Laroque, G;
Choné, P;
(2018)
On the redistributive power of pensions.
Social Choice and Welfare
, 50
(3)
pp. 519-546.
10.1007/s00355-017-1094-0.
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Abstract
We study the tradeoff between efficiency and redistribution in a model with overlapping generations, extensive labor supply, and perfect financial markets. The government instruments are a pension scheme and a age-independent nonlinear income tax schedule. At the second-best optimum, the pension system constrains the agents’ labor supply behavior, forcing them to work to achieve a required lifetime performance. Income taxes affect labor supply directly, but also indirectly through pension incentives. The indirect effect of taxes counteracts the usual forces in the efficiency-redistribution tradeoff: through the interplay with the pension system, decreasing taxes induces redistribution and reduces productive efficiency.
Type: | Article |
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Title: | On the redistributive power of pensions |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
DOI: | 10.1007/s00355-017-1094-0 |
Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1094-0 |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | © The Author(s) 2017. Open Access: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
URI: | https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10027591 |
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