Fehr, D;
Huck, S;
(2016)
Who knows it is a game? On strategic awareness and cognitive ability.
Experimental Economics
, 19
(4)
pp. 713-726.
10.1007/s10683-015-9461-0.
Preview |
Text
ii13-306r.pdf - Accepted Version Download (388kB) | Preview |
Abstract
We examine strategic awareness in experimental games, that is, the question of whether subjects realize they are playing a game and thus have to form beliefs about others’ actions. We conduct a beauty contest game and elicit measures of cognitive ability and beliefs about others’ cognitive ability. We show that the effect of cognitive ability is highly non-linear. Subjects below a certain threshold choose numbers in the whole interval and their behavior does not correlate with beliefs about others’ ability. In contrast, subjects who exceed the threshold avoid choices above 50 and react very sensitively to beliefs about the cognitive ability of others.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Who knows it is a game? On strategic awareness and cognitive ability |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10683-015-9461-0 |
| Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9461-0 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| Keywords: | Cognitive ability, Beliefs, Beauty contest, Strategic sophistication, Strategic awareness |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1573569 |
Archive Staff Only
 |
View Item |
