Soteriou, Matthew John;
(1996)
Veridical hallucination, causal dependence and the concept of perception.
Masters thesis (M.Phil), UCL (University College London).
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Abstract
Does the Intentional theory of perception conflict with our ordinary "naive" concept of perception? Grice's thought experiment (1961) shows that the Intentional theorist must adopt the Causal Theory of Perception (CTP) if he is to claim that his theory does not conflict with our ordinary concept of perception. Chapter 1 introduces the Intentional theory of perception, the Grice thought-experiment, and the CTP. Chapter 2 examines Searle's account of visual experience and argues that if the Intentional theorist agrees that the subject of the Grice thought-experiment fails to see, then the concept of perception cannot be analyzed simply in terms of the veridicality of experience, no matter what one includes as part of the content of experience. Does the CTP offer the best account of our ordinary concept of perception, or does it merely offer a formula for distinguishing those cases where we would ordinarily judge that the subject sees what is before him? In Chapters 3 and 4, in an attempt to answer this question 1 consider a question which Strawson poses (1974): If the notion of causal dependence is part of our concept of perception, then what role does it play in that concept? I try to undermine the claim that the notion has any role to play. Chapters introduces the disjunctive theory as an alternative explanation of the subject's failure to see in the Grice thought-experiment (following Snowdon 1981 and 1990), and discusses the relation between the disjunctive theory and the CTP. Chapter 6 presents the disjunctive theory as offering the best account of the epistemological aspects of our concept of perception. The conclusion drawn is that the disjunctive theory leaves the CTP unmotivated, and it is suggested that even if the Intentional theory offers the best overall account of perceptual experience, it may still be in conflict with our ordinary concept of perception.
| Type: | Thesis (Masters) |
|---|---|
| Qualification: | M.Phil |
| Title: | Veridical hallucination, causal dependence and the concept of perception |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Thesis digitised by ProQuest. |
| Keywords: | Philosophy, religion and theology; Perception |
| URI: | https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10106155 |
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