Retter, Mark;
(2015)
Internal goods to legal practice: reclaiming fuller with macintyre.
UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence
, 4
(1)
p. 1.
10.14324/111.2052-1871.028.
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Abstract
Lon Fuller rejected legal positivism because he believed that the ‘procedural morality of law’ established a necessary connection between law and morals. Underpinning his argument is a claim that law is a purposive activity grounded by a relationship of political reciprocity between lawgivers and legal subjects. This paper argues that his reliance on political reciprocity implicates a necessary connection between his procedural morality and an unarticulated ‘substantive morality of law’: it presupposes that law is properly understood by reference to the political task of achieving a common good. To establish this necessary connection, I propose we look to Alasdair MacIntyre. Understanding law as a ‘social practice’, on MacIntyre’s terms, can provide the necessary socio-political context to explain why and how legal practice is conditioned by political reciprocity. If we apply MacIntyre’s distinction between the internal and external goods of a social practice, legal positivism can be understood as confusing law as a co-operative social practice with the instrumentalisation of that practice by legal officials.
Type: | Article |
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Title: | Internal goods to legal practice: reclaiming fuller with macintyre |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
DOI: | 10.14324/111.2052-1871.028 |
Publisher version: | http://ojs.lib.ucl.ac.uk/index.php/LaJ |
URI: | https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1469723 |
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