Does Type of Violence Matter for Interventions to Mitigate Mass Atrocities?

Michael P. Broache
Assistant Professor of Political Science
University of North Carolina at Greensboro

Kate Cronin-Furman
Lecturer in Human Rights & Director of Human Rights MA Program
Department of Political Science
University College London

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ABSTRACT

Preventing and mitigating mass atrocities is a critical challenge in international security. But international interventions to stop mass atrocities have met with mixed success, and the academic literature offers limited guidance on how to improve this record. We argue that more attention must be paid to the nature of violence, specifically whether violence targets identity groups as such or political opponents of the perpetrator more broadly. Using Krain's (2017) data on interventions and mass atrocities, we test for heterogeneous effects of interventions by violence type. We find that while anti-perpetrator military interventions can reduce the severity of identity-based violence, non-military actions have negligible effects. By contrast, in cases of politicide, "naming and shaming" is effective, while military intervention is not; neutral and pro-perpetrator military interventions and economic sanctions are ineffective regardless of violence type. We conclude that intervention strategies should be more narrowly tailored on the basis of violence type.

INTRODUCTION

In April 2015, Burundi descended into crisis when President Pierre Nkurunziza announced that he would seek a controversial third term. Protesters poured into the streets of the capital, Bujumbura, angry over what they saw as an illegal power grab. The response was brutal, as the government shut down media outlets and used deadly force in an attempt to suppress the demonstrations. The violence escalated after a failed coup in May and the election in July, leaving hundreds dead and hundreds of thousands displaced by the end of the year (Raleigh et al. 2016).

As the body count mounted, activists and journalists sounded the alarm, drawing parallels to the 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda and calling for international action to prevent a similar episode of ethnically targeted mass violence (Simon 2015). However, many area experts cautioned against this analogy, arguing that the violence was political rather than ethnic in nature and that this distinction was critical for properly tailoring responses (Hajayandi 2015). Others downplayed this distinction, arguing that a similarly robust international response was required regardless of the type of violence (Shurkin 2015).

But it is not clear that this is the case. An extensive academic literature (discussed below) debates whether violence based on ascribed identity characteristics such as ethnicity is distinct from other forms of violence; while some studies have concluded that identity-based violence cannot be meaningfully distinguished from other types of violence, others suggest that identity-based violence has fundamentally different causes, is more intense, and may be more intractable. As far as we are aware, however, no study in this literature, nor in the growing literature on international interventions, systematically examines whether the effectiveness of international efforts to halt violence varies by violence type.

In this article, we ask: does atrocity type affect the success of international interventions? We argue that if identity-based and political violence do have different causes and characteristics, then the distinction should be expected to impact intervention effectiveness. We test this claim by extending an existing series of studies on interventions, and we find evidence that the effects of interventions vary by atrocity type. Specifically, we find that anti-perpetrator military interventions have ameliorative effects for identity-based violence, but negligible effects for political violence, while "naming and shaming" by human rights organizations reduces the severity of political, but not identity-based, violence.

This article proceeds as follows. First, we review the growing literature on intervention effectiveness. We then propose two hypotheses specifying how atrocity type might condition the effectiveness of interventions, drawing on insights from the civil wars literature. We then present our data and findings.

INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION: A MIXED RECORD

Can international intervention mitigate ongoing mass atrocities? This question is the subject of a growing empirical literature, which examines the effectiveness of various components of the atrocity response "toolkit," including military action, economic sanctions, and "naming and shaming." This literature has yielded mixed findings concerning the impacts of interventions on atrocities and related outcomes such as civilian victimization and human rights.

Military Interventions

There is evidence that certain forms of international military action can contribute to the mitigation of mass atrocities and other forms of violence. For instance, Krain (2005, 2012, 2017) finds that "anti-perpetrator" military interventions reduce the severity of ongoing atrocities, while DeMeritt (2014) finds that "oppositional" military interventions limit civilian killings by

government forces after violence has begun. Other studies suggest that impartial interventions are more effective; for instance, Kathman and Wood (2011) find that neutral interventions are associated with reduced civilian victimization over the long term, and there is a growing body of evidence that peacekeeping, which is ostensibly impartial, can contribute to reduced violence against civilians (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; Kathman and Wood 2016).

However, there is also cause for pessimism. Most notably, notwithstanding cases where military interventions may have reduced the severity of atrocities, there have been few, if any, clear-cut cases where such action *halted* violence entirely (Bellamy 2009). Furthermore, military intervention may exacerbate violence under certain conditions; for example, while Kathman and Wood (2011) find that neutral interventions reduce civilian victimization in the long run, they also find that military action is associated with *increased* violence in the short term, and Wood, Kathman, and Gent (2012) find that non-neutral interventions increase civilian killings by factions targeted for intervention.

Non-Military Interventions

There is likewise mixed evidence concerning non-military interventions. For example, Krain (2017) finds that economic sanctions have negligible effects on ongoing atrocities, while Wood (2008) finds that sanctions exacerbate human rights violations under certain conditions. Conversely, both Krain (2012) and DeMeritt (2012) find that "naming and shaming" reduces atrocity severity. Murdie and Davis (2012), however, find that that the effects of "naming and shaming" on human rights depend on the presence of human rights organizations in the target country and/or external pressure, while Hendrix and Wong (2012) find that it contributes to human rights improvements only in autocracies. Finally, Hafner-Burton (2008) concludes that "naming and shaming" is associated with improvements in "political rights" focused on

participation but has negligible or perverse effects on the use of "political terror" by governments.

HYPOTHESES ON VIOLENCE TYPE

These mixed findings suggest that specific characteristics of interventions and the varied contexts in which they occur may condition their effectiveness. However, recent studies have largely ignored a characteristic of violence that may condition intervention effectiveness: the targeting of atrocities, specifically whether violence is committed against members of defined identity groups or against political opponents.

The question of targeting is critical in international law. The Genocide Convention of 1948 defines genocide as acts "committed with in intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such" (UN 1951, 280), but excludes violence targeting political opponents based on ideology and/or partisan affiliation (Van Schaack 1997). Political scientists have similarly differentiated between types of violence, notably in distinguishing between genocide and politicide. For instance, Harff (2003, 58) defines genocide as policies "intended to destroy" a communal identity group and politicide as policies targeting groups "defined primarily in terms of their political opposition" to the perpetrator.

The distinction between genocide and politicide provides a useful starting point for differentiating between types of mass atrocities. However, both the international legal and Harff's definitions of genocide require evidence of "intent" to destroy a defined group, which poses two difficulties. First, genocidal intent is frequently difficult to infer (Greenawalt 1999). Second, this requirement excludes violence targeting communal identity groups where there is no clear "intent to destroy," including ethnic cleansing, which rather involves removing designated groups from certain geographic areas (United Nations 1994). For these reasons, we

refer to violence targeting groups designated in the Genocide Convention as "identity-based violence," rather than genocide.

Identity-based violence may differ in important ways from politicide, as suggested by findings in the civil wars literature. For instance, Sambanis (2001) finds that ethnic and religious civil wars are more strongly driven by grievances than "revolutionary" wars, while Bhavani (2006), Denny and Walter (2014), and Esteban and Ray (2008) suggest that it may be easier for leaders to organize ethnic and other forms of identity-based violence, due to the reduced costs of collective action and/or group norms encouraging participation. Relatedly, because ethnicity may be perceived as less malleable than political affiliation, ethnic violence may be more intense and/or intractable (Kaufman 1996). Furthermore, the more visible salience of ethnic identities may increase vulnerability for group members, thereby exacerbating security dilemma dynamics (Posen 1993).

Notwithstanding theory and research suggesting differences in the causes and dynamics of identity-based and other forms of violence, empirical analyses of international interventions and mass atrocities have largely ignored this distinction. For instance, Krain (2005, 2012, 2017) uses a combined sample of genocides and politicides but does not differentiate by violence type. Other studies, such as Hultman (2010), include violence type as a control but do not test for interactions between violence type and interventions. As a first cut at addressing this gap in the literature, we propose two hypotheses suggesting how violence type may condition the effectiveness of international interventions in mitigating ongoing atrocities, focusing on the general categories of military and non-military interventions. At the same time, we acknowledge that there remains considerable debate as to whether identity-based violence is indeed distinct from other forms of violence (Mueller 2000; Kalyvas 2008). Therefore, while our hypotheses are

intended as a starting point for our analysis, we begin from a generally agnostic position as to the claim that violence type matters at all for intervention effectiveness.

Military Interventions

Military interventions involve the deployment of armed forces of one country in the territory of another (Pickering and Kisangani 2009). Effective military interventions therefore require forces operating in foreign territory to defend vulnerable populations, degrade perpetrator capacity, or otherwise protect potential victims. This requires interveners to physically distinguish between victims and perpetrators, often with limited information and in the uncertainty of ongoing violence. In this respect, the distinction between identity-based violence and politicide may be relevant; specifically, to the extent identity differences are more visibly salient, or populations of identity groups are more extensively clustered, it may be easier for interveners to distinguish between victims and perpetrators of identity-based violence and protect victims or neutralize perpetrators. This suggests our first hypothesis:

> H1: Military interventions will have stronger ameliorative effects in cases of identity-based violence.

Non-Military Interventions

In contrast, non-military interventions operate primarily by imposing economic or reputational costs on perpetrators (Krain 2012, 2017). Accordingly, the effectiveness of non-military interventions depends largely on perpetrators' sensitivity to these costs, which in turn depends on the degree to which perpetrators understand their goals as permitting compromise with targets. In this respect, the distinction between identity-based violence and politicide is potentially relevant, particularly to the extent that perpetrators perceive identity differences as intrinsic and therefore less amenable to compromise; if this is the case, then non-military

interventions are less likely to succeed in mitigating atrocities. Conversely, to the extent political differences are understood as more amenable to compromise, perpetrators are more likely to adjust their behavior in response to increased costs. This suggests our second hypothesis:

H2: Non-military interventions will have stronger ameliorative effects in cases of politicide.

DATA

To test our hypotheses, we use the most recent version of Matthew Krain's data on mass atrocities and interventions. Krain employs the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) State Failure dataset (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2017) to identify cases of mass atrocities. Krain's most recent analysis uses PITF data from 1975 through 2008, covering 30 atrocity episodes in 26 countries (Krain 2017). The unit of analysis is the country-year, with separate observations for each year during which there was an episode in the relevant country; the data also include the year following the end of each episode to allow for analysis of lagged intervention variables, yielding a final sample of 199 observations.[1] Each observation is coded on an ordinal scale measuring annual atrocity severity, which is the dependent variable in Krain's analysis and ours; the values of this variable, summarized in Table 1, range from zero to 10 according to the estimated number of deaths in the country in the given year.

We next distinguish between episodes of identity-based violence and politicide. The PITF data includes what it terms "genocides" and "politicides", but as noted previously, Krain does not differentiate between types of violence. However, other studies employing the PITF data, albeit not examining interventions, have made this distinction. Following the definitions in the PITF codebook (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff), Uzonyi (2014, 233-234) codes genocide where "the

[1].See the "Sample Note" in the Online Appendix for further details.

government's actions were committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" and politicide in cases of violence against "opponents of the state, regardless of national, ethnical, racial or religious groups". We generally follow Uzonyi's coding, with one important exception aimed at capturing cases of violence, such as ethnic cleansing, that do not meet the requirement of genocidal intent but nonetheless involve targeting identity groups; following this rule, we recode five episodes in Uzonyi's data as identity-based violence.[2]

Table 2 lists the atrocity episodes included in our analysis, distinguished by type. Our sample includes 16 episodes of identity-based violence in 13 countries and 14 episodes of politicide in 13 countries; however, there are slightly more country-year observations of politicide (n=105) than identity-based violence (n=94).

Krain's data includes information on three forms of military intervention and two types of non-military interventions, allowing us to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. The military intervention variables are sourced from the International Military Interventions dataset (Pickering and Kisangani 2009) and lagged one year:

1) *Anti-Perpetrator Military*, a count of foreign countries and international organizations explicitly targeted against perpetrators and/or supporting victims;
2) *Neutral Military*, a count of international military actions that were expressly neutral or did not directly support either perpetrators or targets;

[2] These cases are Iraq (1988-1991, targeting Kurds and Shia Muslims); Pakistan (1975-1977, targeting Baluchis); Philippines (1972-1976, targeting Moros), Sudan (1983-2002, targeting southern Christians and other non-Muslims), and Sudan (2003-2008, targeting Fur, Masalit, and Baghawa). Our analysis also includes Serbia (1998-1999, targeting Kosovar Albanians) as identity-based violence; this case is not included in Uzonyi's data.

3) *Pro-Perpetrator Military*, a count of international military actions supporting perpetrators and/or targeted against victims;

The non-military intervention variables are likewise lagged one year:

4) *Sanctions*, a count of economic sanctions imposed by other countries and international organizations, sourced from Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi (2009);
5) *Naming and Shaming*, the annual count of reports and press releases on the country produced by Amnesty International, compiled by Ron et al. (2005).

In addition to these intervention variables, Krain codes each observation on a set of controls, which we also include in our analysis:

1) *Lagged Severity*, the dependent variable lagged one year;
2) *Duration*, a running count of the number of years in which the episode was ongoing as of the observation year;
3) *State Failure*, a dummy coded 1 if the country experienced any other form of state failure defined in the PITF dataset (revolutionary war, ethnic civil war, disruptive regime transition) in the previous observation year;
4) *Coup*, a count of coups (successful, attempted, plotted, alleged) in the country in the previous year, per Marshall and Marshall (2009);
5) *Regime*, the Polity IV composite measure of political regime, per Marshall and Jaggers (2009);
6) *Population*, the country's log population in the previous year, per the World Bank Development Indicators (WBDI)*;*

7) *Marginalization*, measured continuously as a function of the country's percentage of overall world trade, per the IMF's *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook* for the relevant year;
8) *ODA*, the log amount of development aid received by the relevant country in the prior year, per WBDI.

Krain additionally includes a dummy variable for the Cold War, but to better account for temporal variation, we include the dummy variables *1980s*, *1990s*, and *2000*s; these variables are coded 1 for episodes in the respective decade, with the 1970s as the base category. We also include several additional controls to capture other potentially important factors omitted by Krain:

9) *Previous Episodes*, a dummy coded 1 if the country experienced a previous atrocity episode per the PITF dataset, separate from the ongoing episode, in order to account for the effects of prior atrocities (Harff 2003);
10) *Africa*, a dummy coded 1 for episodes occurring in Africa, in order to account for regional variation; we select Africa because African episodes comprise a plurality of observations in the overall sample (n=89).

Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and intervention variables for the overall sample and sub-samples; descriptive statistics for other variables are reported in the Online Appendix.

FINDINGS

Table 4 reports three ordered logit models, appropriate for the ordinal structure of the dependent variable, with robust standard errors to account for clustering by episode. These models extend Model 1 in Table 1 of Krain (2017). Our Model 1 replicates Krain's Model 1 for

the entire sample, including our additional controls, while Models 2 and 3 repeat this analysis for the identity-based violence and politicide sub-samples. For brevity, we report estimates for intervention variables only; full models are reported in Table OA2 in the Online Appendix.

To estimate the magnitude of intervention effects in the sub-samples, we use the estimates in Models 2 and 3 to generate predicted probabilities that a hypothetical case of the respective atrocity type will experience various levels of severity one year post-intervention, given different values of intervention variables; we then calculate the probabilities that atrocities in our hypothetical case will escalate, remain at the same magnitude, or de-escalate in the year after an intervention.[3] Although the intervention variables are measured as counts, we compare probabilities between cases with values of zero and one on the respective intervention variable, in order to illustrate discrete intervention effects. For all models and intervention variables, we define a "hypothetical case" as having mean lagged severity (rounded to the next integer, five for both sub-samples); no other interventions, coups, or state failure episodes in the year prior; no previous atrocity episodes; mean sub-sample values for continuous controls; and occurring in the 2000s in Africa. For brevity, we report predicted probabilities only for statistically significant intervention variables. Tables 5 and 6 report predicted probabilities for significant intervention variables in Models 2 and 3, respectively.

[3] Predicted probabilities were estimated using the "mtable" function in Stata (Long and Freese 2014). The predicted probability of escalation is calculated as the sum of predicted probabilities for values of severity greater mean lagged severity. The predicted probability of severity remaining the same is the predicted probability for the mean of lagged severity, and the predicted probability of de-escalation is the sum of all predicted probabilities for magnitudes of severity less mean lagged severity. This procedure follows Krain (2012).

Model 1, which tests the combined sample, indicates that anti-perpetrator military interventions significantly reduce atrocity severity. This is consistent with Krain's (2017) findings; however, Krain also finds that "naming and shaming" significantly reduces atrocities, while we find that "naming and shaming" has negative, but insignificant, effects in the combined sample; this difference is likely attributable to our inclusion of controls omitted by Krain.

Of most direct relevance to our hypotheses are Models 2 and 3, which test the identity-based violence and politicide sub-samples, respectively. Consistent with our hypotheses, these models indicate that the effectiveness of military and non-military interventions varies by atrocity type.

Military Intervention

Model 2 indicates a negative, statistically significant relationship between anti-perpetrator military interventions and atrocity severity for identity-based violence, but no significant relationship between either neutral or pro-perpetrator military interventions and atrocity severity; this implies that anti-perpetrator military interventions, but no other types of military interventions, have ameliorative effects for identity-based violence. In terms of substantive impact, Table 5 suggests that anti-perpetrator military interventions have modest, but nonetheless meaningful, effects in cases of identity-based violence; specifically, we find that the probability of de-escalation from mean severity in a hypothetical case of identity-based violence increases from 0.165, or slightly less than 1-in-6, with no anti-perpetrator interveners deployed, to 0.220, or slightly greater than 1-in-5, with one anti-perpetrator intervener present. Conversely, Model 3 indicates insignificant relationships between all types of military interventions and atrocity severity, suggesting that military action has negligible effects in cases of politicide.

These results support Hypothesis 1, which predicted that military interventions will have stronger ameliorative effects for identity-based violence. However, these findings also indicate that only anti-perpetrator military interventions are effective in mitigating identity-based violence; pro-perpetrator and neutral military interventions are ineffective regardless of atrocity type.

Non-Military Intervention

Models 2 and 3 both indicate statistically insignificant relationships between economic sanctions and atrocity severity, implying that sanctions have negligible effects for both identity-based violence and politicide. However, we find evidence of differential effects with respect to "naming and shaming." Specifically, Model 2 indicates a positive, but insignificant, relationship between "naming and shaming" and atrocity severity, while Model 3 indicates a negative, significant relationship between these variables; these results suggest that "naming and shaming," at least as measured by Amnesty International reports, has negligible impacts in cases of identity-based violence, but ameliorative effects in cases of politicide. Substantively, Table 6 indicates the predicted probability of de-escalation from mean severity in a hypothetical case of politicide increases from 0.630 with no Amnesty International reports released to 0.665 with the release of one report; this suggests that "naming and shaming" has small, but still consequential, effects in cases of politicide.

These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2, which predicted that non-military interventions will have stronger ameliorative effects in cases of politicide. However, we find that only one type of non-military action, specifically "naming and shaming," is effective in reducing the severity of politicides, while economic sanctions are ineffective in both types of atrocity.

CONCLUSION

Our findings suggest that interventions to halt mass atrocities should not be treated as a one-size-fits-all solution. While our methods do not allow us to test the causal mechanisms underlying our hypotheses, our findings indicate that the effectiveness of certain types of international action varies by atrocity type. Specifically, we find that anti-perpetrator military interventions have ameliorative effects only in cases of identity-based violence, while "naming and shaming" helps only in politicides. Notably, we also find that some types of interventions, including pro-perpetrator and neutral military actions and economic sanctions, are ineffective across the board.

Returning to the example discussed in the introduction, our findings suggest that in a context like Burundi, where victims are being targeted based on their political affiliation, international military intervention is unlikely to be effective in reducing the violence. A robust naming and shaming campaign, however, may have a real impact. By contrast, in a case like the ongoing genocide of Burma's Rohingya minority, naming and shaming is unlikely to have any effect, but a military intervention to protect these victims might save lives.

TABLE 1: Mass Atrocity Severity Coding in Krain (2017)

Value	Annual Deaths
0	less than 300
1	300 - 1,000
2	1,000 - 2,000
3	2,000 - 4,000
4	4,000 - 8,000
5	8,000 - 16,000
6	16,000 - 32,000
7	32,000 - 64,000
8	64,000 - 128,000
9	128,000 - 256,000
10	256,000 +
Table 1 is reproduced from "Table OA2: Genocide/Politicide Severity Magnitudes of Severity and their Equivalent Ranges of the Estimated Number of Deaths per Country-Year in the Online Appendix" to Krain (2017), with the permission of the publisher, Taylor & Francis, Ltd. (www.tandfonline.com), dated April 1, 2019.	

TABLE 2: Atrocity Episodes by Type, 1975-2008

Identity-Based	Politicide
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1993-1995	Afghanistan, 1978-1992
Burundi, 1988	Angola, 1975-1994
Burundi, 1993	Angola, 1998-2002
Cambodia, 1975-1979	Argentina, 1976-1980
Guatemala, 1978-1990	Chile, 1973-1976
Iran, 1981-1992	Congo-Kinshasa, 1977-1979
Iraq, 1988-1991	El Salvador, 1980-1989
Myanmar, 1978	Equatorial Guinea, 1969-1979
Pakistan, 1975-1977	Ethiopia, 1976-1979
Philippines, 1975-1976	Indonesia, 1975-1992
Rwanda, 1994	Somalia, 1988-1991
Serbia, 1998-1999	Sri Lanka, 1989-1990
Sudan, 1983-2002	Syria, 1981-1982
Sudan, 2003-2008	Vietnam, 1975
Uganda, 1975-1979	
Uganda, 1980-1986	

TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistics (Atrocity Severity and Intervention Variables)

	Overall				Identity-Based				Politicide			
N	199				94				105			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev	Max	Min	Mean	Std. Dev	Max	Min
Atrocity Severity	4.24	2.94	0	10	4.54	3.22	0	10	3.96	2.65	0	9
Anti-Perpetrator Military	.32	1.06	0	13	.48	1.45	0	13	.18	.43	0	2
Neutral Military	.26	.60	0	3	.38	.76	0	3	.15	.36	0	1
Pro-Perpetrator Military	.48	.98	0	8	.17	.48	0	2	.76	1.21	0	8
Sanctions	.29	.50	0	2	.47	.58	0	2	.13	.34	0	1
Naming & Shaming	6.59	7.21	0	40	8.00	8.30	0	40	5.32	5.84	0	24

TABLE 4: Ordered Logit Estimates of Atrocity Severity (Intervention Variables)

Model	**1**	**2**	**3**
Atrocity Type	ALL	Identity	Politicide
Anti-Perpetrator Military	-.46 (.14)**	-.35 (.18)*	-.82 (.69)
Neutral Military	.05 (.35)	-1.05 (.76)	.81 (.67)
Pro-Perpetrator Military	-.18 (.20)	.83 (.91)	-.09 (.35)
Sanctions	.08 (.34)	-.18 (.50)	-.57 (.63)
Naming and Shaming	-.05 (.03)	.02 (.04)	-.16 (.05)**
N	199	94	105
Pseudo R-squared	.15	.17	.21
Log-Likelihood	-383.68	-177.11	-180.71
Robust standard errors in parentheses Significance Levels: *: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001			

TABLE 5: Predicted Probabilities of Atrocity Severity for Identity-Based Violence

	Anti-Perpetrator Military Interventions	
Atrocity Severity	**0**	**1**
0	.017	.024
1	.037	.052
2	.034	.046
3	.027	.035
4	.050	.063
5 (Mean)	.141	.165
6	.275	.278
7	.185	.160
8	.165	.127
9	.049	.035
10	.021	.015
Probability of De-Escalation from Mean	.165	.220
Probability of No Change from Mean	.141	.165
Probability of Escalation from Mean	.695	.615
Predicted probabilities based on Model 2, with covariates set at the following values: Neutral Military=0, Pro-Perpetrator Military=0, Sanctions=0, "Naming and Shaming"=0, Lagged Severity=5, Previous Episodes=0, Duration=6.20, State Failure=0, Coup=0, Regime Type=-4.02, Marginalization=52.70, Population=16.65, ODA=18.73, 1980s=0, 1990s=0, 2000s=1, Africa=1 (Probabilities may not sum to 1.00 due to rounding).		

TABLE 6: Predicted Probabilities of Atrocity Severity for Politicides

	Amnesty International Reports	
Atrocity Severity	**0**	**1**
0	.083	.095
1	.059	.067
2	.166	.181
3	.206	.210
4	.116	.112
5 (Mean)	.192	.178
6	.123	.108
7	.051	.044
8	.003	.003
9	.001	.001
Probability of De-Escalation from Mean	.630	.665
Probability of No Change from Mean	.192	.178
Probability of Escalation from Mean	.178	.156
Predicted probabilities based on Model 3, with covariates set at the following values: Anti-Perpetrator Military=0, Neutral Military=0, Pro-Perpetrator Military=0, Sanctions=0, Lagged Severity=5, Previous Episodes=0, Duration=7.49, State Failure=0, Coup=0, Regime Type=-4.98, Marginalization=49.51, Population=16.26 ODA=18.77, 1980s=0, 1990s=0, 2000s=1, Africa=1 (Probabilities may not sum to 1.00 due to rounding).		

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ONLINE APPENDIX

SAMPLE NOTE: The full version of the PITF dataset covers 1955 through 2008, and Krain's (2017) analysis is reported as covering cases of *ongoing* atrocities from 1976 through 2008; however, because Krain's data includes the year after the end of each episode, his analysis effectively covers atrocities that ended in 1975. Three episodes in Krain's data—Iraq (1963-1975), South Vietnam (1965-1975), and China (1966-1975)—ended in 1975, and therefore Krain's data includes observations for Iraq 1976, South Vietnam 1976, and China 1976. However, two of these observations are omitted from Krain's analysis due to missing data (Iraq 1976 and China 1976). Two additional observations in Krain's sample (Iran 1983 and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992) are also omitted from Krain's analysis due to missing data; this yields a sample of 201 observations in Krain's reported analysis. However, two observations for 1975 (Angola and Equatorial Guinea) were erroneously included in this sample, as confirmed by the first author's correspondence with Krain, dated January 24, 2018. The final sample in our analysis therefore includes 199 observations.

TABLE OA1: Descriptive Statistics (Control Variables)

	Overall				Identity				Politicide			
N	199				94				105			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev	Max	Min	Mean	Std. Dev	Max	Min
Lagged Severity	4.48	2.85	0	10	4.81	3.15	0	10	4.19	2.53	0	9
Previous Episode	.38	.49	0	1	.51	.50	0	1	.27	.44	0	1
Duration	6.88	5.02	1	21	6.20	4.61	1	20	7.49	5.32	1	21
State Failure	.80	.40	0	1	.80	.40	0	1	.81	.39	0	1
Coup	.29	.64	0	3	.46	.77	0	3	.13	.44	0	3
Regime	-4.53	4.37	-9	8	-4.02	4.36	-9	8	-4.98	4.36	-9	6
Marginalization	51.02	106.61	.92	781.85	52.70	84.78	1.34	419.38	49.51	123.31	.92	781.85
Population	16.44	1.04	12.16	18.17	16.65	.83	15.13	18.17	16.26	1.17	12.16	17.69
ODA	18.75	1.76	12.51	21.47	18.73	1.71	12.51	21.47	18.77	1.81	12.95	21.40
1970s	.23	.42	0	1	.18	.39	0	1	.27	.44	0	1
1980s	.45	.50	0	1	.40	.49	0	1	.49	.50	0	1
1990s	.26	.44	0	1	.31	.46	0	1	.21	.41	0	1
2000s	.07	.26	0	1	.11	.31	0	1	.04	.19	0	1
Africa	.45	.50	0	1	.47	.50	0	1	.43	.50	0	1

TABLE OA2: Ordered Logit Estimates of Atrocity Severity (Full Models)

Model	**1**	**2**	**3**
Atrocity Type	ALL	Identity	Politicide
Anti-Perpetrator Military	-.46 (.14)**	-.35 (.18)*	-.82 (.69)
Neutral Military	.05 (.35)	-1.05 (.76)	.81 (.67)
Pro-Perpetrator Military	-.18 (.20)	.83 (.91)	-.09 (.35)
Sanctions	.08 (.34)	-.18 (.50)	-.57 (.63)
Naming and Shaming	-.05 (.03)	.02 (.04)	-.16 (.05)**
Lagged Severity	.49 (.09)***	.30 (.14)*	.42 (.13)**
Previous Episodes	.89 (.42)*	1.10 (.82)	-.37 (.73)
Duration	-.07 (.03)*	-.15 (.06)*	-.05 (.05)
State Failure	.21 (.47)	.33 (.58)	1.68 (1.00)
Coup	.22 (.30)	.20 (.39)	-.24 (.54)
Regime	-.03 (.03)	-.004 (.07)	-.14 (.10)
Marginalization	-.006 (.002)*	-.006 (.006)	-.008 (.004)
Population	-.21 (.23)	-.05 (.29)	-.46 (.50)
ODA	-.35 (.15)*	-.46 (.24)	-.37 (.23)
1980s	.90 (.39)*	-.46 (.88)	.94 (.59)
1990s	1.29 (.49)**	1.11 (.85)	.81 (.81)
2000s	.15 (.70)	.78 (1.09)	.43 (1.25)
Africa	.76 (.31)*	1.81 (.78)*	-.95 (.72)
Cut 1	-10.27 (4.39)	-10.58 (6.40)	-15.25 (8.42)
Cut 2	-9.43	-9.37	-14.64

	(4.37)	(6.36)	(8.41)
Cut 3	-8.75 (4.35)	-8.84 (6.34)	-13.65 (8.43)
Cut 4	-8.23 (4.34)	-8.55 (6.36)	-12.79 (8.40)
Cut 5	-7.85 (4.33)	-8.13 (6.35)	-12.31 (8.40)
Cut 6	-7.02 (4.32)	-7.33 (.6.34)	-11.32 (8.42)
Cut 7	-5.89 (4.33)	-6.19 (6.36)	-10.01 (8.47)
Cut 8	-4.60 (4.32)	-5.33 (6.36)	-7.39 (8.54)
Cut 9	-3.23 (4.26)	-3.92 (6.28)	-5.74 (8.52)
Cut 10	-1.80 (4.19)	-2.67 (6.17)	---
N	199	94	105
Pseudo R-squared	.15	.17	.21
Log-Likelihood	-383.68	-177.11	-180.71
Robust standard errors in parentheses Significance Levels: *: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001			