Kostøl, AR;
Mogstad, M;
(2014)
How financial incentives induce disability insurance recipients to return to work.
American Economic Review
, 104
(2)
624 - 655.
10.1257/aer.104.2.624.
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Abstract
Using a local randomized experiment that arises from a sharp discontinuity in Disability Insurance (DI) policy in Norway, we provide transparent and credible identification of how financial incentives induce DI recipients to return to work. We find that many DI recipients have considerable capacity to work that can be effectively induced by providing financial work incentives. We further show that providing work incentives to DI recipients may both increase their disposable income and reduce program costs. Our findings also suggest that targeted policies may be the most effective in encouraging DI recipients to return to work.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | How financial incentives induce disability insurance recipients to return to work |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1257/aer.104.2.624 |
| Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.2.624 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Copyright © 2014 by the American Economic Association. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS |
| URI: | https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1390258 |
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