Lianos, Ioannis;
Economides, Nick;
(2020)
Antitrust and restrictions on privacy in the digital economy.
Concurrences
(3)
, Article 94275.
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Abstract
We present a model of a market failure based on a requirement provision by digital platforms in the acquisition of personal information from users of other products/services. We establish the economic harm from the market failure and the requirement using traditional antitrust methodology. Eliminating the requirement and the market failure by creating a functioning market for the sale of personal information would create a functioning market for personal information that would benefit users. Even though market harm is established under the assumption that consumers are perfectly informed about the value of their privacy, we show that when users are not well informed, there can be additional harms to this market failure.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Antitrust and restrictions on privacy in the digital economy |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-3... |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| Keywords: | United Kingdom, European Union, United States of America, Regulatory, Economic analysis, Dominance (abuse), Dominance (notion), Relevant market, Market power, Exchange of information, Access to information, Remedies (antitrust), Structural remedies, Behavioural remedies, Privacy, Online platforms, Big Tech |
| UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Laws UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL |
| URI: | https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10145817 |
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