Milosavljevic, Jelena;
(2023)
Taking Pleasure in the Wrong Things: Aristotle’s account of the failures in akrasia and vice in the Nicomachean Ethics.
Masters thesis (M.Phil.Stud), UCL (University College London).
Preview |
Text
Jelena_Milosavljevic_20114070.pdf - Submitted Version Download (1MB) | Preview |
Abstract
The main aim of this thesis is to understand what the failures in akrasia and in vice are, on Aristotle’s view, as he describes them in the Nicomachean Ethics. I begin by examining the textual issues within the NE, which have been the subject of a long and complex debate, and consider some interpretations of akrasia and vice in the current literature. Having shown that the interpretations in view fail to give us an adequate account of these characters, I suggest that we have reason to investigate this issue further. Since both akrasia and vice involve errors with respect to pleasure, I propose to consider what errors with respect to pleasure look like for Aristotle, and what it means to take pleasure in the right, or wrong, thing. I go on to argue that Aristotle evaluates pursuits of pleasure as right or wrong depending on quantitative features of a pursuit – such as the amount pursued, at what time, and in which context – rather than based on the source of a pleasure, or which object elicits it. My main claim is that pursuits of pleasure are good insofar as they are in accordance with the prescriptions of reason, independently of the specific pleasure that an agent enjoys. Therefore, I argue that we should conceive of the mean quantitatively. Furthermore, I show that this allows us to explain the failures in akrasia and vice, and resolve apparent contradictions in the text. I argue that the akratic agent fails by misidentifying the quantitative features of his akratic action as good, and by failing to cultivate reason within his soul. Meanwhile, I suggest that the vicious person’s failure lies in his misidentification of the merely pleasant as the ultimate good, and his lack of commitment to reason as a guiding force in life.
| Type: | Thesis (Masters) |
|---|---|
| Qualification: | M.Phil.Stud |
| Title: | Taking Pleasure in the Wrong Things: Aristotle’s account of the failures in akrasia and vice in the Nicomachean Ethics |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Copyright © The Author 2022. Original content in this thesis is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/). Any third-party copyright material present remains the property of its respective owner(s) and is licensed under its existing terms. Access may initially be restricted at the author’s request. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10164547 |
Archive Staff Only
 |
View Item |
