLELLAND, D. C. The achieving society, op.cit. p. 56.
54. ibid. Chapter 3, pp. 63-106.
55. ibid. p. 337.
56. Quoted by HIGGINS, B. H. Economic development: principles, problems and policies. London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1959. p. 301.
57. HAGEN, E. E. On the theory of social change: how economic growth begins. Homewood, Illinois, The Dorsey Press, Inc., Preface p ix.
58. ibid.
59. SHILS, E. op.cit. p. 10.
60. EISENSTADT, S. N. Modernization: protest and change. N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. p. 1.
61. LERNER, D. op.cit.
62. ibid. p. viii.
63. Quoted by HERSKOVITS, M. J. The human factor in changing Africa. New York: Random House, Inc., 1962. p. 378.
64. ibid.
65. INKLES, A. and SMITH, D. H. op.cit. p. 18.
66. BERNSTEIN, H. "Modernization theory and the sociological study of development", The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, Jan. 1971. Raising questions about the meaning of 'modern world' and about the 'historical processes' which formed it, Bernstein ascertains two things: first, that the modern world as 'an inclusive international structure of economic, political and cultural relationships represents a novel situation in the history of human society, secondly the situation was created principally through the midwifery of European imperialism'.' (p. 153)
67. ibid. pp. 153-154.
68. see MAHMOUD, Z. N. Our culture in the face of present age. Cairo: Dar al-Shorouk, 1976. pp. 54-67. (Arabic text).
see also: HUSSEIN, T. The future of culture in Egypt. Beirut: Dar al-Kateb al-Lobnany, 1973. Volume 9. pp. 16-80. (Arabic text).
69. This call gains the acceptance of increasing numbers of Arab thinkers especially those who are graduated from Al-Azhar.

70. MAHMOUD, Z. N. op.cit. pp. 2I-53.
- 7I. see Shil's argument about political modernity in the new States included in SHILS, E., op.cit. This will be elaborated later in the present chapter.
72. EL-BIBLAWY, H. The modern technological society. Alexandria: Monshaat al-ma'aref, 1972. p. 222. (Arabic text).
73. see LERNER, D. op.cit.
74. ibid. p. 45.
75. HUSSEIN, T. op.cit. p. 29.
76. SHARMA, J. C. 'Education and political stability: a comparative analysis of the relationship between education and political stability with illustrative case studies', Unpublished Ph. D thesis, Institute of Education, University of London, 1972. pp. 35-36.
77. ibid.
78. EL-BIBLAWY, H. op.cit. p. 226.
79. SHILS, E. op.cit.
also BAUM, R. C. 'On political modernity: stratification and the generation of societal power', in E. B. Harvey (ed.) Perspectives on modernization: essays on the memory of Ian Weinberg. Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1972. pp. 22-23.
80. SHILS, E. op.cit.
- 8I. SHILS, E. 'Scientific development in the new states', in J. W. Hanson, and C. S. Brembeck (eds.) Education and the development of nations. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966. pp. 206-2I7.
82. SHILS, E. Political development....., op.cit. p. IO.
83. ibid.
84. ibid. p. II.
85. DAHL. R. A. Modern political analysis. 2nd edition. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.,: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970. p. 48.
86. DAVIES, M. R. and LEWIS, V. A. Models of political systems. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 197I. p. 98.
also WIESEMAN, H. V. Political systems: some sociological approaches. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966. p. 70.
87. SHILS, E. Political development, op.cit. pp. 6-8.
88. ibid. pp. 47-85.
89. ibid. p. 48.
90. Quoted by SMITH, W. O. L. The government of education. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 197I. p. I8.
- 9I. SHILS, E. Political development, op.cit. p. 50.
92. ibid. p. 48.

93. *ibid.* pp. 51-52.
94. *ibid.* p. 52.
95. *ibid.* p. 57.
96. *ibid.*
97. *ibid.* p. 58.
98. *ibid.*
99. *ibid.* pp. 58-59.
100. *ibid.*
101. ABERNATHY, D. B. *op.cit.* p. 3.
102. PALMER, M. *op.cit.* p. 16.
103. Statement contributed at the Hakone Conference, and reproduced in JANSEN, M. B. (ed.) Changing Japanese attitudes toward modernization. Princeton, N. J.,: Princeton University Press, 1965. pp. 20-23.
104. SHILS, E. Political development ..., *op.cit.* p. 26.
105. *ibid.*
106. LEVY Jr., M. J. *op.cit.* p. 11.
107. PALMER, M. and STERN, L. *op.cit.* p. 5.
108. WARD, R. E. and RUSTOW, D. A. Political modernization in Japan and Turkey. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1964.
Chapter I.
109. SHILS, E. Political development, *op.cit.* p. 9.
110. EL-RASHIDI, F. *op.cit.* p. 8.
111. FOSTER, G. M. Traditional cultures and the impact of technological change. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962. pp. 2-3.
112. MEIER, G. M. Leading issues in economic development: studies in international poverty. 2nd edition. London: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1964. p. 6.
113. BLACK, C. E. *op.cit.* pp. 242-270.
114. *ibid.*
115. PAPNEK, G. F. 'Arguments for development of agriculture', in G. M. Meier (ed.) *op.cit.* pp. 410-411.
116. JOHNSTON, B. F. and MELLOR, J. W. 'Agriculture's contribution to development', in G. M. Meier (ed.), *ibid.* p. 412.
117. HOSNY, A. (ed.) Problems of accelerated growth. Cairo: Institute of National Planning, 1964. p. 25. (memo. No. 407)
118. SHILS, E. Political development ..., *op.cit.* p. 9.
119. HOSNY, A. *op.cit.* p. 25.
120. SHILS, E. Political development ..., *op.cit.* p. 9.

I21. SHILS, E. 'Scientific development in the new states', op.cit. p. 211.

I22. SHILS, E. Political development ..., op.cit. p. 9.

I23. APTER, D. E. 'Forming a scientific culture', in J. W. Hanson and C. S. Brembeck (eds.), op.cit. p. 219.

I24. SHILS, E. 'Scientific development in the new states', op.cit. p. 212.

I25. ^{ibid.}
I26. KUNKIL, J. H. Society and economic growth, a behavioural perspective of social change. London: Oxford University Press, 1970. p. 17.

I27. see APTER, D. E. op.cit., pp. 1-42.

I28. ABERNETHY, D. B. op.cit. pp. 3-4.

see also DE SOLA POOL, I. op.cit. pp. 281-282. He cites seven norms for 'modern' man as follows:

- "1. The norm for the modern man is to work with high aspiration level, energy and discipline. He does not necessarily work harder than the peasant who breaks the baked crust of the earth under the tropic sun. But the work norm accepted in modern society is that of striving, by mental effort, system and hard work, for the successively higher levels of achievement.
2. The modern man has strong secular aspirations- in particular, aspirations to improve his material condition.
3. The modern man computes strategies on a broad stage. He considers policy for the nation, or even for the world. If he is an entrepreneur, he thinks about wide markets and the management of vast enterprises.
4. The modern man calculates his strategies with relatively little inhibition by custom. Taboos are vital to any society, modern as well as traditional; but the modern man enjoys a greater freedom of means and goals. He is more free about where he lives, whom he marries, how he earns his living, and which faction he supports. Over considerable areas, means-ends considerations supersede fixed traditions.
5. As modernization prevails, ascribed status becomes less, and functional role becomes more significant in interpersonal relation. The way a man is treated is largely determined by the job he is doing, rather than by his family origins. Since jobs in modern society can be reassigned according to criteria of expediency, emphasis on functional role promotes social mobility.
6. All these factors make it possible for the device of organised association to be used extensively in modern societies. There are voluntary associations, business firms, and the state bureaucracy- each has the characteristics of a body of members organized in a hierarchy of ranks who, though free in their private lives, owe certain voluntarily assumed obligations of discipline in restricted portions of their lives. These organized associations are tree-connected. Decision-making of a medium or high degree of generality is assigned to specific persons; and all other persons act under the guidance of these decisions as they are transmitted by intermediaries responsible for leadership of specific portions of the social body.
7. There is, subject to retrieval, information covering advanced science and advanced technology somewhere in society."

I29. Mc CLELLAND, D. C. in D. Weiner, op.cit. p. 29.

I30. LERNER, D. op.cit. pp. 93-96.

I31. *ibid.* pp. 49-50.

- I32. *ibid.*
- I33. *ibid.* pp. 45-52.
- I34. *ibid.* p. 49.
- I35. *ibid.* pp. 49-50.
- I36. INKLES, A. and SMITH, D. H. *op.cit.* Chapter 2 especially pp.19-21.
- I37. *ibid.* Table 7.I, p. 101.
- I38. *ibid.*
- I39. KAHL, J. A. *op.cit.*
- I40. INKLES, A. and SMITH, D. H. *op.cit.*
- I41. KAHL, J. A. *op.cit.* p. 132.
- I42. *ibid.* p. 133.
- I43. *ibid.*
- I44. *ibid.*
- I45. *ibid.* p. 134.
- I46. *ibid.* pp. 132-134.
- I47. INKLES, A. and SMITH, D. H. *op.cit.* p. 290.
- I48. INKLES, A. 'The modernization of man', *op.cit.* pp. 139-144.
- I49. INKLES, A. and SMITH, D. H. *op.cit.* p.20.
- I50. *Vide supra* pp. 239-241.
- I51. INKLES, A. and SMITH, D. H. *op.cit.*
- I52. *ibid.* p. 22.
- I53. *ibid.* p. 23.
- I54. *ibid.* pp. 19-24.
- I55. *ibid.* p. 25.
- I56. *ibid.* pp. 25-32.
- I57. WIESEMAN, H. V. *op.cit.* pp. 16-17.
- I58. PALMER, M. *op.cit.* p. 17.
- I59. WIESEMAN, H. V. *op.cit.* p. 17.
- I60. *ibid.* p. 18.
- I61. PALMER, M. M. *op.cit.* p. 17. It has to be noted that Palmer has drawn it from various sources.
- I62. EISENSTADT, S. N. Modernization: protest and change, *op.cit.* pp. 2-3.
- I63. EISENSTADT, S. N. Tradition, change and modernity, *op.cit.* p. 14.
- I64. PALMER, M. *op.cit.* p. 4.
- I65. *ibid.*
- I66. EISENSTADT, S. N. Tradition, change and modernity, *op.cit.* p. 23.
- I67. *ibid.*
- I68. *ibid.*
- I69. EISENSTADT, S. N. Modernization: protest and change, *op.cit.* p. 2.
- I70. *ibid.*

- I71. EISENSTADT, S. N. Tradition, change and modernity, op.cit. p. 23.
- I72. MARCH, R. Comparative sociology. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967. p. 31.
- I73. PALMER, M. op.cit. p. 4.
- I74. BLACK, C. E. The dynamics of modernization: a study in comparative history. New York: Harper & Row, Torchbooks, 1967. pp. 80-81.
- also PALMER, M. ibid. p. 4.

Chapter Six

Possible Contribution of Adult Education to Modernity Realization

The concept of causation in education has been taken by many educationists as 'dangerous and difficult'. (1) This imposes certain limitation on the argument of the present chapter. On the one hand, the assumption that adult education serves a social cause the result of which is change in society, may not be accepted without reservation. The social functions that adult education has, are not independent of other social processes of society. One may be induced to argue that education per se has no separable social effect. On the other hand, one can raise the view that adult education is not mere education, any education, but rather education with a social mission in mind. In line with this, the Third International Conference on Adult Education (Tokyo, 1972) (2) takes an adult educator not as an ordinary teacher, but ^{as} an individual who operates in the community as a 'catalyst'. (3)

With the complexity of interrelations that characterize the social setting, only few researches could verify the impact of adult education in other than mere inference. (4) The few that are available, mainly deal with the significance of 'literacy' acquisition. (5) In case of 'adult vocational education', one has to consider the complaint raised by Staley concerning the rarity of researches undertaken on the impact of vocational education on attitudes and personality traits. (6) Staley's view is recalled by Thompson who stresses the inseparability of the impact of vocational education from the impact of other institutions and, hence, the uncertainty of findings. He puts it unambiguously that:

"We cannot identify with a high degree of assurance all the specific institutions and situations that influence the outcomes of vocational education. Nor can we measure the exact influence that a specific institution has had or does have on vocational education." (7)

Besides, investigating the impact of adult vocational training on the upgrading of individual skills hits with semantic barriers. It is admitted that 'skill' is very complicated and difficult to be measured. It depends on many factors as education, experience, aptitude and ability to work.'⁽⁸⁾ One mid-way is to estimate skill through the pace with which the worker performs his work.⁽⁹⁾ In one way or other, worker's productivity is involved.

The argument of the present chapter focuses on the possible contribution of adult education on the creation of apt individuals for carrying out the modernity proposals. It attempts to probe its possible impact on attitude modification and skill adequacy. Both are dealt with in some detail.

I. Adult Education and Attitude Modification

a. The impact of literacy

Gaining literacy exceeds the mere ability of adult individuals to encode and decode messages, i.e. reading and writing. It facilitates an adult's orientation to social and other changes around him. The U.N.E.S.C.O. takes the provision of literacy programmes as one tool for 'promoting man's adjustment to change, so that he may become both agent and the object of development.'⁽¹⁰⁾ The Experimental World Literacy Programme (EWLP), carried out in thirteen underdeveloped countries (1965-1972)⁽¹¹⁾ has, despite its short duration, yielded positive results that U.N.E.S.C.O. experts pointed out especially in the case of Tanzania,⁽¹²⁾

the Sudan, (I3) and India (I4).

The changes that experts could measure are expressed in the form of I67 indicators or indices retained after methodological refinement of six out of the eleven projects (I5) and which represented 85.9% of the participants of the EWLP. (I6) At the level of the three dimensions which the UNESCO experts put including: insertion in the milieu, mastery over the milieu, and transformation of the milieu, the overall picture is a positive one as indicated in the following table:

Table 6.I

Changes related with the EWLP at the level of the three dimensions^(I7)

	Insertion in the milieu	Mastery over the milieu	Transformation of the milieu
	in percentages		
Positive influence, possible or plausible	39	53	38
Positive influence, uncertain or concomitant	33	35	48
No influence,	9	3	3
Negative influence, uncertain or concomitant	I3	9	8
Negative influence, possible or plausible	6	0	3

The evaluation of the positive changes in so far as attitude modification is concerned, indicates that through participation in functional literacy programmes, many adults have become more 'rational-activist', open minded, with better attitudes toward science, technology and collective work. These have been

reported by UNESCO experts in the three dimensions cited above:

(A) Insertion in the milieu

- i. Functional Literacy Programmes incite individuals to pursue a rational type of behaviour.
- ii. Such programmes encourage the development of future-oriented behaviour. Adults participating in them have adopted modes of behaviour related with savings accounts, family planning, etc. more frequently than illiterate adults.
- iii. Adult participants seek the advice, counsel and technical assistance from competent organizations or individuals, more readily than illiterates.
- iv. Adults with functional literacy training can better locate problems of everyday life and seek their solution in the community.
- v. Adults who have undergone functional literacy participate more frequently in collective activities (professional, cultural, confessional, leisure organizations, etc.) than illiterate adults.

(B) Mastery over the milieu

- i. Workers with functional literacy training have a lower rate of absenteeism than illiterate ones.
- ii. Better quality of work habits and higher level of technical knowledge linked to production.
- iii. Higher level of knowledge and understanding of techno-productive practices.
- iv. Higher degree of adoption of techno-productive practices and better techno-economic behaviour.
- v. Adoption of more rational techno-productive norms.

(C) The Transformation of the milieu

- i. Exposition of adults to functional literacy programmes leads to more orientation toward economic and social change and development. They are more highly conscious of the rational needs required, of their role, and more open to the scientific approach of problems. Their concern with the quality and qualification of work is better than in the case of illiterates.
- ii. Orientation toward the desert of traditional values and order. Their orientation toward change and innovation is stronger than in the case of illiterates. (18)


Studies by individual researchers indicate the existence of a correlation between literacy acquisition and the attitudes of individuals. In their study on cultivators and factory workers in East Pakistan (1967), Schuman, Inkles and Smith found every reason "to expect literacy to be significantly and strongly associated with many attitudes and values." (19) The findings of their study, which will be mentioned later in the chapter, (20) generally indicate that literate adults in East Pakistan have got more modern attitudes than illiterate ones.

Likewise, Lerner (1963) (21) in his study on six Middle Eastern countries highly appreciated the role of literacy acquisition as people move from traditional to a modern outlook in life. He sees literacy operating as "the pivotal agent in the transition to a fully participant

society." (22) At the national level, he recognized the existence of a joint interacting growth in urbanization, literacy, mass media participation and political participation. From this, he came to a model which he regarded as "applicable to all modernizing societies on all continents of the world regardless of any variations." (23) Each of these mentioned above was found to form one rung in a chain leading to the other and the eventual outcome is the turn to a modern society both politically and economically. If we take Lerner's argument into account, literacy is one essential step that a traditional society has to reach on its way to modernity, for, as in Lerner's conclusion:

"Everywhere, , increasing urbanization has tended to raise literacy, rising literacy has tended to increase media exposure: increasing media exposure has "gone with" wider economic participation (per capita income) and political participation (voting)." (24)


Similar consequences of literacy have been verified in Rogers' empirical study on Columbian peasants (1969). (25) He made a three-division classification including: antecedent, process and consequence. Literacy, as one antecedent, facilitates the process of mass media exposure, and the final outcome is illustrated by rise of 'man' on the indices of modernity. He becomes more emphatic, achievement-oriented, innovative, etc. as is shown in the following diagram:



The focus on the relation between functional literacy and individual modernity as illustrated by empathy, innovativeness and the like shows Rogers' findings to be in line with the already mentioned ones by UNESCO experts. On each of Rogers' eight modernization indicators, functional literates (N=78) had higher average scores than the functional illiterates (N=177) in the five Columbian villages of his study. The results are displayed in the following figure:

Figure 6.I

Difference between 'functional literates' and 'functional illiterates'
(26)
in Rogers' study



Attitude modification that may be attributed to the acquisition of literacy is evident particularly in three areas: openness to change, empathy and familism, the three are given special attention.

I. Openness to Change

In the study by Schuman, Inkle^s and Smith, mentioned above, it was suggested that literacy "makes men more open to change, to new information, to different goals."⁽²⁷⁾ The same is reported by Fakoury (1973)⁽²⁸⁾ who builds his argument about the psychological aspects of literacy programmes on that information which people get about technological development, for example, is indirectly related with literacy via mass media communication. Such information leads them to more awareness of the disparity between their standard of living and that of the technologically advanced countries. This, along with the prospect for a higher standard of living, "will change the attitude of the people toward their environment."⁽²⁹⁾ In this way, it may be argued that literate adults are more open to new techniques.

Awareness of the need for change, and openness to change, often result in more acceptable modes of behaviour. 'Family planning', which has for long been the major source of concern in the underdeveloped countries struggling for modernity, is one realm in which adult literacy has a role. As previously mentioned, this was indicated by UNESCO experts evaluating the EWLP.⁽³⁰⁾ The same was reported in the study of Schuman, Inkle^s and Smith⁽³¹⁾ mentioned above. A difference was recorded in the response of their literate and illiterate respondents to family planning

schemes in terms of limiting the number of children in a family. A difference of 12% was found between illiterate and literate workers, though in the case of cultivators such difference was non-existent, as indicated in the following table:

Table 6.2

Views of literate and illiterate cultivators and factory workers as regards their approval of family planning (32)

Response	Cultivators			Factory Workers		
	(a) illiterate (N=103)	(b) literate (N=74)	difference c b - a	(a) illit- erate (N=180)	(b) literate. (N=205)	Differ- ence b - a
Agrees that limiting the number of children in a family may be necessary	30%	30%	0%	30%	42%	12%

However, the researchers could not accept to negate the impact of literacy on the cultivators, but rather argued if the urban industrial setting generated perceptions, interests and knowledge reflecting the socio-economic relationship of workers and their contact with modern technological world. A question was raised whether certain social psychological changes are related both with literacy and urban industrial experience. Relating their findings with the time in which their study was carried out (November 1963 and May 1964), they suggested that until that time birth control was not propagandized in East Pakistan and none at all in most rural areas. Only in some cities there were advertisements which promoted contraception besides the availability of contraceptive

devices in urban market areas. Such conditions have their relevance, but the impact of literacy cannot be negated. One result reached was, hence, that, "It is only among the urban literates who have moved both physically into the city and intellectually into the symbolic realm of new ideas that a change seems to occur." (33)

2. Empathy

An individual adult acquiring literacy is likely to be more emphatic than an illiterate one. From this angle, literacy contributes to the creation of 'modern' individuals. The argument as regards the relation between 'literacy' and 'empathy' shows how control over a formal language is followed by changes in an adult's power to see himself in the role of others, which, to use Lerner's terms, "gives people access to the world of vicarious experience and trains them to use the complicated mechanism of empathy which is needed to cope with the world." (34) The correlation was ascertained in Lerner's study on the responses of 248 Syrians and in which empathy, semi-empathy and non-empathy were related with the degree of literacy which was classified in three levels: illiterate, elementary or less, secondary or more. The percentage of empathetic individuals within each group was positively correlated with the degree of education as shown in the following table:

Table 6.3


(35)

Correlates of empathy with education among Syrians in Lerner's study

	Emphatic	Semi-emphatic	Non-emphatic
Illiterate	5%	21%	74%
Elementary or less	14%	45%	41%
Secondary or more	39%	42%	19%

A comparison of the 'non-emphatic' among each group shows how the percentage drops from 74% in the case of illiterates to 41% then 19% in accordance with the rise in the educational level.

Other than Lerner's Middle Easterners, variation between literate and illiterate Housa men was no less evident. A study by Doob (1961) (36) showed how literates were better able than illiterates in their reply to the question about what they would like to know about what they did not know. While this might not be a measure of empathy after Lerner's style, it, nevertheless shows that literates are less 'apathetic' toward objects in the world around.(37) In the same way, functional literacy, mass media exposure, and cosmopoliteness are, to Rogers(38) important antecedents to the development of emphatic ability as expressed in the following paradigm:(39)



Rogers' words sum up the whole argument about the relation between literacy and individuals' empathy:

"The relationship between empathy and literacy thus appears to be positive and independent of factors such as age and social status. Empathy and literacy are positively related. With the development of literacy skills, an increase in the individual's ability to empathize with roles outside of his particular environment can be expected. Perhaps literacy facilitates exposure to the larger society and hence develops empathy." (40)

* *Italicised in the original*

3. Familism

The exaggerated bonds between an individual in a traditional society and the family is embodied in what may be put under 'familism'. The question raised in this respect is, whether literacy contributes to the shift of adult masses to more modern attitudes toward family and class. On the individual basis, the fundamental shift required is that the individual thinks of himself "primarily as a member of the recently formed political state."⁽⁴¹⁾

In the above study by Schuman et al (1967), they tended to discover if literacy could have an effect on familism in East Pakistan. They asked each of their adult respondents whether he regarded himself "first and foremost as a Pakistani, a Bengali (language-ethnic group), a man of (R.'s) district, or a man of (R.'s) village. Literates in each of the two groups (cultivators and factory workers) formed a higher percentage in considering oneself first and foremost a Pakistani as is indicated in the following table:

Table 6.4

Positive effects of literacy irrespective of occupation ⁽⁴²⁾

Response	Cultivators			Factory Workers		
	(a) Illiterate (N=103)	(b) Literate (N=74)	Differ- ence $\frac{a-b}{}$	(a) Illiterate (N=180)	(b) Literate (N=205)	Differ- ence $\frac{a-b}{}$
Considers self first and fore- most a Pakistani	36%	58%	22%	45%	62%	17%

The conclusion reached in the study ascertains the view that literacy makes adults more 'modern' in their attitudes as they desert, at varying degrees, traditional attitudes toward family and clan. Schuman et al interpreted the figures they got in their study in that "literacy is an important and highly correlate of this variation. Whereas urban versus rural occupational setting produces only a 6.5% difference on the average, literacy accounts for nearly a 20 per cent change in the level of a man's political identity." (43)

b. The impact of adult vocational education

As for 'Adult Vocational Education', many, like Radwan, (44) believe in the double purpose of vocational education: skill upgrading together with "the insight, understanding, knowledge and spirit of adventure necessary to establish themselves in business and industry." (45) But, this double impact throughout adulthood is, in some views, controversial. By the time an individual reaches adulthood, his personality traits are seen as "fairly well set", (46) though the possibility ^{of change} is not, altogether, discarded. There is, as Staley (47) states:

"some plasticity, and there is reason to believe that education and training programmes can be devised which have a significant impact on at least some of these traits." (48)

Ezz el-Din (1970) (49) chose three issues to see whether vocational training of adult workers has effect on attitudes:

1. Respect of punctuality and awareness of the value of time in the process of production.

2. Discipline-orientation within the firm.

3. Accuracy in the productive processes.

He could see a part of each of the three related with the

'behavioural aspect' while the other part is related with technical skills of performance that workers have. From this, adult vocational education and training may be said to have its impact both on the attitudes and skills of adult workers though both aspects are interrelated. He sees the regard for punctuality, the awareness of the value of time and commitment to discipline within the firm^{as} types of workers' behaviour rather than expression of their technical skill. Likewise, accuracy in the productive process is mostly an indicator of skill and technical efficiency more than it is a mere pattern of behaviour among workers. Nevertheless, he differentiates to a certain degree, between the process of modifying behavioural patterns, and developing skills regarding the means in each case to be different. The conclusion he reaches is that the development of workers' regard for punctuality and their commitment to discipline, is likely to be realized through proper supervision, good example of rational leadership, and through effective contact between workers and supervisors. As regards the development of precision in the productive processes, it basically depends on good selection, proper induction into work, continuous vocational training as well as implementation of a good system of incentives. (50)

The extent to which adult vocational education and training contributes to the modification of behavioural patterns among workers, is a controversial issue. On the one hand, Ezz Eldin denies that direct instruction or technical

skill has got direct role in behavioural adjustment.⁽⁵¹⁾

Ezz el-Din could only accept such a role to be found when any of the following three occurs:

1. the rise of income through the rise of wages or the promotion of services provided.
2. the promotion of a worker's social status.
3. the vertical upgrading of a worker to supervisory level.⁽⁵²⁾

Putting the argument this way he did, and making modification subject to certain conditions, Ezz el-Din fails to give an unambiguous answer to the question he attempted to answer. S.C. Kelley,⁽⁵³⁾ on the other hand, argues strongly in favour of the possible role of education in the change of social and cultural values. His study, presented before the 'International Conference on Education as a Factor of Accelerated Economic Development' (Istanbul, 1966)⁽⁵⁴⁾ puts the role of education in developing skills and expanding scientific knowledge only in a second place to the task of value orientation, to the extent that he even denies that the development of skills and scientific knowledge is "the principal contribution of education to economic development."⁽⁵⁵⁾ The whole issue of economic development is seen in the light of capability of institutions of value orientation. Economic development, as he declared, "is a function of the social capacity to adapt its institutions and values to particular requirements of industrial organizations and technological change."⁽⁵⁶⁾ Hence, what is needed, in the first place, is the adaptation of workers' values and personality traits to accord with technological change. Vocational education and training is in the ^{middle of} orientation task mostly needed in in a modern technological society, as Kelley indicates:

"If a society is to use rather than be used by technical change, it must possess an adaptive capacity that permits role fulfilment in a context of coincidence between individual and social values. The capacity depends upon the development of a set of institutions which are concerned with the shaping of values, attitudes and perceptions. While ducation is not the sole receptient of this responsibility, it must assume a primary role in a condition in which other value-Producing and sustaining institutions, the family and kinship group, are losing their relevance and authority." (57)

The capability of vocational education and training to modify attitudes has, as well been raised by a report by Arab Labour Organization (A.L.O.) in 1976. (58) The rationale on which the argument goes, is based on the notion that mastery of one's profession or vocation generates inherent feeling of self-confidence and self-capacity, which have their bearing on other aspects of one's behaviour. Besides, the broadening of knowledge and experience related with one'e vocation, is to the Director - General of the A.L.O., associated with resistance to the monotony of mechanical work and with self-accomplishment. (59) Vocational education and training is taken as a means "to implant in a citizen, through enlightenment and understanding of his role in society, feeling of work-value, and work-dignity especially the high ranking of vocational belongingness." (60) The impact on individual workers by vocational programmes was put, in the above report in points, of which the following are noticeable:

1. Development of abilities, whether physical, mental or behavioural.
2. Self-confidence, ability to find fitting solution to work problems, and more accpetance to shoulder responsibilities.
3. Increasing awareness of work-dangers and how to protect oneself.
4. Development of collective spirit among workers. (61)

c. The impact of adult civic and political education

Adult political and civic education, which is part of the overall socialization process, has its impact on adult acquisition of knowledge, skills and dispositions that make them able members of society. The purpose of adult education, in this respect, is defined in terms of society's purpose and serves in the process of transformation of "the raw material of biological man into a person suitable to perform the activities of society." (62)

A 'modern' society, based on political democracy, tends to make its individuals more 'apt' for democratic practice, i.e. active participants. This involves on the part of the individuals concerned both perception and adaption. These two form the basis of the socialization process.

An individual acquires an understanding of the recognized statuses in his society. He learns what Brim⁽⁶³⁾ calls, the names which enable him to locate other individuals in the social structure, and learns, as well, role participation and role behaviour associated with different positions.⁽⁶⁴⁾ Adult education has been trusted, in this respect, as one agent. 'Fundamental Education', that was strongly advocated by UNESCO in the 1940's and 1950's was directed toward the realization of specific objectives, of which democracy was one.⁽⁶⁵⁾ As one form of the education of adults, Fundamental Education was advocated as process of transmitting the minimum knowledge, training and attitudes that man in 'backward' areas needs to better health, to profit by the chances offered to him for education and to be prepared to fulfil the duties and exercise the rights of a free citizen and/^{become} productive individual in his community.⁽⁶⁶⁾

Through this transmitted knowledge and training, an individual adult perceives and understands. With understanding, comes mental effort which is essential complementary to an adult's goodwill for the formation of sound political democracy.

The 1919 Report on Adult Education in Great Britain, (67) highly regards this complementarity:

"It is not the lack of good will that is to be feared. But goodwill without mental effort, without intelligent provision, is worse than ineffectual; it is a moral opiate. The real lack in our national history has been the lack of bold and clear thinking....." (68)

But, understanding and goodwill are not the ultimate goal that adult citizens are required to reach. The matter is more than one of allegiance to a particular government or political setting. Bergevin, (69) adds active and constructive participation in various social institutions. This, involves the inclination to participate actively, which in turn needs motivation. Motivation may come through education as well as through some other means. The individual adult may, thus, be adapted to democratic practice. It is lack of adaption that many traditional societies suffer from as a great many of their adults remain with passive attitudes toward participation in political action, i.e. within the circle of 'marginality'. This is another realm in which adult education has got a task. Bergevin strongly argues that:

"With proper continuing education, many marginal citizens can be helped to carry a share of the social load, even if it is a very small share. Everybody can do something, and the greatness or smallness of the contribution is not as important in this instance as the fact that each of us is continuing to learn how to share, how to play his part. It is equally important that each of us learns that we have a part to play, that we are needed." (70)

2. Adult Education and Skill Adequacy

The 'human capital theory' in economy gives special regard to the worker himself in terms of his capacities whether physical, intellectual, etc. Productivity is seen as an aggregate of various factors some of which may be improved through 'investment in man'.⁽⁷¹⁾ Such investment includes among others, facets of the individual worker such as his information, education and technical capacities. But, recent thoughts about lifelong and recurrent education seem to add more dimensions to the above theory. Investment gives yield, not only to a specified age, as traditional economists used to think, but rather throughout the whole adult life. Hence, economists are, more than ever before, in favour of what we may call 'lifelong vocational education'. This is supported by the words of Scultz:

"that not all of the economic capacities of individuals are given at birth, or at the age of 14 when some of them enter work, or at some later age when some complete their schooling; but that many of these capabilities are developed through activities that have the attributes of an investment." ⁽⁷²⁾

Thompson's views in this respect run in line with those of Schultz.⁽⁷³⁾ The age-range of occupational development to him is broad enough to include the period from the age of 18 to 65.⁽⁷⁴⁾

According to Thompson's classification, an adult continues to grow and mature occupationally through five sub-stages:

I. Transition in the typical age-range of 18-21 during which the individual converts a generalized choice that he has made at an earlier stage of his life, into a specific choice. He makes a final commitment to it by embarking on specialized and training

programme, or by taking a job.

2. Trial (little commitment) during the typical age-range 18-23 during which he implements the choice. The period witnesses the individual's transition from 'general' to 'specialized' education, or from 'school' to 'employment'. It is likely that the adult during this period shifts from one occupation to another.

3. Trial (commitment) in the typical age-range 21-30 during which the adult is settled on one occupational area. However, 'job change' rather than 'occupational change' may occur.

4. Advancement, during the typical age-range 30-45 when establishment in the occupation is reached and it is likely that the job provides security and comfort.

5. Maintenance, in the typical age-range 45 until retirement during which the major concern of the adult is to maintain his material and prestigious status. (75)

With the above classification, Thompson is induced to adopt Geiger's view that since the early years of adulthood, and until the age of retirement, an expanding programme for adult vocational education is essential. (76) In other words, both seem to favour a 'lifelong vocational education' trend 'which will exploit every possible device for making men think, for making them sensitive to authentic and imperative problems, for enriching the making of a living so that it becomes more than a carefully neglected instrument.' (77)

It should be noted, however, that Thompson's classification accords more with the American society and other similar advanced 'countries' than with less developed ones, as the case with Egypt, for example.

On the one hand, the inability to accomplish universal primary education for the whole children of a nation deprives a great number of individuals (that varies from one nation to another) from getting even the minimum base on which further development of their education and training is built. Besides, the low quality of what is provided to accepted children, and the high drop-out and wastage rate, aggravate the problem. The outcome, in most cases, is prevalent illiteracy among the adult population. Vocational education at the 'transition' stage is not provided, unless an individual imitates what the elders do. This, in turn, reinforces the continuation of the traditional techniques. It is thus, that adults in rural Egypt for example, suffer the drawbacks of the absence of Thompson's 'Transition' which is reflected both on their skills and, accordingly, on the national economy.

It is difficult to think of Thompson's five sub-stages apart from a clear mission to be undertaken by 'adult education' if the smooth move of the individual adult throughout his lifetime is maintained, and if the society keeps the skills of its adults continually upgraded. It was thus, that 'Vocational improvement' was recognized by the 'Second World Conference on Adult Education' (Montreal, 1960)⁽⁷⁸⁾ as part of the mission of adult education to undertake in its programmes for the accomplishment of four goals namely, economic preparation, vocational improvement, public responsibility and liberal education.⁽⁷⁹⁾ In so far as the first two are concerned, we quote the report's words:

"I. Economic preparation.-- This component of the learning experience will be concerned with the preparation of adults to meet their responsibilities as citizens and workers in whatever society they live. It will be primarily a remedial

program to provide training not secured during youth. It will include night and day courses which can permit men and women to continue their education after work. It will provide literacy and vocational training for adults who never had the opportunity for such training during their youth. This program will also, where required, include basic education in health and citizenship. It should have as its objective the preparation of all adults for useful and productive work in community life. It should be carried out by public education systems. It should be entirely underwritten by the government.

2. Vocational Improvement. -- This component of the learning experience will be concerned with continuing technical and vocational education which will provide adults, throughout their working lives, with the new skills and ideas necessary for effective operation as workers or as members of a profession. It will be looked upon not so much as a remedial program but as a program to admit adults to keep up with the essential technological and scientific developments which occur during their life span and which they must know about to be effective workers or professionals..... Some provision for contribution by the individual involved might be included. Its objective should be the maintenance of the knowledge and techniques required for the continued effectiveness of workers and citizens in a rapidly changing democratic society." (80)

The last statement above is related with the quick rate of technological progress at present times, and which serves to make equipment and machines obsolete in short duration even before the instructors themselves gain complete mastery over them. This points out^{to} the special position that is given to 'adult vocational education' in the age of 'modern technology'. Competition in such an age becomes more acute, and it is in fields like new processes, machinery, procedures and universal solutions that one firm wins, or loses. Hence, the above fields are kept as secret, carefully guarded. This represents, to Fawcett's way of thinking, an invitation for non-public agencies to make up for the lag of public vocational agencies behind current vocational practice. (81) This led him to state that 'This line of reasoning inevitably leads to the suggestion that it is the non-public agency that should bear the prime responsibility for vocational education.' (82)

Skill dilemma from which many underdeveloped countries suffer is also a matter in which adult vocational education is involved. Balance between supply and demand on skilled manpower is not determined solely through planning for formal education. Shortage in some sectors and surplus in many others cripple the attempts to build 'modern' economy from two angles:

a. 'Skilled' manpower available do not cover the requirements of various industrialization schemes. Hence, the difficult choice between two alternatives: either to accept to employ unskilled or semi-skilled workers in positions that have to be filled by skilled ones, which means the sacrifice with productivity; or to resort to foreign skilled labour which may prove highly uneconomical.

b. Abundance in 'unskilled' labour whose number exceeds the actual needs of 'modern' economy. This gives rise to various kinds of unemployment which stand in the way of attaining optimum benefit of human resources.

It may be argued that the satisfaction of the needs of industrialization schemes of skilled labour is possible through technical secondary and intermediate schools and centres. However, one has to take into account that, in most cases, the capacity of such institutions is far behind the actual needs, as is the case with Egypt mentioned earlier.⁽⁸³⁾ Hence, unskilled (and to an extent semi-skilled) labour is reported to, especially in the transition from 'traditional' to 'modern' economy. Furthermore, the development of the 'modern' sector cannot, however, be unlimited. It uses modern technological means that require less numbers. In other words its capacity to absorb the unskilled labour surplus is limited.

Agriculture, as the traditional sector in most underdeveloped countries, has also to be developed in order to satisfy the increasing needs for food. The modernization of the rural economy requires that the skills of adults have to be upgraded.

In the light of these, adult vocational education has a big task at three levels:

I. Upgrading the skill of the adult population who will continue to work in agriculture in the way that allows the accomplishment of the following goals:

- i. developing agriculture to the extent that facilitates specialization, concentration and mechanization;
- ii. farmers reach a degree of awareness and progress that allows their adoption of modern technological methods;
- iii. developing agricultural co-operation to the extent that allows the organization of production on the basis of concentration and specialization;
- iv. training the technical cadres necessary for various activities related with rural development; and
- v. finding surplus labour power to be made use of in other sectors. (84)

2. Upgrading the skill of semi-skilled and unskilled labours now working in the industrial sector. This is designed to solve the bottlenecks that impede the industrial expansion.

It has to be remembered that 'The semi-skilled category is the immediate shortage of underdeveloped countries in the transitional stage to modernity.' (85) On the other hand,

it will lessen the ratio of 'frictional unemployment' that accompanies quick technological transformation and which threatens many workers with the loss, not only of their jobs but of the profession itself.

3. Training the higher cadres whether administrative or technical including agricultural engineers, scientists, veterinarians, and indeed leaders and specialists with knowledge and skill necessary to keep in line with the ever developing technology.

Functional Literacy and Skill Adequacy

The move from 'verbal' to 'functional' literacy was especially witnessed in the 1960's. As one form of adult education, literacy was to be directed toward the acquisition of skills that facilitate the adults' involvement in their community, and their participation in solving its problems. The Second World Conference on Adult Education (Montreal, 1960) recognized this 'functionality' as an immediate need of the underdeveloped countries:

"The rapidly developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin-America have their own special problems. For them, adult education, including education for literacy, is an immediate need, a need so overpowering that here and now we must help adult men and women to acquire the knowledge and the skills that they need for the new patterns of community living into which they are moving. The developing countries have few immediately available resources, and great demands on them" (86)

Hence, functional literacy programmes are envisaged to have vocational implications fitted to solve the problems of skill inadequacy from which underdeveloped countries suffer (see chapter 4 for the case of Egypt).

From the perspective of the individual adult, 'functional literacy' programmes are designed to make him more apt to live in a modern society. Apart from the 'communication skills' that he acquires from learning to read and write, he gets those kinds of skill needed for successful interaction with his community. In line with ^{this} William S. Gray takes a person

to be functionally literate when he has acquired the knowledge and skill in reading, writing and notation, which make him more apt to engage effectively in all those activities in which a normal person in his culture or group is assumed to engage.⁽⁸⁷⁾

If the Montreal Conference was the starting point for the new approaches of literacy work, the Tehran World Congress of Ministers of Education on the Eradication of Illiteracy (1965)⁽⁸⁸⁾ combined literacy acquisition with the accomplishment of development activity distinguishing thus between 'functional' and 'traditional' literacy. Functional literacy came eventually to be 'not only a method for acquiring skills but also a process for the development of the personality; it is not basically and exclusively a method of making the written or printed word accessible.'⁽⁸⁹⁾

The Third International Conference on Adult Education (Tokyo, 1972) went with the belief in the capacity of adult education programmes to upgrade skills, some steps further. It recognized adult education as one specific and indispensable education that an individual gets throughout his life.⁽⁹⁰⁾ Amidst the new look, evident stress is laid on the ability of adult education, whether through literacy or other programmes, to provide the adults with various skills. In clear words, it is stressed that the availability of apt man for the realization of development is increasingly accepted as one task of adult education:

"... , adult education has been increasingly concerned to foster the development of the individual's productive capacity by training and refresher-training courses, to contribute to the development of human relations and to the respect of human rights, and to assert the ideals of peace and international understanding." (91)

The argument of the present chapter has shown adult education to be capable, to a certain extent, of influencing the attitudes and behavioural aspects of the adult masses towards 'empathy', 'open-mindedness', 'innovativeness', 'achievement motivation', and 'rationality-activism'. On the other hand, adult education has got the capacity to upgrade skills whether in the purely 'technical' sense through adult vocational programmes, or in the 'comprehensive' one through functional literacy programmes and others.

Seen in the light of the 'problem intellectualisation' dealt with in chapters 2, 3, and 4, adult education may be seen as one solution to the staggering modernity in underdeveloped countries caused by the inavailability of 'modern' individuals in terms of attitudes and skills. It seems that, through a sound policy for the expansion of adult education opportunities to penetrate as many adults of these countries as possible, that the inconsistency between the 'high modernity proposals' on the one hand, and the 'inaptness' of adults on the other, may be solved.

Notes - Chapter Six

1. OTTAWAY, A. K. Education and society: an introduction to the sociology of education. 2nd edition. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962. p. 12.
2. UNESCO. Third International Conference on Adult Education (Tokyo: 25 July-7 August 1972).
3. ibid. Adult education in the context of lifelong education (Basic Working Paper). UNESCO/CONFEDAD/5. pp. 29-30.
4. see BERGEVIN, P. A philosophy for adult education. New York: The Seabury Press, Incorporated, 1967.
see also COLES, E. T. Adult education in developing countries. London: Pergamon Press, Ltd., 1969.
also LOWE, J. (ed.) Adult education and nation building: a symposium on adult education in developing countries. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1970.
5. ROGERS, E. M. and HERZOG, W. 'Functional literacy among Columbian peasants', Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 14, No. 2, January 1966. pp. 190-203.
also SCHUMAN, H., INKLES, A. and SMITH, D. H. 'Some social psychological effects and noneffects of literacy in a new nation', Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 16, No. 1, October 1967.
also HERZOG, Jr. W. A. 'The effects of literacy training on Modernization variables', Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Michigan State University, 1967.
also GOLDEN, H. H. "Literacy and social change in underdeveloped countries", Rural Sociology, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 1955. pp. 1-7.
also ROGERS, E. M. Modernization among peasants: the impact of communication. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969.
6. STALEY, E. Planning occupational education and training for development. New York/London: Praeger Publishers, 1971. p. 39.
It is to be noted that Staley recognizes such a difficulty in a more definite manner than others have cared to do. He puts it unambiguously that 'the amount of hard, carefully verified evidence and clearly stated conclusions seems to be relatively scanty.'
7. THOMPSON, J. H. Foundations of vocational education: social and psychological concepts. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.,: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973. p. 7.

8. HAMDY. M. Long-term manpower planning research- a proposed occupation structure for the manpower for U.A.R. in 1985.

Cairo: Institute of National Planning, 1963. memo No. 264.

p. II.

also ABDEL- RAHMAN, I. H. 'Preface', in M. Hamdy (ed.)

Manpower requirements for the U.A.R. for the period 1960-1985.

Abdel-Rahman complains of the lack of sound indicators of skill

which often leads to arbitrary judgements. He puts it clearly that:

"For lack of a better indicator, educational training levels are taken to represent the degree of skill and organisation. Evidently, this is not a sufficient indicator, since a form of leadership, team work and a set of social values are required to make out of a group of (educated) or (trained) citizens an enterprising and developing community."

9. HAMDY. M. Long-term manpower, *ibid.*

10. UNESCO. Practical guide to functional literacy: a method of training for development. Paris: UNESCO, 1973. p. 9.

11. UNESCO, The Experimental World Literacy Programme: a critical assesment. Paris: UNESCO Press and UNDP, 1976.

12. *ibid.* p. 110. - Few systematic sample studies were conducted in 1971-1972 showing that the programme was a success in terms of such criteria as the generation of under-consumption habits among participants as well as increased technical knowledge, and the adoption of modern sanitary and nutrition practices. Furthermore, some before-and-after studies of three Tanzanian groups in 1970 and 1971 seemed to show that:

"the functional literacy classes had a direct influence on participants' behaviour vis-à-vis their participation in formal organizations, their knowledge of modern technology, their adoption of modern methods, their knowledge and adoption of improved health and nutritional practices, and their level of socio-economic aspirations".

13. *ibid.* p. 94. The 'critical assesment' states the following as regards results in the case of the Sudan Republic:

"The Sudanese WOALP resulted in mostly positive changes in levels of knowledge and skill acquisition, attitudes, consumption patterns and behaviour on the part of participants completing the course. Differences tended to be found in these areas both in comparison to participants' preliteracy performance and in comparison to matched groups of non-participants (control)."

14. *ibid.* p. 54. the critical assesment of the Indian case points to results 'sufficiently favourable for UNESCO and UNDP to recommend the continuation of the project. Among the positive results were:

"acquisition of literacy and numeracy skills, improvement in knowledge of new agricultural practice, attitudinal change, behavioural change (utilization of newly-learned agricultural skills), and improvement in the standard of living, although differences were found among the various subprojects and programmes."

15. In India, Tanzania, Iran, Ecuador, Ethiopia and the Sudan.
see BATAILLE, L. (ed.) A turning point for literacy, adult education for development, the spirit and declaration of Persepolis.
(Proceedings of the International Symposium for Literacy, Persepolis, Iran: 3-8 September 1975. Oxford: Pergamon Press, Ltd., 1976.
16. *ibid.* pp. 55-56.
17. *ibid.* p. 56.
18. *ibid.* pp. 57-58.
19. SCHUMAN, H., INKLES, A. and SMITH, D. H. *op.cit.* p. 3.
20. When dealing with the impact of literacy acquisition on the openness to change as indicated by attitudes toward family planning. pp. 275- 277.
21. LERNER, D. *op.cit.*
22. *ibid.* p. 62.
23. *ibid.* p. 46.
24. *ibid.*
25. ROGERS, E. M. *op.cit.*
26. *ibid.* p. 82.
27. SCHUMAN, INKLES^E and SMITH. *op.cit.* p. 9.
28. FAKOURY, E. "Some psychological aspects of literacy programs", Literacy Works, Vol. 2, No. 4, May 1973.
29. *ibid.* p. 20.
30. UNESCO. The World Literacy Programme: a critical assesment, *op.cit.* p. II0.
31. SCHUMAN, INKLES^E and SMITH, *op.cit.* p. 9.
32. *ibid.* Table 5, p. 10.
33. *ibid.* p. 9.
34. LERNER, D. *op.cit.* p. 64.
35. *ibid.* p. 436.
36. DOOB, L. W. 'Communication in Africa', cited in ROGERS, E. M. *op.cit.* p. 198.
37. *ibid.*
38. ROGERS, E. M. *op.cit.*
39. *ibid.* p. 204.
40. *ibid.* p. 206.
41. SCHUMAN, INKLES^E and SMITH, *op.cit.* p. 5.

42. *ibid.* p. 5.
43. *ibid.*
44. RADWAN, A. F. A. Old and new forces in Egyptian education. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers' College, Columbia University, 1951.
45. *ibid.* p. 173.
46. STALEY, E. *op.cit.* p. 40.
47. *ibid.*
48. EZZ EL-DIN, A. 'Vocational literacy for illiterate workers in the Arab states', in ASFEC, Eradication of functional illiteracy in the service of development and production in the Arab states. Sirs-El-Layyan: ASFEC, 1970. pp. 137-161. (Arabic text)
50. *ibid.* p. 157.
51. *ibid.* pp. 157-158.
52. *ibid.* p. 158.
53. KELLEY, S. C. 'Education as a means for changing social and cultural values for economic development', in The Economic and Social Studies Conference Board, Education as a Factor of Accelerated Economic Development. Fifth Conference, 1966. Istanbul: Celtüt Koll. Sti., Economic and Social Studies Board, 1967. pp. 120-137.
54. *ibid.*
55. *ibid.* pp. 130-131.
56. *ibid.* p. 131.
57. *ibid.*
58. A. L. O. An Arab perspective of the future of vocational training. Report of the Director-General of the A. L. O., Part I - Arab Labour Conference, 5th Session, March, 1976. Cairo: A. L. O., 1976.
59. *ibid.* p. II.
60. *ibid.*
61. *ibid.* pp. 12-13.
62. BRIM, ^{Jr.} O. G. 'Socialization through the life cycle', in BRIM, Jr. O. G. and WHEELER, Socialization after childhood, two essays. London: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966. p. 4.
63. *ibid.*
64. *ibid.* p. 5.
65. see UNESCO, Fundamental education: common ground for all peoples. (Report of a special committee to the Preparatory Commission of the UNESCO). Paris: UNESCO, 1947. p. 158. It is also stated on p. 128 that fundamental education is 'one of the components of democracy and an essential instrument for establishing a democratic life in nations'.

66. *ibid.* pp. 155-171.
67. MINISTRY OF RECONSTRUCTION (Great Britain), Adult Education Committee, Final Report . (cmd 321). London: H.M.S.O., 1919.
68. *ibid.* p. 7 .
69. BERGEVIN, P. *op.cit.*
70. *ibid.* p. 86.
71. HARBISON, F. and MYERS, C. A. *op.cit.*
72. SCHULTZ, T. W. "Reflections on investment in man", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXX, No. 5, Part 2, Oct. 1962. Supplement, p. I.
73. THOMPSON, J. F. *op.cit.* p. 247.
74. *ibid.*
75. *ibid.* pp. 247-248.
76. *ibid.* p. 96.
77. *ibid.*
78. UNESCO, Second World Conference on Adult Education, " Blueprint for a rounded adult education program", Fundamental Adult Education Vol. XII, No. 2, 1960.
79. *ibid.*
80. *ibid.*
81. FAWCETT, C. W. "Responsibilities of nonpublic agencies for conducting vocational education", in M. L. Barlow (ed.) Vocational education, the sixty-fourth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education. Chicago: N.S.S.E., 1965. pp. 244-245. It should be noted that Fawcett's argument bears heavily on American experience and conditions. However, it is possible to take his argument as applicable to other countries in so far as the quick technological transformation is on the ebb.
82. *ibid.* p. 245.
83. Vide supra, Chapter 4. pp. 156- 163.
84. EL-GABALY, M. "Transmission of scientific and technological knowledge for rural development", Araa fil' Taleem al-Wazifi lil-Kibar (A.S.F.E.C.) Special issue, June 1974. p. 68.
85. ABDEL-DAYEM, A. 'Manpower planning and its professional and educational requirements', in A.S.F.E.C., Eradication of functional illiteracy in the service of development and production in the Arab states, *op.cit.* p. 88.

86. UNESCO, Second World Conference on Adult Education, op.cit.
Educational studies and documents, No. 46.

Paris: UNESCO, 1963. p. II.

87. GRAY, W. S. The teaching of reading and writing. Paris: UNESCO,
1956. p. 24.

88. UNESCO, World Conference of Ministers of Education on the
Eradication of Illiteracy (Tehran: 8-19 September 1965),
Final Report. UNESCO, p. 29 and p. 34.

89. UNESCO, Third International Conference on Adult Education,
Adult education in the context of lifelong education, op.cit. p. 8.

90. Third International Conference on Adult Education, Final Report,
op.cit., p. 39.

91. Third International Conference on Adult Education, Adult education
in the context of lifelong education, op.cit. p. 10.

PART FOUR

CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

The 'contextual analysis' proceeds further with the foundation already laid in the 'proposed policy formulation'. The 'Problem approach' suggests that the choice of one policy solution rather than another is related with its ability to realize certain objectives that reflect aspirations. This can only be reached by giving specification of the circumstances under which the solution in one country has worked, but has not been so successful in another.

In the present study, reconstruction of what War II had damaged in England economically and politically, coincided with the need to establish the British version of the 'welfare State'. Variation between the conditions of Post-War England and Post-1952 Egypt, is not underestimated. However, dealing with political and economic proposals in England after War is a necessary ground on which to see how adult education policy was designed amidst these proposals. This is dealt with in chapter eight. Two adult education policy trends are of special relevance to the argument of the present study, namely the integration of adult education in the national system of education, and the 'fourfold partnership' between the Ministry of Education, L.E.A.'s, universities and the W.E.A.

On the other hand, adult education policy in Egypt since 1952, is analysed in chapter nine. The argument in the chapter shows how the marginality of the adult education sector, and its alienation from the national system of education have left serious stamps on the ability to disseminate it among the adult masses at large. Moreover, adult education was not dealt with comprehensively, but rather in a fragmental manner within which each adult education type has to plan for itself separately. The outcome of the efforts made is inadequate for a country aspiring for modernity.

With these two defects that have characterized the adult education policy in Egypt since 1952, in mind, the choice of the English model for comparison is justifiable, and a clearer view of the solution is reached.

Chapter Seven

Political and Economic Proposals in Post-1944 England

Before the World War II ended, Government bodies, political parties and various pressure groups in England were all enthusiastically involved in drawing the broad lines of the policies that would be implemented after War. Six years of war have, in a sense, evoked new aspirations both political and economic. However, the new policy trends were not solely the ferment of war conditions, but rather consistent with issues that have remained with the society in the inter-war years and even before. The call for 'effective democracy' that was brought into focus after war is hardly separable from the democratic application both of the immediate past under the emergency war conditions, or the distant past since the Chartist Movement (1832-1848). Likewise, in the economic realm, industrialization was more keenly attended to in post-War policies. On one hand, this may be seen consistent with the concern initially felt since the Great Exhibition of 1851 and the fear that Great Britain might lose its industrial supremacy. On the other hand, acute shortage of labour, inadequacy of investment in mass-production machinery during the inter-war years intermingled with scarcity of basic materials and the deterioration of production in some major industries during the War years.⁽¹⁾ Accompanying the two lines of 'effective democracy' and 'industrialization' was a third one which has long been with England ever since the Great Industrial Revolution namely, the intense conflict between classes which made urgent the attempt to find a more peaceful formula that would eliminate the existence of 'two nations'.⁽²⁾

I. Effective Democracy in Post-War II Proposals

That the democratic application in England until the outbreak of World War II was 'inadequate', gained general agreement on the part of political parties themselves. The Labour Party's Declaration of policy (Bournemouth, 1940)⁽³⁾ took as a starting point of its argument that "Our Democracy is still an incomplete Democracy."⁽⁴⁾ The Declaration linked this with the inadequate standard of living of millions, and the incomplete educational opportunities. Inequality, however, was the gravest of all the defects to which the Declaration pointed out. The general evaluation given was that, "Even if there be a deeper social conscience than in the past, our society still remains, in its essential outlines, acquisitive and unequal."⁽⁵⁾ The Conservative view was not far from that of the Labour Party, though with less severe criticism.⁽⁶⁾

The need felt for more effective democracy was not to negate that, long before the Second World War, England had institutionally, accomplished modern political structure. The franchise rights have been broadly extended since the Chartist Movement especially in the peaks of 1842 and 1848. The two Gladstonian Reform Bills of 1832 and 1867 further extended the vote to agricultural workers and redistributed Parliament seats in favour of smaller towns. The 1928 Act eventually removed all anomalies in the male franchise, extending the vote to the vast majority of women as well. Accordingly, 97% of the population aged 20 and over have become actual voters.⁽⁷⁾

As for 'political parties', the arrival of the 'Labour Party' on the stage of politics has been a remarkable landmark. Its solid base was the growing Trade Union movement, although the Trade Union Congress was joined in its creation of the Labour Representation Committee, by the Fabian Society (founded in 1884), the Independent Labour Party (founded in 1893) and the Social Democratic Federation (founded in 1881). Since its victory of 1906, the party has ever since been the Labour Party in Parliament.

In parliamentary institutions, the twentieth century witnessed the growing consolidation of the power of the House of Commons, while the House of Lords sank into a much less activity and importance than before. The former strongly became the true focus of legislative power. It changed fundamentally its electoral base and became more openly the organ of public opinion.

Various pressure groups were allowed to undertake their role in parliamentary democracy. By 1900, trade union membership in Britain had reached a top of two million workers including a mass of skilled and unskilled labour. In the meantime, working class movements were also gaining strength. The Co-operative Movement also flourished. In 1903, the Workers' Education Association (W.E.A.) emerged, and since then has been welcomed by other partners and pressure groups. It is thus, that, at least in form, democracy in England has got by the advent of the Second World War an institutionally modern political structure.

The call for 'more effective' democracy was associated with discovered slips in application rather than with the institutions themselves. This was sharpened by stronger belief in democracy and insistence on it as a way of life since the outset of the present century. The growing lack of faith in religion that came to affect ordinary Englishman through acceptance of philosophies of relativism and uncertainty, was not without relevance to the cause of democracy. Livingstone (1943) lamented the 19th century England when Christian philosophy was strongly adhered to, only giving its place to athiesm and immorality.⁽⁸⁾ The Conservatives (1959) admitted the existence of great difficulty, far beyond the power of statesmen to solve, represented by the growing confidence in the power of science and technology that coincides with 'disturbed religious beliefs'.⁽⁹⁾ Weakened belief in spiritual values has, indirectly, yielded stronger belief in democracy and freedom. It is no odd thing in Ottaway's⁽¹⁰⁾ analysis that this lack of faith among the English population is associated with the growth of their belief in democracy, and from this he comes to a conclusion that:

"The strongest faith is in democracy and freedom, however differently or vaguely these words may be interpreted. Democracy and freedom are not ends in themselves, yet they are held as important values by the majority of the English people." (II)

From this angle, it is easy to interpret the louder call that grew in England in the 20th century for sounder democracy and which came in the post-WarII era to form a major core of policy trends. It centred round three issues: individual freedom, social freedom and equality of opportunity.

(a) Individual Freedom

Strong interference, and even 'control' that the government practised over the activities of citizens during the War years, was justified on the grounds of emergency conditions.⁽¹²⁾ Atlee admitted that some of these were necessary, but "very irksome."⁽¹³⁾ While the economic measures were more likely to be accepted by the Labour Party's Declaration (1945), the extension of restrictions on personal freedom was strongly condemned.⁽¹⁴⁾ The Conservatives were no less critical of the violation of individual freedom under whatever mask, not even 'the interests of the State':

"Had it not been for the War, the British people would never have allowed the power of the State to encroach so far upon their freedom. The surrender of their liberties in 1939-1945 went very far indeed much further than in 1914-1918." ⁽¹⁵⁾

The policies after War went further in asserting the importance of individual freedom.

Participation of common man was not seen in seclusion from his freedoms. The trend that gained support from political parties and individual thinkers highly valued the extension of common man's active participation in politics as a guarantee for more effective democratic application. Shearman (1944), cared to explain that it is not beneficial that government remains the sole concern of specialists whether bureaucrats or statesmen, but, "must be studied and reflected on by ordinary men and women engaged in the affairs of life."⁽¹⁶⁾ The policy that the Labour Party adopted was

included in its Statement of Policy (1945) which was later
(17)
affirmed in 1949. Effective democracy in the former was
associated with with keeping and enlarging freedom of
worship, of speech, of the press and other civil liberties.(18)
In the latter, effective democracy was envisaged as the one
in which the whole people would participate. In a definite
way, it was put that, "There can be no advance without the
participation of the people." (19) As the 'remote' and 'impersonal'
feature of control over apparatus of common life was reinforced
by previous indifference to common man, it was suggested
after 1944 that bringing common man to participate was
essential.

The Conservative policy, while approving the above broad
lines, gave stress on the way the individual uses his ballot
rights. Sound democracy was to be attained through the electorate
who should be strong enough to control Parliament. Parliament,
on its part, must control Government and not governed by it.
The trend was expressed by Marquis^{of} Salisbury in 1949:

"We must ensure that this free and independent electorate
keeps a firm hand on Parliament, and through Parliament on
the Government. We must make it our business to restore
the control of Government by the people." (20)

In this way, the individual becomes the means of sound democracy
as he is its ultimate goal. The Conservative trend embodies
the clash over the increasing role of the State at the expense
of individual freedom and to which the Labour Party has shown
leniency, as will later be elaborated. (21) In 1965, twenty years

after the end of War, the Conservative policy in this concern was unchanged. Their content has ever remained not to let the physical aspect of reconstruction outweigh the human. One report of theirs put it strongly, though vaguely that, 'society was created for the individual and any plan or political party that ignores this will suffer and deservedly so.' (22) What the country needed most was independent and responsible citizens working for the public good "not slaves but free men - the ^{true} masters of their country." (23) Such trend was recalled by Churchill in that the people should not be reduced to a 'mass of State-directed proliterians' controlled by an aristocracy of privileged officials whether party leaders or trade union bosses. (24)

It was thus that individualism which gave new dimensions to the cause of personal freedom and participation represented a controversial issue between Labour and Conservative policies. However, no tendency was there on either part to deprive the State of its responsibility toward the whole community eventhough the Conservatives were more sensitive to the growing role practised by the State. The trend to create balance between both within the framework of a 'welfare State' came to be one major issue in post-War policies. Such balance was strongly advocated by Marshal:

".. if we put individualism first, we must put collectivism second. The Welfare State is the responsible promoter and guardian of the welfare of the whole community, which is something more complex than the sum total of the welfare of all its individual members arrived at by simple addition. The claims of the individual must always be defined and limited so as to fit into the complex and balanced pattern of the welfare of the community, ... " (25)

Marshal's way of thought was midway between, on the one hand Labour policy geared in the first place to protect the interests of the State, and the Conservative policy which, though inclined to protect the individual's initiative, accepts some sort of equilibrium between both 'State' and 'individual'. They admit that the conflict between central authoritarianism and the right of individual choice is a danger, yet "if the individual is given the background and true facts upon which to base his choice, coupled with bold and imaginative leadership from Government, then the choice is likely to be a wise one." (26)

(b) Social Freedom

The attempted balance between 'individual' and 'State' in post-War England was not only a matter of supporting individual freedom that was, in a sense, pressed under War emergency measures, nor the activation of common man's participation in political action after some neglect in the inter-war years. 'Freedom', as one basis of British democracy was to take a new role. Apart from the already recognized forms as freedom of worship, of speech, of opinion, etc..., there emerged what came since the Beveridge Report (1942) (27) to be termed 'Social Freedom'. These are the types of freedom demanded in the interests of social justice. They are envisaged in post-War policies as essential component of 'sound democracy'. Beveridge associates 'social freedom' with 'democracy' on the grounds that without the former, the latter can hardly be complete even in peace time. His argument is made clear in the following quotation:

"I came to realise the intense interest of the citizens of this country in the problem of security after the war. I had a lesson in democracy, and of what is needed to make a democracy wholehearted in war. Democracies make war for peace, not war for its own sake. They fight better if they know what they are fighting for after the war." (28)

Social freedom was dictated as well by humaniterian outlook at man in a 'welfare State', and who should be freed from shakles of want, disease, poverty, ignorance and squalor. (29) Such freedom, as the Beveridge Report recommended, has to be comprehensive if it is to accord with sound democracy. The umbrella of 'social freedom' was designed in post-war policy, to shelter not some sectors of the population, nor even the majority, but necessarily all citizens of both sexes irrespective of any considerations. The line could even be seen clear in the White Paper (1943) which recognizes that, "It is right for all citizens to stand together, without exclusions based upon difference of status, function or wealth." (30) Such comrehensiveness gives what the Paper saw as "concrete expression... to the solidarity and unity of the nation, which in war have been its bulwarks against success in the fight against want and mischance." (31)

The policy of social freedom was vigorously supported by great sectors of the people, as well by the political parties and pressure groups. (32) As for the Government, it received it, at the beginning, rather cautiously and even coolly. (33) Some views of individual thinkers and men of politics were not much in favour of the policy of social freedom.

On the one hand, automatic provision was feared to corrupt self-reliance among citizens, demoralize the family, and magnify the Government. However , it was inseparable for some, to envisage a welfare State without an egalitarian social policy.⁽³⁴⁾

The policy of 'social freedom' did not take long before it was put in legislations that were described as a 'social revolution'.⁽³⁵⁾ The National Insurance Act and the National Health Service were passed in 1946. According to these, every unemployed or sick individual was entitled to receive what is enough for his bare essentials. Free medical services were to be provided for all. Old Age Pensions were to be paid by State to men at the age of 65, and single women aged 60, in case of giving up work. Although these measures were modified after 1948, they underwent no radical change.

(c) Equality of Opportunity

The call for an equalitarian society, rose to the top among trends of after-War policy. Such a call was stirred both by a positive passion for equality, as well by a negative passion for the removal of inequalities that characterized the inter-war English society. To post-War Labour leaders, the major aim was to make sure that England would not slip back into what they called "the degradation ^{and helplessness} /of the twenty years between the wars."⁽³⁶⁾ The classless society that Tawney preached in 1931, and in which

the people would enjoy similar standards was, to many of the Labours, the base on which the new policy should be founded. Fruits of victory have to be distributed fairly among various classes of the one nation.⁽³⁷⁾ Lawson (1945)⁽³⁸⁾ saw such equaliterian distribution to be in the form of, "Homes for All, Jobs for All, Social Security for All, Full Education for All."⁽³⁹⁾ In such a call, he seems to favour the equality of all, hardly recognizing various forms of discrimination that have to be regarded in order that equality may be genuine. The inequalities of the inter-war English society haunted the mind of common man. Sympathy with the call for equality was clear in the thought of Professor Laski.⁽⁴⁰⁾ The danger, to him, has exceeded the boundaries of unjust distribution of privileges, to affect the unity of the nation with all that this might represent to its survival. Writing on 'The War and the Future' (1940), he was induced to shift the focus of attention from the pressing conditions dictated by War, to the cause of inequality which had far more reaching impact. To him,

"The enemy at the gate is the privilege of a class-society which fears the extension of democracy. Men live so differently in our nation that they think differently too. The unity we may establish if they had an equal share in the common good is attainable so long as the claims of the common people are sacrificed to the vested interests of privilege." (41)

Laski's vision of equaliterian democracy came to form the basis of the Labour Party's argument. The defects that Laski pointed out were crystallized in the Labour Declaration of Policy (1940).⁽⁴²⁾ The diagnosis made in the Declaration

was prelude to the socialist planning policy adopted by the Labours, and implemented during their post-war government. To them, 'irrational privileges', which used to disfigure the order had to be abolished, thus giving place to more justice and more active participation on the part of all regardless of class. "Genuine equality and a high level of educational opportunity" were stressed as first hand priorities. Justice that was enjoyed only by a few, had to be made responsive to the needs of the majority, if not all.⁽⁴³⁾

The post-war Conservative policy was declared to be against inequality and class strife. However, the concept they adopted for 'equality' was not the same as the one adopted by the Labours. Equality, in the Conservative sense, is "to secure a better opportunity for our children. A fair and free opportunity for women and children and for family life are first priorities."⁽⁴⁴⁾ Stress, which is easily seen to be laid on the extension and promotion of opportunities rather than on 'equality', has always remained one principle on which the Conservative policy in the post-war era is founded.

On the other hand, the Conservative policy was committed to eliminate class strife. Explaining the Party's policy (May 1949), Churchill declared the condemnation of class strife that might rise from blowing the trumpet of one class only however big the number of its members. Nor did the Conservative policy show leniency toward the 'aristocracy of the State'.⁽⁴⁵⁾

Privileges have, hence, been under attack meanwhile the initiative of the British people has to be preserved by all means:

"We declare ourselves unsleeping opponents of all class, all official or all party privilege which denies the genius of an island race its rightful career and reward." (46)

The dispute over 'equality of opportunity' left its stamps on the policies of post-war England so long as the chance given to each of the two big political parties to rule was accompanied by attempts to embody their concept of the term into legislations and implemented policies. A society of equal opportunities was what Atlee, Bevin and other Labours vigorously dedicated themselves during the 1945-1951 government through the 'Social Policy' adopted in health, education, insurance. As for State intervention in economy, nationalization was committed to as a policy associated with the application of the principle of equality. The coal, gas and electricity industries, the railways, inland waterways and the Bank of England, were all brought under public ownership during the six years of the Labour Government as will be elaborated in detail later. (47) What concerns us in the present respect is their policy declaration of 1949 which states:

"Our aim is that every person with ability should have an equal opportunity to rise to the highest posts." (48)

The Conservative policy that came to be followed in their government (1951-1964) was more in favour of 'opportunity' rather than 'equality'. As a term, equality was almost rejected on the grounds that it is 'a drab slogan'.⁽⁴⁹⁾

The need for an 'Opportunity State' to match and sustain the 'Welfare State', was the focus of the debates especially by the Right-Wing of the Party.⁽⁵⁰⁾ More opportunities in all realms, education, employment, housing, ... etc. was vigorously supported as a principle. Yet, the hierarchy of statuses and status-groups seems to be unavoidable and does not necessarily involve inequality or injustice.

The comparison between 'Labour' and 'Conservative' post-war policies gave Kogan (1978)⁽⁵¹⁾ to see the former confusing 'greater opportunity' with 'greater equality', yet "increasingly moved towards the 'strong' version of egalitarianism,"⁽⁵²⁾ meanwhile the latter "concentrated on those social objectives which aim to produce an efficient work-force and a strong social fabric."⁽⁵³⁾

2. Industrialization in Post-War II Proposals

Immediate challenges that initiated proposals

Problems of Post-War Britain are often seen as 'endemic problems' of twentieth century Britain, and Thompson's view⁽⁵⁴⁾ seems plausible that, "if war had been avoided in 1939, Britain would have to face tasks of economic overhaul and social reconstruction resembling those which confronted the Government in 1945."⁽⁵⁵⁾ However, this does not negate that the Second World War's impact on British economy was far deeper than the impact of World War I in at least three respects:

(a) The Second War had a greater effect in terms of affecting the whole people, rich and poor, from all social classes.

Women were influenced by war conditions in matters of work and employment in almost the same way as men. This accounts for the 'totality' of the Second War that some thinkers find no sound basis for comparison ^{with the First}: "The first World War never was, but the second soon became, after a shaky start a 'total war'."⁽⁵⁶⁾

(b) The wide-scale evacuation due to air bombing was far greater in the Second War. In September 1939, 1,500,000 evacuees were received in the reception areas.⁽⁵⁷⁾ The number rose and fell according to military considerations with whatever bearing this had on economic, social and other aspects of British life.

(c) Government expenditure represented a great challenge that strained economy. It ran at £ 20 millions a week at the outbreak of War. Within six months, it was at £33½ millions weekly. To

cover the increasing expenses, Great Britain had to rely on overseas investments half of which went for war. In later stages, War cost Britain £ 12 millions daily.⁽⁵⁸⁾ It was thus, that a higher proportion of the national income was absorbed by the war effort than it was in the First War.⁽⁵⁹⁾

When industry is specified, the call for a new policy for that sector was inevitable on account of the impact left by War conditions as well as by growing difficulties since the outset of the present century amidst unfavourable conditions. By 1943, the White Paper 'Educational Reconstruction' was clear in admitting the need for a new policy for industry. In the words of the Paper:

"The initial and natural advantages that gave this country, almost for the asking, its place of pre-eminence in world manufacture and world markets, have long been fading. More and more in the future will it be necessary to rely on the capacity, adaptability and the quality of our industrial and commercial personnel." ⁽⁶⁰⁾

It is likely that one of the 'natural advantages' meant by the Paper was concerned with 'basic materials' which was turning against Britain's favour. Import of such materials from other countries has been with Britain for a long time, but a big change has been brought about by the two World Wars. To get them, "we shall have to pay for them by the export of our goods and services. For as a result of two world wars, we have had to sacrifice by far the greater part of the foreign investments which we built up over many years when we were the leading creditor country of the world."⁽⁶¹⁾

When one economy starts to depend largely on the quality of exports, the cause of industrialization naturally comes to top in economic policy, as will later be shown.

But, industry was first among economic sectors that came to suffer due to War conditions. Modernization of British industries or replacement to capital equipment, which was due by 1939, had to be delayed.⁽⁶²⁾ Capital formation represented another challenge. The annual net non-war capital formation in Great Britain fell from £ 214 millions representing 5% of the net national income in 1938, to about - £ 1.000 millions (capital consumption) in 1940-1945 representing -12%.⁽⁶³⁾ This, was reflected on capital formation in the industrial sector, which was diminishing in war period.

Manpower, was another great challenge. Between mid 1939 and September 1943, Britain mobilized 8.500.000 insured persons or 18% of the total working population for the Forces, the auxiliary Forces and the munitions industry. To these are added 400.000 workers of post insurance age, many thousands of immigrants and refugees, 224.000 War prisoners as well as 160.000 from Ireland.⁽⁶⁴⁾ This, was not without significance to manpower in industry which declined during War years from 17.920.000 in 1939 to 17.121.000 in 1943, and continued to decline in the first years of peace to reach 16.209.000 in June 1945.⁽⁶⁵⁾ Decline may look meagre, but was with striking effect on many British industries. Half the manpower in some major occupations as pottery, textiles, clothing, building

and reconstruction, retail distribution was lost. Some other civilian industries as furs, and carpets faced a more acute shortage.⁽⁶⁶⁾

Labour productivity declined in the War years, whether qualitatively or quantitatively. On the one hand, there was the impact of shortage in basic materials, and the delay of equipment replacement. On the other hand, there was the impact of manpower shortage and the distribution of male workers between several industries in accordance with priorities, or between more or less essential industries. Men workers had, according to such distribution, to work for particular firms regardless of the distances from their homes. Similar action was taken with female workers. Married women were called up for industrial service on account of their previous experience in paid work⁽⁶⁷⁾ The outcome of all these was, "simpler styles, plainer finishes and, often, lower quality, and, in some cases, as in clothing and furniture, these became the "utility" grade, supervised by the Board of Trade."⁽⁶⁸⁾ However, poor performance was found to vary from one industry to another and, as a general rule, the resort to female workers was one factor among many that was notable for the decline in productivity. Pollard,⁽⁶⁸⁾ accepts Maddison's estimate that the decline in output per man-hour in industry during the War years was as high as 8% for the period 1939-1946.⁽⁶⁹⁾ But, it was also noted that as the influx of unskilled and female workers was repaired by the return of more skilled male workers, the decline would be stopped or even reversed. ⁽⁷⁰⁾

Industry and State in Post-War Proposals

Public direction and control that dominated the economic policy during War II, was dictated by the need to plan effectively which could not be entrusted to private enterprise. Such a line was strongly supported by the Labour Policy for the Post-War England. Their Declaration of Policy (1940) condemned all previous measures taken in this respect as hesitant and characterized by avoidable delay. It lamented the non-existence of forms of bold, effective and carefully prepared planning.⁽⁷¹⁾ Therefore, the programme they proposed in 1945 was clear in adopting a strong line of nationalizing industries:

"The Labour Party submits to the nation the following industrial programme - public ownership of the fuel and power industries . . . Public ownership of inland transport . . . Public ownership of iron and steel . . . Public supervision of monopolies and cartels (72)

Their argument was founded on the fact that industry, on which the future of Britain lies amidst world challenges, requires the direction of investments the way that best served public interest. Nationalization of coal and power, together with the basic forms of transport, was seen as of utmost relevance to the economic reorganization most needed after War. Those industries to be left in private hands, have to plan their structure and methods, "for the nation can no longer tolerate the grotesque waste of man-power and wealth which arises from unregulated private ownership. Individual initiative and ability must not be restricted, but must be directed to the service of the community."⁽⁷³⁾

The above line of policy of the Labours was also strongly advocated in their 1949 Declaration⁽⁷⁴⁾ though it began to use a less sharp tone possibly due to the modest outcomes of their earlier attempts as may be deduced from the above document.⁽⁷⁵⁾

The Conservative policy for post-War was seen in contrast with with the Labour policy. One report which analyses the Conservative discussion group in which 1092 members took part (1949) condemned the Labour policy in this concern as one leading Britain to slavery.⁽⁷⁶⁾ It quotes Belloc in "The ^{Servile} Savile State" in that, "if we do not restore the institution of property, we cannot help but restore the institution of slavery."⁽⁷⁷⁾ The report looks upon property ownership as the only sure shield capable of protecting individual freedom from encroachment by State or by neighbours. In this way, the policy of bringing industries and other economic institutions under State control was refuted on three grounds:

1. The institution of the family is in danger of being destroyed with the destruction of individual right to acquire property.
 2. Public ownership or nationalization is not a happy solution for whatever problems simply because it denies the individual and family the type of security for which they yearn; it is a 'totaliterian' rather than 'democratic' in both conception and effect.
 3. It kills initiative and responsibility among individuals.
- Referring to the nationalization of industries, David Eccles was clear in stating the Conservative fears that:

"The power of the individual is weakened and the people must study the mood of the Government, toe the line if they wish to keep their jobs, and seek the permission of the Government before they do anything."(78)

The sacrifice of 'private property' at the alter^a of the State's interests is seen in the Conservative report cited above, as improper. Private property has to be maintained if productivity is to be raised. The angle through which the Conservative policy looks takes private ownership as essential for British society as it, "teaches a sense of responsibility and thrift, and, at the same time, is an incentive to hard work. Through it, men and women are enabled to give full expression to their potentialities."(79) It is thus that private industries are strongly supported by the Conservative policy. State monopoly was seen as worse than private monopoly and their declared policy condemns both public and private monopoly.(80) The human factor in industry, which they highly regard, represents the cornerstone of their policies. Macmillan declared in 1948 that the Conservatives are after incentive, opportunity, partnership, security of employment, or in his short-cut words: "Our policy is to humanize not nationalize."(81)

As for the Liberal Party, the nationalization of industries^{was} reservedly taken but with agreement on it as a policy. The nationalization movement was seen in their declaration of 1964 as still in need to be designed in a way that makes the nationalized industries more efficient, to enable them to serve the consumer and the Public better,

and to maximize competition and lower costs." (82)

In implementation, the policy followed by the Labour Government (1945-1951) turned their ideals into legislations. Five major legislations were passed including the acts of the nationalization of the Coal Industry (1946), of Electricity (1947), of Transport (1947), of Gas (1947) and the Iron and Steel (1949). This last one was delayed by House of Lords before the Conservative Government succeeded to denationalize Steel after 1951.

The policy of nationalization that was vigorously pursued by the Labour Government between 1945 and 1951 was reversed by the coming of the Conservatives to rule. In the latter's election manifesto it affirmed its commitment "to undo much of the Socialist legislation of the preceding six years, which involved the nationalized industries." (83) In assesment, the Liberals, on their part saw that the nationalization of industries was not quite successful. (84) The matter is not solely to bring industries under public ownership or control, but whether such nationalization is yielding financial results. Figures show that under nationalization, only slight improvement in financial profit was accomplished and in some industries it even went down as indicated in the following table:

Table 7.1

Financial results of the Nationalized Industries- Profit and loss in
£ million (85)

	1947-52	1952-3	1953-4	1954-5	1955-6	1956-7
*Coal	-5.6	-8.2	+0.5	-3.5	-19.6	+12.8
Gas	+2.9	+2.3	+2.1	+2.5	+0.5	+3.8
Electricity	+20.8	+7.3	+13.2	+18.8	+12.2	+11.7
Civil Aviation:						
B.O.A.C.	-27.5	-0.8	+1.1	+0.3	+0.1	+0.3
B.E.A.	-10.2	-1.5	-1.8	+0.1	+0.6	+0.2
*Transport:						
Railways	-43.1	+3.7	-2.4	-21.5	-38.2	-57.5
Other	+3.6	+1.8	+6.6	+9.7	+7.6	+3.1
	1957-8	1958-9	1959-60	1960-1	1961-2	1962-3
*Coal	-5.3	-3.5	-24.0	-21.3	-15.0	+1.4
Gas	+2.8	-1.5	-2.4	+2.0	+3.3	+4.9
Electricity	+16.1	+27.3	+26.7	+16.3	+26.9	+42.5
Civil Aviation:						
B.O.A.C.	-2.8	-5.2	-0.8	-2.5	-19.9	-12.2
B.E.A.	+1.1	+0.2	+2.1	+1.5	-1.5	-0.3
*Transport:						
Railways	-68.1	-90.1	-84.0	-112.7	-135.9	-159.0
Other	+4.6	+1.1	+0.1	+11.7	+13.9	+15.3
England and Wales * Calendar Year						

Industrial Production

With the growing realization that the country's economy depended more than ever on the quality and quantity of its exports, industrial production became an excessively important issue in post-War proposals. Unfavourable conditions in terms of competition with other industrial countries and the growing difficulty in getting industrial basic materials were seriously considered in arguments about post-War policies. In 'Employment Policy' (1944),⁽⁸⁶⁾ in the Percy Report on Higher Technological Education (1945),⁽⁸⁷⁾ and in the Barlow Report on 'Scientific Manpower' (1946)⁽⁸⁸⁾ the challenge of production in post-War policy was given due concern.

The Labour Policy Statement (1949), while still in rule, gave production the first priority as did their ^{earlier} Declaration of Policy of 1940.⁽⁸⁹⁾ The only hope for Britain to stand challenges and continue in its ambitious programmes for a 'Welfare State' was through production as the 1949 Declaration states:

"Britain's future depends on higher production. The wealth of Britain is only what we ourselves create. Unless we continue to increase production as we have done in the last four years, we cannot improve or even maintain our present standard of living; our people cannot be fed or clothed or rehoused; the social services cannot advance or even survive; and our national freedom and independence cannot continue." (90)

The Four-Year Plan drawn by the Labour Party in 1949 was after an expansion of output by one-third by 1952 above pre-War figures. Their diagnosis of economic difficulties and international challenges led to the suggestion of three bases that would help Britain raise production:

1. That economic planning is essential for economic advance in order to ensure that public interest comes first. This is supposed to be implemented through 'democratic planning' which is taken to mean "continuing consent and co-operation of the people in the objectives and methods of the plan."⁽⁹¹⁾
2. That there should be effective partnership between Government and industry. Rather than hampering, the machinery of government has to stimulate enterprise.
3. Participation of the people is essential for advance. Whether in politics or economy, extension of people's participation is recognized as the most effective means to end remote and

impersonal relations between the authorities which control the apparatus of common life, and the masses. As a rule, the Labours defend their policies against the attacks by stating their firm belief that, "For democracy to thrive, the Government must at all times take the people into its confidence." (92)

The Conservative Party had its own diagnosis despite a broad agreement on the challenges that necessitate raising industrial production in Britain. They give special concern to present and expected changes in industry.⁽⁹³⁾ The nature of industrial society in one Conservative report (1965) suggests a new outlook at British industry. The shift in emphasis, from heavy industry (e.g. shipbuilding) to lighter industry (e.g. electronics, plastics) and the big increase in service industry (e.g. garages, hairdressing) has to be taken into consideration in any plan for industrial development.⁽⁹⁴⁾ The second core in the Conservative policy is by attending to the 'individual worker'. If Britain is to stand the industrial challenge, the way is through stimulating individual initiative not eliminating it under the guise of the community interest. (95)

On the other hand, the Liberal Party was no less critical about Britain's economic lag behind other countries of the West. The responsibility for this is laid on both the Conservative and Labour Governments who failed to untap the country's great potential of economic resources and, ^{wh.} "have put vested or class interests before the interests of the country."⁽⁹⁶⁾

Comparative figures with other industrial countries have convinced the Liberal Party that, in production, Britain has failed to accomplish a proportional rise. Britain's lag is shown best since 1953 and until 1963 during which its production has gone up only by 37 per cent compared with 275 per cent in the case of Japan, 138 per cent in the case of Italy, and 107 per cent in the case of West Germany as indicated in the following table:

Table 7.2

Industrial Production in United Kingdom and other Countries⁽⁹⁷⁾
(1953=100)

	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963*
Japan	116	144	166	168	208	262	312	338	375
Italy	119	128	138	143	158	182	202	222	238
W. Germany	129	139	147	152	162	180	190	199	207
France	117	128	139	145	150	167	175	185	205
E.E.C.	122	132	140	144	153	171	181	193	204
Netherlands	119	124	127	127	139	157	160	166	171
Belgium	116	123	124	116	122	129	135	143	152
Sweden	111	115	119	122	129	141	147	150	152
Canada	110	120	120	120	129	130	134	144	151
U.S.A.	106	109	110	103	116	119	120	130	138
U.K.	114	114	116	114	120	129	130	131	137
* 3rd quarter									

To the Liberal Handbook (1964), which builds on a study by Allen (1964)⁽⁹⁸⁾ underemployment is what the British efforts should collaborate to wipe out. In this respect the Liberal document

strongly stands against three indicators of deterioration of productivity in Britain, and which Allen's study states as follows:

- "1. For each person to produce a ton of steel in America three are required in Britain.
2. In the maintenance engineering activities of the two British chemical industries there are four people to every American worker.
3. Ships could be constructed with about 40 per cent fewer men if labour were employed efficiently." (99)

The policy trends raised by the 'Liberal Party' in the face of the above challenge suggested an immediate attempt to be undertaken to make up for the slow British industrial production since the early 1950's, or else 'France and even Italy will soon have drawn level with the British standard of living. By the fourth quarter of the twentieth century Britain at the rate of growth achieved by the Conservatives of 2.4 per cent per annum will have so declined as to be among the less advanced countries of Western Europe, unless we do considerably better than hitherto.' (100) The goal is likely to be achieved through more attention to be directed to scientific research undertaken within a firm rather than 'State-sponsored research'. (101) Exaggeration in the adoption of the 'nationalization' trend was seen as more harmful than beneficial to the industrial development that Britain is seeking. It is the conviction of the 'Liberals' that:

"industry can be helped over the 'development hump' by public bodies like N.R.D.C. - whose capital they would like to see increased, but unlike the Socialists, we consider that this can only be achieved through persuading industry that partnership in a venture is worthwhile and that if a project is a success that industry (including the employees) will reap attractive profits." (102)

* National Research Development Corporation.

Industrial Training

The industrial challenge that England met after the end of World War II was, in one of its phases, a challenge for more and better trained workers. Amidst various challenges, drawn policies by the Government recognized that 'More and more in the future will it be necessary to rely on the capacity, adaptability and quality of our industrial and commercial personnel.'^(I03) The call was once more expressed by the 'Barlow Committee on Scientific Man-Power' (1946).^(I04) Concerning itself with the need for more scientists, it went far as to call for the release of qualified scientists from the Forces in order to attend to more urgent task, reconstruction.^(I05) Only a few months after the issue of the 'Barlow Report', the Ministry of Education repeated in a similar tone that 'Today there is a palpable need for fully trained citizens The need is implicit in the responsibilities of a democratic society.'^(I06) Furthermore, it considered training as 'a vital challenge to our educational system.'^(I07)

The need was no less emphatically recognized in the policy declarations of the political parties. The Labour Party's Statement Policy (1949)^(I08) took the need for the training of more technicians, draughtsmen, scientists of all kinds not only from the narrow local angle of satisfying the increasing needs of British industries, but for the development of great resources of overseas territories.^(I09) Hence, it favoured the trend of pressing ahead of the policies undertaken since 1945

as regards fundamental research in universities and State-aided institutions, and the establishment of technical colleges in the main industrial centres all over Britain. Moreover, the Labour policy admitted the inadequacy of research applied in practice by industry where the gravest weakness seemed to lie. (II0)

Labours' apparent content with what had been accomplished in the field of industrial training during their rule (1945-1951) turned later into criticism of progress under the Conservatives who succeeded them. In their 'Plan for Progress: Labour's Policy for Britain's Economic Expansion' (1958) (III) they put training on the top of their policy items declaring unambiguously that:

"Our first task must be to increase the total supply of trained personnel and to devote larger resources to research." (II2)

Their outlook was influenced by the severity of competition that British products were facing in the world market for, 'If we fall behind in research and the application of research in industry, our competitive position in world markets will be seriously undermined. Compared with both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. we are currently spending far too little on industrial research and training far too few scientists and technologists in our educational system.' (II3)

Training skill was taken in their 'Policy for Education' (1958) (II4) as one compelling argument. One policy statement assures that 'Without skill, the nation cannot, in such an age, maintain its standard of life skill which enable us to get what we want, ' (II5) It was taken that the capability of Britain to produce skilled technologists was far less than the U.S. and U.S.S.R. who ^{respectively} produced 2½ times and 5 times technologists in proportion to population as Britain did. (II6)

On their part, the Conservatives were in the same line. Their stress in the 'Responsible Society' (1959)^(I17) was on Britain's urgent need for meeting 'the rising demand of science, industry and technology'.^(I18) Specialists, and all kinds of 'exceptional men' well trained and best motivated to give the utmost for their country was, to them, the utmost need of Britain.^(I19) Recognition of such need meant, to British Conservatists, providing adequate training 'not only for boys and girls but for workers of all ages; not only for long courses in skilled occupations but at least a short induction course for every employee.'^(I20) The bitter feelings after the fire of Sputniks drove them to quote Swinburne's line:

"Glory to Man is the highest ! for Man is the master of things".

The implication of such mastery to industry is through 'A big increase in industrial training . . to meet the need for more skill at all levels of management and production. It can only provide wider opportunities for promotion, so acting as a direct incentive to individual responsibility and ^{healthy} ambition.'^(I21)

The feeling of defects in providing adequate numbers of skilled manpower for industry, reached culmination in the early 1960's. The 1962 White Paper 'Industrial Training: Government Proposals',^(I22) pointed out to these inadequacies and that 'ever since the War industry in the country has been short of skilled labour'.^(I23) More important still is the Paper's confession that such shortage has affected the rate of economic expansion.^(I24) In so far as the standard of training is concerned, the Paper admitted the existence of

wide variations. However, the judgment it gave was expressive of qualitative deficiency:

"At its best, the standard of training in this country is high; unfortunately this is by no means universal. Much is barely adequate and some definitely unsatisfactory." (I26)

The White Paper included new trends in training that it saw capable of eliminating past defects and providing for better economic expansion in future:

"To bring about economic expansion, there has to be skilled manpower and this means an increase rate of industrial training. Whether or not we decide to join the Common Market our exports will be faced with increasing competition. Our overseas competitors, particularly in Western Europe have paid great attention to the need to maintain an adequate supply of well-trained labour. We must be quite sure that our own arrangements do not fall too far behind." (I27)

Lack of co-ordination was conceived by the Paper as contributing to the 'training dilemma' and so it called for better arrangements in future:

"A serious weakness in our present training arrangements is that the amount and quality of training is left to the unco-ordinated decisions of a large number of firms. They may lack the necessary economic incentive to invest in training people who, once trained, may leave them for another firm. While the benefits of training are shared by all, the costs are borne by only a few." (I28)

It has to be mentioned that the policy statements raised by the 'Liberal Party' in 1964 were also after better arrangements. It called on the government to take three specific measures in this respect:

1. Promotion of re-training schemes.
2. That Trade Unions and employers accept the principle of freedom of entry for qualified adults into skilled trades.
3. That a system of national trade proficiency certificates to supersede fixed periods of apprenticeship, has to be initiated. (I29)

The 'Industrial Training Act' was issued in 1964 with the aim of ensuring an adequate supply of well-trained working power at all levels in industry and commerce. The Act initiated the 'Industrial Training Boards'. Among other tasks, they 'provide or secure the provision of such courses and other facilities (which may include residential accommodation) for the training of persons employed or intended to be employed in the industry ... '(130) They also look after the integration of further education and training which are seen as complementary. Thus, the new training policy in Britain is built on the training of workers in industrial firms. Though the training is not obligatory for all firms, they all have to contribute to the cost of training in their particular industry. Thus, problems of finance are dealt with in a co-operative manner.

Notes - Chapter Seven

1. see POLLARD, S. The development of the British economy 1914-1967. 2nd edition. London: Edward Arnold Publishers, Ltd., 1969.
also Employment policy, cmd 6527 H.M.S.O., May 1944.
2. COLE, G. D. H. and POSTGATE, R. The common people. 2nd edition. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1946.
also LASKI, H. 'The war and the future', in C. R. Atlee et al, Labour's aims in war and peace. London: Linclons- Prager Publishers, Ltd., 1940. p. 135.
3. ' A socialist Great Britain: a declaration of policy by the conference of the British Labour Party, Bournemouth, Whitsun, 1940', in C. R. Atlee et al, *ibid.*
4. *ibid.* p. 142.
5. *ibid.*
6. CHURCHIL, W. "The faith we hold", The Conservative Approach, No. 7, May 1949. (Extracts from his speech at Blackpool, October, 5, 1946).
also BALIOL, LORD et al, The responsible society. London: Conservative Political Centre, March, 1959.. pp. 5-6.
7. RYDER, J. and SILVER, H. Modern English society: history and structure 1850-1970. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1970. p. 74.
8. LIVINGSTONE, R. W. Education for a world adrift. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1943. Chapter I.
9. BALIOL, LORD, et al. *op.cit.* p. 9.
10. OTTAWAY, A. K. *op.cit.*
11. *ibid.* p. 81.
12. COLE, G. D. H. and POSTGATE, R. *op.cit.*, p. 662.
also Socialist election promises. London: The Conservative Party Headquarters, January 1947. p. 7.
13. Socialist election promises, *ibid.*

In one election address, Atlee was reported to have declared that:

"During the war the government were given great power of control over the ordinary citizen. Some of the Orders and Regulations, though necessary, were very irksome. No one wants control for its own sake. But others are absolutely vital to protect the public from the profiteer and the monopolist. These must be retained."(p. 7).

14. Let us face the future: a declaration of Labour policy for the consideration of the nation. London: Labour Party, April 1945. pp. 1-2.
The 'declaration' showed in strong words that '... the "hard-faced men" and their political friends kept control of the Government. They controlled the banks, the mines, the big industries, largely

the press and the cinema. They controlled the means by which the people got their living. They controlled the ways by which most of the people learned about the world outside."

15. BALIOL, LORD, et al. op.cit. p. 10.

16. SHEARMAN, H. C. Adult education for democracy. London: W.E.A., 1944. pp. 10-II.

17. Labour believes in Britain- a statement policy for discussion at Labour Party Conference. London: Labour Party, 1949.

18. Let us face the future....., op.cit., p. 3.

One policy statement reads:

"The Labour Party stands for freedom- for freedom of worship, freedom of speech, freedom of the press. The Labour Party will see to it that we keep and enlarge these freedoms, and that we enjoy again the personal civil blusters we have, of our own will, sacrificed to win the war."

19. Labour believes in Britain....., op.cit. p. 6.

20. SALISBURY, MARQUIS OF, "Alternative to socialism", The Conservative Approach, No. 5, March 1949.

21. As will be shown in the argument about the avail of the nationalization trend that the Labours vigorously applied after the end of War II.

see COLE, G. D. H. A guide to the elements of socialism. London: 1947. pp. 29-35.

22. CHAPMAN, S. et. al. Blueprint for Britain: a report by the young Conservatives on the reconstruction of Britain. London: The Conservative Political Centre, 1965. p. 8.

23. SALISBURY, MARQUIS OF, op.cit.

24. CHURCHIL, W. op.cit.

25. MARSHALL, T. H. 'Social selection in the welfare State', in A. H. Haley et al. (eds) Education, economy and society: a reader in the sociology of education. New York: The Free Press, 1961. p.149.

26. CHAPMAN, s. et al. op.cit. p. 46.

27. BEVERIDGE, W. H. Social insurance and allied services report. London: 1942.

28. Quoted by LAFITTE, E. Britain's way to social security. London: Pilot Press, 1945. p. 30.

29. ibid. p. 31.

30. Quoted by LAFITTE, E. ibid. p. 40.

31. ibid.

32. see ibid. pp. 32-39.

33. ibid. pp. 35-39.

34. BALIOL, LORD, et al., op.cit. p. 31.

35. MARSHALL, T. H. Social policy. 4th edition.

London: Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers), 1975. p. 84.

Asking whether the legislations following the Beveridge Report (1942) amounted to a social revolution, Marshall comments that 'This is true'. He accepts Beveridge's words that:

"The scheme proposed here is, in some ways, a revolution, but in more important ways it is a natural development from the past. It is a British revolution."

see also

LANE, P. A history of post-war Britain. London: Macdonald & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1971. p. 285.

36. CHUTTER EDE, J. quoted in Socialist election promises, op.cit. p. I.

37. HALL, W. G. quoted in *ibid.* p. I.

38. *ibid.*

39. *ibid.*

40. LASKI, H. op.cit.

41. *ibid.* p. 135.

42. A socialist Great Britain, op.cit.

43. *ibid.* p. 143.

44. BUTLER, R. A. "Conservatism and the individual", The Conservative Approach, No. 8, June 1949.

45. CHURCHIL, W. "The faith we hold", The Conservative Approach, No. 7, May 1949.

46. *ibid.*

47. When dealing with industry and State in post-War proposals.

48. Labour believes in Britain, op.cit. p. 9.

49. CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL CENTRE, The future of the welfare State: seven Oxford lectures. London: Conservative Political Centre, 1958. p. 14.

50. GOLDMAN, P. 'Preface', in *ibid.* p. 7.

51. KOGAN, M. The politics of educational change. Manchester: Fontana, 1978.

52. *ibid.* p. 21.

53. *ibid.*

54. THOMSON, D. England in the twentieth century. Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1965.

55. *ibid.* p. 217.

56. COLE, G. D. H. and POSTGATE, R. op.cit. p. 658.

57. LOWNDES, G. A. N. The silent social revolution: an account of the expansion of public education in England and Wales 1895-1965.

2nd edition. London: Oxford University Press, 1969. p. 203.

58. POLLARD, S. op.cit. p. 51.
59. COLE, G. D. H. and POSTGATE, R. op.cit. p. 658.
60. Educational Reconstruction, cmd. 6458.
London: H.M.S.O., 1943. para. 66.
61. Employment Policy, cmd. 6527. p. 4, para. I.
London: H.M.S.O., May 1944.
62. READER, K. S. The modern British economy in historical perspective.
London: Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd., 1969. p. 51.
63. POLLARD, S. op.cit. p. 308.
64. *ibid.* p. 306.
65. Abstracted from Labour Party Year-book 1946-1947. London:
Research Department of Labour Party, 1947. Table I, p. 271.
66. POLLARD, S. op.cit. p. 309.
67. COLE, G. D. H. and POSTGATE, R. op.cit. p. 667.
68. POLLARD, S. op.cit.
69. *ibid.* p. 310.
70. Quoted by POLLARD, S. *ibid.* p. 310.
71. A socialist Great Britain, op.cit., p. 144.
72. Let us face the future, op.cit., pp. 6-7.
73. A socialist Great Britain, op.cit., p. 145.
74. Labour believes in Britain...., op.cit., pp. 6-13.
75. see *ibid.*
76. CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL CENTRE, What we think about poverty-owning
democracy: a report on the Fourth Phase of the two-way movement of ideas.
London: Alfred J. Isaacs & Sons, for the Conservative Political
Association, June 1949. p. I.
77. *ibid.*
78. ECCLES, D. "Poverty-owning democracy", The Conservative Approach,
No. 3, January 1949.
79. What we think about, op.cit., p. I.
80. MACMILLAN, H. "The faith of a conservative", The Conservative
Approach, No. I, November 1948.
81. *ibid.*
82. LIBERAL PARTY RESEARCH AND INFORMATION DEPARTMENT, Partners
for progress- Liberal candidates and speakers' handbook.
London: Prism Publications, 1964. p. 98.
83. Quoted by THOMSON, D. op.cit., p. 243.
84. Partners for progress ..., op.cit. p. 84.
85. *ibid.* p. 99.
86. Employment Policy, op.cit.

87. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (Britain), Higher technological education, report of a special committee appointed in April 1944 (The Percy Report). London: H.M.S.O., 1945. p. 5 para.2.

The report unambiguously states:

"The evidence submitted to us concurs in the general view: first, that the position of Great Britain as a leading industrial nation is being endangered by a failure to secure the fullest possible application of science to industry; and second, that this failure is partly due to deficiencies in education".

88. 'Scientific Manpower', report of a committee appointed by Lord President of the Council. (The Barlow Report) London: H.M.S.O., May 1946. pp. 3-10.

89. Labour believes in Britain...., op.cit.

'Up with production' was the first major issue dealt with. see pp.6-13.

90. *ibid.* p. 6.

91. *ibid.*

92. *ibid.*

93. CHAPMAN, S. et al. op.cit., p. 6.

94. *ibid.*

95. *ibid.* p. 7.

96. Partners for progress, op.cit., p. 84.

97. *ibid.* p. 103.

98. William Allen, an American management consultant published his study in the 'Sunday Times' in which he condemned under-employment in British labour force. The study was highly considered by the Liberal report above both in terms of argument and findings. The Liberal report states: 'Mr Allen has put his finger on a very sore point in the British economy'. *ibid.*, p. 97.

99. *ibid.* p. 98.

100. *ibid.* p. 103.

101. *ibid.* p. 110.

102. *ibid.* p. 111.

103. Educational Reconstruction, cmd. 6458. op.cit.

104. The Barlow Report, op.cit. pp. 3-10, para. 3-29.

The report started by an emphatic statement that, 'We do not think it is necessary to preface our report by stating at large the case for developing our scientific resources. Never before has the importance of science been more widely recognised or so many hopes of future progress and welfare founded upon the scientist.' p. 3, para. 2.

105. *ibid.* para. 3

106. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (Britain), Further education: the scope and content of its opportunities under the Education Act, 1944.

(Ministry of Education, Pamphlet No. 8). London: H.M.S.O., 1947. p. 5.

- I07. *ibid.*
- I08. Labour believes in Britain ..., *op.cit.*
- I09. *ibid.* p. II.
- II0. *ibid.*
- III. LABOUR PARTY, Plan for progress: Labour's policy for Britain's economic expansion. London: Labour Party, 1958.
- II2. *ibid.* p. 46.
- II3. *ibid.*
- II4. LABOUR PARTY, Learning to live: Labour's policy for education. London: Labour Party, 1958.
- II5. *ibid.* p. 3.
- II6. *ibid.* p. 4I.
- II7. The responsible society ..., *op.cit.*
- II8. *ibid.*
- II9. The future of the welfare state, *op.cit.* p. 7.
- I20. The responsible society..., *op.cit.*, p. I7.
- I2I. *ibid.*
- I22. As may be deduced from the concern, in the few years preceding the issue of the 1964 'Industrial Training Act', with raising skill in British industry and cover the lag with other advanced countries.
- I23. Industrial Training: Government Proposals, cmd. 1892
London: H.M.S.O. pp. 3-6.
- I24. *ibid.* p. 3, para. 3.
- I25. *ibid.*
- I26. *ibid.*
- I27. *ibid.*
- I28. *ibid.*
- I29. Partners for progress..., *op.cit.*, p. 86.
- I30. Industrial Training Act, 1964, Chapter I6, Section 2- (I) a.
H.M.S.O., 1964. p. 2.

Chapter Eight

Adult Education Policy in Post-1944 England

Indicators of Change in Adult Education Policy

The overall educational policy in England was under consideration in the closing years of the World War II and immediately after its end. As one sector among many, adult education was involved in the process of reconsideration. New aims and principles have been included in such official and semi-official documents as the 'White Paper' on Educational Reconstruction (1943),⁽¹⁾ the Education Act (1944), the report of the Committee appointed by the B.I.A.E. under the chairmanship of Lord Sanky, and published under 'Adult Education After the War' (1945),⁽²⁾ the Ministry of Education's regulations and trends expressed in works as 'Further Education' or Pamphlet No 8 (1947), the Ashby Report (1954)⁽³⁾. But, due to the nature of the field, and the amount of attention directed to it, the particulars of the policy are rather implicitly deduced than explicitly declared in such documents. The Sanky Report mentioned above, recorded with pleasure that great many proposals were raised about education in general, yet, ^{in the case of a adult education} 'only a few give any detailed attention to its purpose and its organization.'⁽⁴⁾ This brief and implicit expression of an adult education policy should not conceal the existence of what Professor Wiltshire (1976)⁽⁵⁾ calls 'a fairly coherent group of new trends in post-war adult education which are hardening into policy and which imply clear if unexpressed purposes and principles.'⁽⁶⁾

The way by which this 'group of trends' of post-1944 adult education policy in England is identifiable has something to do with the 'past' and 'future' dimensions. The weaknesses of the older practice during the inter-war period were at the back of the minds of the educationists and policy-makers especially in so far as the penetration of the adult masses is concerned. Meanwhile, adult education was envisaged to have a new role in the realization of the proposals for the setting up of the British version of the 'Welfare State'. The outcome of both was indicative of the new plans raised for the sector.

Among the favoured aims, two stand as significant. The first was concerned with ending the sector's alienation from the national educational structure. Such integration would likely call more public attention to the marginal sector and, accordingly, a fairer share in public finance to extend its service to greater numbers of the adult population. The second, which may also be taken as one means by which adequate extension would be reached, was concerned with the re-organization of the structure of the sector and its providing institutions in the way that would generate the enthusiasm for more adequate service, what Shearman (1944) identified as the 'close co-operation between the Board of Education, the universities, the Local Education Authorities, and those voluntary bodies whose main purpose is educational'.⁽⁷⁾ Thus, adult education after the War was heading for a closer

integration within the overall educational structure, and the consolidation of the spirit of partnership between its major providers oft called by British adult educationists the 'fourfold partnership'.⁽⁸⁾

Past Defects as Indicator of Policy Change

Recognition of the educational defects of the inter-war period served to define the new path for the post-War policy. The McNair Committee on the Supply of Teachers (1944) was quick to note the public demand for educational reform and that 'the nation as a whole has woken up to the deficiencies of its public system ... We are now witnessing one of the most widespread and insistent popular demand for its reform.'⁽⁹⁾ Other reports echoed the same theme of the need for a new educational policy different from the one before the War, though one has to admit that the angles through which the need was looked at was not necessarily the same. The Percy Report on Higher Technological Education (1945),⁽¹⁰⁾ and the Barlow Report on Scientific Manpower (1956)⁽¹¹⁾ exemplified as well the urgency of educational reform. In the former, a warning signal was loudly raised that the leading position of Great Britain as an industrial nation was 'endangered by failure to secure the fullest possible application of science and industry, and this failure is partly due to deficiencies in education.'⁽¹²⁾ The plausibility of the argument could easily be appreciated in the light of the staggering position

of British industries during the inter-war period in the face of growing difficulties. Holmes (1956)⁽¹²⁾ saw a grave defect in the inadequate resources invested in education and pointed out to three kinds of deficiency in education within the limits of its resources. The first, he saw, was concerned with the structure of the system that allowed mal-distribution of young people leaving school and the impact of such a case on the industrial and economic needs. The second is related to the inability of its structure and subsequent distribution effect to improve human relations within industry. The third is concerned with 'content' and 'method' that affected the move of young people to industrial and adult life.⁽¹³⁾ It was thus that a need was clearly felt that the overall educational structure was not functioning as it should. Reconsideration was the task that the 1944 was to undertake.

From the adult education perspective, severe criticism was launched on its ineffectiveness in extending its services to the majority of the adult population masses.⁽¹⁴⁾ Academics like Livingstone bitterly lamented the meagre educational chances open after the end of compulsory learning. This, he saw, was the cause of the steady cultural deterioration at the national level. Of the 347,096 children leaving elementary schools in England and Wales in 1937/1938, 284,372 (81.9 per cent.) left to take up employment, 12 per cent. proceeded to secondary schools, and 5 per cent. to junior technical schools or other full-time educational institution.⁽¹⁵⁾ He saw little prospect of the nation's future so long as 70 per cent. of its children

were 'entirely withdrawn from any educational influence at the age of 14.'⁽¹⁶⁾ It is possible to raise a counter argument that the ratio of children in all schools as proportionate of the total age-group 15-18 was steadily rising from 1.5 per cent. in 1911, to 3.2 in 1921 then to 6.6 in 1938.⁽¹⁷⁾ still, 6.6 per cent. could not be accepted as adequate for England and Wales in the closing years of the 1930's.

The upward trace of educational continuity showed no less defects. The provision of adult education for the 18+ was practically difficult to come by adequately notwithstanding the bright glimpses in the growth of the institutions providing adult education service including the emergence of the W.E.A in 1903, and the vigorous growth of the University Extension after the Oxford Conference (1907).⁽¹⁸⁾ Reflection on the figures of the years immediately preceding the War showed that out of a potential field of recruitment comprising 18 million adults, the service as calculated by Dent⁽¹⁹⁾ could only reach a fraction of about half a million adults whom he found to be 'undertaking any form of organized education; and of the half-million three-quarters or more were doing so for strictly utilitarian reasons.'⁽²⁰⁾ Furthermore, the W.E.A was only reaching unproportionate numbers 'after nearly 40 years of indefatigable crusading on behalf of cultural study.'⁽²¹⁾ Its total class enrolment in 1938/1939 was only 66.966 which Livingstone judged to be inadequate for an island the total population of which amounted to forty five millions.⁽²²⁾

The conclusion reached by Livingstone and Dent that the adult education service had to be extended was echoed in the Sanky Report mentioned earlier and which accused adult education service of failure to reach the majority of the masses. A graver defect to which the report pointed out was the confinement, until the War II, to what the report called the 'converted' or the 'seekers' meanwhile the 'indifferent' are neglected despite their great numbers. The conclusion thus came to declare that the vast majority of the adult population could not be attracted by any of the existing movements 'which have, on the whole been preaching to the converted, or the seekers, and have produced little impression on the indifferent and the uninterested.'⁽²³⁾ Failure to undertake such an important mission justified the call for a new policy that would take into account the judgement passed by the Sanky Committee on adult education as 'still only at the beginning of its task.'⁽²⁴⁾

The need for more adequate adult education provision was associated in the minds of many British thinkers with the grave defects in the society until War II. On the one hand, there was the declining cultural condition which Livingstone cared to warn the government and the people against its continuation.⁽²⁵⁾ From the economic perspective, there was also the warning signals raised by such reports as the Percy Report (1945) and the Barlow Report (1946) mainly dealing with the impact of the inadequacy of formal education provision

on Britain's present and future economic situation. But, they might have as well stirred some minds to question the comprehensiveness of the national education structure and the validity of alienating adult education from the overall picture. More important still was the reflection upon the growing defects of the democratic application which was not seen in seclusion from the cultural standard of the adult population. The 'physical impossibility' of democracy that Herbert Read (1943) raised built on the possibility of getting government of the people, and even government for the people 'but never for a moment government by the people.'⁽²⁶⁾ Such a view seems plausible in so far as the ability of voters to discriminate and choose the right candidate is concerned. Livingstone's reflection on the case of Britain was consistent with Read's argument for '80 per cent of the voters of the country will vote, as far as education is concerned, with the knowledge they have been able to glean in the first fourteen years of their lives.'⁽²⁷⁾ The bearing of an unextended adult education service in England was thus seen as destructive to the democratic experiment. 'True democracy', as the Sanky report emphasized 'cannot exist where the individual members of the community are ill-informed or uninterested Indeed, we are so ill-equipped as a people at present, that it is a question whether any form of democratic machinery can hold its own effectively against the growing tendency to mass regimentation in one direction or another unless we have an immediate and widespread development of adult education.'⁽²⁸⁾

Future Aspirations as Indicator of Policy Change

'Reconstruction' as the immediate task in which many of the people in England were engaged while the War was still raging evoked a new interest in man and his education. Man seemed to be the common link between 'past', 'present' and 'future'. New belief in man as pivot for reconstruction plans was intermingled with a desire on the part of policy-makers and pressure groups to build by him and for him the promised 'Welfare State'. In so far as the Government is concerned, a three-dimensional look at man was standing behind the proposed policies for reconstruction: as a maker of victory, a designer of the plans for peace and welfare, and executor of whatever policies are to be agreed upon for reconstruction.⁽²⁹⁾ Political parties, on their part, had their commitment to reconstruction dictated by similar drives. The Labour Party Declaration (1945)⁽³⁰⁾ laid stress on the heroic role played by the people who 'deserve and must be assured a happier future than faced so many of them after the last war. Labour regards their welfare as a sacred trust.'⁽³¹⁾ Parliamentarians highly appreciated man and his position. To a Conservative member as Fraser, 'Man was what Britain fought for in the two wars'.⁽³²⁾ The object envisaged as capable of transforming words into action was 'to trust the people and set free and encourage their initiative and reward their virtues.'⁽³³⁾

Setting free the initiative of man implicitly meant the involvement of education which has to be adequately provided for him. From this angle, the challenge of post-war England was in reality an educational one. Its success in realizing the set goals for peace and reconstruction was conditioned by success on the educational front, or as Vickers (1940) rightly put:

"... the new society of which both politicians and common men are beginning to talk, will not come by itself. It must be created by the wisdom, the courage and the self-sacrifice of men

People are challenged to choose within the limits of the possible the conditions of life which they must want to preserve or create; and in this process education has a double part to play. It can clarify the choice, and it can enlarge or narrow the limits of the possible." (34)

Such an argument must have been clear in the minds of policy-makers. Churchill, for example, was aware of the link between 'man', 'education' and 'modernization' when he raised in 1943 the call that 'You cannot conduct a modern community except with adequate supply of persons upon whose education much time and money has been spent.'⁽³⁵⁾ In a much similar way, Ernest Green, General Secretary of the W.E.A. cared to show how 'of all the constructive tasks on which the nation is engaged, modern education offers scope for the most exciting adventure and promises the greatest social gain for the effort and expenditure involved.'⁽³⁶⁾

The aspiration for the completion of the British version of the 'Welfare State' was not devoid of relevance to the post-war adult education policy in England. The 1944-1946

enactments bore relevance, however implicit or indirect. The 1944 Education Act recognized adult education as part of the third stage of education 'Further Education' following universal secondary education for all children of the nation. Other acts created an atmosphere amidst which the provision of adequate adult education was more of a necessity than a luxury. The National Insurance Act, the Family Allowances Act, the National Health Act, the Fulll Employment Act, all were embodiment of the need recognized by the Beveridge Report (1942)⁽³⁷⁾ to provide social security for all sectors of the population against the five ills. The impact of putting the social revolution legislations into practice, on the provision of adult education was evident. With affluence rises the need to foster the intellectual occupation of the adult mind. Social security and income rise as indicators of affluence give rise to the value of leisure time preoccupation and a stronger need on the part of policy-makers to provide the means for the use of such time fruitfully. The actual weekly working hours for the manual workers in the United Kingdom dropped from 50 hours in 1943, to 48.6 in 1944 to 47.4 in 1945 to 45.2 in 1947.⁽³⁸⁾ The Ministry of Education, on her part, gave full support to the intellectual investment of leisure time. In its Pamphlet No 8 entitled 'Further Education' (1947)^{it} gave the green light for a new policy in this respect stating that 'We must make constructive use of our leisure,

for on the degree of maturity we achieve in our lives depends in the last analysis the quality of our civilization.'⁽³⁹⁾ Educationists like Dent were no less enthusiasts for a new policy that better caters for leisure time. The adequacy of any scheme of universal adult education in a democratic community depended, in his view, on four bases first among which was leisure time provision.⁽⁴⁰⁾

Effective democracy that was aspired for in post-War England turned into an argument for more adequate adult education provision. The cause of effective democracy was linked with education, in that education for democracy is essential for the achievement of democracy, and that 'The democratic way of life cannot be lived save by some democratically minded community, and this is the last type of community the present set-up (in Britain) however much modified, could be expected to produce.'⁽⁴¹⁾ Such an argument is of more significance to the adults in terms of their age, degree of maturity and responsibilities toward democracy than is the case with youngsters. Hence, the fuller realization of a 'modern democratic society' for post-war England was seen by Shearman (1944) as a task that adult education, in the first place, has to undertake. Adult education was rightly taken as the profoundest motive service to democracy.⁽⁴²⁾ Likewise, the Sanky Report (1945) ran in almost the same line⁽⁴³⁾ affirming Shearman's view that the achievement of effective democracy was depending on the success to provide a sound system of education for English adult. (44)

Agreement among academics and policy-makers alike on a vigorous role to be undertaken by adult education for the realization of post-War aspirations represented the pressure for a new adult education policy. In the 'Future of Education' (1943) and 'Education for World Adrift' (1942), Livingstone went further than the mere statement of the dilemma that the country was heading for. He investigated as well what he called 'The Way Out' represented in a new outlook at adult education where 'the solutions of our educational problems must be found.'⁽⁴⁵⁾ This belief in adult education was highly appreciated by Shearman (1944) regarding it as a 'most welcome feature' of post-War era.⁽⁴⁶⁾

Other than academics, policy-makers at the highest level got similar views which were implicitly and explicitly expressed. At nearly the same time when Livingstone published his 'Future in Education', Churchill affirmed to the nation the value of the 'highly advanced races' for its pre-eminence in peace and survival in war.⁽⁴⁷⁾ Nor was it mere coincidence that the White Paper on Educational Reconstruction (1943) quoted Desraeli's dictum in its very first lines reading: 'Upon the education of the people of this country the fate of this country depends.'⁽⁴⁸⁾ Education that the dictum meant was for the adults and the young alike.

Amidst such an atmosphere, winds of change began to blow on the place that adult education should take within the national educational structure as of similar importance to

formal education. At least nominally, the belief was ever repeated that adult education is a vital sector of the national education. Churchill held on his view during the confrontation between his Minister of Education and the Trade Unions as regards the cuts in the 1953 budget. He strongly affirmed that:

"There is, perhaps, no branch of our vast educational system which should more attract within its particular sphere the aid and encouragement of the State than adult education. How many must there be in Britain, after the disturbance of two destructive wars, who thirst in later life to learn about the humanities, the history of their country, the philosophies of the human race, and the arts and letters which sustain and are borne forward by the ever-conquering English language? This ranks in my opinion far above science and technical instruction, which are well sustained and not without their rewards in our present system." (49)

Such high sounding words may work as indicators of adult education policy statements though words about adult education are, often, much louder than action, or what Lowe (1970) regards as illustrative of 'disgenuous attitudes' on the part of policy-makers towards adult education.' (50)

The outcome of the whole argument shows how the adult education policy in England was directed towards the realization of a comprehensive service for the adult population, what Dent expressed in clear-cut words:

"after the war we must build in this country a system of adult education adequate to meet all the needs which have so far been manifest, and probably many others which have not yet emerged." (51)

The notion was gradually discarded that the reform of formal education alone was all that England needed in the post-War era. If some educationists imagined that the decline of the

cultural standard until War II was to be remedied solely by raising the school leaving age to 15, or 16 or even in part-time to 18, and for a picked few to the age of 21 or 22, it might work a solution but not the radical one that the British academics aspired for. Good as these partial solutions might be, continuity of education throughout the adult life was regarded as the solution which 'rightly conceived might do something to meet the most serious danger to our civilisation.'⁽⁵²⁾ To have the masses in England educated was not to come by through post-primary education, but rather as Livingstone put it 'it can only be solved by adult education'⁽⁵³⁾

In the context of the indicators of change in policy since 1944 which have necessitated a more adequate adult education service to penetrate greater numbers of the adult population, it is possible to point out to the two major trends that have characterized such a policy:

1. Integration of adult education within the national system of education.
2. Consolidation of the partnership between the major adult education providers, i.e. the D.E.S., the L.E.A.'s, the universities and the W.E.A.

In the following pages both the policy trends are analysed in detail.

Official Structure of Adult Education

Dealing with the policy trends in some depth requires a brief comprehensive picture of the official structure. In so far as planning and decision-making in the English education system are concerned, the role of the central authority and the Parliament are of prime importance. The central Government is concerned with the issue of acts of Parliament that deal with the organization of adult education. It may as well issue Education White Papers that reveal the acceptable policy trends at the national level. The Central Advisory Council for England assists the Secretary of State with the development of the policy. It can take the initiative in advising the Secretary of State both in educational theory and practice.


The Ministry of Education (Department of Education and Science since 1964) has its department of 'Planning Organization'. Through the steering committee, the Planning unit and policy groups, the relations with the Local Education Authorities can be regulated.

Parliament, on its part, enacts legislations which lay down the national policy for education as regards central administration. The annual full day's debate on education in the House of Commons mainly centres on the report that the Secretary of State makes annually to the Parliament including how he has used the duties and right conferred on him as well as the work of the Central Advisory Councils. Figure 8.1 indicates planning and decision making in English education.

It is to be noted that the role of the L.E.A's and other adult education providers will be dealt with in detail later in the chapter.⁽⁵⁴⁾


Figure 8.I

(55)
Planning and Decision-Making in English Education



As for the official structure of adult education from the point of view of provision and associated relationships, it is shown in figure 8.2

Figure 8.2



Components of the above figure will be dealt with in some detail when analysing the two major policy trends in adult education since 1944 namely the 'integration' and the 'partnership' trends.

I. INTEGRATION OF ADULT EDUCATION WITHIN THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF EDUCATION

Adequate penetration of the adult masses as necessary for the realization of post-War aspirations could not be thought of while adult education remained a marginal activity within the overall national system of education. Such marginality was indicated by the separation between the 'formal' education at primary, secondary or higher level, and 'adult education' striving for recognition but still remaining the poor relation of the system. Lack of continuity of education after the end of compulsory education was leading until War II to the confinement of the educational horizon of most people to the end of primary education. On the other hand, extending the scope of adult education to cover the 'indifferent' who formed the vast majority of the English adults, required a reconsideration of the map or provision. No more was it acceptable that adult education remains an effort largely undertaken by voluntary bodies meanwhile the State takes it^{as} an essential service for reconstruction and the setting up of the welfare State. A new balance of power between the major providers was essential. The State had to be involved more heavily in the provision of adult education. In the third place, agreement among academics was growing that the adult education service should become varied as it is comprehensive. Sensitiveness to the needs of adults in each

local area suggested that a new role was to be undertaken by Local Education Authorities. If these could look after the provision of adult education in their areas in a similar way to the one they did with formal education, this might serve double purpose. On the one hand, adult education might be helped to integrate more with the national system of education bringing it into closer contact with formal education. In the meantime, adequate provision that fits the varied needs of adults in each area was to be ensured through the leadership of the L.E.A.

The integration of adult education within the national system of education in post-War England may, thus, be seen in the light of three principles brought forth by the 1944 Act and which comprise the progression or continuity of educational stages, the re-definition of State responsibility in adult education and the consolidation of the role undertaken by the local education authorities in provision.

(a) Integration of Adult Education through Progression of Educational Stages

The 1944 Act recast the structure of statutory system of public education. According to the old structure, education was organized in two parts: elementary and higher education the latter including all forms of education other than elementary. This was replaced by a new one that better serves the interests of the youth and the adults as well as children

through the principle of 'continuity' or 'progression'.

Section 7 of the 1944 Act recognized the statutory system of public education in three progressive stages: primary, secondary and Further education.

The dividing line that used to separate 'elementary' and 'secondary' at the age of 11 was, until 1944, a strong impediment before progression. After the end of elementary, education was allowed only to about 20 per cent in the maintained secondary schools for children eligible by age, and junior technical schools for less than one per cent. This represented, to Dent, 'a grave inadequacy of educational opportunity for young adolescents.'⁽⁵⁷⁾ With the issue of the 1944 Act, the principle of continuity between primary and secondary education for all children of the nation after the age of 11 was established. Furthermore, the fees of grammar schools were abolished. Thus, the Act went even further than what a figure like Tawney had claimed in 1924 who argued that 'the only policy which is at once educationally sound and suited to a democratic community is one under which primary education and secondary education are organized as two stages in a single continuous process.'⁽⁵⁸⁾ To policy makers at Tawney's time, turning such a dream into fact was too difficult to be thought of. When President of the Board of Education (1924) was asked in the House of Commons if the Board of Education intended to make a statutory provision that all children of the nation have appropriate secondary education, his reply was 'We could not do that, it would be perfectly impossible at present time.'⁽⁵⁹⁾

What the Hadow Report (1926)⁽⁶⁰⁾ and later the Spens Report (1938)⁽⁶¹⁾ strived to preach, was the recommendation of education in England to be along lines of progression for all children of the nation from infant stage up to the end of secondary school period.

Such lack of continuity between primary and secondary until 1944 should not be regarded as devoid of relevance to the place of adult education within the national system. If formal education, to which special attention was directed was faced with such difficulties, adult education must, by and large, be content with its share of the cake, however small.

What actually represented true shift in the place of adult education after 1944, was recognition of the principle of progression to cover post-secondary education. The need for 'Continuation Schools' that had been stirred by the Lewis Report (1917)⁽⁶²⁾ urged the adoption of part-time schooling for youth. The 1918 Act was an attempt to drive matters in the direction of progression, yet it was unluckily born dead due to subsequent financial and other difficulties. The report of the Adult Education Committee of the Ministry of Reconstruction (1919)⁽⁶³⁾ preached that education should no more be locked within the age of youth, but rather that education be a process continuing throughout life.⁽⁶⁴⁾ However reasonable was the call, time was too early to think of its practicality while the country was just coming out of war.

The call for continuity was there among some educationists, and England was suffering a conflict ^{between} 'ideals' and 'reality'. The gap between universal primary education and youth education remained until 1944 an unsolved problem with whatever bearing such a separation had on the marginality of both youth and adult education within the national system.

With the 1944 Act, continuity of post-secondary education was recognized within the realm of 'Further Education'.⁽⁶⁵⁾ Adult education was the first to benefit by such recognition that was met with evident support from both academics and pressure groups alike. Ernest Green, General Secretary of the W.E.A. saw as essential for the building of sound democracy in post-War England 'that education should be a continuous process and that provision should be made for the adult.'⁽⁶⁶⁾ In no less emphatic words, the Labour Party expressed its conviction that the years 15-20 formed 'an integral part of the educational process'.⁽⁶⁷⁾ Proposed continuity by the 1944 Act went further than mere extension of education to the age of 15 or 16. More vigorously than ever before, compulsory part-time education was advocated to continue to the age of 18. In this respect, the gap between school life and the independent responsibility of adult life, where problems of adjustment arise and important decisions have to be taken, is likely to be bridged effectively in a consistent line without drop.

In the section of 'Further Education' in the 1944 Act, answers to many enquiries about post-secondary education (including adult education) are made. Further Education covers all education beyond the compulsory leaving age. It embraces the continuous education for adolescents by commercial, technical and art education side by side with the liberal education for adults. Such a broad range is defined in the Act as:

"Full-time and part-time education for persons over compulsory school age", and

"Leisure-time occupation, in such organized cultural training and recreative activities as are suited to their requirements, for any persons over compulsory school age who are able and willing to profit by facilities provided for that purpose." (68)

Progression between educational stages in the way that the 1944 Act proposed serves the cause of integrating adult education within the national system in that it ends the deep-rooted separation between 'formal' and 'adult education'. This was what the Education Sub-Committee of Nuffield College (1946)⁽⁶⁹⁾ highly appreciated in so far as the post-War educational policy is concerned. The report stressed the abolition of differences between the education of adults and the education in general in so far as purposes are concerned, which is stated to be the enabling of individuals to live full and interesting lives. Hence, 'formal' and 'adult education' are no separate entities but rather complementary within the overall educational structure.⁽⁷⁰⁾

The 'County College' that the White Paper of Educational Reconstruction (1943) proposed⁽⁷¹⁾ and which^{was} later adopted by the 1944 Act, represents the envisaged link in the educational structure between 'secondary education' on the one hand, and the 'adult non-vocational education' on the other. The scope of tasks attributed to it reveals the nature of such a link. The tasks include three major ones:

1. Training in clarity of expression and understanding of written word.
2. Affording opportunity for the development of technical and vocational skills as well as looking after a wide range of vocational interests.
3. Educating in the broad realm of citizenship.⁽⁷²⁾

Reflection on such a range of tasks shows the possibility of filling the gap between 'technical colleges' and 'adult education organizations' and ^{hence, a remedy to} the weak spirit of partnership.⁽⁷³⁾

The 'County College' is likely to fill the gaps of educational progression after the end of compulsory schooling, and the whole picture draws nearer to what Lowe(1970) recognizes as the 'ideal cycle' from school to County College, from County College to youth clubs, and from youth clubs to adult classes.⁽⁷⁴⁾

Another trend relevant to the cause of integration, is that 'formal education' is conceived in the post-War educational policy as having duties of orientation towards 'adult education'. Further still, the success of primary and

secondary stage is, to the White Paper of 'Educational Reconstruction' (1943) conditioned by the orientation they make to the minds and abilities of children to proceed to the third stage institutions. From this angle, the place of adult education in the national system is raised. Its flourish is an evidence of the successful implementation of the preached orientation. The White Paper put it clearly that:

"Without provision for adult education the national system must be incomplete, and it has been well said that the measure of the effectiveness of earlier education is the extent to which in some form or other it is continued voluntarily in later life. It is only when the pupil or student reaches maturer years that he will have served an apprenticeship in the affairs of life significant to enable him fully to fit himself for service to the community. It is thus within the wider sphere of adult education that an ultimate training in democratic citizenship must be sought." (75)

(b) Integration of Adult Education through Re-definition
of State Responsibility

By its text, the 1944 Act represented a further step towards integrating adult education within the national system of education through defining a more influential role to be played by the State in the provision of adult education. This was expressive of change in the relation between the Government and adult education, and which ^{had} remained rather fluid until the end of War II. Looking back in the history of English education, one finds that the Bryce Commission (1895) (76) vigorously supported the Laissez-Faire policy that was

dominant at that time, accepting only 'little direct executive power' to be allowed to unified central departments' (77)

Adult education, which remained the whole of the 19th century mainly a voluntary service was first to suffer from the confinement of State responsibility. The Board of Education Act (1899) (78) hardly defined any specific tasks by which President of the Board would deal with the adult education sector as responsibility of the State. His duty was rather defined as 'the superintendence of matters relating to education' (79) The conception of the role to be undertaken by the central authority was as weak as stimulation, guidance, supply of information and maintenance of balance between conflicting interests can allow. However, four decades were enough to show how adult education in England suffered from such marginality in State consideration.

In a sense, the 1944 Act is an attempt toward the re-definition of State responsibility toward adult education in the direction of more positiveness. The duty of the Minister as stated in the Act is:

".. to promote the education of the people of England and Wales and the progressive development of insitutions devoted to that purpose, and to secure the effective execution by local authorities, under his control and direction, of the national policy for providing a varied and comprehensive educational service in every area." (80)

It is thus, that 'superintendence of matters relating to education' in older legislations has given its place to a more specific responsibility to be undertaken by him, and so wide as to

include the promotion of the education of the people of whatever age. Out of this stems the redefined responsibility towards the adults and their education. It is true, as will be later shown when assessing the extent to which the policy has worked, that such responsibility is not entirely devoid of vagueness and inspecifity especially in so far as words like 'varied and comprehensive service' are concerned. Yet, it should be appreciated that the Minister (secretary of State for Education and Science) has been given power to secure an adequate adult education service. Through the powers conferred on him by the 1944 Act, he is required to ensure that the local education authorities comply with the Government policy. More important still, is that it is within the realm of his powers to force local education authorities to discharge the duties placed upon them by the Act.⁽⁸¹⁾ He has also the right to force backward authorities to come into line if any of them acts or proposes to act 'unreasonably'.⁽⁸²⁾ Such strong position has been dictated by two considerations that Lester Smith (1966) explained as:

1. a belief that equality of opportunity in education is difficult to come by unless someone is able to force local education authorities and all promoters of voluntary schools to observe and maintain certain standards.
2. the fair distribution of available manpower can hardly be reached unless the Minister has an effective voice in planning as well as priority determination.⁽⁸³⁾

But, the Minister's authority of taking decisions is not left without control. His judgement of technical matters is enlightened, in so far as England is concerned, by the 'Central Advisory Council for Education' the duty of which is

"to advise the Minister upon such matters connected with educational theory as they think fit, and upon any questions referred to them by him." (84)

There are certain responsibilities placed on the Minister of Education, and which are common to education whatever the sector might be. It is his duty to make sure that educational facilities and auxiliary services are adequate in quantity and varied. Auxiliary services have to be well managed, equipped and staffed and maintained, and he must be satisfied with their standard. He looks after the freedom of teachers, parents and other parties in educational matters. Besides, charged fees, rewards and allowances are subject to his control together with the provision of educational premises. (85)

(c) Integration of Adult Education through Consolidation
of L.E.A's Role

The 1944 Act brought with it consolidation of the role of local education authorities in the provision of adult education. Since the education service in England is locally administered, integration of adult education

with the national system of education is principally envisaged through attachment to the realm of work of local councils. Local authorities had some involvement in adult education provision since the Technical Instruction Act (1889) and the Local Taxation Act (1890) which gave County and Borough Councils permission to establish evening classes for children who left school. Yet, it was only with the Fisher Act (1902) that the responsibility for adult education was laid on local administration. Local authorities were empowered 'to take such steps as seem to them desirable to supply or aid the supply of education other than elementary, and to promote the general co-ordination of all forms of education.'⁽⁸⁶⁾ The 1919 Report on Adult Education was much in favour of activating local authorities to assume more role in adult education provision suggesting that they should 'take a large and important part in the development of adult education,' and regarded such a role as 'an integral part of their activities.'⁽⁸⁷⁾ Under Section 86 of the 1921 Act, local authorities were granted comparatively wider powers for the provision of adult education of a great variety.⁽⁸⁸⁾

However, in practice, local authorities remained in the inter-war period content to look after formal education, primary, secondary, technical, etc. leaving the provision of non-vocational adult education largely to the universities and voluntary bodies.⁽⁸⁹⁾ This complaint was clearly recorded in the Ashby Report (1954) that 'Local education authorities

are so pre-occupied with primary, secondary and technical education that they have not yet had the opportunity to give full attention to liberal adult education.'⁽⁹⁰⁾

It was thus, that wide variation characterized the response of local authorities to the proposals raised by the I9I9 Report mainly the establishment of non-vocational or evening centres for humane studies, raising their financial assistance to the universities and voluntary organizations, and setting up Area Adult Education Sub-Committee which would undertake the provision of non-university, non-vocational adult education.⁽⁹¹⁾ Financially, the L.E.A.'s responded indirectly by affording more financial assistance to universities and voluntary bodies. Only in few cases such as the West Riding of Yorkshire that assistance reached full responsibility for all one-year and tutorial classes. Lowe (1970) estimated the response to be, on the whole, weak.⁽⁹²⁾

Fear was justifiable that, if such a trend continued meanwhile educational opportunities are on the threshold of expansion year after year, that time might come when complete negligence of adult education activities would turn into accepted status quo. The main problem was not recognition of the principle that local education authorities have got some role to undertake in the provision of adult education as they did with formal education. The problem was rather with the 'leniency' and 'vagueness' by which their responsibility toward adult education provision was defined under existing legislations. Partly because of such a defect,

and partly because of the lack of financial and other facilities, adult education remained a marginal task undertaken by the L.E.A.'s meanwhile primary and secondary education enjoyed increasing attention. Such differentiation was reflected on the whole picture of the adult education provision , and turned into a challenge for the post-War policy of education. To the Sanky Report, published under 'Adult Education after the War' (1945), the elimination of such differentiation in the treatment of 'formal' and 'adult education' should be the cornerstone of the suggested policy. Continuation of such differentiation after the War II would only lead to one result, more and more marginality for adult education within the national system of education, or as the Report put it:

"The very fact that whilst one section of the educational system is obligatory and the other is permissive, suggests that the second is of minor importance and is consequently less urgent. It is indeed an invitation to neglect." (93)

What is more, is that the system might still work under the notion that 'education ends with childhood'. (94)

The post-War II policy has differed significantly from the one before. The 1944 Act added more to the role undertaken by the local education authorities than was the case under the Acts of 1902 or 1918. The old 'enabling power' which the authorities were reluctant to use actively for more adequate adult education provision in their areas, has now been turned

into 'duty' 'to secure the provision for their area of adequate facilities for further education.'⁽⁹⁵⁾ Moreover, their leading role in the provision of adult education has since the War II been an accepted principle in various documents. The White Paper of Educational Reconstruction (1943), while considering the special contribution that universities and the Workers' Educational Association might make to adult education, it made it clear that:

"Local Authorities will undoubtedly be called upon to play a larger part than heretofore in this field." (96)

The leading part to be undertaken by the authorities was as well accepted by the universities themselves, which saw as natural that 'the ultimate responsibility for securing adequate provision should rest on the local education authorities, and we do not wish to claim any monopoly or suggest any precise delimitation of sphere of action.'⁽⁹⁷⁾

On her part, the Ministry of Education defined the whole realm of 'Further Education' as 'a community effort in which the authority must play the leading part.'⁽⁹⁸⁾ Again it was thrown on the local authorities, in so far as 'Further Education' is concerned, the responsibility 'to assume leadership in the co-operative enterprise of community education.'⁽⁹⁹⁾ Thus, in post-War policy, the local education authorities were put definitely before their responsibilities as regards adult education, a responsibility from which escape is much more difficult than before. They were even invited to respond to the Minister's call 'to plan boldly and comprehensively.'⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

II. PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN BODIES INVOLVED IN ADULT EDUCATION PROVISION

Partnership as an Adopted Policy for Post-War Adult Education

The need was clear after War to extend the base of adult population covered by the adult education service to encompass besides the 'seekers' or the 'converted' the vast majority whom the Sanky Report (1945) called the 'indifferent' or the 'uninterested'.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ Recognition of the White Paper on Educational Reconstruction (1943) of the organic link between adult education and the function of the system as a whole, and that^{without} the fuller opportunities of adult education, the whole system would remain incomplete,⁽¹⁰²⁾ represented an indirect pressure on the adult education providers to co-operate. In the meantime, there were certain considerations that made co-operation between providers essential :

1. The inability of voluntary organizations to undertake, by themselves, the task of penetrating the adult base unless co-ordination with other providers is made possible.
2. The possible failure of the Statutory authorities alone to meet the needs of such an important sector of the population.

The conclusion which the Sanky Committee reached was that 'There is ample room for both, provided always that they work in co-operation and not in competition.'⁽¹⁰³⁾

On the other hand, the consolidation of the partnership spirit was seen as a condition for the success of the future expansion schemes of adult education. In this respect, partnership was expressed in a rather impelling tone which left but little room for argument about its validity. The closing lines of the Report were unambiguous:

".... the development of adult education depends on the willing co-operation of the statutory authorities, the universities and the voluntary organizations concerned. Each of them must carry out its duty to the adult community in the fullest co-operation with the other agencies working in the same field, and to the same general end." (IO4)

The Ministry of Education, on her part, went even further than what the Sanky Committee had gone. It used all the weapons available to her in pressing the partners, mostly in an indirect manner, to co-operate. Partnership between the adult education providing agencies was raised by the Ministry as 'The first need....' (IO5) Mainly through partnership, it is possible, in the Ministry's argument, to 'quicken the cultural, artistic and social life of the community.' (IO6) The argument for partnership was hardly refuted by any of the academics of policy-makers. If it was acceptable that in the old days when the adult education service was still in its infancy, and the involved organizations few and the scope of work not so clear, that duplicated effort was little feared and the development of the work of each partner attainable without much regard to what others were doing, the case after War was different. A new formula of partnership had to be put

into effect, and 'the various organizations concerned should come to agreement not on "mandated territories" or "spheres of influence" but on the particular contribution which each of them is specially fitted to make to the educational needs of the community.' (I07)

Academics, on the whole, were no less supporters of the trend. The base of post-War adult education policy which Shearman (I944) could think of, revolved round the major suggestion; the 'close co-operation between the Board of Education, the universities, the Local Education Authorities, and those voluntary bodies whose main purpose is educational.' (I08)

By the time the Ashby Report (I954) was published, some drawbacks of the policy of partnership were beginning to rise to the surface including the inevitable burden resulting from the more administrative complexities than was the case with other types of Further Education. There was also the 'smooth working of partnership' depending on cordiality of relations between partners and 'which was not always to be found' (I09) Merits and demerits of the policy of partnership were reflected upon by the Committee, but the conclusion reached was much in favour of the continuation of partnership between providers:

"After considering all the evidence we are unanimously of the opinion that at present the merits of the partnership outweigh its drawbacks and that we should make recommendations which preserve it, at any rate during the present period of transition in British education." (IIO)


Ashby's appreciation of the validity of the partnership policy was echoed in no less vigour twenty years later, when the Russell Committee put it on the very top of its list of recommendations. (III)

Types of Post-War Partnership

By 'partnership' is meant all forms of co-operation between the major providers of adult education service. Peers (1972)^(II2) recognized partnership as covering many areas, but saw it largely financial in character.^(II3) It is possible to locate three types of partnership in adult education in England namely, financial, consultative and in teaching service. The following figure illustrates a typical regional organization as expressive of partnership among providing bodies.

Figure 8.3

A Typical Regional Organization and its Financial Links^(II4)



I. Financial Partnership

The complex organization that characterizes adult education in England has induced the Ashby Committee (1954) to describe the finance system as 'obscure'.^(II5) However, a look at the past regulations of finance makes the present financial partnership comprehensible. As a principle, financial partnership has been found in the adult education provision before War II in the form of grants paid, either directly from the Ministry of Education (Board of Education until 1944) and the W.E.A. districts, or indirectly as awarded by the L.E.A.'s towards the administrative costs of responsible bodies.

(1945)

The Further Education Grant Regulations in accordance with the 1944 Act, as well as the 1946 regulations stand as indicative of change in the financial relationships when compared with the previous ones of 1938. According to the 1945 Further Education Grant Regulations, no distinction was made between university and non-university programmes except in the case of the three-year tutorial classes which are eligible for grant only in so far as they are provided by universities, university colleges or joint responsible bodies.

Another aspect of comparison with the 1938 regulations (Chapter II) the 1945 regulations represent an easier path to financial co-operation between the Ministry of Education and the responsible bodies. The term 'responsible bodies'

has continued since the 1924 Grant Regulations to signify the combination of organizations recognized by the Board of Education as providing liberal adult education. These include the universities or university colleges and approved associations. Regulations 22 (I) of 1946 maintained former distinctions (under 1924 and 1938 regulations) in dividing responsible bodies into three classes. Included in the first class are universities and university colleges, while approved associations fall under the second. The third type of responsible bodies created by Regulation 22 of 1946 reads:

"A joint body . . . for the maintenance of facilities for a specified area", consisting of "representatives of other Responsible Bodies . . . whose activities relate to that area together with representatives of the Authority or Authorities concerned with that area" (116)

The rigidity imposed on the direct grant by the Ministry of Education to responsible bodies according to the 1938 Regulations specified six types of courses conducted by university responsible bodies, and three types of courses conducted by approved associations. (117) Detailed requirements as regards class work and written work as well as maximum and minimum numbers of students in each type of course found no place in the 1946 Regulations. These ^{latter} cared to ensure that the programme submitted demanded serious study on the part of the students. As a condition to approve the programme of a responsible body, the Minister of Education (Secretary for Education and Science) had to be satisfied that reasonable provision was being made for one or more of the following:

1. Tutorial classes lasting for a period of three educational years, with twenty-four two-hour meetings each session; (Reg. 24(a))
2. Sessional courses lasting for one educational year, with not less than twenty meetings of at least one hour-and-a half (Reg. 24 (b))
3. Terminal courses of not less than ten meetings of at least an hour-and-a-half. (Reg. 24 (c)).

It was made obligatory that universities and joint bodies should provide at least one of the three. As for other responsible bodies, at least ^{one} of the last two was required.

Only when this obligation is discharged, it was made possible for the responsible bodies to seek approval for grant .

4. Shorter courses of less formal character. (Reg. 24 (d))
5. Training courses for teachers and lecturers for adult education. (Reg. 24 (e))

In so far as the assessment of the grant to be awarded is concerned, the complicated details of 1938 and previous regulations were partly amended as the Ministry of Education undertook to repay to responsible bodies not less than 75 per cent. of the approved cost of the remuneration of the teachers or lecturers employed.. (Reg. 27)

As recipients of financial aid by the Ministry (D.E.S), they must satisfy its requirements in three basic matters: acceptability of their constitutions, efficiency of their organization and teaching staff, and the adequacy of their facilities provided for students. Also through the

direct grants, it is of importance for the Ministry to be satisfied that the adult education service is provided to individuals without discrimination. Recipients have not got the right to exclude any person from their courses on other than reasonable grounds. (II8)

Reflection on the financial partnership between the Ministry of Education as representative of the central authority and the responsible bodies providing an adult education service raises two points:

Firstly: There is a mutual commitment between both sides within a frame of rights and duties. However, it is clear that the financial aid in the form of grants is rather a tool in the hand of the central authority to ensure, to a certain degree, a comprehensive and good standard service in a way that allows it to curb excessive undesirable competitions between various partners.

Secondly: The direct grant from the central authority to university adult education towards teaching costs, administration and accomodation, represents only one source. They are entitled to receive indirect share from the university itself through the University Grants Committee. This is one type of financial partnership which we may term 'internal' as it is granted within the university scope. Besides, there is also finance through students' fees as well as the L.E.A.'s grants. In a somewhat similar way the W.E.A. has its other sources of finance as well.

Whether the financial system of awarding grants, specially to universities, is the most fitting one, has been a controversial issue among the universities themselves since the 1950's. Amidst the approval expressed by the Ashby Committee (1954) of the financial co-operation of the central authority with the responsible bodies, there was an implicit view raised by some university men that such type of financial affiliation was not the ideal one. Yet, many favoured the view that it was undesirable that the Ministry of Education should withdraw its direct grants to universities for the support of adult education service. The Ashby Committee saw some dangers that extra-mural work would remain indefinitely as a 'protected' activity content with what is received from outside. The Committee suggested that:

"Unless adult education fights its own way for recognition, unless it establishes its right to share of the university's finances it will never become an accepted part of university work in the sense that psychology or dentistry are accepted." (II9)

As for the financial partnership between the central authority and the local education authorities, a clear change has been made by the 1945 regulations. Following the issue of the 1944 Act, it was natural that the adult education financial regulations be incorporated in the Further Education regulations. With this change, it has become difficult for the local education authorities to separate the provision of adult education from their traditional sphere of operations, i.e. liberal from non-liberal studies. (I20)

The local education authorities undertake their duties in accordance with the policy set by the Ministry (D.E.S) but with what Lowe (1970) recognizes as 'a great measure of latitude'.⁽¹²¹⁾ They are eligible for a block grant from the Ministry that represents slightly over 60 per cent. of their total expenditure on education, and which they have wide freedom in the allocation of proportions. Besides, they have other means by which they can give more financial aid mainly through the allocations for education from levied rates.⁽¹²²⁾

On their part, local education authorities have their contribution to adult education provision in both direct and indirect ways. But, it must be remembered that diversity characterizes every aspect of the adult education provided by the L.E.A.'s. On the one hand, types of adult education such as the Evening Institutes, Adult Education Centres, Further Education Institutes, or Adult Institutes, are all directly looked after by the local authorities. Non-vocational courses for adults as well as a wide range of courses covering vocational interests are as well directly provided and administered by them.

On the other hand, there is the indirect contribution by L.E.A.'s to adult education in their areas. Authorities foster, side by side with their own direct provision, courses for liberal education for adults through the aid to responsible bodies. Giving financial aid to universities has been one of the

trends that the I9I9 Report strongly recommended.^(I23) Authorities may, as well, award financial aid to independent voluntary organizations sometimes called 'community associations' such as women's organization, music and drama groups, old people's clubs and other social organizations. Bringing these into the local structure of adult education has been regarded as 'of prime importance'.^(I24)

Both direct and indirect provision by the local education authorities in so far as finance is concerned, are shown in figure 8.2.


Indirect contribution of the local authorities may vary from mere financial aid in the form of grants, which confines partnership within a narrow circle, to what may be called 'positive co-operation' through allowing the use of their own resources, equipment, buildings, manpower for adult education service in the areas.^(I25) The principle on which financial grants by the L.E.A.'s to responsible bodies are awarded may take more than one single type. In some cases, it takes the form of grants per-class as supplement to what the D.E.S. pays for the teaching cost. Sometimes, it takes the form of block grant in participation of the cost of administration usually to the W.E.A. district.

2. Teaching-Service Partnership

The general form of the flow of teaching services between major adult education providing bodies in England is illustrated by Figure 8.4 which illustrates as well the cycle of finance.

Figure 8.4

Flow of Teaching Services and Money between Major Adult Education Providers in England⁽¹²⁶⁾



The expansion of the adult education service, which was highly favoured in the post-War policy was seen by the Sanky Committee as dependent on 'the availability and selection of a sufficient number of competent men and women to carry out the work.' (I27) One way suggested to secure the availability of the required numbers was through closer association with the educational system as a whole. To the Committee, 'If there were more fluidity in the teaching service; if it were possible for a teacher in any one branch of education to pass over to full-time adult education, whether organized by the statutory authority, or by an approved voluntary body, without loss of professional status or of salary and superannuation benefits, it would probably be found that not a few teachers in other branches would find themselves attracted to, and would be suitable for, adult work ...' (I28) But, this line of thought representing an appreciation of 'external partnership' in matters of teaching service, could not be envisaged by policy-makers as the sole outlet for getting the required numbers of teaching staff for adult education expansion. The co-operative action between adult education partners, which we may call 'internal partnership' was recognized by the Ministry of Education (I947) as a need for the expansion of adult education provision. Local education authorities, universities and voluntary organizations of every kind were called upon to respond

to the framework put by the Ministry for effective partnership, what is strongly advocated in the Ministry's 'Further Education' (1947) as follows:

"We need a close and confident relationship between those teaching bodies, and the organizations, whether for adults or for young people, which provide an environment wherein things of the mind and spirit can flourish. There is an opportunity to advance, if we march together.' (129)

The local education authorities were asked to provide adequate teaching-service to their own adult education institutes through their own full-time and part-time teachers. However, this was stated as only one partial fulfilment of the security of adult education provision thrown upon authorities by the 1944 Act. Opportunities for active partnership with other providers in the supply of teaching service were suggested by the Ministry to cover four specific spheres:

1. To provide a range of teaching services from their own institutions some of which operating extra-murally as one token of partnership with adult and youth voluntary organizations.
2. To provide what they can towards the ensurance of 'close working arrangements' for the provision of liberal^b study courses by universities and other responsible bodies.
3. To encourage provision of adult education service through strengthening such local organizations with broad

purposes and potentialities as the Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., Community centres,... etc.

4. To exercise general initiative within the community through conferences, training courses and all other ways of focusing attention on particular problems or recent developments worth study. (I30)

On the other hand, responsible bodies were similarly requested to co-operate in the provision of teaching services. This was included in the overall scheme of co-operation raised by the Ministry which preached an elastic method of interchange of staff 'from teaching in school to teaching adult audiences; from teaching undergraduates to teaching in extra-mural classes; from employment by an authority to service in a university or in a voluntary organization, ..' (I31)

The leading position of universities in teaching-service partnership has been an acceptable trend in the post-War adult education policy. The Ashby Committee (1954) observed with inherent content that the 'main burden for providing adult education in England and Wales has been assumed by the universities and university colleges,' (I32) and that the university staffs 'are the most important source of tutors both for Workers' Educational Association and extension classes.' (I33) Figures of the Ashby Report showed how in 1951-1952, 21 university departments of extra-mural studies provided tutors for 80.000 out of the total 150.000 adult education students. (I34)

The case of the W.E.A. represents a different position from that of the L.E.A. or other providers in that it has got no other educational activity. The vital unit of the Association is the 'branch' which has the responsibility of organizing its own programme of studies, recruiting its members and raising money by its own efforts to meet many of the incidental expenses of its work. (I35)

Branches are grouped into districts. The latter are autonomous with wide range of freedom to determine their own policy. (I36) As far as the teaching service is concerned, districts and branches have three main activities:

Firstly, they organize tutorial and sessional classes for which the local university provides tutors. In these classes, co-operation with the university staff is more important than is the case with other types of classes.

Secondly, they organize other classes for which the districts themselves are responsible for providing tutors.

Thirdly, in case of week-end school and day schools, either under their own auspices or under those of W.E.T.U.C. they are responsible for arranging teaching services.

Other than the major providers, teaching-service partnership was called upon from both minor adult education providers as well as out-of-the-field agencies.

Co-operation on the part of the Armed Forces was seen both desirable and possible through the utilization of the educational work that had developed under War II conditions.

Appreciation of such a source was evident in the Sanky Report. It built its argument on the value of using the interest, skill and gift of leadership men of the Armed Forces have. To ensure that their interest in adult teaching was maintained after their mobilization, a recommendation was raised that 'Steps should be taken now, while men are in the Forces, to make the opportunities known to them, and to arrange for such special training as may be desirable.' (I37) On the other hand, the Ministry suggested that the field of adult education should benefit from the possible teaching efforts of a wide range of interested individuals whether in the field of commerce, industry, law, policemen, clerks and even artists, doctors and nurses. (I38) In this way, states the Ministry, 'it may be possible to build up a tradition of adult education among a much wider circle of people than are usually drawn into this field.' (I39)

3. Consultative Partnership

The main theme behind emphasis on the consultation between adult education partners in post-1944 policy seems to be associated with the attempt to achieve, a diversified and complicated set of relations, a greater deal of co-ordination in the adult education service provided. In the 1945 and 1946 Regulations, consultation is stated as a condition for the award of financial grants whether to the

local education authorities or ^{to} the responsible bodies. Domination of any one partner over the service, disregarding the views and interests of other partners has been taken as a hindrance for the attainment of maximum adult education service within the available potentialities. (I40)

Responsibility for leadership of adult education services was laid, according to the 1944 Act, on the local education authorities which have to 'secure adequate provision of Further Education in their areas.' (I41) But, two regulations were put by the Act to organize the way the L.E.A.'s might practise such leadership. Care is given to prevent them from assimilating the type of work undertaken by other fellow partners. On the one hand, the L.E.A.'s are not given the right to ignore the efforts undertaken by other partners. Section 42 (4) of the 1944 Act states that the local education authorities:

"shall, when preparing any scheme of further education have regard to any facilities for further education provided for their areas by universities, educational associations and other bodies" (I42)

The way by which such 'regard' is envisaged to come by has been defined in the same section of the Act through consultation of any such bodies as well as other local education authorities from ~~from~~ adjacent areas. (I43) The Ministry of Education emphatically appreciated such regard on the part of local authorities as a 'duty'. (I44) In such a way, arrangement of the protection of interests of the universities, the W.E.A. and other partners from being assimilated by

local authorities.

Consultation is supposed to cover a wider realm than the provided programmes. It includes as well other aspects related with full-time tutors, tutor organisers, buildings, equipment, .. etc. Consultation of the academic nature is recommended by the Ministry of Education (I947) to come by through conferences and common courses for tutors which are seen 'of great value'. (I45)

The task of the appointed consultative committees for adult education in the local education authorities is to bring the consultation suggested by the I944 Act into effect. Consultation in such authorities described as 'the more enlightened' (I46) takes the form of established adult education committee with broad representation to include beside the Further Education sub-committee, the universities, the W.E.A. as well as other voluntary bodies that are interested in the provision of adult education. (I47) This does not conceal the fact that the alternative to which many of authorities of the 'less enlightened' type resort is through 'informal' consultation with the partners concerned which depends, in the first place, on personal or cordial contact.

While the responsible bodies are safeguarded from the domination of the local education authorities, they are not left to practise their adult education activity disregarding the views of other partners. The direct grant they are entitled to get from the Ministry (D.E.S.) is

conditioned by their presenting an assurance 'that steps have been taken to consult other responsible bodies and local education authorities in the area.' (I48) To this end, some local education authorities are directly represented on the extra-mural boards. However, such representation may be indirect through the joint committee or the university extension committee where these exist separately.

Consultation between the universities and the W.E.A. especially in so far as the W.E.A.'s demand for tutorial and other extra-mural classes is concerned, is to be undertaken through the Central Joint Advisory Committee on Tutorial Classes. Since 1958, this has been replaced by a joint consultative committee of the W.E.A. and the U.C.A.E. The Ashby Report (1954), however, observed that most of the responsible bodies are in agreement on their programmes through consultation both formal and informal. (I49)

Internal consultation between universities was to be undertaken until May 1947 through the Universities' Extra-Mural Consultative Committee. The need for consultation based on a broader base was suggested to come by through the above mentioned Universities' Council for Adult Education (U.C.A.E.) . As for representation, expansion was made possible through the inclusion of representatives of university senates together with extra-mural officers, a new arrangement that was not found in the older 'Extra-Mural Consultative Committee'. Its sphere of interest was also broadened to encompass other than

extension courses, all the other matters associated with extra-mural teaching. Such a council looks after the co-ordination^{of} policy between universities. It recommends a 'common service' to be undertaken by adjacent universities or that competition should alternatively be avoided in the development of extra-mural departments.^(I50) Its recent reports harp not only upon partnership between universities but have moved over to broader areas of partnership. Its 1970 report on 'University Adult Education in the later Twentieth Century' strongly argues that 'The effectiveness of the future contribution which adult education makes to the national system of education is likely to depend to an increasing extent, on the effectiveness of collaboration between the providing bodies.'^(I51) The principle on which necessity of partnership is insisted upon rises from its conviction that 'No single type of providing body' will be able to expand adult education service to the required adequacy unaided by others.'^(I52) It is, hence, easy to prove how consultation has got a higher tone in the post-1944 adult education policy both at the external level, i.e. between one provider and the others, and internally, between the units of the same major provider.

Role of N.I.A.E. in Consultation

Consultation in adult education policy on the national level was envisaged to come by through the 'National Foundation of Adult Education' established in 1946. With

its amalgamation with the 'British Institute of Adult Education' (B.I.A.E.) in 1949 under the 'National Institute of Adult Education' (N.I.A.E.), consultation on the national level was to take a different form. The N.I.A.E. has got the task of promoting consultation among the great many providers of adult education by bringing them together into a single organization. Kelly (1970)⁽¹⁵³⁾ could see its mission as both of consultation and co-operation among the local education authorities, the responsible bodies, the interested government departments, and voluntary organizations such as the National Centres Association, the National Federation of Community Associations, the National Adult School Union, the National Federation of Women's Institutes, the National Union of Townswomen's Guilds, ... etc. Its 'Adult Education' which is published quarterly is another important means by which the views of various partners as well as researches in the field are to be exchanged. Through these, academics and policy-makers alike are given the chance to reach common grounds on various issues. The Institute publishes, as well reports of special enquiries related to adult education. Among these are 'Adult Education After the War' (1945), being the report of a committee appointed by the B.I.A.E., 'Liberal Education in a Technical Age' (1955), 'Accommodation and Staffing' (1963), and 'Recruitment and Training of Workers in Adult Education' (1966). These have proved of considerable influence on post-1944 adult education policy. (154)

The Extent to which the Integration-Partnership Policy
Has Worked

The provision of an adequate adult education service capable of penetrating the wide base of adults in post-War II England was envisaged to come^{by} through two major policy trends, namely, the recognition of adult education on the map of the national education structure as similar to other forms of education; and the activation of the providing agencies involved in adult education provision within a framework of co-operation and co-ordination. Judgement of the outcome of such a policy has to take into account the lack, until present, of one agreed upon comprehensive conception of 'adult Education' among academics and policy-makers alike. This, opens the door wide before the varying estimations of success that has been reached. The implicit and explicit satisfaction expressed by the Russell Report (1973) of the progress so far achieved with level of attendance reaching two millions, was taken as a demonstration of 'great adaptability' and responsiveness to local demands.⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ In clear-cut words the Report states:

"Our evidence shows that adult education has proved remarkably adaptive to changing conditions, so that much of present practice still operates satisfactorily . . ." ⁽¹⁵⁶⁾
Rogers and Groombridge (1976),⁽¹⁵⁷⁾ on their part, express

their deep dissatisfaction of what the adult education service has sunk to until present. Taking as plausible the assumption that omission of any strategy of policy which might be relevant is a serious mistake that governments might fall in, they argue that 'British governments have been and still are guilty of such a sin of omission, by not having, by never having had, a policy for promoting adult learning.' (158) Lowe (1970) has got his strong reasons for dissatisfaction with what has been achieved in adult education in England mostly because of the unfounded separation between vocational and non-vocational education in a most unconvincing manner; and the marginality of adult education, the latter defect is a consequence of the former. Progress in the field, has hence, been estimated as "hesitant and largely unstructured." (159)

Such sharp contradictions in the judgements passed on the post-1944 adult education policy may be attributed to the very complex pattern in which adult education provision is undertaken by a great many formal and informal organizations with a wide set of internal and external relationships. In the absence of a comprehensive survey of the whole field, the matter has become of utmost complexity 'of a proportion equalled only by the Table of Kindred and Affinity which occupies the final page of the Book of Common Prayer.' (160) Furthermore, attempts to generalize judgements based on fragmental investigations may turn to be oversimplified and unrealistic. However, the present study attempts to build judgements on the available studies both inclusive and partial with focus on the outcomes of each of the two policy trends, namely integration and partnership.

I. Policy of Integration

Whatever might be the drawbacks in implementation, which will later be elaborated, it is plausible to suggest that, in theory, the policy of integration has shown considerable success associated with the ability to introduce adult education as one recognized component of the overall national educational structure. Previous alienation of that sector until 1944 could be easily pointed out from the exaggerated attention directed to formal education whether in matters of finance, administration .. etc meanwhile adult education had to be content with very little interest as a poor relation of the system. Throughout the whole of the 19th century, the adult education service remained almost entirely ^{dependent} on voluntary efforts with only reluctant and feeble interference on the part of statutory authority. The position was slightly better since the establishment of the Board of Education in 1902. To judge the validity of the integration policy, three defects that continued to characterize the adult education service until 1944 have to be taken into account:

- i. Lack of progression or continuity between 'secondary' and 'post secondary' education, the latter comprising adult education.
- ii. Lack of adequate interest in adult education on the part of the 'Board of Education' whose commitment was only fluidly stated as 'the superintendence of matters relating to education.' (161) With the notion, not yet weakened until the first decades of the century have elapsed, that education


should mostly be obtained at earlier age, primary and secondary education naturally occupied the attention of planners and policy-makers at the central level, at the expense of the adult education service.

iii. Exaggerated attention of the local authorities to ensure the adequate provision of formal education in their areas while their responsibility towards adult education provision was leniently undertaken as a second task.

Once the policy of integration was introduced through the 1944 Act, progression from secondary to post-secondary and adult education was made smoother through the assumed 'County Colleges' leading naturally to adult education activities. New organization was made for post-school education including 'Higher' and 'Further' education, the former being the concern of universities, Colleges of Education, Colleges of Higher Education, Polytechnics, .. etc. which are financed by direct and indirect grant from the D.E.S. or from the L.E.A.'s. These institutions concentrate on full-time courses. 'Further Education', on the other hand, comprises a great variety of institutions with a wide range of courses which are financed and controlled by L.E.A.'s. Theoretically, the 1944 Act opened better channels of progression from the first stage of education to the second, and from the second to 'Further' and 'Higher' education. This must be regarded as success to the policy of integrating adult education with the national education structure and ending its previous alienation, as might be shown from Figure 8.5

Figure 8.5

Links between Various Stages of Education in 1944 Act⁽¹⁶²⁾



The progression, together with the expansion in enrolment since the end of War II in all stages have yielded evident change in the overall shape of English education. Comparison between such a shape in 1935 and 1965 shows how the narrow unproportionate neck of post-school sector has given place to a more symmetrical one, as is shown in figures 8.6 and 8.7.

Figure 8.6

Public Educational System in England and Wales in 1935^(I63)





Figure 8.7 Public Educational System in England and Wales in 1965^(I64)



On the other hand, the first sector to benefit from the increasing responsibility of the Ministry of Education towards the promotion and expansion of all educational services is 'adult education' which had before been used to struggle for its existence. What it longed for, is secured through the principle of integration. H.M.'s Inspectors undertake the follow-up process of the adult education classes in almost the same way they do with other institutions of Further Education.

In the third place, adult education has been brought to the focus of local education authorities. The provision of adult education service in their areas is, as the case with primary and secondary education, not a matter of 'may' but a matter of 'must', much to the satisfaction of a previously alienated sector. Through the leadership of L.E.A.'s, the spirit is likely to prevail in the provision of responsible bodies or voluntary associations.

If the policy of integration is theoretically successful, have the outcomes, when ^{it} ^{has} ^{been} implemented, in accordance with aims?

In the case of post-1944 England, the policy of integration has partly benefited the place and functioning of adult education within the national framework. The previous confinement within the narrow circle of non-vocational liberal studies has, in a sense, persisted even after putting the 1944 Act into effect. (165) Yet, through the impact of the 'integration' policy, the situation is not the same. It has evidently changed for the benefit of adult education, which could break the barriers of non-vocational interpretation. It has found a place

in many 'further' and 'higher' education positions as a result of its inclusion within 'Further Education'. This is proved in a recent study by Ellwood (1976)^(I66) by the concern given to the adult student and needs in the schools, the polytechnics and the media which have re-oriented their activities. One conclusion reached by that study, is that 'Adult education in its various forms, organised and unorganised, penetrates every part of the educational system and flows out into the community.'^(I67) Furthermore, the educational functions have simultaneously been redistributed between the formal educational system, the family and other agencies in informal provision as is shown in the following figure.

Figure 8.8

Adult Education as Part of Further and Higher Education^(I68)




Figure : Adult Education as Part of Higher and Further Education

This, however, should not be taken as enough judgement that the implementation of the integration policy has been a complete success. Reflection on what the L.E.A.'s could so far achieve shows that the outcomes are still modest in comparison with the sought goals. While they are supposedly the bearers of the greatest statutory responsibility toward adult education, they have actually maintained that sector's marginality amidst their preoccupation with so many 'more important' tasks. One evidence given by Professor Wiltshire to the Russell Committee affirmed the above judgement.

"They are multi-purpose educational bodies, so that for most of them NVAE is a very minor and marginal part of their total educational responsibility. If it were all to disappear overnight, City Hall and County Hall would remain unshaken, educational policy and provision would remain in all important respects unchanged, and the money saved would be swallowed up in larger enterprises unnoticed. So although the stake of the LEAs in NVAE seems large, their commitment to it is small;..." (I69)

It is thus, that integration, which was thought to come by through equal concern given to adult education similar to the case with other forms of education, is good in theory, but in application by the L.E.A.'s, has not yet given proportionate outcomes. In the order of priorities that the L.E.A.'s still have, adult education has maintained the last position in their list. A complaint was raised in the 1960's that they take the matter of adult education provision rather lightly for, '... they have many other things, and much more important things, to think about: first schools, then further education and teacher training, and then (if there is any interest or money left) what the Ministry of Education calls "Other Further Education" ...' (I70)

In this respect, two grave defects have to be taken into consideration:

Firstly, that as yet, no clear-cut definition has been given to the 'varied and comprehensive service of education', stated in the 1944 Act as regards what the L.E.A.'s are supposed to undertake. Such elastic words may give some of the authorities the chance to provide whatever they like so long as they see it 'varied' and 'comprehensive'. The Russell Committee (1973) was induced to recommend as an immediate measure that the Secretary of State should make specified statement of policy defining what is meant by 'a varied and comprehensive service of education in so far as adult education is concerned.' (I71) Moreover, the coordinating task of the work of other partners through consultation was stated by the 1944 Act but was, likewise, left to the discrete of local authorities. These requirements, as has been found by the Russell Committee, 'do not add up to a duty or a right to coordinate, but the local education authority is expected to take the initiative and also, presumably, the blame if adequate provision is not secured.' (I72)

Secondly, that until the present time, diversity exists 'in almost every aspect of local education authority adult education.' (I73) Such diversity must be admitted as related with available potentialities for each authority including beside material resources, the personal relationships of the councillors. Besides, the effectiveness is found to be, in many cases, below what is required. In the 1970 Survey

by the N.I.A.E., 16 per cent. of all L.E.A.'s which responded to the enquiry were not making special provision for the disadvantaged adults in the sense of individuals unable to participate in the normally produced programme of courses and activities. These are abstracted by Clyne (1972)⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ in the following table:

Table 8.1

Local Education Authorities which Offered no Special Provision⁽¹⁷⁵⁾
(Population: 000's)

	Counties	County Boroughs	Greater London Boroughs
England	5	12	1
Wales	1	1	
Under 50	1	1	
50-100	1	7	
100-200	1	4	
200-500	3	1	1

On his part, Clyne analysed, in his study on 'The Disadvantaged Adult' (1972) 71% responses from County Local Education Authorities, 84% from County Boroughs, and 80% from Greater London Boroughs. Wide variation in response to various needs of the disadvantaged, and the neglect, on the part of some authorities are shown in table 8.2
Table 8.2

Percentage of L.E.A.'s making Special Provision for Disadvantaged Adults⁽¹⁷⁶⁾

Nature of Provision	Counties %	County B.'s %	G. Lon. B.'s %	Totals %
Adult illiterates	61	40	75	52
Remedial Education	44	40	56	44
Mentally ill	32	3	6	13
Mentally handicapped	39	19	37	28
Physically handicapped	30	23	50	29
Non-English speaking immigr.	24	37	62	37
Deaf and hard of hearing	30	27	25	28
Blind and partially sighted	12	4	31	11
Elderly	27	17	31	23
No Provision	15	17	6	16

If such is the case with the L.E.A.'s on whom the greatest share in the responsibility of integration falls, it induces one to appreciate the conclusions reached by Lowe (1970),^(I77) Ruddock (March 1974),^(I78) Rogers and Groombridge (1976)^(I79) and others in that the marginality of the adult education has persisted notwithstanding the policy trends since 1944. In, at least, three realms of the integration policy, the outcomes are not in accordance with aims. These are finance, planning and administration.

Finance

From the financial point of view, the outcomes of the integration policy, implemented since 1944, have not been in accordance with the sought aims. Practice has shown that adult education is the first sector to suffer whenever the economic conditions of the country impose cuts. This cannot be seen separate from the ability to extend its service to cover more numbers of adults. For this, policy-makers may be accused of contradicting themselves.

Unjustifiable contrast between 'words' and 'action' in so far as the financial support by central authority is concerned, has left its impact on adult education expansion. Churchill's reply to the resolution sent by Trade Union Congress (March 1953) must have caused the envy of other forms of education for the priority given to adult education:

"There is, perhaps, no branch of our vast educational system which should more attract within its particular sphere the aid and encouragement of the State than adult education." (I80)

Unluckily, this was only followed by sharp stagnation of expenditure on adult education according to the cuts on which

the Ministry insisted. The exaggerated alarm by which the Minister in Churchill's Government noted the rise of expenditure on the responsible bodies which trebled in six years, may be taken as an indicator of the extent to which, contrary to the Prime Minister's own words, adult education was actually regarded not as a necessary service for which funds have to be raised by all means, but rather as Lord Eccles regarded it as some sort of 'luxury'.⁽¹⁸¹⁾

Not only was standstill imposed on grants for 1952/1953 but there was, in addition, insistence, on the Ministry's part, to reduce 10% of the estimates for 1953/1954. When the cuts are reflected upon, they seem to be too small to have an effect on the country's financial situation. The total grants awarded for that year were only £ 330.000 and the 10% reduction did not exceed £33.000.

The strict policy of expenditure was carried on to the 1960's as the Wilson Government (1964) was even more worried about economic difficulties. So parsimonious was the Government that the Joint Consultative Committee of the Universities and W.E.A. thought of publishing a manifesto declaring that the annual contribution by the Government to responsible bodies was only £ 700.000 'rather less than a single mile of motorway'.⁽¹⁸²⁾ The general picture of the 1970's ^{was not different from the 1960's.} Response to the inspiration by the ^{Russell} Report in the first half of the decade⁽¹⁸³⁾ mostly without Government involvement was soon followed by cut-back in public expenditure. Adult education was the first to suffer and the case is vividly described by Bill Toynbee (1976) that:

'the ensuing cut-back in public expenditure has again taken from those who have little, the little they have, with the result that the adult education service is once more fighting for survival.' (I84) Figures for the financial year 1968/69, the last year for which the Russell Committee (1973) could get complete figures, show that the net expenditure on adult education barely represented 1 per cent of the national education budget making, in the Committee's estimate, less than £ 10 per year for each of the two million adult students attending adult education classes. (I85) An urgent need has, hence, been expressed to raise local education expenditure in the proposals for the next five to seven years in order that the student number might be doubled, from £ 16 millions net to a total of £ 38 millions net, and the D.E.S. expenditure from £ 1.4 millions to 2.65 millions. Even with this proposal, the average net expenditure per student would barely exceed £ 10 a year. The proposals, however, represent only 'a very modest rise in total expenditure.' (I86)

It is possible to see how the policy of parsimony by which adult education provision has been treated since the early years of the 1950's has held back its expansion. Enrolment in adult education classes, whether of the responsible bodies or the L.E.A.'s has been until the 1960's been below what was expected. The sharp drop in the early 1950's was not overcome until the first half of the 1960's as is clear in figures 8.9, 8.10 and 8.11.

Figure 8.9

Students in Grant-aided Courses of Responsible Bodies
(England and Wales) 1925-67- Figures for 1939-1945
are conjectural (I87)




Figure 8.10

Enrolled Students in Extra-Mural and W.E.A. Courses (England
and Wales) 1925-1966 - Figures for 1939-46 are conjectural (I88)





Figure 8.II

Students in Evening Institutes (England and Wales) 1925-67 (189)



Close examination of Figure 8.II, which illustrates the enrolment in the L.E.A. classes, may be taken as illustrative of enrolment trends until the late 1960's for all major providers. Adult students in L.E.A Evening Institutes rose dramatically in the period immediately following War II reaching a peak during 1950-1952. This was only followed by decline reaching a severe point in 1961. Since then, it has steadily risen exceeding the 1950-1952 peak with a total enrolment of 1,400,000 in 1966, 1,419,765 in 1967, 1,394,742 in 1968 and 1,352,552 in 1969. ⁽¹⁹⁰⁾ Due to the difficulty that the Russell Committee (1973) mentioned when attempting

to get statistics at the national level, its figures had to stop at the closing years of the 1960's.⁽¹⁹¹⁾ However, a recent study by Wiltshire and Mee (1978)⁽¹⁹²⁾ indicates a decline trend. The tendency to decline that is seen from the 1969 figures in comparison with the year before is linked to a recent trend to shrink the financial aid that the L.E.A.'s receive from the D.E.S. Besides, the Administrative Memorandum no. 15/67 has encouraged the raising of class fees in 1968.⁽¹⁹³⁾ With the D.E.S Circular no. 14/75, another rise in fees was suggested to be at 30%.⁽¹⁹⁴⁾ Studying the statistical figures of seventy-four authorities for November 1975 and 1976, and revising the findings against statistics collected by a group of H.M. Inspectors, a remarkable effect of fees raising on enrolment is found. The two scholars used data from fifty-one authorities to examine the relation between fees and student numbers. Their findings ascertain the existence of a correlation between the rise in fees and the number of students as is shown in Table 8.3

Table 8.3

Fees and Student Numbers 1975-76 to 1976-77 ⁽¹⁹⁵⁾

Percentage rise in Fees	No. of authorities showing rise in students 21+	No of authorities showing fall in students 21+	Student numbers 21+ av. percentage change
33½ and under	14	17	-4:8
40-75	2	15	-13:2
150	-	1	-19:8
200	-	1	-49:6
500	-	1	-71:1

The continuation of the fee-imposing trend can be deduced from a recent D.E.S. Circular (I/77) which recommends further increase in fees. Unless limits are made to curb such a trend, further drop in students will be inevitable and the complaint of adult education marginality will be raised higher as the sector 'will no doubt again find itself suffering cuts which are proportionately much larger than those imposed upon other educational services.'^(I96)

Planning

In a critical survey published by the 'Council for Educational Advance' (I972) adult education in England is referred to as '... the almost forgotten poor relation of the system.'^(I97) It is true that twenty years after the Ashby Report (I954) the planning for adult education at the national level indicates the persistence of the marginality by which adult education is looked at by policy-makers at the highest level. In the White Paper by the Secretary of State for Education (December I972) entitled: 'Education: a Framework for Expansion' adult education is nowhere in the assumed plan for expansion. For this, the O.E.C.D. report (I975) on 'Educational Development Strategy in England and Wales' sarcastically took the official report to be rather 'A Framework of Expansion for certain pre-selected areas.'^(I98) As the White Paper states that it is 'designed to provide a framework for future action'^(I99), it is possible to look in it for a clue to see how adult education has actually been integrated within the national service of education.

and the future prospects in the following years. However, the Paper arouses frustration for the writer of the present study. The problems of the areas of education chosen are dealt with in clear terms, but strikingly enough adult education is almost omitted on account of confinement to 'aspects which acquire close attention at the present time'. (200) It is no convincing justification that adult education was excluded as the Russell Committee was still dealing with the area. The rationale of choice is not convincing to the writer, nor to the O.E.C.D. study, mentioned above which seems to attack the focus of attention on certain areas 'without adequate explanation of the selection criteria and procedure.' (201)

Likewise, the Russell Report concerned itself mainly with 'opportunities for men and women to continue to develop knowledge, skills, judgment and creativity throughout adult life by taking part, from time to time, in learning situations which have been set up for the purpose ..' (202) The concept that the Committee seemed to adopt envisages a society in which the whole lifelong learning needs of all citizens would be taken as the field with which the national system is concerned in its planning, structures and expenditure. (203) The adult education strategy that the Committee recommended is 'a comprehensive and flexible service broad enough to meet the whole range of educational needs of the adult..' (204) But, could the strategy suggested by Russell move further the principle of a lifelong educational service ?

The Report, taking into account present financial and other difficulties that stand in the way of putting the new strategy into operation, . favours the preservation of the status quo.⁽²⁰⁵⁾ Stopping at the point of recommending reorganization and going no further, is one defect in the report that has been waited for since the Ashby Report in 1954. Professor Kelly criticizes the 'high sounding phrases' that characterize the report, and hence, concludes that it is not decisive in predicting the future of adult education. To him, 'Cautious realism is the key note, and fancy ideas such as permanent education are relegated to an indefinite future.'⁽²⁰⁶⁾ While the Russell Report succeeds in arousing the interest of many people in support of continuing education throughout the whole adult life, a plan for the intended reorganization to take place is left unattempted. It is no convincing justification that the nature of the report imposes this, being 'evolutionary' rather than 'revolutionary'. To Woods (1975)⁽²⁰⁷⁾, it not understandable why no identity is proposed for such an education, nor an organizational structure within which the system of adult education could develop.⁽²⁰⁸⁾

Continuation of the unfounded distinction between 'vocational' and 'non-vocational' adult education until present forms another weak point that planning adult education in England has fallen into since the 1919 Report. The false distinction has ever since been preserved, and carried over to the Russell Report. Five decades, and more, have not been enough to reconsider the comprehensiveness of adult education. Kelly, shared by almost

all British eminent adult educationists like Lowe(1970),(209) and
(210)
Wiltshire (1976),agree to condemn this. The distinction
has weakened the Russell Report which assumes itself to be
(211)
'A Plan for Development'. The exclusion of 'vocational adult
education' from the Committee's terms of reference is unsound.
'Non-vocational adult education' is a phrase that has never
been susceptible to precise definition, and nowadays it merges
at the one end into leisure activities and at the other into
(212)
vocational education.' Wiltshire (1976) lucidly echoes
the same view of Kelly negating any possibility of taking
the two as radically different and that 'since there is an
infinite range of shades of green between yellow and blue,
yellow and blue must be the same colour.' (213)
As it is
impossible to locate precisely a position at which the green
ends and the blue begins, all distinctions between vocational
and non-vocational do not exist, and have hence, to be erased.
Confinement of the Russell Report to non-vocational adult
education blurs any attempts at comprehensive planning of
that sector. The task could not be undertaken by the Russell
Committee, and the dilemma is still unattempted in the 1970's.
The only solution that Kelly could think of is 'another report
which will deal with all those things which have been left
out of the present report- post-experience courses, part-time
degree and diploma courses, external degrees, CNA degrees,
the Open University, and so forth - and try to bring the
various elements into some sort of sensible relationship with
each other.' (214)

As for Lowe, he hardly differs with Kelly. He sees as a solution that the continuing education of adults be planned for as an integrative whole comprising vocational, non-vocational, general, formal, informal,.... etc. as constituent parts. (215)

Administration

The 1944^{Act} made adult education one component of 'Further Education' the institutions of which are financed and controlled by the local education authorities. Adult education falls under the non-vocational sector sometimes called leisure-related. Within the non-vocational Further Education sector, it is possible to distinguish youth service and adult education service. The former, is addressed mainly to youth of the age 14-20. The latter, which is designed for adults, has no restrictions for age, and accepts students at whatever age above 16. From the administrative point of view, the integration policy advocated by the 1944 Act has tended to form close organic relations both within 'Further Education' components, and between 'Further Education' as an entity and the Ministry of Education (D.E.S.). However, in two aspects, the outcome of the integration policy ^{has} not been in accordance with the sought aims:

Firstly, that within the 'Further Education' sector itself, some distinction has grown since 1944 between 'Further' and 'Other Further Education', the latter signifying adult education. The distinction was originally one of vocationally oriented work and non-vocational education. Separation was claimed

by the D.E.S. as purely administrative. (216) H.M. Inspectors, until 1968, were concerned with either of the two types. From hence had grown a complaint of unfounded separation. Educationists, like Lowe (1970), saw that:

"in an exemplary society all further or post-school education would be both broadly based and liberally concerned. Given the prevailing utilitarian climate, however, it is likely that if there had been a unified administrative structure since last war, the claims of liberal adult education would have been squeezed out altogether." (217)

Now that both 'Further Education' and 'Other Further Education' have been merged together (since 1968) with inspectors undertaking their task for both sectors without differentiation, the problem is solved though only partially. Still there are fears that inspectors who have for long been responsible for Technical, Commercial and Art Work, may well find 'Further Institutes' more satisfying in terms of being better organized together with the merit of receiving more generous financial support. (218) Amidst such a condition, nothing ensures that, even after the amalgamation of 'Further' and 'Other Further' education together, that adult education does not fall into marginality once more. Such fears have given rise to the recommendation by the Russell Committee 'to ensure that H.M. Inspectors are to allocate adequate time to adult education.' (219) Besides, the need has also been expressed to enlarge the H.M. Inspectors to an adequate number who should have substantial knowledge of the adult education characteristics. (220)

Secondly, that the heavy weight by which the D.E.S. would support adult education service was, nominally, a great success for the integration of the sector in the national system of education. Practically, the D.E.S. has remained reluctant to involve directly under the guise of 'autonomy' that has to be left to the L.E.A.'s to lead and that voluntary associations have to be encouraged to continue. This led to the shrinkage of the D.E.S.'s role to a narrow circle of granting financial aid, offering advice and, sometimes, co-ordinating the activities. The responsibility given to the Secretary of State by the 1944 Act is, indeed, strong. Through his responsibility, it is possible for him to secure a reasonable adult education provision in England. (221)

However, the problem is not to give him more responsibility toward securing better adult education service, but rather that he has the impulse to use the responsibility already given to him. Lack of impetus may be indicated by his reluctance, until present, to give even a rough definition of how much adult education provision there ought to be nor has he attempted to specify the particular developments expected of the local education authorities in so far as adult education is concerned. (222)

2. Policy of Partnership

Some indicators show partial success of the policy of partnership between the major adult education providers in England. The aims behind such a policy have been to create

closer co-ordination and co-operation between them for a more adequate adult education service. If the role of the central authority, represented by the D.E.S., is left aside on account of being mainly financial, which has already been elaborated,⁽²²³⁾ it is possible to point out to the success so far achieved in what may be called 'dual' and 'threefold' forms of partnership.

Dual partnership is, in one of its aspects, between universities and the W.E.A. There are 21 W.E.A. districts in England and Wales with a total of 955 branches for the whole country. Partnership between the W.E.A. districts and the universities has contributed to make the whole country covered by districts each working within a university extra-mural area, although, in some cases, one W.E.A. district may work with more than one university. The whole situation is shown in the following figure:

Figure 8. I2

Boundaries of W.E.A. Districts and Universities in Adult Education Service ⁽²²⁴⁾

Despite variation in the nature of partnership between both from one area to another, a general rule has, nevertheless, been reached in the distribution of the types of course between the universities and the W.E.A. The W.E.A. normally provides the shorter and less demanding courses leaving the universities to concentrate on the three-year tutorial classes, generally the longer and more demanding courses. From the technical and administrative points of view, such

distribution is sensible for the promotion of partnership. It shrinks away from the extremist views which have since the 1950's claimed for the liquidation of W.E.A.'s role ignoring its place as a national organization of about three quarters of a century old and with unique experience and ability for the recruitment of thousands of workers. (225)

The close partnership that has grown between universities and the W.E.A. has also extended into threefold type as both the universities and the W.E.A. work more or less closely with local education authorities in the areas that they serve. Since 1944, favourable waves of change have blown on the L.E.A.'s attitudes to work in closer collaboration with the responsible bodies. The extension of years of schooling since 1947 has started to show its effect on an increasing popular demand for adult education. In response, the L.E.A.'s have attempted to develop better attitudes toward the activation of 'varied and comprehensive' adult education service that they were called upon by the 1944 Act to secure. Such change in the L.E.A.'s attitudes is seen as 'a lasting one which will leave them more fully committed to adult education than most of them ever have been before.' (226)

Though partnership has not yet been investigated on the national level, the extent has been estimated by Peers (1972) as 'close'. (227) The picture, is, nevertheless, characterized by complication. On the one hand, in each area may be found a number of borough and county authorities, the trace of partnership among whom may require close examination of each

case separately. On the other hand, one extra-mural department may serve a number of counties, and hence, extra-mural boundaries are very often across county boundaries. In some cases, the reverse happens with one authority dealing, as Peers has found, with several universities and W.E.A. districts.⁽²²⁸⁾ The boundaries of the new local education authorities (after 1973) are shown in figure 8.I3

Figure 8.I3

The Boundaries of the New Local Authorities of Education ⁽²²⁹⁾

IMAGES REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES



Positive threefold partnership is found where progressive L.E.A.'s are found. This might be illustrated by the close partnership between various partners. The extended committees that have been established by some L.E.A.'s are such that they include the membership of Further Education sub-committee together with representatives of the universities concerned, W.E.A. as well as voluntary bodies.⁽²³⁰⁾ Another bright outcome of the partnership policy is the rising movement to establish multi-adult education centres in which all types of adult education can find a home, with common-room facilities and provision for light refreshments and accomodation for necessary activities.⁽²³¹⁾ This is especially found in East Midland counties of Derbyshire, Lincolnshire and Nottinghamshire where positive partnership between L.E.A.'s and responsible bodies is evident. While the L.E.A. maintains the premises, the teaching costs are shared by responsible bodies. University adult education tutor acts as warden.⁽²³²⁾

However, reflection on what has actually been achieved in co-operation and co-ordination between partners indicates that the outcomes do not fully realize the sought aims. On the one hand, location of areas of functioning for various partners to cover the whole country by adult education service is far from being achieved. Confusion still reigns in so far as the boundaries between the local education authorities, the universities and the Workers' Education Association districts are concerned. Uneven distribution and overlapping boundaries may be deduced from Figure 8. 14.

Figure 8.14

Existing Boundaries of Major Providers of Adult Education⁽²³³⁾

IMAGES REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES



Such condition has cinvinced Ellwood (1976) that, 'In the case of the three major providers there is need for re-assessment of adequacy of provision and spheres of influence. At present there is patchy development and overlapping of interests which is the result of accidental growth.'⁽²³⁴⁾

However, prospects of a better organization in the future are not lacking. According to the new 1973 local government organization the number of the L.E.A.'s in England and Wales is about half their previous number. Also there is a possibility that in the case of W.E.A. districts and extra-mural departments which followed county borders before the above-mentioned re-organization, will possibly adjust with changes. Of the universities that have 'rationalised their own extra-mural boundaries' are Manchester and Liverpool, Newcastle and Durham. (235)

Consultation between the major providing bodies is one aspect in which partnership has not been fulfilled adequately. For the financial role towards the responsible bodies, the L.E.A.'s are actually represented on extra-mural boards. Besides, many of them have established joint consultative committees for adult education which comprise in their membership representatives of university, W.E.A. and voluntary bodies together with Further Education Sub-committees. Such committees mainly work for co-ordination. However, three reservations have to be taken into account:

1. That not all local education authorities have adopted the consultative machinery mentioned above.
2. That where consultative committees do exist, meetings are sometimes infrequent and formal.
3. That consultation depends, in the last resort, on personalities and personal relationships. Hence, it is far from being a rule objectively observed by all. (236)

Partnership between the L.E.A.'s and the responsible bodies has not run through the way that was hoped for. Each side has his suspicions in the intentions of the other for driving the policy of partnership forward. What is more important, is that the conflict is illustrative of differences between the individuals in each sector who have two basically different modes of thinking.⁽²³⁷⁾ The still existent conflict between the L.E.A.'s and the responsible bodies is associated with three types of difference which have served to prevent the accomplishment of close partnership between the two:

Firstly, there is the unfounded variation in the financial arrangements under which workers in each type are treated. Evening institutes' principals have their stipends and even reputation considered by the number of students enrolled and the fees collected. The character of what is provided is consequently affected as the arrangement serves 'to load the scales in favour of quantity rather than quality, to reward those who stick to popular subjects and undemanding tutors and discourage those who want to develop and maintain minority interests and high standards of work.'⁽²³⁸⁾ The case on the other front is widely different. A tutor affiliated to the responsible bodies may be paid three or four times as much as the one affiliated to the L.E.A. classes, though Wiltshire states that the difference is ^{now} 'much narrower' than before.⁽²³⁹⁾

Financial arrangements that do not treat partners in the same task with equal measure must be assumed to have their influence on the policy of evening classes, on the workers in them, and on the partnership policy between the L.E.A.'s and responsible bodies.

Secondly, there is the difficulty of bringing together two partners with different patterns of organization. In so far as the partnership between the L.E.A.'s and the W.E.A. is concerned, difficulties have been, until present, unsolved. The W.E.A. basically differs in its organization from the L.E.A. in that the former is not only a providing body but is also an organizing body and a national educational movement. Its partnership with the L.E.A.'s is conditioned by settlement of organisational matters like student fees and allegiance of students which are more difficult than the case with university. The argument is licidly given by Professor Wiltshire:

"It (W.E.A.) cannot be expected to relinquish its claim on students' fees without some compensation, for fee income is an important part of its budget as a voluntary organisation. It cannot be expected to relinquish its claim upon the allegiance of students, for it is natural and propoer that it should seek to bring class members into active participation in the WEA at branch, district and national level. Can this allegiance to the WEA be allied to allegiance to the local institute?"(240)

If we move to problems of partnership within the responsible bodies themselves, aims of policy cannot be achieved meanwhile the seeds of competition between providers have grown since 1944. It is true that consultation between universities and the W.E.A. has been looked after through the university joint committee organization. However, in most cases, consultation has been effective only in so far as the W.E.A.' demand for tutorial and other extra-mural classes are concerned. In other types of courses, consultation is evidently ineffective ^{particularly} for the ones provided independently by each partner (241) Enough studies on such a point have as yet not been made, but it is significant

to quote what one Director of Extra-mural Department has reported as regards the effectiveness of consultation in some regions:

"We have a regional committee, on paper such a committee is indispensable, joining together the W.E.A., the L.E.A. and the university. In practice it is absolutely futile, all such co-ordinating and regional bodies tend to be ruled by the particularism of the constituent members - each bit takes care that such a committee will not reduce its autonomy." (242)

This spirit of 'particularism' is giving rise to undesirable competition in areas where the relationship between the universities and the W.E.A. is not so close. Indicators do exist that, whereas many W.E.A. districts are anxious to maintain their provision jointly with the universities, they could not resist the charm of having as much independent programmes as possible, a trend which Peers attributes partly to their attempt to justify the grants they receive from the W.E.A. and partly for prestige. (243) This trend may be shown from table 8.4.

Table 8.4

Types of Courses Provided by Universities and the W.E.A.
1968-1969 (244)

	Tutorial (incl. II8 2-year	Sessional	Terminal	Shorter (3 meetings to 6+)
Universities	760	2.662	1.702	1.563
W.E.A.	--	1.154	2.240	1.481

The close partnership between the universities and the W.E.A., that was envisaged by policies since 1944, has not fully reached the aspired for aims. This is caused by difficulties that, so far, could not be overcome on both parts.

On the one hand, a change to the worse is recorded by some academics in so far as the universities' zeal for adult education is concerned.⁽²⁴⁵⁾ Their leading role until the 1950's, which was blessed by the Ashby Committee (1954) seemed to wane afterwards, what Wiltshire expressed in that 'they no longer feel for adult education the sympathy and interest which they once did.'⁽²⁴⁶⁾ Whether this waning has stemmed from academic changes and the shift throughout the last fifty years, in British universities, from the domination of humanities to science and technology; or to the loss of the strong drive that they had felt before 1944 of their responsibility to do justice to those who were unfairly denied their rights for education, the matter that concerns us is that the spirit of partnership has been affected by these together. It is plausible that 'the sense of obligation which impelled the Universities into extension and extra-mural activities between 1870 and 1945 is weakened or destroyed.'⁽²⁴⁷⁾

On the other hand, the W.E.A., after 1944, could not give ample orientation to its scope of work in proportion with the change in educational opportunities by the 1944 Act. It failed throughout the 1950's and until present to agree on a specific definition of the sectors from which it draws its clientele. This, in turn, has been associated with its inability to define the term 'worker'. Change was urged since 1948 when the Shrewbury Branch called upon the annual conference of the W.E.A. to consider that in the present society, everyone may be taken as a 'worker' and that by its present areas of interest, the W.E.A. assumes to foster education among all

sectors of the community irrespective of the way by which they earned their living.⁽²⁴⁸⁾ The distinctions made by Professor Raybould (1948) in interpreting the term 'worker' included, besides the broad 'universal' definition that takes 'worker' to signify one who works, two others: the institutional and the educational. The former defines a worker in terms of membership to trade unions, co-operative societies .., etc. The latter which is echoed by the 1948 annual conference, takes worker as 'educationally underprivileged'.⁽²⁴⁹⁾ The types of work that are undertaken by the W.E.A. as a provider and organiser of 'non-vocational adult education' give the chance to many, mostly from the university, to accuse it of stagnation and inability to cope with the spirit of the age. To Roy Shaw (1959),⁽²⁵⁰⁾ it tries to justify its existence by using a variable definition of 'worker' that best suits circumstances. For assuming allegiance of trade unionist education, it raises an 'institutional' definition. When the case is concerned with the education of other people, it sticks to the 'universal' definition.⁽²⁵¹⁾ It is hence understandable that competition with the universities is turning into a conflict affecting partnership between responsible bodies providing adult education. Professor Cole's warning has to be reflected upon by the W.E.A. if active partnership is to be driven forward:

"..... The W.E.A. cannot have it both ways. It cannot be general adult education provider and at the same time the educational representative of the working-class movement." (252)

Notes - Chapter Eight

1. BOARD OF EDUCATION, Educational Reconstruction. cmd. 6458. op.cit.
2. Adult education after the War, report of an enquiry made for the British Institute of Adult Education. London: Oxford University Press, 1945.
3. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (Britain), The Organization and Finance of adult education in England and Wales, report of the committee appointed by the Minister of Education in June 1953 (The Ashby Report). London: H.M.S.O., 1954.
4. Adult education after the War. op.cit. p. I
see also DENT, H. C. A new order in English education. London: University Press Ltd., October 1942. p. 70.
5. WILTSHIRE, H. 'The great tradition in university adult education', in A. Rogers (ed.), The spirit and the form, essays in adult education by and in honour of Professor Harold Wiltshire. Nottingham, at the University, Department of Adult Education, 1976.
6. *ibid.* p. 33.
7. SHEARMAN, H. C. Adult education for democracy. London: W.E.A., 1944. p. 56.
8. see KELLY, T. A history of adult education in Great Britain. 2nd edition. Liverpool, at the University Press, 1970. p. 361.
also The Ashby Report, op.cit., p. 35, para. 84.
9. BOARD OF EDUCATION, Teachers and Youth Leaders, report of the committee appointed by the President of the Board of Education to consider the supply, recruitment and training of teachers and youth leaders. (The McNair Report). London: H.M.S.O. 1944.
10. The Percy Report, op.cit. p. 5, para. 2.
11. The Barlow Report, op.cit., pp. 3-10, particularly p. 6, para. 15.
12. The Percy Report, op.cit., p. 5, para. 2.
13. HOLMES, B. 'The reform of English education under the 1944/Act', in Year Book of Education, 1956. London: London University and Teachers' College, Columbia by Evans Brothers, 1956. p. 229.
14. DENT. H. C. A new order, op.cit. pp. 70-71.
15. LIVINGSTONE, Sir R. The future in education. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1942. p. 2.
16. *ibid.*
17. HALSEY, A. H. SHEEHAN, J. and VAIZEY, J. 'Schools',
in A. H. Halsey (ed.) Trends in British society since 1900: a guide to the changing social structure of Britain. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1972. Table 6.1, p. 136.

18. Oxford and Working-Class Education, report of a joint committee of University and working class representatives on the relation of the university to the higher education of workpeople. 2nd edition. London: Oxford University Press, 1909.
- see also PASHLEY, B. W. University extension reconsidered. Leicester, University of Leicester, Department of Adult Education, 1968. pp. 4- 38.
19. DENT, H. C. Education in transition: a sociological study of the impact of war on English education 1939-1943. 5th edition. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1948. p. 145.
20. *ibid.*
21. *ibid.*
22. LIVINGSTONE, R. The future in education, *op.cit.*, p. 40.
23. Adult education after the war, *op.cit.*, p. 2.
24. *ibid.*
25. see LIVINGSTONE, R. The future in education, *op.cit.*, Chapter I, pp. 1-32.
- also LIVINGSTONE, R. Education for a world adrift, *op.cit.* Chapter I, pp. 1-27.
26. READ, H. The politics of the unpolitical. Quoted by H. C. Dent, Education in transition, *op.cit.*, p. 154.
27. LIVINGSTONE, R. 'Adult education', in R. W. Moore (ed.), Education: today and tomorrow. London: Michael Joseph Ltd., 1945. p. 170.
28. Adult education after the war, *op.cit.*, p. 6.
29. BRUCE, M. The coming of the welfare state. London: B. T. Batsford Ltd., 1961. p. 262.
30. Let us face the future, *op.cit.*
31. *ibid.* p. 1.
32. A rebel for the right reasons: a selection of speeches and writings by Hugh Fraser. Stafford: C. G. Hodgkinson, September 1975. p. 13.
33. *ibid.* p. 15.
34. Quoted by DENT, H. C. Education in transition. *op.cit.*, p. 170.
35. Quoted by LANE, P. A history of post-war Britain. London: Macdonald & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1971. p. 99.
36. Quoted by DENT, H. C. Education in transition, *op.cit.*, p. 182.
37. The Beveridge Report. *op.cit.*
38. BAIN, G. S. et al. 'The labour force', in A. H. Halsey (ed.), *op.cit.* Table 4.9, p. 120.
39. Further Education (Pamphlet No. 8), *op.cit.*, p. 5.
40. DENT, H. C. A new order, *op.cit.*, p. 73.
41. *ibid.* p. 14.
42. SHEARMAN, H. C. *op.cit.*, p. 6.

43. Adult education after the war, op.cit., p. 6.
44. *ibid.*
45. LIVINGSTONE, R. The future in education, op.cit., p. 40.
46. SHEARMAN, H. C. op.cit., p. 8.
47. see LANE, P. op.cit., p. 99.
48. BOARD OF EDUCATION, Educational Reconstruction, op.cit.
49. Quoted by the Asbhby Report, op.cit. Appendix 8, p. 66.
50. LOWE, J. Adult education in England and Wales: a critical survey. London: Michael Joseph Limited, 1970. p. 34.
51. DENT, H. C. A new order ..., op.cit., p. 73.
52. LIVINGSTONE, R. The future in education, op.cit. p. 85, also preface pp. vii-viii.
53. *ibid.* preface, p. vii.
54. *see* pp. 360 - 432.
55. ELLWOOD, C. Adult learning today: a new role for the universities?. Sage Studies in Social and Educational Change. London: Sage Publications, 1976. p. 89.
56. LOWE, J. Adult education in England and Wales, op.cit., p. 36.
57. DENT, H. C. The Education Act 1944. 12th edition. London: at the University Press, 1968. p. 12.
58. Quoted by PEERS, R. Fact and possibility in English education. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963. p. 39
59. HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1924, 174, p. 1435.
60. BOARD OF EDUCATION, The Education of the Adolescent, report of the Consultative Committee. London: H.M.S.O., 1926.
61. BOARD OF EDUCATION, Report of the Consultative Committee on Secondary Education with Special Reference to Grammar Schools and Technical High Schools. (The Spens Report). London: H.M.S.O., 1939. p. 3II, para. 19. In dealing with the 'school leaving age', the report saw that it was inadequate. Hence, it recommended secondary education to be continued from the age of 11 to the age of 16. Quoting the report:
- "The advance in the school-leaving age will, however, in our judgment, receive even greater impetus from the general recognition of the parity of secondary schools. The adoption of a minimum leaving-age of 16 years may not be immediately attainable, but in our judgment must even now be envisaged as inevitable."
62. DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON JUVENILE EDUCATION IN RELATION TO EMPLOYMENT AFTER THE WAR, Final Report, Vol. I. London: H.M.S.O., 1917. p. 12, para. 21. The report came to judge 'compulsory continuation classes' to be:
- "the remedy to which educational and social reformers look with the greatest confidence as a step towards the final solution of the juvenile problems. There are, of course, no substitution for a sound early education, but such education, when it terminates at 14, or even at 15 leaves the child with intellect and character still unformed"

(cont.)

at perhaps the most critical stage of his development, when both his mental and physical life are at the maximum of instability."

63. MINISTRY OF RECONSTRUCTION (Britain), The 1919 report on adult education, op.cit.

64. ibid. p. 5.

65. The 1944 Act, Sections 41-47.

66. DENT, H. C. A new order ..., op.cit. p. 70.

67. Learning to live, op.cit., p. 35.

68. The 1944 Act, Section 44.

69. NUFFIELD COLLEGE, The future of men and women: a task of the 1944 Act. London: Oxford University Press, 1946.

70. ibid. p. 3.

71. BOARD OF EDUCATION, Educational Reconstruction, op.cit.

72. ibid. pp. 19-20.

73. JEPSON, N. A. 'The local authorities and adult education', in S. G. Raybould (ed.), Trends in English adult education. London: Heinemann Ltd., 1959. p. 96.

Jepson also quotes Dr. Venables' words before one adult education conference that, "although some links exist between the technical colleges and adult education organizations they are tenuous and there is really no active partnership at the present time."

74. LOWE, J. Adult education in England and Wales, op.cit., p. 281.

75. BOARD OF EDUCATION, Educational Reconstruction, op.cit.

76. ROYAL COMMISSION ON SECONDARY EDUCATION, Report of the commissioners. London: Eyre and Spootiswoode for H.M.S.O., 1895.

77. ibid. Vol. I, pp. 256-273.

78. The 1899 Act (Board of Education Act). (Ch. 33 - Vict. 62 & 63). Article 2-(I) states that the Board of Education shall take the place of the Education Department (including the Department of Science and Art).

Article 3- (I) The Board of Education may, by their officers, or after taking the advice of the Consultative Committee....., by any University or other organisation, inspect any school supplying secondary education and desiring it to be inspected

Article 3- (2) The council of any county or county borough may, out of any money applicable for the purposes of technical education, pay or contribute to the expenses of inspecting under this section any school within their county or borough.

79. ibid., article 3-(I).

80. The 1944 Act. op.cit., Part I, para. I.
81. ibid. Section 99.
- see also BURGESS, T. A guide to English schools. 3rd edition. Middlesex, Penguin Books Ltd., 1972. p. 25.
82. ibid. Section 68.
83. SMITH, W. O. L. Education: an introductory survey. 2nd edition. Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1966. p. 137.
84. The 1944 Act. op.cit. Section 4.
85. SMITH, W. O. L. op.cit. pp. 148-149.
86. Education Act, 1902: an act to make further provision with respect to education in England and Wales, 18 December, 1902. (Ch. 42 - 2 EDW). Article 2- (I) of the Act reads as follows:
- "The local education authority will consider the educational needs of their area and take such steps as seem to them desirable", after consultation with the Board of Education, to supply or aid to supply of education other than elementary, and to promote the general co-ordination of all forms of education, and for that purpose shall apply all or so much as they deem necessary of the residue under section one of the Local Taxation Act 1890".
87. MINISTRY OF RECONSTRUCTION, The 1919 report on Adult Education, op.cit. p. 170.
88. The 1921 Act. Section 86.
89. JEPSON, N. A. op.cit., p. 83.
90. The Ashby Report, op.cit. p. 34, para. 83.
91. JEPSON, N. A. p. 84.
92. LOWE, J. Adult education in England and Wales, op.cit., p. 43.
93. Adult education after the war. op.cit. pp. 41-42.
94. ibid. p. 41.
95. The 1944 Act. Section 41.
96. BOARD OF EDUCATION, Educational Reconstruction, op.cit. p. 23.
97. Quoted by LOWE, J. Adult education in England and Wales, op.cit., p. 273.
98. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, Further Education (Pamphlet No.8). op.cit., p. 32, para. 77.
99. ibid. p. 12, para. 20.
100. ibid. p. 8, para. 10.
101. Adult education after the war. op.cit., p. 2
- It is noteworthy that an influential figure on the educational policy of those times, like Livingstone, uses terms like the 'untouched' and 'untouchable' in almost the same sense above.
- see LIVINGSTONE, R. The future in education. op.cit. pp. 40-41.
102. BOARD OF EDUCATION, Educational Reconstruction, op.cit.
103. Adult education after the war. op.cit. p. 43.
104. ibid. p. 57.

- I05. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, Further Education, op.cit. p. 32.
- I06. *ibid.* p. 6.
- I07. Adult education after the war, op.cit., p. 37.
- I08. SHEARMAN, H. C. op.cit., p. 56.
- I09. The Ashby Report, op.cit. p. 35, para. 85.
- II0. *ibid.* p. 35, para. 86.
- III. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE. Adult education: a plan for development (The Russell Report) - report by a committee of inquiry appointed by the Secretary of State for Education and Science under the chairmanship of Sir Lionel Russell.
London: H.M.S.O., 1973. p. xi.
- II2. PEERS, R. Adult education, a comparative study. 3rd edition.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972.
- II3. *ibid.* p. II2.
- II4. *ibid.* p. II7.
- II5. The Ashby Report. op.cit., p. I7, para. 40.
- II6. Quoted by the Ashby Report, *ibid.*, p. 9, para. 23.
- II7. The Ashby Report, *ibid.* p. IO, para. 24.
also see PEERS, R. op.cit. pp. 97-IO2 and II9.
- II8. LOWE, J. Adult education in England and Wales, op.cit., p. 38.
- II9. The Ashby Report, op.cit., p. 39, para. 97.
- I20. LOWE, J. Adult Education in England and Wales. op.cit., pp.43-44.
also MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, Circular 6I, Revised regulations for Further Education, August I945.
- I2I. LOWE, J. *ibid.* p. 44. I22. *ibid.*
- I23. MINISTRY OF RECONSTRUCTION, The I9I9 report on Adult Education, op.cit. p. II0.
- I24. The Russell Report, op.cit., p. 8I, para. 242.
also The Ashby Report, op.cit., pp. 39-40, para. 98-I00.
- In line with such argument, the Ashby Committee recommended that:
"Local education authorities should be encouraged to aid adult education by contributing toward the administrative costs of responsible bodies and by providing accomodation free of charge, in addition to the direct provision they themselves make."
(Summary and Recommendations, p. 48, para. I20)
- also Further Education (Pamphlet No. 8), op.cit., p. 40, para. 93.
- I25. Further Education (Pamphlet No. 8), *ibid.*
- I26. ELLWOOD, C. op.cit., p. 42.
- I27. Adult education after the war, op.cit., p. 48.
- I28. *ibid.* pp. 48-49.
- I29. Further Education (Pamphlet No. 8), op.cit., p. 32, para. 76.
- I30. *ibid.* p. 40, para. 93.

I31. ibid. p. 42, para. 99.

I32. The Ashby Report, op.cit., p. 37, para. 92.

I33. ibid.

I34. ibid. p. I6, para. 38.

I35. ibid. pp. I3-I4, para. 38.

I36. ibid. p. I3, para. 30.

I37. Adult education after the war, op.cit., p. 49.

I38. Further Education (Pamphlet No. 8), op.cit., p. 43, para. I00.

I39. ibid.

I40. The Ashby Report, op.cit., p. 35, para. 84-86.

also The Russell Report, op.cit., pp. 49-5I, para. I49-I54.

The Russell Report states:

"We consider the traditional partnership between statutory and voluntary agencies to be a valuable feature of social organisation in this country and particularly appropriate to adult education."
(Russell, p. 50, para.I53)

I41. The I944 Act. op.cit., Section 4I.

I42. ibid. Section 42/4.

I43. ibid.

I44. Further Education (Pamphlet No. 8). op.cit., p. I2, para. I8.

I45. ibid., para. I9.

I46. see PEERS, R. Adult education, a comparative study. op.cit., p. III.

I47. ibid.

I48. The Ashby Report. op.cit., p. I7, para. 39.

I49. ibid. p. I2, para. 28.

I50. see KELLY, T. op.cit., p. 370.

I51. UNIVERSITIES COUNCIL FOR ADULT EDUCATION. University adult education in the later twentieth century. London: U.C.A.E., I970. p. 23.

I52. ibid.

I53. KELLY, T. op.cit., p. 344.

I54. ibid.

I55. The Russell Report. op.cit., p. I.

I56. ibid.

I57. ROGERS, J. and GROOMBRIDGE, B. op.cit.

I58. ibid. p. I9.

I59. LOWE, J. Adult education in England and Wales, op.cit., pp. 27-28.

I60. TOYNBEE, B. 'Relations between adult education-providing bodies in England', in A. Rogers (ed.), op.cit. p. 85.

I61. The I899 Act, op.cit., article I- (I).

I62. HARDIE, J. L. Education and the community: the State and the school. London: Art and Educational Publishers, January I947. p. 8.

- I63. LOWNDES, G. A. N. op.cit., (Graph 'B'), p. 33.
- I64. ibid. (Graph 'C'), p. 34.
- I65. LOWE, J. Adult education in England and Wales. op.cit., pp. 23-29.
- I66. ELWOOD, C. op.cit.
- I67. ibid. p. 65.
- I68. ibid. p. 66.
- I69. TOYNBEE, B. op.cit., p. 86.
- I70. WILTSHIRE, H. 'Towards co-operation: responsible bodies and the L.E.A.', in A. Rogers, ^(ed.) op.cit., p. 91.
- I71. The Russell Report, op.cit. List of recommendations, p. xi.
also p. 53, para. 159.
- I72. ibid. p. 27, para. 81.
- I73. ibid. pp. 31-32, para. 92.
- I74. CLYNE, P. The disadvantaged adult: education and social needs of minority groups. London: Longman Group Ltd., 1972. p. 7.
- I75. ibid.
- I76. ibid. p. 6.
- I77. LOWE, J. Adult education in England and Wales. op.cit. p. 27.
- I78. RUDDOCK, R. "A time for attack", Adult Education (Britain), Vol. 46, No. 6, March 1974. pp. 372-376.
- I79. ROGERS, J. and GROOMBRIDGE, B. op.cit., pp. 19-20.
- I80. Churchill's reply to the resolution sent by Trades Union Congress in February 1953. Quoted by the Asby Report, op.cit. Appendix 8, p. 66.
- I81. It is reported in some references that Lord Eccles, former Minister of Education, admitted that 'while he appreciated the value of programmes (of adult education) being arranged, he looked upon them as a luxury for which the people should be prepared to pay the economic price.' see LOWE, J. Adult education in England and Wales, op.cit., p. 35. This has also been ascertained in a more recent study by Rogers and Groombridge, referred to earlier. ^{Amidst} their attempt to show the marginality of adult education to British governments, they state that:
- "Lord Eccles was recently big enough to confess, after all these years, that when he was Minister of Education he ought to have done more about adult education. There is no sign as yet that any of his successors recognize that." (Rogers and Groombridge, op.cit., p. 13)
- I82. see KELLY, T. op.cit., p. 342.
- I83. An initial target in the prospects of the Russell Report (1973) is to raise the present number of adult students attending classes from the present level of 2 millions to the double within five or seven years. (The Russell Report. op.cit., pp. x-xi, para. 4-6)
- I84. TOYNBEE, B. op.cit. p. 86. In this way, Toynbee is recalling Professor Wiltshire's view. see the argument in ROGERS (ed.), op.cit. pp. 99-II4.

- I85. The Russell Report. op.cit., p. x, para. 4.
- I86. ibid.
- I87. KELLY, T. A history of adult education op.cit., Figure 2, p. 351.
- I88. ibid. Figure 3, p. 352.
- I89. ibid. Figure 9, p. 358.
- I90. The Russell Report. op.cit., p. 28, para. 83.
also LOWE, J. Adult education in England and Wales. op.cit., p. 44.
also KELLY, T. ibid. p. 343.
- I91. The statistics of the Russell Report stopped at 1968/1969 due to the difficulty of getting statistics at the national level. The inadequacy of available statistics was hence, condemned although the report recognized sympathetically 'the Department's difficulties in obtaining reliable statistics for a field of education in which categories of institutions, of students and classes and of staff overlap in so many ways'. (The Russell Report, op.cit., p. 138, para. 418, and p. xxii, para. II4).
- I92. WILTSHIRE, H. and MEE, G. Structure and performance in adult education, London: Longman Group Limited, 1978.
- I93. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE, Circular No. 15/67.
- I94. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE, Circular No. 14/75.
- I95. WILTSHIRE, H. and MEE, G. op.cit. Table 10.3, p. 100.
- I96. ibid. p. 101.
- I97. CORBETT, A. Much to do about education: a critical survey of the fate of the major educational reports. 2nd edition.
London: Council for Educational Advance, 1969. p. 1.
- I98. O. E. C. D. Reviews of National Policies for Education, Educational development strategy in England and Wales. Paris: O.E.C.D., 1975. p. 34.
- I99. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE, Education: a framework for expansion. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Education and Science, December 1972. cmd. 5174.
London: H.M.S.O. p. 2.
200. ibid. p. 1.
201. O. E. C. D. Educational development strategy, op.cit. p. 34.
202. The Russell Report, op.cit., pp. 2-3, para. 8.
203. ibid. p. 16, para. 50.
204. ibid. p. 1, para. 3.
205. ibid. p. 20, para. 61.
206. KELLY, T. "Two reports: 1919 and 1973", Studies in Adult Education (Britain), Vol. 5, No. 2, October 1973. p. 116.

207. WOODS, N. "A framework for co-operative ventures in continuing education", Adult Education (Britain), Vol. 48, No. 3, September 1975. pp. 162-169.
208. *ibid.*
209. LOWE, J. Adult education in England and Wales. op.cit. pp. 23-29.
210. WILTSHIRE, H. : 'A future of non-vocational adult education', in A. Rogers (ed.), op.cit., p. 100.
211. KELLY, T. "Two reports: 1919 and 1973", op.cit. p. 121.
Kelly takes the failure of the Russell Report to deal comprehensively with the field of adult education as contradictory to its being 'a plan for the development of adult education'. He takes this as 'The most serious defect of the Russell Report'.
212. *ibid.*
213. WILTSHIRE, H. 'A future of non-vocational adult education', in A. Rogers (ed.), op.cit. p. 100.
214. KELLY, T. "Two reports: 1919 and 1973", op.cit., p. 121.
215. LOWE, J. Adult education in England and Wales, op.cit. p. 25.
216. see *ibid.* p. 39.
217. *ibid.*
218. *ibid.* p. 40.
219. The Russell Report, op.cit. p. xi.
220. *ibid.* pp. 53-54, para. 160.3.
221. Vide supra, pp. 368- 371
222. LOWE, J. Adult education in England and Wales. op.cit., p. 41.
223. see vide supra, pp. 380- 385
224. PEERS, R. Adult education, a comparative study. op.cit., p. 109.
225. The Ashby Report. pp. 22-23, para. 45-49.
226. WILTSHIRE, H. 'Towards co-operation: responsible bodies and L.E.A.'s', in A. Rogers (ed.), op.cit., p. 92.
227. PEERS, R. Adult education, a comparative study, op.cit., p. 107.
228. *ibid.*
229. ^LELWOOD, C. op.cit. p. 93.
230. PEERS, R. Adult education, a comparative study, op.cit. p. 107.
231. *ibid.* p. III.
232. *ibid.*
233. ^LELWOOD, C. op.cit., p. 92.
234. *ibid.* p. 91.
235. *ibid.*
236. PEERS, R. Adult education, a comparative study, op.cit. p. 118.
237. WILTSHIRE, H. 'Towards co-operation: responsible bodies and the L.E.A.'s', in A. Rogers (ed.), op.cit., pp. 92-93.

238. *ibid.* p. 93.

239. *ibid.*

240. *ibid.*

241. PEERS, R. Adult education, a comparative study. *op.cit.*, pp. II4-II5.

242. Quoted by ELLWOOD, C. *op.cit.*, p. 91.

243. PEERS, R. Adult education, a comparative study, *op.cit.*, pp. II4-II5.

244. *ibid.* p. II5.

245. WILTSHIRE, H. 'A future for non-vocational adult education',
in A. Rogers (ed.), *op.cit.*, p. IO3.

246. *ibid.*

247. *ibid.* p. IO4.

248. see SHAW, R. 'Controversies', in S. G. Raybould (ed.) Trends in
English adult education, *op.cit.* p. I85.

249. *ibid.* p. I86.

250. *ibid.*

251. *ibid.*

252. Quoted by SHAW, R. *ibid.*