Police Legitimacy among Immigrants in Europe: Institutional Frames and Group Position

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Recent research has indicated that a wide range of factors – beyond performance – can shape the legitimacy of the police (e.g. Jackson et al. 2013; Antrobus et al. 2015; Mehozay and Factor 2016). The ways in which people experience not just policing but also their wider social, cultural and economic environment – and the location of police *and* policed within structures of power, authority and affect – have important effects on lay judgements of this foundational state institution (Weitzer and Tuch 2006) and, in turn, its empirical legitimacy.

In this paper we consider how occupying one particular 'location' in society explains variation in people's judgements of police legitimacy. We investigate the extent to which the socio-structural position and experiences of immigrants predicts attitudes towards the 'rightful authority' of the police. The presence of growing immigrant populations in many European countries has become a topic of fierce political debate, often revolving directly or indirectly around the bond between immigrants and the institutions of their new home (Anderson 2013). In particular, the relationship between the police and immigrant groups is frequently painted as being almost inevitably problematic. Immigrant populations are often young, economically disadvantaged and composed of people who, in the context within which they live, are from ethnic, racial and religious minorities: all characteristics known to predict negative experiences of police. The increasing criminalization of migration – or, at the very least, the well documented turn toward the use of criminal justice actors to regulate and control migration – adds another set of reasons for imagining immigrants will be at best wary of police (Weber 2011; Armenta 2016; van der Woude and Brouwer 2017). Theorists and commentators on, and beyond, the political right have argued that immigration undermines social and cultural norms, and a sense of shared community (e.g. Goodhart 2013; West 2013). Police garner trust and legitimacy when people feel a shared sense of belonging, inclusion, and shared values (Jackson

et al 2013); but immigrants, it is claimed, are less likely to feel a sense of 'social solidarity' with those around them, and therefore with the police (c.f. Putnam 2007).

Yet, the available evidence suggests a more nuanced picture. Strikingly, analysis of large-scale surveys such as the European Social Survey (ESS) (Röder and Mühlau 2012), the Crime Survey of England and Wales (Bradford et al. 2016), and World Values Survey (Nannestad et al. 2014) suggests that, at least in some contexts, immigrants' views of the police can actually be *more positive* on average than those of their native-born counterparts. One possible explanation focuses on the change in 'institutional frames' that immigrants experience as they move from origin to destination countries. In a paper that foreshadowed the current contribution, Röder and Mühlau (2012) found that across 21 European countries, immigrants who had moved from high to low corruption countries had higher levels of trust in the police than the native-born (see also Röder and Mühlau 2011): immigrants may judge the trustworthiness of the police in the destination country partly on the basis of the (un)trustworthiness of the police in the origin country.

This paper advances the literature in three ways. First, we draw upon data from Round 5 of the ESS, which contained an unusually rich collection of measures relating to police-public relations. The dataset used in this paper covers 27 countries, has a sample size of 52,458, and contains 4,962 first-generation immigrants hailing from a total of 166 countries. Second, we assess the relevance of institutional frames alongside important contextual factors. We include in our models a set of criminologically relevant variables as potential predictors of legitimacy – e.g. victimization and contact with the police – alongside measures of social and economic position and change in contexts association with migration. Third, while Röder and Muhlau (2012) addressed trust in the police, we consider legitimacy, a facet of public opinion often treated as a more proximate explanation for why people comply with the law and cooperate with the police – precisely the kinds of normative behaviour some argue that immigration undermines.

Our overall goal is to assess the extent to which a diverse range of factors explain variation in the legitimacy judgements of immigrants – and indeed non-immigrants – living in European countries. To anticipate our results, we find that change in institutional frames does

seem to influence immigrant's views of police. Broadly speaking, people who move from poorer countries with less effective justice systems to richer countries with more effective justice systems tend to grant more legitimacy to the police in the destination country. Yet, like others, views of police among immigrant populations are influenced by personal contact with officers *and* position within vertical and horizontal structures of social ordering.

What shapes police legitimacy among immigrants?

Global flows of migration are complex (Abel and Sander 2014), and a wide range of factors are likely to shape the legitimacy of the police among immigrant populations. These may include experiences of police (in destination and origin countries), the social and cultural characteristics of origin and destination countries, the strength of (and change in) affiliation with local, national and trans-national identities, and ideological stances toward institutions of order maintenance developed on one part of the world yet applied in another. We concentrate here on three sets of variables that relate to people's experiences of both policing and of being immigrants (or non-immigrants) in the county in which they reside: personal experience of police activity in the destination country; group position; and expectations or beliefs influenced by the change of institutional context associated with the act of immigration. Linking all three sets of predictors is the idea that police represent dominant social categories, and indeed the state itself, a point we return to at several points in the discussion below.

Contact with police

Personal contact with officers is one of the most reliable predictors of opinions about the police. Cross-sectional (e.g. Van Damme et al. 2015), longitudinal (e.g. Tyler and Fagan 2008) and experimental studies (e.g. Mazerolle et al. 2013) have consistently identified strong associations between recent contact with police and measures of trust, legitimacy, propensity for future cooperation, and related constructs. The nature of this association is often 'asymmetrical' (Skogan 2006), with contacts with officers judged to be unsatisfactory seemingly having a large negative effect on people's views of police, whereas those judged to be satisfactory tend to have a smaller (often much smaller) positive effect.

Research into what makes an encounter with a police officer satisfactory or unsatisfactory has revealed almost equally consistent findings. Across a wide range of research settings, the assessment of the procedural fairness of police behaviour has been found to be the central predictor not only of satisfaction with the specific encounter but also wider views of police (Mazerolle et al. 2014). This finding, and its putative causes, is particularly pertinent in the present context. One reason why police fairness seems to be so important to the policed is that officers represent important social categories and identities within particular contexts. Through the way they treat people, police communicate powerful messages concerning inclusion, status and value within superordinate social categories, which have been characterized as associated with nation, state and citizenship (e.g. Loader and Mulcahy 2003). People tend to be sensitive to officer behaviour, and react particularly negatively to perceived unfairness, in part because police activity is identity relevant to them – it can serve to weaken, damage or even negate their sense of self and their idea of where they 'fit' in society (Parmar 2011; Justice and Meares 2014).

These processes form an important bridge linking contact experiences with legitimacy: people are intensely attuned to the quality of officer behavior, making it salient in their wider judgements of police. And there is much to suggest that immigrant populations will have high levels of police contact, whether because police attention is concentrated on members of minority groups, a well-established phenomenon across multiple contexts (e.g. Adjami 2006; Goris et al. 2009; Tóth and Kádar 2012; Fassin 2015), or as a result of the increasingly blurred lines between immigration control, law and policing ('crimmigration' – Stumpf 2006). Empirical evidence concerning levels of police contact among immigrants compared with non-immigrants is mixed, however, with some studies reporting that immigrants are indeed more likely to have contact with police (Provine and Sanchez 2011; Añón et al. 2013; Theodore and Habans 2016) but others finding little or no association, or even that immigrants are less likely to have police contact (Davis and Hendricks 2007; Correia 2010).

Group position

Weitzer (2010) argues that police-minority relationships are influenced not only by contacts between minority group members and police but also by the extent to which the former are incorporated into the wider society (see also Weitzer and Tuch 2006). This would seem to apply equally to immigrant groups. The manner and extent to which a particular group is incorporated – or 'socially included' – will likely have important implications for relations with police, not least because the police represent the dominant order and reflect back to people their status and value within it. Indeed, an individual's relationship with police, as a specific state institution, seems likely to be imbricated with their relationship with the state in general. The legitimacy granted to one will reflect and refract the legitimacy granted to the other.

Drawing on Bobo's theory of group position (1999), Weitzer and Tuch (2006) extend this argument to include the objective characteristics of social groups and their location within cultural, political and economic hierarchies: group position will influence how group members conceive of institutions of social and political ordering. People will feel an affinity with institutions that serve their interests; members of groups that 'do well' out of current arrangements will tend to support the agencies tasked with maintaining them. By contrast members of socially excluded or marginalized groups will have less positive views: the legitimacy of the police may suffer when people feel that the system 'doesn't work for them' and may even be working against them. Moreover, the marginalization or exclusion of particular groups may trigger, for a variety of reasons, aggressive styles of policing that seek to control the tensions thus created – via higher levels of stop and search/frisk, for example – providing a link with the experiential factors outlined above. A key claim of this model is that once group position is taken into account, pairwise correlations between minority – or immigrant – status and views of the police should attenuate or even disappear.

Weitzer (2010: 130) identifies five potentially important groups of variables that may define the extent and form of a minority group's incorporation within the wider social order: voluntariness of initial incorporation (which might be very different for a native Romanian Gypsy compared with a Parisian living in London); socioeconomic status; ethno-cultural orientation; population size; and political power. Variables associated with these factors will locate a group vertically within hierarchies of power, wealth, authority and influence; and

horizontally within categories associated with nation, state and/or community. Vertical integration may predict differential experiences of police activity, most obviously via the well-established focus of police on those toward the bottom of the economic and political hierarchies, while horizontal integration may predict relations with police in a more symbolic sense. Since police are 'proto-typical' (Sunshine and Tyler 2003) group representatives, police legitimacy is influenced by identification with the group concerned (Oliveira and Murphy 2014). Members of groups that are associated more strongly with dominant social categories seem likely, all else equal, to grant police more legitimacy; not necessarily because they gain in an instrumental sense from their position within society, but because they feel they belong to, and are included in, the wider social group police represent.

Institutional frames

The final set of factors that may explain the legitimacy judgments of immigrants (versus native-born and in comparison with immigrants from different countries) is the change in institutional frames – or 'frames of reference' (Röder and Mühlau 2012) – they experience as a result of migration. When individuals move to a new context they may view the police, and other state institutions, through a lens developed in their country of origin. Alternatively, the extent to which they grant legitimacy to institutions in the destination country may be predicted by the quality of those institutions in comparison to equivalent institutions in their country of origin (Dinesen 2012; Nannestad et al. 2014). People who move from countries with corrupt, inefficient justice institutions may continue to view those in their destination country as corrupt and inefficient because they have been socialized to do so (Harris 2006); or, by contrast, they may compare the institutions in their new home favourably with those they experienced before. The lens people use to view police, in particular, may also concern the wider ability of the state to protect and properly serve its citizens. Indeed, because police are not merely part of the state apparatus but also represent it in embodied form, its legitimacy may be particularly likely to be influenced by wider perceptions of state performance and the general condition of society.

This last idea chimes with existing research on the predictors of legitimacy and public opinions of policing. Perceptions of the general level of corruption in a country, for example,

have been linked to views of the police (Thomassen 2013), as has 'system satisfaction' (Thomassen and Kääriänen 2016) and perceptions of government performance (Bradford et al. 2014). On a more local or visceral level, research in the US and UK has found that neighbourhood conditions – the extent of low level disorder, the strength of community cohesion – are strong predictors of police legitimacy (Jackson et al. 2013; Nix et al. 2015) as well as wider views of police (Sampson and Bartusch 1998). When local order seems well-established and strong the police, representatives of that order, gain public trust and legitimacy (Jackson and Bradford 2009). Successes – and failures – in dealing with problems of crime, and perhaps particularly violent crime, might also influence people's perceptions of police. It seems entirely plausible to suggest that moving from a more violent to a less violent society may well have an effect on one's views of the police.

There is some evidence that the change in institutional frames associated with migration influence views of the police, the weight of which seems to suggest that moving from a 'worse' to a 'better' institutional context is associated with an uplift in opinions. Röder and Mühlau (2012) found that having moved from a more to a less corrupt country was associated, on average, with more favourable views of police, while Bradford et al. (2016) found that immigrants from Africa and South Asia (many of whom will have come from countries with highly corrupt police and political systems) living in England and Wales trusted the police significantly more than non-immigrants. Nannestad et al. (2014) report similar findings, and conclude that better 'quality' institutions in destination countries (in their case, Denmark) is linked to higher levels of trust in those institutions among immigrants from countries with lower quality institutions.

Hypotheses
The weight of recent evidence suggests that immigrants may on average grant the police *more* legitimacy than non-immigrants. We hypothesize, however, that experiences of police (H1), group position (H2), and change in institutional frames associated with the act of immigration (H3) will also predict legitimacy; and that once these factors are taking into account any association between immigrant status and legitimacy will be attenuated (H4). We suggest, that

is, that one reason why immigrants might have different views of the police is that, compared with non-immigrants, they are located differently within the social order and have views of policing that are conditioned, in part, by comparisons with the institutions of their countries of origin.

Data and measures

Data

We draw on data from the ESS – a survey designed to chart and explain the interaction between Europe's changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour patterns of its diverse populations (www.europeansocialsurvey.org). The ESS is widely seen to be the highest quality cross-European survey. Although not all countries achieve it, the aspiration is that all should have probability samples of the adult (15 plus) population, with high response rates, interviewed face-to-face using CAPI (computer assisted personal interviewing). We draw primarily on the 'trust in justice' module included in Round 5 of the ESS, as well as items from elsewhere in the dataset made available to researchers. Fieldwork for Round 5 was completed in 2010/11; 28 countries took part; and a dataset of 27 countries became available in early 2012.[1] While patterns of immigration and policing may of course have developed since 2010/2011, the 2010/11 survey still represents a rare opportunity to estimate important patterns of association in 27 countries (and the rotating module on trust in justice has not yet 'rotated' – i.e. it has been fielded only once so far).

Our analysis here focuses on broad, aggregate patterns at the general population level of 27 countries – and not, most obviously, on relations between police and policed in local areas, nor on causal relationships between variables. It is, therefore, about establishing the potential for some high-level phenomenon for future studies to build upon and flesh out. In the UK, for example, we have seen general population surveys capturing patterns of police-citizen contact and the dynamics of procedural justice and legitimacy (e.g. Jackson et al. 2012). This work has set the context for more focused analysis on the neighbourhood context of police contact and

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[1] Data for the final country, Austria, were only made available much later and are excluded from the analysis presented here.

legitimacy (e.g. Jackson et al. 2013), on the one hand, and experimental studies considering how people judge police behaviour, on the other (e.g. Radburn et al. 2016).

Measuring police legitimacy

We take a dual component approach to measuring police legitimacy, such that we have two outcome variables for analysis (Jackson *et al.,* 2012; Hough *et al.,* 2013; Jackson 2015). On this account, the police can be said to be empirically legitimate when citizens believe (a) officers wield their power in normatively appropriate ways and (b) that they as, citizens of a given political community, have a positive moral duty to obey police instructions.

Three survey items tapped, first, into respondent's sense of *normative alignment* with police—the extent to which they believed that police act according to societal expectations regarding appropriate conduct. Asking people to agree or disagree with statements such as 'I generally support how the police usually act' tries to capture a series of linked propositions: first, that there are societal values regarding how legal authorities should wield their authority; second, that citizens' judgements about a legal authority's moral right to power revolve largely around the extent to which institutional actors are seen to act in ways that shows respect for these societal values; and third, that when people believe that legal authorities act appropriately, this reflects both the belief that the institution has the right to power and consequently that they, as citizens, should act in normatively appropriate ways (Jackson, 2015). Three further items tapped into respondents' sense that they had a *moral duty to obey* the instructions of police officers (e.g. 'To what extent is it your moral duty to back the decisions made by police even when you disagree with them?'). This component of legitimacy therefore relates to classic conceptions concerned with the ability of authorities to command willing obedience.

Police legitimacy can be defined in terms of reflective measurement, where it is assumed to be an unobservable psychological construct that can be measured by indirect indices, and that variation in such behavioural/attitudinal indicators can be attributed to variation in the underlying psychological construct. But measurement can also be approached in a formative way – by taking, that is, a more pragmatic approach in which answers to the various questions can be combined in some manner to constitute (to *form* not *reflect*) the construct of

interest. Multiple deprivation and socio-economic status are classic examples of concepts that are lend themselves well to formative measurement. The UK's index of multiple deprivation captures levels of neighbourhood deprivation along seven different dimensions, with a weighted mean produced to form the overall index (see for example DCLG 2015). The idea is that each of the seven dimensions can be sensibly measured using various statistics, and that it is useful to aggregate them together for analysis. In this paper we similarly take a formative approach to measurement – for each respondent we take the mean of the three indicators for each of normative alignment and duty to obey – because it represents a pragmatic and straightforward way to address issues of cross-national measurement equivalence (it is also standard in much the literature – see for example Murphy et al. 2008). We assume, then, that police legitimacy within a particular country, and across the 27 countries included in the analysis, can be assessed by taking the mean of the three indicators available for each component, and that the resulting indicator has the same substantive meaning across the individuals and countries included in the dataset.[2]

Potential predictors of police legitimacy

Immigrant status was included in the models as a set of dummy variables, with native-born as the reference category. The dummy variables variously represent (a) whether the respondent was a 'second generation immigrant' (i.e. both their parents had been born abroad), (b) whether they had arrived in their country of residence aged under 16, and (c) if they had arrived as adults the number of years since their first arrival (less than five, five to ten, 10 to 15, 15 to 20, and over 20). This design allows us to distinguish between those born into 'immigrant communities', those who migrated as children (the '1.5 generation' (Rumbaut 1994), and those who migrated as adults, and thus to take some account of the fact that immigration is not a 'state' but a 'process' through which people move.

  Experience of policing. ESS respondents were asked, first, if police in their country had approached, stopped or made contact with them for any reason in the last two years; second,

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[2] Normative alignment (mean 2.46; SD .79; min 1; max 5); duty to obey (mean 5.65; SD 2.61; min 0; max 10).

they were asked how satisfied they were with the conduct of the police on the last occasion this occurred (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). Police contact was entered into the models as three dummy variables, representing satisfactory contact, neutral contact, and unsatisfactory contact (the reference category was 'no contact').

Group position. Five measures of group position were included our models (see, again, Table 1). All concern the extent of political and socio-economic incorporation; the first three, however, relate more clearly to horizontal incorporation: the extent to which people feel they 'belong'. First, a binary indicator represented whether an individual was a citizen of the country in which they lived. Second, to measure experience of *ethnic discrimination* answers to a range of questions were combined into a binary indicator, which was coded 1 if a respondent indicated they were members of a group discriminated against on the grounds of colour or race, nationality, religion, language, or ethnic group. Third, *voting behaviour* was also captured by two dummy variables. The first was coded 1 if a respondent did not vote in the last national election because they were not eligible to vote, while the second was coded 1 if the respondent did not vote in the last election but *was* eligible to vote (the reference category was therefore 'voted in the last national election'). Disengagement (or exclusion) from political activity is a well-recognized indicator of social exclusion (Burchardt et al. 1999|).

The remaining measures of group position relate primarily to vertical incorporation and, specifically, to economic security. *Unemployment* captures the objective experience of being outside paid employment. *Coping on income,* by contrast, captures the subjective experience of economic insecurity as well as its mere existence. ESS respondents were asked "Which of these descriptions … comes closest to how you feel about your households income nowadays?", with the possible responses set as: 'living comfortably on present income'; 'coping on present income'; finding it difficult on present income'; and 'finding it very difficult on present income'. Responses to this item were entered into our models as a set of three dummy variables, with the reference category set as 'living comfortably'.

Institutional frames. Three measures were used to tap into how change in institutional context might shape immigrants' assessments of police legitimacy (all are *individual* level indicators, a

point we return to in the discussion). The first concerned corruption and the rule of law, and here we draw on, and extend, the measure used by Röder and Mühlau (2012). If, as they argue, "immigrants compare the institutional reality of the host country with their experiences of institutions in the home country as a reference point" (ibid: 376), it seems likely that the 'institutional reality' of law and corruption is a particularly salient factor in relation to the police. Two components of the World Bank's 'Worldwide Governance Indicators' (WGI)[3] were obtained: the indices of Control of Corruption and Rule of Law, covering the period 1996-2009. Aggregating data derived from multiple sources, such as surveys of individuals and businesses and reports from NGOs, into an overall country-level index, the control of corruption index is intended to capture "perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests" (World Bank 2015a). The similarly derived rule of law index is intended to capture "perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence" (World Bank 2015b). These two indicators were selected from the set of six WGI indicators as those most likely to frame perceptions of the police.

For inclusion in our models the raw indices were transformed thus. First, the average across the period 1996-2009 was calculated for each indicator and country.[4] The resulting country-level measures of corruption and rule of law were extremely highly correlated (.97), so the mean was taken to create a measure of 'law and corruption'. Each respondent in the dataset was then assigned two values for this measure, one for their country of birth and one for their country of residence. Finally, a measure of *change in law and corruption* was created by subtracting the value for country of birth from that of country of residence (mean .11; SD .46; min -2.81; max 4.22). Non-immigrants by definition scored zero on this measure; a positive score indicates that an individual moved from a more corrupt country were the rule of law was less well established to a less corrupt country where the rule of law was better established.

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[3] http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc
[4] Where data coverage was partial the mean was calculated using the available years.

Among immigrants the mean value was 1.18, indicating that immigrant respondents tended to have moved from more to less corrupt countries.

The second measure of institutional frames was calculated in a similar way. To assess how change in the level of crime might affect views of the police subsequent to migrating, homicide (murders per 100,000 population) data for the period 1995-2009 was obtained from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime International Homicide Statistics database.[5] The average murder rate for each country was calculated, and after mean-centering the resulting scores a measure of *change in the murder rate* was created for each respondent (mean -.29; SD 2.4; min -53.24; max 9.61). A negative score on this measure indicates that a respondent moved from a country with a higher murder rate to one with a lower murder rate – the mean for immigrants was -3.4, indicating that on average immigrants moved from more to less violent countries.

Finally, a measure of *change in GDP* per capita (in current US dollars) was also calculated, again using data from the World Bank. The years 1996 to 2009 were selected to match the timeframes used for the other variables, and the mean for each country was taken. A change variable was then created as before (mean 1,433, SD 6,447; min -63,123; max 55,215). A positive score on the change in GDP measures indicates that a respondent moved from a poorer to a richer country. For immigrants the mean of this measure was 15,883 – immigrants moved on average from poorer to richer countries.

Clearly, many immigrant respondents in the ESS migrated before 1996, and there must be some doubt about the validity of the measures described above for those who had spent a long time in the destination country by the time of interview. However relative levels of corruption (Kaufman et al. 2010) and homicide (Lafree and Tseloni 2006) are generally stable over time, suggesting that variables estimating change between origin and destination countries may have greater validity for longer-term immigrants than would otherwise have been the case.

Control variables
An important control variable was e*thnic minority status*, which was based on a question that simply asked respondents "Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in (this country)?" (1=yes;

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[5] http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/

0=no). Models also controlled for gender, age (entered as two dummy variables to avoid collinearity with the 'length of stay' measure), religion, level of education (years in full-time education) and crime victimization.

Analytic strategy

We start with a descriptive analysis of the experiences of policing and 'group positions' of immigrants compared with non-immigrants. In the main modelling we use a two-level multi-level model to account for the clustering of individuals within countries, and the fact that perceptions of legitimacy varied between countries. A random effects model allows us to partition between-individual and between-country variance, meaning that we can assess the extent to which individual-level predictors explain variation in individual-level perceived legitimacy, while also adjusting for respondent country of residence.

Results

Descriptive analysis

Table 1 shows that across the 27 countries included in the analysis immigrants were somewhat less likely to have experienced police-initiated contact in the past two years. Yet 2nd generation immigrants, and those who had arrived as children, were *more* likely to have experienced unsatisfactory police contact (indicating that when these groups did have contact with police they were more likely to judge it unsatisfactory). Immigrants also, on average, had a less favourable 'group position' than non-immigrants, being: less likely to be citizens; less likely to vote; more likely to be unemployed, and more likely to be finding it hard to get by.

Table 1 near here

Regression analysis

Results from a series of random effects models predicting normative alignment with police are shown in Table 2. At the bivariate level there was an association between immigrant status and this component of legitimacy (Model 1). Compared with the native-born population, immigrants

who had arrived as children, and people whose parents were immigrants, tended to feel less normatively aligned with police; yet immigrants who had arrived between 5 and 15 years ago tended to feel *more* normatively aligned. Model 2 in Table adds the control variables. The inclusion of controls had relatively little influence on the immigration-legitimacy relationship, although note that the negative coefficient for 'arrived more than 20 years ago' strengthens and achieves statistical significance at conventional levels.

Models 3-5 add the three groups of explanatory variables individually, while Model 6 adds all together. Almost all were statistically significant predictors of police legitimacy (which is hardly surprising given the sample size involved). Across the European population as a whole, those with less favourable group positions – who experienced discrimination, who chose not to vote at the last election, who were unemployed and struggled to manage on their incomes – tended to grant the police in their country less legitimacy. A notable exception was citizenship – all else equal non-citizens, perhaps unexpectedly, tended to grant police more legitimacy than citizens. As expected, recent contact with officers was also strongly associated with legitimacy, with unsatisfactory contact having a larger statistical effect than satisfactory contact.

Table 2 near here

When added alone (Model 5), none of the measures of institutional frames were significant predictors of normative alignment. Yet, conditional on contact with police and group position in Model 6, we find that people who moved from more to less corrupt countries, and from poorer to richer countries, tended to feel more normatively aligned with the police in their destination country. By contrast, there was a small but significant *positive* statistical effect associated with moving from a country with a lower murder rate to one with a higher rate – those who moved from a less to a more violent country seemed to be more inclined to support police in their new home.[6] All else being equal, it may be that the experience of a new, more violent context prompts somewhat more positive views of police as potential protection from

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[6] This effect only arose conditional on the other two institutional frame measures – absent these there was no association between the change in murder rate and legitimacy measures.

that violence. Note, though, that all effect sizes here are all smaller than those for the contact and group position variables.

Finally, once all the explanatory variables were present in Model 6, any positive association between immigrant status and normative alignment was broken. It seems this was entirely explained by the other variables in the model. However, the negative associations remain, and controlling for all the variables in Model 6 second generation immigrants, those who arrived as children, and those who arrived as adults over 15 years ago granted the police less legitimacy than their native born counterparts.

Table 3 shows the results from models that repeat the above process for the duty to obey component of legitimacy. Model 1 shows that, again, there was a significant association between being an immigrant and the perceived duty to obey police. Those who had arrived less than 15 years ago tended to feel a stronger duty to obey police; here, however, those who arrived as children, and second generation immigrants, did not on average feel differently to their native-born counterparts. Model 2 adds control variables, which again have little effect on the measures of immigrant status (although the negative coefficient for 'arrived 15-20 years ago achieves significance, at the conventional level, in this model).

Table 3 near here

Model 3-6 in Table 3 adds the three groups of explanatory variables. The findings in relation to police contact and group position are very similar to before, the one exception being that the experience of discrimination had no unique association with perceived duty to obey. However, of the institutional frame measures only change in GDP was significant – people who had moved from poorer to rich countries tended to feel a greater duty to obey police in the destination country. Also as above, any positive association between immigrant status and duty to obey was broken by the introduction of the other explanatory variables. Indeed, once the other variables in Model 6 were taken into account a more negative association between immigrant status and this component of legitimacy emerged, particularly in relation to those immigrants who had arrived as children.

Discussion

To summarize, we found, first, a partial positive association between immigrant status and legitimacy, in that some groups of immigrants, those who had arrived as adults less than 15 years ago, granted the police more legitimacy. Others, though, most notably those who had arrived as children, granted on average less legitimacy. But upon the introduction of the measures of police contact (H1),[7] group position (H2) and change in institutional frames (H3) – measures that as predicted were all associated with police legitimacy – any positive association between immigrant status and legitimacy was broken (H4). Conditional on these variables, though, a more robustly *negative* association between immigrant status and legitimacy became apparent. H4 was therefore only partially supported.

In line with other emerging work, it seems that a range of factors come together in influencing the legitimacy of police. What the police do is important – as reflected by the statistical effects of the contact variables – but so also is the social and economic position which people find themselves and the shift in institutional contexts experienced by immigrants. It seems that immigrants do not tend to 'import' negative views of state institutions formed in their countries of origin, but rather react positively to a new, 'better' institutional framework (c.f. Nannestad et al. 2014). Given that the views of recent immigrants did not differ from those of non-immigrants, once relevant confounds were taken into account, our results therefore suggest that immigration is not, in and of itself, damaging to police legitimacy (at least to the extent that migrant flows are from countries with weaker institutions to those where they are stronger).

To frame our results differently, it may be that recent immigrants grant police more legitimacy than others, on average, *because* they tend to have moved from countries with less well-functioning justice systems and economies, and have lower rates of contact with police. Those who have been in the destination country for longer, who arrived as children, or who are in the second generation on average grant less legitimacy, however. There are two mutually

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[7] We also estimated additional models that tested the idea that police contact might be differentially important for immigrants compared with non-immigrants, but the association between contact and legitimacy was largely invariant across the two categories.

compatible interpretations of this latter finding. First, (more established) immigrant status may serve in our models as a proxy for some other aspect of experience, for example other forms of personal, vicarious or mediated contact with the police, or group position, which were not represented by other variables. Second, it may be that there is something about growing up as an immigrant child that in and of itself serves, on average, to alienate people from institutions such as the police. This process may have much to do with the complicated and often fraught process of identity formation child immigrants, and children of immigrants, go through as they navigate their relationship with dominant and subaltern ethnic and national groups (Rumbout 1994; Tartakovsky 2008) – and the role police can play in such processes. The extent to which police represent dominant groups, for example, may shape the legitimacy judgements of those from the '1.5' and second generations who self-categorize more strongly as minority or marginal, as, relatedly, may the problematic forms of policing directed at immigrant groups across Europe and beyond (Armenta 2016; van der Woude and Brouwer 2017). We begin to see in our data, then, how difficult relationships between immigrant groups and state institutions such as police, where they exist, tend not to be generated by the 'cultural baggage' of the immigrants but the actions and omissions of the institutions with which they interact and the larger state framework within which both exist.

There are of course limitations to our analysis. First, we have by necessity treated the experience of immigration as a characteristic of individuals, but there are likely to be important social or cultural aspects of this experience that attach more properly to families and/or other social groups. Collective experiences, particularly in the destination country, might have implications for the legitimacy members of such communities grant to police. Second, while our analysis partialled out country-level factors (and could not take account of local factors), variation in the 'reception' of immigrants at national and sub-national levels may also be an important factor, not least in relation to how those *policing* immigrant communities conceive of their job in relation to different individuals and groups (Fassin 2015). Third, we have described the 'unique' association between immigrant status and views of the police. Yet the intersection of, most notably, ethnic minority and immigrant status may be important, pointing to more severe forms of exclusion and hence more difficult relations with police. Fourth, we have not

been able to take account of the reasons for migration, which are not recorded in the ESS. Variation here – e.g. as a student, worker, family member or refugee – seems likely to have an important effect on relations with police. Further work – which drills down into local contexts and experiences – will be needed to see if these and related factors are associated with legitimacy judgments.

Conclusion

The analysis presented in this paper supports the idea that diverse factors can shape the legitimacy of the police. Contact with officers and group position, as well as demographic factors, were correlated with legitimacy, as was the change in institutional frames associated with migration. The idea that the police are not only a key component of the state but also represent and indeed embody it is therefore supported by the ESS data. Legitimacy is shaped not only by people's direct contacts with officers but also by the extent to which the wider state – and/or society – is successful in integrating its members and securing social and economic goods for them. Concerns about the institutional effect of what immigrants 'bring with them' seem, on this basis, to be misplaced – the primary factors shaping their views of the police are their experiences in their new home.

While the primary emphasis of this paper has been theoretical there are therefore some policy lessons here. On the one hand, efforts to enhance police legitimacy, which concern policy-makers in many jurisdictions, seem unlikely to succeed if they are applied in a way that ignores contextual factors. Due to the symbolic meanings attached to police, and the affective links people draw between police and wider social and political categories, it is arguable that police legitimacy cannot be 'improved' without also attending to deeper structural inequalities that shape people's relations with the state and their fellow residents. At the very least, since the structure of public feelings toward police is highly complex – there are many 'pillars' of legitimacy – policy-makers cannot simply expect to 'throw a switch' in efforts to enhance police legitimacy. On the other hand, though, moments of personal contact with police officers still matter. Indeed, precisely because of the symbolic meaning of policing it is possible that people's stances toward the wider society may be influenced by their interactions with such

important representatives of it. Most pertinently in the current context, a key moment in which immigrants establish a sense of place and belonging in their new home – or are inhibited in doing so – may be encounters with police officers, who communicate to them authoritative messages about their inclusion, status and value within this new environment (Loader and Mulcahy 2003; Justice and Meares 2014). The dynamic relationship between the structural and interactional processes affecting police legitimacy is likely to have important implications not only for the relationship between the police and policed but also how the latter experience the social context within which they live.

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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

	Non-immigrant	Second generation immigrant	1st generation, arrived as child	1st generation, arrived as adult	Percentages All
Experience of policing					
No police-initiated contact in last 2 years	*67*	*70*	*66*	*70*	*67*
Yes and unsatisfactory	*7*	*9*	*9*	*7*	*7*
Yes and neutral	*5*	*4*	*5*	*4*	*5*
Yes and satisfactory	*21*	*16*	*19*	*20*	*21*
Group position					
Experience of discrimination	*2*	*8*	*9*	*12*	*3*
Citizen of country	*99*	*91*	*84*	*53*	*96*
Eligible to vote but did not	*21*	*24*	*26*	*30*	*22*
Not eligible to vote	*5*	*12*	*13*	*28*	*7*
Unemployed	8	9	10	11	8
Finding it difficult/very difficult to get by	*27*	*35*	*39*	*58*	*29*
Ethnicity					
Member of ethnic minority	*4*	*17*	*17*	*28*	*6*
Legitimacy judgements (scale means)					
Normative alignment	3.5	3.3	3.4	3.6	3.5
Duty to obey	5.9	6.3	6.0	6.2	5.9

n		46,319	1,524	1,719	3,211	52,773

Table 2
Random effects linear regression models predicting normative alignment with police

						Stanadardized betas
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Immigrant status (ref: non-immigrant)						
2nd generation	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
1st generation, arrived as child	-0.01**	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02***
1st generation, adult, arrived <5 years ago	0	0.01	0.01	0.01*	0.01+	0
1st generation, adult, arrived 5-10 years ago	0.01**	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.01
1st generation, adult, arrived 10-15 years ago	0.01**	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.01
1st generation, adult, arrived 15-20 years ago	0	0	0	0.01	0	-0.01*
1st generation, adult, arrived >20 years ago	0	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03***
Age (ref: <50)						
50-70		0.06***	0.05***	0.04***	0.06***	0.05***
Over 70		0.06***	0.06***	0.05***	0.06***	0.05***
Gender (ref: male)						
Female		0.01**	0	0.01**	0.01**	0
Years in full-time education		0.02***	0.01**	-0.01**	0.02***	-0.01
Member of ethnic minority (ref: no)						
Yes		-0.01+	-0.01	0.01*	-0.01	-0.01
Religion (ref: Christian)						
Atheist/agnostic/does not belong		-0.08***	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.04***
Muslim		0.01	0.01+	0.01**	0.01+	0
Other		-0.01	-0.01	-0.01*	-0.01	-0.05***
Victim of crime (ref: no)						
Yes		-0.06***	-0.04***	-0.05***	-0.06***	-0.03***
Experience of police						

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Contact with police (ref: no)						
Yes and unsatisfactory			-0.16***			-0.15***
Yes and neutral			-0.07***			-0.07***
Yes and satisfactory			0.06***			0.09***
Group position						
Experience of discrimination (ref: no)						
Yes				-0.05***		-0.04***
Citizen of country (ref: no)						
Yes				-0.01*		-0.04***
Voted at last election (ref: yes)						
Eligible but did not vote				-0.05***		-0.05***
Not eligible				-0.03***		-0.02**
Employment status (ref: others)						
Unemployed				-0.04***		-0.02***
Coping on income (ref: living comfortably)						
Coping				-0.04***		-0.09***
Finding it difficult				-0.07***		-0.17***
Finding it very difficult				-0.08***		-0.17***
Change in institutional frames						
Law and corruption					0	0.04***
Murder rate					0	0.01*
GDP per capita					-0.01	0.02*
ICC	0.12	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.00
n	48581	48581	48581	48581	48581	48581

+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 3
Random effects linear regression models predicting perceived duty to obey police

						Stanadardized betas
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Immigrant status (ref: non-immigrant)						
2nd generation	0	-0.01	0	0	-0.01	0
1st generation, arrived as child	-0.01	-0.01+	-0.01	-0.01	0	-0.02***
1st generation, arrived <5 years ago	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*	0.01**	0
1st generation, arrived 5-10 years ago	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.02***	0
1st generation, arrived 10-15 years ago	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.02**	0
1st generation, arrived 15-20 years ago	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0	0	-0.01*
1st generation, arrived >20 years ago	0.01*	0	0	0	0.01	-0.01*
Age (ref: <50)						
50-70		0.03***	0.02***	0.02**	0.02***	0.02***
Over 70		0.05***	0.05***	0.04***	0.05***	0.04***
Gender (ref: male)						
Female		0	0	0	0	0
Years in full-time education		0	0	-0.01*	0	-0.02***
Member of ethnic minority (ref: no)						
Yes		0	0	0.01	0	-0.02***
Religion (ref: Christian)						
Atheist/agnostic/does not belong		-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.04***
Muslim		0.02**	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
Other		0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.06***
Victim of crime (ref: no)						
Yes		-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.01**
Experience of police						
Contact with police (ref: no)						
Yes and unsatisfactory			-0.07***			-0.06***
Yes and neutral			-0.03***			-0.03***
Yes and satisfactory			0.05***			0.07***
Group position						
Experience of discrimination (ref: no)				-0.02***		0
Yes						
Citizen of country (ref: no)				-0.01		-0.02**

Yes

Voted at last election (ref: yes)

Eligible but did not vote					-0.04***	-0.04***
Not eligible					0	0
Employment status (ref: others)						
Unemployed					-0.03***	-0.03***
Coping on income (ref: living comfortably)						
Coping					-0.03***	-0.07***
Finding it difficult					-0.04***	-0.12***
Finding it very difficult					-0.03***	-0.10***
Change in institutional frames						
Law and corruption					-0.02+	0
Murder rate					-0.01	-0.01
GDP per capita					0	0.03**
ICC	0.12	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.00
n	48145	48145	48145	48145	48145	48145

+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001