Kugler, T.;
Neeman, Z.;
Vulkan, N.;
(2003)
Markets versus negotiations: an experimental invesigation.
(ELSE Working Papers
104).
ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.
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Abstract
We consider the consequences of competition between two types of experimental exchange mechanisms, a �decentralized bargaining� market, and a �centralized� mar- ket. The experiment demonstrates that decentralized bargaining is subject to a process of unraveling in which relatively weak traders (buyers with high willingness to pay and sellers with low costs) continuously find trading in the centralized market more at- tractive until almost no opportunities for mutually beneficial trade remain outside the centralized marketplace.
Type: | Working / discussion paper |
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Title: | Markets versus negotiations: an experimental invesigation |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
Publisher version: | http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | JEL classification: C78, D40, L10. Centralized markets, decentralized markets, decentralized bargaining, market design, market formation |
URI: | https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14576 |
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