Chang, C;
(2015)
On the Governing of Capital Projects: The Perspective of Risk-Bearing Capacity.
International Journal of Project Management
, 33
(6)
pp. 1195-1205.
10.1016/j.ijproman.2015.02.003.
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Abstract
Project governance is increasingly recognized as a critical factor for the success of project delivery. Theories of organizational economics have had a great influence on the way project governance is analyzed. Owing to great advances in organizational economics in recent years, the first purpose of this research is to provide an updated account of the mainstream economic approaches to governance and build their relevance for the study of project governance. Secondly, this research submits that the existing economic approaches fail to address all three means (organizational, contractual and financial) involved in the working of project governance, which gives a rationale for seeking a new ground that is wide enough to accommodate all of them together in an integrated way. The risk-bearing capacity perspective is then proposed as a hopeful alternative and a preliminary assessment of its feasibility is conducted.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | On the Governing of Capital Projects: The Perspective of Risk-Bearing Capacity |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.ijproman.2015.02.003 |
| Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2015.02.003 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | © 2015 Elsevier B.V. This manuscript is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial Non-derivative 4.0 International license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). This license allows you to share, copy, distribute and transmit the work for personal and non-commercial use providing author and publisher attribution is clearly stated. Further details about CC BY licenses are available at http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0. Access may be initially restricted by the publisher. |
| Keywords: | Project governance; Transaction cost economics; Principal-Agent theory; Quasi-rent; Incentives; Risk |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of the Built Environment |
| URI: | https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1429967 |
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