Replacing the rascals? Corruption and candidate turnover in Central and Eastern Europe

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A number of recent studies have analysed the electoral impact of political corruption. Hanley & Sikk (2014) show that corruption is a crucial condition explaining the success of anti-establishment parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Other studies have shown that widely publicised cases of political malfeasance such as the UK expenses scandal in 2009 affected the re-nomination rates and electoral fortunes of incumbent candidates (Pattie & Johnston 2012). This paper brings together these two streams of literature by looking at the impact of corruption (perception) on candidate turnover. We study party lists in 9 EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe and analyse two aspects of candidate turnover. The analysis is based on a newly created data set that covers most of the elections during the last two decades in the region. We hypothesize that high or increasing levels of corruption create incentives for existing political parties to rejuvenate their candidate lists – getting rid of established (and ostensibly corrupt) politicians and bringing in new candidates with no previous political experience Secondly, we focus on incumbent governing parties, hypothesizing that high or increasing levels of corruption make the revision of candidate lists particularly urgent for those with executive responsibilities. We find that contrary to our initial expectations, increased levels of corruption lead to a decrease in candidate turnover. The effect is only evident and statistically significant among governing parties; turnover in non-governing parties is best explained by party size and changes in popularity.

Key words: Elections, Voting, Candidate, Political Parties, Europe (Central and Eastern), Governance

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Over the last two decades, research on political corruption has become abundant in political science scholarship and a growing number of studies investigates its determinants, working mechanisms, and effects (see e.g. Heywood 1997; Heidenheimer and Johnston 2011). In analysing the effects of corruption, particular attention has been devoted to questions of vertical accountability, i.e. the way in which voters hold corrupt politicians accountable and thus the electoral impact of corruption. The majority of studies focuses on the impact of corruption scandals on the performance of candidates, usually in the form of case studies of individual countries or elections.[1] Examples range from congressional elections in the United States (Peters and Welch 1980; Banducci and Karp 1994; Welch and Hibbing 1997; Basinger 2013), national elections in the United Kingdom (Pattie and Johnston 2012; Larcinese and Sircar 2013), Italy (Chang, Golden and Hill 2010; Asquer 2013; 2014) and Brazil (Ferraz and Finan 2008) to state elections in Bavaria (Kauder and Potrafke 2014) and mayoral contests in Spain (Costas-Pérez, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2012). Overwhelmingly, these studies find that corrupt parties and politicians are punished by voters, but considerably less frequently and less severely than might be expected. However, research has until now largely failed to systematically address the question of how parties respond to potential punishment *before* facing voters at the polls.

Voters' perception of corruption in political parties has been demonstrated to be an important factor in determining party support and voting decisions (Deegan-Krause, Klasnja and Tucker 2011; Slomczynski and Shabad 2012; Ecker et al. 2015). Furthermore, high and increasing levels of (perceived) corruption can be seen as crucial for the break-through of new, anti-establishment parties in Central and Eastern Europe (Hanley and Sikk 2014) which due to their novel set of candidates can often boost more credibility than others (Bågenholm 2013a). At the same time, some of the abovementioned studies have also shown that scandals affect politicians' re-nomination rates and can thus exact the rejuvenation of parties' candidate pools. It follows that high or increasing levels of corruption might not only create favourable conditions for the emergence of genuinely new parties (i.e. those with a high share of new candidates) but also provide significant incentives for existing political parties to refresh their candidate lists by bringing in new candidates with no previous experience in political office.

The aim of this paper is to put this notion to the test by studying the effect of corruption on candidate turnover on party lists in 9 Central and East European (CEE) EU member states

[1] Large-N comparative studies such as Bågenholm (2013b) remain the exception.

during the last 20 years. We begin the paper with an overview of studies on candidate (de-)selection and list turnover and its relationship with corruption. Then, we outline our empirical approach and the new data set on which we test the effects of levels and change of corruption on general candidate turnover, as well as focusing in on candidate turnover in governing parties. We find that changes in corruption perception have a significant impact on candidate turnover, but the effect only affects governing parties. However, contrary to our initial hypothesis we discover that candidate turnover *decreases* rather than increases in response to *increased* levels of perceived corruption. We conclude with a discussion and possible explanations of this surprising finding.

Mechanisms of candidate turnover

Regular turnover of parliamentary elites is a defining characteristic of (and arguably a necessity for) any democracy. While legislative turnover rates are naturally influenced by parties' performance in elections, they also depend on how many members of parliament run again and who parties decide to nominate (Matland and Studlar 2004; Rahat 2007). Turnover of candidates, however, is a largely understudied subject so far. Although it tends to be addressed as part of the abovementioned case studies to some extent, the literature generally focusses on the re-nomination of incumbents rather than previously unsuccessful candidates – a fact that can largely be attributed to the simultaneous focus on elections in single mandate districts or very small multi-mandate districts rather than list-based electoral systems.[2] Incumbents usually only occupy a fraction of places on party lists as parties regularly nominate more candidates than they could reasonably get into office in any given election. Thus, there is considerable scope for candidate turnover even if the majority of incumbents is re-nominated (a trend visible in most Western democracies; see also discussion below).

One can generally identify two different types of candidate turnover, which are similar to those identified by Matland and Studlar (2004) in their study of legislative turnover. Candidate turnover can be due to *voluntary* resignation of candidates, i.e. the decision not to run again for personal reasons (e.g. age, family, general dissatisfaction with party/office, or to pursue a career outside of politics).[3] Although some factors – such as redrawing of constituency boarders and the introduction/phasing out of more beneficial retirement options – have been shown to increase the rate at which incumbents retire from office (Banducci and

[2] Exceptions are Kreuzer and Pettai (1999; 2003) and Shabad and Slomczynski (2004) who look at several countries and elections, yet even they are eventually mostly concerned with inter-party mobility of incumbents between elections.
[3] Party-specific voluntary list turnover can also be caused by political tourism, i.e. candidates' deliberate decision to run for another party in the next election. Nevertheless, this has no effect on general levels of candidate turnover.

Karp 1994), party list turnover should be significantly less affected by this as such (dis)incentives almost only relate to incumbents and legislative turnover otherwise tends to be comparatively stable (albeit on country-specific levels; Mattland and Studlar 2004).

On the other hand, party list turnover can also be caused by the *involuntary* removal of candidates from party lists. Thereby, a candidate is either denied renomination by the party or is forced to give up their list place due to a scandal. Health issues or death present another form of involuntary removal from party lists. As mentioned above, comparative studies of candidate list turnover are still very rare so that providing a preliminary analysis of wider patterns of candidate turnover is part of the rationale of this paper.

Studies of candidate selection in Western Europe and the United States have shown that most incumbent deputies generally seek renomination by their party and tend to be nominated again without problems (see chapters in Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Matland and Studlar 2004). At the same time, targeted deselection of incumbents – denial of renomination or forced retirement – appears to be a very rare phenomenon. Yet as Matland and Studlar (2004) argue, it may only appear rare as 'incumbents who face a serious danger of being deselected [by the party leadership or through intra-party defeat] may opt for "voluntary" retirement instead' (ibid. 97). This notion is supported by a number of studies, most prominently those of the UK expenses scandal in 2009. Eggers and Fisher (2011), Pattie and Johnston (2012) and Larcinese and Sinclair (2013) find that MPs who were implicated in the scandal retired at a significantly higher rate before the 2010 general elections compared to other MPs. Although other factors – such as amount of media reporting on individual deputies' wrongdoings and electoral support in the previous election – are also shown to have contributed to the higher retirement rate, these appear to have rather amplified the effects of the scandal. Basinger (2013) and Banducci and Karp (1994) find a similar pattern with regard to incumbents' retirement from Congress following scandals as affected deputies were significantly less likely to seek re-nomination than others. This pattern is somewhat less clear with regard to Italy. While Chang, Golden and Hill (2010) find that there is no statistical difference in the percentage of deputies retiring following accusations of corruption and unaffected legislators between 1948 and 1994, Asquer (2013; 2014) finds that there was at least a lower renomination rate for deputies charged with corruption before the 1994 elections. Although it is not always clear whether it was incumbents' own decision not to run again or they were (informally) pressured into doing so, it becomes clear that occurrences of political malfeasance play an important role in legislative turnover by involuntary exit.

However, the question remains to what extent such findings on the renomination and retirement can be applied to general party list turnover. First, it needs to be reiterated that studies have so far focussed almost exclusively on plurality voting systems with comparatively decentralised systems of candidate selection. List-based electoral systems tend to be more centralised and exclusive, giving more power to central party organisations or regional leaders in the selection process (Hazan and Rahat 2010). Second, incumbent candidates seeking renomination and 'ordinary' candidates differ in so far as the cost of removing the former is far greater. Incumbents, even those who have been involved in a scandal, still tend to receive more votes than entirely new candidates. As Larcinese and Sinclair (2013) show, parties also did not remove MPs whose voting behaviour frequently deviated from the party line due to their ability to win elections. Ordinary list candidates on the other hand, are considerably less costly to remove and their replacement might even be beneficial for the party. Finally, ordinary candidates might themselves be considerably less interested in running again than incumbents given costs of campaigning and uncertainty about the outcome.

Candidate turnover and corruption: Incentives for rejuvenating party lists

As mentioned above, candidate turnover is still greatly understudied and findings on legislative turnover are not fully applicable. Such problems notwithstanding, in this paper we offer a first step towards explaining candidate turnover by considering the relationship between candidate turnover and corruption.

Previous studies have shown that corruption has electoral consequences and plays an important role in voters' decisions to vote for a particular party – although other factors naturally play an equally if not more significant role (Deegan-Krause, Klasnja and Tucker 2011; Slomczynski and Shabad 2012; Ecker et al. 2015). Voters are overall more likely to vote for parties they perceive as less corrupt (or not corrupt at all).[4] While there are a multitude of measures parties might employ to this end and increase their vote share, the most straightforward way is to 'replace the rascals'. The presentation of a novel set of candidates untainted by political scandals has been linked the success of new anti-corruption parties in Europe (Bågenholm 2013a). Furthermore, voters tend to see individual politicians rather than political parties as such as corrupt (Slomczynski and Shabad 2011), so that replacing old and ostensibly corrupt candidates would appear to be an effective way to disassociate a party from the wrongdoings of previous representatives. Yet, 'newness' can also present a general

[4] A mechanism somewhat weakened by individual party loyalty or political leaning.

strategy for parties to break into the electoral market or to increase their vote share (Sikk 2012). Thus, even if a party or its candidates have not been involved in any scandals, voters' perceptions of rising levels of corruption (and increased awareness of the potential for malfeasance by established politicians) can still present an incentive for parties to change their line-up.

The question remains whether such a strategy would also be feasible for political parties. Contrary to most previous studies on the relationship between corruption and incumbent (re)nomination, we are interested in candidate turnover in list-based (rather than plurality) electoral systems. In such systems, candidate selection tends to be more centralized, thus giving party leaders more influence over candidate (de)selection (Hazan and Rahat 2010). Centralization of candidate selection is further concentrated in the hands of party leadership in younger and less institutionalised democracies, which we are particularly interested in as our data stems from Central and Eastern Europe. Here, the lack of established party structures which could otherwise restrict leadership autonomy and the strategic complexity produced by the high number of competitors strengthens party leaders and should lead to more centralized selection procedures (Field and Siavelis 2008, 630-32). Therefore, the rejuvenation of candidate lists could be seen as a feasible strategy to counter risk of declining electoral fortunes.

Parties should try to anticipate the influence of corruption perception on voter choice and renew their candidate base in order to be punished less at the polls. Parties who held responsibility in government and/or nominated the Prime Minister should generally be under greater pressure to renew their candidate lists. As argued by Ecker et al. (2015), voters evaluate government parties not only on the basis of economic performance (economy, unemployment rate etc.) but also on other dimensions, including the existence and level of corruption. This should particularly be true in the countries of CEE where corruption tends to be among the most important issues for voters (ibid., Singer et al 2011). Irrespective of corruption scandals among other (opposition) parties, voters will attribute blame for high levels of corruption first and foremost with governing parties[5]; it is these parties that not only have access to public goods but also the power to prevent its misuse for private gain. Thus, governing parties will be under greater pressure to anticipate potential punishment by the electorate and can be expected to renew their party lists to a greater extent than other parties.

[5] Admittedly, this mechanism is likely mediated by individual voters' political/party preferences (Eckert et al 2015; see also Anderson and Tverkova 2003).

Before proceeding to the test of this hypothesis, it should be mentioned that the effect of corruption perception on involuntary list turnover coincides with a specific type of voluntary list turnover identified by Asquer (2014). She shows that politicians frequently leave (governing) parties that are perceived as corrupt and join new or different formations in order to have a better chance of re-election. Such instances of 'party tourism' however only affects party-specific turnover rates, not overall candidate turnover.

Finally, note that in addition to being a potentially important consequence of political corruption, candidate turnover is also a relevant variable for the study of other issues. For example, Kreuzer and Pettai (1999) argue that lowering levels of candidate turnover can be seen as an indicator of parties' institutionalisation and development of effective recruitment channels (which favour stability). In a similar vein, Sikk & Köker (n.d) and Barnea & Rahat (2011) use it as an indicator of party novelty, the use of which could improve our understanding of party system dynamics, promising more reliable electoral volatility indices.

Data and variable coding

In our analysis, we use a novel data set on electoral candidates and party lists from 9 Central and East European democracies and 39 elections between and 1996 and 2014 (see Table 1), i.e. all current EU member states in the region with the exception of Romania and Croatia where the data has been more difficult to analyse or obtain, respectively.[6] Candidate lists and electoral results were obtained from public sources, primarily those available online (e.g. the websites of national electoral commissions, parliaments and ministries). As far as available, we incorporated data from the 'Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe' database at the University of Essex. Data from the Comparative Manifesto Project and the *Political Science Data Yearbook* were used to complement the data set and code variables on government participation, electoral performance and party change. Overall out data set contains close to 200,000 candidate-election combinations.

To calculate candidate turnover between elections, we developed a computerised matching function implemented in R which compares individual candidates on party lists within a given pair of subsequent elections. The analysis of candidate novelty extends to more recent elections than that of candidate drop-outs as due to a high number of organizational changes among parties, drop-out is defined in terms of candidates in t-1 not running in t.[7]

[6] We plan to include these countries as well as some of the missing earlier elections in future.
[7] Otherwise we would have to overlook parties that disappeared, merged or split.

Table 1. Elections included in the data set and current analysis

Election number	BG	CZ	EE	HU	LT	LV	PL	SI	SK
1			1992	1990			1991		
2			1995	1994	1996	1995	1993		
3	1994*	1996	1999	1998	2000	1998	1997		1994
4	1997*	1998	2003	2002	2004	2002	2001	2000	1998
5	2001	2002	2007	2006	2008	2006	2005	2004	2002
6	2005	2006	2011	2010	2012	2010	2007	2008	2006
7	2009	2010	-	2014	-	2011	2011	2011	2010
8	2013	2013	-	-	-	2014	-	2014	2012
9	2014	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

* Only parties that entered parliament.

- included in both new candidate and dropped candidate analysis

- included in either new candidate (later elections) or dropped candidate analysis (earlier elections)

Dependent variable: Candidate Turnover

Candidate turnover can be thought of in two distinct ways – the percentage of new candidates who did not compete in the previous election as well as the percentage of candidates who competed in the previous election but failed to run again (dropouts). Although similar, the two measures reflect different processes – namely the recruitment of new candidates on the one hand and the removal of old candidates on the other – which do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. It is therefore sensible to use both indicators and compare the results; our hypotheses should generally apply equally to both indicators. Some adjustments to the raw percentages of new and dropped candidates were necessary for our statistical analysis; these are outlined in more detailed at a later point in this paper.

Independent variables

Corruption. We use Transparency International's corruption perception index (CPI) to operationalize corruption. Although the index neither reflects actual/'real' levels of corruption nor allows us to account for particular corruption scandals or allegations against parties, it reflects the general level of voters' concern over the issue which makes it a meaningful indicator in terms of our study (see also Hanley and Sikk 2014). In our models, we include CPI scored in two ways. First, we include the change in the CPI score over the past four years (i.e. the length of a typical legislative term). Our rationale here is that a trend should represent the public relevance and pressure for political parties better than the average CPI score over the last parliamentary term (cf. Eckert et al. 2015). Following Hanley and Sikk (2014), we also include the CPI score for the year before the election – given that data is

collected in the year preceding the headline year, this is more appropriate than taking the CPI score of the election year; particularly as some of the elections took place in the first half of the year.

Government participation. Particularly in the early years of democratization the new democracies in CEE often experienced several governments during one parliamentary term, making it difficult to code which parties participated in the government, and should according to our hypotheses be under greater pressure to rejuvenate their candidate base. We therefore follow a midway approach similar to Bågenholm (2013b), i.e. parties which were part of the government at least 18 months before the election are coded as a government parties whereas all others are not coded as such.[8]

Party size/vote share. In our analysis, we control for party size operationalized as a party's vote share. Slomczynski and Shabad (2011) and Ecker et al. (2015) find that party supporters are less likely to see their preferred party as corrupt or punish them at the polls. Consequently, larger parties (those with a larger voter base) will be under less pressure to rejuvenate their candidate list as they can count on their supporters' vote regardless. Furthermore, larger parties also tend to be associated with larger organisational structures (or more complicated ones in the case of alliances). We enter the variable as its common logarithm (base of 10) to ensure that the relative differences in party sizes is reflected more accurately.[9]

Change in electoral support. In addition we include a variable on change electoral support, operationalized as the ratio of votes in current election to the votes in previous election. Although changes in a party's vote share may be seen as a potential *effect* of candidate turnover, we include it here as a proxy for change in parties' broad support levels. We thereby expect that parties with decreasing support will be more likely to try and counter the loss of support by bringing in new candidates. Similar to parties' vote share, we include the variable in logged form to equalize similar degrees of increase and decrease in vote shares.[10]

Unemployment. Last, we include a variable change in the unemployment rate in the three years preceding the election. The unemployment rate is an important economic indicator and area in which voters will evaluate parties, particularly those that participated in the

[8] Unfortunately, this strict criterion meant that in some cases (particularly in most recent Czech elections) no party could be coded as governing.

[9] For example, the logarithm ensures that a party with 20 percent of votes is equidistant from parties with 10 and 40 percent of votes, rather than 0 and 40 or 10 and 30 percent of votes. 20 percent is substantively closer to 40 than 0 and 30 is substantively closer to 20 than 10.

[10] Otherwise, if a party doubled its vote share the absolute value of this variable would be twice as large compared to a party which lost half of its votes.

government. Furthermore, sharp rises in unemployment have been shown to be present a favourable condition for the breakthrough of anti-establishment parties (Hanley and Sikk 2014) which established parties will try to counteract. Due to the great variation in the rate across countries and the fact that even high levels of unemployment can quickly become accepted as the norm (ibid.), we include the change rather than the absolute level of unemployment as our indicator.

Overall candidate turnover in CEE

We begin by looking at overall levels of candidate turnover in CEE. Figure 1 shows general trends in turnover by country by plotting the share of new candidates (those who did not contest in the previous election) for each election year. We can see that overall candidate novelty remains relatively stable in most countries with a very slight downward trend (fewer new candidates) in some countries.

Figure 1: Overall share of new candidates



Nevertheless, looking at these overall trends alone might be misleading as it includes many extra-parliamentary parties, which have limited political relevance together with the more established parties where we would expect significantly lower degrees of candidate novelty. Figure 2 focusses on candidate turnover in parties which received at least 5% of votes in the respective election (roughly a typical electoral threshold). Furthermore, we restrict our analysis here to the top 25% of party lists, i.e. the top quartile of a party's candidates in constituencies (national lists in Estonia, Lithuania and Hungary 2014) are compared with the full candidate lists (of all parties) in the previous election.[11] New

[11] To remedy the fact that parties ran oversized lists (listing up to twice as many candidates as seats in parliament; e.g. Estonia 1995), we define 'full lists' and 'top 25 per cent' using the district magnitude of electoral districts or the number of seats in parliament where national lists were used.

candidate percentage thus refers to percentage among top 25 percent who did not contest the *preceding* election. Dropped candidate percentage – analysed below – on the other hand refers to the percentage among the top 25 percent of candidates who did not contest in the *following* election. We defined top 25 per cent based on party rankings in districts (or national lists, where available) – based on preference votes (post-election list placement) where open lists used.

Figure 2: Share of new candidates (top 25%), parties with V% > 5%



Among the leading candidates in main parties, turnover has slightly decreased during the last two decades, yet there are strong country-specific variations. Some of these are caused by *early elections* which restricted parties' ability to recruit new candidates (e.g. Poland 2007, Latvia 2011, Slovakia 2012, Bulgaria 2014), while others can be traced back to the breakthrough of genuinely new parties which fielded almost exclusively new candidates (see Sikk 2005). If we only look at established political parties, i.e. those we could code as contesting subsequent elections using codes from the Manifesto Project[12], the trend towards less new candidates is somewhat more pronounced (see Figure 3). The average share of new candidates decreases from about 50% in the early years to 30% in the most recent elections. Nevertheless, significant variation remains within and between countries.

[12] Unfortunately, some of the established parties – particularly electoral alliances with sometimes small shares of new candidates – are excluded here as they are assigned a different party code in the CMP dataset.

Figure 3: New candidates in established parties by country (top 25%)



Note: only parties that were not coded as new in Volkens et al. 2014 that received at least 5% of votes. The fine black line show loess trend.

Figure 4: Dropouts by country (top 25%), parties with at least 5% of votes in t-1



Finally, the trends for dropouts, i.e. candidates who did not run again in the subsequent election, appear to be fairly similar to those found for novelty (see Figure 4). Note that these two measures of candidate turnover can diverge as we are comparing the top quartile of a candidate list in one election to all full candidate lists in the subsequent election. Even if all top candidates drop out (e.g. due to scandals), it is unlikely that they will all be replaced with new candidates instead of candidates that ran already in the previous election.

Candidate turnover and corruption

We now turn to the analysis of the relationship between candidate turnover and perception of corruption. Before proceeding with our statistical models, it needs to be noted that we mostly looked at parties that contested both in a pair of elections (and where it was reasonably straightforward to code party continuity); this was necessary so that a variable on vote change (see above) could be included. Furthermore, for reasons already outlined above we restricted

our analysis of candidate turnover – in the form of both new and dropped candidates – to the top 25 per cent of candidate lists.

Figure 5. Corruption perception, perception change and new candidate % (V>5% only)



Figure 5 shows the general relationship between two variables related to corruption (corruption perception index and its change in four years before an election) and mean new candidate percentage for main parties (V > 5%). There seems to be a weak negative relationship between CPI / CPI change and new candidate percentage as there are more larger markers in the bottom-left quadrant of the scatterplot (high and increasing corruption), but there are also outliers.[13] The relationship is weak and needs to be analysed in depth looking at individual parties. In preliminary analyses we discovered that candidate novelty is strongly dependent on other variables, particularly party size that we need to add as control variables. We also discovered a very clear relationship between candidate change and time between elections (see Figure 2) – with early elections producing much more limited candidate change than elections held after full term. Also, for reasons that are not of primary interest here, we noticed differences in candidate novelty levels between different countries.

As a result, we adjusted candidate turnover (our dependent variable) by the overall mean for parliamentary parties in a country (across all elections). This is because turnover rates seem to vary across countries (see above) and the adjustment helps to control for the potential effects of different electoral systems or other dependent variables that we have not included in our models. A further adjustment was necessary to account for the fact that the time gap

[13] Note, however, that the two of the prominent outliers in that quadrant (SK 2012 and LV 2011) were early elections – that tend to have lower levels of candidate novelty – held less than two years after the preceding one.

between elections varied. We divided the difference between a party's candidate turnover and the national average and divided that by time between elections. The most typical gap of four years was set at 1 so that in effect all turnovers were normalized to as if the gap between elections was four years. Hence, the dependent variable was adjusted as follows:[14]

$$ncp_{adj} = \frac{ncp_i - \overline{ncp}}{0.25t}$$

where ncp_i stands for the new candidate percentage for party *i*, $\overline{ncp}$ for national average for all parliamentary parties in all elections and *t* for years between the pair of elections.

Table 2. Determinants of candidate novelty (all parties elected to the parliament)[a]

	(1)	(2)
CPI change $_{t-1-t-4}$	2.65	7.01
	(5.85)	(5.00)
CPI_{t-1}	-0.06	1.53
	(3.14)	(2.66)
Unemployment change $_{t-1-t-3}$	-0.29	-1.08*
	(0.71)	(0.61)
$\log_{10}V_t$	-15.12**	-17.88***
	(7.20)	(5.74)
$\log_{10}(V_t/V_{t-1})$		16.54
		(10.73)
Constant	14.40	-2.73
	(16.10)	(14.01)
Observations	185	115
R^2	0.03	0.15
Adjusted R^2	0.01	0.11

Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (standard errors in parentheses)
[a] top 25% of candidates

When we look at all parliamentary parties together (Table 2), corruption or change in perception does not affect candidate novelty. Party's vote share has the most consistent effect in the two specified models while change in party support does not have a statistically significant effect. New candidate percentage tends to decrease by about 15-18 per cent as the vote share of parties is increased ten times (as we use log to the base of 10 with the party vote share). In addition, increasing levels of unemployment tend to decrease candidate novelty, when controlling for the change in party support. Following Hanley & Sikk (2014), who argue that new parties often break through under favourable economic conditions, we can speculate that under difficult economic situations parties may want to stick to tried and tested candidates and expect their voters to prefer them to new candidates (that are more likely

[14] To keep the regression models parsimonious and simple, we chose to transform the dependent variable. The transformation involved variables that are of limited interest here (and should not affect the governing and non-governing parties differently) and does not make the interpretation of results more difficult (we chose to leave party size as an independent variable for that reason).

under decreasing candidates). However, the effect is very marginal and model fits are rather poor, especially in the more encompassing model 1 in Table 2.[15]

Table 3. Determinants of candidate novelty (governing and other parliamentary parties)[16]

	Dependent variable:			
	New candidate %		Dropped candidate %	
	(1) Governing parties	(2) Other parliamentary parties	(3) Governing parties	(4) Other parliamentary parties
CPI change $_{t-1 - t-4}$	13.07***	4.91	12.32*	0.70
	(4.22)	(5.47)	(6.18)	(4.54)
CPI $_{t-1}$	0.08	-3.84	-1.13	-4.03
	(2.21)	(2.84)	(3.79)	(2.43)
Unemployment change $_{t-1 - t-3}$	1.06*	0.39	0.02	1.03*
	(0.53)	(0.70)	(0.72)	(0.58)
$\log_{10}V_t$	-23.68***	-42.69***	-32.09***	-27.29***
	(7.39)	(8.96)	(10.99)	(7.53)
$\log_{10}(V_t/V_{t-1})$	4.90	19.83*	-25.24***	-15.57**
	(9.22)	(11.80)	(8.96)	(7.55)
Constant	7.24	57.54***	28.50	45.23***
	(14.50)	(18.17)	(22.48)	(14.77)
Observations	63	61	60	60
R^2	0.31	0.34	0.28	0.31
Adjusted R^2	0.25	0.28	0.21	0.25

Note:*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 (standard errors in parentheses)

When we run similarly specified models separately for governing parties and other parliamentary parties, we see striking differences in the coefficients (see Table 3, see Appendix for lists of governing and non-governing parties). Most importantly for our present purposes, change in corruption perception has a remarkable effect, but only for governing parties. However, the effect is opposite to our hypothesized direction – instead of recruiting new candidates to improve their presumably tarnished image, candidate novelty *decreases* as perceived levels of corruption decrease (i.e. CPI increases). For each one point change in CPI over the four preceding years (roughly corresponding to an electoral cycle), the governing parties include 18 per cent more new candidates. The effect of party size still remains statistically highly significant – ten times increase in party size leads to 21 percentage points fewer new candidates.

The predicted share of new candidates is close to national average (just 3.3 percent lower) for a governing party with 10 percent of votes if CPI score increases by one point.[17] If CPI

[15] We included two models as the vote change is not available for some parties – including new parties (the ratio is not defined if lagged vote share is zero) and parties for which continuity is difficult to code. Note that we coded continuity for most governing parties below manually where it was missing in the CMP data set (Volkens et al 2014).

[16] One party/election was excluded from some of the models due to extreme leverage: (1) Vienotiba and ZZS 2011 (both Latvia), (3) TPP 2008 (Lithuania) and (4) Smer 2010 (Slovakia). None of the models suffers from heteroscedasticity.

[17] Assuming mean level of CPI, no change in unemployment and the vote share.

decreases by one point (considerable increase in corruption), the share of new candidates for a similar party is well below the national average (30 percentage points lower). The candidate novelty scores for a party with a near-majority (40% votes) are considerably lower: -18 and -44 compared to national average, respectively. Candidate drop-out is likewise dependent on CPI change with a similar but slightly lower coefficient, possibly because of the overall lower model fit. Drop-out also depends much more significantly on party vote change – those that ended up gaining votes were much less likely to lose top candidates.[18] As in all other models, party size has very strong impact on candidate dropout (with candidates of larger parties less likely lose top candidates).

Remarkably, in contrast to governing parties, change in corruption perception does not affect non-governing parliamentary parties. Still, interestingly and somewhat puzzlingly, candidate novelty and dropout among non-governing parliamentary parties is better explained by our set of independent variables – particularly party size and changes in popularity. Note that new parties are excluded here, as vote ratio is not defined for them. Their exclusion is intentional as (a) new parties have been shown to benefit from rising perceptions of corruption (Hanley & Sikk 2014) and (b) we wish to maintain a focus on existing parliamentary parties in this paper. Candidate novelty of new parties that entered the parliament was markedly higher (57.2 percent) than that of previously existing ones (35.4 percent).[19] Combining genuinely new and existing parties would conceptually blur the picture.

Discussion and conclusion

Our main finding here – that increasing perception of corruption lead to lower candidate novelty among governing parties – contradicts our initial hypothesis and begs an explanation. Several reasons can be proposed, the detailed analysis of which is beyond the scope of this paper – a mixed methods approach that combines more sophisticated quantitative models

[18] We find this asymmetry fascinating yet puzzling – why does candidate novelty not depend on changes in party's popularity, yet dropouts are clearly lower for parties gaining support and higher for those that become less popular. The latter effect also applies for non-governing parties, but, notably the candidate novelty of non-governing parties *increases* with increasing support.

[19] The mean candidate novelty for governing parties was even lower at 31.8 percent. New parties defined as those for which continuities compared to previous election were missing in Volkens et al 2014. The low average indicates that new parties such defined include some which included many candidates in the running previously. We plan to review new parties in future, but such "false discontinuities" are sometimes difficult to correct due to frequent organizational changes. Note that what constitutes a new party is a contested and debated issue in political science (see Barnea & Rahat 2011, Litton 2013 and Sikk & Köker n.d.).

with in-depth case studies of carefully selected party/election dyads might be most useful.[20] Firstly, under increasing perceptions of corruption, the government parties try to play it safe as they may trust that even corrupt candidates can often do better in elections than entirely new faces (see studies of UK expenses scandal). Rising levels of corruption may implicate the top leadership of parties, but not necessarily all candidates – particularly those with lower list placement may not be perceived as corrupt. That may, indeed, explain the statistically less robust result for candidate drop-outs – *some* of the governing parties presumably see many of their previous top candidates being removed and replaced by those with previously lower list placements – rather than by entirely new candidates. Indeed, it is likely that new candidates may not necessarily want to join lists of governing parties if corruption perception is increasing. Parties may have to stick to the candidates that they have as they *cannot* (rather than will not) rejuvenate when they stagnate under increasing corruption.

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[20] We also contend that the coding of government parties remains difficult and may have consequences for model results. For example, current coding excludes Czech ODS or several governing parties in Bulgaria because of the strict 18-months-before-election rule. Furthermore, determining which governing parties should be 'blamed' for increasing corruption is far from clear in countries with multi-party cabinets (that applies to most of our cases) – witness the 'clarity of responsibility' discussion in the literature on economic voting (see Andreson 2000, Hobolt et al 2013, Royed et al 2002 and Whitten & Palmer 1999; also see Tavits 2007 on the impact of clarity of responsibility on corruption).

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Appendix

Descriptive statistics of variables for models 1-4 in Table 3.

		New/dropped candidate index[a]	CPI change	CPI	Unemployment change	$log_{10}V$	log_{10}(V change)
Model 1	N	63	63	63	63	63	63
	Mean	-15.1	0.1	4.7	0.4	1	-0.2
	St. Dev.	18.2	0.6	1	4.1	0.4	0.3
	Min	-69.4	-1	3.4	-6.1	-0.1	-1.2
	Max	31.6	1.2	6.7	11.4	1.6	0.3
Model 2	N	61	61	61	61	61	61
	Mean	-7.5	0.04	4.9	0.3	1.1	-0.1
	St. Dev.	20.7	0.5	1	3.9	0.4	0.3
	Min	-93.5	-1	3.5	-6.1	-0.2	-1.2
	Max	32.2	1.2	6.7	11.4	1.7	0.5
Model 3	N	60	60	60	60	60	60
	Mean	-9.1	0.1	4.5	0.9	1.2	-0.2
	St. Dev.	25.7	0.6	0.9	4.6	0.3	0.3
	Min	-100.2	-1	3.4	-6.1	0.7	-1.2
	Max	47.4	1.2	6.7	11.4	1.7	0.3
Model 4	N	60	60	60	60	60	60
	Mean	-3.4	0.1	4.9	0.3	1.1	-0.1
	St. Dev.	16.6	0.5	1	3.9	0.3	0.3
	Min	-37.6	-1	3.5	-6.1	0.6	-1.2
	Max	35.6	1.2	6.7	11.4	1.6	0.5

[a] adjusted by national mean for parliamentary parties and time between elections (see text)

Governing parties (new candidate analysis)

	parties
2001.BG	ODS
2005.BG	DPS, NDSV
2009.BG	DPS, KZB, NDSV
2013.BG	GERB
2002.CZ	CSSD
2006.CZ	CSSD, KDU-CSL
2003.EE	RE
2007.EE	K, RE, RL
2011.EE	IRL, RE
2002.HU	FIDESZ-MDF, FKGP
2006.HU	MSZP, SZDSZ
2010.HU	MSZP
2000.LT	LCS, LKDP, TS
2004.LT	UdL
2008.LT	LICS, LSDP
2012.LT	LRLS, TS-LKD
2002.LV	LC, TB-LNNK, TP
2006.LV	LLP-LC, TP, ZZS
2010.LV	PVL-TB-LNNK, Vienotiba, ZZS
2001.PL	AWSP
2005.PL	SLD
2007.PL	PIS
2011.PL	PO, PSL
2008.SI	DeSuS, NSi, SDS, SLS
2011.SI	LDS, SD
2002.SK	SDKU, SDL, SMK-MPK
2006.SK	ANO, KDH, SDKU-DS, SMK-MPK
2010.SK	HZDS, SNS, Smer
2012.SK	KDH, MOST-HID, SDKU-DS, SaS

Non-governing parties (new candidate analysis)

	parties
2005.BG	KZB, ODS
2009.BG	ATAKA
2013.BG	ATAKA, DPS
2002.CZ	KSCM, ODS
2006.CZ	KSCM, ODS
2010.CZ	CSSD, KDU-CSL, KSCM, ODS, SZ
2013.CZ	CSSD, KDU-CSL, KSCM, ODS, TOP 09
2003.EE	IL, K, MD
2007.EE	IRL, SDE
2011.EE	EER, K, RL, SDE
2002.HU	MSZP, SZDSZ
2010.HU	FIDESZ-KDNP
2004.LT	TS
2012.LT	LSDP, PTT
2006.LV	JL, PCTVL, TB-LNNK
2001.PL	PSL
2005.PL	LPR, PIS, PO, PSL, SRP
2007.PL	PO, PSL
2011.PL	PIS
2008.SI	LDS, SD, SNS
2011.SI	DeSuS, SDS, SLS, SNS, ZARES
2002.SK	HZDS
2006.SK	HZDS, Smer
2010.SK	KDH, SDKU-DS
2012.SK	SNS, Smer

Governing parties (dropped candidate analysis)

	parties
1997.BG	ODS
2001.BG	DPS, NDSV
2005.BG	DPS, KZB, NDSV
2009.BG	GERB
1998.CZ	CSSD
2002.CZ	CSSD, KDU-CSL
1999.EE	RE
2003.EE	RE, RL
2007.EE	IRL, RE
1998.HU	FIDESZ, FKGP
2002.HU	MSZP
2006.HU	MSZP
2000.LT	BSDA, NS
2004.LT	LICS, UdL, VNDS
2008.LT	LICS, LRLS, TS-LKD
1998.LV	LC, TB-LNNK, TP
2002.LV	LC, LPP, TP, ZZS
2006.LV	JL, TB-LNNK, ZZS
2010.LV	Vienotiba, ZZS
1997.PL	AWS
2001.PL	SLD-UP
2005.PL	PIS
2007.PL	PO, PSL
2008.SI	LDS, SD
1998.SK	SDK, SDL, SMK-MPK, SOP
2002.SK	ANO, SDKU, SMK-MPK
2006.SK	HZDS, SNS, Smer
2010.SK	KDH, MOST-HID, SDKU-DS, SaS

Non-governing parties (dropped candidate analysis)

	parties
2001.BG	KZB, ODS
2005.BG	ATAKA
2009.BG	ATAKA, DPS
1998.CZ	KSCM, ODS
2002.CZ	KSCM, ODS
2006.CZ	CSSD, KDU-CSL, KSCM, ODS, SZ
2010.CZ	CSSD, KDU-CSL, KSCM, ODS, TOP 09
1999.EE	IL, K, MD
2003.EE	K, MD, RP
2007.EE	EER, K, RL, SDE
1998.HU	MSZP, SZDSZ
2002.HU	SZDSZ
2006.HU	FIDESZ-KDNP
2000.LT	TS
2008.LT	LSDP, PTT
2002.LV	JL, PCTVL, TB-LNNK
1997.PL	PSL
2001.PL	LPR, PIS, PO, PSL, SRP
2005.PL	PO, PSL
2007.PL	PIS
2008.SI	DeSuS, SDS, SLS, SNS, ZARES
1998.SK	HZDS
2002.SK	HZDS, KDH, Smer
2006.SK	KDH, SDKU-DS
2010.SK	SNS