Luo, R;
Miller, G;
Rozelle, S;
Sylvia, S;
Vera-Hernández, M;
(2020)
Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like CEOS? Substitution Between Incentives and Resources Among School Administrators in China.
Journal of the European Economic Association
, 18
(1)
pp. 165-201.
10.1093/jeea/jvy047.
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Abstract
Unlike performance incentives for private sector managers, little is known about performance incentives for managers in public sector bureaucracies. Through a randomized trial in rural China, we study performance incentives rewarding school administrators for reducing student anemia—as well as complementarity between incentives and orthogonally assigned discretionary resources. Large (but not small) incentives and unrestricted grants both reduced anemia, but incentives were more cost-effective. Although unrestricted grants and small incentives do not interact, grants fully crowd-out the effect of larger incentives. Our findings suggest that performance incentives can be effective in bureaucratic environments, but they are not complementary to discretionary resources.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like CEOS? Substitution Between Incentives and Resources Among School Administrators in China |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1093/jeea/jvy047 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvy047 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | © The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of European Economic Association. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Keywords: | Performance Pay, Public Service Delivery, Managerial Incentives, Nutrition Programs, China |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10053150 |
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