Rothschild, D;
Spectre, L;
(2018)
At the threshold of knowledge.
Philosophical Studies
, 175
(2)
pp. 449-460.
10.1007/s11098-017-0876-7.
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Abstract
We explore consequences of the view that to know a proposition your rational credence in the proposition must exceed a certain threshold. In other words, to know something you must have evidence that makes rational a high credence in it. We relate such a threshold view to Dorr et al.’s (Philosophical Studies 170(2):277–287, 2014) argument against the principle they call fair coins: “If you know a coin won’t land tails, then you know it won’t be flipped.” They argue for rejecting fair coins because it leads to a pervasive skepticism about knowledge of the future. We argue that the threshold view of evidence and knowledge gives independent grounds to reject fair coins.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | At the threshold of knowledge |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11098-017-0876-7 |
| Publisher version: | http://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0876-7 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| Keywords: | Evidence, Knowledge, Thresholds, Tolerance principle, Probability, Rational-belief, Inference, Epistemological skepticism about the future |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1540510 |
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