Amaral, MA; Javarone, MA; (2020) Heterogeneity in evolutionary games: an analysis of the risk perception. Proceedings Of The Royal Society A-mathematical Physical And Engineering Sciences , 476 (2237) , Article 20200116. 10.1098/rspa.2020.0116.

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Abstract

In this study, we analyse the relationship between heterogeneity and cooperation. Previous investigations suggest that this relation is non-trivial, as some authors found that heterogeneity sustains cooperation, while others obtained different results. Among the possible forms of heterogeneity, we focus on the individual perception of risks and rewards related to a generic event, which can appear in a number of social and biological systems. The modelling approach is based on the framework of evolutionary game theory. To represent this kind of heterogeneity, we implement small and local perturbations on the pay-off matrix of simple two-strategy games, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. So, while usually the pay-off is considered to be a global and time-invariant structure, i.e. it is the same for all individuals of a population at any time, in our model its value is continuously affected by small variations, in both time and space (i.e. position on a lattice). We found that such perturbations can be beneficial or detrimental to cooperation, depending on their setting. Notably, cooperation is strongly supported when perturbations act on the main diagonal of the pay-off matrix, whereas when they act on the off-diagonal the resulting effect is more difficult to quantify. To conclude, the proposed model shows a rich spectrum of possible equilibria, whose interpretation might offer insights and enrich the description of several systems.

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