Bryson, A;
Forth, J;
Zhou, M;
(2014)
Same or Different? The CEO labour market in China's public listed companies.
Economic Journal
, 124
(574)
F90-F108.
10.1111/ecoj.12107.
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Abstract
Using linked employer-employee data for all China's public listed firms over the period 2001-10, we find top executive compensation exhibits many of the traits familiar in the Western literature, although sometimes in a more muted way, and with some clear exceptions. We also find a role for managerial power in executive pay setting which may reflect the recency of the stock market and regulations underpinning corporate governance. Nevertheless, there appear to be some elements of executive compensation which transcend national economic, political and cultural differences. The implication is that the Western model is not as idiosyncratic as critics suggest.
Type: | Article |
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Title: | Same or Different? The CEO labour market in China's public listed companies |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
DOI: | 10.1111/ecoj.12107 |
Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12107 |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | Copyright © 2013 The Authors. The Economic Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Economic Society. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/), which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > School of Education UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > School of Education > UCL Institute of Education UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > School of Education > UCL Institute of Education > IOE - Social Research Institute |
URI: | https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1483110 |
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