Chiu, H;
(2014)
Corporate governance: the missing paradigm in the mandatory bail-in regime for creditors of banks and financial institutions.
Journal of Business Law
, 2014
(8)
pp. 611-634.
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Abstract
Mandatory bail-in is set to become an important part of any process relating to the resolution of banks and financial institutions. This article supports the public interest arguments underlying mandatory bail-in but argues that it is necessary to consider how bail-inable debt holders’ interests and concerns should be addressed. The article argues in support of a limited range of ex ante corporate governance rights for bail-inable debt holders as a matter of principle as well as being instrumental for the fair and orderly implementation of mandatory bail-in. Such corporate governance rights may be framed in soft law. This article argues that the scope of such rights could be shaped according to the interface between bail-inable debt holders’ private interests which justify their corporate governance role, and the public interest in orderly resolution that affects the scope of such rights.
Type: | Article |
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Title: | Corporate governance: the missing paradigm in the mandatory bail-in regime for creditors of banks and financial institutions |
Publisher version: | http://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/Catalogue/Product... |
Language: | English |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Laws |
URI: | https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1475931 |
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