Chamberlain, Colin; (2022) What Is It Like to Be a Material Thing? In: Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Volume XI. (pp. 97-136). Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK.

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Abstract

Henry More argues that materialism cannot explain how a single subject or perceiver can have multiple perceptions simultaneously, as, for example, when we see, hear, and smell at once. In response, Margaret Cavendish appeals to the mind or rational matter—terms she often uses interchangeably—to explain the integration of sensory input from multiple senses in her materialist framework. When rational matter integrates perceptions across modalities, different parts share their knowledge so that they all come to perceive alike. When rational parts successfully communicate their knowledge, each part knows what all the others know. They pool their knowledge; they perceive alike. When someone hears, sees, and tastes, each part of her mind hears, sees, and tastes alike, in parallel and in unison. The Cavendishian mind, in short, approximates simplicity by achieving uniformity or homogeneity of perceptions across its parts.

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