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5	The average facial expression of a crowd influences impressions of individual
6	expressions
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Abstract

29 People can accurately assess the "mood of a crowd" by rapidly extracting the average 30 intensity of all the individual expressions, when the crowd consists of a set of faces 31 comprising different expressions of the same individual. Here, we investigate the processes 32 involved when people judge the expression intensity of individual faces that appear in the 33 context of a more naturalistic crowd of different individuals' faces. We show that judgments 34 of the intensity of happy and angry expressions for individual faces are biased towards the 35 group mean expression intensity, even when the faces are all different individuals. In a 36 second experiment, we demonstrate that this bias is not due to a generic tendency to endorse 37 intermediate intensity expressions more frequently than more extreme intensity expressions. Together, these findings suggest that people integrate ensemble information about the group 38 39 average expression when they make judgments of individual faces' expressions. 40 41 Keywords: expression, context, crowd, ensemble coding, summary statistics

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43 Word count: 5291 (excluding references, figure captions and footnote)

45	Statement of Public Significance
46	
47	Most studies testing recognition of emotion from facial expressions show faces in isolation.
48	However, faces are often seen in groups, and in this study we showed groups of different
49	people whose faces varied in emotional intensity. We found that the facial expression
50	displayed by an individual is seen as a combination of their actual expression and the average
51	expression of the entire group (known as the 'ensemble' expression). For example, the face
52	of a mildly angry person seen as part of a crowd of other angrier people is judged as more
53	angry than it actually was. This means that both individual and ensemble information are
54	used when judging an individual's emotion. On a more general level, our study shows how
55	our processing of individual expressions is malleable and can be informed by the context,
56	such as surrounding faces in a crowd.
57	

Introduction

59	Social situations often require us to judge other people's emotional states. One very
60	important source for this information is their facial expressions. However, the perception of
61	facial expressions is malleable, and can be strongly influenced by the situational context (for
62	review, see Barrett, Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011). Viewing a single facial expression in an
63	emotionally congruent scene, or paired with an emotionally congruent object, body posture or
64	word, can facilitate processing of the expression, while viewing the same face paired with
65	emotionally incongruent stimuli can impair it (Aviezer et al., 2008; Aviezer, Trope, &
66	Todorov, 2012; Halberstadt & Niedenthal, 2001; Ngo & Isaacowitz, 2015; Righart & de
67	<u>Gelder, 2008</u>)
68	The presence of other faces might also change how we process individual facial
69	expressions, because the visual system utilizes a specialized process that computes the
70	average properties of sets of similar objects. This "ensemble coding" is well-established for
71	simple objects (often examined with sets of circles varying in size), and recent studies have
72	suggested that it might also be involved in coding properties of sets of faces including facial
73	expression (Haberman & Whitney, 2012), attractiveness (Walker & Vul, 2013), sex
74	(Haberman & Whitney, 2007), and facial identity (de Fockert & Wolfenstein, 2009; Leib et
75	al., 2014; Neumann, Schweinberger, & Burton, 2013). Ensemble coding is one possible
76	means by which information can be compressed into more abstractive statistical
77	representations in visual working memory, in order to deal with the constant stream of
78	information from our environment (<u>Alvarez, 2011</u>). Ensemble coding of facial expressions is
79	also assumed to be advantageous in social situations, as it could allow us to quickly read "the
80	mood of a crowd" at a glance, maybe without having to attend to each individual face
81	separately (<u>Haberman & Whitney, 2009</u>).

82 Previous studies on ensemble coding of expression have predominantly focused on 83 the ability to form average representations under rather artificial conditions. Specifically, 84 ensemble coding of expression has almost exclusively been examined for sets of faces 85 containing one single identity (Haberman & Whitney, 2007, 2009; Leib et al., 2014; Leib et 86 al., 2012). Faces in these sets were sampled from morph continua between two different 87 emotional expressions (e.g., happiness to sadness; neutral to disgust) displayed on the same 88 individual's face. These studies revealed that people are able to spontaneously and accurately 89 code the average expression of these kinds of sets.

90 To our knowledge, only one study has investigated expression coding for naturalistic 91 crowds consisting of different people's faces (Yang, Yoon, Chong, & Oh, 2013). Yang and 92 colleagues presented crowds of different individuals, some with happy expressions and some 93 with angry expressions (in different ratios) and participants had to report whether the crowd 94 was overall "positive" or "negative" in emotion. All participants were able to accurately 95 judge the overall mood of the crowd (although participants with low social anxiety exhibited 96 a small bias towards positive emotion). One possible explanation for the accurate judgments 97 of the overall emotion is that participants had used ensemble coding to determine the average expression (that is, the ensemble expression) of the set, and then judged whether this average 98 99 expression was positive or negative. However, an alternative possibility is that participants 100 were able to judge the relative number of faces belonging to each emotion category in the set. 101 Accurate judgments of the relative numerosity of two large groups of items can be made 102 under limited presentations times (Anobile, Cicchini, & Burr, 2016). As all the expressions 103 were full-blown and the two categories of emotion (happy and angry) have very distinct 104 facial features, rapidly distinguishing the two categories would be relatively easy. 105 Judgements of the ratio of happy to angry expressions might be possible without integration 106 of the expressions into an ensemble. The use of ratio judgements could be confined to groups

in which faces can be easily assigned to different categories such as angry and happy,
because they exhibit full-blown expressions. However, ratio judgements would be less
applicable for naturalistic groups of faces that are less easy to categorize, for instance when
they all show a single expression with different intensities.

111 Thus, a novel approach to answering the question of whether ensemble expression 112 coding occurs for groups of different identities would be to test whether memory for the 113 expression intensity of an individual face is systematically influenced by the ensemble 114 expression of the entire group. Ensemble coding can influence perception of basic features 115 (such as orientation of Gabor patches) by making the features of individual group members 116 look more similar to the group average (Ross & Burr, 2008). Ensemble representations can 117 also bias short-term memory for the individual members towards the mean property of a 118 group (Brady & Alvarez, 2011). Specifically, when judging the size of individual circles, 119 participants' responses are slightly biased towards the mean size of the group. When colour is 120 a distinguishing feature between several different groups of circles, participants are not only 121 biased towards the mean size of all circles, but also to the mean size of the group of circles 122 that had the same colour as the to-be-remembered circle. Brady and colleagues (2011) 123 concluded that information about the size of items in a group is represented on multiple levels 124 of abstraction (e.g., individual circle, same-coloured circles, all circles), and integrated across 125 the different levels during encoding or retrieval. Thus, ensemble representations play an 126 important role for the processing of the individual items in a group.

As yet, it is unclear whether a systematic influence of the ensemble on exemplar information, indicating the integration of ensemble and exemplar information, also occurs for high-level information about facial properties such as expression or identity. Previous work has established that individual and ensemble representations of facial identity can be extracted and stored simultaneously (Neumann et al., 2013), but did not examine whether

132 these representations interact. Some evidence for a possible integration of average and 133 individual information comes from other work by Sweeny and colleagues (2009), which have 134 shown that interpretation of the emotion on a face can be influenced by the expression on 135 another face that is seen at the same time. Very briefly presented valence-neutral faces were 136 rated as more positive when paired with a happy face than when paired with an angry face 137 (Sweeny, Grabowecky, Paller, & Suzuki, 2009). This difference was only found when both 138 faces were shown in the same hemifield, but not when the two faces were in opposite 139 hemifields. The authors suggested that this effect is due to a perceptual mechanism that 140 averages expression information within, but not across, receptive fields. However, it is 141 unclear to what extent such a mechanism is related to - or contributes to - ensemble coding, 142 which has been consistently demonstrated for arrays of stimuli that cover different receptive 143 fields (e.g., are presented in both hemifields). 144 In the present study, we ask whether integration of ensemble and individual 145 information occurs for the expressions of a group of *different identity* faces, by determining 146 whether the ensemble expression influences memory for the expression of individual "target" 147 faces in a group, as has been demonstrated for the sizes of circles (Brady & Alvarez, 2011). 148 We adapted a well-established membership identification paradigm, in which participants are 149 asked whether a probe was a member of the preceding set (e.g., Ariely, 2001; Brady & Alvarez, 2011; Haberman & Whitney, 2009; Walker & Vul, 2013). Membership 150 151 identification paradigms encourage individuation of the set members, and ensemble coding is 152 inferred from incorrect endorsements of the group average. Endorsements of the group 153 average occur frequently, suggesting that participants engage in ensemble coding even when 154 the task encourages individuation. In our study, participants determined whether a subsequent probe face had the same expression intensity or a different expression intensity compared to a 155

156 target face. Probe expressions could either be the same intensity as the target, closer to, or 157 further away from, the group's average expression intensity.

158 If participants code the ensemble expression from groups of different identities, as 159 well as the individual expressions of the group, then we expect that this ensemble expression 160 will influence memory for individual expressions in a group (as shown for the sizes of a 161 group of individual circles, Brady & Alvarez, 2011), which should be systematically shifted 162 towards the average intensity of the group. In this case, participants would be more likely to 163 report that they had seen probes with expression intensities that were closer to the group 164 mean, than those that were further away from it. An alternative possibility is that the 165 ensemble expression is either not coded or does not influence memory for the individual 166 expression. In this case, participants would not exhibit a bias towards the average group 167 expression. Finally, it is possible the participants code the ensemble expression, but not the 168 individual group expressions (Haberman & Whitney, 2009). In this case, participants would 169 endorse probe expressions that match the average expression of the group, independent of 170 what expression the individual target face had. We will refer to these alternatives as

171 "Exemplar biased by ensemble", "Exemplar only", and "Ensemble only", respectively.

Experiment 1 - Methods

173 **Participants**

174	Twenty-four students and staff from the University of Western Australia were
175	recruited (mean age = 23.00 , SD = 5.08 years; 9 male). Student participants received either
176	course credits or compensation of \$5AUD for their time. Sample size was based on related
177	studies (Brady & Alvarez, 2011; Walker & Vul, 2013).

178 Stimuli

179 Three images (happy, angry, and neutral) of four young male Caucasian identities were sourced from the Radboud face database (Langner et al., 2010). We selected individuals 180 181 for which agreement was high regarding the expression displayed (>95% agreement) and 182 which were rated as relatively intense (intensity >3.5, max = 5). We created "weaker" 183 intensity levels for each emotion by morphing each of the original (100%) happy or angry 184 faces with the neutral face of the matching identity, using FantaMorph 5 (Abrosoft, http://www.fantamorph.com/). The full intensity range consisted of 11 steps, including the 185 186 100% emotional and neutral (0%) faces for each identity. All face images were transformed 187 into grey scale, adjusted so that their pupils were horizontally aligned, and placed in a mask 188 that covered external face features and hair.


Study groups consisted of four faces (one of each identity) arranged in a 2 x 2 grid. Grid positions were randomly assigned to each identity on each trial. Faces subtended a visual angle of approximately 3.5° x 4.0° with the total grid subtending 8.4° x 9.2° when viewed from a viewing distance of about 65 cm. Each face in a group displayed the same emotion (either all angry or all happy), but faces varied systematically in expression intensity around a "group mean" intensity level which itself was never shown in the study set. Each study set contained two expressions that were more intense than the group mean (+10%,

+20%), and two expressions that were less intense than the group mean (-10%, -20%). On
each trial the group mean intensity was randomly selected, with the only restriction being that
all faces presented fell within the range of the 11-step expression intensity sequence. The
group mean was therefore always between 20%-80%, whereas the target and probe intensities
could occupy any position in the 11-step sequence (0%-100%), depending on the relative
positions of the target and probe.


202 **Procedure**

203 On each trial, participants were presented with a fixation cross in the centre of the screen for 500 ms, followed by the study group for 2000 ms (Fig. 1a). This study group 204 205 duration matched that used in previous studies on expression ensemble coding (e.g. 206 Haberman et al., 2009). Participants were instructed to remember the expression intensity for 207 each of the four faces as accurately as possible. Immediately after the study group had 208 disappeared, a cue (a black frame 3.8° x 5.1° VA) appeared for 200 ms at the position of a 209 "target" identity. A single probe face (4.9° x 5.5° VA) of the same identity as the cued target 210 was then presented in the centre of the screen. Participants indicated whether they believed 211 the probe face had the same or a different intensity expression as the target face by pressing 212 "a" for "same", and "l" for "different", respectively (keys were labelled with response 213 options). The probe face remained on the screen until the participant made a response. 214 Participants completed two blocks of 160 trials (320 trials in total) with a break 215 between blocks. Each block contained one trial for all possible combinations of the four 216 target face identities, four target expression intensities (+10%, +20%, -10%, -20% relative to 217 group mean intensity), five probe expression intensities (0%, +10%, +20%, -10%, and -20%)218 relative to target intensity), and two emotions (happy, angry). The whole session lasted 219 approximately 25 minutes. To familiarise participants with the trial procedure, they were

- 220 given three happy and three angry practice trials in which each of the four identities was
- shown at least once before the experiment proper. No feedback was provided.









231 **Possible outcomes**

232 Fig. 2 illustrates the three alternative possible outcomes outlined in the introduction. 233 Panel a) shows the expected data pattern if individual expressions were coded accurately, and 234 responses were not affected by the group mean intensity ("exemplar only" outcome, panel a). 235 In this case, "same" responses should occur most frequently for probes that match the target 236 intensity and errors should be normally distributed around the target intensity (that is, errors 237 should be independent of the intensity of the probe relative to the group mean intensity). If 238 however only the group mean intensity was coded (ensemble "only", panel b), "same" 239 responses should be most frequent for probes that correspond to the group mean intensity, 240 and responses should not be affected by the target intensity (c.f., Haberman & Whitney, 241 2007). Finally, if participants' responses reflected a combination of representations for 242 individual target intensities and the group mean intensity ("Exemplar biased by ensemble", 243 panel c), then "same" responses should be most frequent for probes with expression 244 intensities that lie somewhere between the target intensity and mean group intensity. 245 Furthermore, participants' error distributions would be skewed towards the group mean 246 intensity, such that errors should be more frequent for mismatch probes that deviate *towards* 247 the group mean intensity, than to mismatch probes that deviate away from the group mean 248 intensity. More specifically, for targets of a higher intensity than the mean (+10%, +20%), 249 "same" responses should be more frequent for probes that are less intense than the target, 250 compared to probes that are more intense than the target. Conversely, for targets of lower 251 intensity than the mean (-10, -20%), "same" responses should be more frequent for probes 252 that are of more intense than the target, compared to probes that are less intense than the 253 target.





- 264 responses are distributed around the target intensity but skewed towards the group mean
- 265 intensity.

Results

Figure 3 shows participants' "same" responses as a function of the probe intensity relative to 268 269 the group mean intensity. Inspection of the pattern shown suggests that memory for exemplar 270 expressions is biased by the ensemble expression (Fig. 2c.). Participants were most likely to 271 respond "same" to probes that either matched the target intensity, or were close to it, 272 illustrated by the peaks occurring close to the centre of each target's response curve. This 273 result suggests that participants had some memory for individual expressions in the group. In 274 addition, memory for the individual expressions appears to be influenced by the group mean 275 expression, because "same" responses to mismatching probes were more frequent when the 276 probe's expression intensity was shifted towards the group mean intensity, compared to when 277 probe intensity was shifted away.






Figure 3. Mean proportion of "same" responses to probes as a function of probe intensity plotted relative to the group mean expression (e.g., for a -20% target (black solid line), the five levels of probe intensity relative to target intensity (-20%, -10%, 0%, +10%. +20%) are

depicted as -40%, -30%, -20%, -10%, and 0%, respectively). Separate curves are plotted for each target position (-20%, -10%, +10%, +20%). Error bars show standard error.

284

285 First we tested whether the mean group expression had an effect on responses, or if 286 the data could be explained solely by participants' ability to code exemplars without 287 additionally coding the group mean expression ("exemplar only", Fig. 2a). If only the 288 exemplars are coded then participants' responses should not be differently affected by the 289 target position, that is, the target face's expression intensity relative to the other faces in a 290 group. To test this we entered proportion of "same" responses into a repeated measures 291 ANOVA with Target Position relative to group mean intensity (-20, -10, +10, +20), Probe 292 Intensity (0%, +10%, +20%, -10%, and -20% relative to target intensity), and Emotion 293 (happy versus angry) as factors.

294 We found no effect of Emotion, and no interaction involving Emotion and Probe 295 Intensity (all Fs < 2.69, all ps > .115) We found a main effect of Probe Intensity, F(4, 92) =28.22 p < .001, $\eta^2 = .55$. However, there was also a main effect of Target Position, F(3, 69) =296 3.30, p = .025, $\eta^2 = .126$, qualified by a two-way interaction between Probe Intensity and 297 Target Position, F(12, 276) = 12.61, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .354$ (Figure 3). The significant effect of 298 299 Target Position showed that participants' responses to the different probe faces were affected 300 by how intense a target face's expression was in relation to the group mean expression, thus 301 providing evidence against participants only coding the exemplar (see Fig 2b). Separate 302 follow-up ANOVAs confirmed that Probe Intensity effects were significant on each level of Target Position, all F > 12, all p < .001, all $\eta^2 > .340$, but the interaction between Probe 303 304 Intensity and Target Position suggests that the effect of probe intensity varied across the 305 different levels of target position.

The interaction of Probe Intensity and Target Position could either indicate that participants code the mean group expression only ('ensemble only', Fig. 2b), or that participants code both mean and individual expressions, but are biased towards the group mean expression ('exemplar biased by ensemble', Fig. 2c). To distinguish between these two possibilities, we ran two sets of planned contrasts to explore the nature of the interaction, each set addressing one potential outcome specifically.

312 In the first set of planned contrasts, we determined whether encoding of only an 313 ensemble expression could account for the interaction between Probe Intensity and Target Position. We compared the proportions of "same" responses to matching probes (that 314 315 corresponded to the target intensity) with performance on mismatching probes that 316 corresponded to the group mean intensity for each target position (see Table 1). If 317 participants remembered only the group mean intensity, but not the individual target 318 intensities ("ensemble only" outcome), then they should have endorsed group mean intensity 319 probes most frequently. Instead, probes that matched the target intensity received at least as 320 many, if not more, "same" responses as mismatching probes that had the group mean 321 intensity, for all target types. Pairwise t-tests were significant for +20% targets, and 322 marginally significant for +10% and -10% targets, (see Table 1). Importantly, the proportions 323 of "same" responses were never higher for probes matching the group mean expression 324 intensity than for probes matching the target expression intensity. Therefore, participants' 325 responses were not simply reflecting the group mean expression. 326

- 327
- 328

Table 1. *Comparison of proportions "same" responses for probes that match the target*

intensity with probes that match the group mean intensity.

	Prob	Probe Intensity					
Target Desition	Target Match	Group Mean Match			t-stat	tistics	
Target Position	Mean (SEM)	Mean (SEM)	Difference	$d\!f$	t	р	d
+ 20%	.740 (.035)	.648 (.033)	.092	23	2.14	.043	0.55
+ 10%	.766 (.023)	.716 (.024)	.050	23	1.86	.076	0.42
- 20%	.708 (.033)	.659 (.032)	.049	23	1.25	.222	0.31
- 10%	.760 (.030)	.701 (.032)	.059	23	1.78	.089	0.39

331

332 In a second set of planned contrasts, we tested whether memory for the target 333 intensity was systematically shifted in the direction of the group mean intensity, as would be 334 expected if participants' memory for individual expressions was influenced by the ensemble 335 representation of the group expression. We calculated bias scores by subtracting the 336 proportion of "same" responses for probes shifted away from the mean from the proportion 337 of "same" responses for equidistant probes shifted towards the mean, for each target position. 338 As can be seen in Table 2, the average bias for every probe pair was positive, indicating a 339 bias in the direction of the mean group expression in all conditions. One sample t-tests 340 (Bonferroni-corrected) carried out for each probe intensity level were significant, except for 341 probes that were $\pm 10\%$ from target when the target was 10% more or 10% less intense than 342 the group mean, and probes which were ± 20 from the target when the target was 10% more 343 intense than the group mean (see Table 2). Note that a bias was expected to be smaller for 344 targets that are closer to the group mean, and also for probes that were closer to the target. 345 Thus, the critical comparisons, for which a stronger bias was expected, were the 20% target 346 comparisons, which were all significant. These findings indicate that the ensemble 347 information had a systematic influence on participants' responses, consistent with the 348 "exemplar biased by ensemble" outcome alternative (Fig 2c).

351

- 352 **Table 2.** Results of t-tests for level of bias towards the mean in "same" responses for
- 353 mismatching probes. Bias is computed by taking proportion of "same" responses for probes
- 354 shifted away from the mean from proportion of "same" responses for equidistant probes
- 355 shifted towards the mean, separately for the two possible probe distances. Bonferroni
- 356 *correction for multiple comparisons have been applied to p values.*

Target	Probe	Bias	t-statis		stics	
Position	Distance	Mean (SEM)	$d\!f$	t	р	d
+20%	±20	.208 (.034)	23	6.05	.000	1.24
+20%	± 10	.128 (.035)	23	3.61	.012	0.74
+10%	±20	.070 (.039)	23	1.80	.686	0.37
+10%	± 10	.042 (.032)	23	1.31	1.00	0.28
-20%	±20	.193 (.041)	23	4.72	.000	0.96
-20%	± 10	.148 (.025)	23	5.83	.000	1.19
1.00/	±20	.141 (.033)	23	4.31	.002	0.88
-10%	±10	.018 (.030)	23	0.60	1.00	0.12

358	Experiment 2: A response bias to intermediate intensities?
359	A possible alternative explanation for the bias towards the group mean expression in
360	Experiment 1 is that participants could have a generic bias to endorse intermediate expression
361	intensities (e.g., moderately angry faces of 50% absolute expression intensity) more often
362	than expression intensities at the endpoints of the intensity range (e.g., neutral expressions of
363	0% absolute intensity or very angry/happy expressions of 100% absolute intensity). 'Central
364	tendency' biases, in which participants' estimates are drawn towards the centre of the range
365	of presented stimuli, are well established (Allred, Crawford, Duffy, & Smith, 2016;
366	Crawford, Huttenlocher, & Engebretson, 2000; Duffy, Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Crawford,
367	2010; Hollingworth, 1910; Olkkonen, McCarthy, & Allred, 2014). Therefore, we must
368	consider whether the bias to endorse intermediate expression intensities found in Experiment
369	1 could have been induced by a higher probability of probe and target faces with intermediate
370	than extreme (low or high) expression intensities.
371	

Table 3. Probability of probes and targets for each level of absolute expression intensity.
 372

						1		2			
	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%
Target	0.02	0.06	0.08	0.11	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.11	0.08	0.06	0.02
Probe	0.04	0.06	0.09	0.11	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.11	0.09	0.06	0.04

Absolute expression intensity

373

374 *Note*. The sum of the shown probabilities may not equal 1 due to rounding errors.

375

376 In Experiment 1, participants endorsed probe faces that deviate towards the mean 377 group intensity more frequently than probe faces that deviate away from the mean group 378 intensity. A potential central tendency bias might also lead to this response pattern, because 379 probes that deviated away from the group mean were more likely to be of extreme intensities than probes that deviated towards the group mean (Table 3). For instance, a 0% (neutral) face 380

381	could only ever occur as a probe that deviated away from the mean of the group, because for
382	it to deviate towards the mean, the group would had to have a mean group intensity below
383	0%, which was outside the range of expressions used in the present study design.
384	To rule out a central-tendence bias account of our results in Experiment 1, in
385	Experiment 2 we removed non-target faces from the sets (leaving just the target face
386	presented alone) while keeping the procedure otherwise identical to Experiment 1. If the bias
387	observed in Experiment 1 reflects a genuine influence of ensemble coding, then it should no
388	longer be seen, because there is no group to be ensemble coded.

Methods

391 **Participants**

392 Twenty-four students and volunteers from the University of Western Australia
393 participated (mean age = 20.3, SD = 3.4 years; 8 male). Student participants received course
394 credits.

395 Stimuli

Face stimuli and the experimental protocol from Experiment 1 were used. However,
the critical change to Experiment 1 was that only the target face of each study group was
presented.

399 **Procedure**

The trial procedure was identical to Experiment 1, except that the target face was presented alone. Participants were instructed to remember the expression intensity of the target face as accurately as possible. A single probe face of the same identity as the target was then presented in the centre of the screen, and participants indicated whether they believed the probe face had the same or a different intensity expression as the target face.

405

Results

Figure 4 shows participants' "same" responses as a function of the probe intensity
relative to the group mean intensity. Inspection of the pattern shown suggests that memory
for the exemplar expressions was accurate (cf. Fig. 2b expected "exemplar only" pattern),
with no evidence of any systematic bias as found in Experiment 1. To formally test accuracy
we conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with Emotion (happy, angry), Target Position
relative to group mean intensity (-20, -10, +10, +20) and Probe Intensity (0%, +10%, +20%, -

412 10%, -20% relative to target intensity) as factors. Importantly, there was no interaction of 413 Target Position and Probe Intensity, and no triple interaction of Target Position, Probe 414 Intensity, and Emotion, both F < 1.1, both p > .40, indicating the absence of a systematic bias 415 towards the mean expression intensity. These results confirm that the bias towards the mean 416 in Experiment 1 reflects the influence of the surrounding set rather than any generic bias to 417 endorse probes with intermediate intensity expressions.

418 We found several other effects that were not of any theoretical significance. We

419 report them for completeness. There were significant main effects of emotion (angry >

420 happy, F(1,23) = 35.87, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .609$) and Probe Intensity, F(1,23) = 155.27, p < .001,

421 $\eta^2 = .871$. Emotion interacted both with Target Position, F(3,69) = 13.29, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .366$

422 and with Probe Intensity, F(4,92) = 15.85, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .408$.¹

¹ The interaction of Emotion and Probe Intensity is driven by participants' higher rate of "same" responses to mismatching probes (that is, lower accuracy) for angry compared to happy faces, and this effect was particularly pronounced for the ±20 % probes. Post-hoc t-tests confirmed that there were fewer endorsement in happy compared to angry trials when probes were -20 %, t(23) = 11.09, p < .001, d = 1.68; +20 %, t(23) = 4.84, p < .001, d = 1.43; -10 %, t(23) = 2.30, p = .031, d = 0.55 and +10 %, t(23) = 3.42, p = .002, d = 0.98 from the target. In contrast, there was no difference between emotions when the probe matched the target (0 %), t(23) = 0.32, p = .75, d = .06. The Emotion by Target Position interaction was driven by more "same" responses to happy faces of higher intensity than lower intensity (greater "same" responses for probes testing -20 % targets compared to +20 % targets, t(23) = 5.05, p < .001, d = 1.00). In contrast, responses to -20 % targets and to +20 % targets were not significantly different, t(23) = 1.42, p = .169, d = 0.31).






Figure 4. Mean proportion of "same" responses to probes as a function of probe intensity
plotted relative to the group mean expression (e.g., for a -20% target (black solid line), the
five levels of probe intensity relative to target intensity (-20%, -10%, 0%, +10%. +20%) are
depicted as -40%, -30%, -20%, -10%, and 0%, respectively). Separate curves are plotted
for each target position (-20%, -10%, +10%, +20%). Note that the target and probe intensities
are relative to the mean intensity of a "group" that was not seen. Thus, any potential bias in
the data is unrelated to the context of a group. Error bars show standard error.

432	Discussion
433 434	We found that memory for the intensity of a facial expression is biased towards the
435	average intensity of the expressions of a surrounding crowd. Participants overestimated the
436	intensities of individual expressions that were less intense, and underestimated the intensities
437	that were more intense, than the average expression of the group. A control experiment
438	confirmed that this bias could not be explained by a general bias to endorse intermediate
439	intensity expressions. Our results provide an important and novel extension to the studies
440	indicating ensemble coding of expression for groups containing a single face identity
441	(Haberman & Whitney, 2007, 2009) by showing that representations of individual
442	expressions are biased by the ensemble expression. This extends our own previous work that
443	showed that extraction of exemplar and ensemble identity information can co-occur
444	(Neumann et al., 2013), by suggesting an information transfer between these representations
445	(for facial expressions). Finally, by showing that ensemble coding of facial expression occurs
446	for more naturalistic, heterogeneous groups containing distinct identities, our data and those
447	of <u>Yang et al. (2013)</u> , provide convincing evidence for the idea that such coding could play
448	an important role in determining the mood of a crowd.
449	Participants in the current study not only coded ensemble information, but also
450	retained memory for the individual expressions of the group (shown by the fact that "same"
451	responses were given at least as often to probes that matched the target as to probes that
452	deviated towards the mean expression intensity). In previous studies using only one identity
453	face little information about the individual exemplar expressions appeared to be retained
454	(Haberman & Whitney, 2007, 2009). The memory for individual expressions seen here may
455	reflect the increased discriminability of facial expressions displayed on different identities
456	(see Avons, 1999 for evidence that similarity of visual stimuli reduces accuracy of short term
457	memory). Our finding that ensemble expression representations influence memory for the

458 individual expressions in a group parallels findings for ensemble coding of properties of 459 simple objects (Brady & Alvarez, 2011; Brady, Konkle, Oliva, & Alvarez, 2009; Brady & 460 Tenenbaum, 2013). Thus, although there is evidence that ensemble coding for higher level 461 properties such as facial expression is supported by a system that is separate to a system 462 supporting ensemble coding for low-level properties such as size (Haberman, Brady, & Alvarez, 2015), our findings suggest that both types of ensemble representation can have 463 464 similar effects on memory for the properties of individual group members. Another line of evidence has suggested that ensemble representations of face 465 466 properties systematically influence representations' of individual faces in groups. Walker and Vul (2013) showed that individual faces are perceived as more attractive when seen in a 467 468 group than when seen alone. This finding, known as the "cheerleader effect", has been 469 attributed to the influence of the ensemble identity representation on perception of 470 attractiveness of the individual faces. Average faces (such as an ensemble identity) are generally perceived as attractive (Rhodes, 2006), so it is argued that attractiveness ratings for 471 472 the individual faces are pulled up by the group ensemble identity. However, others have 473 argued that the "cheerleader effect" could be explained by selective attention to the most attractive individual in a group (van Osch, Blanken, Meijs, & van Wolferen, 2015). Crucially, 474 475 here we found that memory for individual expressions was biased toward the average 476 expression intensity regardless of whether the individual expression was more or less intense 477 than the average, which rules out selective attention to the most emotionally intense 478 expression in a group as the source of the effect. The demonstration of the cheerleader effect 479 (Walker and Vul, 2013), and the present data provide converging evidence that ensemble 480 representations can influence the coding of information about the individual faces in a group 481 (here, different expression intensities), and that this effect cannot be explained by higher 482 selective attention to the most intense face in a group.

483 A bias towards the mean property of a group, as seen here, reflects the integration of 484 ensemble information with information about individual members of a group. It has been 485 suggested that the optimal combination of ensemble and individual information could serve 486 to minimize the effects of perceptual errors that result from capacity limitation during 487 encoding or retrieval of individual group members (Brady & Alvarez, 2011). When viewing a 488 crowd, capacity limitations (e.g., too little time to attend to all individual faces) may lead to 489 either inaccurate representations of each individual's expression, or coding only a subset of 490 the group's faces. In contrast, ensemble representations have been shown to accurately 491 represent the mean facial expression of all faces of the group, even when encoding time is 492 very limited (Haberman & Whitney, 2009). Therefore, it is possible that a bias to see 493 individual faces to be slightly more like the group mean reflects an adaptive "optimal 494 integration" process (Brady & Alvarez, 2011) by which the visual system integrates the 495 group information (which contains some information about the individuals) into the 496 representation of the individual items, to increase accuracy of the individual representations, 497 on average. Knowing something about the group, e.g., that the faces were overall very angry, 498 could help us decide that one of the faces that we have perceived as relatively neutral could in 499 fact be more angry than we thought, particularly if our memory for this face is inaccurate. 500 A strategy of "optimal integration" (Brady & Alvarez, 2011) might predict that the 501 knowledge about the group mean becomes increasingly useful (and could thus cause stronger 502 bias), as our knowledge of an individual becomes less accurate. If we know very little about 503 an individual face of a group, but have encoded the group as overall very angry, it is 504 reasonable to assume that the individual face was about as angry as the group on average. If 505 however we have a very accurate representation of an individual face's expression, we might 506 not need the ensemble group information at all. Future research could establish the precise

507 relationship between representation strength of individual expressions and the strength of the

508 bias towards the mean expression of the group, for instance, by manipulating the presentation 509 duration of the study group. Longer presentation times would be expected to facilitate the 510 coding of individual exemplars, thus potentially reducing the influence of the ensemble, which would be indicated by a weaker bias towards the mean expression intensity of a group. 511 512 Finally, in our study we tested participants' visual short-term memory for a previously 513 presented expression. However, it is possible that the bias observed in Experiment 1 is the 514 result of a bias that occurs during perception, rather than a bias that occurs when expressions 515 are stored in short term memory. A perceptual source of the bias would be consistent with 516 evidence from ensemble perception of simpler features, for instance the computations of 517 orientation statistics from Gabor patches (Ross & Burr, 2008). From the present data we are 518 unable to determine whether the observed bias occurs in perception or memory (or both). 519 Whether the there is a bias in perception, which alters how the expressions individuals in 520 crowds are perceived, will be an interesting question for future studies.

Conclusion

523	This study demonstrates that judgements of the intensity of individual facial
524	expressions in a group are biased towards the group "ensemble" expression intensity. This
525	bias suggests that ensemble coding of expression occurs for groups that consist of different
526	identity faces. It also shows, for the first time, that information about the ensemble expression
527	of a group is integrated with information about the individual group expressions, consistent
528	with an "optimal integration model" (Brady & Alvarez, 2011). More generally, our results
529	add to increasing evidence that emotional expression processing is malleable and generally
530	affected by context (Barrett et al., 2011).

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