Bhaskar, V.; (2008) Games played in a contracting environment. (ELSE Working Papers 195). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.

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Abstract

We analyze normal form games where a player has to pay a price to a supplier in order to play a specification. Our focus is on sup- plier competition, arising from the fact that distinct suppliers supply different players, and possibly the different actions of the same player. With private contracts, where a player only observes the prices quoted by his own suppliers, the set of equilibrium distribution over player actions coincides with the set of equilibrium distribution when all ac- tions are supplied competitively, at cost. With public contracts, the two distributions differ dramatically even in simple games.

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