UCL Discovery Stage
UCL home » Library Services » Electronic resources » UCL Discovery Stage

Jigsaw Puzzle: Selective Backdoor Attack to Subvert Malware Classifiers

Yang, L; Chen, Z; Cortellazzi, J; Pendlebury, F; Tu, K; Pierazzi, F; Cavallaro, L; (2023) Jigsaw Puzzle: Selective Backdoor Attack to Subvert Malware Classifiers. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) 2023. (pp. pp. 719-736). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Green open access

[thumbnail of IEEESP23_Jigsaw_Puzzle.pdf]
Preview
Text
IEEESP23_Jigsaw_Puzzle.pdf - Accepted Version

Download (548kB) | Preview

Abstract

Malware classifiers are subject to training-time exploitation due to the need to regularly retrain using samples collected from the wild. Recent work has demonstrated the feasibility of backdoor attacks against malware classifiers, and yet the stealthiness of such attacks is not well understood. In this paper, we focus on Android malware classifiers and investigate backdoor attacks under the clean-label setting (i.e., attackers do not have complete control over the training process or the labeling of poisoned data). Empirically, we show that existing backdoor attacks against malware classifiers are still detectable by recent defenses such as MNTD. To improve stealthiness, we propose a new attack, Jigsaw Puzzle (JP), based on the key observation that malware authors have little to no incentive to protect any other authors' malware but their own. As such, Jigsaw Puzzle learns a trigger to complement the latent patterns of the malware author's samples, and activates the backdoor only when the trigger and the latent pattern are pieced together in a sample. We further focus on realizable triggers in the problem space (e.g., software code) using bytecode gadgets broadly harvested from benign software. Our evaluation confirms that Jigsaw Puzzle is effective as a backdoor, remains stealthy against state-of-the-art defenses, and is a threat in realistic settings that depart from reasoning about feature-space-only attacks. We conclude by exploring promising approaches to improve backdoor defenses.

Type: Proceedings paper
Title: Jigsaw Puzzle: Selective Backdoor Attack to Subvert Malware Classifiers
Event: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) 2023
Location: San Francisco, CA, USA
Dates: 21st-25th May 2023
ISBN-13: 978-1-6654-9336-9
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179347
Publisher version: https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179347
Language: English
Additional information: This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher's terms and conditions.
UCL classification: UCL
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science > Dept of Computer Science
URI: https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10176633
Downloads since deposit
770Downloads
Download activity - last month
Download activity - last 12 months
Downloads by country - last 12 months

Archive Staff Only

View Item View Item