Noble, BH; (2018) Authoritarian amendments: Legislative institutions as intra-executive constraints in post-Soviet Russia. Comparative Political Studies 10.1177/0010414018797941. (In press).

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Abstract

Why are executive bills sometimes amended significantly in authoritarian legislatures? Bill change clashes with the conventional picture of parliaments in non-democracies as 'rubber stamp' bodies. Recent work challenging the 'rubber stamp' model suggests that cases of amendment are the result of legislator influence. This article proposes an alternative argument: amendment can result from intra-executive policy-making processes, unresolved in the pre-legislative, cabinet-level stage. Factionalised executives can use legislative institutions to help overcome information asymmetries, as well as the commitment and monitoring problems involved in collective decision-making. This article evaluates this alternative account using a combination of statistical and case-study analyses, drawing on both cross-national and fine-grained data from contemporary Russia. The findings contribute to our knowledge of authoritarian legislatures, policy-making processes in non-democracies, and Russian politics.

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