Systematic Measurement Error in Election Violence Data: Causes and Consequences

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Abstract:

What are the causes and consequences of systematic measurement error in violence measures drawn from media-based conflict event data? More specifically, how valid are such event data for geo-coding and capturing election violence? We examine sub-national variation in election violence and use original data from domestic election monitor surveys as a comparison to widely used sources of event data. We show that conventional data under-report events throughout the election cycle, particularly in sparsely populated areas and outside anticipated violence hotspots. Moreover, systematic measurement error of media-based event data for measuring election violence generates significant relationships where none exist, and different effect magnitudes. We offer ways forward for future research and indicate ways in which existing work on election violence may have been affected by systematic measurement error.

1. Introduction

Since a wave of democratization swept the world in the 1990's, elections have become a global norm (Levitsky and Way 2010). However, many new democracies struggle with consolidation and holding elections that meet international standards. Elections have been marred by irregularities and repression. Most notably, violence has become a prominent feature of elections in many developing countries (Beaulieu 2014, 138; Collier 2009). When elections turn violent, it threatens their integrity, it tilts the electoral playing field towards actors with repressive capacity, and it limits participation, particularly among those unable to protect themselves from repression (Bratton 2008).

Election violence is a type of political violence that is aimed at influencing the election's process or outcome and occurs temporally close to elections.[1] A burgeoning literature in comparative politics and international relations examines the causes and consequences of such election violence.[2] Some of the quantitative work on election violence has been cross-national (E.g. Birch and Muchlinski 2018; von Borzyskowski 2014; Daxecker 2014; Fjelde and Höglund 2016a, Hafner-Burton et al. 2014, 2017; Kuhn 2015; Taylor et al. 2017), while other work has been *subnational* (E.g. Reeder and Bech Seeberg 2018; Burchard 2015; Goldring and Wahman 2018; Dercon and Guitérrez-Romero 2012; Ishiyama et al. 2016; Linke 2013; Weidmann and Callen 2013; Wilkinson 2004). Both sub- and cross-national

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[1] Election violence can be directed against people (candidates, voters, election officials, external supporters) or objects (election facilities, party offices, material) and can happen before or after election-day. Our definition of violence is fairly comprehensive and includes fatal and non-fatal events. A narrow focus on only the most extreme fatal incidents would seriously underestimate the level of violence experienced in many African countries. Violence does not have to be fatal to reduce trust in political institutions or affect citizens' participation in the democratic process (Norris 2014).

[2] For recent reviews, see Dunning 2011 and Fjelde and Höglund 2016b

studies tend to assume that underlying data on election violence are free of systematic measurement error and reflect dynamics on the ground reasonably well; or more formally, that there is no systematic measurement error, and that the variables used are a valid measure of the underlying concept of election violence. We argue that this assumption is incorrect for some widely used datasets.

Most subnational (and some cross-national) work on election violence has relied on media-based conflict event data.[3] A number of newer social conflict datasets, like the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (Raleigh et al. 2010) and the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) (Salehyan et al. 2012), have enabled researchers to place violent events geographically and study variation both within and across countries. Such conflict event data have opened up a wealth of new opportunities for researchers interested in the causes and consequences of election violence. But how valid are such media-based conflict event data to measure election violence? Even more importantly, do these measures of violence have errors that may systematically skew empirical results? Indeed, some earlier work has argued that this may well be the case (Eck 2012; Weidmann 2016). Media logics inherent in domestic and international reporting are likely to create serious underreporting and potential systematic measurement error. Several studies have acknowledged the limitations of media-based event data in their ability to capture violence or political mobilization (Davenport and Ball 2010; Earl et al. 2004; Mueller 1997; Weidmann 2016). Yet, we are the first to measure the extent of such systematic measurement errors in relation to elections and at a low level of aggregation (constituencies). We document how serious this under-estimate is, as well as its causes and consequences.

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[3] Some research also uses surveys (Bratton 2008; Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero 2012, Gutiérrez-Romero 2014), such as the Afrobarometer. However, these survey data are usually only representative at high levels of sub-national aggregation (regions) but not politically relevant units (constituencies), and cover only few constituencies in the country.

To deal with under-reporting and mis-classification, researchers have proposed two main solutions. One solution is to triangulate between multiple measures (Hendrix and Salehyan 2015, Weidmann 2016), for example with capture-recapture methods or merging. This solution is only possible when multiple sources exist and assumes that the measures do not suffer from similar systematic measurement error. A second solution is to fix the issue with statistical remedies, trying to assess the severity and direction of systematic measurement error through sensitivity analyses (Gallop and Weschle 2017) and try to correct for it (Cook et al. 2017). However, as Weidmann (2016, 208) notes, "there have been no tests on a real case of selectively reported data where the true values are known." While we do not claim to have revealed the absolute "truth," we provide two cases for which the more accurate values are known, as data are systematically collected from domestic election monitors evenly spread across the country, regardless of remoteness and communication. The difference between the more accurate monitor measure of where violence happened and the media-based event measure is what we call under-reporting.

Measurement error concerns the relationship between an observed variable and a specific concept it is intended to capture, and can be random or systematic. Both our own data and event data may have some random measurement error. However, event data suffer from *systematic* measurement error due to the logic of reporting. Media-based incident data (such as ACLED and SCAD) are not clean measures of violence but measures of *reported* violence. This threatens measurement validity (Adcock and Collier 2001). Our method guarantees equal coverage across space and provides a baseline against which we can estimate the sources and effects of systematic measurement error in event data. Scholars wishing to use event data in their own research may use these results to account for systematic measurement error in modeling sub-national variation in election violence.

We make both substantive and methodological contributions to research on measurement error concerning media-based event data. Methodologically, we contribute to research on under-reporting by comparing two frequently used media-based event datasets (SCAD, ACLED) to new datasets on constituency-level election violence. Our novel approach, captured in the Malawi Election Monitor Survey (MEMS) and Zambia Election Monitor Survey (ZEMS), uses systematic expert surveys with domestic election observers to map election violence. This new approach is designed to ensure consistent national coverage at the constituency level. Using two recent African elections, Malawi 2014 and Zambia 2016, we compare these constituency-level expert survey data to SCAD and ACLED. Based on these comparisons, we then sign the direction of the systematic measurement error likely to result from using media-based event data to capture election violence.

Substantively, we document under-reporting not only in rural areas but also outside expected violence hotspots and disproportionately in the pre-election period. We show that the consequences of these systematic measurement errors are severe, generating significant relationships where none exist and also different effect magnitudes. Our findings have important implications for scholars conducting empirical research on election violence, but also for those using other media-based event data on issues such as social mobilization or civil conflict.

To be clear, our argument is not that event data are entirely unsuitable for research on election violence. For large-N cross-national analyses, such event data often remain the only easily accessible data source. However, scholars should be aware of systematic measurement errors in these data, should be careful when interpreting results, and use appropriate models to analyze the possible consequences of such errors. Our substantive results cast doubt on some of the most important empirical work on the frequency, location, and timing of election violence. Taken together, our findings raise a larger issue,

as it suggests that the current state of knowledge on election violence may well be affected by systematic biases when using violence measures from media-based event data.

2. Potential Systematic Measurement Error When Using Media-Based Event Data

Geo-coded data on social conflict creates new opportunities to conduct cross-national (e.g. Burchard 2015; Daxecker 2014; Goldsmith 2015) as well as sub-national election violence research (e.g. Reeder and Bech Seeberg 2018; Buchard 2015; Ishiyama et al. 2016; Linke 2013). We focus on two such datasets: ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2010) and SCAD (Salehyan et al. 2012) and concentrate particularly on their ability to capture subnational variation in election violence.[4] In this paper we will compare these datasets with our own collected expert survey data (M/ZEMS).

Neither ACLED nor SCAD were designed with the primary purpose of capturing election violence but both have been used for this purpose (e.g. Reeder and Bech Seeberg 2018; Buchard 2015; Daxecker 2014; Ishiyama et al. 2016; Linke 2013). We focus on ACLED and SCAD because of their popularity and their comparability to M/ZEMS data. ACLED, SCAD, and M/ZEMS all aim to capture conflict events in African countries sub-nationally, include lethal as well as non-lethal incidents, and events inside as well as outside of civil wars.[5]

ACLED and SCAD are also similar to each other in that they both document conflict events in Africa based on media sources, and offer a geographic location indicator. They also differ in a number of

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[4] A third frequently used dataset, the UCDP-GED (Croicu and Sandberg 2015), could also possibly be used for this purpose but only includes fatal incidents which makes it less comparable to the two datasets described above, and even less comprehensive for capturing violence.

[5] ACLED 2012 codebook pages 3, 16; SCAD 2014 codebook pages 1, 3. About 88 percent of all ACLED and SCAD events recorded are non-lethal.

ways. In terms of news sources, ACLED uses a variety of local, regional, national newspapers, and NGO reports to locate violent events. SCAD's data collection is limited to two international news agencies: *Associated Press* and *Agence France-Presse*.[6] Importantly, that means SCAD excludes all local newspapers. For the two countries included in this paper, it means that SCAD excludes local newspapers such as Malawi's *Malawi Nation* and *Malawi Times* and Zambia's *The Post*, *Times of Zambia*, and *Zambia Daily Mail.*.

There are at least two preconditions for mapping constituency-level election violence: geo-precision and election specificity. In terms of geo-precision, we must be able to place each violent incident within the boundaries of an electoral constituency. One limitation of both ACLED and SCAD is that none of them were designed to map incidents into electoral constituencies and the precision of the geographic coordinates is often limited. For instance, a newspaper article may name the district of an election violence event, but a district (as in the case of Malawi and Zambia) may have several constituencies.[7] The second precondition for mapping election violence is that we can distinguish election violence from other forms of social conflict, which are not directly related to the electoral process. Although neither of the two datasets is particularly focused on election violence, they provide ways to filter election-specific violence – with more or less objectivity and replicability. An election "issue" filter exists in SCAD but not ACLED, so that single-sentence incident narratives must be used for ACLED, which can be ambiguous in terms of electoral relevance.[8]

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[6] SCAD codebook, page 1.
[7] ACLED codes the precision of the event. However, not even the highest geographic precision (spatial precision=1) guarantees that an event is placed in the appropriate constituency. Precision = 1 means that a town is specified; however, we might not know the location within the town where the incident occurred. For instance, the Zambia's capital Lusaka has 14 constituencies.

The fundamental problem of media-based event data is that they are likely to underreport violence, especially lower-scale violence that is overshadowed by other, more dramatic events. Some violent events are unlikely to be picked up by newspapers. For an event to appear in the media, a journalist needs to know and write about it, and an editor needs to decide to publish it. Yet both actors face constraints. Journalists face physical and economic constraints, they routinely make decisions about where to go and trade off one location over another. In deciding where to go, journalists consider where (more important) events are likely to happen, how to reach these places, and how to publish stories from there. If notable events are likely to happen in both places A and B, but A is within easier reach or offers other conveniences, then journalists choose A over B. Such patterns are reinforced if journalists are mainly freelancers, paid per published story. Thus, journalists tend to privilege towns over villages, central areas over more remote ones, and places with access to better communication tools.[9] However, even if journalists see/hear and write about an event, it does not guarantee publicity. Editors also face constraints on what to publish; these can be space constraints due to paper/column space, or political constraints as to what is fit for print given the outlet's preferences and government policies. As a result of these constraints, many events do not make it into the media, and thus do not appear in event datasets based on media outlets.

This fundamental problem of media-based event data also applies to the case of election violence. Based on these reporting dynamics inherent in media, we argue that underreporting varies by election cycles, by connectivity, and by expectations of violence. As for electoral cycles, general underreporting should be especially noteworthy in the longer pre-election period where journalists are likely to be less alert on possible violence. After elections, however, journalists pay closer attention to reactions to the

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[9] E.g. cell phone or internet connection; see Öberg and Sollenberg 2011, 55

election results and process, and any contestation or unrest. We hence formulate the following hypotheses:

Underreporting Hypothesis (H1): Media-based conflict event data tend to under-report incidents of election violence.

Pre-Election Hypothesis (H2): Media-based conflict event data tend to under-report incidents of election violence more in the pre-electoral than post-electoral period.

These conjectures are important because underreporting of election violence in media-based event data can paint a misleading picture of security concerns in relation to elections. A misrepresentation of the relative frequency of pre- and post-election violence can also distort research on the timing of election violence. For instance, using Reuters news database, Bhasin and Gandhi (2013) show that most government electoral repression happens after rather than before elections, but this result could have been affected by an increased propensity for the media to report on post-election violence. In addition to distorting studies on the timing of violence, under-reporting can also generate inference problems for violence studies more broadly if the underreporting is systematically related to the independent variable (Weidmann 2016; Wooldridge 2006). Below we outline two different sources of possible under-reporting: (1) constituency connectivity and (2) expectations of violence. We argue that both of these sources may create media under-reporting, systematic measurement error, and thus biased estimate and inaccurate inference from (election) violence studies using media-based event data.

2.1 Constituency Connectivity

Sub-national units vary vastly in their level of connectivity. This is especially true in the developing world, where infrastructure is poor, mobility limited, and access to electricity, the internet, and mobile

networks restricted. Journalists and editorial offices are based in cities and organizational life is much denser in major urban areas. We should hence see a significant urban bias in the reporting of election violence. Similar arguments have been made about the measurement of social conflict more generally (Weidmann 2016) and state terror (Davenport and Ball 2002). We hence formulate the following hypothesis:

Connectedness Hypothesis (H3): The less connected a constituency, the greater the extent to which media-based conflict event data under-report incidents of election violence within the constituency.

Connectivity driving underreporting is important because much literature on election violence argues that election violence is a predominantly urban phenomenon (Burchard 2015; Wilkinson 2004). Possible systematic measurement error in relation to constituency connectivity could have significant ramifications as the level of violence in less urban, more remote places is likely under-estimated. Even more troubling, urban-rural contrasts in Africa are stark and local political dynamics differ significantly between cosmopolitan African cities, regional commercial centers, densely populated commercial agricultural zones, and semi-arid pastoral regions. Many locations that have been hypothesized as high-risk areas for election violence, including ethnically diverse cities (Straus 2011), agricultural settlement schemes (Boone 2011; Kanyinga 2009), and resource extraction sites (Bratton 2008) are also areas with high population density. Population density and electoral competition correlate highly, with cities and highly populated rural areas showing significantly higher levels of political competition than low-density rural areas dominated by subsistence farming and pastoral areas (Wahman and Boone 2018). Population density also serves as a strong proxy for modernization and economic development. Figure 1 shows the relationship between constituency-level population density, political competition, ethnic

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fractionalization, and economic development [10] in our sample. Population density is significantly

correlated with political competition, ethnic fractionalization, and economic development (night light

density). This is important for studies on sub-national election violence because relationships between

socio-economic conditions, population density, political competition, and election violence are

difficult to disentangle if underlying data fail to record election violence equally in high and low

population density areas. We return to this issue in the robustness section.

Figure 1: Correlation Matrix (Malawi and Zambia)

Note: Correlation statistics in individual plots, * indicates p<0.05.

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[10] Following a significant literature in development economics and geography we approximate sub-national wealth with night light density (Weidmann and Schutte 2016). For each constituency we take the mean score, divide it by the land area to get the mean night lights per square kilometer, add 1 to avoid losing observations that equal 0, and take the natural log. Data from United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association's (NOAA) National Geographic Data Center have been aggregated to the constituency level by Boone (2016).

2.2 Expectations of violence

In the run-up to elections, journalists and other country specialists often have expectations about where in the country violence is more likely to occur. These locations may be politically contested (high competition) or have a history of election violence. Election observers often invest more effort into monitoring such election "hotspots." Civil society also tends to increase efforts to prevent violence, and representatives of international organizations tend to be more present in such locations. The increased attention devoted to such hotspots should increase the probability of incidents being captured and reported. Hence we formulate the following hypothesis:

Hotspot Hypothesis (H4): Media-based conflict event data tend to under-report incidents of election violence in elections outside expected violence hotspots.

Such potential systematic measurement error from using media-based conflict data are problematic because they reinforce our pre-conceptions of the causes of election violence. Wilkinson (2004), using data from Indian newspapers, finds that election-related ethnic riots[11] tend to recur in the same locations. However, the logic presented above suggests that there may be a tendency for media to increase reporting from areas with a violent history.

3. An Alternative Measure: Expert surveys for mapping constituency-level election violence

As an alternative to media-based event data, we propose a new technique of mapping election violence based on systematic surveys with domestic election monitors. The advantage of this method is that it

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[11] Wilkinson does not talk about election violence specifically. We address this in section 5.3.

ensures consistent national coverage by systematically collecting data on a constituency-to-constituency basis regardless of the constituency's salience, connectivity, or expected levels of election violence. This study builds on two original constituency-level surveys, the Malawi Election Monitor Survey (MEMS) carried out in relation to Malawi' 2014 general election and the Zambia Election Monitor Survey (ZEMS) carried out in relation to Zambia's 2016 general election. Descriptive statistics in the appendix document that Malawi and Zambia are representative of African countries in terms of election violence levels and drivers, and thus allow generalization.

We use our Malawi and Zambia surveys as our benchmark for empirical comparison with data from ACLED and SCAD. Both surveys were executed in collaboration with leading, non-partisan domestic election observer organizations, following the same general principles. We carried out our Malawi survey with the assistance of the country's leading domestic election observation organization, the National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE). NICE engaged its full-time district civic education officers, regional civic education officers, and community volunteers in long-term monitoring and party mediation, and also engaged a total of 4,500 stationary monitors in short-term observation during election day in every polling center. In Zambia, we collaborated with two organizations, the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) and the Southern African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD). FODEP and SACCORD are two leading domestic election observation organizations who jointly covered all constituencies in the country, deploying a combined 9,000 election monitors throughout the election cycle. NICE, FODEP, and SACCORD are all non-partisan organizations with international funding. They all have a clear organizational structure and provide their monitors with extensive training. In both Malawi and Zambia, we carried out phone interviews with three selected observers in each constituency.

Importantly, respondents were *not* a random sample but instead deliberately a sample of experts, as in other prominent expert surveys on election integrity.[12] The survey respondents for MEMS and ZEMS were recruited from the NICE, FODEP, and SACCORD networks. The Executive Directors of NICE, FODEP, and SACCORD commissioned the regional and district coordinators to collaborate in identifying three suitable respondents in every constituency (193 constituencies in Malawi and 156 in Zambia). In particular, we asked for individuals who had appropriate monitor training, a thorough understanding of the entire electoral cycle for a particular constituency, and no known partisan affiliation. The surveyed monitors include the constituency coordinators for each constituency as well as two additional suitable monitors. In total, we conducted 579 interviews in Malawi and 464 interviews in Zambia. Overall inter-coder reliability scores are reasonable: they are high for Malawi but a bit lower for Zambia pre-election violence.[13] We would not expect perfect scores since constituency coordinators (coder 1) are higher in the hierarchy and thus receive more information than coders 2 and 3. Indeed, constituency coordinators (coder 1) generally report more violence than other coders.[14] To err on the side of caution given a lower score in inter-coder reliability for pre-election violence in Zambia, we conduct analyses of under-reporting for the two countries separately; we show pooled results in the appendix. Generally, similar patterns of under-reporting emerge in Malawi where inter-coder reliability is larger as in Zambia where inter-coder reliability is lower.

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[12] Norris et al. 2015. MEMS and ZEMS experts have knowledge about the entire constituency rather than particular polling stations. During the election cycle our experts received information about events in the entire constituency and the survey asked about events in the entire constituency.

[13] We use the Kuder-Richardson statistic which is similar to Cronbach's Alpha but designed for binary variables instead of Likert scales. Kuder-Richardson scores range from 0 to 1 with higher scores indicating higher reliability. Kuder-Richardson scores above 0.5 are usually regarded as reasonable. Pooling the two countries, the ICR score for pre-election violence is 0.56 and for post-election violence is 0.70. Malawi's scores are 0.74 for pre-election violence and 0.86 for post-election violence.

[14] In Zambia pre-election violence, the case with the lowest ICR score, we observe the largest deviation between coordinators and the other coders: coordinators (coder 1) reported violence in 25% of constituencies compared to only 15% for coders 2 and 3. In Malawi pre-election violence, the same pattern persists but the difference is smaller: coordinators (coder 1) reported violence in 17% of constituencies compared to 13% for coders 2 and 3.

The original MEMS survey in June 2014 asked respondents whether any pre-election or election-day violence had occurred in their constituency.[15] To validate our findings and ensure consistency across respondents and consistency with our definition of election violence, we also asked respondents who indicated violence for a narrative of the event.[16] The narratives provide more precise information on the location, severity, and actors involved in the violence. In some cases, the respondents' violence narratives did not meet our definition of election violence (such as tense rhetoric); here, we changed the coding to no violence for that respondent. Our datasets represent a wealth of material at the constituency level with several monitor reports per unit and qualitative descriptions.

Our analysis hinges on the assumption that our indicator of election violence based on experts' evaluations is measured without systematic error. One line of criticism of this assumption would be that the roles our experts hold may give them an interest in either downplaying or exaggerating the extent of violence. While we cannot rule this out completely, several aspects – including the non-partisanship of the monitor organizations and monitors, the timeline and detail of the surveys – make this unlikely. The first potential concern is individual partisan biases among monitors. Although we would not expect any institutional bias within our non-partisan monitoring organizations, we cannot exclude the possibility of individual biases. However, asking for detailed event narratives makes it less likely that respondents fabricate incidents and also allows assessing the reported events for validity. A second concern is that monitors may themselves be affected by the media sources included in ACLED and SCAD.[17] However, our data would mitigate these systematic measurement errors because – in

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[15] The exact survey question was: "Thinking <u>only</u> about the election in [Name of constituency]. To what extent have you personally experienced or received <u>credible</u> reports of Pre-electoral violence (i.e. physical violence targeted at voters, party officials, candidates, monitors or election officials).

[16] In Malawi, we conducted a second round of surveys in November 2014 during which we re-contacted all the respondents who had indicated violence in the first survey round. In Zambia, we did not perform a follow-up survey, but instead asked for detailed narratives already in the first round of surveys.

[17] To be precise probably more the sources in ACLED than the sources in SCAD: SCAD is based on two international media and few monitors im Zambia and Malawi are likely to be consumers of these sources.

contrast to journalists – domestic monitors provide coverage across all constituencies, regardless of connectivity, violence history, or electoral period. Lastly, there could be recall error if monitors forget about incidents that were less serious or happening earlier in the election cycle. However, the empirical results – showing a significantly higher number of election violence observations in our monitor data than in the media-based event data – give us confidence that recall error is not a serious issue.

4. Research Design

To test the hypotheses about systematic measurement error which results from using media-based conflict event data to capture election violence across space, we use expert surveys as a benchmark and then compare them to media-based event data in bivariate graphs and multivariate regressions. That is, we measure election violence before/after elections in each constituency in each of the four datasets (ACLED, SCAD, MEMS/ZEMS), and then generate three sets of outcome measures: (1) *consistency* between media and monitor datasets to test the under-reporting and pre-election hypotheses (H1 and H2) in bivariate graphs; (2) *under-reporting* in media as compared to monitor datasets to test the consistency and hotspot hypotheses (H3 and H4), using measures for our hypothesized drivers of under-reporting; and (3) "raw" violence measures from each dataset to investigate the *consequences of under-reporting* for inference, by emulating a canonical study of election violence in Africa.

4.1 Empirical Strategy to Assess the Consequences of Underreporting

To assess the consequences of underreporting for inference, we run identical model specifications on different dependent variables, i.e. violence measures drawn from the monitor surveys and media event

data. From each of the expert surveys (MEMS, ZEMS) we code two variables capturing election violence at two different stages of the electoral cycle. For example, the variable *MEMS pre-election violence* is a binary variable based on the Malawi expert survey coded 1 for any electoral violence before or on election-day and 0 otherwise. We code violence if one or more of the constituency's observer respondents reported election violence. Similarly, the variable *MEMS post-election violence* is coded 1 for electoral violence after election-day and 0 otherwise in Malawi. Pre-election violence occurred in 22 percent of constituencies in Malawi and 51 percent of constituencies in Zambia. Post-election violence occurred in 4 percent in Malawi and 9 percent in Zambia. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the spatial distribution and frequency of violence in the pre- and post-election period in the two countries.

Figure 2: Constituencies with Election Violence in Malawi 2014 (MEMS Data)

Pre-election violence (left) and post-election violence (right)

We source media-based event data from SCAD and ACLED, using their geocoded information to map these events to constituencies. To filter *electoral* violence from other violence which just happens to occur during the election period, we use dataset-specific strategies. For SCAD, we filter electoral

violence by using their issue variable, which categorizes events as election-related or not (issue=1). For ACLED, we filter by narrative because no objective filter is provided. These strategies follow previous studies using these datasets for information on electoral violence (Daxecker 2014). We have also tried, as best as possible, to match the time frames of pre- and post-election violence in the three sources. The MEMS/ZEMS surveys asked for "pre-election violence during the general election campaign." To approximate this time period, we follow the convention in the literature (e.g. Birch and Muchlinski 2018; von Borzyskowski 2019; Daxecker 2014) and collect all events in ACLED and SCAD that occurred within six months before the election. While the official campaigning periods are only 2-3 months in Zambia and Malawi, the longer 6-month cutoff effectively gives ACLED/SCAD more chances to report an event, thus reducing the risk of documenting under-reporting in media sources.[18] For post-election violence we include the period from election day until two weeks after the final results are announced (which is about 3 weeks after the election). This is the time when we start conducting the monitor surveys. In both Malawi and Zambia post-election violence had settled at this point. [19]

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[18] Empirically the vast majority of incidents in SCAD and ACLED cluster close to election day within the official campaign period. The longer six-month window for ACLED/SCAD also accommodates the possibility that monitors may refer to events that happened before the official start of the campaign.

[19] The last recoded event for Zambia was 11 days after the election in ACLED and 5 days after the election in SCAD. The last event in Malawi was 10 days after the election in both ACLED and SCAD.

Figure 3: Constituencies with Election Violence in Zambia 2016 (ZEMS Data)

Pre-election violence (top) and post-election violence (bottom)

We create the "raw" violence variables *ACLED pre-election violence, ACLED post-election violence, SCAD pre-election violence,* and *SCAD post-election violence.* According to ACLED (SCAD) data, pre-election

violence affected 4 (1) percent of constituencies in Malawi and 17 (0.6) percent of constituencies in Zambia. Also, according to ACLED (SCAD) data, post-election violence affected 2 (0.5 percent of constituencies in Malawi and 9 (0.6) percent of constituencies in Zambia. Note that both media-based event datasets record significantly lower rates of violence than our expert surveys. We also combine information from ACLED and SCAD to emulate what an analyst of electoral violence might do, i.e. combining all available media-based event data. Thus, we generate variables called *ACLED/SCAD combined pre-election violence* and *ACLED/SCAD combined post-election violence*. They are coded 1 when either or both media datasets indicate violence and 0 when none does. These are our dependent variables when analyzing the consequences of systematic measurement error.

For model specification, we emulate a recent study on constituency-level election violence in Africa by Reeder and Bech Seeberg (2018).[20] Like Reeder and Bech Seeberg, we control for urbanization,[21] night time lights (economic development),[22] competitiveness,[23] and democracy.[24] Further, we use multiple model specifications (logit/OLS, country fixed effects, region clustered standard errors) to ensure that it is indeed the varying data source (monitor vs. media) rather than varying model specification that drive the differences in results.

4.2 Empirical Strategy to Test Hypotheses 1 and 2

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[20] Reeder and Bech-Seeberg are particularly interested in differences between intra-party and inter-party violence and hence use a dummy for that as well as measuring time until election. We do not include these variables in our models as we (like most of the election violence literature) do not distinguish between intra- and inter-party violence.

[21] Reeder and Seeberg use grid data and measure the percentage of each grid cell covered by urban areas, averaged over each constituency. This measure yields little variation in Malawi and Zambia, as it suggests that 90 percent of all constituencies are less than 1 percent urban, and even urban constituencies are estimated to be less than 10 percent urban. Instead we use logged population density, which varies widely and better captures differences between semi-urban and rural locations. Data comes from the latest available census (2008 Malawi, 2010 Zambia).

[22] Night lights data from Boone (2016) and NOAA, as described above.

[23] Competitiveness is measured as 1- vote margin in the last presidential election (Malawi Electoral Commission and Electoral Commission of Zambia)

[24] Following Reeder and Seeberg we use national level Polity IV scores. This control is redundant in the models using country-fixed effects.

Using the "raw" violence variables from both the expert surveys and the media event datasets (as detailed in the previous section), we then generate *consistency* variables to test hypotheses about the existence of under-reporting generally and particularly in the pre-election period (H1 and H2). *Consistency* measures agreement about whether the two types of datasets report violence for any given constituency and electoral period. For example, the variable *consistency SCAD pre-election violence* for Malawi is coded 1 when **both** MEMS and SCAD reported pre-election violence, or when **neither** dataset reported pre-electoral violence for a given constituency. It is coded 0 when MEMS reported violence but SCAD did not; and when SCAD reported violence but MEMS did not. We code equivalently the variables *consistency SCAD post-election violence, consistency* ACLED *pre-election violence,* and *consistency ACLED post-election violence* for both countries. Similar to the violence measures, we also combine the media datasets and generate *consistency ACLED/SCAD combined pre-election violence* and *consistency ACLED/SCAD combined post-election violence*. These are coded 1 when monitor reports are consistent with either ACLED or SCAD, and 0 otherwise. We test hypotheses about the existence of under-reporting generally and particularly in the pre-election period (H1 and H2) with the use of bivariate graphs of distributions and paired t-tests.

4.3 Empirical Strategy to Test Hypotheses 3 and 4

To test hypotheses 3 and 4 about the drivers of under-reporting being connectivity and hotspots. To capture connectivity, we measure *population density* (i.e. number of people per km^2) using the most recent census data.[25]

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[25] We divide the variable *population density* by 10 to ease interpretation of the coefficient. The latest available census is 2008 (Malawi) and 2010 (Zambia).

To capture anticipated hotspots, we measure *history of election violence* and *vote margin* from the presidential election. The variable *history of election violence* is sourced from the two media-based event datasets (ACLED and SCAD) for all prior elections. While media-based event data have significant blindspots (as we document in this paper) we use these data for capturing history because it is precisely the *widely* reported violence that might drive journalists' expectations of more violence and thus reporting dynamics. This variable is categorical and coded 0 when no violence was widely reported for a constituency in previous elections, 1 for widely reported violence in one previous election, and 2 for widely reported violence in multiple previous elections. In line with the Hotspot Hypothesis (H4), we expect a negative coefficient: hotspot constituencies – those with a history of election violence – should be less subject to under-reporting in the current election.

As another indicator of anticipated hotspots, we also use *vote margin* from the Presidential election (from the Malawi Electoral Commission and Electoral Commission of Zambia, respectively). That is, we use presidential vote margin results from the current election in the models of post-election outcomes in both countries. We use vote margin results from the previous election (the 2015 presidential by-election) for pre-election outcomes in Zambia. However, in the case of Malawi we also use current results for pre-election outcomes. We do so because these dynamics (competitive vs. non-competitive constituencies) were widely anticipated and major realignment in the Malawian party system (the government party had split into two parties) made 2009 electoral results a poor approximation for 2014 competitiveness. Note that this could introduce post-treatment bias in the models of pre-election consistency for Malawi, since this variable is observed only after election-day. However, the results are robust to dropping that variable in the pre-election period.

We include several control variables to capture other potential causes of systematic measurement error. Since poorer locations may be less likely to attract media attention, we include economic development in terms of *electrification* (i.e. the percentage of households with electricity in a constituency, census 2008 and 2010)[26] and human development in terms of *literacy* (the percentage of literate citizens over the age of 15 in a constituency, census 2008 and 2010). Descriptive statistics of all variables are in Appendix Tables A1 and A2.

To test the Connectivity and Hotspot Hypotheses (H3 and H4), we estimate the following statistical model

$$\mathrm{DV}_{cr} = \beta_0 + \boldsymbol{C}'_{cr}\beta_1 + \boldsymbol{H}'_{cr}\beta_2 + \boldsymbol{X}'_{cr}\beta + \epsilon_{cr},$$

where β_1 and β_2 are the parameters of interest on the key explanatory vectors C_{cr} and H_{cr}, which capture connectivity and hotspot variables and thus test hypotheses 3 and 4. DV are the respective dependent variables: *consistency* between survey and media data for analyses of the causes of systematic measurement error, and *violence* measures for analyses of the consequences of systematic measurement error. Further, the vector $\boldsymbol{X'}_{cr}$ represents a set of control variables, ϵ_{cr} is the idiosyncratic error, and the subscripts c stands for constituency, and r for region. The model is estimated using logit with region-clustered standard errors to account for the lack of independence between constituencies within the same regions. Constituencies within one region might differ from constituencies in another region because regions differ somewhat in remoteness/distance to the capital as well as language, which might influence reporting. We thus cluster standard errors by region.[27] Our estimates represent the average constituency-level variation within the same subnational region and conditional on the included

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[26] The average electricity prevalence is quite low in Malawi (under 5 percent of households), so this coefficient has a rather large magnitude in the regression results.

[27] We cannot use region fixed effects in many of the models because several regions have no variation in violence. This is especially true for the post-election models and for SCAD.

controls. We estimate models on each country – Malawi and Zambia – separately. We also provide pooled models in the appendix.

5. Results

5.1 Reporting of constituency-level violence

To assess the first two hypotheses, Figures 4-5 document *consistency* between the expert surveys and media-based event data. Figure 4 shows consistency in Malawi and Figure 5 equivalently in Zambia. In each of these Figures, we show four graphs (from left to right): monitor vs. ACLED pre-election, monitor vs. ACLED post-election, monitor vs. SCAD pre-election, and monitor vs. SCAD post-election. Each marker represents a constituency; we add random noise around the markers to visualize the relative frequency. The location of each data point within the graph denotes whether a constituency was coded consistently in the media-based event data and expert survey. Consistently coded constituencies are located in the upper right (1,1) if both types of datasets coded a constituency as violent; or the lower left (0,0) if both datasets coded it as non-violent. Inconsistently coded constituencies are located in the lower right (1,0) if media-based datasets coded violence but the expert survey did not; and in the upper left (0,1) if the expert survey reported violence but the media event data did not. Numbers indicate the number of constituencies in each group.

Figure 4: Consistency between ACLED/SCAD and Malawi Survey (MEMS)


Figure 5: Consistency between ACLED/SCAD and Zambia Survey (ZEMS)

Figures 4-5 provide empirical support for the existence of general under-reporting and particularly in the pre-election periods (Hypotheses 1 and 2). Figures 4-5 show several constituency observations located off the diagonal, indicating disagreement between the datasets. In most cases, this disagreement involves constituencies where the media-based event data reported "no violence" but the expert survey reported violence. Those are the cases clustered in the upper left corner of each graph where ACLED/SCAD=0 and MEMS/ZEMS=1 (marked by solid red triangles). In a minority of the inconsistencies, the relationship is reversed: there are a handful of cases where media data reported violence but the expert surveys did not (lower right corner of Figures 4-5). However, overall the relationship between media-based event data and expert survey data is one in which media data tend to under-report incidents of election violence.

The underreporting of violence in media data compared to survey data is statistically significant. For example, for the pre-election period in Malawi, the survey data indicate that 22 percent of constituencies experienced violence, while ACLED indicates 4 percent and SCAD 1 percent. Paired t-tests indicate that the difference between the survey measure and each of the media measures is highly statistically significant ($p<0.001$).[28] For the post-election period, these differences are somewhat less severe (4 percent versus 2 and 1 percent) but still statistically significant ($p<0.09, 0.01$). From the eight comparisons, all but one[29] result in statistically significant differences between survey and media measures. This supports Hypothesis 1 about the existence of underreporting in violence measures drawn from media-based event data.

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[28] We use paired t-tests because the same constituencies are measured both in survey and media data, so there *should* be a strong relationship between the scores. This test looks at the difference in scores for each constituency with the null hypothesis that the mean difference is zero. We reject the null hypothesis in almost all cases.

[29] The one exception is the paired t-test on post-election estimates between survey and ACLED in Zambia.

Moreover, the underreporting is significantly stronger before elections than after elections, supporting Hypothesis 2. Figures 4-5 and paired t-tests indicate that media-based event data under-report violence more in the pre- than in the post-electoral period. Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix show descriptive statistics: in the pre-election period, consistency between the media data and expert survey ranges between 49 and 77 percent, while it ranges between 90 and 96 percent in the post-election period. Importantly, paired t-tests indicate that these differences between consistency before and after elections are highly statistically significant (p<0.001). That is, consistency between survey and media data is significantly higher after elections than before elections.

The general trend shows that ZEMS/MEMS are more capable of picking up events than SCAD/ACLED. Nevertheless, there is a handful of constituencies where ACLED/SCAD found violence but MEMS/ZEMS did not. Looking at these cases we find a number of explanations as to why monitors may not have reported these incidents. In the case of Zambian pre-electoral violence, 3 of 10 cases concern the burning of billboards. This may be examples of recall bias where monitors failed to remember this relatively mild form of violence. There are also cases where we have reason to question the authenticity of the newspaper reports. The ACLED data include both heavily biased government newspapers and online publications (such as the *Zambian Watchdog*) without editorial control.

5.2 Causes of systematic measurement error

What drives these substantial differences in violence reporting between media and expert survey data? We argue that under-reporting is contingent on constituencies' connectivity and expected violence hotspots, as stipulated in Hypotheses 3 and 4. We test these hypotheses through multivariate analyses.

Tables 1 and 2 show estimated logit coefficients for the determinants of under-reporting, that is whether monitors reported violence but media sources did not. Table 1 shows results for Malawi and Table 2 for Zambia. Columns 1 and 2 show the determinants of under-reporting between MEMS and ACLED; columns 3 and 4 show under-reporting for MEMS/SCAD; columns 5 and 6 show under-reporting for MEMS with the combined ACLED/SCAD measure. Table 2 is structured the same way but for ZEMS data in Zambia. We remove the capital, Lusaka, from the sample;[30] we show results with Lusaka included in Appendix Table A3. We also provide results pooling both countries in the appendix (Table A4); results are robust. An important caveat is needed here: there are fewer post-election violence events than pre-election violence events and also more consistency in the post-election period. The low number of inconsistencies in the post-election period makes the post-election results more unstable.

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[30] ACLED has a particular problem with geo-precision for the geographically small constituencies in Lusaka. Events are clustered in the most central constituency, Lusaka Central, although Lusaka is comprized of 13 constituencies. As a consequence, Lusaka constituencies that are not Lusaka Central have missing events as they have wrongly been given the geographic coordinates of Lusaka Central.

Table 1: Determinants of Underreporting between ACLED/SCAD and Survey – Malawi

| | ACLED Data | | SCAD Data | | ACLED/SCAD combined | |
| | pre-election | post-election | pre-election | post-election | pre-election | post-election |
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Population density	-0.011***	-0.033***	-0.005***	-0.033***	-0.011***	-0.033***
	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.008)
History of election violence	-1.413***	2.316***	-1.824**	2.316***	-1.413***	2.316***
	(0.502)	(0.286)	(0.798)	(0.286)	(0.502)	(0.286)
Vote margin Presidential election	0.206	1.131	0.159	1.131	0.206	1.131
	(1.735)	(2.028)	(1.529)	(2.028)	(1.735)	(2.028)
Literacy	-0.650	2.525	-0.618	2.525	-0.650	2.525
	(1.237)	(2.903)	(1.490)	(2.903)	(1.237)	(2.903)
Electrification	8.161***	1.720	7.765***	1.720	8.161***	1.720
	(0.459)	(3.685)	(0.986)	(3.685)	(0.459)	(3.685)
Constant	-1.005***	-5.141***	-1.105**	-5.141***	-1.005***	-5.141***
	(0.358)	(1.565)	(0.556)	(1.565)	(0.358)	(1.565)
Observations	182	182	182	182	182	182
AIC	186.31	58.04	189.05	58.04	186.31	58.04
BIC	192.71	64.44	195.46	64.44	192.71	64.44
LL	-91.15	-27.02	-92.52	-27.02	-91.15	-27.02

Notes: Logit models with robust standard errors clustered on region in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2: Determinants of Underreporting between ACLED/SCAD and Survey – Zambia

| | ACLED Data | | SCAD Data | | ACLED/SCAD combined | |
| | pre-election | post-election | pre-election | post-election | pre-election | post-election |
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Population density	-0.015	-0.212***	-0.014**	-0.048***	-0.015	-0.092***
	(0.009)	(0.022)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.016)
History of election violence	-0.011	2.027***	0.240	0.535	-0.011	2.359***
	(0.773)	(0.535)	(0.669)	(0.369)	(0.773)	(0.594)
Literacy	-1.733	-1.238	1.108	-4.311*	-1.733	-4.853
	(2.586)	(2.946)	(1.975)	(2.380)	(2.586)	(3.304)
Electrification	1.665	25.241***	0.673	26.875***	1.665	23.554***
	(1.576)	(6.161)	(1.308)	(5.223)	(1.576)	(7.096)
Vote margin presidential election	1.389	37.553***	1.222	35.440***	1.389	37.752***
	(0.924)	(8.078)	(0.799)	(8.707)	(0.924)	(7.976)
Constant	-0.301	-35.778***	-1.562	-31.025***	-0.301	-34.167***
	(1.267)	(7.525)	(1.244)	(7.795)	(1.267)	(7.613)
Observations	142	142	142	142	142	142
AIC	195.52	31.22	202.16	42.30	195.52	28.07
BIC	213.26	48.95	219.90	60.03	213.26	45.81
LL	-91.76	-9.61	-95.08	-15.15	-91.76	-8.04

Notes: Logit models with robust standard errors clustered on region in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The results in Tables 1 and 2 provide support for the argument that connectivity drives underreporting (Hypothesis 3) as well as some – concededly weaker – support for the argument that anticipated hotspots drives underreporting (Hypothesis 4). The estimated coefficients on *population density* are negative and significant in almost all models of Tables 1 and 2. This suggests that higher population density (higher connectivity) is associated with less under-reporting. This supports the Connectivity Hypothesis (H3). While the coefficients on *population density* are highly statistically significant for Malawi (p<0.01), for Zambia three of these coefficients are only borderline significant (p<0.10) or insignificant. All coefficients point in the hypothesized direction. As noted above, population density in the African context is highly correlated with political competition (a variable that has been associated with election violence in the literature). In table A5 and A6 of the appendix we re-run the models without controlling for vote margin in the presidential election. This modified specification strongly reinforces the results in relation to population density. Without controlling for vote margin, the coefficient for population density is negative and significant for all post- and pre-models for both Malawi and Zambia.[31]

Surprisingly, SCAD and ACLED even missed some fatal cases of pre-election violence in rural areas. For example, lethal election violence in Malawi occurred in both Mulanje (where supporters of the incumbent party killed a DPP supporter for wearing DPP regalia) and Rumphi (where a person interrupting an AFORD meeting was killed). In Zambia, one person was stabbed to death in clashes between the Patriotic Front (PF) and the United Party for National Development (UPND) in Magoye, Southern Province, again without the story reaching the news media. These events clearly show the problem of underreporting violence outside major urban centers.

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[31] We also replicate Tables 1 and 2 without controlling for population density; those results are in Appendix Tables A7 and A8.

Among the control variables, the positive coefficient on *electrification* was unexpected. However, electrification is strongly correlated with population density (the correlation coefficient is r=0.79 in Malawi and r=0.52 in Zambia). When *electrification* and *population density* are interacted (Tables not shown), the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant in all models. In line with the argument, this indicates that more populated and developed places have less under-reporting in the media-based event data.

In addition to finding evidence that connectivity generates underreporting, we also find some evidence that expected hotpots receive differential attention. However, these results are weaker and not consistent. Recall that we use two variables to capture potential hotpots: competitiveness (*vote margin*) and *election violence history*. Election violence history is negatively and significantly associated with underreporting pre-election violence in Malawi (Table 1 columns 1, 3, 5). This is evidence in favor of the Hotspot Hypothesis (H4). However, coefficients on *history of violence* point in the opposite direction in columns 2, 4, 6 of Tables 1 and 2, indicating that previous violence hotspots are more subject to underreporting. This is surprising and counter to our expectation. However, as noted earlier, the low number of constituencies with post-election violence and the low underreporting in the post-election period should caution strong inference from these post-election models.

For the second measure of anticipated hotspots, *vote margins*, the coefficients are consistently in the hypothesized direction (positive), indicating that larger vote margins (less competitive constituencies) tend to have more underreporting. While the coefficients are consistently in the expected direction, the relationship only reaches statistical significance in the models for post-election violence in Zambia

(Table 2, columns 2, 4, 6). We thus conclude that while there are some signs of underreporting being more pronounced in anticipated hotspots, that evidence is weaker and limited to particular cases.

These analyses provide support for the argument that election violence measures drawn from media-based event data have systematic measurement error. Both media-based event sources under-report violence; this under-reporting is more pronounced before than after elections; the systematic measurement error is driven by connectivity, with more densely populated areas receiving better coverage; measurement error also seems to be generated by journalists going to and reporting from highly competitive areas within the country, but this seems limited to post-election violence (recent competition) and the case of Zambia. We now turn to the consequences of these measurement errors. Given that media-based event measures of violence are affected by systematic measurement error – how do they affect our inference? Do our substantive conclusions about the drivers of violence change when using different datasets?

5.3 Consequences of Systematic Measurement Error

To investigate this question, we change the dependent variable from *underreporting* to the raw measure of *violence* reported in each dataset and period. As outlined in the research design and shown in the descriptive statistics (Appendix Table A1, A2), these variables include *MEMS pre-election violence* and *MEMS post-election violence* as well as the equivalents for ZEMS, ACLED, SCAD, and ACLED/SCAD combined per country and electoral period. Recall that our model specification here emulates, a recent constituency-level study on election violence in Africa by Reeder and Bech Seeberg (2018). Following the analysis of Reeder and Bech Seeberg, the models include measures of urbanization, night lights, competition, and democracy. As in the prior analyses, we use logit and robust standard errors clustered

at the region.[32] The results for the pre- and post-election period are in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. In each of these Tables, column 1 shows results for using the dependent variable from the monitor surveys, column 2 is for ACLED, 3 for SCAD, and 4 for the combined ACLED/SCAD measure of election violence.

Table 3: Determinants of Pre-Election Violence using Different Outcome Measures

	M/ZEMS	ACLED	SCAD	ACLED/SCAD Combined
	1	2	3	4
Urbanization	0.190	0.478**	0.824**	0.401*
	(0.240)	(0.210)	(0.390)	(0.220)
Night lights	0.357	0.686	1.631**	1.820**
	(0.797)	(0.453)	(0.690)	(0.735)
Democracy	-1.523***	-2.290***	0.057	-2.214***
	(0.309)	(0.589)	(0.540)	(0.651)
Competition	-0.430	-0.322	-3.484	-0.369
	(0.678)	(0.659)	(6.132)	(0.744)
Constant	9.057***	11.319***	-6.735**	10.985***
	(1.840)	(3.420)	(3.155)	(3.743)
Observations	338	338	338	338
AIC	415.11	190.79	33.38	189.80
BIC	434.23	209.90	52.49	208.91
LL	-202.56	-90.39	-11.69	-89.90

Notes: Logit models with robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

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[32] We use several other model specifications for robustness (OLS instead of logit), adding country fixed effects, and not clustering standard errors. The Reeder/Seeberg study does not use clustering. Our results are robust to replicating Table 3 with different model specifications; Appendix Figures A1-A2 summarize these results.

Table 4: Determinants of Post-Election Violence using Different Outcome Measures

|	M/ZEMS	ACLED	SCAD	ACLED/SCAD Combined
	1	2	3	4
Urbanization	0.409	0.478**	0.553*	0.476*
	(0.304)	(0.232)	(0.290)	(0.243)
Night lights	-1.822	-0.113	-9.849***	-0.079
	(1.608)	(2.241)	(1.993)	(2.305)
Democracy	-1.129	-2.204***	-0.708	-2.265***
	(1.014)	(0.649)	(0.636)	(0.685)
Competition	-1.633	-1.888	-2.528	-2.275
	(2.553)	(1.720)	(3.528)	(1.866)
Constant	4.455	10.750**	-0.630	11.347**
	(6.933)	(4.796)	(6.015)	(5.052)
Observations	338	338	338	338
AIC	165.05	127.31	33.39	131.25
BIC	184.16	146.43	52.50	150.36
LL	-77.52	-58.66	-11.69	-60.62

Notes: Logit models with robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The results point to important differences for inference. Differences in measuring the dependent variable can generate significant relationships where none may exist. The coefficients on *urbanization and night lights* suggest significant relationships with violence in media event datasets, but not in the expert surveys. The estimated coefficient on *urbanization* is not significant in the monitor data but significant for ACLED, SCAD, and the combined media data (columns 2-4 in Tables 3 and 4). Using ACLED data, Reeder and Bech and Seeberg (2018) find urbanization to be significantly correlated with election violence at the constituency-level in their analysis of Kenya and Zimbabwe. Although

this is not their main finding, our results here suggest that this particular positive association between urbanization and election violence in Reeder and Bech Seeberg may be, at least partially, an artifact of the data.

Similar to urbanization, the coefficient on *night lights* (a proxy for development) is not significant for the monitor data but significant for SCAD and the combined media data (columns 3-4 in Table 3 and column 3 in Table 4). The expert survey data suggest that there is no relationship between election violence and urbanization and development. In contrast, the media event data suggest significant relationships for these variables. Researchers might also come to different conclusions about the substantive magnitude of the effect. For example, the marginal effect of democracy on election violence is smaller in media event data than in monitor data, which is illustrated in Figure 6.[33]

Figure 6: Consequences of Reporting Bias:
Different Predictions Depending on Monitor or Media Event Data

As an additional robustness test, we ran all our models again including all violent events in SCAD and ACLED (independent of whether they were directly related to the election or not) for the period under investigation. The results are shown in the appendix (Tables A9-A11). Including non-election related

violent events does not change our substantive results and adds surprisingly few additional events; in the case of Zambia and Malawi, most political violence in this time period was related to the election.[34]

Based on these results for Malawi and Zambia, we propose some ways in which election violence studies using media-based event data may over- and under-estimate relationships. Studies using geocoded media-based event data tend to skew the effects of population density and development, showing relationships where none may exist. These over-estimates seem largely driven by the selection of journalists into urban areas: they are more likely to reside and report from urban, more densely populated, economically vibrant centers as opposed to more remote areas with worse communication technology. Further, studies using media-based event data might find smaller effects for some variables (such as democracy) than they would find using higher-quality data.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, we have examined the prevalence, causes, and consequences of systematic measurement error in violence measures drawn from in media-based event data. From qualitative work on election violence we know that violence varies significantly across space (Boone 2011), but in this paper we have discussed the potential limitations of existing conflict data for mapping such election violence systematically across space. As a way to assess and correct for underreporting, we have introduced a new expert survey-based approach for measuring election violence at the constituency level. We have argued that the new approach is better designed to systematically measure election violence at the constituency level. Although restricted to two countries in this study, Malawi and Zambia, the method

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[34] For violence after election-day in Zambia, ACLED and SCAD do not record violent events of a non-electoral nature, so that replicating Table 4 by including non-electoral violence yields identical results and is thus omitted.

could be replicated in other places. Finally, we used these new data to document the causes and consequences of under-reporting and systematic measurement error in media-based civil conflict literature, pointing to problems in achieving consistency and geocoding accuracy.

So what should researchers interested in sub-national variation in election violence do with this information? Most research on sub-national variation in election violence are single-election studies (e.g. Wilkinson 2004; Dercon and Guitérrez-Romero 2012; Linke 2013; Ishiyama et al. 2016). When the sample is small, our survey-based approach offers a realistic and preferable alternative to existing media-based event data. Other research on sub-national variation includes several countries. Here, the most radical solution would be to altogether abandon media-based event data as a source. This would, however, not be our recommendation. For multi-country studies, media-based event data are more cost effective and enable comparisons across time and space. Thus, researchers may still wish to use event data but should be aware of their systematic measurement error, explicitly discuss them as weaknesses, and try to remedy them. As we demonstrate, violence measures from monitor and media data cannot be used interchangeably, so it is important for researchers to choose violence measures carefully and demonstrate robustness across measures where possible. The results obtained in this study should help researchers wishing to account for measurement error in event data. This paper has helped to identify some variables that may introduce systematic measurement error. It has also provided insights about the direction of such error. This information may be used to run sensitivity tests with simulated data (Gallop and Weschle 2017). Moreover, we have also shown that underreporting is not equal across event data sources, but higher in SCAD than ACLED. Researchers interested particularly in more low-scale incidents of election violence would do well to rely on data sources that do not solely rely on two or three international news outlets but a range of domestic and

non-media sources as well. For subnational studies, researchers should also investigate the accuracy of geocoded information in these datasets.

The results in this paper also have important implications for prominent findings in existing work on election-related violence. Using data from Indian newspapers, Wilkinson (2004) shows, among other things, that ethnic riots are more common in large cities and in places with history of violence. However, our results suggest that newspapers are better at picking up violent events in urban areas and in historic hotspots. Bhasin and Gandhi (2013), using reports extracted from the Reuters news database, show that government electoral repression is more common after than before elections. However, our results suggest that media-based data record events in the post-electoral period to a higher extent than events in the pre-electoral period.

This paper focuses on systematic measurement error in sub-national data, but many of these measurement errors also have consequences for cross-national work. Media freedom and journalistic capacity varies significantly between countries, implying that countries with better infrastructure and a more independent flow of information have more reports than otherwise similar countries where information is more restricted for political and/or capacity reasons. For instance, it seems likely that a higher share of incidents would be captured in a country like South Africa than in the Democratic Republic of Congo or Ethiopia, even if the same events happened.

Our discussions have focused specifically on violence related to elections. Election violence is a topic where we are in particular need of sub-national data. However, we contend that our findings have implications for violence event-data more generally. There is no reason to believe that under-reporting of violence or systematic measurement error, particularly stemming from uneven reporting from urban

and rural areas as well as geocoding problems, would be more pronounced in and around elections than at time periods disconnected from the electoral campaign. In fact, the opposite is likely true. Elections signify a focal event, as media attention, both local and international, is high. The systematic measurement error and under-reporting we find on violence in media-based event data around elections is likely to be as high, or probably even higher, when studying violence unrelated to elections. Thus, researchers have to take systematic measurement error seriously when studying violence at the sub-national level.

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