Mckay, Phyllis Kirstin; (2000) Practical reason and reasons for action. Masters thesis (M.Phil), UCL (University College London).

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Abstract

In this thesis, I am responding to Bernard Williams's argument in his three papers published in 1980, 1989 and 1995 that there are no external reasons for action. I have three aims. My primary aim, which continues throughout the thesis, is to deconstruct Williams's argument in detail and show that it depends for its plausibility on assuming that all values are subjective, and that motivation is external to value judgements. My second aim is to show that Williams's two assumptions are controversial, and look at what an alternative view on each subject might imply about practical reason and in particular external reasons for action. So I argue in chapter 3 that there are at least some grounds to suppose that some values might be objective, or subjective but in a way which is not dependent only on the individual who holds the values. In chapter 4, I argue that the position that motivation is external to value judgements is not secure. My third aim is to show that values are incommensurable, and draw out the implications of this for practical reason and the reasons for action debate. I address this in chapter 2. In particular, I argue that incommensurability of values does not imply either that values are subjective, or that motivation is external to value judgements. I conclude that incommensurable values are a problem, but not an insuperable problem, for the external reasons theorist. I conclude my thesis by detailing how my position on practical reason allows me to describe, in opposition to Williams, external reasons for action.

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