Amsterdam and William III: the role of influence, interest and patronage on policy-making in the Dutch Republic, 1672-1684

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Abstract

The general theme of the thesis is the relationship between Amsterdam and the restored stadholder, William III, from 1672 to 1684. Within this survey, several subsidiary themes analyse the interests of the decision-makers during a period of war and uneasy peace, and the compromises the principals made to prevent a return to the crisis politics of 1650 and 1672. After three years of the restored stadholdership the relationship tended to the confrontational, but the study shows that effective lines of communication enabled Amsterdam and the stadholder to survive their differences over the peace negotiations in 1677-78, the struggle for alliances, 1679-1681, and the crises over military expenditure, 1682-1684, and eventually to co-operate in the invasion of England in 1688.

The two major subsidiary themes are firstly, the regency of Amsterdam, in particular the burgomasters, their backgrounds, interests and ideologies, and secondly, the principal advisers and officials in the service of the stadholder and the States. These two groups were not mutually exclusive and the study also shows how the Amsterdam regents in the 1680s were able to operate as a more coherent group than those in office in the 1670s.

The first of these groups is examined within a discussion of the role of party, factional and individual interest in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, which further develops recent theories of party and faction. Analysis of the second centres around the changes in the administration of the Dutch Republic and the emergence of a new kind of *raadpensionaris*, working both with and for the provincial states and the stadholder. Both are further contextualised by analysis of the political, economic, religious and social changes which had taken place during the "Golden Age" and the first stadholderless period of the mid-seventeenth century, and the changing relations with France and England.

Contents

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Abbreviations and Conventions

Abbreviations:

A.H.N.	*Acta Historiae Neerlandicae, The Low Countries Yearbook*
A.R.H.	Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague
B.MG.N.	*Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden*
E.H.J.	*Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek*
E.H.R.	*Economic History Review*
G.A. Amsterdam	Gemeente Archief, Amsterdam
G.A. Haarlem	Gemeente Archief, Haarlem
Kn.	Knuttel, W.P.C., *Catalogus van de pamfletten-verzameling berustende in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek*
N.N.W.B.	*Nieuwe Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek*
P.R.O.	Public Record Office, London (SP, State Papers)
Res. Holl.	*Resoluties van de Heeren Staten van Holland en West Friesland*
Res. Vroed.	*Vroedschap resoluties*
V.O.C.	Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie
W.I.C.	Westindische Compagnie

Conventions:

Dating throughout the text is as given in the primary sources, with both continental and English dates shown where appropriate.

As this study is set within the Dutch Republic, on the whole Dutch forms of proper names and official titles have been used. Exceptions have been made where the anglicised forms are common currency among historians, such as William III, rather than *Willem III*, and burgomaster, rather than *burgemeester*.

Chapter 1
Introduction

William III (1650-1702), stadholder of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland and Overijssel, only visited Amsterdam officially three times between 1672 and 1684, in 1675, 1677 (after his marriage to Mary Stuart) and in 1683. But in the United Provinces of the Dutch Republic in the later seventeenth century, where distances were not great, communications were not a problem and representative towns and cities had delegates and deputies in permanent residence in The Hague, a discussion of the relationship between the stadholder and the leading town should not therefore be based too much on this failure of William to make formal visits. It is perhaps of greater note that he was not on such terms with any of the leading regents to make more informal visits.

The relationship between the Prince and the Amsterdammers was always an official one, most frequently fraught with tensions. The Prince's circle of friends did not include Amsterdam regents,[1] but members of the nobility or those who climbed the social ladder through service to the stadholder.[2] However, although the Prince's friends may have been unofficial advisers, they were not formally empowered to act as official advisers,[3] and he had to take advice from the States and their representatives from the towns, including Amsterdam. The Prince did not always act on advice received but tried to devise ways of circumventing States policy when he believed it was contrary to his interpretation of the "interest of state". Differences of interpretations of the interests of state between the Prince and

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1. His one attempt at the serious exercise of patronage within the city's government during this period failed (see below p. 129).

2. For a full discussion on the Prince's circle, see below pp. 179-181.

3. The nobles were of more significance on the international stage, where they could be seen as comparable to the ambassadorial representatives from monarchical states and, as the 1670s progressed William began to send separate embassies drawn from his own circle of noble supporters to treat with foreign powers, alongside those comprising representatives of the States.

several of the representative constituents were one of the major causes of the tensions within the government structure of the Dutch Republic.

The interests of state were articulated for Holland by Pieter de la Court in *Het Interest van Holland*, as edited by *raadpensionaris* De Witt.[4] In essence it was argued that the good of Holland was dependent on securing the liberty necessary for prosecuting the trade fundamental to the state's success. The corollary of this was that anything which appeared to work against this purpose, particularly the actions of William II in 1650, must be rejected and opposed. The stadholdership of William II (1648-50) was seen as a return to the policies of dynasticism and militarism of his great-uncle Maurits (1585-1625), rather than continuing the more tolerant attitudes of Frederik Hendrik (1625-50), during whose stadholdership the full potential of the economy of Holland began to be realised. Hence after the death of William II in 1650, during the first stadholderless period, ideas of state were developed which could treat the stadholders more theoretically. The year 1662, after the failure of the Stuart restoration in England to effect similar changes in the Dutch Republic, provided the ideal moment to assert the principles of the true freedom (*ware vrijheid*) within which a successful state should be run.[5] Pieter

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4. Pieter de la Court in *Het Interest van Holland, ofte Grond van Hollands welvaren* (Amsterdam, 1662); J.I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic, Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806* (Oxford, 1995), p. 760.

5. See J.W. Smit, "The Netherlands and Europe in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century", in J. Bromley, and E.H. Kossman, eds., *Britain and the Netherlands in Europe and Asia, Papers delivered to the Third Anglo-Dutch Historical Conference* (1968), pp. 22-28 for a discussion on the theory of True Freedom. Smit, p. 23, quotes Pieter de Groot writing in 1673: "What constitutes the wealth of the Republic? The opulence of its trade. And what is the source of that trade? Good government. For nothing is more attractive for the whole world than freedom of conscience and security of possessions. It is impossible that this freedom and this security of possessions would survive the government of a monarch." See also "Considerations Upon the Present State of the United Netherlands, composed by a lover of his countrey for the encouragement of his countreymen, in this troublesome time. Exactly translated out of Nether-dutch into English by a most cordial lover of bothe the nations", in Baron Somers, *Civil Tracts* (1812), pp. 1-26, and *Delenda Carthago, ibid.*, p. 37, "The interest and life of Holland, all the world knows is trade. It is advantageous to others; but it is necessary to them...," speech made by Shaftesbury at the opening of the English Parliament on 5

de la Court was however a realist and although he saw established churches as a denial of the freedoms of state, he also saw the advantages of adherence to the Reformed Church by those with a formal role within the state.[6]

Amsterdam in the 1670s and 1680s, despite many internal dissensions, was securely aligned behind this policy, subject to the pressures of war and peace. These two qualifications of internal dispute and the demands of war and peace were critical in the 1670s and 1680s. William III's intentions were, in the early years of his restoration, less clear. Because he was restored to power on a wave of Orangist support sustained by many of those outwardly opposed to Wittian principles of toleration and true freedom, assumptions were made that he epitomised a combination of the leadership qualities of William the Silent and Frederick Hendrik and the Orangism of Maurits and William II. In fact he developed very much his own ideas and although they may have been drawn from his predecessors' examples, they were also determined by the circumstances of the 1670s and 1680s and the internal and international affairs with which he had to deal.

Interest dominated the direction of the foreign policy of the Republic. That is to say, those determining foreign policy were working from the point of view of their own dominant interest. In 1672 the invasion of the Republic by France provided a basic common interest, but apart from such major critical events, on the whole motives were very mixed, according to the issues at stake and their relation to the more fundamental complexity of interests. The combination of powerful interest groups and the representative system of government operating in the Dutch Republic meant that effective power could not be concentrated in the hands of one man or even a small group, although on occasions necessity forced a small group to act unilaterally. However, many of the interest groups were very powerful within the States and the city government of Amsterdam was one of the most

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February 1673.

6. Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 639.

powerful.[7]

The primary question which this study will be addressing is the role of Amsterdam in the internal and external policy-making of the States during the period from the restoration of the Prince of Orange in 1672 to the build-up to the invasion of England in 1688. Critical to this is an understanding not only of the final decision-making processes, but also of the processes by which the decision-makers were empowered. This will necessarily include an analysis of the Amsterdam regency, but unlike other studies of regent elites in the seventeenth century, this will not be the end in itself.[8] For those of us who want answers to the wider questions of European history the role of individual groups must be put into a broader context. Whatever the particulars regarding the life of one regent, it is his contribution to the decision-making processes which affected the whole city, province, state and in many cases international events which will be addressed here.

The question is not being addressed from the point of view of the Prince of Orange for several reasons. Firstly, it has already been done by many historians, particularly Dutch, English and American.[9] Secondly, approached from the point of view of the stadholder, Amsterdam's importance became identified with the personalities who represented the town at the highest level in the States of Holland and the States General. In this way the period has become synonymous with the activities of Coenraad van Beuningen, whose open determination to put the interests of his town first, has led to assumptions of faithful representation of Amsterdam within this one personality. Studies of van Beuningen's activities as a

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7. Other influential groups including the major trading companies and their close association with Amsterdam will be discussed in chapter 5 below.

8. Recent studies of regent elites have tended to the particularist, see for example: J.J. De Jong, *Met goed fatsoen. De elite in een Hollandse stad, Gouda 1700-1780* (Dieren, 1985); L. Kooijmans, *Onder regenten. De elite in een Hollandse stad, Hoorn 1700-1780* (Dieren, 1985); M. Prak, *Gezeten burgers. De elite in een Hollandse stad, Leiden 1700-1780* (Dieren, 1985).

9. See Chapter 2 below for a discussion on the historiography of the Prince of Orange.

statesman drawn as representative of Amsterdam have confirmed this impression.[10] This will be shown to be a partially flawed assumption. Thirdly, the reaction of Amsterdam to various initiatives by the stadholder can be gauged from the central point of view, but they cannot be accurately assessed without a fuller analysis of the formative arguments. Thus the security of the Republic was deemed vital by both the stadholder and Amsterdam, but what constituted such security was at times interpreted in widely varying ways. At their widest the differences were between territorial security and the needs of trade, but these differences could lead to more critical divisions over the relative importance of alliances. Anti-French alliances could safeguard the Dutch territories; pro-French alliances would enhance the security of trade. But things were not so simple. Fourthly (finally), historians of the Dutch Republic in the later seventeenth century have approached its history either as a direct reflection of the dominant themes in the extant sources or, as in the case of Geyl's *Democratische Tendenties*,[11] as a contribution to a particular historical debate.

The original motivation for this research was simple historical curiosity and a straightforward approach to a question which posed itself after preliminary study of the Dutch Republic and its place in European history in the second half of the seventeenth century: did Amsterdam have the power to threaten the political survival of William III during the period before he became King of England and, if so, why did they not use it? It will become clear that, in seeking answers to these questions far more complex issues have had to be tackled.

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10. M.A.M. Franken, *Coenraad van Beuningens politiek en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84* (Groningen, 1966); C.W. Roldanus, *Coenraad Van Beuningen Staatsman en Libertijn* (The Hague, 1931); G.H. Kurtz, *Willem III en Amsterdam 1683-5* (Utrecht, 1928).

11. P. Geyl, *Democratische tendenties in 1672* (The Hague, 1950); D.J. Roorda, *Partij en Factie: De Oproeren van 1672 in de Steden van Holland en Zeeland, een Krachtmeting tussen Partijen en Facties* (Groningen, 1961), pp. 11-36 looks at "*partij en facitie in de historiografie*", from the historical perspective of the period when the proponents of the different theories were writing.

Before going on to look at the available sources and what has previously been made of them, some explanation should be made about the assumptions which led to the formulation of the original questions.

William III had been excluded effectively from the offices of his ancestors during the first stadholderless period (1650-1672), when the fortunes of the Republic had been in the hands of the *raadpensionaris*, John De Witt. He was welcomed back enthusiastically in 1672 and until 1675 was held in general esteem. Thereafter his activities became less and less effective for the perceived general good of many parts of the Republic. Amsterdam was in the strongest position of all the contributory towns in the States of Holland, which paid the largest quota to the States General. She had a long history of cultivating skilled and influential politicians and could on occasion effectively veto important decisions. The decisions of the burgomasters and the *vroedschap* (town council) were more than once a thorn in the flesh of the Prince, but throughout the whole period - even in the critical crisis of 1684 - compromises were reached between both parties. Such compromises had the effect of strengthening the stadholder's hold on office and reducing the influence of Amsterdam to that of a major pressure group. Is there any evidence to determine whether the Amsterdammers ever wanted more than that? Was it not the case that they could have precipitated a return to the stadholderless period if they had wanted to? These questions can only be answered by a careful study of the make-up of the regency, their dominant interests, their role within the city, and their perception of the place of the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century world. These then need to be considered from the more central point of the role of the Prince and his ways of working with and within the central government of the Republic.

The foundations for this study have been laid in two sections. The first is the background to the elevation of the Prince of Orange in 1672. This is firmly set in the foreign policy of De Witt, the majority of Louis XIV, the weakness of restoration English government and the failure of the States to undermine the innate Orangist sympathies of a large part of the Republic. The second is the regency of

Amsterdam itself, and its role within the Dutch Republic.

The Dutch Republic was an anomaly in seventeenth century Europe. Although comparisons may be made with the English Commonwealth insofar as both resulted from a struggle against autocratic rule, the Dutch Revolt had been fought against a system of government operated from distant Spain, whereas the English Civil Wars had been a protest against the interpretation of the rights of kingship by Charles I. The Commonwealth hardly lasted beyond the death of Oliver Cromwell; the Dutch Republic lasted for two hundred years. A new kind of state had been created which had been born from the common interests of the northern states of the Netherlands, had incorporated many of the institutions of government from the days of Hapsburg rule and had thrown up a new ruling elite which comprised both the aristocratic House of Orange and its peers, and the bourgeois merchant elite of the representative towns and cities.[12]

The first ten years of the first stadholderless period coincided with the English Commonwealth, but the Restoration of Charles II in 1660 brought England once more into the tradition of monarchical government, while the Dutch Republic consolidated the notions of federal republican government.[13] This small group of provinces, each with its own government and interests could not be ignored by the rest of the European powers in the way the Swiss Federation had been since its secession from the Hapsburg Empire. The Dutch Republic was very different from that inland mountainous country, and in the seventeenth century its characteristics

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12. For a fuller discussion of the government and institutions and structures of the Dutch republic see J.L. Price, *Holland and the Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century: The Politics of Particularism* (Oxford, 1994), pp. 209-93; S. J. Andreae Fockema, *De Nederlandse staat onder de Republiek* (Amsterdam, 1962); Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp. 276-300; and below pp. 49-53.

13. Israel, *op. cit.*, p. 277, following J.C. Boogman, "The Union of Utrecht: Its Genesis and Consequences", *B.M.G.N.*, vol. iciv (1979), pp. 390-1, argues that the "best way to describe the political entity created by the Revolt is a cross between federal state and confederacy, with more of the confederacy in form and theory, and more of the federal state in substance and practice." See also Price, *Holland and the Dutch Republic*, pp. 212-13

had made it a major player in European affairs, although whether it could be called a major power is a little less certain.

Geographically the Netherlands have always been a vital focal point for other European powers. The delta of the major westward flowing rivers from the European hinterland held economic importance from the earliest times and this increased as trade grew. The drainage of the surrounding areas created a favourable environment for the development of an urban infrastructure which quickly assumed its natural place in the politico-economic life of Europe in the early modern period.[14] A new system of centralised taxation on those with the closest interest in the drainage schemes was introduced during the sixteenth century and ensured that maintenance was carried out effectively thereafter.[15] The change in the political structure of the Netherlands in the late sixteenth century shifted the economic advantage from the southern part (the rump of the Spanish Netherlands) to the north and increased the relative importance of the new Dutch Republic in the economy of Europe. This change was epitomised by the Dutch closure of the Scheldt in 1585, a major interference with the economic geography of the area and the trade through Antwerp.

The contemporary growth of overseas exploration, trade and competition towards the Americas added a further dimension, and the advantages of an Atlantic coast and a flourishing and innovative shipbuilding industry for a short time put the new Republic on an equal footing with the English and gave it an advantage over the French. The Dutch West India Company (*West Indische Compagnie* (*W.I.C.*)), founded in 1621 and re-formed under a new charter in 1674), may not have achieved the success and status of the Dutch East India Company (*Vereenigde*

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14. A. Lambert, *The Making of the Dutch Landscape* (London, 1971), p. 212 describes the drainage activities at their height in the early seventeenth century, just as the Dutch Golden Age was beginning.

15. Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 27-8.

Oostindische Compagnie (*V.O.C.*)),[16] but its struggles against the French and English in the Americas, and particularly the Caribbean during the 1670s, were a crucial, if not critical, factor in the military and naval conflicts of the late seventeenth century.

If the geographical context of the Dutch Republic gave it the potential for developing as the major seafaring and trading nation of the seventeenth century, at the same time it made it one of the most vulnerable to military and aggressive diplomatic policy. Sandwiched between the Spanish Netherlands in the south and the Hapsburg-influenced German States in the north, it necessarily became a factor for French interest in these areas. However, until the late 1660s it was the English who appeared to pose the greater threat. Competition in trade and conflicting assumptions of the control and use of the seas provided a strong scenario for the struggles which arose soon after the establishment of the English Commonwealth and the first stadholderless period.[17]

The three Anglo-Dutch wars of the seventeenth century (1652-54, 1665-67 and 1672-74) can, from a longer term-historical perspective, appear to be constituent parts of one conflict, just as twentieth century historians have seen the First and Second World Wars as part of one conflict leading to a European balance of power.[18] There is some justification for such an approach and the arguments are stronger for the first two wars. Equally, however, the third war, which for the Dutch was a longer and more serious struggle against France, can be seen as the early stages of the wars against Louis XIV and the creation of an eighteenth century European power balance. Nevertheless, one contemporary observer noted that the English had "publikly pretended causes" for fighting the war which were a combination of the economic and political, and clearly continue the themes of the

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16. J.R. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century* (London, 1966), p. 35.

17. C.R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800* (London (Pelican edition), 1973), pp. 100-103.

18. Jones, *Anglo-Dutch Wars*, p. 4.

two earlier wars.:

- "Honour of the King of England and of his people so insolently trampled upon by the States-General;
- "Hindering of our East India trade;
- "affronts ... upon our merchants at Surinam;
- "Disputes over sovereignty at sea;
- "Failure to strike flags"[19]

In this context it is perhaps most useful therefore to look at the war of 1672 as two independent struggles against allies with widely differing war aims: the Anglo-Dutch war of 1672-74, and the Franco-Dutch conflict of 1672-78.

The successful outcome of the eighty years struggle against Spain had marked the new Dutch Republic as an independent state to be reckoned with by the greater powers by the middle of the seventeenth century. Economically and politically she was important to both the French and the English. The concessions Spain had made, together with the vulnerability of the Spanish Netherlands, and the potential threats from the French meant that the former masters of the whole Netherlands had to strive to achieve working diplomatic relations with the Dutch. Their strong presence in the interests of the Atlantic states coincided with the decline of the interest of the Austrian Hapsburgs, and the continued conflicts between the various German States.[20]

If the role of the small Dutch Republic in the international theatre was remarkable in relation to France, England and Spain, it was of a more traditional character with the neighbouring German states and the Danes and Swedes in the Baltic. These were more comparable in size and, with strong interdependence and competition in trade, the complexities of tensions and alliances during the latter part of the seventeenth century gave all these small northern European states a part in the

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19. Baron Somers, *Civil Tracts* (1812), p. 13, "An account of the Reasons which induced Charles the Second... to declare war against the States-General of the United Provinces in 1672".

20. For a full discussion of the Republic's relations with the other European powers after the end of the Eighty Years War, see H.H. Rowen, *John De Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland* (Princeton, 1978), particularly Chapters 14 and 16.

struggles between the larger powers. For reasons of trade, dynastic relations and contemporary major power interest, the Dutch Republic was normally more inclined to reluctant friendship with Brandenburg and Denmark and hostility with Sweden and the bishopric of Munster,[21] but from time to time made temporary alliances with these, most notably the 1668 Triple Alliance with Sweden (and England).

The rulers of this small but important Republic in the later seventeenth century had therefore a high profile on the international stage. Supreme rulers throughout Europe were of course without exception of royal heritage. The Dutch Republic had no supreme ruler; since the establishment of the Union in 1585 authority had rested in theory with the States General which was itself subject to the constraints of the confederacy. Under the Princes of Orange after William the Silent (Maurits, Frederik Hendrik and William II), there had been signs that they were either aspiring to royal status, or were identified as such by other powers, by pursuing what were seen as the traditional royalist policies of dynasticism and militarism. However, the Princes of Orange were in reality less of a royal family, but more of a higher nobility. Their powers remained similar to those they had exercised as stadholders under the Hapsburg imperial rule, that is, they were the servants of the central authority; they remained in theory the servants of the States.

There was therefore no royal authority within the Dutch Republic, and the role of the nobility itself changed. In practice, without the means of ennoblement there was an inevitable decline in the numbers of the nobility.[22] The studies by van Nierop and Price have raised interesting questions about whether the role of the nobility within the administration of the Republic "declined". Van Nierop argues that status and traditional roles ensured a separate and continuing role for the

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21. Rowen, *ibid.* pp. 295-6 and p. 317.

22. J.L. Price, "The Dutch Nobility in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries", in H.M.Scott, ed., *The European Nobilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, Vol. 1 (London, 1995), pp. 84-5; H.F.K. van Nierop, *The nobility of Holland: From knights to regents, 1500-1650*, Marten Ultee, trs. (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 46-66.

nobility.[23] Indeed this was also a contemporary seventeenth century interpretation by the English Ambassador, Sir William Temple:

> "The Nobles, though they are few in this Province [Holland], yet are not represented by all their number, but by Eight or Nine, who as Deputies from their Body have session in the States-Provincial; And who, when one among them dies, chuse another to succeed him. Though they have all together but one voice equal to the smallest Town; yet are they very considerable in the Government, by possessing many of the best charges both Civil and Military, by having the direction of all the Ecclesiastical Revenue that was seized by the State upon the change of Religion; and by sending their Deputies to all the Councils both of the Generality and the Province, and by the nomination of one Councellor in the two great Courts of Justice. They give their Voice first in the Assembly of States, and thereby a great weight to the business in consultation...."[24]

Nevertheless, the power of the other representatives, the towns and provinces, was more than a counterbalance to that of the nobility, and Price's approach, while acknowledging that "the superior status of the nobility went almost unchallenged until the second half of the eighteenth century", appears the more realistic. He argues that although the actual political power of the Holland nobles at least was "slight", in many ways the regent classes of the Dutch towns underwent a form of ennoblement.[25]

There was therefore a closing of *political* status, while the traditional *social* status remained unchallenged. This provided a unique political system in which a quasi-royal prince and representative commoners had almost equal political influence - influence which was far greater than was the traditional role of the aristocracy in

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23. van Nierop, *op. cit.*, pp.33-45; but the privileges accorded the nobility underwent gradual erosion during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, *ibid.*, p.38.

24. Sir William Temple, *Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands,* Sir George Clark, ed. (Oxford, 1972), pp. 58-9.

25. Price, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-84 and 107-113; De Vries, *The First Modern Economy*, p. 529 draws on Belle van Zuylen's simplistic definition of "nobility" as "the right to hunt" to demonstrate that the acquisition of this privilege by the regents of Utrecht in 1683 also indicated an aristocratisation of the regent class in that province.

most other European states. The political power of the regents had been consolidated and achieved international credibility during the first stadholderless period. The restoration of the Prince of Orange in 1672 to the titles and roles of his predecessors did not recreate the situation before 1650, but provided a new scenario for the determination of the policy of the States. It is therefore very much within the context of the preceding twenty years that this study has been undertaken.

There was high consciousness within the Dutch Republic of its history since the Revolt; within the states of Holland and Amsterdam in particular there was a deep awareness of the importance of the events of 1650, when the power of Amsterdam was openly confronted by William II. It may be that in the final analysis it was economic interest that determined policy, but when economic interest combined with this sense of political identity, the development of strong ideological politics was an inevitable consequence. It will also be seen that the Prince of Orange was the inheritor of his predecessors' experiences, and it is the convergence, tensions, confrontations and compromises between these two clearly defined political entities which provide the raw chronology of this study.

Chapter 2

The Historiography of Amsterdam and William III in the 1670s and 1680s

The Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century is not one of the neglected areas of history; much has already been made common knowledge, not least because of the cultural contribution of the artists whose secularism has given us a vivid visual idea of life within urban Holland and its maritime and overseas interests.[1] Its role as the leading trading nation and its intervention in international dynasticism have been well covered, creating some of the assumptions alluded to. This broad knowledge may also be one of the reasons why so many modern Dutch historians have turned to the particularist in order to satisfy their (and others') need for original research. It has been disappointing to find that several of these studies have become so particularist that they do not relate the local interests of their subject to the external affairs of the city, States or the whole Republic.[2] On the other hand Roorda based his study of the regent elites in the Holland towns solely within the context of the *Rampjaar* of 1672 and the consequences of the French invasion of the provinces of Gelderland, Overijssel and Utrecht.[3] I have chosen, however, to make the most of the work that has already been done in order to follow an investigation into a period which, at second glance, proves to have been less adequately covered than that of the Wittian period when the Dutch Republic was apparently at its zenith.

For William III the literature speaks for itself. In 1966 Stephen Baxter,

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1. Simon Schama, *The Embarrassment of Riches* (London, 1987), admits in the opening lines of his preface that his visual image of seventeenth century Dutch "culture" stimulated the writing of his somewhat "eccentric project".

2. Jong, *Met goed fatsoen;* Kooijmans, *Onder regenten;* Prak, *Gezeten burgers*, see above p. 10, note 8.

3. Roorda, *Partij en Factie*.

presumably coinciding with his biography of William III,[4] analysed the then current writings on the stadholder-king.[5]

The Dutch historians tend to be fairly circumspect about the 1670s and 1680s, which saw a changing international political and economic role for the Republic;[6] English and American historians approach the earlier years of William from their interest in his role as King of England after 1688.[7]

For the regency of Amsterdam the basic work has been done for all students by Elias in his massive reference work on the Amsterdam regency from 1575-1795.[8] This has been an excellent starting point, but has raised questions. It is itself dependent for the 1660s and early 1670s on Bontemantel,[9] an active participant in the contemporary events, and more broadly on Wagenaar,[10] and yet manages to omit one of the burgomasters of the 1670s from its records.[11]

The most notable thing about the primary sources on Amsterdam in the 1670s is missing evidence. On the wider canvas the researcher is hampered by the problems of the Fagel Archive, which has never been successfully catalogued. The contents

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4. Stephen B. Baxter, *William III and the Defense of European Liberty 1650-1702* (London, 1966).

5. S.B. Baxter, "Recent Writings on William III", *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. lviii, No.3 (1966), pp. 256-66.

6. N. Japikse, *Willem III, De Stadhouder-Koning* (Amsterdam, 1930).

7. Baxter, *William III*; Tony Claydon, in his recent study *William III and the Godly Revolution* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 12.

8. J.E. Elias, *De Vroedschap van Amsterdam*, 2 vols. (Haarlem,1903-5).

9. H. Bontemantel, *De regeeringe van Amsterdam, soo in 't civiele als crimineel en militaire (1653-1672)*, G. W. Kernkamp, ed. (The Hague, 1897).

10. J. Wagenaar, *Amsterdam in zijne opkomst, aanwas, geschiedenissen, voorregten, koophandel, gebouwen, kerkenstaat, schoolen, schutterij, gilden en regeeringe*, 4 vols. (Amsterdam, 1760-88).

11. See below p. 116, note 6.

are tantalising, but too often one-sided because of the illegibility of Fagel's handwriting, even as far as dating is concerned.[12] What can be found in abundance is the correspondence of Coenraad van Beuningen and Nicolaas Witsen, which has made the former the main source of knowledge about Amsterdam and - because of his diplomatic service - a major contributory source to Dutch foreign policy researches. Although correspondence from Gillis Valckenier, probably the most dominant regent in Amsterdam from the late 1660s until his death in 1680, has survived in many archives, it is fragmented and appears to have been archived in relation to his correspondents' affairs and importance. This fragmentation raises the question in the researcher's mind as to how much more correspondence has not survived archiving processes. The lack of correspondence between Valckenier and Witsen, made much of by Gebhard, is evidence of the kind of gap in evidence.[13] Nevertheless, the final decisions of the Amsterdam regency are easy to follow through the cumbersome delegation procedures of the constitution of the Dutch Republic. It is therefore at the more basic level of motivation and background that evidence should be sought.

The lack of pamphlet literature in the 1670s is more interesting. Most that is extant deals with the past, that is the events surrounding the fall of De Witt rather than the contemporary issues.[14] Not until the crises of the early 1680s does the pamphlet literature recapture its earlier dominance; this has been carefully analysed

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12. K.H.D. Haley, *An English Diplomat in the Low Countries: Sir William Temple and John De Witt 1665-1672* (Oxford, 1986), Preface, p. vii, complains about this as a warning to all students of Fagel, echoing Baxter's frustration with "The... disappointing Fagel papers in the Algemeen Rijksarchief", S.B.Baxter, "Recent Writings on William III", p. 260.

13. J.F. Gebhard, *Het Leven van Mr Nicolaas Cornelisz. Witsen (1641-1717)*, 2 vols. (Utrecht,1881), p. 144, although Franken, *Van Beuningen,* does make extensive use of correspondence between Valckenier and van Beuningen.

14. A. Munt, "The Impact of the *Rampjaar* on Dutch Golden Age Culture", *Dutch Crossing, A Journal of Low Countries Studies,* Vol. 21, No. 1 (1997), p. 12, shows that there was a threefold increase in the average annual publication of pamphlets during 1672-1674, but an average one-third decrease during 1675-87.

by Kurtz in her study again dominated by the then already failing van Beuningen.[15] Engravings and prints do continue to centre around major events like the arguments over the Gelderland sovereignty issue and the Peace of Nijmegen, particularly the large output by Romein de Hooghe, but at the parochial level they are minimal, or more concerned with the physical development of the city at a time when visual display played an important role in the outward demonstration of economic and political power.[16] The subject matter of engravings followed the pattern of the pamphlet literature, returning to themes of internal politics in the 1680s. The contrast is clearly seen between a set of four engravings of 1674, illustrating an allegoric verse on the struggles of the Netherlands and the importance of the role of the Prince of Orange,[17] and the allegory on the discord between Amsterdam and William III in the 1680s over the "*Fabel van der Koeyen, de Herder, en de Wolf*".[18]

More attention therefore has to be paid to the informal notes appended to official documents, the prosaic records of Joan Appelman,[19] the interests and correspondence of the regents, their patronage networks, for instance their role in the *Kerkeraad*, their financial interests and family relationships. From these it is possible to build up a picture of the particular activities of the individual regents and to understand their degree of contribution to the final decision-making processes.

With such a clearly defined group of ruling class and merchant elite, there is a danger of falling into the trap of drawing conclusions about interest and 'party' without paying due attention to the finer distinctions of individual and faction. The

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15. Kurtz, *Willem III en Amsterdam*.

16. The number of similar, but not identical studies of the development of the centre of seventeenth century Amsterdam in the Prentenkabinet of the Gemeente Archief in Amsterdam demonstrates this tendency.

17. Atlas van Stolk, no. 2570 (1-4), Fig. 1.

18. Atlas van Stolk, no. 2705. Fig 2.

19. G.A. Amsterdam, J. Appelman, Notulen van 't Gepasseerde in de Vroedschap der stad Amsterdam, van 11.9.1672 tot 23.9.1694.

1670s in Amsterdam do not follow the pattern of clear-cut divisions which were discernible in the 1660s and returned to a certain extent in the 1680s. The inspiration of Roorda originally informed these researches, but he was dealing with the element of party and faction as reflected throughout the Republic in a single historical event where choices had to be made in extreme circumstances.[20] The variables open to the participants after 1672 were far greater and offered greater scope, particularly within Amsterdam, for the individual to assert himself in spite of factional interests. The analysis of the individual's role in faction, interest and states policies will be central to the discussions within this study.

Stephen Baxter focused his biography of William III by placing him firmly as a European, the man who opposed and contained French aggression.[21] Japikse in his two-volume biography dealt in great and effective detail with the internal fluctuations of power in the United Provinces until the Peace of Westminster in February 1674, but thereafter dealt mainly with foreign policy from the point of view of William.[22] Baxter believed he was filling in the gaps left by Japikse whom he felt had given an imbalanced view of William's achievement.[23] This international military role has become so firmly attached to William because much of his time as stadholder and king was taken up with wars against Louis XIV; and even during the early 1680s, most of the internal disagreements in the United Provinces were concerned with William's desire to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy. The result of such approaches has been to distort the reality of William's foreign policy and military activities, by either assuming that he was the

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20. Roorda, *Partij en Factie.*

21. Baxter, *William III*; Tony Claydon, *William III and the Godly Revolution*, p. 12 , follows Baxter's thesis and takes the view that William's struggle against Louis XIV was firmly based in his status as protestant Prince of Orange.

22. N Japikse, *Prins Willem III: De Stadhouder-konig*, 2 vols. (Amsterdam, 1930-31).

23. "...a wholly disproportionate amount of space is given to the years 1650-74 with the result that the account of the prince as soldier and king is necessarily superficial." Baxter, "Recent Writings on William III", p. 258.

only true representative of the Dutch Republic on the international stage, or by overlooking the greater role played by the regent classes in determining the scope of the Prince's activities.[24]

Taken together with his assumption of the English crown and the political changes thus enforced, this has made William III an important figure in the development of Modern Europe. Attempts to make him an attractive figure have often failed, partly no doubt because of the over-enthusiasm of his apologists, which has not been altogether justified by the available material. For example Baxter argued that William was a very successful general and politician;[25] he certainly took pride in his role as Captain-General and was frequently portrayed as the successful military leader in commemorative medals and portraits. But the reality was that his successes were limited and very often not due to the quality of his generalship. Within three years of his appointment as leader of the armed forces, his military abilities were being questioned and scrutinised very carefully, once the early military successes were followed by stalemate sieges. His political abilities will be examined throughout this thesis in the context of his relations with Amsterdam. J. Smit saw Fruin's attempts to restore William's respectability in the mid-nineteenth century as abortive but undertaken by Fruin as "*een waardig exponent van de nationale politieke des Oranjes*".[26] Fruin's defence of William rested on the events of 14 August 1678 and the battle of St Denis and the question of the peace treaty being finalised at Nijmegen at the same time, in opposition to William's wishes.[27]

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[24]. This point was also made by Jonathan Israel about the Dutch role in the invasion of England in 1688, see J.I. Israel, "The Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution", in J.I. Israel, ed., *The Anglo-Dutch Moment* (Cambridge, 1991), p. 105.

[25]. Baxter, *William III*, p. 36: "The boy was an extreme example of this [family] pattern: weaker, braver, abler, more precocious than any of his ancestors, he was to prove both a first-class soldier and a first-class politician."

[26]. Smit, J. W., *Fruin en de Partijen Tijdens de Republiek* (Groningen, 1958), p. 189.

[27]. Quoted from Fruin's, *Correspondentie*, 5 November, 1888, in Smit, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

The Prince of Orange's international position has often removed him from close consideration in internal Dutch histories[28] and his 'foreignness' has been at the mercy of the insularity of some British historians.[29]

However, from 1672 until 1685 there *was* a continual relationship between William and various components of the States, which had an influential effect, together with that of the international situation, on the position he was to reach by 1688, and on the role of the United Provinces in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. Antagonism between William and these elements is the most obvious theme to catch hold of, but the undercurrents of internal factional disputes and the methods of avoiding antagonism were perhaps more important in the long run. It is these which tells us how the States came to make the policy towards France during the crucial years, 1683-88. Always a major factor in the internal balance of power and decision-making was the city of Amsterdam, sometimes in the forefront, at other times merely a contributory factor. Amsterdam's position was decided by its numerical superiority and financial domination of both the provincial and federal States. The Amsterdam representatives, however, were limited in theory by the rules of representation and circulation of presidency as much as other representative towns. But historians following the idea of a European foreign policy have largely ignored the composition of the decision-making bodies and concentrated on those closely linked to the implementation of policy. There has thus been an emphasis on those who participated in foreign policy either in the service of the States or in the direct service of the Prince of Orange.

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28. "After 1674 William III's foreign policy belongs so clearly to European history in its widest sense that it is perhaps of less interest to the student of Dutch history than the analysis of the strength on which it rested", E. Kossmann, "The Dutch Republic", in F.L. Carsten, ed., *New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. V The Ascendancy of France* 1648-88 (Cambridge, 1961), p. 298.

29. Such "pigeon-holing" within distinct historical studies has also been noted by Steven Pincus in his study of English foreign policy during the period of the Anglo-Dutch Wars, which attempts to provide a fuller analysis of the contributions of both domestic and foreign issues, Steven C.A. Pincus, *Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650-1668* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 441.

The challenge of approaching historical research on the basically more orthodox lines chosen is two-fold. The choice of one part of the subject (that is William III) is familiar and has often been dealt with and argued by eminent historians of the past; in addition to the sources already quoted, there are more "populist" studies. There is consequently unlikely to be a large amount of really new material to uncover, although any new view of the available material reveals relevant details dismissed by previous researches. Secondly, and in part consequent on the first point, there are many familiar themes and pre-conceived ideas which have become accepted as "fact". Here a debt is owed to the more recent studies which have looked closely at the underlying structure of society in all its facets and rationalised such myths.[30]

Studies of Amsterdam have tended more to the macroscopic, for example, I. J. Brugmans, *Geschiedenis van Amsterdam,* H. Brugmans, *Opkomst en Bloei van Amsterdam* and J. Wagenaar, *Amsterdam in zijne opkomst, aanwas, geschiedenissen...*[31] looking at the last quarter of the seventeenth century as a coda to the Golden Age and dealing superficially with the prominent persons. However, there have been one or two in-depth studies, apart from Elias' mammoth work on the *vroedschap*, which have discussed Amsterdam's political role as seen by van Beuningen. These studies by Franken (*Coenraad van Beuningen's politieke en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84),* Kurtz (*Willem III en Amsterdam 1683-5*) and Roldanus (*Coenraad van Beuningen Staatsman en Libertijn*), *inter alia*, look primarily at the political role of Amsterdam as a factor in the determination of the foreign policy of the Dutch Republic. They do not analyse the basis of that role. More of the actual nature of Amsterdam in the 1660s and 1670s can be found in Bontemantel's *De Regeeringe van Amsterdam...*, which has

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30. Coymans, *op. cit.;* de Jong, *op. cit.;* Prak, *op. cit.*; Roorda, *Partij en Factie;* M. van der Bijl, *Idee en Interest: voorgeschiedenis, verloop en achtergronden van de politieke twisten in Zeeland en vooral in Middelburg tussen 1702 en 1715* (Groningen, 1981).

31. H. Brugmans, *Opkomst en Bloei van Amsterdam* (Amsterdam, 1911); I.J. Brugmans, ed., *Geschiedenis van Amsterdam*, 2nd. edn., 6 vols. (Utrecht/Antwerp, 1972-73); and J. Wagenaar, *op. cit.*

been drawn on extensively by historians, particularly Elias. Perhaps the greatest contribution Bontemantel's account makes is to give a contemporary picture of the jealousies and factional politicking which were so much part of the regent class; much of this comes from Bontemantel's own bitterness after his removal from office in September 1672.

There are also very useful studies by van Dillen and Nusteling on the financial organisations and economic history of Amsterdam in this period,[32] as well as individual studies of the great trading companies. More often than not, though, they tell us little about the broader picture, as in the case of Klein, *De Trippen*,[33] which is a good study of the fortunes of the Trips and their industrial and financial empire in the Netherlands and Sweden, or deal with the overseas activities of the *V.O.C.* and *W.I.C.*[34] Although these paint a good background to understanding the importance of such family merchant houses and trading companies and their contribution to the regent class, they do not add any significant detail to the foreground.

Hence in this approach to William III and his relations with Amsterdam, we are partly at the mercy of two sets of historians who have produced a large volume of works, none of which can be discounted. There are firstly, the historians from

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32. J. G. van Dillen, *Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis der Wisselbanken (The Hague 1925)*; "Stukken betreffende der Amsterdamscher Graanhandle omstreeks het jaar 1681", *Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek*, Vol. iii (1917), pp. 70-85; "Een boek van Phoonsen over de Amsterdamsche Wisselbank", *Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek*, Vol. vii (1921), pp. 1-18; "Amsterdam's Role in Seventeenth Century Dutch Politics and its Economic Background", Bromley, J.S. and Kossmann, E.H., eds., *Britain and the Netherlands,* Vol. ii (Groningen, 1964), pp. 133-147; H. Nusteling, *Welwaart en Werkgelegendheid in Amsterdam, 1540-1860. Een relaas over demografie, economie en sociale politieke van een wereldstad* (Amsterdam/Dieren, 1985).

33. P.W. Klein, *De Trippen in de 17e Eeuw: Een Studie over het ondernemensgedrag op de Hollandse stapelmarkt* (Assen, 1965).

34. C.R. Boxer, "Jan Compagnie in Japan, 1672-1674, Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in Japan and Formosa", *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan,* second series, vii (Tokyo, 1931); W.R. Menkman, *De West-Indische Compagnie* (Amsterdam, 1947).

Wagenaar to Israel, who have written large-scale accounts of the period often making contemporary political statements.[35] Secondly, there are the historians of particular periods or particular disciplines who have greatly enhanced the work of the former. Both of these groups are supplemented by historical biographies. With such a wealth of works to draw on there is a temptation to resort to critical argument of the major themes already explored. However, the surest way to avoid this excessively is to return to the original source material. Professor Haley, in his book on Sir William Temple, has argued for the need for research to be based more on original works, preferably not even edited printed collections.[36]

This approach frees the researcher from an overreliance on pre-conceived ideas and allows a fresh viewpoint on incidents and characters, but care needs to be taken not to re-invent the wheel, and the researcher therefore needs a good understanding of earlier works, particularly where so much valuable work has already been undertaken by eminent historians.

In the case of the Dutch Republic in the late seventeenth century there is a lot of unpublished original work, much of which, however, shows signs of previous researchers. The greatest loss to the historians of this period is the Fagel archive in the Rijksarchief in The Hague which has been collected with care, but has never yet been deciphered or indexed fully. Apart from the difficulty of reading Fagel's writing, many are undated and, dealing with several subjects, complicated to index. Hence the study of Fagel has been relegated to a small biographical entry in

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35. Wagenaar, *Amsterdam in zijne opkomst, aanwas, geschiedenissen, voorregten...*; J. Wagenaar, *Vaderlandsche Historie*, Vols. 13, 14 and 15 (Amsterdam, 1794); R. Fruin, *Geschiedenis der Staatsinstellingen in Nederland tot der val der Republiek*, Colenbrander, H., ed. (The Hague, 1922); P. Geyl, *Oranje en Stuart 1641-72* (Utrecht, 1939); transl., *Orange and Stuart* (New York, 1969), *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* (1954), Vol. 7, and The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, *Vol.2 1648-1715* (London, 1964); *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, J.A. van Houtte, *et al.*, eds. (Utrecht 1949), vol. 7; P.J. Blok, *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, revised ed. (The Hague, 1980), vol. 8; Israel, *The Dutch Republic.*

36. Haley, *An English Diplomat*, preface.

Ontbekende Raadpensionarissen[37] and the use of generally available but not particularly enlightening material.

No study of Amsterdam can be complete or justified without proper consideration being given to economic affairs. There is a dilemma in choosing, on the one hand, between mere allusion to economic factors by reference to the general works on the Dutch Republic of historians like de Vries, Nusteling and van Dillen,[38] and, on the other hand, the more specialised studies on Amsterdam, particularly by van Dillen, and attempting to enter the lists by some kind of in depth study of economic life. The latter choice is not feasible since the major theme of this thesis is not an attempt to enter the arguments on the state of the Dutch economy in the later seventeenth century. The aim is therefore to attempt to strike a compromise between the two methods, hence acknowledging the debt to major works, and drawing all the relevant inferences from the papers in the *Gemeente Archief* in Amsterdam which show how the mercantile factor was ever present in all political discussions and decision-making by the Amsterdam regents, but did not prevent them from being politicians and diplomats.

Whatever the interpretation of later historians on a particular period, no matter their method of study, be it dominated by subjectivity or empiricism, it seems clear that the most important starting point for a general overview is to be gleaned from contemporary commentators. In the seventeenth century, these were most frequently involved in the events of the day, and even if they were working on mistaken or limited premises, further policy decisions were often made on the grounds of their interpretations. Such an argument has of course to be qualified where accounts were compiled from notes several years after the events. For example, there are two sources from the French Ambassador in the Netherlands at

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37. A. De Fouw, *Ontbekende raadpensionarissen* (The Hague, 1946).

38. J. de Vries, S.A. van de Woude, *The First Modern Economy*; H. Nusteling, *Welwaart en Werkgelegendheid in Amsterdam*; J. G. van Dillen, *Van Rijkdom en Regenten: Handboek tot de economische en sociale geschiedenis van Nederland tijdens de republiek* (The Hague, 1970).

the end of the 1670s and early 1680s, D'Avaux. The first are his notes, letters and diaries written at the time and the second are his memoirs written several years later.[39] Presumably the second were written with reference to the first, but no doubt the underlying commentary was informed by hindsight and knowledge of the outcomes.

However, for this period there is a limited wealth which enables the historian to wander, *inter alia*, from the republican Bontemantel to the Orangist Dohna;[40] and then to see how these are justified or not by the *Observations* of Sir William Temple, as an author and a working ambassador with sympathies towards both the Republic and the Prince of Orange,[41] and the wiles of the chauvinist D'Avaux establishing his contacts in Amsterdam. There are also the pamphlets and news sheets to take account of, many of which, while anonymous, show the general views.[42] However, as we have seen, there was either a dearth of such literature in the mid-1670s relating to Amsterdam, or, following the events of 1672, an informal form of censorship restricted pamphlet literature to support of the Orangist

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39. Godefroy D'Estrades, *Lettres, Mémoires et Négociations de M. le Comte d'Estrades,* 9 vols and supplement, P. Marchand, ed. (The Hague, 1743), Vols. 7, 8 and 9 specifically include the correspondence of the three French ambassadors (D'Estrades, D'Avaux and Colbert) at Nijmegen from1676-1678; Jean Antoine de Mesme, Comte d'Avaux, *Négociations de Monsieur Le Comte D'Avaux en Hollande depuis 1679, jusqu'en 1684,* E. Mallet, ed., 6 vols. (Paris, 1752).

40. Bontemantel, *op. cit.*, Frederic de Dohna, *Les Mémoires du Burgrave et Comte Frederic de Dohna 1621-88* (1898).

41. There is a wide range of Temple's works available, including his structured account of the Dutch Republic as he observed it during his time as ambassador, *Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands,* first published in 1673; the edited printed volumes of his *Works*; and his diplomatic correspondence archived in the P.R.O.

42. W.P.C. Knuttel, *Catalogus van de Pamfletten-verzameling berustende in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek*; *Hollandse Mercurius* (monthly news sheet). The majority of the pamphlet literature published in the Dutch Republic between 1672 and 1684 can be referenced through the Knuttel *Catalogue*, but where they have been sourced through the archives at the Institute of Historical Research, they are referenced as *Dutch Historical Pamphlets, 1672-84.*

regime.[43] However, after 1678 this situation changed and, as has already been noted, Kurtz was able to draw in detail on the pamphlet literature for her thesis on the crisis of 1683/4.[44]

There has of course therefore been recourse to the large body of work discussed above, but the issues have been looked at principally from the point of view of the activities of the whole of the Amsterdam regent class and to a lesser extent of the intelligence network operated by Fagel in dealing with Amsterdam and other sometime dissident groups, rather than using the foreign policy of William III as a starting point. The thesis is therefore firmly set *within* the Dutch Republic. And in this way, it is based largely on researches into the Amsterdam archives, comparison and contradictions with earlier works being used as references within the arguments. The main exception is the extensive use made of the biographical details given in Elias's work on the Amsterdam *vroedschap*.

This study is an attempt to analyse the influences on the relationships within the most powerful force in the States, the City of Amsterdam, and to understand the role of both the Prince and Amsterdam in the policy-making of the Dutch Republic during the years 1672-1684. The *raison d'état* as perceived by the Prince and the Amsterdam regents was so different that there were natural inbuilt difficulties to be overcome, before the occurrence of domestic and international crises imposed additional pressures.

A brief examination of the extant historiography shows why there is a need to repair an omission in the studies of the Dutch Republic in the 1670s and 1680s. This study, as an attempt to place a revised perspective on the balance of power within the Dutch Republic in the years 1672-1684, might be considered an attack on previous histories of the period, and to a certain extent this must be true. But the attack is limited. Earlier histories have tended to concentrate on particular

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43. Roorda, *Partij en Facite*, p. 12.

44. Kurtz, *op. cit.*

aspects determined by the major historical "events" of the period. Thus the revival of Orangist fortunes is seen in the light of the *Rampjaar* of 1672. Thereafter the history of the city of Amsterdam and Prince Willem III appear to converge only where a crisis is perceived: the peace negotiations at Nijmegen;[45] the struggle for alliances 1679-81; the Luxemburg crises of 1682 and 1684;[46] and the invasion of England in 1688.

However, by 1688, when William went, with the support of the States General, to take up the challenge in England, Amsterdam and William had found enough common ground in the anti-French struggle to formulate a coherent foreign policy, whatever fundamental differences still remained over the distribution and use of power.[47]

The Prince has been perceived to be concerned only with foreign policy, Amsterdam only with its own commercial pre-eminence; the majority of studies which deal with both restrict themselves to the relationship between the Prince and the central States role of Coenraad van Beuningen. The divisions between the two have been sharpened by the studies of English historians who have started from the point of view of an English king who happened to be Dutch; while at least Dutch historians like Japikse describe him as "*Stadhouder-konig*" thus acknowledging that his earlier role and responsibilities were as valid after the Glorious Revolution as before.

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45. Roorda, D. J., "The Peace of Nijmegen, the end of a Particular Period in Dutch History", *The Peace of Nijmegen 1676-1678/9*, International Congress of the Tricentennial Nijmegen 14-16 September 1978 (Amsterdam, 1980), pp. 17-28.

46. Kurtz, *op. cit.*

47. J.I.Israel, "The Dutch Role in the Glorious Revolution", pp. 105-162, and "The Dutch Republic and the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688-89 in England", in C. Wilson, and D. Proctor, eds., *1688, The Seaborne Alliance and Diplomatic Revolution, Proceedings of an International Symposium held at the National Maritime Museum Greenwich, October 1988* (London, 1989), pp. 31-44.

Studies of William III have appeared regularly and the historiography of the Stadholder-King has itself on occasion been the subject of historical discussion. The Tercentenary celebrations of the Glorious Revolution added to this output.[48] The sixteen years between the restoration of William III and the acquisition of the English crown demonstrate the exercise of political relationships within the Dutch Republic which prevented the stadholder from prosecuting his anti-French policies successfully after 1675 until 1688.

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48. Much of the literature did of course deal with the impact of the Revolution on England and the international role of William as King of England. However, in D. Hoak and M. Feingold, ed., *The World of William and Mary, Anglo-Dutch Perspectives on the Revolution of 1688-89* (Stamford, 1996), the influence of the Dutch role is examined within these larger issues.

Chapter 3

The Prelude to 1672 in the Dutch Republic and Amsterdam

In 1648 the Dutch Republic emerged confidently from the Eighty Years' War of independence against Spain. The following two decades were to witness the greatest manifestation of the Golden Age of the Republic. The fruition of the seeds which had been sown during the war to secure the financial and commercial basis of the young Republic was complemented by the material display of the wealth generated. Respect, tempered by competition, was paid to these achievements by the French and English and led to Dutch involvement in international conflict on an almost equal footing with the major powers. The few years immediately following peace with Spain did not produce the untroubled conditions which the Republicans were to argue were essential for the successful prosecution of the true interest of the State.[1] The tensions between the new Stadholder, William II (1648-1650), and those wishing to restrict military activity and expenditure took the Republic to the edge of civil war and in the medium term put the House of Orange into eclipse. The short stadholdership of William II and his early death coincided with the consolidation of the Dutch State after the end of the Eighty Years' War. Although the following twenty-one years were not years of uninterrupted peace, the wars in which the Republic became involved did not undermine the progress of the Golden Age.

The Dutch Golden Age has for long been identified as a specific period when everything from arts to commerce, from domestic orderliness to provincial government, and from religious toleration to the Republic of Letters, was seen to be contributing to the international success of the United Provinces. The dates of its inception and demise have been debated by historians, but the terminology has rarely, if ever, been denied.[2] For the purposes of this study the zenith of the

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1. For a full discussion on the "interest of state", see above pp. 8-10.

2. De Vries, *First Modern Economy*, dates the "decline after 1660s", see below p. 85, note 1.

Golden Age is taken to be the period between the end of the war against Spanish authority in 1648 and the *Rampjaar* of 1672.

The Golden Age of the Dutch Republic was underpinned by the vibrant economy and maritime supremacy which made the States for a brief time a major player in European history. Coinciding with civil wars and uncertainties in other countries, its secure roots in overseas activities and strong influences over international trade gave it a lever in international agreements. The crisis between William II and the Loevensteiners was used as a contender for evidence supporting the political side of the General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century theory,[3] but the death of the stadholder did not precipitate the kind of domestic turmoil in which the minority rule of Louis XIV in France had resulted; nor was it the culmination of a long period of civil struggle as in the execution of Charles I in England. William II died of natural causes after a short period of office and a very short illness. It is not the purpose of historians to discuss what might have been except insofar as it can help our understanding of what did happen. In this way the importance of the brief civil strife during William II's stadholdership is therefore the influence it had on the administration which followed during the minority of William III, both domestically and in international relations; and the continuing influence it had on relations between his son on his restoration and the regents of the leading towns.

When William III was born on 14 November 1650, the week after the death of his father from smallpox, there was a power vacuum in the Dutch Republic and chaos in the Orangist organisation. The Frisian stadholder William Frederick could not command the support of Holland and Zeeland and the two leading women remaining in charge of the senior line of the House of Orange, the Dowager

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3. H.R. Trevor-Roper, "The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century", in T. Aston, ed., *Crisis in Europe 1560-1660* (London, 1965), p. 87-8; this debate of the 1960s was neatly put into perspective as far as the Dutch Republic was concerned by Franken in his introductory chapter to his thesis "Coenraad van Beuningen's politieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-1684", translated in *Acta Historiae Neerlandica*, vol. iii (1968), p. 2, note 2: "The political crisis in the Republic ... should be explained rather from a point of view of the specific relationships and the situation in the [country] rather than as a common problem."

Princess Amalia with her Brandenburg connections, and the Stuart Princess Mary, widow of William II and mother of the new prince, were at odds with each other.[4] The death of William II negated his victory over Amsterdam and the States of Holland and allowed the opposition to make victory out of defeat. The six imprisoned regents in the castle at Loevenstein had provided a focus for those who saw potential monarchist dangers in the stadholdership and "Loevensteiners" became synonymous with "Republicans". *Raadpensionaris* de Pauw was getting valuable support from the pensionary of Dordrecht, John De Witt, who was to take over from him on the former's death in 1653. However, early in 1652 the States found themselves at war with Cromwell's England and the peace which De Witt conceded in April 1654 was unpopular and caused rifts in the States. The conditions, kept secret until after ratification, included the Act of Exclusion in Holland which prevented the Prince of Orange from being accorded the title of stadholder and it was not until the following year that De Witt persuaded Zeeland to accept it.[5] These events, justified by De Witt in his *Deductie* (1654),[6] despite their unpromising beginnings, established Holland's *raadpensionaris* as the *de facto* director of the States' foreign policy and strengthened further the domination of Holland while it was at the height of its economic power.

Although the Prince was too young to be involved in all this, the events of these years were to be part of his legacy. For the time being, he was educated strictly

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4. M.C. Trevelyan, *William III and the Defence of Holland* (London, 1930), p. 11; Baxter, *William III*, pp. 15-16. Trevelyan's "royalist" description of "The Youth of William III, 1650-1668", pp. 11-42, sets the scene for those biographers who have attempted to paint a favourable portrait of the Prince, and is echoed, although not quoted, by Baxter., pp. 23 and 36-37.

5. Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp. 722-23; Rowen, *John De Witt*, p. 213.

6. *Deductie, ofte Declaration van de Staten van Hollandt ende West-Frieslandt; Behelsende Een waerachtich, ende grondichbericht van De Fondamente der Regieringe vande vrye Vereenichde Nederlanden ... Ingestelt ende dienende tot Justificatie van't verlenen van seckere Acte van Seclusie, Raeckende 't employ vanden HEERE Prins van Oraigne...* (The Hague, 1654).

under his mother's guidance and the tutelage of the Orangist Zuylestein[7] and was early given ideas of the importance of his Stuart royalty. On the restoration of Charles II in 1660, the Act of Exclusion was revoked, but the English king vacillated and no strong moves were made to restore the House of Orange in the person of the young prince to a position of power in the Dutch Republic. And when his mother died suddenly on a visit to England in 1661 during protracted negotiations with the States over the further education of William, the fortunes of the child were dependent on confrontation or consultation between his grandmother, Amalia, together with the States, and the King of England whom Mary had named as his guardian contrary to previous understandings with De Witt. The proposals for making William a Child of State foundered and from the age of eleven to sixteen he remained under the influence of the Orangists

The time was growing nearer when the Prince would be an element to be reckoned with and this was reflected in the steps taken to control him during his formative years. In 1666 Zuylestein was finally dismissed and William was made a Child of State,[8] but the plans of De Witt were not wholly successful, as they might have been if the agreements reached with Mary before her death had been enforced five years earlier, and when the Perpetual Edict was passed in Holland in 1667 compromises were already being made. The Perpetual Edict acknowledged that there would eventually be a role for the Prince by admitting him to the Council of State in due course, but tried to curb his eventual powers by prohibiting tenure of the office of Captain- and Admiral-General together with that of Stadholder. Potentially this allowed both the supporters and opponents of the House of Orange to see benefits in the passing of the Perpetual Edict.[9] By the time Holland had

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7. Frederick of Nassau, Heer van Zuylestein, an illegitimate son of Frederik Hendrik.

8. The full group responsible for the new status of the prince consisted of: Valckenier (from Amsterdam), De Witt, the Heer van Noordwijk (representing the Ridderschap), Blijenburg (from Dordrecht), van Fiorrest (from Alkmaar, as *Raad and Reekmeester der Domeinin van Holland en Westfriesland*), see Elias, *Vroedschap*, no.166, Gillis Valckenier.

9. See below p. 162.

persuaded Zeeland to accept this by the Act of Harmony in 1670, it was in fact too late for De Witt to have any effective control over the Prince's future. Zeeland had already accorded him the ritual acknowledgement of his status as First Noble in 1668 and accepted Odijk as his nominated representative in its States.[10]

De Witt's foreign policy had foundered on the failure of the Triple Alliance and his influence in Amsterdam had waned. Events were moving too fast for the *raadpensionaris*, but his impressions on the Prince - they had almost daily meetings during the late 1660s - were added to his earlier education and gave the latter an insight into the *raison d'état* of the States as they had been guided under De Witt.

De Witt was unable to be sure of support from Amsterdam during the latter part of the 1660s; differences had arisen between him and van Beuningen over relations with France. For both these "statesmen" the basis of the differences was political ideology not personal conflict and ambition, but they undermined the friendship which had been so fruitful for the previous fifteen or so years and prevented De Witt from exploiting van Beuningen's mediating skills within Amsterdam.[11] De Witt had lost some of his influence in Amsterdam after the death of the leader of the Bicker/De Graeff faction, Cornelis de Graeff, Heer van Zuidpoelsbruik, in 1665.[12] De Witt had married Wendela Bicker (daughter of Jan Bicker) in February

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[10]. Willem Adriaan van Nassau, Heer van Odijk, a cousin of William III through an illegitimate line of Prince Maurits. A contemporary English observer writing in 1675 saw Odijk as "a man of no great capacity, but knows how to gaine the acquaintances of the ablest men, pomp out their sense and sentiments, and so by other men's abilityes and experience gets the Prince's faver and Esteeme", in M. Lane, ed., "A Relation of the present state of affaires in the United Provinces written about the last of April of the yeare 1675," *E.H.R*, vol. xxx, 1915, p. 313.

[11]. Franken, *Coenraad van Beuningen's politieke en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84*, p. 69. De Witt had great respect for van Beuningen's political methods because he "*meer oog had voor het algemene belang van de Republiek dan de partikularistisch Amsterdamse faktieman die Valckenier was.*", *ibid.*, p. 77.

[12]. Rowen, *John De Witt*, p. 662.

1654 and exploited the family connection with the Amsterdam *vroedschap* well into the 1660s. However, after the death of De Graeff, new political alignments developed in Amsterdam and De Witt's influence waned. At the same time he was very much aware that his ablest subordinate was the pensionary of the largely Orangist town of Haarlem, Gaspar Fagel.

Fagel, as *raadpensionaris*, was to become critical to the establishment of policy within the Republic after the fall of De Witt and the restoration of William in 1672. His role in the history of the Dutch Republic has never been fully researched because of the illegibility of his handwriting, but it is clear that he was far more than one of the *Ontbekende Raadpensionarissen* of de Fouw.[13] His relationship with both the Prince and the burgomasters of Amsterdam will form an important strand in the following chapters.

In 1672 the invasion of the Dutch Republic by the forces of France, Munster and Cologne in alliance with England sealed De Witt's fate. In the late 1660s the European arena was dominated by the French monarchy under Louis XIV, who had firmly established his own rule and was creating the absolutism for which he was to become the archetype, with the support of Colbert's economic measures. Colbert believed that attack on Dutch economic strength was one sure way of continuing the promising trends in the French economic expansion. Since 1667, therefore, the French and Dutch had in effect been in a state of economic cold war with the punitive tariffs imposed by the French on Dutch imports. This threat had been reflected politically by the French incursions in the Spanish Netherlands and the Triple Alliance between the Dutch, the English and the Swedes.[14] But that alliance had been negated by the Treaty of Dover in 1670 between the French and the English, once more a sign of the increasing power of the King of France, who

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[13]. See below pp. 176-179.

[14]. Rowen, *De Witt*, pp. 683-708.

could at this stage acquire the support of the English king by financial incentives.[15]

Internationally, therefore, the Dutch were torn between France and England. With the former there was always a large core who believed in maintaining peace with France and attempting to work out compromise agreements, based on the Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659 and the alliance of 1662 in order to preserve the strength of the Dutch Republic, based as it was on economic not military resources. At the same time there was a strong feeling of threat from French expansionism. The issues became joined when it came to the questions surrounding the Spanish Netherlands. The economic growth of the Dutch Republic owed much to the failure of Antwerp to preserve its international role as the major port for the Low Countries during the Eighty Years War. Inevitably, the Dutch were always going to be very reluctant to allow any intervention from, predominantly France, but also any other potential trading rival, which might restore Antwerp to its former position. Territorial gains in the Spanish Netherlands were therefore not only a threat to the frontiers of the newly consolidated Republic, but also a potential threat to the economy which underpinned it.

With England there was also an element of sympathy, particularly among the Orangists, who saw the possibility of exploitation of Stuart links and religious confraternity; but there was also an element of tension because of what was perceived by most as a greater economic threat than France, and the obverse of the Orangist view that the Stuart link was a threat to the sovereignty of the provinces and likely to support such dynastic monarchist ambitions as William II had displayed. Hence an alliance between France and England, aimed principally at the Dutch, deprived them of the possibility of help from either of the two perceived greatest powers in Europe. Spain was weak, and the Hapsburg Emperor was preoccupied by the Turkish incursions into the eastern part of the empire.

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15. Although there is still no real consensus about Charles II's religious motivations there is agreement that for his own political purposes he needed a source of finance which did not require the approval of Parliament. See for example, P. Sonino, *Louis XIV and the origins of the Dutch War* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 59-63.

Therefore when the bishoprics of Munster and Cologne joined forces with the two large allies and increased the territorial landward threat, the vulnerability of the Republic was quickly evident with the fall of Utrecht, Overijssel and Gelderland, disasters which changed the motivation of the pacifists who now saw a combined military and economic threat as likely to destroy their hard-won independence for ever.

Within the stadholderless period the Republic went to war three times with England, the first time with the Republican government of Cromwell, which the new Dutch administration under the *raadpensionaris* de Pauw had recognised in January 1651. However, recognition did not imply unqualified approval of regicide, nor did English assertion of rights of trade and shipping embodied in the Navigation Act of October in the same year endear them to the Dutch merchant interest. Mutual interest, arising from common religious and republican cause, counted for little as relations deteriorated into war in May 1652, and yet the peace treaty which the English forced on the Dutch at Westminster in April 1654 was underlined by Cromwell's motives for keeping the House of Stuart, through its connections and refuge in the Netherlands, in a powerless position and of establishing a common Protestant cause. The repercussions of this treaty were to be far-reaching beyond the lifetime of the first stadholderless period. One of the outcomes of the diplomacy of the First Anglo-Dutch Wars was the beginnings of the friendship between De Witt and Coenraad van Beuningen, then pensionary of Amsterdam, which was to last until the late 1660s when their differences over France proved greater than their common interests.[16]

The Restoration of Charles II in England in 1660 effectively weakened the English hold over the Dutch Republic. The King's lack of sympathy for the aims of the Wittian regime removed most of what friendly feelings there were towards the English and provided the opportunity for the economic tensions already existing between the two countries to resurface. The inability of the royal houses to work

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16. Rowen, *De Witt*, p. 67.

in concert over the present and future status of the young Prince of Orange did, however, act to a certain extent to the benefit of De Witt in the short term. Until the determination of a longer-term role for the Prince had to be faced when he reached his majority, for the time being the Wittian regime was the sovereign authority of the Republic.

The gradual further deterioration of relations between England and the Dutch Republic has generally been ascribed to the resurgence of economic warfare, the renewal of the Navigation Acts and the introduction of a ten-mile fishing limit around the coast of England. This consensus by historians naturally has its nuances, but whether it was primarily caused by the machinations of the newly appointed ambassador to The Hague, Sir George Downing, the negotiations by De Witt with the French or the colonial struggles across the Atlantic, the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-67) can justifiably be described as a trade war. Only Baxter in his study, strongly underpinned by the importance of dynastic conflict, saw the war as a direct result of the purely personal/political breakdown between Charles II and De Witt.[17] And although Pincus denies economic causes for the war[18] he argues that to the English, Dutch trading practices were another manifestation of the republicanism which was a threat to the restored monarchy.[19]

However, before this deterioration in relations finally led to war in 1665 the Dutch continued to strive for working alliances with both the English and the French. With England the negotiations were mainly over trading disputes often dating back to the Commonwealth period and earlier. A Treaty was finally signed in September 1662. In April of the same year De Witt had succeeded in making a treaty with the French which included terms for military support in the event of threat from England and an agreement on satisfactory tariff policy, but crucially

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17. Baxter, *William III*, pp. 32-3; Israel, *Dutch Republic*, p. 753; Jones, *Anglo-Dutch Wars*, pp. 145-150; Rowen, *De Witt*, pp. 449-50; Geyl, *Orange and Stuart*, 192-93.

18. Pincus, *op. cit.*, p. 441.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 443.

omitting discussion of the status of the Spanish Netherlands.[20]

By 1664 the relations between the Dutch and the English had reached such a low point and the increase in English attacks on Dutch shipping were so great that war, declared by Charles II in March 1665, could be seen to be inevitable. The early English ascendancy was overcome in 1667 as the Dutch achieved a superiority at sea through their privateering activities and the attack on the Medway. The Peace was signed at Breda in July 1667. The elements of victory by the Dutch, which were in the long run to be tainted by the agreement to concede the acquisitions of the English during the early stages of the war, particularly the transformation of New Amsterdam to New York, were in the short term offset by the acquisition of Surinam by the Dutch.

Throughout the war the role of France had fluctuated from supportive ally of the Dutch to competitive major (Catholic) power. At the core of the distrust between the Dutch and the French was the French interest in the Spanish Netherlands and its potential impact on the security and trade of the Republic. Two months before the Peace of Breda, the French had undermined the terms of the 1662 treaty with the introduction of tariffs on the import of foreign manufactured goods. This was compounded by a very open breach between France and Spain and the threat of incursions into the Spanish Netherlands.

Therefore by 1667 the Republic could not be sure of any treaty with either France or England. The internal divisions of the States which had continued throughout this period, were often caused as much by the intervention of the foreign powers and their ambassadors, as by the ideological differences between Orangists and Republicans, or Coccejans and Voetians. These differences could extend beyond those obviously taking opposing views and, by the end of 1668, even Van Beuningen and De Witt were unable to reconcile their different views of the possible potential of French or English friendship.

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[20]. Rowen, *De Witt*, p. 469.

For all its maritime strength and superiority and the apparent "glorious end" to the Second Anglo-Dutch War,[21] the Dutch Republic remained in its vulnerable geographical position. Its style of Government had reduced its credit among the crowned heads of Europe, particularly the Emperor and it was becoming increasingly clear that its continued existence as a political force to be contended with was founded solely on the basis of economic wealth and the lead it had established in international maritime trade.

French success against Spain in the Spanish Netherlands, after the invasions of 1667, led to the creation of the incongruent Triple Alliance between the Dutch Republic, England and Sweden. This alliance was primarily the formation of a partly successful international pressure group against Louis XIV, but its consequences released France from any lingering responsibilities to the Dutch under the terms of the 1662 alliance. The gloves were off and the economic warfare, renewed with the introduction of the 1667 tariffs, was succeeded by the landward threat from the alliance of France with Cologne and Munster.

The fragility of the Triple Alliance made prevention of the signing of the Treaty of Dover between England and France in 1670 impossible. Thus, by 1670, the final negation was achieved of all the diplomacy of the Dutch with France and England during the preceding ten years.

Together with its geographical vulnerability, the Republic's position was also considerably weakened by the serious underfunding of its military forces.[22] The troubles of 1650 had been stimulated by fears of excessive demands for rearmament and the supporters of De Witt were aware that the army was synonymous with Orangist power. And it was the coming of age of the Prince

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21. Rowen, *De Witt*, p. 683.

22. The success of the Dutch war reforms which had been effected during Maurits' stadholderate (see Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp. 267-71) had contributed to the suspicion of royalist militarism, but its imitators included Brandenburg-Prussia, one of the more secure of Dutch allies and the provider of many mercenaries in 1672, *ibid.*, p. 270.

which provided an Orange symbol to take over as Captain-General. It was only the delay of war from the summer of 1671 to the spring of 1672 which gave the Republic time to overcome its internal struggles over military expenditure enough to meet the co-ordinated French and English attacks with anything like a prepared army.

The two previous Anglo-Dutch conflicts had been naval affairs and the threat of real invasion and battles on the European inland frontiers required new measures. Baxter estimated that in June 1672 the Dutch had only 50,000-60,000 active soldiers dispersed throughout the Republic.[23] But even these forces were hardly well-prepared. Many of the senior officers were in effect German mercenaries and many other officers were civilians holding appointments arising from nepotism and patronage. Little practical training and few manoeuvres had taken place and despite the threat to their commerce from French tariffs and military advance, the States of Holland and Amsterdam in particular were still reluctant to commit themselves to military expenditure which would pave the way for the reinstatement of the Prince of Orange.

The war officially started between France and the Republic on 6 April 1672. By that stage William had been attending the Council of State for two years, and had been Captain-General for two months, but De Witt was still clinging to control of foreign policy. War with England had effectively started a month earlier with the naval attacks in the Channel. The French invasion added a new dimension which had not been present in the earlier two Anglo-Dutch Wars. Franken suggests that this changed the Dutch foreign policy from one dominated by trade to a check on French imperialism.[24]

In the event, the Dutch acquitted themselves creditably at sea, but this was little

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[23]. Baxter, *William III*, p. 64.

[24]. Franken, *Coenraad van Beuningen's politieke en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84*, English summary, p. 258.

defence against the combined land forces from France, Munster and Cologne. The enemy advances in the east and the subsequent retreat, first to Utrecht and then back into Holland, were only halted by the success of the waterline. Dutch mastery of the sea and the inland waters was so vital to its very survival that it was the one form of defence at which it could normally prove superior to any enemy.

The provincial states began to believe that they would have to give into the might of France and make concessions acceptable to Louis XIV. They sent de Groot to make overtures to the French King, but critically they were rejected.[25] For the first time the initiative in forming Dutch policy began to shift from the ruling class to the mass of the population. They had already shown their displeasure at the apparent weakness of the ruling class to tackle the enemy in allowing the French to push to the frontiers of Holland and Zeeland. De Witt was beginning to be identified as the villain of the piece, having been the principal formulator of the unsuccessful Triple Alliance. But early rioting had not been focused; rather it had been directed not at central policy, but at the local *vroedschap* level where each town determined its own policy.

After Louis XIV's rejection of the Dutch terms in June 1672 and his retaliation with more excessive ones of his own, the mass of the population began to focus their attention on changing the balance within the Republic. Latent Orangism became blatant and the restoration of the Prince to the stadholdership was the rallying cry.

The Dutch did not have to look far for a scapegoat or a saviour. After twenty years of power, De Witt had at last become exposed to an effective opposition. His persistence with a pro-French attitude was seen to have been misguided and on the other hand his completion of the Triple Alliance totally ineffective. There could therefore be no dependence on his ability as far as foreign policy was concerned. He had already begun to lose the support of friends like Amsterdam's

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25. D.J. Roorda, *Het Rampjaar 1672* (Bussum, 1971), pp. 55-6; Israel, *Dutch Republic*, pp. 799-800.

van Beuningen and his resources became restricted.

Having lost the confidence of his peers and having been vilified in pamphlets, De Witt now fell victim to the anger of the masses. The attack on him and his brother, Cornelis, on 21 June resulted in his prolonged illness and effective loss of control of the power of state and, more sinisterly, in the execution of his attacker, Jacob van der Graeff, eight days later.[26] This was interpreted by the mass as a martyrdom, and comparisons were made with the execution of Buat for Orangist-inspired treason in 1666,[27] and calls for the elevation of the Prince were strengthened. The civil unrest, often sustained rather than controlled by the civic militias, forced the hands of the towns and eventually all the Holland representatives agreed to the revocation of the Perpetual Edict on 3 July and the appointment of William as stadholder six days later.

Less than two weeks later, the final overthrow of De Witt was brought about first through accusations of treason against his brother and, after his sentence fell short of death, the violent reaction of the crowd on the night of 20 August and the murder of both the De Witt brothers. Three days later Gaspar Fagel was appointed *raadpensionaris* and the internal conflict began to subside.[28]

In contrast to the fall and death of De Witt was the dramatic rise to favour and power of the Prince of Orange, whose education De Witt had tried to direct, but who was also strongly influenced by his family and its history. The Prince was available for the use of the Republic, at the right age, with the right military tendencies, and with a large body of supporters who were prepared to overlook his father's extremism in the face of the strong external threats. These supporters had

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[26]. Rowen, *De Witt*, p. 873; P. Geyl, *Orange and Stuart 1614-72* (London, 1969), pp. 347-9.

[27]. Rowen, *op. cit.*, p. 882.

[28]. For a full chronological, narrative discussion of the events of 1672 from the internal Dutch perspective, see Roorda, *Het Rampjaar*, and for the motives of the regents, Roorda, *Partij en Factie*.

the added help of the more popular movements and the church, who saw Orangist principles as more allied to their own sympathies.

It was an inexorable move from the assumption of the role of First Noble of Zeeland in 1668 to the restricted appointment as Captain-General of the forces, to the revocation of the Perpetual Edict and confirmation as stadholder in the provinces of Holland and Zeeland in July 1672, with nominal status in the occupied provinces of Utrecht, Overijssel and Gelderland.

In 1672, the Dutch Republic was only a hundred years old and during that time, while the system of government remained unchanged, some changes were taking place in practices and the role of officials. The basic structure of government had persisted from the later middle ages, and particularly from the time of the Emperor Charles V, with the provincial assemblies being authorised by the representative decisions of the constituent towns and the States General by those of the provincial assemblies. With independence, the States General had assumed the final decision-making role in financial and military matters hitherto in the hands of the imperial or Spanish overlords.

In 1643, an Instruction was issued for the States General on which decisions could not be taken without the approval of the Provincial States: the size of the army; sending of embassies; formation of alliances; declaration of war; and conclusion of peace. The provincial estates had, with the Union of Utrecht, established their own individual sovereignty, a privilege which they continued to guard jealously.[29] Price has warned that it can be misleading to apply modern concepts of the sovereignty of states to the political system of the Dutch Republic.[30] Nevertheless, whether it was their "privileges" or "sovereignty" which they were determined to preserve, such preservation was innate to the provincial states. In this system, the stadholder

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29. J.C. Boogman. "The Union of Utrecht: Its Genesis and Consequences, *B.M.G.N.*, iciv (1979), pp. 377-404.

30. J. L.Price, *Holland and the Dutch Republic*, p. 209.

was no more than one member of the nobility with one vote as such in the provincial assemblies. Theoretically there could be a different stadholder in each of the seven provinces, chosen by the states. In practice there were never more than two, often the five provinces of Holland Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland and Overijssel being represented by the same one, and stadholders were nearly always members of the branches of the Orange family.

By taking on the leadership of the Revolt, William the Silent had established a role for the stadholder which was to be strengthened by Maurits and Frederik Hendrik. By confirming their role as military leaders they effectively separated themselves from many other functions of the state. Despite the continual war until 1648, these were concentrated on the exploitation of the resources of the Dutch which were to flourish in peacetime. Meanwhile Frederik Hendrik and William II extended their military leadership to a level comparable with that of European royalty and by overtly pursuing dynastic policies succeeded in separating the stadholdership from a large part of the ruling classes. Frederik Hendrik's more conciliatory approach to the States avoided major tensions, but the underlying differences over military policy after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 grew more intense during the less tempered stadholdership of William II 1648-50. However, the twenty years of De Witt's power changed the political state permanently and it was one of the major restraints on William III that he could never assert himself in the way his forefathers had done, despite being granted many of their privileges "in perpetuity" for his family.[31] Previously privileges had been granted to each stadholder for life only. In effect, this concession was emptier than their lifetime appointments.

The events of 1650, and more particularly the Act of Exclusion of 1654 and De Witt's justification of it in his *Deductie*, established a *raison d'état* which brought political theory near to reality. The ideas expounded in de la Court's *Het Interest van Holland* reflected the working ideology which could not be undone by the changes of 1672.

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31. Res. Holl. 2 February 1674.

But while the stadholders were changing their role and status as theoretical servants of the States, the membership of the ruling classes was also changing. The power of the nobility, of whom the Prince of Orange had been *primus inter pares* during the Revolt, had been eroded, until only a few members played a role of any significance and these were mainly close supporters of, and often related to, the stadholders, functioning principally as advisers to them. Price's theory that the Princes of Orange were not in fact *primus inter pares*, but rather "universal patrons" draws rather a nice distinction, but nevertheless is substantiated by the evidence of actual practice during the stadholdership of William III.[32] By the time he acquired political power the number of nobles with any real political interest had dwindled to a mere handful, particularly in Holland, although in the more rural provinces there was still some assertion of noble rights. In Zeeland, for example, there were only six representative towns and as two of these (Veere and Vlissingen) were William's "vassals", together with the three nobles the Orangist were able to establish a powerful party. William III was able to consolidate this small group of aristocratic supporters in 1674-75 when Utrecht (1674) and Gelderland and Overijssel (1675) were re-admitted to the Union. However, from those available in Utrecht, he preferred the support of the more centralist Dijkveld[33] to the parochial Amerongen.[34]

The presidency of the States of Utrecht was conferred on Van Reede van Renswoude for life. This act of patronage by the Prince might have had very little significance since Renswoude was already eighty at the time. However he lived for another eight years until 1682, acting on the Prince's behalf through both war and peace. His alleged support for William II's attempt on Amsterdam in 1650 had led to a sharp decline in his influence in the first stadholderless period, and his restoration to favour under William III was in some circles seen as a threat of a

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32. Price, "Dutch Nobility", p. 102.

33. Everard van Weede, Heer van Dijkveld.

34. Roorda, "William III and the Utrecht Government Regulation", p. 109.

return to the policies of 1650.[35]

The restoration to influence of a member of the nobility closely linked to the actions of the least favoured Prince of Orange contributed to the failure of the consolidation of a group of noble supporters to be as effective as it might have been. The re-entry to the Union in 1675 of Gelderland accompanied by the offer of the Dukedom to William further raised the spectre of monarchical tendencies, with or without his active connivance. But perhaps more importantly for the real political significance of the Dutch Republic, the role of Fagel and the influence of Amsterdam in the negotiations for the re-entry of principally Utrecht, but also the other two provinces, confirmed the importance of both in the maintenance of the Prince's authority.[36]

With the freedom from Spanish rule, the States General became the ultimate legislative body of the Republic, in financial and military matters, and the provincial States retained their own sovereignty in provincial matters, including local excise duties. As these provincial bodies comprised the representatives of the leading towns and were only empowered to act by the decisions of the towns, the ruling citizens in the towns had acquired considerable political power. This cumbersome political system of the Republic has led to what is a common problem arising between specialist and general histories. In the case of the Dutch Republic, the more general European history may argue that the politics of the Republic were determined by the will of the most powerful town of the most powerful province, that is Amsterdam. However, this is not a view substantiated by more specialist Dutch historians and, as several modern studies have shown even during the stadholderless period, when there was no apparent opponent to the will of Amsterdam, there was an effective centralised system of policy-making (or

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35. *N.N.B.W.*, III, pp. 1037-8: "*Als prinsgezind staatsman had Johan van Reede in de statenvergadering veel invloed...*"

36. For a full discussion of the terms of the re-entry of Utrecht to the Union, see D.J. Roorda, 'William III and the Utrecht Government Regulation: background, events and problems', *A.H.N.* XII (1979), pp. 85-109.

"decision-making" as Grever calls it)[37]. This could work independently of the restrictions imposed on it by the system, and not solely because the complexities of the system precluded easy consultation. Thus it was that in the later 1660s De Witt was able to arrange the Triple Alliance almost single-handed. Part of the main argument here will be to pursue this further in the case of William III, Fagel and Amsterdam during the years 1672-4.

Much work has already been done on the regents themselves, that is the ruling classes within the towns,[38] but there is as yet no real consensus on their constituents in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. The general themes of discussions have been the changes during the seventeenth century from the rise of a merchant elite to the gradual growth of an increasingly aristocratic and contracting ruling class of rentiers rather than merchants, and a subsequent decline in quality.[39] All these questions are bound up with the social, economic and religious background of the time as well as the developments in political ambitions and have often been simplistically divided into generations, with the final quarter of the century dismissed as degenerate, with one or two exceptions. Such structured examination, together with the limited use of economic statistics, has provided good material for sterile arguments on the Dutch decline, but does provide a firm basis for understanding the real society of the period.

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37. Grever, J.H., "The Structure of Decision-Making in the States-General of the Dutch Republic 1660-68", *Parliaments, Estates and Representation,* 1 (1981), pp. 13-33, cites particular examples of how De Witt overcame the "official" processes to achieve swift decisions. See also Price, *Holland and the Dutch Republic*, p. 213.

38. Prak, de Jong, Coymans, *op. cit.*, J.L. Price, 'The Rotterdam Patriciate 1650-72', unpublished PhD Thesis, University of London, 1969, and building on works such as J.E. Elias, *Geschiedenis van het Amsterdamsche Regenten Patriciaat* (The Hague, 1923) and others. See also Roorda, *Partij en Factie*, pp. 28-9 on Japikse's study of party alignments in the factional politics of Veere.

39. P. Burke, *Venice and Amsterdam, A Study of Seventeenth Century Elites*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1994) makes the point that "aristocratization does not necessarily imply a complete role change but that the merchant elite were simply imitating aspects of the noble style of life", p. xvi.

The regent class was narrow, but at least in Amsterdam not exclusive.[40] Qualification for membership was very dependent on patronage, or financial competence. In the smaller towns where the practice of intermarriage between merchant houses and regent families led to a contraction of the membership, it was by the middle of the seventeenth century possible to talk of a closed family network.

There are very real problems associated with assertions of closed oligarchies controlling any constituted authority. These are complicated when the nature of these oligarchies is essentially family groupings. The general description of an oligarchy is that it is a closed group with common interests, which maintains its power and authority by excluding those outside its particular family, interest, party or class group. However, very rarely are the fundamental interests which give the oligarchy its cohesion spelt out. There may be broad statements of policy which are understood by all, such as the communist ideal of state ownership of all the means of production. In the seventeenth century Dutch Republic, survival of the States was a common theme. But membership of the oligarchy which Soviet Russia confined to members of the Communist Party, was far vaguer in the Dutch Republic. The criteria included an acceptable level of wealth, citizenship of an acceptable period and professions of allegiance to the Reformed Church.

These criteria could be enhanced quickly by marriage into a family already acceptable to the ruling group, or could be maintained by ensuring marriage only between acceptable family groupings. But marriage as a political expedient, despite having played a focal role in the politics of states for centuries, has always had a very variable success rate, and its impact is often of very short duration.[41] What such theories tend to overlook is the fact that structured analysis of the

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40. See below pp. 87-88.

41. Prak, in his study of the Leiden regency from 1700 to 1780 supports this argument that some modern historians have overdone the importance of family connections in the development of factions, Prak, *Gezeten burgers*, p. 58.

composition of ruling groups, whether it be the British House of Commons,[42] or the Amsterdam regent class in the late seventeenth century, however convincing, cannot be the whole picture. History is a study of man's political, social and economic interaction and each individual has their own history within the family, civic/institutional organisation and state. There may be cultural and family similarities, but there are as yet no clones. One member of a group may support the overriding aims of the rest of the group, but within that group they may have greater or lesser understanding of the issues involved; they may assert themselves or be passive - each reaction may influence the way decisions are reached and implemented. More importantly, individuals or small groups may break away or develop links beyond their oligarchic grouping, for avaricious, altruistic or cultural/religious reasons. These tendencies can work to the good of the oligarchy by keeping it vibrant and alert to changes. Arguments for closed oligarchies, such as are alleged about the Dutch regent class in the later seventeenth century, point to evidence that this vibrancy was being lost, and by the mid-eighteenth century had sown the seeds of their final demise.[43]

But, although there may be some validity in this argument, it is invalid to put it forward on its own. The changes in the Dutch Republic, just like the changes in the industrial organisation and structure of late nineteenth century England, were also determined by international events. The stimulus which both had brought to the international economy gradually changed their own status within it. Therefore the regent oligarchy of a Holland town in the early eighteenth century was having to perform within a very different political and socio-economic environment from that of its forebears a century earlier.

We can ascertain that members of the ruling classes filled posts from minor town

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42. L. Namier, *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III* (London, 1975).

43. Boxer, *Dutch Seaborne Empire*, pp. 302-330 illustrates the eighteenth century "the Periwig Period" as a time of decline in industry and commerce, exacerbated by a "conservative and unenterprising mentality" (p. 312).

officials to representatives on the *Raad van Staat* and States General; that the same family could have members filling minor paid secretariat jobs and acting as advisers to the Prince of Orange[44] (although some families never rose above the minor level); and, as the century progressed, these families began to dominate the local civic guard as well, with senior members holding the major commissions;[45] and that these trends substantiate the arguments that the regent class was becoming increasingly closed and oligarchic. Nevertheless, we cannot therefore assume that the nature of the oligarchy is simple, coherent and static. As we will see later, in Amsterdam at least there was still a very wide membership, many of whom were of a quality comparable with those of the earlier years of the century and who were prepared to take individual initiatives which maintained the vibrancy of Amsterdam's role within the changing demands of the Republic.[46]

By 1672, the political structure of the Dutch Republic had adjusted to the demands and circumstances of the century. Despite the major upheavals of the Revolt, the events of 1618, when the ultimate defeat was inflicted on Advocat Oldenbarneveldt by Prince Maurits, and the dramatic changes of fortune caused by the excessive militarism (cut short by death) of William II in 1650, there had been no major revolution in the system of Government. The roles and titles of various principals however did change. The title of Advocat had been changed to *raadpensionaris* after the execution of Oldenbarnevelt in 1618. The De Witt period had established the *raadpensionaris* of Holland as a central figure in the administration of the Republic as a whole, and by judicious manoeuvring, his successor Fagel continued this role, accommodating himself to the changes required by the re-emergence of the stadholdership. By the extension of the powers of the *griffier* in 1670 (the

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44. See Appendix V, for office holders in Amsterdam, 1672-84.

45. For full biographical details of all members of the *vroedschap*, see Elias, *Vroedschap.*

46. This is supported by Burke's analysis of the occupations and country home ownership of the Amsterdam ruling class from 1618 to 1748, in which he demonstrates that the *wetsverzetting* in Amsterdam delayed the transition to a rentier class of regents until 1700, Burke, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

post then held by Fagel) and his careful combination of these powers with those of the *raadpensionaris* in 1672 in the *Instructie Raadpensionaris*, the role of the *raadpensionaris* was not diminished and, as will be seen, in many ways Fagel was able to exert the influence thus gained to enforce decisions which William III was unable to do.

William III had no first hand experience of a stadholder to follow, but merely a concentration of education on what he should expect (from his own family and their supporters), and what was expected (from De Witt and those given responsibility for his education in 1666). Geyl went so far as to say that William proved better than his teacher,[47] that is, a greater success than De Witt, no doubt because in the final analysis he was accepted while De Witt was rejected.

What was restored to the Prince were the rights previously held of appointment, or at least veto of, many local officials. In the case of Amsterdam and the other major towns of Holland this did not extend to membership of the *vroedschap* or the appointment of burgomasters, but did still apply to the *schepenen*.[48] He was however able to take the opportunity after the popular revolts of the late summer 1672 to use the practice of old of changing the membership of various bodies by *wetsverzettingen* (changes of law), attempting to install a more pro-Orangist representation in the basic institutions. This power was far more effective in the three provinces re-admitted to the Union in 1674-75, when William's profile as saviour of his country was still high and he could make the most positive use of Fagel's skill at re-structuring the administration to the best effect.[49]

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47. P Geyl, "Willem III, de Stadhouder-Koning", *Studies en Strijdschriften*, Part II (1958), p. 154.

48. The following towns were answerable to the Prince: Rotterdam, Schiedam, Gorinchem and Alkmaar, "The other towns retained complete freedom of co-option", J. L. Price, "The Rotterdam Patriciate 1650-72", unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1969, pp. 2-24.

49. Roorda, "William III and the Utrecht Government Regulations", p. 109, "The whole set up of a permanent administration to provide for the needs of the population ... was for him of secondary importance. It was more essential to have a machinery which could react to the demands of the

In 1672 the Republic was governed by essentially the same system of representative institutions as a hundred years earlier, with the implementation of the final policy decisions on financial and military matters in the hands of the States General.[50] The stadholder, however, as Captain General of the forces, as well as the First Noble in five of the seven provinces and despite the deeply rooted anti-monarchist tendencies, fulfilled a role as a central representative of the States in the eyes of foreign courts, but still remained their servant and theoretically subject to their decisions. He had a close working relationship with the *raadpensionaris*, and although he did maintain a small circle of close advisers, these were not established on the semi-official lines of Frederik Hendrik's "secret committees", which were predominantly filled by the stadholder's appointees.[51] The close alliance of the *raadpensionaris* and the Stadholder did in fact establish a central administrative force, which the provincial bodies were not always able to dominate, and it was this balance which led to the intricate shifts and compromises which were to characterise the following dozen years, influenced as they were by the demands of both war and peace.

Always near the centre of these shifts and compromises was the Amsterdam *vroedschap* and its representatives at the States of Holland, the Council of State, the *Gecommitteerde Raad* and on ambassadorial duties. The regents of Amsterdam had to accommodate themselves rapidly to the changes effected by international events and the re-emergence of the House of Orange. In 1666 Gillis Valckenier, then the new rising star of Amsterdam, had been one of those made responsible for William's education as Child of State. In 1672 Valckenier eventually joined and quickly took the leadership of the group within Amsterdam which pressed for the

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day, a reliable apparatus of embassies, the army camp, and trustworthy counsel from experienced colleagues like Fagel."

50. For a concise discussion on the evolution of decision-making practices in the States of Holland after the Revolt, see Israel, *Dutch Republic*, pp. 277-80.

51. Israel, *Dutch Republic*, p. 526; see below, pp. 180-181 for a full discussion on the nature of "secret committees" during the stadholderate of William III.

repeal of the Perpetual Edict and set itself up behind the Orangist cause. The balance of political power in Amsterdam had been shifting throughout the later 1660s, but in September 1672 a more dramatic change was enforced by the *wetsverzetting*. This purge of leading opponents of the House of Orange from most of the *vroedschappen* of the Holland towns was an attempt to ensure support for the Prince of Orange. Much of this study will be an analysis of the extent to which this was successful in Amsterdam, and how its impact affected the overall role of Amsterdam in the determination of States policy.

The *wetsverzettingen* which took place in the Holland towns in the first half of September 1672 were the final phase of the transition from the Wittian regime to the stadholderate of William III. The States of Holland had given William authority to effect the necessary changes in the local administrations on 27 August.

In part these changes were a response to the demands of the populace, who saw the opportunity for influencing changes to their advantage arising out of the momentum of the local revolts over the preceding two months. In Rotterdam the *vroedschap* was purged by the forceful intervention of the civic militia on 22 August.[52] But response to these demands, apart from the immediate reaction in Rotterdam, had a far more realistic base to it. William III had been restored to the privileges of his forefathers within a very short time after a twenty-year break. By a large proportion of the regent classes this had been accepted either willingly or at least with equanimity.

It was therefore essential to ensure that the Prince was secure in his appointment beyond the immediate crisis, and could rely on the powerful town regents to support his aims. And the approval of the States of Holland five days after the purges in Rotterdam took the initiative away from the militias and the people.

The casualties of the policy of *wetsverzetting* were of course firstly, those who had

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[52]. Israel, *Dutch Republic*, p. 803.

always opposed Orangist power on ideological grounds, and secondly, those who had benefited by their patronage and protection. Insofar as the exclusion of these people also met the demands of the masses, the *wetsverzettingen* were a response to popular demand. But, although renowned Loevensteiners and radical dissenters were purged, those whose sympathies to either the Republican or Orangist/Calvinist causes were a matter of political judgement were less likely to be excluded.

Naturally the traditional Orangist towns of Haarlem and Leiden came off lightest and the towns with more overtly anti-Orangist elements, such as Amsterdam, Delft and Dordrecht, were more severely dealt with. The following chapters will provide a general introduction to Amsterdam in the 1660-1680s, through a discussion of its social, cultural and religious background and its economic structure. This will provide the framework for a detailed analysis of the *vroedschap* as it emerged from the 1660s through the *wetsverzetting* to its new appearance in 1672-73.

Chapter 4

Amsterdam at the end of the Golden Age

Seventeenth century Amsterdam was a melting pot which refused very few rejects from the religious and political intolerance of other parts of Europe and created such a mixture that it became endowed with a reputation as a city of toleration, the home of refugees, an entrepreneur's paradise, a centre of cultural riches and the arbiter of a rational pursuit of the welfare of the Republic. At least two modern studies have made comparisons between Amsterdam and Venice,[1] with many justifications, but these must be approached with a clear understanding that, unlike Venice, Amsterdam was not an independent city state, but was an important and integral part of the States of Holland.[2] Although all the major Holland towns had their own identities and therefore their own uniqueness, they also had much in common in the second half of the seventeenth century. To begin with they were, following Huizinga's geographical definition of Dutch civilisation in the seventeenth century, "concentrated in a region not much more than sixty miles square".[3] Amsterdam was only a short ride away from Haarlem and not more than half a day's travel from Leiden, Delft, Rotterdam and the seat of the States of Holland and the States General in The Hague. Although short distances may have been by the few overland routes, the majority of journeys were made on the efficient system of inland waterways.[4] The towns were bound together by their

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1. Burke, *Venice and Amsterdam;* E.O.G. Haitsma Mulier, *The Myth of Venice and Dutch Republican Thought* (Assen, 1980). The most recent comparative study is of Amsterdam with Rome, P. van Kessel and E. Schulte, *Rome, Amsterdam, Two Growing Cities in Seventeenth Century Europe* (Amsterdam, 1997).

2. Boogman, "The *Raison d'Etat* Politician Johan De Witt", p. 61 describes how this difference was understood in the seventeenth century, at least by De Witt who was anxious not to encourage "particularist independence movements, the city-state aspirations of the towns of Holland".

3. Huizinga, *Dutch Civilisation*, p. 15.

4. The *trekschuit* passenger transport was handling about 300,000 passengers annually between Amsterdam and Haarlem, de Vries, *First Modern Economy*, pp. 186-7.

short and intense history since the Revolt, by their economy and by their domination of the politics of the Republic. They were also divided by many of the issues underlying these foundations of a united province. That is to say, although the "interest of Holland" was a fundamental principle to all, each constituent was anxious that their own "interest" should have its rightful influence within that wider sphere.

It is inevitable therefore that any discussion of Amsterdam in the seventeenth century will often cover generalisations and particulars about the States of Holland. In Chapter 1 we looked briefly at the uniqueness of the Dutch Republic in Europe; equally we could look at the uniqueness of Holland within the Republic. And, extending the corollary, we can look at the uniqueness of Amsterdam within Holland, but without ignoring the ties of State. The importance of Amsterdam in the latter half of the seventeenth century, its dominant position in world trade and finance and its larger population and scale of operations than all the other Holland towns, have led historians from time to time to simplify the image of the city, to imply that it was led and maintained by a group of regents following a coherent and single-minded policy.[5]

Amsterdam in the last quarter of the seventeenth century was of course the dominant city in the United Provinces, but, as we have seen, was not necessarily representative of the character of the rest of the Republic or even of Holland. Its evolution and consequent large and mixed population set it apart from other cities even those who were also beneficiaries of the Golden Age like Haarlem, Leiden and Rotterdam. By the 1660s Amsterdam had created an image of itself which was interpreted by those who dealt with the city as the true Amsterdam, epitomised

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5. Franken in particular draws a very simplistic picture of the singlemindedness of the Amsterdam regents after 1650: "If the ideal of the whole of Holland was to carry on trade in peace and quiet with all the Powers it was to an even higher degree the aim of Amsterdam, which being the great staple-market and the great financial centre of Europe had not the least interest in an active foreign policy which would certainly do damage to commerce and which would require very high taxation for the upkeep of a standing army", Franken, "Foreign Policy and Diplomacy", p. 6.

by the completion in 1662 of van Kampen's great town hall with its facade depicting the wealth of the town and its domination of the sea.[6] Such expressions of self-confidence were to continue in buildings throughout the eighteenth century, but were by then an attempt to create a belief in the continuation of the Golden Age glory, with greater emphasis on the wealth of the individual citizens rather than that of the city.

Historians of the Dutch Republic and Amsterdam have made clear the division between the Golden Age and the apparent beginnings of decline in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. For example, the former is called by Brugmans *Opkomst en Bloei*, the latter by Evenhuis, *Nabloei en Inzinking*,[7] but this must be understood for the historical nicety it is, where research has conveniently found evidence to support a general decline thesis and has looked at Amsterdam with the benefit of hindsight. It has little to do with the image Amsterdam portrayed to the world in the 1670s and 1680s. This image was reported by several observers during the early years of the 1670s when the eyes of much of Europe were on the drama being played out in the Netherlands. The most coherent of these is Sir William Temple's, *Observations upon the United Provinces.*

This image, which observers were so fascinated with, was created and sustained by a self-conscious ruling class, the membership of which was as wide as was possible within the system. There were old merchant families like the Huydecoopers, who had progressed to the rentier class, but these were still a minority in Amsterdam (see p. 56, note 46); there were merchants still actively involved in trade - old Holland families, newer immigrant families and merchant families such as the Trips

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6. For a detailed analysis of the imagery in the architecture and decoration of the Amsterdam Town Hall, see K. Fremantle, *The Baroque Town Hall of Amsterdam* (Utrecht, 1959).

7. H. Brugmans, *Opkomst en Bloei van Amsterdam*; R. B. Evenhuis, *Ook Dat Was Amsterdam, Vol III, de Kerk der bervorming inde tweede helft van de zeventiende eeuw - nabloei en inzinking* (Amsterdam 1971).

brought in through marriage;[8] there were professional *ambachtsheeren*; there were members of the professions, doctors and academics; but members of the church were excluded. The clergy and the majority of the regent classes had established different political roles and consequently social status. Appendix I, which is drawn primarily from Elias' *Vroedschap*, includes information about the occupational background of the members of the regent class where known.

Although, as will be demonstrated, Amsterdam was not able to use its apparently dominant position always to assert its own interests over those of the other Holland towns, the other provinces or the Prince, the influence of its regents was felt both within and outside the city. The arrogance of intervention in the affairs of others whether paternal or merely for political advantage was a role frequently adopted by the regency. Amsterdam felt perfectly within its rights, under the system of consultation inherent in the constitution, to take a strong line over the terms of Utrecht's re-entry to the Union in 1674 and in particular over the level of taxation.[9] Thus they also felt free to interfere in the affairs of Groningen over the Ommeland dispute, particularly as they felt they could use the incident to bring up the issue of unpaid quotas dating back to 1670,[10] and in Middelburg during the heated dispute between the Coccejans and Voetians.[11]

Amsterdam tended to take a strong line against Zeeland in most political issues, whereas in the 1680s she was pursuing active friendship with Friesland, and it is possible that ideological differences were in fact being used in parallel with

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8. Louis Trip, member of the armaments and finance firm whose daughter was married to Valckenier's son Wouter on 15 July 1670.

9. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 30 January 1674.

10. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 10 and 13 July 1677; Kn. 11533, "*Kort Verhael waer my de jegenwoordige Geschillen en onlusten tussche de Stadt Groningen ende van de Ommelanden sijn gesprooten...*" (1677); Kn. 11534, "*Receuil van allen de Authenticke Stukken raeckende het Geschil Tusschen de Stadt Groningen en Ommelanden* ..." (Amsterdam, 1677).

11. Knuttel, *Bekker*, p. 133. The leading Coccejan in this dispute was Momma, who after his expulsion from Middelburg was in fact welcomed in Amsterdam on his way to Franeker in 1676.

economic strategy. Zeeland had the most to offer as a competitor, whereas Friesland was an essential part of the Amsterdam's European hinterland trade. Zeeland's majority support of the Prince of Orange and the stadholdership of Friesland and Groningen in the hands of the Nassau branch of the House of Orange were the political framework which Amsterdam exploited.

The City also embraced alternative policies with impunity towards other Holland towns where economic advantage was involved. This was particularly the case with Leiden and Haarlem, both identified as Orangist in the 1660s, although there were much stronger ideological links with the former and its university. The relationship with Rotterdam is interesting, as that town seems to have developed its own economic success without causing friction with Amsterdam. There was constant exchange of ideas between the intelligentsia of both towns, there was a strong English church, and many English merchants, and although Rotterdam usually took the majority conservative line in the States of Holland, there is a general impression of goodwill between the two.[12] It is worth noting in passing that Delft was the only town to support Amsterdam in 1682 over the Luxemburg issue, and had been known to take an individual line on various occasions throughout this period.[13]

The practice of political power in Amsterdam in the 1670s and 1680s can be further understood by looking at the involvement of the secular authority in the administration and ideology of the Dutch Reformed Church. The regents were keenly interested in the status of all religious groupings in Amsterdam, whether native or immigrant.

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12. M.C. 't Hart, "The Dutch Republic: the urban impact upon politics", in K. Davids, and J. Lucassen, eds., *A Miracle Mirrored: The Dutch Republic in European Perspective* (Oxford, 1995), pp. 76-78, discusses Amsterdam's continued dominance in the last quarter of the seventeenth century while other towns declined. However, she points out that Rotterdam was the exception to the general decline.

13. M.J. Soutendam, "Verklezingskwestie te Delft in 1676", *Delftsche Courant* (March, 1877), pp. 271-274.

To begin with, we will deal with the religious proclivities of the indigenous population as practised by their clerical representatives and the interference or intervention which they had to take from the regents. However, far more important motivators for actions taken by the regency were the immigrant communities, for sound economic reasons which we will look at later. Huguenots and Walloons were accepted as members of the reformed church.

The reformed church in Amsterdam was orthodox Calvinist and subject to scrutiny at *Kerkeraad* level with occasional intervention from the burgomasters. Whatever the religious ideologies of the regency the reformed church on the whole ran itself according to its own strict interpretations of its beliefs and duties, accepting instructions from above, but making its own judgements. During the war of 1672-78 they were from time to time requested to say prayers for military success, particularly during 1676, in the build-up to the siege of Maastricht and were always being exhorted to make financial contributions to the week's good cause.[14] The dealings of the *Kerkeraad* are however chiefly concerned with the day-to-day administration of the practical affairs of the church and treatment and correction of wayward members of the congregation, and in 1675 and 1676, in the progress of a revised translation of the Bible in the light of discussions they had been having on church orthodoxy.[15]

The burgomasters' intervention was principally in financial matters with great concern shown over shortfalls in the annual budget, although throughout the 1670s they were largely unsuccessful in reversing the trend, despite repeated exhortations.[16] They also had the right of veto in the appointment of predikants,

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[14]. G A Amsterdam, Kerkeraad, 23 June 1675, 26 April 1676.

[15]. *Ibid.*, 13 June 1675; 27 June 1675; 12 March 1676.

[16]. For example in 1672 the shortfall was *fl.*2011 (G.A. Amsterdam, Kerkeraad, nr. 12, 19 January 1673); in 1676 it was *fl.*14,304 (G.A. Amsterdam, Kerkeraad nr. 13, 14 January 1677); and in 1678 it had only fallen to *fl.*9,485 (G.A. Amsterdam, Kerkeraad nr. 13, 12 January 1679).

but this was a privilege they invoked only on rare occasions,[17] but nevertheless, the treatment of predikants and the congregation of the reformed Church was strictly monitored by the burgomasters, the *Kerkeraad* and thence through the pulpit.[18] Normally there was no problem over the appointment of predikants, but disputes in 1677 led to the formulation of an agreement between the burgomasters and the church authorities for appointments to be made henceforth alternately of stricter Calvinist and "*libertijn*" predikants.[19]

The burgomasters also oversaw the *Kerkeraad's* intervention in issues which did not directly relate to the religious practices within the city. For two months in the spring of 1677 the *Kerkeraad* was seriously exercised over the affairs of Jakob Koelman, an evangelical predikant who until 1673 had been predikant at the reformed church at Sluis in Zeeland.[20] This affair took up a disproportionate amount of time, comparable to that spent on the translation of the Bible, and may reflect the tensions over orthodoxy, which were still unresolved. He was chaplain on one of van Beuningen's embassies, to Denmark in 1657, and the two were in correspondence throughout the 1680s, when Koelman became one of the prominent advocates in support of the role of miracles and the supernatural in the teachings of the church.[21] Koelman had been expelled from his post in Sluis in 1673 on publication of a pamphlet in which he outlined his own understanding of reformed

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17. For example on 26 February 1674: Christanus Abel; and on 3 November 1678 the *Kerkeraad* noted the burgomasters' interest in the appointment to a vacancy in the Noordkerk.

18. Bergsma, "Church, state and people", p. 218, "Ruling elites in the Dutch Republic clearly set value on the Reformed Church as a central institution of society."

19. Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp. 667-68.

20. Kn. 13339, "*Alle de Brieven ende Schriften sedert eenigen tijd opgesteld by den gewesen Burgemeester C V Beuningen ... om de Christenen, en alle menschen, door het herstellen van het Eeuwig Evangelium, sonder menschelijke uytleggingen*", p. 51.; E. van der Wall, "Antichrist Stormed: The Glorious Revolution and the Dutch Prophetic Tradition", in Hoak, and Feingold, *The World of William and Mary*, p. 159.

21. Koelman's biographer, A.F. Krull, *Jacobus Koelman* (Sneek 1901) omits this correspondence.

doctrine on superstitions and feast days. The matter had been taken up by the States of Zeeland and the States General and Koelman had been forbidden to practise as a predikant.[22]

In April 1677 it was discovered that he was living and practising as a predikant in the house of de Nijs, a predikant from Amstelveen, in Kalverstraat[23] (from where in the 1680s he published several of his works).[24] The matter was brought to the *Kerkeraad* and much debated by the brothers who consulted not only with the authorities at Sluis, but also the States of Zeeland and the Rotterdam authorities.[25] The intervention of van Beuningen who championed Koelman on account of his personal acquaintance assisted the *Kerkeraad* in deciding to give Koelman asylum in Amsterdam and to regard him as '*een soorte van een maartelaar*',[26] although he was required to absent himself from Amsterdam for at least one month in each year.[27] Such a decision is surprising in the stance taken by van Beuningen, who was also a friend of Balthazar Bekker in the 1680s,[28] one of Koelman's main protagonists in the debate over superstitions. As an example of intervention in the affairs of the church by the regency its significance is somewhat diminished since in 1682 they did join with twelve other Holland towns who had already passed

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22. G.A. Amsterdam, Kerkeraad, nr. 13, 22 April 1679.

23. *Ibid.*, nr. 13, 29 April 1677; R. B. Evenhuis, *Ook Dat Was Amsterdam* (Amsterdam 1967), Vol. III, p. 227.

24. I. H. van Eeghen, *De Amsterdamse Boekhandel 1680-1725*, Vol. IV (Amsterdam 1978), p. 168. Koelman published three works with Jean Wasteleirs of Kalverstraat between 1679 and 1680, which were sold by Joh. van den Bergh also of Kalverstraat.

25. G.A. Amsterdam, Kerkeraad, nr. 13, 13 and 20 May 1677.

26. Knuttel 13339, p. 51.

27. Krull, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

28. W.P. C. Knuttel, *Balthazar Bekker, De Bestrijden van he Bijgeloof* (The Hague 1906), p. 151 and p. 156n. Bekker arrived in Amsterdam in 1679 and published his book, *Het Betoverde Wereld* from there in 1691, prompting Koelman's vigorous response.

resolutions against Koelman.[29] Personal intervention was also made by one of the leading regents, Geelvinck, in the matter of a dispute concerning Dr Bousset, a predikant of Buycksloot which was also brought to the *Kerkeraad*.[30]

Perhaps most noticeable, because of its absence at other times, was the attention paid to the management of the churches both orthodox and minority. However, these requirements were almost exclusively to do with the outward observance of the reformed church. Later in 1677, an attempt was made to restrict the behaviour of predikants, by encouraging stricter observance of the tenets of orthodox Calvinism.[31] This is in line with the thanks the *Kerkeraad* had received from the burgomasters in August 1674 for taking a strong line on abuses of the Sabbath[32] and also with the restrictions on the activities of meat sellers in 1679.[33] Nevertheless, in January 1676 they were content to leave implementation of Sabbath Day restrictions in the hands of each district.[34] The burgomasters were continually concerned with the standard of music, and the quality of the organs in the early 1680s resulted in considerable upheavals to ensure that the right one was being heard in the right church. The start of these attempts at "*better harmonie*" came with the move of the organ from the *nieuwe kerke* to the *wester* and that of the *oude* to the *zuider kerk*.[35] But this was merely symbolic. As the organs were only used before and after services,[36] and were not part of the act of worship, their

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29. Krull, *op. cit.*, 91: 1676 - Utrecht, Dordrecht; 1677 - Delft; 1678 - Leiden; 1679 - Gouda, Edam; 1680 - Rotterdam, Alkmaar; 1681, Gorinchem, Haarlem, Nijmegen; 1682 - Briel, Amsterdam, Leeuwaarden, Zutphen; 1683 - Hoorn, Arnhem.

30. G.A. Amsterdam, G.A. Amsterdam, Kerkeraad nr. 13, April-June 1675.

31. *Ibid.*, nr. 13, f. 229, February 1677.

32. *Ibid.*, nr. 13, 30 August 1674.

33. *Ibid.*, nr. 14, 10 August 1679.

34. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 13 January 1676.

35. *Ibid.*, Res. Vroed., 25 January 1681 and 11 November 1682.

36. Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 694; stricter elements in the *nadere reformatie*, had campaigned successfully in some cases to get organs removed as the use of music was considered one of the many signs of laxity.

function as a public image was the more important. At the more "spiritual" level, an undated paper of the early 1680's gave instructions to predikants of Amsterdam to work for peace within the churches and to live in "*liefde, vrede en eenigheyd*", by not raising theological differences to the level of open dispute and by trying to abide by the formulas laid down for the reformed church. Moderation was to be the order of the day, but nevertheless issues should be tackled, albeit tactfully.

Thus the strict orthodoxy of the Amsterdam brothers persisted and although Balthazar Bekker took up an appointment in Amsterdam from 1679 onwards he was not allowed to retain his office as a predikant in the city after the publication of *Betoverde Wereld* in 1691. The level of intervention from the regency was cosmetic and on the whole went along with the views of orthodox Calvinism, asserting their patronage over the church and its congregation, whose interests they believed would be served better by the strict orthodoxy which would have been an unacceptable restriction on the more wordly interests of the ruling class.

Schama maintains that there was a strong orthodox element in the Amsterdam regency which brought pressure to bear on the more tolerant majority in the middle of the century,[37] but this simplistic scenario was certainly not so in the 1670s, when matters of church administration were dealt with by the burgomasters, whose dominant theological ideals cannot be identified with strict Calvinism, rather than the *vroedschap*, or in the 1680s, when those whose ideologies were of less strict remonstrant origins had once again got the upper hand within the *vroedschap*. If it was the minority strict Calvinists like Backer and Tulp, who had formed the genuine Calvinist backbone of the Orangist Party in 1672, they had lost all effectiveness by 1675, when Valckenier was at the height of his power.[38] The noted contrast between the sobriety of the celebrations of Tulp's fifty years in office and the opulence of the celebrations of the wedding between Wouter

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37. Schama, *Embarrassment of Riches*, pp. 118-119.

38. See below p. 127.

Valckenier and Trip's daughter exemplifies this division of interpretations.[39] No doubt the wedding would have received far greater censure in 1681 after the Amsterdam church authorities encouraged predikants to leave wedding celebrations where dancing took place.[40] After all the regents were quite happy by the 1660s to allow Cartesian principles to be taught by Arminian teachers in the *Illustre Schole* - and this of course was where many of their sons were being educated for future office.

Having mentioned the role of the regency in the determination of church policy, a further examination of the known sympathies of the burgomasters and the *vroedschap* and their senior officials should show how little influence the church had in the determination of civic secular policy.[41] There has been a consensus among historians about the secularisation of Amsterdam politics in the first stadholderless period.[42] In fact, there is very little evidence to show what the religious philosophy of most of the regency was in the 1670s beyond discovering what their education might have been. But of those that more is known about, the "*libertyns*" certainly dominated the leading characters. Valckenier himself had been sponsored by the remonstrants Van Loon and Schellinger, but it would need a vivid imagination to argue that Valckenier was in any way a religious ideologist. Hooft, Van Vlooswijk and van Oudtshoorn were open in their remonstrant sympathies. Van Beuningen was technically a remonstrant, but his humanist sympathies began to dominate his ideas in his dotage. He had encouraged Spinoza, fulfilling the role of patrician sponsor in the 1660s, at the same period as Spinoza

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[39]. G. Cotterell, *Amsterdam, The Life of a City* (Boston, 1972), p. 185.

[40]. Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 693.

[41]. De Vries, *First Modern Economy*, pp. 167-8 in discussing the role of Calvinism in the economic development of the Dutch Republic argues that the demands of confessionalism applied by strict puritans "set many urban magistrates in opposition to the Reformed Church. Their practical interest... caused them to insist upon a measure of religious toleration and subordination of the religious to the secular authority."

[42]. Johan E. Elias, *De Vroedschap van Amsterdam 1578-1795* (Haarlem 1903), Vol I, p. CXI; D. J. Roorda, "William III and the Utrecht Government Regulation," pp. 95-6.

and Hudde were sharing their scientific interests in telescopes and microscopes.[43] Nicolas Witsen was a pupil of the Coccejan School and had been encouraged by Valckenier in his early career, but his diplomatic skills led him to act as mediator in the Voetian dispute of 1676 and to create a reputation for the kind of fairmindedness which precludes obsessively strong ideologies. The one-time pensionary Cornelis Hop was also a "*libertyn*" and it must be assumed that his son Jakob who was to figure so prominently in the French negotiations in the 1680s, was of a like mind during the 1670s. Bontemantel also lists seven other '*libertyn*' regents including Geelvinck and Munter.[44] The only two members of the *vroedschap* who are known to have been stricter Calvinists (rather than those who were Orangists and therefore assumed by those following Fruin's interpretation of seventeenth century politics, to have been strict Calvinists) in the early 1670s were the aged Tulp and William III's staunchest, but relatively weak, supporter, Cornelis Backer. The former died in 1674 and the latter faded into obscurity after his failure to obtain high municipal office in 1675.[45]

This assertion of the relative lack of interest of the majority of the regent class in ideological debate is not an argument against their understanding of the importance of the role of the reformed church in the "interest of state". It is, however, an argument in support of additional and alternative motives for their motivation for determining the policies of Amsterdam. It is in fact very little different from the analysis made of the majority of the Holland Regents in the sixteenth century by Boogman in his study of the consequences of the Union of Utrecht, in which he alleges that "the Holland regents should largely be classed with the fairly numerous groups which voiced objections to both the rigid contra-reformatory catholicism according to the model of Trent and the strict Calvinism of Geneva" and that what

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43. Spinoza's friendship with Hudde dated back to the mid-1650s, K.O. Meinsma, *Spinoza en zijn Kring*, pp. 163-164 (Amsterdam, 1896); Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 905.

44. Cited in Evenhuis, *op. cit.*, Vol III, p. 167: Hasselaer, van Vlooswijk, Geelvinck, van de Poll, Munter, Bas, Cloeck, and Van Loon.

45. *N.N.B.W.*, VI, p. 58.

they really wanted was a "broad protestant church, not too rigid in matters of dogma, closely aligned with the State and thus subject to Government supervision."[46] We cannot pretend to know what the real depths of belief were in the minds of men dead for three hundred years, however attractive a challenge this is to an historian.[47] But to generalise, it is very rare for a true religious ideologist to assume high political power, whatever outward pretence of conformity may be made. And it is particularly rare in successful economic states where so much has to be sacrificed to the altar of Mammon. In the mid-seventeenth century Amsterdam was the heart of the most successful contemporary economic state. However, this does not argue against the interests of the church having an influence on the politics of the regents, or that the regents might use the church for political ends. The Reformed Church was not an established state church in name, but in practice only those who conformed to its tenets could participate fully in all spheres of civic life. Therefore the majority of those who believed full citizenship was the key to the full range of benefits available belonged to the Reformed Church.[48]

However, there were minorities of course who were never to be accepted on the same basis as those who conformed to the Reformed Church.[49] The Catholics had been excluded from true citizenship since the Union and were in effect an outlawed church. One of their churches, for example, was taken over as the English church

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46. Boogman, "Union of Utrecht", p. 379; De Vries, *First Modern Economy*, p. 167 has also made this point, "Catholics [in Amsterdam] remained numerous, and many who embraced the Reformed faith, especially among the urban elites, had both principled and practical reasons to resist a rigorous suppression of other forms of religious belief".

47. R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, J. van der Dussen, ed. (revised edition, Oxford 1993), pp. 282-302.

48. De Vries, *op. cit.* p. 169, admits the difficulty of understanding the personal life of individuals and the influence Calvinism may have had on them and their approach to their commercial life.

49. Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 640, quotes Nusteling's figures for baptisms in Amsterdam from 1671-80 as follows (including Huguenots and Walloons in the numbers for the Reformed Church: Reformed (40,934); Lutheran (12,520); Remonstrant (592); Catholic (9,535).

(see below) and their members were unable to take public office. Nevertheless, the Catholics had formed the majority of Amsterdam's population at the *Alteratie* and therefore there were few truly native Amsterdam families who did not have Catholic relatives who had not converted to protestantism until the end of the sixteenth century or even later. Among the best know of these are perhaps Rembrandt whose parents both came from practising Catholic families[50] and the poet Vondel whose own religion at the end was openly declared.[51] So while Amsterdam was not likely to be a city to attract Catholic immigrants, it did not make it impossible for them to live there. Their "hidden churches" flourished and Catholic merchants were to be found among the English community. There were also protestant dissenting groups, principally the Mennonites who had been practising since the early days of the Reformation, and they were treated in much the same way as the separatist groups in the English and German churches until the 1670s when they were finally accepted as native Hollanders. But other sects like the Quakers, Collegiants and Fifth Monarchists remained beyond the pale.

The subject of Amsterdam as a home for refugees is on the face of it an easy one to deal with. Perhaps there is less direct evidence for the South Netherlandish immigrants who had moved after the Union of Utrecht, but for the purposes of this discussion it has to be assumed that now in the second or third generation they can be considered by the late seventeenth century as native Hollanders, since most conformed to the tenets of the reformed church and were eligible for all the benefits and offices open to native Hollanders (among the Amsterdam regency in the 1670s were, for instance, representatives of the Flemish Sautijn and Scott families). They had moved to the city during its expansion and played a fundamental part in establishing its economic supremacy. For the most part their importance for further immigration was their contacts in other parts of Europe where persecution or economic oppression might create a need for a more friendly environment.

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50. G. Schwartz, *Rembrandt*, p. 18.

51. Schama, *Embarrassment of Riches*, p. 97.

But the building works mentioned at the beginning of this chapter required the labour of skilled craftsmen who were drawn from within the Republic, from the Spanish Netherlands, from France, from Germany and from England: craftsmen whose skills could be used to perpetuate the image of wealth (for example Quellinius, the Flemish sculptor of the Town Hall gable), artists who could provide the kind of portraits and allegoric scenes for the perpetuation of the myth of family prestige and fortune.[52] All these workmen added to a population which needed services such as housing, food, clothing, education and not least churches. And they needed the approval and cooperation of the regents for their activities beyond their labour. The Amsterdam book trade had begun to burgeon in the 1660s with the influx of French booksellers[53] and the opening up of the market for anti-Catholic propaganda material and resulted in an expansion of all the associated trades and skills in much the same way.

There is evidence in abundance of Amsterdam's willingness to accommodate refugees and immigrants, not only internal outcasts like Koelman, but exiles like Le Clerc who settled in Amsterdam in the 1680s as the protegée of Phillip van Limbourch, with whom he taught at the University.[54] We should, however note the status of Amsterdam in the "Republic of Letters", which although partly a centre of theological and philosophical debate, was rather more a city of practical activity. Hence its book trade, which was organised principally for profit became the centre of freedom of speech, but many of its authors were just as likely to be found in Leiden, Rotterdam, Utrecht and Middelburg, or in France and England. The views of the publishers were therefore no doubt an expeditious combination of their native ideologies and the demands of the market place.[55] Hence Pierre Bayle was living in Rotterdam after 1681, but his monthly *News of the Republic of Letters*

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52. K. Fremantle, *The Baroque Town Hall of Amsterdam*, pp. 49ff.

53. Nusteling, *Welwaart en Werkgelegenheid in Amsterdam*, p. 149.

54. R.L. Colie, *Light and Enlightenment* (Cambridge 1957), p. 31.

55. The Amsterdam book trade capitalised on the re-emergence of the "Cartesian and Cocceian controversies" in the 1670s, selling books and pamphlets devoted to the discussions, Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 897.

was published in Amsterdam.[56]

The well-known refugees are only the very tip of the iceberg. The majority of immigrants were artisans and potential merchants who came with their entire families to establish themselves as fully participating city residents. They were expected to become part of the Dutch Reformed Church, unless they were practising members of "separatist" sects, Catholics or Jews. In order to qualify for welfare assistance and to facilitate worship in their own language they were given their own churches, the Lutherans first, followed by the Walloons in 1578 and the English in 1605. Alice Carter has suggested that the burgomasters had greater control over these churches than over the native Dutch ones principally because there was a smaller number of possible candidates for clerical office.[57]

Regular subsidies were made to the immigrant churches and their poorhouses.[58] By 1682, it was felt that it was time to draw up a general directive on the treatment of French immigrants and the conditions of their residence. There had already been generous allowances made to French immigrants during the previous few years when it was becoming clear that the idea of toleration had been abandoned in France. The trend in France, which had begun early in the century after the assassination of Henri IV, was by the 1680s only too clear for those who had lost most of the rights they had achieved a hundred years earlier. Refugees normally continue to migrate to states where their predecessors have had a reasonable reception. They will find compatriots speaking their own language and with a basis in their culture, who have adapted to the economic and social structures of their new homes, and this was certainly the case with the Huguenots. To the

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56. E. Labrousse, *Pierre Bayle*, Denys Potts, trs., (Oxford, 1983), p.30.

57. A. C. Carter, *The English Reformed Church in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century* (Amsterdam 1964), p. 41. Carter's study, focused on the English Church does not take full account of the status of the Dutch Reformed Church. The burgomasters intervention may have appeared light of touch, but their influence was not to be underestimated.

58. For examples see G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 23 March 1682 (Nederduits church); 5 December 1682 (Walloon church).

advantages of some familiarity were added the willingness of the Dutch to offer "a variety of fiscal and social inducements" to those with skills and sufficient economic means.[59] And in 1681 one thousand houses had been built for Huguenots at nominal rents.[60]

Amsterdam, like many European cities, had its share of Jewish immigrants, first the Sephardic refugees from Portugal and Spain who found a city where they could live, work and, most importantly in the case of the marranos, revert to their own religion. They first arrived in about 1593, were given permission to have a separate place of worship five years later, a consecrated burial ground in 1614, and given final permission for public worship in 1619. In 1639 they built a new synagogue, but not until 1657 were they acknowledged as Dutch citizens but without full rights. Between 1669 and 1675 two new synagogues were built with the approval of the city government, the largest in Europe, which set a new trend for the status of the Jews in Amsterdam. But by accepting the restrictions which were more lenient than those to which they had been accustomed, they were able to establish a role in the structure of the city which became indispensable to its economic function. Therefore the regents were inclined to take an interest in the well-being of the Jewish community, and even to encourage interchange of intellectual ideas, in a way they did not with the separatist groups of the protestant religion. By the middle of the century, the Jewish community was facing its own divisions with the numbers swollen by the Ashkenazi immigrants from Eastern Europe. These did not bring as many advantages to the Netherlands as the Sephardi and the majority of them settled in the eastern provinces. But where they did come to Amsterdam they were treated by the regents in the same way, if they were able to support themselves without undue difficulty.

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59. G.C. Gibbs, "The Reception of the Huguenots in England and the Dutch Republic, 1680-1690", in O.P. Grell, J.I. Israel, N. Tyacke, eds., *From Persecution to Toleration, The Glorious Revolution and Religion in England* (Oxford, 1991), pp. 299-300.

60. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 23 September 1681, when consent was given that "*vrijheden en exemption aan de supplianten te willen stellen*". Res. Vroed. 22 November 1682; G C Gibbs, "Some Intellectual and Political Influences", *B.M.G.N.*, xc, afl.2 (1975), p. 260.

There is no doubt that a degree of toleration towards all religions was implemented in Amsterdam throughout the seventeenth century, and therefore it was always likely to be one of the first places of refuge particularly for protestant dissenters and Jews.[61] But toleration meant just that in most cases; it was not an open ended invitation for all to come and practise their own particular brand of their religion at will, neither did it carry automatic rights of citizenship. These rights and privileges were restricted only to those who were prepared to conform, at least in word if not in deed, to what was in effect the state church. Once they had been accepted, the regents were then more accommodating and were prepared to accept and even encourage theological debate, but only as long as the ground rules of outward observance were acknowledged. But religious toleration was also limited by the social administration of the city. The welfare of the citizens was treated as important, particularly where their needs and the primary economic function of the city coincided; the indigenous poor, elderly and orphaned were looked after, but they were not encouraged from elsewhere. Amsterdam was not a city to create ghettos of impoverished refugees. The principle of toleration was utilitarian rather than founded on any philosophical principle, and the regents never tired of repeating that foreign trade would inevitably be destroyed by the establishment of an exclusive Calvinist supremacy, which would deny participation in the economic life to those immigrant groups such as the Jews who had financial and other resources to contribute to the wealth of the Republic.

Only those who conformed to the Dutch Reformed Church were accorded full citizen status. Those whose protestantism was aligned to the Calvinist/Lutheran tradition were more easily assimilated, but the English protestants, whose reformation had started on a different base, tended to be more eccentric and the sects which emerged were not always willing to conform. The most prominent among these were of course the Brownists, but there were several other sects which also set up in Amsterdam, but not within the English congregation.

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61. Boogman, "Union of Utrecht", p. 279; Bergsma, "Church, state and people", p. 203 quoting Article 13 of the Union of Utrecht: "provided that each person shall remain free in his religion..."

All these immigrants - most of whom came because their beliefs were such that they were not prepared to adjust to the dictums of the ruling orthodoxy in their native land - created problems amongst themselves which had to be faced by the Amsterdam regents. Hence in 1660 the regents were not anxious to alienate the Jewish hierarchy who had excommunicated Spinoza and they may have encouraged his absence from Amsterdam, although his friendship with Hudde was renewed when he moved to Voorburg in 1664.[62] He would have been welcomed back in the 1670s but he chose to move from the relative isolation of Voorburg to The Hague, ostensibly out of concern for his health.[63]

The reasons for the tolerance shown by Amsterdam to these refugees are of course as well known as their refuge. And the fact that Amsterdam in no way encouraged the impoverished from its own environs to set up permanent home in the city but moved them on at the first opportunity makes it clear that philanthropy was hand in glove with economic advantage. The skills and wealth brought by many of the refugees, together with their exclusion from municipal office for at least a generation, permanently in the case of the non-congregational sects, provided a strong substructure for the activities of the merchant elite. Prejudices can be easily overlooked if those concerned can provide welcome services but are prevented from becoming part of the elite. Not only money, financial skills and new economic activity were brought in, but also vast international networks could be linked into to the advantage of all. In particular the Amsterdam regency did not flinch from acquiring many French connections. The standard of living for the Amsterdammers continued to rise throughout the period,[64] encouraged in part by the influence and wealth of the immigrant population.

There had been many Anglican exiles from England during the first half of the

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62. A. Wolf, trs., *The Oldest Biography of Spinoza* (New York, 1927), p. 55-6; R. Scruton, *Spinoza* (New York 1986), p. 8; Meinsma, *Spinoza en zijn Kring*, p. 258.

63. Wolf, *Spinoza*, p. 59.

64. Nusteling, *Welwaart en Werkgelegenheid in Amsterdam*, pp. 98-9.

seventeenth century - and after the Restoration there was a new generation of puritans who were also likely to be political refugees. The English church in Amsterdam was prone to conflict because of the presence of the separatist groups who were not part of the congregations. In addition to these there were many English merchants operating in Amsterdam on a semi-permanent basis who did not consider themselves as part of the resident community. And when in 1679 English Catholic merchants in Amsterdam and Rotterdam were known to be supplying arms to Ireland, this was not likely to endear them to their protestant compatriots domiciled in Amsterdam.[65] The Ambassador Sidney tried to quash rumours of discontent among English ministers in 1680.[66] But perhaps more important to the argument here, Sir William Waller complained that the treatment the English protestants received from the Amsterdam authorities was less than fair and in the end he left and went to live in Geneva.[67] The English agent William Carr maintained that those responsible for problems two years later were Brownists who were out to cause trouble by supporting political refugees like Shaftesbury and Atterbury who were given a refuge in Amsterdam in December 1682.

> "We have a junto of very bad men mett together in this citty, members of the Bronist Church went to the Burgomaster to tell that Shaftesbury had fled for religious reasons + desired refuge in Amsterdam."[68]

Carr told the burgomasters not to be taken in, but his advice was ignored and Shaftesbury and Atterbury were made burgers and given a house in Amsterdam.[69] This was clearly a case of the regents taking a decision on political grounds rather than consulting the wishes of the orthodox English church. They may have been more convinced by the Earl than by Carr, whom the former, after visiting him on 5

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65. P. R.O., SP84/215, f.138 De Wilde to Meredith 10 June 1679.

66. *Ibid.*, f.237, Letter from Sidney, 1 May 1680.

67. P. R.O., SP84/215, f.237. K.H.D. Haley, *The First Earl of Shaftesbury* (Oxford, 1968), p. 729, note 2, describes Waller as "the fanatical puritan magistrate who had been the scourge of London Catholics, had preceded the Earl [of Shaftesbury] into exile and was to receive him on 2 December."

68. P. R.O., SP84/217, f.80, Carr to Blaythwayt, 16 August 1680.

69. *Ibid.*, f.153.

December, described as "an impudent adventurer" and "an obvious spy".[70]

By seventeenth century standards Amsterdam was physically a pleasant city to live in, for the wealthy, the skilled craftsmen and small traders. Improvements continued throughout the 1670s and 1680s with the introduction of street lighting, the improvement of the waterways, and the general maintenance and extension of the fabric of the city and the large subsidies (always dependent on strict accountability) made to the almshouses, orphanages etc;[71] in 1673 the *vroedschap* had agreed that the management of the finances of the almshouses should be at the discretion of the burgomasters.[72]

The practical and spiritual welfare of the population of Amsterdam were not the only aspects of life in which the regency took an active interest. Entertainment and education also came under their control and scrutiny. In 1672 theatres had been closed in Amsterdam because of the crisis, but although they were not opened officially for another five years,[73] this did not preclude a blind eye being turned to some forms of theatrical entertainments and a troupe of French actors was welcomed in the city for a month in 1673.[74] Once the closures had been lifted theatres operated under fairly rigorous censorship, but William and Mary themselves were patrons of the theatre, making a rare informal visit to the opera in Amsterdam in 1681.

Commentators were beginning to see French influences in the social life of the

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70. K.H.D.Haley, *The First Earl of Shaftesbury* (Oxford, 1968), p. 729.

71. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 14 July, 1673, 14 December 1679, 14 April 1681 (dealing with the treatment of beggars in religious houses); 23 March 1682.

72. *Ibid.*, 23 June 1673.

73. Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 694: the pressure for the reopening was led by van Beuningen and Hudde in the face of determined opposition from the stricter Voetian Calvinists.

74. P. Scheltema, *Amstels Oudheid, of gedenkwaardigheden van Amsterdam*, (1855-1885), Vol. 1 , p. 103.

cities, not only in theatre and entertainment, but also in the personal habits of the population.

> "Go no further than to Amsterdam, or more especially to the Hagh, where you may observe all to be turned perfect Monsieurs, and in Amsterdam the old Hollander is so changed that there is scarce such a creature to be found..."[75]

The influence of the French was particularly noticed in women's fashions,[76] but Gregori Leti also noticed that the cosmopolitan nature of the population of Amsterdam led to a tolerance of a wide range of dress styles.[77] The influence of immigrants on the city cannot be overlooked. Amsterdam was by seventeenth century standards a large city. In common with many other major trading cities it had a large non-native population, many temporary residents, but many real immigrants. Most of these immigrants came from states whose cultural development was on a par with the Dutch and therefore less likely to be overwhelmed by their adopted city's culture. The influences of the Jewish community were widely felt, not only in the development of sound financial institutions, but also in representational art, architecture and fashion. Many seventeenth century paintings and prints of the Dam show not only the relatively sober dress of the Dutch merchant, but also the more lavish decoration of the

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75. Kn. 11485, "A Representation of the present Affairs and Interests of the most considerable parts of Europe more especially those of the Netherlands: as they now stand in the beginning of the year 1677. Laid open in a Letter from Holland by a lover of Truth and Race". It is difficult to establish whether the French influences came from the Huguenot immigrants, or from the diplomatic and trading links with France during this period. Were they a reflection of the changes being effected by the French court, or a more basic acquirement from those fleeing that court? Gregori Leti, *Teatro Belgico, o vero Ritratti historici, chronologici, politici, e geografici, delle sette provincie unite* (Amsterdam, 1690) Part 2, Book 8, p, 340 shows that the spread of French immigrant families across the social spectrum in the 1670s and 1680s in Amsterdam, was on a ratio of 3/4 rich families to about 300 of middle income, but many artisans and labourers. Such a distribution would certainly have had a widespread influence.

76. *Ibid.*

77. Leti, *op. cit.*, p. 330.

foreign merchants.[78] In May 1681 during negotiations with France where the main points are the trade in the East Indies, Africa and the Levant, comments were also made on the migration of protestant merchants, artisans and manufacturers into Amsterdam. The theme was in support of Dutch aims to reassert their trade, but did not lose the opportunity to praise their toleration to immigrants.[79]

The involvement of the burger class in the government not only of the city but also of the States brought a non-noble stratum of society into the wider European diplomatic society. Education abroad was not restricted to the aristocracy, but was available to the sons of relatively wealthy merchants. For example, Nicolaes Witsen travelled broadly from Moscow to Oxford, both as part of his education and his early years in the service of the States.[80] Such a privileged education was of course readily available to the sons of the wealthy merchant and regent class, but a basic education was also available to a large proportion of children, even though writing was not considered an essential and had to be paid for.[81] Both the church and the regency had considerable influence in the schools. Nicolaes Tulp and Joan Commelin, who entered the *vroedschap* in 1672, were both professors at the *Athenaeum Illustrae*,[82] and other members had official appointments within both the *Athenaeum* and the *Latijnsch Schole*.[83] As with their influence within the church organisation, the regency supported the teaching of the stricter ideals of the Reformed Church within the schools, but encouraged their own sons to experience

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78. See for example Gerrit Adriaenz Berckheyde, *The New Town Hall of Amsterdam, c.1675*, Coll. Amsterdams Historisch Museum.

79. G.A. Amsterdam, *Collectie Hudde*, nr. 47, 1 May 1681.

80. Witsen accompanied Boreel on his embassy to Moscow in 1664, taking with him a list of questions from his professors and visited the patriarch Nikon, J.J. Driessen, *Russen en Nederlanders uit de Geschiedenis van de Betrekkingen tussen Nederland en Rusland 1600-1917* (The Hague, 1989), p. 59.

81. Israel, *Dutch Republic*, pp.686-90.

82. Appendix I.

83. For example both Dr. Roetert Ernst and Nicholas Opmeer were "*curator der Illustre Schole en Scholarch der Latijnsche Schole*", Elias, *Vroedschap*, nos.172 and 213.

the wider debates in the universities.

The expansion of world trade opened the eyes of the humblest trader to the wealth of culture and commodities, which all passed through the Amsterdam warehouses. Although a number of people did go out to live more or less permanently in the newly acquired colonies or the "fort and factories" of the trading companies, more probably only went for a few years and then returned.[84] Their knowledge and experience of a wider world contributed to the assimilation of those aspects of foreign cultures which could be usefully integrated with the Dutch.

It was in the interests of the Amsterdammers to establish and maintain favourable trade with all parts of the ever-expanding commercial world, and in the next chapter we will see how this interest informed the political activities of the regency.

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84. Boxer, *Dutch Seaborne Empire*, p. 245.

Chapter 5

Economic Interest and the Politics of Amsterdam

In terms of economic history, the years 1672 to 1684 are a very short period. And examining the economic history of one city for such a short period makes for a contracted study, notwithstanding that that city is Amsterdam on the crest of the Golden Age. However, as part of the purpose here is to examine how the economic situation influenced those who were in a position to determine foreign policy, that is the regent class and those with whom they shared common interests among the non-regent merchant class, traditional methods of analysis cannot be strictly employed.

Contemporary observers were as constrained as economic forecasters are today in making judgements about the situation and the actions necessary to rectify unsatisfactory trends. Unlike economic historians, they could not put events into an historical context, but merely make comparisons with past developments and future ambitions. And if economic historians themselves, with the advantage of hindsight, are very divided as to whether the 1670s and 1680s were in fact the beginning of economic decline in the Dutch Republic, the future must have been even more obscure to those involved in the decision-making.[1]

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[1]. De Vries and van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy*, p. 412, have recently revived this debate, arguing that the 1660s and 1670s saw the beginnings of a change in the Dutch economy resulting from the mercantilist activities of England and later France, under Colbert's policies, and *ibid.*, p. 675: "... the ongoing elaboration of restrictive laws governing foreign trade, especially by England and France, brought the growth of international trade to a standstill and put the Republic - the all-too-conspicuous beneficiary of free trade - under increasing pressure". Their argument, based on a wealth of detailed evidence, is very convincing, but it does appear rather perverse that they are unwilling to accept any correlation between political events and economic activity, *ibid.* p. 674. While Israel, "The Amsterdam Stock Exchange and the Revolution of 1688", in J.I. Israel, *Conflicts of Empires* (London, 1997), p. 328 sees the crash of 1672 "occasioned by invasion" as a cause for the cessation of public building and the dramatic slump in the property market, De Vries and van de Woude argue that this was a growing trend from 1663 which culminated in the halt in investment in land and improvements in 1672. Writing in the 1680s, the Italian, Gregori Leti, *Teatro Belgico*, p. 317 observed that Amsterdam's "*aggrandimento*" had ended in 1675, as a result of the war.

By the late seventeenth century economic theories were developing, many of which were related to the amount of money in circulation and the benefits of trade. No longer were governments closely constrained by the belief that there was a finite amount of wealth in the world, but were developing a deeper understanding of the methods for creating wealth. Planning therefore was a positive part of economic life, based on current trends, experience of the past and assumptions about the future. For the Dutch Republic the main considerations were competition in the long-distance carrying trades, control of international re-export trade and appropriate fiscal mechanisms. Therefore their concern was principally in those overseas areas where they were seeking to expand and maintain their interest at the expense of England and France, the inland European markets, the more entrenched traditional European supply sources from the Baltic, and the Fisheries. Imposition of taxes or rules of trade by their major competitors were seen as a direct threat to the sovereignty of the economic strength which underpinned the Republic. French tariffs and English Navigation Acts became issues for the development of foreign policy and played a major part in the waging of war in the late seventeenth century.

Amsterdam's population peaked in 1681 at about 220,000.[2] No doubt the steady growth in numbers to that date was in large part due to the establishment of immigrant families, and the halt in the 1690s to the general pressures on population then operating throughout western Europe. However it is interesting to note that this peak was achieved before 1685, when the flood of Huguenots are generally assumed to have left France. Graham Gibbs quotes the figures for the Walloon Church in Amsterdam's new arrivals in the years 1681-89 as a total of 5,840, of whom the largest proportion came between 1685 and 1688 (3,977) with the peak years 1686 (1,246) and 1687 (1,067).[3] In fact, the Amsterdam *vroedschap* was

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2. For details of the estimates of Amsterdam's population in the seventeenth century, see H. Nusteling, *Welwaart en Werkgelegendheid in Amsterdam*, Appendix I (Appendix III below).

3. G.C. Gibbs, "The Reception of the Huguenots in England and the Dutch Republic", p. 279.

already discussing the problem of the large influx of Huguenots in 1681 and 1682, although still taking a largely paternalistic attitude towards them.[4] But, although these particular immigrants may have had political and economic significance for the regents, they were only a small part of the wide range of immigrants choosing Amsterdam for their refuge. Between 1681 and 1705 it is estimated that about 2.6 per cent of the population of Amsterdam were French refugees.[5] Besides the Huguenots from France immigrants included, of course, the protestants from the Southern Netherlands, Jews and marranos from Spain and Portugal and religious and political refugees other parts of Europe, the growing Jewish community, and even traders from other Holland towns.[6]

It would therefore appear to be justified to say that by the 1680s Amsterdam had attracted the optimum number of immigrants with commercial expertise and capital, financial acumen or manufacturing skills, from among those who felt that the city would offer them not only safety from persecution, but also economic security. Limitations on public service restricted most immigrants with wealth to the commercial sector and attitudes towards the poor did not encourage settlement of unemployable immigrants, despite the avowedly greater concern shown generally for the welfare of the population. Taken alongside the immigrants, there was not a noticeable number of native Amsterdammers leaving the city for economic advantage elsewhere, either within the Republic or overseas. Boxer has shown that there was little success in the colonies in attracting settlers from the Republic, beyond the lower calibre of direct employees of the commercial companies.[7]

Overall a growing population, attracting immigrants for positive economic reasons, was one of the main advantages for Amsterdam in the 1670s and 1680s. This advantage was sustained by the constant monitoring of the immigrants, by

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4. See above p. 76.

5. Gibbs, *op. cit.*, pp. 295-96.

6. Leti, *Teatro Belgico*, pp. 333-40.

7. Boxer *Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800*, pp. 215-22.

restrictions on some of their activities and by positive encouragement of those who might be a burden, to re-emigrate. Unlike Rotterdam, Amsterdam did not encourage the establishment of foreign-owned firms within the city apart from political and religious refugees with the right credentials, and therefore on the whole wealth generated in Amsterdam remained within the City to the benefit of the citizens.[8]

There were close links between the ruling regents and the merchant class. Aspirants to the regency normally came from the merchant class and the marriage alliances between wealthy merchant houses and the families of regents supported the greater success of both sides, financially and politically. Some merchant houses remained outside the ruling class themselves, but established such close links through marriage and shareholding that their influence was almost as great as that of their regent relatives and colleagues. During the 1680s one of the most closely linked, non-regent merchant families was that of the merchant house of Hochepied, whose daughter Catarina had married Nicolaes Witsen in December 1674.

Even at the wealthiest and most powerful levels there was still strong involvement in, or at least dependence upon, active commerce. Louis Trip, who was brought into the *vroedschap* in 1672, as an ally (and father-in-law) of Valckenier, was - and remained primarily - involved in the family munitions trade, with close links with the de Geers in Sweden.[9] Two other leading regents, Huydecooper and Boreel, had married directly into a branch of the Trip family joined by marriage to the powerful, but non-regent Coymans family. So although Huydecooper was himself above the basics of trade, his family involvement was so close that commercial concerns were still paramount.

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8. P.W. Klein, '"Little London"', British merchants in Rotterdam during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries', D. C. Coleman and Peter Mathias, ed., *Enterprise and History, Essays in honour of Charles Wilson* (Cambridge, 1984), p. 117.

9. For full details of the Trip family's commercial connections in Sweden, America and with the *V.O.C.*, see Klein, *De Trippen*, pp. 474-75.

However, aside from this example, we can see that this widespread system of intermarriage and family alliances gave great advantages to the Amsterdam regent and merchant classes. The number and diversity of commercial, trading and financial concerns in Amsterdam were such that intermarriage was spread throughout a very large class which, far from contracting as a result, was still expanding by the development of new organisations and the immigration already mentioned above. And of the seventy members of the *vroedschap* from 1672 to 1684, at least twenty-two (approximately one third) were still closely identified with the original basis of their wealth in trade. Appendix I lists the direct trading interests and connections of the members of the *vroedschap* and shows how wide and potentially powerful this top rank merchant class was. Particular attention is drawn to men like Corver, who was one of the dominant men of the 1680s and yet was not the rentier oligarch of the smaller towns. In fact in the 1670s, starting with the *wetsverzetting*, the Amsterdam *vroedschap* began to attract proportionately more merchants than in the recent past as merchants from immigrant families like the Sautijns and Scotts also began to move into the regent class, providing an injection of fresh blood not readily available in smaller towns. Seven of the ten new members introduced at the *wetsverzetting* in September 1672 were identified as "merchants".

There is a problem in defining "active participation in commerce". It is, of course, recognised that the demands of municipal office would preclude full-time commitment to business, but where there is some evidence that members were taking an active "interest" in their business concerns, they have been included as "merchants". The actual degree of participation would need a detailed study of the day-to-day running of the various merchant houses and their employees. No doubt the regent merchants of the 1670s were of a different mould from their grandfathers, because they were operating in a different time and in an established commercial world. And full participation in the day-to-day affairs of the city, which was taken seriously by most members of the *vroedschap* would of course preclude much time being spent on other business. But in order to make the most of their connections, influence and interest within the ruling group, they would

certainly have to be fully cognisant of the current concerns of what was after all the basis of their financial and regent status. The majority lived in the city within close walking distance of all the primary organs of trade, all of which were within "a few minutes walk" of each other;[10] and even those with country estates also had town houses. For example Hasselaer lived on the Keizersgracht "*over de brouwerij 'de Kroon'*" and had an estate at Hofstede on the Vecht. However, on the whole it was only a minority, among whom were several of the more influential regents in the 1670s and 1680s, who also owned property outside Amsterdam.[11]

And, immediately below these in social ranking, and perhaps in some cases exceeding them in wealth and potential influence, were merchants, manufacturers and financiers, many originally from immigrant families, dominated by the likes of those already mentioned - Coymans, Deutz, and Hochepied - but also including van Bambeeck, Bartolotti and others, many of whom, like Lanschot, Stabroek and Pellicorne, exerted their influence in local chambers of the trading companies independently of family connections.[12] These were the men who provided much of the capital for commercial investment, and, for example, without Coymans' money the new *West Indische Compagnie* would have failed within its first ten years.[13]

Not only did this network represent an enormous amount of wealth for investment but with its connections in all parts of the Republic's trading empire it had a strong and active interest in the Republic's foreign policy. The strength of capital enabled

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[10]. De Vries, *First Modern Economy*, p. 148, Map 4.1.

[11]. Among those with properties outside Amsterdam were Pancras, Geelvinck, Hasselaer, Hulft, Huydecooper, De Graeff, De Vicq (Dr. F.), Corver, Ranst, Witsen, Trip and Commelin . See Appendix I for the known addresses of the members of the *vroedschap* from 1672-1684.

[12]. Of these financiers, the oldest merchant banking house was Weduwe Jean Deutz and Co., which first lent money to the Emperor in 1659 during the period while Deutz's brother-in-law, De Witt was in control of the foreign policy of the Dutch Republic, de Vries, *First Modern Economy*, p. 139 and 141.

[13]. One or two of these merchants did have representation on the important, but less prestigious offices, such as *thesauris extraordinaris*, for example Pellicorne in 1672 and Bambeeck in 1679.

the Bank of Amsterdam to conduct its cashiers' business free until 1683, and the Bank withstood the run on it in 1672, despite having debts repayable at call of over *fl.*7m.[14] A brief study of the rate of bankruptcies in Amsterdam between 1670 and 1688 shows that despite the small increase in the war years, there was a resilience among the core of the commercial world. Bankruptcies increased from 111 in 1671 to 136 in 1673 and 137 in 1675, although they dropped to 97 in 1674, and dropped again to 83 in 1683.[15] Interest rates remained low, rising from 3.5 per cent in 1673 to 4.5 per cent, but quickly being reduced to 3.5 per cent again on conclusion of the peace in 1678.[16]

There was also one other advantage enjoyed by Amsterdam which by 1680, as the English consul, William Carr noted, was not enjoyed by many other cities.[17] The demise of strong men like Valckenier and Hooft at the end of the 1670s did not leave Amsterdam without able men. Van Beuningen, who remained a force of some weight well into the 1680s, was one of the first to argue in favour of peace in 1675 on the grounds that one small South Netherlands town was not worth the trade of Amsterdam. Nicolaes Witsen produced a treatise on shipping, *Aeloude en Hedendaegsche Scheepsbouw en Bestier*, in 1671[18] and throughout his years of service to the City there was hardly a subject on which he could not speak or write to great effect. In 1678 he was instrumental in restoring trading links with France through the Southern Netherlands,[19] and in 1679 he worked hard to establish a fair

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14. V. Barbour, *Capitalism in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century* (Michigan, 1963), p.44; Israel, "Amsterdam Stock Exchange", p. 328; De Vries, *First Modern Economy*, p. 133: the Amsterdam bank "weathered the storm of 1672 nicely since it held in its vaults a metal stock sufficient to cover 90 per cent of total deposits".

15. W. F. H. Oldewelt, 'Twee Eeuw Amsterdamse faillissementen en het verloop van de conjunctuur (1636 tot 1838)', *Tijdschrift*, LXXVI (1962), pp. 421-35.

16. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 3 January 1673 and 16 October 1679.

17. B.L.Add.41820 f12, W. Carr to W. Blaythwayt Amsterdam 21 March 1681 (Appendix II).

18. Gebhard, *Witsen*, pp. 63-73.

19. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 2 April 1678.

deal for the Dutch in the Baltic. He pressed the negotiators for:

> *"egaliteit der tollen niet anders en worden geconsideert als andere landschappen en plaetsen by syn Majesteit van Sweden geconquesteert, en sulx de Hollands schepen op die drie gewyde provincien traficquerende egael gestelt niet de Sweedsche."*[20]

At a more fundamental level the mathematical brain of Johannes Hudde was applied throughout the 1670s to making improvements to the accounting systems which were implemented in the 1680s. His activities were not restricted to Amsterdam itself; he was also closely involved with Paulus de Roo, who was based in Batavia, in reorganising the accounting system for the *V.O.C.*[21] After 1683 Hudde concentrated his efforts on the *V.O.C*, taking over as President and consolidating the influence of the ruling oligarchy in the activities of the major trading company.[22] Cornelis Geelvinck had a superior knowledge of the workings of the financial organs of the City and, together with Witsen and Hudde, was able to apply his efficient methods to the improvements to the city's waterways which were essential for the defence of the city, the maintenance of amenities and principally for the improvement of traffic movement. In 1682 Hudde took these improvements further and introduced a system of measuring the water level in the Ij, thus providing a regular and accurate indication of sea levels as a further aid to shipping.[23] These men may have been rentiers, they may have formed an oligarchy, but over and above the struggles of local power politics, they were making positive contributions to sustaining the commercial life of the city, including financing drainage schemes.[24]

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[20]. *Ibid.*, 17 May 1679.

[21]. F. Gaastra, *Bewind en Belied bij de V.O.C. 1672-1702* (Zutphen, 1989), p. 253; For further discussion on Hudde's work and the suggestions made by Johannes Phoonsens, see J. G. van Dillen, *Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis der Wisselbanken* (The Hague 1925), Part I, 165-78.

[22]. F.W. Stapel, "Johannes Hudde over de balansen van de Oost Indische Compagnie", *E.H.J.*, xiii (1927), p. 217.

[23]. Lambert, *Dutch Landscape*, p. 218.

[24]. *Ibid.*, p. 214.

The level of civic improvements throughout the 1670s and 1680s was of a less prestigious nature than the building of the town hall in the 1660s, but were a direct result of the buoyancy of confidence within the city and the need to maintain and improve standards to meet the current demands. Although in the early years of the 1670s they were mainly directed towards defence, they were soon more clearly connected with the practical concerns of the city's welfare, safety and hygiene. Together with the improvements to the waterways and sluices, bridges were improved and many new ones built,[25] street lighting was introduced through the innovative skills of van de Heyden as a safety and security measure.[26] Such improvements would not have been possible without large expenditure, good housekeeping and a skilled workforce, all of which resources Amsterdam had.

Much of the concern of the Amsterdammers throughout the 1670s and 1680s was with taxation, but for those determining policy, the constant high level of duties on consumables was not a serious problem. This, as ever, was a problem for those on lower incomes who spent the larger proportion of their income on necessaries.[27] It only became a problem therefore where it affected the level of consumption, and this was not generally the case in a period of growing demand. However, greater concern was felt over personal taxation[28] and import duties, particularly where this was related to war expenditure. This will be looked at in more detail in chapter 9, but the latter will be referred to from time to time where appropriate during the following discussion. The complexities of import duties are fairly predictable: whether they affected the cost of internal manufactures; whether they prevented the import of competitive goods; whether they were imposed equally throughout the

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25. See below p. 132, note 58.

26. Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 681. In 1670, 1800 street lamps had been installed and a further 600 added by the time of the Peace of Nijmegen in 1678.

27. De Vries, *First Modern Economy*, pp. 103-5. Before 1675 no-one was exempt from taxation under the *gemeene middelen*, which covered all the main consumer goods, but after 1675 a system of exemptions related to income was introduced.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 107, wealth taxes, the 100th and 200th *penningh*, were levied as the need arose and the latter was levied twenty-eight times between 1671 and 1678, during the war with France.

Republic, or on goods from different sources; and, whether they damaged the potential for re-export.

And of course all these questions were borne in mind during decision-making where the fundamental issues were related to the political and military decisions about foreign policy.

By the 1670s the Amsterdam domination of the *V.O.C.* was so great as to make it in effect an Amsterdam company. Over half the capital was owned in Amsterdam and until 1684 at least, the *V.O.C.* was still expanding.[29] In contrast to the trials of the old *W.I.C.*, the Charter for the *V.O.C.* was renewed free in 1672 as payment for services in the second Anglo-Dutch war. So at the outset of hostilities, the company was confident and secure. Throughout the 1670s it was able to withstand several setbacks which would have finished weaker organisations. In 1672, the *V.O.C.* lent money to the States as part of the war effort, but repayments were of course slow and the company was at the same time faced with interest rates in the East Indies 3 per cent above those in force at home, interest payments rising from *fl.*200,000 in 1670 to *fl.*700,000 in 1675.[30] The effect of this in 1673 was that creditors had to be - and, more importantly, were - satisfied with company bonds rather than payments. Throughout these years the Company was heavily indebted to loans authorised through Amsterdam mainly to offset slow returns on expeditions, but these loans were always agreed and, after 1676, when a dividend was paid for the first time during the war, became more rare.[31] This mutual support system worked to the advantage of both the City and the Company.

Glamann has argued that all the Anglo-Dutch wars ended to the advantage of the Dutch in the East Indies, but the *V.O.C.* did not necessarily see that they had

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29. F. Gaastra. "The Shifting Balance of Trade of the Dutch East India Company", L. Blussé and F. Gaastra, ed., *Companies and Trade: Essays on overseas trading companies during the Ancien Regime* (Leiden, 1981), p. 48.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

secured their position thereby, and they continued to see the English as the strong rival it was in this long-distance trade.

The arguments over the relevant clauses of the treaty of Westminster extended for almost a year after the peace was made in February 1674. To the English the Dutch were exposing their vulnerability by moving from a policy of *mare liberum* to *mare clausum*, while the English were pursuing the more open policy.[32] This was partly as a result of the stagnation in the development of Dutch shipping with which both the English and French were beginning to compete and the clauses in the English Navigation Acts insisting that their own trade should be carried on in English bottoms.[33]

Although in effect the balance between the Dutch and English carrying trade remained fairly stable, gains by the one being offset by losses elsewhere, the Amsterdammers saw three major factors as causing problems to their trade, which by 1680 they believed to be in serious trouble. They were able, after the Peace of Westminster in 1674, to re-establish the terms prevailing after the Peace of Breda in 1667, until 1678, but they felt that the English were in a strong position to capture markets which the Dutch war effort made vulnerable. This view was the more naive since they themselves had been able to exploit markets throughout the Eighty Years War, and was perhaps more a failure to understand the real causes of English expansion.

Secondly there was the evidence of falling prices. For example white pepper

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[32]. C.C. Goslinga, *The Dutch in the Caribbean* (van Gorcum, 1971), p. 473.

[33]. P. R.O. SP/84.197, f.31, Letter from Arlington 24 November 1674: "Mons. van Beuningen appeared soe good a temper and disposition towards the Treaty of Commerce which Mons. Fagell assures mee, he hath power and directions from hence to expedite..." but *ibid.*, f.85, 4/4 December 1674, Arlington wrote: "I am sorry to understand by yours that the Marine Treaty and that the Indies is not finisht, the Pensioner told mee hee had sent Monsieur van Beuningen such a power as he desired to conclude it, and I told him that I thought neither party would..."

prices dropped by a third between 1670 and 1687 (the low point being in 1680)[34], and this trend was reflected in other trades as well. But if prices were dropping in some of the older trades, new markets with new potential were being established, and it was in the East that one of the major new commodities, tea, was being established. Scheltema cites Tulp as one of the early promoters of the tea trade in Amsterdam.[35]

And finally, this perceived decline in the East India trade was reflected in falling share prices, which in 1670 were at 500, but by May 1678 had fallen to 428 and even with the recovery after the war had still not, in March 1681, reached 450.[36] Whether justified or not, this crisis of confidence largely determined their actions in the 1680s with strong reaffirmations of their commercial priorities. Policy during the Luxemburg crises of 1682-84 was argued very strongly on grounds that war would mean markets lost to England, if, as was most likely, she remained neutral.

Nevertheless, the East India trade was still, and was to remain for some years, one of the strengths of Dutch and particularly Amsterdam commerce, but there were changes taking place, because of the growing involvement of the English and to a lesser extent the French in the East, and because of the changes of supply and demand. As a result of this, consideration had to be given to the security of the trade, much of the pressure being exerted from within the Amsterdam chamber by

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34. W. A. Horst, 'De peperhandel van de Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie', *Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudhiedkunde*, R.vii, D.3 (1942), p. 99.

35. Scheltema, *Amstels Oudheid*, of gedenkwaardigheden van Amsterdam, 7 vols. (Amsterdam, 1855-1885), vol. i, p. 98; he also cites Witsen as one of the early promoters of coffee, particularly traded through Surinam.

36. Carr to Blaythwayt, 21 March 1681 (Appendix II); PRO SP/84 199, f.5, letter to Sir Joseph Williamson 7/17 May 1675: "...a second peece of newes is, that the East India Actions are fallen unto 428, and are like to fall on Monday next to 400..." For the pattern of share prices in the *V.O.C.* for the period 1671-1690, see J.I. Israel, Amsterdam Stock Exchange", Appendix, "Movement of the V.O.C. Share Prices (Amsterdam Chamber) 1671-90", p. 347.

Hochepied.[37] However by strengthening their own position, Amsterdam had a greater success in achieving supremacy over Zeeland rather than their overseas competitors, who were better equipped to withstand commercial antagonism. Problems were not unknown in the organisation of the *V.O.C.* in Batavia and as well as the intervention in the accounting system by Hudde, Amsterdam had sent out Dirck Blom in 1679 to take over as President of the *Heemraden* following the crisis of confidence in employees and consequent sackings.[38] The necessity of such intervention which took the highly unusual form of asking a member of the *vroedschap* to resign his seat and take his administrative expertise abroad shows just how important it was to Amsterdam to ensure that the company continued to run efficiently.

In the West Indies, the picture was very different from that in the East. In relation to the English the Treaty of Breda in 1667 had further strengthened the Dutch position in the East Indies, but in the West their acquisition of Surinam was in fact offset in the long run by the loss of New Netherlands. The West Indische Compagnie had been weakened during its struggle with Portugal, and the 1672-78 war with France had an outlying battle arena in the West Indies. The loss of the Barbados sugar was reflected in a fall in sugar as a percentage of total commodity sales in Amsterdam from 8.80 per cent in 1650 to 2.02 per cent in 1670 and 0.20 per cent in 1700.[39] But to the Dutch the greater loss at the time was that of Tobago to the French and the major market lost for the slave traders as the French began to establish their own sources of manpower in West Africa,[40] However, this loss was also principally a Zeeland loss, and although Amsterdam fought to the last to retain Tobago[41] she was still slave trading with the Spanish colony at Curacao.[42]

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37. R.A., The Hague, V.O.C. papers, 104.03, 20 July 1676.

38. Gaastra, *Bewind en Beleid*, p. 251.

39. K. Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade 1620-1740*, p. 14. Table 2.

40. C. C. Goslinga, *The Dutch in the Caribbean*, pp. 463-4; Menkman, *De West-Indische Compagnie*, p.150.

41. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., in particular October 1677.

This is perhaps the point at which clarification should be made about the difference between the Dutch problems with the English and the French. It is misleading to say that one or the other was the more serious competitor, because the interdependence and competition were on completely different bases. The English were by this time well established as competitors in the long-distance carrying trade, in the fisheries, and to a lesser extent in manufactures. But what England was not was a very important market for Dutch trade. The English did complain bitterly about imports of Dutch pottery, but this was justified by arguments that the English potteries were not supplying demand.[43] And when the Dutch succeeded at Breda in restoring some of their rights over carrying European hinterland trade for the English market they were establishing a superior position in the carrying trade rather than the market place. The latter half of the seventeenth century was a period when most of western Europe was developing a demand for consumables, and in a period of general expansion of trade to fulfil this demand at home the carriers were more likely to compete for suppliers than markets.[44]

But the French were one of the Republic's major customers, and sources of goods, whether raw materials like salt, or supplies of wines and cloths, as well as beginning to challenge the Dutch in carrying trades, mainly in the Mediterranean. We will look later at the Dutch/French trade, but suffice it to say at this stage that the distinctions between these two major developing economic powers and their relations with the Amsterdammers created different problems which, on the whole, demanded different solutions. We shall see that in the last resort the Amsterdammers managed to withstand the competition from both with a greater degree of success in the short term than their pessimism and misjudgment of the

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[42](...continued)

[42]. Goslinga, *op cit.*, 208.

[43]. P.R.O. SP/84 199, f.274-322, letter from van Beuningen to Charles II, November 1675, claiming that the Dutch were free to continue exporting pottery to England because the law enacted three years earlier banning Dutch imports was not yet effective.

[44]. De Vries, *First Modern Economy*, p. 421, demonstrates that by the 1670s the English had established a carrying trade completely separate from that of the Dutch.

situation justified.

But there were still some favourable developments in the West Indies for Amsterdam, if not for the Dutch Republic as a whole. The Amsterdammers in fact capitalised on Zeeland's misfortunes and in the early years of the war successfully privateered in the Caribbean, and losses to the English were recovered after the Peace of Westminster.[45] In 1679 only the Amsterdam and Stad and Land chambers of the *W.I.C.* were in profit, the Zeeland and Noordquartier chambers in particular making substantial losses.[46] Goslinga has argued that the losses in the Caribbean were to the advantage of the Dutch in that they removed a damaging financial burden, but losses were not generally seen as rationalisation at the time. However, the *Nieuwe West Indische Compagnie* which was set up in March 1674, after the Peace of Westminster and the agreement of status in the Caribbean between the Dutch and the English, did produce a more effective company with the balance once again definitely favouring Amsterdam. In 1674 there was only one director of the *W.I.C.* on the *vroedschap*, the relatively less influential de Vicq, but in the early 1680s, regents like Scott, Opmeer and van Heuvel became directors and strengthened Amsterdam's hold on the Company.[47]

On the whole, however, matters in the West Indies could not be seen as advantageous at this time with constant shortages of capital, and the Amsterdammers were unhappy at losing any ground to their competitors. In 1682 the serious position and need to establish a firm base in Surinam, now their major asset in the West, led Amsterdam to agree that in the short term the colony should be free of all fiscal impositions.[48] The new establishment of the *Societeit van Suriname* was based on a three-way division of ownership between Amsterdam, the

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45. Goslinga, *op.cit.*, 470.

46. R.A., The Hague, Secret Notulen, W.I.C. 1675-1700.

47. Van de Bijl, *Idee en Interest*, discusses in detail the growing disadvantage of the Zeeland towns at the hands of Amsterdam.

48. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 27 November 1682.

W.I.C. and the Heer van Somelsdijk, for which each of them made a payment to Zeeland of *fl.*260,000, on condition that the new company would be based in Amsterdam and all dealings managed there.[49]

If it is fairly easy to list the advantages and drawbacks in the long distance trades, those in the European and Mediterranean trades were less clear. In the seventeenth century it was common to divide the trading areas of the world in two, as Sir George Downing did in 1663,[50] with the distinction made between the "rich trades" of the East and West Indies and the Mediterranean, and the bulk carrying trade in northern Europe. However, while supremacy in the East and West Indies could be fairly long-term and only overthrown by major upheavals, the situation in the Levant, also classed as a "rich" trade, was more unstable.

Navigation was, of course, far easier in the hospitable waters of the Mediterranean, but so was attack from enemy shipping and the possibility of blockading, and convoying was essential for security. So although the returns on the trade could be high, the outlay was also high. By the 1670s the Dutch had established sixteen "*handelhuizen*" in Smyrna, a few less than the English, who were trading in parallel with the Dutch, and a few more than the French, with whom they were in competition.[51] Amsterdam was well represented at a high level in the Levant, by not only Everard Scott, but also Gillis Sautijn. Both were merchants trading in Italy and the Levant, and the former was also a prominent banker and the latter was with his brother in the gunpowder business.[52] In the Levant the interests of Amsterdam coincided with those of Haarlem and Leiden and, with the latter in particular, the Amsterdammers were able to turn economic assistance to good

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49. A.R.H. Societeit van Suriname, nr. 564; Menkman, *op.cit.*, pp.154-55.

50. V. Barbour, 'Dutch and English Merchant Shipping in the Seventeenth Century', *E.H.R.* II (1929-30), p. 265.

51. Van Dillen, *Handboek,* p. 357.

52. Sautijn was a member of an extraordinary embassy to England in 1675, to negotiate the terms of the Marine Treaty.

advantage when their political differences began to narrow. In March 1681 Amsterdam gave qualified support to Leiden's request for strengthening the convoys to Smyrna, qualified that is by ensuring that such convoys did not restrict the trading freedoms too much.[53]

The importance of the Mediterranean trade was that, like the European hinterland trade, returns could be relatively quick, but in the 1680s Amsterdam was having to work hard to maintain a reasonable representation in the Levant and much angst was caused by attempts to stabilise the situation. In this respect it had far more in common with the other "trading areas" in northern Europe where competition could be more evenly balanced.

The Baltic had long held an important place in Amsterdam's trade as a supplier of raw materials and market for manufactured goods as well as the source of the grain trade, and probably for as long as it had been important, it had been fraught with insecurities. These arose mainly from the political fluidity of Danish, Swedish and German alliances and the control of the Sound. After 1660 the Dutch were also faced with a loss in carrying goods for the English market, as the English sustained the terms of the Navigation Acts with an improved and enlarged merchant fleet carrying their own goods; but in effect there was enough trade in the Baltic to accommodate them both. One example of this has been found in the level of cloth exports to the Baltic by the English and Dutch. The Dutch share of the market increased from 55 per cent in the period 1661-70 to 66 per cent in 1681-90, while the English share declined from 40 per cent to 33 per cent. However, in real terms, the Dutch exports increased by 100 per cent and those of the English by 50 per cent.[54] The relative loss by the English was to some extent caused by the Swedes and Danes purchasing their own shipping, usually Dutch, in order to circumvent the Navigation Acts themselves. French efforts were to prove less

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53. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed. 16 March 1681.

54. H. Zins, *England and the Baltic in the Elizabethan Era*, H. C. Stevens, trans. (Manchester, 1972), p. 167, Table 7.2; De Vries, *First Modern Economy*, p. 415.

successful despite the establishment in 1669 of Colbert's *Compagnie du Nord*, partly because during the war in particular the Dutch were unable to carry French salt to the Baltic and French captains had no compunction in getting their cargoes made up in Amsterdam. The French threat too was however very real after 1679, and improvements were made to Dunkerque harbour to facilitate French Baltic trade.[55]

Continual efforts were made to maintain the Baltic trade and these were seen as particularly crucial in 1675, when the Swedish alliance with France threatened to halt it. In April of that year the Amsterdammers had increased difficulties with the Danes over the Sound tolls, exacerbated by what they saw as the non-cooperation of the States of Holland generally, who were more prepared to abandon trading privileges to assist the war effort. Roger Meredith in a letter dated 2 April 1675 wrote

> "...We heare of 4 shipps of Amsterdam going to Sweden laden with salt were stopp'd at Copenhagen by the Resident of this state there, which something choques the towne of Amsterdam that claims a custom in the case, but is well approved of by the States... The States of Holland having agreed upon the state of warre are chiefly busied at present about letting the imposts..."[56]

Taken together with the ever present threat from enemy shipping, the *vroedschap* had to take a strong line and resolved to maintain a strong convoy system.[57] And two months later they took a firm stand against declaring war with Sweden without first establishing the exclusion of trade from all hostilities.[58] In effect they

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55. Van Dillen, *Handboek*, p. 334.

56. P. R.O. SP/84 197, f.199.

57. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 26 April 1675.

58. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 31 July 1675; The English translation of the final paragraph of the declaration of war on 15 June 1675 reads, "...we strictly prohibit alle persons whatsoever to molest hinder or disturbe the traficking marchants, subjects and inhabitants of the King of Sweden, their ships, goods or merchandise by water or by land, so long as the said king doth grant the same liberty to the Marchants and inhabitants of this State...", P. R.O., SP84, f.47.

legislated for what had been done clandestinely with the Spanish during the Revolt.

These efforts by the Amsterdammers during the war paid dividends with imports from the Baltic, which dropped from 62,000 lasts in 1670 to 14,000 in 1672, rising once more to 60,000 in 1679.[59] And further efforts, often fairly fraught, in the years 1680-81, to establish good trading relations with the Swedes and Danes safeguarded the Baltic trade for another quarter of a century.

To all intents and purposes the situation in the Baltic was therefore relatively stable, after its established fashion, but the political intervention of the French and the crises of the 1670s, had made the Amsterdammers more aware of the frailty of even the *"moederhandel"*. As we have already seen, it was the French, with their alliance with Sweden and Colbert's *Compagnie du Nord*, who introduced a new element to an old story, and created a renewed determination in the Amsterdammers to strengthen the framework of their commercial structure. One result of this was that until 1686 convoy and licence charges increased as a percentage of costs from 3.98 per cent in 1675 to 9.49 per cent in 1680.[60]

In two areas, the fisheries and the Muscovy trade, the Dutch position was not under serious threat. In fact, in the latter, the situation had never been more secure.[61] The only real competition had once again been the English in the mid-century, but in 1649 the English were expelled from Moscow and by the 1670s the Russian trade was dominated by the Dutch, and in particular the Amsterdam firm of *de Volgelaer*, owned by Coenraad van Klenck's father, and also Sautijn's firm. The van Klenk family had established themselves so securely into the confidence of the

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59. Van Dillen, *Handboek*, p. 333.

60. J. A. Faber, "Graanhandel, Graanprijsen en Tarievenpolitieke in Nederland gedurende de tweede helft der zeventiende eeuw", *Tijdschrift*, LXXIV (1961), pp. 533-9; De Vries, *First Modern Economy*, p. 415.

61. In 1667 new trade regulations were introduced which gave the Dutch greater freedom in the Russian trades, permission being granted by the Tsar until 1755, Driessen, *Russen en Nederlanders*, p. 57.

Muscovites that van Klenk senior was given the rank of "Goost", which in Britain today would entitle him to use the royal coat of arms and "by appointment to the crown" on his merchandise, and in 1675 Coenraad was sent as the States ambassador to Moscow.[62] From time to time there was a decline in the trade, but the prospects of the westernisation of Russia were already being laid and the Amsterdammers were not slow to take advantage. Nicolaes Witsen had already established contacts that he was to use to advantage during the ascendancy of Peter the Great.

The limitations of climate and terrain meant that the Russian trade had to be carried on according to a strict timetable, which could be worked to advantage. In contrast, the nature of the fisheries (despite the inherent seasonal nature of the trade) exposed them to competition and danger. However Dutch superiority in the Greenland Fisheries was secure. Its importance for Amsterdam was, as with most commodities, in the re-export market, but there were prominent shipowners in the whale fisheries, and in April 1677 agreement was reached for freedom of trade in the fisheries between France and the Republic, thus once again pre-empting the peace.[63] Protection was also afforded the fisheries by continual resistance to the imposition of damaging taxes on salt, an essential prerequisite for the fishing trade, even as early as 1673, when other taxes were generally accepted as part of the war effort.[64] In August 1682 there were differences with Gelderland over fisheries through the Zuyder Zee which echoed the disputes of the inland carrying trade.[65] Nevertheless this trade was dependent on the security of the fishing fleets. Amsterdam was therefore always willing to acquiesce in the annual contributions

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62. B. Raptschinsky, "Uit de Geschiedenis van den Amsterdamschen Handel op Rusland in de XVIIe eeuw, Georg Everhard Klenck", *Amstelodamum*, xxxiv (1937), pp. 57-83.

63. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 21 April 1677.

64. *Ibid.*, 21 November 1673.

65. *Ibid.*, 12 August 1683; for disputes over inland trade see for example, GA Amsterdam, Missieven en Requesten van Particulieren (Binnenland), 15 March 1673 Letter to Cornelis Hop as pensionary of Amsterdam from Roshuysen about the cost of goods which were not "*half zo veel uit Groningen en Friesland.*"

made to the fisheries, and apart from the three years from 1672 to 1674, when a ban was imposed on the Greenland Fishery, the fleet remained stable throughout the 1670s - 155 ships in 1671, 148 in 1675, but rising steadily in the early 1680s to reach 242 by 1683.[66]

We now come to the most complex part of the story, that nearest home, and more concerned with overland trade. Of course overland trade was still mainly water-borne in the seventeenth century, and for the transport of hinterland goods to and from Germany and beyond, the Rhine, Maas, Wesel complex to Rotterdam was the major arterial route.[67] Rotterdam, by the late seventeenth century, was one of the foremost economic towns in Holland, but its different approach to foreign trade mentioned earlier and its excellent port facilities which were of use to all of Holland meant that Amsterdam did not on the whole come into conflict with Rotterdam as they did with the Zeeland towns. There were however minor conflicts between Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the Mediterranean after 1674, when Rotterdam had been granted a Director of the Levant trading company.[68] The Holland towns in fact joined in imposing local excises on internal trade between Friesland and Zeeland, and this minor economic warfare persisted throughout the period.[69] But Amsterdam's loyalty to other towns did not go beyond her own interests and in 1682 no sympathy was given to Haarlem's complaint that Friesland manufactures were being sold through Amsterdam at the expense of native Holland

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66. C. G. Zordragen, *Bloeijende Opkomst Der Aloude en Hedendaagsche Groenlandsche Visschery* (Den Haag, 1727), p. 302, Holland List. See also Barbour, *English and Dutch Shipping*, p. 267, Note 1.

67. For the importance and complexity of the internal Dutch trade in the seventeenth century, see de Vries, *The First Modern Economy*, p. 179ff, Maps 5.1 and 5.2 showing the *beurtveer* services network.

68. R.A., The Hague, Levantshandel papers 1.03.01, f.18.

69. For examples G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., for *turf*, 2 September 1681, and *wijn*, 9 November 1682. Amsterdam had imposed restrictions on Zeeland trade in 1671 and the regulations worked effectively until 1680 when "*de strijd opnieuw ontbrande*", Faber,"Graanhandel, Graanprijzen en Tarieven politiek", p. 536-6. Under the terms of the Union of Utrecht it was in theory forbidden to introduce internal taxes, but this was one of the many clauses which had never been implemented, de Vries, *The First Modern Economy*, p. 96.

goods.[70]

The hinterland trade was the one to benefit most from the improvements to the waterways particularly the major improvements to the Lower Rhine and Maas in 1682.[71]

On the whole, therefore, the Fisheries, the hinterland trade and the Russian trade remained stable and secure parts of Amsterdam's economic base in this period. There were minor difficulties from time to time, but these required standard measures and no serious rethinking of policy. But in the scale of things they were not the highest of priorities.

By contrast the other overland trade - that through the Southern Netherlands (or of course around the coast) from France - provided the Amsterdammers with their biggest headache throughout the 1670s and 1680s, and the greatest need for readjustment. At the end of the Republican period, Jacques Accaria de Serionne saw the beginning of the problems for the economy in the last part of the seventeenth century, and the vulnerability of trade with France, Spain and Portugual and their Mediterranean islands as critical.[72] It was mainly in relation to the French trade that the Amsterdammers were constantly harking back to the past. To them the Golden Age of French/Dutch trading relations was embodied in the Treaty of 1662, whatever disadvantages that had been thought to contain at the time. It was in relation to the French trade that the so-called Peace Party of the mid 1670s pressed for easing of restrictions on trade and it was with regard to the bans on French trade that in the late 1670s and early 1680s much rhetoric was brought forth in support of the tenets of Pieter de la Court's *Het Interest van Holland*. For example, on 19 July 1678, the *vroedschap* declared,

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70. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 20 July 1682.

71. *Ibid.*, 23 March 1682.

72. Jacques Accarieas de Serionne, *La Richesse de la Hollande*,(1778), p. 52; he believed that the strengths of the Dutch trade were in the East Indies, America, the Levant and the Rhine and Meuse overland trade.

> *"Que la prohibition du commerce de France sera fait ici aussi bien qu'en Angleterre, cela parissant absoluement nécessaire au succes de la Guerre, et le Commerce de cet Etat ne se peuvant mesme faire qu'and l'Angleterre sera en guerre pas qu'il faudra nécessairement empescher le commerce de France comme le seul moyen de l'affoiblier."*[73]

However, economic relations with France were never to be the same again. The advent of Colbert's ambitious plans and the attempts to bring France on to an equal competitive footing with England and the Dutch Republic introduced a new era. So while the Amsterdammers saw the difficulties of trade in the 1670s primarily as a result of the war and the restrictive French taxes of 1667, and therefore reversible if peace and a satisfactory commercial treaty could be achieved on the basis of the pre-Colbertian measures, they were in fact prosecuting an abortive policy in the long run. Therefore, although the terms of the Treaty of Nijmegen did restore 1664 tariffs on Dutch goods in France, and help in the economic recovery of the early 1680s, this was only a temporary reprieve and could in no way negate the progress the French had already made. The only Amsterdammer who had a real grasp of the new French threat was van Beuningen, who had had first hand experience of Louis XIV's France. The general reluctance of the majority of Amsterdammers to become involved in any major way in issues outside the immediate interests of the city may have restricted their understanding of the wider questions, and this will be discussed further.

By showing such a willingness to accommodate the French trade in order to bring as much as possible through Amsterdam, the city to some extent weakened itself. Politically there was a strong, barely concealed, interchange between the French Ambassadors and Amsterdam, which ensured that the French were able to count on the city and, while not undervaluing the power of Amsterdam, the French were able to exploit its obsessive mercantile interest.

Of course at the beginning of the war in 1672, when the military threat was very

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[73]. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 19 July 1678.

real, the Amsterdammers had been as willing as others to impose a complete ban on French trade and to a certain extent some lasting advantages were drawn therefrom. The ban on French wine and brandy led to an expansion in home production which there was a reluctance to relinquish later on. In 1674 Amsterdam had agreed to an increase in brandy excise duty, so long as it was imposed throughout all the provinces;[74] in 1677 they consented to a proposal that local brandy should be excluded from local taxes; in 1678 they agreed to a request from local wine merchants that Spanish and Rhine wines should also be taxed; and in 1680 the *vroedschap* was quite happy to acquiesce in imposing a minimum price on French wine.[75] In the long run it was once again the Zeeland towns, particularly Middleburg, which suffered most with the loss of the French wine trade. In other manufactures as well, cessation of trade with France gave the impetus to home manufacturers, most notably the paper and cloth trades, and the resulting competition in the 1680s with the latter brought Amsterdam and Leiden closer together, as we have seen.

However, during the war the French also undermined the advantages the Dutch had achieved over the Spanish during the last thirty years. At the same time as capturing the bullion market and capitalising on the Spanish economic decline, the Dutch had also succeeded in working with the Spaniards and much trade went through Seville and Cadiz. The Dutch fine cloth trade was still dependent on Spanish wool and trade became very vulnerable during periods of French aggression as it was a simple matter for Dutch ships to be blockaded in Spanish harbours. In these circumstances retaliation was ineffective, and the only ways seen by Amsterdam as safeguarding trade through, and with, Spain was by peace with France, or by pursuing the policy mentioned earlier with regard to the Fisheries, of concluding trading treaties separate from hostilities. This was done in

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74. Set at *fl.*16 per vat, *Ibid.*, 6 December 1674.

75. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 21 July 1680; the price was set at not less than "*6 stuyvers de pint*". Brandy and Wijn were kept separate for taxation purposes.

1675 with the trade from Spain through Bayonne, which continued unhindered.[76]

We therefore have a rather contradictory picture of Amsterdam's economic situation in the 1670s and early 1680s. Their predominance among the other towns of Holland and particularly their gains at the expense of Zeeland, the wealth of capital and entrepreneurial manpower and their development of markets, continued to grow despite the pressures of war. We have seen that the financial institutions and the major trading companies had not only withstood the drain on resources, but had also consolidated their strength in Amsterdam. But nevertheless, there was throughout the period an undercurrent of insecurity, reflected in underlying trends, which prevented a positive approach to further economic possibilities. Amsterdam was no longer making major investment in the Zaandam shipbuilding industry, which was losing its technical dominance in world shipping. It was perhaps this single fact of failure to look globally to the future, exemplified by the attitude towards shipbuilding, which is most noticeable at this time. The local measures sustained the position of Amsterdam itself within the Republic, but on the whole the attitude was one dominated by a policy of reestablishment rather than progress, in a period when conditions required positive rather than negative readjustment. There was no lack of awareness of the problems, real and potential, but there was a misunderstanding of the underlying causes.

The relatively successful outcomes of the wars with England had strengthened the belief that there was an achievable economic balance with England, that could be struck by negotiation and continual watchfulness at sea. But this failed to take account of the greater resources and independence of the English economy, which put it on a par with the Dutch while still in relatively early stages of growth. And this was even less well understood with regard to the French. The punitive measures taken in 1667 by Colbert, together with the military aggression in 1672, failed to undermine Amsterdam's belief in its dependence on France for upholding its economic base. On this understanding, throughout the whole period the

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[76]. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 19 December 1675.

measures that were taken were only retaliatory in the short term, and on the whole were aimed at restoring the *status quo ante*. Therefore, in the important period from 1678 to 1681, while there was much detailed negotiation over individual clauses in commercial treaties, the Dutch argued in all cases for "*de reciproque liberteit ende vrijheid van de commercie*", with agreements being based on earlier treaties.[77] But even in the face of such agreements, they were already pursuing a more closed and defensive policy in their overseas trade as a natural reaction to situation as they saw it, which in the long run did not stand up against the more positive policies of their competitors.

Where Amsterdam did exploit its own resources, that is in relation to the North Holland and Zeeland towns, it was in fact undermining the strength of the Dutch economy generally in the interests of safeguarding its own.

The 1670s and 1680s were a period of economic readjustment in Amsterdam, because there was an awareness that things were changing and needed to be faced, although the interpretation of change was that its causes were temporary and possibly reversible. In the 1670s this was dealt with in an *ad hoc* manner as the vicissitudes of the war demanded. But after 1678, and most particularly in 1680-81, a definite policy can be seen emerging. There is evidence of considered statements of commercial priorities and of a structured approach to agreements with competitors, with some acknowledgement of the worth of shared markets.

The basic precept that the security of the state rested on superiority in trade and commerce, and that this in turn demanded peace, was no more than a foundation on which to build a more complex approach to foreign policy. The seventeenth century saw a shift in international conflicts from the dynastic, territorial struggles of the fifteenth and sixteenth century to a greater emphasis on the consequent and complementary economic issues. The potential for armed conflict at sea, whether declared or waged through quasi-legal piracy, which had escalated with the

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77. The French of course on those pertaining in the early 1660s and the Swedish on those of 1668.

discovery of the Americas and the dramatic increase in wealth and trade, blurred the distinction between merchantmen and warships. With the Navigation Acts the English government had stated clearly that primacy on the seas was an issue which was always likely to lead to international struggles. Control of the seas and trade routes was essential to maintain the growing economies of western Europe in the seventeenth century. France understood that all the strengths of a pompous, autocratic monarchy were vulnerable if they could not be sustained by a vibrant economy and this meant competing with the leading international traders in their own field. We have seen in chapter 1 how this theory of "interest of state" had been articulated by several Dutch commentators and this was not lost on Colbert and those implementing his policies.

These challenges to the Dutch maritime supremacy were not always perceived as clearly as they might have been. Efforts continued to be made to reach compromise agreements through economic and marine treaties, such as the longwinded negotiations following the Peace of Westminster in 1674. There was still largely a reactive rather than proactive approach to economic policy. Amsterdam's reaction to the French invasion of 1672 was to raise tariffs on some goods and ban trade in the higher-profile ones. When this did not have any perceptible effect on the progress of war or peace, but did have a damaging effect on their own income, they immediately pressed for a reduction of tariffs and a lifting of bans.

In the West Indies the war was fought out entirely on the basis of supremacy within the region, having little to do with the threat to the very existence of the state from the French invasion. Similarly the Fisheries struggled to maintain their centuries-old hold on the northern waters, fully participating in the distribution of war funding.

The political and strategic importance of the Spanish Netherlands was in the end subjugated to the greater need for economic welfare. Trade with France was not dependent on peace in these states; political security might be, but had proved

more resilient and was to do so for another hundred years and with a different scenario. It was far more important to keep the ships coming into and out of Amsterdam than to keep long, slow land routes open. Nowhere was the shift of the balance from the dynastic to the economic within warfare more clearly demonstrated than in the ease with which the States of Holland, critically represented by Amsterdam and Rotterdam at Nijmegen, abandoned the question of the Spanish Netherlands and one of the Prince's major strategies. The religious and dynastic policies of Charles V and Phillip II, which had given birth to the Dutch Republic, reached their nadir at Nijmegen, although their echo was to be listened to more strongly in 1702.

However, even though the States may have been reacting to events rather than anticipating the future, and appeared to be harking back to an idealised world of the 1650s and 1660s, where peace and economic supremacy proved the theory that they were indivisible, there was some acknowledgement that they were reacting to a different set of circumstances. The Dutch Republic had been the pioneers in moving the world of international trade on from the mercantile dominance of the Italian city states to one of chartered companies supported by a firm banking and insurance infrastructure. The rigour with which the new *West Indische Compagnie* was granted its charter in 1674 took account not only of the demands in the Caribbean, but also of the importance of a strong and committed organisation at home.

It has already been indicated earlier in this chapter that the majority of the regents of Amsterdam who were largely responsible for the decisions taken by the city on matters of policy during war and peace relating to the economy of the States, and particularly of the province of Holland, had their roots firmly in the mercantile establishment of the city. The following two chapters will analyse further the role of these regents, their backgrounds, personal and factional interests, and their role during and after the *wetsverzetting* in Amsterdam.

Chapter 6

The Structure of the Amsterdam *Vroedschap* after the *Wetsverzetting*

An analysis of the changes within the Amsterdam *vroedschap* needs to be put within a clear chronological framework for the period in question, 1672-1684. For Amsterdam there were always two chronologies: two lines following generally parallel courses which converged from time to time. One line followed the development and internal history of the city as a international entrepôt, the other its role as a major influence in the determination of the Republic's foreign policy. Many of those most influential in the first sphere held key roles in the other. These were members of the merchant families who had evolved into what is commonly called the ruling merchant elite. Membership of the *burgermeesterschap*, the *vroedschap* and *schepenen* identified the most prominent among them.[1]

Although the year 1672 was a year of change in the Dutch Republic and its constituent towns and provinces, all the changes took place within the established structure. The restoration of the stadholder in the unoccupied provinces was to an office which had remained vacant, but had not been disestablished. And of course the stadholdership of Friesland and Groningen had remained with the Orange-Nassau family throughout the previous twenty-two years. Purging the *vroedschappen* was a method of political surgery which had been used in the past and, even where it was most incisive, did not interfere with the basic system or bring in members dedicated to a radical new form or government; rather it was likely to introduce those who would uphold the more conservative traditions of the stadholderate. And finally, the occupation of parts of the Republic by the French

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1. For the careers of members of the *vroedschap* between 1672 and 1684, see Appendix I. Members are listed in aphabetical order. Most of the details have been extracted from the comprehensive entries in Elias, *Vroedschap,* and the first reference to each member, during the discussion on the politics within Amsterdam, is therefore followed by the number of the Elias entry. Appendix V list members elected as *schepenen* from 1672 to 1678, together with *pensionarissen* and *secretarissen*, from 1666 to 1684.

was in some ways a repetition of the threat of subordination to a greater power of which the Dutch had had ample experience of from the Spanish. What had changed was not therefore the internal structure of administration in the States, but the external influences and the potential relationship between the new stadholder and the States of Holland and the City of Amsterdam.[2]

With this in mind, it is necessary to understand that the changes which 1672 brought about in the government of Amsterdam were not likely to make great alteration to what was after all a very successful organisation with its own internal dynamism. For the purposes of this analysis we will start with a survey of the regent class after 1650 and the close relationship between De Witt and Amsterdam through his connections with the Bickers and the De Graeffs.[3] Then, following the death of Cornelis de Graeff and the weakening of the *raadpensionaris's* influence in Amsterdam, we will consider the role of the new members of the 1660s, particularly Valckenier (*Elias 166*) and Hooft (*Elias 177*).

The importance of the Amsterdammers in drawing up the Perpetual Edict, and the interpretations of Valckenier's role in this, will lead on to the apparent changes in support among some of the rising regents during the last few years before 1672.

We will then move on to a more detailed exposition of the structure of the *vroedschap* and the *wetsverzetting* in Amsterdam For this I will draw widely on Bontemantel, who laid the foundations for the later more structured works by Wagenaar and Elias, but the whole of this chapter will be in the nature of survey history with individual analysis used only where particular incidents require it. The basic structure of the chronological framework will start with the *wetsverzetting* leading to the development of a strong peace party by 1675, consolidated in the

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2. Like William III after him, De Witt fully appreciated the importance of Amsterdam's co-operation and support and the risks involved in losing it: Boogman "The *Raison d'Etat* Politician Johan De Witt", p. 61

3. The Bickers and De Graeffs were the leading Amsterdam families in the middle of the seventeenth century. The Bickers were removed from office in 1650, the De Graeffs in 1672.

Concept tot Eenigheit in 1676, and the drift towards a more oligarchic government after 1679 and particularly after the death of Valckenier in 1680. Finally we will look at the tensions of the period 1682-84 from the viewpoint of both chronologies.

Further to the discussion on the nature of oligarchies in Chapter 3 (pp. 53-55) in Amsterdam, as in other towns, intermarriage was frequent and extensive family networks developed. However, with its much larger population and proportionately larger concentration of merchant elite (local, immigrant and foreign),[4] these networks became so widespread that in effect some relationships were nominal only. The convenience of marriages made for common interest in the 1650s and 1660s may have ceased to be relevant in the 1670s when the political situation drew together erstwhile opponents or separated those who previously had common interests. The continual small addition of new blood, attracted by the potential of Amsterdam's commercial growth, brought not only new money, but also a wider range of possible alliances between families.[5]

The elite of the ruling classes were the members of the *vroedschap* and the *schepenen*. Membership of the former did not preclude membership of the latter, and the control of the administration by a select, although quite large, number of representative families can be seen clearly through a study of the membership of both bodies. The *schepenen* included both older experienced regents and younger, ambitious men (see Appendix V). The *vroedschap* was the major representative body from which the burgomasters were elected, nominees for States office were drawn, and definitive town policy was drawn. Many of the influential members of the *vroedschap* in 1672 were already quite active in the 1660s, providing the core of an experienced membership ready to take over in the 1670s. Appointment for life meant not only a continuation of the same methods and some policies, which gave the *vroedschap* a resilience which could withstand the loss of so many influential members in September 1672, but also a continuation of some personal

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4. Leti, *Teatro Belgico*, p. 333.

5. For example, Everard Scott, elected to the *vroedschap* in 1674, see Appendix I.

and factional disputes. During the first stadholderless period the towns had exercised their privileges to the full and the senior Amsterdam regents had been in the fortunate position of having close relations and influence with the *raadpensionaris*, De Witt. When Fagel was made *raadpensionaris* of Holland on 20 August 1672, the new administration took the opportunity of the local revolts and the *wetsverzettingen* to wrest back some of that power.

In Amsterdam the purge took place on 10 September 1672, with new members being appointed to office on 15 September. Ten members of the *vroedschap* and five *schepenen* were replaced. Of the thirty-six [thirty-seven][6] members of the *vroedschap* in 1672, seventeen had been members since before the death of Cornelis de Graeff in 1665, nine had been elected between 1666 and 1672 and ten replaced those who were removed in 1672.[7]

The ruling burgomasters before the *wetsverzetting* were van der Poll, Reynst, Oudtshoorn (*Elias 152, 157 and 181*) and Hooft; after 15 September Hooft and Oudtshoorn remained in office and Hudde (*Elias 197*) was elected burgomaster together with van Beuningen (*Elias 189*). However, this was only a short-term

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6. Munter is not mentioned in Elias. As he continued in office and was elected burgomaster on several occasions it is difficult to account for the omission, or to account for the numerical discrepancy this causes, unless he was one of the few burgomasters, like Cornelis Bicker before 1650, who exceptionally never became part of the *vroedschap*, and Andries De Graeff who was burgomaster before his election to the *vroedschap* on the death of his brother in 1665, Burke, *Venice and Amsterdam*, p. 21-22. However, these two examples are of cases where brothers were both serving in the administration and the rules of election to the *vroedschap* did not allow such close family relations to become members concurrently. There was no such issue in the case of Munter, who also served for many years as *Thesauris*, an office normally held by a fully elected member.

7. The *wetsverzetting* in Amsterdam, September 1672:
Vroedschap members removed: Jan van de Poll (ruling burgomaster); Lambert Reynst (ruling burgomaster); Joan Blaeu; Hans Bontemantel; Dr Roetert Ernst; Nicolaes Rochusz van Capelle.; Andries De Graeff; Pieter Schaep; Johan Hulft; Dr Willem Backer (Elias, *Vroedschap)*.
Replaced by; Louis Trip; Jean Appelman; Michiel Tiellens; Hendrick Becker; Coenraet van Klenck; Gerard Bors; Joan Commelin; Nicolaes Opmeer; Dirck Blom; Gillis Sautijn (Elias, *Vroedschap)*.
Schepenen removed: Pieter de Graeff; Dirck Spiegel; Nicolas van Waveren; Arnoout Hooft; Gerard Bors (Brugmans, *Geschiedenis van Amsterdam, III*, p. 180).

burgomastership and the new influences within the *vroedschap* were more clearly reflected in the elections at the beginning of 1673. Hudde remained (as *oud burgemeester*) and Valckenier, Geelvinck (*Elias 167*) and Huydecooper (*Elias 191*) were elected. Of the four, only Valckenier had served as burgomaster before the *wetsverzetting* (his first term had been in 1666); on the whole the *burgemeesterschap* of the 1670s was dominated by long-serving members of the *vroedschap*, but whose experience of office was varied. Munter and Pancras (*Elias 161)* had both been burgomasters before 1672.[8] Oudtshoorn and van Vlooswijk (*Elias 168*) were the most experienced burgomasters before 1672, but there is evidence that their influence was limited to a greater or lesser extent after the *wetsverzetting*.[9]

It will be seen that in many ways the changes effected in 1672 were little more than an extension of what had been happening within Amsterdam since the death of Cornelis de Graeff in 1665. Those removed from office were republicans who had made clear their opposition to the reinstatement of the House of Orange, but those that replaced them were not conspicuous Orangists, but rather men who were prepared to support the Prince during the crisis of 1672. And many of those who remained were still known to be republican in outlook, particularly Hooft and van Vlooswijk. The completion of the removal of the De Graeff family by the purge of the younger generation on the *schepenen* can be seen as an attempt to complete the severance of links with the De Witt administration, but the De Graeffs soon began to benefit from patronage in a small way again as the zeal of the purges weakened after 1675.[10]

Throughout the 1650s De Witt derived much of his support from the Amsterdam

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8. Munter in 1670 and Pancras in 1667, 1669 and 1670.

9. Oudtshoorn was burgomaster in 1656, 1660, 1662, 1663, and 1668 and van Vlooswijk in 1656, 1657, 1660, 1661, 1666, 1668, 1669, 1671, but although the former was to hold office again after the *Concept tot Eenigheit* in 1676, the latter remained out of office until his death in 1687.

10. See below p. 152.

regents. The conflict with William II was still fresh in their memories, the interests of the city were served by the policies of De Witt and the close relationship between the *raadpensionaris* and the De Graeffs who dominated the *vroedschap* ensured this support. Nevertheless mutual co-operation was not unequivocal and in 1661 De Graeff had shown disquiet over De Witt's policy.[11] Gradually, during the 1660s more tensions began to appear between the *raadpensionaris* and Amsterdam, as the influence of Valckenier in particular began to shift the balances within the *vroedschap*.

Family groupings had survived the forced removal of Bicker from the *vroedschap* in 1650 as the closeness of the connections between the major families remained. But their permanent removal from positions of authority within the Amsterdam regency did not seriously affect the balance within the *vroedschap*, while the De Graeff family retained influence. And the vibrancy of the Amsterdam economy and the continuing growth of wealth gave increasing power to a wider range of those already building merchant empires and republican status. Second and third generation representatives like Huydecooper were able to participate more fully in the internal politics of the city, confident that their business and patronage networks would continue to provide their security. The purchase of inland estates and the display of increasing wealth has given rise to the argument for the growth of a rentier class removed from real participation in business. Gary Schwartz has shown how Joan Huydecooper's patronage of the arts had long lasting effects and such a study is of great value to the art historian.[12] However for the student of the place of Dutch history in the development of Modern Europe, Huydecooper pales into insignificance beside his more dominant colleagues on the *vroedschap* and, according to Burke, he was "not typical of the majority of [his] colleagues in

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11. Rowen, *De Witt*, p. 541. De Witt was chagrined by De Graeff's understanding that it would be impossible to prevent William III from one day returning to office, no matter what might be determined by the States. See also Valckenier's interpretation of the Perpetual Edict, below pp. 162-163.

12. G. Schwartz, "Jan van der Heyden and the Huydecoopers of Maarseveen", *J. Paul Getty Museum Journal* (1983), p. 204, note 13; and *Rembrandt, his life, his family, his paintings* (London, 1985), p. 283.

office" in his patronage of the arts.[13] (Half a generation earlier Jan Six the elder in the 1650s and 1660s had likewise been a patron of Rembrandt, but again, although Six was an active member of the regency, he was not a leading political figure)[14] Schwartz has shown how Huydecooper with Valckenier, Scott and van Vlooswijk, as landowners of Maarseveen, "came to form a redoubtable enclave of Amsterdam regents in the territory of the Utrecht politicians".[15]

However, in the 1660s and 1670s the transition was not complete and many of those participating in the city government still had first-hand experience of their businesses. In this way, rather than arguing for a decline in the quality of members of the ruling class, this would prove a strengthening of their experience, drawing both on the confidence of status, tempered by the reality of the basis of that status.

Elias argued that the mid-1660s in Amsterdam saw a shift from a religious division between Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants (Coccejans and Voetians) to a secular division between Republicans and Orangists; this is echoed by Roorda in his study of the Utrecht Government Regulations of 1675.[16] The secularisation of divisions may indeed have occurred, but it did not lead to a straight division into two parties and it would be misleading to imply that political alignments were at any time strictly on religious or ideological political lines. While generalisation can be made it must always be understood that the nuances of support for any particular issue are probably far more complex than Elias' theory suggests. The Revolt of the Netherlands against Spanish rule had become subsumed into a fight for religious freedom and Amsterdam had in time adjusted its religious politics to

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13. Burke, *Venice and Amsterdam*, p. 9.

14. Schwartz, *Rembrandt*, pp. 174 and 283.

15. G. Schwarz, *Jan van der Heyden, loc. cit.* Huydecooper was in this instance again not comparable with his contemporaries as his family had established themselves as landowners during the previous generation, while those like Valckenier and Scott were the first of their families to buy country estates.

16. Elias, *Vroedschap*, p. CXI; Roorda, "William III and the Utrecht Government Regulations", pp. 95-96, dates the shift from "Voetians v. Coccejans" to "Statists v. Orangists" to the crisis of 1672.

the prevailing trend. There were always those who supported the more overt Calvinism of the contra-remonstrant movement and those who remained truer to the ideals of arminianism, but during the first stadholderless period the importance of these professed allegiances became less critical as prosperity grew. International conflicts developed for political, territorial and economic causes and not for religious freedom, although this might be cited as a complementary ideological reason. Treaties with the United Provinces invariably had a core of clauses protecting trade, and William III's "crusade" against Louis XIV was never a single issue conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism.

Within the changing structure of the *vroedschap*, a new set of rules began to apply to political choices. The orthodox interpretation of this new framework is that a middle party developed. Historians have tended to put anyone into this "middle party" who did not fit in with traditional roles of republican or Orangist.[17] This is misleading. Not only is the concept of "parties" within the Amsterdam ruling class fallible, but it is an over-simplification to ascribe unity to any group of politicians who come together either during crises or for particular constitutional aims. "Middle parties" are commonly made up of those with *one* common interest, but with a much wider variety of individual interests. The struggle of the individual within the overall factional structure[18] in fact can be seen as the dominant theme of Amsterdam politics through the later 1660s and the 1670s, after the Peace of Westminster in February 1674.[19]

The epitome of the individual using the potential of factional politics for his own

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17. Kurtz, *Willem III en Amsterdam*, p. 214, identifies the beginnings of three political groups in 1665 among the regents: Valckenier and the Orangists; Wittians; and Hooft and middle party.

18. Roorda, *Partij en Facite*, identified the importance of faction as well as party in the politics surrounding the events of 1672, but his definition of a faction, p. 190, implies a greater permanence of "bonding" between its members than that used in this study; see also, Grever, "Structure of Decision Making", p. 152, explanatory note.

19. A full discussion of the divisions within Amsterdam is given in chapter 7 below.

ends was Gillis Valckenier:

"O staetzucht eijenbaet
vervloekte monsterdien
Hoe swelt, hoe alijt ghij uijt
In 'thart van Valckenier."[20]

Valckenier quickly filled the power vacuum within Amsterdam on the death of De Graeff, replaced by his brother Andries but not to the same effect, and the consequent reduction in De Witt's influence. He was elected burgomaster for the first time in 1665 and, on 15 April 1666 became a member of the commission responsible for the education of the Prince of Orange, alongside De Witt and three other representatives of the States of Holland. He therefore had vital experience of, and influence over, both internal Amsterdam politics and the future government of the States. Another politician of great influence in the 1670s, van Beuningen, was also establishing a highly individual role for himself in the 1660s and cannot be placed within any hypothetical party grouping.

Van Beuningen, who had already established a reputation as an ambassador with the interests of Holland and particularly Amsterdam ever his first priority, began to find De Witt's intransigent pro-French attitude a cause for concern and had gradually distanced himself from the *raadpensionaris* by 1670.[21] And Rowen notes the close friendship between Joan Munter and De Witt came under threat in 1670.[22] But alliances between members merely because they were disaffected with De Witt did not establish long-term parties which could overcome the factional differences which were always close to the surface.[23]

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20. Caption under portrait of Gillis Valckenier, Amsterdam Historisch Museum.

21. De Witt had great respect for van Beuningen's political methods because he "*meer oog had voor het algemen belang van de Republiek dan de particularistisch Amsterdamse faktieman die Valckenier was*", Franken, *Coenraad van Beuningens politiek en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84*, p. 77.

22. Rowen, *De Witt*, p. 785.

23. Common interest may have brought members like Munter and Valckenier together briefly in 1672, but it will be seen (pp. 151-152) that these were very temporary alliances.

Between 1670 and 1672 the struggle for power within Amsterdam appeared to have little to do with external affairs, although the loss of De Witt's credibility and influence may well have highlighted the opportunities for Amsterdam to take an active role in foreign policy. At this stage Valckenier's influence in Amsterdam was in the face of his own unpopularity. D'Ailly quotes adverse descriptions by some of his contemporaries:

Hooft:	"*schelm, schagruijn*"
Hop:	"*zoo grot uitgemakt date deze ontslag vroeg...*
Tulp(zoon):	"*ontweetende pluijm strijcker*"
Van de Poll:	"*claphouttooper*"
Van Vlooswijk:	"*sijn twee gecke soonen te zullen ruineeren*"
De Graeff:	"*quaede bejenuige*"[24]

In 1671 he was balked of the burgomastership by a return of support for the De Graeff faction and for the only time in his career he accepted the role of representative at the States of Holland in The Hague. He also failed to get his son's father-in-law, Trip, elected as *schepen*. It was not until July 1672 that Valckenier finally committed himself to the group within Amsterdam which was working for the restoration of the House of Orange.[25] By force of personality and established superiority he took over the leadership of this group and, by biding his time until the February 1673 elections, was able to ensure that he held the burgomastership for the two crucial years following the *wetsverzetting*. After 1672 two of those critics cited above (Van de Poll and De Graeff) had been removed from office; Hooft and van Vlooswijk remained in opposition. Hooft continued as a fully participating member of the *vroedschap* although he refused office as burgomaster again until 1677. Van Vlooswijk was sidelined by a strategic appointment to the Amsterdam Admiralty for seven years. A fuller analysis of the power struggles within Amsterdam between 1672 and 1684 is given in the next chapter, but I will establish here the framework within which the analysis will be made.

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[24]. A. E. D'Ailly, *Zeven Eeuwen Amsterdam*, II, p. 196.

[25]. Bontemantel, *Regeeringe*, II, 17-18.

The *wetsverzetting* of 10 September 1672 has been interpreted widely as an Orangist purge of republicans, but we have already seen that not all those opposed to the group supporting the Orangist restoration were removed from the *vroedschap*. D'Ailly suggests that the list submitted to the Prince for approval was drawn up by Valckenier.[26] I have found no further evidence of this list, which appears to have been apocryphal, and we will see in the next chapter that only one of the new members (Trip) can be described as an uncritical supporter of Valckenier.[27]

However, the *wetsverzetting* temporarily imposed a unity on the *vroedschap* which was closely associated with the need for preserving the security of the city against the possibility of further French incursions into Dutch territory. The practical considerations of such security ensured that the efforts of members were focused on water defences both within the city and in the crucial hinterland.[28] The Prince of Orange had raised the issue because of the need to use water as a defence, but the general opinion of the *vroedschap* was that, even at this stage of the war, Amsterdam would only take a decision which was the least disruptive to the daily life of the city. The management of the waterways was always of course of prime importance and the work of Geelvinck and Hudde, in particular, in the modernisation and improvement of the sluices in 1672 was crucial not only to the security of the city but also to its present and future economy.[29] The main points

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26. D'Ailly, *loc.cit.*

27. Franken, *Coenraad van Beuningens politiek en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84*, pp. 110-11, accepts the view that the new members were Valckenier's men; his error in saying that Witsen, not Hudde was made burgomaster in 1672, may have been based on the assumption of the controlling influence Valckenier is alleged to have had over Witsen; see Appendix I for Witsen's career.

28. Some of the practical defences are illustrated in Marc Hameleers en Erik Schmitz, "Zeven Kaarten van Cornelis Koel van Militaire Versterkingen buiten Amsterdam (1674)", *Amstelodamum*, lxxxvi (1994), pp. 91-106.

29. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed, 21 October 1672. By quoting the ancient privileges accorded Amsterdam, Haarlem and Leiden by Charles V, acknowledgement is made to the fact that action regarding the waterways had an effect beyond the city limits.

in the discussion were firstly that enough water was provided in summer to allow trading ships through and secondly that flooding in winter had to be avoided to prevent damage to the city.[30] Flooding the land was used as a weapon of war to prevent further French advance, but such flooding was used as a preventive barrier securing the city well outside its limits.

The security of Amsterdam was therefore set firmly within the context of its economic life. In contrast to the desire for security for the city was the reluctance to increase military expenditure unnecessarily. This was the issue over which conflict had developed with the Prince's father in 1650 and was to precipitate the crisis of 1684. In 1673, however, Amsterdam fully supported the military resistance to the French, and merely exercised restraint on its cost. In May of that year, Waldeck wrote to pensionary Hop urging Amsterdam's support for fortifications at Weesp, but followed it up with a direct letter to Valckenier, no doubt in an attempt to ensure an influential response to his request. A few days later, on 25 May, Waldeck wrote to the burgomasters as a group requesting billets for five companies for between one and nine days, offering payment of 100 ducats in advance.[31] Once agreement was reached, Waldeck was in negotiation with Blom (who had some responsibility for troop movements and supply, working to Geelvinck) over palisades and water control. But the experience of billeting these five companies of Waldeck's men in the spring of 1673, when promises of payment in advance for food and supplies were not kept,[32] gave rise to resistance to further billeting and a downright refusal to take Witgensteyn's cavalry regiment.[33]

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30 *Ibid.*

31. G.A.Amsterdam, Missieven Requesten van Particulieren (Binnenland), Waldeck to Hop and Waldeck to Valckenier, May 1673.

32. G.A. Amsterdam, *ibid.*, Waldeck to the Amsterdam burgomasters, 30 May 1673. The soldiers had received no pay for six weeks.

33. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 2 October 1673: "... *te versocken, dat de admissie de voorsz. gemelte Regimenten, sooland niet met special paten van Sijn Hoog. selfs ... sullen gelieven te declineren.*"

Throughout the entire period of the war until 1678, the prevailing interest in Amsterdam was to preserve as normal an economic life as possible. This purpose was not deflected by the interests of security in the early years, although the methods for pursuing it varied. As the immediate threat of French advance into Holland receded, the balance tipped once more in favour of legislation that would most benefit trade rather than the prosecution of the war. This coincided with the Peace of Westminster in February 1674 ,which took England out of the military war and reestablished her as a trading rival. The Dutch were thereafter more anxious than ever to secure favourable trading rights and excise duties.

Peace with England followed close on the *Staat van Oorlogh*[34] for 1674, which was associated in that year with the appointment of the Prince of Orange to the offices of Captain- and Admiral-General in perpetuity. Amsterdam's accord in the latter was tempered by an enquiry about the status of the Prince when Utrecht was readmitted to the Union.[35] At this stage, lip service was still being paid to the myth that Amsterdam and the Prince were working together without divisions, but in reality it was little more than lip service. Once Amsterdam had shown its gratitude to the Prince for his military successes by exempting him from repayment of the *fl.*2m debt in March 1674,[36] their policies no longer reflected the intentions of the *wetsverzetting*, but were made solely on the grounds of parochial and provincial interest. The *vroedschap* pointed out that peace with England in 1674 meant that the city would be in credit over contributions for military expenditure and they should thus be excused further contributions under the 100 and 200 *penningh*.[37] The city was anxious that the Peace of Westminster should not be made purely on diplomatic procedures; terms had to be favourable to both the States of Holland and in particular Amsterdam. Van Beuningen as one of the chief

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34. The annual agreement for funding military expenditure approved every December by the States of Holland.

35. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 30 January 1674.

36. Baxter, p. 110; Res. Holl. 24 March 1674.

37. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 26 February 1674; Muniment Register, fol.137.

negotiators of the peace treaty was deputed by Amsterdam to put their interests first in the negotiation of the terms of the Marine Treaty which was largely concerned with the relative status and interests of the Dutch and English East India Companies. Van Beuningen was present, as one of the accredited ambassadors, but the deputation to London to negotiate Marine Treaty, had two additional representatives from Amsterdam, Corver (*Elias 194*) and Sautijn (*Elias 215*).[38]

The degeneration of relations with France had begun with Colbert's decision to impose swingeing tariffs on Dutch goods in 1667; during the early part of the 1672 war the Dutch had retaliated with high import duties on French goods, particularly on the salt crucial to the herring industry, and a total ban on the import of French wine and brandy. By the end of 1673 Amsterdam had begun to query these restrictions,[39] and resistance to excessive military expenditure quickly became inextricably linked to the complexities of the taxation system. By the end of 1674 the Amsterdam *vroedschap* found it impossible to agree to the proposed level of taxation.[40]

However, in 1674 there was not yet a group which could be called a "peace party"; policy was directed to life as near as normal while ensuring the French retreat of 1673 was pursued and maintained by judicious military expenditure and generalship. Van Beuningen, who was allowed to act as spokesman for the city, remained confident of his overriding concerns for the interest of Amsterdam. The diplomatic relations between Valckenier, Van Beuningen and Fagel ensured that the Prince could still count on the support of Amsterdam for the war effort, even if that support was no longer so wholehearted. Eventually, however, van Beuningen's protection of the interests of the city were to work to the detriment of his relations

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38. G.A. Amsterdam, Register op het Receuil van Tractaten van Cornelis Hop, pensionaries van Amsterdam, 166-1680, nr. 65. This was hard work lasting at least from September until December 1674.

39. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 4 December 1673.

40. See chapter 9 below for a full discussion on the issues surrounding military expenditure and tax levels.

with the Prince and Fagel, and Valckenier was to enlist others to act as go-between as his own "Orangist" sympathies waned.[41]

It was the events of 1675 which began to speed up the change in Amsterdam's policies. The re-entry of Gelderland and Overijssel to the Union (Utrecht had been readmitted in 1674) was accompanied by the offer of the Dukedom of Gelderland to the Prince of Orange in April 1675. This proposal misjudged the sentiments of a large proportion of the Dutch who still looked on the House of Orange as their saviours, but as one of themselves. Sovereignty was the prerogative of the States. The Dutch Republic may not have had democratic tendencies,[42] but neither was it at all inclined towards the quasi-monarchism to which William II had aspired. In each of the provinces there were strongholds of Orangist sympathies, notably parts of Zeeland and the three provinces which had been released by the Prince from French occupation, but in Holland there were only pockets like Haarlem, Leiden and one or two of the smaller towns. The Amsterdam *vroedschap* did not take the issue too seriously, but did take the trouble exceptionally to minute the members present and voting (only 20 out of a potential 36).[43] However, the vote in the States of Holland was on the whole favourable to the Prince with those supporting his elevation (the *ridderschap*, Dordrecht, Gouda, Rotterdam, Gorinchem, Schiedam, Schoonhoven, den Briel, Hoorn, Edam and Medemblick), outnumbering those in opposition (Haarlem, Delft, Leiden, Amsterdam, Enkhuisen and Monnickendam) with Alkmaar and Purmerend abstaining.[44] The opposition of purportedly Orange towns like Haarlem and Leiden demonstrates the depth of

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41. See also chapter 9 below.

42. P. Geyl, "Willem III, de Stadhouder-Koning", p. 148.

43. Those present and voting were: Pancras, Hudde, Valckenier, Hooft, Backer, Bronckhorst, Grootenhuys, Boreel, Roch, Tiellens, Becken, Klenck, Bors, Commelin, Opmeer, Blom, R. Hudde, Cloeck, de Vicq and Scott. The absentees, including leading members, were: Van Loon, Oudtshoorn, Trip, Appelman, Geelvinck, Vlooswijk, Hinlopen, Van Beuningen, Huydecooper, Van Neck, Corver, Graafland, Witsen and Munter. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 9 February 1675.

44. Secret Res. Holl., 9 February 1675.

understanding that there were political implications which should have serious consequences for the Union if the Prince's status was changed. In the end it was the advice from Zeeland,[45] where the strength of the support for the Prince was greater, that made the major contribution to his decision to reject the offer, but by then much damage had been done to his reputation. Personal ambition had moved on to the agenda alongside the political and economic security of the Republic and the defeat of Louis XIV.

The change of mood which was taking place in Amsterdam was most tellingly illustrated by the appointment of Hooft's nominee, van den Bosch, in 1675 as pensionary.[46] His opponent was Heemskerck, the nominee of Valckenier, but the success of van den Bosch not only implied a majority of support for the policies of Hooft over those of Valckenier. Bontemantel is quite clear in his assertion that van den Bosch was schooled by De Witt; he had also worked with Fagel - a point overlooked by Baxter who sees his appointment as a straight return to Wittianism in Amsterdam.[47] But as we have already seen, Fagel had himself learnt much of his craft under De Witt. Van den Bosch became the correspondent of the French Ambassador, d'Estrades, a crucial role as the "peace party" led by Hooft began to gain ascendancy in Amsterdam. The appointment of van den Bosch which an historian of the House of Orange like Baxter can ascribe to party politics can in fact be the starting-point for an argument that politics in Amsterdam were more complex than straight divisions between "parties". By 1675 the few real Orangist regents were eclipsed by the patronage struggles of the more powerful, whose interests tended far more to the personal. Personal interest led directly to the creation of factions. Those colluding in these factions were completely aware of their temporary nature and that they were usually alliances of convenience. That

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45. *Hollandse Mercurius* in March 1675 published a letter from the Prince to the States of Zeeland dated 18 February 1675, explaining his intentions towards the Republic and his response to the offer of the dukedom of Gelderland.

46. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 5 April 1675; Bontemantel, *Regeeringe*, II, p. 241, 5 April 1675, Van den Bosch replaced Hop as *pensionaris, "Den gesyden van de Bos is geweest van de Raetpensionares de Wit en Fagel"*.

47. Baxter, *William III*, p. 124.

Hooft was able to secure the appointment of his own nominee against that of Valckenier does not imply a Wittian/Orangist split, but a personal struggle between two very different regents with the power of patronage. The failure of Cornelis Backer to secure election as burgomaster in 1675 despite all the force of the Prince's patronage exercised by his Master of Requests illustrates the independence of Amsterdam in its own internal appointments system. Determination of Amsterdam's foreign policy therefore had to be made separate from, but within the constraints of, these underlying political struggles.

The "peace party" was hampered by the entry of Sweden into the war alongside the French. This final denial of the Triple Alliance of 1668 had major implications for Dutch trade. The Baltic trade was always dominated by the power of those controlling the Sound and collecting tolls. We have seen how this had given the Danish an undue influence in the area and subjected other trading nations to the vagaries of the ever-changing tensions between the Swedes and the Danes. Amsterdam had been very anxious early in 1675 to maintain good relations with Denmark in order to ensure the security of ships going to Norway and in April they reintroduced convoys for ships going through the Sound.[48] The insecurity of the Baltic trade, the escalating competition from England and the anxiety to restore trade with France dominated the policy decisions within the *vroedschap* when agreement was sought to the declaration of war on Sweden. Amsterdam insisted that the Swedish trade should continue unimpeded despite the hostilities, a requirement which they carried.[49]

By 1676, therefore, Amsterdam was largely treating the war as an irrelevancy to her main interests, but one which was an increasingly irritating burden. Fagel received short shrift in May 1676 when he tried to persuade Amsterdam that prompt payment of quotas was needed for military provisions. Amsterdam retorted

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48. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed, 26 April 1675. The security of the Sound was seen as essential for trade not only with Sweden and Denmark, but also Norway, Danzig and Brandenburg.

49. *Ibid.*, 31 July 1675.

that this should have been anticipated and that the money (*fl.*50,000) should be taken from funds already raised by the *Raad van Staat.*[50] They reiterated this policy in July when they only agreed to *fl.*120,000 of the *fl.*300,000 requested for the seige of Maastricht, insisting that the balance should be met from quotas on the 200 *penningh* already paid.[51] Fagel was beginning to discover that negotiating with Valckenier could no longer ensure the support of Amsterdam at the same time as the Prince was reducing his reliance on van Beuningen as Ambassador to England and sending his own representatives on a parallel embassy.

All of the leading Amsterdam regents were aware by 1676 that the only policy for the city to adopt was one of peace, but their internal divisions had created such a fragmented series of factional and individual disputes highlighted by the patronage struggles of 1675 and 1676, that unity of purpose seemed impossible. The culmination of these divisions was a concerted effort to restore unanimity for the purposes of peace and this was achieved through the *Concept tot Eenigheit* (Appendix IV) in 1676, the final terms of which were drawn up by Hooft and van Vlooswijk, and Hooft was subsequently elected burgomaster in 1677. From then on Amsterdam openly pursued its peace policy and the final negotiations at Nijmegen in 1678 were influenced by Hooft's presence there. Opposition to taxation for military expenditure was no longer couched in terms of bad planning or unnecessarily high costs but in the arguments for the advantages of peace and the economic ruin which would result from continued warfare.[52]

Plans were made for a return to peace in which "*de commercie en navigatie deser landen synde de eenigsten syl en subsistence van de Staet...*"[53] This is of course the view of the Dutch merchant elite with which we have already been familiarised

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50. *Ibid.*, 23 May 1676.

51. *Ibid.*, 25 July 1676.

52. *Ibid.*, 19 July 1677.

53. *Ibid.*, 25 April 1678.

by authors from De la Court to Kossmann and beyond.[54] The mood had swung so completely that opposition to the Prince and any further military expenditure was total; the personal ambition of the Prince, of which suspicion had been roused during the Gelderland sovereignty issue of 1675, was now exposed by Amsterdam as "*selfs gloire*".[55] It was relatively simple to put the Prince's anxiety to protect the Spanish Netherlands down to his military ambitions and therefore deny its relevance to the interests of the Dutch Republic. By July 1678 Amsterdam could see that it was going to gain its point and that peace would be made with France and Sweden without the full consent of all the allies. Few queries were raised on the negotiation of the treaties beyond matters of form on the navigation and commerce clauses and they even agreed to approve provisional military expenditure on a month to month basis.[56] Peace was made on 14 August 1678 without the direct acquiescence of the Prince but, having achieved her aims, Amsterdam now had to manage her peace.

The peace necessarily made certain changes inevitable; others such as the deaths of Hooft and Pancras were coincidental, but nonetheless important. The British Ambassador to The Hague, Sir William Temple, was replaced by Sir Henry Sidney and the Comte D'Avaux took over as French Ambassador. Van Beuningen and Boreel returned from ambassadorial duties; the latter took up a new appointment as ambassador to France almost immediately,[57] but van Beuningen began to take an active part in the city's government for the first sustained length of time in his career.

The *vroedschap's* immediate policy was to direct funds towards the fabric of the

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54. De la Court, *Het Interest van Holland*; Kossmann, *C.M.H.*, p. 280.

55. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed, 23 May 1678.

56. *Ibid.*, 2 and 26 July 1678.

57. Boreel joined Odijk and Dijkveld, two of the Prince's closest personal advisers on the embassy to France to attempt to restore "*der oude vriendschap met deeze kroon*", Wagenaar, *Vaderlandsche Historie*, Part XV, p. 3.

city itself and a fairly large scale repair of old, and the building of new, bridges was put in hand.[58] Funds were given to securing the city's immediate defences at the Haarlemmer and Leidsepoorten.[59] However, the tensions which had arisen between the city and the Prince in the last few months before the conclusion of the peace were strained further during the immediate post-war period over the general defence of the Republic. Amsterdam resorted to the terms of the Union of Utrecht to support her arguments for restricting the level of military expenditure and the sovereignty of the states.[60]

Throughout 1679 and 1680 it was unclear what policy would be adopted towards possible alliances between the Dutch, English and French. The difficulties this posed the Dutch were acutely observed by D'Avaux,[61] who after 1680 had close links with the Amsterdam ruling group through the new pensionary Jakob Hop.[62] The gulf now appearing between the Prince and Amsterdam about further military expenditure came to a head in the spring of 1679 over the size of contributions required for the building of the fortifications at Naarden. Amsterdam's arguments against this expenditure were put into the context of the possibility of their being used as a base from which the Prince could repeat the actions of his father in threatening an attack on the city if they countered his wishes too far.[63] Their resolution to oppose the expenditure stated:

1. that it would be wiser to reduce the fortifications so that they would be less beneficial to an enemy should they be taken.
2. that commerce not fortifications were the basis of the city's

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58. G.A. Amsterdam, 14 July 1679. New bridges were identified as being needed as follows: on the Leidsegracht (1), Angeliersgracht (1), Bloemgracht (1), Lauriergracht (2) and Elandsgracht (2).

59. *Ibid.*, 15 October 1678.

60. *Ibid.*, 20 November 1678.

61. D'Avaux, *Négociations*, pp. 10-11.

62. Son of Cornelis Hop, pensionary of Amsterdam 1666-68, see below p. 191-192.

63. *Coenraad van Beuningens politiek en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84*, p. 168.

security.

3. that they saw only the hand of the Prince of Orange in all this.[64]

Nicolas Witsen was deputed to negotiate with Fagel and the Prince, a role which he assumed with consummate ease and was to maintain during the next few years. This was however a battle which Amsterdam lost and the fortifications, still untouched by enemy bombardment today, remain a monument to William's defence strategy. The Prince's only retribution visited on Amsterdam was to send Heemskerck, who had put his own, outspoken, interpretatation of Amsterdam's views to the States of Holland, on the Spanish embassy.[65]

From 1680-82 the Republic was able to operate on a fairly peaceful footing, and Amsterdam took the advantage in both hands. They began to re-establish good relations with France in order to put their trade back on to the most profitable footing, through continuing to press for a French alliance. This was in the face of strong opposition from van Beuningen, who persisted throughout the entire period in his distrust of any potential alliance with the French. The continued respect paid to van Beuningen by his fellow regents, despite their differences over very essential policy issues, is complete evidence of the calibre of his political reputation by the 1680s. Domestic matters dominated the business of the regents as they dealt with a new wave of immigrants from France, and of German and Portuguese Jews. Regulation of the Dutch church and toleration to immigrant communities coincided with the English Exclusion Crisis which encouraged the Prince of Orange to include the religious freedom of protestant peoples within his foreign policy.

The negotiations over the potential treaties between either France and England were mild affairs beside the crises of 1683 and 1684, when the threat of France at the seige of Luxemburg raised the spectre of Orangist militarism again in the eyes of

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64. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed. 27 February 1679: the request for the fortifications was *fl.*300,000, but Amsterdam claimed that the time would come when they would have paid *fl.*1m. towards the expenditure.

65. Baxter, *William III*, pp. 179-80.

the Amsterdammers, and the threat of active defiance from the major city in the eyes of the Prince. On the face of it, William's request for 8,000 men in 1683 does not seem excessive, and Amsterdam's opposition was seen as open defiance of the Prince rather than purely a matter of policy.

Throughout the entire period, the business as usual policy continued alongside the issues which were forced on the city by external affairs: control of immigrants; maintenance of the fabric of the city; management of almshouses; management of the churches; and taxation ordinary and extraordinary. In many ways it was the importance of these internal matters for the Amsterdam regency which informed their antagonism towards a possible return to the conflicts of the 1670s. War and the necessary imposition of taxes, and implicit threat to secure trading routes, would infringe the freedom of the city to prosecute its own interests and the interests of the States. The regents, who in 1672 had understood the necessity of supporting the Prince's endeavours against the French, now felt that the economic threat was greater than any possible military aggression in the Spanish Netherlands. For the third time in a period of twelve years,[66] in 1683-84 these regents showed a unity which was not reflected in their everyday affairs. The following chapter will look at how these occasional periods of unity emerged from a strong factional system when external pressures put the interests of the whole city in jeopardy.

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66. 1672 during the *rampjaar*, 1676-78 during the push for peace and the Luxemburg crisis of 1683-84.

Chapter 7

Party, Faction and the Individual in Amsterdam Politics in the 1670s and 1680s

From the point of view of the Prince of Orange and the United Provinces of the Dutch Republic in the 1670s and 1680s, Amsterdam was of greatest importance as a political unit, based as it was on economic superiority. But Amsterdam was, as all political units, made up of a diversity of individuals and factions, whose primary interests were likely to be motivated by many other factors besides the politics of city and state.

The structure of the regency in Amsterdam can be misleading. There were thirty-six members of the *vroedschap*, co-opted for life (the only ways out other than death were through bankruptcy or a deliberate career move away from the city).[1] However of the thirty-six members many were virtually ineffectual; several members of the *schepenen* had far more influence, particularly those who were also members of the *vroedschap*. The *vroedschap* was not dependent on the approval of the stadholder for its membership, although annual nominations for the *schepenen* were forwarded for his notice as a courtesy. Did the real power lie with the four burgomasters? Burgomasters served for one year and then usually for a second as *Oud Burgemeester* and then were not re-elected for at least a year. Elections to the *burgemeesterschap* were usually made from a small group, but these were not necessarily allies at any one time, and they were dependent on not only support from others but also the success of their patronage networks.[2] The *vroedschap* had an efficient process of working, meeting regularly throughout the

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1. For a discussion on the rules of entry to the *vroedschap*, see Burke, *Venice and Amsterdam*, p. 21.

2. See the Text of the *Concept tot Eenigheit* 1676 (Appendix IV) for the regulation of elections to the *burgemeesterschap* and representation at *Raad van Staat, Gecommitteerde Raad*, and the Amsterdam Admiralty. Burgomasters had to be over 40 before election, Burke, *Venice and Amsterdam,* p. 21; this would account for the failure of Witsen, who was born in 1641, to be elected burgomaster until the 1680s.

week and delegating much of the detailed work relating to complex issues to small committees comprising a selected number of members. The make-up and effectiveness of these committees reflects the relative importance of particular members and provides evidence of a loose career structure among the more seriously involved members (see Appendix VI). This consultative process could also be dispensed with during periods of crisis when decisions had to be reached quickly, and in this way the committees reflect rather more the "normal" peace-time workings of the *vroedschap*.

Throughout the 1670s and early 1680s only about half of the members of the *vroedschap* were able to command events through their influence and patronage networks and even these were dominated by the smaller core of members who were within the group eligible for election to the *burgemeesterschap*.[3] Principal among this latter small group were Hooft, Valckenier, Van Beuningen and Geelvinck in the 1670s and, after the deaths of the first two in 1678 and 1680, Hudde and Witsen. Members were not closely united by any clear, long-term, interest and it was therefore important for each of them to establish a network of support from among those aspiring to the same kind of influence. The resultant shifting alliances and jealousies between these various groupings were crucial to the line taken by the *vroedschap* in its intervention in States decisions. An analysis of the background, careers and interests of these leading burgomasters in the context of their activities during the 1670s and 1680s will show how the ebbs and flows of interest and conflict interacted with the external policies of the States of Holland and States General.

Hendrik Hooft had been a member of the *vroedschap* since 1655 and was the son of the poet politician, P.C. Hooft. He had been burgomaster in 1662 and 1664, but was not elected again until 1672. Together with van Oudtshoorn he is the only member whom Elias judged it necessary to call "remonstrant".[4] In Elias' discussion

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3. See *Concept tot Eenigheit*, clauses 3 and 4, Appendix IV.

4. Elias, *Vroedschap*, I, p. CXXVI.

this has implications of liberal, republican, anti-Orangism. As we have seen, the direct correlation of strict Calvinism with Orangism is not really applicable at regent level, but has been conveniently extended from the mass popular support for the House of Orange inspired within congregations by Orangist Calvinist predikants. This theme was picked up strongly during the historical revisionism of the nineteenth century and the controversies over Fruin's work which received so much critical debate in the earlier part of the twentieth century.

The difficulties of identifying the most appropriate description of individual regents and their political, religious and ideologic interests have already been discussed. As much of the present chapter is concerned with analysing these interests, the following usage will be employed, except where direct evidence is drawn from contemporary commentators and later historians, when their usage will be quoted.

The terms "Orangist" and "strict Calvinist" will be used where there is no doubt of such interests. However, as such simple categorisation is rare in the *vroedschap* during this period, these terms will need further qualification. It is important to note that these terms are not synonymous. Similarly those with strong republican tendencies will be referred to as "*libertijn*", but again there will be need for qualification and variation. Although there is an implication of a relaxed approach to religion within the term, again it should not in every case be assumed to be synonymous with Coccejan or "remonstrant" tendencies.

Hooft's opposition to Valckenier is dated to the death of De Graeff in 1665. Hooft was appointed to the Amsterdam Admiralty from 1666-68 and to the *Gecommitteerde Raad* from 1669-71. The former may have been an attempt to remove Hooft from active influence within the *vroedschap* but representation at the *Gecommitteerde Raad* was an important role for a member of the regency, particularly during critical periods of foreign policy such as the late 1660s.[5]

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5. Grever, "The Structure of Decision-Making", p. 131; see also Clause 5 of the *Concept tot Eenigheit*, Appendix VI.

Valckenier secured the post for himself in 1672 as replacement for Hooft in order to influence events as much as possible, after failing to secure election as burgomaster. It has already been noted that this was the only time Valckenier took office outside Amsterdam, preferring to exert his influence within the City's own organisations.[6]

Hooft has a largely untarnished reputation for honesty and freedom from corruption. Sir William Temple's description written to contrast Hooft with Valckenier in 1678, exemplifies the contemporary impressions of his character:

> He was "a serious, honest man, of great patrimonial riches, learning, with humour, without ambition, having always refused all employments the state had offered him, and serving only in that of burgomaster in his own town in his turn, and as little busy in it as he could ... He had all the credit that could be in his town, without seeking, or minding, or using it..."[7]

However, as we have seen, Hooft did serve the States in 1666-71 and although he is said to have declared that he would not take office in Amsterdam after 1672[8] he did continue to serve on committees, undertaking other municipal duties and negotiation on sensitive defence issues with Haarlem.[9] He even succeeded in securing the post of pensionary for his son in 1672 and secretary in 1673 for a

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6. Grever, *op. cit.*,p. 25-6: "For the proud regents of Amsterdam, it was more prestigious to stay at home, and form part of the inner circle of faction leaders who dominated the city, and from there tried to rule the whole republic."

7. Temple, *Works*, II, p. 439.

8. J.F.L. de Balbian Vesters, *Burgemeesters van Amsterdam in de 17e ende 18e eewuen* (Zutphen, 1932), drew on Bontemantel to conclude that Hooft refused to take office again until 1677 because "*oprecht en rondborstig als hij was, verklaarde hij uit vordent zich in 1673 niet meer beschiktbaer testellen, omdat hij den "schelm" en den "schagwijn" Valckenier als burgemeesternaastzich zou krijgen.*"

9 G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 28 November 1672 and 7 March 1673. Appendix VI lists the membership of working committees 1672-1684; for Hooft's activities see also, particularly G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed, the issue over the granting of offices in perpetuity for the Princes of Orange, 28 January 1674; the Gelderland sovereignty issue, 5 February 1675; and the protection of the Baltic trades, 2 December 1675 and 11 February 1676.

short while, until Valckenier's nominee Heemskerck was appointed.[10] And, of course, in 1675 Hooft successfully nominated van den Bosch to the post of pensionary.

The major question over Hooft is why he was not included in the purge of 10 September 1672. Bontemantel, together with Six (*Elias* 223) was urging a reconciliation between De Graeff and Valckenier as late as 26 August, and De Graeff subsequently sought Hooft's advice. De Graeff and Valckenier had had a fragile alliance since the former's election in 1665 on the death of his brother until 1669, but a temporary revival of De Witt's influence and popularity brought this to an end. Hooft could not see his way to encourage De Graeff to agree with their proposition; De Graeff himself found Valckenier's attempts to dominate others, particularly van Vlooswijk, unacceptable and the reconciliation was never effected.[11] Hooft remained loyal to the line taken by Reynst who was removed from office, and he continued outspoken in his fears of Orangist monarchical tendencies.[12]

Hooft's and Reynst's former ally, Nicolas Opmeer (*Elias 213*) was one of the new members of 15 September 1672 following the purge.[13] Opmeer had already been a *schepen* since 1659, had served at the Admiralty of the *Noord Kwartier* since 1666 and was reappointed after a year from 1673-80. He was replaced for 1673 on the Admiralty of the *Noord Kwartier* by Spiegel,[14] a *schepen* with a republican reputation. The election and subsequent official appointment of Opmeer is strong

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10. Bontemantel, *Regeeringe,* II, pp. 64-5.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 189.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 188.

13. Elias, *Vroedschap*, I, p. CXIX.

14. Eldest son of Hendrik Spiegel (*Elias 130*) who before his death in 1667 had been one of the leaders of the opposition to Valckenier. Dirck Spiegel had been a *schepen* since 1660 and was removed in September 1672. His removal from formal office-holding within the city did not therefore affect his eligibility for representing Amsterdam on States bodies.

evidence that there were ambitious men who were prepared to support the cause of change in 1672, without essentially changing their allegiances. Opmeer was considered by Bontemantel to have moved to Valckenier's side while "*doch Spiegel bleef constant aen de sijde van Reynst en Hooft*".[15] Bontemantel in fact assumed that Opmeer only began to support Valckenier's lead after his election and that his reappointment to the Admiralty of the *Noord Kwartier* was on Valckenier's recommendation.[16]

After the death of Valckenier in 1680 Nicolas Witsen saw Opmeer as an ally of Geelvinck with whom Valckenier had come into conflict in 1676. That men such as Opmeer, who quickly realigned themselves with their former allies, were on the list of replacements in 1672 points to a certain cynicism in the support for the restoration of the Prince.

Among those already on the *vroedschap* who also appeared to change their allegiances to suit the occasion in 1672, one of the most difficult to understand fully is Cornelis de Vlaming van Oudtshoorn (*Elias 181*). Oudtshoorn was closely related to Hooft and also first cousin to Geelvinck, but Bontemantel assures us he could be securely thought of as Valckenier's man.[17] This is one of the clearest cases of evidence against too much reliance being put on the family/faction argument. As one of the four ruling burgomasters with Hooft, Reynst and van de Poll (who was absent at the time), Oudtshoorn was jointly responsible for Amsterdam's acquiescence in the repeal of the Perpetual Edict which was "*op verzoek van de Heeren Geelvinck en Valckenier, gehaelt en gelesen*".[18] However, in 1676 his furtherance of the family interests of the De Graeff's in the service of the Prince were seen as a deliberate affront to Valckenier, whom the De Graeffs had only the previous year held responsible for the high level of taxation imposed

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15. Bontemantel, *Regeeringe*, II, p. 179.

16. Elias, *Vroedschap*, I, p. CXIX.

17. Bontemantel, *Regeeringe*, II, pp. 1-6; Elias, *Vroedschap*, I, p. CXXVI.

18. Bontemantel, *loc. cit.*, p. 16-17.

on them while Valckenier's own family had escaped relatively lightly.[19] Like Hooft, Oudtshoorn remained as burgomaster until February 1673, when he was deputed as Amsterdam's representative at the *Raad van Staat* until 1675.[20] This may indicate the level at which Valckenier valued his support. We can only assume that Oudtshoorn's support of the Organist restoration made him follow Valckenier's lead in 1672, which would have been in complete contradiction to Bontemantel's own stance and hence accounted for the latter's assumptions.

Hooft's only close ally on the *vroedschap* who did not make compromises over his views was Cornelis van Vlooswijk, who was quite clearly removed from the centre by his appointment to the Amsterdam Admiralty for seven years. This was van Vlooswijk's second stint of duty at the Amsterdam Admiralty; he previously served from 1663-5. However these two remained with influence among other members of the *vroedschap* throughout the early 1670s and were jointly responsible for drafting the final version of the *Concept tot Eenigheit* (Appendix IV). The *Concept* was signed by van Vlooswijk and Hooft on 29 June 1676 and then passed to Oudtshoorn, Valckenier, Munter, Huydecooper, Pancras, Hudde and Trip.[21]

The reconciliation effected by the *Concept* allowed Hooft to take office as burgomaster again in 1677 and to make a positive contribution to the negotiations of peace at Nijmegen largely on Amsterdam's terms but, by the end of 1678, he

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19. J.F.L. de Balbian Verster, *Burgermeesters van Amsterdam*, see entries for Andries de Graeff and Gillis Valckenier. In 1675 De Graeff's bill was for *fl.*700,000 for 200p compared to Wouter Trip's *fl.*75,000 and Valckenier's son's *fl.*10,000. Tax assessments had been made in 1674 just over 40 years after the previous assessments, when the De Graeffs were rising in importance in the regency and the Valckeniers were insignificant; these assessments were not to be revisited for another sixty years, Burke, *Venice and Amsterdam*, p. 17. Burke, p. 63 also describes De Graeff's vain attempt to escape the 1674 assessment by moving to Utrecht. For the tax assessments for those members of the *vroedschap* liable in 1674, see Appendix I. The 1674 tax assessment, during a period of frequent imposition of wealth taxes, was an important feature in the maintenance of military expenditure.

20. Bontemantel, *Regeeringe*, II, pp. 265-7.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 246-63.

was dead.

Gillis Valckenier had been elected to the *vroedschap* in 1652, during the same period as Hooft, Oudtshoorn and van Vlooswijk, while De Witt was in the ascendant. He had many family relationships and connections within the ruling class, and these even extended to Hooft himself. For example, in 1674 Nanning Cloeck *(Elias 217)*, who was a relative of both Hooft and Hulft *(Elias 199*, removed in 1672), replaced Valckenier's father-in-law Ranst *(Elias 202)*. Cloeck's alliegances are not clear, but his family is well represented in the official offices of Amsterdam (see Appendix V), and was a well-established regent family. Thus, although family patronage could strengthen the representation of families within the regency, family cannot be cited as the dominant pre-condition for faction. That there are enough historical examples of the failures of dynasticism (whether royal or *burgelijk*) to contribute to the argument against its exceptional success in seventeenth century Amsterdam has already been discussed.[22]

That historians have ascribed total domination of the Amsterdam *vroedschap* to Valckenier from 1672 until his death in 1680 is not surprising. Most histories of Amsterdam between Bontemantel and Franken have either dealt with periods outside the 1670s or have included the 1670s within a much longer time span. They have therefore necessarily summarised the events and circumstances of the 1670s by drawing on the most accessible and obvious evidence. Consequently even Bontemantel himself is only quoted where he gives generalised descriptions rather than the more detailed accounts of incidents.

H. Brugmans, *Opkomst en Bloei*, for example, contends that from 1672-80 Valckenier was supreme, basing his assertion on the opinion of Sir Henry Sidney, the new English Ambassador to the Dutch Republic who was appointed on 8 June 1679. Sidney was so impressed with Valckenier after his first meeting with the burgomaster that he wrote: "The great Turk has not more absolute dominion and

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[22]. See above pp. 54-55.

power over any of his country men than he hath at Amsterdam."[23] I. J. Brugmans in his *Geschiedenis van Amsterdam* takes his evidence at third hand from D'Ailly and mentions the list alleged to have been drawn up by Valckenier and says "*zij partij volgte hem blindelings*".[24] A list was sent to William on 6 September 1672 but according to the contemporary Bontemantel it was a list of the *current* holders of positions, not a proposal for replacements.[25] These generalisations naturally get taken up and used with varying degrees of appropriateness in the kind of broad-based historical studies mentioned.

Both the ambassadors Temple and D'Avaux had strong opinions about Valckenier: the former would have seen him at work during the 1670s and observed the differences between his approach and that of Hooft; the latter's experience was limited to the period after Hooft's death in 1678. In some ways, therefore, Temple is the more reliable source and he did not see Valckenier as without opposition - even quite strong opposition, but grudgingly admitted his abilities:

> "He [Hooft] (see above p. 137) had all the credit that could be in his town, without seeking it, or minding, or using it, whereas Valckenier sought and counted it all that could be, without having half the other's, being a morose and formal man, but of great industry, much thought, and, as was believed, avarice, and making the terms easily that were necessary in the government to carry his ends. These two had long been enemies, and thought irreconcilable, till the French instruments at this time, with great art and industry, made up the quarrel, and joined them both in the design of making the peace upon the terms offered by France."[26]

Temple clearly ascribed the unity within Amsterdam to the skills of the French ambassadors and their agents within the city. De Fouw has seen it as the work of

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[23]. H. Brugmans, *Opkomst en Bloie*, p. 180: "*Valckenier was machtigen den ooit; zijn authoriteit wordt door een English gezant bij die van der Sultan vergeleten*".

[24]. I.J. Brugmans, *Geschiedenis van Amsterdam*, p. 182; D'Ailly, *loc. cit.*

[25]. Bontemantel, *Regeeringe*, II, p. 196.

[26]. Temple, *Works*, vol. II, pp. 440-41.

Fagel,[27] and van Beuningen's biographer, Roldanus, ascribed it to Valckenier as a deliberate ploy to bring van Beuningen into stronger opposition to the Prince.[28] But whatever the truth, no reconciliation could have been effected without the overwhelming motivation of working for peace to the benefit of Amsterdam itself. Both Hooft and Valckenier had proven the strength of their personalities and they were therefore unlikely to be swayed by outside "instruments" except insofar as their own objectives were in concert with those of the outsiders. D'Avaux's view of Valckenier is more generous but confirms the strength of character which would not be swayed without conviction - a wise politician who "*parle peu et qui paraît un peu pesant, mais fermes dans ses résolutions, qui a de grandes vues et un très grand crédit.*"[29] Another contemporary observer, the English Consul, Sir William Carr, wrote in 1681 (after the death of both Valckenier and Hooft):

> "in Ano 1676 this Citty was wholely governed by the singel faction of Burgemaster Valconier but the said Burgem. Valconier observing that his Party was weakened by the Death of some of his friends in the Gouverment was forced to call in Burgemaster Hooft who before was kept out as being an Arminian, these 2 intrest being then joyned then the Citty was Equally devided betweene those 2 great mean + all places of Trust + profit put into there hands,"[30]

This is yet another view of the reasons behind the *Concept tot Eenigheit* and reflects more about the writer than about the true state of Amsterdam in the 1670s. As the Amsterdammers had been convinced at least since 1675 that the Prince's respect for the influence of the city only extended to the support he could rely on for his overall plans, that is, only to the extent that his own position could be secured to pursue his military aims, the argument for French involvement need be considered as no more than the obvious exploitation by the enemy of the most vulnerable spot in the Republic's military support. And, on the other hand, since it

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27. de Fouw, *Ontbekende Raadspensionarissen*, p. 111.

28. Roldanus, *van Beuningen*, pp. 36-7.

29. Fruin, "Geschiedenis van het Burgemeesterschap", p. 319.

30. Carr to Blaythwayt, 21 March 1681 (Appendix II).

had been clear since the late 1660s that Valckenier was likewise more interested in his own political power than anything else, it would not have been difficult for him to make concessions to the opposition which could reunite the Amsterdam ruling group in order not only to secure his own position, but also to strengthen the town's influence at a time when the towns of Holland were all moving further away from a continuation of the war. After all, he had done the same in 1672.

Few vacancies occurred between 1674 and 1678, and those were only minor members who were on the whole replaced by relatives within the formal family representative structure. Nanning Cloeck replacing Valckenier's father-in-law (1674) has already been mentioned and Tulp (*Elias 111*) (a long-time and intransigent enemy of Valckenier), van Neck (*Elias 165*, bankrupt), van Loon (*Elias 169*) and van Bronckhorst (*Elias 198*) were replaced respectively by de Vicq (*Elias 219*),[31] Rombout Hudde (*Elias 216*), van Loon the younger (*Elias 220*) and Cornelis Valckenier (*Elias 221*, Gillis Valckenier's first cousin) in 1678. These new members were all from regent families, but none of them except Cornelis Valckenier took an active part and even his municipal responsibilities were at the secondary level.[32] It must be assumed that the replacement of the elder van Loon (Valckenier's sponsor in the 1650s) by his son would not have changed the balance of potential support for Valckenier.

Only one new member came from outside the normal ruling group: Everard Scott, elected in 1674 *(Elias 218*), a member of the influential banking and trading family with connections in Spain, Italy and the Levant and related to the Trips. He was the first member of his family to achieve regent status and his association with Trip would have brought him within Valckenier's sphere of influence. He replaced Gerard Hasselaer (*Elias 222*) in 1674. Hasselaer was a close relative of Hooft and what should be noted is that he was not replaced by his son Nicolaes, who was by

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31. De Vicq died in 1678 after serving for only three years, and was replaced, in 1679, by his son.

32. He had been secretary in 1676 (Appendix V).

then in his late twenties (a perfectly normal age for election on the family structure). Nicolaes Hasselaer did not find a place until the death of Graafland (*Elias 196*) four years later. The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from this is that the politics of the *wetsverzetting* were still partially effective and while Hooft's opposition was so great, the exclusion of the younger Hasselaer was a political move. Of course Scott had much to offer; he was to take an active, specialist role, being the only member who was a director of the newly constituted (1674) *W.I.C.* until the election of de Vicq the younger (*Elias 226*) and van Heuvel (*Elias 225*) in 1679.[33] And Hasselaer may not have been interested at this stage; he does not show up as a nominee for any other office, particularly that of *schepen*, where a role in the regency ensured younger members of representative families greater prestige than that of the less effective members of the *vroedschap.*

Therefore, rather than the deaths and replacements of the mid-1670s working to Valckenier's disadvantage, in a minor way his support was being consolidated. Carr's letter therefore remains an interesting and valid example of contemporary interpretations of the politics of Amsterdam, but its ardent anti-republican views render its overall veracity open to some question. Carr's judgement can also be questioned further when his comments about Hudde's politics are considered.

> "this Burgem [Valckenier] being Dead last Octob, then Burgem Van Beuengen grew strong in his intrest + this yeare there is a hope 2 new Burgems (vis) Burge Corver + Burge Opmer, so that there is only one of the ould rank Commonwealth men left which is Burge Hudde + Burge Van Beuengen still remaines the 4th,"[34]

At the time Hudde was not considered an "ould rank Commonwealth man" by anyone else.

We have already seen how between 1670 and 1672 Valckenier, after nearly twenty

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[33]. Scott was president of the Amsterdam Chamber of the *W.I.C.* from July 1681, A.R.H., W.I.C., 336. After Scott's death in 1682, Opmeer became a *bewindhebber* and immediately was elected president of the Amsterdam chamber, *ibid.*, 337.

[34]. Carr to Blaythwayt, 21 March 1681 (Appendix II).

years in the *vroedschap* was unable to get his own way despite the power of money and patronage in the face of opposition. In 1671 he had failed to get either of his nominees, Munter or Trip,[35] elected and failed himself to be elected burgomaster. Neither did he lead the movement for the repeal of the Perpetual Edict in 1672 and the elevation of the Prince to the County of Holland. "*Der Heer Valckenier adviseeren niet gevoecht te sijn op 't Eeuwich edict te aviseeren; waer op eenige discoursen sijnde gevallen, argumenteerde verder, dat het edict in sijn geheel can gelaeten werden.*"[36] The original change of policy came from Geelvinck, Pancras, Hinlopen, Corver and Backer.[37] Eventually Valckenier joined the group which was dominated by Geelvinck and Pancras. Thereafter it has been assumed by historians such as Elias that Valckenier took over the leadership of this group and that Pancras was his "*createur*".[38] Bontemantel himself, no doubt in the frustration of having been removed from office, found it impossible to understand how the Prince could have forgiven Valckenier and his colleagues their opposition to his restoration in January 1671. According to Bontemantel, Valckenier's persistence that he knew nothing of it all is invalidated by his knowledge of what went on.[39]

Elias lists Valckenier's allies in 1671 as Oudtshoorn, Munter, Pancras, Huydecooper, Hudde, Geelvinck and Trip. [40] This list bears considerable similarities to those receiving the *Concept tot Eenigheit* in 1676 after it had been drafted by Hooft and van Vlooswijk (Oudsthoorn, Valckenier, Munter,

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35. Elias, *Vroedschap*, I, p. CXVII.

36. Bontemantel, *Regeeringe*, II, p. 18.

37. *Ibid.*

38. Elias, *Geschiedenis*, p. 164.

39. "*Syn soon, den secretares, soude geyst hebben, dat de instatie van Syne Hoogheyt sijn vaeder heeft gemoereernt eenige op te stellen, die [sijn vader] s[-]e fraey mannen te weesen, doch [dat syn vader] nimant gerecommandeert.*" Bontemantel, *Regeeringe*, 2, Bilage 7, p. 226.

40. Elias, *Geschiedenis*, p. CXXVI.

Huydecooper, Pancras, Hudde and Trip), but as we have seen, the views of this group were not unanimous over such an important issue as the restoration of the Prince of Orange until July 1672. The omission of Geelvinck from this group in 1676, when he had serious differences with Valckenier, is of significance, and suggests that rather than the group all being allies, they were the senior members of the *vroedschap*, whose agreement to issues of major importance was essential for determining a common policy for Amsterdam.

The *wetsverzetting* temporarily disguised all other points of view and allowed Valckenier to establish his reputation through domination of the burgomasters for the next two years. His path was somewhat smoothed by the decision of van Beuningen not to remain in parochial office but to return to ambassadorial duties in the States' service in 1673, and Hooft's publicised withdrawal from elected office. The only other possible contender for major influence at this stage was Geelvinck and during this period he and Valckenier had established a close working relationship. Of the other two mentioned as the central core of influential members from 1672-84, Hudde and Witsen, the former was still biding his time and the latter was at the beginning of his career.

The burgomasters in 1673 (Hudde, Valckenier, Geelvinck, Huydecooper) and 1674 (Valckenier, Trip, Pancras, Munter) were as much of a coherent group, under the leadership of Valckenier, as was possible within the factional politics of Amsterdam:

In 1673 the grouping was more of individuals with a common viewpoint determined by external events and the security of the city; in 1674 it reflected Valckenier at the height of his influence. Trip and Pancras are the only two serving burgomasters in the 1670s who can without question be seen as Valckenier's men, and we have seen how recently Valckenier's total influence over Pancras dated from. Trip, however, owed his position on the *vroedschap* completely to Valckenier. Valckenier had recently made a marriage arrangement between his son, Wouter, and Trip's daughter. Trip was also the only 1672

replacement member to serve as a burgomaster in the 1670s (in 1674, 1677 and 1679, in 1674 and 1679 alongside Valckenier). From then (that is from the death of Valckenier) until his own death in 1684 he took a far less active part in Amsterdam politics. No doubt on the personal level his vast Swedish trading interests, particularly during the Baltic crisis of 1675, were invaluable, but his early election to the *burgemeesterschap* in 1674 can only be explained by the influence of Valckenier and Trip's role seems never to have been more than a supporting vote for his sponsor.

Huydecooper has probably received greater attention from historians than his real influence justified. Difficulties in assessing where he stood have tended to align him with Hudde as a member of the new "middle party", the validity of which I have already questioned, and will discuss again later (see p. 157 below). Huydecooper would appear to have been motivated more by status and wealth than by the exercise of real political power. He is a prime example of the type of rentier regent who has been identified with the alleged decline in the quality of the Dutch ruling classes in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. His estate at Maarseveen and his patronage of the arts have created the image of demonstration of wealth at the expense of real involvement in politics, or commerce. In 1673 his interest in his own property took precedence over the *causus belli*, and he paid the French not to molest his estate at Maarseveen in Utrecht.[41] He was always near the centre of activity and decision-making, but his principal role seems to have been to communicate the decisions of the burgomasters to the representatives in The Hague, rather than being instrumental in making the decisions. Although he had a long career, holding the *burgemeesterschap* with regularity, in the end he failed to make the right political judgement in 1688 in support of the invasion of England and thereafter what influence he had declined.

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41. Schwartz, "Jan van der Heyden and the Huydecoopers of Maarseveen", p. 213; Temple noted in a letter to Ormond in 1673 the importance of the inland estates to the rentier regents: "... and besides, in a manner all men of fortunes among them have a great part of their estates lying in the cantores of the States or the Provinces, which would all be lost upon the conquest of their land; so as they will lend to the last...", Temple, *Works*, Vol. II, p. 236.

The relations between Munter and Valckenier had been of the disruptive kind in the 1660s and their reconciliation in opposition to De Witt seems to have weakened rapidly after 1672. De Witt had been surprised by the apparent alliance between Valckenier and Munter in 1670, as he had counted Munter as one of his friends, and knew that Valckenier and Munter had quarrelled bitterly over family matters in 1665.[42] He had been unsuccessful in 1664, when he had competed with De Graeff as replacement for his brother.[43] Together with Pancras, he was a victim of Valckenier's general unpopularity in 1671 and failed to be re-elected as *oud burgemeester* as the latter's nominee. Valckenier had shown his ability to make enemies by being outspoken in his opinions of van de Poll and the aged and revered Tulp.[44] In 1676 Munter was once again at odds with Valckenier, moving much closer to his brother-in-law Geelvinck, following the breakdown of relations between the two more senior regents.

Valckenier did not restrict his conflicts to members of the *vroedschap.* His relationship with Cornelis Hop, pensionary 1672-5, deteriorated rapidly. The Hop family remained outside the ruling group, but both Cornelis and his son remained in the service of the city and States for many years. After the death of Valckenier Cornelis was restored to favour in Amsterdam, and his son, Jakob, after serving the city for some time, eventually went into the service of the Prince when he became King of England.[45]

The more we look at the Amsterdam ruling group of the 1670s the more shadowy a figure Valckenier becomes. There is the vitriolic poem about him displayed under his portrait in the Amsterdam Historische Museum which seems no more

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42. Rowen, *De Witt*, p. 785.

43. Bontemantel, *Regeeringe*, II, p. 11.

44. Elias, *Geschiedenis*, pp. 162-3.

45. This was a radical change for a civic official who had been the go-between of Amsterdam with the French Ambassador D'Avaux. For a fuller discussion of the role of Jakob Hop in the politics and administration of Amsterdam, see below pp. 192-193.

than a summary of all other descriptions of a fairly unpleasant, powerful political intriguer. His career can be plotted simply. There is a fair selection of his letters, albeit scattered among major collections, rather than collected together, but they are on the whole businesslike and do not tell much about the man. There is certainly nothing like van Beuningen's later plaintive self-justification for his actions, or the detached academic approach of Witsen's collections to indicate what he was really like. The frustration of all this is that commentators and historians from Bontemantel to the present day tell of this one man's dominance of Amsterdam, but virtually always from observation and report rather than through the evidence of his own writings. He was wealthy, he had good contacts and he exercised a powerful patronage system, but did he dominate Amsterdam's policy or merely take the initiative when he saw the way it was going as he most certainly did in 1672 and 1676?

Geelvinck is also a somewhat elusive character to discover. He too had been elected to the *vroedschap* in the early 1650s, but did not reach political prominence until the 1670s after the *wetsverzetting*. He was probably the only prominent member who could be classified as Orangist in the sense that from the late 1660s he worked for the restoration of the Prince and for the repeal of the Perpetual Edict. He also worked hard in the interests of the city. His alliance with Valckenier in the early 1670s seems to have been based on the temporary unity imposed on the *vroedschap* by the *wetsverzetting*, but was subject to the tensions imposed by the differences which continued to arise between Valckenier and his allies, despite common purpose. The most serious of the disputes between Valckenier and Geelvinck in 1676 led to the somewhat unlikely alliance between Hooft and Geelvinck. Valckenier had been responsible for the changes in office of *secretaris* in 1676 which reflected the trends in the internal politics of Amsterdam.[46] The resulting quarrels gave rise to the trading of insults including Geelvinck pointing out that Valckenier's grandfather was only "*een schipper op*

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[46]. Dirck Geelvinck had first held the post, was replaced by Dirck Munter, who in his turn was replaced by Cornelis Valckenier (Appendix V).

Leiden".[47] Attempts were made within the *vroedschap* to mend the breach, but they were largely unsuccessful. Witsen believed that the spirit of the *Concept tot Eenigheit*, which had allowed the restoration of Haringscapel to the commission from which he had been removed from in 1672 and the award of a commission to the son of Andries de Graeff, should be practised more widely. In his letter of 29 December 1676 to Valckenier he talks of the "*infamie van de Hr. van Castricum*", encouraging Valckenier to reconcile himself to Geelvinck while maintaining the higher moral ground.[48] Attempts at reconciliation went beyond the personal, though, and there was an enquiry by Oudtshoorn, Huydecooper and Munter to try to reconcile the two "*die lange jaren met den anderen in vruntschap hebben geleeft*". This resulted in the publication of an *Accord tot Wegnening van het different tusschen den Burgemeester Valckenier en den Heer van Castricum (C. Geelvinck)* on 11 January 1677.[49] This difference of opinion probably accounts for Geelvinck's omission from those agreeing to the *Concept tot Eenigheit*, but the attempts at reconciliation afterwards demonstrate the importance of not only Valckenier and Hooft, but also Geelvinck to the successful prosecution of Amsterdam's interest at the time.

Like Huydecooper, Geelvinck was a hard worker within the routine administration of the city and correspondence with representatives at The Hague. During the early years of the war he had overall responsibility for military movements and defences around Amsterdam, and was active with Hudde and Witsen in the management of the waterways.[50]

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47. Bontemantel, *Regeeringe*, II, p. 267.

48. Gebhard, *Witsen*, p. 146; Bontemantel, *op. cit.*, p. 268, note 1.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 272.

50. Hameleers and Schmitz, "Zeven Kaarten van Cornelis Koel", p.99. In 1672-73 (G.A. Amsterdam, Missieven end Requesten van Particulieren (Binnenland), no. 351, C. Geelvinck, 11 and 18 October 1672 and 3 January 1673, and extending his responsibilities to Utrecht and the waterline in the following autumn, *ibid.*, 20 October, 4 and 20 November 1673 and 4 January 1674.

His dominant role outlasted the death of Valckenier, when there was a distinct shift in the power balance within the *vroedschap*, and this indicates that he had reached his position of authority without being dependent on the other. His wealth and patronage were obviously such that he could operate individually in much the same way as Huydecooper. The principal difference between these two appears to be the willingness of Geelvinck to tackle issues on grounds of politics or personality, while Huydecooper remained more passive.[51]

What is clear is that for the whole of the period under discussion no issue can be considered without taking account of the role and stance of Geelvinck. His prominence during both the restoration of the Prince and the discussions surrounding the *Concept tot Eenigheit* confirm this central and individual role. Like Valckenier, he tended to contain his activities within Amsterdam, only taking up provincial office for two years in the 1680s when he was at the *Gecommitteerde Raad* from 1681 to 1683. After 1676 representation at The Hague broadly followed the guidelines which had been drawn up under the *Concept*, which ensured that ruling burgomasters took a more representative role, rather than delegating affairs to either those they wanted out of the way or those over whom they had influence.

The *Concept* was the instrument by which the Amsterdam regents restored unity amongst themselves. Its terms were very much a statement of how they should conduct themselves, carrying with them the implication that by the mid-1670s corruption had become rife and the processes for making appointments were largely being bypassed. The first clause which limited the number of past or present burgomasters within the *vroedschap* at any one time to twelve, can be interpreted either as means of restricting the chance of higher office to a small, highly exclusive group, or an attempt to ensure that only members with the appropriate experience could be elected burgomaster. The former argument is supported by the

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[51]. For Geelvinck's obituary and funeral procession, see Leti, *Teatro Belgico*, II, p. 380.

second clause which says that replacement for any burgomaster who has died should be agreed by all the ruling burgomasters, and if they cannot agree the number in the pool available for election may fall as low as ten. However, the strict terms outlined in the succeeding clauses make it clear that the *Concept* was also largely about preventing corruption among the burgomasters themselves and a highminded attempt to avoid the factional quarrels of the preceding years.

Like the *wetsverzetting* four years earlier, the *Concept* was largely cosmetic, but for the short term it served its purpose and united the leading regents behind the common purpose of seeking peace as quickly as possible. It gave both Hooft and Valckenier a face-saving opportunity for reconciliation by putting the interests of the city before their political differences. By 1680 its force was spent as both the leading contenders for power were dead and Van Beuningen had returned to participate fully in the civic administration. But, during the next ten years, no-one was elected burgomaster who had not been serving on the *vroedschap* since at least 1672. This would seem to support the argument that only members with proven experience could be elected burgomaster and thus avoid the kind of patronage and packing which Valckenier was able to achieve from 1672 to 1674 when he successfully sponsored the career of Trip.

As the one member of the senior group who had been unable to patch up quarrels with Valckenier in 1676, Geelvinck, did not serve as burgomaster again until 1684, by which time the ruling group was clearly centred around those favoured by Hudde and Witsen with little disunity displayed on matters of States policy. Only Van Beuningen tended to put forward his own idiosyncratic views, but as he had never been deeply involved in factional disputes, his different opinions were respected, but ignored until they were proven to be right. Overall the *Concept* probably did contribute to a concentration of the real power in Amsterdam within a smaller, more coherent group, but the political situation within which they were operating was different by the 1680s from that which had given Valckenier the opportunity to exploit his political skills so effectively in the early 1670s.

During the 1680s and 1690s probably the most influential regent in Amsterdam was Nicolaes Witsen *(Elias 204)*. From the copy of Witsen's "*Korte Verhael van mijn levenshoop tot den jaere 1714*" in the Amsterdam Archives it is claimed that after Valckenier's death "*hadde na heere Hudde, die sijn neve was 't grootste gezag*".[52] He had been elected to the *vroedschap* in 1670 at the age of twenty-nine and served for forty-seven years. He was nominated by Valckenier, but was of a long-serving, well-established regent family, closely related, *inter alia*, to the Huddes and Opmeers.[53] His life has been well-documented by Gebhard in the late nineteenth century, which is a useful source.[54] There is a large Witsen archive and his hand is relatively easy to read. He had been educated at Leiden in the Coccejan school and had travelled widely in Europe, including Oxford. He had been on an embassy to Moscow, and was married to Catarina Hochepied, a daughter of one of the leading merchant families.

Both Gebhard and Franken have assumed that Valckenier's sponsorship of Witsen ensured the latter's domination by the burgomaster. They both, however, lament the lack of extant correspondence between the two in the mid-1670s when this domination should have been in full force.[55] Soon after his election, Witsen began to develop the kind of career which he maintained throughout his active working life. He entered into the service of the city at The Hague rather than remaining in Amsterdam, and in 1676 took up a position as Field Deputy in the service of the Prince. His education had been thorough and international and several pieces of

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52. G.A.Amsterdam, Collectie Witsen, f. 171-177, *Kort Verhael van myn levenshoop tot den jaere 1714* (copied by Tydewen).

53.



54. Gebhard, *op. cit.*

55. *Ibid.*, p. 144.

his published writings have remained.

He was clearly the more superior kind of regent who can be cited in opposition to the view of degeneration of the regent class. Notably during the later 1670s and early 1680s, he managed to establish working relationships with the Prince, particularly through Fagel, and yet remained a respected representative of Amsterdam. Witsen's development as an influential regent through representation and mediation argue strongly against the domination by Valckenier thesis. And although it may be the case that much correspondence has been lost, it is also quite possible that there may not have been much in the first place. There is no dearth of extant correspondence of either with others. Valckenier's is slightly harder to trace being spread among many archives, but Witsen's, as Gebhard found, is still very accessible. The collections of correspondence do not demonstrate that either was likely to have destroyed correspondence because it was compromising. Their views on the relevant issues were not such that this would have been necessary.

In the 1670s Witsen remained outside the various factional disputes and was not elected burgomaster for the first time until 1682. Once he reached that status, he quickly took a leading position; Hudde was accorded the title *Magnificaat* after Valckenier's death, and van Beuningen retained some nominal status as the senior burgomaster, but the future quite clearly belonged to Witsen. In the 1670s and 1680s members were unlikely to sit on sub-committees while they held office as burgomaster. Witsen was an exception and on several occasions, during his period as burgomaster, was a member of sub-committees which undertook the routine policy making for the *vroedschap* (see Appendix VI). On Witsen's first election as burgomaster P. de Conjonde wrote him a good luck poem addressing him "*so een Cato by de Staet*":

> "*Um lujster, Romen, kan by onze in't minst niet haalen,*
> *En Witsen, die was soo een Cato by de Staet,*
> *Een Nestor in het Veld, vorstreetd zijn raad, en daad*
> *Die Amstels recght bank, als een zan, door zijnd staat an*
> *Van Wijshed, er verstand versight heeft me veer vor*
> *Het hujs, en bondereght ontfanger, als burgerheer,*

Dus zied men in de zoon de Vader veer geleeren
Die so weer jaaren als een hoofd ijslaar en stuk
Heyt raad huis, stad, en staat voor on gem heeft besoght
Wiener deugd moch in het hert den burgeren staat geschreven
Nu werdt di zoon geert, girent van ider een
Als voorbeeld van Staat kunste in't van't algemeen."[56]

On the same occasion as burgomaster, he received a fulsome letter of congratulations from Pierre Valkenier in Frankfurt.[57]

During the 1680s Witsen was closely allied to Joan Hudde, and their co-operation with other members of their family group has led to more valid arguments for a closing of the ruling oligarchy in Amsterdam during the last quarter of the seventeenth century. There was certainly more unity of purpose in the way of the 1650s and early 1660s, than the struggles of the 1670s indicated. Hudde had been elected to the *vroedschap* in 1667 when he was nearly forty, but he had not been inactive before that. His reputation rests on two points. He was an eminent mathematician of his time, and had already achieved success in his developments to the microscope.[58] He rationalised the accounting procedures for the City Treasury. Like Witsen he seems to have remained outside factional disputes, achieved within a career which included many terms of office as burgomaster, and to have developed a reputation which has been labelled for convenience the leadership of a middle party within Amsterdam in the 1670s. We have seen that Hudde had common interests with van Beuningen, mainly in scientific and technical developments,[59] although not in his more millenarianist views, and they had served as burgomasters together immediately after the *wetsverzetting*. They also both avoided the factional disputes of the 1670s. They were not to work closely within the city government until the 1680s, but their common interests and

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56. G.A. Amsterdam, Collectie Witsen, nr.180, fol.170.

57. *Ibid.*, nr 180, f.199.

58. See above p. 71.

59. Jan Swammerdam, who had taken the potential for the microscope forward had been sponsored by van Beuningen, Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 905-7.

lack of identification before then with any of the leading factional leaders may have contributed to the idea of their leading a "middle party", Hudde within Amsterdam, van Beuningen in the Republic as a whole.

To argue for the existence of a middle party assumes that there are at least two other parties which are at political opposites. The idea of party was very strong in the nineteenth century, when these labels began to be applied to earlier periods and issues of Orangism and republicanism had relevance to the current situation. The consolidation of the Dutch monarchy after 1830 led to a revision of interpretations of the Republic and the arch-Orangist Fruin set the scene for a debate over democracy and party which is still not settled. Fruin based his structure of a two-party, Orangist/republican system in the seventeenth century Republic on the interpretation of D'Avaux who said there were two parties in Amsterdam led by "*deux des principales têtes de la République ... Hooft et Valckenier*".[60] It was also D'Avaux who first mooted the idea of a "middle party" of those who had survived the *wetsverzetting*, but really supported neither the Orangists nor the republicans.[61] D'Avaux was writing after 1684 and admitted that his memoirs were written to explain the relations between the United Provinces and France from the Peace of Nijmegen until 1684, and it must therefore be remembered that he was justifying his own failure to facilitate a rapprochement with the Dutch. His summary of the situation covers the whole of the Republic and is not therefore easily translated to Amsterdam, although he was principally working in and with the regents of the city at the time.[62] However, he did provide contemporary material for later

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60. Fruin, R., *Verspreide Geschriften,* ed. P. J.Blok, *et al.*, 10 vols (The Hague, 1924), Vol. IV, p. 319; D'Avaux, *Négociations*, p. 12.

61. D'Avaux, *Negociations,*p. 1-2. D'Avaux divided the groupings in the Dutch Republic between the Orangists who were "*interessés à maintenir le Gouvernement d l'Etat dans la dépendance du Prince d'Orange*"; "*Les Républicains*" who were few in number, but influential - the remnants of the Wittians and those forced to Wittianism by the *wetsverzetting*; and those who were neither.

62. Japikse's view was that in the seventeenth century Republic there were three parties, the republicans, the Orangists and, in between, van Beuningen and Amsterdam. This argument is only tenable where it is assumed that van Beuningen's ideological policies were following those generally agreed by the city

historians to use to their own ends.

The legacy of this historical debate has been to impose a version of later politics on to the Amsterdam regency in the seventeenth century which cannot be upheld on analysis of the evidence. It starts with the premise that there were Orangists within the Amsterdam *vroedschap* who wanted a quasi-monarchical system of government of the kind that Frederik Hendrik and William II had appeared to be working towards. This is counter to the way the Union of Utrecht had established the Dutch Republic and the Princes of Orange had been seen within their role as stadholders of the various provinces. The Revolt of the Netherlands had been against a strongly dynastic and autocratic monarchical system, which denied the Dutch the opportunity to develop religious and economic freedom. Amsterdam was one of the later converts to the cause of the revolution, but once converted made the most of the opportunities opened up by freedom from Spanish domination. The regent class by the middle of the seventeenth century was made up predominantly of those whose wealth and position directly benefited from the very conditions which the Revolt had made possible, not least trading with the enemy until 1648.

Support for the House of Orange and the office of stadholder can therefore be equated with more justification to support for the principles of the Union of Utrecht, than support for a quasi-monarchical system. No doubt there were one or two members of the regency who were more slavish followers of the House of Orange in the way that seventeenth century royalty attracted obsequious followings, but these were more likely to be minor members who, like Cornelis Backer in 1675, signally failed to make any impression on the *vroedschap*. As we have seen, Geelvinck appears to have been the only leading member who really took the restoration of the House of Orange as a political issue for its own sake before

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government, and that neither republicans or Orangists had major influence in Amsterdam. Franken saw the weakness of such a simplistic structure, finding Roorda's "*factie*" theory more supportive of his own interpretation of van Beuningen's central role, *Coenraad van Beuningens politiek en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84*, pp. 66-7.

1672. But, like all the other leading members during the early 1670s, his line quickly moved to the realistic politics of peace in opposition to the Prince.

There is perhaps a stronger case to argue for a republican party, although it must be made within an understanding that all members of a republic, unless they are actively dedicated to overthrowing the constitution and imposing a different one (in this case a monarchy), are to a greater or lesser extent republican. Those in Amsterdam who have been put within the republican party in the later 1660s and 1670s are those who were opposed to the restoration of the House of Orange to the stadholdership together with the offices of Captain- and Admiral-General. Such opposition is closely related to the events of 1650 and the label which was more commonly used in the seventeenth century of "*Loevensteiners*" is perhaps the more accurate.[63] These men were supporters of the regime as it had been administered under the guidance of De Witt during the first stadholderless period. They were more prepared to see a continuation of that regime tackle the problems incurred by the French invasions than to risk a return to the militarist policies which had become a feature of the Orangist stadholdership during the 1630s and 40s.

Essentially, however, both groupings were anxious for the security and economic survival of the Republic - and in particular that of Amsterdam - as established under the Union of Utrecht. The differences have been complicated somewhat by the concurrent assumptions that republicanism was consonant with arminianism as interpreted by Coccejus and Orangism with the contra-remonstrantism of Voetius. These religious disputes which emerged from the intellectual environment of the universities, principally Leiden, had their genesis in the crisis which resulted in the execution of Oldenbarneveldt after the Synod of Dordrecht in 1609. By the 1670s the conflict between Coccejans and Voetians had largely disappeared within the Amsterdam regency, which took a pragmatic view of affairs. They were to arise in different parts of the Republic during the next few decades, and Amsterdam was to take a mediating role in some of them.

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63. For example, Sir William Temple "...the Lovesteyn party's being so much bent upon the measures with France...", *Works*, vol. IV, p. 109.

What therefore was a middle party to stand for in Amsterdam in the 1670s? Obviously those who have been seen as forming the core of this middle party, Hudde and Huydecooper, had not opposed the restoration of the Prince of Orange and had continued their careers within the regency unhindered. (Kurtz, in her study of the crisis years 1683-84, included Hooft in the middle party from as early as 1665 with the extremes being the Wittians and Valckenier as an Orangist. As it has been seen that Valckenier did not join the group supporting the Prince's restoration until 1672, the rest of this argument may also be treated with great scepticism.).[64] Equally they had maintained a working interest in the security and interest of the city. In this way they did not differ from the group led by Valckenier, which had worked more directly for the changes in 1672. By the middle of the decade they were once again in accord with the moves to work towards peace and, after the deaths of Hooft and Valckenier, were ready to assume leadership of the *vroedschap*. In fact the only "party" line that can be found that was different from those assumed to have been in other groupings, is that they were not involved in factional or individual disputes with the other leading members of the regency. This may have been through lack of strong political interest, their own independence of patronage and interest, relative inexperience or influence within the ruling group, caution in order to secure longer-term ambition, or even a more intelligent judgement of the realities of the politics of the 1670s. Each of these characteristics can be applied to a greater or lesser extent to Hudde[65] and Huydecooper, to Witsen and to those newly elected to the *vroedschap* in 1672 ostensibly in the Orangist cause like Opmeer, Bors van Waveren *(Elias 211)* and Sautijn, who joined the ruling group in the early 1680s after the death of Valckenier.

However, although these are all fairly strong arguments against formal party divisions in Amsterdam in the 1670s, we have to return to the role of Valckenier to finalise the point. Hooft, despite his survival of the *wetsverzetting*, was clearly a

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64. Kurtz, *Willem III en Amsterdam*, p. 214.

65. See below p. 231, note 135.

supporter of the Wittian-type republic and in this had to be in opposition to the restoration of the privileges of the House of Orange where they showed monarchical tendencies. But Valckenier was not in contrast a whole-hearted supporter of the Prince. Support for the restoration of the House of Orange in 1672 was support for the most sure solution to the military difficulties of the Republic. Valckenier had been an opponent of De Witt in the 1660s, but not in any way an Orangist. He had successfully taken the opportunity of the weakening of the power of the De Graeff's in Amsterdam to further his own political ambition, and had introduced an era of factional disputes dominated by individual interest. His political ambition was closely tied up with the success of his financial interests, which were in turn naturally closely bound up with the wider interests of Amsterdam's strong international mercantile role.

His support of the Perpetual Edict in 1667 may have been one of the most perceptive in that the conditions allowed in the long term for the restoration of the House of Orange to part of their ancient privileges, but had exclusion clauses which would prevent the stadholder from integrating political and military power. In this way, the Edict was a force in favour of the provincial and municipal sovereignty inherent in the Union of Utrecht, which was seen to be undermined in the terms of the re-entry of Utrecht, Gelderland and Overijssel in 1674-5. This would accord with the fairly rapid change of view of Valckenier between 1672 and 1674, when his own interests, as reflected in the interests of the city, would have been undermined if the principles of the re-entry of the three occupied provinces had operated throughout the Republic. Apart from his actions in 1672 when he took over the leadership of the group working for change, but even then if the assumptions about his motivation in first supporting and then revoking the Perpetual Edict are accepted, Valckenier is in fact closer to being a republican than an Orangist. That he has not been so described is more likely to have occurred because of personal conflict with De Graeff and later Hooft, based on political interest and ambition, rather than on political ideology.

Roorda argued that "party" only operated in the Dutch Republic on national issues

in periods of crises like the *Rampjaar* of 1672,[66] and that the dominant system was one of faction and interest. We could go further and say that in Amsterdam in the 1670s at least, faction itself was subordinate to the individual.[67] Further it can be argued that the "parties" of the crises were so limited in terms of unity of purpose that it is unhelpful and unrealistic to impose modern ideas of party on political movements which develop and dissolve within a few months. Roorda's thesis deals effectively with the history of the various theories of party and faction which were developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and challenged in the twentieth.[68] There is probably little real difference between his interpretation of interest relating to faction and the argument for individual interest subordinating faction, other than the perspective of the studies themselves. He was looking generally at the prevailing trend throughout Holland and Zeeland in the later seventeenth century; we are considering the determinants of policy within Amsterdam during a brief and singular twelve-year period. He could therefore only draw conclusions from a survey of a broad range of civic administrations; we are looking in detail at the composition of the administration of one, and the most influential, city.

There is one other aspect of this discussion of political affinities which is best raised in the context of the interests of the only other leading regent so far not discussed, Coenraad van Beuningen. As we have seen, van Beuningen has received greater attention from historians than any other politician in the Dutch Republic in this period, for reasons which have much to do with the international role which was so much part of affairs at the time. Foremost among these issues was the question of France. De Witt fell over his French policy; William III

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66. Roorda, *Partij en Factie*, p. 3: "*De partij is dan de politieke groepering, die zo groot mogelijke groepen van de bevolking door een min of meer ideële binding bij de politiek van het gehele...*".

67. In his study of the Rotterdam regents from 1650-72, Price argues against Roorda's theory of the role of faction in the 1672 crisis and alleges that protests "were directed at individual regents and particular policies", Price, "Rotterdam Patriciate", pp. 390-96.

68. Roorda, *Partij en Factie.*, pp. 11-34.

secured his place in history because of his continual wars with France and his religious crusade against Louis XIV. Van Beuningen fell out with both these leaders within the Republic because of their policies towards France, in the interests of Amsterdam. He always maintained that he put the interests of his own city first, although he acted as an ambassador for the States as a whole and until his last years was rarely in his native city. But as an Amsterdammer in public service he came to represent the city as a "true Hollander" - these are not my words.[69] And yet, this arch-supporter of the sovereignty and interest of his native town and province was ideologically far removed from the majority standpoint. From the later 1660s onwards he pursued a strong anti-French view, only moving towards the peace party line when he felt that the Prince was putting political security over the more basic interests of state for which the Republic was fighting. After the Peace of Nijmegen in 1678, when he returned to Amsterdam from his many embassies abroad, he was outwardly in opposition to the majority view working towards a French alliance and yet managed to retain the respect of the regency because of his experience and influence. In 1679 he was shrewd enough to foresee the influence that Witsen would have within the regency once he became eligible for election as burgomaster and attempted unsuccessfully to win him round to his anti-French views.[70]

Van Beuningen's election as burgomaster in 1680 gave credence to the general understanding that he was an influence within Amsterdam and the Prince had not yet given up hope that he might be used as an intermediary between himself and the city.[71] It was therefore van Beuningen who bore the brunt of the Prince's anger over Amsterdam's opposition to the request for 8,000 men during the Luxembourg crisis of 1682.[72] The inherent difficulties in fully understanding the role of van

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69. Evenhuis, *Ook dat was Amsterdam*, Vol. III, p. 189.

70. Franken, *Coenraad van Beuningens politiek en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84*, pp. 172-73.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

72. The Prince's exasperation at the problems with Amsterdam, expressed in correspondence with Waldeck on 16 October 1682, is quoted in Franken, *Ibid.*, p.

Beuningen in the late 1670s and early 1680s arise from his intransigent views against any possible French alliance, but his also implacable opposition to what has been seen as the militarism of William in his anti-French policy. These differences highlight the problems that arose when the similarities of "interest of state" were completely undermined by the difference methods argued for prosecuting that interest. Van Beuningen believed that it was essential to operate a policy of peaceful opposition to any French interests, but the Prince believed that the best way to contain French expansionism (whether territorial or economic) was by military strength. The importance of the Spanish Netherlands was disputed by van Beuningen, but suppression of its economic potential was assumed to be of critical importance to his fellow regents. Hence van Beuningen was in the very difficult position of holding influential office within his city or on States service, but unable to agree with either of his principals. In the last resort in 1684 he was able to take the side of his fellow burgomasters, because his opposition to military finance was greater than his opposition to pro-French views in Amsterdam. It was possible to separate the interests of those arguing in the longer term for negotiations to continue with the French, from the immediate short-term aims of the Prince.

Only when his eccentricities became extreme and his faculties began to wane did his unwavering opposition to French alliances receive justification and was Amsterdam able to see its way to support the Prince in his invasion of England.[73] Burke has argued that his final breakdown in 1688 may have been the culmination of the stresses on a schizoid character who had such diverse interests as millenarianism and the supernatural, literature and science, and politics and diplomacy.[74] Van der Wall takes a more cynical view of his breakdown, based on her interpretation of the lucidity of his writings which she does not see as

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207: "*Celle [conduite] de Mr van Beuningen commence aussie a estra insupportable...*"

73. Israel, "The Dutch Role in the Glorious Revolution", p. 119.

74. "Van Beuningen is a fascinating but not an isolated sample of the coexistence of new science, Cartesianism, astrology and millenarianism inside one man's head", Burke, *Venice and Amsterdam*, p. 103.

presaging madness, but "rather it seems that this millenarian went mad because of the heavy financial losses he suffered when the Amsterdam stock exchange crashed in the later summer of 1688".[75] As an historian favouring causation theories based on the culmination of the full range of previous circumstances, I am more inclined to the view that age and the stock exchange fall may have been the trigger, but the predisposition for breakdown was, by 1688, already inherent in van Beuningen's character and had been constantly exacerbated by his confrontations even with those with whom he had common cause.[76] Indeed his diversity of intellectual and political interest may have been his security against mental breakdown earlier in his career.

The individuality of van Beuningen, even allowing for his continued absences on States' business, further substantiates the case for the absence of any formal party structure within Amsterdam. The regents had thought it a wise move to bring him into the burgomastership in 1672 to give credibility to the new regime. He had opposed De Witt and was in the service of the States and could therefore be assumed to be in support of the restoration of the Prince. He quickly returned to ambassadorial duties as a servant of the States and Amsterdam rather than the Prince, and was soon out of favour with the latter. Therefore like the majority of the Amsterdam regents in 1672 his support of the changes can be seen as a response to the needs of the crisis, and not a response based on long-held party allegiances. Equally his return to Amsterdam politics in the 1680s maintained the individuality which had always dominated his role and yet he was able to work with the ruling group and was seen by outsiders like D'Avaux as one of major influences in the city, and the one with whom matters would have to be resolved.[77]

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75. Van der Wall, "Antichrist Stormed" p. 162-3.

76. Israel, "The Amsterdam Stock Exchange", p. 339-40 drawing on contemporary witnesses, dates Van Beuningen's final descent into madness to the 1688 crash, but points out that he "had been showing signs of mental instability for some time..."

77. D'Avaux, *Negociations*, p. 35, "*Van Buning se servit de toutes forces d'artifices, pour faire passer cette affaire à Amsterdam*".

So far, this survey of the political alignments in the Amsterdam *vroedschap* has dealt only with those who reached burgomaster status during the 1670s and 1680s, and without doubt they were the most influential. During critical periods many of the major decisions were left solely within the hands of the burgomasters. However, the overall policy of the city was developed through the routine meetings and committees which met three or four times a week. Attendance was high and for many there was a distinct career structure within the regency. This pattern can be easily followed by a brief look at the short term careers of some of those elected in the *wetsverzetting* in 1672. Trip and Opmeer have already been mentioned. Gerard Bors had been the representative of Amsterdam at the Zeeland Admiralty since 1670 and was to hold this office until 1679. Thus, like his relative Opmeer, he was kept clear of influence until after Valckenier's death, when he too joined the ruling group as burgomaster in the 1680s.

Of the rest, Appelman *(Elias 207)*, Tiellens *(Elias 208)*, Becker *Elias 209)*, van Klenck *(Elias 210)* and Sautijn were all from merchant families, who had some part in the government of Amsterdam prior to 1672 and can therefore be considered as possible candidates by reason of wealth and position if conditions should prove favourable. Sautijn's family had moved to Amsterdam on the fall of Antwerp where they had begun their prosperous merchant firm dealing in *laken* with the Levant, Italy, France and Russia.[78] Sautijn himself never made any pretence to be a supporter of Valckenier,[79] and as he replaced his wife's uncle, Reynst, in the *wetsverzetting* there is evidence to suggest that he was selected on his own merits. He was certainly called early into the service of the States in the negotiations of the Marine Treaty with England in 1675, following the Peace of Westminster.

All five continued as active members of the *vroedschap* throughout their lives,

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78. Elias, *Vroedschap*, No. 215, p. 573-8; *Nieuwe Nederlandse Biografisch Woordenboek (NNBW)*, IX, 950.

79. *N.N.B.W.*, Vol.X, p. 950, "*Als lid den vroedschap stand hij niet aan de sijde van Valckenier*".

particularly Appelman (a distant relative of van Beuningen) who, although allegedly Valckenier's man, was in fact sponsored as *schepen* in 1673 by Geelvinck while Valckenier proposed Witsen. Appelman was the successful candidate and the importance of this distribution of favour has been discussed above. Appelman was already in his sixties in 1672 and continued as a prominent member until his death in 1694.

Of the remaining two new members Dirck Blom had also held minor office before 1672 and had strong connections in the East Indies; he was related by marriage to Appelman and seems to have been brought into the *vroedschap* for his administrative abilities. In 1679 he resigned his seat and went to work for the East India Company in Batavia, but he played a full-time part in the workings of the *vroedschap* until then.[80]

Therefore apart from Commelin *(Elias 212)*, who was a Professor of Botany and whose municipal responsibilities were restricted on the whole to the application of his professional knowledge to the development of the city's reputation,[81] all the new members were very active at various times.

Apart from periods when they were on business, such as Sautijn's ambassadorial duties in England in 1674, the new members played a major part on the committees. There was a degree of specialisation, with members more likely to serve on a committee dealing with matters in which they had a vested interest. But there also appears to have been a kind of loose career structure based on experience: to take three examples, in the early 1670s Tiellens, Appelman and Sautijn were appointed almost without exception only to committees dealing with local matters commensurate with their previous experience. By 1675-6 they were

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80. Blom was deliberately "head-hunted" for the post of president of the *Heemraden*, after a crisis of confidence in the employees in Batavia and a number of sackings, F. Gaastra, *Bewind en Beleid*, p. 251.

81. Commelin established the new Amsterdam *hortus* in 1682, Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 907.

also being appointed to those dealing with financial matters and by the early 1680's Appelman and Sautijn (Tiellens died in 1679) were also being consulted on questions of foreign policy. (Appendix VI)

And there was of course a continued participation at a high level (particularly on important financial and military matters) of already active members such as Boreel, Corver *(Elias 194)* and Hudde. Boreel was frequently used in the diplomatic service of both De Witt and William III on embassies to Russia, Brussels and England as well as taking part in the negotiations at Nijmegen. Boreel was following in his father's diplomatic career, and it is possible that, like his father, his sympathies were more inclined to the Orangists.[82] However, the use of his services by both De Witt and William III would also indicate a respect for his diplomatic skills. Thus the business of Amsterdam continued to run in well-oiled channels and the change of personnel in 1672 was only important in the short run, where it changed the balance of factional allegiances.

Apart from Bors and Opmeer there is no evidence to link any of the 1672 nominees closely together and certainly very little to define a clear party under the influence of Valckenier. On the whole the new members seem to have been elected because they were of the regent class and had not identified themselves closely with the De Graeff groupings in 1671-72, with the exception of Opmeer. The *wetsverzetting* in Amsterdam was therefore probably a largely cosmetic exercise carried out to the apparent short term satisfaction of the Prince, but with the same kind of long-term intentions as the Perpetual Edict had been supported. The Amsterdam regency wished to ensure that the ruling structures would continue to operate as they had always done.

After 1680 Amsterdam was no longer dominated by the parochial Valckenier and Hooft, but by the twin abilities of a worldly-wise van Beuningen and the moderate and experienced Hudde and Witsen. Franken, in his study of van Beuningen

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82. Rowen, *De Witt*, p. 271.

complains that there is no evidence after the end of Bontemantel's chronicles of the intrigues in Amsterdam in the early 1680s.[83] However, there was still jostling for place, but the ruling group was by now so secure that there was little need for intrigues on the scale of the late 1660s and 1670s. The major difference until late 1682 was the strong pro-French views of the majority of the *vroedschap* and the strong and continuing anti-French policy of van Beuningen, although the latter's reputation prevented divisive factions developing. It was van Beuningen's tragedy that, after 1685, when his powers and faculties were waning, his twenty-year anti-French stance was finally justified by Louis XIV's actions.

Until the end of 1682 van Beuningen was still ostensibly working with the Prince and Fagel attempting to conclude an alliance with England. His relations with Amsterdam remained good since he had always stressed the interest of Holland, being a true representative of the ruling merchant class, while he continued to pursue his anti-French policy. In 1681 D'Avaux complained bitterly about van Beuningen's attempts to persuade the pro-French burgomasters of the advantages of seeking an English alliance.[84] But he continued to work on slightly different lines from the Prince and Fagel with communication becoming more suspicious and intermittent all the time. The final breach and his immediate return to Amsterdam as a burgomaster in 1681 gave the Prince good ground for blaming him for Amsterdam's opposition during the next two or three years, particularly as the theme of the Amsterdam burgomasters since the death of Valckenier had been moderation, with concentration on the improvement of trade. They had of course opposed the first blockade of Luxemburg in 1682, but so had at least six other Holland towns and in any case the matter had not finally come to a head.

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[83]. Franken, *Van Beuningen*, p. 177.

[84]. D'Avaux, *Negociations*, I, pp. 99-102. D'Avaux, who had worked well with Valckenier. "*qui gouvernoit absolument cette ville-là*", p. 42, found it necessary to seek "contact with two or three regents in Amsterdam, in league with Valckenier in 1672 and just coming to office [in 1681] who are good republicans ruling Amsterdam". In the end it was the pensionary, Jakob Hop, who became D'Avaux's main contact and his own "undercover agents" rather than regents. See also Chapter 8 below.

The events of 1684-85 saw the beginning of the end of van Beuningen's effectiveness as a politician. The previous few years had seen him as the leader of the anti-Prince groupings in the *vroedschap*, the breach and lack of trust preventing all correspondence between him and William. But at the same time Witsen was in constant touch with both the Prince and *raadpensionaris*, without in any way undermining his position in Amsterdam. His mediating abilities had first been used in 1676 during the Voetian and Coccejan crisis, which was less vitriolic in Amsterdam than elsewhere, when he was representative at the States General, and this not only stood him in good stead later but also kept him clear of the intrigues in Amsterdam at that time. During his first year as burgomaster, he took an active part in the committees (Appendix VI) and as Deputy to the States General from 1683-85 he kept a foot in both camps producing a large volume of correspondence showing his ability to deal equally with both sides, while retaining credibility as an Amsterdammer. As Deputy in the Field in 1676 and representative at the States of Holland from 1674-77, he had early been removed from the factional conflicts, and was not therefore involved in the political manoeuvrings of 1676. Through these more centralised activities he had gained experience in dealing not only with the Prince's advisers, but also with the wider issues facing the Republic, if not at first hand at least closer than Valckenier ever got.

The relations of Witsen with the Prince in the 1680s were much the same as van Beuningen's with De Witt in the late 1660s; he remained on good terms with him but disagreed with the turn his views were taking.[85] In this respect the 1670s were the extraordinary period. At first, immediately after 1672, there was co-operation between Amsterdam and the Prince and Fagel but, after 1673 contacts were infrequent and usually indirect. Until 1675 Fagel and Valckenier were working closely enough for the former to use the latter as a lever on the *vroedschap* but, by 1677 at the latest, there was no real working communication between the Prince and Amsterdam. The pattern of communications is discussed in detail in the next chapter.

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[85]. Franken, *van Beuningen*, p. 71.

Of the others who survived Valckenier, Oudtshoorn served as burgomaster in 1679 and 1680, but thereafter dropped into obscurity (although he did not die until 1688), mainly because he opposed the family oligarchy now taking hold of the *vroedschap*.[86] In the crisis year of 1684 the ruling burgomasters were van Beuningen, Hudde and Huydecooper (the alleged 'middle party' of the 1670s) and Geelvinck. Geelvinck had been the representative at the States of Holland for the previous three years. These four burgomasters were now put into the position where they not only openly opposed the Prince, but also led their city so far from the general mood of the States. This demonstrates the strength of opposition the Prince's policies had engendered and the way that the Amsterdam regency could continue to rely on their burgomasters to take a strong line where necessary; the change of personnel was not likely to diminish this quality during a crisis. The most forceful argument was that war with France would be an economic disaster. The Amsterdammers still felt that they were trying to regain the ground and markets lost in 1672-74 and the exacerbation of these difficulties after the Peace of Westminster. Van Beuningen's firm belief in the continued neutrality of England and the failure of Charles II to recall Parliament added to these worries.[87]

The burgomasters were now operating with the kind of unity missing in the 1670s and therefore could be more sure of support. In 1678 Amsterdam had been just one of many members of the States of Holland pressing for peace, and although peace was pushed through in opposition to the Prince, it was the terms of the peace that were in question not the necessity for it - on which all sides professed to be agreed. In 1684 it was a straight conflict between military intervention or passive acquiescence of French manoeuvres. With agreement assured within Amsterdam, the ruling group became less consultative and more autocratic, relying less and less on the work of committees. The membership of the *vroedschap* had little choice of opposition leadership even if there had been major issues of dissent. For this reason this study does not look closely at the new members after 1680, most of

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86. Elias, *Vroedschap*, I, p. CXXXI.

87. Franken, *Van Beuningen*, pp. 186-98.

whom would not have become fully active until the later 1680s anyway.

Chapter 8

Lines of Communication between Amsterdam and the Prince

In 1672 the Dutch Republic reinstated the Princes of Orange as stadholders after a period of government by the States General guided by the *raadpensionaris*. This twenty-year break in aristocratic representation at the highest level foundered principally on the failure of the De Witt's foreign policy and diplomacy. The invasion of the Republic in the early summer of 1672 may have been the trigger for the overthrow of De Witt, but the restoration of the Prince had been presaged since 1668 and coincided with the deterioration of relations between the Dutch and the French dating from the reimposition of heavy duties on Dutch exports to France.

So far we have looked at the interests and motivations of the Amsterdam regency within the economic and political framework of the States of Holland during the 1670s and 1680s. To the student of the Amsterdam regency this raises many interesting questions and hypotheses. But, for the student of the Dutch Republic and its contribution to European history in the late seventeenth century, it is necessary to take investigations a step further to attempt an analysis of the channels of communication between the regents and those working with the Prince of Orange to establish and implement foreign policy. The approach taken here will be to look in detail at some of the individual issues facing both groups and the roles played by Valckenier, Witsen, Fagel and van Beuningen in particular, but also others, setting the various relationships within the context of "events" closely relating the stages of war and peace to the chronology set in the earlier chapters.

This chapter will draw largely on the contemporary accounts of Temple, D'Avaux and others and the records in the Fagel archive to show the shifts and balances between support for war or peace up to 1678 and for France, England or neither in the early 1680s. The crises of 1682 and 1684 will be dealt with by comment and

analysis rather than narrative, which can be drawn from other historians.[1]

This will extend the natural sequence to the issue which gave rise to the most frequent tensions and disagreements between the Prince and Amsterdam, the financing of military and naval expenditure, which will be further analysed in the next chapter. The changing relationship between the Prince and Amsterdam will be seen as each phase in the prevailing attitude among the Amsterdam regents emerges.

Immediately after the *wetsverzetting*, the relationship between Amsterdam and the Prince and the *raadpensionaris*, Fagel, experienced a brief honeymoon period. Valckenier took office at the *Gecommitteerde Raad* for a few months and became the principal link between the city and the Prince. This did not last. Nevertheless, for a short time there was a real change in the government of Amsterdam which worked to the advantage of the Prince. The crisis summer months of 1672 had seen the consolidation of a group which saw the need to work for the elevation of the Prince of Orange and left the hardcore loyal Wittians vulnerable to reprisals (that is expulsion at the *wetsverzetting*) or to exclusion from the influential posts in the service of the city or the States. It has been seen that very few of the new members were of any immediate real influence, but were assumed to be packing on the side of the Prince and those who had chosen the Orangist way to defeat the French. Those who did control the power for the few months until the routine elections in the new year of 1673 were therefore drawn from members who had been active before 1672.

In the normal course of events there were established channels of communication which were part of formal decision-making processes. The *raadpensionaris* of Holland was responsible for the implementation of the decisions of the States of Holland and representation at the States General by Holland included the

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1. Principally in Kurtz, *Willem III en Amsterdam 1683-5*; Franken, *Coenraad van Beuningen's politieke en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84*, pp. 204-237; and Baxter, *William III*, p. 190.

raadpensionaris using the widest range of his powers. In 1672 these powers gave the new *raadpensionaris*, Fagel, confirmation of the role at States General level which had been exercised by De Witt and his predecessors. The post of *griffier*, or administrative secretary to the States General, had already been held by Fagel since 1670 and was subsumed within that of *raadpensionaris* after he succeeded De Witt.[2] Delft and Leiden made representations to the States of Holland that "*de raadpensionaris gechargeert is met de financies, met de correspondenties, en met de comparitie ter vergaderingh van de heeren Staten Generaal...*" Fruin saw this as "*een hervorming van gewicht: drie ministers voor een; de raadpensionaris zou dus in hoofdzaak slechts met de leiding der vergadering belast blijven.*"[3] Therefore the new *raadpensionaris* had an official and influential role in both the States General and the States of Holland. Boogman has pointed out that the direction of foreign policy should strictly have been within the responsibilities of the *griffier*, as "director of the Chancery of the States General"; however, after describing how this role was taken over by the *raadpensionaris* during the stadholderless periods, he fails to note that Fagel's assumption of both posts after the fall of De Witt gave his executive powers more legitimacy than those of any other *raadpensionaris*.[4] The responsibilities of the *raadpensionaris* were detailed in the *Instructie raadspensionaris* in 1672.[5] Fagel's work as *griffier* had prepared him well for the foreign policy role he was to take on two years later when in December 1670 the States General had resolved that the *griffier* should be present at, and record the resolutions of all the "*besognes en konferenties bijwonen en op hun verzoek de gedeputeerden van advies dienen*".[6]

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2. The appointment of *griffier* was normally for life, Price, *Holland and the Dutch Republic*, p. 219.

3. R. Fruin, *Geschiedenis der Staatinstellingen in Nederland tot der val der Republiek*, H.T. Colenbrander, ed. (The Hague, 1922), p. 295.

4. Boogman, "Union of Utrecht", p. 397; see also Boogman, "The *Raison d'Etat* Politician Johan De Witt", p. 60.

5. Fruin, *Geschiedenis der Staatinstellingen in Nederland*, pp. 294-5.

6. Franken, *Coenraad van Beuningens politiek en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84*, pp. 31-2. Franken believes that this unusual knowledge of the

The post of *griffier* had been a promotion for Fagel from that of pensionary of Haarlem to which he had been appointed in 1664. Haarlem was known to be the most overtly Orangist of the Holland towns and therefore it could be assumed that Fagel was likely to have close sympathies with the Prince of Orange.[7] At the same time the *raadpensionaris* was in theory at least the servant of the States of Holland and it was therefore imperative that he should have an adequate working relationship with the regents of Amsterdam, and the other representative towns. Much of the following discussion will be a consideration of how far Fagel was able to sustain both these roles during a period of considerable political changes responding to the demands of war, peace and economic security.

Amsterdam's role in the normal decision-making process was as just one of the major Holland towns; in order of seniority Amsterdam came after Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft and Leiden, but in order of wealth, interest and consequent influence Amsterdam was easily the most important. The method of arriving at decisions on straightforward matters of policy which would eventually be passed to the States General was similar to that for local administration, described in Chapter 7 above.[8] Sometimes this would involve a sub-committee comprising those with specialist knowledge, at others a decision would be reached at the meeting.

The representative(s) of the *vroedschap* at the States of Holland would be notified of the decision and Amsterdam's views would be debated with the representatives of the other constituent towns. In most cases a majority view would be arrived at and passed in the same way to the States General. In some cases it was imperative

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affairs of the States General gave Fagel, whom he sees as "*een voorstand politikus*", a role in foreign policy which was above that normally associated with the office of *griffier*, which served as a counter to De Witt.

7. A. de Wicquefort, *Histoire des Provinces-Unies, 1648-1679* (Amsterdam/Utrecht, 1861-74), pp. 211-2, commented on De Witt's fears of a *griffier* being appointed from a town which "*avait tousjours esté fort passionée pour les interests de la Maison d'Oranje*".

8. See Grever, *The Structure of Decision Making*, pp. 129 for a full description of the "normal" procedures, the critical, but routine, role of the *griffier* being highlighted pp. 138-142.

that a unanimous decision was reached and if this was possible there would be no problem. Once decisions had been passed to the States General, the process of discussions between the representatives of the seven States would proceed to a final decision which would be implemented.[9]

However, more often than not the States were concerned with matters outside the "normal course of events" and this was particularly so in the 1670s and 1680s when these highly-structured decision-making processes became subject to other pressures. These might be, firstly, an urgency for immediate decisions brought about by the military or diplomatic situation. Secondly, it became common from 1673 onwards for practice to revert to the different interests attempting to influence decisions at all levels. The Prince of Orange was one of the most powerful interests, but his role as stadholder of Holland and four of the other provinces was not a guarantee that the other members of the provincial States would necessarily support his policies. It was therefore important for him to attempt to ensure that he could use all the possible means at his disposal to influence those who were likely to have conflicting interests and to ensure that those normally loyal to the Orangist line remained so. As far as the States of Holland and Amsterdam in particular were concerned the obvious choice for influence of this kind was the *raadpensionaris*.

The role of the *raadpensionaris* had changed since the days of Oldenbarnevelt's tenure as Advocate and, in the first stadholderless period, De Witt had used the sovereignty of the States, particularly the States of Holland, to establish a central role which was effective without any higher power than the nominality of the States General.

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[9] Israel, *Dutch Republic*, p. 276; Boogman, "Union of Utrecht", pp. 390-91: Clause 9 of the Union - one of the three which became effective - spelt out the requirement for unanimity on decisions concerning war, truce, peace and financial burdens on the Generality. This clause informs Price's argument that the Union was essentially an alliance formed during the struggles against Spain, and that failure to agree unanimously put the Union into jeopardy, Price, *Holland and the Dutch Republic*, pp. 221-2 and 233.

William III had developed a shrewd understanding of the office of *raadpensionaris* through his daily contact with De Witt during his years as Child of State, and had seen how the foreign policy of the Republic had in effect already been taken over by De Witt, despite his nominal representation of the States of Holland only. By establishing a close relationship with De Witt's successor, William was ensuring greater success at working with those who might wish to perpetuate the regime of the first stadholderless period than if he relied for his influence on a clique of nobles who had no first hand experience of the politics and interests of the towns of Holland. In correspondence with his cousin Hendrik Casimir, he showed already in June 1672 that he appreciated the necessity of working with Amsterdam if he was to ensure their support for the war effort and also the difficulties inherent in a state which comprised provinces with very diverse interests.[10] At this stage William was exercising what Boogman has termed the "prudence of the Princes of Orange" who understood the necessity of giving "due consideration to the interests and wishes of the hegemonic province [of Holland]",[11] a characteristic clearly not demonstrated by his father in 1650.

The nobles were of more significance on the international stage, where they could be seen as comparable to the ambassadorial representatives from monarchical states and, as the 1670s progressed, William began to send separate embassies to treat with foreign powers alongside those comprising representatives of the States. In 1677 Bentinck was sent to England to represent the interests of the Prince alongside van Beuningen who was currently the accredited Dutch ambassador. But by this stage William was beginning to believe that the ambassador was an Amsterdammer first and a Dutchman second.[12]

The Prince of Orange did have a group of nobles with whom he worked closely

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10. Groen van Prinsterer, ed., *L'Archives du Correspondance inédité de la maison d'Orange-Nassaue* (Utrecht, 1861), Letters mcxliv, p. 253 and mcxlvii, p. 255.

11. Boogman, "The Union of Utrecht", p. 402.

12. Baxter, *William III*, p. 144.

and who represented his views where possible. Thus Odijk in Zeeland and Amerongen and van Reede van Renswoude in Utrecht, after the terms of re-entry to the Union had been devised in 1674,[13] could normally be relied on to push for the Prince's interest, and many of his military advisers were drawn from the nobility like Bentinck, Dijkveld and the German Count von Waldeck.[14] However, he was unable to make unilateral policy with any "Secret Committee" on issues of outstanding importance to the States. Negotiations were of course conducted in secret on matters of foreign policy and these were conducted by various *ad hoc* committees which appear to have been given titles arbitrarily by those commenting on their activities. It would appear that in the mid-1670s there was a *Committeerde tot de Secrete Besognes van Staat* which received reports on military progress and was consulted about the difficulties of persuading Friesland to contribute to military resourcing in 1675.[15] On 19 June 1674, the Amsterdam pensionary, Cornelis Hop, alludes to the discussion of a "Secret Committee for Foreign Affairs" about the Baltic treaties.[16] But the nature of this committee does not seem to have been one of decision-making, but rather of recommendation. That their deliberations were communicated to the Amsterdam pensionary and then discussed in the *vroedschap*, where Amsterdam gave its approval to the recommendation, would seem to point to the committee having met for purposes approved by the States General. Cornelis Hop, as pensionary of Amsterdam was obviously privy to secret negotiations during this period. As early as 1673 he was handling secret correspondence about the negotiations for an alliance with Denmark.[17]

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13. Roorda, 'William III and the Utrecht Government Regulation, p. 107.

14. Israel, *Dutch Republic*, p. 822.

15. N. Japikse, ed., *Correspondentie van Willem III en van Hans Willem Bentinck* (1932), Part II, p. 34, No. 36.

16. G.A. Amsterdam, Register op het Receuil van Tractatan van Cornelis Hop pensionaris van Amsterdam 1666-1680, nr. 65, 19 June 1674.

17. *Ibid.*, nr. 64, 4 February 1673.

Their deliberations may have been secret, but the outcome of these deliberations were not implemented without further consultation. Quite who had the greatest influence within these committees seems to have varied. In 1675, while there were still some vestiges of support for the Prince's military policy remaining, Temple alleged that the "Commissioners of Secret Affairs" were "timorous of acting anything in the absence of both Prince and Pensioner, without being instructed in either of their minds".[18] However, after the peace, when the tensions between Amsterdam and the Prince were being increased over the negotiations for alliances with England or France, Temple's replacement, Sidney, reported on 8 July 1680 that the Prince was sure the committee of the "deputies for forreigne affaires" would not agree Fagel's suggestion that their proposals should be pushed through without further consultation.[19] A few months later Sidney refers to this committee as "Secret Committee for Foreigne Affaires" when they wanted to talk to him. He put them off on grounds of ill health and Fagel and another member [Munro] were deputed to go to see him.[20] It is therefore clear that these committees were instrumental in forming policy, but that the relative influence of their membership, whether the representatives of the States or the Prince and Fagel, fluctuated according to wider issues. Unlike his grandfather, Frederik Hendrik, William III does not seem to have had the sole power of patronage for membership of committees established to discuss foreign policy. Consequently, such committees, having several masters were more likely to be circumspect about making recommendations without further consultations.

To the Prince of Orange Amsterdam was largely an unknown quantity. He made only rare visits to the city during the course of these thirteen years, culminating in his abortive week-long effort in 1683 to gain the burgomasters' support for his

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18. Temple, *Works*, Vol. IV, p. 247.

19. "The deputies ... will not do so without consulting their principals and that there are likely to be difficulties with Holland. Fagel doubts if Amsterdam agrees but no feares of other towns if Amsterdam agrees...", P.R.O., SP 84/215, f. 283.

20. P.R.O. SP 84/216, f.65, 5 December 1680.

foreign policy,[21] and he never really came to terms with the burgomasters. His distrust of the motives of the city led to the breach with van Beuningen by the end of the 1670s and the consequent gradual undermining of the latter's diplomatic status. This was in the face of the evidence that the experience of van Beuningen on overseas missions had confirmed his anti-French bias, which was more in tune with the policy of the Prince than that of the majority of the Amsterdam regency and the Holland towns.

The Prince never managed to negotiate directly with Valckenier, when the latter was arguably the most powerful regent in all of Holland, if not the Republic, but had to use the *raadpensionaris*, Fagel, as a go-between. As early as 29 October 1672 this role was clearly established with direct communication between Fagel and Valckenier over the provisioning of troops.[22] On the whole, however, Fagel was more likely in these early years after the *wetsverzetting* to communicate with van Beuningen over issues relating to Amsterdam's views on foreign policy. But when the Prince's disaffection with van Beuningen began to grow as he blamed him for the opposition of Amsterdam, the relationship between the *raadpensionaris* and van Beuningen also began to falter.[23] So much is tantalisingly unclear about Fagel because of the illegibility of his hand and the consequent loss of his extant archive, but there are glimpses of the man who was able to set up working relations with Valckenier for a couple of years and later with Witsen throughout the crisis years in the early 1680s, and in between to maintain a flow of communication between The Hague and Amsterdam. However, even Fagel does not seem to have always been able to maintain good relations with the Amsterdam regents. During the six day "farce" in 1683 he undermined the bridges he had built by threatening the regents with another *wetsverzetting* if they did not agree to

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21. Baxter, *William III*, p. 189.

22. A.R.H. Collectie Fagel, nr.1947, 29 October 1672.

23. *Franken, Coenraad van Beuningens politiek en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84*, p. 134-5.

the Prince's request for additional troops.[24] William Carr, the English consul who summed up the Amsterdam *vroedschap* so simplistically, also had a description for Fagel:

> "Lastly I am to name Pens Fagel who is a man of good parts, but short of John De Witt, yet stumbles threw all the grand affares + bissness concernes relating to this States..."[25]

If Fagel "stumbled through the affairs of state", he did so very effectively from time to time. Mostly he did succeed in keeping the balance between the Prince and Amsterdam by judicious use of appropriate and varied personnel at times when both were building intransigent stands.

Elias described Fagel as Valckenier's "*alter ego*" in the 1660s, but Elias was writing a history of Amsterdam over a broad period and saw Fagel as an instrument of the downfall of De Witt from the States side rather than the *vroedschappen* of the towns.[26] However, the other implication of such a description is of a devious politician in Valckenier's mould and not therefore one who would "stumble". Once again it is Carr's understanding which is exposed and therefore, interesting as his letter is as a rare example of an English interpretation of the details of the administration of Amsterdam and the States in the 1670s and 1680s, its value is very limited.

Sir William Temple was a little less definite in his interpretation of the role of Fagel. In 1674, during the early days of his last embassy to the Dutch Republic he wrote to Coventry that "I find the pensioner is the great man here, and acts all under the Prince's influence, though not without some distaste among the richer sort of people in the towns".[27] The, almost throwaway, remark about the "richer

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24. Baxter, *William III*, p. 189.

25. Carr to Blaythwayt, 21 March 1681 (Appendix II).

26. Elias, *Geschiedenis*, p. 168.

27. Temple, *Works*,vol. IV, p. 29.

sort of people in the towns" recalls the status consciousness of the regent classes, echoing the strength of the Geelvinck's insult to Valckenier about his grandparentage.[28] Fagel came from a Haarlem family which had a tradition of service as *ambachtsheren*, but it was not until later in the Republic that they generally reached regent status, and therefore his promotion would have been looked at with some disfavour by many.[29] Later, in his memoirs, Temple was more definite and complimentary to Fagel "whose love to his country made him a lover of the Prince, as believing it could not be saved by any other hand, and whose zeal to his own religion made him an enemy irreconcilable to France, whose professions as well as designs were to destroy it".[30] And while talking about the peace negotiations at Nijmegen, he gives his opinion that together Fagel and the Prince worked with a skill and understanding of politics/foreign affairs that was second only to that demonstrated a decade earlier by De Witt,[31] and repeating this later when he said only William and Fagel "had so full a grasp of the business in Holland, as to make a true judgement of what the general sentiments there would determine."[32]

Once again Temple's view is more generous than that of D'Avaux, whose relationship with the *raadpensionaris* was frequently confrontational and often frustrating to the French aims. The French ambassador grudgingly admired the political manoeuvring of Fagel, but frequently felt that he was being thwarted by him. D'Avaux was not negotiating directly with the Prince of Orange, but was

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28. See above pp. 151-152.

29. N. Japikse, *Het Archief van de Familie Fagel*, p. 5.

30. Temple, *Works*, Vol. II, p. 263.

31. *Ibid*, Vol. II, p. 391-2; Franken, *Coenraad van Beuningen's politieke en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84*, p. 34 posits the possibility that together William and Fagel were in fact more powerful than De Witt.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 477; another English observer commented on the closeness of the Prince and Fagel at the same time noting that among his circle of close friends, "all these men, that are most in favour with the Prince, are divided into factions amongst themselves, Fagels relyes only upon the Prince", M. Lane, ed., "A Relation of the present state of affaires...", p. 313.

expected to deal with the *raadpensionaris*. On one of the rare occasions he did speak with the Prince alone, it was a polite interchange, leading to a further meeting with Fagel.[33] D'Avaux had already grasped that the Prince's position was not comparable to that of a monarch and that he could not act without the consent of the States.[34] He understood that the Prince relied heavily on Fagel to ensure his policies and believed that Fagel was capable of persuading the regents in most of the towns; he also had great faith in his own abilities and undertook a similar strategy of approaching the representatives of all the Holland towns in The Hague to influence them against the Prince and the *raadpensionaris*.[35] The mutual suspicion aroused during the inconclusive negotiations after Nijmegen inevitably led to greater use of informants by both Fagel and the French ambassador.

Frequently Fagel used normal routes of communication with the Amsterdam burgomasters. For example in December 1673, during the conflict over subsidies to Brunswick-Luneburg, he took an intermediary role,[36] and again after the Peace of Westminster in 1674, he worked through van Beuningen to gain Amsterdam's support for subsides to Brandenburg.[37] However Fagel also had a network of agents working within Amsterdam to inform him of not only day to day affairs, but also of links with France and Friesland. It is also clear that he had "spies" elsewhere as well. One of these, Van Heukelom, was sending the *raadpensionaris* copies of code names and instructions on how to read them in 1679,[38] and evidence of his handwriting was still being used in 1684, by which time he appears to have been working in Amsterdam as well. Although one of the letters is filed "*ontbekende*", it is almost certainly in Van Heukelom's hand and advises Fagel to

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33. D'Avaux, *Négociations*, p. 37.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 39-40.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

36. C.L. Grose, "The Anglo-Dutch Alliance of 1678", *E.H.R.*, Vol. xxxix (1924), p. 118.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 119 and 125; see also below Chapter 9, p.

38. A.R.H. Collectie Fagel, nr. 1972, Van Heukelom to Fagel, 29 December 1679.

be cautious about using the information he is passing on about the French Ambassador D'Avaux's visit to the house of Madame Buasson in Amsterdam. A further undated note, possibly in the same hand adds, that "*Il est sieu que M. L'ambassadeur avoit insue a messieurs d'Amsterdam de demander le rappel des trouppes, et qu'il avait esperer qu'ils en fervour l'aproprosition dans la derneir assemble, it semple presenter quiil doute que la chose puisse veusser, cependant...*"

The French may not have been written by a native speaker and if doubt is cast on Van Heukelom's authorship, then it merely confirms the breadth of Fagel's network of agents.[39] In January 1684 he received a letter from Henrick Helt (which is the only one discovered from this particular correspondent) which refers to communications between Jakob Hop and D'Avaux:

> "*De Heer Hop pensionaris van Amsterdam geduring converseert end correspondaert met Mons. le Comte d'Avaux gemeenlijck omme den 2 + 3 dag incognito dog handt hem nu als een weinig geretereenrd voor sijn persoon doende het meerendeel bij besloten geschriften den voorn. Hop heeft een gisteren persoonlijck dag gisteren bij geschrifte ten huis van de eergen ambassadeur geweest.*"[40]

D'Avaux's visits to the houses of various women were also reported to Fagel by one J. Bossier and particularly during July and August 1684 to mevrouw van Gravenanen, who was possibly later referred to as "madame"[41] Reports of D'Avaux's activities were at times taken more seriously. In 1682 the rumour that a French born person had been offered money by D'Avaux, then resident in Amsterdam, to write a book against "*hooghte gedachte syn Majesteit*", "*Le Louis d'Or Executé*" was raised in the States of Holland. This was all denied by D'Avaux, who claimed not even to be in Amsterdam. The States of Holland resolved not to make anything of it.[42] The most serious issue was of course the infamous letters scandal of 1684 which precipitated the crisis of confidence in

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39. *Ibid.*, nrs. 1996 and 1998.

40. *Ibid.*, nr. 1994, Helt to Fagel, 29 January 1684.

41. *Ibid.*, nr. 2000, Bossier to Fagel, various, July/August 1684.

42. Res. Holl., 12 May 1682.

Amsterdam's role by the Prince and the majority of the States representatives.

The interception of D'Avaux's correspondence with Louis XIV, which made public his contacts within Amsterdam was a colourful incident within the bitter arguments raging between the Prince and elements within the States of Holland over the raising of a further 16,000 men to meet further possible French threats in the Spanish Netherlands. Although, the quarrel between William and Amsterdam was of an extreme nature, other Holland towns, notably Leiden, Delft and eventually Rotterdam, also opposed the military proposls.[43]

One of the most ubiquitous of Fagel's agents was De Wildt, whose official role was secretary to the *V.O.C.* He was working directly to Fagel as early as 1673 and wrote to him on 15 May and 29 May 1673 shortly after his arrival in Amsterdam about equipping ships and the possibilities for contributions from the States.[44] He reported that Zeeland and Groningen were being difficult, but that Amsterdam would pay if Groningen did. Again, on 1 June 1673 de Wildt reported further about the affairs of Amsterdam to Fagel, and later (11 October) on the equipping of six warships for Tobago. De Wildt was reporting directly on the decision of the *vroedschap*; but why did Fagel need someone, who did not have an official role within the *vroedschap*, to report separately on decisions and actions within Amsterdam?

The information which he was passing on was not of any particular significance and ought to have been readily available to the *raadpensionaris* through regular channels, but de Wildt seemed able to range from Admiralty business to Amsterdam's trade in the Mediterranean and the West Indies, as well as the day-to-

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43. Kurtz's definitive work, *William III en Amsterdam*, has provided a useful source for this crisis, and her examination of the current pamphlet literature demonstrates the level of propaganda which it created. See also, Franken, *Coenraad van Beuningen's politieke en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84*, pp. 220-238, and Israel, *Dutch Republic*, pp. 830-834.

44. A.R.H. Gecommitteerde Raad van Staten van Holland na 1572, nr. 1.0501, De Wildt to Fagel, 15 May 1677.

day activities of the *vroedschap*.[45] He also established an effective line of communication between Fagel and the secretary to the English Ambassador, Roger Meredith, which brought the English interpretation of the activities of the French ambassadors, D'Estrades and D'Avaux, to the *raadpensionaris's* notice.[46] However minor or irrelevant the information they transmitted, Fagel does seem to have seen the need to establish trusted agents in many areas in order to secure his acquisition of appropriate information. Their length of service would seem to point to a faith in their ability and presumably to their receiving appropriate compensation for their labours.

In May 1678 de Wildt was still reporting to Fagel, but this time on the strong relations between Amsterdam and Friesland again on military resources, and a few months later (5 August) discussing the attempts to draw Friesland into line about military provisioning.[47] This was probably of greater significance than some of his earlier reports as the relationship between Amsterdam and Friesland was to become of importance during the post-war period and the determination of foreign policy. By the autumn de Wildt was in The Hague still holding out hopes that the problems with Friesland would be resolved. But a month later he was back in Amsterdam negotiating with the Heer Burmamini en Camstra and again on 17 October, writing about the Zeeland decision on the same business, enclosing a letter from Burmamini about the deputation from Friesland.[48]

Fagel appears to have suffered from "convenient" illness at critical times when he would either absent himself or be unavailable for meetings. He was also not

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45. G.A.Amsterdam, Collectie Witsen, nr. 180, f.211; A.R.H. Collectie Fagel, nr. 1960, De Wildt to Fagel [undated] 1677.

46. P. R.O., SP 84, 215 (1679), f. 85. Meredith's information about D'Estrades' visit to Amsterdam in 1679 could not however be discovered to be of any moment as he appeared to be doing no more than arranging a family marriage. *Ibid.*, f. 136 and 138. De Wildt was updating Meredith about the provision of arms for Ireland through a Scottish catholic merchant based in Amsterdam.

47. R.A.Collectie Fagel, nr. 1967, De Wildt to Fagel, 30 May 1678..

48. *Ibid.*. De Wildt to Fagel, 28 August 1678; De Wildt to Fagel, 17 October 1678..

necessarily in complete agreement with the Prince, particularly during the negotiations at Nijmegen, when he saw that there was a probability that the only outcome would be the conclusion of a separate peace between France and the Dutch, ignoring the rest of the allies and particularly the interests of Spain and the security of the Spanish Netherlands.[49]

One of the most pitiable victims of Fagel's convenient periods of inaccessibility was the Count van Waldeck, who was brought into the service of the Prince and the Dutch army by William in 1672. We have seen that Waldeck had had his struggles with the Amsterdam regency in 1673, but they were as nothing compared with his continued efforts to meet with Fagel to push his own interests from 1675 to 1678.

On 20 December 1675 Waldeck wrote to Fagel to say how sorry he was he was ill and they could not meet, and to remind him of his undertaking to protect his interest and an outstanding payment of 6,000 francs.[50] On 9 June 1676 Waldeck was still bemoaning his lack of luck in getting a meeting with Fagel, but continuing to remind him of his presence.[51] By 1677 Waldeck was more plaintive; he had just missed Fagel again and urged the *raadpensionaris*, notwithstanding the important business which Waldeck knew that he had to deal with, to turn his attention to the business with the Frisian stadholder.[52] There was a continual flow of correspondence between the two; it appears that it was only personal contact that could not be made by Waldeck. Much of the correspondence clearly shows that Fagel was the accepted channel of communication between Waldeck and the Prince.

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49. This difference of opinion was noted by the English ambassador, Temple, *Works*, II, pp. 391-2.

50. A.R.H. Collectie Fagel, nr. 1956, Waldeck to Fagel, 20 December 1675.

51. *Ibid*, nr. 1958, Waldeck to Fagel, 9 June 1676.

52. *Ibid.*, nr. 1961, Waldeck to Fagel, 20 November[?]1677.

Was Fagel deliberately avoiding Waldeck? Perhaps because there was nothing he could do for him, or perhaps because he did not believe that his business at this time was of particular importance, and could be dealt with elsewhere, or perhaps because he simply did not want to put himself face-to-face with someone with whom discussions were bound to lead to conflict. To an English observer it was clear that "C. de Waldeck and the Pensioner cannot agree".[53] Whatever the truth of this relationship, by June 1678 Waldeck was playing the sick card himself and writing to Fagel urgently requesting his intervention in the peace negotiations at Nijmegen.[54] A month later Waldeck had had enough and felt it would be unwise for him to continue in office while affairs were "*si delicat*".[55]

However, Fagel's illnesses were not necessarily discriminatory. In 1676 Witsen wrote to Valckenier reporting that he was not able to speak to Fagel "*omdat de Hr. raadpensionaris onpassilijke is, heb ick hen ... later koomen spreken aen desen middag, wat tot Amsterdam is gepasseert lopende dit Calvinsite saeck, heb ik hem bekent gemaetsh tot bij legging van op geldend.*[56]

No-one was more aware of the tensions between Amsterdam and the Prince in the 1680s than the French ambassador D'Avaux, who publicised them with the glee that all political divisions are exposed by enemies.[57] Most of his information was drawn directly from his own contacts within the administration of the city. He encouraged the idea of remonstrant republicans working to undermine the Prince and was clearly in close contact with the pensionary Jakob Hop in Amsterdam in the 1680s. However, even D'Avaux underestimated the real balance of power

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53. Lane, ed., "A Relation of the present state of affaires...", p. 313.

54. A.R.H. Collectie Fagel, nr. 1969, Waldeck to Fagel, 12 July 1678.

55. *Ibid.* Waldeck to Fagel, 15 July 1678.

56. G.A. Amsterdam, Collectie Witsen, f.158, Witsen to Valckenier, 20 [dese?] 1676.

57. D'Avaux, *Negociations*, p. 109, where he expresses satisfaction with his arminian agent's contacts even after the death of Valckenier, although by March 1681 this satisfaction had waned and he felt it necessary to make personal contact with Friesland and Groningen and report back to Amsterdam himself.

within the republic. He confidently led his king to believe that Amsterdam would remain aloof from William's militarism and failed to foresee that an incident like the captured letters in 1684 would render a critical, although by no means fatal blow to Amsterdam's reputation in the States of Holland.[58] He had intervened to strengthen the links between Amsterdam and Friesland and Groningen and in the early 1680s he had used an arminian cleric as his agent in Amsterdam to form close contacts with "two or three regents who had been in league with Valckenier in 1672.[59]

Jakob Hop was the son of Cornelis, who was pensionary for Amsterdam until 1675. Cornelis Hop had been introduced to Amsterdam politics in 1666 by Valckenier. He was the first member of his family to be educated and started a family tradition of working as paid officials with an influential role in civic and States politics, but continuing to be dependent on the patronage of their masters. Hop's biographer in the *Nieuwe Nederlandsche Biografische Woordenboek* claims that from 1667 to 1675 Hop "*bleef ... de voornaamste ambtenaar der machtigste stad...*".[60] As a servant of Valckenier he has been seen as an instrument of the *wetsverzetting* and yet by 1675, when he was deputed to the *Hoogen Raad*, he was effectively out of office and complaining bitterly that Valckenier had always been against him. But his new appointment, drawing on his correspondence with the Prince and his advisers in the early years of the war gave him the opportunity to extend the range of influence open to both himself and, later, his son Jakob.

Jakob Hop's (1654-1725) career in Amsterdam lasted from 1680, when he was appointed pensionary until 1687, when he entered William III's service as ambassador until 1700. From 1700 until his death in 1725, he was *Thesauris General.* The family connections continued the tradition of service to the States:

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58. D'Avaux, *Negociations*, p. 31, in which he boasts of his success in bringing all the towns of Holland against the policies of the Prince and Fagel.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

60. *Nieuwe Nederlandsche Biografische Woordenboek*, III, nr. 600.

his sons were also ambassadors and his nephew became secretary to the *Raad van Staat* and also *Thesauris General.*

Jakob's first position was in Leiden in 1675 and he then went with Van Beverning's embassy to Louis XIV's camp at Gent, extending his own range of experience at the same time as his father's career was being forced into other spheres. He returned to Amsterdam after the Peace of Nijmegen.

Hop's biographer Den Tex is fulsome in his praise of Hop's person and character[61] and, although it is clear that it was the crisis of 1683-84 which brought Hop into the limelight, Den Tex does not give much evidence of his activities before he entered the service of the Prince. This may have been because the career of Hop before 1685 had a distinct French link - no doubt first established during van Beverning's embassy.[62] It was his expertise in dealing with the crisis between Amsterdam and the Prince which seems to have brought him to the attention of the Prince.

In 1682 he was talking personally with the Prince and reported back to the city about a conversation during which he had succeeded in getting the Prince's patronage for Captain Sekerij of Amsterdam in the face of competition from representations from Leiden, Haarlem and Gouda.[63]

The other Amsterdammer who was also constantly in the service of the States, Boreel, had his own line of communication with his native city during the negotiations at Nijmegen in 1678. In August he entrusted his messages to a

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[61]. Den Tex, p. 77-8.

[62]. *N.N.W.B.*, Vol. III, 613, notes the apparent *volte-face* in Hop's allegiances in 1685: "*maar nadat sinds 1685 de betrekking er tusschen Amsterdam en den prins veel beterden kwam ook in Hop's verhouding tot Willem verandering, en spoedig werd hij een der bekwaamste medearbeiders aan het verbond tegen Lodewijk XIV*".

[63]. G.A. Amsterdam, Collectie Witsen, nr. 180, f.228.

Frenchman named d'Aguerres who was married to an Amsterdammer.[64] Once again the element of French involvement in the communication of information to and from Amsterdam is demonstrated.

By 1684 Amsterdam was virtually out on a limb but it can be seen from a pamphlet published during that year that the city was as yet far from bending its will to others.[65] It is written in the form of a fictitious dialogue between an "*Haagenaer*" and an Amsterdammer, in which the former expresses surprise that the latter dares to show his face. The Amsterdammer defends himself saying that the people cannot be blamed for the politics of their regents but then adds that he does however believe in the wisdom of these regents. Later on, he asserts that Amsterdam has the right, by virtue of its major financial contribution to the States, not to be overruled by all the smaller towns. These were the kind of postures which merely confirmed the Prince's view of the city.

The "wise regents" praised in this pamphlet were those who had established themselves as a far less divided group after the deaths of first Hooft and then Valckenier in the two years after the Peace of Nijmegen. Principal among them were Hudde and Witsen who, as we have seen in Chapter 7, had consolidated their reputations and experience during the troubled 1670s without incurring censure from either their fellow regents or the Prince's closest advisers. The poor relations between the Prince and van Beuningen which had steadily worsened during the latter years of the 1670s, endowed the elderly regent with the role of scapegoat for any Amsterdam policy which ran counter to that of the Prince. This allowed Witsen to continue to make the most of the intermediary role which he had been cultivating since his initial representative post in The Hague at the *Gecomitteerde*

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64. G.A. Amsterdam, Arch. Burg., nr. 351, 1 August 1678. This is presumably the "French Agent Mons. de Guerr" referred to by Carr in his letter of 21 March 1681 (Appendix II), who together with "Mon Chaubert the French consul doe make often feasts + presents amongst the Duch..."

65. Knuttel 12161, "*Discours Tusschen twee wel-meenende Patrioten wegens dese tegenwoordige verschillen zijnde d'een een Hagenaar, en d'ander een Amsterdammer*".

Raad in 1674.

By following a career very different from that of Valckenier who had only once taken up a representative post in The Hague, Witsen was able to make himself known as more than just a proponent of Amsterdam's policy. Therefore a more conciliatory relationship grew up between the Prince and Witsen, whom the former used to good effect in disputes not concerning Amsterdam, but in matters concerning the city Witsen, like van Beuningen, would still put its interests first and in these cases, the Prince was still more likely to use Fagel as an intermediary.

A brief survey of the range of issues and personages with whom Witsen dealt during the 1670s and early 1680s will serve to argue the case for the important role he played in the delicate diplomacy between Amsterdam and the Prince which finally allowed the crisis of 1684 to be relegated to the background as events moved to the expedition to England at the end of 1688.

As early as 1675, when Witsen was still a fairly junior member of the *vroedschap*, his interest was sought by those seeking to influence policy. While Valckenier, Hudde, Trip and Oudsthoorn were disagreeing with van Beuningen over the benefits of a possible alliance with England, van Beuningen thought it worth his while to try to win Witsen over to his point of view. Clearly, he did not feel that the younger man was bound to go along with his sponsor, Valckenier, but that he had a mind that was open to reasonable argument in the interests of Amsterdam.[66]

The following year Witsen was drawn into the Momma dispute as an intermediary between the protagonists and was writing to Valckenier telling him about his meeting with Fagel about "*dit Calviniste saeck*"[67] But, at the same time as prosecuting the Prince's interests in 1679, Witsen had also been identified by the burgomasters as the man most likely to convince Fagel that the burgomasters had

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66. Grose "The Anglo-Dutch Alliance of 1678", pp. 172-73.

67. See above p. 190, note 56.

done all they could to support the work at Naarden. The latter no doubt fell within his remit as representative at the *Gecommitteerde Raad*, but the former task would have been allocated on merit, as it was reviving old sores which needed a delicate touch. Together they show the breadth of experience and respect which he had acquired in a relatively short time. Some of this may have been by default because of the comparative failings of the Amsterdam regents themselves to prolong the period of conciliation with the Prince beyond 1674.[68]

By 1678, when Witsen had returned to Amsterdam he was in conversation with Fagel about disputes between the Admiralty of Amsterdam and the Bewindhebbers of the *V.O.C.*,[69] and in August 1679 he was once again acting on behalf of the burgomasters in correspondence with the Prince over his wishes to develop the defences at Naarden.[70] On this occasion he was not arguing Amsterdam's willingness to support the extension of the fortifications, but was conveying their displeasure at further military expenditure, which they had so forcefully stated in Amsterdam.[71]

During the next few years of peace, reconstruction and negotiations for alliances, Witsen played a central role in all aspects of these issues which touched on Amsterdam's interests. He took an active role in the improvements to the city with the building of the new bridges and sluice.[72] In an undated letter from Witsen to Fagel (although clearly from the 1681-1682 period) he put forward the traditional arguments about the importance of shipping and its continuation, with reference to the losses of slaves. He argued strongly that the role of the Admiralty must be

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68. Gebhard, *Witsen*, p. 130, argues that Witsen's experience at the *Gecommitteerde Raad* brought him into closer contact with Fagel and the Prince just as the breach was growing between them and Valckenier in 1676.

69. G.A. Amsterdam, Arch. Burg., nr. 351, 2 January 1678.

70. Gebhard, *Witsen*, pp. 161-65.

71. See above pp. 132-133.

72. Gebhard, *Witsen*, pp. 190-91.

made to work and was looking for a favourable answer and an understanding of the need for convoys, without which there could be no real security.[73]

Concurrently he was talking to the Prince about his views on the possibility of a new treaty with Spain. Witsen was careful not to commit himself, but gave warning that an alliance with Spain would cause a complete rift with France; this was quite clearly arguing for the interests of Amsterdam on the preservation of good relations with France.[74] But this was not his only foray into diplomatic relations at this time; he was also acting as go-between for Fagel and the imperial resident, Crampricht.[75]

On 11 May 1679 Witsen had written to Valckenier after discussions with Odijk, warning about the deteriorating relations between the Prince and Amsterdam.[76] The descent into open dispute between the Prince and Amsterdam in 1684, while obviously placing Witsen clearly in the opposing camp from the Prince's point of view, did not undermine the respect with which he was held. Witsen had established good relations with van Sevenaer of Friesland and had discussions with the peace group in Friesland, and with D'Avaux.[77] He also began to question William's influence over the States General. And yet, despite being one of the major contacts with the Frisian leaders, with whom Amsterdam were now clearly allied in the cause against the apparent militarism of the Prince, he was still accepted as the principal negotiator with Fagel and the Prince in the attempts to restore unity within the States.[78]

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[73]. G.A. Amsterdam, *Collectie Witsen*, f.146, Witsen to Fagel, undated.

[74]. Gebhard, *Witsen,* p. 207.

[75]. *Ibid.*, p. 208.

[76]. G.A. Amsterdam, Collectie Witsen, f.164, Odijk to Wisten, 11 May 1679.

[77]. Gebhard, *Witsen*, p. 210.

[78]. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed. 24 August 1684; on 25 August 1684 Witsen received instructions for a meeting on 30 August to search for "*...eenigheit inde Staat*" and "*... goede correspondentie met zijne Hoogheit*", G.A. Amsterdam, Collectie Hudde; Gebhard, *Witsen*, p. 209-10 for a discussion of the relations with van

The chronology of the wars can also be followed through the *Vroedschap Resoluties*, States of Holland Resolutions and States General Resolutions and through British and French histories. There is no shortage of references on actual incidents and different interpretations among historians such as Jones and Baxter.[79]

But by looking at the issues relating to these incidents from the point of view of the decision-makers motivation becomes clearer. Indicative are *the Staat van Oorlogh* (every December); responses to requests for money; committees within Amsterdam and correspondence with representatives on embassies or at The Hague either in the States of Holland or the States General. The first three of these will be dealt with in the following chapter. The final one will only be looked at insofar as Amsterdammers were directly involved; as representative of Amsterdam at The Hague or on embassies, van Beuningen had, as we have seen, a crucial role.

Sevenaer of Friesland and his discussions with the peace group in Friesland with D'Avaux, and beginning to question William's influence over the States General.

79. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars;* Baxter, *William III.*

Chapter 9

Amsterdam and States Policy: 1672-84

In the previous chapter we have seen how the regents of Amsterdam and the *raadpensionaris* Fagel worked within the cumbersome structure of the United Provinces central government by establishing working relationships at the appropriate level. This chapter will take this further and set the changes in Amsterdam's policy within the context of the decision-making processes of the central government, that is, the foreign policy as articulated by the States General and/or the Prince of Orange.

Price has argued that the role of the States General was "co-ordinating" rather than "governing".[1] If this was indeed the case, the strength of the position of the States of Holland was certainly reinforced by the physical closeness of their meetings in The Hague.[2] Communications between Amsterdam and The Hague were daily, while the States of Holland were meeting and they had immediate contact with their permanent representatives at the States General. We have also seen that the decision-making processes of the States were not necessarily strictly adhered to and that, although the ideology underlying the Union had led to a policy of unanimity on decisions of war, truce and military finance, circumvention of this had been effective from time to time.[3] Among the methods used was that of packing the committees with those members most likely to support the proposed policy, and providing the States General with little more to do than acquiesce in the advices

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1. Price, *Holland and the Dutch Republic*, p. 220.

2. The advantages of the South Holland towns, including Amsterdam, Leiden, Delft, Rotterdam and Gouda, and their proximity to The Hague were strengthened by their privileges as being the majority of the eight permanent representatives on the *Gecommitteerde Raad*, K.W.J.M. Bossaers, *"Van Kintsbeen aan ten Staatkunde Opgewesen", Bestuur en Bestuurder van het noordkwartier in de achttiende eeuw*. Hollandse Historische Reeks 25 (Den Haag, 1996), pp. 74-5; J.L. Price, "Rotterdam Patriciate", pp. 31-2.

3. Grever, "The Structure of Decision-Making", has demonstrated this by drawing on particular examples from De Witt's period as *raadspensionaris*, pp. 142-152.

forwarded to them.[4]

For the purposes of this study, the process of decision-making is of less importance in itself than the interests applied to, and the outcomes of, that process. The rationale behind the policies formulated by the Amsterdam regents, and their opposition, or sometimes grudging concessions, to the policies of the Prince and the States General are the principal issue. The relative influences within the States of Holland are under consideration here rather than whether the States operated a majority, consensus, or unanimous system of voting on particular issues. What eventually went forward for implementation at States General level was the culmination of the various forces at work within the States of Holland. The Prince, as first noble, with control of the *ridderschap* vote, and influence in several of the leading towns and more generally among the minor towns, could not however seek to sway the whole of the assembly through representative channels only. The *raadpensionaris*, in the person of Fagel, was without doubt the most influential official in the States of Holland, and had confirmed the role of his office within the States General as well. However, as we have seen, as an individual, paid officeholder he was not particularly powerful; his influence came from mutual support with the Prince and an ability to establish working relations with the important regents in the towns.

Fagel had been pensionary of Haarlem and presumably his contacts there remained strong. He was quite successful in working with the Amsterdam regents, but on many occasions this success was within the constrictions of negotiations of the Prince's wishes and the contrary views of the Amsterdam regents. For all his importance of position he had none of the direct political power which De Witt had been able to exercise during the first stadholderless period. It was therefore all the more important to ensure, where possible, the continued support of the various interest groups.

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4. *Ibid.*, p. 151, "The States General would have been doomed to helpless waiting, had they not maintained a special osmotic relationship with the States of Holland ..."

The senior towns theoretically had equal power and influence, and from time to time their mutual interests would cause alliances between some of them. However, throughout the 1670s in particular, the self-righteousness of those who paid their quotas promptly interplayed with their relative size and economic muscle and gave Amsterdam in particular a louder voice than the rest. But it would be inaccurate to say that Amsterdam was able to sway the decisions of the States of Holland. In the crises of 1682 and even more 1684, she was left out on a limb with the support of one or two other towns. The failure of the States to come to a decision allowed the Prince to relax his own entrenched views during 1685 and both were able to affect an understanding of the other's view which must have contributed to the easier passage towards co-operation in 1688.[5]

For the purposes of decisions within the States of Holland therefore, not only were relationships between members important, but the decisions of the *vroedschappen* themselves were also critical. What their representatives were authorised to argue for could on occasion be so out of line with the other members' views that it could fall at the first hurdle. Majority decisions could be agreed at the expense of the policy of even the most powerful town. Nevertheless Amsterdam remained the strongest voice in the States of Holland and her representatives and regents in the *vroedschap* were on most occasions politicians enough to operate within the system to ensure the greatest possible success for their policies. Only when they felt really threatened, whether on ideological, economic or other grounds, or when they were sure of the support of the majority of the other representative towns, were they prepared to take a firm stance. The crises of the 1680s are examples of the former, the push towards peace from 1677 onwards an example of the latter.

The following argument therefore will be based on a discussion of the policies Amsterdam's representatives were instructed to argue for at the States of Holland, set into the context of their relative importance to the other issues facing the

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5. Israel, "The Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution", pp. 113-4; Kurtz, *Willem III en Amsterdam*, pp.173-4.

vroedschap, and their status *vis à vis* those of the other Holland towns and the Prince of Orange.

Amsterdam and States Policy: 1672-78

The immediate concerns of the Amsterdam *vroedschap* in October 1672 were the war and local matters which necessarily required attention whatever the external disruptions; the *wetsverzetting* had markedly little effect on the procedures. One of the first issues therefore to receive major consideration was the control of waterways and sluices in order to secure both the defence and trade of the city.[6] Throughout this latter part of 1672 the issues being debated at length in Amsterdam were those directly concerned with the city's economic life as it was affected by the war.[7] One of the major concerns was over the consumption of French manufactures. At this stage, Amsterdam was being perhaps uncharacteristically patriotic and saw the constant import of French goods as detrimental to home consumption. However, part of Amsterdam's concern was that there would be internal competition if the exclusion orders were not strictly followed by all provinces.[8] Within a few years Amsterdam was to change its views on the policy and be among the major proponents arguing that if French goods were banned from the Republic there was an even greater threat from them in overseas trade.

Steps were also taken to ensure that the French were prevented from exploiting Dutch resources and the States of Holland passed a resolution which gave Geelvinck and Prins Maurits responsibility for ensuring that Amsterdam administer the production of peat and hay from the villages on the Utrecht side of Amsterdam in order to keep it out of French hands.[9] Huydecooper's payment of the French

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6. See above pp. 92 and 123.

7. The trend of issues of importance can be seen in greater detail in the committees listed in Appendix V.

8. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 20 December 1672.

9. Secrete Resolutien van de Heeren Staten van Hollandt ende West Frieslandt, 25 November 1672.

troops not to raid his lands at Maarseveen on the Vecht near Utrecht could be argued as merely an extreme implementation of this policy.[10]

The other issue taking up a large amount of time was an ongoing dispute with Haarlem over the building and financing of the Veendijk between Amsterdam, Naarden and Muiden. To this end pressure was put on Haarlem to co-operate in the completion of the Veendijk to Muiden. This was all part of their desire to see the fortification of the largest possible area around Amsterdam. Amsterdam was anxious to solve the question amicably, but Haarlem seemed willing to be awkward.[11] Naturally enough, at this stage of the war, while Amsterdam's very security was under threat there was little debate over requests for men and money, which dominated the turn of the year and the approval of the *Staat van Oorlogh* for 1673. In January 1673 Amsterdam was pressing the importance of its own security hard; van Beuningen was having discussions with the Prince, and Cornelis Hop was instructed to write to the Prince expressing Amsterdam's concern over the need for the dijk to Muiden to be completed.[12] Such concerns continued throughout the next year, strengthened by the success of the inundations of the summer of 1673,[13] and the repair of the *sluis* at Naarden in October 1673 was also part of the maintenance of a defensive ring around the city.[14]

However, although Amsterdam was concerned for her own security and for the

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[10]. See above p. 149.

[11]. G.A. Amsterdam Res. Vroed., 22 November 1672. A week later, the importance of preserving good relations with Haarlem over defensive issues resulted in Corver and Hooft being delegated to talk with representatives from Haarlem, *ibid.*, 28 November 1682.

[12]. *Ibid.* 16 January 1673.

[13]. Israel, *Dutch Republic*, pp. 798-99; A.R.H. Gecommitteerde Raad Staten van Holland: on 20 May 1673 it was agreed that fortifications should be put in hand at Nieuwerslius and on 13 July 1673 Amsterdam requested further defences at Hinderdam. Amsterdam's contribution to the dijk to Muiden had already been paid promptly on 18 April.

[14]. Secrete Resolutien van de Heeren Staten van Hollandt ende West Friesland;.and G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 9 October 1673.

continual flow of trade, she was not averse to getting into disputes with the Admiralties over funding for naval provisions and, on 4 March 1673, demanded to know why a request for the essential provision of *fl.*100,000 for equipage by the Prince of Orange could not be met by the Admiralties' contingency fund and only consented grudgingly to the charge being made on the new tax of the 200 *penningh* if all the other members of the States of Holland agreed.[15] This qualification was made to draw attention to a continual complaint against other members for lack of contributions and in particular to the current shortfall on the *Saken van Staet* because of excessive military expenditure. Van Beuningen and van Kinschot (pensionary of Delft) were deputed to attempt to put pressure on Friesland and Groningen to participate fully in equipping warships.[16]

Thus, even as early as the first part of 1673, when both the Prince and Amsterdam were anxious to preserve the Republic, the former was prepared to assert what he saw as essential requirements and the latter to press for measures least damaging to their own purse. Bearing in mind the level of Amsterdam's contributions, and her relatively good record of payment, such a reaction was probably only to be expected. That tensions of this kind, however minor, could arise within six months of the *wetsverzetting* should come as no surprise bearing in mind the traditional fear of Orange militarism which had been overlaid by the events of 1672, but not smothered by them, and the evidence that many supporters of the Orange revival were fairweather converts.

But while Amsterdam may have quieried expenditure on naval equipage they were prompt in their own requests to Prince Maurits to put forward works to fortify the largest possible area around Amsterdam.[17] It will be seen that within a year or so Amsterdam completely reversed this policy as the military threat receded and the

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15. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 4 March 1673.

16. Secrete Resolutien van de Heeren Staten van Hollandt ende West Frieslandt, 28 March 1673.

17. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 8 March; on 31 March, it was reported that the expenditure on these fortifications for six months would be *fl.*1,840.

importance of merchant naval supremacy became paramount once more.

As the campaigning season drew nearer in 1673, questions of the progress of the war began to dominate with the embassy to Cologne, and Amsterdam foremost among the Holland towns in stressing that nothing should be given away without their unanimous consent, and full representation of their views by the embassy[18]. The stress that Amsterdam laid on unanimous consent over major issues highlights the fact that in Holland at least, the principle of unanimity on decisions was sometimes breached. By April Valckenier, during his short spell on the *Gecommiteerde Raad* in The Hague, and van Beuningen, once again in the service of the States, were working closely on the peace negotiations. Valckenier quickly ceded his place to a subordinate (in this case Cornelis Hop) so he could remain in control in Amsterdam.

The summer of 1673 was dominated by the negotiations of treaties with the German states and more particularly establishing a positive working relationship with Denmark. Amsterdam's interest in these was predictably concerned, but not contentious, although in September they were raising objections to the way peace negotiations with France, England, Cologne and Munster were going and resolved "*te declineren en afte staen*".[19]

By now there was already a marked resistance to excessive military expenditure and the Amsterdammers were protecting themselves as far as possible against the expense of billeting within the city.[20] Earlier that year they had had to cope with five companies of Waldeck's men who had not been paid for six weeks previously and for whom no payment was made for food and supplies despite promises of

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18. *Ibid.*, 26 March 1673

19. *Ibid.*, 20 December 1673.

20. *Ibid.*, 2 October 1673, resolving only to admit Waldeck's regiments if they had the required special licence from the Prince.

payment in advance.[21] The clear impression is that the *vroedschap*, while anxious for the fortifications of the city, wanted nothing more than absolutely essential to impinge on daily life in the city.

As the year declined and the threat of French advances retreated with the end of the campaigning season, so did the *vroedschap's* interest in military matters and once again concern began to rise on threats to commerce. In particular duties on salt were seen as a threat to the fisheries and opposition was mounting to restrictions on wines and spirits, which only a few months earlier had been agreed without complaint, with the introduction of the argument that, since French wine was freely imported into the Spanish Netherlands, restrictions were becoming self-destructive to Dutch trade[22].

The turn of the year saw the usual discussions on taxes and the *Staet van Oorlogh* and the general consent to the appointment of William to the offices of Captain-and Admiral-General, although Amsterdam did not let this go without raising the question of the terms of Utrecht's re-entry into the Union.[23] This, together with the charter for the new *West Indische Compagnie*, and the peace with England, were to dominate the early spring of 1674. The principal query that the *vroedschap* raised over the peace was that, with its conclusion, they would be in credit over contributions for military expenditure and should be freed from further contributions under the 200 and 100 *penningh*;[24] van Beuningen was charged with protecting Amsterdam's interests in the negotiations of the marine treaty with England.

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[21]. G.A. Amsterdam, Missieven en Requesten van Particulieren (Binnenland), 25 and 30 May 1673.

[22]. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 21 November and 4 December 1673.

[23]. *Ibid.*, 30 January 1674: Amsterdam's continued interest in the security of the waterline remained part of the terms of the discussion.

[24]. *Ibid..*, 26 February 1674.

In the establishment of the new *W.I.C.* Amsterdam was able to ensure that the advantages she was gaining over Zeeland were confirmed with a larger share of the company and, being the only city with a chamber of their own, a privileged position.[25] Relations with Zeeland were never good at this period and it will be seen over various issues how Amsterdam rarely attempted to repair these breaches, unlike the attitude she took towards other towns in Holland with whom she was involved in a mutual support system. In March they were arguing against a 17 per cent increase in personal contributions with the introduction of a new tax to replace one fixed in 1654.[26] Amsterdam was not alone in objecting to further taxation and on 22 March representatives at The Hague were reporting back on the views of Delft, Rotterdam, Alkmaar and Leiden, who all felt that the impositions were getting out of hand.[27]

The late spring and early summer of 1674 were taken up with the ratification of the treaties and defensive alliances with Munster, Cologne, Spain, Brunswick and Luneburg, but with the *vroedschap* beginning to object to the raising of armies without receiving some compensation from allies.[28] This year there was more discussion over the continuing military provisions, although in August and September the theme changed to import duties and the continuation of the ban on French manufactures.[29]

The entry of the Danes, Brandenburg and Luneburg into the war in late 1674, enticed by Dutch subsidies, was seen not only as an increased tax burden, but also

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25. Goslinga, *The Dutch in the Caribbean*, pp. 5-10.

26. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed, 18 March 1674: this new tax was interpreted by Amsterdam as an increase of one-sixth in personal taxation.

27. G.A. Amsterdam, Missieven aan Burgemeesteren-Regeerden van Amsterdam - missieven van wege Gecommitteerde Raad, 1673-1708, 22 March 1674; G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 22 March 1674.

28. *Ibid.*, 14 June 1674.

29. *Ibid.*, 14 August 1674: by now Amsterdam was arguing that a reduction in peat tax would have an effect of the repayment of interest on the *Capital Leening.*

as an unnecessary cause of war with Sweden, the implications of which Amsterdam did not let the States General overlook (see below).

In December the *vroedschap* found it impossible to agree to Fagel's proposal on taxation levels. But as might be expected, the main issue in early 1675 was the Gelderland sovereignty, although competing with it in Amsterdam was the status of the *West Indische Compagnie* in the Caribbean, the maintenance of relations with Denmark, and the security of ships going to Norway. Within a month of this the controversial appointment of van den Bosch as pensionary took place, but by then Amsterdam was far more concerned with the protection of Baltic trade and the need to reintroduce convoys of ships through the Sound.[30] This became even more important in July when Sweden entered the war on the French side.[31] With the Danish attitude to Dutch traders never to be relied on it was crucial that Amsterdam should ensure that some degree of protection of trade with Sweden be incorporated into the declaration of war.[32] By now the affairs of war were receiving scant attention except where they touched on such matters. Although there was a degree of communication between the burgomasters and the principals determining foreign policy, on the whole Amsterdam was prepared to rely exclusively on van Beuningen to protect its interest, a role he fulfilled admirably eventually to the detriment of his relations with the Prince and Fagel.

It was towards the end of 1675 that van Beuningen began to state clearly his opposition to the policies pursued by the Prince and Fagel and in October of that

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30. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 26 April 1675.

31. Samuel Tucker wrote to Williams on 6 June 1675 commenting on the pressures the Dutch were coming under from both subsidies to the Danes and the vulnerability of their trade in the Baltic: "This state is now the goose that everyone plucks and which will make it both poore and quiet in a little time, the King of Denmark's yearly income, amounts not to the sallarie this state pays to him neither doth that of the D. of Brandenburg to which he receives here; whilst the people here are taxed to extremity and have little or noe trade, and will have less in case of a warr with Sweden which will put a stop to there trade in the Sound", P.R.O., SP84, 1675, f.28

32. See above pp. 102-103.

year made his policy statement that a small town in the Spanish Netherlands was of less concern to the States than safeguarding trade.[33] Early the following year these disagreements became open conflict as van Beuningen, on his embassy to England, argued strongly that the Prince and Fagel should be working to persuade the States that an English alliance was the best way forward to achieving peace.[34] But he was beginning to be aware that his views were no longer reflecting those of Amsterdam, and that they were also unacceptable to the Prince and the *raadpensionaris*. When the Anglo-Dutch alliance was eventually signed on 26 January 1678, against the wishes of Amsterdam, van Beuningen, despite his long service as ambassador to England, was conspicuous by his absence.[35]

In the autumn of 1675 Amsterdam's concerns were over the threat to ships in the Mediterranean; in December it was a request for warships to protect shipping in the North Sea and negotiations with Spain over inland trade along the Maas through the Spanish Netherlands. On these issues Amsterdam was able to enlist the support and interest of Dordrecht and Zeeland as well.[36]

In January 1676 the question of security of Swedish trade was once again raised with a fairly rapid ratification of the trade treaty with an extension of the ban on Greenland trade to 1 May 1676[37]. In May, however, the brewers were complaining about taxes on beer, while the Prince was using Fagel to persuade Amsterdam that prompt payment of quotas was needed for military provisions. Amsterdam's answer was that this should have been anticipated and that the money (*fl.*50,000) should be taken from funds already raised by the *Raad van Staat*[38]. For the siege

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33. Franken, *Coenraad van Beuningen's politieke en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84*, p. 141.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 144-145

35. *Ibid*, pp. 156-7

36. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 12 and 18 November 1675.

37. *Ibid.*, 23 March 1676.

38. *Ibid.*, 23 May 1676.

of Maastricht Amsterdam again resolved that the request for *fl.*300,000 should be met only to the sum of *fl.*120,000 and the balance should be met from quotas on the 200 *penningh* already paid.[39] Now that Amsterdam was quite secure, the immediacy of fortifications was wearing thin and the dijk between Amsterdam, Muiden and Naarden, in 1673 so vital, was now solely a source of financial adjustment with repayment on loans to be made within eight years.[40]

If the opposition to the war effort was firmly resolved by the summer of 1675, but did not become effective until the end of 1676, it was not without a voice. During these eighteen months the Holland towns began to pursue with greater vigour their policy of withholding quotas, until by the end of 1676 Amsterdam was paying little over half its quotas and the other large contributors like Delft, The Hague, Leiden and Rotterdam were withholding more than a third. Dordrecht did keep its payments up to nearly ninety per cent, although as early as January 1675 it was Dordrecht which had raised the question of unpaid interest on the *Capital Leening* for 1672, before agreeing to the quotas for 1675.[41]

In March of 1675 Leiden, supported by Amsterdam, was asking for a reduction in its quota for 1674 and even the smaller towns of Alkmaar, Hoorn, Enkhuisen, Edam, Monnickendam, Medemblik and Purmerend were demanding payment of interest on Danish subsidies.[42] These two complaints came in the same week as the States of Holland formally approved payment of *fl.*1m for military provisions and suggests that the approval of military budgets and supplementary requests for provisions were still regarded as a matter of formality and that the intention to pay was not implicit in the resolution. In other words, withholding payments of taxes and quotas was not yet considered a means of directing policy, but was merely an expression of dissatisfaction, still reflecting the traditional practice of querying the

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39. *Ibid.*, 25 July 1676.

40. *Ibid.*, 21 July 1676.

41. Res. Holl., 19 January 1675.

42. *Ibid.*, 21 and 26 March 1675.

assessment of taxes.

But by the end of 1675 opposition was being raised even to the formal consent. A request for further provisioning of *fl.*600,000 and *fl.*180,000 for *"de Defroyment"* received on 21 September 1675 was not agreed until 21 November and the payment of the 1676 quotas was queried by Delft on the same day (21 December) as they were agreed. And in January 1676, just one month later, Rotterdam was requesting a reduction in its quota again.[43] By 11 January 1677 the States of Holland were unanimously hoping for a reduction in the requests for extra funds, and received a response from the States General, on 18 January, justifying the need for sustained expenditure. This was convincing enough for the States of Holland to grudgingly approve both requests both for *legerlast* and *artillerye.*[44]

In September 1676 as well, there had been strong opposition to a proposal from the *Munt* for a ban on the export of capital silver and a general ban on export, since this was seen as far too restrictive on trade.[45] The following January Heemskerck was deputed to an audience with the Prince to get Danish subsidies reduced since the level of trade was not sufficient to support them.[46]

At the same time as opposition was growing to direct measures working against the interest of commerce and trade, the pattern of opposition to military finance within Holland began to take specific shape. In January approval was given to equip twelve ships and a further *fl.*1m was agreed for provisions, but two days later the States of Holland reduced a payment of *fl.*80,000 approved by the States General by *fl.*20,000.[47] And again in March, the building of six warships was approved on

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43. *Ibid.*, 21 January 1676.

44. *Ibid.*, 11, 18 and 22 January 1677.

45. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 5 Septemmber 1676.

46. *Ibid.*, 16 January 1677.

47. Res. Holl., 21, 22 and 25 January 1676.

the same day as a request from the *Groote Visscherye* for *fl.*30,000 to compensate for the cost of the war was agreed.[48] On 31 March Temple wrote that the Prince believed the Holland towns preferred to arm at sea rather than support the land forces, as a more secure insurance for their trade - even in the event of renewed hostilities with England.[49] Throughout 1676 the qualifications of, and discussion on, payments, grew with discontent centring on payments of subsidies to the allies as, for example, the lengthy discussion on subsidies to the Danes, Brandenburg, Brunswick and Luneburg in late July, which contrasted sharply with the swift ratification, on the Dutch side at least, of the commercial treaty with Sweden on 29 July.[50] For the first time in September 1676 only qualified approval was given to the supplementary request for provisions followed shortly by a request by the States of Holland for the statement of payments outstanding. This was supplied in November 1676[51]

Of course the grain handling trade was still one of the major income earners in Amsterdam, despite the growing competition from England, and it was therefore essential to the Amsterdammers that the trade routes through the Sound should also be protected. Towards the end of 1674 the political situation in the north-east had shown signs of working against the Dutch and intense diplomatic activity began to take place. English observers at The Hague began to note that Fagel was becoming so concerned with the risks for the alliance with Brandenburg in the face of the threat from Sweden, that he was paying less attention to the Surinam question,[52] and he consequently put pressure on the States of Holland to accept the

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48. *Ibid.*, 26 March 1676.

49. Temple, *Works*, IV, pp. 204-5.

50. Res. Holl., 24, 28 and 29 July 1676.

51. Appendix VII.

52. P.R.O. SP84/197, f.38: "...that till the point of liberty of trading from one Enemy's port to another can pass in the States Generall; they have resolved to send provisional order to all the Admiralties that no English shipps shall be arrested ... of their former Resolution concerning there rule - Free Shipps free goods", Meredith to Williamson 20/30 November 1674.

necessity for concluding a swift alliance with Brandenburg, Brunswick-Luneburg and Denmark.[53] The latter met with little resistance at this stage since it could be seen as better to have at least one ally in the Baltic and that the one with the greater control over the Sound (although politically of little significance in the area), but there was much strong feeling against the Brandenburg alliance since they had defaulted over the promise of military aid in 1672 and had left the eastern borders of the Republic exposed to the French forces. Six months later Amsterdam refused to pay the Brandenburg subsidies and it was already being pointed out that Dutch subsidies to the Danish crown and the Duke of Brandenburg probably exceeded the monies these rulers raised within their own territories.[54]

The Amsterdammers were beginning to feel that the political and military alliances forced on them by the policies of William were in large part responsible for the breakdown in relations with Sweden and the declaration of war in June 1675. As the acute and prolific English observer, Samuel Tucker, noted on 6 June 1675 that, together with the high levels of taxation, a break with Sweden would have disastrous consequences for Dutch Trade.[55] However, the States of Holland were able to ensure that the declaration was accompanied by the provision for the continuation of unmolested trade, a condition pressed with greater urgency by the Dutch, but with less enthusiasm by the Swedes, dominated by dreams of imperial grandeur.

Throughout 1676 the alliance with Brandenburg was under discussion, Amsterdam delivering its final judgement in September, that while it was best to keep the alliance for a position in the north it should not prejudice a possible new alliance with Sweden.[56] It is clear that for Amsterdam at least, whoever they were at war

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53. G.A. Haarlem, *Minuut Notulen*, 19 January 1675; Res. Holl. 22 January 1675..

54. P.R.O., SP/84/199, f.5: "Our great newes is, that the city of Amsterdam have denyed the Duke of Brandenburg", 7/17 May to Sir Joseph Williamson from [?] The Hague.

55. See above p. 207.

56. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 22 September 1676.

with was of secondary consideration to the need to enter into trade negotiations with not only Sweden, but also France and Denmark.

Again in 1676, the ratification of the commercial treaty with Sweden was expedited without delay by the Dutch, while lengthy debates were held over continuing subsidies to Brandenburg and Denmark.[57]

D'Estrades, one of the French Ambassadors at the negotiations at Nijmegen,[58] believed as early as July 1676, from his contacts in Amsterdam, that if the right proposals were made to the Prince, the States would be only too willing to conclude an early peace with France. Baxter sees this evidence of d'Estrades infiltration into Amsterdam, dating from 1675, as symptomatic of a complete breach between the Prince and Amsterdam.[59] On the other hand Temple, while accepting that the general mood of the Dutch was for peace and that they would gladly come to terms with France, still believed that the Prince's convictions and loyalty to his allies, would carry the day and keep the Dutch in the war.[60] Yet by January 1677 Temple too began to believe that the Dutch would accept peace at any price - even the loss of Flanders - after he had had lengthy discussions with Fagel and the Prince.[61]

We have seen here how the military financing was closely linked to changing views of the Amsterdammers and the States of Holland. This has shown how support for the Prince's policies had begun to wane to some extent as early as 1673, when he failed to achieve any real military success. But until the peace was made with England in February 1674 and the French had finally been driven back, or had withdrawn from all the Dutch territories except Grave and Maastricht, there

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57. Res. Holl., 24-29 July 1676; G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 31 July 1676.

58. The others were D'Avaux and Colbert.

59. Baxter, *William III*, p. 127.

60. Temple, *Works*, II, pp. 343, 352-3 and 355.

61. *Ibid.*, 384-6 and IV, pp. 373-7.

was enough unity of opinion in favour of continuing the war. However, 1674 saw many changes which led the provincial governments to question more and more the arguments in favour of continuing military actions against France and the events of 1675 were to compound these factors.

These changes were further reflected at the more basic level of the economic structure of administration of excise duties. 1674 saw the introduction of increased tax levels. In March import duties on salt were doubled and by September virtually all import duties had followed suit.[62] In July the tax of the 200th *penningh* had also been doubled which meant that the citizens were now paying a double increase for the war both in direct and indirect taxation, a burden unlikely to be accepted lightly anywhere, even in the Dutch Republic where high tax levels were the norm.[63]

The States of Holland, who paid almost two-thirds of all taxation, were quick to point out that these increased duties were being exacted before interest had been paid on loans for the previous two years.[64] However, at this stage the unhappiness with high tax levels was not directly associated with a desire for peace, although Amsterdam had expressed hopes for an early peace in the summer of 1674, and the theory developed during the previous regime that only peace was really compatible with commercial success continued to dominate Holland politics.[65] Nevertheless a direct recommendation from Fagel to Valckenier that reinforcements be provided for the siege of Grave met with unconditional approval in Amsterdam.[66]

In June 1672 a total ban had been re-imposed on French imports, but throughout 1674 these embargoes were gradually lifted, and although such imports became

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62. Res. Holl., 12 September 1674.

63. *Ibid.*, 21, 28 July 1674.

64. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 14 August 1674.

65. Wagenaar, *Amsterdam*, Vol. I, p. 658.

66. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 9 October 1674.

liable to the same high excise levels, they did in some way compensate for the earlier loss in trade and the diminution of the manufacturing industries during the first two years of the war. Amsterdam's commerce had also been seriously undermined by the massive withdrawal of capital, much of it foreign, after the 1672 invasions,[67] and it was therefore important for the carrying trade in particular to retain as many of the overseas markets as possible and this was dependent on the normal channels of trade being kept open unhindered. To this end Amsterdam saw the neutrality of England after February 1674 as a source of commercial advantage to the English trade, particularly in the East Indies and was therefore concerned in the negotiations of the Marine Treaty with England. They were able to take full advantage not only of Van Beuningen's presence in London as Ambassador, but also in the appointment of Gillis Sautijn, a Director of the *Societeit van Suriname*, and Joan Corver, as two of the six commissioners in London (the other four came from Rotterdam, Enkhuizen, Middleburg and Vlissingen).[68] The major clauses to be argued over were those relating to free access for trade from one enemy port to another. Despite what was in the end a fairly favourable agreement for the Dutch, during the next few years complaints were frequently raised that the English neutrality gave them a trading advantage, an argument seemingly upheld by the dramatic drop in the value of East India Company shares just two months after the conclusion of the treaty.[69] Although there is possibly still much ground to be argued over the relative rise and decline of the English and Dutch in the late seventeenth century, it will be seen that contemporaries believed the war and the English peace were disastrous to Dutch trade.[70]

Amsterdam was becoming increasingly dependent on the manufactures of Leiden

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67. V. Barbour, *Capitalism in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century* (1950), pp. 57-9; Israel, "Amsterdam Stock Exchange", p. 327.

68. P.R.O., SP84/197, f.217.

69. *Ibid.*, f.5: "...the East India Actions are fallen unto 428."

70. See above pp. 94-99 for a fuller discussion on the balance between the Dutch and English trade.

and Haarlem for re-export, and it is noticeable that throughout the mid-1670s Amsterdam, who had been embroiled in bitter disputes with Leiden as recently as 1670 over local issues, frequently supported that town's claim to fairer treatment under taxation, and most particularly in March 1677, when the commercial clauses of the treaty with France were being discussed at Nijmegen.[71] This is the more understandable when it is considered that one of the major markets for Leiden cloths was Turkey, and the losses to the trade through the French blockade of Dutch shipping in the Mediterranean were of a significant level, and therefore once there was a general discontent with the war, it was inevitable that steps should be taken to return to the commercial understandings achieved during the 1660s and the policy of the Wittian regime. The deterioration of the Mediterranean trade was also deepened by the intervention of the English who had been quick to seize the opportunity of taking over the carrying trade while the Dutch ships were still blockaded, and added to fears that the English attitude to both the Dutch and the French had not been changed by the Peace of Westminster.

It is therefore clear that in the six months since the relief of Grave in November 1674 was met with such euphoria and the Prince was seen as the saviour of his country, the mood in Amsterdam was swinging violently against him.[72] Pamphlets began to circulate in vitriolic terms about the Prince and Fagel,[73] and as another English observer wrote to Sir Joseph Williamson:

> "The people in Amsterdam half mad, it is not be believed how strongly the peoples' affections are alienated since that attempt of making the Prince, Duke of Gelderland. This country dayly decayes in politiques and traide and the suffrable taxes make the people

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71. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 15 March 1677.

72. Res. Holl. 24 November 1674; Baxter, *William III*, p. 120: the relief of Grave saw the major threat of the French removed from Dutch territory, and in consequence weakened the motivation for fighting.

73. P.R.O. SP84/199, f.6: "The Arminians, and fifth monarchy men, still continue printing pasquilles against the Prince of Orange, and Pensioner Fagel; Knuttell 11246: *Twee Missieven den Eersten aan eenen goeden Vriend van d'aenstaende ordeelen over Amsterdam, Haarlem, Leyden, Haegh, Holland, Den Tweede aan den Heer Raetpensionaris*, Letters written by Rothe. In the second he refer to Fagel's "*bloedige Handen*"; Baxter, William III, p. 130.

made. If the war last one year more, this land will be ruined..."[74]

The mood expressed by the pamphlets and the general impression of discontent were taken seriously enough for the States of Holland in September 1675 to be persuaded to restate their faith that the Prince was not seeking sovereignty but had the true interest of the Republic at heart.[75]

What were the factors operating against William in 1675? There was certainly resentment against the aspiration to monarchy assumed to be inherent in the settlements in Utrecht, Gelderland and Overijssel, the Gelderland sovereignty issue and the Stuart connection. On the other hand, the continuation and further development of the war, with the ramifications of continued high taxation levels and threats to trade and commerce probably played as important a part as all these. They are of course far more complex to argue than the oft-quoted remark that Amsterdam would rather be subject to French rule than an Orange sovereign.[76] However, there was still some support for the war, principally in Flanders, and in 1675 the war against Sweden was further seen as an unnecessary diminution of the forces for the protection of territorial interests in Flanders. Together with the desire for having a weak buffer between themselves and France, the Dutch were anxious not to have the Flemish commerce restored to the advantage of France and the disadvantage of Amsterdam in particular. But by the end of 1676, the States of Holland by Amsterdam were clamouring for peace at any price, even the cession of virtually all rights in Flanders to the French and the abandonment of Spanish interests.[77] I am reluctant to accept that these claims were meant in good faith, but were more likely to be threats to push the dilatory negotiations at Nijmegen forward, since, as we know, for all the advantages gained by the French out of the peace, the theory of the barrier towns was firmly developed and Flemish trade

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74. P.R.O. SP84/199, f.6.

75. States of Holland *Placaet,* September 1675 (translation) P.R.O., SP84/199. f.149.

76. Temple, *Works,* IV, p. 76.

77. *Ibid,* II, pp. 384-5.

remained totally suppressed.[78]

The point at question here is how and why the Amsterdammers were able to regain the advantage they had lost in 1672 and had continued to forgo as late as January 1675.

Within Amsterdam itself there was a clear realignment, brought about by Valckenier's realisation that he was no longer in total control of the ruling group. The introduction of the *Concept tot Eenigheit,* while in the end succeeding in uniting the regents and strengthening the oligarchy, only did so by concessions made by Valckenier to Hooft.[79]

It can hardly be seen as coincidental that, as the Amsterdam regents became united in purpose, the debates and resolutions in the States of Holland took on a different nature. Throughout 1675 opposition had been expressed regularly to the payment of quotas, impositions of taxes and subsidies to allies, by individual towns often causing delay, but not final withholding of quotas and subsidies.[80] And in 1676 this pattern had taken on a specific shape with the opposition centred on the military requests, while efforts were made to sustain or improve the position of the navy and the fisheries. As we have seen, from January 1676 the emphasis was put on restricting military expenditure while maintaining an effective level of financing for naval and merchant shipping.

At this time the massive gulf between William and Holland became more apparent as the former continued to press for the maintenance of alliances, realising that any resolution of the present hostilities would not mean the end of the causes of such hostilities. The latter believing that the territorial conflicts were no longer their

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78. A. C. Carter, *Neutrality or Commitment. The Evolution of Dutch Foreign Policy 1667-1795* (London, 1975), Chapter 2.

79. See above pp. 142-143.

80. Res. Holl., 24 May 1675; G.A. Haarlem, Minuut notulen, 24 May 1675.

concern, but merely an unnecessary drain on resources by demands for subsidies, desired nothing more than a return to the situation operating after the Treaty of 1662 and a reversion to a policy of neutrality.

When on 16 September 1676 the States of Holland, at the instigation of the *raadpensionaris*, requested the statement of income outstanding on the tax of the 200th *penningh*,[81] this reflected the rising discontent with higher war taxation, and although it was agreed that payments should be made in full, the failure of the siege of Maastricht, in the same month was particularly severely felt.[82] As one of Temple's staff at The Hague, Roger Meredith, observed:

> "The discontents are great here upon this ill success and at Amsterdam especially the discourses are said to be very licentious, that city having advanced a million for the expence of the siege."[83]

From this time onwards, the States of Holland assumed a more unified policy reflecting a greater unity among its members. The quotas for 1677 were agreed without individual dissension, but the approval was qualified by a request that the peace negotiations be pursued vigorously and a refusal to grant further subsidies to the allies,[84] and in several cases the quotas were actually reduced by between twelve and a half and sixteen per cent.[85] However, although there was a degree of accord within the States of Holland, in March Amsterdam was complaining that other provinces were not meeting their quotas in full and that "... *haer daer van dispenserenden veele ende verscheyde Persoonen end familien haer buyten deser Provincien*".[86] A few days later Amsterdam was requesting payment of interest for

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81. Appendix VI.

82. Res. Holl., 1, 2, 12 September 1676; November 1676.

83. P.R.O., SP84/199, Meredith to Williamson, 1 December 1676.

84. Res. Holl., 10 December 1676.

85. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 2 March 1677; G.A. Haarlem, Vroedschap Resoluties, 27 December 1677.

86. Res. Holl., 16 March 1677.

the supply of ships to Denmark in 1674.[87]

Throughout the following year attempts were made to make the Prince more accountable for expenditure and, in 1678, the release of monies was made dependent on the Prince providing realistic formulae for the reduction of troops once hostilities had ended together with demands for urgent prosecution of the peace negotiations.[88]

Observers began to note throughout 1677 that the *raadpensionaris*, who in 1676 had been prepared to argue strongly for the Prince's cause, was coming to realise that peace was now inevitable and was no longer able to support wholeheartedly the views of the Prince. He appears to have relaxed his grip temporarily on the Holland towns, just as the new found unity in Amsterdam and its reflection in the States of Holland was becoming a more powerful force. It is true that at this time Fagel was troubled by ill-health and was also aware of growing resentment of his power and influence, and that he was due for re-election in 1677.[89] By this time van Beverning, one of the principal peace negotiators, had moved far from the views of both the *raadpensionaris* and the Prince and was pressing for peace on the terms offered by the French going almost as far as Valckenier himself, only stopping realistically at the need for Flemish security; but at this stage even the French were prepared to concede that Flanders needed to be secured and this was by now hardly a major obstacle. All the negotiators and concerned parties were by now quite well aware that the peace was never likely to be more than a truce and the Holland towns were prepared to admit that the Prince of Orange had "made a truer judgement than they had done of the measures they were to expect both from France and England".[90]

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87. *Ibid.*, 24 March 1677.

88. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 19 May 1678; 2 July 1678.

89. Fagel was re-elected on 3 July 1677, Res. Holl., 3 July 1677.

90. Temple, *Works*, II, p. 456.

At this point it is possible to point to further evidence of the difference in values held by Fagel and Valckenier. The former, by nature of his office and close association with the stadholder, of necessity considered the views of the whole Republic, albeit dominated by Holland and his service to the States of that province, whereas the latter even in 1677-78 was unable to exert himself beyond the confines of local politics, even where issues of wider importance were debated. And it was therefore Hooft who went to meet the negotiators as a representative of Amsterdam and who realised that the French terms needed to be tested before being accepted, in opposition to the line taken by Valckenier, who would willingly have conceded all to the French.[91] Nevertheless, political survival was as important to the *raadpensionaris* as it was to Valckenier or, come to that, to the Prince of Orange, and by removing himself one step from the crucial discussion he was safeguarding his reputation with both the Prince and the towns for life after the peace.

The line taken by Van Beuningen at Nijmegen was for the improvement of trade with France and Sweden and, when there was a request for fifteen warships to be sent against the Swedes in the Baltic, Amsterdam's consent could only be obtained if they were equipped solely in Amsterdam.[92] As far as France was concerned Amsterdam was pressing for a return to the favourable trade position agreed in the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1662. The spring of 1677 was concentrated on questions of reductions of moneys already paid and the negotiation of these trade and marine treaties, particularly getting clauses on home manufactures to the most favourable state, and free trade for the important grounds in the fisheries and in the West Indian and Guinea Trade.

There was a concerted objection to the imposition of a new tax on the 200 *penningh*; no longer were the arguments against heavy taxation merely on the grounds that military expenditure was too high, but more and more arguing for the

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91. *Ibid.*, II, p. 455.

92. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 2 March 1677.

advantages of peace and the economic ruin which would soon result from continued warfare.[93] And in July they resolved to make it clear that anything negotiated secretly regarding the peace which pertained to Amsterdam should first have the consent of the burgomasters.[94]

Once again in the late summer and autumn of 1677, Amsterdam tackled the questions of duties on imports. In October the question of the security of shipping after the war was being addressed. It was resolved that the aim should be for ships to the West Indies to be escorted and financed by the Admiralties, a continuation of the policy that the Admiralties should be made to meet as much expenditure as could possibly be made from their coffers.[95] This policy was restated in December when Amsterdam was trying to impose rules on the use of the 200 *penningh* again, restricting it to *lands milities*, believing that naval funding should come from the Admiralties.[96] On 2 January Witsen was talking to Fagel about the disputes with the Admiralties. This was a prelude to the role he was to take on in 1679 as intermediary working with the *raadpensionaris* between the Prince of Orange and Amsterdam. Meanwhile, threats against quotas in 1678, with the impending peace were to become a weapon against the Prince, and when the question of non-payment of soldiers also came up, a compromise was struck between opposition to military expenditure and the rights of the soldiers to receive their pay, with payments being agreed on a month-to-month basis.[97]

On 2 April the first major steps were taken to restore normal trade routes with a free passage for those of the enemy still in the Netherlands through Gent and the

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93. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed.,19 July 1677.

94. *Ibid.*, 27 July 1677.

95. *Ibid.*, 12 October 1677. The issue at Tobago continued to be important after peace with France had been concluded in Europe.

96. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 20 December 1677.

97. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 2 and 26 July 1678.

restoration of normal trading with Gent.[98] A week later normal trading was restored in the North Sea and the Greenland trade.[99]

In the peace negotiations with France, Amsterdam put forward its well-known view that:

> "*de commercie en navigatie deser landen synde de eenigsten syl en subsistence van de Staet, sedert het begin van de oorlogh seer verminst en tot Engeland en ander nabeurge plaetse voor en groot gedeelt over gegaen was ook by consummatie van de oorlog*, etc."

and consent to the 200 penningh was only given on the understanding that peace was imminent.[100] By now the various merchant groups were pressing for reductions in tariffs and all other means of making trading easier, perhaps most urgent among them the wine merchants, who had long been maintaining that such taxes were an infringement of ancient practices.[101]

The most obvious reason why the internal balance had shifted in 1677 rather than 1675 was that the war was two years older and the consequent increase in tax burden, loss of trade, growing disillusionment with the allies and an awareness that the French could never be beaten, only contained - with the help of an unpopular alliance - were all stronger arguments than they had been in 1675. And the failure of the siege of Maastricht from July to September 1676 finally dispelled any pretensions William had as an effective general of a strong military alliance.

1678 saw the obvious divisions of interests between the peace negotiators, held up as far as Amsterdam was concerned by the Prince's intransigence over the Spanish Netherlands and the commercial interest in preparing for peace and absolutely resolved on keeping military expenditure down and, if possible, getting refunds on

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98. *Ibid.*, 2 April 1678.

99. *Ibid.*, 11 August 1678.

100. Ibid., 25 April 1678.

101. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 27 April.

quotas already paid.[102] The burgomasters now made a concerted statement that peace was essential to restore the life blood of the state to its full vigour and were prepared to support negotiations directly with the Prince. The unity of Amsterdam shines through these resolution of May to July 1678, with full blown statements of principles and intent.[103]

By July Amsterdam was more cooperative when it became obvious that they were going to gain their point and that peace would be made with France and Sweden without the full consent of the allies. They raised few queries on the treaties beyond matters of form on the navigation and commerce clauses,[104] in addition to their agreement to approve provisionally military expenditure on a month-to-month basis. The principal interpretation of Amsterdam's views over treaty negotiations, apart from the minor matters of commercial interest was left in the hands of the appointed negotiators in The Hague.

Throughout August and September the business of ratifying the treaties naturally predominated (the peace being made controversially on 14 August 1678),[105] one of the major problems being the unfavourable trade balance created by French subsidies to Sweden.

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[102]. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 11 May 1678.

[103]. The burgomasters were formally sending instructions to van Beuningen and requesting van Beverning to put pressure on England to intervene over the security of Flanders, G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed, 25 April 1678, but by now Hooft's role as representative burgomaster at Nijmegen was becoming more prominent and influential, Temple, *Works*, II, p. 445, "Monsieur Hooft proposing... to make a trial and judgement of the sincerity of France... by their evacuating the Spanish towns and without it to continue the war, he carried his point... in spite of Valkenier"; and G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed, 22 July 1678

[104]. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed, 21 July 1678. It was essential to reach "*de reciproque liberteit ende vrijheid van de commercie*" with Sweden, and a month later negotiations were working towards restoration of toll levels to those operating during the Triple Alliance period of 1668, *ibid.*, 23 August 1678.

[105]. The issues surrounding the Peace of Nijmegen 1678 are fully discussed in *The Peace of Nijmegen 1676-1678/9*, International Congress of the Tricentennial Nijmegen 14-16 September 1978, J.A.H. Bots, ed. (Amsterdam, 1980), with the tensions within the Dutch Republic highlighted in Roorda's contribution, "The Peace of Nijmegen, the end of a particular period in Dutch History", pp. 20-24.

Amsterdam and States Policy: 1679-84

By the autumn there was a change in mood and the impression given by the resolutions of October and November 1678 is that having achieved their objectives over the peace with such united effort, Amsterdam was not altogether certain what her objectives during the peace were, apart from restoring normality with the city and lowering military expenditure. A fairly large-scale repair of old bridges and building of new bridges were put in hand together with funds provided for the immediate defences of the city at the Haarlemmer and Leidsepoorten,[106] but when it came to the general defence of the states, Amsterdam was not so happy and wanted to refer back to the Union of Utrecht and question the needs of the army.[107]

This period immediately after the peace until the end of 1679 is seen generally as that during which Valckenier reigned supreme in Amsterdam and yet there is something of an intimation of his decline [no-one foretelling his death] within the papers available. The relative lack of involvement of Valckenier in the peace negotiations had demonstrated that the interests of the city could be successfully prosecuted without him. The death of Valckenier's man Pancras, his replacement on the *Gecommiteerde Raad* by the seasoned Boreel, newly returned from ambassadorial duties in England, and the beginning of the domination of committees by the moderates Hudde and Witsen[108] support the argument that others were now asserting themselves. Approval was given to the 1679 *Staat van Oorlog* and other minor military expenditure with less equivocation,[109] although in February Amsterdam was reiterating to Fagel their opinion on the deficiencies of the peace treaty and stating firmly their belief in the sovereignty of the states.[110]

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106. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 15 October 1678.

107. *Ibid.*, 22 November 1678.

108. See Appendix VI.

109. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 12, 29, December and 3 January 1679.

110. *Ibid.*, 4 February 1679.

Although very concerned in such matters, immediate attention was given to the protection of shipping to Tobago.[111] Meanwhile steps continued to be taken to restore trading positions with an accord being made with the English West Indian Company and the *V.O.C.* and *W.I.C.* among all the tidying up necessary after the war, that is final agreement of terms of treaties, movement of military hardware etc.[112]

But the main issue at this time was without doubt the size of Amsterdam's contributions expected for the fortifications of Naarden and their reluctance to spend money on what was seen by many as provision for a base for William to perhaps repeat his father's attack on Amsterdam. Witsen was deputed to talk to Fagel and William, a role which he assumed with consummate ease.[113]

But the dissatisfaction with the Prince re-emerged in April with the question of authorising troops of the Duke of Neurenburg to pass through Zutphen with once again a clear statement that it was not up to the Prince to make decisions in such matters but for the sovereign provinces "*is gebleven het regt om over syn territori to laten passeren en repasseren*".[114] However, in April they were prepared to put down a very formal resolution supporting the Prince in his position as stadholder.[115]

One of the more noticeable things about the *vroedschap resoluties* after 1678 is the greater depth they went into, with lengthier reports being made. There was the kind of proliferation of paper which is often associated with greater bureaucracy, and frequently carries the implication that decisions are in fact being concentrated within fewer hands. The role of Witsen, who was one of those reporting from the

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111. *Ibid.*, 20 February 1679; see above p. 222, note 95.

112. *Ibid.*, 29 May 1679.

113. See above pp. 134 and 195.

114. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 1 April 1679.

115. *Ibid.*, 24 April 1679.

committee and one of the principal links between Amsterdam and Fagel and the Prince, is strong evidence for the concentration of the unity of purpose within the regency. Throughout 1679 it was Witsen who was reporting on many diverse matters, but especially the restitution of favourable trading terms in the Baltic, and there is little evidence among his papers that he was reporting solely to Valckenier, rather that he had assumed role of his own, as adviser to the ruling burgomasters. Witsen's role, established in the immediate post-war period, set the scene for the further concentration of effective power within the hands of the ruling burgomasters and their immediate circle in the early 1680s after the death of Valckenier. Gebhard saw Witsen as the direct successor to Valckenier,[116] but it must be recognised that although he may have succeeded him as one of the leading burgomasters, he did follow his practices or his politics. Once Witsen had joined the group of those among whom the burgomastership circulated in the 1680s, his influence continued to increase with domination of both final decision-making and the preliminary reporting work of the committees.

By July 1679 this trend was further confirmed. An organised effort by the States of Holland to regularise taxation on various trades and the *vroedschap* pointedly left all decisions to the burgomasters.[117] During a period when the states, the Prince and the French and English Ambassadors were struggling over the prospect of defensive alliances, two issues began to take up more and more time in the *vroedschap*, where little reference was made to foreign policy, although it was receiving major attention from Fagel and his agents, who were keeping a close eye on D'Avaux and other French operators in Amsterdam. These other matters were the advantages to be reaped from the Algerian slave trade and the status of the colony at Surinam.[118]

There is further evidence of a movement away from the involvement in foreign

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[116]. Gebhard, *Witsen*, p. 165.

[117]. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 4 July 1679.

[118]. See above pp. 99-100.

policy with a proliferation of more parochial matters, perhaps an inevitable result of the peace such as the payment of *fl.*1,000 to Andrei Backer for a picture for the entrance to the *schepen kamer* and the consent to one Silvert Colman retaining his burger rights in Amsterdam while holding his post of professor of law at Leiden University.

The general air of tidying up went on throughout 1679 with various adjustments being made to individual contributions,[119] and in particular, attention being paid to those finances which related either to expenditure by the Prince or his income before additional expenditure was approved. For example on 16 October when considering a States of Holland resolution for back pay for infantry and cavalry this was followed with a statement of the city's finances showing interest due on loans made during the war. And again on 26 December, when there was a request for a further *fl.*400,000 for the Prince the *vroedschap* felt it right to examine in detail the rents paid from Holland on the Prince's properties during the year amounting to some *fl.*500,000 including interest.[120]

This attendance to good housekeeping was made plain in early January 1680 during the discussion on the *Staat van Oorlog* when Amsterdam resolved to oppose any increase in military expenditure during the time of peace but couched their resolution to be passed to the States of Holland as hoping for a reasonable conclusion.[121] Unusually the *Staat van Oorlog* was still being debated in February, and in March firm resistance was made against additional expenditure joined by Haarlem, Delft, Alkmaar, Edam and Purmerend.[122]

At this time there was a perceptible reduction in tariffs and interest rates. In

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[119]. For example, see G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 20 November 1679.

[120]. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed, 18 and 26 December 1679. At *fl.*115,200 Amsterdam's payments were three times that paid by any other town.

[121]. *Ibid.*, 9 January 1680.

[122]. *Ibid.*., 12 March 1680.

October 1679 all rent interest was reduced from four to three and a half per cent;[123] in January 1680 the tax on beer was reduced by a third and in February a loan to the administrators of the almshouses was made at three and a half rather than four per cent.[124]

The first half of 1680 was dominated by the issues relating to taxation and military expenditure, with the involvement of the senior members in lengthy committee work, but in June consent was finally given to the payment of the 200 *penningh*.[125]

In July there was a change of personnel in Amsterdam. Whereas for five years van den Bosch had been pensionary, this post now fell into the hands of Jakob Hop who, with his father, had been excluded from service by Valckenier's displeasure since 1675. By 1682 Jakob Hop was to be one of the most active political servants of Amsterdam and, as the French ambassador, D'Avaux's main contact with the *vroedschap* often in secret. As we have already seen, in the late 1680s he made a smooth transition to the service of the Prince.[126]

Throughout this period, although the *vroedschap* was rather silent on discussions about alliances leaving them to the secret negotiations with D'Avaux and the burgomasters and their representatives at The Hague, the mood of Amsterdam is still evident. There was a constant awareness of the need to keep French goods at artificially high prices, for example on 21 July 1682 a resolution was passed that

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123. *Ibid.*, 16 October 1679. On the same day a report was made on interest accrued by the city during the war, totalling over *fl.*3m, *ibid.*, 22 January and 20 February 1680.

124. *Ibid.*, 22 January and 20 February 1680.

125. See Appendix VI, and G.A. Amsterdam, Res Vroed., 5 June 1680. As early as the end of 1679 the burgomasters had firmly stated that Amsterdam could not countenance any increase in military expenditure in time of peace, G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 9 January 1680 quoting in full a twenty page report from the "*Secret Notulen van Burgemeesteren*".

126. A.R.H. Fagel 1985, 19 January, 1682.

no French wine should be sold for less than *"6 stuyvers de pint"*,[127] but there was a general accord with Boreel's views from Paris that an alliance with France would be of the greatest advantage.[128] With the main questions under discussion still taxation and prices the need for security for trade was naturally a contingent priority and in August 1680 a resolution was passed pressing for the continuation of warships accompanying convoys.[129] In these circumstances it is not therefore very surprising that in April 1682 when the case for arming against France was in the offing, Amsterdam considered sending its own warships against the French interference in Algeria, while continuing pressing strongly the case for peace with France in the States.[130]

By the end of 1680 all the work on tax and prices seemed to have had an effect with a non-controversial request for continuation of tax levels for 1681 and support for maritime expenditure agreed without long debate,[131] followed by an uncontested consent to a supplementary request for the *Staat van Oorlog* of *fl.*180,000, and on 9 December consent being given to undertake repairs to fortifications throughout the province.[132] The only qualification made here was that of full accountability, no doubt a merely formal request. It could be said that during 1680 the new group in Amsterdam were working at all these financial matters and differences with the Prince over contributions and, on the death of Valckenier, began to pursue this moderate line more overtly. The speed with which the transition from the confrontational and divisive policies operating during Valckenier's lifetime to the more united moderate line took place demonstrates just how frail and illusory the true force of his power was. On the other hand, the fact that the other able and

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[127]. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 21 July 1682.

[128]. *Ibid.*, 8 September 1679.

[129]. *Ibid.*, 21 August 1680.

[130]. *Ibid.*, 16 April 1682.

[131]. *Ibid.*., 18/19 November 1680.

[132]. *Ibid.*, 2 December 1680.

influential regents did have to wait for his death before they could assert themselves fully, does also demonstrate the force of the personality of the one man. In the later 1670s the "group in waiting" were not of course in any way dependent on Valckenier's patronage or wealth; they had sufficient power, wealth and influence of their own.[133] Therefore they must have had some respect for his political skills and his potential for influencing the progress of policy, even if thwarted. This respect may have dated back to his manipulation of events from 1671 to 1674, and the successes of his opponents from 1675 to 1677 were seen in the context of the external pressures on the regency to form a coherent policy for the overall interest of the city. D'Avaux was unhappy about the death of Valckenier in 1680 as he believed he was the only member of the regency who would ensure that Amsterdam would remain united in favour of the French alliance.[134] Despite the breach between the Prince and van Beuningen, it was well-known that the latter was less likely to forward the interests of France and was still closely involved in foreign policy discussions with Fagel. But D'Avaux's agents in both Rotterdam and Amsterdam assured him that there would be moves towards unity within the city.[135]

In 1681 and 1682, before the Luxemburg issue caused massive rethinking, business was devoted to day-to-day affairs in Amsterdam. Much of the activity was concerned with treatment of religious and political refugees, not only Huguenots from France, but also Portuguese and German Jews. This open policy coincided

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[133]. Of particular note is the relationship between Hudde and his nephew, Witsen. The former's administrative and intellectual strengths have been discussed, above p. 123, but his role before the emergence of Witsen as a leading member of the regency in the 1680s was based on his administrative abilities. After 1680 his correspondence with Witsen, Opmeer and Jakob Hop in particular became far more political, see for example, G.A. Amsterdam, Collectie Hudde, 29 March 1681, Hop to Hudde, 22 March 1681, Opmeer to Hudde, 26 March 1681, Hudde to Witsen and, G.A. Amsterdam, Collectie Witsen, 16 June 1682, Hudde to Witsen. By 1684 Hudde was one of van Beuningen's principal correspondents over the troops crisis. The consensus type of political organisation developing in Amsterdam after 1680 seems to have suited Hudde rather than the individual and factional disputes of the 1670s.

[134]. D'Avaux, *Négociations*, p. 108.

[135]. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

with the English Exclusion Crisis and the Prince's declaration that any future European conflict would be for the religious freedom of the protestant peoples. Thus even before Amsterdam was called on to support aggression against France, which she was unable to see her way to do, the groundwork was being prepared for the change which would be inevitable in 1685. There is something contradictory in Amsterdam's reluctance to accept any other arguments against a pro-French policy. It clearly shows how much they felt they had been damaged by the earlier war, that prevention of another conflict at all costs was the ruling theory. In 1683 they were still arguing that any military undertaking would impose serious restrictions on trade and quoted to Fagel the problems being encountered in the Baltic with Danish ships, which to their mind was a far more urgent problem than French aggression in Luxemburg.[136]

The summer of 1681 had been relatively quiet, with more settlement of outstanding taxation questions and arrears of military payments, and the continued interest in the long distance trade regulations. Differences between Holland and Zeeland began to predominate both in the East Indies and nearer home with disputes over changes imposed on the internal import of Friesland peat to Holland, and the question of favourable terms for trading through the Sound. This was just as negotiations were taking place with Zeeland over the proposed takeover of the administration of Surinam, after dominating the committee work of the *vroedschap* for several months. Early in 1682, before the troubles of later in the year began, there was a continuation of rationalisation of trading privileges with attempts to improve the Dutch position in the Baltic by working on the Danish tolls;[137] and with reductions of the taxes on exports of grain and tobacco through Amsterdam warehouses. Municipal improvements continued mainly on the waterways to facilitate the passage for shipping.[138] Concurrently in December 1681 Friesland

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136. Exceptionally, resistance was still being made to the *Staat van Oorlog* for 1683 as late as 4 March, which Amsterdam felt did not take full account of the needs of commerce, G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 4 March 1683.

137. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 2 December 1681.

138. *Ibid.*, 8 February 1682.

and Groningen were once more in the centre of interest over the imposition of taxes on commerce. This assertion of rights and independence by these two provinces (and the support they were given by Amsterdam) was indicative of the stance they would later take towards the Prince's actions against France. In July 1682 Haarlem felt driven to quote the Union of Utrecht in support of criticism of Friesland's actions.[139] And in January 1683 the Frieslanders themselves were asking for favourable treatment from Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht in the *Staat van Oorlog*. Naturally enough the autumn of 1682 showed greater interest in foreign affairs, but the dominant theme was still the maintenance of commerce. At this stage, Witsen in his first term as burgomaster, seemed to be taking the upper hand in the administration. It was Witsen who corresponded with Fagel over losses in the slave trade,[140] Witsen who kept a record of all the discussions over the 8,000 men in 1682, and Witsen who supported Pierre Bayle with only occasional reference being made to Hudde as *Magnificaat*.[141]

But despite the greater apparent involvement of the *vroedschap* committees in discussion, it is clear that most of the major decisions about Amsterdam's policy on the 8,000 men were dealt with by the burgomasters' direct instructions to their deputies in The Hague.

In 1683-84, however, much fuller consultation took place within the regular meetings of the *vroedschap*. Resistance to militarism followed the prevarication over the *Staat van Oorlog* in July 1683 when objections were raised to requests for equipping twelve warships, since the fleet "*soo groot ende machtig in de Zee waren*".[142] And when the request for further men was formally made in the autumn support from Leiden, Delft "*en sodanige andere*" in opposition was welcomed by

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[139]. *Ibid.*, 20 July 1682.

[140]. G.A. Amsterdam, Collectie Witsen, Witsen to Fagel (undated, but filed with 1681 papers and reflecting issues current at that time, "*lossen der slaven*", etc.

[141]. Gebhard, *Witsen*, p. 196; G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 16 January 1683.

[142]. G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 14 July 1683.

the *vroedschap*.[143] The intensity of activity and discussions increased throughout the winter of 1683-84, firstly centering around the visit of the Prince to Amsterdam in November 1683,[144] then around the publication of D'Avaux's intercepted letters in February 1684, and finally in April on the support Amsterdam could expect from Friesland.[145]

Quite clearly, the crisis of 1683-84 was, in the eyes of the Amsterdammers, equal to that of 1650 or 1672, and required unity of purpose. For the burgomasters to act without the full co-operation and knowledge of the whole regency would not have been politcally wise. Any disunity amongst the leading regents that there was, was not the result of factional interest, but was over the political ideology of van Beuningen. In this way the opposition to William in 1683-84 was far more coherent than support for his restoration in 1672, or the push for peace in opposition to his will in 1676-78.

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143. *Ibid.*, 16 Deptember 1683. See also above p. 187.

144. G.A. Amsterdam, 16 November 1683, at which lengthy details of the arrangements, including the seating plan, were considered.

145. *Ibid.*, 6 April 1684.

Chapter 10
Conclusion

At the end of 1688 Amsterdam was fully prepared to support the Prince of Orange in his expedition to England, with the subsidiary but eventually more critical intention of pursuing his crusade against Louis XIV. The reasons for the change of heart in the city's attitude to the Prince's policy and his use of Dutch military resources for this adventure were well-rehearsed in the Glorious Revolution tricentennial conferences and publications in 1988-89. The simplistic nature of the tradition of crediting Amsterdam with a high moral attitude against the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes aligned with their need for the economic security was successfully exposed and a more realistic understanding of the far more complex dynamics working within the city and its relations with the Prince was rebuilt.[1]

That Amsterdam was able to establish a successful working relationship with the Prince for this enterprise has its roots in the previous fifteen years of the stadholdership of William III. These years had not been free of tensions and incident, and the relationship between the stadholder and the leading city had matured throughout a series of tensions and compromises which increased in severity throughout the 1670s and early 1680s. From the guarded co-operation of the 1672-74 period to the tensions of the push for peace from 1675 to 1678, through the "betrayal" of the States commitment to its allies and the policies of the Prince, to the friction of 1682 and the outright quarrel of 1684, somehow there was always just enough common concern for the "interest of state" to avoid declared conflict.

The breach of 1684 may have left the Prince and Amsterdam in two extreme positions, but there always remained some potential channel of communication open to them to attempt to search for a common purpose. And, in the last resort, if the common purpose were serious enough, both parties were prepared to co-operate

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1. Israel, "The Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution", pp. 109-119.

despite the manifest differences between their motivation and interest. This study has shown that the internal political structures of the Dutch Republic - in this case the city of Amsterdam and the office of *raadpensionaris* in the 1670s and 1680s - were such that the security of the states and the bases of that security, as interpreted by the different participants, were treated as paramount.

It is very difficult to argue that, collectively, any governing body comprises more or less able politicians, and yet the application of reason does appear to have determined the actions of those operating during this period. Contemporary and historical consensus agreed that De Witt was a very successful politician, and yet he was unable to build bridges with either individuals, as in the case of his breach with van Beuningen, or popular movements, as in the case of the local pressures which led to his eventual fall. Neither William II nor those with whom he came into conflict were able or willing to make compromises. Nevertheless, in many ways, the Amsterdam regency of the 1670s and 1680s and William III were their direct heirs and were steeped in the ideologies and culture of their heritage. But throughout their stormy relationship, even the most severe breaches did not finally close the door to compromise and potential for future co-operation.

The previous chapters have attempted to explain why the development of this relationship was so different from that of their predecessors. The reasons have of course been drawn from both the internal structure and politics of the Dutch Republic and the changing international scene. This study has avoided structured historical theories, such as the "General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century", but has drawn on those based on ideologies of the "interest of state". The former restrict the historian to selecting evidence which contributes to the theory, contradictions being either sidelined or explained away as individual idiosyncrasies. The latter allow for change, development and the influence of ideas and responses to circumstances.

The seventeenth century provided the ideal circumstances for the evolution of ideas of state, and the Dutch Republic the almost perfect setting for debate of them. Its

ruling class were closely involved in these debates and in their practical application. The frequency of war and the consequent explosion of diplomatic activity leading to changing alliances and leagues, took place at the same time as the mercantile world and economic competition expanded, and a culture of religious and philosophical debate began to co-exist with rigid conformity. This was the background within which the Dutch Republic had reached its Golden Age, and had become a full and leading participant. At the centre was the city of Amsterdam.

The diplomacy of the later seventeenth century continued to exploit interest groups within the principal participant states and institutions. And influence and interest were the powerful tools which the Amsterdammers were able to use to gain their own ends. But if through them they were able to impose limitations on the stadholder, other influences imposed limitations on them. The constituents of their own regent class reflected a wide variety of interest and influence which mirrored that operating throughout the States of Holland and other parts of the republic. Popular reaction and external pressures had forced them to compromise in 1672 and for the next twelve years they never forgot that. Constitutionally the role of the stadholder was strengthened by the political awareness of William III. He too had learnt some of the lessons of the past and knew where his strength lay.

The foreign policy of the United Provinces was not the result of the consultations through the official, cumbersome decision-making processes; it was a series of compromises, emergency decisions, opportunist actions, and more likely a shortcircuiting of the official processes. Ultimate decision-making on military expenditure rested with the States General, but policy was more than decisions to become involved in military exploits, and much rested with those commissioned to act for the States or the Prince as official or unofficial diplomats. It was therefore at the formative stage that the influence of those closely involved at whatever level became critical. Much of the history of the relationship between Amsterdam and the Prince of Orange in the last quarter of the seventeenth century is in this way an analysis of the formation of the foreign policy of the Dutch Republic, however far

removed it was at times from the official channels leading to approval by the States General. But it is not the whole picture of the formation of foreign policy; other influences and interests were at work as well, although closer analysis has shown that the interests of both the major participants (that is, the Prince and Amsterdam) more often than not infiltrated most critical parts of the Republic's government. Hence the role of Amsterdammers in the affairs of Friesland and Groningen, its weighting in the chambers of the major trading companies, its paternalistic intervention in religious or civic disputes in smaller towns and other provinces, the estates of regents in the inland provinces and their consequent influence over their local affairs. The list is endless.

The influence of the Prince of Orange also reached far into the politics of the States, through the exercise of patronage, the assertion of control over the three provinces readmitted to the Union after the withdrawal of the French in 1674 and 1675, influence in the ridderschap, the international prestige attached to a Prince of royal descent and, not least, the identification of the non-regent classes with the Orangist cause. Most importantly for this discussion, however, was his close relationship with De Witt's successor as *raadpensionaris.* The change from his predecessors' dependence on a small group of, mainly aristocratic, supporters to a working relationship with the principal office holder in the States of Holland, who also had an important functional role as *griffier* to the States General, may hold the key to the success of the compromises reached with Amsterdam. This is not to say that William III did not listen to the advice of his noble friends, but he was able to listen to it within a clear comprehension of the reality of the exercise of power in the States.

Amsterdam's attitude to foreign policy was unpredictable and changing throughout the period. This was as much to do with the internal politics of Amsterdam and the ebbs and flows of faction, party and individual interest as with the larger issues of city, state and republic. We have seen in chapter 5 how the determination of economic policy was very much a reactive affair, sometimes to large-scale trends, such as the growing involvement of France in the Atlantic trade, sometimes to

smaller issues of tariffs on French goods brought through the inland provinces. This has also reinforced the argument that economic and foreign policy were inextricably linked within the minds of those influencing decisions in the Dutch Republic in the late seventeenth century. And, to go further, it can be argued that since that period it has been unrealistic to separate the study of economic and political history (or any of the subsidiary strands of history). This thesis has been approached from the more traditional political perspective but the primary evidence has frequently been that which would contribute to an economic study and the tools and work of the economic historian have been invaluable in defining the argument.

By examining the activities of Amsterdam in this way there are some interesting conclusions to be drawn. To deal with the earlier period (1672-78) first; that there was considerable jostling for power and place has to be accepted and yet Amsterdam managed to sustain a fairly consistent policy reflected in the actions taken by van Beuningen, who was seen by the Prince as the personification of the Amsterdam administration. A partly biographical study like Franken's is naturally bound to put the emphasis on the activities of the one man, but time and again he was acting on the lines of the resolutions from the *vroedschap*, often on direct instructions from them, which would seem to suggest that either the burgomasters were in control of policy decisions among the thirty-six members or were prepared to accept their advices. At a period when all were vulnerable, the latter is probably the more accurate assumption. However up to 1677 at least, by when the Prince was getting exasperated with van Beuningen and the recalcitrance of Amsterdam, the main channel of communications was between Fagel and Valckenier or their representatives, but thereafter this line seems to break down.

Rather than take this argument further, I will briefly draw conclusions about the period after the death of Valckenier in 1680. The Prince and his advisers did not appear to have made much allowance for changes in Amsterdam; to them the role of van Beuningen as Amsterdam's spokesman was unchanged (even though the relations between him and The Prince and Fagel had deteriorated). The Prince had had a working relationship with Witsen for several years, and yet even with the

breach of 1684 it was van Beuningen's role that assumed importance with the Prince, or at least was seen by historians to have done so.

During these years Amsterdam sustained a consistent policy but, in the latter part, it was based on an unforced unity by the acquiescence of the majority in the decisions of the minority, whose major problem was dealing with the vagaries, as well as benefiting from, the experience of van Beuningen.

We have seen that dominating these policies was the need to restore Amsterdam's trade to its former status in relation to France and England, to continue to assert her dominance overseas where possible, not only over foreign, but also home competitors and in order to do this to apply the principles of sound local financial administration and welfare. By the late 1670s many of the leading members of the *vroedschap* were directors of the *V.O.C.*, and although there was only one director of the new *W.I.C.* until 1679 - Scott - he played an important part in determining policy within the workings of the *vroedschap*.

Amsterdam could not of course ignore foreign policy, but in the mid-1670s she was prepared to state that it was not a sound basis for the security of the State and, in 1684, to go even further and abdicate from active participation in foreign policy decisions. Yet within a very few years Amsterdam was once again playing a critically important role in foreign policy; the regents were sufficiently convinced by the needs of the 1688 crisis to be able to respond positively to the Prince's requests for support for what in many respects was the archetypical dynastic and militaristic enterprise.

There are of course limitations to a study of this kind, which is putting the formation of the foreign policy of one state within the context of international issues, but without a detailed examination of those issues from the point of view of the other interested parties. Assumptions therefore have to be made about the value of researches by other historians who have studied the wider context. This exposes the writer to greater risks than if the study had dealt solely with, say, the

structure of the ruling class in Amsterdam, with only passing allusion made to the external influences which impacted on the regents. However, the challenge of seeking answers to the wider questions of European history within a detailed study of an important participant in that history, in this case the city of Amsterdam, produces a far deeper understanding of more than just the structure of the city government or the nature of international relations. It gives the researcher the opportunity of developing a fuller understanding of the nature of the later seventeenth century and gives the angle of the study a clearer perspective and context.

Dependence on the work of others could have had an undue influence on the interpretations within the thesis and increased the risk of it becoming a critical study of the extant works. This problem was faced squarely from the outset and the use of recent (and less recent) relevant works, although of course being used for basic contextual background, was primarily as a source of discovering the gaps in historical research of a period which has become obscured between the first stadholderless period and studies of the Dutch Golden Age, and the enterprise of the Glorious Revolution and the French war. In this way it is in very small part a critical analysis of the secondary sources, but not a criticism of them. What has been highlighted is the lack of in-depth secondary sources on the correlation between the internal structures and the determination of policy.

The primary source material was not waiting to be discovered. It was all well-known, generally well-catalogued and had previously been well-sifted. The purposes to which it had been put were different, and much had been discarded as irrelevant to those purposes, but it was unlikely that the current study would find much new material.

The extensive use made of the extant correspondence between Valckenier and Van Beuningen by Franken and of Witsen by Gebhard have contributed fully to our knowledge of the respective roles of these leading regents. The value of these studies to this thesis cannot be overestimated, but once again it is what they have

omitted and their lamentations at these omissions, that are being looked at here, albeit in the context of thin primary sources. There is a case for arguing that what should perhaps be attempted is full research into the correspondence of Valckenier for its own sake, rather than as one of the principal correspondents of other leading regents and statesmen. This would be useful if the aim was to produce a critical biography of Valckenier, but would be a less effective vehicle for explaining the full relationship between Amsterdam and the central States organisation and the Prince of Orange in the 1670s and 1680s.

At the beginning of this study two questions were posed.[2] These questions have become refined into a study of the relationship between the two most powerful interests in the Dutch Republic, the stadholder and the city of Amsterdam. In searching for answers to the wider questions raised it has become clear that the overriding interest of the majority of the regents of Amsterdam, was not the exercise of power for its own sake, but the influence of political power for their more fundamental interests of commercial superiority and wealth and the freedom to pursue these within an city environment over which they had almost total control. Subsidiary to this main aim were the individual interests of the leading participants.

Therefore the key to the argument has been the motivation of those whose influence, or willingness to agree to financing, finally determined the policies of the States. Motivation is rarely single-minded, but may be a mixture of ideology, power and wealth. Ideology may be the cloak under which religious beliefs or prejudices flourish; it may be informed by political and economic theories; or it may emerge through a rational analysis of contemporary needs. The desire for power may be at the individual level or may be influenced by territorialism or dynasticism. Wealth can be sought equally for the individual, the family or the state.

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2. See above p. 12.

One of the main strands of the argument has rested on an analysis of the contribution of the individual in the city government of Amsterdam and in the service of the Prince and the States. This poses a fundamental question about the contribution of the individual to the progress of history. This is not the place to rehearse the arguments about causation, determinism and the role of "great men" in history, but the author has clearly, with eyes open, taken the path that leads to the conclusion that the role of the individual cannot be discounted. This does not claim that the individual is paramount; they cannot operate in isolation. The study of history is the study of societies, communities and states and their interrelation. We have seen that, however dominant or isolated an individual is, they have to operate within a group of some kind. So the importance of a Valckenier or a van Beuningen in the politics of Amsterdam is only as great as that which the larger group will allow. The make-up of the larger group, all its individual components, will make it unique and establish its own importance in the next stage of decision-making.

Autocratic and absolutist power can be defined and analysed, but it depends on support, whether willing or coerced, and it is clear to any rational student of humankind that in any such regime the motivations of those supporting the ultimate leader may be very varied. Some may be operating solely through self-preservation, others through ambition and greed. But whatever the motivation, their presence is indispensable to the leader. When it is lost, the regime becomes fragile and eventually succumbs.

The aim here has therefore been to show how the individual worked within the system pertaining in the Dutch Republic in the late seventeenth century to influence and determine foreign policy. The study has not denied theories of trends, but has concentrated on the human side of them. Thus, for example, the secularisation of Amsterdam politics is not considered solely from a municipal reaction to the changing religious, political and economic circumstances, but is also considered from the point of view of the individual and his own factional and family interest.

By asking specific questions about status, relationships and influence within the Amsterdam regency, it has been possible to determine that the power of Valckenier was not as complete as might at first appear. When he had power and control, he did exercise it with the appearance of complete confidence, but he was constantly aware of the need to ensure that the base for such actions was secure. At times he was walking a tight-rope and in 1675-76 he had to seek support from those whom he would have preferred to exclude from power-sharing. The most prominent among those was Hooft, who emerges from the shadows as a republican keeping his wise counsel, into a shrewd politician who continued to exercise his influence despite his apparent withdrawal after 1672.

The compromises arrived at between Amsterdam and the Prince were often the result of an ultimate common cause which may have had widely divergent foundations: the known level of external risks and pressures, and a rational perception of the basis for the strength of both city and Prince. That such compromises were seen as essential to both sustains the argument that Amsterdam had accepted in February 1674,[3] with the confirmation of the status of the Prince, that the role of stadholder was a crucial part of the government of the Dutch Republic, and that the Prince understood quite clearly how best to preserve that status. What this study has also shown is that both were quite determined to push the other as far as possible within the well-understood constraints, where they believed their interpretations of the interests of state were the best justified.

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3. Reaffirmed in April 1679, see above p. 226.

Figure 1



Figuren getreckenuyt de oraties an de Professor L. Wolsog *en over syn droom en de uytleggingе van die selve gedaen inde hoogescheele ten Amsterdam op den 11den van Lou maent na des aerts hertants geboortestent het 1674ste jaere* (Atlas Van Stolk, no. 2570, 1–4)

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Figure 2

Fabel van de Koeyen, de Herder, en de Wolf, (Atlas van Stolk, no. 2705)

Appendix I

The Amsterdam *Vroedschap* 1672-1684

APPELMAN, Jean (1608-94), Koopman *(Elias 207)*; **Member** 1672-94; **NOMINATED 15.9.72**
Address: Singel "in de Roos"
Quota 1674: *fl.*118,000

BACKER, Dr. Willem (1608-86) *(Elias 203);* **Member** 1670-72; **REMOVED 10.9.72**
Address: Binnen Amstel
1674 quota: *fl.*110,000

BACKER, Cornelis (1633-81) *(Elias 183)*; **Member** 1658-81; Director **VOC** 1662
Address: Heerengracht bij de Utrechtschestraat
Hofstede Nijssenburch onder Overveen
1674 quota: *fl.*200,000

BECKER, Hendrick (1621-88), Reeder ter walvischvangd *(Elias 209);* **Member** 1672-88; **NOMINATED 15.9.72**; Director **VOC** 1671
Address: Heerengracht bij de Leidschestraat
1674 quota: *fl.*117,000

BLAEU, Dr Joan (1596-73), Printer and Publisher *(Elias 163)*; **Member** 1651-72 **REMOVED 10.9.72**
Address: (1) Bloemengracht; (2) Gravenstraat achter de Nieuwe Kerk
1674 quota: *fl.*355,000

BLOM, Dirck (1632- ?) *(Elias 214)*; **Member** 1672-79; **NOMINATED 15.9.72**; Batavia 1679
Address: 't Nieuwe Waalseiland
1674 quota:

BONTEMANTEL, Hans (1613-88), Koopman *(Elias 171);* **Member** 1653-72 **REMOVED 10.9.72**; Director **WIC** 1654
Address: Keizersgracht nast "de Wallens" over the Groenlandsche Pakhuizen
1674 quota:

BOREEL, Jacob, Ridder, Vrijheer van Dijnbeek, St Aecht en Meeresteyn (dates) *(Elias 200)*; **Member** 1668-97; **Burgomaster** 1691,93,95,97; **Gecommitteerde Raad** 1680; Ambassador **Russia** 1664; Extraordinary Envoy **Brussels** March-June 1678; Extraordinary Ambassador **France** 1678-80; Director **Societeit van Suriname** 1689
Address: Heerengracht bij de Leidsegracht
't Huis Meesteynen onder Velsen
1674 quota:

BORS, Gerard (later Bors van Waveren) (1630-93) *(Elias 211)*; **Member** 1672-93; **NOMINATED 15.9.72**; **Burgomaster** 1683,85,87,89,92; Director **VOC** 1679
Address: Singel bij de brouwerij "de Swaan"
1674 quota:

CLOECK, Nanning (1643-1702), Lawyer *(Elias 217)*; **Member** 1674-1702
Address: Keizersgracht
1674 quota:

COMMELIN, Joan (1629-92), Professor of Botany, Athenaeum *(Elias 212)*; **Member** 1672-92;

NOMINATED 15.9.72
Address: (1) Kalverstraat "in de Crokodil"; (2) Heerengracht bij Flora
Hofstede Zuijderhout aan't emden van der Haarlemmerhout
1674 quota:

CORVER, Joan (1628-1716), Koopman *(Elias 194);* **Member** 1666-1716; **Burgomaster** 1681,85,86,89,92,94,95,98,1700,1,3,4,6,7,9,12,13; Director **VOC** 1688
Address: Heerengracht tuschen Leidsche- en Spiegelsgrachten
Hofstede Beeckesteyn en Velsen
1674 quota: *fl.*419,000

DE GRAEFF, Andries, Ridder (1611-78) *(Elias 193);* **Member** 1665-72 **REMOVED 10.9.72**; **Burgomaster** 1657,60,64,66,67,70,71
Address: Heerengracht tusschen de Leidschenstraat en de Nieuwe Spiegelstraat in een dubblehuis
(1) Hoofstede nabij den Venusberg onder Valkeveen; (2) Hofstede Valkenberg onder Heemstede
1674 quota: *fl.*150,000

DE VICQ, Francois (1646-1707) *(Elias 226)*; **Member** 1679-1707;
Director **WIC** 1674
Address: Heerengracht

DE VICQ, Dr. Francois (? - 1678) *(Elias 219)*; **Member** 1675-78
Address: Heerengracht
Hofstede Spaeren Hout onder Heemstede
1674 quota: *fl.*257,000

DE VLAMING VAN OUDTSHOORN, Cornelis, Ridder, Heer van Oudtshoorn en Griephoek (1612-88) *(Elias 181)*; **Member** 1657-88; **Burgomaster** 1656,60,62,63,68,72,76,77,79,80; Director **VOC** 1677
Address:(1) Heerengracht bij de Heidenstraat; (2) Singel tusschen de Bergstraat en den Bluwburgwal "in de Kleynen Dolphijn"
(1) Hofstede Kostveloren te Oudtshoorn; (2) Hofstede Reynoord
1674 quota: *fl.*169,000

DE VRIES, Joan (1633-1708), Merchant (Italy) *(Elias 228)*; **Member** 1680-1708; **Burgomaster** 1686,90; Director **VOC** 1681
Address: Heerengracht bij de Utrechtschestraat

DE VRIJ, Egbert (1626-1701), Laken merchant *(Elias 224)*; **Member** 1679-1701
Address: Keizersgracht

ERNST, Dr. Roetert (1616-85) *(Elias* 172); **Member** 1653-72 **REMOVED 10.9.72**
Address: Singel bij de Warmoesgracht "in den vergulden Ketel"
1674 quota: *fl.*126,000

GEELVINCK, Cornelis, Heer van Castricum en Croonenburg (1621-89) *(Elias 167);* **Member** 1652-89; **Burgomaster** 1673,75,84,88,89; **Gecommitteerde Raad** 1681-83
Address: den Singel bij den Blauwburgwal "in de vergulden zon"
Hofstede Akerendam onder Beverwijk
1674 quota: *fl.*291,000

GRAAFLAND, Cornelis (1619-77), Koopman *(Elias 196);* **Member 1667-77;** Director **VOC** 1664
Address: Keizersgracht over de Groenlandsche Pakhuizen
Hofstede te 'sGraveland
1674 quota: *fl.*130,000

HASSELAER, Gerard (1620-73) *(Elias 174)*; **Member** 1653-73; **Burgomaster** 1665,69
Address: Keizersgracht over de brouwerij "de Kroon"
Hofstede Lankskroon aan de Vecht

HASSELAER, Nicolaes (1647-1684) *(Elias 222)*; **Member** 1678-84
Address: Keizersgracht, bij de Westerkerk

HINLOPEN, Jacob, Jacobsz (1644-1705) *(Elias 229)*; **Member** 1680-1705; **Burgomaster** 1694; Director **VOC** 1695
Address: Heerengracht bij de Nieuwe Spiegelstraat

HINLOPEN, Jacob Jacobsz (1621-79), Lakenkoper *(Elias 182);* **Member** 1657-79
Address: Heerengracht
1674 quota: *fl.*240,000

HOOFT, Gerrit (1649-1717) *(Elias 227)*; **Member** 1679-1717; (Pensionary 1672, Secretary 1673); **Burgomaster** 1708,11,14.16, 17; Director **VOC** 1678
Address: Binnen Amstel

HOOFT, Henrick, Heer van Oud-Carspel in Koedijk, Schoter en Schoterbosch (1617-78) *(Elias 177)*; **Member** 1655-78; **Burgomaster** 1662,64,72,77,78; **Gecommitteerde Raad** 1669-71
Address: (1) Breestraat; (2) Heerengracht
1674 quota: *fl.*340,000

HUDDE, Johannes, Heer van Waveren, Botshol en Ruige Wihuis (1628-1704) *(Elias 197);* **Member** 1667-1704; **Burgomaster** 1672, 73,75,79,81,82,84,85,87,88,90,91,93,94,96,99,1700,2,3; Director **VOC** 1679

HUDDE, Rombout (1629-79) Lawyer *(Elias 216)*; **Member** 1674-79
Address: Keizersgracht
1674 quota: *fl.*143,000

HULFT, Joan (1610-77), Merchant *(Elias 199);* **Member** 1668-72; **REMOVED 10.9.72**; Director **VOC** 1647; Director of the Colony **Guyana** 1660
Address: Singel
't Huis te Velsen
1674 quota: *fl.*200,000

HUYDECOOPER, Joan, Heer van Maarseveen en Neerdijk (1625-1704) *(Elias 191);* **Member** 1662-1704; **Burgomaster** 1673,75.76,78,80,82,84,86,87,89,90,92,93; Director **VOC** 1666
Address: Lauriengracht
Hofstede Goudesteyn aan de Vecht bij Maarseveen
1674 quota: *fl.*

MUNTER, Joan (1611-85), Koopman *(not listed in Elias);* **Thesauris Ordinaris** 1672,73,75,77,79,81,85; **Burgomaster** 1670,74,76,78,80,82,83

OPMEER, Nicolaes (1631-96) *(Elias 213)*; **Member** 1672-96; **NOMINATED 15.9.72**; **Burgomaster** 1681,83,87,91,92,94; **Gecommitteerde Raad** 1684-86; Director **WIC** 1682
Address: Keizersgracht
1674 quota:

PANCRAS, Nicolas (1622-78) *(Elias 161);* **Member** 1650-78; **Burgomaster** 1667,69,70,74,75; **Gecommitteerde Raad** 1678

Director **VOC** 1668
Address: (1) Nieuwendijk; (2) Heerengracht
(1) Hofstede Schoonoord onder Velsen; (2) Hofstede Wester-Amstel
1674 quota: *fl.*143,000

RANST, Leonard (1631-73) *(Elias 202);* **Member** 1669-73
Address: (1) de Oude Schans "in de Twee Tijgers"; (2) O.Z. Achterburgwal bij de Walenkerk
Hofstede in de Purmer

RENDORP, Joachim (1608-78), Brewer *(Elias 159);* **Member** 1650-78; Director **Nordsche Compagnie** 1654 (or earlier)
Address: de Geldersche Kaay op den Zuiderhoek van de Rechtsboomsloot
1674 quota: *fl.*120,000

REYNST, Lambert (1613-79), Lawyer *(Elias 157);* **Member** 1649-72; **REMOVED 10.9.72; Burgomaster** 1667,68,72; Director **VOC** 1667
Address: Keizersgracht over de Groenlandse Pakhuisen
1674 quota: *fl.*160,000

ROCH, Cornelis (1630-81) Lawyer *(Elias 205);* **Member** 1671-81; Director **VOC** 1680
Address: Flueweelenburgwal
1674 quota: *fl.*120,000

SAUTIJN, Gillis (1635-89), Koopman (Italy and Levant) *(Elias 215);* **Member** 1672-86; **NOMINATED 15.9.72;** Director **Societeit van Suriname**
Address: Keizersgracht over de Westerhal
1674 quota: *fl.*100,000

SCHAEP, Pieter (1635-85) *(Elias 195);* **Member** 1666-72; **REMOVED 10.9.72**
Address: Keizersgracht
1674 quota:

SCHELLINGER, Bernard (1609-80) *(Elias 150);* **Member** 1640-80
Address: Kloveniersburgwal
1674 quota: *fl.*240,000

SCOTT, Everard (1639-82), Merchant (Spain, Italy, Levant) *(Elias 218);* **Member** 1674-82; Director **WIC** 1682
Address: Keizersgracht over "'t Oud Glashuys"
1674 quota: *fl.*178,000

SIX, Jan, Heer van Wimmemum? en Vranade (1618-1700) *(Elias 223);* **Member** 1679-1700; **Burgomaster** 1691
Address: (1) Kloveniersburgwal; (2) Heerengracht bij den Amstel
1674 quota: *fl.*280,000

TEN GROOTENHUYS, Joan (1621-79) *(Elias 201);* **Member** 1668-79
Address: O.Z. Achterburgwal bij de Beraniestraat
1674 Quota: *Fl..*100,000

TIELLENS, Michiel (1620-79), Zijdelakenkoper *(Elias 208);* **Member** 1672-79; **NOMINATED 15.9.72**
Address: Warmoesstraat over de Servetsteeg "in den Soutlooper"
1674 quota:

TRIP, Louis (1605-84), Koopman *(Elias 206);* **Member** 1672-84; **NOMINATED 15.9.72**; **Burgomaster** 1674,77,79; Director **VOC** 1678
Address: (1) St. Anthoniebreestraat; (2) Singel "in de groote Pauw"; (3) Kloveniersburgwal Hofstede Meervliet onder Velsen
1674 quota:

TULP, Dr. Nicolas (1593-1674), Professor of Anatomy, Illustre Schole, Amsterdam *(Elias 111)*; **Member** 1622-74; **Burgomaster** 1654,56,66,71; **Gecommiteerde Raad** 1663-65, 1673-74
Address: Keizersgracht, w.z. bij de Westerkerk.
1674 quota: *fl.*280,000

VALCKENIER, Cornelis (1640-1700) *(Elias 221)*; **Member** 1678-1700; **Burgomaster** 1696,99; **Director** Societeit van Suriname 1689
Address: (1) Kloveniersburgwal bij de Nieuwemarkt; (2) No. 23 Kloveniersburgwal
1674 quota:

VALCKENIER, Gillis (1623-80) *(Elias 166)*; **Member** 1652-80
Burgomaster 1665,66,68,70,73,74,76,78,79; **Gecommitteerde Raad** 1672; Director **VOC** 1657
Address: St. Anthoniesbreestraat
1674 quota: *fl.*227,000

VAN BEUNINGEN, Coenraad (1622-1693); **Member** 1660-93) *(Elias 189)*; **Burgomaster** 1669,72,80,81,83,84; Director **VOC** 1681
Address: (1) (Blijenburg, den Haag); (2) Binnen Amstel tusschen Heerengracht and Keizersgracht (after 1680)
1674 quota: *fl.*100,000

VAN BRONCKHORST, Vincent, Ridder (1635-1703) *(Elias 190)*; **Member** 1667-77
Address: Keizersgracht
1674 quota: *fl.*100,000

VAN CAPELLE, Nicolas Rochusz (1609-95), Koopman, lijnslager, reeder en assuradeur *(Elias 190)*; **Member** 1661-72 **REMOVED 10.9.72**; Director **VOC** 1652; Director van de Colonie **Guyana** 1660
Address: Heerengracht
1674 quota: *fl.*146,000

VAN HEUVEL, Isaac (1640-1686) *(Elias 225)*; **Member** 1679-86; Director **WIC** 1674

VAN DE POLL, Jan (1579-78) Houtkooper? *(Elias 152);* **Member** 1646-72, **REMOVED 10.9.72**; Burgomaster 1653,55,58,61,67,71,72
Address: Kloveniersburwal
1674 quota: *fl.*150,000

VAN NECK, Jacob Jacobsz (1629-87) *(Elias 192)*; **Member** 1662-87
Address: Singel bij de Gasthuis molensteeg
1674 quota:

VAN NECK, Jacob (1602-?) Insurance Underwriter *(Elias 165)*;
Member 1652-73 **BANKRUPT 1673**
Address: Lauriergracht, w.z. bij de Westerkerk.
1674 quota:

VAN KLENCK, Coenraet (1628-91), Koopman *(Elias 210)*; **Member** 1672-91; **NOMINATED 15.9.72**

Address: (1) Heerengracht bij de Heerenstraat; (2) No. 96 Heerengracht
1674 quota:

VAN VLOOSWIJK, Cornelis, Heer van Vlooswijk, Wilverlast, Diemmerbroek en Papenkop (1601-87) *(Elias 168);* **Member** 1653-87; **Burgomaster** 1656,57,60,61,66,68,69,71; Director **VOC** 1667
Address: (1) Heerengracht; (2) Kloveniersburgwal
1674 quota:

VAN LOON, Lieve (16?-92); **Member** 1677-92
Address: (1) Singel; (2) Keizersgracht
1674 quota: *fl.*240,000

VAN LOON, Nicolas (1602-74), Koopman *(Elias 169);* **Member** 1653-75
Address: Keizersgracht
1674 quota: *fl.*240,000

WITSEN, Nicolas (1641-1717) *(Elias 204)*; **Member** 1670-1717; **Burgomaster** 1682,85,88,90,93,95,96,98,99,1701,2,4,5; **Gecommitteerde Raad** 1674-77,87,91-92,97; **Deputy States General** 1683-85; Director **VOC** 1693
Address: (1) Keizersgracht over den Schouwburg ; (2) No. 327 Keizersgracht; (3) Heerengracht tusschen de Utrechtschestraat en der Amstel
Hofstede Tijdverdrijf te Egmond op den Hoef
1674 quota:

Appendix II

Extract from Letter from W. Carr to W. Blaythwayt Amsterdam 21 March 1681 (B.L.MS.Add.41820 f12)

"Esteemed Sir

According to my promise I now send you a brief state of the present condition of this Citty: in Ano 1676 this Citty was wholely governed by the singel faction of Burgemaster Valconier but the said Burgem. Valconier observing that his Party was weakened by the Death of some of his friends in the Gouverment was forced to call in Burgemaster Hooft who before was kept out as being an Arminian, these 2 intrest being then joyned then the Citty was Equally devided betweene those 2 great mean + all places of Trust + profit put into there hands, in Ano 1678 when the french King craftily write his letter to Amsterdam + to the States callin them his ould Allyes + good friends + offering them Mastriche + all that ever belonged to the States and threw them some sugar plumbs (vix) that he would take of Divers impositions on Duch goods, then these 2 great men contrary to the Politque opposed all the other Cittys + Provinces (except Gronengan + Vriesland, who had quarell with the P of Orange) forced a Peace + to except the terms the French offered, basely leaving out all their Allyes (for which this States are now sufficiently reproched by the [?] Denmark, Brandenburg + otheres) theare I cannot write letting you know what an Extravagant speach Burger Hooft made in the States, first that his principalls the Citty of Amsterdam did Except of the terms of the French + that they would not continue the warr any longer, nor pay a peny more Taxes to a warr, + that they paying above half the whole charge of the warr, ought to overrule those as did not pay so much, that they had payd 2000 tunn of Gould for thire 200 peny, + he concluded his speach with these words that give him a peace although come from Hell, + no warr lthough directed from Heaven, a few months after this Burger dyed, then Burgem Valconier gouverend all againe, but finding his party weeke + that Burgem van Beuengen would come into the Gouvernement by cource, he craftily unknowne to his owne party, wrote his peace with the P of O + by his applying himselfe to the D of Yorke ... give me leave to tell you without a Vanity thus I had the hart to conduct the Burgem. to his Highness, after which day it was observed that he stuck fast to the Princes intrest, + Elected van Beuengen last yeare + on all occasions showed great Effections to our King , + the Prince, + he being Director of the East India Company caused the Company to make a Present to the D of Yorke last yeare, which made our Phanatiks English take at an ?? as if the Parliament would be angry with the Company for making the D a present, that this great man was so changed Aldmn Blackwell knowes, who I brought to him, and during his life he shewed fresh demonstrations of his respect to our King, + it was he that proposed to me that I would doe well to procure every post a paper of news from Whitehall for the Burgem, that they might be able to confront the Phanatik lyes spread in the Citty, by the English nations, this Burgem being Dead last Octob, then Burgem Van Beuengen grew strong in his intrest + this yeare there is a hope 2 new Burgems (vis) Burge Corver + Burge Opmer, so that there is only one of the ould rannk Commonwelath men left which is Burge Hudde + Burge Van Beuengen still remaines the 4th, hence thee are come in that have invited the P + Princes of Orange to thire Citty, + ... them 8 dayes, + gave great presents, the P not being in Amsterdam in 7 years, before, for this Citty is so chnaged in thire affection to the French within yeares that all the Art + ? the French Emssaryes use to [make] the condition of England Miserale + Desperate cannot any longer prevaill with the magistrates although the French Agent Mons. de Guerr, + Mon Chaubert the French consul doe make often feasts + presents amongst the Duch, there is now nobody doth so much hurt as our English Phanatiks who fill this Citty full every Posts with seditious papers, + lyes, sent them from England to prevent that mischiefe, there is now by you Sir Rob Soutwell + Mr Skellen + Mr Bertue now in Germany can tell how much hurt those papers doe in foraigne courts, being translated heare + sent up to those parts, but to returne to the present condition of this Citty it rather decayes in its riches, + Traide then otherwys, the east India Actions which in Ano 1670 were 500 + once 550 are now but never as yet since the warr could be brought up to 450, so proportinably all other obligations on the land, + the Armie is no 26 monthes in avanes, + severall comptors pay not now

this intrest as in Zealand + the 4 Provinces that were under the french, + it is generally believed by many wise men that this States will never arrive to the riches + traide they had in Ano 1670, + as for great Heads they are gone, there being now in the Gouvernment in most Cittys very weake magistrates, Odike gouvernes all in Zelands, Mon Beuham in Overyssel, Van Ameron in Utrich, in Guelderland, Pens Fagells Brothers + such like heads else they had not ruined the P of Orange intrest in Electing him Duke of Guelder, but in this Province of Holland there are yet some of worth as Burge Huse of Dort, a good financier, Harlam Eihenhave the Pens, inn Delph the Heers Blaysich + van der Joose, in Leyden Pens Burgedijk, + Burg Leu Van Veyden, whos party ... have experence of in England, in Amsterdam 7 or eight noatable men for parts, in Rotterdam the famous ambassador Paws, in Furgo Burgemaster Morme, now Ambassador in Danmark, Van Beverning, in the Ridderscape the P of Orange for the others I will name the whole number that you may see what number the Nobelty or, but for this party will not medel with.

P of Orange, Baran von d'Asper, Heer Opdam, Heer Devenfort, Heer Eewarten, Heer Northwick, Heer Werkindan, Heer Van der Reed, Heervan den Leek, Heer Benhe.

The Heer Masedomson is not admited into the riddersape because he retained not any of the virtues of his father, Lastly I am to name Pens Fagel who is a man of good parts, but short of John de Witt, yet stumbles threw all the grand affares + bissness concernes relating to this States, I formely sent the Earle of Sunderland the names of all the Magistrates of Consideration in the whole Gouvement the wyse the name os all thire minester abroad...."

Appendix III

Population statistics and sources for Amsterdam, 1635-1685

Date	Population	Source
1635	118,000	Kohlbrugge
	136,000	De Vries
1655	132,000	Kohlbrugge
	134,000	De Vries
1662	200,000	De Gouw
	210,000	De la Court (in Brugmas, p. 51)
1664	138,000	Kohlbrugge
	201,000	De Vries
1670	200,000	Temple (in Brugmans, p. 51)
1680	217,000	Van Houtte
	220,000	Van de Woude
1685	185,700	Kersseboom (1738)
	187,000	Petty
	158,000	Schraa

Source: H. Nusteling, *Welwaart en Werkgelegendheid in Amsterdam, 1540-1860. Een relaas over demografie, economie en sociale politieke van een wereldstad* (Amsterdam/Dieren, 1985), Appendix I.

Sources for Nusteling's population statistics: J.H.F. Kohlbrugge, "Iets over der invloed den steden", *De Economist,* 56 (1907); De Vries, *Handboek; J. ter De Gouw, Amstelodeamiana,* I and II (Admsterdam, 1874); A.M. Van der Woude, "Demografische ontwikkeling van de Noordelijke Nederlanden 1500-1800, *A.G.N.* 5 (Haarlem, 1980); W Kersseboom, *Proeven van politque rekenkunde vervat in drie verhandelingen,* I (1738); P. Schraa, "Onderzoekingen naarde bewolkings anvang van Amsterdam tussen 1550-1650", *Amstelodamum*, 46 (1954); J. A. van Houtte, *An Economic History of the Low Countries 800-1800* (London 1977), 229.

Appendix IV

Concept tot Eenigheit (1676)

Wy burgemeestern en regeerders der stad Amsterdam, so dienende in die qualiteit als voor desen gediend hebbende, beloven elkanderen ter goeder trouwe te sullen naerkomen ende ons level land voor soo veel in ons is te praesteeren die condities hiernaer gespecificeert, sonder dat wy deselve ofte eenige van die met onse stemmen ofte directie sullen contremineeren directelijj ofte indirectelijk, ook dat wy ale geoorloofde devoiren sullen aanwenden dat niemand its ter contrarie en onderneme maer alles dat mogelijk is tot erlangen van deselve praestere, als namentelijk:

1. *Dat men niet sal excedeeren het aloude gebruijk van meerder dan twaelf burgemeesteren, regeerende en oude te same genome, te verkiezen.*

2. *Dat een or meerder van die twaelf komende te sterven, men derselver plaetsen ofte eenige van die niet en sal vervullen (so lange deselve niet onder tien sijn gekomen) als by eenparig goedvinden van alle de regeerende burgemeesteren.*

3. *Dat de regeerende burgemeesteren, sulx eenparig goedvinden, ook sullen convoceeren de oud-burgemeeteren, ende aldaer in deliberatie leggen of men een of meer nieuwe burgemeesteren sal maken of niet, ende hetgeene bij meederheid van stemmen onder regeerende en oud-burgemeesteren te samen sal wereden goedgevonden, sullen all gesamentlijk end een ider in het bijsonder gehouden sijn te secundeeren.*

4. *Dat de regeerende en oud-burgemeesteren te same beneden het getal van tien sijnde gekomen, een ander, die noijt burgemeester is geweest, ten tijde als men gewoon is electie te doen, in den verstorvene sijn plaetse sal moesten verkiesen.*

5. *Dat een van de voormelde heeren sal werden gecommitteert in het collegie van H.E.G. Gecommitteerde Raden, een ter Generaliteit, een in den Raad van State, op de touren van de stad van Amsterdam in de twee laetsgenoemde, ende een in het collegie ter Admiraliteit aldaer.*

6. *Dat de eerste die in een der respective collegien, in art.5 genaemt, sal werden gesonden (bijaldien sig niemand daartoe vrijwillig en vertoont) door het lot onder alle de oud-burgemeesteren, voorts naar de verandering van de regeering op Vrouewndag te trekken, tot die commissie sal werden gedesigneert.*

7. *Dat vervolgens de oudste der oud-burgemeesteren, aan de lotbeurige komende te volgen, in het eerst opkomende collegie sal werden gecommitteert, ende soo voorts, op deselve order, de in rang volgende in indefinitum.*

8. *Dat in der voorstaende gevallen de respective gedesigneerden oft gecommitteerden aldaer sullen hebben de keuse (bijaldien sy niemand iut de oud-burgemeesteren weeten te disponeeren om vrijwillig waer te nemen de commissie op HaerEdele geconfereet of staende geconfereert te werden) of sij de voorschreven commissie selfs voor den tijt van drie jaren willen waernemen, dan of sij liever sien willen dat een schepen en vroedschap, die noijt burgemeester is geweest, in haer plaets werde gecommitteert.*

9. *Dat by verkiesing van de laetste gevalle de respective gecommitteerden of gedesigneerden sullen moeten occupeeren in een subalterne collegie, sonder tot het burgemeestersampt verkooren te wereden, de tijt van drie jaren, die haar respective commissie in de Gecommitteerde Raden, de Staten-Generael, den Raad*

van State of de Admiraliteit tot Amsterdam soude hebben gedurrd.

10. *Dat die van de oud-burgemeesteren, dewelke daer in een derselver collegien is geweest ofte drie jaren in een subalterne bank, omdat daer niet selfs heeft willen dienen, heeft gevaceert, in geen van desleve wederom sla behoeven te gaen so lange eeen oud-burgemeester overig is, die in een der voorschreven collegien niet is geweest.*

11. *Dat in de gevallen, daer twee der voorseijde collegien in een jaer komen te vaceeren, de oudste dergenen die aldaer sal moeten gaen sal hebben de keuse, in hetwelk van beide sal willen gecommitteert werden.*

12. *Dat de eerste drie burgemeesteren, die om n den jare 1677 te dienen sullen verkoren wereden, meede by loting onder alle de oud-burgemeesteren primo Februarij 1677 voorseijt te trekken sullen werden gedesigneert.*

13. *Dat naer de te verkiesen nieuwe burgemeester or burgemeesteren succivelijk uit het getal der oude sullen wereden verkoren en voor andere geprefereert degenen die den langsten tijt als burgemeester niet hebben gedient, ten sy sake sij waren gecommitteert in het collegie van H.E.G.M. Gecommitteerde Raden, ter vergadering van de Staten-Generael, den Raed van State ofte het collegie ter Admiraliteit tot Amsterdam, ende de drie jaren harer commisse primo Maij naest de te doene electie niet waren geexpireert, ofte ook wel dat iemand, op publicque commissie sijnde buiten 's lands, selfs quam te orrdeelen, dat hij den meesten tihjt des jaers, dat als burgemeester hadden te dienen, buiten 's lands soude moeten continueeren, en eindelijk mede dat degene, die langst uit den dienst als regeerender burgemeester was geweest, selfs sig wilde en wiste te excuseeren, in welke gevalle de naest daeraen volgende, langst buiten dienst als burgemeester sijnde geweest, sal moeten werden verkooren.*

14. *Dat naer degenen die den lagsten tijt als burgemeester niet hebben gedient successivelijk sullen moeten verkooren wereden ende voor anderen geprefereert de oudste der oud-burgemeesteren, te reken den ouderdom naer den tijt dat sij der eerst mael tot het burgemeestersampt sullen sijn verkooren geweest en rang hebben genomen, dies dat die oudsten niet te naer bestaen aen degenen, die vooral als nieuw burgemeester of langst niet gedient hebben is verkooren, in welken geval de oudste daeraenvolgende verkooren sal moeten werden.*

15. *Dat altoos de oudste in dienst als burgemeeter van de drie burgemeesteren door den oud-raed het vorige jaer verkooren het volgende jaer, so sig niet selfs wilde en wiste te excuseeren, sal werdengecontinueert, ten ware sake hhij door maegshcap ofte affiniteit van een der drie nieuw verkoren burgemeesteren wierde gesecludeert.*

Reprinted in R Fruin, "Bjdrage tot de Geschiedenis van het Burgemeesterschap van Amsterdam Tijdens de Republiek", *Verspreide Geschiedenis*, IV (1923), pp. 320-22.

Appendix V

Burgomasters and other office-holders of Amsterdam, 1672-85

Burgomasters of Amsterdam 1671-85

1671	Van Vlosswijk, Tulp, De Graeff, Van de Poll
1672 (Feb.-Sept.)	Van de Poll, Reynst, Oudtshoorn, Hooft
1672 (Sept.)	Hooft, Oudsthoorn, Hudde, Van Beuningen
1673	Hudde, Valckenier, Geelvinck, Huydecooper
1674	Valckenier, Trip, Pancras, Munter
1675	Pancras, Hudde, Huydecooper, Geelvinck
1676	Huydecooper, Valckenier, Oudsthoorn, Munter
1677	Oudsthoorn, Trip, Hooft, Hudde
1678	Hooft, Valckenier, Huydecooper, Munter
1679	Valckenier, Trip, Oudsthoorn, Hudde
1680	Oudsthoorn, Van Beuningen, Munter, Huydecooper
1681	Van Beuningen, Hudde, Corver, Opmeer
1682	Hudde, Munter, Huydecooper, Witsen
1683	Munter, Van Beuningen, Opemeer, Van Waveren
1684	Van Beuningen, Hudde, Geelvinck, Huydecooper
1685	Hudde, Corver, Witsen, Bors van Waveren

Schepenen elected 1672 to 1684

1672	Trip, De Wilhelm, Nanning Cloeck, Opmeer, Opmeer, Corver, Six, Hinlopen, Backer, Boreel
1673	Backer, Corver, Roeters, De Vicq, Ranst/Tiellens, Van Neck, Appelman, Becker, Sautijn, Witsen
1674	Van Neck, Appelman, Van Bronckhorst, Cloeck, R. Hudde, Van Klenck, Blom, Scott (the younger), A. Geelvinck
1675	Van Bronckhorst, Cloeck, De Wilhem, Becker, Sautijn, Tiellens, De Vicq, Beaumont, Bentes
1676	De Wilhem, Becker, C. Cloeck, Appelman, Scott (the younger), Boelenz, van Loon, van Dijk, Popta
1677	C. Cloeck, Appelman, Boreel, Roch, Hinlopen (the younger), N. Cloeck, Bentes, De Vrij, D. Munter
1678	Boreel, Roch, van Loon, Witsen, R. Hudde, Scott (the younger), Pellicorne, Haren Carspel, Bambeeck
1679	Van Lon, Witsen, De Vries, Hinlopen (the younger), Boelensz, De Vrij, D. Munter, Hasselaer, G. Hooft
1680	De Vries, Hinlopen, Bors, Roch, Pellicorne, Bambeeck, C. Valckenier, De Haze de Georgio, Grootenhuys
1681	Bors, Roch, C. Cloeck, Van Loon, Sautijn, De Vrij, Oudtshoorn/De Vicq, Van Heuvel, Bas
1682	C. Cloeck, Van Loon, De Vries, Scott/Appelman, A. Geelvinck, Bambeeck, De Haze de Georgio, Elias, Weert
1683	De Vries, Appelman, Hinlopen, De Vicq, Van Heuvel, De Woede, H. Bicker, Pater, Coymans
1684	Hinlopen, De Vicq, Bentes, Hasselaer/Bas, C. Valckenier, De Haze de Georgio, Grootenhuys, Elias, Hulft

Pensionaries of Amsterdam 1666 to 1684

1666	Cornelis Hop
1668	R. Van Heemskerck
1672	Gerrit Hooft
1673	C. Van Heemskerck
1675	Van den Bosch
1680	Jakob Hop

***Secretarissen* of Amsterdam 1666 to 1684**

1666	Spiegel/Vlooswijk
1668	Blaeu
1672	C. Van Heemskerck
1673	G. Hooft/Velters/J. Geelvinck
1675	B. Huydecooper
1676	D. Geelvinck/D. Munter/C. Valckenier
1677	Rodenburg
1678	P. Hop/W. Hooft
1680	C. Hop
1684	B. Huydecooper

Sources: G.A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed.; Appelman, Notulen van 't Gepasseerde in de Vroedschap der stad Amsterdam van 11.2.1672 tot 23.9.1694; Elias, *De Vroedschap van Amsterdam*; Bontemantel, *De Regeeringe van Amsterdam;* Wagenaar, *Amsterdam in zijne opkomst..., Vol. III, Privilegen, Poorterschap, Regering*

Appendix VI

Representation on Working Committees of the Amsterdam *Vroedschap* 1672-84

The following lists of the business of the sub-committees and their membership are included as further background to the workings of the Amsterdam *vroedschap.* As the aims of this thesis do not include a comprehensive analysis of all the activities of the members of the Amsterdam regency this appendix does not include the full details which would contribute to such an analysis (some clarification of the activities of individual members can be made by direct correlation with the bibliographical details in Appendix I). The evidence from this appendix would be more useful if the records of the sub-committees were extant; all that is available to the researcher today are the names of the members and their recommendations as reported to the full meetings of the *vroedschap.* However, from time to time throughout the study general inferences have been drawn from the information given here.

The senior members of the *vroedschap* were more likely to sit on sub-committees dealing with important issues, but this did not preclude their membership of other sub-committees, particularly where they were dealing with matters in which they had special interest or expertise. Interest, expertise, experience and - presumably - willingness, also determined the participation of lesser members. The frequency with which some names appear (for example Appelman, Tiellens and Klenck) indicates that there was a large core of working members, whose influence beyond the sub-committees was limited. In this way Cornelis Backer, who was not in favour with the leading regents, was able to participate effectively in the work of the *vroedsc*hap through membership of sub-committees. But it would be misleading, without closer analysis, to make assumptions that all frequent members of sub-committees were relatively ineffectual beyond this sphere. For example, Corver, who came to prominence as a burgomaster in the 1680s, was often an active member of the sub-committees. Ruling burgomasters were unlikely to be members of sub-committees, with the exception in the 1680s of Witsen (see p. 156).

21.10.72	Management of Sluices:	Van Beuningen, Hudde, Valckenier, Geelvinck
16.11.72	Consumption of foreign goods:	Graafland, Appelman, Tiellens, Sautijn, Geelvinck
28.11.72	*Veendijk byde Overtoom* (dispute with Haarlem):	Hooft, Corver
29.12.72	Negotiations between Admiralty and V.O.C.:	Boreel, Corver, Witsen (talking to Admiralty) Valckenier, Pancras, Huydecooper, Becker (talking to V.O.C.)
18.1.73	*Lands finanties*:	Pancras, Blom, Hop (neogtiating with Fagel and the Prince)
31.1.73	Peter Brack's request for licence to trade in *laken*:	Valckenier, Backer, Corver, Appelman
2.2.73	Request from Gecomm. Raad	

	for 100,000 men:	Valckenier, Van Beuningen, Boreel, Graafland
3.3.73	Request from Prince of Orange for *fl.*100,000 for *"extraordinaris equipage ter zee ":*	Backer, Van Beuningen, Corver, Graafland, Boreel
7.3.73	Security of Amsterdam:	Pancras, Hooft, Backer, Van Loon, Bronkhorst
14.3.73	*Aelmoesseniers Armen:*	Tulp, Corver, Appleman, Tiellens
25.3.73	Ambassadors to Cologne (Van Beverning and Renswoude):	Tulp, Corver, Graafland, Boreel, Trip
14.4.73	Peace Negotiations:	Valckenier to represent Amsterdam
17.3.73	Hop replacing Valckenier:	
12.6.73	Graafland and Roeters representing Amsterdam on Committee for fortifications	
15.7.73	Admiralty issues:	Huydecooper, Van Vlooswijk, Appelman, Sautijn, Tiellens, Trip, Klenck, Blom
11.9.73	*Hoofdgeld:*	Valckenier, Hooft, Pancras, Backer, Van Beuningen, Boreel, Corver
16.10.73	Wine and Brandy Manufacture:	Corver, Graafland, Boreel, Appelman, Tiellens, Klenck, Blom, Sautijn
3.12.73	Ban on Fench Manufactures:	Appelman, Beker, Sautijn, Tiellens, Graafland, Klenck
17.12.73	*Familiegeld*:	Pancras, Van Beuningen, Corver, Becker, Tiellens, Graafland, Boreel, Trip, Klenck, Blom
14.1.74	*Imposten*	Corver, Appelman, Hinloopen, Klenck, Blom
28.1.74	Captain-Generalship	Pancras, Hooft, Oudtshoorn, Backer, Corver, Hinloopen, Roch
30.1.74	*Landsoorlog schepen*:	Appelman, Witsen, Tiellens, Boreel, Klenck, Blom
	De vervallen studien tot Leiden te redressen:	Hudde, Bcker, Corver, Witsen, Bronckhorst, Grootenhuys, Roch
	Familiegeld:	Appelmn, Tiellens, Graafland, Boreel, Klenck, Blom
7.3.74	*Middelen*:	Hooft, Appelman, Backer, Corver, Witsen
30.4.74	Holland and Zeeland *"Gemeynschap van justitie"*:	Backer, Corver, Grootenhuys, Witsen, Roch
4.8.74	French manufactures and wine	Appelman, Klenck, Blom, Becker, Tiellens
18.9.74	Request from *de gemeene spychenmakers*	Appelman, Tiellens, Becker
	het niewe zijds sitten huys	Hudde, Appelman, Blom,Tiellens
12.11.74	Increase in *Staat van Oorlogh*	Appelman, Blom, Scott, Tiellens, Becker
10.12.74	New *W.I.C.*	Geelvinck, Appelman, Tiellens,Becker, Klenck, Blom
23.12.74	Admiralty report on quicksilver	Appelman, Klenck, Scott, Tiellens, Commelin
5.2.75	Gelderland sovereignty issue	Valckenier, Hooft, Hinloopen, Backer, van necq, Boreel, Roch, Appelman, Bors, Blom
23.10.75	Letter from Resident in Vienna	Valckenier, Tiellens, Appleman, Klenck, Commelin, Scott
12.11.75	Trade with Spain	Bronckhorst, Cloek, Hinloopen, Backer, Corver, Boreel, Roch, Opmeer, Hudde
	Requests from *Directeurs* Levantshandel	Becker, Sautijn, Tiellens, Boreel, Scott
18.1175	Spanish Trade	Bronckhorst, Trip, Corver, Roch, Opmeer, Scott

2.12.75	Baltic trade and protection	Hooft, Backer, Corver, Neck, Boreel, Roch, Appelman
10.12.75	[See Res. Holl. 21.11.75]	Valckenier, Bronckhorst, Neck, Corver, Appelman
	9 light frigates	Hooft, Backer, Neck, Corver, Boreel, Roch, Appelman
	Tax of 40th and 80th penningh	Hooft, Becker, Backer, Corver, Boreel
17.12.75	See Muniment Reg. K.f15	Bronckhorst, Backer, Neck, Boreel, Appelman, Bors, Sautijn
7.1.76	*Concept Placaet* re Sabbath	Becker, Sautijn, Tiellens, Appelman, Blom, Scott
16.1.76	Letter from Directors *Levants-handel* re salaries	Becker, Sautijn, Tiellens, Boreel, Scott
22.1.76	*Sout*	Beckler, Tiellens, Corver, Boreel, Scott
29.176	*Loopende middelen; impost op de Goijlan*	Neck, Corver, Boreel, Roch, Appelman, Bors, Blom
11.2.76	Swedish trade	Geelvinck, Hooft, Scott, Corver, Bronckhorts, Blom
14.5.76	Request for 400 men	Witsen, Geelvinck
23.5.76	Trade from Hamburg	Trip, Scott, Appelman, Blom
	Management of *Gods- en Gast-huizen*	Thesaurier, Tiellens, Blom
21.7.76	*.W.I.C.*	Trip, Becker, Scott, Appelmanb, Tiellens, Blom, Sautijn
	Impost op Wijn	Becker, Sautijn, Tiellens, Appelman, Blom, Scott
	Request from Lemp and Tenk for 30 year *solie* licences for *"mercurius sublimatus en precipitatus"*	Commelin, Sautijn, de Vicq
12.8.76	*Concept Placaet op Munt*	Appelman, Tiellens, Blom
14.9.76	*Impost op Tabaq*	Becker, Appelman, Tiellens, Blom
26.2.77	Foreign Policy	Trip, Tiellens, Blom, Sautijn, Scott
	Cost of 15 ships to Baltic	Hooft, Hudde, Valckenier, Huydecooper, Becker. Scott
16.3.77	Fortification of Wesel	Hooft, Hudde, Valckenier, Huydecooper, Becker. Scott
31.5.77	20th Article of Marine Treaty	Valckenier, Boreel, Appelman, Tiellens, Sautijn
7.7.77	Free Trade in West Indies and Guinea	Roch, Graafland, Becker, Scott
10.7.77	Dispute between Groningen and Ommeland	Hudde, Valckenier, Roch, Graafland, Scott
19.7.77	*Middelen*	Valckenier, Appelman, Backer, Graafland, Scott
	Impost op Tabaq	Appelman, Graafland, Tiellens, Scott
9.9.77	Request from merchants re imports	Appelman, Tiellens, Klenck, Scott
15.9.77	*Impost op Wijn*	Appelman, Tiellens, Klenck, Scott
7.10.77	Six Warships to Tobago	Valckenier, Appelman, Boreel, Roch, Backer, Scott
15.11.77	Commercial Treaty with France	Boreel, Appelman, Sautijn, Tiellens, Valckenier (liaison with vab Beverning)
4.2.78	Letter from van Beuningen in London re 12th Article of 1674 Treaty	Valckenier, Hudde, Boreel, Roch, Backer,

		Corver
16 3 78	*Lands middelen* and internal *impasten*, Holland	Hudde, Boreel, Roch, Backer, Corver
29 3 78	Letter from van Beuningen re blockade of Dutch merchant shipping in French ports	Hudde, Boreel, Roch, Scott, Backer, Corver, Sautijn
25.4.78	Convoys and licences, France; Request from "*impost meesters*"; "*Impost*" on Spanish "*seep*"	Roch, Appelman, Tiellens, Becker, Klenck., Blom., Sautijn, Scott
29 6.78	Treaty negotiations: France, Spain, Sweden	Roch, Witsen, Trip, Scott, Tiellens, Klenck, Blom
17 7 78	Treaty with England	Roch, Backer, Corver, Appelman, Tiellens, Becker, Klenck, Blom, Sautijn
25 8.78	Ratification of French Treaty	Huydecooper, Trip, Scott, Corver, Appelman, van den Bosch
19 9.78	Wine Tax	Appelman, Tiellens, Klenck
29.12.78	Continuation of *Lands Militie*	Hudde, Witsen, Appelman, van den Bosch
4 2.79	*Lands Middelen*	Hudde, Trip, Witsen, Appelman, Roch, van Heuvil, van den Bosch
21 3.79	Military Finance	Hudde, Trip, Witsen, Appelman, Roch, van Heuvil, van den Bosch
7.6 79	Letters from Envoys	Geelvinck, Backer, Roch, Sautijn, van Heuvil
4 7.79	Continuation of Hugo de Bors as *Commis Fiscal*	Appelman, Scott, Becker, van Klenck, Sautijn
2 10 79	*Concept van Garantie* between Spain and France	Geelvinck, van Beuningen, Witsen, Corver, Roch, van Heuvil
4 12.79	*Ordinaris Loopende Middelen*	Huydecooper, Hooft, Corver, Becker, Klenck, Scott
	Comm. van de Monsteringe	Huydecooper, Hooft, Corver, Becker, Klenck, Scott
3 2.80	*Staat van Oorlog*	Van Beuningen, Huydecooper, Geelvinck, Valckenier, Roch, Corver, Witsen, van Heuvil, van den Bosch
6 2.80	Brandy	Van Beuningen, Huydecooper, Geelvinck, Valckenier, Hudde, Roch, Corver, Witsen, Heuvil, Scott, Appelman
20 2.80	41 Warships	Van Beuningen, Huydecooper, Geelvinck, Valckenier, Hudder, Roch, Corver, Witsen, Heuvil
	Gemeene Middelen	Van Beuningen, Huydecooper, Geelvinck, Valckenier, Hudde, Roch, Corver, Witsen, Appelman, Scott, Heuvil
1 3 80	*Gemeene Middelen*	Van Beuningen, Huydecooper, Valckenier, Geelvinck, Hudde, Roch, Corver, Witsen, Appelman, Scott
19 7.80	*Painction van Beschrijving*	Van Beuningen, Huydecooper, Geelvinck, Valckenier, Hudde, Roch, Corver, Witsen, Appelman, Scott, Heuvil
21 7 80	Tax collecting frauds	Van Beuningen, Huydecooper, Geelvinck, Valckenier, Hudde, Roch, Corver
2 8 80	Captain de Jong and French Fleet	Van Beuningen, Valckenier, Hudde, Bors
6 8 80	Quotas of two burgers	Backer, Corver, Becker, Sautijn, van Loon, Six,

		Hooft, Heuvil
29.8.80	Management of seadefences	Geelvinck, Valckenier, Vlooswijk, Hudde, Trip, de Vries, Backer
6.9.80	Wine and brandy tax	Huydecooper, Van Beuningen, Geelvinck, Valckenier, Hudde, Roch, Corver, Witsen, Appelman, Scott, Heuvil
3.10.80	Differences between brugomasters and *vroedschap* at Schoonhoven	Van Beuningen, Valckenier, Hudde, Corver, Witsen, Heuvil
	De Belastinge ter See	Van Beuningen, Valckenier, Hudde, de Vries, Backer, Witsen, Appelman, Becker, van Klenck, Sautijn, Scott, Heuvil
18.11.80	Foreign goods	De Vries, Roch, Bors, Hudde, Becker, Hooft
2.12.80	Tabago	Hudde, Vors, Appelman, Becker
5.12.80	*Staat van Oorlog*	Van Beuningen, Geelvinck, Hudde, de Vries, Backer, Corver, Witsen, Roch, Appelman, Becker, van Klenck, Sautijn, Heuvil
25.2.81	Ships to Norway	Van Beuningen, Hudde, Sautijn, Heuvil, Witsen, Appelman, Becker, van Klenck, Scott, de Vries
	20th and 40th penning	Boreel, Roch, Witsen
26.3.81	*Groote Defenses*	Roch, Witsen, Becker, Six
30.4.81	*Aelmoesseniers*	Appelman, de Vries, Van Beuningen, Hudde, Corver, Opmeer*
19.7.81	*Dobbelen en speden*	Hudde, Roch, Witsen, Becker, Six
22.7.81	Arrears of soildiers' pay	Hudde, Heuvil, Witsen, Appelman, van Klenck
12.9.81	French refugees	Wisten, Becker, Hasselaer
20.9.81	*Munt*	Kloeck, Sautijn, Becker, Six
7.10.81	Surinam and Zeeland	Hudde, Bors, Witsen, Appelman, van Klenck
27.11.81	Shortfall of city weaponry	Huydecooper, de Vicq, Heuvil, Neck Jacobsz
17.12.81	*Staat van Oorlog*	Corver, Heuvil, Witsen, de Vries, Hinlopen
28.12.81	*Staat van Oorlog*: shortfall on military expenditure	Corver, de Vries, Heuvil, Hinlopen
16.1.82	Danish tolls	Heuvil, Appelman, van Klenck
	Surinam	Hudde, Bors, van Waveren, Witsen, Appelman. van Klenck
6.2.82	*Gemeene Lands Middelen*	Wisten, Corver, de Vries, Bors, Sautijn, Heuvil
9.3.82	Difference with France over Spanish Netherlands	Witsen, Corver, Boreel, de Vries, Bors, Heuvil
23.3.82	Request from *Nederduits* church re poorhouses	Corver, Appelman, Commelin
4.5.82	Convoy list	Witsen, Hudde, de Vries, Appelman, Becker, van Klenck, Bors, Sautijn, Heuvil
11.5.82	Convoy list and licences: benefits to colonies	Witsen, Hudde, de Vries, Appelman, Becker, van Klenck, Bors, Sautijn, Heuvil
16.7.82	Request from [Barill...?] en Schepen	Appelman, Backer, van Klenck, Sautijn
7.9.82	Zeeland and Surinam	Witsen, Hudde, Boreel, Appelman, Bors, Sautijn, van Klenck, Hevil
	France	Appelman, Opmeer, Bors, Sautijn, Heuvil
22.9.82	*Aelmoesseniers*	Hudde, de Vries, Appelman, van Klenck, Commelin, Sautijn
26.9.82	Pierre Baille	Witsen*
18.11.82	Brandenburg memorial	Witsen, Corver, Boreel, Sautijn

5.12.82	request from Walloon Community over subsidy	Boreel, de Vries, Sautijn, Valckenier
23.12.82	Increase in military and Guarantee with Sweden, Spain and Emperor	Corver, Boreel, Appelman, van Klenck, Bors, Valckenier, Heuvil
	Wisselbank	Hudde, Munter, de Vries, Appelman
5.1.83	*Staat van Oorlog*	Corver, Boreel, de Vries, Appelman, Bors, Heuvil
5.2.83	Differences between Zeeland and Overijssel: *Staat van Oorlog;*	Bors Van Waveren, Corver, Boreel, de Vries, Appelman, Heuvil
	Reduction of den Briel's quota	Bors Van Waveren, Corver, Boreel, de Vries, Appelman, Heuvil
29.6.83	*Commis Fiscal*	Boreel, de Vries, Appelman
	Resident at Hamburg	Appelman, Becker, Sautijn
14.7.83	Resident in Poland: improvement of Baltic trade	Boreel, de Vries, Heuvil, Sautijn
16.7.83	*Munt: Concept Placcaet*	Van Beuningen, de Vries, Appelman, Sautijn
26.7.83	Twelve warships	Hudde, de Vries, Backer
13.9.83	8,000 men for Spain	Munter, Van Beuningen, Opemeer, Van Waveren, Hudde, Corver, Boreel, de Vries, Appelman, van Klenck, Hooft - with Hop. (Report made same day.)
2.9.83	Shortfall on Zeeland Admiralty, Grain etc	Corver, de Vries, Appelman, Sautijn, Elias
4.2.84	*Staat van Oorlog*	Corver, Boreel, Bors Van Waveren, Opmeer, Appelman, van Klenck, Heuvil, Hooft, de Vries, Cloeck
23.3.84	Tunis and Tripoli	Corver, Becker, Sautijn, Heuvil, de Vries
	Burgomasters' report on foreign affairs	Trip, Appelman, van Klenck, Sautijn
24.5.84	Fortifications, artillery	Geelvinck, Corver, BorVan Waverens, Appelman, de Vries
15.12.84	Levant trade	Valckenier, van Neck, Sautijn, de Vries

Appendix VII

Extract from Statement of Income outstanding on 200th *penningh* 27 March 1674-31 October 1676. (Received by the States of Holland November 1676)

Date due		27.3.74	28.7.74	24.12.74	24.5.75	20.12.75	15.7.76
Dordrecht		fl	fl	fl	fl	fl	fl
	due	182,838	91,419	115,380	115,389	115,389	115,389
	paid	182,838	91,419	101,200	103,000	105,800	92,000
	% o/s	-	-	12	10	8	20
Haarlem	due	343,820	171,910	151,488	151,488	151,488	151488
	paid	343,820	171,910	126,365	129,763	121,641	100,920
	% o/s	-	-	16	14	20	33
Delft	due	324,360	162,180	212,241	212,241	212,241	212,241
	paid	324,360	162,180	154,264	168,842	187,956	165,180
	% o/s	-	-	28	22	12	22
Leiden	due	420,220	210,110	219,798	219,798	219,798	219,798
	paid	420,220	210,110	161,942	184,287	126,133	127,900
	% o/s	-	-	27	17	43	42
Amsterdam	due	2,706,001	1,353,006	1,580,583	1,580,583	1,580,583	1,580,583
	paid	2,706,001	1,304,693	1,362.353	1,302,441	1,131,571	846,512
	% o/s	-	6	10	20	25	45
Gouda	due	115,460	57,730	70,422	70,422	70,422	70,422
	paid	115,460	57,730	65,005	62,704	47,693	38,653
	% o/s	-	-	7	11	32	46
Rotterdam	due	510,384	255,192	272,029	272,029	272,029	272,029
	paid	510,384	255,192	255,233	239,989	212,618	188,713
	% o/s	-	-	10	12	26	33
Schiedam	due	34,460	17,230	15,641	15,641	15,641	15,641
	paid	34,460	13,260	15,010	af.	9,251	9,607
	% o/s	-	24	10		40	38
Schoonhoven	due	13,300	6,650	5,446	5,446	5,446	5,446
	paid	8,494	4,140	4,538	2,459	4,160	4,140
	% o/s	25	38	19	56	26	27
Brielle	due	32,660	16,330	14,224	14,224	14,224	14,224
	paid	32,660	16,330	12,875	11,923	9,607	9,535
	% o/s	-	-	7	14	40	41
Den Haag	due	799,070	399,535	433,500	433,500	433,500	433,500
	paid	799,070	399,535	392,500	385,000	305,249	254,260
	% o/s	-	-	7	9	30	41

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3.01.04, 3021	Gecommitteerde Raden van Staten van Holland
10.10.29	Collectie Fagel
1.03.01	Levantshandel, Amsterdam Directie
1.04.03	V.O.C.
1.05.01	W.I.C.:
	Hooft participants boeck O.W.I.C.
	Resolutiies van Amsterdam Kamer O.W.I.C., 1672-74
	Secret Notulen W.I.C., 1675-1700
1.05.03	Societeit van Surinam
	Secrete Resolutien Staten-General
3.01.04	Staten van Holland, na 1572

Atlas van Stolk Museum, Rotterdam

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Archief Burgermeesteren.:

5059.47	Collectie Hudde
5059.180	Collectie Witsen
5026.	Missieven en Requesten van Particulieren (Binnenland)
5026.342	Missieven Burgemeesters-Regeerden van Amsterdam
5026.	Missieven van de Gedeputeerden ter dagvaart
5026.337	Missieven van Gedeputeerden van Amsterdam ter Staten General, 1646-1719
5026.342	Missieven aan Burgemeesters-Regeerde van Amsterdam
5059.10	Missieven van Nicolaes Witsen
5026.336-8	Missieven van Raad van State, 1650-1749
	Missieven van Staten General, 1636-1767
5026.339-11	Missieven van de Staten van Holland, 1672-80
5026.345	Missieven van de Staten van Holland, 1681-1793
5026.348	Missieven van Stahouders en Familie Leden
	Missieven aan Burgemeesters-Regeerde van Amsterdam
5059.46, f.1-151	Notulen van 't Gepasseerde in de Vroedschap der stad Amsterdam van 11.2.1672 tot 23.9.1694
5059.64-5	Register op her Receuil van Tractaten van Cornelis Hop pensionaris van Amsterdam 1666-1680
5059.49	Stads Finantie
5025.20-	Vroedschap Resoluties, 1672-1684
5059.171-177	Witsen, Nicolaes, Kort Verhael van myn levenshoop tot den jaere 1714, copied by Tydewen),
376.12-14	Kerkeraad, 1672-84

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