Cavatorta, Elisa;
Guarino, Antonio;
Huck, Steffen;
(2024)
Social Learning with Partial and Aggregate Information: Experimental Evidence.
Games and Economic Behavior
(In press).
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Abstract
In our information cascade experiments, we study social learning in decisionmaking situations in which decisions “not to do” are unobservable. Subjects, in sequence, choose whether to invest or not, without knowing their position. They observe a private signal and the number of investments made by their predecessors, but not how many predecessors have chosen not to invest. We find that down cascades, in which agents neglect the signal and do not invest, occur, in contrast with the equilibrium predictions. Up cascades, in which agents invest independently of the signal, occur, but less than in equilibrium.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Social Learning with Partial and Aggregate Information: Experimental Evidence |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/games-and-ec... |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author-accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10190721 |
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