

## CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions Embodied in International Migration from 1995 to 2015

Sai Liang <sup>†, ‡</sup>, Xuechun Yang <sup>‡</sup>, Jianchuan Qi <sup>†, ‡</sup>, Yutao Wang <sup>\*, §</sup>, Wei Xie <sup>§</sup>, Raya Muttarak <sup>||, ⊥</sup>, Dabo Guan <sup>\*, ¶</sup>

<sup>†</sup> Key Laboratory for City Cluster Environmental Safety and Green Development of the Ministry of Education, Institute of Environmental and Ecological Engineering, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou, Guangdong, 510006, China.

<sup>‡</sup> State Key Joint Laboratory of Environment Simulation and Pollution Control, School of Environment, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, 100875, China.

<sup>§</sup> Fudan Tyndall Center and Shanghai Key Laboratory of Atmospheric Particle Pollution and Prevention (LAP3), Department of Environmental Science & Engineering, Fudan University, Shanghai, 200438, China.

<sup>||</sup> Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, A2361, Austria.

<sup>⊥</sup> School of International Development, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK.

<sup>¶</sup> Department of Earth System Science, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100080, China.

\* Corresponding author: [yutaowang@fudan.edu.cn](mailto:yutaowang@fudan.edu.cn) (Yutao Wang);  
[guandabo@hotmail.com](mailto:guandabo@hotmail.com) (Dabo Guan).

### ABSTRACT

Whilst present international CO<sub>2</sub> mitigation agreements account for the impact of population composition and structure on emissions, the impact of international migration is overlooked. This study quantifies the CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of international immigrants and reveals their non-negligible impacts on global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Results show that the CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of international immigrants has increased from 1.8 Gigatonnes (Gt) in 1995 to 2.9 Gt in 2015. In 2015, the U.S. had the largest total and per capita CO<sub>2</sub> emissions caused by international immigrants. Oceania and the Middle East are highlighted for their large portions of immigrant-caused CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (around 20%). Changes in the population and structure of global migration have kept increasing global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions during 1995–2015, while the reduction of CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensity helped offset global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The global CO<sub>2</sub> mitigation targets must consider the effects of global migration and demand-side measures need to concern major immigrant influx nations.

**Keywords:** international migration, immigrant, climate change, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, trade, consumption.

**Synopsis:** This study links the population mobility with global CO<sub>2</sub> mitigation, which evaluates the contribution of international immigrants to global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

## INTRODUCTION

International migration is a phenomenon accompanying the process of human civilization and globalization. In recent decades, the number of international immigrants has proliferated and the destinations of immigrants have become increasingly diversified. International migration has a variety of implications on the place of destination including politics, economy, culture and welfare security issues.<sup>1-</sup>

3

Migration can be a critical demographic factor affecting the environment.<sup>4</sup> Previous studies have investigated the environmental impacts of regional migration (including interregional migration, rural-rural migration, and rural-urban migration) on land use,<sup>5, 6</sup> forest cover,<sup>7, 8</sup> air pollutant emissions,<sup>9, 10</sup> and carbon emissions.<sup>11-13</sup>

Population migration has implications for carbon emissions mainly because migration flows affect population size and structure both at the origin and destination. Not only does migration-induced population growth translates into higher energy consumption, migration process can bring about lifestyle change which influences consumption pattern and consequently CO<sub>2</sub> emissions<sup>14</sup>. This line of argument has been put forward to campaign for restriction of immigration for example in the US because population growth induced by migration coupled with the American lifestyle adopted by immigrants will have consequential environmental impact<sup>15, 16</sup>.

The evidence on the impact of migration on the environment however is inconclusive.

On the one hand, rural to urban migration within a country is typically found to be associated with an increase in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions given a rise in the demand for

residential energy in the urban area and lifestyle change thanks to increased income level<sup>13, 17</sup>. On the other hand, studies on the environmental impact of immigration measured by air quality and air pollutant emissions focusing on the US do not find evidence that immigration contribute to heightened air pollution levels<sup>18, 19</sup>. Ma and Hofmann even find that the presence of immigrant population is associated with better overall air quality<sup>20</sup> possibly because migrants express greater environmental concerns and have lower energy consumption than the US native born. The inconclusive nature of the evidence calls for further research using different indicators of environmental impact<sup>20</sup> as well as cross-national comparisons between sending countries with high and low emissions<sup>18</sup>.

Indeed, more accurate and objective studies about the migration–environment relationship are needed since they have relevant policy implications. However, little attention is paid to the impacts of international migration on environmental emissions at the global scale. In the context of enormous challenges of global climate change, the international community formulates active CO<sub>2</sub> mitigation agreements to keep the temperature arisen within 2 degrees at the end of this century. However, these agreements do not account for changing population structure and distribution which can shift the global patterns of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. A study of population mobility finds a significant contribution of tourism on global CO<sub>2</sub> emission growth, especially in the sectors such as transportation, food, and accommodations.<sup>21</sup> If a short-term population movement like tourism has a substantial impact on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, this raises an

important question how migration as a long-term population movement will impact the global emissions.<sup>22-24</sup> Longer term population mobility involves comprehensive consumption sectors (e.g., housing, infrastructure, energy use, health care, and education) which would lead to long-term environmental impacts. Given the current trends that international migration will continue to play a role in global population dynamics coupled with the intensity of globalization and labor transfer, global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions caused by international migration are no doubt worthy of critical attention. However, the impacts of international migration on global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are not well evaluated.

To that end, this study fulfills the above knowledge gap by analyzing the impacts of international migration on global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. We construct a set of international migration matrixes to uncover the sources, destinations, and quantities of the migrant population. Then we evaluate the CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of the international immigrants and the impacts of international migration on global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Findings of this study can contribute to the formulation of CO<sub>2</sub> mitigation strategies in different nations with the consideration of future immigrants.

## **MATERIALS AND METHODS**

**Constructing International Migration Matrixes.** This study constructs the migration matrixes in 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015 to describe the international

migrant stock by destination and origin. Each row of the matrixes represents emigrants from a country of origin, while each column denotes the immigrants to a country of destination. Thus, the sum of each row equals the original population of a nation, while the sum of each column equals the current population of a nation. The diagonal elements of the matrixes represent the population which do not emigrate. The migration matrixes are constructed with the international migration data and national population data. The international migration data are from the dataset of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA)<sup>25</sup>. This dataset presents the estimates of international immigrants by ages, sexes, and origins, based on official statistics on the foreign-born or foreign population. The national population data are from the World Bank<sup>26</sup>.

**CO<sub>2</sub> Footprint of Immigrants.** We use a global environmentally extended multi-regional input-output (EE-MRIO) model to evaluate the CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of nations and their immigrants. The EE-MRIO model has been widely used to investigate environmental issues related to socioeconomic activities, such as CO<sub>2</sub> emissions,<sup>27-29</sup> mercury emissions,<sup>30, 31</sup> resource extraction and scarcity,<sup>32-34</sup> and health risks<sup>35, 36</sup>. We construct a global EE-MRIO model by treating global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions as the satellite account of the global MRIO table. We use the global MRIO tables from the Eora database<sup>37, 38</sup>, mainly due to two reasons: (1) Eora covers 190 nations/regions, which is more than other global MRIO databases. Thus, it is suitable for investigating the issue of international migration. (2) Eora has a complete time series for 1990-2015,

which covers all the time points in this study.<sup>37,38</sup> This study groups all the nations into 13 sub-regions considering geographical factors and their significance for migration, including the U.S., Canada, Mexico, China, India, South America, European Union (EU), Russia and CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) regions, Southeast Asia, Middle East, Africa, Oceania, and the Rest of the World (RoW). The list of nations and corresponding sub-regions are shown in SI Data S4. Data for the satellite account of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are also from the Eora database. We use the satellite account of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions generated from the PRIMAP-HIST dataset, as recommended by the Eora database. The selected satellite account is the National Total (CAT0) CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. It covers all the sources of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, including the Total Energy, Industrial Processes, Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry (LULUCF), etc.

The CO<sub>2</sub> footprints of nations are calculated by the Leontief MRIO model, as shown in equation (1).

$$cf_n = q(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A})^{-1}y_n \quad (1)$$

The notation  $cf_n$  represents the CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of nation  $n$ . The row vector  $q$  indicates the CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensity, where each element  $q_i$  represents the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions for unitary output of nation sector  $i$ . The matrix  $\mathbf{A}$  is the direct input coefficient matrix, where the element  $a_{ij}$  equals to the direct input from nation sector  $i$  to nation sector  $j$  divided by the total output of nation sector  $j$ . The matrix  $\mathbf{I}$  is an identify matrix. The matrix  $(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A})^{-1}$  is the *Leontief Inverse* matrix, where the element  $l_{ij}$  indicates

both direct and indirect inputs from nation sector  $i$  to satisfy unitary final demand of sector  $j$ . The vector  $y_n$  represents the final demand of nation  $n$ .

The CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of immigrants in a nation is calculated with the CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of this nation and the proportion of immigrants in the current population of this nation, as shown in equation (2).

$$cf_{m,n}^{immi} = cf_n \times \frac{p_{m,n}^{immi}}{p_n^{total}} \quad (2)$$

The notation  $cf_{m,n}^{immi}$  indicates the CO<sub>2</sub> footprint in nation  $n$  caused by the immigrants from nation  $m$  ( $m \neq n$ ). The notation  $p_{m,n}^{immi}$  represents the population of immigrants from nation  $m$  to nation  $n$ , and the notation  $p_n^{total}$  denotes the total current population of nation  $n$ . Consequently, the CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of immigrants to nation  $n$  ( $cf_n^{immi}$ ) and that of the world ( $cf^{immi}$ ) are calculated by equations (3) and (4), respectively.

$$cf_n^{immi} = \sum_m cf_{m,n}^{immi} \quad (3)$$

$$cf^{immi} = \sum_n cf_n^{immi} \quad (4)$$

**Structural Decomposition Analysis.** We combine the structural decomposition analysis (SDA) with the EE-MRIO model to investigate the relative contribution of the international migration to global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions during 1995–2015. In this study, we decompose global CO<sub>2</sub> emission changes into the relative contributions of the changes in CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensity, production structure, final demand structure, per



capita final demand level of the current population, migration structure, and original population.

Global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions can be expressed with the global EE-MRIO model, as shown in equation (5)

$$t = q \times (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A})^{-1} \times y \quad (5)$$

The notation  $t$  denotes global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, and  $q$  is a vector of CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensity of nation sectors. The matrix  $(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A})^{-1}$  is the *Leontief Inverse* matrix, and  $y$  is a vector of the final demand.

The final demand vector  $y$  can be further decomposed into the final demand structure, per capita final demand level, and population, as shown in equation (6).

$$y = y_s \times \hat{y}_v \times p \quad (6)$$

The notation  $y_s$  represents the final demand structure, which is the proportion of the nation sectors in the total final demand. The notation  $y_v$  denotes the per capita final demand level, and  $p$  represents the current population of nations. The hat notation  $\hat{\phantom{x}}$  denotes the diagonalization of a vector.

To investigate the relative contribution of the international migration, we further decompose the population into vector  $e$ , migration structure matrix  $\mathbf{B}$ , and original population  $m$ , as shown in equation (7).

$$p = (e \times \hat{m} \times \mathbf{B})^T \quad (7)$$

The elements of the row vector  $e$  are all 1. The notation  $m$  represents a vector of the original population of nations. The matrix  $\mathbf{B}$  indicates the migration structure, where the element  $b_{ij}$  equals to the number of immigrants from nation  $i$  to nation  $j$  divided by the original population of nation  $i$ . The hat notation  $\hat{\cdot}$  and the notation  $T$  denote the diagonalization and transposition of a vector, respectively. Consequently, global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions can be expressed by equation (8).

$$t = q \times (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A})^{-1} \times y_s \times \hat{y}_v \times \mathbf{B}^T \times \hat{m}^T \times e^T \quad (8)$$

We use  $\mathbf{L}$  to represent the *Leontief Inverse* matrix  $(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A})^{-1}$ . The changes in global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions can be expressed by equation (9). Items in the right-hand side of equation (9) represent the relative contributions of the changes in CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensity  $\Delta q$ , production structure  $\Delta \mathbf{L}$ , final demand structure  $\Delta y_s$ , per capita final demand level of the current population  $\Delta \hat{y}_v$ , migration structure  $\Delta \mathbf{B}^T$ , and the original population  $\Delta \hat{m}^T$  to global CO<sub>2</sub> emission changes  $\Delta t$ .

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta t = & \Delta q \times \mathbf{L} \times y_s \times \hat{y}_v \times \mathbf{B}^T \times \hat{m}^T \times e^T \\ & + q \times \Delta \mathbf{L} \times y_s \times \hat{y}_v \times \mathbf{B}^T \times \hat{m}^T \times e^T \\ & + q \times \mathbf{L} \times \Delta y_s \times \hat{y}_v \times \mathbf{B}^T \times \hat{m}^T \times e^T \\ & + q \times \mathbf{L} \times y_s \times \Delta \hat{y}_v \times \mathbf{B}^T \times \hat{m}^T \times e^T \\ & + q \times \mathbf{L} \times y_s \times \hat{y}_v \times \Delta \mathbf{B}^T \times \hat{m}^T \times e^T \\ & + q \times \mathbf{L} \times y_s \times \hat{y}_v \times \mathbf{B}^T \times \Delta \hat{m}^T \times e^T \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

We have 6 decomposition forms, and we average all the 6 decompositions to calculate the relative contributions of the decomposed factors. Moreover, to make the indicators in different time points comparable, we convert the current-price global MRIO tables (in U.S. dollars) to ones in 1995 constant prices (in U.S. dollars) using methods of previous studies<sup>39, 40</sup>. Such a conversion can eliminate the effects of price changes caused by inflation or deflation. Producer Price Index (PPI) is an economic index reflecting the price changes during a time period. It is typically used to convert comparable prices. The PPIs used for the conversion in this study are from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics<sup>41</sup>.


## **RESULTS**

**International Migration During 1995–2015.** The number of international immigrants are 161 million (2.8% of the total global population) in 1995. This percentage has shown an upward trend from 1995 to 2015 with slight fluctuations. International immigrants reach 248 million (3.4% of the total global population) in 2015. The quantity of international immigrants has increased by 54% during 1995–2015 (more results in SI Data S1).

Figure 1a shows that, in 2015, the most significant international migration corridors are from Mexico to the U.S., from Africa to the European Union (EU), and from India to the Middle East. The migration corridors highlighted in Figure 1a can be generally

classified into three types: from developing regions to developed nations (e.g., from Mexico to the U.S., from South America to EU countries,), labour exports (e.g., from India and Southeast Asia to the Middle East, and from Southeast Asia to the U.S.), and refugee flows (e.g., from Africa and Middle East to the EU). The U.S. is a primary destination for migrants from Mexico, India, and China (including Chinese Mainland, Hongkong, Macao, and Taiwan). The number of immigrants in the U.S. exceed 320 million in 2015 (SI Figure S1).

Figure 1b shows the changes in the migration population from 1995 to 2015. Migration to the U.S. expanded the most. During 1995–2015, immigrants from Mexico, Southeast Asia, South America, India, and China to the U.S. increased dramatically. Meanwhile, immigrants from India to the Middle East presented the most substantial increments. In contrast, the migrant population in Russia, Ukraine, and India decreased remarkably. In Asia, the number of migrants from India in United Arab Emirates (labour exports) increased substantially, while the number of migrants from Iraq in Iran decreased (SI Figure S1).



**Figure 1.** Global migration population in 2015 and migration changes during 1995–2015. Panel (a) shows global migration in 2015 (million), and panel (b) shows changes in the number of global migration during 1995–2015 (million). The colour of nations in the world maps shows the number of migrant population (a) and changes in migrant population (b). The arrows start from the origins of immigrants and end at their destinations (at the sub-regional scale). The red arrows indicate an increased population of immigrants, while the blue ones represent a decrease. The numbers and

width of the arrows indicate the migrant population (a) and the migrant population changes (b).

**CO<sub>2</sub> Footprint of International Immigrants.** The CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of international immigrants is 1.8 Gigatonnes (Gt), occupying 6% of the global total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in 1995. It has shown an upward trend during 1995–2015 with slight fluctuations, and reaches 2.9 Gt (8%) in 2015. The CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of international immigrants has increased by 65% during 1995–2015 (more results in SI Data S2).

Figure 2a shows global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions caused by international migration (hereinafter called immiCO<sub>2</sub>, which is part of the CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of the migrants receiving nation) in 2015. The developing regions are generally net exporter of immiCO<sub>2</sub>, while the developed regions mostly act as net importers of immiCO<sub>2</sub>.

The U.S. has the highest immiCO<sub>2</sub> in 2015 (947 million ton, Mt). The immigrants from Mexico contribute the most (25% of the immiCO<sub>2</sub> in the U.S.), followed by Southeast Asia (9%), the EU (8%), and South America (6%). The immiCO<sub>2</sub> flows are in consistent with typical migration corridors such as corridors from developing regions to developed regions and labour export corridors. For instance, Mexico, a developing economy, has been one of the largest origins of immigrant population in the U.S. The immigrants from Mexico move to the U.S. for job opportunities and better living conditions (e.g., better healthcare and education). The improvement of personal income and living conditions promote the consumption of immigrants. This

can drive larger CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from the upstream regions/sectors in the supply chains, and hence increases CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of the U.S. The U.S. is the primary migration destination with a diverse migrant composition, which leads to enormous effects of the immigrants on global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

The immiCO<sub>2</sub> of the Middle East (513 Mt) rank second, mainly induced by immigrants from India (leading to 38% of the immiCO<sub>2</sub> in the Middle East) and Southeast Asia (13%). In particular, immigrants from India to the United Arab Emirates and Qatar are the most critical causes of immiCO<sub>2</sub> in the Middle East (SI Figure S2). The United Arab Emirates and Qatar have small populations, with immigrant populations accounting for the majority (SI Data S1). Their prosperous economic development requires large amounts of labour forces. These nations attract overseas labour forces, especially immigrants from India. This reveals that labour export to the Middle East results in large amounts of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. For the EU, the immiCO<sub>2</sub> reaches 274 Mt, with Africa, South America, and Russia and CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) contributing significantly. The refugee flows from Africa to EU lead to large amounts of immiCO<sub>2</sub>. The political unrest and severe natural disaster in Africa bring about lots of refugees, and EU becomes the main destination of African refugees. CO<sub>2</sub> emissions driven by immigrant refugees cannot be neglected.

From 1995 to 2015, the migration flows from India to the Middle East lead to the most massive global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (Figure 2b). Notably, the immiCO<sub>2</sub> flows from





India to Qatar and the United Arab Emirates significantly increased immiCO<sub>2</sub> of the Middle East (SI Figure S2). The immiCO<sub>2</sub> of the U.S. has increased and then declined slightly during 1995–2015, while its portion in total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of the U.S. steadily has increased from 11% in 1995 to 15% in 2015 (more results in SI Data S3). Figure 2b also shows that all the immiCO<sub>2</sub> flows from Mexico, Southeast Asia, India, China, South America, and Africa to the U.S. have increased. This finding is in accordance with the changes in migration trends. On the other hand, immiCO<sub>2</sub> flows from the EU to the U.S., South America, and Russia and CIS have shown a small decrease.

In 2015, the per capita immiCO<sub>2</sub> of the U.S. reached 20 ton/capita, followed by Oceania (12 ton/capita) and the EU (8 ton/capita). Although the U.S. and the EU are both major destinations of immigrants, they are evidently different in terms of per capita immiCO<sub>2</sub>. The value of the U.S. is approximately 2.5 times as that of the EU (Figure 2c). In Africa and India, the per capita immiCO<sub>2</sub> is the lowest. At the national level, nations with the highest per capita immiCO<sub>2</sub> include Qatar (48 ton/capita) and San Marino (41 ton/capita), which have small populations. Moreover, the immiCO<sub>2</sub> in Luxembourg, United Arab Emirates, and Singapore all exceeded 30 ton/capita (SI Figure S2).

Oceania and the Middle East are highlighted for their large portions of immiCO<sub>2</sub> in their total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, with the percentages of 22% and 20%, respectively. The immiCO<sub>2</sub> in the U.S. and EU, which are major migration destinations, account for




15% and 7% of their total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, respectively (Figure 2d). At the national level, the percentages in the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar all exceeded 65%, which were the highest in 2015 (SI Figure S2). CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of the emphasized areas are more greatly influenced by international migration. Prospective CO<sub>2</sub> reduction strategies in these areas are suggested to take the quantity and structure of population movement into account.



**Figure 2.** Global immiCO<sub>2</sub> and immiCO<sub>2</sub> flows. Panel (a) illustrates the global immiCO<sub>2</sub> and the critical sub-regional flows in 2015 (Mt). Panel (b) shows the changes in immiCO<sub>2</sub> and the critical sub-regional flows during 1995–2015 (Mt). The colour of nations in the world maps shows their immiCO<sub>2</sub> (a) and immiCO<sub>2</sub> changes (b). The arrows start from the origins of immigrants and end at their destinations (at the sub-regional scale). The numbers and width of the arrows indicate the immiCO<sub>2</sub> (a) and the changes in immiCO<sub>2</sub> (b). The red arrows indicate an increased immiCO<sub>2</sub> caused by the migration flows, while the blue ones represent a decrease. Panel (c) illustrates the per capita immiCO<sub>2</sub> in each sub-region in 2015 (ton per capita), where the colour of the sub-regions in the world maps shows their per capita immiCO<sub>2</sub>. Panel (d) shows the portion of immiCO<sub>2</sub> in total CO<sub>2</sub> footprint for each sub-region in 2015, where the colour of the sub-regions in the world maps shows their proportions of immiCO<sub>2</sub> in total CO<sub>2</sub> footprint.

**Impacts of International Migration on Global CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions.** We evaluate the relative contribution of the international migration to global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, by decomposing global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions into six socioeconomic determinants (i.e., CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensity, production structure, final demand structure, per capita final demand, original population, and migration structure). Figure 3 reveals that global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions have increased steadily during 1995–2015, with the increasing per capita final demand being the largest contributor. The reduction of CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensity has the most significant contribution to global CO<sub>2</sub> mitigation. The changes in the original population and international migrants structure have kept increasing global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions during 1995–2015. Natural population growth, which is the second largest contributor to global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, contributes to an increase in global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by over 4% every five years while changes in the international migration structure act as the third largest contributor. The pushing effects of migration structure changes vary across different time periods, with the highest being 0.7% during 2005–2010 and the lowest being 0.1% during 2010–2015. The impacts of international migration structure changes on global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are expected to be lower in recent years, because the migration structures of major migration destinations have been plateaued. The changes in the final demand structure have relatively small impacts on global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions during 1995–2015. In general, changes in the quantity, structure, and affluence of international immigrants have contributed to global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions increase during 1995–2015, while final demand

structure changes of international immigrants have little effects on global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions during this time period.



**Figure 3.** Impacts of socioeconomic transition and migration trend on changes in global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions during 1995–2015. The positive values indicate that socioeconomic factor changes contribute to the increase of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, while the negative values mean that the socioeconomic factor changes lead to the mitigation of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, if other factors remain constant.

## DISCUSSION

This study for the first time examined the CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of international immigrants. The CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of international immigrants has increased by 65% during 1995–2015, while that of the global population (i.e., global total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions) has increased by 33% during the same period. Meanwhile, the portion of the CO<sub>2</sub>

footprint of international immigrants in global total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions has also increased. International migrants accounted for 3.4% of the total population in 2015, but its CO<sub>2</sub> footprint was as high as 7.9%. However, in 1995 the portion of international immigrants and their CO<sub>2</sub> footprint was only 2.8% and 6.3%, respectively. Since migration is generally from relatively poorer regions to richer regions, immigrants would typically live in more advanced economies with significant lifestyle change. Their consumption of living necessities (e.g., foods and clothes), housing, infrastructures, health care, and education would be more CO<sub>2</sub> intensified, and cause more massive CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. This finding facilitates policy makers to reconsider the role and status of global population mobility in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Population mobility will accompany the development and transformation of human society for a long time. The understanding of the CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of human migration in this study will contribute to current efforts and routes to tackle climate changes. At the same time, this study reveals that migration structure tends to be stable in recent years, and the changes in the number of immigrants are the main factor influencing migration-related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

**Policy implication I: CO<sub>2</sub> reduction targets of the Paris Agreement and**

**subsequent agreements must consider the effects of global migration.** Many

nations have set their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) since the Paris

Agreement in 2016<sup>42</sup>. However, CO<sub>2</sub> emission changes caused by global population

movements have not been fully considered in current targets. The allocation of

responsibilities for global CO<sub>2</sub> emission reduction can be different when considering the impact of international migration. For net immiCO<sub>2</sub> importers, immigrants contribute to CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in these nations, which increases the challenges of CO<sub>2</sub> emission reduction. Based on our results, the U.S. is still a primary destination of global migrants. It is likely to maintain this trend for a long time to come. Thus, the pressure for CO<sub>2</sub> emission reduction in the U.S. will be more severe in the future. The U.S., as the second largest CO<sub>2</sub> emitter in the world, has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement. This situation will pose great challenges to global climate changes. Among other major signatories, developed nations such as those in the EU are also major migration destinations. They need to consider future changes in the number and structure of population movements when setting their NDCs.

**Policy implication II: Both production-side and demand-side measures are required to curb CO<sub>2</sub> emissions caused by international migration.**

On one hand, production-side measures are important to offset the impacts of international migration on global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. For producers, decreasing their CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensity is beneficial to lowering CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of the whole supply chain. Although international migration affects the consumption, the decreased CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensity can offset the impact of consumption pattern changes on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions to some extent. Since migration restriction is not a desirable option for economic development, immigrant inflow nations should accelerate both the reduction of CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensity of their own economic systems and the transition

to the post-fossil energy era. In this way, even if the migration pushes up the overall population, it will not cause a significant increase in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

Compared with the U.S., the overall CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of immigrants in Europe (especially in Nordic countries such as Denmark and Sweden) is much lower. Nordic countries have made significant efforts to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Their own CO<sub>2</sub> footprint is relatively low, despite immigrant inflows. Subsequently, there is no significant promotion of their own CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. This fully illustrates that reducing the intensity of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in their economies can significantly reduce the boosting effects of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions brought by immigrants.

The individual CO<sub>2</sub> footprint will have a downward trend, if immigrants move from high CO<sub>2</sub> emitting nations to low CO<sub>2</sub> emitters. In some Middle East energy-dependent nations, immigrants from India and other major nations can significantly boost their CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. How to accelerate the transition to a post-fossil energy era in relevant nations will be a major challenge.

On the other hand, demand-side measures need to focus on major immigrant inflow nations, and sustainable consumption strategies of major immigrant inflow nations need to consider the trade-off effects of future migration. Major immigrant inflow nations should fully consider CO<sub>2</sub> boosting effects of future migration, especially in nations with high CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (e.g., the U.S. identified in this study). Since international migration is inevitable in the context of globalization, it is crucial for immigrant inflow nations to optimize consumption behaviors (e.g., guiding the



consumption through carbon tax on finished goods and services) and accelerate technology improvements. In particular, consumption behaviors of immigrants should be guided through tax or financial incentives to decrease immiCO<sub>2</sub>. Moreover, industries should be encouraged to choose upstream inputs with lower CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensities. In this way, the immigrant inflow nations may not suffer huge rises in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions under the impact of international migration.

**Limitations.** This study focuses on the macro-scale analyses. We assume that the consumption structure of immigrants is the same as that of native people in immigrant destination. The ratio of immigrants to total population is used to analyze the impact of international migration on global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Other underlying factors influencing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions through international migration are not considered due to data unavailability. These factors (e.g., lifestyles in different immigrant destinations, destination selection of immigrants, and consumption custom of different ethnic groups) can be further considered in future studies based on micro-level databases and social surveys.

In this study, we only calculated the CO<sub>2</sub> emission effects of global migration, without considering other effects caused by the migration (e.g., economic and social impacts). The primary cause of immigrants' CO<sub>2</sub> emissions is also related to the high-carbon economic systems of destination nations. The relevant policies should focus on how to reduce the CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of their own economic systems. Meanwhile, there is also a trend of international migration to low-income or low-carbon nations. In the

future, global migration will become more diversified, and thus the CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of immigrants will be more diversified.

**Uncertainty.** The MRIO tables and global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in this study are from the Eora database<sup>37, 38</sup>. Data of other global MRIO databases (e.g., GTAP<sup>43</sup>, WIOD<sup>44</sup>, EXIOBASE<sup>45-47</sup>) are not identical with that of Eora, which may lead to differences in results. Moreover, the international migration data are based on the number of documented immigrants. The undocumented immigrants, which also draw international attention, are not considered in this study due to data unavailability. These issues can be further addressed when the databases and statistical accuracy are improved.

## **ASSOCIATED CONTENT**

### **Supporting Information**

The supporting information provides supplemental Figures and Data supporting the main text. In the SI, Figure S1 for the international migration population and migration change; and Figure S2 for the national immi CO<sub>2</sub> and immiCO<sub>2</sub> flows. In the Supporting Data, Data S1 for the immigrant population and total population of nations; Data S2 for the immiCO<sub>2</sub> of nations; Data S3 for the proportions of immiCO<sub>2</sub> in total CO<sub>2</sub> footprint of nations; and Data S4 for the list of nations and associated sub-regions.

## **AUTHOR INFORMATION**

### **Corresponding Authors**

**Yutao Wang** - *Fudan Tyndall Center and Shanghai Key Laboratory of Atmospheric Particle Pollution and Prevention (LAP3), Department of Environmental Science & Engineering, Fudan University, Shanghai, 200438, China; Email: [yutaowang@fudan.edu.cn](mailto:yutaowang@fudan.edu.cn)*

**Dabo Guan** - *Department of Earth System Science, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100080, China; Email: [guandabo@hotmail.com](mailto:guandabo@hotmail.com)*

### **Authors**

**Sai Liang** - *Key Laboratory for City Cluster Environmental Safety and Green Development of the Ministry of Education, Institute of Environmental and Ecological Engineering, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou, Guangdong, 510006, China; State Key Joint Laboratory of Environment Simulation and Pollution Control, School of Environment, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, 100875, China.*

**Xuechun Yang** - *State Key Joint Laboratory of Environment Simulation and Pollution Control, School of Environment, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, 100875, China.*

**Jianchuan Qi** - *Key Laboratory for City Cluster Environmental Safety and Green*

*Development of the Ministry of Education, Institute of Environmental and Ecological Engineering, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou, Guangdong, 510006, China; State Key Joint Laboratory of Environment Simulation and Pollution Control, School of Environment, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, 100875, China.*

**Wei Xie** - *Fudan Tyndall Center and Shanghai Key Laboratory of Atmospheric*

*Particle Pollution and Prevention (LAP3), Department of Environmental Science & Engineering, Fudan University, Shanghai, 200438, China.*

**Raya Muttarak** - *Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human*

*Capital, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, A2361, Austria; School of International Development, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK.*

## **Notes**

The authors declare no competing financial interests.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

This work was financially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71874014; 71774032; 71961137009) and Newton Advanced Fellowship from the British Academy and the Newton Fund (NAFR2180103).

## REFERENCES

- (1) Young, Y.; Loebach, P.; Korinek, K. Building walls or opening borders? Global immigration policy attitudes across economic, cultural and human security contexts. *Soc. Sci. Res.* **2018**, *75*, 83-95.
- (2) Duncan, N. T.; Waldorf, B. S. Immigrant selectivity, immigrant performance and the macro-economic context. *Reg. Sci. Pol. Prac.* **2016**, *8*, (3), 127-143.
- (3) Hatton, T. J.; Williamson, J. G. The impact of immigration: Comparing two global eras. *World. Dev.* **2008**, *36*, (3), 345-361.
- (4) De Sherbinin, A.; VanWey, L. K.; McSweeney, K.; Aggarwal, R.; Barbieri, A.; Henry, S.; Hunter, L. M.; Twine, W.; Walker, R. Rural household demographics, livelihoods and the environment. *Global Environ. Chang.* **2008**, *18*, (1), 38-53.
- (5) Taylor, M. J.; Aguilar-Støen, M.; Castellanos, E.; Moran-Taylor, M. J.; Gerkin, K. International migration, land use change and the environment in Ixcán, Guatemala. *Land Use Policy* **2016**, *54*, 290-301.

- (6) Radel, C.; Schmook, B.; McCandless, S. Environment, transnational labor migration, and gender: case studies from southern Yucatán, Mexico and Vermont, USA. *Popul. Environ.* **2010**, *32*, (2), 177-197.
- (7) Oldekop, J. A.; Sims, K. R. E.; Whittingham, M. J.; Agrawal, A. An upside to globalization: International outmigration drives reforestation in Nepal. *Global Environ. Chang.* **2018**, *52*, 66-74.
- (8) Pan, W.; Carr, D.; Barbieri, A.; Bilsborrow, R.; Suchindran, C. Forest clearing in the Ecuadorian Amazon: a study of patterns over space and time. *Popul. Res. Policy. Rev.* **2007**, *26*, (5-6), 635-659.
- (9) Li, G.; Fang, C.; Wang, S.; Sun, S. The effect of economic growth, urbanization, and industrialization on fine particulate matter (PM<sub>2.5</sub>) concentrations in China. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* **2016**, *50*, (21), 11452-11459.
- (10) Lin, B.; Zhu, J. Changes in urban air quality during urbanization in China. *J. Clean. Prod.* **2018**, *188*, 312-321.
- (11) Ponce de Leon Barido, D.; Marshall, J. D. Relationship between urbanization and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions depends on income level and policy. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* **2014**, *48*, (7), 3632-3639.
- (12) Bekhet, H. A.; Othman, N. S. Impact of urbanization growth on Malaysia CO<sub>2</sub> emissions: Evidence from the dynamic relationship. *J. Clean. Prod.* **2017**, *154*, 374-388.

- (13) Qi, W.; Li, G. Residential carbon emission embedded in China's inter-provincial population migration. *Energ. Policy*. **2020**, *136*, 111065.
- (14) Feng, K.; Hubacek, K. Carbon implications of China's urbanization. *Energ. Ecol. Environ.* **2016**, *1*, (1), 39-44.
- (15) DinAlt, J. The environmental impact of immigration into the United States.  
<http://www.carryingcapacity.org/DinAlt.htm>
- (16) Cafaro, P.; Staples, W. The environmental argument for reducing immigration to the United States. *J. Soc. Polit. Econ. Stud.* **2009**, *34*, (3), 290-317.
- (17) Zhao, X.; Li, N.; Ma, C. Residential energy consumption in urban China: A decomposition analysis. *Energ. Policy*. **2012**, *41*, (C), 644-653.
- (18) Price, C.; Feldmeyer, B. The environmental impact of immigration: An analysis of the effects of immigrant concentration on air pollution levels. *Popul. Res. Policy. Rev.* **2012**, *31*, (1), 119-140.
- (19) Squalli, J. An empirical assessment of U.S. state-level immigration and environmental emissions. *Ecol. Econ.* **2010**, *69*, (5), 1170-1175.
- (20) Ma, G.; Hofmann, E. T. Population, immigration, and air quality in the USA: a spatial panel study. *Popul. Environ.* **2019**, *40*, (3), 283.
- (21) Lenzen, M.; Sun, Y.-Y.; Faturay, F.; Ting, Y.-P.; Geschke, A.; Malik, A. The carbon footprint of global tourism. *Nat. Clim. Change* **2018**, *8*, (6), 522-528.

(22) Teixeira, C. Living on the “edge of the suburbs” of Vancouver: A case study of the housing experiences and coping strategies of recent immigrants in Surrey and Richmond. *Can. Geogr* **2014**, 58, (2), 168-187.

(23) Larrotta, C. Immigrants to the United States and adult education services. *New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education* **2017**, 2017, (155), 61-69.

(24) Liebert, S.; Ameringer, C. F. The health care safety net and the affordable care act: Implications for hispanic immigrants. *Public Admin. Rev.* **2013**, 73, (6), 810-820.

(25) United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs International migration stock: The 2017 revision.

<https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2017/estimates17.asp>

(26) World Bank Population, total.

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

(27) Peters, G. P. From production-based to consumption-based national emission inventories. *Ecol. Econ.* **2008**, 65, (1), 13-23.

(28) Mi, Z.; Meng, J.; Guan, D.; Shan, Y.; Song, M.; Wei, Y.-M.; Liu, Z.; Hubacek, K. Chinese CO<sub>2</sub> emission flows have reversed since the global financial crisis. *Nat. Commun.* **2017**, 8, (1), No.1712.

(29) Liang, S.; Qu, S.; Zhu, Z.; Guan, D.; Xu, M. Income-based greenhouse gas emissions of nations. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* **2017**, 51, (1), 346-355.



- (30)Liang, S.; Wang, Y.; Cinnirella, S.; Pirrone, N. Atmospheric mercury footprints of nations. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* **2015**, *49*, (6), 3566-3574.
- (31)Qi, J.; Wang, Y.; Liang, S.; Li, Y.; Li, Y.; Feng, C.; Xu, L.; Wang, S.; Chen, L.; Wang, D.; Yang, Z. Primary suppliers driving atmospheric mercury emissions through global supply chains. *One Earth* **2019**, *1*, (2), 254-266.
- (32)Wiedmann, T. O.; Schandl, H.; Lenzen, M.; Moran, D.; Suh, S.; West, J.; Kanemoto, K. The material footprint of nations. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U S A* **2015**, *112*, (20), 6271-6276.
- (33)Font Vivanco, D.; Sprecher, B.; Hertwich, E. Scarcity-weighted global land and metal footprints. *Ecol. Indic.* **2017**, *83*, 323-327.
- (34)Wang, H.; Wang, G.; Qi, J.; Schandl, H.; Li, Y.; Feng, C.; Yang, X.; Wang, Y.; Wang, X.; Liang, S. Scarcity-weighted fossil fuel footprint of China at the provincial level. *Appl. Energ.* **2020**, *258*, 114081.
- (35)Zhang, Q.; Jiang, X.; Tong, D.; Davis, S. J.; Zhao, H.; Geng, G.; Feng, T.; Zheng, B.; Lu, Z.; Streets, D. G.; Ni, R.; Brauer, M.; van Donkelaar, A.; Martin, R. V.; Huo, H.; Liu, Z.; Pan, D.; Kan, H.; Yan, Y.; Lin, J.; He, K.; Guan, D. Transboundary health impacts of transported global air pollution and international trade. *Nature* **2017**, *543*, (7647), 705-709.
- (36)Chen, L.; Liang, S.; Liu, M.; Yi, Y.; Mi, Z.; Zhang, Y.; Li, Y.; Qi, J.; Meng, J.; Tang, X.; Zhang, H.; Tong, Y.; Zhang, W.; Wang, X.; Shu, J.; Yang, Z. Trans-

provincial health impacts of atmospheric mercury emissions in China. *Nat. Commun.* **2019**, *10*, (1), 1484.

(37) Lenzen, M.; Kanemoto, K.; Moran, D.; Geschke, A. Mapping the structure of the world economy. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* **2012**, *46*, (15), 8374-8381.

(38) Lenzen, M.; Moran, D.; Kanemoto, K.; Geschke, A. Building EORA: A global multi-region input–output database at high country and sector resolution. *Econ. Syst. Res.* **2013**, *25*, (1), 20-49.

(39) Lan, J.; Malik, A.; Lenzen, M.; McBain, D.; Kanemoto, K. A structural decomposition analysis of global energy footprints. *Appl. Energ.* **2016**, *163*, 436-451.

(40) Malik, A.; Lan, J.; Lenzen, M. Trends in global greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 to 2010. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* **2016**, *50*, (9), 4722-4730.

(41) United States Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Indexes (PPI).

<https://www.bls.gov/ppi/>

(42) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs>

(43) Aguiar, A.; Chepeliev, M.; Corong, E.; McDougall, R.; van der Mensbrugge, D. The GTAP Data Base: Version 10. *Journal of Global Economic Analysis* **2019**, *4*, (1), 1-27.

- (44) Timmer, M. P.; Dietzenbacher, E.; Los, B.; Stehrer, R.; Vries, G. J. An Illustrated User Guide to the World Input–Output Database: the Case of Global Automotive Production. *Rev. Int. Econ.* **2015**, *23*, (3), 575-605.
- (45) Tukker, A.; de Koning, A.; Wood, R.; Hawkins, T.; Lutter, S.; Acosta, J.; Rueda Cantuche, J. M.; Bouwmeester, M.; Oosterhaven, J.; Drosdowski, T.; Kuenen, J. EXIOPOL - Development and illustrative analyses of a detailed global MR EE SUT/IOT. *Economic Systems Research: Global Multiregional Input-Output Frameworks* **2013**, *25*, (1), 50-70.
- (46) Stadler, K.; Wood, R.; Bulavskaya, T.; Södersten, C. J.; Simas, M.; Schmidt, S.; Usubiaga, A.; Acosta-Fernández, J.; Kuenen, J.; Bruckner, M.; Giljum, S.; Lutter, S.; Merciai, S.; Schmidt, J. H.; Theurl, M. C.; Plutzer, C.; Kastner, T.; Eisenmenger, N.; Erb, K. H.; Koning, A.; Tukker, A. EXIOBASE 3: Developing a Time Series of Detailed Environmentally Extended Multi-Regional Input-Output Tables. *J. Ind. Ecol.* **2018**, *22*, (3), 502-515.
- (47) Merciai, S.; Schmidt, J. Methodology for the Construction of Global Multi-Regional Hybrid Supply and Use Tables for the EXIOBASE v3 Database. *J. Ind. Ecol.* **2018**, *22*, (3), 516-531.

### For Table of Contents Only

