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Markets versus negotiations: an experimental invesigation

Kugler, T.; Neeman, Z.; Vulkan, N.; (2003) Markets versus negotiations: an experimental invesigation. (ELSE Working Papers 104). ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK. Green open access

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Abstract

We consider the consequences of competition between two types of experimental exchange mechanisms, a �decentralized bargaining� market, and a �centralized� mar- ket. The experiment demonstrates that decentralized bargaining is subject to a process of unraveling in which relatively weak traders (buyers with high willingness to pay and sellers with low costs) continuously find trading in the centralized market more at- tractive until almost no opportunities for mutually beneficial trade remain outside the centralized marketplace.

Type: Working / discussion paper
Title: Markets versus negotiations: an experimental invesigation
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
Publisher version: http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php
Language: English
Keywords: JEL classification: C78, D40, L10. Centralized markets, decentralized markets, decentralized bargaining, market design, market formation
URI: https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14576
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