Reyes Gonzalez, Jose; (2023) Collective Action in Governance Networks: Modelling and Assessing Organizational Behavior in Anti-Corruption Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships. Doctoral thesis (Ph.D), UCL (University College London).

Preview	Text Reyes Gonzalez_10165864_Thesis_id_removed.pdf Download (9MB) | Preview
	Text Datasets.zip - Supplemental Material Download (174kB)

Abstract

To achieve solutions across conflicting policy arenas, decisions are increasingly made within governance networks. While the narrative, promotion and growth of governance networks is indisputable to solve societal problems, the same enthusiasm has not fueled their disciplined study. Their potential to deliver on their promise of being effective, inclusive, and innovative collaborative platforms is far from established. This thesis identifies and explores neglected dimensions of governance networks in the literature. It tests hypotheses related to mechanisms that may affect governance networks’ integration, composition and inner stability. It does so by collecting unique relational data from 116 organizational members of ten multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) – associated with the Infrastructure Transparency Initiative (CoST) – in Latin America, Africa, and Eurasia. Drawing from this data, chapter 2 investigates whether actors’ motivation to participate in governance networks can predict their level of influence. It finds that, contrary to widely held assumptions about MSPs, actors who are self-interested, rather than pro-socially motivated, exchange more information, expanding their ability to influence others. Chapter 3 examines when information exchange between network actors emerges. It indicates that once joint committee attendances are taken into account, the statistical effect of contact making based on participatory motivations diminishes, proving that actors prioritize opportunity structures that maximize contact-making outreach. Chapter 4 explores the extent to which the structure of networks reflects actors’ efforts to cope with cooperation and coordination risks, and how this impacts functions for innovation. Evidence shows that self-organizing structures, such as bonding, when actors experience fear of partner defection, and bridging, when actors experience lack of direction, are not antagonistic. Actors can respond to these risks simultaneously at the cost of innovation. These findings challenge the normative claims of the governance network literature and contribute to the theories around governance systems of fragmented authority.

Download activity - last month

Export as XMLCSVJSON

Download activity - last 12 months

Export as JSONCSVXML

Downloads by country - last 12 months

Export as CSVXMLJSON

Archive Staff Only

View Item